

continued its deliberations in the hotel which we had forcibly captured by sternly warning the proprietor not to accept any other guests. But the police discovered us even in our new abode, and two prisoners fell into their none-too-gentle hands; but the minutes and other documents were carried to safety in time. We hastily finished the most important organizational work, elected the first Central Committee, and appointed a commission to draw up the Party platform.

The commission hid itself in a small town in the province of Poltava immediately after the police had surprised us in the hotel. There again ferreted out by the Czarist minions, we transferred ourselves to Simferopol, once more leaving two prisoners in the clutches of the government.

The result of the commission's deliberations was the ideological strengthening of our Party. One of the resolutions of the conference was to establish the "World Poale Zion Alliance".

In the course of these ten years, the Russian Poale Zion has played an important role in the world movement. Our Party in Palestine is to some extent the product of the Russian Party. The same comrades who organized the movement in Russia participated in establishing and leading the Party in Palestine. Russia systematically contributed editors to the Party periodicals in Austria, America, England, Palestine and Argentina. Russia was for a long period the foundry in which Poale Zionist thought was molten and cast for the whole world.

The secessionists, the S. S. and the *Scimists*, who in the beginning far surpassed the Poale Zion both numerically and intellectually, quickly disappeared. Their influence over the Jewish community soon evaporated, because everything that was vital in their platforms was already in the program of the Poale Zion. We continued to grow in numbers and still more in influence.

The day is not far off when the Poale Zion will assume the leadership of the whole Jewish working class. That will be history's judgment of the small, secret conference in the hot and dusty bakery where we were in constant fear of the police.

OUR PLATFORM

I.

THE NATIONAL problem arises because the development of the forces of production of a nationality conflicts with the state of conditions of production.¹ The most prevalent national conflict is the result of the development of the forces of production within one country clashing with the conditions in foreign countries. The most general prerequisite of the development of the forces of production is the territory in which the group lives. The territory comprises all the internal conditions of production; it is the ultimate source and governs all outside influences. A territory is the positive base of a distinct, independent national life.

Expatriated peoples lack this positive base. In the course of their adaptation to the natural and historic environment of the nations among whom they dwell, they tend to lose their distinctive national traits and to merge with the surrounding social *milieu*. That such peoples nevertheless exist as distinct national entities demonstrates that objective forces do not permit them to adapt themselves to the surrounding social *milieu* or, at best, hinder the process of their adaptation. Two diametrically opposed forces operate in the life of landless peoples: (1) the urge to *assimilate*, which is a result of the desire of the group to adapt itself to the environment, and (2) the tendency to *isolate* the group and make it inaccessible to the environmental pressure.

The second factor (isolation) operates as a negative element in the national development of expatriated peoples.

The national cohesion of territorial groups is based upon their national wealth, that is, upon their territories and the material conditions of production therein. A territorial nation possesses its own national economy within which the development of the forces of production takes place, and thus it constitutes a complete economic unit. In the course of its development, a nation's forces of production may be hampered by the resistance of adverse conditions. The nation is then faced by a conflict which arises from the need to expand the field of opportunities which determines its production. This necessitates the invasion of foreign territories. In such a case, the national policies assume an aggressive character. When, however, the forces of production of a given group suffer from the intrusion of foreign economic interests, that group is faced by a national conflict which arises from the need of guarding the integrity of its national territory. The policies of such a nation are defensive (protective) in character.

The *class struggle* is the concrete expression of the social conflicts which arise because the development of the forces of production disturbs the mode of economic relations of production. The *national struggle*, however, is an expression of the conflict between the developing forces of production and the existing conditions of production. But whereas social conflicts,

¹ See p. 140.

such as the class struggle, take place within the socio-economic organism, national conflicts transcend the bounds of the territorial economic unit. Of course we are not speaking of completely isolated economic units, for such do not exist. But we do have to recognize the existence of *relatively* independent economic units. The increasing economic interdependence of the capitalistic system makes it possible for us to speak of even a world economy.

There is a marked distinction between national and social conflicts. The class struggle—the concrete expression of social conflicts—grows out of the economic exploitation of one class by another. Competition within the bounds of a definite group is of importance only to the individuals concerned and does not provoke any social conflicts; competition between the individuals of a social group is a social phenomenon but not a social problem. National struggles, however, grow out of competition between national groups; and the exploitation of one national group by another is merely an incidental phenomenon which creates no crucial social problem. Only in one case does national exploitation attain the importance of an acute social problem, namely, when two national groups live together in one economic unit but constitute two distinct classes. Such a relationship exists in India, for instance, where the British residents form the class of bureaucrats and capitalists while the natives form the class of peasants and workers.

From a social point of view, national competition under capitalism is very different from individual competition. Individual competition aids in the development of the forces of production, sharpens the inner contradictions, and undermines the bases of the capitalistic society. National competition, however, is a hindrance to individual competition and acts in the same manner as a monopoly. In Czarist Russia, for example, the Jew could have held his ground in competition with the individual Russian; but since this was an economic struggle between two national groups, the Russian majority was in a position to eliminate the competition of the Jewish minority. National competition, like any factor which tends to paralyze the freedom of individual competition, hampers the development of a capitalistic economy and defers its rise and ultimate decline. National competition is not merely a struggle between two groups; it is an endeavor of one national group to seize the material possessions of another national group and to replace the latter minority along all economic lines.

Effective national competition is possible only within the national economic territory. No nation can compete successfully unless it has a strategic base. When national competition takes place between a nation living on its own territory and one that is expatriated, the territorial nation endeavors to expel the expatriated one and to deprive it of the use of its economic resources. But since the expatriated nation has no basic possessions of its own, it cannot exist unless it is allowed to use the material possessions of the majority nation.

In order to penetrate the economic sphere of the native population, the expatriated nationality endeavors to adapt itself to the conditions prevailing in its new home. The native inhabitants, however, do not allow their economic strongholds to pass into the hands of newly arrived immigrants. The new immigrant groups are therefore forced to become "useful" by turning to economic fields as yet unoccupied. They are tolerated as long as they are active in economic functions which no one has previously assumed. But when the development of the forces of production

has reached a stage wherein the native population can itself perform those same economic functions, the foreign nationality becomes "superfluous", and a movement is begun to rid the country of its "foreigners". Since the "foreigners" have no national material possessions to use in the competitive struggle with the native population, they are forced to yield their economic positions, thereby losing their livelihood. In short, the landless nationality can more or less withstand exploitation, bad as it may be; but as soon as exploitation is replaced by national competition, the landless nationality loses its economic position.

At no time is the foreign group allowed to enter into agriculture and other basic industries. Even when it is being exploited, the foreign group is tolerated only in commerce and in the last levels of production.² As soon as the native population is ready to occupy those positions, the foreign nationality is entirely isolated from any possibilities of access to the economy of the land in which it lives. A national struggle thus comes into being.

The Jews are the classic example of an expatriated group.³ The Jewish nation in the Galut has no material possessions of its own, and it is helpless in the national competitive struggle.

In our analysis of the Jewish problem we must bear in mind the fact that the national struggle is closely allied with the social. There is no struggle which is equally in the interest of all the classes of a nation. Every class has national interests differing from the national interests of other classes. National movements do not transcend class divisions; they merely represent the interests of one of several classes within the nation. A national conflict develops not because the development of the forces of production of the whole nation conflicts with the conditions of production, but rather because the developing needs of one or more classes clash with the conditions of production of its national group. Hence the great variety of types of nationalism and national ideologies.

Since the Jewish nation has no peasantry, our analysis of its national problem deals with urban classes: the upper, middle, and petty bourgeoisie; the masses who are being proletarianized; and the proletariat.

