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SOCIALISM AND THE BOURGEOIS WORLD

(Papers read at the Xth Session of the **Korčula Summer School**)

Contributions by Ernst Bloch, Rudi Supek, Predrag Vranicki, Veljko Korać, Jürgen Habermas, Gajo Petrović, Lucio Lombardo-Radice, Mihailo Marković, Ivan Kuvacić, Srđan Vrcan, Abraham Edel, Svetozar Stojanović, Stefan Morawski, Danko Grlić and others.

APPENDIX

Gajo Petrović: Three Philosophical Lenins

Prema **MISLJENJU** Republičkog sekretarijata za prosvjetu, kulturu i fizičku kulturu broj **4849/1-1972** od 10. 11. 1972., časopis »Praxis« je oslobođen plaćanja poreza na promet proizvoda.

**FROM POST-REVOLUTIONARY DICTATORSHIP
TO SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY¹**

YUGOSLAV SOCIALISM AT THE CROSSROADS

Svetozar Stojanović

Beograd

There is only one adequate word to describe the present social situation in Yugoslavia, and that word is *crisis*. For a long time now, the intellectuals of the Left, and, more recently, the leftist student movement, especially since 1968, have been dramatically drawing attention to the accumulating symptoms of the impending crisis. However, awareness of the crisis has become widespread only since the deterioration of the relationships between the Yugoslav nationalities (the most sensitive side of Yugoslav life) caused a kind of social neurosis.

It is no longer possible to conceal the true state of affairs by verbal evasions or by well-known intellectual acrobatics, using the notion of the »transitional period.« This notion in itself does not say much, for *every* period is a transition between two others, one past and one future. The »only« question is what will the period toward which the transition is heading be like. The fatalistic optimism of our officials, so clearly exposed by the satirist's aphorism »The past is constantly changing, but the future is fully certain«, has been discredited long ago.

In fact, even some officials speak of the seriousness of the situation, and even of crisis. However, this is done with an attitude of peculiar objectivism, as if the crisis were a natural catastrophe in which they have taken no part and for which they share no responsibility. Nearly all of them remain »at the head« of the crisis, just as before they were »at the head« of stagnation, and before that, »at the head« of success. It is not difficult to foresee

¹ A paper read at the International Korchula Summer School in August 1971. It was published in the Serbo-Croat edition of »Praxis« 3—4/1972.

that most of them will simply continue their attacks on radical Marxists who are resolute in exposing the sources of the crisis, rather than seek a genuine solution.

2.

Stalinists also speak of the Yugoslav crisis. But in my opinion, the Yugoslav crisis is not the result of destalinization, but, on the contrary, its source lies in the unwillingness to be *radical* in this break with the past. The Stalinists have no reason to rejoice since their own system is in an even more hopeless predicament. One need not cite past examples to substantiate this point; there are more recent ones, e. g., Poland (1971), and Czechoslovakia (1968).

However, we must be on our guard against theoretical monomania which is quite common in Yugoslavia. It should be emphasized that the suspending of destalinization, although essential, is only one (although essential) of several reasons for the crisis and cannot, therefore, provide a *complete* explanation. I should add that I am deliberately speaking of »destalinization« avoiding as much as possible the official euphemism »destatization«, because this latter term seems to lend itself to ideological mystifications, due to its abstract and non-historical character. Finally, I shall be speaking here only of the political dimension of the crisis; a full discussion would have to take into consideration the economic and moral dimensions as well.

Without an adequate historical consciousness it is not possible to develop a sufficiently sharp social consciousness with regard to the present. We are, unfortunately, still far from possessing an adequate knowledge of the history of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Yugoslav revolution. This is not simply an accident nor the result of sheer intellectual inability. It is instead the case of the dominant interest in the society imposing a limit on historical knowledge. It is to be hoped, never-the-less, that historians will be resolute enough to undertake a revision of the official picture of the history of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Yugoslav revolution.

The official version obscures the close connection between the Stalinist social organization adopted at the time of the taking over power and the Stalinist dimension of the Yugoslav Communist Party before and during the revolution. It is therefore necessary to investigate immediately the process of »Bolshevization« (the period expression for Stalinization) of the Yugoslav Communist Party; sectarianism of the Party; the Party's attitude towards the leftist intellectuals; the suppression of internal opposition to the Stalinization of the Party; the relationships between the Yugoslav Communists in the USSR, especially at the time of the Stalinist purges; the revolutionary terror during the war and after the victory.

Until now, the primary concern of Marxists, both in Yugoslavia and throughout the world, has been the *struggle* with Stalin's cult. There have been very few serious *studies* of the charis-

matic leaders and their role in socialist revolutions and in post-revolutionary developments. Since the need for an investigation of this kind is evident, we may conclude that the lack of it is due to the power of charisma, rather than to intellectual incompetence.

Stalin's cult represented an immense material power and not a few Yugoslav communists, who were torn apart by a painful dilemma between two charismatic giants, were broken by it in 1948 and chose to follow the hierarchic principle, betraying the domestic for the international charisma. It may be said that until now the socialist revolutions have not been able to summon up the strength to treat their leaders only as human, and therefore, as limited beings. They have, *in this respect* completely failed, since they have in fact allowed their leaders to achieve unrestricted power. As Sartre said: »Human roles always have a reference to the future: to each of us they appear as tasks to be fulfilled, snares to be avoided, power to be exercised, etc.« (»The Question of Method«) Revolutionary leaders should be no exception, since they too, as long as they live, are a potential source of evil as well as good. Nevertheless, even during their lifetime their historical role is given a »definitive« assessment, monuments to them are raised, people are bound to them by »unconditional loyalty«, etc.

A most interesting theme for research would be the relationship between the spontaneous and deliberate elements in the creation of a leader's cult. It is, of course, a commonplace of social science that great leaders *spontaneously* acquire charismatic status in times of great social crisis and revolution. The cult of Lenin is the best example. After Lenin's death, however, the leaders of communist parties have more and more ceased to rely on spontaneity, making *deliberate efforts* through the party and state apparatus to create their cults.

The building of Stalin's cult is interesting to the social scientist in many ways. First of all, it is a rare example of one big cult following almost immediately after another. Stalin relied on the existing cult of Lenin, turning his grave into a sanctuary and making Lenin's word, naturally in his own interpretation, the final authority on all questions. Spontaneity was, in this way, replaced by design, in the development of both Lenin's and Stalin's cult. Stalin's case has shown how fatal a charismatic leader with great theoretical ambitions but little talent for theory can be to intellectual life.

Special attention should be given to the fabrication of leaders' cults in Eastern Europe, where Stalin allowed the local leaders to develop their own cults in his shadow. Unlike Stalin's cult, which was to a *certain extent* spontaneously based on the fact that he was a member of the leadership of the October revolution, these cults were fully fabricated.

The cult of the leader, fabricated or not, gradually becomes an immense material force. The leading members of the party and state apparatus as well, who have worked with so much faith and enthusiasm to create the cult, inevitably become its prisoners. Even if they wanted to, they would now be unable to fight suc-

cessfully against their own creation. One finds here, not only historical irony, but a certain kind of historical justice as well.

Unfortunately, even when charisma has exhausted all the internal possibilities it had for coping with social problems, it can still remain a formidable source of power. I am referring to the extremely humiliating situations in which a society can find itself, for example as in the USSR, during the last years of Stalin's reign, when the members of the party and state hierarchy were concerned only with surviving the leaders' arbitrary whims, while together with the people, they both feared his death and desired it secretly. Can a socialist revolution, this real flight to freedom, degrade itself more than by surrendering to the determinism of chance and a chance of a *biological* character at that? This confirms splendidly a thesis about the positive social and moral functions of death.

These are some of the reasons why the transition from the charismatic to the post-charismatic period presents a particularly difficult problem. The only socialist revolution to make this transition with ease is the Vietnamese, probably owing to the fact that it did so in the midst of armed struggle. On the other hand, it is well known how serious the repercussions in the party and state hierarchy of the USSR were after the death of Stalin.

A particular problem for the social scientist is the behavior of the charismatic leader of the post-revolutionary dictatorship when it enters the process of liberalization. If the decisive role of the charismatic leader is not made clear, it will be impossible to understand why the liberalization of a post-revolutionary dictatorship as a rule follows a zig-zagging pattern. It is true that liberalization inevitably subverts the power of the charisma. Although this may seem paradoxical, it is also true that the charismatic leader can compensate for this loss precisely by acting as the initiator and champion of liberalization. This, of course, can be his *genuine* role only to a very limited extent, for, the stronger the democratic institutions, the weaker the charism, and conversely, the stronger the charisma, the smaller the chances are for creating and maintaining democratic institutions. This is why the tides of liberalization regularly alternate with counter-attacks by the charismatic leader, who appeals to the principle of monolithic unity. To maintain his charisma at such times, the leader resorts, among other tactics to »leftist« demagogy: although he lives in abundance, the leader nevertheless leads the egalitarian political campaign.

Social scientists since Weber have often drawn attention to social crises and the attempts to resolve them as the most favorable condition for the appearance of charismatic leaders. But they failed to note that the cause sometimes reverses direction, and that the charisma can play an important part in *creating* social crises. In this process, too, we should differentiate between *spontaneous* effects and *deliberate* efforts. Systematically obstructing the process of liberalization in a post-revolutionary dictatorship, the charismatic leader inevitably leads the society into a cri-

sis. Although this may again seem paradoxical, the charismatic character of the leader is renewed in times of crisis, owing to his monopolization of the saviour's role. One of the consequences of such a renewal of charisma is the widespread feeling of uncertainty and fear about a future in which the charismatic saviour and guide will no longer be present.

The charismatic leader is aware that democratization would gradually deprive him of his power unless he secures for himself the saviour's role. He may, therefore, occasionally even instigate disagreements, tensions, as well as conflicts in the party and state hierarchy, and thus, in society as a whole. A crisis created in this way will then be energetically resolved by him, thus refreshing his charismatic prestige. However, the leader is also aware that too strong an attack on one part of the hierarchy will make him dependent on the other, thus preventing him from exercising his role as arbitrator. In other words, he will refrain from resolving too radically the disagreements, tensions and conflicts, i. e. the sources of eventual future crises within the hierarchy, since only in crisis can his charisma be renewed and refreshed.

3.

After the taking of power, the Yugoslav Communist Party carried out a series of revolutionary measures (the nationalization of private capital, the land-reform, etc.); but the new social system introduced in Yugoslavia was to a great extent an application of the Stalinist model. I would like to emphasize that I am speaking of the *Stalinist* rather than the *Soviet* model. A certain measure of continuity with the latter was achieved only after the creation of the first workers' councils in 1950. But continuity was never complete because an essential difference remained from the beginning. The workers' councils in Russia emerged as the result of the spontaneous revolutionary self-activity of the working class; the Bolshevik Party had to make great efforts to gain majority in the councils. In Yugoslavia, however, »the party and state leadership *turned over* the management of the factories to the workers«, (quotation from memorial tablets found in factories), so that, even today, the communist organization is not *forced* to contest for influence within the worker's councils.

Fortunately, however, Stalinism was not the only dimension of the Yugoslav Communist movement. The Yugoslav Communist Party led an indigenous national liberation movement and succeeded in transforming it into a socialist revolution. The Yugoslav revolution of 1941—45 must be regarded as one of the important revolutions of our times, especially because since 1948 it has shown signs of being a revolution within a revolution. If a demystification of the revolution and CPY failed to acknowledge this fact, it would itself become a new mystification.

The dualistic nature of the Yugoslav socialist revolution (Stalinist vs. indigenous dimension) could not remain hidden for long. The latent contradiction had to become an actual conflict. One can

detect here a certain regularity: there is no autonomous socialist revolution which did not resist the hegemonistic pressures of the »international revolutionary centre«. Cuban post-revolutionary development too would have been far more independent of the USSR if Cuba had not found itself so seriously threatened by the USA.

There is no need to insist today on the well known facts concerning Stalin's attempts to quash the autonomy of the Yugoslav revolution in order to subordinate it to the interests of the USSR as a great power. However, one should mention that during the war Stalin, *in fact*, though not explicitly, criticized the Yugoslav revolutionary leadership for »leftist« tendencies. It is also interesting to note Stalin's perfidious suggestion to the same Yugoslav leaders which induced them to attack from the »left« the French and Italian communist parties at the first meeting of the Cominform in 1947; this had, of course, contributed to the isolation of the Yugoslav party when it was itself attacked the next year. In 1948, however, Stalin reversed his tactics completely and attacked the Yugoslav leadership from the »left« for alleged »rightist deviations«. In these changes of tactics one can easily recognize an essential feature of the policy he had pursued with such success against the anti-Stalinist opposition in the Bolshevik party: first against the »left« wing (in coalition with the »right«), and then against the »right« using the platform of the suppressed »lefts«.

The Yugoslav leadership reacted with characteristic ambivalence in 1948 against Stalin's accusations. There is nothing surprising in this when one remembers the ingenious point made by William James, that nothing new can be accepted as a truth until it is received into the body of recognized truths with the *minimum of disturbance and the maximum of continuity*. On the one hand, the Yugoslav leadership indignantly rejected all the accusations, declaring that it would show by its actions that it had been slandered. On the other hand, these actions were gradually transformed into a series of »ultraleftist« measures which the Yugoslav Communist Party would later regret: the nationalization of the last remnants of small, private, retail businesses and crafts; the hardening of the policy toward the rich and the middle peasant as shown by the forced selling of agricultural products to the state and the attempts at forced collectivization; a series of purges of the »bourgeois element« from the Popular Front, etc. Through this *practical self-criticism* the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party tried to be faithful Stalinists and at the same time to take the force out of Stalin's »leftist« arguments.

Sartre has said in another connection: »It is always time, of course, that to fight something one must change one self into it: in other words one must become its true opposite and not merely other than it« (the Interview published in »The New York Review of Books«, 26 March 1970). In the case of Yugoslavia in 1948, no special effort of this kind was required as the conflict was between two very similar social entities. It is not surprising, therefore, that for a long time the Yugoslav attitude was in fact a *Stalinist anti-*

-*Stalinism*. The evidence for this may be found in the markedly Stalinist *methods* of struggle against domestic Stalinists, although the struggle was and still remains justified. Since I have written at length on this topic in my book »Between Ideals and Reality« (1969, Beograd),² I shall merely add here that the *methods* used against the Stalinists may explain the willingness to easily resort to repression in later years.

Protagonists of great historical events generally cannot appreciate their full historical significance. For a long time the leaders of the Yugoslav Communist Party were unable to understand the full historical import of their decision to oppose Stalin. They entered the conflict without having any new social ideas. Theoretical elaboration and justification followed in the wake of political struggle. The first workers' councils, which were basic to the new position, were introduced two years later, in 1950. It is only an apparent paradox to say that only Stalinists, enjoying Stalin's confidence on the one hand and having an inside knowledge of Stalinism on the other, had a chance to resist Stalin successfully.

To say that the process of destalinization in Yugoslavia has always shown this essential internal limitation is, of course, not to cast doubt on the historical importance of it. If the Yugoslav Communist Party had capitulated to Stalin, the Yugoslav revolution of 1941—1945 would have been of purely local significance. The resistance to Stalin gave it a dimension within the framework of world history, as the first breakingaway of a socialist revolution from the »socialist« encirclement. As a result of this encirclement there came the suppression of the socialist revolutions in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968), the failure of socialist reforms in Poland (began in 1956), and now the threat to the beginnings of socialist reform in Rumania. The Yugoslav victory in the conflict with Stalin has certainly been one of the most important events in the international communist movement since the October revolution.

This is undeniable even if one gives due weight to reasons which have influenced the Yugoslav New Left in its somewhat more moderate evaluation of 1948. The New Left rightly objects to the immodesty of the protagonists of 1948 for, *in the last resort*, they had only revised their own Stalinist choices and corrected their own Stalinist errors. I am not saying, of course, that conscious choice is the only real factor in history and that the principle of determinism has no application to it. But one should note an inconsistency in the attitude of the protagonists of 1948. They regard the break with Stalin as the result of their own *choice*, while their previous Stalinist policies are represented primarily as the outcome of *objective* factors. But, one can ask oneself, why was the *objective* situation more favourable to the introduction of the workers' councils in 1950 (at a time when Yugoslavia was completely isolated, from the political, economic and military points of view) than immediately after the taking of power?! It seems clear that the

² The English translation is published by the Oxford University Press, New York, 1973.

decisive factor in this case was the Stalinist attitude of the Yugoslav Communist Party at the time of the taking of power, and not an objective necessity independent of that attitude. The notions of »objective necessity« and »objective factors« line themselves up very easily to ideological mystification, once they are conceived as independent from the choices made by the principle figures in historical events.

There is another thing to be taken into account in the analysis of 1948, — brutal fact that a small country cannot achieve anything great in this world of immensely concentrated material and military power if it is not prepared to resist and sacrifice. The Vietnamese revolution shows that, if they possess these qualities, their position is not hopeless. But Yugoslavia itself, since 1941 also provides a good example. This is something one needs to emphasize today, and for two apparently contradictory reasons.

The external Stalinist threat to Yugoslavia is still present and will be so for a long time to come. But the threat of foreign intervention is also used in internal politics, as an excuse for slowing down the process of destalinization. Sometimes this reaches such proportions that Yugoslavia's present position could be naively misinterpreted as worse than in 1948—1953. According to this strange logic, it would seem that the safest defense against the external Stalinist threat is to slow down the process of destalinization. It is not difficult to see, however, that this attitude is, in fact, a rationalization which reveals a hostility to radical socialist democratization. In fact, the best defense against Stalinism would be a system in which the most important positions would be held only by people who have *completely* broken away from Stalinism. Such a system, though, is impossible without a genuine socialist democratization. I do not want to underestimate, of course, the seriousness of the problems — such as the need for sition from post-revolutionary dictatorship to socialist democracy, particularly in a small country between two great blocks.

4.

The fundamental principles of de-stalinization in Yugoslavia are: (1) workers' self-management and social self-government; (2) withering away of the state, and deprofessionalization of politics; (3) transformation of the Communist Party into the League of Communists; and (4) gradual emancipation of mass political organizations from the Party in opposition to the Stalinist conception of »transmission belts«.

Although these ideas were first formulated by the party and state leadership, it is impossible to deny their revolutionary character. What happened to them in actual social practice is an important question for revolutionary forces.

The fundamental achievement of de-stalinization in Yugoslavia was to introduce the *forms and institutions* of self-management into working collectives. At first self-management was introduced into the factories, and then, later, into other types of collectives

(universities, schools, medical and cultural institutions etc.). This step was a logical consequence of the Marxist assumption that the working class is unable to liberate itself if it does not, at the same time, liberate the society as a whole.

Beyond the working collectives, however, there is neither real self-government, nor even real *participation* of the working class. The »producers' chambers« in the representative bodies (parliaments and local assemblies) as a possible form of their participation, were from the very beginning the chambers of managers and intellectuals ideologists of self-government. Although these »representations of self-government, from the very base« are, as a rule, quite obedient, the professional politicians have, nevertheless, found it necessary to protect themselves even against *them*: the »producers' chambers« were never given the same power as the chambers composed of professional politicians. One should add that the various supposedly self-governing associations and unions are also controlled by professional politicians with the help of technocrats. This is, of course, true, as well, of the important state bodies, such as the new Presidium of Yugoslavia, which is composed exclusively of professional politicians. Since the party and state leadership never took seriously the proposal that the Congress of Self-governing People become the supreme legislative body of the country, this congress turned out to be only a periodic manifestation at which politicians, managers, and ideologists of self-government expressed their unanimity.

This is reality. However, there is also the *ideological myth* concerning Yugoslavia as a »society of self-management and self-government« which has grown together along with genuine forms and institutions of self-management and self-government in the working collectives. On the one hand, self-management and self-government provides a potentially revolutionary element in the existing system and they are rightly relied upon by socialist forces. On the other hand, it has become transformed into an ideology. Our radical Marxist intellectuals have a moral obligation towards the leftist movements throughout the world, which have introduced the notion of self-government into their programmes, and to point out the essential difference between the ideological pretensions and the social reality in Yugoslavia.

How did the revolutionary *idea* of self-management and self-government degenerate into an *ideology* of the *status quo* which is made up of forms and institutions of self-government in the working collectives, but statism at all higher levels of social organization? I have already emphasized that destalinization in Yugoslavia had certain characteristics of a revolution within the revolution. It was, nevertheless, a revolution *from above*, even though it was wholeheartedly accepted by the majority of the people. Destalinization was initiated and then carefully led and controlled by the party and state hierarchy. Its golden age was therefore quite brief: entrophy followed after ten years, and this was followed by stagnation and crisis. The Yugoslav politocracy has never

in practice abandoned the Stalinist model of the political system of socialism.

I have just said that self-management in Yugoslavia is to be found in the working collectives; but even there, it is restricted to the questions of production and distribution. All political questions *par excellence* are kept within the existing political organizations, i.e. within their leadership. Self-management, therefore, is strictly within the »realm of necessity.« Yet, as Gramsci pointed out, the workers' self-management and self-government cannot work out and develop if it does not extend beyond the economic, to all other spheres of social life.

The politocracy is determined to use repression, if necessary, to protect its monopoly and prevent any breakthrough of self-government into political life. While the politocracy usually hesitates before intervening in economic life, no ideological scruples restrain it in politics.

Drawing a simple deduction from the myth of »our self-governing society«, the politocracy concludes that all Yugoslav institutions and organizations are genuine manifestations of self-government. According to this logic, any attempt to transcend them or even to submit them to radical criticism becomes, *by definition*, an attack on self-government. In this way, the struggle for genuine self-government can easily be stigmatized and suppressed as an attack on the »system of self-government.« In this sense one can speak of *repressive »self-government«* in Yugoslavia.³

There are politicians who are willing to concede that Yugoslavia is hardly a good example of developed political democracy, but this is in their opinion compensated by economic democracy. This, too, is a myth since economic democracy cannot be properly developed without political democracy. That is why economic democracy is still in its infancy, and only within the working collectives. True, politicians admit that a new development of economic democracy requires that a larger share of surplus value be left to the working collectives. Although this would certainly be a positive measure, it is far from being revolutionary, because the real centres of political power would remain unaffected.

In addition, the incomparably more radical idea that the entire surplus value should be under the control of the working class, does not have a real revolutionary character until it is combined with a thorough criticism and reform of the present politocratic-statist system. Without a reform of this kind, it is not realistic to hope for institutional arrangements that would enable the working class to exercise effective control over surplus value. The slogan »factories to the workers« once played a revolutionary role in

³ In Slovenia, for example, a group of twenty-five representatives-communists was checked and fiercely attacked for wanting to add another of *their own choice* to the list of candidates for the Presidium of Yugoslavia. It made no difference that they proposed another highly placed and »reliable« political functionary, and that their action was in complete accord with the law which had been previously passed by the Slovenian Parliament. Their action was, nevertheless, seen as violating the principles of self-government in politics!

Yugoslavia. It has ceased to do so for a long time now, not because the factories already in fact belong to the workers, but because it will remain impossible until the workers begin to play the decisive role in society as a whole. The only position which remains truly revolutionary today is the one which insists on the demand: *society to the workers.*⁴

5.

When speaking of the withering away of the state and the de-professionalization of politics one should again clearly distinguish social reality from ideological myths. I do not think that there is any valid evidence to show that the historical process of the withering away of the state and the transcending of politics, as alienated social power dominated by a particular professional group, has begun in Yugoslavia.

Following the socialist revolution in Yugoslavia, the privately owned means of production were expropriated by the state, all political power was concentrated in its hands, and an *immense* party and state apparatus was created at the same time. Since de-stalinization began in 1950, this apparatus has been diminished and its power has decreased; there have also been important decentralizing measures within it.

