



AFRICAN PARTY FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF GUINEA AND CAPE VERDE

PORTUGUESE AGGRESSION

against

**THE SPECIAL MISSION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS**

By P. A. I. G. C. Secretary - General

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I - FORWARD

Following UN General Assembly Resolution 2795 (XXIV) and at the official invitation of our Party, the Special Committee for Decolonisation (also called the Committee of 24), decided to send a Special Mission to the liberated regions of our country.

The members of the Special Mission were:

- Ambassador Horacio Sevilla-Borja, representative (councillor) of Equador at the United Nations, head of the Special Mission (chairman).
- Mr. Folke Lofgren, representative (councillor) of Sweden at the United Nations.
- Mr. Belkhiria Kamef, representative (councillor) of Tunisia at the United Nations.

They were accompanied by two officers of the UN General Secretariat, Mr. Cheikh Gaye, (Senegal), and Mr. Yutaka Nagata, a Japanese photographer.

As everybody knows, it was not possible to keep this mission secret within the UN, because of the war situation in our country, and due to the criminal nature of the colonialists. Indeed the Portuguese immediately launched a vast diplomatic campaign to kill the initiative from the start, with certain powers exerting pressure on the Decolonisation Committee. At the same time, the Government mobilised the Portuguese media, their representatives, spokesmen and writers, to start a major campaign of intimidation and threats against the Special Mission, and to discredit the Committee of 24 and the UN itself.

In a letter to the UN Secretary General dated March 25th 1972, circulated as an official document of the UN, no. A/AC. 109/398 of March 28th 1972, M. Antonio Patricio, permanent representative of Portugal, made a 'strong protest against this proposed violation of Portugal's sovereignty and the most elementary principles regulating relations among nations.....' He then threatened, echoed later by Portuguese media and by several Portuguese Government spokesmen: 'Moreover, an initiative of this nature (the Special Mission) can have consequences for which the Portuguese Government must decline any responsibility. Those who have agreed to participate in illegal activities must take responsibility for the outcome of these acts.' And so as not to leave any doubts, Portugal's representative 'draws the attention' of the Secretary General 'to the grave nature of the decision taken by the Special Committee of 24...'

For anyone familiar with the UN diplomatic language, the threat implied in the rhetoric of the Portuguese representative was very clear; the members of the Special Mission were running the risk of possible (even certain) physical liquidation if they dared to cross the borders of our country.

Less diplomatic than the UN language was the editorial in the official daily Portuguese paper, 'Diario de Noticias', of March 24 1972. After vilifying the Decolonisation Committee and the UN, which they consider capable of the worst lies, the editorial describes as a dream, an event cherished by all Portuguese colonialists; 'let us imagine that the three diplomats (of the Special Mission) suddenly find themselves in the middle of an exchange of fire between their terrorist escort and one of the Portuguese patrols which are constantly on the move around all the border areas. What a responsibility for the Secretary General of the United Nations, and what a responsibility for the Government of Ecuador if the eminent Sevilla-Borja were to be hit in an anonymous corner of the African jungle....'

Their diplomatic operation was a resounding failure - the colonialists did not succeed at all in their campaign of intimidation. Faced with the courage of the members of the Mission and the firm determination of our Party to proceed with the visit that we had promised, the Portuguese Government took the serious and criminal decision to make the UN Special Mission visit a failure by resorting to every possible means at their disposal, including the physical elimination of the members of the Mission.

These events even though outlined rather briefly show that for the first time, the colonialists have lived up to their own words. The barbaric aggression launched against the southern liberated areas, between March 18th and April 9th, was a desperate attempt by the Government of Lisbon to try and physically eliminate the members of the UN.

The Portuguese colonialists set loose all their technical and human resources to achieve their goal. Desperate, they had forgotten that living reality of our country; the existence of people in the liberated areas, proud of its sovereignty, with fighters who are aware of their rights and their role in history at the head.

II - AGGRESSION AGAINST THE SPECIAL MISSION

1. Number of men deployed

Members of the Special Mission left New York on March 28th, without disclosing their destination. But the colonialists did not need that additional information. In any case, the Decolonisation Committee had previously revealed their schedule in Africa, in which the first leg of their visit was to Conakry. Therefore, it was not too difficult to guess that their first country to be visited would be ours.

The day after the Mission left for Africa, the Portuguese Chief of Staff declared a state of alert for the 45,000 colonial troops in our country, 15,000 of which are stationed in the South, mainly in the towns of Bolama (former capital), and Catio, in the important garrisons of Tite (Command Head-quarters for the South), Buba, Kebo (near the border with the Republic of Guinea), Empada and in other military camps (Guiledje, Fulacunda, Bedanda, Cacine). Ten thousand special troops were transported in a few days from Bissau to the southern areas as reinforcements. If one adds in the airforce and the naval power in operation during the aggression the total number of troops deployed was around 30,000 men.

If it is true that only a part of these troops could operate during this aggression, nonetheless they were all ready to intervene whenever necessary, to capture or eliminate members of the Special Mission. In fact the majority of these troops must have had to act since, faced with stiff resistance by our fighters and the population, the units of the colonial army and the special troops were frequently forced to relieve each other during the operations.

