

No. 2 January 12, 1981

BEIJING REVIEW

北京周報

A CHINESE WEEKLY
OF
NEWS AND VIEWS

- Tasks for 1981
- On U.S. "Taiwan Relations Act"
- Trial of Jiang Qing



HIGHLIGHTS OF THE WEEK

China's Current Tasks

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The Party and Government

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Morning in the Wangjianglou Park.
Photo by Tang Zhengyi

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Views on China's domestic situation and her foreign policy are as varied as they are numerous abroad. Some are misconceptions and some are mere speculations. Many readers have written to us for clarification. In this new column, our editors will give their views on these questions instead of replying to the letters separately.

The Kampuchean Issue

Does China favour the convening of an international conference to solve the Kampuchean question? Why do you support Pol Pot?

China supports the resolution adopted by the U.N. General Assembly calling for the convocation of an international conference on the Kampuchean question. Its most important task should be the discussion of Vietnamese troops withdrawal from that country. If it should fail to do so, the conference would be meaningless, for this withdrawal is the key to solving the issue.

The situation in Kampuchea is quite serious. Viet Nam has thrown in 250,000 aggressor troops in Kampuchea, and unless they are dealt heavy blows, the Vietnamese authorities will not pull them out. What is more, Hanoi has already rejected the U.N. resolution. Thus the only effective way now is to actively support the Kampuchean patriotic forces to fight against the aggressors and saddle Hanoi with increasingly heavy burdens and difficulties, thereby gradually creating conditions to force Viet Nam to withdraw its troops and seek a political settlement.

Democratic Kampuchea has an armed force totalling tens of thousands. This is at present the only effective force resisting Vietnamese aggression. To turn a blind eye to this force would

only be of advantage to the Vietnamese invaders.

China supports the emergence of a coalition government in Kampuchea uniting all the resistance forces there. Democratic Kampuchea should not be excluded but should be part of it. China will support such a coalition government as soon as it comes into being.

Pol Pot committed serious mistakes, and China did not approve of his policies. Now the Government of Democratic Kampuchea is implementing the programmes of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National Union and correcting past mistakes. And its

Will China stop importing technology in the future now that a number of big construction projects have been cancelled?

Joint ventures with foreign countries will not be as many as expected for some years to come, and in some joint ventures, necessary readjustments will have to be made. But China's policy regarding the modernization programme and the principle of relying mainly on its own efforts, with foreign assistance as a supplementary means, will remain unchanged.

For more than a decade we have made the mistake of clos-

ing our doors to exchanges with foreign countries. The history of other countries abundantly proves that the closed-door practice is not advantageous to the development of any country. We have summed up the experience gained and the lessons learnt. China's policy of keeping the doors open and maintaining closer economic ties and technical co-operation with other countries will be a long-term one. Reduction in the scale of construction is only temporary, while in the long term, there will be increased co-operation between China and other friendly countries.

forces have frustrated the Vietnamese dry season offensive and stood their ground. It should be noted that the most trying period for Democratic Kampuchea has passed. It is reported that considerations are being given to change its state system so as to promote unity among the various factions and step up resistance against Vietnamese aggression. It is hoped that Samdech Sihanouk would take up a leading post in the government.

Kampuchea should be a peaceful, neutral, democratic and non-aligned country. After the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, the Kampuchean people should be allowed to choose their own government through free and just elections, with guarantees from the world community. The Chinese Government will also give such a guarantee and has no intention whatever to make Kampuchea her satellite.

— *International Editor Guo Ji*

Importing Technology

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— *Economic Editor Jin Qi*

LETTERS

Lifelong System Abolished

I have found most interesting the articles in which you sum up economic and political experiences and also articles in which you overcome dogmatism and clarify the essence of the Marxist-Leninist approach to important questions. The article in issue No. 46 (1980) on "The System of Lifelong Leadership Must Be Abolished" was excellent. The final sentence of this article was very important for us as well as you: "Best efforts must be made to create a democratic system which is more advanced and more workable than that of the Western bourgeois republics."

C. Burford
London, U.K.

Eliminate Feudal Influences

The article "The Need to Eliminate Feudal Remnants" in issue No. 45 (1980) is excellent. Personally, I have only a limited knowledge at best of Chinese history after the 1920s. To understand the present status quo of China, I feel that I must gain some knowledge of China's feudal history which lasted thousands of years. I recommend this enlightening article to other readers.

Junichiro Ide
Ibaraki, Japan

Progressive Social Policy

The article entitled "Swindler Mends His Ways" (No. 46, 1980) prompted me to write you this letter.

I am currently unemployed and have deep feelings about the fate of Mr. Li Wanming [the swindler discussed in this article]. In our country, many people are filled with despair from the material and psychological poverty they are forced to suffer. Anyone who is labelled once by the government as being detrimental to the society will never again be able to remove the smudge from his name.

Conditions in China also demonstrate that unfair things have too often occurred there. The social system of China is aiming at the future instead of keeping the conventions of the past intact.

My feeling is that Li Wanming is not only a symbol of China's progressive social policy, but also an example of those who have degenerated in the mire of society. Following his path, a bright future would appear.

Gert Weiershaus
Koln, W. Germany

Danger of War

However painful it may be to admit, we do face the real possibility of world war in the 80s. Many Americans, however, seem to underestimate this reality and their ability to affect it. There seems to be widespread fatalism about the possibility of war, as if it is something outside of anyone's control. I hope that in some small way, my work can contribute to countering this view and building the international united front against Soviet expansionism. In this vein, I agree completely with the opinion expressed in the June 30, 1980 issue (No. 26) of *Beijing Review* that "under the present international situation, every nation is facing the common problem of upsetting the Soviet global strategy and safeguarding world peace and stability" ("Crucial Choice").

Steve Gorin
Rhode Island, U.S.A.

Needs Further Improvement

In contrast to 1979, I think that *Beijing Review* has become more practical and is no longer only a journal of ideological articles. This has greatly lightened the work of researchers in Europe who present articles on China's economic life. But I am of the opinion that to increase the number of readers in the West, this magazine needs further improvement. I assume that Europeans, who may become your new readers, wish to read articles from the Chinese press and journals dealing with Western life. For instance, I would very much like to know how the Chinese people regard the cultural habits and economic problems of the mem-

ber states of the European Economic Community.

Roberto Bianchi
Bologna, Italy

An Enjoyment

I am a subscriber to your publication and have been reading *Beijing Review* for a long time. The articles are generally very good and I appreciate reading them. The column "Events and Trends" gives me a clear picture of your country, and current international affairs are well-covered in the "International" column. Your articles are very clear and easy to understand. I suggest that you print colour pictures, which are usually more attractive, and that you use thicker paper for the cover. Another thing is that I hope you will publish more reports about Chinese films.

Kaji Ishaque Uddin, Lablu
Dacca, Bangladesh

Love for Viet Nam

I was impressed by your article on Viet Nam. I worked as an anaesthetist in an army hospital there and gave the same kind of treatment to our own soldiers and enemy troops. Because of this, doctors holding the ranks of colonels in this hospital nicknamed me a "world citizen." In order to drive out the inhuman imperialists — my compatriots, I saw with my own eyes that China had given enormous assistance to Viet Nam both in materials and in manpower. I have loved Viet Nam and its people, and in one of my works I described this deep love, but no publisher was willing to have my book printed.

Le Duan and company have obstructed the Vietnamese people from their normal development. He has already sacrificed large numbers of Vietnamese people. How many more will he sacrifice?

Edouard Nicolini
Marseille, France



POLITICAL

Division of Work Between Party and Government

There should be a clear division between Party and government work. This view was set forth at the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in August-September last year.

Earlier, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had decided that leading comrades of the Party Central Committee do not concurrently hold government posts, that the first secretaries of Party committees at various levels generally do not concurrently hold the posts of governors, mayors or county heads in provincial, municipal or county people's governments.

Newspapers throughout the nation recently discussed the question of division of work between the Party and the government. Following are some salient points of the discussions:

Historical Reasons. The practice that there is no division of work between the Party and the government can be traced back to the years of revolutionary wars when the Party exercised unified leadership. The central task of the Chinese Communist Party at that time was to achieve victory in the revolutionary war. The army had to fight the enemy and the government had to support the front. In those days, a high degree of concentration of power was indispensable.

After the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the Party was confronted with the arduous task of socialist construction, something quite different from the situation in those war years.

The change demanded that the system and methods of giving Party leadership be changed accordingly. However, this question was not given enough attention, and unified Party leadership has remained intact as it was previously. For a period of time, undue stress was put on opposing the tendency for decentralization and independence, and the result was that although there were several attempts at defining the functions and powers of the central authorities and those of the localities, actually no clear distinction was made between the Party on the one hand and the government, economic departments and mass organizations on the other.

Of course, erroneous ideas also played their role. For instance, Party leadership was construed to mean that the Party committees should be in charge of everything, that the Party could place itself above all organizations and even counterpose Party leadership to directives from the organs of state power, judiciary and the mass organizations which should have the right to carry out their work independently.

Malpractice. The old unified leadership has resulted in over-concentration of power. As a result, power is concentrated in the Party committees, which means power is concentrated ultimately in the hands of the first Party secretaries. This naturally obstructs the implementation of socialist democracy and leads to the emergence of a patriarchal system.

- Members of Party committees at various levels are submerged in daily routine work, and do not have the time and energy for Party affairs. When the Party does not do a good job in studying its line, principles and policies and in building and consolidating itself organizationally and ideologically, the education of its 38 million members and supervision over them will naturally be affected, thereby diminishing the strength of the Party.

- If the Party supersedes the government, it will be difficult for the people's governments at various levels to perform their own functions and duties or to adopt administrative rules and regulations and effective work systems suited to the actual conditions. This will inevitably dampen the enthusiasm of those



Mayor of Tianjin Hu Qili (first from left), 51, soliciting opinions from women members of the local committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference on the municipal work.

working in the government organs.

• Leading Party committee members often hold too many posts and are responsible for too many things, with the result that people working under them have to report everything to them. This affects work efficiency. What's more, those in the leading position are often not well acquainted with the actual conditions below, so it is inevitable that they sometimes make incorrect decisions. This is a major reason for the emergence of bureaucratism.

Strengthening Party Leadership.

With the introduction of division of work between the Party and the government, Party leadership will be strengthened. Correct leadership should represent the interests of the people and act in accordance with their wishes. Such leadership can be realized and strengthened only by adopting and carrying out a correct line and correct principles and policies, correctly handling and co-ordinating the relations between the Party on the one hand and the state organs, economic and mass organizations on the other, and by giving full play to the vanguard and exemplary role of the Party members.