Stalin thought, as we know, that the socialist state must become increasingly stronger in the present in order for it to be able to wither away in the future. This sophistry was exposed in Yugoslavia in the early fifties. But, from the fact that the power of the state in Yugoslavia has been diminished *compared to* its power immediately after the armed revolution, it does not follow that we have a case of the withering away of the state in the Marxist sense. This point remains valid even if one takes into account that the dimensions and powers of the state apparatus in Yugoslavia are in fact *less than* they are in any other so called socialist country. Besides, there are countries no one would call socialist, where the power of the state apparatus, even in the basic production units, is less than the power of the state apparatus in Yugoslavia. No Marxist would say, however, that in these societies the state has begun to wither away, and that its politics are being deprofessionalized, and even less, that they, are ahead of Yugoslavia in that process.

6.

To get to the roots of the situation in Yugoslavia one must deal with the ruling communist organisation. The Yugoslav society today remains a political society *par excellence*. The Party is the fundamental factor of power, legitimacy, continuity and change. In a situation of this kind, there is no possibility for a genuine democracy within the society as long as democracy is in its infancy within the ruling party.

⁴ This concept should include those who create material as well as those who create spiritual values and live exclusively from their own labour.

Destatization has been the object of great theoretical and practical concern in Yugoslavia. Yet, it has generally been overlooked that the Party is the core of the Yugoslav state. Until the parcel-concept of statism is opened, it is impossible to appreciate the fact that Yugoslav statism belongs to the party-politocratic type. It is naive to believe that the state has begun to wither away as long as the country is still ruled by a Party which predominantly follows the pattern of the Third International. To criticize statism without reference to the Party as its core is to turn attention from the roots of the problem to its peripheral aspects (state administration).

Also, the real problems concerning the nature and function of the L.C.Y. are ignored since the ideological struggle is often aimed at the idea of a multiparty system in Yugoslavia. I should like to say immediately that I do not believe in the possibility of a developed socialist society which would be politically monolithic. I am not concerned here, however, with developed socialism, but with socialism in Yugoslavia as it is at present and as it will be in the near future. I have argued against the multi-party system for presentday Yugoslavia in my book *Between Ideals and Reality* and therefore think that it is not necessary to repeat that argument here. Even if the idea were acceptable for Yugoslavia, it would have no chance of being realized. It is well known that the way in which a political movement comes to power tends to determine its future behavior. It is not realistic to expect that a ruling party will be willing to allow the organized entry into the political scene of those social forces which drove it underground in pre-war Yugoslavia and which later fought against it in the civil war and in the revolution. A multi-party system during the post-revolutionary dictatorship could arise only through spontaneous disintegration of the ruling party, if the balance of power between the contending groups would not allow for the political elimination of the one by the other.

Although it may appear paradoxical, the real question concerning the nature and function of the L.C.Y. is obscured not only through the attacks on the idea of the multi-party system, but also through the insistent dwelling upon the visionary ideal of a partyless system in the socialist future. However, I do not wish to discuss here the reality of this element of revolutionary utopia. I shall proceed on the assumption that Yugoslavia will be keeping its one-party system in the near future, and I shall therefore concentrate on its critical analysis. I shall be particularly interested in the possible »checks and balances« within this system of political monopoly. It is a mistake to assume, as dogmatic advocates of the multi-party system do, that there is absolutely nothing that can be done against political monopoly within a one-party system. In admitting defeat on this point, the Marxists unintentionally surrender to the theoreticians of bourgeois democracy and thus reveal an inferiority complex before the developed political systems of capitalist societies.

I shall begin by pointing out that nothing essential has been achieved in the transformation of the Communist Party into the League of Communists. All attempts at a radical reform of the Party have ended up very modestly, as mere reorganizations. For this reason it is still justifiable to speak of the Party in spite of the fact that it has changed its name to the League of Communists.

The Party not only does not *in practice treat* the working class as a »class for itself«, but also within its own ranks there is a *de facto* division into a »party for itself« (the leadership) and a »party in itself« (the membership). True, it cannot be denied that the Party has been considerably liberalized and that in this respect no other Communist Party with a monopoly of power can be favourably compared to it. Nevertheless, there is no doubt, that the Party has achieved neither any form of new radical democracy, nor even classical democracy.

The group which dominates Party politics, and Yugoslav political life in general, was formed under the influence of the Stalinist conception of the Party, and has remained to a considerable degree faithful to it ever since. This is the reason why the Party still is, in fact, although not in theory, obsessed by monolithism, centralization and uniformity.

On the other hand, the Party is a heterogeneous mixture since its members belong to very different classes and strata. There are other factors as well that tend to undermine the monolithism of the Party: economic development, education, the openness of Yugoslavia to ideological influences from abroad, and so on. It follows that all attempts to save monolithism are ultimately doomed to failure, and that sooner or later it will have to give way to the diversity of the Party membership. Yet, Yugoslav practice has been consistently aimed at bringing reality into accord with the principle of monolithism. Because of this predominance of the principle of monolithism, all the groups and orientations within the Party tend to subscribe to *abstractly identical* platform. Thus, all declarations favouring open discussion of ideological differences must remain in vain, since they are, in fact, provocations.

The right to differ in certain important matters has implicitly been conferred only to the leadership of the republics which make up the Yugoslav federation; monolithically conceived democratic centralism is still insisted upon within each republic. In a country like Yugoslavia this is the most dangerous and undesirable way of creating pluralism within the Party since it may quickly lead to the emergence of nationalistic factions. This might eventually turn all social disputes into national conflicts, and find the revolutionary concept of the League of Communists degenerating in practice into a coalition of *monolithic national* communist parties.

There is still no possibility of finding out whether the majority of the Party membership supports the official platform since there are no real elections in the Party: the candidates neither offer a platform nor is there generally more than one candidate for each important post. If the absence of free elections in the society as

a whole could perhaps be justified, there can be no valid justification for a similar situation in the Party. Under these circumstances the leading hierarchy is able if it so wishes, to secure perpetual renewal of its power. In other words, there exists monolithic, rather than democratic, rotation.

It should also be pointed out that the leading hierarchy will not be exposed to serious challenge and competition until the Party recognizes the legitimacy of an *active minority*. I have in mind the right of the minority to openly advocate changes in the officially adopted party policies. This idea is usually denounced as anarchistic by the ruling hierarchy and it is contended that if adopted, the activity of the Party would be paralyzed. However, the idea is not anarchistic, nor can this practical argument against it be convincing, simply because acting upon the democratically adopted policies would be binding for everyone, until the minority might possibly turn into a majority.

There is another factor favouring the monopoly of the leading hierarchy: the members and the party cells are, to use Sartre's term, serialized. They are not allowed to communicate *directly*, and, even less, to cooperate *directly* in order to influence the policies of the Party. The present leadership is an *unavoidable* intermediary in this respect. One should not overlook the fact that the membership does not choose the mode of association within the Party; it merely complies with the organizationa scheme, prescribed by the leadership. This is not all: as the power to exclude individual members and to disband entire party cells today still rests with the leadership, it therefore is in the position to exercise full control over the rest of the Party. This allows also for the theoretical possibility that the leadership may, in this way, fundamentally change the composition of the Party. The example of the Czechoslovak Communist Party since 1969 shows that this possibility can in fact be realized in exceptional cases.

This position of the party cells and the individual party members explains why even that part of the working class which belongs to the Party is nevertheless precluded from significantly influencing its policies. It has been argued by politicians and even certain theoreticians, that this situation in the Party is in sharp contrast with the present state of self-management and self-government in Yugoslavia. I am inclined to think, however, that this supposed asymmetry is an illusion. Both the working class and the institutions of self-management and self-government are no less fragmented and »serialized« than the membership of the Party. It would otherwise be impossible to explain why the crucial decisions in the Party as well as in the society are still made by the professional politicians. One of the characteristics of our prevailing political culture, to which I shall return later, is the constant criticism of professionalized politics, even by the politicians themselves; while, at the same time, the professional political elite continues to retain full power. The de-professionalization of politics is proclaimed so loudly and so often that its monopolization

by professional politicians is thus obscured and the significant qualitative differences among the latter are overlooked.

I have, so far, analyzed and criticized the situation in the Party in terms of well-known imagination, one might require, for example, that the present composition of the Party membership be altered in favour of an obligatory working class majority for the future. Why should not the Party statutes follow the practice of the workers' councils and require that all leading bodies should have a majority composed of democratically elected workers and other creators of material and spiritual values who live exclusively from the result of their labour? What serious arguments can there be against the proposal that in addition to the existing leading party organs in which there must be professional politicians, party organs composed of »common« Party members should be elected as well. These latter organs could take part in all of the activities of the leading Party organs (except for the decision making), and would, before the Party congresses and conferences, give their own assessment of the work of the leading party organs and of the situation in the Party.

7.

From what I have said above concerning the Party and its situation, it is not difficult to see what must follow in regard to the other political organizations and their relationship to the Party. If a communist party internally continues to follow the pattern set up by the Third International, it can hardly be expected that its external relationship will follow a different pattern.

It is time that the Party organs no longer simply overlap with the leading bodies of other political organisations and mass media; to a certain extent, a division of labour and competence has been carried out between the Party and other factors of the socio-political system. However, the Party continues to control them as its »transmission belts« simply by appointing its disciplined members to all crucial positions. To this day the Party is not obliged to resort to argument in order to gain influence and to command respect in those institutions. In this sense, it has not become the internal avant-garde, but instead, has remained the predominantly external avant-garde. Without forgetting the sincere attempts to gain authority for the Party by the force of argument, mention can be made of the fact that whenever these arguments failed, they were abandoned in favour of the old authoritarian methods.

The real role of other political organizations in comparison to the Party can best be seen through a thought-experiment. What would be changed if all these organizations vanished and only the Party remained? Almost nothing! The remaining illusions of the political apparatus of these organisations would suffer the final blow. I do not want to draw from this any cynical conclusion, but merely wish to point out that political organisations in Yugoslavia still await radical reform.

It is time to change the theoretical perspective. We often argue in Yugoslavia about cultural politics, yet hardly ever speak of *political culture*. The political under-development of Yugoslavia is usually explained by its economic and cultural backwardness. Yet, in Yugoslavia today there is a higher level of economic and cultural development than political development.

In every society one can find a variety of different political cultures, but I shall speak here only of the prevailing political culture. As Yugoslav society is predominantly political, it is dominated by the political culture of its professional politocracy. This culture, as we shall see in a moment, is still closely related to Stalinism. It is, nevertheless, an error to see Yugoslav politocracy as a single homogeneous world which absolutely does not allow for any breakthrough towards democratic socialism. However, I shall not speak explicitly of this other side of Yugoslav politics. The reader will *per contradictionem* easily come to the conclusion what are its main features. How welcome are these new politicians and how foreign they appear in their surroundings!

The majority of politicians still *live in intermundias*, not, of course, in the sense of non-interference in public affairs. On the contrary, their interference is excessive. However, the yawning gap between their actual achievements and their own ideas concerning these achievements is hardly disputable. The engine idles in reservation often incapable of imparting movement to the »transmission belts« inherited from the period of revolutionary enthusiasm. In mass political organisations, the professional apparatus has for a long time now remained its own principal pre-occupation. The intellectuals, managers, workers, women and young people chosen by the professional politicians to represent the society, merely help them to live in the illusion that they are not cut away from it.

This isolation is connected with an *overbearing vanity*, which is another characteristic of the majority of Yugoslav politocracy. G. Lukacs once argued that the essential trait of Stalinism is that it treats tactical moves as strategic principles. This diagnosis applies *mutatis mutandis* to the Yugoslav situation as well. The difference is that Stalinism has been somewhat transformed: political meetings and measures are often declared to be of *historical significance*. Thus, we have more phases of the revolution than the revolution itself. This can be taken as a sure sign that the revolutionary and the ephemeral have been confused, and that the sense of what has genuine historical importance has been lost.

It is hardly surprising that this inflation of historical turning points has led to the loss of optimism and, therefore, to the contrary of what has been intended. Permanent revolution cannot be identified with the constant exaltation of historical pretensions. On the contrary, the more genuine historical achievements, there are, the less is the need for ideological-political noise. Already

Greek philosophers knew that the fact of movement is proved by actual movement and not by statements about it.

It is interesting to observe that the majority of our politocracy remains bragging even in times of crisis. Yet, at such times, their self-confidence manifests itself in sharp criticisms of the existing situation, so that even their failures become pretentious. To be self-critical is undoubtedly a virtue, but it can hardly be considered proof of success. The least the Yugoslav politocracy could do in the present crisis would be to lower their tone and speak *pianissimo*.

The language of the politocracy is a story in itself. We are often concerned today about the pollution of our natural environment. Perhaps we should also pay more attention to the *pollution of the linguistic environment* and its prevention. I am not thinking of something like Orwell's »double-talk«, but of some kind of »half-talk«, »quarter-talk«, etc. It is not a language of straight-forward lies, but of half-truths, and quarter-truths, to which people have become accustomed and at the same time numb. The language sometimes has such power that as Ovid says in »Metamorphosis«, »By magic songs and powerful spells even the moon may be taken out of the sky.« The politicians I am speaking of are not deluded to such an extent. Their language has primarily an anaesthetic function.

The second basic function of this language is ritual. It is some kind of pass-talk of professional politicians. If they did not make use of certain words constantly, they would remain exposed to attack by their superiors or rivals. Politicians recognize each other by the use of this language which represents a guarantee that the uniform rules of the game will not be violated through a deviant personal attitude. Someone wanting to compile a dictionary of good political terminology would find very little material in Yugoslavia, but he could easily put together a rich collection of political nonsense.

A. Koestler once wrote about a young man who was discovered by his captors to be a communist because he repeatedly used the word »concrete«. The majority of our politicians could likewise be discovered through their overused stereotypes clichés, euphemisms, e.g., »structure«, not to mention senseless expressions such as »self-governing logic« (language, process, consistency).

The prevailing political language is also »enriched« by giving new names to old things. There are two principal reasons for this practice. The first is that linguistic innovations create an illusion of political dynamics which has the effect of concealing the practical stagnation. The second is that new expressions such as »self-governing agreement« and »self-governing settlement« conceal the failure of previous policies, in this case the failure of the *laissez-faire* conception of distribution, according to which income is to be distributed by completely autonomous workers' collectives.

The prevailing political cultural is also characterized by a *specific variant of practicisim*. The importance of theory is not denied, but in practice, no hypothesis is excluded in advance and so the

expense of social experimentation is unnecessarily high. So it «had» to be proved in practice that, e.g., the whole L.C.Y. or Yugoslavia cannot simply be the sum of its parts or that *laissez-faire* market economy necessarily leads to economic crisis.

At the end of this sketch I would like to say something on the *central role of the enemy* in Yugoslav political culture. It is very closely connected with the remnants of a specific pseudo-dialectical understanding of social conflict.

The original version of this pseudo-dialectical understanding is well-known: in pure Stalinist ideology the existence of conflicts in socialist societies is admitted, but only in the form of conflicts of the «old» with the «new.» However, when it comes to the polarization within the «new», it is declared that one side of the conflict in fact belonged to the «old» and was only disguising itself as the «new». So it seems that there has been no conflict within the «new» since the other side is subsequently excommunicated.

There is another, somewhat milder form, of the same theory, particularly in the Chinese ideology manifested in the Cultural Revolution. According to this view, conflicts may appear even within the «new», in the Party, and even in its leadership, e.g., the conflict between bureaucracy and communism. However, there is ultimately very little difference between this view and the original one. In both cases, only one side is completely untainted, completely socialist, and all others are finally seen as enemies and given «appropriate» names such as «revisionism», «the restoration of capitalism», etc.

This pseudo-dialectical theory is explicitly and contemptuously rejected in Yugoslav ideology, but it constantly reappears in new and concealed forms. Apart from certain unimportant conflicts, *all fundamental* conflicts in Yugoslavia are renounced as being of a non-socialist character. *All* these conflicts are ultimately reduced to different pairs of contraries — e. g., unitarianism — nationalism, statism — anarcholiberalism, state ownership — privatization of ownership — which are equally hostile to *pure* socialist orientations (internationalism, self-management and self-government, social ownership, etc.) Official Yugoslav ideology has never admitted that any important social conflict in *socialism* could be really *socialist in character*. This might serve to explain the tendency to suppress social conflicts rather than to allow for their solution through democratic process. Fear, and near panic invariably accompany any serious disagreements or conflicts in the Party, i. e. in the organization which should be socialist *by definition*.

It is well-known that Stalin thought that class struggle becomes intensified with the development of socialism. Although it has been officially rejected, this thesis is constantly reappearing in concealed forms in Yugoslav political life. Judging by the frequency of the politicians' attacks on the enemies of «self-governing socialism», their number must be constantly increasing. In more developed political cultures the more successful a politician is, the fewer enemies he has. However, listening to political spee-

ches in Yugoslavia, one sometimes gets the impression that socialist forces are surrounded by the enemy, both from the inside as well as the outside. It would be naïve to deny that socialism has dangerous enemies, but it is one thing to be aware of their existence, and quite another to be haunted by them. It is not incorrect to say even now that the struggle against the enemies of socialism is often disproportionate to the genuine struggle for socialism.

Following the principle that opposites coincide many politicians treat different »enemies« as if ultimately there was no difference between them. The opposites coincide, but merely because they were forced to (A. Huxley). As the official politics believes itself to be the standard of socialism, any criticism of it becomes by definition an attack on socialism. At the same time it is always considered to be an insult to some »Platonic socialist idea« which is felt to stand behind the official politics. Such ideas not only justify current politics, but every change of political course as well, since nothing can sully the purity of the »Platonic idea«. The change in policy often entails the acceptance of the critique and ideas of radical Marxist intellectuals but the official propaganda continues to attack their authors as enemies of socialism. Woe to him who is shown to have been right before his time!

9.

It can safely be said that the past thirty years since the beginning of the revolution, have in many respects, been an »historical epoch« for Yugoslavia (as distinct from an »historical period«, to use for the moment Merleau-Ponty's distinction). Before the revolution one could say that Yugoslavia lived for the most part in the margins of history. The revolution 1941-45 and the beginning of the revolution within the revolution in 1948, resulted in a great acceleration of the historical process in Yugoslavia, which brought it closer to the centre of the historical stage. This has, actually, happened disproportionnately to its physical size and economic and political power. There is no need to dwell on the social progress that followed the revolution in Yugoslavia. It is well-known that under difficult conditions Yugoslavia made an industrial »take-off« and almost caught up with the low middle developed countries; that urbanization proceeded at a staggering rate; that institutions of workers' self-management and social self-government are introduced at the local level; that the independence of the country was won and preserved under difficult geo-political conditions; that Yugoslavia is the first, and until now, the only socialist society which is in many respects open towards the world, etc.

There are three possible approaches to any social situation: 1) the historical, 2) the comparative, 3) the revolutionary. Although the internal development of Yugoslavia has come into a crisis, the *status quo* continues to be legitimised successfully by appealing to the first two criteria: by assessing that which has been accomplished in terms of the starting point, and the attendant difficulties, as well as by comparing Yugoslavia to closed societies, which

nevertheless call themselves socialist.⁵ The revolutionary approach has, of course, nothing in common with nihilism, but goes beyond the historical and the comparative perspective, without neglecting them.

Marxists have, in the past, paid more attention to the transformation of the revolutionary into a conservative (Stalinist) dictatorship than to its evolutionary potential for a socialist democracy. Some Marxists have come to the conclusion, almost in agreement with certain bourgeois analysts of communism, that the corruption of revolutionary dictatorship is some kind of »iron law« inevitability.

Political democracy is often appealed to in order to justify invidious comparisons between socialism and developed capitalism (standard of living is another criteria used for this same purpose). This practice has been so successful that it results in an unconscious sense of inferiority of socialism shown in the aping of the *most formal* elements of bourgeois democracy; and socialism therefore lags still further behind developed capitalism.

It is not accidental that the theory of permanent revolution has almost retained its original form in which it postulated a continuous development from the bourgeois to the socialist revolution. The need to more resolutely extend the theory of the permanent revolution is long overdue; it should also cover a continuous development from socialist political to socialist social revolution as well. The theory of permanent socialist revolution ought particularly take into account recent historical experiences in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Yugoslav experiments are of fundamental importance in connection with the democratization of the workers' collectives, and after the Prague Spring of 1968, the democratization of political life in socialism is no longer a *terra incognita*. Are we to say that the majority of Yugoslav theoreticians and politicians do not really believe in the possibility of political democracy in contemporary socialism since they show no genuine analytical interest in the Czechoslovak political ideas and experiments of the Prague Spring? It seems that here again we in Yugoslavia are going about in circles. The times of the most important theoretical breakthroughs and innovations coming from the top of the political elite are inextricably past. The democratic conception of socialism can only be built with the participation of *all* the intellectual and progressive forces of society but this kind of mobilization itself presupposes a certain measure of political democratization.

I shall now return to my statement that social developments in Yugoslavia after 1948 had some characteristics of a revolution within the revolution. It might be objected that the processes of destalinization were initiated and controlled *from above* and that therefore they could not have been genuinely revolutionary. I have

⁵ There is another factor which reinforces this legitimation: the fear of risk involved in the radical reforms of the existing system, especially when it is combined with a sense of external threat to the achievements of destalinization in Yugoslavia.

of course, no wish to deny the premise of the argument, but I do not believe that the conclusion follows. What I said earlier concerning the role of the party and state leadership was not meant to imply that there was no pressure from below. This pressure was partly responsible for certain fundamental structural reforms whose revolutionary nature it is very hard to deny. Finally, it should not be forgotten that Yugoslav Stalinism until 1948 was a part of the *international Stalinist system*, so that the revolutionary character of the break with it in 1948 and afterward is due to both Yugoslav secession from that system and to internal structural reforms in Yugoslavia as well.

One cannot, of course, speak of a revolution within a revolution in *the full sense of the word* before the rise of a communist movement. Since this failed to happen in Yugoslavia, our revolution within the revolution proceeded from stagnation, through entropy, to crisis. I am afraid that we have thus passed from an »historical epoch« to an »historical period«, to use once again Merleau-Ponty's pair of terms.

It is increasingly evident that the Yugoslav political system has become petrified in the past few years and that it has found itself in opposition with its own previous results. The present distribution of economic and political power is incompatible with the mobilization for an *essential* breakthrough; The selection of people for important posts is controlled by basic centres of social power and is not made according to satisfactory criteria. We live in a society of *political scarcity*, although the level of economic development favourably compares Yugoslavia to the lower bracket of the middle developed countries.

Contrary to the usual opinion, the economic and political system as it is today, is not in opposition to the *existing* institutions of workers' self-management and social self-government. The monopolization of the basic decision-power by professional politicians is in full accord with the atomization of self-management and self-government. The Yugoslav political system is only in conflict with the vision of the integral system of the workers' self-management and social self-government.

It is impossible to deny that the post-revolutionary dictatorship in Yugoslavia has been significantly *liberalized* since 1950, but this should not be allowed to blind us to the absence of real democratization. The impetus created by the initial destalinization has been quickly exhausted. Creativity and planned experimentation have been replaced by political inertia and improvisation. Economic and social reform failed first politically and then economically, and was finally reduced to stabilization; socialist changes during the past few years have been more quantitative than essential.

The basic centres of social power are still dominated by forces which are unwilling to allow radical socialist changes in the existing system. Therein the »mystery« of the occasional revolutionary proclamations unaccompanied by its practical realization is explained. It is not surprising that lay people are often confused

and unable to understand why such declarations are never put into practice.

