



TASKS OF THE NEW STAGE

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INTRODUCTION

The Third National Congress of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine was held between March 6 and 9, 1972.* The Congress was held amid very complex and difficult objective and subjective conditions. Since the events of September 1970, and the series of battles that followed between the resistance movement on the one hand, and the reactionary and imperialist agent regime of Jordan on the other, it has become very clear that the revolution waged by our people falls in a new stage which is more strenuous and difficult than the previous one. This picture became clear to the masses following the results of the battles in Jerash and Ajlun in July 1971.<

The task of the revolution in this situation is to undertake a critical view of the previous stage and to combine this with a scientific analysis of the new reality together with a complete understanding of the present stage. It is in the light of this analysis and understanding that the tasks and programmes of the revolution for dealing with the coming stage must be defined.

As a left-wing organization, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has become aware that its primary task lies in formulating a clear vision of its future development. A complex situation like the one facing our people now cannot be dealt with by spontaneous and off-hand action or by hasty adventurist undertakings. We view the Palestinian liberation struggle as a long-term people's war extending over tens of years. It cannot achieve victory except through a people's revolutionary struggle. Such a struggle must be led by a revolutionary organization, itself built through struggle, and must be based on a revolutionary, theoretical perspective together with a proletarian determination which knows no despair.

Therefore, the energies of the organization were devoted, during the months that preceded the congress, to the study of the political report and organizational programmes that were presented by the political leadership to deal with the coming phase.

The political program together with the proposal relating to the internal organization of the Front, were the subjects of democratic discussion among the cadres and the bases of the Front. This was in preparation for the Third National Congress so that it would be able to develop and sanction these programmes in the light of the issues and matters raised by the discussion.

It is this which gives a special importance to the Congress, the political report that emerged from it, the organizational programme on transformation and the internal regulations of the Front. For all these form a comprehensive guide for action in the coming phase for which the Front is preparing itself. This new situation is more difficult and arduous than the one we faced during the period between mid-1967 to mid-1970.

This report, which was crystallized at the Third National Congress of the Front, and which was officially approved as a guide for action complementing the political and organizational programme issued by the

February Congress of 1969 ** should form the basis for observing and analyzing the coming events and for defining scientific positions on these. Its program should also form the basis for the direction of all our military and political effectiveness. In this we must, naturally, benefit from our experience and all the lessons revealed by dynamic practice.

PFLP – CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMITTEE

* The First Congress was held in August 1968, the second in February 1969. ** Published in English under the title, “A Strategy for the Liberation of Palestine.”

I. A View of the Experience in the Previous Stage

The defeat of June 1967 created new objective conditions which helped to accelerate the growth of Palestinian armed resistance. In the previous period, the resistance was confronted with the political reality by the Arab Nationalist regimes and their leaders at a time when they had reached the peak of their growth. In addition the resistance was subjected to harassment and repression at the hands of the reactionary Arab regimes.

The collapse of the nationalist regimes' plans and programmes, and the destruction of their power in the June 1967 war, coupled with the collapse of the reactionary regime's total hegemony in Jordan and the dislocation of its military establishment and its instruments of repression led to a rapid growth of the resistance movement. Other objective consequences of the June defeat, taken into account provide the Palestinian and Arab masses with the direction that would facilitate the resolution of their contradictions with their enemies, hence to realize their aims.

The resistance movement created a revolutionary situation among the Palestinian masses and the beginnings of a feeling of agitation among the Arab masses as a whole, which had an impact on the Arab Liberation Movement. It attracted the attention of international revolutionary forces. It also formed, to some extent, a source of anxiety to the Zionist and imperialist enemy and a serious threat to the reactionary regime in Jordan. This regime constituted, historically speaking, the safety-valve of the plans of imperialism in Palestine and more generally in the whole area. The Palestinian resistance movement has also come to constitute a serious threat to the plans of imperialism in the latter's attempt to solve the Palestinian problem so as to ensure the continuation of its interests in the area. Through all this the resistance movement became a force capable of exerting pressure on and exposing the impotence of the Arab regimes. Hence it was accelerating the process of terminating the stage represented by the regimes and thus prepared the way for the consolidation and the ascendancy of a new revolutionary stage led by a new class, capable, this time, of putting an end totally and radically to the contradictions between the masses and the imperialist presence in the area.

The resistance movement continued, increasingly, to express all this up to the battles of September 1970 and July 1971. It became obvious to the Palestinian and Arab masses – following these two battles – that the resistance was in a difficult predicament. This predicament was creating doubts about the future and the actual capabilities of the resistance to represent the hope that the masses previously attached to it.

The hasty analysis preferred by some following the battle of September 1970 and of Jerash (July 1971) and which predicted the temporary, partial and passing nature of the situation of retreat and weakness that the resistance experienced, were merely deductions based on wishful thinking and lacked the minimum level of bold scientific analysis. Such analysis should delve into the real causes, both objective and subjective, which led to the deepening and prolongation of the debility of the resistance, and the resulting wave of despair among the ranks of the Palestinian and other Arab masses who had given the resistance, before September 1970, their unconditional confidence.

Our responsibility lies in taking a precise look at the new conditions, comprehending them fully, and perceiving the factors which brought them about. This should be in preparation for the formulation of a program of action which can lead the resistance movement out of the resent morass and towards its revitalization so that once again it can represent the hopes around which the masses gather and mobilize, and for the realization of which they fight resolutely.

The starting point lies in having a new situation. This can be classified scientifically under two main headings:

- The new objective conditions which were formed lately and more clearly than ever before.
- The subjective conditions of the resistance movement.

II. The Objective Conditions

a) The Reactionary Regime of Jordan

The Jordanian reactionary regime found itself after the June defeat, at the weakest point in its history. A history founded on the suppression of the masses and on a complete reliance on imperialism externally, and exploiting forces internally.

The June defeat crushed and fragmented the Jordanian military establishment. This was due not only to the strong military blow of the Israeli army but also to the fact that the Jordanian military establishment was formed from the beginning, not as a nationalist army, but as a repressive police-like instrument experienced in assaulting the unarmed masses. This explains the enormity of its collapse, despite the very light losses, which it sustained in the few battles it was forced into in the West Bank.

As a result of the situation to which the military establishment was reduced (its smashed equipment, fleeing cadres, broken morale) the Jordanian reactionary regime was forced to advertise in the newspapers its readiness to pay the amount of two months' salary to soldiers who re-joined the armed forces. This step provided new evidence of the determination of the ruling class to rebuild the military establishment on the same mercenary principles as those established by British imperialism when the latter created the emirate of Trans-Jordan. This was meant to ensure the allegiance of this institution as an instrument of repression against the masses.

The defeat, the loss of the West Bank, and the long, bloody repressive history which forms the essence of the Jordanian regime, have destroyed all hopes the regime had of winning support. It had clung to such hopes since it announced its intention to wage the June battle of 1967. The new situation resulted in the regime's mental and moral weakness. This spread to such an extent that some of the social forces which the regime used to depend on in facing the mass movement were not prepared, at the time, to support an early battle against the resistance movement. The latter was quickly moving towards filling the vacuum resulting from the semi-total collapse on the two banks of the Jordan.

The reactionary Jordanian regime, which we consider as part of the enemy camp, attempted several times, on different occasions, to undermine the resistance: its subjective strength, the degree of popular support it enjoyed, and its Arab national extensions. Each time it was forced to retreat out of fear that the consequences might turn out the opposite of what it planned.

The reactionary regime in Jordan guided directly by imperialism and its experts in counter-revolution and as a result of a large number of studies, worked continually for the whole three years on changing the balance of power. In this it derived the maximum benefit from the serious weakness in the structure of the resistance movement and the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois nature of its leadership. It also benefited from the accelerating revival of the reactionary together with the reconciliatory Arab forces.

The reactionary regime in Jordan was not only able, during the September battles of 1970, to defend itself, but was also able to pursue the resistance movement, and to disrupt the reconciliatory tactics of its leadership. Thus it was able to achieve a sense of victory which stretched from September 1970 to July 1971 and ended in the elimination of the open existence of the resistance movement in Jordan and the renewed domination of the machinery of repression over the Palestinian and Jordanian masses.

The reactionary regime depends now on a military institution which numbers around 70 thousand. These are equipped with the latest American weapons. Some of them have been specially trained to fight guerrilla movements. They have also been mobilized psychologically and politically to develop a deep hatred for the resistance. They were also given material incentives so that the salary of a soldier increased from 9 Jordanian dinars prior to June 1967 to 19 dinars. This military machine was tested by the campaigns conducted against the resistance before September 1970. Furthermore, all nationalist and even hesitant elements were dismissed from the ranks of the army. This ensured the readiness of the military establishment to strike at the masses without any consideration.

Furthermore, the reactionary regime in Jordan was able, through its material capabilities and its utilization of the mistakes of the resistance, to mobilize and recruit the majority of Jordanians in the East Bank, so as to enlist their support against the resistance. All available means were used for this purpose. For instance it recruited mercenary groups of intellectuals, journalists and artists to manufacture a historical and intellectual basis for the Jordanian structure, and to establish regionalist feelings supported by privilege. It also set about building up regionalist traditions giving the royal family a pivotal place. All this was supported by a campaign of plays, songs and poems which were produced and popularized specifically for this purpose.

To this must be added the political and military experience in its dealings with and deception of the resistance movement. This experience is provided by imperialism whose own experience is gained from its fight against struggling peoples.

The most prominent characteristics of the new political situation which we now face are as follows. The recovery by the reactionary regimes of its military, oppressive and investigatory powers, its reliance on all the power capabilities and experiences of imperialism. In addition there is the regime's dependence on regionalist sentiments which it succeeded in mobilizing and its consequent success in regaining the initiative in its battle against the resistance. All these characteristics must be appreciated fully. This will enable us to find the way out of existing predicaments in a correct and scientific manner.

b) The Designs of Imperialism

It is natural that imperialism from the beginning viewed the resistance phenomenon as a danger to be watched. It is natural too for imperialism to view the danger of the resistance initially, in terms of the latter's size and effectiveness at that period. That is a cautious, watchful view, based as a whole on that of Israel's at the time. At the time Israel thought that it would be able to finish off the resistance

movement in a few months or at least to live with it for a number of years without it having an effect on the Israeli Zionist presence in the area.

It is obvious that this outlook springs from the basis according to which imperialism views the movement of the masses. It thought that the devastating defeat inflicted upon the Arab regular armies would be sufficient to curb the masses and that the resistance movement would not be capable of forming a real or serious threat to the status quo which was established through the use of force in June 1967.

The resistance movement, especially during the second half of 1969 and the beginning of 1970, proved that it is not as limited as imperialism believed. Objectively speaking, the resistance constituted the beginning of an Arab mass movement on a wide scale. Nothing which could be considered as a large obstacle appeared then to stand between the resistance and its ability to achieve more polarization of the Arab masses.

The resistance movement had become a model emphasizing revolutionary violence as the method by which the masses confront their enemies. It had also come to exert pressure on the nationalist regimes thus preparing the way for the emergence of a nationalist movement surpassing these regimes, and constituting a real threat to imperialist interests and bases in the area, especially those represented by the reactionary regime in Jordan. Similarly the left-wing forces within the resistance movement had begun to exert pressure on the whole political perspective, examples of this are: their position regarding the plans for settlement, in particular their emphasis on the organic link between the Israeli presence, imperialist interests, and the reactionary regimes in the area; and the question of surpassing the leadership of the nationalist regimes and their refusal to submit to the tutelage of these regimes.

American interests in the Arab area are basic and have both material and strategic value. They also form an indispensable source to the dominant imperialist power, and an essential link in the chain of its economical domination in other parts of the world. For example, although American investments in Arab oil constitute only 2.5 per cent of the total American investment abroad, they, nevertheless, provide the US with 45 per cent of the total revenue it receives from its foreign investments. The American companies reaped in 1968 from their exploitation of Arab oil a new profit of 2418 million dollars. Furthermore, America trade with the Arab world achieved in 1969 a surplus in its trade balance of 545 million dollars. This figure represents 34.2% of the total foreign trade balance of the U.S.

These passing examples about American companies alone are mere indicators regarding the way in which the Arab world is being pillaged by imperialism. Nevertheless, profits of non-American Western companies from Arab oil in the extracting stage alone, totalled one thousand million dollars in 1968. This accordingly returns to the pockets of dominant American monopolies in Western Europe. Western monopolies achieve a profit on invested capital that reaches nearly 65%. This is the highest in the world. In addition, there is a strategic value to this pillage. It is symbolized glaringly by the fact that most of the fuel used by American forces in its aggressive war in Indochina is derived directly from the oil refineries in the Saudi part of "Ras Tannura" which is controlled by American oil companies.

This exploitative reality briefly exemplified above is reflected in serious American designs to crush any national liberation movement which has the potential to carry out a struggle to put an end to this situation.

The accelerating developments of the resistance, its ability to attract the masses, its growing effectiveness on the Arab national liberation movement, its increasing call to link the Israeli presence with American imperialist domination of Arab wealth, and the conclusions reached by many studies carried out by American institutions linked with the Department of Defense (such as “Rand Corporation” and “Ford”) all these hastened in pushing the American leadership towards exerting its pressure and all its capabilities in order to supervise directly the crushing of the resistance and its actual and potential danger, thus blocking the road to another Vietnam in the area.

The Middle East has become “area number one” for imperialism according to Nixon himself. This explains the announcement made by Nixon during the September events that the period was the most critical period in his life. It also explains the existence of an operations’ room in the White House during September which supervised the battle and which issued hourly reports about its progress to president Nixon.

Thus imperialism moved from being the observer simply encouraging Israel and Jordan to attack the resistance, to that of the major power responsible for crushing and eliminating the resistance.

If we ignore the fact of the non-employment of American troops directly in the battle we find, nevertheless, that the U.S. did all it could to strike at the resistance: all its capabilities were put on the alert, it was concealed behind a Jordanian reactionary front, helped and directed it from the wealth of its experience in its attack on the resistance.

The intervention of U.S. imperialism was total. It included the supervision of Jordanian propaganda abroad. As a result of instructions given by the CIA to American information centers, U.S. imperialism was equipped to help in deepening the regionalist struggles and division between “Jordanian” and “Palestinian. This became clear from documents that were published later.

In June 1970, to be exact, Washington began, through the chief of the “Agency for International Development” (general security branch) in Amman, to establish a direct link with the Jordanian forces for training and giving advice as a consultant. The “security branch” of the Agency for International Development is well-known in Latin America where it is associated with wide experience of repression. The task of this center is to provide various forms of aid to the systems of repressions of reactionary governments.

Later, sixty-five Jordanian officers, who received training in the International Police Academy in Washington were put into responsible positions in Jordan in preparation for the September campaign.

Washington, together with Jordan and Israel prepared what was known as the emergency plan for September 1970. The responsibility for this was in the hands of Henry Kissinger, Richard Helms from the CIA, David Packard from the Defence Department and Admiral Thomas Mooser from the general staff. The ambassadors of Israel and Jordan also participated in this plan.

The basis of this emergency plan depended upon Israel attacking Syria should the latter move to help the resistance, and on parading the Sixth Fleet. It also depended on mobilization of the 8th Airborne Division in readiness for its landing at Amman Airport for operations there, to prepare the way for the arrival of American troops stationed in West Germany. After September 1970, the United States allocated 120 million dollars to Jordan to be paid for the next three years as a reward for the part played in smashing the resistance. The American Senate considered Israel, South Korea and Jordan to be the three countries of the world to have proved the success and effectiveness of American foreign aid.

These examples show the importance that Washington attached to the role of Jordan before September 1970 and afterwards.

The transition of imperialism, headed by America, to a position of direct supervision of the clash with the resistance and the mobilization of all its capabilities for this, constitutes one of the major characteristics of the current stage. This must be taken into consideration when discussing the new objective conditions which the resistance movement has had to confront since September 1970.

c) The position of the Nationalist Regimes

During the early period of the resistance (1967-1969), when the defeated nationalist regimes were unable either to wage a war against Israel or enter into acceptable process of negotiations with it, they saw in the resistance a trump card capable of helping to pressurize Israel into withdrawing from the occupied territories in return for their recognition of Israel and of its rights to secure borders and free movement in water passages of the area. Hence, these regimes stood, generally speaking, in alliance with the resistance, at least they declared so in public.

These regimes, whose promises had been believed by a large number of people, were unable to stand against the resistance. The "vacuum" which was created as a result of the collapse of the Jordanian military establishment corresponds to a political collapse in the nationalist regimes. It was impossible, therefore, for these regimes to view the resistance as a negative phenomenon, as was the case before the defeat.

It was still in the interests of these regimes to hold the resistance as a trump card with which to pressurize Israel. However, conditions for the initial stage of implementing the Security Council Resolution No. 242 of 1967 became favourable in mid-1970. The U.S. then introduced the Rogers Plan and this was accepted by Egypt which began to think seriously about creating the conditions suitable for its implementation.

Egypt's acceptance of the Rogers Plan came as the logical step in the retreatist direction which the petit-bourgeois military regime had found itself forced to follow since the defeat, this, despite its verbal and propagandist war. Such regimes, in their behaviour towards and their fear of organizing the masses, their truce with reactionary forces, their dependence on the latter's so-called aid, and their reliance on the same class forces that led to the defeat were moving, in reality, towards the acceptance of more defeatist plans. No other road was open to them.

The development in the positions of the "nationalist regimes" could not take place without it having direct and indirect consequences on the resistance movement. For the acceptance of surrender is implicitly, an acceptance to liquidate the resistance.

The resistance generally rejected plans for this elimination and for a political settlement. Indeed, at the time it had achieved a level of military and political effectiveness capable of being a real obstacle in the face of the implementation of these plans. Furthermore, the left-wing forces within the resistance were capable – through their popular revolutionary and political stands – of imposing their position on the whole of the resistance movement. And these facts made it in the interest of the regimes to subjugate the resistance, incapacitate it, and absorb it into their own strategic framework. Hence, they moved into a position of conflict with the resistance and prepared to clip its wings.

This also constitutes an important element in understanding the new objective conditions of the resistance. It means the transition of a specific force from a position of support to one of antagonism. The transition forms an essential and radical change in the balance of forces. These regimes now stand objectively, with forces whose aims are the emasculation and eventual elimination of the resistance movement as a revolutionary phenomenon. This does not necessarily mean the slaughter of the resistance. But it definitely means attempts at its contents and paralysis of its independent and revolutionary political effectiveness, hence, transforming it into accepting a policy for capitulation.

d) The International Position and the Resistance

National liberation movements in this age are intimately linked to each other, to the socialist countries and to the struggle of the proletariat in the capitalist and imperialist countries. No doubt, these three forces have both positive and negative effects upon each other, which are reflected in the development of their struggle.

Any view of the Palestinian or Arab national liberation movement which sees this in isolation from the international struggle against imperialism (which is international in scope) is utopian in outlook, and is incapable of understanding the nature of the struggle in our age or its dimensions and dialectical relations.