Now that several leading members of the Party Central Committee are relieved of their government posts, they can devote their time and energy to Party work, and keep an eye on the Party's line, principles and policies. This is conducive to the strengthening and improvement of the unified leadership of the Party Central Committee.

With the implementation of the division of work, Party committees at the grass-roots level, as in the workshop of a factory, will do political and ideological work, exhort Party members to

give play to their vanguard and exemplary role and arouse the workers' enthusiasm to fulfil production quotas. Administrative cadres, such as workshop directors, will be held responsible for production and the technical training of the workers. In this way, the Party and the government, working for the same goal, will encourage each other to do its own work well.

The division of work between the Party and the government is a major reform aimed at meeting the needs of the four modernizations. Discussions on this reform are still being carried out in the newspapers and in theoretical circles.

ECONOMIC

Second High-Yield Year

Last year sustained spring cold and continuous rain in the south, coupled with a prolonged dry spell in the north, were the causes of worry about China's agricultural production in 1980.

However, year-end returns showed that total grain output was only 10 to 15 million tons less than in 1979, the peak year since 1949, thus making 1980 the second highest year in grain production.

Not counting Taiwan Province, ten out of the 29 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, including Sichuan, Guangdong, Fujian and Guangxi, registered a grain increase last year over 1979. Grain-poor regions in northwest China which used to be hit by natural disasters, such as Gansu, Qinghai and Ningxia, and the Tibet Autonomous Region also had a rich harvest.



Good peanut harvest in Penglai County, Shandong Province.

What accounted for last year's good harvest in spite of serious natural calamities? The reasons are: In the past two years persistent efforts have been made to eliminate the pernicious influence of the ultra-Left line in agriculture; a flexible economic policy has been adopted and the production brigades and teams now have greater power of making their own decisions; and various forms of responsibility in production have been introduced or improved. All this has enhanced the peasants' enthusiasm for production and increased their capability to combat natural disasters.

Another reason for the success was the support and aid given to agriculture by the people of other sectors of the economy all over the country. The many water conservancy projects built over the past 30 years have played their role in combating drought and preventing flood and waterlogging. During the long dry spell last year, water from the more than 2 million

power-driven wells built in north China was used to irrigate 6.6 million hectares of farmland.

Rich Harvests of Cash Crops

Overemphasis on "taking grain as the key link" over the years has resulted in the lopsided development of farm production. Initial changes have been made to this irrational situation after readjustments in the past two years.

Last year due attention was paid to taking measures suited to local conditions in farm production. For instance, Guangdong and Fujian Provinces in south China increased the acreage under sugar cane and other cash crops, while Shandong and Anhui Provinces in east China grew peanuts instead of grain on the ancient bed of the Huanghe (Yellow) River and in sandy areas and were rewarded with good harvests. By giving full scope to their own strong points, the various localities in China reaped rich harvests in cotton, oil-bearing crops, sugar crops, silkwork cocoons and tea.

According to statistics, 1980 registered a 10 per cent increase in cotton production and total output surpassed the state plan.

The output of the oil-bearing crops went up by a big margin following a good harvest in 1979. Total output was 500,000 tons more than in 1979 and 1.7 million tons more than in 1978.

Compared with 1979, total output of sugar cane and sugar beet last year upped by 10 per cent, sugar increased by 300,000 tons, while cocoons went up by

14.8 per cent and hit an all-time high, and tea increased by 13,000 tons. Output of ramie also increased, but the figures for jute and bluish dogbane remained the same as 1979.

Coal and Petroleum Targets Met

State plans for coal, crude oil and natural gas were all fulfilled last year. The output of coal was 600 million tons, that of crude oil was 105.8 million tons and natural gas reached 13,700 million cubic metres.

Daqing Oilfield in northeast China's Heilongjiang Province met its planned target of 50 million tons of crude oil ten days ahead of schedule. The oilfield has achieved an annual output of 50 million tons of crude for five years running.

More Urban Housing

In the first 11 months of 1980, over 40 million square metres of floor space were built for urban residents in China. This was a 39 per cent increase as compared with the corresponding period of 1979.

To speed up housing construction, the various localities and departments have readjusted the ratio of investment. Over the past 20 years, annual investment in housing averaged only 5.8 per cent of the total investment in capital construction. This was raised to 14.8 per cent in 1979, and there was a further increase last year.

In the coastal city of Tianjin in north China, investments in production facilities were reduced in the past two years. Last year's investments in housing, schools, hospitals, cinemas and theatres and other public facilities accounted for 55 per cent of the city's total, and equipment and manpower put into these projects made up two-thirds of the city's total construction force.

In the last two years, the principle of giving play to the initiative of the central authorities and the localities, and of the enterprises and individuals, was practised in housing construction which used to be handled by the state alone. Housing projects were generally given top priority.

In southwest China's Sichuan



New apartment buildings in the southern suburbs of Xian in northwest China.

Province (the most populous province in China with a population of 100 million), 84,470 square metres of apartments were built last year in over 40 universities and colleges, providing new homes for 1,564 teachers and their families.

With the enterprises now enjoying greater rights in making their own decisions, they are building more housing for their workers and staff. Last year the funds so used in various parts of the country accounted for 64 to 81 per cent of the total investments in housing construction in these localities. Private houses are also being built. According to statistics from 111 cities and towns, privately built houses amounted to 1.81 million square metres in the first ten months of last year.

In some big and medium-sized cities, while building living quarters for the inhabitants, attention has been paid to the building of schools, kindergartens, shops, clinics and other service facilities.

SOCIAL

More Youths Employed

Young people without work are decreasing in number. In the bookstores and department stores young customers have notably increased, because they now have jobs.

According to the Beijing Bureau of Labour, 181,000 young people were given jobs in 1980 and work for another 40,000 is being arranged.

Last year 220,000 young people were waiting for jobs in Beijing, half of them were middle school graduates in 1980 and the other half were middle school graduates back from the



Young applicants for jobs in 40 light and textile industrial enterprises in Shanghai undergoing an examination on technical skill.

countryside where they had settled several years ago.

Among those who were given jobs, 130,000 work in enterprises owned by the state or the collective, and 24,000 work in neighbourhood-run factories. Among the others were those enlisted in the People's Liberation Army or licensed to run their own restaurants, tea shops and other stores.

All the districts in Beijing (including those on its outskirts) have set up their own labour service companies to help young people find work in the shops and repairing and construction companies. According to an official in the Bureau of Labour, 510,000 young people were given jobs in 1979 and 1980.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

Deng Xiaoping Meets U.S. Guests

Deng Xiaoping, Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Par-

ty, met on January 4 with Theodore Stevens, U.S. Senate Republican Deputy Leader, Mrs. Stevens and Mrs. Anna Chennault, Chairman of the U.S. National Republican Heritage Groups. They exchanged views on current issues of mutual interest.

At the press conference held in Beijing on the same day, Theodore Stevens said that his discussion with Vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping was fruitful and informative. He also said that the United States would like to expand its relations with China on the basis of the principles outlined in the Shanghai Communiqué and the Sino-U.S. Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations.

The American guests arrived in Beijing on January 2 for a friendly visit at the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.



*Answering Readers' Enquiries***U.S. "Taiwan Relations Act"**

Question: U.S. President-elect's Asian affairs adviser Ray Cline declared at Taipei airport recently, "The new Reagan administration has promised to carry out the Taiwan relations act fully and fairly." Such statements have drawn fire from the Chinese media, which charged that on several aspects the U.S. "Taiwan relations act" went against the principles set down in the Sino-American agreement on establishing diplomatic relations. What are the main points of this particular act, and why are the Chinese so firmly opposed to the act?

Answer: When China and the United States normalized their relations on January 1, 1979, Taiwan, an integral part of China, was still separated from the mainland. So, it was in a way understandable if the U.S. Congress should move to adopt some reasonable regulations to permit Americans to continue cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with Taiwan. All these, of course, must accord with the understanding reached during negotiations on normalization of relations and with the principle of the communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the United States. But this "Taiwan relations act" in many ways contravenes the principle laid down in the communique.

Interfering in China's Internal Affairs

In Section 2 (b) (4), the act says that it is the policy of the United States "to consider any

effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts, or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States." Section 2 also declares that the United States must "maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." Section 3 says that in the event of "any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests to the United States arising therefrom," "the President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the United States to any such danger." The act also declares that it is the policy of the United States to continue "to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character." "Nothing contained in this act shall contravene the interest of the United States in human rights" and "the preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States."

All these are unjustified interference in China's internal affairs. The future of Taiwan can only be decided by the Chinese people, the people on Taiwan included. No country has any right at all to meddle. It is our hope that Taiwan returns to the embrace of the

motherland peacefully. But if we are driven by the Taiwan authorities' adamant refusal to resort to non-peaceful means to solve the issue, that is entirely China's internal affair which the United States has no right to meddle in, let alone claim that it poses "a threat to the peace and security of the western Pacific area." What right has the U.S. President or the U.S. Congress to take action on this issue? What qualifies the United States to incorporate the "preservation and enhancement" of the human rights of a part of the Chinese people, the people on Taiwan, into "objectives of the United States?" During the Sino-American negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations, the Chinese side made it quite clear that the export of weapons is different from that of general merchandise, that it must be under government control and not allowed to come, after the establishment of diplomatic relations, under the term maintenance of unofficial contacts between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan. The continued supply of weapons by the United States will only make the Taiwan authorities more arrogant and obstruct the peaceful reunification of Taiwan with the motherland. That is really detrimental to "the peace and security of the western Pacific area."

Making Out Taiwan as a "Country"

Section 4 (a) of the "Taiwan relations act" declares that "the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979." The same

section (b) (1) says, "Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan." Section 4 (b) (2) makes the same stipulations concerning transactions and other relations with Taiwan. Section 4 (c) states that all 50-odd U.S. treaties and agreements with Taiwan (except the one on joint defence, which has been declared null and void) remain in force. The same section (d) declares that the "Taiwan relations act" may not be used as a basis for excluding or expelling Taiwan from any international organization.

Section 12 of the act stipulates that the United States may conclude new agreements with the Taiwan authorities through "a non-profit corporation," the "American institute in Taiwan." These agreements, it says, must be put to the U.S. Congress for "review" and "approval." Like agreements made by the U.S. Government itself some of these, too, could be kept secret. In (d) of the same section the Secretary of State is required to report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, every six months, about U.S.-Taiwan economic relations. Section 10 notes, "Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable privileges and immunities with respect to the Institute and its appropriate personnel, the President is authorized to extend with respect to the Taiwan instrumentality and its appropriate personnel, such privileges and immunities (subject to appropriate conditions and obligations) as may be necessary for the effective performance of their functions."