Under pressure from the more progressive elements in the Party, the center, as well as the conservative wing of the Party, occasionally will consent to radical political declarations. However, no one should confuse mere verbal acceptances of a principle with a genuine disposition to use it as a guide for action, and therefore fall into the misconception that the right wing and the center could actually favour the realization of their declared aims. This balance of forces in Yugoslav professional politics explains why the most successful politicians are those who are radical in their programme and rhetoric, somewhat left of center in their criticism of the current situation and centrist in their practical attitudes. What other explanation could there be for the shifting from reform to stabilization; from one reorganization to another?

There can be no hope of breaking away from this circle until the Party is transformed from the guardian of the existing order into the initiator of the communist movement. It is well known that for Marx, communism was foremost a movement, but in the last thirty or forty years the majority of communists have become so rigid that the Party has become synonymous with the Movement. In all revolutions, until now, however, the active movement has been considerably broader than the Party. It was only after it had seized power that the Party eliminated all other participants in the movement from the political scene. Is the democratization of the post-revolutionary dictatorship conceivable without returning to the original idea of the Movement?

In addition to the Party, the Yugoslav communist Movement should include, above all, industrial workers, and leftist students and intellectuals. It goes without saying that the Movement would grant no special privileges to the Party. In order to gain influence in the Movement, the Party would have to rely on persuasion, argument, and example. But the uncertainty evolving out of such a situation seems harmless when compared to the certainty that there can be no developed socialism until the Party is *forced* to act in this way. A benefit which is freely granted does not have the same significance as that which has been fought for, and won. Real and secure democracy can never be a gift of the benevolent political leadership — the masses must conquer it.

Many Party members wish for a communist movement, but are unwilling to face any kind of spontaneous initiation from below. The trouble is how to get out of this circle: in times of crisis the officials are too afraid to risk democratization, and yet, a socialist solution for the crisis is impossible without democratization.

The fundamental reform of the Party will also continue to retreat like a mirage if there is no effective pressure from below. »The materialist interpretation of history is no cab to be taken at will; it does not stop short of the promotees of revolutions.« (M. Weber, »Politics as a Vocation«, From *Max Weber, Essays in Sociology*, H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., p. 125). The Party

apparatus is under the illusion that its motives are the historical interests of the working class rather than its own immediate interests. This altruistic self-satisfaction can only be dispelled by the pressure of the proletariat expressing its real interests. The real question is not why the Party doesn't enable the working class to enter the political scene, but rather in whose interest it is, in the Party, to allow and support the political activity of the working class.

The point is that the Yugoslav Party created the conditions for the development of the working class and not conversely: classical Marxism was mistaken in supposing that the industrial revolution could not follow, but must precede the socialist revolution. The Party tried, of course, to create a working class which by its atomization and even »serialization« would correspond to the political monopoly it had in society. Atomized self-management is certainly not favourable to the development of the workers' class consciousness. The trade union hierarchy is bent on doing everything in its power to prevent the development of a class consciousness from the fragmentary consciousness of workers' isolated from each other by the opposed interests of their self-managing firms.

The view that the class consciousness of the working class could be formed by Party preaching and lecturing has long been discredited, at least in theory, in Yugoslavia. It is well known that the workers cannot develop from a »class in itself« to become a »class for itself« until they are politically active and organized. The myth that the working class is the ruling class in Yugoslavia is nevertheless very influential, although the working class as a class is not present on the political scene. To justify this state of affairs, the politocracy usually points to the backwardness of the working class. However, Yugoslavia already has large industrial centres, and the political position and function of the workers there is also quite insignificant. It is not enough to have a working class ideology; what is necessary is a politics really inspired by working class interests. Gramsci rightly maintained that the proletariat will achieve its historical emancipation from the fetters of immediate existence through simultaneous constituting and suppressing itself as a class. Yet, in socialism so far, there have been few signs of the self-suppression of the proletariat; we find instead its repression by the Party which has effectively prevented it from constituting itself into a class.

History shows that a social crisis which cannot find a solution on the left, will very probably be resolved by a shift to the right. The historical responsibility for the strong emergence of the nationalist right on the Yugoslav political scene lies, therefore, with those circles within the Party which in 1968, and later, decided to quash the leftist student movement that might have instigated the political engagement of the working class and a general shift to the left. In 1968 the Party hierarchy felt for the first time threatened from the left, and so, the majority of the leadership opted for the suppression of the student movement as a »group-in-fusion«. This is one of the points in the history of the L. C. Y.

that might be as far reaching as the suppression of the workers' opposition was for the Bolsheviks.

Our crisis cannot be genuinely overcome by a centrist politics which successively resorts to attacks against the left and against the right or against both at the same time, in an effort to keep the balance that safeguards its interests. The guardians of the past are still too strong in the party to allow the democratic-communist wing to rely *openly* on support from below. Radical socialist democracy will remain unattainable until both these conditions are realized: differentiation within the political hierarchy and the spontaneous rise of a leftist workers' and intellectuals' movement from below. Both the Stalinists and the anarchists — though of course for opposite reasons — never had any faith in the possibility of this fruitful union between political organization and political spontaneity. It would be insincere to say that such a union in Yugoslavia, at present, could be realized, but conscious commitment to a future course of action and preparation for it is sometimes more important in history than the length of time necessary to attain it.

MIDDLE CLASS IDEOLOGY

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I

Creative thinking is forever obstructed by schematism and routine. Many people neglect creative thinking because it seems that standard routines ensure more efficacy and, accordingly, progress. But things are not as simple as they appear, because what looks at first sight acceptable and desirable often leads to a dead end. A good example is the belief that economic conditions directly determine social consciousness. If we start from this assumption we are bound to encounter difficulties in many cases when it will not be possible to give an explanation for the behaviour of whole social strata, who accept an ideology and adhere to it although it is contrary to their economic and other interests. Accordingly, in such cases we will have to consider some other factors aside from the economic conditions of life, which seem to influence the forming of social consciousness. The investigation of the various ways in which these influences affect the consciousness of individuals and social groups represents a special problem.

Starting from this introductory remark we will try to define the essential dimensions of middle class ideology. We are aware of the fact that this is an extremely difficult task. The middle class is a very numerous social group, with a protracted historical genesis, which is constantly undergoing modifications due to the development of society and to the specific conditions of individual countries. Accordingly, the term »middle class« is rather vague when used in a general sense. In order to give a preliminary definition I would like to point out that I am speaking of the bourgeois middle class. When speaking about the last century and about the first half of the 20th century, these strata are usually referred to by the term petty bourgeoisie. The social position of these strata and the the contradictions of their position become especially evident in times of crises and clashes. This has been brilliantly dis-

cribed by Marx in his articles on class struggle in France. Contrary to 19th century theoretical predictions the middle class is not decreasing but fastly increasing in numbers. Its character is somewhat changed in so far that its basis is no longer exclusively small property and free enterprise, but positions in the structures of corporative or state-owned property. The majority of the middle class are no longer small entrepreneurs and shopkeepers but so-called »white collar workers«, i. e., numerous office employees, businessmen, people working in various services, and the majority of the intellectuals. The difference is usually expressed by using the terms »old« and »new« middle class, which are undoubtedly more neutral terms than the term bourgeoisie. The old middle class, compared to the new one, was relatively independant and could occasionally join the proletariat in its struggle against the upper classes. However, this was always only temporary and for tactical reasons, because the small proprietor and entrepreneur were always the greatest and loudest enemies of proletarian ideology. The new middle class is part of the economic and administrative system and therefor cannot represent an independant political force. Its members become employees selling their labour power and in this they resemble the workers. On the other hand, due to their education, upbringing, jobs and salaries the majority of the middle class clearly differ from the workers and represent the government's chief and most numerous support in developed capitalist countries.

Any endeavour to reach the source of middle class ideology leads to the study of the structure of the small peasant property, i. e., of the family that lives on it. This type of family came into existence after the abolition of feudal bondage. In its struggle to survive and strengthen its position on the small plot of land that was given to it, it developed a new, conservative ideology which was in favour of dictatorial governments. A good example is the situation in France about the middle of the 19th century, accurately described in Marx's »18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte«. Hitler had in mind these strong bonds with the soil and private property when he maintained that the small and medium peasants represent a powerful dam against the expansion of communist ideology. Such peasant families are relatively isolated and depend more on natural forces than on social institutions. They manage to exist by hard work and privations of all sorts and due to the lack of good prospects for the future easily become the victims of organizations and movements that propagate irrationality and fatalism. Because of their manner of production the peasants have little mutual contact, they are isolated and disunited. As a social group they are not opposed to any other social group. In recent history they have usually been represented by somebody else on the political scene. The feeling of belonging together realized by the idea of nation usually encompasses almost all social strata, which blurs the class contradictions and facilitates dictatorial ruling. In this respect the peasants and the middle classes have a lot in common. Namely, both classes form their class conscious-

ness not on the class level but on levels of nation and state. This is due either to mutual competition, as is the case with small entrepreneurs and shopkeepers, or to servility and careerism in the case of the numerous office employees. The essential difference between the small and medium peasantry on one side and the contemporary middle class on the other, lies in the fact that the first group is culturally and historically in a dead end, while the latter's prospects are closely linked with the fast development of large state and social organizations. Therefor the old middle class is retreating and the new middle class expanding, but there are no major changes in the ideology. It continues to be an ideology developing between anvil and sledgehammer, because the economic and social position of the lower middle class resembles more that of the proletariat than of the upper class, but its aspirations are in most cases upper class ones. They try to imitate those who form the top of the social pyramid and, accordingly, strive to differ as much as possible from those at the bottom. In developed capitalist countries this fact contributes more than anything else to the balance of the established regime. Because of this we encounter the illusion of classlessness most often among the members of the middle class. Recently this illusion has been expressed in the theory that the expansion of the middle class eradicates all class distinctions but not so the national distinctions. It is a theory which serves for the preservation of differences between developed and undeveloped nations and regions and by the help of which rich countries, in their confrontation with poor countries, try to achieve an ideological homogenization of all their social classes and strata. They succeed in this to a high degree because the realized surplus value is distributed more evenly and among a greater number of inhabitants than was the case in the last century.

The ideology developed on the free peasant homestead is basically identical with middle-class ideology. This is best perceived when one researches the disintegration of the peasant homestead brought about by its confrontation with modern market economy. This process is felt in all Western industrial countries. It was experienced in its purest form in the USA, where the farm was oriented towards the market from the very beginning. This orientation helped the development of the country town described by Veblen as one of the most significant American institutions, which had in the past and still has a stronger influence than anything else on public opinion and on American culture.¹ All that had such a decisive influence and still is essential for the so-called American way of life is firmly connected with the inner driving force of the movement itself. That is in the first place the insatiable drive for limitless individual and family profit and advancement. The patriarchal peasant community did not know of such an absolute principle of profit, but allowed for a distribution of a part of the profit to the poorer members, to beggars and vagrants. Capitalist progress asks for an inhuman treatment of the poor. The profits

¹ Absentee Ownership, Beacon Press, Boston 1967, p. 129.

are reinvested into the further development of production in spite of the fact that at the same time people are dying of hunger. The ideology fully justifies this by the standpoint that worldly success is the sign of the chosen. There dominates the view that natural resources must become the private property of those who are sufficiently lucky and cunning to obtain them adhering to certain rules. Naturally, work ethics and rational discipline cannot be avoided. If we study the middle class, we must consider first the mechanisms that instigate and favour the capitalist accumulation of commodities, because that is the medium in which the middle class thrives and expands. It is the domaine of business, which rests firmly on speculation. Veblen described it as the »legal margin to get something for nothing«. It is significant that the farmer was one of the pillars of that system, in spite of the fact that he was the chief victim of speculation and exploitation, because of his belief that he too had a chance to enter the ranks of speculators and create the basis for a life of leisure at the expense of others, who had been less successful. This belief had no foundation. It was true that most entrepreneurs and shopkeepers had a farmer background, but the farmers as a social group never had any control of their own situation. Those who succeeded left the sphere of small property and entered the middle class business circles. They managed to appropriate a smaller part of the surplus values, while the lion's share went into the hands of powerful groups which surreptitiously controlled the national market.

We have pointed out earlier the reasons why the collective consciousness of the middle class acquired the form of a national or nation-wide ideology. Now we should explain how this became possible, i. e., how a particular interest got general value. If we start from the basis, i. e., from small market towns and localities that sprang up around crossroads and economic centers as collecting and distributing centers, we will find that from the very beginning they protected the interests of their whole area. As business speculations represent the main interest, the natural resources and other immovables are not considered as valuables because the proprietor has invested in them his »savings«, but because the community needs them and is prepared to pay for using them. In accordance with this, the inhabitants of the small town together with the farmers are: »pilgrims of hope looking forward for a chance to secure an inflatory price for their real estate, or, what is even more important, who wait for a chance that one or the other of the naïve takes them by their word.«² That means that speculative mechanisms are the link between all businessmen in a small town. The profit realized by the town is rather considerable, but the participants get only a small portion of it because they are numerous and, besides, many of them work on the brink of bankruptcy. Yet they all unanimously support the myth about the big profit because that is a part of the speculative mechanism, which raises the cost of communal facilities and causes money to

² Ibidem, p. 144.

flow incessantly from the hands of the weak and naive into the pockets of the cunning and strong.

The above analysis shows how individual interests, in spite of mutual competition, find a common language on the level of town and county. But the common interests usually conflict with the interests of neighbouring towns and counties which represent a competition within the framework of the general development of the country. In the course of economic development we witness an expansion and a merging of areas with similar individual and group interests, which eventually brings about a spatial unification of both nation and market regulated and protected by a national state. But the former driving forces do not get lost. They get more concentrated and work through various interest groups up to the national state which is the top, and which, because of its interests will enter into international, imperialistic wars and wide-scale destructions. Due to recent developments, the national state no longer represents the top. There have developed supra-national structures but still with the same old mechanism as their foundation.

It is evident from our discussion that in the same manner as »common interests« served to camouflage the true interests of business groups, who were exploiting in various ways the helpless and unorganized farmers, »national interests« successfully cover the essentially predatory motives of powerful groups. I do not want to imply here that the middle class is by its nature bellicose and, accordingly, the main supporter of imperialist politics. Quite contrary, the very nature of the work executed by a small entrepreneur or shopkeeper is such that he has to avoid conflicts and rely on his talent to oblige and appear benevolent, in order to extract as much profit as possible. All the time he has to be alert and ready to exploit the shortcomings of those he deals with — because what one loses, the other gains. He must adjust his behaviour and character to suite the taste of those who have money and make important decisions. He genuinely hates all troublemakers and revolutionaries who might endanger his business and the established regime. In spite of the fact that it can be rightfully maintained that he is the embodiment of the capitalist system, he is not given much importance and often comes out on the short end of the stick. Marx gives a good example for this in his description of the June Revolution in Paris. He points out that no one fought for the preservation of private property and credits with such ferocity as the Parisian petty bourgeoisie — the owners of cafés and restaurants, innkeepers, small shopkeepers, artisans and others. »The shop was frightened and turned against the barricades in order to reestablish the movement from the street into the shop. But behind the barricades stood the shopkeeper's customers and debtors and on the other side were his creditors. After the barricades were demolished, the workers beaten, the shopkeepers still inebriated with victory rushed back to their shops, but the doors were barred by the saviours of property, by the official representatives of credit, who mouthed the horrible de-

mands: Overdue payment! Overdue lease! Bankrupt shop! Bankrupt shopkeeper!³

Such is the lot of small proprietors, who act as a sort of go-between between the proletariat and the upper class. They are the most sincere and enthusiastic adherents of the bourgeois order, but in times of crisis they are the first to suffer and the deterioration of their economic position undermines their ideals and aspirations. General insecurity and the desire to differ from the proletariat at all costs, render the middle class the chief supporter of adventurous politics. Fascism evidently appears in the phase of the general disintegration of capitalism as a system, due to the fear the upper classes have of socialism. Yet all analyses clearly show that it is basically a movement of the petty and middle class bourgeoisie. In times of the general state and economic crisis that overtook Germany after its defeat in WW I, which was most strongly felt by the middle and lower cadres in state administration and in the army, by employees in other offices and enterprises, free-lance professions, medium and small entrepreneurs, artisans and shopkeepers, all these people were threatened by proletarianization and the Nazis confronted them with the alternative: »The world will either drown in a grey mass, the proletariat, where everybody will own the same, i. e., nothing; or, individuals should be given a chance to accomplish what they want, relying on their own work and sweat. Middle class or proletariat — that is the issue!«⁴

If we add to this slogan (which hits the mark, because it opposes private initiative as the basis of affluence to proletarian collectivism), the instigation of a national euphoria with racist overtones, we get the broad basis of the growth and expansion of German Fascism. We have already pointed out the mechanisms through which the interests of individuals and groups are raised to the level of general and national interests. The inner drive is insatiable egotism, which necessarily gets confronted by similar egotisms. If they happen to find a common language and start to collaborate, it will be only because of common interests in their struggle against a third group. Thus any nationalism can be reduced to individual or group egotistical interests, which un-masks its essence as a social relation based on capitalist ownership. When it is accompanied by biological, racial and national features, it finds a foothold in the emotional — irrational sphere and acquires unheard-of power. That is the true platform of nationalism on which it gathers the majority of adherents, fellow-travellers and allies and from which it constantly undertakes crusades in all directions. This platform is especially important as concerns the numerous individuals and groups who have, for some reason, failed to succeed in the conditions of rapid technological and social changes and have, consequently, lost their own produc-

³ Klasne borbe u Francuskoj, Izabrana djela tom I, Kultura 1950.

⁴ From the Nazi electoral address 1932. Quoted according to W. Reich in his: Massenpsychologie des Faschismus, Sexpol Verlag 1933.

tive or human foothold. They come from various social strata, and it is natural that the majority is recruited from the middle class and the proletariat (Lumpenproletariat). They easily become subject to nationalist manipulation and past experience has shown that the black shirts that do the dirty jobs of Fascist regimes get recruited from their ranks. The stressing of biological characteristics which cannot be acquired but are inherited by birth as the most important criterion for social promotion opens the road to a negative selection of cadres. Due to this, nationalism brings to the top people, who themselves do not mean anything and therefore have a great craving for identification with the national. Their identification with the national myth and general national values easily turns into euphoria, which means that they will regard as traitors all those who do not share their views. The pressures exerted in this manner are considerable because they touch upon psychoanalysts that almost all representatives of extreme nationalism had emotional or physical drawbacks and sought compensation in nationalism and chauvinism, but there certainly exists ample evidence in favour of this view. We do not want to dwell on this subject any longer because we would get sidetracked to a sphere, which in spite of its significance for our topic, we could not easily include into our research, because of the type of analysis required and the length of the elaboration. For this reason we will just point out the general opinion confirmed by a number of researchers. According to it the psychological readiness to accept a nationalist orientation is due to the circumstance that a personality subdued on the personal level in the family will seek compensation in group euphoria and terrorism. It is important to add here that this does not apply solely to individuals but also to entire social strata, in which case we have to a higher degree as a corrective the factor of broader social frustration. We are not considering here the basic source of nationalism, which, we believe, is inherent in capitalist relations and, accordingly, supported by social groups which benefit mostly from the existing distribution of power, privileges and commodities. We are considering its broadest basis, i. e., the forces which accept it as a compensation for their own insecurity and frustration. We can illustrate that by concrete examples: this second group comprised the majority of 160,000 Nazi officials, teachers by profession. In most cases they were elementary school teachers (that is 22.9% of a total of 700,000 party officials, according to data for 1936 and 1937).⁵ If we want to elucidate the reasons why such a great number of German teachers accepted the Fascist party we must not forget that they represented the bottom stratum of their profession and that they were devided from high-school teachers who had academic degrees by a gulf of social prejudice. With regard to salary and social prestige the teachers' position was not any better than that of any lower official. If we add here the circumstance that

⁵ See Franz Neumann: *Behemont, The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933—1944*, New York 1966, p. 378.

the Weimar Republic had divested the teachers of their prestige derived from the status of reserve officers, we will understand why they joined the ranks of the SS and the SA.⁶ Following Neumann's analysis we could arrive at the circumstances which facilitated the acceptance of Nazi ideology in other strata of the middle class. We will limit ourselves to some concrete circumstances which provided Nazi manipulation with a basis for developing anti-semitism in the middle classes. The peasant went to Jewish banks, to Jewish cattle-dealers and Jewish grain-store owners, to Jewish money-lenders. The small shopkeeper, who hated Jewish shopkeepers, had to supply himself in Jewish whole-sale stores and depend on Jewish banks. The acknowledgement of the fact that the Jewish traders were only a link in the service of big German capital was not in keeping with the aspirations of the middle class. Such an acknowledgement would have necessarily led them to the position of the proletariat, which suited the middle class the least. The middle class genuinely accepted the Nazi view about the Jews as the extension of foreign, international capitalist plutocracy which threatened German national interests. This view was accepted as well by the circles who were concerned that traditional culture was endangered by avantgardism in which the Jews played the leading rôle. They were joined by many representatives of free-lance professions and university professors who feared the strong Jewish competition.⁷ Thus the resentments and protests of the lower and middle strata were channeled in such a way that they did not endanger the system, but, on the contrary, strengthened the foundations of the system which had created them.

While Hitler's mechanism of racist manipulation rested on the segregation of »pure Arians« and their confrontation with the Semites and other races, in America similar procedures start with the segregation of white people from coloured people. This segregation does not find supporters only among racists in the South, but also among other social strata in various parts of the USA. Naturally, there exist rather numerous forces that actively oppose segregation. But on the other hand it was black riots and the students' leftist movement which advocated the interests of the negroes that brought about a deviation to the right among many workers and in various strata of the middle class. In the first place these are the strata which have close contacts with the coloured inhabitants of the ghetto. By this very fact these people are marked and feel frustrated, and the prosperity and mobility of the black population aggravates their frustrations. In such circles the extreme, right ideology finds its adherents, which is shown by the fact that most of the provocateurs who affront leftist demonstrators come from the same background. These are usually rough, primitive youths and girls who admire power and detest weakness and accordingly demonstrate an aggressive chauvinism concerning race, country and way of life. Many of them are members of well

⁶ Ibidem p. 379.

⁷ Ibidem p. 121.

organized organizations starting from the Ku-Klux-Klan, the John Birch Society, veterans' organizations and women's organizations up to the American Nazi party and numerous youth organizations, among which belong also the motorized groups of rowdies who advocate and practice a philosophy of violence. In spite of the fact that the peace-loving middle classes protest against aggressive ideology and practices, it is evident that they are a medium which conditions them and makes them possible. Indicative of the essence of this ideology is the fact that it failed to enter and dominate the leading universities in the West. Their campuses have remained to be the strongholds of leftist opposition, both against the radical right-wingers and against the flood of mediocrity which threatens to level everything down to its own standards. Part of the explanation for this can, undoubtedly, be found in the fact that, according to a great number of researches, well-marked ethnocentric viewpoints correlate with a lower intelligence quotient.⁸

II

If we want to summarize the essential points of the above discussion, we must stress in the first place that middle class ideology is strongly influenced by the position and interests of the small proprietor, who is increasingly becoming a marginal character, but individual egotistical goals remains the basis of the entire bourgeois system. Egotistical and private interests are camouflaged as national interests, which on a wider, ideological level successfully screens the very essence of the basic relation. But, as this relation is essentially repressive and both its camouflage and amortization only conditional, it seeks and finds an outlet in nationalism and chauvinism. In other words, this ideology serves as a compensation which takes the edge from the sufferings of the oppressed. A common enemy has to be found abroad and a systematic harangue must represent him as the cause of all the internal grievances. This blurs the internal contradictions and at the same time provides an adequate basis for the homogenization of domestic forces and the maintenance of law and order.