The following phenomena are bound to influence the movement of the Palestinian and Arab struggle: the inactivity of labour movements in the Western bourgeois democracies, the rift in the unity of the

socialist countries, and the revival of petit-bourgeois, reformist and military regimes which have offered themselves and an alternative to mass movements.

On the other hand, there is the inability of the Palestinian Resistance Movement to understand the international dimensions of its struggle against imperialism and consequently its future to establish serious and intimate alliances with other liberation movements in the world, the socialist countries, and with proletarian parties in the capitalist countries. This weakness led, generally speaking, to the support by many of the progressive forces in the world of the Security Council Resolution No. 242 of November 1967 as a framework for political action on the international level, it also was the reason for their inability to undermine this support for the benefit of the resistance movement and the Arab national liberation movement.

The leadership of the resistance movement is partly responsible for this, but it by no means bears the total responsibility. The following factors all have their part in explaining this failure: a) the general conditions through which the national liberation struggle is passing; b) the disunity of the socialist countries; c) the conditions of the proletariat of the capitalist world; d) the present situation of the total imperialist attack; e) and the "Vietnamization" policy adopted by imperialism (not only in Vietnam but also in other parts of the world.)

Furthermore, the submission of the Arab nationalist and petit-bourgeois regimes to the will of the reactionary regimes and their repression of progressive movements, i.e., communist parties, labour movements and youth uprisings have all contributed, in the present situation, towards the creation of obstacles to a more advanced international alliance.

In addition, the left-wing in the resistance movement, despite all efforts made in this sphere, did not give this basic dimension of the struggle adequate attention.

III. The Subjective Conditions of the Resistance

Objective conditions are not sufficient as an explanation for all the aspects of crisis of the resistance.

The picture remains incomplete without a look at the resistance movement itself, its class, its attributes and programs. All these played and continue to play a basic role in clarifying matters.

The resistance movement in its present state does not possess the necessary conditions to enable it to defy imperialism. The resistance, because it is not led by a revolutionary party representing the working class, has no such theory when facing the difficulties of the battle and their solution for the benefit of the revolution and the provision of the subjective conditions necessary for victory. These are:

- a revolutionary theory to provide a clear vision of the battle.
- a solid party to lead the battle.
- a wide national front led by this party which mobilizes all class and political forces under the leadership of the working class and its revolutionary party.
- an organizational structure which creates in the consciousness of the revolutionary individual discipline, efficiency and honourable conduct toward the masses. In this way he becomes both an example to and a leader for the people.

The resistance movement did not seem to be aware of these things.

It was and remains led by a group which represents on the whole an alliance between the bourgeoisie and the petit-bourgeoisie, with all that these classes represents in the way of intellectual and political oscillation, and organizational instability, together with the negative consequences of these on the revolutionary movement.

The left-wing forces within the resistance were:

- immature and had not completed their development into real Marxist-Leninist organizations on the intellectual, organizational and combative level.
- disunited in their position, in fact, in most cases they were opposing and fighting each other.
- unable, in terms of size and effectiveness to impose their theoretical, political and military stands on the arena.

The fact that the resistance movement was led by a bourgeois class led to certain attitudes and mistakes which must be taken into consideration in explaining its predicament.

a) The attitude towards the reactionary regimes

The structure of the resistance as a whole and its bourgeois leadership made it a dangerous mistake; i.e. the non-specification of a correct attitude and outlook with regards to the reactionary regime in Jordan.

The concentration of the main forces of the resistance in Jordan, and its vague position with regard to the existing powers there, meant its submergence in idealism and the absence of a clear definition of political attitudes toward basic and concrete issues. It is clear that all this was bound to have fateful consequences.

The Jordanian regime was established originally as a base from which imperialism and Zionism could fulfill their plans in Palestine. And its history is witness to this fact: it is totally and organically linked to American imperialism. Consequently, it constitutes a force for oppressing the masses. It is part of the enemy's camp as far as the revolution is concerned. Despite all this the leadership of the resistance – because of its class and ideological structure and its lack of a clear vision – thought that the Jordanian regime (because of its ability to attack it after the June defeat and because of the deceptive slogans it used) could be a friend or at least a neutral force. Its occasional clashes with the resistance were explained away as partial conflicts or else the result of mistakes made by the resistance itself, and therefore they could be avoided.

It was on the basis of this mistaken evaluation that the resistance movement formed itself openly to Jordan. Its military bases, organization, cadres and locations were all exposed. It behaved as if it were working in a liberated area.

This evaluation was not the result of a partial error, or that of good or bad intentions. It was essentially the result of its inability to comprehend the dialectical link between imperialism and reaction at this stage of history, and its failure to see the mechanics of imperialist activity. This needs an outlook based on revolutionary theory – a working class theory – with its analysis of reality and its consequent manifestations.

The consequences of these manifestations were not merely military; they were also political and moral. Thus the degree of mobilization and readiness and the determination of the resistance to fight the reactionary enemy were not equal to the mobilization and determination of the organs of repression to crush the resistance. This became very clear during the September battle: the resistance was not only forced to fight in the open – which contradicts the principles of guerrilla warfare in its early stages – but leaders of some of the resistance organizations were victims of surprise. This stage of affairs continued during the battle and even afterwards (between September 1970 in Amman and July 1971 in Jerash) i.e. that it was possible to change the mind of the regime and to co-exist with it.

Had the resistance movement adopted, on the basis of a scientific revolutionary outlook, a correct political position toward the Jordanian authority (considering the part of the enemy camp) and consequently built itself underground, the result would certainly have been different.

The resistance would have been able to inflict heavy blows on the regime instead of vice versa.

b) The view of the resistance to the Jordanian masses

The main error committed by the resistance is not confined to its inability to adopt a scientific and revolutionary position toward the masses in Jordan.

It was necessary that the resistance, having come to depend for its existence mainly on Jordan, to clearly define its position in this area: a) who is the main enemy there? b) who is the friend capable of enhancing its power?

The leadership of the resistance did not undertake this basic theoretical and analytical process. It continued, therefore, to work on the principles of the “Palestinian people’s revolution” against Israel and Zionism as though its relationship with all the forces in Jordan was of no concern and as though those forces had nothing to do with the battle.

The resistance considered itself as a purely “Palestinian revolution.” That is, it did not interfere in the internal affairs of Arab countries, including Jordan where the revolution was located and upon which its continuity depended.

If the resistance movement had a clear scientific and revolutionary outlook it would have realized that the regime in Jordan was its enemy and that the people of Jordan, who suffer from exploitation and repression, were its allies – allies with whom it could unify its struggle so as to change the balance of forces in Jordan in its favour.

The lack of a clear and comprehensive political outlook made the resistance neglect this central issue. This led the Jordanian masses to support the resistance at the beginning of its development, emotionally only. This was the result of the patriotic and nationalist feelings of the Jordanian masses. But emotional support is one thing and conscious revolutionary mobilization is another.

The nationalist feelings of the Jordanian masses did not withstand the mistakes of the resistance, which in turn reflected themselves negatively on their daily lives. The Jordanian regime capitalized on these errors by stirring up regional jingoism which was to undermine the resistance movement’s ability in mobilizing the masses. In fact, the Jordanian masses ultimately turned against the revolution.

The Jordanian masses did not feel as if they were part of the revolution, in spite of the fact that the revolution was against Zionism, imperialism and reaction, the simultaneous enemy of both the Jordanian and Palestinian peoples.

The precise conceptualization of the effect of these two political errors (i.e., inattentiveness to an internal enemy and negligence of a main friend both existing in the same area as the resistance itself) shows the role of these mistakes in the emergence of the difficult situation in which the resistance finds itself now.

There is a great difference between a situation in which the resistance faces the reactionary enemy in Jordan supported by the people in Jordan, and the existing situation where it faces a regime capable of mobilizing these masses against the resistance.

The leadership of the resistance behaved as if it were an alternative to the national Jordanian government and as if it had, in its programs, a real alternative capable of fulfilling the tasks of the Jordanian national movement.

Moreover, if the leadership of the resistance – for one reason or another – attempted to address itself to the Jordanian masses, it would do this through their leaders who are a traditional symbol representing to the masses an organic part of the ruling class (and one of its instruments.)

The leadership of the resistance movement, because of its lack of an analytical scientific outlook, has contributed to deepening the direction which was considered by American intelligence services (through its instructions to American information offices) as the main factor by which to end the resistance movement. That is the division between Palestinian and Jordanian. Thus the establishment of trade unions (labour, professional and student) for Palestinians only helped – regardless of intention – to serve the policy of the reactionary regime.

The outlook of the leadership of the resistance was very limited. This manifested itself in several ways: a) its class analysis; b) its attitude towards the military establishment; c) towards the possibility of polarizing and encircling the offices; d) its attitude towards political action among the rural population and bedouins; e) its relationship with the feudal and tribal dignitaries whom the leadership of the resistance treated as if they represented or even constituted an alternative to the masses. All this helped imperialism to act and move freely.

c) The resistance and the national regimes

The relationship of the resistance with the Arab nationalist regimes was not based on a clear scientific and revolutionary perspective which would define correctly its tactical and strategic positions. The class basis of these regimes – which are antagonistic to imperialism and Zionism – makes them an ally, tactically speaking with the resistance in the battle against Israel and reaction. But, because of their inability to face imperialism and Israel using the method of long-term popular war they stand strategically speaking in contradiction to the resistance movement. There are further contradictions over the political and fateful situation currently being faced by the Palestinian people.

The law governing these relationships with the regimes is not a straightforward one. It is simultaneously one of conflict and alliance – alliance in the battle against Israel, imperialism and reaction, and conflict with these regimes with regard to the development of a strategy of a people’s war of liberation and to the capitulationist solution of the issue.

The materialization of this law of conflict and alliance with these regimes – which in turn move in accordance with changes in the class forces on which they are based – needs tactical capacities of the kind that the resistance generally speaking lacked. The resistance – in an opportunistic way, objectively speaking – gave dominance to the alliance with these regimes. This was, in its overall result, in the interest of the regimes and their policy of domination.

As a result of the general situation of military truce with the enemy, these regimes succeeded in playing an increasingly effective role within the resistance and among its groups. Wearing a nationalist guise they were able, for three years to establish for themselves a representative presence inside the resistance movement. Thus the resistance fell prisoner to the positions and policies of these regimes, despite all the slogans which rejected their guardianship and their attempts to contain it.

This tactical alliance resulted, in addition to the things we mentioned, in helping – in a major way and unconsciously – to delay the process of crystallizing new class and political forces in these countries. Thus it facilitated oppression by these forces, a process being continually carried out by the “nationalist” regimes. Undoubtedly the results of such behaviour are exceedingly dangerous to the resistance movement as an integral part of the general Arab liberation movement.

This point – as we shall see later – is related to a basic and essential issue that is the immature outlook of the leaders of the resistance movement on the nature of the relationship between the struggle of the Palestinian masses with the total progress of the Arab national liberation movement, and the degree of their mutual influence. This outlook also viewed the resistance as a separate phenomenon unconnected with the Arab national democratic revolution.

d) The Resistance and the Arab masses

The view of the leadership of the resistance movement with regard to the Arab masses and the Arab national liberation movement was not based on a clear revolutionary vision of all the dimensions of the battle.

The resistance movement, because of its objective and subjective conditions, cannot be but part of the whole Arab liberation movement. Outside this movement, it could only fail to achieve its objectives.

The relationship between the Palestinian resistance with the Arab national democratic revolution in the Arab world and the struggle for socialism is not merely one of support and help; it is a strategic relationship in a single battle, practically speaking.

It was from the viewpoint of material and moral support that the resistance movement viewed the masses and the Arab national liberation movement, and not from the viewpoint of the strategic and commensurate alliance between the resistance and the national movement in the Arab countries. Nor was this movement considered – on the strategic level – as the genuine Arab ally without which the resistance would be unable to solve its strategic difficulties.

Such an acknowledgement helps in understanding what is happening and the way out of the predicament. It is ridiculous to think of the crisis of the resistance movement independently of the crisis of the Arab national movement, which remains generally speaking, under the leadership of the petty-bourgeoisie. Despite this, the Arab national movement has been subjected on the one hand to the oppression of the reactionary regimes, and on the other hand to liquidation attempts by the military regimes.

It is also clear, and from the same perspective, that the forward movement of the Arab liberation movement and its success in polarizing the new and rising class forces and their mobilization and organization reflects itself, dialectically speaking, on the Palestinian resistance and contributes in solving an essential part of its problems.

e) The relationship with the Palestinian masses

The relation between the resistance movement and the Palestinian masses was not based on a revolutionary perspective which depends first of all on the masses and aims at their mobilization through political consciousness and organization, thus confronting it with its historical responsibilities:

- mobilization was propagandistic and demagogic.
- the relationship with the masses was elitist.
- military action was considered as an alternative to the struggle of the masses instead of being the most advanced form of such a struggle.
- the Palestinian masses on the whole supported the resistance movement, but the resistance did not take complete advantage of this support so as to increase it.

f) The question of national unity

National unity constitutes one of the main factors in the confrontation with the enemy. Of course, the existence of a revolutionary party which adopts the theory of the proletarian revolution is one of the main conditions for the victory of the masses in its war against the imperialist, Zionist reactionary and superior enemy. Another main condition is the achievement of a national unity which comprises in a wide form all the forces which have an interest in defeating the common enemy. This condition cannot be ignored or dispensed with.

The leadership of the resistance has completely failed to realize the importance of national unity. All the forms which were presented to achieve what was called national unity were aimed at preserving a domination imposed from above and was able to enable it to contain and dissolve the various forces which do not agree with it politically. These forms were presented without them having any clear program acceptable to these forces.

Such behaviour does not originate in a vacuum but is the result of the bourgeois and petit-bourgeois mode of thought. These classes view the issue of national unity in non-class terms. That is, as an issue which floats above classes and is seen as a way of achieving its domination and dictatorship.

The move towards “national unity” was, for the leadership of the resistance, always based on emotional appeals and vague slogans: these avoid defining clear political and organizational lines which can form the basis of the combative program representing the content of national unity and the foundation of the organizational programs which govern its internal relationships.

Many factors hindered the development of a minimum political and organizational program for the realization of one form of national unity. The most important of these factors was the role played by the Arab regimes in fragmenting and splitting Palestinian groups and the incitements (using various forms of lures, threats and corruption) of these groups against each other.

At the same time the fragmentation of the left within the resistance movement played a large part in obstructing the emergence of a form of national unity. This is so because some left groups – for tactical reasons related to their own plans – supported the appeals of the right and rejected the alliance with other left-wing forces, so as to impose on the whole movement a minimum shared program.

The inability of the resistance movement to establish a minimum shared program (capable of development) for national unity obstructed in turn the rapid mobilization and organization of the Palestinian masses. It also hindered the acceleration of the revolutionary situation and popular alliances at the Arab and international level. Furthermore, the superficiality and facetiousness of all the forms which were developed for national unity led to the preservation of the fragmentary state among the patriotic and progressive Palestinian forces. This lowered the political and fighting effectiveness which the resistance could have achieved against the Israelis, the imperialist and reactionary enemy.

g) Backwardness in military science

The importance of adopting revolutionary violence in solving the contradiction between the masses and its imperialist, Zionist and reactionary enemy dictates the importance and necessity of acquiring military thought and sciences together with the principles of using revolutionary violence in dealing with an enemy advanced militarily and technologically.

The revolution in order to protect itself and to deal with the enemy, needs to follow a number of military principles. These principles are what protects the revolution in its early stages from annihilation by the enemy.

The resistance movement was not based militarily on such a foundation (secrecy, proficient use of weapons and tactics, avoidance of confrontations, adequate standards of training, right types of weapons).

Furthermore, the resistance depended, in its propaganda, on traditional attitudes to armed action, e.g., glorification of martyrdom and of suicidal heroics, the encouragement of a spirit of adventure, etc. This was done in spite of the fact that popular armed struggle is a political science which depends on accurate and studied principles and on the development of a collective sense of struggle, disruptive, combative intelligence and on the accumulation of a very large number of small victories which can be used to achieve a strategic victory.

This lack of a revolutionary military science led to serious mistakes: a) these were reflected in the failure of most of the resistance groups to achieve armed organization inside the occupied territories; b) they were also reflected in the attempts of the leadership to hide this failure by issuing a large number of false reports.

Apart from the Gaza strip, the leadership of the resistance has proved, in its combative experience inside the occupied territories, its inability to absorb the military technology of people's war as well as its incompetence to learn from the political science that is based on the experience of victorious national revolutions in the world.

h) Nature of the organizational structure of the resistance

The absence of a clear political perspective has also manifested itself in the lack of interest by the leadership in organized action. This is so despite the fact that the organizational weapon is the most effective weapon against a superior enemy.

Thus the internal relations which predominated within some of the resistance groups did not differ greatly from those found in any of the regular Arab armies except that they were less disciplined in the former. This led to the emergence of the problem of salaries and ranking.

The absence of organizational consciousness (which is probably a result of the ideological consciousness) was accompanied by a weakness in the political development of the fighters which resulted in:

- weak discipline.
- weak military and political effectiveness.

– a superabundance of privileges and formalities.

Our discussion about the resistance, its class structure and what this entails from mistaken attitudes and practices shows the importance of the subject. It is the basis which explains the reality of the resistance with its negativisms, mistakes and deviations. This in turn plays a part in explaining the present condition of the resistance.

There are a large number of examples which show the mistaken practices of the resistance: a) bureaucratic leadership; b) opulence and extravagance; c) lack of frankness towards the masses; d) empty and loud propaganda; e) political mistakes; f) lack of initiative or quick action; g) sectarianism (which was reflected in the national unity); h) misuse of weapons; i) inadequate training; j) dependence on military formalities; k) mistaken methods of fighting; l) laziness in the guerrilla bases; m) time wasting for the fighters; n) the abuse of the citizens by some of the fighters, who spoiled their crops or showed disrespect for their traditions, etc. All of this can be explained in terms of the ideological and class structure of the leadership of the resistance.

The resistance movement represents, objectively speaking, a force against imperialism, Zionism and reaction. Thus it earned the support of the Arab and Palestinian masses. It remains to this day a vanguard of the Arab liberation movement. However, the nature of the formation of its leadership and the consequences of this contributes towards explaining the nature of its present crisis.

IV. The left-wing of the Resistance Movement

Why was the left-wing of the resistance movement unable to change the subjective conditions of the movement?

There was, relatively speaking, a left-wing in the resistance movement which had a clearer political vision and a more scientific and revolutionary stand towards the regime in Jordan, and towards the relationship between the resistance and the Jordanian people together with the Arab masses and the Arab national movement. Furthermore, it presented a more scientific and revolutionary picture of national unity and a wide national front to be realized between all the sectors of the resistance.