The above shows that the "Taiwan relations act" of the United States is actually an attempt to treat Taiwan as a "country," the Taiwan authorities as a "government," upgrading as far as possible the unofficial relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan into official relations, whereas it should be officially laid down as unofficial relations. This is incompatible with the principle of the Sino-U.S. communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations. The communique, which was made public on December 16, 1978, stipulates, "The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China.

Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan." It is also in conflict with the statement the U.S. Government issued the same day, which says, "The administration will seek adjustments to our laws and regulations to permit the maintenance of commercial, cultural, and other non-governmental relationships (with people on Taiwan) in the new circumstances that will exist after normalization." Although some of the articles of the "Taiwan relations act" conform with the spirit of this U.S. statement and say similar things, very many of its specific regulations, as quoted above, are exactly the opposite. The Chinese people

Chinese Readers' Views

What Is the Dutch Government Up to?

The Dutch Parliament on December 18 approved the decision of the government agreeing to the sale of two submarines by a Dutch company to Taiwan. This has aroused much bitterness among the Chinese people, many of whom have written to the newspapers. Following are three letters published in the press. — Ed.

When the Dutch Prime Minister and Foreign Minister officially visited China some time ago, they received a real welcome. Prime Minister Andreas Van Agt said he hoped to see friendly relations and co-operation between China and the Netherlands develop. But he failed to mention the proposed sale of submarines to Taiwan. Was he trying to deceive the Chinese people?

Shen Han
Nanxiaojie, Beijing

I am very angry at the Dutch Government's decision. Firm steps should be taken by the Chinese Government. The Dutch Government has endangered friendly relations with China and violated the principles for the establishment of diplomatic relations. We should in no way sit on our hands. Some kind of counter-measure is called for. For example, why not reconsider economic ties and the implementation of contracts?

Ding Derun
Shanxi Tongchuan Mining Bureau

On the Taiwan issue, the Dutch Government has set the clock back. Obviously, that government must be working hand in hand with someone behind the scenes. It must know that anyone wanting to create "two Chinas" will fail.

Jian Hui
No. 26 Middle School, Beijing

stand firm in their opposition to "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," in whatever form.

Encroaching on China's Legal Ownership of Properties

In the U.S. "Taiwan relations act," Section 4 (b) (3) declares that the severance of "diplomatic relations" between the United States and Taiwan should not affect in any way "the ownership of or other rights or interests in properties, tangible and intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on or prior to December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the governing authorities on Taiwan," including the diplomatic properties such as "embassy" premises. This violates the norms of international relations and encroaches on the interests of the People's Republic of China. Soon after the publication of the Sino-U.S. communique on establishing diplomatic relations, the Chinese Government notified the U.S. Government that as China and the United States have now announced formal establishment of diplomatic relations and the U.S. Government now recognizes the People's Republic of China as the sole legitimate Government in China, Chinese official property in the United States held by the Taiwan authorities should all revert to the Government of the People's Republic of China. And, in accord with generally recognized norms governing international relations, the U.S. Government has the obligation to protect these properties, prevent them from being transferred or taken over and to turn them over promptly to the Chinese Government. The Chinese Government made

many representations to the U.S. Government about this and the U.S. Government conceded that the Chinese side had grounds for claiming the above-mentioned properties. Although the U.S. President expressed certain reservations over certain stipulations in this act passed by the U.S. Congress concerning Chinese official properties in the United States, he still signed the bill. The diplomatic properties held by the Taiwan authorities have thus still to be returned to the People's Republic of China.

China's Attitude

According to what we know, Foreign Minister Huang Hua had pointed out on behalf of the Chinese Government to the American Government on March 16, 1979, when the U.S. "Taiwan relations act" was still before the U.S. Congress, that, if the bill were passed by Congress and went into effect after the U.S. President's approval, the newly established Sino-U.S. diplomatic relations would be adversely affected, because it ran counter on a series of questions to the principles mutually agreed upon in the negotiations for normalizing diplomatic relations and went back on the U.S. side's promises. He said he hoped that the American Government would exercise its influence in the legislative readjustment of U.S.-Taiwan relations so as to avoid any possible violations of the principle of the communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries. But the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate on March 28 and 29 of the same year respectively approved the act in disregard of

China's objection, and it was made legal after the U.S. President's approval on April 10. On April 28, the Chinese Foreign Ministry officially notified the American Government, reaffirming China's opposition to the conducting of U.S.-Taiwan relations in the light of the "Taiwan relations act." Rebutting U.S. attempts at explanations, it cited examples to show that the act did not conform to the principle of the communique on the normalization of diplomatic relations, and expressed the hope that the American Government would abide by the principle of the communique with the overall situation in mind and not do anything to adversely affect the two countries' relations. This was followed by the Chinese Government's resolute and reasonable refutation of the U.S. side's statements with respect to the U.S.-Taiwan relations, which contradicted the principle of the communique.

Sino-U.S. relations have a direct bearing on world strategy. We hope to see it develop continuously. It should not come to a standstill or be allowed to retrogress. The U.S. "Taiwan relations act" has become an obstacle to the development of relations between China and the United States. If implementation of the act, which damages Sino-U.S. relations, is continued by the incoming U.S. administration, it will be going counter to the aspirations not only of the Chinese people but of the American people as well. It will also adversely affect the global struggle against hegemonism to the detriment of the people of the world.

A Turbulent Year for the Middle East

- The Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan, closed in on the Persian Gulf, and took a step further south.
- The United States moved to improve its strategic posture and urged Gulf countries to establish a regional defence structure to check this Soviet drive.
- The Palestinian issue was stymied by Israel's stubborn policy of aggression and expansion.

THE Middle East in 1980 went through its most turbulent year since World War II. And with the old status quo there upset by developing contradictions, the international community was more anxious than ever about peace and security in the Middle East.

Last year, the Soviet Union made good use of the United States' unprecedented disadvantage in the Middle East, which has always been a cockpit of Soviet-U.S. rivalry. The overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty, a former U.S. pillar in the Middle East, the worsened Iran-U.S. relations and the hostage crisis, and the vehement opposition which the Egypt-Israel peace treaty aroused in some Arab countries—all these afforded Moscow an opening to send its troops into Afghanistan to get closer to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. What the Soviet Union has done, however, has made the people of the Middle East more chary of it. Most Arab countries denounced Moscow for its aggression despite Soviet pressure. They made it clear to Moscow that they wanted Soviet troops withdrawn from Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan left free from outside interference to solve their own problems. To safeguard their own security, some Arab

countries took steps to improve defence capabilities. Saudi Arabia and several other Arab countries have talked about establishing a system of regional defence.



with U.S. policies. It is hoped that both sides will continue efforts to work out a solution. It should be noted that while U.S.-Iranian relations left much to be desired during this period, the Iranians also firmly abrogated all the unequal articles in the Iranian-Soviet treaty, repeatedly refused to knuckle under to Soviet pressure and categorically rejected Soviet offers "of support." They also denounced Soviet aggression and intervention in no uncertain terms.

To ensure the security of the Gulf and oil from the Middle East, the United States has taken steps in the region to check the Soviet drive south. Militarily, its ability to react and intervene in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf has been raised and it has helped its friends there with arms deliveries and military co-operation

(such as joint military exercises) to improve their defence capabilities and let them do their share in safeguarding the region's security. It has also been urging on the Gulf countries the idea of setting up a regional defence and calling on its allies to concert efforts to safeguard the security of the Gulf.



The Palestinian Issue. No breakthrough was made last year regarding the crucial Palestinian problem. No change was observed

in Israel's policy of aggression and expansion. It refused to withdraw from territory it occupied and continued to reject recognizing the national rights of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, it took advantage of the disturbed situation to annex the rest of Jerusalem on July 30 and declared Jerusalem to be Israel's "eternal and inseparable capital." The Israeli authorities tightened their repressive rule over the Palestinian people in the occupied territory and built more Jewish settlements. They expelled two Palestinian mayors who were upholding Palestinian rights and they abetted ultra-expansionists in terrorism. They bombed and shelled Lebanon again and again and tried to annex the Golan Heights. All this held up negotiations for Palestinian autonomy.

However, internationally, recognition and support for the Palestinian people's national rights made further progress last year. The European Economic Community in a statement adopted at a summit conference recognized the Palestinian people's legitimate rights (including the right to self-determination) and declared that the Palestine Liberation

Organization (P.L.O.) must be allowed to take part in negotiations designed to bring about an overall peaceful solution to the Middle East issue. The July emergency special session of the U.N. General Assembly on the Palestinian question and the 35th U.N. General Assembly both adopted resolutions denouncing Israeli aggression and expansion, setting a time for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and granting the Palestinian people the right to self-determination and the right to set up their own state. In explicit terms, the resolutions pointed out that in any negotiations involving the Palestinian people's destiny, their national rights and the occupied territory, the P.L.O. must be represented.

Some 30 years of Arab-Israel confrontation have shown that the Palestinian people's liberation cannot be stamped out, which is why the trend is growing for a more realistic approach to bring about an early solution to the Palestinian problem and a lasting peace and stability in the Middle East. While the P.L.O. adheres firmly to armed struggle, it does not rule out a political settlement, which it

also actively proposes. Some Arab leaders now are inclined to believe that the Palestinian people's legitimate rights and Israel's security are not irreconcilable. Egypt, for its part, hopes to continue along the Camp David path, but taking into account present realities, it no longer stresses that the Camp David process to be the only way to the settlement of the Middle East issue. Naturally, many differences and disputes over this problem exist within the Arab world. The Soviet Union has been trying to exacerbate and exploit these to its advantage. It has tried hard to make use of Arab feelings against Egypt's go-it-alone approach to urge people to convene another Geneva conference, which will allow it to have another chance to interfere in Middle East affairs.

To a certain extent, of course, the problem hinges on Israel, whether or not it will change its stand and abandon its policy of aggression and expansion.

The United States has still not recognized the Palestinian people's national rights. Its strong bias for Israel has helped make Begin more intractable

and the Palestinian problem harder to solve, while hurting its own strategic interests in the Middle East.



Need for Unity.

The Iran-Iraq border dispute has led the two fraternal Moslem countries into their fourth month of war.

Both sides have sustained heavy losses and seen their vital oil industries severely damaged. The war also widened the Arab rift, preventing Syria and some other Arab countries from attending the 11th Arab summit conference. The armed confrontation between Syria and Jordan made friends sad and played into the hands of the hegemonists. However, the recent easing of Syria-Jordan relations shows that it is possible to gradually restore Arab unity.

The lesson to be drawn from the last 30 years is that Arab strength lies in its unity. Only Arab unity can solve the Middle East problem at its source.

— Dan Lin

Western Europe's Independent Role

Western Europe's demand for a bigger say in international affairs grows louder and more insistent. But, what exactly is its role in the world? How should its inclination towards greater independence be assessed? This deserves close study.