Nationalism as an ideology of the bourgeois classes differs essentially from previous governing ideologies. Namely, all these ideologies, each in its own manner, were undermining all human endeavours in the struggle against existing repression. If we take as an example the ideology of feudal society we will notice that, in its basic variant, it was more successful in this function than the variant of bourgeois ideology we are discussing. The idea about our planet as a valley of tears and of heaven where all wrongs finally meet retribution, is by far more fundamental and effective than any national myth. In spite of the fact that this idea had lost its power and influence in the course of time, mostly due to a

⁸ See: *The Authoritarian Personality*, by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, Senford, New York 1964.

worldly orientation of bourgeois society, it remained indispensable and successful in its function even after the corrections due to protestantism. The formula remained that man is the means for God's glory; only, God became the abstract incarnation of world capital. Church eschatology underwent changes that opened possibilities for a fruitful cooperation with the new national myths. That made it evident that the new order did not abandon but only modified the general conditions for repression.

Feudalism successfully paralysed the people's desire for pleasure and happiness by religious eschatology which was the inner formative principle of both the entire culture and the everyday behaviour of the people. Capitalism does the same but in a different way. Worldly success becomes the visible sign of the chosen and human life is nothing else but a means for work and accumulation of wealth. The monstrous expansion of production and the constant appropriation of new territories becomes a new, insatiable Moloch who has to be worshipped.

It will be necessary for us at this point to pay special attention to the dynamics of the human personality, not only in a general way but applied to concrete historical conditions. This will help us to understand the ways in which a certain ideology undermines human power and determination in the struggle against repression, because the acquaintance with the ideology and its workings is not enough. It is not possible to avoid the sphere of psychoanalysis here. I do not mean by this the wide-spread and well-integrated psychoanalytical treatments which have become part of the contemporary obsession, but the genuine Freudian thought. Freud opened new possibilities for fruitful research by his definition of culture as the essential factor of the repression and limitation of the instinctive sphere.

As a good example we can quote Lenin who relates how in 1905 Russian soldiers would, out of commiseration with the oppressed peasants, rebel, kill an officer or two they hated and let the others go, and thus permit the instigators of the rebellion to be shot while the rest of them got yoked again. These soldiers were uniformed peasants, helpless and undetermined in their struggle against tyranny. The vast potential energy of the peasantry became revolutionary only after the historical conditions put it under the guidance of the proletariat. This shows that class analysis provides the key for understanding social dynamics.

However, if we want to comprehend correctly the dynamic structure of the ideology itself, i. e., the psychological mechanisms by which ideological views take hold of the consciousness of individuals and social groups, we cannot neglect the significant discoveries which followed in the wake of Freud's scientific opus. Accordingly this is one of the spheres which have all the prerequisites for a successful cooperation of Marxism and psychoanalysis. I would add here that such a cooperation has become indispensable. This is not a suggestion but rather a conclusion, which has been amply confirmed by the research carried out by a number

of well-known authors such as: Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse, to mention only the most important.

The Marxist adversaries of such a cooperation point out the pro-bourgeois character of the official psychoanalytical practice in contemporary society or stress the contradiction between Marxian and Freudian theoretical standpoints. All this does not exclude the possibility of combining many of their ideas in scientific research, and even more so, the combined use of the scientific approaches inaugurated by these two great thinkers. Marxist class analysis can only benefit if it gets supplemented (and in some aspects explicated in greater detail), by psychoanalytical projections into the subconsciousness of the peasantry. Such a combined procedure would probably lead to the assumption that the Russian soldiers in 1905 recognized unconsciously in their officers: »the fathers of their childhood, represented by the image of God, who condemned sexuality, but whom at that time they did not have a right to kill and could not kill, although he destroyed the joy of living. Their repentance after they had seized power and their retreat in the form of pity were reflections of their transformed pity, which could not become action.«⁹ The importance ascribed to sexuality has estranged many people from Freud and psychoanalysis. The laical conception that sexual means genital has played a rôle in this. It is one of Freud's greatest merits that he kept these two spheres apart and gave to sexuality a rather broad meaning. Sexuality is the immediate expression and the core of genuine instinct for pleasure and happiness. Its repression and negation are inherent in any form of repression. Accordingly, religious or moralistic repression of sexuality in the name of saving the soul, human nature or something else, finds its sociological meaning only in relationship with the process of alienation and exploitation of man. In order to understand this relationship it is necessary to study the social institutions in which the economic merges with the sexual. Psychoanalysis of people from all age groups, from all countries and from all social strata shows that this merging and the creation of the ideology of the society takes place during the first four or five years of life within the framework of the family. The Church and other institutions of class society play here a secondary rôle, because they just strengthen the foundations provided by the family structure.

If we accept the hypothesis about the fundamental significance of the family, we must not forget that the internal relations and the so-called atmosphere in the family are conditioned not only by its genetic and economic-productive positions, but that the family is an integral part of society and that it is permanently interrelated with many other institutions and especially so with those that are directly participating in the process of forming the system of social values. This means that various forms of repression and frustration and the related sphere of individual and social pathology cannot be confined to the narrow frame of clinical

⁹ W. Reich, op. cit.

practice, but must be studied in a wider class and social context. With such an approach the family can serve as a very appropriate basis for the study of ideology.

The fruitful hypothesis that the Nazi regime was partly made possible by the authoritarian structure of the German bourgeois family, is one of the chief reasons that recent research took the above mentioned direction. We encounter many reserves concerning the significance ascribed to sexual repression in a number of these studies, but it is certain that they have widened the scope of knowledge in this sphere.¹⁰ Firstly — it is evident that the repression of material needs gives different results than the repression of sexual needs: the first instigates rebellion, the second creates a subconscious moral censorship which makes rebellion impossible. Moral inhibition of natural sexuality, based on prejudice and indoctrination, creates well-behaved, obedient citizens burdened with anxieties which annihilate the capability to oppose and rebel. Inner urges and desires barred from natural satisfaction are easily transformed into aggressiveness and become the foothold of bellicose politics. Analysis leads us to the conclusion that the morality of a bourgeois family, in which sexual inhibition is a significant factor, represents a reservoir from which capitalist ideology draws its power.

Wilhelm Reich arrived at the above conclusions (in their extreme form) in the thirties. He carried out a socio-psychanalytic analysis of the German middle-class which was at that time already completely permeated by Fascist ideology. He quite successfully confronted the bourgeois morality with his vision of a new proletarian morality which radically negates any repression of sexuality and visualizes a whole system of sexual education for young people accompanied by legal abortions and birth control. He relied on the first post-revolutionary experiences in the USSR, but was soon to be disappointed because the bourgeois criticism of this views was joined by the official communist criticism.

However, the new development put the thesis about sexual repression as a reservoir of bourgeois ideology under question marks. Namely, this thesis rested on the assumption that the creation of moral inhibitions which render natural sexual satisfaction impossible, helps perpetuate repression in the family and society in general. In the first place it strengthens the family as the prototype of inequality and repression on a small scale, because it provides the psychological prerequisites for the authoritarian rôle of the father of the family and for the unequal position of women in relation to men. Besides, sexual repression creates neurotic and aggressive predispositions, which become the basis of nationalism and militarism. All this vindicates and affirms the thesis that sexual inhibition is a significant foothold of bourgeois ideology. But does not the 2nd half of the 20th century bring with it radical changes in this sphere? Is not puritanism on the retreat from

¹⁰ See: Hotkheimer, *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, Paris 1936, and more recent: Mendel G.: *La Révolte contre le Père*, Paris 1969.

all spheres of life, including the sphere of sex, under the onslaught of market stimulation and is not the so-called »sexual revolution« a direct negation of sexual repression and its consequences?

If we try to answer these questions, we must first give a precise definition of certain concepts. First of all, Reich's socio psychoanalytical analysis and critique of the bourgeois family has in its basis the opposition between the principle of pleasure and the principle of reality. Reich believes that the true human perspective lies in the reversion of the trend in this relation in favour of the principle of pleasure. However, neither he nor Marcuse, who shares the same opinion,¹¹ visualize this as a mere increase and intensification of sexual consumption. Their chief contribution in this field is in their questioning of the concept of sexual consumption, which means that the intimate sexual relations as well as family relations are founded on the principles of profit and exploitation. Accordingly, the terms sexual repression and inhibition, frequently used in their writings, refer to the circumstance that in bourgeois society the principles of market economy regulate the intimate relationships. However, the so-called sexual revolution in consumer society does not question this, but quite on the contrary its deepest meaning lies in the fact that it has facilitated an organized penetration of the market principle into this sphere. The exploitation of a basic natural need thus became the basis of a wide-scale business enterprise. We must distinguish between this so-called »sexual revolution«, which is amply reflected and advertised in the mass media, and the dawning of new relationships and a new sensibility, which represent a negation of the very essence of profit-loving relations. These new features can be observed in various groups of young people and they are reflected by the so-called underground culture.

It is not easy to define the middle-class way of life and manner of thinking, because they represent the medium in which the majority of us lives and moves. Most analyses restrict themselves to defining the approximate limits and scopes, which is very risky, because the middle class does not comprise only small shopkeepers, humble employees and similar people. Marx, who dedicated to this problem many a page of subtle analysis, points out that a person can be, due to his education, as far removed from such people as heaven from earth, and yet belong to the middle class because his thinking cannot break out from the limits of petty bourgeois life and thinking. Such a person will arrive at the same theoretical answers, which the petty bourgeois arrives at in practice thanks to his economic interests and his position in life.¹²

We can define the above limits and scopes in a general way, if we say that the middle class is subordinated to the governing structures, but in relation to the workers and other lower strata it represents upper strata. Accordingly, the feature that marks it as a class is not its relation to the strata above it, but its confront-

¹¹ See: *Eros and Civilization*, Zagreb 1965.

¹² *Class Struggle in France*, op. cit.

tation with the interests of the oppressed workers. Middle class wants to differ at all costs from those at the bottom, which is the most prominent feature of its way of life. As many employees have rather small incomes, they are all their life torn between their actual economic position and the ideology they have accepted. Their only alternative is to differ from the lower strata fictively. They accomplish this by »correct dress« and a »genteel« education of their children, imitating the manners, fashions, etc. of the upper classes. It is a sphere which reflects in many examples and details hidden frames of mind and aspirations, which are not easily perceived because we all participate in them and because they exist on a mass scale. Those who have obtained good positions and who know how to launch themselves well and show it to the world, become models, regardless of what sort of people they really are and by what means they got rich. It is significant that people who have easily succeeded are in greater esteem than those who succeed by hard work. This is understandable because the former are much closer to the average person by their character and outlook. Besides, the manner of their success articulates directly the very essence of the system. In all this there can be sensed an ever present aversion to the ideology of the lower class, but seldom openly and explicitly. It can be sensed in the very manner and style of action and thought, which are carefully elaborated and differentiated so as to appeal to the sensibilities of certain groups. This can be best perceived and understood if we analyse the contents of various forms of the so-called mass culture we get confronted by daily: in the newspapers, cartoons, advertisements, in the movies, on TV, and in other mass media.

Thanks to the development of technology and especially to the enormous concentration and scope of the mass communications, all this is all-encompassing and irrefutable to such a degree, that it gave rise to theories about a general »disappearance of classes« and about the end of ideologies within the framework of the so-called »postindustrial capitalist society«. All these theories have the middle class as their social basis. This is evident from the fact that the universal social levelling is represented as a process in the course of which the middle class gradually assimilates or »swallows up« all other classes and strata. In the USA this has a wide basis in the attitude of a great many people. Many members of the upper and lower strata like to identify with the middle class; the former not only in order to obtain more votes but on the ground of firm beliefs, and the latter do it because of their aspirations for social promotion.

It has already been pointed out that the majority of the so-called new middle class have no possibility for independent activity. Their success and promotion depend on the degree to which they are able to subordinate and adjust their personalities to the requirements of their jobs. That means that many people sell not only their labour power but their personalities as well. Actually the personality gets sold in the first place, because this ensures the fastest promotion. Accordingly, it is more important at what

or in what form one sells himself than what he really is. This situation, propped up by the myth about social levelling, in which a diabolic double-facedness is a requirement, in which people are compelled to wear masks and play rôles, is well-illustrated in Erving Goffman's¹³ theory of social »dramaturgy«. Goffman's theory differs from functionalism in not accepting the metaphysics of hierarchy. People are not the product of a system but individuals who »create the system« in order to promote themselves. Social activity is for Goffman not a series of mutually interrelated functions. He sees life as a developed form of drama in which people, like actors in the theatre, try to project their picture to the others. People are not considered as beings who try to do something, but as beings who try to be something. A. Gouldner remarked the Goffman's dramaturgical model reflects the new situation in which a certain middle class stratum no longer believes that success is a result of hard work and diligence. In the world of movie stars and dividends work and income are no longer correlated.¹⁴ The cynical conclusion is near at hand that the economy based on production is getting replaced by a new economy based on selling and advancing on a mass scale, including here also the selling of one's own self. In the new situation people produce »shows« rather than objects. But the difference between projections and material objects is only marginal, they differ only in their outward appearance. Accordingly, it is exactly the outward appearance that matters in the new economy. Naturally, style is also important. Where there exist no real alternatives, the differences in style create an illusion of choice. This must be kept in mind especially by employees, officials and others whose success is based on education and not on property. Gouldner further comments that in this way social relations become an »interaction of espionage agents«, in which everybody is trying to persuade the others that he actually is what he pretends to be, and everybody is trying to see through the other's camouflage. For Goffman it is not important whether a man is actually moral but whether he appears so in the eyes of others. Morality thus has been reduced to the rules of a convention you must be familiar with if you want to participate in the game. This is, as Gouldner puts it, the »sociology of selling souls«. Human nature is treated as a commodity, which can achieve a »market value«. The »use value«, if there is any, is not foreseen by the rules of the game.¹⁵

From the above it is evident that for one section of the American middle class the old hierarchy of values does no longer exist. Not only is this old hierarchy completely shaken, but the ideological illusion is gone, so that the naked social relation on which everything is based, can be clearly seen.

The goal of our discussion is to discover and analyse the mentioned social relation, i. e., to show what part it plays and how

¹³ According to A. Gouldner's: *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, New York, 1970.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 381

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 383

it is masked in middle class ideology. This does not imply that the endeavours and fates of a vast number of people who belong to the middle classes are foreordained. Such a fatalistic conclusion would be basically wrong, because it bars the way to human, historical progress. Besides, it has been contradicted by past historical events, which clearly show that humanity always has various alternatives and that under certain conditions not only individuals but whole social groups and nations can take a new way which was indiscernible before. Who could, f. i., foresee in the 19th century that it was the backward peasant masses of Eastern Europe and Asia, masses whose very being helped perpetuate stagnant modes of production and social relations, who would become the main force of a movement that opened new, unforeseen vistas for mankind? But, when we come to think of it, it seems that the accompanying circumstances of these events confirm the view that middle class ideology represents a strong barrier which prevents the peasantry from adopting the revolutionary program of the proletariat. History has shown that an alliance of peasants and workers on the basis of a proletarian ideology was possible only in countries where the middle classes were still too weak to influence political events. Good examples for this are Russia and China, where the bourgeoisie was so undeveloped and dependant that the communists, in their struggle to destroy the feudal system, had a relatively easy job to neutralise the influence of bourgeois ideology on the peasant masses. By this the communists created the basic prerequisites for the realization of their program. It is significant that even today, more than half a century after the victory of the October Revolution, when the USSR is one of the richest and most powerful countries of the world, its so-called middle strata are in no way segregated from the mass of the working people and have no special economic or political significance. This is undoubtedly one of the important structural differences in relation to modern consumer capitalism, which, on the one hand, probably slows down economic growth. It is only logical to assume that by stimulating this numerous stratum, which is in modern society the chief possessors of scientific and technical knowledge, much would be achieved on the global level. On the other hand this would probably represent a strong impulse towards a convergence with the West and a strengthening of tendencies leading to an ideological pluralism, which would threaten the political and ideological monopoly of the ruling élite. China has not yet reached such dilemmas in its development. That is the reason why in its ideology egalitarianism is more prominent; an egalitarianism that expresses the aspirations of the poor and oppressed from all over the world. It is very strange and interesting that this type of egalitarianism could find a certain response in the sensibility of a section of middle class youth in developed capitalist countries, to whom China can hardly serve as a model in any sense. Their attention was strongly drawn to the Chinese Cultural Revolution, which they understood in their own manner, i. e., as a determined attempt to remove from life all modes of behaviour

and thinking characteristic of contemporary bourgeois culture. This medium into which they have been born and which proves to be irrefutable for the majority, is the ideology, the essential dimension of which can be called middle class ideology, which has by no means entered into a serious crisis, as it may appear to its young and hopeful contestants. What they question and repudiate, more by style and behaviour than verbally, encompasses ever widening strata of the population in the most developed countries. In developing countries, which are in the process of drawing nearer to the richly laid table of the affluent, the trends, these young people would like to contest, are so strong that opposition is practically impossible. The fact should not be disregarded that the widening of the gulf between the developed and the undeveloped increases the number of the privileged in developed countries. This is undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the stability of the middle class and its ideology in Europe and North America.

III

Yugoslavia is located on the outskirts of this zone and ever increasing impulses are felt towards a complete incorporation into it. There exists a number of circumstances that direct tendencies and movements in that direction, and one of the most prominent is, undoubtedly, the rapid expansion of the middle class. This expansion rivifies and strengthens the basic social relation which we are discussing in this paper. If we ask for the ideology which camouflages and protects this, we will soon discover that in its system the most important rôles are played, or should be played, by the categories: technological progress and higher standard of life. These are, it is maintained, goals obtainable only for a society based on individual and private enterprise, which represent the basis for differentiation and affluence. This argument is constantly corroborated by the weaknesses and deformities of socialism. It is also sustained by the mass culture of the consumer society, which is permeating all spheres of life.

According to character and type, our middle class is more »new« than »old«. Its majority comprises employees from various enterprises and offices, trade and state administration. There are also present rather strong tendencies to develop the »old middle class«, which comprises artisans, innkeepers, owners of restaurants, owners of transport vehicles, and some free-lance professions. But, this second category is rather insecure and irresolute. Its representatives are, according to their way of life and position, typical petty bourgeoisie and serve as scape-goats to any new ideological deviation. They have no support in the system, they have failed to establish their own professional organization which would protect their interests and therefore they serve as the scapegoat in situations of crisis. The »new middle class« is mutually interrelated and closely linked with the administrative apparatus and partly

also with the political élite. Its numerousness and presence in economic, political, administrative business and other social organizations, and especially in the media of mass communications, ensure its power and influence. In the present situation and with the present balance of forces, it is impossible to neutralize the influence of the middle class over a longer period of time. Our middle class is, moreover, protected by the fact that the upper, ruling strata support the ideology of a population not stratified into classes, in order to strengthen their own position. It is significant that this ideology has recently experienced a crisis due to the rapid strengthening of the middle class. It was the moment when our middle class entered the political scene, in alliance with the part of our ruling élite, which sees its big chance in the constitution of a bourgeois society. The former, integrative ideology of the »working people« which mobilized the entire population on the platform of struggle against the remnants of the dethroned bourgeoisie and its allies, has been replaced by the bourgeois ideology of the homogenization of all inhabitants on a national basis, i. e., in Republics and Autonomous Regions.

If we study the basic social processes that brought about the strengthening of the middle class, the type of analysis seems most appropriate which was applied by Veblen, when he studied capital accumulation in small American towns at the beginning of our century. There are, of course, major differences, but still it can be maintained that the rise of our middle class rests upon a mechanism of speculation described by Veblen by the formula »to get something for nothing«. In other words, there is, in the first place, an advancement of individuals and groups, who acquired good positions in business and trade. This mechanism has, in our conditions, greatly taken over in our business enterprises. This is understandable when we consider that a capitalist enterprise encounters greater risks and can go bankrupt more easily than a socialist enterprise. Transactions are carried out under the mask of self-management, and crafty individuals and cliques do not have to be illegal but just legalize their private interests by appropriate changes in internal regulations. They encounter no major difficulties because the political structures do not repudiate Veblen's formula. Even if they do not directly participate in the game, it enables them to incessantly raise their incomes, which seems »cleaner« and more comfortable but is basically the same thing. That is the very mechanism that leads the Party irresistibly to the right, which is amply illustrated by statistical data about its composition, i. e., the backgrounds of its membership.

From the above explanation the reader could easily conclude that the expansion of our middle class is relatively painless and easier than was the case in capitalist countries. But — while this represents a natural process in capitalism, accompanied and vindicated by an adequate ideology, the rise of our successful people into the ranks of the rich takes place surreptitiously, i. e., against the official ideology, which most of them publicly accept and propagate. It can be assumed that this stratum is burdened by a »bad

conscience«, which they easily compensate in private life, but which represents a serious obstacle for this class to consolidate itself as a leading political force. That is the reason why its political movement was prepared and accompanied by a systematic undermining of Marxism and open propagation of nationalist ideology. But even in this our middle class shows a characteristic irresoluteness and hypocrisy, which has been brilliantly pointed out in Kangrga's analysis.¹⁶ On one hand it has, in the defence of its interests, to refer officially to Marxism and socialism all the time. On the other hand, it is exactly these two things it would like to rid itself and society from. Accordingly, the position of our middle class is precarious and contradictory and more so than the position of any other similar social group we have discussed so far. What afflicts and discourages it most is the feeling of general insecurity. The desire for power and success, which is the source of all action, was the basis of its recent movement. The thoughtlessness and the rampant venture of the movement in Croatia had its social basis in the insecurity and impatience of certain social groups who wanted to consolidate their forces and grab power as fast as possible. Their impatience and their incapability to act in an organized way over a longer period of time, shows that theirs was a typical petty bourgeois movement and that it was not as strong as it appeared. Like all right movements it was aggressive and impudent as long as it was backed by the government, but once that support disappeared there followed a fast desorganization and decadence.

A prominent feature of the ideology of our middle class is its fascination with the past and with tradition. National symbols and celebrations are the chief instruments for the mobilization of our middle class. In this we are not alone. We can find a similar situation in many European countries, where local interests are posed to the integrating, technocratic concept of development or to the interests of an other, neighbouring area. Such local interests usually find support in traditional or ethnic solidarity of the population, which usually has separatist aspirations. Our case is rather characteristic and interesting, because the conflicting interests of the two basic nations are accompanied by cultural differences that have developed during centuries of struggle between Eastern and Western influences and which are still strongly felt in our country.

The turning towards the past has yet another reason — the need for the creation of an ideological platform which will, in its basis and goals, clearly differ from the proletarian platform. The main aim of the glorification of the past, not only in nationalist papers and publications but in almost all media of mass communication, was the degradation of the significance of our socialist revolution and its ideology. It was an attempt to pave the road for the appearance of the middle class and its ideology on the political scene. This gave a central position to the traditionally oriented

¹⁶ Fenomenologija ideološko-političkog nastupanja jugoslavenske srednje klase, Praksis 3/4 1971.

intellectuals, whose field were the humanities in most cases, and created a basis for the mobilization of a certain type of subdued and dissatisfied intellectuals and a part of the youth. Naturally, we must not forget that one of the main reasons for the success of this, or any past or future movement, is the dissatisfaction with the existing situation. Regardless whether this takes place at a university or another place, the malcontents will support anything that provides an alternative to the existing, even if they do not fully accept the alternative. That is the case with a section of the technocratic structures, in the first place the professional leadership and groups in factories, institutes and universities, who repudiate the traditional-humanist articulation of the ideology.