But this left-wing sector had the following characteristics:

1) It was not the actual leader of the resistance. On the contrary, other sectors of the resistance, because of the nature of their structure, received support from all the Arab regimes, including the nationalist ones. Moreover, the level of political consciousness among the Palestinian and Arab masses enabled the non-left to address the emotions of these masses in a democratic way. Thus it transformed all this support into a manifest force which enabled it, at the time, to claim to be the main body of the resistance.

2) It was not unified in its attitudes towards the right-wing of the movement. Thus some of the left groups trailed behind the right in some of their attitudes instead of finding their way to the leadership of the resistance movement and imposing their understanding on it with reference to the attitudes toward the agent regime in Jordan and the subject of national unity.

3) The left-wing of the resistance remains underdeveloped on the level of practice. It suffers from an inability to raise its practice to the level of its theoretical standards. This gap between theory and practice remains great. Thus it has been unable to develop a clear alternative in an organizational, combative, military and political way for the masses.

As a result of this situation, mention must be made of major mistakes made by the left and which are its responsibility:

1) In its relations with the Jordanian masses it failed to put an advanced alternative to the practices of the right-wing of the resistance. It is true that it launched: a) labour, peasant and student struggles in Jordan; b) it did attack on different occasions, the regionalist and rightist policies of the resistance leadership. However, these struggles were on the whole, partial, and did not take place according to a strategic line practiced regularly and at all levels.

2) Theoretical and political consciousness which left-wing articulated concerning the reactionary regime in Jordan, i.e. its position on the imperialist attack, and its being one of the main enemy forces, was not

translated organizationally. Thus it is possible to say that this consciousness did not advance beyond the “evangelization stage,” a stage which cannot fulfill the tasks of a real revolutionary left-wing movement. This political “evangelism” did not reflect itself, as it should, in the organizational structure of the movement, nor in its knowledge and practice of the principles of underground war and popular struggle which are aware of the consequences of the combative contradictions between the existence of the resistance and that of the reactionary regime in Jordan.

3) The left-wing did not devote the necessary and sufficient effort towards hastening the process of building the party or towards forming its political and fighting cadres. It often found itself forced to give priority to activities which were not of the same level of importance as the building of a Marxist-Leninist party.

4) It also fell victim to theoretical, political, military and organizational infantilism. The following are examples and illustrations of this infantilism:

a) It failed to combine the necessities of the strategic position and the urgencies of the tactical position with regard to Egypt’s acceptance of the Rogers plan. Despite the absolute necessity which led to the rejection of the Rogers Plan and the importance of this, the way this rejection was expressed ignored the whole spectrum of possibilities that existed at the time.

b) It failed in its evaluation of the balance of forces with regard to the battle with the reactionary regime. It led to the taking up of incorrect positions and plans, tactically speaking.

c) Some of the left-wing contributed to misguiding the masses. It went along with the rightist propaganda campaigns when it began to issue military reports concerning what were then called big military operations and other forms of deceptive military demonstrations.

d) Various left groups committed infantile mistakes which gave the authorities material with which to create confusion and publicize their claims locally, in the Arab world and internationally. Some of these were mistakes in the types of slogans that were used and in the type of practices resulting from them (such as the slogan of “all power to the resistance” which isolated the resistance from the Jordanian masses). Some were mistaken in practice and in the evaluation of the consequences of these; such as the antagonistic and provocative challenge of the traditions and customs of the masses; and also the consequences – especially in terms of propaganda – that resulted from the hijacking of airplanes in September 1970. This allowed Jordanian reaction and imperialism to use this event to justify the massacre of September. Thus it attempted to cover up the real reason behind the reactionary regime’s move, i.e. the contradiction between the reactionary Jordanian regime and the resistance movement which was leading to inevitable collision. This was manifested when the resistance specified the 17th of September as the date for civil disobedience and for the convening of the Palestinian-Jordanian popular meeting. Zaid Bin Shakir admitted this in a well-known official memorandum which explained, from the official point of view, the immediate motives behind the massacre.

e) The left-wing failed to establish during its activity in Jordan organic and deep relations with sectors of the national liberation and democratic movements in the Arab world. It remained in its relationship with these a prisoner of the immediate considerations dictated by the battle.

V. The Battle of September 1970-July 1971

This then was the objective and subjective situation (of both the right and the left) on the eve of the September battle. It explained fully the nature and the consequences of what happened, not only during the September battle, but also during the decisive period which extended from that date until the July 1971 battle in the mountains of Ajlun.

The dual power – as the situation in Jordan from the middle of 1969 to September 1970 – was decisively resolved in favour of the reactionary regime and the class forces on which it depends.

Objectively speaking, dual power expresses a social crisis, which is mainly a form of class struggle, existing on the eve of the uprising which substitutes a new class for the old one and proceeds to give it power.

History shows that dual power leads to a situation of disintegration in the state system which cannot continue for very long. If, in such a case, the revolution does not act to resolve this situation to its benefit, then no doubt counter-revolution will.

The problem of dual power cannot, in any form, be solved through the sharing of power. Society comes increasingly to feel the growing need for resolving this dualism. Hence people begin to gather and center around the new class tones. If these let them down they will be forced to adopt a “neutral” position.

Should this new rising force not contemplate resolving this dual power by revolutionary violence (including civil war) to its benefit, then this means that it is willing to hold open the door for the victory of the counter-revolution (through civil war also).

The leadership of the resistance faced the situation of dual power without a plan. Thus it abandoned the Jordanian masses. It continued to speak about the possibility of coexistence (i.e. the sharing of power) with the reactionary regime in Jordan. Such a coexistence is impossible both scientifically and practically. At the same time the Jordanian regime was convinced of the impossibility of such a coexistence. In short, the resistance created a situation of dual power and then stood idly by.

Thus the situation in Jordan, as expressed by the violent contradiction between the resistance and its masses on the one hand, and the Jordanian regime and traditional forces on the other hand, led to the September massacre. It was clear, after September, that the Jordanian regime would not stop until it liquidated the known body of the resistance both physically and politically. Because of its middle class nature and in the absence of a scientific understanding of the battle it is engaged in, the leadership of the resistance was unable to understand this reality and the direction of its movement. Thus its own policies led to its defeat.

The inability of the right-wing of the resistance – which held the position of leadership – to understand or to transform these conditions was accompanied by the inability of the left-wing of the resistance to analyze the phenomenon of dual power in a Marxist way and to act accordingly. In addition, the size of the left-wing and its subjective situation prevented it from exercising sufficient pressure towards a revolutionary understanding of the problem of power and towards the struggle for its resolution in favour of the resistance.

We cannot, of course, be completely certain that if the resistance movement had a clear left-wing structure it would have been able, given the prevailing Arab and international conditions, to resolve completely in its favour the dual power situation present in Jordan before September 1970. But we can say that if the resistance differed in its structure its losses would have been less, its blows against the regime would have been more painful, the strength and support given to it by the masses would have been clearer, and given popular Palestinian, Jordanian and Arab support, it would have more easily continued its battle against the regime, eventually putting an end to it.

VI. The Post-September Stage

It is necessary for the resistance movement to review critically and from a revolutionary point of view, the whole of its past growth. From this it should deduce its major mistakes and reach a deeper understanding of the new situation so as to begin its resolute struggle – organizationally, popularly, politically and militarily – to find a way out of its existing crisis.

However, the structure of the resistance did not enable it to take the above path; consequently a sector of its right-wing leadership considered the September battle a final defeat for the resistance movement. This group began, therefore, to think of succumbing to capitulatory schemes, especially those related to the establishment of a stooge Palestinian political structure which came as an expected expression of the political degeneration that arises from the bourgeois nature of such leadership.

A second group of the traditional leadership of the resistance movement reacted to the battle of September in a somewhat different way from the first group; while this group did not reach the same level of degeneration achieved by the first, neither did it seem to learn from the September events and in fact turned toward conciliatory policies without learning anything from this. This group continued to retreat in the face of the attacks of the Jordanian regime, justifying this sometimes in the name of tactics and at other times under the pretext of temporary submission to the status quo with its unequal balance of forces.

As far as the left is concerned, one group began to express its indignation in irritable and grumbling forms without any analysis of what happened. It refused to take any responsibility and was satisfied with pouring rage on everything.

The picture that emerged after the September events has shown clearly the readiness of the right-wing leadership to deviate and retreat, and showed itself at the first obstacle, either in retreatism or in a state of loss and in some cases deviation.

This readiness was potentially there right from the start. It simply waited for the first obstacle so as to manifest itself either in retreatism or else in a state of loss and in some cases manifested itself in deviation.

The Jordanian authorities were able to take the initiative and to plan these tactics: thus they directed their tactics on the resistance blow by blow. They then controlled the situation after which they snatched one gain after the other from the resistance, (the events of Jerash, Ajlun, the events in Amman, and finally the battle of Jerash in July 1971.)

It cannot be claimed that following the September events the resistance was capable of preserving its open existence in Jordan. However, had the resistance leadership been structured differently then it would have been possible for it, in a defensive strategic position, to take the initiative in concealing

itself. It would also have been possible for it to deal tactical blow to the regime, to explain the new situation and its own programmes to the masses so as to win their support. It could have continued its fight against the regime – defensively and in tactical attacks – keeping a clear vision of what lay ahead with its fighters and organization in high morale. In this way it would have retained the support of the Arab masses and would have altered its present image.

However, the behaviour of the resistance leadership (especially between September 1970 and July 1971) led to the lessening of alertness against the reactionary regime. Their insistence on preserving conciliatory coexistence contradicted and opposed the developments of the situation. This policy led to a series of retreats which ended the open existence of the resistance in Jordan.

VII. The new political battles facing the resistance in the new reality

The new situation with its new objective and subjective conditions, leads, naturally, to essential changes in the plans of all the forces involved. Consequently this applies to the nature of the political battles facing the resistance movement. In this it finds itself confronted by a number of interlinked and varying battles, where it no longer has the initiative.

The first political consequence of this new situation is an increase in the opportunities for peaceful settlement in the area. Such a “solution” – because of the inequality in the balance of forces and the domination of the reactionary forces – gives the Israeli and imperialist enemies more than at any time before, new opportunities to double their conditions for a total official Arab surrender.

All the effective political forces in the area – imperialism, Zionism, reaction, Israel, nationalist regimes – are oriented towards preventing fighting and towards political settlement. This is so despite the existing partial contradictions within this camp.

The resistance movement was the main obstacle against the settlement plans. It put forward the necessity for continuing the fight and it was against capitulation. It possessed, besides its correct political line which enjoyed the support of the Arab masses, an effectiveness which made it an obstacle to the realization of the aim sought by all other effective forces in the area.

These new objective conditions coupled with the blows received by the resistance, and its third subjective situation lead us to force an important political battle. That is, the serious intention of all these forces to impose a political settlement, i.e. total political surrender.

We are aware of all the obstacles which still stand in the way of a settlement. These are represented first of all by the Israeli position. We are also aware of all the contradictions existing among the parties of the peaceful settlement camp. Similarly we are aware that the period for imposing a peaceful settlement is not over. It is in fact very clear that opportunities for a settlement have increased enormously and that the tendency to follow such a line is more serious than at any other time. The plans of all the forces are now devoted to working seriously for its new conditions, which might counteract the possibility of finally demolishing the revolutionary situation which developed after June.

Connected intimately with all this is another political battle confronting the resistance movement, and which is a more serious problem now than it was before September, that is the “Palestinian State.”

The new situation and the weak state of the resistance have created conditions which are congenial to thoughts about a solution to the cause of the Palestinian people. Such a solution will erect a Palestinian political structure to put an end – historically speaking – to the whole Palestine problem and all that it created and continues to create in the way of difficulties for imperialism and its interests.

Because of its complexity and the number of parties involved and the contradiction between these, the “Palestinian battle” is bound to take various and complex forms. It is a mistake, therefore, to assume that it will take a simple form with a direct formula.

The victories of the reactionary regime in the September and Jerash battles have renewed the regard that imperialist circles have of the role that this regime can play in serving imperialism and Zionism. Nevertheless, a new reality has been created which imperialism could not totally ignore. Thus, and after a long period of hesitation, Nixon was obliged at the beginning of 1972 to admit that “stability” in the Middle East would not be achieved without providing a solution to the problem of the Palestinian people: not as a refugee problem – as America used to say – but as a “people searching for a homeland.”

This new American formulation was immediately linked with an appropriate explanation: the American interest in this problem is the result, as Nixon said in the same address, of fear that “extreme elements” may exploit the feelings of the Palestinian people with regard to the search for a homeland.

American policy acknowledged, then, the Palestinian people, not in order to solve their problem, but to abort their cause. It chose this time precisely not only because some of the traditional Palestinian leadership has begun to move openly towards suspect solutions but also because the political indecisiveness and conciliatory mode of large sectors of the leadership of the resistance movement helps, in one way or another, towards the realization of the plans.

The United States, as the leader of the imperialist attack on the area is careful not to have the suspect Palestinian entity at the expense of the existence of the stooge regime in Jordan and the part it plays in its plans. Hence we have King Hussein’s plan which speaks about a “United Arab Kingdom.” This represents a middle solution which agrees with imperialism and coordinates between its need to liquidate the cause of the Palestinian people and its need to maintain the Jordanian revolutionary regime.

The following events constitute links in one chain: the municipal election which Israel staged in the West Bank and for which it made sure in advance of winning King Hussein’s support; the “United Arab Kingdom” project; the Allon Plan; Nixon’s address on the necessity of solving the problem of the Palestinian people; and also the major role played by the United States in the conspiracy against the resistance, and in conducting its propaganda campaign to split Jordan down the middle. All these then constitute links in the chain of liquidating the Palestinian cause. This is to be carried out by creating a suspect entity to be dominated at the same time by Israel, reaction and imperialism. It is intended to form an instrument for enforcing foreign exploitative domination over the Arab area.

There are still difficulties and contradictions facing the realization of this conspiracy against the revolution of the people. Nevertheless, this battle has become after September 1970, one of the real political battles of the people and the resistance movement.

For the political settlement to be implemented, and for the scheme for the “Palestinian State” to be accepted, a final adaptation of the resistance movement is required. The resistance will then be faced with specific battles aimed at either annihilating it or rendering it void of its revolutionary content and potential development, so that it will merely have a formal existence presenting no obstacles.

As for the reactionary-Zionist-imperialism camp, this final solution means the indubitable and utter destruction of the whole resistance movement. The camp of imperialism, reaction and Israel realizes that the new conditions may be the last big favourable opportunity for the implementation of the complete and decisive destruction of the resistance’s revolutionary existence (and its manifestations of violence), which previously threatened imperialist interests and came near to demolishing all its schemes in the area. It is natural then, for this camp, after regaining the initiative, to continue its attempts to finish off the resistance completely. This is designed to uproot the whole phenomenon of violence from the minds of the masses, and to convince them of the futility of this path, so as to block any return to it in the foreseeable future.

This should lead us to expect new and continuous campaigns of elimination wherever the resistance has a military presence. This means new Israeli attempts to destroy any presence of the resistance in the West Bank and in Gaza, especially in view of the encouragement it received after the September events. It also means serious attempts by various powers – Arab and international – to remove the political revolutionary presence of the movement, so as to force it into complete submission to the will of the Arab right which has itself completely accepted capitulation.

All the partners of the counter-revolutionary camp, together with all the interested reactionary forces, will be in a state of battle against the resistance, up to its final destruction. The continuation of the ceasefire on all fronts is favourable to the implementation of these schemes.

Some tactical considerations will, no doubt, decide the nature and timing of confrontation in any given Arab country, as the reactionaries will be careful not to rock their economy and not to make a great display which might expose them to isolation on the Arab and international level. But that should not make us forget for a moment that the counter-revolutionary camp is bent on rooting out the resistance and the revolutionary violence it represents.

As for the petit-bourgeois military Arab regimes, their conceptualization of the limits within which the resistance should stay might differ from that of the reactionary regimes. But in the final analysis it does not go beyond the drive for political settlement. These regimes want a settlement which frees them from all their declared commitments to the Palestinian people. Therefore, they realize the necessity for the resistance to participate in the settlement as a representative of the Palestinian people, in alliance with the regimes and tied to their leaders and programmes.

These regimes are anxious to domesticate the resistance and subordinate it to their tactical needs; their behaviour towards the resistance stems always from their class nature, hence their fear of the organized masses, and of guiding the masses along the path of revolutionary violence.

As the class contradiction grows within these regimes, their actions become increasingly reactionary, and the methods and the extent of their oppression of the rising class forces escalate. Inevitably this leads to the widening of the gap between them and the resistance.

These regimes support the idea of a Palestinian entity, regarding it as fitting in with their schemes for a peaceful solution. In spite of partial differences between their conception of such an entity and the reactionary imperialist conception, the former is continually evolving towards coinciding with the latter; this is because their pursuit of peaceful settlement requires that they constantly give way which increasingly brings them nearer to the imperialist conception of this entity.

The pursuit of peaceful settlement requires time, many changes and diversions which are not possible to forecast easily. Moreover, the conditions of the resistance have not crystallized yet in accordance with this conception. We should prepare ourselves for attempts in the direction of settlement. It is clear that these attempts will be aimed at weakening the left-wing forces inside the resistance and strengthening those forces which are able to fit in with the required picture. Consequently, the pressure will be directed towards national unity under the hegemony of these forces which support such schemes. Some anti-imperialist regimes will, in varying degrees, play roles in this direction by creating an alliance between the various forces which accept the scheme, thus minimizing their internal contradictions, and strengthening them militarily; their fighting forces will be transformed into a semi-classical army under whose banner all other organizations will unite.

Such is the picture of the new situation. We see the new objective conditions, the subjective state of the resistance movement, and the initiative taken by the counter-revolutionary camp. We have seen the transformation of the resistance into a position of defence and weakness and the new political battles it will have to face and which are sharper and more difficult than at any time before. In addition, we can predict the agreement between the Zionist-imperialist-reactionary camp and the "nationalist" Arab regimes under the banner of "peaceful solution" and "Palestinian state," even though at the same time they have conflicting interpretations of these slogans.

The question now is: How is the resistance going to face this new situation?

VIII. Tasks of the New Stage

It is necessary, before defining concretely our organizational, military and political lines in this new stage, to emphasize a number of premises which are deeply rooted in our minds and the minds of the masses of the revolution. These premises and their subsequent application form the basic background to the programme of confrontation.

Firstly, ours is a difficult, complex and ruthless struggle. In addition to those general aspects of liberation struggle (wherever imperialism mobilizes its military, economic and material forces, trying with all its alliances and experience to keep and forcibly expand its interests), there is the specificity of our own struggle, where Zionist settler-imperialism defends its existence in a life or death battle. Besides this, the nature of imperialism's interests (mainly oil) determines its outlook on the area, i.e., its resolve to use all its resources to keep those interests. There is also the fragmentation of the Arab nation and problem of political entities (states) which have been maintaining their independent existence for decades, forming a real barrier to the revolutionary mobilization of the whole of the Arab nation's potentialities for its battle of destiny.