WEAKENED or defeated, the major West European countries were reduced to second rate powers tied to the United States after World War II. Thirty years later it is in-

evitable that the fully recovered West European countries should want to lead an independent existence and have "their voice heard in the world."

Changing Balance

For Western Europe, the issue of independence is closely linked with unity. When the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) was first set up, the drive for greater independence was already apparent. As an entity, the E.E.C. has become the largest economic and trading group in the world. The combined gross national product for its members is higher than the United

States' and 50 per cent higher than the Soviet Union's. E.E.C. exports are three times that of the United States and 8.6 times that of the Soviet Union. Politically, too, E.E.C. countries have achieved some degree of co-operation, "speaking with one voice" on some major international issues. While the United States declines, Western Europe is becoming a rising new centre of power in the West. This tilt in the balance of strength between Western Europe and the United States cannot but be reflected in the former's growing demand to become more independent.

Apart from this, as the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union weighs more heavily in the latter's favour, Western Europe begins to lose confidence in the United States and feels less secure. Because of U.S. vacillation and chops and changes in policy, Western Europe is being forced to look after itself. Moreover, the major West European countries have long recovered from the loss of their colonial possessions and, on this new basis, have readjusted and improved their relations with the third world countries. Through regional preferential trade arrangements and economic co-operation, the E.E.C. has established special economic and trade relations with more than 70 developing countries. On their part, some third world countries have endeavoured to use Western Europe as a leverage to shake off U.S. and Soviet control and influence. This has opened up broader vistas for Western Europe "to recover its rightful position in world affairs."

Not Without Limitations

However, Western Europe has many outstanding weaknesses and its independence is not without limitations.

In the first place, Western Europe cannot do without the United States militarily. Its security still depends on the U.S. nuclear umbrella and some 200,000 U.S. troops stationed there. In recent years Western Europe has been giving greater priorities to improving defence capabilities to counter Soviet military might. To enlarge their nuclear arsenal the French have pushed their neutron bomb experiment with determination. Britain has decided to renovate its nuclear missile submarine force and the ceiling is being lifted on West German naval armaments. But Western Europe cannot, in the short run, develop enough military clout to do without the United States.

Western Europe has another fatal flaw. It has to import most of its energy and raw materials to keep up its economy. Over 90 per cent of its oil and 75 per cent of its minerals are imported, mainly from Africa and the Middle East, which are vulnerable to Soviet manipulation and threat. Since Western Europe's ability to make an independent response to Soviet expansion in these areas is limited, the task of maintaining the security of these strategic areas flanking Western Europe and keeping the sea-lanes open to bring in oil and raw materials falls mainly on the United States.

Furthermore, the pace of Western Europe unity is ill-matched for the goal of establishing an "independent Europe." The E.E.C. member countries have to a large measure built up an economic alliance, but they are still

burdened by a conflict of interests in many areas. Political co-operation has just begun and not yet coalesced into a clear common strategy. So differences are bound to surface when it comes to specific issues. Co-operation in defence, nuclear co-operation in particular, has not yet been formally put on the agenda. West European joint defence is unimaginable for many years to come.

However, what is apparent is that Western Europe will press for greater independence from the United States, mainly in formulating policies on major international issues in light of its own conditions and interests. In spite of this, as it has neither the political nor the military means to put its policies into practice, Western Europe will be able to exert only a holding or a motive influence on the United States.

A Possible Development

The world is becoming polycentric and Western Europe's growing presence in the world arena is something positive in present international relations. But, as some in the West have pointed out, if Western Europe exaggerates its own immediate, separate interests and pursues inappropriate policies because of this, then its independence will not be able to fulfil its useful function and may even affect its overall strategic interests.


Since the mid-1970s, especially after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, European-U.S. differences in policy have emerged over a number of major international issues, including differences in policies and tactics towards Soviet aggression and expansion. Harboursing an ulterior motive, Soviet exhortations for West

The 10th E.E.C. Member State

Greece officially became the 10th member state of the E.E.C. on January 1, 1981. The organization has thus spread from Western to southeastern Europe — a significant advance for the alliance.

Greece is strategically important in defending Europe's southeast flank. The invasion of Afghanistan, bringing the Soviet Union closer south, poses a more serious threat to the region. Greece's move to join the E.E.C. after its recent official re-entry into NATO's military wing will help the West curb Soviet hegemonist expansion into Western and Southern Europe.

Economically, Greece will have a transitional period of five years to create for itself the conditions to share the full rights and responsibilities of an E.E.C. member state. Greece's entry will undoubtedly increase overall E.E.C. economic strength. But, because the country lags far behind the other nine in economic development, its entry will inevitably deepen the community's internal contradictions.



Sketch map of the E.E.C.

European independence have as their aim the widening of rifts between Western Europe and the United States in order to disintegrate the West's common front and finish them off one by one. This has led many with foresight in the West to call on Europe and the United States to set common strategic interests above everything else and co-ordinate policies and close their ranks to counter the Soviet Union.

As Western Europe is out in the forefront of the West-East confrontation, and Moscow is achieving overall military superiority in Europe, the fear of tension and war with the Soviet Union is growing in some West European countries. Their advocating detente and simultaneously strengthening their defence capabilities vis-a-vis the Soviet threat is understandable, as well as being in the interests of peace and security in Europe. But what has people worried is that West European independence could mean its relations with Moscow no longer hinging

on U.S.-Soviet relations, in which case, Western Europe could opt for "detente" with the Soviet Union and avoid being involved in a U.S.-Soviet confrontation and there would be no concerted European-American action. In reality neither the United States nor Western Europe by itself has the ability to meet the Soviet global menace. It is in the interests of both to contain Soviet expansion, so they must adopt a common strategy and co-ordinate action. This is vital to the West.

Consequently, how Western Europe is to exercise its independence, entering into an equal partnership with the United States and playing its proper role in the joint confrontation with the Soviet Union, is a question of vital importance to the West European countries. Some people think that if Western Europe is to play a new and greater role in international affairs, it is crucial for it to see and handle problems from an all-round strategic

point of view. If Western Europe is set on becoming "an island of detente," content to be a little oasis, then the establishment of a genuinely "powerful and independent Europe" is out of the question. The security of Western Europe itself would be problematic. This seems to be the more far-sighted view.

Judging by the present general trend, West European independence will continue to develop, the contradiction between Europe and the United States will wax and wane, but vis-a-vis the gathering Soviet storm, Western Europe and the United States are in the same boat. They have to help each other for they are interdependent. Since allied confrontation with the Soviet Union will not change, it is manifestly unrealistic, in the foreseeable future, for Western Europe to become completely independent of the United States and a third force standing between the two superpowers.

— Zhang Fan

The Tasks Before Us

— "Renmin Ribao" 1981 New Year's Day editorial

"Renmin Ribao" on New Year's Day carried an editorial entitled "Fulfil the Tremendous Tasks of Readjustment of the National Economy on the Basis of Stability and Unity." It pointed out: China's present political and economic situation is excellent, but there is a potential danger; we must really free ourselves from the trammels of "Left" ideas in economic work, proceed from the actual conditions in China and do what is possible step by step. It also called on the entire nation to rise with revolutionary vigour of building the country through diligence and thrift and hard work. The following is a slightly abridged translation of the editorial. Subheads are ours. — Ed.

NINETEEN eighty-one is the fifth new year the Chinese people have celebrated since the downfall of the gang of four.

Achievements


At present, an excellent political and economic situation lies in front of us. During the past year, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party established its Secretariat at its Fifth Plenary Session and adopted the resolution to rehabilitate Comrade Liu Shaoqi. The enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee in last August and the ensuing Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress have decided to introduce reforms to democratize the Party and state leadership system and carry them out, and have started to abolish de facto lifelong tenure for leading cadres. The Special Court of the Supreme People's Court solemnly tried the principal defendants in the case of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques and will mete out due punishment to them, which they deserve according to law. On the economic front, agricultural production developed fairly rapidly and the livelihood of the overwhelming majority of the peasants showed fairly big improvements. Industrial production maintained

a fair rate of growth almost without any increase in energy production, and there was an even bigger growth for light industry. Due to the big increases in light industry and agricultural and sideline production, the market supply is one of the best in the past 20 years. The livelihood of the majority of city workers and staff members also was improved because of wage increases, introduction of bonus systems and enlarged employment. These achievements are there for all to see.

However, in the course of advance, there is no, and cannot be, smooth sailing for everything. The country's economic situation is excellent. This is only one side of the picture. On the other side, there is a hidden danger in the economy, that is, the big financial deficit, over-issuance of currency and rising prices. If resolute measures are not taken to cope with this, both the peasants and workers will lose the economic benefits gained since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee held in December 1978 and the situation that is turning for the better with each passing day will suffer another setback.

The Hidden Danger

Why is there still a potentially serious financial and economic crisis four years after the gang of four was toppled? The question can only be answered from a historical point of view. Many serious imbalances long plagued economic life in pre-liberation China. People can still remember that on the eve of liberation longtime galloping inflation endangered the existence of all the people under Kuomintang rule. This disaster lasted until early post-liberation days. Relying on the great superiority of the socialist system, the Party and the People's Government made enormous efforts to bring about a fundamental change in the situation, rehabilitated the national economy and then started planned economic construction.



The Gezhouba multipurpose water conservancy project on the Changjiang River under construction.

During the First Five-Year Plan (1953-57), economic development was smooth and rapid. Later, the Party and government leadership was anxious to accelerate economic growth so as to build China into a rich and strong modern country at an early date, but it failed to proceed strictly from the objective economic conditions and observe the economic laws while starting to realize this praiseworthy desire. As a result, "Left" mistakes existed in economic work for a long time. Of course, it must be stressed that there were both correct and incorrect aspects in our economic work over the past 20 years and more. Achievements during that period were still tremendous. Our economic growth, including improvement of the people's living standards, was still much faster than that of other big developing countries with similar conditions. If not for those mistakes, the socialist system would certainly enable us to make still greater achievements.

The seriousness of the past mistakes varied at different stages and they took different forms. The conspicuous one was the "Left" mistake in the latter half of the 1950s. Though it was corrected during 1962-66, it was nevertheless far from being completely eliminated ideologically. The mistaken guideline of deciding the speed of development by subjective desire was not thoroughly criticized. In the first two years after the fall of the gang of four, we underestimated the serious consequences of the damage done during the preceding decade and failed to repudiate the "Left" mistakes in the guidelines of economic work. Instead, we were overanxious for success and again raised unrealistic slo-

gans and targets and greatly extended the scale of capital construction that already was beyond the nation's financial power. The policy of ending the closed-door practice, utilizing foreign funds and importing technology is undoubtedly correct, but the scale of importing complete sets of equipment was greatly overextended for lack of experience. It exceeded actual needs and possibilities. The repetition of old mistakes in the new historical conditions aggravated the imbalances in the national economy and increased financial and economic difficulties.