An ideology based on tradition, historical and national values has one great advantage — it has deep, organic roots in the sentiments for the native. Because of this it can activate and mobilize forces in a short time and on a mass scale, especially if it can prove that the neighbour with whom we are confronted for many other reasons, is threatening what is ours and what is dear to us. It is a situation in which minor incidents or conflicts can assume a nation-wide significance if skillfully represented, which is very favourable to the dynamics of the ideology. However, on the other hand, a traditionally oriented ideology has many serious drawbacks. One of them is that it does not appeal to the technically and scientifically oriented population. The same may be said about the majority of the young people. Perhaps we can elucidate this by pointing out some contradictions inherent in this ideology. Namely, we have already stressed that middle class ideologists in their dispute with communists point out technological progress and a higher standard of life as unquestionable goals, and according to them these goals can be attained only on the basis of private enterprise and a differentiation of the population. We must admit that these arguments are well founded, because they have as their starting point the need of the individual to succeed, excel and attain recognition. The traditionalists in our country stress pride and dignity as their goal and their slogan, which is in their case not only a matter of style but part of their program, which seemingly substitutes the real and contemporary by the emotional and »historical«. Looked at from a practical viewpoint this is more than funny, because it makes us think of the petty bourgeois, who is fascinated by things at the top, and is miserable and suffers because he can identify with them only in his imagination. However, the farcical side of this exultation is evident even without associations, because shopkeepers, small entrepreneurs, businessmen, small and medium officials are requested to defend and glorify a code of pride and honour, whereas the very essence of their occupations and positions compels them to flatter, deceive and embezzle if they want to succeed. Accordingly, the romantic emotions could get some response only from a thin stratum of the bourgeoisie, which failed to participate in the vital currents of economy and have a nostalgia for the good old days; further, from a number of quasi-intellectuals who compensate for their impotence and lack

of talent by identifying with the national and easily become victimized by an euphoric belief that they are the only true representatives of the nation. As for the majority of the adherents of this ideology, they have a very different relation to it, because they develop and use it as a means of advancement and for acquisition of power. Some of them were doing this with a lot of skill and success. Scientific foundation and erudition usually made way to a black and white technique of labelling and placing opponents into the ranks of centralists and Stalinists. Most of their discussions, regardless of subject matter (language, literature or economy) revolve around the mentioned extremes, which in our conditions incessantly mutually feed and sustain each other.

From the above we should not conclude that middle class ideology in our society is undergoing a crisis and slowly but surely disintegrating. Quite to the contrary, we think that it represents a well-founded phenomenon we will have to take into account over a long period of time in the future. Its sudden appearance on the political scene provoked a counterattack which bears witness of the existence and power of a contrary movement, which is not all that weak as some think and therefore made a temporary retreat unavoidable. What forms the next onslaught of the middle class will assume, it is hard to predict. It depends on a great number of circumstances, and a lot depends on the fact whether the counterattack will remain in the sphere of political campaign (namely, on the surface) or whether it will succeed in activating the workers both economically and politically. Nationalism will undoubtedly continue to play an important rôle, but whether it will continue to be traditionally oriented or put on a more modern attire is an open question. Its articulation up till now was directed towards the »old middle class« which does not play an important part in our society. The »new middle class«, the nucleus of which are the technocratic structures in our industry, remained impassive. To involve these structures it would be necessary to move the center of ideological articulation from the categories »pride«, »honour«, »national inheritance« towards the categories »efficacy« and »standard«. This would, naturally, imply many other changes, which could increase the chances for a successful break-through of the middle class and its ideology on the whole Yugoslav territory. However, these are only conjectures leading us towards a different, more modern type of ideology and we will not elaborate them here.

In the conclusion of our discussion it should be pointed out that the middle class is the medium in which the basic social relation of bourgeois society is ever again reconceived and in which it rejuvenates itself. The whole building of bourgeois society rests upon it. The essential meaning of its ideology is the legalization and vindication of an egotistical purpose, which is the origin and end of everything. »Every man by acquiring, producing and enjoying, produces and acquires for the enjoyment of others«. This is the formula which camouflages best the inner social and human essence of modern market economy. The more we get engrossed

in our endeavours to obtain a good position and keep up at least with those from the middle of the line if we cannot make it to the front rank, the less it is likely that we will be disturbed and revolted by the fact that this race is accompanied by an ever increasing exploitation of labour power. Actually, modern economy with its stimulation of consumption complicates matters greatly, so that one begins to doubt the interdependence of work and success. In such a situation various theories appear and succeed, even such that maintain that an economy based on production has been replaced by an economy based on selling and progress on a mass scale, including here also the selling of one's own self. There is, undoubtedly, a lot of cynicism in this, but it unintentionally expresses in a crude manner the basic dilemma of our times: does the selling of labour power imply also the selling of one's self, and does this undermine the desire to break out of the existing repression; or, does the fact that the selling of labour power is present everywhere stimulate and arouse the forces of dissent and freedom. These are two contrasting positions, human and social at the same time. That the existence and scope of the middle class as a class are placed within the framework of the first alternative is evident from our discussion. Accordingly, the thesis about the middle class as the basis and main force of the managerial revolution has no sound foundations. Mill's appraisal that the middle class is by no means an avantgarde but a rearguard that »in the shorter run, will follow the panicky ways of prestige, in the longer run, will follow the ways of power, for, in the end, prestige is determined by power«¹⁷ — has been confirmed by experience from all over the world including here also the Yugoslav experience.

¹⁷ White Collar, New York 1956, p. 354.

WHY IS FUNCTIONALISM MORE DESIREABLE IN PRESENT-DAY YUGOSLAVIA THAN MARXISM?

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The basic presupposition of this discussion is that the social climate of Yugoslav society today favors functionalism over Marxism. It could even be maintained that functionalism is promoted and approved of by some influential circles and that Marxism is often rejected and politically persecuted. The aim of this paper is to provide arguments for the above presupposition. This presupposition is based on the probability of a positive connection between the functionalist theory and certain characteristics of Yugoslav society that have become more and more prevalent in the last decade. The author also wants to show the correlation between the claims of present-day Yugoslav society and the answers offered by functionalism. This can be reversed: Marxist approach and outlooks do not suit the needs of the existing social system, and the gap between Marxist theory and the social system is constantly widening. This is best illustrated by the clash between the representatives of the political system and those scientists who represent the critical, humanist orientation in Marxism. To prove this it is necessary to compare the characteristics and standpoints of functionalism with those of Marxism and to see how they are related to the characteristics of Yugoslav society.

1

Although the basic postulates and characteristics of functionalism are well known, it is necessary to discuss them here so that we can compare them with those of Marxism, and while doing so, point out the reasons for the preference of functionalism in present-day Yugoslav society and its recent movements. This preference results from the basic postulate of functionalism i. e. of

the functionality of a system as a whole. This leads to an examination of the parts of a system and their efficiency in a whole which itself cannot be questioned. (This means that there can be disfunction only within some parts in cases when they spoil the harmony of the whole). Central to the functionalist theory and analysis is *the system* as a whole while its stability and workability are a priori presupposed, and the problems of the theory are directed towards defining the institutional mechanisms for the integration of parts and individuals into the system. In the same way, it treats social processes and struggles as movements within the system, and the theory strives to provide solutions for the institutionalization of social struggles. The basic problem regarding individuals is to ensure their integration into the mechanisms of the system by socialization, i. e., to make the individual correspond to the needs for which he has been socialized.¹

All this rests on the premise that the system is self-sufficient (independent of the endeavors of human beings and their needs) and that the »needs« of the system exist a priori and by their own force.² In other words the needs of the system do not result from fundamental human needs (functionalists, with the exception of B. Malinowski, consider human needs as an »unscientific notion«); quite contrary, the system imposes a whole range of needs and the individuals incorporate them into their own structure in the form of »social instincts«. The problem is, namely, conceived as the adjustment of the individual to the system. The maladjustment of individual needs and desires to the »needs of the system« and the ensuing conflicts are solved by directing conflicting interests towards a complete integration of the individuals and parts into the existing social pattern. Functionalism is therefore primarily concerned with the functioning of the system and with those elements which are functional and maintain the system. All the concern is thus for what is »constructive« in the system and helps maintaining the existing social order (Gouldner, 114). In spite of the endeavors of the functionalists to make us believe that they do not disregard social dynamics, their theory and analysis often show that their critics are right in maintaining that the *stability of the system* is the chief concern of functionalism and not social processes with their real conflicts and contradictions. In the system of functionalist analysis there is room only for processes and conflicts which remain within the framework of the system, but not for those that try to negate the system and to transcend it

¹ A. Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, Heineman, London, 1971., p. 143.

² J. Rex, *Key Problems of Sociological Theory*, Routledge and Kogan, London, 1961. This standpoint of functionalism seemingly excludes subjective motives and patterns of action and adopts an »objective approach«. Functionalism starts from the premise that the needs of the system have arisen by themselves and that their relation to individual needs can be neither questioned nor evaluated. Thus functionalism accepts voluntarism in politics and the substitution of the global with the particular but tries to hide this by means of the untenable thesis about the system that constitutes itself.

(that is the reason why social movements, revolutionary actions and uprisings are excluded! there is room only for institutionalized processes and conflicts such as most strikes, group struggles, conflicts in corporations, etc.) R. Dahrendorf points out this characteristic of functionalism by saying that functionalist theory does not seek for those dynamic elements capable of changing the structure of the system, i. e., the elements independent of the functional integration of the structure. That is the reason why social classes are not assigned an important rôle in functionalist theory, whereas, according to Dahrendorf, classes are the elements in the structure that work towards its change.³ We can easily apply to functionalism what has been said about the »theory of social order«,⁴ i. e., that it accepts existing practice and values as standards without trying to question them.

Thus functionalism lends only one single alternative to history. It will research only the changes in the parts (institutions) within the framework of the system as well as changes that remain in the system (reforms), but it excludes all the other historical alternatives. In other words, functionalism is a theory concerned with the existing, the present, but neither with the past (it refuses to reconstruct history) nor with the future. The continuity of the system is its central category and it is essentially static. This particularism as regards history and global society has been pointed out by H. Marcuse, who stated that this actually represents a rationalization of capitalist society.⁵ The same has been pointed out also by R. Blackburn in his »Brief guide to Bourgeois Ideology«.⁶ In connection with this he has also pointed out the markedly negative attitude of functionalism towards revolutionary movements which are treated as »a sickness that befalls politics«. Instead of speaking about social revolution, functionalists use the terms »industrial« and »scientific and technological« revolution.

Functionalist theory speaks solely in terms of institutionalized structures and disregards all that is non-institutional, informal, spontaneous and individual (meaning here: autonomous and authentic). B. Moore is right in stating that »modern sociology has

³ R. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in an Industrial society*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963, p.p. 122—3. However, Dahrendorf himself does not realize the significance of radical changes — revolutions — and he dismisses the idea of revolution as not essential in discussing social dynamics, explaining that revolution means a destruction of the structure and not its alteration. Dahrendorf reduces the concept of revolution to a meaning of »civil war« because he fails to realise its essential content, i.e., a qualitative and substantial change in the structure as the source of a sequence of ensuing changes. He ascribes to Marx such a narrow concept of revolution and compares him to Parson, because he thinks that Marx can also be blamed for a concept of the system as something essentially static (as if Marx had seen changes brought about only through revolution). See p.p. 131—3.

⁴ J. Horton, »Order and Conflict Theories of Social Problems«, in Lindenfeld (ed), *Radical Perspectives on Social Problems*, New York, 1968, p.p. 39.

⁵ H. Marcuse, On Revolution, in A. Cockburn and R. Blackburn (eds), *Student Power, Problems, Diagnosis, Action*, Penguin books, 1969., p.p. 375.

⁶ In A. Cockburn and R. Blackburn (eds), *Student Power*, p.p. 186.

less to say about society than was the case 50 years ago»,⁷ because it uses a »neutral language« incapable of saying anything about the real problems of society and humanity. A language purified in such a way becomes bare and cannot express the human problems of our time. This was also pointed out by C. W. Mills (in »Sociological Imagination«), by Z. Bauman,⁸ R. Dahrendorf,⁹ R. Blackburn and others. It is a language that avoids certain key-words that can express the essential problems of class society such as: exploitation, distribution of social power, alienation, autonomy and freedom of personality, etc. Critical impulses of science are suffocated because due to such a language science loses the possibility to express anything which suggest a critical analysis of society (Blackburn, 164). Sociology is thus limited to problems that do not disturb anybody,¹⁰ because as Dahrendorf puts it: sociologists realise that they have to abandon any severe critique of society for the sake of their careers.

Thus the so called »wertfreie Soziologie« which »wants only to state facts and not to give any evaluations« shows itself to be an ideological weapon of class society and its politics. Evading to describe how people really live and suffer as well as whether and in what way they render resistance, functionalist sociology puts itself at the service of the existing order and helps create mystification such as »the open society«, »affluent society«, »industrial society«, »post-capitalist society« (meaning here a society that has surpassed class conflicts). It pretends to be indifferent towards distinguishing humane from inhuman (according to functionalists such problems belong to the realm of philosophy), and hides its ideological character behind »scientific truth«. This is evident from the following: a) the choice of topics for research and the selection of facts (all relevant human problems are evaded by functiona-

⁷ B. Moore, »Strategy in Social Science«, in M. Stein and A. Vidich (eds), *Sociology on Trial*, Prentice-Hall, 1969., p. 73.

Moore compares the language Marx uses speaking about social stratification with Parson's language. I will quote a passage from Parson's text which illustrates my statement:

»It has come to be widely recognized in the sociological field that social stratification is a generalized aspect of the structure of all social systems, and that the system of stratification is intimately linked to the level and type of integration of the system as a system. The major point of reference both for the judgement of the generality of the importance of stratification, and for its analysis as a phenomenon, is to be found in the nature of the frame of reference in terms of which we analyze social actions.« (74)

An even better example is the definition of man by L. Apostel in his »Can Metaphysics be a science?«, in *Studia Philosophica Gandensia*, 1963.: »Man is a complex error-controlled regulator, restoring its continually disturbed equilibrium through compensatory actions executed by many superimposed feedback cycles, obeying criteria of efficiency, which are not pre-determined forever« (cited from R. Blackburn, p. 207). This requires no additional comment!

⁸ Z. Bauman, *Wizje ludzkiego swiata*, Warszawa, 1965.

⁹ R. Dahrendorf, »Homo Sociologicus«, in *Essays in the Theory of Society*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1968.

¹⁰ M. Coluson and D. Riddell, *Approaching Sociology: A. Critical Introduction*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1970., p. 12.

lists), represent by themselves an attitude (chosen values) hidden behind a proclaimed »neutral« position; b) »scientific truth« arrived at by willfully reducing research to »neutral topics« in a society in which exploitation and inequality exist, cannot represent the full truth about the society in question but an ideological mystification; c) a consciously accepted noncriticism towards the own society and a professed »neutrality« do not show the »non-alignment« of functionalist sociology, but on the contrary, its apologetic function in the maintaining of the status quo of the social order, which is an ideological and not a scientific standpoint; d) by studying social patterns rather than a real social system functionalist sociology also performs an ideological function, because it substitutes the ideal for the real and thus avoids to tell the truth about the reality.

With such characteristics¹¹ functionalist sociology appears as the right hand of bourgeois society by trying to diminish the significance of the idea that man is capable of changing it (Blackburn, 182); and that social sciences ought to fulfill the function of promoting such changes by which the main human problems would be overcome. All the above mentioned reasons render functionalist sociology most suitable to become the official science of class society and the »sociology of technical progress«. It helps propagate peaceful coexistence and a cooperation of politics, science and technics, disregarding at the same time real class conflicts and contradictions. It is, however, useless for researching essential social processes and conflicts on which the historical perspective of a society depends, and therefore incapable to be the »critical conscience of society« and of any help to revolutionary practice.

The approaches and standpoints of critical Marxism are quite different. The Marxist sociological approach is historical. The study of social processes, movements and conflicts is regarded by Marxists as more important than the research of the existing order, because the essence of a system can be fully understood only in view of its global processes and its history, but not just from the structure regarded as a non-historical category. For this reason Marxism cannot take the system as an unquestionable entity as its starting-point. Marxism has to question the system permanently in order to find the true historical alternatives. It analyses processes and movements that reflect social contradictions and conflicts and points out both the elements of integration and the tendencies that oppose the existing order. Marxist analysis tries to discover new possibilities for social changes and those social movements that are capable of bringing them about, i.e., it tries to discover the forces opposed to each other in class struggle and

¹¹ This is naturally, not a complete »characterology« of functionalism. Not all the nuances by which different functionalist schools are distinguished from each other have been considered, especially the differences between the so called classical functionalism and modern functionalism. I have chiefly considered those characteristics that elucidate the social function of modern functionalist theory.

their goals and interests, so as to be able to understand the true nature of the social system, which does not represent an entity *sui generis* but a living texture of interwoven human destinies moved by human needs and desires, and on the other hand ossified institutions existing for their own sake which have to be abolished so that the fresh blood of human hopes and desires can again flow freely and direct social mechanisms towards solving real human problems.

R. Dahrendorf gives¹² all the mentioned reasons when he explains his preference for Marxism and shows that the best approach for studying social dynamics can be found in Marx's work. He points out in Marxism as specially valuable its endeavour to discover those factors and forces that can be used as an explanation for social changes, and above all the conflicting groups as the bearers of changes, for it understands that the structure of any society gives rise to antagonisms and conflicts because of the struggle between the two essentially opposing interests that exist in every structure: one that wants to bring about change and another one wanting to preserve the status quo. Stressing the significance of the theory of conflict for a progressive development of society, Dahrendorf adds that conflict is the »moving spirit« of a free society and represents a threat only to totalitarian societies (314).

Marxism, furthermore, does not evade valorisation and places itself explicitly on the side of the humanist stand point Marxist concepts, such as: class struggle, exploitation, inequality, alienation,¹³ being critically oriented represent the central ideas of Marxist sociology; whereas functionalism has a set of neutral terms (the terms position and rôle as the central concepts of functionalism blur the true nature of the class structure of society). Marxist sociology does not exclude from its research the problems of man; rather it takes human nature, for its starting-point, essential human needs and fundamental human problems in the man-society relation. And from these realms it chooses the topics for the investigations.

Marxism draws conclusions about the function or conversely dis-function of existing social institutions and the social system as a whole, considering the interests of individuals and groups and the conflicting interests of the forces which want to realise a humane society on one side and the adherents of the existing order on the other.

¹² R. Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict* . . . pp. 124—6.

¹³ The Dutch sociologist J.M.G. Thurlings gives an interesting explanation why functionalist theory accepts the idea of anomy but rejects the idea of alienation. According to him anomy threatens the individuals desire for security and control, whereas alienation blocks the development of the autonomous human nature; therefore the theory of anomy implies that man is a helpless creature who can ensure his security only in a well organized society, while the theory of alienation treats man as an autonomous being capable of freeing himself, in his own life as well as in history, from the bonds of the existing structure which prevents him from his self-realization.

Marxist sociology is socially committed, but not in the service of the existing order as its defender, but »in the service of historical truth«, and therefore it has to adopt a critical attitude towards the existing social system in order to be able to discover historical ways and possibilities for surpassing it. Marxist sociology is interested in changing society to more humane forms and it cannot be indifferent to the tendencies of social processes and to the ensuing results. Therefore Marxist analysis is not a lifeless technical operation which fabricates data that can be exploited in various ways, but it aims at discovering the »illnesses of society« and finding the social potentialities capable of surpassing the existing order. Because of these Marxist sociology is in conflict with society (as a system) and gets persecuted by the system both in capitalist and socialist countries. (C.W. Mills was dismissed from Columbia University in U.S.A. because of his Marxist orientation; Leszek Kolakowsky, Zygmund Bauman and other Polish Marxists had to emigrate because of their unmistakably critical Marxist standpoint; Karel Kosik was removed from Prague University and imprisoned for applying Marxist philosophy in the everyday practice of the socialist development in Czechoslovakia in 1968).

It is symptomatic that radical scientists in the West are more and more turning towards Marxism. This can be explained by the fact that Marxist analysis is capable of uncovering what is hidden behind the »harmonious functioning« of the structure of capitalist society. Functionalist sociology has never succeeded in this; it met its gravest defeat during the era of student movements¹⁴ The events were completely unforeseen and contradicted the conclusions of sociologists about the »stability« and »integrity« of the capitalist social system. Latent tendencies and social movements outside the framework of the institutionalised structures of the system had been completely overlooked. It was by no means by chance that the Marxist thinker Herbert Marcuse foresaw the new forces that shook capitalist society in the sixties, which the functionalists failed to do.

2.

What exactly is nowadays encouraging functionalism and discouraging Marxism in Yugoslav society?

When a social system exists for its own sake it unavoidably opposes movements, and as social power is in the hands of the ruling forces of the existing order (according to sociological investigations of Yugoslav society power is in the hands of the political and industrial bureaucracy, while technocrats are gaining more and more influence), revolutionary processes and spontaneous movements are repressed. Global social conflicts are not treated in

¹⁴ Sociological analyses of student movements are accompanied by a severe criticism of functionalism in sociology, which shows that sociology in the West is becoming increasingly critical of itself and of society, which, again, brings about a strengthening of Marxist influence.

a sociological manner — as results of existing contradictions between the interests and aims of different social classes (strata), but primarily as political offences, that is, as »the enemies' attacks against the acquirements of revolution«.

Marxism applied as a scientific analysis and not as an ideology¹⁵ will uncover these contradictions and the ensuing struggle of opposed classes. Marxist theory does not assume a priori that a system that is harmoniously structured is functional by its own force, but it poses the question: functional to what end and for whose benefit? Marxism has at its disposal a terminology capable of expressing the true nature of social structures (to this end Marxist sociology uses terms such as: wage labor, capital, social and individual interests, classes, strata, social division of labor, etc.), and accordingly it can define how a certain system functions considering always the forces interested in the functioning of the system who profit mostly by maintaining it. Marxism thus shows that the functioning of a system (in case that the question about the nature of the system is not also posed), is not of a neutral character, but on the contrary, closely linked with the vital interests of the ruling classes in society.

As soon as the system becomes an end in-itself, a new principle is introduced: »Staats Räson« as a criterion for judging social aspirations, aims and processes. All tendencies and movements that question this criterion and indirectly also the state as the only approved »centre of revolution« are severely criticized. Thus the system places itself above the individuals, their aspirations, and needs; and in the name of order, it endangers human rights, freedom, and the free development of the individual. It also places itself above all movements and social groups that aspire to change the system. The state, as the guardian of order, opposes spontaneous movements and questions positive, revolutionary social processes.

Marxist analysis neither is nor can be a neutral stating of »facts«. It starts from certain theoretical presuppositions concerning the rôle of social institutions in determining the character of a social system. One of the basic presuppositions is that the state is an instrument of class society, and in spite of the fact that in socialism it temporarily takes over the rôle which history has assigned to the working class it cannot possess a revolutionary nature. Unless the state is controlled and bridled by revolutionary forces, the bureaucracy will unavoidably take over, and the logic of »Staats Räson«, threatens to replace the logical of the revolutionary movement. The state cannot replace the revolutionary

¹⁵ Here the term »ideology« is used in its original Marxian meaning, i.e., meaning a distorted or partial (class) consciousness about society but even if we take it in the meaning so often given to it by politicians, i.e., as the orientation of a political party or movement, ideology has primarily the function of explaining existing ideas and systems to the masses and of recruiting and activating individuals and classes. Ideology is not capable of questioning ideas and goals; therefore it is always on the side of the status quo and has to be criticized and surpassed.

movement of workers. Thus Marxist analysis unmasks the rôle of the state and defines it for what it is in its essence: as an instrument of class struggle in the hands of the ruling class that preserves its own interests. The state becomes this even in socialism if it grows into a force above the revolutionary working class.