The upper bourgeoisie, because it is not confined to the home market, is not national in any true sense, but highly cosmopolitan. The Jewish bourgeoisie finds its interests best served by assimilation; and were it not for the "poor *Ostjuden*",⁴ the Jewish upper bourgeoisie would not be disturbed by the Jewish problem. The continuous stream of immigration of East European Jews and frequent pogroms remind the upper bourgeoisie of Western Europe only too often of the miserable lot of their brethren.

² See p. 65.

³ There are some aspects of Borochovism the truth of which is denied by some students of history. Ezekiel Kaufman, for instance, considers Borochov's classification of the Jews as one of the expatriated, landless nations as wrong. The Jews, he claims, are the only landless nation; therefore, their case must be considered as unique. He challenges Borochov's assumption of the impossibility for a minority to gain positions in the basic industries and points out cases in history as evidence. He denies that the Jews entered European economy after it had assumed a definite shape and therefore came to occupy secondary positions. He maintains that the Jews were pushed, during the early medieval period, out of agriculture and certain branches of industry and commerce by special efforts of the Christian society, which were directed only against the Jews and which interfered in an artificial way with the natural economic tendencies. The basic problem in Jewish life of the Galut, he maintains, is not the isolation and crowding of the Jews in certain industries but their competition with the non-Jews situated in the same economic class.

⁴ East European Jews.

The East European Jewish bourgeoisie is, of course, more directly affected by the status of Jewry. The West European upper bourgeoisie, however, considers the entire problem to be a gratuitous and unpleasant burden. And yet it cannot find a safe retreat away from our East European masses. Since the Jewish upper bourgeoisie would like above all else to lose its individuality and be assimilated completely by the native bourgeoisie, it is very much affected by anti-Semitism. It fears everything which tends to spread anti-Semitism. If anti-Semitism were the hobby of only a few psychopathic and feeble-minded individuals, it would not be dangerous. But anti-Semitism is very popular among the masses, and very frequently its propaganda is tied up closely with the social unrest of the lowest elements of the working class. This creates a dangerous cumulation of Judaeophobia.

Anti-Semitism is becoming a dangerous political movement. Anti-Semitism flourishes because of the national competition between the Jewish and non-Jewish petty bourgeoisie and between the Jewish and non-Jewish proletarianized and unemployed masses. Anti-Semitism menaces both the poor helpless Jews and the all-powerful Rothschilds. The latter, however, understand very well where the source of trouble lies: the poverty-ridden Jewish masses are at fault. The Jewish plutocracy abhors these masses, but anti-Semitism reminds it of its kinship to them. Two souls reside within the breast of the Jewish upper bourgeoisie—the soul of a proud European and the soul of an unwilling guardian of his Eastern coreligionists. Were there no anti-Semitism, the misery and poverty of the Jewish emigrants would be of little concern to the Jewish upper bourgeoisie. It is impossible, however, to leave them in some West European city (on their way to a place of refuge) in the care of the local government, for that would arouse anti-Semitic ire. Therefore, in spite of themselves and despite their efforts to ignore the Jewish problem, the Jewish aristocrats must turn philanthropists. They must provide shelter for the Jewish emigrants and must make collections for pogrom-ridden Jewry. Everywhere the Jewish upper bourgeoisie is engaged in the search for a solution to the Jewish problem and a means of being delivered of the Jewish masses. This is the sole form in which the Jewish problem presents itself to the Jewish upper bourgeoisie.

The middle bourgeoisie is bound more closely to the Jewish masses. In general, the economic interests of a middle and petty bourgeoisie depend on the market which the mass of the people affords, which market is co-extensive with the national language and cultural institutions. Therefore, in the case of territorial nations, the middle and petty bourgeoisie is the chief supporter of all types of "cultural" nationalism. Since this section of the Jewish bourgeoisie has no territory and market, it falls under the influence of assimilatory forces. On the other hand, because of the intense national competition in which the middle and lower bourgeoisie is involved, the isolating factor of anti-Semitism is felt in every branch of activity. Anti-Semitism is at the root of all the discriminatory laws against Jews in politically backward countries and of the social boycott in the bourgeois-democratic countries. The boycott, which is becoming more organized and more intensive, overtakes the Jewish bourgeoisie everywhere: in trade, in industry, in social life, and even in the press. With the growth of capitalism there is a corresponding growth of political democracy on the one hand, and of national competition on the other. Those who see in the growth of political democracy the elimination of discriminatory laws against the Jews and the corresponding lessening of the acute form of Judaeophobia (such as pogroms) see merely one side of the process.

They fail to recognize the continual sharpening of national competition in bourgeois society, the growth of which is parallel with that of democracy. This process strengthens the hostility and makes for a stronger and more efficiently organized boycott against the Jews. The Jewish middle and petty bourgeoisie, with no territory and no market of its own, is powerless against this menace. In the white-collar class the discrimination against the Jewish physician, engineer, and journalist forces them to face the Jewish problem. Jewish misery is closer to them than to the upper bourgeoisie. Their nationalism, however, is of a specifically middle and petty bourgeois character. Lacking any means of support in their struggle for a market, they tend to speak of an independent political existence and of a Jewish state where they would play a leading political role. They feel the effects of state anti-Semitism very strongly and therefore strive to protect Jewish civil and national rights. Since they are directly affected by the poverty and degeneration of the Jewish masses, they tend to advocate a Jewish national policy.

But as long as they succeed in retaining their middle class position, as long as the boycott and the isolation brought about by anti-Semitism have not yet undermined their material well-being, the center of gravity of their political interests continues to be in the Galut. Their personal needs remain outside the Jewish national sphere, for the conflict between their economic interests and the conditions of production restricting Jewish life has not yet reached a peak. In other words, as long as the Jewish middle bourgeoisie retains its economic position it is relatively unconcerned with the Jewish problem. True, the Jewish problem is a cause of certain discomforts to the middle class, but the class is not sufficiently hard pressed to desire a radical change in its condition. Its energy can be utilized to a certain extent in behalf of the rehabilitation of Jewish life, but the middle class as a whole can never be the base for a movement of Jewish emancipation.

II.

For the purpose of this discussion we may consider the Jewish petty bourgeoisie and the proletarianized masses as one group. As a result of historical circumstances, this group constitutes a large majority of the Jewish people. To us proletarian Zionists this class is doubly significant. In the first place, the Jewish proletariat has become socially differentiated from the larger group only recently. (To understand the Jewish proletariat it is necessary to analyze properly the petty bourgeoisie, which still serves as its reservoir of manpower.) Secondly, the heterogeneous mass of emigrating petty bourgeoisie and proletarians-to-be is the main source of the human material for the future Jewish rehabilitation.

National competition, which is characterized by economic isolation and government boycott, both organized and unorganized, weighs heavily on the back of the Jewish petty bourgeoisie. The Jewish petty bourgeoisie suffers much more acutely than does the petty bourgeoisie of any other nation and is forced to enter the ranks of the proletariat. However, the extent to which Jews can become members of the established working class is quite insufficient. Capitalistic economy requires a large reserve of unemployed labor. To this reserve the Jewish petty bourgeoisie supplies a larger percentage of its number than does the petty bourgeoisie of other peoples.

Should we divide world production into two groups, one of which is engaged in creating the means of production and the other in producing consumers' goods, we would find that Jewish capital is invested mainly in the production of consumers' goods. Because of the effects of national rivalry among the masses who are in search of jobs, Jewish labor finds employment almost exclusively at the hands of the small Jewish industrialist. Hatred of Jews on the part of non-Jewish employers and non-Jewish workers practically excludes Jewish labor from non-Jewish work-shops.