After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee, the central authorities decided to implement the policy of readjustment, restructuring, consolidation and improvement, and this should have become a fundamental turn in economic construction. However, in the past two years, many comrades from the central to the grass-roots levels, including those responsible for economic work at various levels, failed to understand the policy of economic readjustment fully and carry out the policy effectively. On the one hand, consumption levels of the urban and rural population have been raised, but on the other, the scale of capital construction was not reduced. Some localities and enterprises have started building a number of redundant projects. Necessary readjustment has not been carried out in some enterprises according to their economic conditions. The increase in administrative expenses has exceeded finances. As a result, in distribution, the total of accumulation and consumption surpassed the national income, and capital construction and other expenditures exceeded the state revenue.

These basic facts were explained to all the nation's people in the reports on national economic plans, the final state accounts and draft state budget delivered at the Third Session of the Fifth National People's Congress last September, but the measures taken then were far from effective. Therefore, the economy's passive situation as a whole was not reversed fundamentally, though readjustment has gone on for two years. The imbalance between state revenue and expenditure led to the improper issuance of more currency, which, coupled with problems in enterprise and commercial management, resulted in a rise in prices last year.

Readjustment in Earnest

Now, in order to reverse the passive situation in the national economy, put the state finance and credit imbalance into balance, get the modernization drive on to a sound basis and ensure its healthy advance, the Party Central Committee and the State Council decided to make further and earnest readjustments. The main point is that the scale of capital construction must be sufficiently cut back, administrative expenses must be reduced, and construction of new projects and administrative facilities and improvement of the people's livelihood must be kept within the country's capability. Only when sufficient retreat is made in some



Polyester fibre fabrics turned out by a Shanghai mill.

fields will it be possible to free the national economy as a whole from the potential danger. Other fields of work, mainly agriculture, light industry and production of articles of daily use, energy production, construction of transport facilities, and educational, scientific, health and cultural work must continue to be expanded as far as possible. Therefore, to make further readjustments is not a negative, but a positive policy. There must be both advance and retreat. Temporary and partial retreat means better, long-term and smooth advances in the days to come.

Such readjustment is entirely necessary at present; in a more profound sense, it is intended to free basically our economic work from the shackles of "Left" ideas and ensure the work to proceed from China's actual situation. China is a developing country with a population of 1,000 million, of which 800 million are peasants, and it is in such a country that we are carrying out our construction. We must clearly bear this fundamental situation in mind. Time and again we committed "Left" mistakes in socialist construction, the reason being that we failed to study earnestly our country's situation and were impetuous. The result was more haste and less speed.

Guiding Principle

Now that we are working for the four modernizations, we must have a unified guideline, i.e., to proceed from China's actual situation and act according to economic and other objective laws. Since we are building in a big nation with a large population, poor economic foundation and low level of technology, we should not expect quick results, nor hope for miracles overnight. Instead, we should do what we are capable of and march forward step by step in a down-to-earth way. We should continue to stick to the spirit of "transforming China in the spirit of the Foolish Old Man who removed the mountains," and make protracted and arduous efforts.

When we explain the true situation in the country to the people, they will understand our policies and the country's difficulties, and increase their confidence in their advance. If we make casual promises about the future of economic development and raise impractical plans which cannot materialize, even if this is out of the desire to build a prosperous country and seek happiness for the people, it inevitably will bring on complaints from the people and disappoint them.

To fulfil the tasks now confronting us, it is essential to strengthen and improve Party leadership and carry out extensive, deep-going and meticulous organizational, ideological and political work. We must practically and effectively educate the whole Party and the whole people regarding the extreme importance of adhering to the socialist road, the people's democratic dictatorship, that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the Party's leadership and



A good grain harvest on the outskirts of Lhasa.

Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. It is imperative to educate Party members and cadres to resolutely implement the Party's line, principles and policies, worked out since the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Party Central Committee. We must educate all Party members to rely closely on the masses, share weal and woe with them, take the lead in observing discipline, work hard and resolutely overcome bureaucracy and other styles of work keeping them aloof from the masses. We must educate the masses to take China's overall situation into account, firmly safeguard the hard-won lively political situation of stability and unity, strictly observe laws and discipline, and firmly combat ultra-individualism and anarchism which might strangle our future.

Spiritual Civilization

It is necessary to point out to the whole Party and the whole people that the socialist country we are building should not only be highly civilized materially, but spiritually as well. By spiritual civilization, we mean, in addition to science and culture, the dominance of communist ideals, beliefs, morals, discipline, revolutionary stand and principles and comradesly relationship among the people. From the years in Yanan to the founding of New China, the people, particularly the youth, all over the country were attracted by our correct political orientation and lofty revolutionary spirit. We must publicize, restore and display the spirit of Yanan and the pioneering spirit in the early days of liberation. All Communists should not only keep and carry forward such spirit, but

also popularize such spirit among the young people and the entire population. When the people of all nationalities, under the leadership of the Party Central Committee's correct line, display the revolutionary spirit of working hard to build the country through diligence and thrift, it will give us immeasurably great strength.

In the 31 years since the founding of New China, we have indeed made many mistakes, including serious ones; the people suffered tremendously from these ups and downs and the course of socialist construction was retarded. But through 31 years of hard work, around 400,000 industrial and transport enterprises were set up and industrial fixed assets have increased more than 20-fold since the early post-liberation days. Large numbers of skilled workers and some 10 million people with special knowledge have also been trained, and a fairly complete industrial and national economic system has been established. The livelihood of the people throughout China has improved considerably compared with the pre-liberation years.

The Party and government have now put special emphasis on examining past shortcomings and mistakes and have correctly summed up positive and negative experiences and lessons aimed at putting our future construction on a practical and reliable basis. It can be said that we have now truly freed ourselves from the shackles of "Left" ideas and are moving ahead on a sound road of development. So long as the whole nation is united and marches ahead, the future of our socialist modernization programme is very bright. □

Interview With Vice-Chairman of Legal Affairs Commission

Starting from November 20, 1980, the Special Court under the Chinese Supreme People's Court tried the ten principal culprits of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques. Questions concerning the trial have come from some of our readers. Our reporter obtained replies to readers' questions from Wang Hanbin, Vice-Chairman of the Commission for Legal Affairs of the N.P.C. Standing Committee. — Ed.

Question: Before the court's verdict is announced, some readers noted, reports and comments in the Chinese media all asserted that the defendants were guilty. Would this in some way affect the independent judgment of the court?

Answer: It is true that our public opinion circles generally hold that the chief offenders of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques have committed heinous crimes and don't follow some other countries' principle of "presumption of innocence."

According to China's Law of Criminal Procedure, our trial procedure ensures the implementation of the principle of basing ourselves on facts and taking the law as the criterion. Before trial ends, the court does not presume the accused guilty or innocent, but decides on the basis of facts. It attaches importance to evidence and investigation and study and does not consider confessions lightly.

The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques played havoc for about ten years and did great harm to the Chinese people. Though the mass media was controlled by these cliques during those years, people throughout the country still sought all sorts of ways to expose their crimes and express their own anger and hatred for them. The famous Tian An Men revolutionary incident in April 1976 well reflected this kind of feeling when tens of thousands of Beijing citizens went to Tian An Men Square to put their poems and prose, many denouncing the gang of four, on funeral wreaths for Premier Zhou, on the balustrades of the Monument to the Heroes of the People and in other places of



the square. Many handed out leaflets and statements listing the crimes of the gang of four. Though a lot of people were arrested, people did this in defiance of being jailed. After the gang's downfall, the media returned to the hands of the people. How could they keep silent and not reflect the people's thinking before the court makes its decision?

However, though the comments of the press, radio and television hold that they are guilty before the court decides, this doesn't mean that they are legally guilty. The judgment — whether they are guilty or not, what offences they committed and what sentences should be attached — has to be made by the court on the basis of facts and according to law. Public opinion does not interfere in the independent judgment of the court.

Legal systems vary in different countries. In some countries the media are not supposed to say before the court delivers its verdict if a defendant is guilty or not; in other countries it is different. China's socialist legal system needs to be improved and strengthened. While enacting laws, we should take into consideration and absorb the useful parts of laws in other countries and those of our past laws. But, as regards our judicial work, we must follow our present laws, not something else.

Q: Some readers asked: What the Lin-Jiang cliques did are acts performed years ago, during the "cultural revolution." The Criminal Law was promulgated in 1979 and came into effect on January 1, 1980. Can past offences be judged according to present law?

A: This is a question concerning application of the law. Article Nine of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China contains specific stipulations on this question. It says: "If an

act performed after the founding of the People's Republic of China and prior to the enforcement of the present law was not deemed an offence under the laws, decrees and policies then in force, these laws, decrees and policies shall be the standard. If an act was deemed an offence under the said laws, decrees and policies and is also subject to prosecution under Section VIII, Chapter Four of the General Provisions of the present law, the standard of criminal liability shall also be the said laws, decrees and policies. But if the act is not deemed an offence or the penalty for the offence is lighter under the present law, the present law shall apply."

In 1952, China promulgated the Regulations Governing the Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries. Its content conforms with the provisions in the Criminal Law concerning the scope of the counter-revolutionary offences which must be punished. But the former was formulated just after nationwide liberation and when the movement to suppress counter-revolutionaries reached a high tide; it provided for heavier sentences for counter-revolutionaries than the present Criminal Law. Apart from this, other charges made in the Indictment of the Special Procuratorate of the Supreme People's Procuratorate against the principal defendants of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques, such as the offence of false charges and persecution and the offence of illegal imprisonment of people, are also deemed criminal offences under the past policies and decrees as well as legal precedents of the court. Moreover, according to the said policies and decrees, when these crimes were committed for a counter-revolutionary purpose, heavier punishment should be handed out to them.

As all the charges against the principal defendants of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques are deemed criminal offences under the past laws, decrees and policies as well as the Criminal Law and as the penalties under the Criminal Law are lighter than those under the past laws (including the Regulations Governing the Punishment of Counter-Revolutionaries), decrees and policies, only the Criminal Law shall be the standard in meting out penalties to them, not the past laws, decrees and policies. This accords with stipulations in the present Criminal Law concerning the application of law.

This application of the principle of handing out lighter punishment while implementing the new and old laws is a common practice in many

countries. The principle that law shall not be applied retroactively means that acts which were not deemed criminal offences or to which the old laws hand down lighter punishment cannot be dealt with according to the present law. Otherwise, the present law should be applied.