Yugoslav society shows more and more class differentiation (this has been pointed out by several sociological analyses, see: S. Suvar: »Sociološki presjek jugoslavenskog društva«, 1970. (Sociological Profile of Yugoslav Society), because the growing social differences reflect the classical tendency to divide people into the rich and the poor and bring about a corresponding hierarchy of social classes. The top strata of the Yugoslav society are not likely to accept a truthful presentation of the social structure, and that renders Marxist analysis less desirable (because it »alarms«), than functionalist analysis.¹⁶ Marxist analysis is not satisfied by a mere description of the social structure. It endeavours to find the cause of social differentiation and therefore it has to answer the question: does the differentiation have a class character; which are the forces interested in it and which forces oppose it. This leads to a demystification of the goals of the state and its political bureaucracy and also explains their readiness to replace Marxism by functionalism.¹⁷

The growing pressure exerted upon the Marxist intelligentsia corresponds in time with the growing tension between the bureaucracy in the political apparatus and spontaneous movements in the lower strata of society (workers' strikes that, according to number and frequency, have grown into a mass movement; student unrest incited by markedly capitalist tendencies in Yugoslav society in sixties, all in the name of the perpetuation of the socialist revolution). All this was especially felt in the past decade.

The critical standpoint towards society implicit in Marxism, is becoming less and less desirable under conditions in which the truth about society is not supposed to be said; in which the forces in power maintain that the continuity of the revolution can be ensured only by the political top. The revolutionary spontaneity¹⁸ of the working class and other social forces is denied and the blame for all deviations (referred to even by some politicians as »the

¹⁶ This can be well illustrated by the favorable reception of the Portorož meeting of Yugoslav sociologists in 1972., which got a lot of publicity in the media of mass communication, in spite — or just because — of the fact that a strong functionalist orientation could be felt in a great number of papers.

¹⁷ In the USSR sociology entered the ranks of officially approved sciences through functionalism and only the positivist-functionalist sociology got »civil rights«.

¹⁸ As spontaneity is often interpreted as non-organization, unruliness and even anarchy, it is necessary to stress here that the words spontaneous and spontaneity are used to describe actions and open movements not moulded by institutional frames and not directed from the centers of social power which came into being as organized movements of social groups and individuals on the basis of their inner needs and aspirations to change social institutions and conditions that hamper their activities and their development.

penetration of capitalist elements»), is laid upon »left« intellectuals and taken from those who have for the past three decades held all the political power in their hands. Under such conditions, Marxism as the »critical conscience of society« becomes undesirable. On one side we meet with the insistence that Marxist ideology should be renewed and on the other with the claim that a new »marxist-functionalist« sociology should be developed.

The intolerance towards Marxist theoretical analysis has yet another reason and that is the historical study of the sources of the Yugoslav revolutionary movement. The Yugoslav social system is based on the same model as the social system in the U.S.S.R. after 1921, with modification that have not basically changed the model. But in its later development it is characterised by a hybrid structure in which there exist two contradictory tendencies each with its ensuing structures. One is the tendency to strengthen an independent state apparatus and the economic bureaucracy. This is realised through a monopoly in economy and the complete control the political bureaucracy assumes over political processes (i.e., it monopolizes all the decisions about social goals and social development). On the other side we find the tendency to strengthen self-management. It is, however, present more in words than in practice (in the institutional sphere of the structure self-management is present in embryo and it is very inconsequently practised, but it represents a strong tendency in spontaneous movements).

Marxist analysis should try to uncover the roots of these contradictory tendencies. By applying the methods of historical analysis it should be able to find all the strata inherent in the Yugoslav revolutionary movement from its very beginning due to its source and model: the Bolshevik party and the Comintern. Marxist analysis would undoubtedly show that the roots of present »deviations« should not be sought in events that took place in the last decades, but in much earlier periods. The political movement in Yugoslav society has never done with its past (with all those characteristics which Rosa Luxemburg criticized in the Bolshevik party, i.e., the substitution of the dictatorship of the proletariat with a dictatorship over the proletariat, the substitution of a revolutionary class by institutionalized party organizations, the repression of the initiative of the working class, the prevention of the working class from becoming the ruling class, the substitution of democracy by dictatorship, etc.).

3.

It is evident that functionalism can better meet all the requirements that spring from the mentioned characteristics of present-day Yugoslav society and above all from the political system which tries to »prove« ideologically that the socialist goals are not endangered and that all the processes in Yugoslav society work towards

their realisation, in spite of the evidence which shows something entirely different. (The state apparatus together with the economic bureaucracy and the technocrats openly speak the language of capitalist political economy and do not even try to camouflage this fact). Functionalism helps to mask the illusion »scientifically« because it does not uncover the nature of the social system but only discusses the network of institutions and the mechanisms through which a system functions (in such analysis the term »social division of labor« is replaced by neutral terms such as: positions, rôles, statuses, professions, i.e., terms that cannot give a true picture of the social differentiation unless they are situated within the system of social division of labour). In the era of »technological and scientific progress«, functionalism helps to give a scientific justification to the actions and endeavours of the state and to make them appear well founded, because the data obtained by functionalist analysis are very suitable for manipulation (thanks to the fact that they are »neutral« and everybody can use them for his own purposes).

In the seventies our sociology answers society's challenges by promoting tendencies that are much closer to functionalism than to Marxism:¹⁹

First. Yugoslav sociology is increasingly turning toward minor, local groups — working groups, enterprises, the family and it is neglecting the analysis of the global system. (At the above mentioned meeting of Yugoslav sociologists in Portorož, the aim of which was the discussion of social conflicts in Yugoslavia, from the 62 published papers only 18 dealt with the analysis of global social conflicts and their sources.

Second. Yugoslav sociology is orienting itself more and more to the research of individual parts of society and particular institutions (self-management is investigated only as a particular institution), and is turning away from the essential problems of socialism. (For instance: a lot of research investigates partial problems in industry, but there are no studies about the organization and the problems of the economic system within the frame of the global structure of society, about its functioning or the reasons for its inefficiency; or — a number of research work is dealing with the distribution of power in working organizations, but there are none which would deal adequately with the distribution of power on a global level, etc.).

¹⁹ Hereby I do not wish to imply that earlier Yugoslav sociology was more Marxist in character; in my article »The Trends and Dilemmas of Yugoslav Sociology« (Praxis-international edition — no. 3—4, 1969), I pointed out some of the characteristics of the development of Yugoslav sociology, showing that, during the first years of its post-war development, it had to face the dilemma: should it continue with dogmatic Marxism or should it take a new path and constitute a critical, Marxist sociology? Namely, this first phase was characterized by an inherited dogmatism and Stalinism, but a number of our sociologists had started to extricate themselves from that bondage at the very beginning (about 1956).

Third. A considerable number of Yugoslav sociologists is getting more and more interested in models and not in real social relations and processes (that was evident at the mentioned meeting in Portorož). In their conclusions they substitute models for reality, which shows the ideological function of sociology.

Fourth: Yugoslav sociologists are increasingly adopting a bare and lifeless language, which greatly differs from the language used by Marx. This fact also says something about the topics and problems their research deals with. The language of Yugoslav sociology is becoming more and more »specialised« and incomprehensible for »ordinary« people (because« research is not carried on for the ordinary people«), burdened with formulas and graphs which do not contribute to the clarity of the picture of society given, but only create an illusion of »scientific approach«. Nevertheless many sociologists live under the impression that they are meeting the »scientific requirements« despite the fact that Yugoslav sociology can be described as not having fulfilled its duty towards society. This description applies to Yugoslav sociology even to a greater extent than to American sociology.

Fifth. Another characteristic of Yugoslav sociology is its tendency to spend itself in methodological criticism, meeting by this simultaneously two needs, i.e., developing a critical attitude science cannot do without but with an emphasis on methodological problems only, and not considering the actual problems of the society; by this it is meeting the second need as well: it avoids conflicts with the system (this leads to the above mentioned narrowing of its field of research, which is reduced to neutral topics, problems and language).

We are witnessing nowadays an expansion of Yugoslav sociology both as concerns the number of sociologists and the number of institutions it has recently entered (it is interesting that we find the largest number of sociologists in the Party committees and in political organizations). Do the tendencies we can observe in Yugoslav sociology represent a permanent orientation which is constituting Yugoslav functionalism and definitely pushing Marxism into the sphere of ideology? Or — are these tendencies just a reaction to the present social climate and do they represent only a desire of sociologists to »survive« and ensure peaceful conditions for work? It is hard to predict in what direction Yugoslav sociology is going to develop, but it is evident that *only as Marxist sociology it has a chance to gain worldwide significance*. Only by facing openly its own society and its problems can it become a social force which can make predictions and act towards the changing society. As such Marxist sociology will not be passed over by history.

Ljubomir Tadić

Tradicija i revolucija
(Tradition et révolution)

Srpska književna zadruga
Beograd, 1972.

Tradition et révolution de Ljubomir Tadić est un livre unique dans notre littérature et appartient probablement aux meilleures oeuvres de la littérature mondiale dans ce domaine.

Dans l'introduction, dans dix chapitres logiquement articulés et dans la conclusion, l'auteur analyse l'opposition entre la pensée idéologique progressiste et la pensée conservatrice, entre la révolution et la contre-révolution, l'universalisme et l'individualisme, l'autorité et la liberté. La période embrassée commence par la Réforme et l'Age lumière en tant que prolégomènes, la Révolution française de 1789 représentant une limite authentique, et finit au seuil de notre siècle. L'espace géopolitique de l'analyse est les modèles différents des idéologies politiques font son contenu. Donc, tout se déroule à l'Ouest européen, qui est le berceau des plus grandes révolutions, mais aussi le lieu de la genèse de l'idéologie conservatrice contre-révolutionnaire, dont l'explication représente l'ossature du livre.

Dès la préface, Lj. Tadić détermine le problème qu'il considérera dans son livre. Les notions de *conservatisme* et de *progressisme* ont acquis une grande popularité, mais aussi un usage parlé différent; c'est pourquoi l'auteur, avec des excuses sincères, rappelle leur signification littéraire: «tout ce qui tend au progrès est progressif, tandis que ce qui s'engage pour la conservation de l'état existant est conservateur». La pensée progressiste tend sans cesse

au mieux, tandis que la pensée conservatrice considère que le Bien est déjà réalisé et qu'il ne faut que le garder. Faire ce que personne n'a jamais fait auparavant, représente un péché mortel pour la conscience conservatrice. «Quelque chose de si nouveau, que personne n'a jamais fait, a été fait par la Révolution française en son temps». Ce qu'elle a fait le plus, c'est qu'elle a provoqué une crise jamais vue jusqu'alors, de toutes les autorités, excepté l'autorité de la raison.

L'introduction nous expose également ce problème. Lj. Tadić nous présente la conception conservatrice de la révolution de F. J. von Stahl et explique d'une manière ingénieuse l'essence même du conflit entre la révolution et la tradition. Un des aspects de ce conflit est résumé dans la question suivante: Etant donné que la tradition n'appartient pas seulement à l'histoire et que son extension historique sur le présent et le futur apparaît souvent comme un impératif, la Révolution n'a-t-elle pas alors droit à la légitimité historique, elle aussi? Peut-on limiter la réalité historique seulement au passé et à la durée, ou embrasse-t-elle aussi un changement?

D'après l'auteur, on se demande de plus en plus à notre époque quel est le rapport existant entre la tradition et la révolution, ce que l'on ne fait sans raison valable. Ce livre essaie donc de répondre à cette question importante, mais à vrai dire, avec une prétention limitée à l'exposition de la genèse historique et conceptuelle de ce rapport.

Dans le premier chapitre Lj. Tadić pose immédiatement la question sur la date de la genèse du conservatisme en tant qu'idéologie politique — est-ce que c'était après ou peut-être avant le jaillissement de la Révolution française. Après avoir exposé

des thèses différentes, l'auteur explique son propre point de vue: »Le conservatisme politique en tant que tentative d'établissement de l'idéologie totale, apparaît après la Révolution française. Mais spirituellement, en tant que résistance à l'Age lumière, il apparaît avant la Révolution aussi.«. L'Age lumière précède la Révolution et cela par le concept d'autonomie ou d'autodétermination de l'homme en opposition au concept d'hétéronomie. L'Age lumière apporte également une nouvelle interprétation de la relation entre la raison et l'autorité qui consiste en ce que toute autorité doit être justifiée par la raison. C'est par là que commence la grande antithèse entre l'Age lumière et ses opposants conservateurs qui peut être exprimée en deux mots: »faire contre créer«.

Avec l'absolutisme, c'est l'Etat moderne qui est né. Le concept de base de cet Etat n'est plus l'autorité, mais la souveraineté. Avec la naissance de la monarchie absolue au sein du droit naturel rationnel, il était possible de formuler la notion de la souveraineté du peuple.

Dans le deuxième chapitre l'auteur considère les thèses des traditionalistes d'après lesquels l'Age lumière n'est que fille de »l'hérésie«, tandis que la vraie »hérésie« n'était personne d'autre que la Réforme. D'après leur avis, la cause principale du jaillissement de la Révolution française était la Réforme protestante. La Réforme et la Révolution sont la destruction et l'insurrection, disent les conservateurs, parce que la Réforme détruit l'autorité divine tandis que la Révolution détruit l'autorité profane.

Tadić pose avec raison deux questions concernant les interprétations conservatrices de la Réforme: »Est-il possible qu'une réforme purement religieuse provoque tant de conséquences révolutionnaires et si c'était possible, est-ce que c'était uniquement une réforme religieuse?« En répondant à ces questions l'auteur se sert des textes originaux et met en lumière d'une manière très documentée, la situation controversée du catholicisme et du protestantisme dans le cadre du contexte social. Il conclut que »toute la controverse entre le catholicisme et le protestantisme concernant la cause de la Révolution... finit par un résultat

presque non-résolu«. A côté de toutes les différences, on a réussi à se mettre d'accord que les protestants et les catholiques devaient mener une lutte commune contre le pouvoir de ce temps, et c'était »le pouvoir de la raison révolutionnaire«. A l'opposé de la raison athée de la Révolution on met en relief l'autorité de l'homme en tant que devise combattive de toute la contre-révolution et de la Restauration. Lj. Tadić mentionne — en passant et non sans mélancolie — que l'autorité n'était pas seulement le mot d'ordre de l'époque de la Restauration, mais qu'elle est restée aussi le symbole de la réaction dans notre siècle. »Il est évident que l'idéologie de la non-majorité humaine a les racines profondément plantées«.

Le conflit entre le principe de l'autorité et le principe de la rationalité se manifeste également sous la forme de l'universalisme et de l'individualisme, et c'est le sujet d'analyse du troisième chapitre. La pensée catholique spécifique de la contre-révolution attaquait la Réforme au moins en tant que complice de la rationalisation, de la particularisation et de l'individualisation du monde chrétien uni. Ce que la Réforme a commencé, la Révolution française l'a achevé. La société bourgeoise a effectivement apporté au monde un partage de la civilisation chrétienne jusqu' alors unie tant bien que mal. Ce n'était pas seulement un individualisme bourgeois, mais aussi la formation d'Etats nationaux distincts. L'universalisme était menacé par des Etats en tant que totalités nationales. Les traditionalistes catholiques d'origine française, de Maistre et de Bonald, dont l'auteur analyse très attentivement les conceptions idéologiques, regardaient en Europe chrétienne le moyen de se sauver de la Révolution. S'appuyant sur la thèse de Montesquieu que les secousses consolidaient toujours le pouvoir, les deux traditionalistes exprimaient la conviction que la Révolution elle-même deviendrait prolégomènes de cette nouvelle unité de l'Europe chrétienne. La Révolution ne doit devenir par là qu'un purgatoire de la conservation sociale. Tous les deux, de Bonald ainsi que de Maistre, rejettent avec dégoût les innovations révolutionnaires, et avant tout le mot citoyen et le calendrier révoluti-

onnaire. Le traditionalisme nie aussi énergiquement deux éléments constitutifs de la Révolution et de la démocratie: la constitution écrite et la notion révolutionnaire du peuple et de la souveraineté du peuple. Lj. Tadić examine d'un oeil critique leur argumentation de ces attitudes. Ensuite, il actualise ce discours par la thèse que »non seulement le vieux traditionalisme mais aussi tout le conservatisme suivant jusqu'à nos jours, exprime la conception que le peuple ne peut exister qu'en tant que nation«.

Cet universalisme admet seulement l'humanisme chrétien, et non laïque et profane. Mais c'est justement la Révolution française — nous révèle l'auteur — qui a mis en relief un tel principe et qui a montré que la liaison de l'homme avec l'humanité n'était possible qu'au moyen de la raison en tant que caractère commun à tous les hommes.

À côté des nombreux caractères communs, le conservatisme a ses propres particularités nationales. Au quatrième chapitre Lj. Tadić présente la critique anglaise de la Révolution française exprimée dans l'oeuvre d'Edmond Burke. Non seulement par leur contenu, mais aussi par leur style, ces pages appartiennent vraiment aux plus grandes créations et peuvent se mesurer avec l'analyse stylistique brillante de Burke faite par S. Jovanović. Qu'y a-t-il de tellement attirant dans l'oeuvre de Burke pour qu'elle absorbe également la pensée de nos contemporains? »Burke est resté un classique conservateur... à cause de la particularité avec laquelle il a exprimé une spécificité nationale purement anglaise dans sa critique de la Révolution française. Cette particularité se manifeste dans l'expérience supérieure de la tradition politique anglaise, qui a réussi, malgré la révolution anglaise au XVII^e siècle, à survivre toutes les secousses sociales et à faire la paix avec le nouvel esprit des temps«.

Burke se présente comme un critique »objectif« de la Révolution française bien qu'on ne puisse pas s'attendre à cela de sa part. D'après Burke, la Révolution française est la première révolution totale dans l'histoire mondiale, elle est »la suppression du principe de la domination de l'homme par l'homme et la for-

mation d'un monde tout à fait nouveau«. Pourtant, Burke souligne la différence paradoxale et de principe entre la Révolution française et la révolution anglaise au XVII^e siècle. »La révolution anglaise est exclusivement une révolution conservatrice«. Comme les traditionalistes français, Burke est également »apologiste conscient de la sainteté de ce qui est devenu«, avec cette différence qu'il souligne le passé anglais et la sagesse politique anglaise comme modèles à tout le monde. Burke a utilisé tout son arsenal oratoire et religieux-rituel des preuves — dit Lj. Tadić — pour nous convaincre que »les nouvelles générations n'ont aucun droit de changer en principe quelque chose de ce que l'esprit des ancêtres leur a laissé en héritage«.

Tadić finit l'analyse de la conception idéologique de Burke avec une ironie fine et subtile, mêlée au cynisme: »Il serait juste que tous les conservateurs contemporains, sans égard à l'appartenance nominale à un parti ou l'autre, lui rendent publiquement hommage, parce qu'il a pensé pour eux et souvent à leur place«.

L'évolution de la situation idéologique spirituelle en Allemagne depuis la résignation jusqu'au romantisme, occupe la partie centrale du livre. C'est dans ce chapitre que l'érudition de l'auteur atteint son sommet. Une richesse de données, une profondeur d'analyse et un texte systématique et concis, le prouvent. Il semble qu'il n'y ait pas de nom plus important ni de thème plus significative sans avoir reçu une place adéquate.

Au commencement, l'auteur formule le problème qui, sans doute, incite chacun de nous à la méditation. Au cours des cent dernières années, l'Europe a vécu des expériences pénibles avec l'Allemagne, ce qui a généralement créé une image défavorable de ce pays et représenté son peuple comme un conquérant cruel. D'autre part, l'Angleterre et la France, eu égard à une expérience contraire, étaient considérées comme des pays libéraux et pacifiques. »Toutes ces appréciations concernant ces pays et ces peuples ne sont pas tout à fait inexactes, dit Lj. Tadić, mais elles sont trop superficielles et unilatérales pour qu'elles puissent être acceptées sérieusement«. Tout grand

Etat manifeste — de préférence et normalement — sa «vérité du pouvoir» plutôt que le pouvoir de la vérité.

L'Allemagne, divisée en série de petits Etats, ne vivait qu'une ascension spirituelle au temps de l'Age lumière. Les esprits éclairés de l'Allemagne créaient leurs grandes oeuvres avant la Révolution française: Goethe, Schiller, Kant, Herder etc. Les Allemands célébraient la Révolution même lorsqu'elle était déjà devenue l'objet de la critique contre-révolutionnaire dans d'autres pays. L'auteur cite les mots connus de Hegel, écrits en l'honneur de la Révolution française. Mais, «après l'enthousiasme et l'ivresse c'est le malaise qui vient... Après la défaite c'est la résignation qui se présente. Et cette psychologie sociale appartient surtout à la petite bourgeoisie». La résignation était cet état d'esprit qui régnait en Allemagne lorsque la Révolution eut dégénéré en bonapartisme.

Après la résignation c'était le passage au romantisme politique qui commençait. Donc, l'avenir est issu du passé après lequel le romantisme soupirait justement. Tadić a particulièrement analysé la liaison de Schelling avec les romantiques, ensuite il a analysé Müller et Baader, moins connus. Marx et Engels mentionnaient Baader parmi des représentants du socialisme féodal.

Au sixième chapitre l'auteur continue son analyse de la situation idéologique allemande moderne. «Entre le romantisme politique, qui, en général, considère la Moyen Age d'état comme une «utopie inverse», et l'idéologie politique agressive de la Restauration, se trouve la théorie politique... de K. L. von Haler». Haler est un idéologue typique de l'absolutisme comme «bon vieux temps».

L'auteur revient, d'une manière beaucoup plus profonde, à l'explication des conceptions idéologiques de von Stahl. En tant que représentant marquant de l'idéologie de la Restauration, Stahl attaque les principes de la Révolution, non seulement à cause de leur substance rationaliste, mais aussi à cause des conséquences communistes.

Dans ce chapitre la place centrale est donnée à l'analyse de l'école historique de droit «considérée comme

un certain prolongement du conservatisme allemand jusqu'au XIX^e siècle avancé...» Après une analyse très attentive des textes originaux de cette école et la confrontation des interprétations différentes, Lj. Tadić offre sa propre appréciation concise: «Pour Savigny et Stahl, le passé est en même temps la source universelle et le confluent; tout en provient et tout lui revient. C'est pourquoi la notion de genèse est pour Savigny la même chose que le passé; le nouveau ne peut être qu'un pur renouvellement ou une rénovation de l'ancien, le changement ne peut être qu'une ré-forme».

Le point de vue de Tadić sur l'histoire spirituelle totale de l'Allemagne est moins original, mais très clair et acceptable. «L'histoire spirituelle allemande, comme d'ailleurs l'histoire de toutes les vieilles nations européennes, créait sa propre tradition conservatrice... Mais parallèlement à cette tradition spirituelle et à son opposé, on créait en Allemagne la tradition de la révolution, qui avait également son propre accent, et cela à partir de Tomas Münzer et de la guerre des paysans allemande jusqu'à Marx et notre temps. Il n'y a qu'une différence — la tradition conservatrice allemande avait une racine institutionnelle beaucoup plus profonde que la tradition révolutionnaire et démocratique, justement parce que dans l'histoire allemande les classes révolutionnaires et démocratiques étaient trop faibles pour que leur tradition ait pu laissé une racine plus profonde».

Le titre du septième chapitre — Théocratie, sociocratie et technocratie — suscite un intérêt plus vif et plus spontané, parce qu'en une excursion historique, l'auteur nous conduit aux phénomènes contemporains. En effet, l'analyse ne nous trahira pas. Le contenu correspond au titre. En outre, ce chapitre est peut-être le plus riche vu la matière et les idées présentées.