Aside from the intentional boycott, both organized and unorganized, there are other factors which contribute toward the inability of the Jewish worker to face the competition of the non-Jewish worker. The Jewish proletarianized elements are mainly city-bred, while their non-Jewish rivals hail from an agricultural environment. The latter have a number of advantages over the former. They are stronger physically, and their standard of living is lower. The Jewish worker, steeped in the traditions of a non-worker's life, requires much more comfort and luxury; therefore he adapts himself more quickly to the class conflict and enters the struggle with his employer more readily than the non-Jewish worker. In addition, for a number of historical reasons, the Jewish worker is not as well prepared technically as the non-Jewish city-bred worker. These factors, however, are insignificant in comparison with that of national competition between the Jewish and non-Jewish worker. National competition is found even in the well-developed capitalistic countries, such as America, England, and South Africa—wherever the Jewish immigrants encounter masses of non-Jewish immigrants who are better adapted to obtain employment. As a result Jewish labor gains employment mainly from the Jewish middle bourgeoisie.

As soon as the national conflicts and national competition grow intense, a conscious anti-Jewish boycott is undertaken which results in immigration restrictions. In both England and America there is ample evidence of a growth of anti-Semitism with all its reactionary characteristics and consequences. Since Jewish capital becomes the sole employer of Jewish labor, the growing need for proletarianization among the Jewish masses cannot be satisfied.

Jewish capital is mainly invested in the production of consumers' goods. This type of production is usually characterized by seasonal employment, sweatshop conditions, and piece-work. The exclusion of Jewish labor from the heavy industries is so prevalent that non-Jewish workers consider them as their own special field of employment. The encounters between the Jewish and non-Jewish workers at Bialystok are ample proof of this state of affairs.

The national problem of the declining Jewish petty bourgeoisie consists in its search for a market which should free it from the horrible economic isolation which characterizes it at present.

In the case of this group, the national problem is very acute. To solve it, the Jewish petty bourgeoisie is forced to abandon its native lands and to migrate to new countries, but even there it finds no satisfactory solution. Misery overtakes the bourgeoisie; poverty is its lot in the new country. It therefore enters the labor market and is transformed into a part of the working masses. In the labor market, too, it must face national competition. Consequently, the proletarianized Jewish petty bourgeoisie can penetrate only the final levels of production. Thus there arises a national struggle based on need and the impossibility of satisfying the need.

The national question of the petty bourgeoisie, then, is the quest for a national market and the conservation of the associated cultural institutions such as the language, national education, etc. Concretely, the problem of the Jewish petty bourgeoisie is that of emigration; the quest of an expatriated nation for a place of economic security.

The Jewish problem migrates with the Jews. Thus a universal Jewish problem is created which involves not only Jewish philanthropists but also the political powers of the civilized nations.

In general the existence of an impoverished petty bourgeoisie constitutes a great danger. This element represents the decaying remnants of a previous economic order. They are socially and psychologically disorganized and constitute a "mob" whose activities will be characterized mainly by chaos and reaction. Wherever they are given a chance to engage independently in the solution of a social problem, they inevitably produce undesirable and chaotic results. The progressive forces within a democratic country must always be on the alert lest these elements cause irreparable damage. But these "dregs of the capitalistic order" also participate in the quest for a solution of the Jewish problem. Pogroms and other primitive forms of reaction—these are their method of solving the Jewish problem. This "solution" succeeds only in poisoning the entire surrounding political life. This mob is the same everywhere: in Baku and in London, in Kishinev and in New York, in New Orleans and in Berlin, in Tokyo and in Melbourne, in San Francisco and in Vienna. Everywhere its method is identical: pogroms and violence. It kills Jews in Russia, massacres Armenians in Caucasia, and lynches Negroes in America. This mob is the mainstay of all political charlatans and of all the reactionary forces of a moribund social order. These excesses which the dying regime sponsors are a permanent menace to law and order in democratic countries. But they are inevitable as long as migrations of petty bourgeois and proletarian masses continue and as long as national competition exists between them and the corresponding Jewish classes. It is significant that these anti-social methods of solving the Jewish problem are employed by the most reactionary elements of society under the leadership of representatives of the middle bourgeoisie and the chauvinistic intelligentsia. The democratic governments, however, cannot afford such chaotic methods for the solution of any problem. For these interfere with the law and order which are so necessary for the proper development of capitalism. Open violence and public scandals are not in the interests of the ruling bourgeoisie. Both the bourgeoisie and the revolutionary proletariat are equally interested in a peaceful and systematic solution of the various problems, including the Jewish problem.

How then is the solution of the problem to be achieved? Those factors which tend to intensify the conflict did not exist in the feudal countries where Jews had been living for a long time. The complete social isolation of the Jews and the migrations common to Jews and non-Jews alike are of recent appearance and are closely bound up with the development of capitalism. Under these circumstances it is futile to resort to assimilation as a solution. It may sound paradoxical, but it is true nevertheless, that in the Middle Ages the prospects for assimilation were not as utopian as they are under the present order. In the Middle Ages the isolation of the Jew was not as fundamental as it is at the present time. The Jews, though excluded from the basic economic processes of life, nevertheless had some economic foundation. They fulfilled a function which accelerated the development of the system of production of that society and were thus

"useful". The then existing civilized world was their national market. Later, as capitalism developed, the Jews were eliminated, and wholesale expulsion took place. But this was not typical of every country where Jews lived and did not occur in all places at the same time.

Only in the first epoch of the newly developed industrial capitalism did the assimilating factor operate strongly in Jewish life.

It was then that the industrial revolution caused the walls of the Ghetto to collapse, and a wide field of free competition was opened to the Jews. The epoch of the decisive struggle between capitalism and feudalism was the golden era of Jewish assimilation. But this era of free competition which characterized the rise of capitalism was superseded by national competition. Then assimilation gave way to isolation.

All assimilationists are essentially utopianists, for all the forces operating within Jewish life point in a diametrically opposed direction. Intensified national competition does not stimulate Jews to assimilate; on the contrary, it strengthens the bounds of national solidarity. It unites all the scattered parts of the Jewish nation into one isolated unit. Along with the development of the inner national forces, national competition evokes universal interest in the solution of the Jewish problem.

All the processes operating within Jewish life arise from national competition against the Jews and are influenced by Jewish migration. Therefore, to obtain a correct perspective of the development and dynamics of Jewish life, it is necessary to make a thorough investigation of the tendencies of Jewish migration.

Emigration alone does not solve the Jewish problem. It leaves the Jew helpless in a strange country. For that reason Jewish immigration and any other national immigration tend toward compact settlements. This concentration alleviates the process of adaptation to the newly found environment, but at the same time it accelerates the rise of national competition in the countries into which the Jews have recently immigrated. If so large a number of Jewish immigrants had not settled in New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago, it is doubtful whether national competition against them would have come into existence; but the existence of the Jews as such would have become impossible. The outward contradictions of Jewish immigration—the clash between the habits brought along from the old country and the conditions in the new country—necessitate concentration.

Such concentration, however, contains a double contradiction. Mass concentration aims at facilitating the process of adaptation to the new environment, but it results in the segregation of the newly arrived group and hinders the process of adaptation. Upon his arrival, the immigrant seeks to enter the first levels of production. Through their concentration in the large cities, the Jews retain their former economic traditions and are condemned to the final levels of production—the manufacturing of consumers' goods. Thus the need of the Jews to develop their forces of production and to become proletarianized remains unsatisfied.

The contradictions inherent in this process lead to decentralization of the concentrated mass of immigrants. Jewry settles in more or less compact masses not in one place, but in many, thus aggravating the problem. Instead of remaining localized, the contradictions appear in numerous places. The Jewish problem thus becomes more acute and evolves into a world problem.