Q: Many members of the Special Procuratorate and the Special Court were framed and persecuted by the Lin-Jiang cliques. According to stipulations in China's Law of Criminal Procedure, it seems that they should withdraw from exercising their functions. Why should they be allowed to handle the case?

A: The Law of Criminal Procedure has made stipulations about withdrawal. The Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques have brought the entire country and nation unimaginable disasters and the people of the whole country suffered. Should there be a withdrawal, everyone would have to do so. That would mean only the accused themselves could try the case. This is obviously impossible.

Members of the Special Procuratorate and Special Court were all appointed by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and they were entrusted by the people of the whole country to prefer public charges against and conduct the trial of the principal defendants of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques. In this respect, the case differs entirely from ordinary criminal cases. In special cases like this, withdrawal will not be exercised. This was also the practice during the trial of the arch war criminals of Germany and Japan in Nuremberg and Tokyo. Both courts were formed by the victorious nations and the principle of non-withdrawal and no permission for withdrawal was adopted.

Q: Only a restricted number of people were allowed to attend the trial. How then can it be called a public trial? Why were foreign journalists not invited?

A: The trial of the principal defendants of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing cliques was held publicly in total accordance with stipulations in the Law of Criminal Procedure. In order to ensure that people from all walks of life had the chance to attend, representatives were sent by various provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government, various political parties, people's organizations, state organs and the People's Liberation Army. They attended the court

sessions in rotation. During every session, some one thousand people were allowed to attend. The total number reached tens of thousands. Very few courts in other countries have allowed so many people to sit in their public galleries. Some people have said: If it is a public trial, whoever wants to attend should do so. This is impractical. China has a population of 1,000 million. If those who wanted to could take part, even Tian An Men Square would not be big enough. If this were done, how could court order be maintained?

As regards coverage by foreign journalists, Article Nine of the Regulations Governing the Trial by the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China, which was adopted by the Supreme People's Court on December 11, 1979, stipulates: "In public trials of cases involving foreign citizens or firms, if foreigners want to sit in the public gallery or foreign journalists

want to cover the trials in their news reports, they may apply to the related departments for permission. When the permission is granted by the people's courts concerned, they may enter the courtroom on the strength of certificates issued to them by the people's courts."

In line with the stipulation, our court does not invite foreigners to attend trials of cases not involving foreign citizens or firms (as in the trial of the principal culprits of the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques), or allow foreign journalists to cover the court proceedings of these cases in their news reports. It is true that in the past we invited some foreigners to our hearings of cases not involving foreign citizens or firms. However, it was only for the purpose of enabling them to observe and understand something in general about China's legal proceedings. They did not sit in the public gallery as auditors of the cases.

Report From the Court (7)

Debate on Jiang Qing's Case Ends

THE court debate on Jiang Qing's case ended on December 29, 1980 with the prosecution demanding that she be punished according to Article 103 of the Criminal Law.

Article 103 says: "Whoever commits any of the counter-revolutionary offences specified in this chapter (Chapter Two: Offences Against Public Security), with the exception of Articles 98, 99 and 102, and causes particularly grave harm to the state and the people in a particularly flagrant case may be sentenced to death."

Jiang Qing, who refused to accept the charges in the indictment against her in the December 24 session, still insisted at the final debate that she was not guilty.

Jiang Wen, the prosecutor, said the charges against Jiang Qing had been ascertained by an abundance of conclusive evidence exhibited in court, including recordings of her speeches.

He pointed out that Jiang Qing was guilty of conspiring to subvert the government and split the nation, organizing and leading a counter-revolutionary clique, framing, arresting and jailing innocent people, torturing people to

extract confessions and illegally searching people's homes.

Refusing to bear any responsibility for the offences she was charged with, Jiang Qing said she had done everything during the "cultural revolution" "on behalf of Chairman Mao Zedong" or "according to his instructions."

In a long statement refuting Jiang Qing's arguments, the prosecutor said it was futile for her to try to place her responsibility on to Chairman Mao so as to cover up her counter-revolutionary offences which had done great harm to the state and the people, and to shirk her criminal liability. (For excerpts see next page.)

Jiang Qing also tried to deny she had collaborated with the Lin Biao clique, claiming she had fought against Lin Biao. Jiang Wen refuted this allegation by enumerating the facts that she had colluded with Lin Biao and company in framing and persecuting Liu Shaoqi, late Chairman of the State, and He Long, Peng Dehuai, Luo Ruiqing and Lu Dingyi, former Vice-Premiers of the State Council.

After the Lin Biao clique was exposed and crushed in September 1971, the prosecutor said, Jiang Qing gathered together remnants of this clique and continued to carry on counter-revolutionary activities.

"Are these facts still not enough to show that the gang of four headed by Jiang Qing and the group led by Lin Biao were counter-revolutionary cliques working hand in glove?" the prosecutor asked.

Unable to produce any facts and evidence proving herself innocent, Jiang Qing refused to reply to the charges against her in the indictment, shrugging them off as "negligible issues aimed at defaming me."

At the same time, she continued to attack the current Party and state leaders as "reactionaries," "counter-revolutionaries" and "fascists" and hurl abuse at the bench and prosecution.

Warning her, the prosecutor told Jiang Qing that she was continuing to commit offences by slandering Party and state leaders, countering the trial which was backed by the whole nation, showing contempt for the law, the court and its rules, and vilifying the bench, the prosecution and other court personnel.

Presiding judge Zeng Hanzhou once again warned Jiang Qing that she was committing a new offence in slandering and vilifying Party and state leaders.

He said that with regard to Jiang Qing's counter-revolutionary offences charged by the Special Procuratorate of the Supreme People's Procuratorate, the court had held six sessions for investigation, at which an abundance of evidence and statements in testimony were exhibited and read out, witnesses including the co-defendants in the case were summoned to testify and recordings of her speeches framing a number of cadres were played. "The facts are clear and the evidence is conclusive," Zeng Hanzhou said.

During the court hearings and debate, he continued, the tribunal gave Jiang Qing enough time to defend herself and present her views. However, she evaded the offences charged by the Special Procuratorate and refused to present her case within the framework of the accusations stated in the indictment but, on the contrary, made use of the debate to make counter-revolutionary remarks.

"While making her last statement, Jiang Qing continued to vilify Party and state leaders, smear the bench and slander the prosecutors. This constitutes a fresh offence. The Special Court will pursue her criminal liability in accordance with the law," the presiding judge said.

Finally, Zeng Hanzhou ordered Jiang Qing to leave and await the judgment to be handed down by the Special Court.

— "Beijing Review" and Xinhua
correspondents

Jiang Qing Can't Disclaim Criminal Responsibility

(Excerpts from the prosecutor's statement
of December 29, 1980)

JIANG Qing, in arguing her defence, went so far as to turn things upside down and allege that her criminal activities were carried out on behalf of Chairman Mao Zedong or in accordance with his instructions. Her aim was to cover up her counter-revolutionary crimes which had caused the country and people serious damage and to shirk her criminal responsibility under the law.

During the "cultural revolution," Jiang Qing made use of various opportunities to frame large numbers of Party, government and army cadres and ordinary people, smeared people with false charges like "renegade," "enemy agent" and "counter-revolutionary," detained the innocent at will, rigged up false evidence and fabricated cases.

Jiang Qing, in collusion with Kang Sheng and Xie Fuzhi, directed special investigation groups to extort confessions by torture, and personally ordered "shock interrogation" of Yang Chengzuo and Zhang Zhongyi, two professors who were critically ill at the time and died as the result of torture.

Together with Kang Sheng and Chen Boda, Jiang Qing illicitly decided to have the Chairman of the State, the General Secretary of the Party Central Committee and Vice-Premiers of the State Council framed, repudiated and struggled against.

To frame and persecute Members of the Eighth C.P.C. Central Committee, Jiang Qing, in July 1968, asked Kang Sheng to give her a list of the Committee's Members and Alternate

Members, of which 88 were labelled "enemy agents," "renegades," "elements having illicit relations with foreign countries" or "anti-Party elements."

Jiang Qing speciously argued in court that she also asked Premier Zhou Enlai for such a list, but she admitted in court that the list from Premier Zhou contained "nothing about their political condition," having only notations of those members who had died.

On March 2, 1976, Jiang Qing summoned leading members from 12 provinces and autonomous regions to a meeting at which she maligned Deng Xiaoping, calling him a "big quisling," a "fascist" and a "counter-revolutionary double-dealer." In court, Jiang Qing openly denied this crime, saying she "had the habit to visit cadres on behalf of Chairman Mao," thus trying to shift on to Chairman Mao the responsibility. This is a lie.

Just about that time, Chairman Mao denounced Jiang Qing for "interfering too much when she addressed a 12-province meeting which she called without any authorization." Although Jiang Qing denied she ever framed Deng Xiaoping or called him a "big quisling," what she said is borne out by the record and cannot be denied.

Jiang Qing framed Zhang Linzhi, late Alternate Member of the C.P.C. Central Committee and Minister of the Coal Industry, as a "sworn follower of Peng Zhen" and incited people who did not know the facts to harass him to death.

Jiang Qing framed Zhou Yang, Alternate Member of the C.P.C. Central Committee, as a "renegade," "hidden traitor," "Kuomintang agent" and "Japanese agent."

She framed Shi Chuanxiang, a national model worker, as a "scab who was bribed," and had him persecuted to death. (For details of the above facts, see our previous reports.)

Jiang Qing framed and persecuted too many people to enumerate. She attempted to shift the blame to Chairman Mao so as to deny her responsibility and escape due punishment by law. This will never work.

Jiang Qing said: "Arresting me and bringing me to trial is a defamation of Chairman Mao Zedong." This is a vicious slander and calumny against Chairman Mao Zedong.

The people of all nationalities throughout the country are very clear that Chairman Mao

was responsible, so far as his leadership was concerned, for their plight during the "cultural revolution" and he was also responsible for failing to see through the Lin Biao and Jiang Qing counter-revolutionary cliques.

However, the Party, the army and the people of all our nationalities will never, for this reason, forget or obliterate Chairman Mao's great contributions to overthrowing the "three great mountains" (i.e., imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism), founding the People's Republic of China and pioneering the socialist cause in China. Neither will they fail to sum up the experience and lessons of the ten years of the "cultural revolution." Our Party and state leaders have time and again reiterated that throughout his career, Chairman Mao's great achievements are primary, while his mistakes are secondary.

These facts cannot be shaken and obliterated by Jiang Qing, Lin Biao and company. It is futile for Jiang Qing to attempt to cover up her counter-revolutionary crimes by using Chairman Mao's high prestige.

As a matter of fact, Chairman Mao himself exposed and refuted Jiang Qing some years ago.