«Sans égard aux particularités nationales ou à l'intention personnelle de ses créateurs, la pensée conservatrice tend à la subordination énergique du principe rationnel de la liberté à l'ordre compris irrationnellement». Prenant deux exemples, l'auteur montre comment l'idéologie conservatrice a influencé la sociologie classique et contemporaine, particu-

lièrement la formation du positivisme sociologique d'Auguste Comte et celui de la «sociologie conservatrice plus nouvelle». Après avoir considéré certaines catégories du système de Comte, l'auteur formule l'attitude finale qui est exacte d'après ce qu'il affirme, mais qui est en même temps unilatérale: «La naissance de la sociologie en tant que science de la société, est marquée par là par une symbiose de l'esprit des citoyens conservateurs et de la réaction». Nous n'avons pas l'intention de faire un reproche à l'auteur, mais nous voudrions pourtant exprimer notre impression qu'il n'y a pas de différence de principe entre cette formulation et l'affirmation que la sociologie est une discipline bourgeoise qu'il faut jeter du bord dans la mer. Le deuxième exemple, l'influence de l'opinion conservatrice dans la sociologie moderne, n'offre point de base pour n'importe quelles remarques. Tout au contraire, peut-être l'attitude marxiste immanente de l'auteur l'a-t-elle conduit ici aux analyses critiques les plus brillantes de «la sociologie conservatrice» — nous préférons pourtant dire des théories sociologiques conservatrices au service de l'intégration conservatrice existante de la société. La sociologie conservatrice, incitée par le contexte social de deux blocs militaires politiques, a tiré la conclusion que l'ère de la science et de la technique a achevé l'idéologie et a établi un ordre complètement nouveau. L'histoire des idées est finie et la fin de l'idéologie est arrivée. La dépolitisation des citoyens grandit, la forme classique de l'Etat démocratique disparaît et la civilisation scientifique et technique est incompatible avec la démocratie. Et enfin, d'après la sociologie conservatrice, les citoyens ne sont pas capables de diriger leur destin, mais leur destin est dans les mains de ceux qui savent et qui planifient adroitement. En basant ses objections sur les recherches théoriques de Habermas, l'auteur a démasqué d'une manière très convaincante la nature conservatrice de ces thèses «contemporaines». «Le type nouveau du conservateur, affirme Lj. Tadić, se range résolument du côté de la technique et veut gouverner le monde au moyen de l'Etat technique. Au fond, «le progrès» dans l'interprétation conservatrice contempo-

raïne signifie que les hommes sont continuellement dominés, mais cette fois d'une manière technique plus adaptée, plus parfaite et plus efficace».

Dans le huitième chapitre Lj. Tadić se rallie à la révolution est bourgeoise, est exacte, mais complètement unilatérale. D'après ses buts fondamentaux, la Révolution française tendait «au-delà de l'horizon bourgeois» — l'auteur y accepte la thèse de Lukacs. En s'appuyant sur les estimations de Marx, l'auteur cite Babeuf en tant que premier phénomène de l'activité communiste dans la révolution bourgeoise. Par l'analyse des conceptions idéologiques de Babeuf, Lj. Tadić a tourné une page nouvelle dans sa propre analyse. Jusqu'ici Tadić le révolutionnaire a analysé principalement les modèles idéologiques conservateurs, tandis qu'à présent il commence à analyser des conceptions révolutionnaires communistes. D'ailleurs, c'est tout de suite perceptible, peut-être pas à cause d'une meilleure connaissance du contenu, mais à cause d'un rapport émotif différent parce que le pathos révolutionnaire jaillit de chaque ligne de l'auteur. Il s'agit ici du rapport entre la révolution et le droit naturel. Lj. Tadić affirme que «le droit naturel était en effet une théorie de la Révolution», avec les caractéristiques suivantes: le droit naturel contestait le droit coutumier, niait la monarchie absolue et mettait en question la dépendance de l'individu de la commune politique. Le droit naturel a été différemment interprété. A la différence du libéralisme qui met la liberté et l'égalité dépendantes de la propriété privée, la démocratie révolutionnaire représente le point de vue de notre auteur, et d'après lui la réalisation de la liberté et de l'égalité superpose la propriété sociale.

Au chapitre suivant Tadić continue l'analyse du libéralisme et de la démocratie entre lesquels s'est faite «une scission historique mondiale qui dure jusqu'à nos jours». Au cours du temps, le libéralisme abandonnait de plus en plus son passé révolutionnaire et s'orientait vers le présent conservateur, tandis que la démocratie gardait ou perdait sa continuité révolutionnaire en proportion du flux et reflux de la Révolution, c'est-à-

-dire du socialisme qui a repris son héritage révolutionnaire. C'est à partir de ce chapitre qu'on trouve probablement les meilleures pages sur l'analyse du libéralisme écrites dans les langues de nos peuples yougoslaves. Nous nous permettons aussi de dire qu'il ne doit y avoir aucun activiste qui puisse parler du libéralisme ici et aujourd'hui sans avoir étudié ces lignes. Mentionnons au moins quelques thèses sur la détermination du libéralisme: le libéralisme économique intercède en faveur de l'entreprise libre et de la liberté du commerce. La concurrence est un credo vital du libéralisme et elle ne laisse pas de place à son prochain.

A la question suivante: la suppression de la propriété privée est-elle une condition essentielle pour le changement des formes de notre vie et de nos rapports, l'auteur présente l'opinion de Freud: «Malgré tous les avantages possibles que la société sans propriété privée peut apporter, la malveillance et l'inimitié entre les hommes ne peuvent pas être supprimées». Freud conclut inébranlablement, dit Lj. Tadić, que ce n'est pas la propriété privée qui a créé l'agression humaine en tant que danger menaçant et destructif. Elle est, pour ainsi dire, «une partie inéluctable de la nature humaine». Tadić ne partage pas ce pessimisme anthropologique de Freud, mais il est d'accord que la suppression de la propriété privée n'est pas suffisante pour la construction de la société socialiste ou démocratique. «Ce qui est nécessaire, c'est une négation révolutionnaire profonde des domaines de vie beaucoup plus larges et des relations qui ne s'épuisent pas seulement dans l'économie».

Les réflexions de l'auteur concernant les buts de la critique du libéralisme, sont particulièrement instructives: «La critique du libéralisme en tant qu'idéologie de la propriété privée et du mécanisme de la concurrence, ne signifie aucunement l'exclusion du conflit social... là où il n'y a pas de conflit, il n'y pas de progrès de la société non plus».

Au dernier chapitre qui est vraiment brillant dans son ensemble, Tadić continue son analyse du libéralisme, mais il ne s'y arrête pas et examine la démocratie et l'anarchie. Le libéralisme est l'idéologie du privé. Le libéralisme se distingue égale-

ment par son attitude antiétatiste au nom du principe de l'individualité. Pourtant, l'idéologie libérale devait s'arrêter devant le problème suivant: «Si le principe de l'individualisme s'effectue d'une manière conséquente, alors il conduit inévitablement à l'anarchisme». Bien que l'idéologie libérale reculât devant ce dilemme, les autres ne se sont pas arrêtés.

Pour Marx, l'Etat moderne libéral de son temps n'est que «comité d'affaires» de la classe bourgeoise, et les lois ne représentent que la moyenne de ses intérêts de classe. Marx a appelé le parlement libéral «un salon de bavardages bourgeois». Après ces mots de Marx, Tadić pose deux questions importantes: 1. la démocratie révolutionnaire, est-elle un adversaire de principe du parlementarisme, et 2. le principe de la souveraineté populaire peut-il être égalisé à la souveraineté nationale, c'est-à-dire le peuple peut-il confier sa volonté législative à la représentation nationale ou à l'assemblée nationale sans que cette volonté ne soit essentiellement tronquée? «Les révolutionnaires jacobins... soutenaient l'unité du pouvoir législatif, exécutif et judiciaire. Ils croyaient que la souveraineté populaire ne pouvait être assurée que par la dictature populaire (sans-culotte)». Cet héritage politique de la démocratie française révolutionnaire a été également transmis au socialisme marxiste révolutionnaire, et s'est confirmé dans la construction léniniste du pouvoir soviétique et du parti communiste. Quelles étaient les conséquences pratiques de ce modèle de la démocratie révolutionnaire: «Sans égard à ses formes historiques, la démocratie révolutionnaire n'a pas trouvé — avec la seule exception de la Commune de Paris — ni dans sa pratique ni dans sa philosophie politique, un moyen sûr pour la limitation du pouvoir politique. C'est pourquoi il arrivait et il arrive qu'une minorité au pouvoir, à vrai dire une élite, gouverne d'abord au lieu du peuple et ensuite sur le peuple, et de cette façon, s'en référant à la souveraineté du peuple, supprime la réalisation de cette souveraineté».

Le libéralisme, la démocratie, le socialisme et l'anarchisme poussaient sur le même arbre du droit naturel. Lj. Tadić tâche de réaffirmer l'anarchisme en tant que pensée sérieuse

libertaire. Si la raison gouverne le monde ou il faut qu'elle le gouverne, affirment les anarchistes, alors l'application de la force est en soi quelque chose d'irrationnel et d'inhumain. Il n'est possible d'assurer la liberté contre l'autorité «que par la suppression de l'Etat et de ses lois». Tadić montre que l'idée fondamentale libertaire concernant l'organisation de la société sur le principe des associations, a été conçue par Proudhon. Les gouvernements libéraux ainsi que socialistes persécutaient l'anarchisme en tant qu'hérésie la plus dangereuse. Notre auteur déclare avec résignation: »L'anarchie n'avait pas de chance plus visible de vérifier historiquement la validité de ses principes«. C'est exact, elle ne l'avait pas et probablement elle ne l'aura pas à cause de la nature de l'anarchisme.

Dans la conclusion au titre particulier — Autorité et liberté — outre le raccourci des analyses précédentes, Lj. Tadić indique sa propre attitude qui émane de l'optimisme, il exprime la foi en la raison et espère une vie sociale basée sur la raison. La dernière phrase contient cette pensée: »Lorsque l'idée que l'homme est mûr pour construire sa vie sociale sur des principes rationnels, a été une seule fois, elle ne peut plus jamais être refoulée de ce monde«.

L'oeuvre de Lj. Tadić — *Tradition et révolution* — est d'une valeur durable, non tellement par des idées théoriques nouvelles, mais par l'analyse marxiste fondamentale et consistante des formations idéologiques traditionnelles contre-révolutionnaires. C'est vraiment une oeuvre rare d'un marxiste contemporain, presque unique dans la littérature internationale, qui analyse les sources idéologiques spirituelles de la tradition et de la contre-révolution, qui ne fait pas de constructions abstraites et ne colle pas d'étiquettes. Ce livre a une place particulière dans notre littérature philosophique et sociologique parce que nous n'avions jusqu'à maintenant l'occasion de lire une telle oeuvre qu'en traduction.

Si nous voulions objecter par principe quelque chose à ce livre, l'objection éventuelle serait donc réduite à l'argument suivant: malgré son attitude implicite présente dans toute l'oeuvre, l'auteur devait indiquer d'une manière plus explicite sa pro-

pre attitude dans certains passages fondamentaux de l'analyse. L'aspect sociologique de l'analyse des phénomènes idéologiques n'est pas partout suffisamment respecté non plus.

Il n'est pas difficile de conclure que cette oeuvre n'est que prologomènes à une analyse des rapports entre la tradition et la révolution dans notre siècle. C'est pourquoi nous pouvons seulement souhaiter d'avoir cette analyse le plus tôt possible dans l'oeuvre suivante de Ljubavica Tadić.

Veljko CVJETIČANIN

Max Müller

Erfahrung und Geschichte

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Dieses neueste Werk von Max Müller (dem bekannten Professor an der Philosophischen Fakultät München) enthält 19 philosophische Betrachtungen, die zusammen ein Ganzes der thematischen Auseinandersetzung über die Erfahrung und die Geschichte ausmachen, jede aber doch nach dem Inhalt der Darlegung eine eigene Besonderheit ist.

Im einführenden Kapitel beschäftigt sich der Autor mit dem Problem der Wahrheit der Metaphysik und der Geschichte, und dies ist der erste Teil des Buches. Im zweiten Teil, im Kapitel über die Persönlichkeit, spricht er über folgende Themen: Persönlichkeit und Funktion, Sinn und Bedrohung des Sinns der menschlichen Existenz, der Mensch in der veränderten Welt und über einige zeitgenössische Ansichten über den Menschen in philosophischer Hinsicht. Im selben Werk finden wir unter dem Titel Geschichte diese Erörterungen: Zeit und Ewigkeit in der abendländischen Metaphysik, Erfahrung und Geschichte, Evolution und Geschichte, Historie und Geschichte bei J. G. Droysen. Im Kapitel, in dem über Freiheit gehandelt wird, finden wir vier Beiträge. Dieses sind: Freiheit (beigefügt eine Erörterung über die Determination), philosophische Grundlagen der Politik, ontologische Problematik des Naturrechts (beigefügt ein Betrag über das Problem der

Werte) und zuletzt: der Friede als philosophisches Problem. Im vierten Kapitel behandelt der Autor allgemein das Problem der Bildung in folgenden Themen: Bildung, Schule und Welt, Tradition-Institution-Revolution, Abendländische Wissenschaftstheorie. Der dritte Teil des Buches enthält zwei Beiträge. Im ersten, der den Titel *Fragmente zur Geschichte des Abendländischen Denkweges* trägt, finden wir einen Überblick der Ideen: Aristoteles, Augustinus, Thomas von Aquin, Pascal, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Guardini, Reinhold Schneider (religiöser Dichter und Schriftsteller).

Im abschließenden Beitrag: *Symbolos-Vollendung und Mitte* befindet sich die philosophische Autobiographie von Max Müller. Sie ist ein kurzer Auszug aus seinem Buch: *Symbolos*, (München 1967).

Aus dieser Autobiographie wollen wir hier einige kürzere Informationen anführen. Max Müller studierte Geschichte, Philosophie und Literatur. Er steht unter dem Einfluß von Romano Guardini (Theologe und Philosoph), dem Historiker Friedrich Meinecke, dann von Karl Vossler, dem Münchner Romanisten, und auf dem Gebiet der Philosophie vor allem unter dem von Martin Heidegger.

Seine Dissertation *Über Grundbegriffe philosophischer Wertlehre* verteidigte er im Sommersemester 1930 in Freiburg. Auf Anregung von Martin Heidegger wurde Max Müller dann der Assistentenposten an der Philosophischen Fakultät angeboten, und man bot ihm die Möglichkeit zur Habilitation. Im Programm seiner Arbeit hatte er auch Vorlesungen aus Philosophie für Theologen (Auf Grund »des Konkordats«). Er habilitierte 1936 mit der Schrift *Realität und Rationalität*, was unter dem Titel *Sein und Geist* (Tübingen 1940) veröffentlicht wurde. Wegen seiner Ablehnung der nationalsozialistischen Ideologie wurde ihm durch eine Anweisung aus Berlin die Dozentur verweigert, und so lehrte er eine Zeitlang Philosophie als erzbischöflicher Dozent des Collegium Borromaeum. Nach dem Krieg kehrte er im Mai 1945 nach Freiburg zurück, wo ihm unter aller Anerkennung die »*Venia legendi*« zurückgegeben wurde, die man ihm 1937/38 entzogen hatte. Hier blieb er als Or-

dinarium für Philosophie von 1946 bis 1960 und dann ging er an die Philosophische Fakultät München. Er gab Gastvorträge an vielen Universitäten. Er ist unserer Studentengeneration bekannt, da er auch in Zagreb Vorlesungen hielt.

In diesem seinen Werk: *Erfahrung und Geschichte* begründet M. Müller die Möglichkeit und den Sinn des philosophischen Zugangs zu allen Lebensfragen. Die Philosophie ist keine Abstraktion, die sich durch Deduktion im Arbeitskabinett formen ließe, sie muß geistig in der Realität selbst anwesend sein.

Für Max Müller ist die Philosophie keine »strenge Wissenschaft«, die sich in der Verifizierung verschiedener Experimente und Tatsachen erschöpfte, die man auch immer beliebig wiederholen kann, auch ist die Philosophie nicht in fertigen Behauptungen auf Grund logischer Schlüsse gegeben. Die Philosophie ist »strenges Wissen« als Darlegungsweise des vergangenen, gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Verstehens von Sein und Welt. Dies ist die gedankliche Interpretation, die wegen der dauernden Veränderlichkeit von allem immer wieder wiederholt werden muß. Die Philosophie ist nicht das Schema für einzelne Wissenschaften und die Vieldeutigkeit der Philosophie ist nicht ihr Fehler in wissenschaftlicher Hinsicht, sondern gerade ihr historischer Reichtum (S. 517)!

Die Philosophie muß also dauernd anwesend sein in der Welt. Was ist aber die Welt überhaupt? Die Welt ist nicht nur physische Anwesenheit. Für die Philosophie erscheint die Welt als historisches Phänomen (S.559). Das ist im Wesen die Sinngabe der Existenz überhaupt. In der Lösung dieser Fragen ist M. Müller als Philosoph auch im katholischen geistigen Raum anwesend, nicht aber, um eine besondere christliche Philosophie zu bilden, sondern um zwei Disziplinen, die einander ergänzen in den Dialog zu bringen, dies sind seiner Ansicht nach die Philosophie und die Theologie. Diese zwei Bereiche zu trennen würde die Thematik des Denkens allgemein einengen.

Das Wirken ist das Verhältnis in seiner Art zum historischen Moment, und nur so kann der Mensch aus dem Getto kommen und die

»schizophrene Spaltung« überwinden, die zwischen ihm und der Welt liegt. Es wäre ein Irrtum anzunehmen, die Freiheit wäre in Isolierung möglich. »Freiheit gibt es nur, wo es die Freiheit der Äußerung, der Gestaltwerdung und die Freiheit zum Werke und zur Repräsentation gibt. Die bloße Gedankenfreiheit ist illusorisch.« (S. 565). Diese Fragen werden immer als gesellschaftliches Konkretum gelöst. Damit im Zusammenhang steht auch der Begriff der Pflicht, der nicht konstruiert und gepredigt werden kann, sondern er muß als Verpflichtung und Verantwortung in der Gemeinschaft erlebt werden.

Aus diesen einführenden Bemerkungen können wir den Zugang von M. Müller zur verschiedenartigen Thematik, die er in den 19 Beiträgen bearbeitet, sehen. Um nur einige Fragen anzuführen, die daraus erstehen: wie ist es heute möglich, zu philosophieren; was ist das Prinzip des Fortschritts; wie muß das Denken beschaffen sein, um der Wirklichkeit zu entsprechen; mit welchen kategorialen Mitteln können wir die heutige Welt verstehen; was verhindert eine klare Einsicht; was für eine Welt wollen wir und wie wollen wir sie aufstellen; was bedeutet es daß der Mensch das Wesen der Möglichkeit ist; wie sich den Institutionen gegenüber verhalten (Familie, Gemeinschaft, Staat, Partei, Kirche); worin liegt der philosophische Wagemut; wie stellt uns die Philosophie vor das Sein; der »Pluralismus« als Schicksal; ist »eine« Industrielwelt möglich; worin liegt der Sinn der höchsten Spezialisierungen; wie den Frieden in der Welt sichern; was ist Stabilität; wie kann freiliebende Koexistenz zur echten Kooperation werden; usw. Diese Fragen werden nicht mit Hilfe von Apriori-Prinzipien gelöst, die zeitlose Prinzipien wären, sie müssen in der Zeit realisiert werden, wobei immer der Unterschied zwischen normativem und faktischem Verhältnis besteht (oder der Unterschied zwischen Sein und Seiendes). Deshalb muß auch das Sein selbst als Zeit begriffen werden und in das Raum-Zeitverhältnis eingeschlossen werden.

Gesellschaftliche Probleme können nicht aus der subjektiven Innerlichkeit, aus der Privatisierung gelöst werden, denn eine solche Art

und Weise ist inhaltslos, und das würden wir uns in einer Scheinwelt bewegen. Damit in Verbindung führt M. Müller in seine Betrachtungen die Kategorie der transzendentalen Erfahrung als dem wesentlichen Unterschied zwischen der Grunderfahrung und der Erfahrung, die auf positiven Fakten beruht, ein. Erst in der transzendentalen Erfahrung besteht die Möglichkeit der Verteidigung gegen aufgedrängte politische Weltanschauungen. Diese grundlegende Erfahrung über den Menschen, die Gesellschaft, das Recht und die Wahrheit erscheint dann als normative Erfahrung der bestimmten geschichtlichen und gesellschaftlichen Situation gegenüber, die erzwungen sein kann. Das wäre das Prinzip der unpositivistischen Erfahrung, das sich wesentlich der phänomenologischen Philosophie von Edmund Husserl nähert.

Nach der Ansicht von M. Müller steht die philosophische Gegenwart immer noch im Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger, über den er keine Apologie schreiben will, aber er meint, daß die Diskussion mit Heidegger die Denkaufgabe auch nach dem 20. Jahrhundert sein wird. Diese Problematik und Differenzierung zeigt Müller in seinem Werk *Existenzphilosophie* (erste Ausg. 1949, zweite 1958, dritte 1964, alle unterscheiden sich untereinander).

M. Müller erörtert in mehreren seiner Betrachtungen auch das Problem der Philosophie bei Marx, wenn er über viele Fragen der menschlichen Existenz spricht, diese Philosophie ist heute als Idee der sozialen Wandlung der Welt anwesend.

In der Lehre von Marx sieht Müller das Ziel der Befreiung mit überpersönlichem Charakter. In der neueren Philosophie (Fichte, Kant, Hegel) wird die Freiheit als »Überwindung der Entfremdung« angesehen, wo auch Marx fortsetzt, aber zum Unterschied zu Hegels Begreifen »der Dialektik des Geistes« sieht Marx die Lösung dieses Problems in der Aufhebung der Ausbeutung und der Bildung der klassenlosen Gesellschaft. M. Müller schreibt, daß sich in diesem historischen Prozeß der Einzelne verliert, und der Träger dieses Glücks ist nicht der Einzelne, sondern die Gesellschaft, und die Gesellschaft ist frei, nicht er (S. 109—110), und so ist das wesentliche

Verhältnis zum Staat und zur Gesellschaft im Verlangen nach dem Absterben des Staates geprägt. Da ist M. Müller sehr skeptisch. Durch das Absterben des Staates und seiner Autorität, meint er, kommt es dazu, daß die klassenlose Gesellschaft seine Funktion in zielstrebigem Selbstverwaltung übernimmt (wobei die Frage, ob das erwünscht ist oder nicht gar nicht gestellt wird). Da geschieht, nach Müller etwas, was man auch in den »christlichen Kreisen« nicht erkennt, nämlich, mit dem Absterben des Staates stirbt auch die Persönlichkeit. »Staat kann nur als personaler Staat sein, Gesellschaft aber auch als unpersönlicher kollektiver Vollzug. Person braucht des Staates als personalen Werkes, als ihres Korrelates.« (S.120) In der Auffassung, daß das Kollektiv vor dem Einzelnen ist, treten viele Formen der Freiheit ab und erscheinen als »Epiphänomen«. »Kultur wird höchstens noch als Instrument zum Glück, nie mehr aber als Lebensweise verständlich. Es ist klar, daß die christliche Sozialphilosophie diese Einseitigkeiten der marxistischen Freiheit — Geschichtsauffassung ablehnen mußte. Auch bei Marx ist nicht die einzelne Person der substantielle Träger der Freiheit, vielmehr die menschliche Gattung in ihrer Organisation als Gesellschaft. Diese menschliche Gattung steht im geschichtlichen Gewinn ihrer Freiheit als gesellschaftliche Freiheit selbst unfrei unter den Gesetzen des Dialektischen Materialismus, den Gesetzen der Produktionsverhältnisse.« (S.317)

Um dem Einzelnen in seiner Verschiedenartigkeit Recht zu sichern, muß die Religionsauffassung von Marx und Feuerbach als »Epiphänomen« des »sekundären« Lebens verworfen werden, das auf dem Boden des Mißerfolges des »primären« Lebens entsteht, da die Begriffe des sekundären Daseins nicht an die Religion angewendet werden können und nicht von da deduziert werden können. Die religiöse christliche Lebensform hat ihre historische Ganzheit in der Idee des selbstoffenbaren Gottes (S. 414—415). Diese Schlüsse Müllers über die Unfreiheit des Einzelnen im Marxismus können nicht aus der Lehre von Marx entnommen werden, und gewisse Formen des politischen Pragmatismus haben mit

dem ursprünglichen Marx nichts gemeinsam.