As a result of these two fundamental contradictions, the Jewish petty bourgeoisie and working masses are confronted by two needs. The impossibility of penetrating into the higher levels of production creates the need for concentrated immigration into an undeveloped country. Instead of being limited to the final levels of the production as is the case in all other countries, the Jews could in a short time assume the leading position in the economy of the new land. Jewish migration must be transformed from immigration into colonization. This means a territorial solution of the Jewish problem.

In order that the Jewish immigration may be diverted to colonization of undeveloped countries, it is not sufficient that the colonization merely should be useful to the Jews. It is also necessary that the immigration to the previous centers become more difficult. This, as a matter of fact, is taking place. Because of national competition, immigration into the well-developed capitalistic countries is being limited. At the same time, the need for Jewish emigration is steadily becoming greater; and it can no longer be satisfied by the old centers of absorption. New lands must be found, and the emigrants increasingly tend to go to semi-agricultural countries.

To avoid decentralization, there is need for organizational forces which would unite the Jewish masses and which would introduce system into the spontaneous processes of migration. Left alone, Jewish migration will continue to be a confused and scattering process. A new and conscious element is required. The Jewish emigrating masses must be organized, and their movements, directed. That is the task of the conscious Jewish proletariat.

The scheme of the dynamics of Jewish life operates as follows: (1) emigration of the petty bourgeoisie who turn to proletarianization, (2) concentration of Jewish immigration, and (3) organized regulation of this immigration. The first two factors are the products of the spontaneous processes operating in Jewish life; the last, however, is introduced by the organized Jewish proletariat.

Capitalistic economy has reached the stage where no revolutionary changes are possible without the participation of the working masses and especially of the organized sections of the proletariat. The emancipation of the Jewish people either will be brought about by Jewish labor, or it will not be attained at all. But the labor movement has only one weapon at its command: the class struggle. The class struggle must assume a political character if it is to lead to a better future.

Proletarian Zionism is possible only if its aims can be achieved through the class struggle; Zionism can be realized only if proletarian Zionism can be realized.

III.

Proletarian Zionism is a complex product of Jewish proletarian thought. After eliminating all factors that are incidental, temporary, or local, and aberrations that inevitably complicate every fundamental social process, we could find an unusually strict consistency in the development of the Poale Zion. As in the case of every social movement, the evolution of Jewish proletarian thought is the result of a wide gap between the needs of the masses and possibility of satisfying these needs. The main factors that give rise to this gap operate in two directions: (1) the *social* conflict between the developing forces of production of the Jewish proletariat and the economic relationships in which it lives, and (2) the *national* conflict

between the developing forces of production of the Jewish proletariat and the sum total of the conditions of production.

The Jewish proletariat therefore faces two tremendous tasks: the abolition of the capitalistic system and the elimination of national oppression.

The social conflict is invariably clearer and much closer to the proletariat than the national conflict. The social conflict is embodied in the personal relations between the employer and the employee. The fact that the capitalistic economy makes the worker *de facto* master over the operation of the means of production gives the worker at once a powerful weapon of struggle. The obvious exploitation of the worker and the possibility of his laying down his tools and gaining concessions thereby present the economic side of the social conflict in bold relief. For this reason the worker grasps this phase of the conflict in the very early stages of its development.

The political aspect of this conflict is much more complicated and therefore harder to analyze and comprehend. The determining factors are more remote from the worker, and his encounter with them takes place at a relatively advanced stage of the economic struggle.

As a result of the law of economy which operates in organic and social mechanics (a direct consequence of the more general law of conservation of energy), every gap between need and provision seeks its abridgement first of all within the framework of the conditions that caused the gap. Only gradually there matures the realization of the necessity to change the conditions. The emphasis of the struggle then shifts to new and more remote spheres. At the beginning of its struggle, the proletariat strives to attain liberation by means of the economic conflict. Only at a later and more advanced stage does this struggle assume a political nature. The Jewish proletariat passed very rapidly through both stages of development of the social conflict. The economic struggle very easily transformed itself into a political struggle because of the harsh conditions prevailing under the Czarist regime.

The national conflict is infinitely more complex than the social conflict. In the case of the national struggle the personal relations between the oppressed and oppressor do not play such an important role. In spite of the personal character of national encounters, it is clear at first sight that national oppression is of an impersonal nature. The objective and impersonal characteristics of class exploitation appear to the proletariat only at a late stage in the development of proletarian thought. National oppression, on the other hand, immediately makes its impersonal nature manifest to the observer. The oppressed Jew is not faced by a particular individual non-Jew who is directly responsible for his sufferings. It is very clear to him that a whole social group oppresses him. The Jew finds it difficult to analyze his social relations to this group, especially in the early period of the conflict. In addition, the mutual national relationships do not provide the oppressed group with any weapons for its struggle.

The stages in the development of national conflicts are therefore more numerous than those of social conflicts. The Jewish worker first of all tried to solve his national problem under the same conditions which had given rise to the problem. Gradually, however, he arrived at the revolutionary solution—the need for a radical change in the conditions of his national existence.

We can now understand why some Jewish proletarian parties offer a highly advanced analysis of the social conflict but are very backward in their interpretation of the national problem. Such parties may have a

large following, but that only proves that the national conflict is not sufficiently advanced for the true analysis to win support. Such backward programs are doomed to extinction with the development of the national conflict.

It is not at all surprising to see such proletarian parties existing among Jews, especially when we remember that the Jewish problem is probably the most complicated of all. To find a correct solution requires the expenditure of much energy. It is for this reason that the initial response of the Jewish proletarian parties to the national problem is often primitive and reactionary.

The proletariat must be considered from two different angles. In the first place, the proletariat produces the social wealth; in the second place, it constitutes a class which carries on its own struggles with the non-proletarian classes. The worker, as a worker, is interested only in the raising of his wage level and in the general improvement of his conditions of work. For this purpose the worker needs, first of all, a secure place of work. As long as the worker still has to compete with others in the search for employment, he is part and parcel to the proletarianizing masses and has not assumed as yet a definite proletarian class physiognomy. The worker becomes a full-fledged proletarian only after he has acquired the feeling of security in his place of work; only then is he ready to take up the struggle against capital for the betterment of his condition. His place of work becomes a strategic base for his struggle, in contrast to what it had been formerly—a *casus belli* among the workers themselves. At this stage of development there emerges proletarian solidarity. Of course, workers' solidarity is not an absolute guarantee against competition for employment. On the contrary, the danger of dismissal is always imminent; every now and then the worker has to be able to defend his place in the face of competition of his fellow worker. He again emerges as a potential member of the unemployed, with the interests which were peculiar to his former status during the transitional period of proletarianization. Thus in dilatory fashion, sometimes falling, sometimes halting, often retreating, the proletarian slowly emerges purified by the sufferings of his bitter struggle for work and bread. The road travelled by the proletarian in the formation of his class consciousness is long and hard.

The worker who is bound by his economic insecurity to the work place, so that he cannot use it as a strategic base, is not in a position to carry on independent political action and can play no historic role. He is not master of his own fate. But when we speak of the proletariat as a class, we must exclude the competition for employment among the workers and imply only the unconditional class solidarity in the struggle against capital. The worker is concerned with the place of work only insofar as he has not succeeded in entirely severing his relations with the proletarianizing masses to which he formerly belonged and into which he may be thrust again at some future time. The interests of the proletariat as a class are related only to the strategic base—to those conditions under which it carries on its struggle against the bourgeoisie. In summary, the development of the forces of production of the masses who are forced to proletarianization compels them to find a place of work; the development of the forces of production of the proletariat demands a normal strategic base for an effective class struggle. The striving for a strategic base is neither less materialistic nor less idealistic than the struggle for a place of work; but the former concerns an entire stratum of society, while the latter is merely in the interest of individuals or groups. In the sphere of interests connected with the search for a work place, there arises not only a

personal but also a national competition. The achievement of a strategic base eliminates both. Without a work place it is impossible to carry on a struggle; and as long as any group of workers is subject to national competition, it cannot carry on the class struggle successfully. Its strategic base is bound to remain weak.