Secondly, this picture is mentioned here so as to emphasize the necessity for having the revolutionary proletarian strength to face these difficulties. Ours is a protracted struggle – and this should be deeply understood – and our tasks and deeds should be based on this understanding. There is no easy solution to a difficult problem.

A prime task of ours is to fight the petit-bourgeois mentality which sinks into pessimism in the face of difficulties, and wants an immediate solution, a ready-cooked victory.

Also to the fore of our tasks is to root out other petty-bourgeois diseases, mainly that of grumbling, which gradually replace responsible revolutionary criticism and lead to defection, exhaustion, and erosion of responsibility.

The resistance, in order to break out of the predicament it is now living through, requires long, persistent, patient effort with a clear programme based on a clear vision of the struggle. All the current petit-bourgeois “wailing” and all its adventurist solutions will not get us out of the predicament.

Thirdly, in the same way that we pinpointed the difficult objective conditions of this stage and the difficult subjective conditions of the resistance, we should see, clearly and scientifically, the other side of the picture represented by the left-wing of the resistance and by its (the resistance's) defiance until now in the face of all intrigue and conspiracy. Local, Arab and international conditions for guaranteeing the victory of revolution strategically.

On the Palestinian level: the conditions in which the Palestinian masses are living form a favourable objective background for the revolution.

On the Arab level: the manifest impotence of the petit-bourgeois leadership which presides over the Arab national liberation movement paves the way, scientifically, for a new stage of the Arab revolution, under the leadership of the working class.

On the International level: the present imperialist onslaught is, in the meantime, a reaction to the degree of growth of the world revolutionary movement, and it will help the maturing of conditions favourable to our revolution.

We have a crying need, at this stage, for the deep assimilation of history's lesson and of the meaning of the wider international struggle between people and imperialism, the great victories the people have achieved on that path (China, Cuba, Vietnam, Korea, the socialist countries in Europe, national liberation movements in Cambodia, Laos and Latin America). We are also in need of the deep assimilation of the theoretical, moral, mobilizational and military methods through which these victories were achieved, and which are stronger – in practice – than the enemy's technological superiority, its military might and its economic powers.

It is by deep understanding of the totality of this picture that we can put the movement of our masses in the historical current of our era, the era of the victory of revolution. When the movement of our masses becomes an integral part of the current of history, its victory will be inevitable.

It is by our adherence to these facts and historical premises and by basing our actions on them, that our faith in victory is generated, hence, the power to engage in a protracted complex battle which requires a high degree of patience, sacrifice, toughness and hard work.

Headlines of the Programme for the Present Stage

- 1) The building of the revolutionary party which leads the revolution.
- 2) The new United National Front required by the new conditions.
- 3) Mass mobilization – the masses are the only force capable of changing the present balance of power. Violence should be a culmination of the mass movement, not an alternative to it.
- 4) Revolutionary violence in a new way. This should grasp the past experience, and is based on the principles of clandestine warfare and guerrilla warfare, strongly bound to a clear political vision. This is the main method of confrontation in the coming period. We have to answer the important question: how to comprehend the dialectics between revolutionary violence, party building, the national front and mass mobilization.
- 5) New perspective on revolutionary Arab action as the strategic solution to the crisis of the resistance.

- 6) Alliance between Arab and other revolutionary movements.
- 7) The resistance in occupied Palestine.
- 8) The resistance's battle against the regime in Jordan.
- 9) The resistance's battle against peaceful settlement, the plan for a Palestinian state and the attempts at making the resistance a part of this process of settlement.
- 10) The resistance outside the occupied territories and outside Jordan.

IX. The Building of the Revolutionary Party

The preceding review of the experience of the resistance and of its progress in the past years, points directly to the central importance of the thesis of building a revolutionary party which leads the revolution, and to the (dangerous) consequences of the absence of such a party.

The major revolutionary experience in history emphasizes, without any doubt, the basic importance of the existence of a revolutionary party which leads the masses to victory. The responsibility of such a party is to organize and direct the unlimited powers of the masses, and to raise them to a level of ability which can defeat the technological superiority of the enemy camp.

The organizational structure of the resistance movement has been, generally speaking, a mixture of liberalism and chaos on one hand, and the classical military discipline of the regular armies on the other. These two forms of organization, undoubtedly, are not up to the revolutionary tasks of the movement.

Bureaucratism, tribalism and sectarianism are dominant organizational diseases of the resistance movement. As a reflection of the right-wing nature of most of the leadership of the resistance, and their underestimation of the importance of organization, these defects served as a guarantee for the maintenance and immunity of these leaderships and to keep the organizations open to their moods, individualities, and the fluctuations of their unprincipled policies.

On the other hand, the left of the resistance movement, organizationally, could not rise to the level of its political and ideological theses, being unable to differentiate itself from the right-wing in a decisive way. The fragmentation of the movement was one factor which led to the spread of the organizational mistakes from the right to the left organizations.

As for the PFLP, the political and theoretical distinction which was reflected on different occasions and in different attitudes, and borne out in militant action, was not accompanied by any organizational distinction which could have presented an advanced model of the harmony of political and theoretical stands with the organizational instrument capable of carrying these out. The organizational question, i.e. the task of building the revolutionary party, must be one of the first tasks of the present stage. However, it is necessary here to emphasize the following points:

A) The process of building the party is accomplished through practice; the practice of leading the masses in the national and class struggle. It cannot be accomplished outside the present condition of the masses and the struggle without adopting the necessary positions and plans to deal with all the dangers and the battles imposed on us, apart from the struggle for the deepening and widening of the revolution. Any other scholastic and idealistic vision of the building of the party has nothing to do with Marxism-Leninism.

B) The process of building the party requires a clear guideline which presents the revolutionary scientific answer to all the questions and problems the process puts forward. Without such a guideline, the building of the party remains a mere wish and an empty slogan. Hence, the PFLP regards the “Organizational Programme” approved by the Third Congress of the Front a basic document providing such a guideline. This contains the programme of “transformation” which looks at the present reality of the Front, provides a scientific analysis of its structure and contradictions, and draws the lines of action to transform the front into a Marxist-Leninist party.

In addition to that, the process of building a party requires the availability of revolutionary theory which directs scientific action and which gives it strength and faith. This is represented by the following documents:

- * Our theoretical guidelines for building the party, based on the organizational strategy of PFLP (Report to the February Congress 1969)

- * The internal constitution and the circular attached concerning the methods of practice.

- * The programme of military building which prepares the party for underground resistance and guerrilla warfare, and which provides for military effectiveness in spite of the present balance of forces, and which guarantees self-preservation, the major task now, in light of the preceding analysis.

The theoretical thesis of those studies presents clear guidelines for the process of building the party. What remains is to truly comprehend and execute them to the best of our ability and with resolution; then we will see a concrete advance in the building of the party; in the meantime, however we should avoid hasty and idealistic judgement.

These theoretical programmes and organizational indices should harmonize the process of the building of the party. This will be achieved by a dialectical relationship between theory and practice, because the Front believes that practice is a mainspring of knowledge.

X. The New National Front

If it is scientifically acknowledged that there is no revolution without a revolutionary party, and that the question of the party is the central question in Marxism-Leninism, then historical experience has also shown, and as strongly, that the patriotic front is a basic, necessary and strategic tool for the fulfillment of the tasks of the national democratic revolution.

This basic strategic line guarantees the mobilization and the organization of the largest section of the masses and of the progressive classes at any given state, providing the possibility for the recruitment of the largest possible number of people in the liberation struggle. It prevents the isolation of the party from the masses, which could result in its inability to play its historical role in the stage of national democratic revolution.

The national front, however, is not a mere numerical accumulation subject to the programme of a bourgeoisie mobilizing the various classes for its own goes and interests, and serving as an instrument of oppression, and containment of the masses, seeking to eradicate their programmes. The national front is the platform of the mass struggle for the establishment of the correct line of the national democratic revolution. These lines are deeply and clearly represented by the programmes of workers and peasants. This is especially true of the present era, when the bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped countries is increasingly attaching itself to the imperialist orbit, which makes its vision of the national democratic revolution and incompetent one, and one a long way from the achievement of real liberation.

The objective and subjective conditions of the forces of the resistance made the right-wing the main force in the leadership of the resistance movement. All the left-wing could do was differentiate itself, to guarantee its growth, and to influence the resistance movement in such a way as to ensure its own march, and to prepare itself for the responsibilities of leadership in the future.

The dominance of the right was not due merely to its potentialities and the support of the Arab regimes, but also stemmed from the fragmentation of the left and the carrying out by some left groups of the task of theorization for and justification of the right, especially on the question of "national unity," which was aimed at strengthening the grip of the right over the leadership of the resistance movement.

The new objective conditions, since September, have proved the inability of the right to lead the new stage. The new stage requires ideological, political and organizational clarity, with its concomitant practice, and these conditions are unobtainable from the right-wing.

The central point, then, as regards the national front in the present stage, is that the left sees itself responsible for confronting this new situation. It is on this basis that it must start to prepare the way for the unification of all patriotic Jordanian and Palestinian forces and elements.

This change in the structure of the leadership of the resistance cannot, however, be accomplished without struggle. This struggle must be waged, bearing in mind the following factors:

- a) The struggle should be waged around organizational, military and political problems that are clearly linked to the battle;
- b) It has to aim at unifying all the forces of the left, the masses, and all the rank and file of the resistance groups in order to consolidate a strong pole of attraction which can effectively challenge the right-wing and seize the leadership from it without dispersing the forces of revolution. The struggle, however, must be followed by unity.

The right-wing of the resistance movement is nationalistic; consequently we should aim at containing it within the national front. Seizing the leadership from the right-wing of the resistance must not lead to the loss of a national force, which although incapable of leading the liberation struggle, still has a part to play in the national democratic revolution.

Naturally, we must disregard those elements whose behaviour symbolized hesitation, indecisiveness and fear, as well as those who were pushed into the camp of "peaceful solution" and "Palestinian state" by the difficulties of the new struggle. Similarly we must disregard all those who conspired with the reactionary Jordanian regime, and those who, on account of their present position, seem likely to do so. But all other patriotic forces should be included in the new national front, including the patriotic right-wing.

The new stage necessitates a more complicated organizational force for the national-patriotic front than was required previously. The resistance now faces two separate yet interlined tasks; the first is to carry on the fight against Israel under the slogan of the liberation of Palestine; the second task is the fight against the reactionary regime in Jordan under the slogan of overthrowing the regime and liberating Jordan from reaction.

We cannot deal with these two tasks through one organizational form alone. The first task requires a front which includes the resistance groups but with the aim of changing the nature of their programmes and structure in the light of what has been said before. The second task requires a patriotic front comprising the Jordanian national-patriotic movement together with the resistance groups which consider the overthrowing of the regime in Jordan a central task.

The first organizational form exists today in the shape of the Palestine Liberation Organization. We know that this organization does not and cannot represent our ambition. Nevertheless, we consider that the minimum programme, on the basis of which we have participated in the Executive Committee since the 9th Conference of the Palestinian National Council held in July 1971 provides a strictly delimited possibility for the struggle towards a partial and gradual evolution. This programme is necessary in this form.

Our experience within the Executive Committee furnishes us with a partial example which can be considered as an indicator of the possibilities that the above organizational form allows. This concerns the struggle that was waged when most of the leadership of the resistance accepted negotiations with the reactionary enemy in Jeddah. The Popular Front was able to distinguish itself with its revolutionary stance which rejected this indecisiveness and conciliatory attitude. It did this both within the Executive Committee itself and outside it (i.e. among the masses, inside refugee camps, etc.). There is no doubt that the struggle of the Front against the Jeddah conference contributed to the foiling of the negotiations that took place there. At the same time it deepened among the masses the combative line of the Front and its (i.e. the Front's) understanding of the role of Jordanian reaction as an organic part of the Israeli-imperialist enemy.

Our continued representation on the Executive Committee does not constitute all our understanding on the issue of the patriotic front. This is so because we aim at grouping the left-wing forces around any agreement on a revolutionary, political and organizational programme which we can then struggle to impose on the right of the resistance. We also aim to continue the struggle to overthrow the hesitant and deviating elements which have played a part in the retreat of the resistance before the regime and which have practically become a part of the political settlement and the Palestinian state camp.

We aspire to represent the correct political line inside the Executive Committee, the National Council and those organizations which have grown out of them. We realize, at the same time, that the new patriotic front, which is capable of coping with the tasks of the new stage, requires more revolutionary programmes capable of attracting the forces of the left. The struggle for the leadership of such a front is a popular struggle, and the legitimacy of such a struggle derives from the masses. Such a front must be established outside the framework within which the Palestine Liberation Organization originated and developed, as well as outside the links and mentalities of the organization.

The second task requires a different organizational form; i.e. a Palestinian-Jordanian patriotic front composed of the revolutionary and patriotic Jordanian groups that aim at overthrowing the reactionary regime which exploits the majority of the people; i.e. workers, peasants, and petit-bourgeoisie. This regime prevents their economic, social and cultural development. Included in this front are the resistance movement groups which believe that the liberation of Palestine requires the liberation of Jordan, and believe also in the unity of the Arab revolution.

There is obviously a link between the two organizational forms. Such a relationship is, initially, one of co-ordination. Strategically the relationship is based on the unity of the instrument of the Palestinian-Jordanian revolution. Naturally there are a number of issues which need to be dealt with. Among these are: the position of the small resistance groups, the Palestine Liberation Army, and the Yarmouk forces in the above organizational forms. Also the position of the Palestinian and Jordanian middle forces which have no consolidated political line or attitude.

It is difficult here to deal thoroughly with all these issues. The important thing is to specify our outlook in the light of these political lines and practical experience.

The central issue of the national front, as we envisage it, is its new structure, programme and form. This is based on the scientific analysis of the present situation of the resistance, the role of Jordanian reaction and its organic link with the totality of Arab reaction, the role of the latter in the mechanism of the Imperialist-Israeli attack, the emergence of new class forces in the Arab homeland which are increasingly giving a more progressive attribute to the Arab democratic national movement, the fall of the petit-bourgeois leaderships after their domination over a national democratic movement lasting more than twenty years, and finally the result of all this on the designs of the Israeli enemy, the way they are carried out in the West Bank and Gaza, and the manufacture of a stooge Palestinian entity, together with the readiness of some of the right-wing Palestinian and Arab leadership to accept this capitulationist line.

All this must be reflected in our understanding of the national front in the new stage. It is necessary, however, to deal with two mistaken political lines that are represented by right-wing deviation and by left-wing opportunism; hence the importance and necessity of the party's struggle to consolidate its position with regard to the scientific left-wing view.

We are required to struggle ideologically during our activities and contacts in order to push towards consolidating an effective left-wing axis. But having a correct theoretical position is not sufficient in itself. Undoubtedly, our scientific definition of a patriotic front in the new stage is the beginning of our ability to contribute effectively to this front. This, however, is not sufficient. The new patriotic front with all that it implies in terms of new structure and programmes, cannot be realized without changing the balance of forces within the resistance groups. Although our scientific understanding is the beginning of this change, the growth of a revolutionary and popular situation is what helps in the realization of this new front.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is required, therefore, to engage in popular political and military struggle in accordance with the tasks of this stage. This should prepare the way for the creation of conditions conducive to the emergence of the new front. These activities should be tied to the necessity of creating the national front. Any independent actions at this stage should aim at facilitating the establishment of the Front, and not at strengthening and affirming our independent activities.

XI. The Mobilization of the Masses

The balance of forces existing at the present time between the resistance movement and the enemy camp, together with the various existing objective conditions, make the masses the only force capable of challenging this for the benefit of the revolution. The mobilization of the masses and the release of their combative potential is a basic necessity for confronting this difficult situation.

Mobilization that is based on emotions and radio propaganda does not and cannot turn the masses into a solid revolutionary force which knows no despair. On the contrary, a mobilization based on verbalism and emotionalism leads, in most cases, to the creation of illusions about our capabilities, to the dissipation of emotional promises (based on unfounded enthusiasm which itself gives the illusion of a quick and easy victory.)

What are required now are the mobilization of the masses through revolutionary political consciousness and the organization of their vanguard in the party. The broad bases of the masses must also be grouped into various mass organizations and trade unions. This should enable each citizen, man and woman, young and old, to contribute daily and effectively to the battle. This will increase the strength of the revolution, deepen and consolidate it. The organized masses will then be able to fight the enemy forces, weaken them and demolish their support.

Revolutionary violence – military action – should not appear in our confrontation with the enemy and its plans as an alternative to the mass movement. Such an alternative would lead us to conceive, analyze, and plan the battle in purely military terms, i.e. to evaluate all the problems and possibilities (including the balance of forces) militarily. Revolutionary violence and military activity must be the crowning of the mass movement and not an alternative to it.

As much as it is very important to affirm the line of revolutionary violence as the main method of confronting the enemy (an enemy whose domination and exploitation of our country and people cannot be eliminated except by military force, it is also basic, at the same time, not to give this violence an adventurist form which can easily be terminated. Violence must have to sustain it, the mobilized masses which form the solid base and the main support for a long-term popular war of liberation. It is through this, and through this alone, that enemy forces can be weakened and the unconquerable power of the masses consolidated.

The practice of violence must emerge from the subjective picture which complements the basic requirements of victory (as has been proved by the experience of peoples and by popular wars of liberation of this century); for the revolutionary party leads a broad patriotic-national front surrounded by popular organizations through which the masses are mobilized in such a way that revolution becomes a huge historical enterprise in which millions of people engage through their daily effort. Such efforts are expanded continuously for the building and development of strength and for the increase of the

combative and fighting abilities. This, simultaneously weakens, fragments and annihilates the main pillars of the enemy forces.

The mobilization of the masses, in this sense (and with the aim of creating the strength necessary for changing the existing balance of forces to enable the resistance to find a way out of its crisis) requires a transformation in the style of our work and practice. What is required is not simply the repetition of the word “masses” and verbal emphasis on the popular line of the party, but a change in the way we behave which aims at translating such words into action. We should make it a central tradition in our work to be always among the masses, to think with them and to subject our programmes to their interests, capabilities and energies.

This means providing the masses with the facts about the new political situation, explaining to them our analysis of it, the reasons that led to it, and finally how we see the way out of this crisis. We should listen to their views and understanding of things. We should also ask their opinion about the programme of action. This should make it clear that this battle is the battle of the masses and that the cause is their own. It will also become clear that all the designs of the enemy which we talk about are designs that aim at keeping their situation as it is and, therefore, at continuing the injustice, exploitation and dispersion in which our people live. Thus they are required to think responsibly about this situation and its solution. The following should become an essential tradition of our work; we cannot think or plan or fight without this creative dialectical relationship between us and the masses.