On July 17, 1974, he told a meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.P.C. Central Committee: "She (Jiang Qing) does not speak for me, she speaks only for herself." "In a word, she represents herself."

On December 23, 1974, Chairman Mao sternly pointed out: "Jiang Qing, one, don't flaunt yourself in public; two, don't write instructions on documents irresponsibly; three, don't take part in forming a government." He also said: "Do you think Jiang Qing has wild ambitions or not? My view is she has."

At the end of 1974 he said that "Jiang Qing has wild ambitions. She actually wants Wang Hongwen to be chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and herself to be Party chairman."

At the beginning of 1975, Chairman Mao Zedong said: "After I die, she will make trouble."

These remarks of Chairman Mao Zedong's made things very clear. Now, Jiang Qing still wants to describe her counter-revolutionary crimes as being carried out on behalf of Chairman Mao or in accordance with his instructions. Such lies can deceive nobody! □

Madness Reigned in Their Last Days

— *Plotting a counter-revolutionary armed revolt in Shanghai by the gang of four and its followers*

by Gao Ji

HEARINGS at the First Tribunal of the Special Court on the counter-revolutionary offences of Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen and their followers in plotting an armed revolt in Shanghai have brought the whole story to light.

Setting Up the Gang's Own Armed Force

Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen at the beginning of the "cultural revolution" instigated and conducted two large-scale clashes in Shanghai, one at the end of 1966, the other early in August 1967. After these two incidents, they succeeded in taking over Shanghai's Party and government leadership and started "reorganizing" the city's people's militia so as to set up an armed force controlled by the gang. Zhang Chunqiao described the purpose of this armed force as "defending with the rifle the revolution by pen," adding that "learning street fighting" and building up eight to ten anti-aircraft divisions was necessary. After 1969, he told Wang Xiuzhen (a nameless woman technician catapulted to a vice-chairman on the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee during the "rebellion") and others that they should make rifles, hand grenades and mines in suburban Shanghai. "You musn't make light of these things, I mean these homemade mines, rifles and hand grenades," said Zhang, "they will be useful in case of war."

In one of his depositions, Wang Hongwen said: "Our purpose in arming was to defend the pen with the rifle, that is, defend the power Lin Biao and the gang of four had seized. It was the gang's own armed force."

He and the gang's followers in Shanghai faithfully carried out the principle and ways of building up the armed force laid down by Zhang Chunqiao.

They claimed they would use this force to "deal with the capitalist-roaders" "in preparation for civil war" and also to handle so-called class struggle. From the moment it was established in 1968, it searched, ransacked and closed down the Shanghai offices of the ministries under the State Council as well as those of provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions, under the pretext that these were havens for the "capitalist-roaders." In the name of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee, they also authorized this armed force to arrest, detain and interrogate people and to organize "study classes."

To firmly control it, Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen deprived the Shanghai Garrison of command over the Shanghai People's Militia. Wang said that the militia "was founded by Chunqiao and me," "I want to be in complete



Wang Xiuzhen (left), now in custody, testifying at the court against Wang Hongwen, giving an account of the part the latter had played in the planned armed revolt.

charge of it." "The Army must not lead the militia, let the [Shanghai] Municipal Revolutionary Committee command the people's militia." He also told Wang Xiuzhen to send people to head its municipal command and district commands to make sure the militia was in the hands of people they could trust.

Wang Hongwen and the gang's followers also appropriated local funds to finance the manufacture of arms for the gang's armed force. One machine-building factory was turned into a plant making automatics. In 1970 Wang Hongwen told a motor-bicycle factory to equip part of the militia with motor-bikes to form a motorized regiment. He said: "Shanghai's people's militia should be well equipped and on a par with the Liberation Army."

It took Zhang Chunqiao and Wang Hongwen nearly ten years to build up this armed force in Shanghai. The latter admitted that what he and the gang's followers there had done to build up the gang's own armed force laid the groundwork for an armed revolt.

"A War Mobilization Order"

After the Second Plenary Session of the Tenth Party Central Committee in January 1975, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen, whenever the situation turned against them, would stuff their followers in Shanghai with ideas about "getting ready to fight guerrilla war in the mountains," "going to war" and "settling things by force in coming struggles" to get them mentally prepared. After Chairman Mao Zedong died in September 1976, they secretly came out with a string of instructions to foment an armed revolt.

The Second Plenary Session of the Tenth Party Central Committee, at the proposal of Chairman Mao Zedong, named Comrade Deng Xiaoping Vice-Chairman of the Party Central Committee, Vice-Chairman of the Military Commission under the Central Committee, First Vice-Premier of the State Council and Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and also to take charge of the day-to-day affairs of the central authorities. During the session, Wang Hongwen was worried and told Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian, and Wang Xiuzhen (all then vice-chairmen of the Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee): "What worries me most is the army. There are people there who are not on our side."

Chairman Mao Zedong on many occasions criticized the gang of four in 1974 and the first

half of 1975; Jiang Qing was criticized in the first half of 1975 at the Political Bureau of the Party Central Committee presided over by its Vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping. In the circumstances, Wang Hongwen went to Shanghai in July and did not return to Beijing until mid-November. While in Shanghai, he discussed with Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen the matter of the central authorities appointing commanders, deputy commanders, political commissars and deputy political commissars of the various services and arms and military areas. He said: "Deng knows these people very well, Chunqiao and I don't." Wang Hongwen repeatedly told Ma Tianshui and his "buddies" who "rebelled" with him during the "cultural revolution" to "get ready to fight guerrilla war in the mountains." In September that year he called a meeting of the heads of the Shanghai people's militia to let them know the gang's ultimate aim. After the meeting, he told Ma Tianshui not to keep arms in army depots, but issue them to members of the people's militia so that they would be armed in case of war. He then went to see the depots where the arms were kept.

The Tian An Men incident erupted in Beijing in April 1976 during which many young men made speeches attacking the gang of four. This alarmed them, and Wang Hongwen, between April 1 and 7, talked with Ma Tianshui and Wang Xiuzhen over the phone practically every day, telling them to "have the people's militiamen patrol the city" "to prevent any incident in Shanghai similar to Tian An Men."

In August 1976, commander Ding Sheng of the Nanjing Units of the P.L.A. went to Shanghai and had a secret midnight meeting with Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen at the Yanan Hotel. Ding said: "What worries me most is Unit 6453, which refuses to take orders from me." "This unit has several divisions positioned along the Wuxi-Suzhou-Shanghai rail-line, which greatly disturbs me." "You people must get ready." Ma Tianshui replied: "When there is war, we in Shanghai are counting mainly on the people's militia." Ma eventually asked about how well it was armed and ordered speeding up issuance of 74,220 rifles, 300 pieces of artillery and over 10 million rounds of ammunition in preparation for an armed revolt.

On September 23, 1976, Wang Hongwen told Wang Xiuzhen on the phone: "You must be on guard, the struggle isn't over yet. The

capitalist class inside the Party won't take its defeat lying down. Some people are bound to push Deng Xiaoping on to the scene." In one of his depositions, Wang Hongwen admitted that this statement had a strong influence on his followers in Shanghai, and "prepared conditions mentally for a meeting by the Shanghai people's militia."

On September 28, 1976, Zhang Chunqiao sent Wang Hongwen's secretary to Shanghai to relay his opinion to the gang's followers. According to the record kept by Xu Jingxian, Zhang told them "to constantly analyse the situation in class struggle, to heighten vigilance on the one hand and enhance confidence on the other," that "Shanghai has yet to undergo a severe test," and "Shanghai will go through a big test, war." In his deposition, Xu wrote: "Zhang Chunqiao was here giving us a war mobilization order."

Death Throes of the Gang's Followers

The gang of four was toppled on October 6, 1976. Two days later, Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen sent someone to Beijing to dig up information. That person made a night call to notify Shanghai that the worst had happened to the gang of four — in prearranged code talk: "My mother had a myocardial infarction!" Between the night of October 8 and that of October 12, the gang's followers in Shanghai met many times to plot a last-ditch struggle through an armed revolt.


They called an emergency meeting at the office of the municipal Party committee on Kangping Road the evening of October 8. Present were: Xu Jingxiang and Wang Xiuzhen (secretaries of the municipal Party committee), Feng Guozhu, Wang Shaoyong and Zhang Jingbiao, (who were members of the municipal Party committee's standing committee), Zhu Yongjia (in charge of the writing group under the municipal Party committee), and also He Xiuwen (Zhang Chunqiao's secretary stationed in Shanghai), and Liao Zhukang and Xiao Mu (Wang Hongwen's secretaries). They figured that the gang of four had probably been arrested. Zhu Yongjia immediately made his stand clear: "Let's fight. Send the people's militia to the front. If not for a week, we can at least fight for three or five days and that's long enough to let the whole world know." Zhu's position was approved by the gang's other followers. Xu Jingxian signed a written order

then and there to mass 33,500 militiamen "to be combat ready." After the meeting, the conferees were divided into two groups to go to their respective secret command posts to get ready for the armed revolt.

After the meeting, Zhu Yongjia, who was in the first group, rushed to the Shanghai dailies and the municipal radio broadcasting station where he arranged for propaganda work via the media. This done, he visited the writing group under the municipal Party committee, where he made ready for the writing of counter-revolutionary propaganda material.

The other group, headed by Wang Xiuzhen, turned up at the Municipal Command of the People's Militia late on the night of October 8 to prepare for the armed revolt. This group consisted mainly of Wang Hongwen's "pals" and the gang of four's roughnecks in Shanghai, who had engaged in all kinds of nefarious deeds. Wang Xiuzhen gave them the following tasks: to study and produce an operational plan for the armed revolt; those who had participated in large-scale clashes before were to be in charge of various command posts in the event of war.

Under Wang Xiuzhen's command, those in charge of the Shanghai People's Militia worked out a preliminary plan of action and leaders of the ten city districts and of the five divisions of people's militia immediately under the municipal command were summoned to a meeting at which orders were given to mass troops for action, issue arms and ammunition, and collect vehicles and materiel. In a few days, over 27,000 pieces of weapons of all descriptions were issued and 225 vehicles as well as a large stockpile of food and materiel were gathered, while 15 radio transmitters were installed at various militia's



Ammunition collected for the armed revolt.



The secret commanding post on 76, Yueyang Road. The antenna tower seen at the right was installed for a radio transmitter to be used in the revolt.

command posts. Xue Ganqing and Xu Chenghu, deputy secretaries of the Party committee of the Shanghai Municipal Bureau of Public Security, acting on the orders of Wang Xiuzhen, also assembled 1,300 people as a mobile force equipped with additional arms.