Thus although the proletariat as a class is ideologically not concerned with national competition, national competition may nevertheless have an indirect but important bearing on its interests. With the petty bourgeoisie and the proletarianizing masses, this competition expresses itself concretely in the form of a national struggle. In the case of the proletariat, the competition assumes the form of a national problem. The national problem looms before the proletariat as well as before all the classes of the nation. If the development of the forces of production of the proletariat (i. e., of its class struggle) is hampered by the abnormal conditions of its strategic base, then there arises before it the national problem. The national consciousness of the proletariat awakens.

In some classes which retain a caste character, national consciousness and class consciousness exist and function independently of each other. For example, the feudal lords of Russia are "genuine Russian patriots" as well as members of the nobility. As Russians they have the "welfare of the nation" at heart, but as nobility they are ready to exploit the nation for their own ends. The middle and petty bourgeoisie and the impoverished masses characteristically have their class consciousness obliterated by their national consciousness. Class consciousness is, so to speak, excommunicated as a threat to "national unity". These above classes are, then, *nationalistic*. Only with the proletariat is the national problem closely allied with the same strategic base, with the same imperatives of the class struggle upon which is built its class consciousness.

One characteristic of the relationship between class consciousness and national consciousness should be noted. Because the national interests of the proletariat have little in common with the national struggle of the other classes, proletarian nationalism is not aggressive. The nationalism of the proletariat is thoroughly negative; it fades away as soon as the need for normalizing the strategic base is gone. That does not imply, however, a lack of positive content. No other class is as capable of providing a real national program such as the proletariat offers.

There are all sorts of misunderstandings with regard to the nationalism of the proletariat. Some who fail to see the positive content consider proletarian nationalism reactionary. Others, who see clearly the causes which have given rise to it, are apologetic; they consider a Jewish national program to be a tragic necessity. "Unfortunately, we are forced to carry through a national program. We would like to assimilate, but we are forced to remain Jews"—such for example is the tone of the propaganda of the S. S.

But these errors are merely the result of immature thought. The proletariat welcomes everything which aids in the development of its forces of production and opposes everything which hampers that development. Therefore the obfuscation of class consciousness and of national consciousness are equally odious to the proletariat. The proletarian is not ashamed of the tasks which are incumbent upon him as a class conscious worker, and he is equally unashamed of his national obligations. With pride we declare, "We are Social Democrats, and we are Jews." Our national consciousness is negative in that it is emancipatory in character. If we were the proletariat of a free nation, which neither oppresses nor

is oppressed, we would not be interested in any problems of national life. Even now, when under the pressure of national conflicts we have acquired national consciousness, spiritual culture concerns us less than social and economic problems. Ours is a realistic nationalism, free from any "spiritual" admixture.

For the Jewish proletariat the national problem arises because the development of its forces of production disturbs the conditions of its strategic base. The strategic base of the Jewish worker is unsatisfactory both politically and economically. The economic struggle of the Jewish worker is successful during the busy season when his employers are forced to yield under pressure in order not to lose valuable time. Once the season is over, the employers are in a position to take back all the concessions which they had previously granted. At the beginning of the new season, the fruits of the economic struggle have vanished; and the worker once more has to take up the struggle in order to regain the same uncertain victory. The Jewish strategic base is even less satisfactory politically. Since the Jewish worker is employed almost wholly in the production of consumers' goods and performs no important function in any of the primary levels of production, he does not hold in his grasp even a single fundamental thread of the economy of the land in which he lives. Thus his influence upon the general mode of life is very limited. He is incapable of paralyzing the economic organism in a single stroke as can the railroad or other workers who are more advantageously situated in the economic structure. The Jewish worker is not exploited by *gross Kapital*; his exploiter is the small capitalist whose role in production is negligible. When the Jewish worker does go on strike against the industry which exploits him, he does not appreciably disturb the equilibrium of the country. He is not even strong enough to obtain his just demands without the support of the other more fortunate workers of the surrounding nationalities. He cannot obtain even the most minor concession when his national needs do not coincide with those of workers of another nationality. This helplessness engenders within him the sense of proletarian solidarity and brings him closer to revolutionary ideals. As a matter of fact, class antagonisms within Jewish life are comparatively minor. In the first place, the concentration of capital is small. Then, too, the Jewish middle class, which is oppressed even more than the middle class of any other oppressed nationality (such as the Armenian, etc.), constitutes itself as an opposition group. Politically it offers the proletariat some support, unreliable though it may be. Under these conditions, the Jewish proletariat is doomed to trail behind the mighty political labor movements of the country.

The Jewish proletariat is in need of revolution more than any other. It is hoping most ardently for the good which is expected to come with the growth of democracy in society. The terrible national oppression; the exploitation on the part of petty Jewish capitalists; and the comparatively high cultural level and restlessness of the city-bred Jewish proletarian, the son of the "people of the book"—these generate an overwhelming revolutionary energy and an exalted spirit of self-sacrifice. This revolutionary zeal, hampered by the limitations of the strategic base, very frequently assumes grotesque forms. A disease of surplus energy is the tragedy of the Jewish proletariat, and is the source of its sufferings. A chained Prometheus who in helpless rage tears the feathers of the vulture that preys on him—that is the symbol of the Jewish proletariat.

IV.

In its efforts to solve the problems connected with the national conflict, the Jewish proletariat has undergone definite stages of thought and activity. Its reactions have become steadily more complex, more coordinated, and more revolutionary. At first the Jewish worker attempted to solve his national problem in the framework of the conditions that had given rise to it. Only at a later stage did he realize the need for a radical change in the conditions themselves. Each one of the stages through which the proletariat passed was of significance, for each was anticipating the following, more revolutionary stage. It is the Jewish proletariat that has developed the most coordinated program for the solution of the national problem, namely, the program of the Jewish Social-Democratic Workers Party, Poale Zion.

Our ultimate aim, our maximum program, is socialism—the socialization of the means of production. The only way to achieve socialism is through the class struggle of the Jews within the ranks of world-wide Social-Democracy. On this we shall not dwell.

Our immediate aim, our minimum program, is Zionism. The necessity for a territory in the case of the Jews results from the unsatisfactory economic strategic base of the Jewish proletariat. The anomalous state of the Jewish people will disappear as soon as the conditions of production prevailing in Jewish life are done away with. Only when the Jews find themselves in the primary levels of production will their proletariat hold in its hands the fate of the economy of the country. When Jews participate in those sectors of economic life wherein the social fabric of the whole country is woven, then will the organization of the Jewish proletariat become free and not reliant on the proletariat of the neighboring peoples. The Jewish workers' class struggle will no longer be directed against a powerless bourgeoisie, as in Galut, but against a mighty bourgeoisie which organizes the production of the country. The class struggle will enable the proletariat to wield the necessary social, economic, and political influence.

Our point of departure is the development of the class struggle of the Jewish proletariat. Our point of view excludes a general program of the Jewish people *as a whole*. The anomalies of the *entire* Jewish nation are of interest to us only as an objective explanation of the contradictions in the life of the Jewish proletariat. The subjective motivation of our program flows solely from the class interests of the Jewish proletariat. We defend our own interests, that is, the interests of the Jewish worker. We also defend our cultural needs and economic needs, wherever we are. We fight for the political, the national, and the ordinary human rights of the Jewish worker. For that reason we also advance national demands along with the general demands of the Social-Democratic minimum program. The national demands enter automatically into our minimum program.