The mobilization of the masses, as explained above, does not depend on the use of the mass media (radio and press). The basic means of propaganda are those members of the political organization who work deep among the masses and hold diverse group meetings which explain to the people their responsibilities and demand from them fulfillment of these. They also demonstrate to the people how to transform their spontaneous patriotic and class feelings into revolutionary struggle which is the only method capable of realizing their ambitions and aims.

The main key to the mobilization of wide sections of the masses so as to deal violently with their national and class enemy, is by pointing out the relationship between the problems of their daily life, and the political struggle which aims at liberation and the establishment of a democratic power working for the interests of the classes of the revolution. It is through the clarification of this relationship that an objective link is established between the people’s daily struggle to solve their problems – a struggle which they are especially prepared to wage – and their struggle within the strategic framework of a popular war of liberation which aims at finding the radical solution to all these problems. This affirms the importance of mass organizations and trade unions, and also the importance of the political programme that the revolution puts before the masses. It is through this programme that these masses see clearly the link between their daily struggle and the political struggle which aims at liberation, democracy and Arab unity.

It is natural for these political programmes, through which the masses are mobilized, to be, on the one hand inter-linked because the camp of the enemy is one, and on the other hand separate because of the

specificity of the political structure within which the Arab masses live in each of the Arab states or political structures.

XII. Revolutionary Violence

The three previous prescriptions (i.e. the building of the party, the patriotic front, the mobilization of the masses) must not be understood or practiced at the expense of revolutionary violence and its necessary continuation against the Israeli enemy and the reactionary Jordanian enemy. On the contrary, these prescriptions should aim at increasing the capacity and effectiveness of armed struggle against these enemies. Moreover, the practice of violence should aim at the creation of conditions that facilitate the process of building the party and the patriotic front, and mobilization of the masses, on the other, must always remain clear in our minds.

This is not due to an emotional attitude based on a romantic attachment to weapons, nor to any adventurism. It is due, firstly to the strategy of people's popular war of liberation which is the only road to liberation, and it is necessary secondly because of the serious historical consequences that might result should the existing phenomenon of armed struggle come to an end with its subsequent reflection on the mass movement. It is due, thirdly, to the position that the enemy would be in if it were to succeed in totally crushing the armed struggle and take complete control of any mass political and unarmed action. For in such a situation any activity of this kind will remain at the enemy's mercy and confined to the limits set by it. Such activity can never accomplish liberation. Finally, the process of building a party in such a situation will become simply a traditional one. The masses will not support anything of this kind and will only be attracted to revolutionary violence where it feels that its struggle may be worthwhile and where it feels that it is able to reply to the violence practiced by the enemy.

The practice of revolutionary violence drives the adversary into using the cruellest forms of force and oppression. Given the existing military balance of forces, the acquisition of advanced knowledge regarding the rules, methods and experiences related to the practice of violence in such a situation, become a basic issue. Apart from emphasizing the importance of revolutionary violence as a political line in the new situation, it is equally important to affirm the necessity of acquiring the fundamentals of revolutionary violence as a military science to be practiced with the highest degree of ability, experience and competence. These fundamentals can be summarized as follows:

- a) The avoidance of major military confrontation.
- b) The use of quick and sudden attack followed by complete disappearance.
- c) Selection of enemy targets which receive the support of most of the people and which do not create conflicting interpretations about their legitimacy and the appropriateness of their selection.
- d) Proficiency in issues pertaining to the security of the revolution. This is in order to protect the revolution, its members, cadres, leaders and weapons from an oppressive police apparatus which is well advanced in the arts of repression, terrorism and infiltration into revolutionary organizations.

e) Raising the political, fighting and psychological level of the fighters.

f) Deep familiarity of all principles and tactics of the art of guerrilla warfare. We must also acquaint ourselves with the huge wealth of experience that has been provided by people struggling in the rural areas and those working clandestinely in the cities, and which is relevant to the nature of our struggle.

g) The minimization of ostentatious display in armed struggle and a higher level of understanding of weapons and collective fighting linking this with genuine appreciation of the people and their aims and preparing to sacrifice for these, instead of glorifying death in itself.

The resistance movement remains weak in its knowledge and practice of the principles, methods and necessary fundamentals of revolutionary violence in the early stage of revolution. Therefore, the study of this subject, as a science and an art, should become a principal concern to the leadership, cadres and fighters of the resistance at this stage.

The revolution today is in a strategic defensive stage. Its main aim is to build and preserve its existence. Consequently, the practice of violence in this stage, is not directed at liberation through major military battle by which the forces of the enemy are eliminated within a short period of time; the aims of this violence is the establishment of an iron-strong party, the patriotic front, and mass mobilization which can, gradually, change the balance of forces towards the strategic interests of the revolution. We shall, therefore, continue limited to the practice of violence until we are able to utilize this process in the building of the mass revolutionary situation capable of achieving victory.

Revolutionary violence at this stage plays a very important role. This is so despite the fact that this violence cannot realize a strategic victory over the enemy. Its importance stems from its establishment as the only line capable of solving the antagonistic contradiction between our masses and imperialism along with its agents. It also, at this stage, prevents the enemy from achieving victory. This is so in accordance with the equation that imperialism discovered from their defeat in Indo-China, and which says that the inability to defeat the revolution, at a certain stage, is in itself a victory for the revolution.

This fact consolidated the line of revolutionary violence as a popular tradition. It also accelerates and deepens the process of building the revolutionary fighting party and its leadership of the patriotic-national front and develops gradually to the level of achieving total victory over the enemy.

Finally, the resistance movement established itself in reactionary Arab states on the assumption that it was on neutral or friendly territory. Its open establishment obliged it to engage in overt confrontation with these regimes when they showed their teeth. The resistance, therefore, needs to quickly rebuild itself so as to avoid direct confrontation and large-scale attacks. It needs to go underground so that the reactionary enemy cannot control it or force it into battle, which would ensure that the resistance could not win at this stage of its development.

XIII. Arab Revolutionary Action

Any view which sees the Palestinian resistance as a liberation movement existing on its own, lacks understanding and the strategic outlook necessary for the victory of the liberation struggle. Consequently such a view remains incapable of providing any real solution.

It is essential to realize that the struggle, in its totality, is the struggle of the Arab national liberation movement against imperialism. It is from this perspective that we should view the resistance movement and its problems.

It is clear that any view of the Palestinian problem must take into serious consideration the essential role that imperialism and reaction plays in the totality of the Arab world. It must also consider the basic role of the Arab masses in fighting these enemies. Any view which does not do this remains incapable of understanding the mechanism of imperialist domination and its methods of control and its horizons in the Middle East.

It is essential to see the resistance movement as an organic part of the Arab Liberation Movement. This is so not only in order to know the possibilities of the future and to deal with these, but also in order to analyze and explain what happened in the previous period which dates from June 1967 until July 1971.

Should we consider the failure of the resistance leadership to understand the essential role of the Jordanian masses in the Palestinian revolution as one of the main reasons which have led the resistance to its present degree of retreat, then the failure of the leadership to understand the role of the Arab masses and the relationship of the resistance with the Arab liberation movement is no less serious a reason.

If these mistakes have led to the results which the resistance have arrived at in the preceding stage, then being aware of these and making a start at stepping over them and dealing with them in a revolutionary manner become the most urgent task in the coming stage. This stage will, undoubtedly, be harder and more complex.

The resistance movement will remain in a difficult situation if it faces alone the camp of Zionism, imperialism, and reaction. It is not logical, realistic or scientific to demand from the Palestinian people to achieve, alone, final victory over Israel and its military establishment, also the agent regime in Jordan with its military establishment; behind these stand Zionism and imperialism with all their power and potential.

The existing situation defines the limits of the revolution of the Palestinian people alone: Here we find that half the Palestinians – about one million and a half – face Israel with all its capabilities and potential while the other half of the Palestinians face the reactionary regime in Jordan which imperialism, together with Israel, is prepared to do their utmost to defend. The preliminary exit out of the crisis that faces the resistance movement can be found then in the directives mentioned above and which aim, in their totality, at correcting the subjective situation of the resistance movement and the mobilization of the Palestinian masses to the utmost. But this is not sufficient by itself.

The real and historical way out of the crisis of the resistance depends on the growth of the Arab national liberation movement. This would enable the resistance movement to become a part of the side movement of the Arab masses which possesses the human and geographic depth necessary for victory.

The resistance movement will remain in a difficult position as long as the Arab national liberation movement stays within its present limits. As such the latter's moral and material support to the resistance is limited.

This, however, is not sufficient to ensure victory. Similarly the inability of the Arab national liberation movement, with its present content, to confront the imperialist, Zionist, reactionary enemy by force, fighting and popular armed struggle and thus its paralysis, threatens the revolution of the Palestinian people for the liberation of their land, and increases the complexity of the situation for the revolution and adds to its troubles and problems.

The bourgeois Arab national liberation movement is no longer capable of continuing the national democratic revolution. Consequently, this movement needs radicalization to renew its bases so as to continue its development and realize the tasks of the national democratic stage. These tasks cannot be fulfilled without a strategy for a popular war of liberation which aims at uprooting imperialism, Zionism, Israel and reaction from our homeland. It is only by such a movement that millions of people can be mobilized so that the resistance movement becomes a part of the Arab mass movement which is rebelling against all forms of existence of imperialism and reaction. The destruction of such an existence provides undoubtedly an essential contribution to the tottering of the Israeli existence.

Any conceptions that our struggle with Israel will remain confined within a limited geographic area, or with one form only of the Israeli usurpation, fail to understand the reality of imperialist and Zionist aspirations and their methods of operation. In reality Israel is not – literally speaking – a Palestinian problem only. It is a great mistake to continue the arbitrary separation between the Palestinian resistance and the Arab national liberation movement as it is done by the leadership of the resistance whose right-wing often manifests excessive regionalism. It is a mistake because Israel and imperialism are directly involving more and more of the Arab masses in the battle.

Nevertheless, we must realize at the same time that the radicalization of the Arab national liberation struggle and its re-establishment, is a huge historical operation. The basis of this involves a radical change in the structure of this ideological and class movement together with its method of confronting the national and class enemy.

The leadership of the Arab national liberation movement must be based on a proletarian party which can mobilize the Arab working class in order to lead the alliance of the workers, peasants and the petty-bourgeoisie. This is to be accomplished by a wide national front which mobilizes all the revolutionary masses in the light of a political programme derived from a scientific study of the political, economical, social and regional reality. Such a front must be oriented towards the movement of the Arab masses; must use revolutionary violence within the strategy of popular war in its struggle with imperialism, Zionism, Israel, reaction and all the forces that obstruct the practice of this programme.

The resistance movement, by correcting its subjective conditions, can become one of the factors for such a movement. At this time when the resistance movement cannot represent the Arab national liberation movement not consider itself directly responsible for its radicalization or establishment, it has, nevertheless, the right and the duty to aspire to facilitate the birth of such a movement and to coalesce with it as soon as it emerges. This would be the embodiment of the principles of the unity of the instrument of Arab revolution; the revolution of the one nation.

The fact that the resistance movement has a vanguard role, in this respect, must not be understood in terms of putting up a fence between it and the Arab national liberation movement. On the contrary its vanguard role obliges it the basic task of setting in motion its dialectical relation with this movement and the affirming and deepening of this relationship.

The left-wing of the resistance and the Popular Front in particular, is required to play an essential role in this sphere. This is based on the understanding that the Arab national liberation movement is derived from: the fact that this movement aims at realizing the unity of the Arab working class and the dominance of its leadership and programme against its class and national enemies.

XIV. The Alliances of the New Stage on the Arab and International levels

The picture of the new situation outlined above defines clearly the relationships of the resistance movement: it is struggling against Israel, the reactionary regime in Jordan and against imperialism which supports them and which wages through them its battle against the Arab national liberation movement. It is on the vanguard of the movement (i.e. the Palestinian resistance and all it represents) that imperialism concentrates the battle.

The resistance movement depends, in this struggle, on the revolutionary Palestinian and Arab masses, and on the revolutionary forces on the international level, which, in the all-engulfing internationalist struggle, supports the Arab national liberation movement and the Palestinian resistance in its struggle for liberation.

The correct position, with regard to the reactionary Arab regimes, is the one which considers them, objectively speaking, as an organic part of the enemy camp. However, the position in reference to the en-called nationalist Arab regimes (or more precisely the military, petit-bourgeoisie regimes) is more complex. This is so because of the general nationalist character of this stage of the Arab revolution and also because of the role that these regimes, in varying degrees, can play in the stage of the democratic revolution, and in conditions where the masses are waging a ferocious battle against the imperialist reactionary forces in the area.

Hence the urgent necessity of taking a clear position with regard to the relations with these regimes. At the same time it is necessary to review these relations continuously, at every stage, because of the changing role of the petit-bourgeoisie and its oscillating position in society.

a) The Position with Regard to the Arab Petit-Bourgeois Regimes

The PFLP defined its position toward the petit-bourgeois regimes in its second national congress (February 1969) and it was recorded in "The Political and Organizational Strategy" which was issued by the congress. This basic document studied in detail the nature and role of these regimes in this stage. IT affirmed that, "Given that these regimes are, on the one hand, anti-imperialist and are against Israel, and do, on the other hand, put forward compromising and non-radical programmes in their confrontation with the enemy; the relationship with these regimes must be at the same time one of alliance and conflict. Alliance because of its antagonism to imperialism and Israel, and in contradiction with it because of its strategy in the battle."

As was expected by the above document, the series of events that followed touched upon the factors that have formed the basis of the PFLP position. The document says, under the heading of "general observations," the following:

“The basic contradiction that has been defined by this strategy does not constitute a straight mathematical line on whose sides stand two contradicting forces. It is, in reality, a dialectical winding line on each of its sides stand a group of allied forces which retain: despite its alliance, contradictions. Sometimes their alliance grows stronger, at other times it is their contradictions that deepen. Thus at certain periods the picture becomes interlocked, interrelated and dynamic on each of the two sides of the line.” This demands from us another look at this position in the light of recent developments. These developments which have occurred in recent years are important. They were the result of the breaking out of conflicts, at all levels, in the area and the gradual, but quick, consolidation of the process of class polarization in the Arab homeland.

The petit-bourgeois position as a class which is not directly engaged in the process of production is characterized by oscillation and instability. When this class reaches power, especially through its military wing, it adds new elements to its characteristics: The most important of these is antagonism towards the masses and fear of them; a tendency towards elitist bureaucratic forms which lays the foundation for bureaucracy and the privileges of a technocratic strata.

Some Marxist thinkers go as far as to affirm that the petit-bourgeoisie has never been in power at any historical period and is incapable of doing so. This is so because it stands on the margin of the production process. Consequently as soon as its representatives achieve power it has to depend on class forces which participate directly in production and has stable and firm social and material roots.

These forces are often those of the middle bourgeoisie, the rural bourgeoisie and sometimes those of the big bourgeoisie. All there find enough loopholes in the reformist laws that the petit-bourgeoisie legislates to renew their rise as dominant class forces.

This then is what lies behind the failure of the “nationalist” regimes and their inability to complete their national and democratic tasks. This failure and inability becomes increasingly clear with the deepening of (the situation of) national and class crisis. It is these that reveal the enormity of the failure in such a way as to make it seem surprising.

It was expected that the defeat of June 1967 would reveal the extent of the weakness reached by these regimes, and disclose their inability to continue their tasks, and their gradual transformation into reactionary forces.

In fact, the defeat of June 1967 not only revealed the national predicament of these regimes, but also the class crisis with which they live. They were successful in covering up this crisis claiming that they were utilizing their full strength to fight the Zionist imperialist enemy. This is the reason they claim for the absence of fully-developed class solutions. This is the background to the concept of class reconciliation which these regimes like to put forward frequently.

The exposure of these regimes will, no doubt, become increasingly obvious as time goes on, and their worn-out slogans such as: “The elimination of the track of aggression,” “No voice above that of the

battle,” “what has been taken by force will not be regained except by force,” and “The year of decision,” lose their credibility.

The weak position of the petit-bourgeois Arab regimes, resulting from the June defeat and its consequences, explains their hypocrisy and flattery toward the masses, in particular towards the resistance movement; it also explains their attitude towards the resistance movement during the period 1967-1970, which then gave the impression that it was supporting armed resistance. These regimes, having prepared themselves by rebuilding the machinery of repression, and having recovered some of their prestige through an intensive campaign of promises and demagogic claims (capitalizing on the absence of revolutionary Arab party capable of consolidating the spontaneous stand of the masses in 1967), began to show their intentions towards the masses and in particular towards the armed resistance movement.

These could be noted at the Tripoli conference; from their silence during the massacre: of September 1970 and those of July 1971; from their wish to take part in liquidating the resistance through attacks on its left-wing; from the encouragement they gave to the mediators during the Jeddah negotiations; and from their opportunist policy towards the stooge Palestinian State...etc.

He cannot separate these positions, which the petit-bourgeois regimes carefully adopted towards the resistance, from the whole situation of class and national surrender that these regimes are subject to internally and externally. In addition to their appeasement and the mortgaging of itself to reactionary Arab regimes such as Saudi Arabia, and their war against national and democratic liberation movements in the Arab World, they were internally retaking gradually the gains made by the working class and peasants. It also began to increase, more and more, the opportunities for the development of an economy based on consumption and for the growth of urban, rural and estate bourgeoisie so that this might increase its social domination. All this took place at a time when those regimes were moving determinedly towards reconciliation with American and West German imperialism. This was accompanied by a propaganda campaign which tried to suggest that it is possible to neutralize imperialism in our battle with Israel.

This new situation created a sharp conflict between this class – whose privileges began to acquire a solid basis because of the total retreat of the petit-bourgeois military regimes, and the new class forces emerging in society. This was consolidated in proletarian movements which could neither be ignored nor contained.

This conflict which has been raging continuously as a result of the class alliance made by the ruling class to protect its interests and because of its acceleration of oppression against workers, peasants, youth and the progressive sections of the petit-bourgeois class, is reflected in the ruling class itself. This is clearly manifested in the struggle between the right-wing sections within the “nationalist” regimes – which are usually the strongest – and the left-wing and revolutionary sections. This struggle leads the right-wing elements to ally themselves with the old remaining state machinery and with reactionary class forces which in turn leads to alliance with or appeasement of the reactionary forces and the

imperialist camp, and to total isolation from the (positions of the) masses; they develop into a force antagonistic towards the demands of the masses and practiced in oppression of any revolutionary activity.

This general fact is clearly expressed in the series of developments that the Arab world has witnessed since 1968. The most important of these can be summarized in the following:

1) The petit-bourgeois regimes have been able to rebuild their instruments of oppression which were dislocated as a result of the Israeli attack. They were also able to turn the Arab armies into an instrument for the preservation of their own power and to use them in solving its conflicts and contradictions with the opposing patriotic sections. Thus the process of rebuilding the Arab armies has been transformed by the petit-bourgeois regimes into a process of building all instruments of oppression for use against the masses.