On the morning of October 9, Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen got a telephone message from Ma Tianshui in Beijing. When the two asked over the phone if something had happened to the "three in the leadership" (meaning Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and Wang Hongwen), Ma Tianshui hemmed and hawed. That night, Ma Tianshui phoned again to relay the Party Central Committee's order for Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen to go to Beijing for a meeting. The two left for Beijing the following afternoon.

Ma Tianshui's call from Beijing to the gang's followers and the order from Beijing sending for Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen served to a large extent to slow down armed revolt preparations by the gang's followers. For two days, on the 10th and 11th, they could only await the news after Xu and Wang got to Beijing.

At around eight on the night of October 12, the gang's followers in Shanghai had another

secret meeting, at which some were grief-stricken because of the downfall of the gang of four; some suggested taking action at once since "further delay will simply mean utter ruin." Others clamoured that if it meant action, it must be something big. Desperate, they proposed getting the masses to stop work and strike, blocking airfield runways with steel ingots, sealing the Wusong River estuary by sinking ships there, cutting off the power system, controlling key departments, blowing up railway bridges and other counter-revolutionary acts. While the meeting was still on, Ma Tianshui and Wang Xiuzhen called from Beijing to say they would return to Shanghai on the 13th and urged their cohorts to hold on until their return. But Zhu Yongjia and someone else didn't think they should keep waiting. He suggested sending the militia to occupy newspaper offices and the radio station before dawn to issue a "message to the nation and the city's residents." They wanted to go all-out and came out with the slogan "We want Jiang Qing, we want Zhang Chunqiao, we want Yao Wenyuan, we want Wang Hongwen!" But, in the absence of someone to head these thugs, who would give such orders? Some members of the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, while agreeing to step up preparations, preferred that the armed revolt be staged only when Ma Tianshui, Xu Jingxian and Wang Xiuzhen got back. This mad meeting by these reactionary remnants, on the eve of their doom, lasted well into the early hours.

Early in the morning of October 13, one of the gang's followers had worked out a plan for an armed revolt. The chiefs of the Municipal Federation of Trade Unions and of the people's militia command started spreading the word about a possible counter-revolutionary armed revolt. In the afternoon, several followers of the gang actually tried but failed to send the people's militia into action for a last-ditch struggle.

When the historic victory of smashing the gang by the Party Central Committee was officially made known in Shanghai, the gang's ten-year rule there and their plot for an armed revolt immediately collapsed.

A few days later, the Party Central Committee sent new leaders to take over the work in Shanghai. The Shanghai Municipal Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a decision: The Shanghai Garrison was to be responsible for the day-to-day work of the people's militia. □

TV PLAYS

A Bumper Year

Last year China produced some 100 TV plays, surpassing the number of stage plays and movies shown in the same period. This was the best record since the first TV play was produced in 1958.

There used to be few plays specially created for TV in China and most of the TV programmes were movies or relayed theatre performances.

The current modernization drive has served as an inspiration for the vigorous creation of TV plays with rich, varied content and style. Closeness to real life is a common characteristic. The artists have drawn on the daily lives of ordinary people. All of the stories are impressive and interesting except for some which leave much to be desired in terms of artistic merit.

The play *Director Qiao Resumes His Post*, based on a popular short story of the same title and its sequel, has enriched the original work with the addition of many lively incidents.

The director joins the workers in healing the wounds inflicted during the ten years of havoc beginning from the mid-60s and putting an end to the period of mismanagement and failure to fulfil plans. During the process of overcoming hardships, he forms a new family (his first wife was persecuted to death in the "cultural revolution"). The skilled acting of the players in China's northeastern city of Shenyang has added a great deal of artistic appeal to the play.

Who Is He, shown last month, depicts how a swindler claims

to be the son of a provincial Party committee secretary and is exposed at the end. The play was finished over a year ago, but was held up because of different views about it. Some suspected that it would undermine the image of veteran revolutionaries in the eyes of the audience.

And how did the audience react? As it turned out, they generally took it as a simple straightforward attack on the privilege-seeking and erroneous styles of work which have not yet been eliminated since they emerged in the decade of turmoil.

Similar works dealing with real life and touching on social problems of wide concern or praising beautiful ideas and criticizing bad behaviour have made up the major part of the year's TV plays.

Girl Friend tells the story of a young doctor. He is depressed because his father is persecuted by the gang of four. Then with help from a girl, he becomes enthusiastic about his work again. He finally falls in love with her.

Beijing's *At the Wedding* describes the various characters

a new county Party committee secretary meets when he attends a collective wedding.

Sweet Watermelons produced by central China's Hunan Province tells how the melon-growers prosper under the new, flexible economic policies.

Looking Forward of south China's Guangdong Province is a play about the misery and ill-treatment suffered by two scientists during the years of turmoil.

Smile depicts how a newly promoted young officer, with the help of his comrades-in-arms, rekindles his love for his future wife, a peasant girl.

Among last year's TV plays, more than a dozen were for children.

Chinese audiences have also enjoyed foreign TV plays dubbed in Chinese such as the British production of *Madam Curie*, Ibsen's *Nora* produced in Norway and George Sand's beautiful pastoral work *La Petite Fadette* produced in France, as well as several thrillers and science fiction films in serial form produced in the United States, Korea and Japan.



Scene from a Tianjin TV play: They agree to try to help people.

Works jointly produced by Chinese and foreign artists are on the increase.

The Central TV Station in Beijing has shown several TV plays over a national network. Although a private TV set is still a luxury in most Chinese families, nearly all workshops, production brigades in rural areas, schools, state organs and neighbourhood committees have their own, including some colour TVs. It is estimated that China's TV audience numbers over 30 million.

SPORTS

Big Gains in 1980

In their effort to attain world standards, Chinese athletes made notable progress at international tournaments last year.

Apart from equalling world records in three events, they broke seven world records and a number of Asian ones and set many new Chinese national marks.

China's table tennis players won men's and women's team and women's singles championships in 13 international tournaments.

As for the gymnastic, diving, volleyball teams, they distinguished themselves by their world-level skills. The men's gymnastic team for the first time defeated Japan, a gold medal winner in the team event at the international championships and Olympic Games. Two Chinese from northeast China took first place in the parallel bars and hand rings respectively at the World Cup Competition in Canada. Another man gymnast tallied three full scores in the horizontal bar at two international tournaments, one held in Beijing and the other in Tokyo.

Up against strong opposition like the United States, West Germany and Canada, China's diving team also did well, as was the case in the Matini Games in London.

The men's volleyball team won all its 22 games while in Japan and Latin America. The women's team won seven and lost one against the U.S. team of which the world's No.1 spiker, Hayman, is a member, and won five to zero against Japan which placed first at many international competitions.



Chinese gymnast Li Cuiling, winner of the women's all-round championship at the Hartford world gymnastic invitational tournament in the United States.

In their debut at an international competition, Chinese athletes placed third in 11 events at the Fourth Session of the Acrobatic-Gymnastic Championships. And 19-year-old Liu Shilan won the title of international master at the invitational tournament of women's chess in Yugoslavia.

At the Guangzhou competition in which three countries took part in November, four

Chinese parachutists broke a world record by accomplishing 16 figures in one jumping.

There also were other events in which Chinese broke world or Asian records such as in weight-lifting, shooting and model airplanes.

In addition, there was improvement in track and field and swimming which had not progressed during the past decade.

SCUBA DIVING

Chinese Set Underwater Record

Eleven Chinese scuba divers set a new world record in depth diving last October when they worked underwater for eight days and seven nights around a support submarine moored 205 metres beneath the surface of the Mediterranean Sea.

The Chinese divers were part of a group undergoing scuba training in Villefranche-sur-Mer, France, under an agreement signed by the two countries. The training was primarily in underwater exploration and scientific research. The Chinese were praised by the French for their bravery, and each received a graduation certificate from the National Diving School of France after completing the one-month training course.



Research on Philosophy

History of Chinese Philosophy
(in two volumes)

《中国哲学史》

Edited by teaching and research section of history of Chinese philosophy of the philosophy department, Beijing University,

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*Renminbi 1.50 yuan (Volume I),
1.60 yuan (Volume II).*

The 600,000-word *History of Chinese Philosophy* published in 1980 systematically deals with the history of the development of philosophical ideas in China from ancient times to the eve of the 1919 May 4th Movement. In chronological order, the book is divided into five parts: 1. From ancient times to the Spring and Autumn Period (770-476 B.C.), 2. Warring States Period (475-221 B.C.), 3. From the Western and Eastern Han Dynasties (206 B.C.-220 A.D.) to the Sui and Tang Dynasties (581-907), 4. From the Song (960-1279) to Qing Dynasties (1644-1911) and 5. From the Opium War (1840) to just before the May 4th Movement (1919). The authors also devote special chapters to analysing and commenting on the major philosophers and philosophical trends. They give the historical background of the emergence of different philosophical ideas and their relations with the class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment and inventions at the time. They

explain how one school of philosophy criticized and accepted the others. By overcoming the tendency of studying problems in an isolated and static way as certain works have done, this has brought out a better interpretation of the history of philosophy.

The book contains new achievements in archaeological excavations as well as new progress in the study of the



history of philosophy. It holds, for instance, that the order of the 64 divinatory symbols in the current version of *The Book of Changes* was not the same as in the original book written in the Western Zhou Dynasty, but was later rearranged. This view was based on *The Book of Changes*, copied on silk and excavated from a Han tomb in Mawangdui in Hunan Province's Changsha in 1973, which is different from the current version in the order of the symbols. This rectifies the previous erroneous stand of some researchers on this question.

As to those controversial academic questions, the authors positively and thoroughly expound their own views without refuting other ideas.

Historical records are quoted to explain all the problems dealt with. Supported by

the quotes which are concise and to the point, the analyses and comments the authors make are realistic and well-founded.

The *History* explains the evolution and development of some basic concepts in the history of Chinese philosophy and makes necessary analyses. For example, Laozi interpreted *dao* as a mysterious essence, but in the four philosophical works of *Guanzi*, *dao* is matter, or the finest matter. Here the *History* explains the difference between the two *daos* in a specific and profound way.

While commenting on every major philosopher, the authors introduce his life and major works, and the sources of quotes are listed so that readers can refer to the original works when necessary. As to those passages difficult to comprehend, the authors interpret or summarize them in modern Chinese.

In short, this is a new, concise and popular book on the history of Chinese philosophy which explains the profound in simple terms. It is a good reference book for students of philosophy as well as a guide for self-study. It took a fairly long time to print this book. The manuscript was finished at the end of 1978, when the democratic atmosphere in academic circles was not as lively as it is today. Therefore, the authors appraised some philosophers more negatively than they should and there is room for improvement in the analyses. Moreover, new progress in academic research in the past two years could not be included in this book. Such shortcomings will be amended in future editions.

— Xiong Guozhen

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