Müllers Auffassung der Idee des offenbaren Gottes und der christlichen Lebensform und Formung der Anschauung erscheint als Differenzierungsproblem im Rahmen des Denkens überhaupt, worauf wir in dieser kurzen Rezension gar nicht eingehen können. Auch in der Philosophie finden sich Differenzierungen, die Wegweiser für einen dauernden Denkdialog in der Lösung der Lebenssituationen geben. M. Müller ist hier, obwohl er persönlich anwesend ist, sehr tolerant. Er sieht die Philosophie nicht als eine Reihe verschiedener Lehren, die sich historisch nach einer immanenten Notwendigkeit abwechseln, sondern als dauerndes Problem des menschlichen Denkens in der Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft. Deshalb enthält seine Darlegung immer den Gedankenreichtum, der breite Gebiete für weiteres Denken eröffnet. Über jede gestellte Frage kann auf unterschiedliche Weise gesprochen werden, und so ist die Lebenserfahrung manchmal Anregung für eine bestimmte Denkweise. Bei M. Müller ist das philosophische Verhältnis zur Philosophie dauernd anwesend, was bedeutet, daß man über die Philosophie aus ihrer Ganzheit sprechen muß. Ein solches methodologisches Vorgehen erleichtert die Lösung der gestellten Probleme. Wenn es hier zu Unterschieden kommt, so ist damit noch nicht der Weg in diesem Ganzen verringert, und darin liegt der dauernde philosophische Wert dieses Werkes.

Branko BOŠNJAK

A. N. Prior

Objects of Thought

(edited by P. T. Geach and A.J.P. Kenny)
Oxford 1971

Four years have already passed since the sudden death of Arthur Prior and now here it is his last book »Objects of Thought«, published posthumously. The editors, P.T. Geach and A.J.P. Kenny, mention in the preface that the book has not been completed and ready for pu-

blishing, although some chapters in the manuscript date back to 1964. In spite of this, nothing has been added or changed in the text with the exception of the addition of two passages from Prior's previously published works. It is very probable that Prior would not have published this book in its present state, i.e., without substantial changes and revisions, yet even so the book represents a well-rounded thematical whole.

The book is divided into two parts on the basis of the two meanings Prior ascribes to the expression »objects of thought«. The first meaning is: what one thinks, i.e., proposition that grass is green; that two plus two are five). The second meaning denotes the thing one is thinking about, i.e., an object in the broadest sense. The discussion, however, is not limited solely to the objects of thought, because a similar double meaning can be found in connection with the objects of beliefs, or speech, etc. Somehow, right at the beginning a superficial remark imposes itself on the reader, namely — that the title of the book is not adequate because it unnecessarily narrows the field of inquiry.

The main question discussed in the first, larger, part of the book is how do propositions become objects of thoughts. The presupposition that has a decisive influence on the direction of the following deductions and arguments is the well-known definition of a proposition as a logical construction. Each sentence including the word »proposition« can be replaced by a sentence in which this word does not appear. Prior is here taking up F. P. Ramsey's theory, expounded in the article »Facts and Propositions«, from 1927. According to this, so-called, »No truth« theory the sentences »The proposition p is true« »it is true that p« have the same meaning as p itself. The seemingly simple procedure of eliminating propositions understood as abstract entities encounters difficulties when applied to sentence with a different logical form. In one of the following chapters Prior successfully proves that the sentences pertaining to the types: »Every proposition« and »Some propositions«, when changed to another form, i.e., by quantification of the propositional variables in the manner: »For all

p...« and »For some p...«, do not implicate the existence of the objects represented by the letter p. In other words, the introduction of a quantifier does not imply an ontological commitment. However, there exists a certain type of sentence that does not lend itself to such a logical analysis of propositions. That are the sentences of the type: »x believes (thinks, says) that p...«, the nature of which appears to be in a certain sense something alien to logic. To assume that this expresses the relation between two objects, x and »that p«, would be, according to Prior, the gravest possible mistake, because it should always be borne in mind that a proposition is not, and cannot possibly be, an object. If x believes that grass is green this by itself does not establish any relation between x and »that grass is green«. The origin of such a mistake is hidden, it is maintained, in the faulty and inadequate analysis of the form of the proposition, because the correct division into the constituting elements is not »x believes) that p« but, on the contrary, »x believes that) p«. The functor is not the simple verb (believes, thinks, says) which would establish a relation between the subject of the sentence and the abstract »that p«. The compound form (believes that, thinks that) has the function of constituting the sentence if on its left is the sign for the object and on its right the sign for the proposition. Actually, the functor is on one side a predicate and on the other a connective. A similar expression is, e.g., »... is man if ...« which becomes a meaningful expression if the first empty space is taken by a name and the second by a propositional symbol. However, this connective cannot contain any one of the ten logical constants that have been defined by combining the truth-values of the elementary propositions. It is evident that the truth of »x believes that p« does not depend on the fact whether the proposition p is true or not. The truth-value of the complex proposition seems to depend on the proposition p, but on which of its components or how Prior does not ask. The entire above analysis of the propositions of the mentioned logical form rests on a wrong division into component parts. Although Prior's solution may

appear accurate at first sight, it can be subjected to at least one essential critique which renders it untenable. What is the argument against Prior's division of the mentioned proposition in »x believes that / p«? Let us take the example of languages which instead of »that« sentences use the accusative or nominative plus an infinitive or only the infinitive. Does not this clearly show that »believes« constitutes by itself one element of the proposition and that »that p« is the second part which is sometimes transformed into a specific form. The connection of »that« with the symbol p denotes the content of the proposition but says nothing about the truth-value. In that way the proposition is not asserted, only its content (meaning) is considered. As concerns form and grammar there is nothing that would hinder the division and partition of propositions of this type. From the standpoint of logic, on the contrary, it seems that »that p« is contained in the meaning of »x believes« which would, if looked upon separately, remain undefined or denote something different than it does in the compound, i. e., a psychological state.

Prior also discusses the logic of commands and questions and gives a very interesting definition of the question as a specific form of assertion. He speaks about the law of extensionality he denies its general validity, which is a logical consequence of his presuppositions in connection with intensional functions, and also about a couple of paradoxes which are solved differently than was shown in the theory of types.

In the second part of the book Prior poses the question about »objects of thought« in the second meaning that appears in sentences of the type »x thinks/says about y.« Does this opinion set up a relation between the objects x and y? If there exist. However, in spite of this it the case when object y does not exist. However, in spite of this it seems certain in a way that in the case when the proposition is true the acceptance of the relation cannot be avoided, only — it is not quite clear what is related to what. If we try to avoid the difficulty by assuming that y represents the idea of the object instead the object itself we will not succeed. Although,

this would explain the relation that always exists between the subject of the sentence and the idea of the object and there would remain only the empirical question« does something fall under the concept or not. This solution does not hold good if confronted with the objection that the objects of fear, belief, but also of thought and speech, are not the idea of y, but y itself. Trying to find a new solution Prior disputes with Reid, Brentano, Meinong and Findlay, and finally quotes the basic thoughts from G. E. M. Anscombe's essay: »The intentionality of sensation«. Prior considers her answer to be unsatisfactory as well, but perhaps she has contributed mostly to this problem by her differentiation of the object from the intentional object.

The last two chapters deal with Russell's concept of proper names. Prior is trying to prove that Russell's definition is applicable only to demonstratives, the complex function of which is revealed by comparison with sentences, in which they have been replaced by definite descriptions and ordinary names.

Generally speaking, in Prior's book we should not look for or expect final solutions and definite answers to the mentioned problems and topics. If there exists something at all which could decisively characterize the approach and method applied in this book, then it is the fact that the questions are posed and discussed with all their implications and aspects, while there is no insistence on the absolute truth of any of the answers. Some difficulties (the second part) seem to be unavoidable if one is to remain within the frame of logic.

Neven SESARDIĆ

Wolfgang Harich

Zur Kritik der revolutionären Ungeduld

Edition etcetera
Basel, 1971

Wolfgang Harich, der Mitarbeiter des Akademie-Verlags in der DDR, hat mit dem Buch: »Zur Kritik der revolutionären Ungeduld« große Publizität erlangt. Weder hätte das

theoretische Niveau, noch die Tiefe oder die Originalität diese Aufmerksamkeit erregt, wenn der Autor nicht schon im Untertitel »Abbrechung mit dem alten und neuen Anarchismus« der »revolutionären Ungeduld« den Krieg erklärt hätte.

Das Interesse wurde bei den Studenten geweckt, da sie durch ihre nonkonformistische Handeln der Kritik ausgesetzt sind. Dies trifft die Studentenbewegungen zweifach: theoretisch als Unmöglichkeit, die Revolution auf subkulturelle Kreise zu übertragen und praktisch als Desavouierung ihres Handelns und Entsansen an ihre Revolutionierung.

Harich begründet seine Kritik auf der Analogie des alten und neuen Anarchismus, der sich nach seiner Ansicht in unmarxistischen, sogar kontrarevolutionären Ideen sammelt: Negation der Diktatur des Proletariats, Trennung der Bewegung von der ökonomischen Basis, Negierung der entscheidenden Rolle der Arbeiterklasse, Entfernung vom Problem des Topos der Revolution — dem Privateigentum. Deshalb ist jede Bewegung »des alten und neuen Anarchismus« der Ausdruck »der revolutionären Ungeduld«, die vom alten Anarchisten Grave als: »Alles muß schon jetzt, rasch jetzt geschehen« artikuliert wurde und vom neueren Anarchisten Daniel Chon-Bendit: »Wir kämpfen für uns, nicht für unsere Kinder und wollen darum dem Sozialismus kleine Opfer bringen«.

Die Festlegung der Kritik, die der Autor reichlich mit marxistischen Textziten und der politischen Revolutionspraxis versehen hat, ist uns bekannt, wie auch die Tatsache, daß die anarchistischen Bewegungen erfolglos blieben.

Was anfechtbar bleibt, ist die Negierung der veränderlichen Bedingungen im zeitgenössischen Kapitalismus, die Spannung der Klassenkämpfe und auch die Möglichkeit der Revolution auf dem klassischen bewaffneten Weg seitens des Autors. Harichs Negierung trifft dann auch Adorno, Marcuse, die »Frankfurter Schule«. Obwohl die »Integrations-theorie« der Arbeiterklasse zweifelhaft ist-wenigstens pauschal bewertet (z. B. der »wilde« Septemberstreik in Deutschland 1968), obwohl das Ziel der sozialistischen Bestrebungen das aufgehobene Privatei-

gentum sein muß, obwohl die studentischen Mini-Revolutionen zu keinerlei Resultaten geführt haben, gelangt der Autor nicht zum Wesen des Begriffs Privateigentum, und deshalb ist diese Kritik so scharf und auch ideologisiert. Einfach alles führt zu dem Schluß-das Privateigentum aufheben. Die Frage ist sogar im juristischen Sinn problematisch, man findet keinen Ausweg, und so ist die »revolutionäre Ungeduld« auch kein Wunder. Wenn wir noch sinngemäß im Sinne von Marx das Privateigentum als äußere sinnliche Form der Entfremdung der Arbeit mit sich selbst verstehen und den Sozialismus als »allgemeines Privateigentum«, wo der Arbeiter nicht dem Nichtarbeiter arbeitet, sondern das Gegenteil der Arbeit mit sich selbst, den geschlossenen Kreis der »Arbeitswelt«, der Organisation, die Bürokratie, »der repressiven Zivilisation«, dann wird die »revolutionäre Ungeduld« um so klarer. Die Arbeitsproduktivität, das Leistungsprinzip in der Gesellschaft des Privateigentums (Kapitalismus) und des allgemeinen Privateigentums (Sozialismus) wird zu dem Sollen, dem perpetuum mobile der Produktion, zum grauen Alltag der organisierten Arbeitszeit und der bürokratischen Institutionen.

Der Begriff »Diktatur des Proletariats« selbst ist eine höhere Form der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung in der Reinheit der Gegensätzlichkeit der Arbeit mit sich selbst, aber da sie noch selbst oder erst »Arbeitswelt« ist, so wird uns die ganze extreme linke Studentenbewegung nicht so pseudo-rebellisch erscheinen, wie sie vom Autor verurteilt wird, indem er ein Zitat von Chon-Bendit anführt: »Zieh dich an und geh ins Kino. Schau dir die tragische Langeweile eines Lebens an, aus dem du jetzt ausgeschlossen bist. Schau die Bilder an, die vor deinen Augen tanzen, die spielen und leuchten, Schauspieler, die spielen und leuchten, was du täglich erlebst- aber bei dir ist es leider nicht Spiel. Dann, sobald du die erste Werbung für die nächste Vorstellung siehst, nimm deine Tomaten und verdorbenen Eier und ziele! Sag nein zu allem! Tue etwas! Suche ein neues Verhältnis zu deiner Freundin, liebe eine andere, sag der Familie nein. Beginne, nicht für andere, sondern

mit anderen für dich selbst, hier und jetzt mit der Revolution!«

Natürlich führt dieser kindische Nihilismus und dieser Hedonismus nicht zur »Diktatur des Proletariats«, und auch nicht zur Revolution. Man muß nur an den häufigen Konservatismus auch der kommunistischen Parteien denken (z. B. als die KP Frankreichs darin übereinstimmte, daß Algerien Kolonie bleiben müsse, damit der eigenen Arbeiterklasse Extra-Profiten zugesichert wären). In der Profitgesellschaft, den autoritären Strukturen und der massenhaften Verbrauchsmannipulation bestehen die Möglichkeiten eines Integrationsprozesses. Es wäre mehr als das, ein zeitgenössisches, entsprechendes Selbstbewußtsein der Arbeiterklasse zu haben, die sich vom groben Materialismus nicht bestechen ließe. In dieser Situation berühren die Studentenbewegungen, die natürlich trotz ihrer anarchistischen und romantischen Elemente nicht revolutionär sind das Wesen der zeitgenössischen bürgerlichen Welt: Stimulierung und Mitarbeit mit der Ordnung, die nur wachsenden Verbrauch sichert.

Harich Vergleich des neuen und alten Anarchismus ist korrekt gebracht. Es stimmt auch, daß heute bei den Studenten im Westen: Greve, Bakunjin, Kropotkin interessant werden. Auch ist der anarchistische Apolitismus, der dann zum Reformismus führt ebenfalls authentisch.

Der Autor ist der Ansicht, daß diese Pseudo-Rebellen, die Studenten, im kapitalistischen System absorbiert werden können, da ihnen auf dem Raum der Universität einige Rechte eingeräumt sind. Weiter ist das Problem der höheren Schulen ebenfalls periphär, und die Studenten können nur in den revolutionären Strukturen- »im individuellen Terror« gegen die Professoren revolutionäre sein. Seiner Ansicht nach sollen die Studenten die Alma Mater verlassen und sich auf den politischen Standpunkt gegen das System konzentrieren.

Die ganze Kritik der »revolutionären Ungeduld« ist in einigen Kapiteln geschrieben:

1. Das Grundmotiv des Anarchismus

2. Zustand ohne Gewalt-das Endziel auch des Marxismus

3. Die revolutionäre Ungeduld als Ausgeburd des Wunschenkens

4. Anarchismus und Voraussetzungen des realen Zustands der Gewaltlosigkeit

5. Der anarchistische Apolitismus als Konsequenz der revolutionären Ungeduld

6. Die Priorität der proletarischen Revolution und die Nutzlosigkeit der diffusen Rebellen

7. Exkurs über die Geschichte der Ideen der Bedrohung von Institutionen

8. Der Anarchismus als Zwillingsbruder des Reformismus

Die Reichweite der Studentenbewegungen, die von sozialer Unterlage getrennt sind, ihre oft kindische Schwärmerei zur »schöpferischen Macht der Zerstörung« ist uns bekannt. Trotzdem hat Harich auf dogmatische Weise den Studentenbewegungen jede Mission versagt. Das ist für die Studenten von Westdeutschland besonders interessant, die oft in ihren Aktionen an Ostdeutschland als Ideal denken.

Blaženka DESPOT

Corrado Barberis

Gli operai-contadini

Società Il Mulino
Bologna, 1971.

The transformation of rural society and home industry into urban and industrial society creates as a by-product a, let us call it, new category of citizens — the part-time farmers (»peasant-workers«). These are individuals or families with a double occupation, i. e., agriculture and industrial work or some other job. Their economy is referred to as »mixed economy« because of their double sources of income.

Economic theory and sociological research have not as yet dealt with this phenomenon in a satisfactory way, because, as far as we know, it has been difficult to organize a systematic and thorough going research. In Yugoslav society this phenomenon has practically not been researched either.

Many economists held the view that the part-time farmers, with their mixed economy, are an accompanying and temporal phenomenon and a

transitional category in all countries and especially so in developing countries; namely, during the process of transformation of agricultural society towards industrial society, from partially to highly developed industrialization.

According to this theory it was possible, on a theoretical level, to assume that this category does not deserve much attention as a very typical socio-economic category pertaining to the transitional period. It was also maintained for a long time that on the practical level, in production and income distribution, this category did not exercise a significant influence.

Such theoretical considerations often took it for granted that part-time farmers would disappear or be reduced to insignificant numbers at the end of the transitional period, because they would orient themselves to only one, more acceptable, occupation. Historical analysis has shown that the creation, existence and growth of this category of citizens does not correspond with theoretical assumptions, but is, on the contrary, constantly increasing in numbers.

The book contributed by the rural sociologist Corrado Barberis attracts our attention because it represents the first serious attempt to give a thorough-going analysis of the problem of part-time farmers as a significant economic and social factor which exists in almost every society as a successive and persistent phenomenon. Some of the problems considered by the author of «Gli operai-contadini» («Peasant-Workers») which I would like to mention here are analogous in other European societies and can be found in capitalist as well as in socialist countries to a certain degree.

In the last 15 years Italy has experienced a very significant rural exodus towards the bigger urban centres. According to Barberis the consequences of this exodus will become even more «aggressive», if the economic development in Italy continues to encourage the migration of workers to urban centres. The present situation in some regions (Lombardy, Piemont, Toscana, the Venice region; and recently also the Campania and Sicily), is characterized by a constantly increasing number of part-time farmers. That is the rea-

son why the authorities in the mentioned areas are paying more and more attention to the improvement of transportation facilities and the organization of new services, etc., because the existing facilities are not adequate to the new situation in small urban centres. By regional spatial planning they want in the first place to counteract the «catastrophic» process of spontaneous urbanization in metropolitan zones, which are in the truest sense of the word «besieged» by part-time farmers.

Italy can count on an increase in the number of part-time farmer families in the near future. Their number will grow by 2-3 million including here also a million families occupied in home industry and the same number of families that will make their living by small trade (i piccoli commercianti). Undoubtedly, Italian society is bound to encounter a number of difficulties in its endeavour to organize itself well. Therefore it is necessary to take steps right away to intensify agricultural production not only in the plains but also in mountainous regions, because such an organized production could attract a great number of the already existing part-time farmer families as well as families that are about to enter this category in the near future.

Historical analysis shows that a combination of agricultural and non-agricultural occupations has a long tradition not only in Europe but in non-European countries as well. C. Barberis poses the question of naming the new category: «peasant-workers» or «peasant-employees» according to their double occupation and partial working hours («il tempo parziale») devoted to agriculture.

The author gives a shematical representation of their participation in activities outside agriculture according to sectors of production or temporal intervals: in industry, in other occupations, at home or elsewhere; furthermore according to their dependence on the job and according to daily, weekly or temporary work.

Another indicator for defining this category, the author considers, is the question of defining it according to individuals or whole families. The answer is in favour of the generally accepted sociological standpoint to

name the individual part-time farmers and to consider whole households to be part-time farmer ones if they have at least one family member employed outside of primary productive activities.

In the second chapter of the book that bears the title »Peasant Workers in Italy« (Gli operai-contadini in Italia) C. Barberis, with his well-known literary style, enlivens the dry statistical data and by simple counting: one, one, two — represents the new statistical formula for 1970. about the evidence of the increase of part-time farmer families. The data for 1970. for the agricultural regions that gravitate towards the five most significant industrial centers: Torino, Milan, Brescia, Padova and Rome show that the number of mixed families has reached 60% of the total of households.

The typical peasant family is reported to be small, »aged«, and feminized — a situation that clearly depicts the crisis of classical farming with the family as the nucleus. In other words, many Italian families continue to exist thanks to the fact that they have abandoned agriculture as their sole occupation. In part-time farmer families there are less »aged people« and women and there is a tendency to have more children. These families are better organized in their internal structure, accept innovations more readily, make better use of their free time and acquire urban habits faster.

Entrepreneurs are quite common in Italian rural areas. Recently the appearance of a new profession could be observed: »mixed entrepreneurs«, who rent machines and agricultural equipment from the direct producers, organize various services and thus find a new means of income aside from farming.

This chapter, that gives a global description of the life situation of the Italian part-time farmers accompanied by statistical analysis, is followed by a chapter with the somewhat unusual title »Workers' Vegetable Gardens, Bourgeois Gardens«, which can perplex the reader at first sight. Namely, the comparison of a small workers' vegetable garden and a bourgeois park and the statement that they resemble each other in so far as they represent a recreation area. The worker grows small quan-

ties of agricultural products, chiefly vegetables, for his household. The author calls this »una agricoltura di gioia« — agriculture for fun, while he refers to the park as a »giardino-sport europeo« for the idle bourgeois.

The transformation of the workers' vegetable garden into a park is an idyl about which the Italian worker can only dream. He needs this space for living and producing and looks upon it as a part of his past, where he spends his »il tempo parziale.«

This somewhat naive attempt to define the free time the part-time farmer spends in his vegetable garden as — recreation, is unacceptable. After his work in the factory the worker is actually working in the garden to increase his income in order to survive.

There follows an analysis of the position of the part-time farmer from the political aspect. It is evident that legal regulations will not be able to influence Italian reality which instigates an ever increasing number of peasant families to seek new sources of income.

Italy is a highly developed tourist country and for this reason a well organized agricultural production is indispensable. The expansion of tourism will determine the increase of the number of families with a double occupation and double sources of income. According to C. Barberis the crucial question for those people is: survival or advancement. The part-time farmer families do not want to be able just to survive, but necessarily strive to reach a more appropriate, higher level of human life and to become consumers of other, hitherto unattainable, goods and commodities (culture, education, recreation and amusement).

The final chapter deals with present disputes about the problems of part-time farmers. We encounter here more analyses than polemics about individual theories, and the dilemmas: »progress or intelligence« and affluence or personality are according to the author (unfortunately) fictitious.

Italy is a country with highly developed industrial areas and a strong workers' movement. The twofold process of shortening the working hours and expanding industry thro-

gout the country will bring about simultaneously an increase of the number of class conscious part-time farmers and an expansion of the workers' movement which has up till now had a tradition in the industrial zones.

As an appendix, the author has added four articles from: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Poland and Japan, dealing with the same topic. The phenomenon of a new category of citizens in the mentioned countries bears some resemblances to the Italian situation.

Corrado Barberis' book is interesting primarily because of the scope

of the analyses, statistical data and the (literary) style. The industrial development has brought about a symbiosis of agriculture and industry and opened up new possibilities for socio-economic changes, especially concerning the family structure, but as well on the political level. The author has displayed an accurate feeling for the posing of questions and provided new instruments for the analysis of a region striving to organize itself and a period of time burdened with heavy obligations due to fast industrial development.

Jordan JELIĆ

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