2) The petit-bourgeois regimes have also succeeded in regaining their political awe which was weakened by the defeat of 1967. This was accomplished by a concentrated demagogic propaganda campaign which utilized its nationalist past and the absence of a revolutionary party which could have articulated the results of the June defeat in such a way as to foil the designs of these regimes in their attempts to mislead the masses.

3) The right-wing in the petit-bourgeois regimes was able to ally itself with reactionary class forces together with the old machinery of the state so as to get rid of the national-patriotic opposition represented by some wings within the petit-bourgeois regimes.

This enabled them, especially after the attacks on the resistance from September 1970 till July 1971, to practice their policy of surrender and liquidation.

4) These regimes played an antagonistic role toward the left-wing of the resistance. This reached the level of a conspiracy at the famous Tripoli conference, accompanied a propaganda campaign to which some of the leaders of these regimes took upon themselves for the benefit of King Faisal and Jordanian reaction.

The antagonistic role was due not only to these regimes' fear of an increasing left-wing influence upon the resistance as a whole, but also because of the organic link between such an influence and the quick rise of an Arab National Liberation Movement and its democratic and socialist forces.

5) All this took place in a situation of total retreat at the political and economic level. National surrender was accompanied by an accelerating class surrender. Thus, in addition to its peaceful appeasement of reaction and the sacrifice of gains that reaction never dreamed about before 1967 (North Yemen – conspiring against Democratic Yemen – the encirclement of the revolution in the Gulf – the surrender of the Arab islands to Iran – the manufacture of the federation of the Gulf States...etc.), it conducted a series of meetings with the representatives of imperialism (the visits of Rogers, Sisco and the

representatives of Western bourgeois countries to some Arab capitals, the restoration of relations with West Germany...).

The retreatist policy of these regimes included, on the national level, the appeasement of the right-wing and reactionary forces within each of the petit-bourgeois regimes. Thus under the slogan of “national unity” all the reactionary and right-wing forces were brought back to political life: Moslem brothers were let out of jail, and state custody over the property of the feudalists and bourgeoisie in Egypt was lifted. Furthermore the ban was lifted from 200 members of the Syrian bourgeoisie and big merchant class. On the economical level, the policy of retreatism was embodied in a series of economic decisions which sought to encourage imperialist and Arab reactionary investment, and in the creation of wide opportunities for the development of the private sector at the expense of the public sector. It was also manifested in reversing many of the progressive economic measures and in their substitution by right-wing and reactionary measures and policies.

This retreatist policy on both the national-patriotic level and the economic level, which was the result of the weakness and bankruptcy of the petit-bourgeois regimes, demanded the crushing of all forces opposed to it. Hence we find the retreatist policy accompanied by an oppressive policy.

This began in the conspiracy against the resistance movement at the Tripoli conference and culminated in the bloody liquidation campaigns against the people, against the patriotic movement, and against the communist party and democratic forces in Sudan. Also in the crushing of the movements of workers, peasants and youth in Egypt and elsewhere.

The transformation of some petit-bourgeois regimes into a force of repression against the masses and their revolutionary activities so as to proceed with the retreatist policy imposed on them by their inability to face up to the task of this phase, is the most important factor in the struggle that is taking place between the Arab masses on the one hand, and imperialism, Israel and Arab reaction on the other. The danger of this role comes from the use of these regimes of their nationalist patriotic political past to mislead the masses, benefiting in this from the absence of a revolutionary Arab national movement.

This situation should not blind us from seeing the other side of the picture, i.e. the emergence of new class forces composed of vanguard workers, peasants, revolutionary intellectuals and a wide progressive sector of youth. These forces have on various occasions expressed their awareness of the dynamics of the on-going struggle and of their primary role in this struggle. There is no doubt that these manifestations, measured by the amount of repression which they have been subjected to, are important indicators of a new birth.

This fact is very important for our understanding of the retreatist position of the petit-bourgeois regimes. This retreat does not occur in a vacuum and in isolation from a historical process of class polarization. Thus we have to realize that the new class forces; and the consolidation of their role require time and struggle. But we must be aware simultaneously of the part that we must play in this

situation and must reaffirm the primacy of alliances with progressive popular forces. This must take place according to our understanding of the process of class struggle in these countries.

We face today in some of the petit-bourgeois regimes, a new reality. This reality differs radically from that which existed in 1968, 1969 and at the beginning of 1970. It requires a new stand.

This position must not be understood as requiring a continuous battle with these regimes on the subject of the Palestinian resistance movement. For the objective and subjective conditions now existing requires a certain (style of) tactical relationship with these regimes which reflect the predominant objective and subjective conditions.

The state of retreat in which the Palestinian revolutionary movement finds itself because of the heavy blows at it, especially in Jordan – together with the stagnation of the Arab national revolutionary movement which could provide support for the resistance movement in its battle against all curtailing and liquidatory schemes summarize the dominant objective and subjective conditions at both the Palestinian and Arab levels. These conditions demand tactical consideration when we define our position towards these regimes.

Daily attempts are made by these regimes to interfere with the resistance. This interference aims at dominating the resistance in such a way that the latter becomes objectively and practically unable to rebel against the plans and policies of these regimes. This demands that the resistance wage a legitimate struggle against such plans so as to protect the independence of its struggle and political line. This legitimate struggle will lead the resistance into unequal battles (which will make its success in such battles doubtful) unless this struggle takes into consideration the tactics that are demanded by the existing objective and subjective situation.

This, while it is important and necessary to review the positions and previous methods of dealing with these regimes, it is important and necessary to consider, in our review, the tactics that are necessitated by the existing objective and subjective conditions at both the Palestinian and Arab level.

We must, in the coming stage take into consideration the following aspects:

– The contradiction between Israel and the Arab petit-bourgeois regimes, despite the impotence and surrender of these regimes (in the light of Israeli ambitions to annex the land it has occupied, and with reference to the freedom of economic dealings after the settlement) on effective contradiction that cannot be resolved easily or quickly. Consequently, there is a period during which the resistance can benefit tactically, especially when arranging its priorities in the coming battles. During this period the resistance can avoid exposing itself to all the enemies simultaneously without sacrificing or ignoring the interests of the rising patriotic and democratic movement inside these Arab countries.

– The relationship of the resistance with these regimes will be dynamic and not static. The resistance movement has to define this relationship in such a way as to serve simultaneously, its tactics and strategy.

At this stage, the resistance must avoid confrontation except in defending its cause and the freedom of its political and military movement. This tactic must not be followed at the expense of the relationship of the resistance with the Arab national movement which is more revolutionary and radical than these regimes.

b) International Alliances

The resistance movement, in general, has been mistaken during the previous stage in its understanding of the problem of alliances, whether these were with the regimes or with the Arab masses. This mistake led to the loss of one of the most important of its dimensions (i.e. its mass Arab dimension).

Consequently, it committed a strategic mistake. However, the resistance committed another basic mistake when its leadership failed to realize the importance of the internationalist arena for its battle, and the objective necessity for alliance with the forces of revolution and progress in the world. These forces are represented under three main headings:

a) Movements of national liberation in the Third world. b) The Socialist countries. c) The progressive movements of the proletariat in the capitalist countries in the West.

An understanding of the question of alliance seen from this perspective places the resistance movement in its correct position on the map of internationalist struggle against imperialism. This is the struggle against which the Palestinian and Arab masses wage one of its most prominent battles and which constitutes one of the most dangerous and powerful imperialist links.

The left of the resistance movement is required to put its general theoretical positions into material political and organizational forms. It is also required to translate into a realistic language its understanding of the international struggle and the international features of the imperialist attack. It is required to do the same with respect to its awareness of the unity of the struggle against imperialism, its links and its interactions.

The key points for such a strategy must be based on the following:

1) The belief in the necessity and inevitability of the unity of the socialist camp, and of the establishment of relationships with the socialist countries by realistic commitment to this belief. The contemporary importance of this line reflects itself directly in the rejection of opportunism in international relations and internationalist alliances.

2) Awareness of the primary role that national liberation movements play in the 'Third World' today, and the central importance of these movements in the process of confronting imperialism and defeating it. Similarly, we must be aware of the degree to which the armed struggle of these movements is becoming closer to each other and influencing each other effectively and positively.

It is, however, necessary to realize at the same time that national liberation movements of the 'Third World' cannot, today, be bourgeois movements or under bourgeois leadership, or expressed by petit-bourgeois reformist military regimes. This is so because of the objective conditions and because of the international nature of imperialism. We must try to find out whether and to what degree it is possible to utilize, tactically speaking, such conditions to push the revolution forward. However, the basic criterion remains in use by the national liberation movements the method of armed struggle led by the working class and its allies to solve the contradiction with its class and rational enemies.

3) A deep belief in the historical role that the proletariat in the capitalist industrial countries will play. This part can temporarily be delayed through an increase by the capitalist class of the process of the pillage of the 'Third World'. However, such a historic role cannot be abolished, nor can its natural and conscious development into a revolutionary role be arrested. He must be aware of the relationship between this role with the continuity of struggle in the world, and the increasing support of the socialist countries for this struggle.

The left of the resistance movement in particular is required to build the strongest of links with the international progressive, labour and student forces in the West, and to strengthen its international solidarity with them. It must be realized also that such solidarity does not express itself in the form of material, moral and other support given to the resistance, but also through strengthening and raising the level of the struggle against the ruling classes inside their countries.

XV. Resistance Inside Occupied Palestine

We should not be distracted by our awareness of the strategic dimension according to which the battle of the liberation of Palestine is waged by the fact that resistance in occupied Palestine (in the sense of confronting the enemy daily with armed violence and other means) must have priority in our thinking.

However, this orientation cannot produce positive results if it is not based on the following:

- a) A continuous critical review of our experience, so as to benefit from its lessons, constantly feeding it with new elements and tactics which are as elastic and changeable as the Israeli and reactionary plans in their battle against our people in the occupied territories.
- b) Keeping abreast with the plans and programmes of the enemy and its political, economic, social and cultural measures, in addition to its military movements. These must be studied scientifically and their aims uncovered early so as to take the necessary steps to foil them.
- c) Care must be taken not to break the link between the combatants inside the occupied areas and those outside. These links must not be relaxed because of the problems faced by the leadership, most of which is found outside. Such a relaxation can only lead to the lessening of the importance and priority which must be given to the fighters inside the occupied territories in terms of political and military support in all its forms and in terms of giving this area the appropriate size when drawing plans of action for each stage of the struggle.

The leadership of the central resistance movement (most of which is found outside occupied Palestine) must be careful not to let its existence outside lead to an inadequate interaction with the struggles of the masses inside the occupied area. The degree to which this leadership is occupied in the struggle against the stooge regime in Jordan and in other resistance battles in the Arab area must remain balanced with its duty as the leader of a revolution of more than a million of our people under Israeli occupation. These masses cannot contribute directly now in the fateful battle between the resistance and the reactionary regime in Jordan. Consequently, its task remains to resist the Israeli enemy and to support the resistance against the Jordanian regime through its struggle against Israel.

These three basic principles must remain in our minds whenever we discuss the resistance movement and its tasks.

We must realize that raising the level of armed struggle against Israel, together with increasing its effectiveness and building it on secure historical bases odds strength to the resistance movement in its battle against Jordanian reaction. It also strengthens the resistance movement in all its other political battles and contributes in pushing the Arab national liberation struggle forward.

The continuity of the fight against Israel and the serious work to raise the effectiveness of this fight has a special importance in this period. This is so because such a struggle retains the national-patriotic aspect of the revolution and this wine the resistance the general support of the widest sections of the Arab masses. Such a wide support helps the resistance in its various other battles in Jordan and in the Arab arena generally.

With reference to our experience in armed struggle in the past period, we can record, briefly, the following points:

1) The resistance movement tended, on the whole, towards emphasizing military action in itself. This was done by training armed groups and sending them from outside instead a working among the people in the occupied territories according to organized revolutionary methods, and through establishing the secret bases, cells and leadership which can continue the battle amid the organization and mobilization of the masses.

2) This method led to neglect of the political side of the struggle. Yet this is the basic aspect of the struggle according to which the masses can be organized and a general revolutionary atmosphere can be created; and according to which the conspiracies of the occupiers and their agents, together with their domination of the morale and direction of the masses, can be foiled.

3) The vacuum that resulted from the political absence of the resistance in the occupied territories has opened a wide sphere for the emergence of three forms of activity:

a) patriotic activities based on emotional reactions. These would become inflamed on certain occasions and go through heroic but temporary phases and could easily be contained. The vicissitudes of this form of patriotic activity were subject mainly to emotional criteria.

b) the activities of the nationalists and reactionaries, old and new. This initially took a form opposed to occupation; however, it gradually converged to meet with the occupation as the mutual class interests coincided.

c) political activities initiated under the direction of the Israeli occupation, and whose aims were defined right from the beginning, by the occupation. This aim was to create a suitable atmosphere for the consolidation of the occupation either directly or in the form of a puppet Palestinian state, amid all this the resistance was, as a whole, lacking in effective political work among the masses.

4) The Israelis exploited this situation to the full. Thus their programme was based right from the start on driving the resistance gradually to the East so that fighting it would take a purely military form away from the daily life of the masses. They also aimed at preventing the introduction of revolutionary violence into the daily political life of Israeli civilians and Arabs of the West Bank. Except for their failure in Gaza, in this sphere, they did achieve their aims in the West Bank and the Golan Heights.

5) The central point concerning the aim of the Israelis in the occupied land was based on the creation of ordinary life conditions for the majority of the masses so that the people would direct their attention to their daily problems, leaving the resistance as a vanguard force only, without it becoming a mass movement. As such, the secret police and the instruments of oppression can deal with it; hence, the policy of 'open bridges' with East Jordan and the policy of employing Arab labour in Israel, together with various other similar policies.

All these policies benefit the Israeli economy, and at the same time serve to abort the resistance.

These five points constitute the main five general observations which can be mentioned generally concerning the situation in the occupied territories. However, it is important to be aware of the differences in the situation between the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and the territories occupied since 1948.

a) The Gaza Strip

The conspicuous state of poverty in Gaza led to the consequent growth of class consciousness there in comparison with the west Bank. This together with the high population density (under Arab-Egyptian administration during a period of the latter's nationalist expansion) and the familiarity of the people of Gaza with arms (before 1956 and during the Israeli occupation in 1956 and afterwards) plus the fact that over half the population in Gaza are 1948 refugees, all established a strong base for struggle that the occupation forces could not use for its own benefit. On the contrary this has created a suitable atmosphere for the launching of armed resistance among the masses who have strongly embraced it.

The resistance experience in Gaza constitutes one of the most prominent historical experiences concerning the capacity of a small, poor unarmed and geographically isolated people to continue, given its conditions a heroic and almost unknown struggle.

It is no secret, nor is it historically false to say that the organization of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine played in Gaza an essential role in leading the struggle of the people of the Gaza Strip. This has proved in the admission of the enemy itself, not only its organizational strength, but also the depth of its patriotic roots.

Despite these heroic deeds which our people in the Gaza Strip continue to perform, it has had to pay a price – martyrs and prisoners – and faces dangers and obstacles from within and without. In other words, there are a number of factors each of which has had its influence on the organization, both materially and morally. These factors – objective and subjective – cannot all be listed here; but the subjective factors relate to the insufficiency of the political-military cadre after the continuous blows it received (group arrests of the first line of command which happened several times, the martyrdom of a number of leading cadres). However, because of the organization's popular base, it partially succeeded in compensating for the loss of these cadres; however, this was achieved in such a way that requires the organization to give this aspect greater attention.

The silence prevailing on the other front lines allowed the Israeli enemy to concentrate on suppressing and crushing the resistance in the Strip. Thus it sent into the Strip its most barbaric and ruthless section (i.e. Blue Berets). It also carried out a series of operations of forceful emigration, banishment, collective imprisonment, the destruction of houses, building of wide roads through refugee camps and the establishment of permanent and mobile guard and check points almost everywhere.

The enemy finds in the conditions of recession and their Arab reflections its best aid. This is so because the September events have encouraged the activities of some of the traditional and reactionary stooge leaderships outside and inside the Strip. This was done under the supervision of an Arab intelligence service in preparation for the “inheritance” of the Israeli occupation in case of a peaceful settlement according to which the Israelis would withdraw from the occupied Strip.

The basis for the calling phase in which the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine undertakes to play a major role is composed of the following factors: Israel’s attaching of the Strip to its command of the middle area; the constant activity towards lessening the population density of the Strip; the encouragement of the activity of the stooge traditional leadership by an Arab intelligence service; the establishment of collective security camps in Sinai; and the acceleration of the campaign of terror and pursuit; all this amid the situation of retreat through which the Arab national liberation movement and the resistance in particular is living.

The Popular Front is required to continue to accelerate and deepen its leadership role in the armed struggle of Gaza amid all these complex difficulties. This must be done through its complete programme for the struggle, and through increasing the interests of its cadres and leaders in their responsibility to accelerate the process of building the party, of deepening the consciousness of its bases, providing the party with the necessary combative capabilities, and through the establishment of a national-patriotic front that is capable of benefiting from mass mobilization and its direction according to the principle of revolutionary violence.

b) The West Bank

When the Hashemite army retreated from the West Bank it left it to the Israelis shattered and torn. This was so because the reactionary and stooge Jordanian authorities undertook in successive and total campaigns to crush and liquidate the patriotic and progressive movements and individuals, especially in the regime’s campaigns at April 1957 and November 1966.

Following the Israeli occupation there was an outburst of armed resistance. This launched attacks against the enemy most of which were organized and sent from outside. There is no doubt that a large part of these were undertaken at the expense of the quiet and patient work among the people of the West Bank to renew the building of their cadres and their vanguard bases as a foundation for revolutionary action.

This activity was accompanied by noisy propaganda. This was facilitated by the petit-bourgeois regimes which were interested in lessening the enormity of their defeat in the eyes of the masses. It was also facilitated by the petit-bourgeois mentality of the leadership in most of the resistance organizations.

At the same time the Israelis had their own well-prepared and long-term plans concerning the future of the West Bank. Thus, while the resistance was acting as if liberation were a question of two or three years, the Israelis were planning to keep the occupied territories for a long period; that is, until they have been successfully transformed into a structure or structures that are, practically speaking, under its political, military, economic and cultural domination.

This, then, is what explains the policy of open bridges, the building of numerous colonies, the “unification” of Jerusalem, the utilization of Arab labour, the creation of a fake and deceptive atmosphere of prosperity, the lessening of direct military appearances suggestive of the occupation, the attention given to reactionary municipality, leaders in reparation for transforming them into political leaders when necessary, the expansion of imports and transport between Israel and the West Bank and between the latter and the East Bank and other Arab markets.

It has become very clear now that the Israelis are planning to keep their domination in various forms over the occupied territories. Regardless of whether this domination takes the form of “Israel establishing its little empire over the West Bank as a first stage” or the form of “Israel considering itself as the permanent government in the West Bank” as Dayan said, it is a fact that Israel has gone a long way towards achieving this transfer from settler-colonialism to imperialist expansionism. This will take various forms according to the situation, and to the demographic, geographic and economic map.