We will consider the Jewish question fully solved and its anomalies wholly removed (insofar as it is possible within the framework of bourgeois society) only when territorial autonomy for the Jewish people shall have been attained and the entire nation shall constitute a relatively unified national economic organism.

But colonizing a territory is a prolonged process, during which we must also defend our needs in the Galut. We must assume that a large part of the Jewish people, including a part of the proletariat, will always remain in the Galut as an ordinary national minority. For that reason

we include in our program, along with territorial demands, the demand for the maximum protection of our national needs in the Galut. Explicitly, this means national political autonomy for the Jews in all Galut lands.

National autonomy is not a radical solution of the Jewish problem and, therefore, cannot remove the anomalies of the Jewish economic strategic base. However, it provides the Jewish proletariat with the necessary political forms. It serves to place the proletariat in the political arena face to face with the Jewish bourgeoisie. But even if it is incapable of making a radical change and cannot give the Jewish proletariat an efficient weapon in the struggle against the prevailing form of capitalism, we must still remember that national political autonomy is the maximum obtainable in the Galut. The shortcomings of national political autonomy emanate from the abnormal conditions of Galut life.

National political autonomy, even with all the democratic guarantees possible, remains only a mere palliative. Without territorial autonomy it will not lessen the national oppression of the Jewish people, will not change the Jewish social structure, and will not set great forces in motion. Jews, however, will be granted a normal representation which will serve to make an end to shameful backdoor politics. It will be a powerful unifying force among the Jewish masses; it will provide the Jewish nationality with a proper financial apparatus; and what is most important, it will provide them with a political education, will teach them even in the Galut to create and shape their own destiny.

This achievement is small in comparison with what can be obtained in an autonomous territory, but it is important when compared with what exists at present. We know how limited our civil equality will be in practice; yet we demand legal civil equality. We know that our national equality in the Galut will in reality be very circumscribed; nevertheless, we demand full national equality without any legal limitations. Life itself will see to it that we do not gain too much, so we must do everything within our power to get the optimum out of national equality.

An examination of the growth of democracy will reveal the stages in the attainment of national political autonomy. Just as socialism will result from processes implicit in the concentration of capital and will be established by means of the class struggle, just as the fall of autocracy will result from processes inherent in the capitalistic development of Russian society and will be precipitated by the class struggle—just so will the realization of national political autonomy result from processes inherent in the development of society along nationality lines and will come about through the class struggle of the proletariat and its allies. However, our most important national demand is territorial autonomy. It is being realized by means of processes inherent in Jewish immigration. In the course of its migration, the Jewish people does not degenerate, nor does it resurrect itself; it merely transforms itself.

V.

The most general law governing migration in the capitalistic era is the following: *the direction of migratory labor depends upon the direction of migratory capital*. This law was propounded by Marx. In order to deduce the real facts concerning general and Jewish migration, it will

be necessary to describe the social relationships between the entrepreneur and the laborer.

Language is the medium of contact, constituting a national bond. In small-scale industries, the entrepreneur and the laborers are in close propinquity; for there the entrepreneur not only organizes and distributes the jobs, but frequently also works shoulder to shoulder with the employees. Mutual understanding of questions pertaining to the functioning of the industry thus develops another national bond. But in large industrial establishments, a complex hierarchy of managers and officials separates the entrepreneur capitalist from the laborers. Therefore, in large-scale production there is no necessary national tie between entrepreneur and worker.

Similarly, in the field of distribution the language is merely a means of communication between the seller and the buyer. The wholesale merchant is separated from the consumer by brokers and other intermediaries. To him, therefore, language and other national ties are of little significance. The retailer, however, is closely allied with the consumer by language and national customs. Large industry and business are international, while petty industry (and a part of middle industry as well) bears a clearly defined national character. The latter's sphere of activities is determined by the national market, and its sphere of exploitation reaches only the workers within the national boundaries. (As far as Jewish industry is concerned, this particular analysis has to be modified; for the Jews find themselves in a foreign economy. They do not use their national language in business but generally assume the language of the land. However, wherever they live in compact masses, Jews do not assume the foreign language very readily.) The petty merchant is very close to the consumer and is therefore liable to national boycott, but the large capitalist can very easily hide his nationality under a hierarchy of intermediaries.

This, fundamental fact—the existence of national ties between the entrepreneur, worker, and consumer in petty industry, and the absence of them in large industry—is even more obvious during the migration of capital and labor. *Capital and labor of petty industry always migrate together and retain their national character in their new domicile.*

The migration of labor is never directed to countries where there exists a large labor reserve in the peasantry. Countries such as Germany, France, and Italy will never be countries of immigration as long as their capitalistic development follows the present trend.

In determining the direction of migration we must also consider the differences between the level of economic development and the level of cultural and political development. In the European democratic countries, all parts of the population enjoy the benefits of a high cultural and political level of life, regardless of sharp economic differences. If we want to apply to the phenomenon of mass migration the law according to which migration tends in the direction of least resistance, we must determine the resistances and all the factors connected with them. We then arrive at the following important conclusions. Of two countries acceptable for immigration, that country which promises the higher economic level affords the line of least resistance. Of two countries with identical economic levels, that country which promises the higher cultural and political level affords the line of least resistance.

The causes of emigration may lie in a prolonged economic depression or oppression. In the capitalistic era, the proletarianizing masses emigrate because of persistent economic pressure. The landless peasant masses migrate to new countries, where pools of unused capital accumulate because of the absence of reserve labor forces. Accumulation of capital is possible only in places where there are good prospects for its development. The cultural and political standards of a country are of great importance in determining the influx of capital. For that reason the ruined peasant population of Europe will not migrate into politically backward countries. *The migration of European peasantry is tending and will continue in the direction of the democratic countries of the New World.*

The outstanding national character of the lower middle class is evident in the process of immigration. The peasants concentrate into national blocs in their newly found homes. Italians, Germans, and other nationalities each make up independent settlements. Along with the Italian peasants, who constitute a mass of small consumers, there immigrate also Italian petty merchants, artisans, and professionals. This is also the case with every national group of immigrants.

Only international investment capital, the transfer of which gives direction to immigration, is perfectly free of any national character. (One other group bears no national character in immigration. It includes the dregs of society, such as professional thieves, white slave traffickers, and gamblers. International hooliganism knows no nation or fatherland. Its favorite centers of immigration are the harbor cities, the gold and diamond districts, and all places where it is possible to fish in troubled waters.)

Of an entirely different character is the immigration of the urban petty industrial population. In the case of this element, the migration of wage-labor depends on the small capitalist. The urban petty industrial population follows the entrepreneurs of its nation. No matter how acute the need for proletarianization grows to be, it will not be filled unless conditions force the petty capitalist to emigrate. On the surface, it would seem that economic ruin is sufficient to cause the emigration of small capitalists. This, however, is erroneous; for a ruined capitalist loses his class status. In order for capitalists to emigrate, there must be a constant economic threat or continual persecution. In the case of Jewish emigration, pogroms, civil persecution, and general insecurity play a decisive role. If the new country of refuge is economically suitable, if Jewish capital may be utilized to advantage and production enhanced, emigration of the impoverished masses increases and the success of the first pioneers of Jewish capital brings additional numbers of Jewish entrepreneurs and workers. Mass immigration is thus precipitated and gains impetus from new pogroms and persecutions. (It must be noted, too, that for petty capital the cultural and political development of the country is of much less significance than it is for large capitalistic ventures.)

Until recently, international capital was directed to the newly developing countries. The large inflow of capital into those countries accelerated the development of the forces of production, exploited natural resources, and created a demand for labor. For that reason, an intensive migration of the proletarianizing peasantry of many nations has been directed toward the new countries. Since a developing economy ruled by international capital created a need for consumers' and service goods, there was room

for Jewish immigration. Jews followed the general stream of world migration.