Thus we find so far that, apart from the settlements established by it in the West Bank, imports from Israel have come to form 85% of the total imports of the West Bank. More than 10% of the exports of Israel go to the occupied territories. More than 1/5 of labour forces of the West Bank work in Israel in what is called “material work.”

Since the Israeli plans (which are in total harmony with those of imperialism) are designing this future for the occupied territories and for the West Bank in particular, it has become imperative for the resistance movement to confront this plan and to use all possible revolutionary methods to hinder its execution, and to create the combative atmosphere to foil it.

The project of the United Arab Kingdom was put forward to serve towards consolidating an acceptable form of Israeli imperialism in the West Bank. With this project – taking into consideration the time span necessary for its realization and the necessary amendment which must be applied to it – Israel should be able to consolidate with Arab reactionary forces and under the supervision of American imperialism, the plans it has drawn following June 1967.

This reality has, however, another side to it: This is the clarity that the position has gained generally - especially the Hashemite-Israeli convergence. Consequently, a specific aim has crystallized during this

period in the West Bank. This is the thwarting of the Hashemite plan and, at the same time, failing the Israeli support given to it and which is reflected in the series of procedures such as municipal elections, the expansion of what are called opportunities for Arab labour in Israel as together with the various attempts designed to minimize the direct feeling of the burden of occupation.

The recent experience of the resistance compared to Israeli plans, and the lessons derived from practice together with the developments since September 1970 make any vision of future action in the West Bank (and the occupied territories in general) related to the following points:

1) Any attentive observation of the situation and changes in the West Bank and the viewing of events through a total analysis of imperialist, Zionist and reactionary plans in the area, cancels immediately any arbitrary separation between the struggle inside the occupied territories and the totality of struggle outside against the various forms taken by the conspiracy.

The relationship between the struggle inside the West Bank and that of the patriotic democratic movement in the East Bank must be viewed dialectically. It is necessary to increasingly unify the two at both the level of planning and execution.

2) Serious work must be undertaken to create and expand the leadership cadre which is capable of taking the political and organizational responsibility inside the West Bank. It is also necessary to develop and expand the rear leadership responsible outside the occupied territories. All this must be undertaken with a deep understanding of the importance of the party, its central role, and the priority it takes in this fateful battle. The party is not only capable of understanding the complex map and the interconnected and intertwined forces waging the battle, but also capable of drawing its counter tactical and strategic plans and their realization on the road to victory.

3) Revolutionary violence must continue and accelerate. It must be understood that in this period it plays a central role in the process of realizing the remainder of the conditions for victory. These armed activities must, however, be governed by military science which is dictated by guerrilla warfare, together with the consideration it is subject to at specific periods and places.

Armed struggle leads, in this period, not only to the wrecking of the status quo that Israel wants to impose and more, but also to an acceleration of the ripening objective conditions and helps the subjective conditions to grow.

The natural introduction to the demolition of all the conspiracies surrounding our people in the West Bank and the rest of occupied territories is to be found in the scientific practice of the tactics of secret war in the cities, guerrilla warfare in the countryside and other aspects of revolutionary violence that have to be practiced in the first stages of a long-term popular war of liberation.

4) A view of armed struggle which looks at it in isolation from the total battle (especially if it is understood in a mechanical accumulative process of military operations launched from the outside or

simply as armed patrols which carry out specific tasks) such a view cannot fulfill the required revolutionary tasks.

Such tasks cannot be fulfilled without awareness of the necessity to develop the struggle in its various forms (military, political, cultural) through the understanding of the strategy of the enemy and its plans in the occupied territories together with the methods it uses to carry out these plans.

The mobilization of the masses, and their organization into associations, unions and societies and so on together with waging the battles which express their daily needs, national hopes, and future ambitions is what is required to create the combative mass political climate which can hinder the plans of the enemy and expose them. It can also isolate the collaborators and traitors who are being prepared to play a stooge and collaborationist role. Such a mood also creates the shield of the revolutionary liberationist action, its major weapon and solid ground for victory. All this has to be achieved by participating in the various forms of struggle which have been developed by revolutionaries in history (revolutionary violence, demonstrations, strikes, partial and total boycott, bulletins, national celebrations and the revival of national events which express the combative conscience of the masses, the punishment of collaborators, the development of progressive national culture...etc,etc.).

5) In the occupied territories especially in the West Bank, we must be oriented towards creating the widest national front which includes all the forces that are against the occupation. The programme of this front must be based on a scientific understanding of all the existing contradictions. This front, led by a progressive force aware of the dynamics and dimensions of the struggle, must lead the masses in their daily battles, and must realize a policy of self-dependence by providing the necessary military requirements and various other needs. This policy must have priority and cannot be achieved without moving among the masses and without its will.

Our task in the caning phase in the West Bank must be decisively limited by these five major points. They must be developed into a detailed programme and subjected to daily leadership capable of acting quickly through scientific awareness of the dimensions of the enemy's plans. Such leadership must also be aware of the inter-related nature of its front and of the necessity of polarization in the coming phase. There is, on the one side, the front which includes the Hashemite regime and the class forces which are shared with the Israelis and American imperialism, and the front composed of the Palestinian and Jordanian masses together with the other Arab revolutionary forces on the other side.

c) The Territories Occupied since 1948

The national and class oppression which the Zionist enemy has practiced in various forms against our people living under the burden of occupation since 1948 was reflected mainly in the open racial discrimination practiced by the oppressors and occupiers against the owners of land and right. This enemy kept a portion of our people under tough military administration. The most important of its manifestations was the expropriation of the land, collective expulsion, psychological warfare, the deprivation of the right of movement and work, together with the deprivation of political rights and

their total isolation from their Palestinian and Arab nation. This is in addition to the ruin the enemy inflicted on our people's national heritage especially its progressive aspects. This is apart from various other forms of national and class oppression.

All this, however, has failed to erase the patriotic feelings of our people in occupied Palestine: Naturally these masses were able to express in various forms bitterness during the period between 1948 and 1967. These received the most repugnant form of political, cultural and bloody oppression. However, the emergence of the armed resistance and its growth provided these masses with a method of struggle which it was quick to support.

The policy of 'open borders' between the new and old occupied territories which the Israelis have used in varying degrees since the 1967 occupation, has not served Israeli plans as was intended. On the contrary it led to the creation of important contacts between the Arab people of the occupied territories, old and new, after an isolation that had lasted 20 years. This renewed the natural relatedness, relatively speaking, between our people in the occupied territories of 1948 and the remainder of the Palestinian people. Thus the same political expressions were established between them within the projected horizons. This provided a fertile ground for the resistance movement to spread its roots to the previously 'forbidden' territories. However, because of its class, ideological, and organizational structure, the resistance did not devote sufficient energy and effort to this. Nonetheless, the Popular Front was relatively conscious of this important problem, and undertook, despite its delay in the matter, the formulation of plans intended to draw our people in that area and seriously oriented itself towards mobilizing and organizing them and creating the core of a revolutionary organization.

However, it is delusive to think that such a precious core can grow spontaneously, or to imagine that the difficulties that relate to its work, connections, and the channels that tie it to the central command are transitory difficulties. Similarly it is a delusion to think that the plans of the Zionist enemy which are designed to contain and crush such a revolutionary core are easily confronted.

The Popular Front is required in the coming phase to devote special effort concerning the future of such a core, and must provide the tactics that fit the strategic tasks that we expect from our organization in the occupied Palestine of 1948 to fulfill.

It is important that we should work according to a scientific plan for the benefit of the revolution. This must be done through the understanding and activation of the class contradictions inside Israel itself.

We are aware that the class contradictions in any colonialist-settler society move slowly and are slow in playing a basic role for the benefit of the national liberation movement. But this should not mean that Israel is a classless society or a society existing above classes.

The left-wing movements in Israel which are still in the early stages of growth and which are still so far both numerically and politically very weak, provide a symbolic indicator of the direction towards which the struggle inside Israel may develop strategically speaking.

These then are the broad outlines of the conditions of our people in the occupied territories, the nature of the objective and subjective conditions through which we face the enemy and our general expectations of the coming period.

We must, however, realize that there are no easy solutions to complex and difficult problems and we must remain aware of this fact when we deal with these difficulties.

The failing of the American-Zionist-reactionary conspiracy in the occupied territories (the establishment of a stooge, client entity on the dead body of the patriotic movement and its future) cannot be achieved in isolation from the total situation of confrontation between the imperialist attack on the one side and the Arab national liberation movement on the other.

The historical answer resides in the consolidation of the broad strategic outlines of the Popular Front: i.e. the building of the revolutionary party; the building of the patriotic front; the mobilization of the masses and the intensification of revolutionary violence.

The historical answer must at the same time give the utmost importance to the preservation of our revolution inside the occupied territory and its support with all the means of force, growth and defiance. The occupied territories must be given priority in terms of material and planned propaganda and by considering our work inside Palestine as of the utmost importance. The Popular Front, because of its special situation inside Palestine, and because it is considered the most aware and alert vanguard of the Palestinian resistance movement, is required, before all others, to put forward these programmes and to translate them into practice so as to be in harmony with, and organizationally inter-linked with the struggle of our masses in the East Bank of the Jordan so as to establish Popular Liberation war as a method of total liberation of Palestinian and other Arab land.

The application of the four principles mentioned in this programme (the building of the party, the national front, mass mobilization, the practice of revolutionary violence) and in the sense that has been mentioned is the way towards a higher standard of our war against the Israeli enemy that suits the nature of the phase.

Our people must orient itself towards establishing a revolutionary organization which can confront the enemy and its plans, and can deal with the situation of our people in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and the occupied territories since 1948 (especially the Jaleel area). This revolutionary organization must evolve a suitable political and military programme in the light of which it can proceed towards mobilizing the exploited, oppressed and deprived masses which must take their cause in their own hands and start a long, historical and difficult struggle. This struggle must be based on revolutionary violence against the enemy that occupies our land, exploits its resources and the fruits of its labour.

Through such a detailed translation of the four main principles – mentioned above – our work inside can be transformed from its present standard to the standard of revolutionary historical work.

XVI. The Battle of the Resistance Against the Reactionary Regime in Jordan

Events have decisively resolved the subject of the relationship between the resistance movement and the reactionary regime in Jordan. The resistance has paid the price of its huge error in its reluctance, wavering and indecisiveness towards the subject. What is required now is for the resistance or at least the revolutionary sections of it, to resolve this subject in a final and decisive manner and not in the manner of temporary reaction that can be aborted by the maneuvers of the regime and its long experience in crushing the movement of the masses.

The translation of the decisive resolution can be performed first through open, clear and scientific criticism of the previous stand of the resistance, and a deep scientific conviction of the impossibility of coexistence between the revolution and the reactionary regime. It can be accomplished also by declaring to our people this conviction and by moving from a position of defense, appeasement, and wavering to one of attack and clarity which aims at overthrowing the regime through revolutionary violence – the only method capable of accomplishing this task.

We have discussed somewhere else in this programme the subject of the experience of the armed Palestinian resistance with the reactionary regime in Jordan, and we also provided a quick evaluation of this experience and its strategic mistakes. It is not necessary, therefore, to repeat the main critical points that were recorded. However, these points lead us to the following preliminary inferences:

The battle of the resistance against the reactionary stooge regime in Jordan is, in the coming phase, a central battle for the resistance. It represents objectively and historically, the main link in the foiling of the liquidationary plan in all their forms, and in the establishment and development of armed struggle against the Israeli occupation.

The Jordanian regime plays now more than at any time before, its historical role as a police station for imperialism and as a guard for its interests. As a policeman it executes its plans that are, at the same time, the plans of Israel. Thus the destruction of the regime is a basic task in the battle against Israel and imperialism in the area.

It has become clearer now than at any time before, that the Jordanian reactionary regime is an indivisible part of the mechanics of imperialism in its activity in the Middle East. The obvious reaction to this objective fact lies in placing on top of agenda of the revolutionary movement a revolutionary programme for overthrowing the regime.

This fact has an important consequence whose neglect in the previous stage formed a deadly error in the programmes of the resistance.

Since the battle has become aimed at overthrowing the regime, and not merely at acquiring the right of existence, the freedom of action and the ordering of the relations between the regime and the resistance, it can-not be restricted to the resistance alone. It becomes the task of the masses of this

regime, i.e. the task of the national-patriotic and revolutionary movement. Consequently, the complete form of the instrument to achieve this task is a "National Jordanian-Palestinian Front" which includes the revolutionary and patriotic Jordanian forces together with the forces of the resistance movement which has come to consider the overthrowing of the regime as one of its central tasks.

It is obvious that this position assumes the emergence of a Jordanian revolutionary force which can mobilize the masses of the Jordanian people around a programme that concerns its daily struggles for the building of its future. The resistance must not consider itself, with its programme for the liberation of Palestine, an alternative to this revolutionary movement which has to deal with the tasks of the national democratic revolution in Jordan.

A revolutionary Jordanian party with a programme of political, military and organisational action, forms a central issue in the coming stage.

The Palestinian resistance, especially its left-wing, are required to support this question.

This process of building a foundation must be based on a clear vision and this must come as a consequence of a scientific study of a group of issues, the most important of which are the following:

a) The regime and the nature of its past and present connections with imperialist forces. This must be demonstrated in tangible economic, political and military terms and in the way these links are reflected in the attitude of the regime towards the masses, beginning with the establishment of the regime until today. This includes the events of 1936, 1948, 1957, 1963, 1966, September 1970, July 1971 and the project of March 1971.

– The class forces on which the regime depends must also be clarified; their numerical size, economic role, political weight, the nature of their connections with the regime on their secondary contradictions with it.

– The military establishment on which the regime depends; the economic foundation of its loyalty to the regime; its numerical size; its political and military weight and the nature of contradictions within it.

– How does the regime benefit from the conditions of underdevelopment to mobilize other forces to support it in its battle against the masses (e.g. the tribes, national and religious minorities.)

– All the plans (political, economic, social and cultural) during this period.

b) The class forces that are harmed by the regime:

– The working class: size, distribution, nature, its history of struggle the trade union movement of workers in Jordan, the labour laws...etc.

– The peasantry: number, nature of relations of production, the peasant movement; agricultural workers, etc.

– The petit-bourgeoisie: its various sectors.

c) The Jordanian society: economically and socially.

d) The national Jordanian movement in its various stages: The various political parties; their experience and reality.

In light of this study a revolutionary Jordanian party can be established which is to mobilize the masses in Jordan (East-bankers and Palestinians) for the national democratic revolution i.e. the overthrow of the reactionary authority (feudal and comprador) and for the establishment of the authority of the new democracy (the alliance of workers, peasants, and the petit-bourgeoisie under the leadership of the working class).

As for the tasks of the national democratic forces in Jordan they can be summarized under the following headings:

1) The overthrow of the royal regime which represents the alliance between agricultural and tribal feudalism and the comprador under the hegemony of American imperialism. This has transformed Jordan into a police station for the protection of Israel and Zionism and into a major obstacle in the face of the popular movement in Jordan and its open relationships with the Arab national liberation movement.

2) The erection of a national democratic regime that relies on the alliance of all the national democratic forces and that releases the freedom of the masses and restores to Jordan its national and patriotic face. Such is the necessary atmosphere for making Jordan a major launching ground for the liberation forces. It should also provide the opportunity for the realization of the following:

a) The release of the Jordanian economy from the domination of imperialism through the impotent feudal-comprador structure; and the creation of a national economy that depends basically on Jordan's own resources, on its complementary nature to other independent sectors of Arab economy, and on the dominance of the public sector.

b) The erection of an agricultural economy that liberates the land and the man working on it. This should guarantee the full utilization of the land, secure for the peasants the ownership of their efforts, the establishment of irrigation projects that protect against the danger of drought (such as dams, installations, and pumps that utilize the water of streams and underground water) the mechanization of agriculture and the adoption of modern agricultural techniques.

Such an agrarian reform can resolve the existing rural problem which expresses itself in poverty, emigration and semi-total dependence on the bureaucracy that enslaves the will of the peasant and bedouin masses.

c) The resolution of the rural problem in the way mentioned above establishes the material foundation for the resolution of the nomadic problem and lays down the economic base for the sedentarization of the bedouins. This should transform them gradually into a productive sector which will consequently liberate them from the domination of the bureaucracy and reaction that builds its power through forcing them to depend on it.

d) The realization of full democracy in education by providing it free for all and by giving it a progressive patriotic content.

e) The provision of social and health services in the rural and desert areas.

f) The provision of basic freedoms for the masses without distinction, and the securing of collective and personal freedoms (freedom of political organization, of trade unions, of peasant societies and collectives, the freedom of the press, publication and speech, and the right to strike and work for all, and equality and freedom for women.

3) The full liberation of the political relations of Jordan from all forms of dependence and the establishment of an external policy based on the following principles:

a) The central position of the Palestinian cause.

b) A progressive, patriotic, Arab policy antagonistic to imperialism, Zionism and reaction and totally open to the Arab national liberation movement.

c) The establishment of the widest net of relationships with the socialist world and dependence on fair aid from the socialist countries in realizing the national democratic development programme.

It must be clear, however, that the instruments that can realize the tasks of the national democratic revolution in Jordan can only be the "Jordanian-Palestinian national front." The basis of this stage is the armed struggle against the Israeli occupation and against the reactionary stooge regime in Jordan.

This means the existence of a Jordanian front which includes all the patriotic and democratic forces in Jordan and is linked to a Palestinian national front, which, in turn, includes the Palestinian resistance groups.

This formulation requires three programmes: the programme of the Jordanian national front, the programme of the Palestinian national front, and the programme of the Jordanian-Palestinian national front.

The diversity, difficulties and multiplicity of the arenas of the battle, together with the inter-connectedness of the enemy camp, makes the above formulation the most objective and effective.

This means that the political programme of the Jordanian-Palestinian national front cannot be confined to the affirmation that the reactionary stooge regime in Jordan is now the instrument of imperialism for striking at the resistance, nor to the necessity of overthrowing it to protect the revolution. The political programme of this front must present to the Jordanian and Palestinian masses in Jordan on analysis of the nature of the regime, its class structure, the way it exploits the masses and its positions as an obstacle to social progress. Thus the classes of the revolution -workers, peasants, petit-bourgeoisie and sections of the national bourgeoisie – come to feel that the eradication of this regime is the only way to remove poverty, misery and underdevelopment on the one hand and to confront oppression and the Israeli-imperialist danger on the other hand.

Given the reality of the revolutionary and patriotic Jordanian movement, a big theoretical and organizational effort is required so that the revolutionary and patriotic movement becomes capable of mobilizing the masses in Jordan and consequently the main force in the Jordanian-Palestinian front which aims at overthrowing the regime.