This situation was the case until recently. Lately, new tendencies began to appear. The natural resources, for the development of which a great deal of capital has been expended, became limited. Wage reductions became common, and capitalists' profits diminished. International capital began to look for new investment channels and turned to financing agricultural projects. At the same time, workers who had been too compactly settled were unable to find employment. Thus a break occurred in world immigration, and even larger groups of immigrants turned to agrarian countries.

It is necessary to point out two characteristics of agricultural colonization in undeveloped countries. These characteristics arise from the fact that colonization takes place upon the initiative of government institutions which encourage loans in order to improve conditions in the grain trade and to provide live stock and machinery on a long term credit basis. Italian, German, and Slavic peasants, who formerly immigrated into the United States, Australia, and South Africa as unskilled workers, at present go to Argentina, Brazil, and Canada where they become independent homesteaders on government lands, with an inventory for which they can pay on the installment plan. Even though these homesteaders appear to be independent, they nevertheless find themselves in the clutches of investment capital. Because of long term credit, loans from international financiers do not seem so oppressive and do not ruin the farmers. In agrarian countries the farmers cannot grow products to meet their household needs; they must grow crops for the market. They must pay their debts and must therefore exchange their products for money. The new countries dump large quantities of grain on the world market, and the resulting competition eliminates those elements which cannot maintain the proper standard of farming. On the other hand, long term credit helps the farmer to entrench himself in his holdings and keeps him from proletarianization. In countries which are predominantly agricultural there is no place for individual large farms because of the lack of laborers. Instead of offering one's services to the landowner, one has the opportunity to acquire land for oneself. Even the intensification of agriculture does not tend to ruin the farmer, because the farmers cooperate in the introduction of machines, new methods of fertilization, and land irrigation. In this, the government is of great help. Along with the farmer of a particular nationality, there enter into the land petty merchants of the same nationality who satisfy the limited needs of the farming population.

From what has been said, it is possible to draw important conclusions concerning the tendencies of Jewish migration. Since the stream of world migration has turned in another direction, Jewish migration must also find new channels. But are predominantly agricultural countries adapted to Jewish immigration?

To answer this question we must first distinguish between spontaneous immigration and planned colonization.

It is clear that spontaneous, unregulated Jewish immigration cannot direct itself to new countries in order to serve commercial and industrial functions or to take up agriculture. The former task is impossible, because in those countries there is no place for petty capital. Small-scale production and petty commerce do not reach the world market. If the Jewish masses do not find a local market for their products there, they have no good reason for immigrating into such countries. It is true

that the Jews can make a determined attempt to engage in farming, but such attempts are doomed to failure. Jewish farmers would have to compete in the world market and would surely lose. As city-bred people, the Jews are unable to compete with Italian and other peasants who have an agricultural background. The geographical location is unimportant. Jewish workers may live in Africa and the Italians in America—they will still compete in the world market. For this reason, all attempts at Jewish land colonization to date have been a failure and have borne merely a philanthropic character.

Equally unsuccessful will be the attempts at planned colonization in such lands. The organization of such colonization must, from its very inception, assume the character of a large-scale financial enterprise. It will have to compete in the world market and will swiftly be led to bankruptcy. If, on the other hand, it should attempt to engage in large-scale manufacturing, it will fail either because of comparatively low productivity or because of the relatively higher price of Jewish labor.

Territorialism, if it is to continue to be a revolutionary movement within the Jewish people, must find support in the spontaneous processes of Jewish life. Territorialism does not signify a mere spontaneous migration of Jews, but a spontaneously concentrated immigration. The analysis of territorialism may be considered as complete only when one can point to the land for immigration. Territorialism apart from a particular territory is utopian.

The above determined laws with regard to the processes of immigration and emigration have led us to the conclusion that Jewish immigration is being excluded from countries of wide land colonization and from countries of large industrial investments. The world-wide stream of immigration increasingly tends toward agricultural countries which offer free land to immigrants. The Jews, in the era of capitalistic competition, cannot at once turn to farming. The economic activities of the Jewish immigrants tend to lose their industrial and commercial character and to be transferred from the final levels of the process of production to the primary levels—to the basic industries and farming. This transfer, however, cannot occur at once.

For that reason, Jewish migration differs from the general stream of migration and must seek for itself entirely different channels. Everything that tends to isolate Jewish life helps to make Jews more nationally conscious. Jewish immigration assumes a national character, and this spirit finds expression in the spread of a national ideology of emigration.

The need for emigration of the Jewish nation is merely one of the forces leading to its rehabilitation. When planned immigration will assume a national character, it will fuse with our other aspirations for rebirth. Abstract territorialism is an incomplete ideology of national emancipation; the whole and synthetic form is Zionism.

Jewish immigration is slowly tending to divert itself to a country where petty Jewish capital and labor may be utilized in such forms of production as will serve as a transition from an urban to an agricultural economy and from the production of consumers' goods to more basic forms of industry. The country into which Jews will immigrate will not be highly industrial nor predominantly agricultural, but rather semi-agricultural. Jews alone will migrate there, separated from the general stream of immigration. The country will have no attraction for immigrants from other nations.

This land will be the only one available to the Jews; and of all countries available for immigrants of all lands, this country will provide the line of greatest resistance. It will be a country of low cultural and political development. Big capital will hardly find use for itself there, while Jewish petty and middle capital will find a market for its products in both this country and its environs. *The land of spontaneously concentrated Jewish immigration will be Palestine.*

The immigration of the Jews into Palestine will differ considerably from their previous wanderings. Formerly, they had to adapt themselves to the needs of the native population; their primary function was to satisfy the native consumers' needs or, as in the case of the United States, the needs of a mixed population which consisted more of immigrants than of natives.

In Palestine, Jewish immigrants for the first time not only will aim to satisfy the needs of the native population, but will also produce for the external market of the surrounding countries of the Mediterranean, and in time even for the world market. Until now, Jews have always been dependent upon the native populations in the lands of the Galut. The organization of Jewish labor was not self-sufficient but was determined by the nature of the relationships that existed among the native population. The Jewish welfare in the Galut was always dependent upon the "usefulness" of the Jews to the ruling nationality. The needs of the natives, their ability to pay, and the rivalry between Jewish merchants and professionals and the corresponding groups of the native population—all of these factors helped bring about a narrowed field for Jewish economy in the Galut. Aside from these limitations the Jews, both in their old places of residence and in the new lands of immigration, began to be displaced and become pauperized; they became superfluous. Compulsory isolation became their fate; national oppression and persecutions took place. The chief cause for this one-sided dependence of the Jews on the native population lay in the expatriation of the Jewish people.

With the migration into Palestine the situation will change radically. The welfare and functions of Jewish immigrants in Palestine will depend not on the native population but on the foreign market, which will for a long time be able to absorb the products of Palestine because of the favorable location of the Mediterranean. Jewish labor will encounter national competition neither on the part of the native population nor on the part of the new immigrants. In Palestine, the Jews will perform the functions which serve as a transition from the production of consumers' goods to the creation of the means of production.

As to the question of how many Jewish immigrants Palestine can absorb, it is easy to see that the absorptive capacity of the land depends on the degree of capitalistic development in the neighboring countries.

If, for instance, Egypt becomes a land with increasing exports, it is evident that the imports to Egypt will grow as well. Since the Jewish settlers in Palestine will be interested in the neighboring foreign market, large-scale capitalistic enterprises will develop among the Jews. The tendencies of Jewish immigration will be affected by those of the world market insofar as they affect the southeastern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. We do not assert that Jewish immigration into Palestine will always progress uniformly; from time to time it may fluctuate. Also, because

of economic crises or political complications, there may be a temporary exodus from Palestine. *But the general tendency will undoubtedly be a continual growth of Jewish immigration into Palestine.*

Those who think that such a radical transformation of Jewish life as territorialism implies can occur without a bitter struggle, without cruelty and injustices, without suffering for innocent and guilty alike, are utopianists. Such revolutions are not recorded in ink with high sounding phrases; they are written in sweat, tears, and blood.

We have investigated the tendency towards the concentration of Jewish immigration and towards the formation of a relatively economically independent Jewish community in Palestine. The masses of the Jews in the Galut, who do not take a far-seeing view of their emigration needs, will join in our Zionist endeavors because of their immediate needs. The greater the interest of the surrounding nations in the radical solution of the Jewish problem and the greater the national consciousness and organization of the Jews in the Galut in response to oppression and isolation, the more energetically will organized Zionism impress itself upon this spontaneous process and the more desirable will its results be.

The broadening and consolidation of Jewish economic and cultural positions in Palestine will proceed at a rapid pace along with the above mentioned processes. Parallel with the growth of economic independence will come the growth of political independence. The ideal of political autonomy for the Jews will be consummated by *political territorial autonomy in Palestine.*

Political territorial autonomy in Palestine is the ultimate aim of Zionism. For proletarian Zionists, this is also a step toward socialism.

VI.

Because proletarian Zionism has recognized the *spontaneous concentration of Jewish immigration into Palestine*, it has completely shaken off all former utopian concepts with regard to the realization of territorial autonomy.

Immigration to Palestine rises above those measures with which utopianists usually approach the question of Palestine. Some of us may revere Palestine as our former fatherland. Others may consider Palestine a proper center of immigration because of its geographic proximity to centers of Jewish population. Still others may imagine that the ideology of the movement, of national emancipation, includes a special preference for Palestine. Others, on the other hand, may believe that Zionism is guided by purely practical calculations. All these differences of opinion have no bearing on our analysis.

Our Palestinism is not a matter of principle, because it has nothing to do with old traditions. Nor is our Palestinism purely practical; for we do not recognize the existence of other fit territories to choose from. The trend of thought of the practical adherents of Palestine is as follows: a territory is needed; Palestine is a possible territory; it is the best territory under the circumstances; therefore, Palestine. Our line of thought, however, is: there are migratory processes inherent in the Jewish life; Palestine is the future land for the spontaneous waves of immigration; consequently we will have territorial autonomy in Palestine. The practical adherents of Palestine assert that theoretically they are territorialists, while practically they are for Palestine. With us, however, theoretical territorialism is not to be distinguished from concrete territorialism;

for concentrated Jewish immigration will direct itself toward Palestine and not toward any other territory. We do not claim that Palestine is the sole or best territory; we merely indicate that Palestine is the territory where territorial autonomy will be obtained. Our Palestinism is neither theoretical nor practical, but rather predictive.

Thus we have liquidated the "search for a territory". This task we entrusted to the inherent processes of Jewish immigration. Our task is not to find a territory, but to obtain territorial political autonomy in Palestine.

The general task of the territorialist movement is to regulate the spontaneous processes, especially the immigration processes, which lead finally to territorial autonomy. As a matter of fact, we have two territorial movements: bourgeois Zionism and proletarian Zionism. What then is the role of each in Jewish life?

In every spontaneous process, it is necessary to distinguish between two factors, even though the distinction is difficult: creative factors and liberating factors.

The development and accumulation of the forces of production, the creation of new combinations of material forces, the growth of capitalism—these are the creative factors in the evolution of modern society. The creation of free conditions for the development of the productive forces, the growth of democracy—these are the liberating factors of modern social evolution. Both the creative and the liberating factors are spontaneous, even though they both are subject to regulation.

The bourgeoisie regulates the creative factors of the spontaneous process; the proletariat regulates the liberating factors. The development of capitalism is being carried on by the bourgeoisie; but it is the struggles of the proletariat that bring about the growth of democracy.

The sphere of activity of the bourgeoisie cannot be precisely delimited from the sphere of activity of the proletariat. The bourgeoisie is partly interested in the growth of democracy and aids in the process, but its role is insignificant in comparison with that of the proletariat. On the other hand, in whatever concerns the development of the forces of production and the capitalistic evolution of society, the organizing role belongs to the bourgeoisie. Although the proletariat is interested in the development of the forces of production, its sphere of activity lies outside of it, and it puts forth no particular demands therein. When the dictatorship of the proletariat shall have been attained, labor will organize all work. Until then, the proletariat does not interfere, as a class, in the regulation of the creative factors. Thus, it is not the task of the proletariat to be concerned with digging canals or building railroads. Here the proletariat puts forth no demands, because these are the creative factors of capitalistic evolution. But whenever it does interfere in the technical organization of the work, it is for the sake of obtaining better working and living conditions. In the case of colonization, one finds an identical situation. Colonization methods are not the concern of the proletariat in the capitalistic era; for they are a part of the creative area of capitalistic activity, a part of the organization of production. The proletariat, however, may demand some regulation of the property relationships and other legal arrangements in the colonies; for these are in its proper sphere—the liberating one.

When we pass to those spontaneous processes in which territorialism is realized, we must again distinguish between creative and liberating factors and thus clarify the respective roles of the bourgeoisie and of the proletariat.

The creative elements in the process consist in the accumulation of capital and labor in Palestine, in the exploitation of the natural resources of the land, in technological development, and in the general development of the forces of production. To regulate all these is chiefly the task of bourgeois Zionism. Immigration into Palestine must be properly guided, and colonization must be supervised.

To regulate the spontaneous Jewish immigration into Palestine means to facilitate the entry of capital and labor and to utilize those forces in the most economical and rational manner possible. This must be the realistic direction of the activity of the Zionist Congress.

The Jewish proletariat lives in the Galut, and there it struggles for its daily needs. Among these needs is the freedom of immigration into Palestine—the inviolability of the right of entry there. Objective processes lead the Jewish proletariat to Palestine, and in Palestine it must struggle bitterly. It would be easier to attain freedom in Palestine if life in the Galut were more bearable; and the stronger our political power in Palestine, the more respected will our rights be in Galut. This is an integration of Galut and Zion. The maximum we can obtain in the Galut is national political autonomy. In Palestine, however, the maximum is territorial and political autonomy. Which we shall obtain first does not matter. National political autonomy in the Galut is not only one of the means by which territorial autonomy in Palestine can be obtained, but is also an independent goal. These are two aims that are united by the historic process which unfolds itself simultaneously in all its breadth in Galut and in Palestine.

Utopianism always suffers because it strives to ignore historical processes. Utopianism wishes by means of human endeavor to create something not inherent in social life. Fatalism, on the other hand, assumes that the effective participation of human will is impossible with regard to these historical processes, and thus it drifts passively with the stream. Utopianism knows of no historical processes. The utopianists fear to mention the phrase "historical processes"; for they see in the so-called historical process fatalism and passivity. The fatalists, on the other hand, fear the conscious interference with the historical process as a dangerous artificiality. The fatalists forget that history is made by men who follow definite and conscious aims. Utopianists forget that the results of human activity coincide with human aims and purposes only when those aims and purposes are well adapted to the historical necessities of social life.

We ask, "What role can our will, our consciousness, play in the historical processes of Jewish life?" To the conscious interference of human will there must be added another factor, that of organization. Organization is not a mere sum of individual efforts, but rather a collective social force. Along with the historical social tendencies we must introduce planning. To regulate historical processes means to facilitate and accelerate their progress, to conserve social energy, and to obtain the optimum results from the labor put forth.