Our battle against the reactionary regime in Jordan requires a special consideration of the precise and detailed translation of the major points mentioned in this programme: The building of the party; the patriotic-national front, mass mobilization, violence and alliances (a detailed study will be published by the front on this subject).

The main point that we want to emphasize here is that at a time when we are seriously moving towards the building of the party, the national front and the mobilization of the masses – according to our political programme which aims at the mobilization of all the forces of the revolution – the practice of violence against the regime is the line that enables us to succeed along these lines. The regime, given the big difference in the balance of forces that exists now, will adopt the practice of violence as a basis for hitting very hard and for imposing a black and terrible police state to choke any free movement among the masses. Our main weapon here will be the way we practice violence without allowing the enemy to crush us totally: The requirement for secret activity, for concealment, for depriving the enemy of control of our forces; the nature of targets, secret resistance in the city; the aim of mobilizing the masses through our practice of violence; the mobilizing institution and its interest in us, and before anything else determination and patience together with all the subjective traits necessary for a hard battle of this kind.

Our understanding of the sources of the strength of the reactionary regime (internal and external) and our scientific analysis of it is our best aid in directing our blows to weaknesses of the regime in order strategically to overthrow it.

Our awareness of revolutionary method in dealing with soldiers inside the repressive institution in Jordan comprises a basic element in determining the future of the battle.

It is similarly determined by our success in understanding and dealing with the bedouin question, the position of the bedouins in the process of production and the reasons for the success of the regime in exploiting them.

We realize that the overthrow of the regime in Jordan might be followed by an Israeli and American occupation of East Jordan and other parts of the homeland. But we must realize too that when the bottle reaches such a level, the confrontation will have reached an advanced stage, and imperialism will be on the way to losing its position to the masses. Thus the strategic ebb of the enemy camp would have begun. This means an acceleration of the process of the ripening of the objective conditions through which the contradictions can be resolved in the interests of the people.

To reach such a stage in the battle, in a difficult period, requires continuous revolutionary effort (intellectual, political and organizational) that remains steadfast in front of obstacles.

XVII. The Battle of the Resistance Against the Liquidatory Plans

The danger of liquidating the Palestinian problem has been in existence since June 1967 as a probable result of the big military defeat of the Arab regimes in that war. This danger has become clearer since the Security Council resolution of November 1967 and the acceptance by Egypt of this resolution. The danger of liquidating the problem during the present period is clearer and more immediate because of the weak situation of the resistance movement since September 1970; before that date the resistance movement formed an obstacle in the face of political development. Another reason is found in the changes witnessed by the nationalist regimes – which have generally hit at the left-wing of these regimes. Furthermore, the concentration of international efforts, especially American, to enforce settlement constitutes another reason for the immediacy of the danger. American imperialism realizes – as it has officially announced several times – that now is the best time to enforce a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Indeed these liquidatory schemes were consolidated gradually. The project of King Hussein came in March 1972 as the most obvious of conspiratorial forms.

However, before arriving at such consolidation (and perhaps in preparation for a more capitulationist plan) American imperialism has – with the help of reactionary regimes in the area – continued to upset the balance of forces for the benefit of Israel so as to achieve the conditions necessary for its absolute domination over the area and for a total Arab surrender.

The policy of American imperialism has counted on winning time; time which Arab reaction has used primarily to attack the resistance and to instigate attacks on all the Arab national liberation movements wherever they might be found. This is because of the influence enjoyed by Arab reaction since the Khartoum conference in 1967.

It is also the time that was used by the military petit-bourgeois regimes to strengthen their position of power and to gradually stabilize their retreatist and capitulationist positions hiding behind the slogans that they used in order to keep the masses busy. It is furthermore the time that was used by Israel to deepen its domination (geographically, militarily, economically and politically) over the occupied territories and to strengthen the status quo together with its military superiority over all existing Arab forces.

Israel and American imperialism have found others to help them carry out their plan to gain time and to strengthen the status quo. These were represented by the United Nations, the Western bourgeois states, the international balance of forces, in addition to the client regimes in the area and the increasing impotence of the other regimes.

It is clear that despite the seriousness of the capitulations offered by the Arab regimes surrounding Israel – in their eagerness for what is termed peaceful settlement – imperialism and Israel still believe

that they can (because of the great disparity in the balance of forces and because of the retreat of the Arab regimes) achieve more domination over the area and strengthen their control.

The plan put forward by King Hussein to establish a United Arab Kingdom forms a more treacherous step than any step towards a peaceful settlement. This step – as we explained previously – represents the beginning of a solution in which American imperialism, Israel and Jordanian reaction are on a common ground: This common ground involves finding a “solution” for the problem of the Palestinian people (that is absorbing it in a stooge entity) and the securing of Israeli domination reflecting the size of the conquest. It also involves the continuing development of Jordanian reaction that has proved to the White House its qualification as a police station for counter-revolution.

This formulation suggests an urgent political issue which is going to develop more and more and which can be used by the enemy camp: That is, the issue of the representation of the Palestinian people.

XVIII. Who Represents the Palestinian People and their National Rights

What makes this question more urgent now than at any time before is the angle from which the imperialist and reactionary enemy suggests its “innovations” for the liquidation of the cause of the Palestinian people: Whether this is King Hussein’s plan or any other plans that might be put forward in the future and from the same angle.

Despite the problems which define the special position of the Palestinian problem, the Palestinian people, because they have been dispersed from their land, forced to live in exile and consequently subjected to national oppression, must naturally have a political movement that (if it is to be representative) works for the liberation of its land from occupation and for the eradication of the national injustice to which it has been subjected. Therefore, that which represents the Palestinian people is the Palestinian National Liberation movement which aims at destroying the Zionist structure as represented in Israel. It also aims at liberating all the Palestinian land, the return of the Palestinian people to its land and the establishment of a democratic society in Palestine. All this assumes the rejection of all the conspiracy and liquidating solutions headed by the Palestinian state plan.

However, the practice of the Palestinian people of their legitimate struggle to regain their land has created a complicated situation which stipulates special tasks that require fulfilling. The first of these tasks is the right of the Palestinian people to work for organizing the movement of their national struggle and all that is related to it. Such a right is natural for a people that have been subjected to national oppression and whose land has become occupied. As far as the Palestinians are concerned, the practice of such a right is not an easy task because a large part of their people has been forced to live on a land that is not under direct occupation.

Consequently, the primary task facing the Palestinian people is that of winning their right to act for the regaining of their land.

Since a large percentage of the Palestinian people are found today on the East Bank (about 70% of the population) and since the West Bank (a piece of Palestine) was part of Jordan before 1967 and forms with the East Bank one political entity, then this special relationship (represented in the unity of the two banks) and the nature of the links between Jordanians and Palestinians makes Jordan the main arena for realizing this task.

Since Jordan is subjected to a reactionary puppet regime that is tied to imperialism and consequently to Zionism and Israel, the fulfillment of the above task depends on the struggle for the overthrowing of the reactionary regime that is allied to imperialism and Israel and for the establishment of a patriotic democratic regime.

The struggle to create an armed popular revolution (which comprises both Jordanians and Palestinians) to overthrow the reactionary regime and to establish a patriotic-democratic regime must be based on a

programme that guarantees the national rights of the Palestinian people represented in the right to armed action. It must also prepare the Palestinian masses politically, militarily and organizationally and must put an end to the process of oppression and slaughter. It must also work to strengthen its integration with the people of trans-Jordan. Finally, it must be based on the programme for the patriotic-democratic revolution in Jordan.

XIX. The Future of the West Bank and its Relationship with the East Bank of Jordan

The relationship of the now-occupied West bank to the East Bank is subject to three possibilities.

A. The First Possibility:

This concerns the continuation of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the continuation of the struggle against the occupation until the destruction of the Israeli structure by revolutionary armed struggle.

The continuation of armed struggle and the achievement of its final aim – the destruction of the Zionist structure – is impossible without overthrowing the stooge regime in Jordan and without the erection of a patriotic democratic regime together with the liberation of the West Bank and all the Palestinian land that falls now under occupation, the unity of the two peoples (the Palestinian and Jordanian) become – apart from the unity between the two banks – an urgent need. In this case the unity is to be accomplished on the basis of the historical relationship between the two people and their common membership of the Arab nation.

B. The Second Possibility:

Here the West Bank or part of it is returned to the domination of the Jordanian regime. This might be accomplished by a joint conspiracy between Jordan and Israel as part of a peaceful settlement. In fact the stooge regime tries to exploit the consequences of the September 1970 attack on the resistance movement to announce that it is the only representative of the Palestinian people. Thus the king is trying to utilize the unity of the two peoples and the historical relationship between them to secure once again, should a peaceful settlement be reached, his domination over the West Bank.

The Palestinian people cannot, given the revolutionary tools at his disposal at the movement, prevent the return of the West Bank to the domination of the puppet regime in Jordan as part of a peaceful settlement. But the Palestinian people will not halt their struggle until they have overthrown this regime in order to continue their struggle for the liberation of all their land. Thus the claim by the Jordanian regime that it represents the Palestinian people at a time when it is preventing Palestinians from struggling to liberate their homeland and is in fact slaughtering them, is an impertinent, incorrect and groundless claim.

The struggle of the Palestinian people against the reactionary regime will continue until they seize their legitimate right to struggle for the return of their homeland and the liberation of their country. This struggle will continue even if the West Bank is returned, under a capitulationist settlement, to the Jordanian regime as was the case before 1967. As long as this regime forms an obstacle to the struggle of the Palestinian people for the liberation of their country so it is necessary to overthrow it and build

the unity of the two banks of the Jordan on the basis of the historical unity between the two peoples (Palestinian and Jordanian) and on the basis of joint belongingness to the Arab nation. This should foil the attempts made to exploit the animosity and the rejection that the Palestinians feel toward the regime in order to make acceptable the idea of the Palestinian state. This idea is equally as dangerous as the repressive situation that the regime will impose should the West Bank return to its domination.

C. The Third Possibility:

This consists in the creation of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This would take place as part of a general settlement to what is called the problem of the Middle East.

The third possibility is something that the Arab petit-bourgeois military regimes tend to favour. It was also favoured by the U.S. Department of State before September 1970. However, Israel rejects this for private considerations concerning its strategic interests. Similarly it is also rejected by the Jordanian regime as well as other Arab reactionary regimes.

Nevertheless, the question of creating a client entity for the Palestinians remains on the agenda of imperialism and it is likely to find different expressions.

What needs to be emphasized is the fact that what imperialism puts forward now in the plan of King Hussein is no more than integration between the idea of the "Palestinian state" and that of "the return of Hashemite rule in the West Bank." Thus this plan contains what is worst in both these ideas which constitute its basis and backbone.

The resistance movement is required now:

a) To stand firmly in the face of every attempt to contain the resistance and to use it as an instrument in its plans for a peaceful solution and the creation of a Palestinian state. b) The resistance movement must expose and isolate all the forces and elements within its ranks that find in the difficult situation a chance to push the resistance movement towards surrender; or else those forces which have been overtaken by the new situation and which have begun, therefore, to contemplate surrender, instead of thinking about the programme that will make the resistance movement capable of survival despite all the difficulties. c) Continual mobilization against liquidatory solutions and the plan for a Palestinian State so that these become associated, in the minds of ordinary people, with treason. d) To seek to form the widest possible Arab patriotic front to support the resistance and its right to continue until liberation.

Finally, the vital point for the resistance in its fight against capitulationist solutions is for it to regain its military and political effectiveness in the occupied territory and in Jordan. For there will be no political solution with a revolutionary Jordan, and the continuation of the resistance's effectiveness in the occupied territories will prevent Israel from finding an advantage in a settlement.

The difficulty of the resistance's battle against peaceful settlement, and the existence of a wide front of forces working for a peaceful settlement and its imposition on the Palestinian people, together with the weak situation in which the liberation movement now finds itself in the Arab world; all this must mean – as far as the resistance is concerned – planning seriously to foil these projects. For in no event must we believe that capitulationist solutions are on the way and that it is no good fighting against them.

Our outlook concerning the liberation movement must be historical and long-term. Consequently, the struggle of our people for liberation must be a continuous one against every conspiracy. For it is through continuous struggle that the issue of liberation remains alive and the struggle towards it remains active under all conditions. Similarly, the petit-bourgeois mentality imagines in its examination of the difficult present day situation, the peaceful settlement on its way, and that the struggle has totally finished.

It is important, historically speaking, for the armed resistance of the Palestinian people to continue. It is important that it should remain in existence in Gaza, the West Bank, in the 1948 territory, and in Jordan. Armed revolution must continue; this is so regardless of whether arms are carried against the Israeli occupation or against any other traitor authority (Palestinian or Jordanian) that may be imposed on the masses as a result of conspiracies to liquidate the revolution.

If it follows this line the resistance movement will continue to lead the masses.

In wars of liberation the balance of forces define the tactics of the battle; but this should not question whether the battle should or should not be waged.

XX. The Resistance Outside Palestine and Jordan

The new objective conditions together with the new phase we discussed above cannot remain without influencing the resistance movement outside Palestine and Jordan. Similarly, these cannot be translated by the resistance movement into new plans.

It is natural for imperialism to plan the elimination of all branches of resistance, so that these will not provide the soil for the return of a strong resistance to Palestine and Jordan and will not be a source of hope, even a weak one, for the masses, or remain as evidence of the survival of the resistance.

The resistance movement should expect to be hit and finished in Lebanon. The resistance movement in Lebanon must, therefore, watch the situation carefully and learn all it can from the Jordan experience. It should rebuild itself in light of this programme and formulate a clear confrontation plan according to which it can fight for survival and continuity. In as much as the resistance must avoid confronting the Lebanese authorities and opening a new front for the resistance in this difficult situation, so it must be careful to take all the necessary organizational procedures and political positions that will ensure for it continuity and steadfastness.

This cannot be achieved just by controlling the revolutionary behaviour of the members of the resistance and by going underground and planning its tactic precisely, but also through an intimate alliance with the patriotic and progressive movement in Lebanon which is the natural ally of the resistance.

These conditions may, in Syria, lead to an attempt to contain the resistance movement and transform it into a mere traditional military institution whose political horizon does not exceed that of the Syrian regime. It is the duty of the resistance movement to preserve its independence and liberationist revolutionary strategy.

It is the duty of the branches of the resistance outside Jordan and Palestine to exceed plans for survival and self-defence. It is the duty of these branches to formulate the necessary plans to consolidate the resistance's revolutionary character, and to benefit from the lessons of the previous process. Thus it will increase its effectiveness and strength and compensate, relatively speaking, for the losses that have been inflicted on the body of the resistance in the previous period and actually support the central movement of the Palestinian masses in occupied Palestine and Jordan.

A real and deep understanding of the relationship between the resistance movement and the Arab national liberation movement is what constitutes the primary guarantee for achieving these tasks. It is difficult to imagine that the resistance is able, outside Palestine and Jordan, to achieve these aims without such an understanding.

The resistance movement is also required to initiate political and organizational activities among young Palestinians who migrate to Western Europe for work in the black market of labour there or who emigrate to North and South America.

The revolution must begin to utilize these precious potentialities in all possible ways.

Such a task can be accomplished with less difficulty through international alliances with progressive movements and organizations, and through contributing to the ideological, political and organizational struggle among the ranks of the impoverished Palestinians and other Arabs in the Western countries, America and elsewhere.

XXI. Conclusion

In confronting the new phase, “the previous phase must be completely liquidated.”

This liquidation does not only take place through scientific criticism and objective review of our previous experience, but also and simultaneously, through putting forward the programmes and appropriate lines for work in the new phase.

The Third National Conference of the Popular Front (March 1972) – that studied, discussed and approved the above report – has emphasized in the report the following main headlines as guidelines for action in the new phase.

1) The consideration of the organizational issue as a central issue: The new phase requires the transformation of the organizational structure of the Front into a revolutionary organizational structure (both ideologically and in class terms). The new situation cannot be confronted except through a revolutionary tool based on a Marxist-Leninist theory and its theses on organization. The subject of building a Marxist-Leninist Party is a central issue for the Palestinian revolution now.

The Third National Conference of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has given the organizational programme the same degree of importance as the political programme.

2) The wide national Palestinian Front, together with the national Jordanian-Palestinian Front: The Front is fully ready and fully prepared to act in order to establish a wide national Palestinian Front that can lead the movement of the masses in the coming phase.

This must take place within the framework of an agreement on a political programme that takes a clear and radical position from the reactionary regime in Jordan; from the liquidatory and surrenderist plans which must be exposed; from the plan of the Palestinian State which must be clearly and decisively rejected.

3) The masses are the force that is capable of leading the resistance out of its current crisis. Therefore, the mobilization of these masses through political and military struggle is one of our most important orientations in the coming phase. The Front will review all its methods so as to remain always among the masses; to struggle with them; through them and for their aims.

4) The line of revolutionary violence will remain the basic line in facing the enemy camp, and our practice of revolutionary violence will be the crowning of a total struggle of the masses and not an alternative to it. Similarly our practice of violence will benefit from all previous experience and lessons.

5) The future of the Palestinian revolution is dependent on its integration with the political movement of the Arab masses and the Arab national liberation movement. The contribution in building a wide Arab national front antagonistic to imperialism will be one of our main interests in the coming phase.

6) The strengthening of our alliances at the international level, with all the East European countries, national liberation movements, and international labour movements will enable us to confront the international imperialist camp and all its plans to smash the movement of the people.

The above are then the themes of the subjects that the Third Conference of the Popular Front paid attention to. These themes will provide the foundation for the organization's and people's educational process that the Front will practice through its publications and the activities of its cadres and members.

The Popular Front of Palestine has never suggested that the battle for the liberation of Palestine is one, two or several years' project. The political report issued by the February Conference (1969), together with the other publications of the Front, and the Front's relations with the Palestinian and Arab masses were established on the basis of an awareness that the battle of liberation requires a popular people's war that stretches for tens of years. With such a vision and with the determination it produces in us, we will face the new phase with all its difficulties and complexities.

The Third National Conference of the Front greets the struggle of our brave Palestinian masses in occupied Palestine and in Jordan. It also greets our steadfast comrades in the prisons of the Israeli and reactionary enemy. Furthermore, it also greets our comrades, cadres, and steadfast leadership in the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and the occupied territory of 1948; also in Jordan and in the various other areas where the Front is active.

The Third National Conference of the Front greets all sections of the Arab revolution in every part of our large homeland.

We greet the struggle of the heroic people of North Vietnam and the struggle of the peoples in South East Asia and in every country of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

We greet and appreciate the support that the Palestinian revolution and the PFLP receives from all the patriotic and revolutionary forces especially the support of the great socialist countries which have applied in its relations with us – as a Front – the revolutionary principles of internationalist support.

The PFLP – through its Third National Conference – promises our Palestinian people and the people of the Arab nation, together with the Arab revolutionary and international forces, that it will live up to their expectations as a left-wing force supporting all the forces of revolution – at the Arab and world level – and continuing its struggle till victory.