One may wonder why the Portuguese, having at their disposal such powerful resources, did not opt for a general 'scraping' offensive using thousands of men in a single operation. They already have

experience enough - and bitter experience - which has taught them not to embark on such operations. It was in the South, in 1964, the year after the beginning of the colonial war and of our liberation struggle, that the Portuguese colonialists suffered one of their worst defeats. They deployed about 3,000 men to recapture the island of Komo - the first liberated area in the South of our country. We fought for seventy-five days and inflicted on the enemy about 900 casualties, finally expelling the invaders from the islands. Recently (December 1971) during an operation called 'Solitary Sapphire', against the liberated zone of Mores (in the North-Central area of the country, the colonial troops suffered a crushing defeat. In this operation 102 enemy troops were killed and a large number wounded; the Portuguese commanding heading the operation found it honourable to commit suicide.

2. War materials used

The colonialist army used mainly airplanes, helicopters and boats in their aggression. If members of the UN Mission had been chosen outside the Decolonisation Committee, there could well have been a representative of the US or Great Britain or France among them. It would then have been a tragic irony, for this representative to risk being killed on our African soil, by the very same war materials that his country gives to Portugal either under NATO or bilaterally. However it was others who, like us, were taking this chance.

Airplanes - Cessna T-37 C; North American Harvard T-6; Nord-Atlas 2502; Fiat G-91 Nato Type R-4; Sabre F-86-F and Sabre F-86-K (RFA); Lockheed P-2V Neptune (for night bombings).

Helicopters - Alouettes 2 and 3; Saro Skeeter and others.

Boats - Frigates, patrol-boats and corvettes (type 'Joao Coutinho') of French and West German origin, as well as high-speed boats adapted for river operation.

Other war materials utilised - with the exception of armoured cars, tanks and other heavy vehicles which they can no longer use in the southern areas of our country, the Portuguese army resorted to every available weapon in their arsenal, to thwart the UN Mission. It is worth noting here the continual use of 130 mm. canon, against the liberated areas and the routes that could be used in the UN Mission.

3 - Regions and zones that were subject to terrorist aggression

It was particularly the border region of Balana-Kitafine that suffered most. But, from April 2nd the aggression was extended to the Catio region in the zones of Cubucare and Tombali. In effect, unable to control the corridor of Guiledje, which they believed to be the approach route to the south of the country, they suspected (or knew) that the members of the Special Mission would be taken up to Catio region. For this reason, while still maintaining continual assaults and bombardments on Balana, they launched attacks against the zones of Cubucare and Tombali.

It was in fact precisely these zones of Balana (Balana-Kitafine) and Cubucare (Catio region) that were visited by the Special Mission during its week-long stay in the liberated areas of the south.

It should be pointed out that the first acts of aggression were directed against the zone of Kitafine (South-Western part of the country), which dozens of people of different nationalities have already visited and written about.

4 - Characteristics of the aggression

The aggression^{was}/characterised chiefly by aerial bombings (night and day) of napalm and fragmentation bombs; terrorist assaults with helicopter troops; landing of special troops along the rivers; steady bombardment of the liberated areas and routes that could possibly

be used by the UN Special Mission.

The Portuguese Air Force attacked the most populated villages, and bombed indiscriminately the bush and forest zones suspected of sheltering the population or providing a support base for the UN Mission. The landing of helicopter-troops or river boats was aimed at the destruction of villages and crops as well as the occupation of certain positions important for control of approach routes and bar the way to the UN Mission and eventually to capture or kill its members.

Canon fire from Portuguese garrisons in Catio, Bedanda, Guiledje, Kebo and Gadamaal were aimed at creating insecurity everywhere, especially along the border areas and along the routes, which would possibly be followed by the UN Special Mission, as well as in the bush and forest areas.

Members of the UN Special Mission were able to come into direct contact with these varied aspects of Portuguese terrorist aggression. In fact they witnessed bombings for several days, photographed villages that had just been bombed and also bombs which had just fallen but not exploded; they saw groups of helicopters heading towards landing points for assaults, they visited villages and saw charred remains of crops just burnt by special helicopter-troops. On the return journey they were forced to take cover against canon fire to which they were by then accustomed.

The objectives of the aggression were:

- a) to terrorize the population so that they would refuse to collaborate with the UN Special Mission;
- b) to intimidate the members of the Special Mission so that they would cut short their work programme;
- c) to destroy as far as possible the social and cultural achievements of our Party in the areas near the border (mainly hospitals, clinics

and schools), so that the Special Mission could not confirm their existence.

d) to lure our fighters to a classical attack whereby the colonialists could use the tens of thousands of men stationed in the south and all the available weapons. That would have enabled them to destroy a large part of our armed forces and capture or kill members of the UN Special Mission.

The active participation of the population (men, women and young people) in the work of the Special Mission meetings, enquiries, conversations, public meetings etc. were the best evidence of what one of the people said during a meeting in Cubucare sector: 'Whatever the means and the crimes perpetrated by the Portuguese colonialists, and despite all the sacrifices that we have to bear, we would like to declare that we feel happy and proud at the presence of your Mission. No power in the world is able to break our determination to liberate our country from the heinous Portuguese colonialist domination.' (Excerpts and literal translation from a taperecording made during a meeting on April 5th, 1972).

Portuguese terrorist actions did not intimidate the members of the UN Special Mission, who were able to overcome all the difficulties. On the contrary, Portuguese aggression showed clearer than ever the importance of the Mission and strengthened their decision to continue to the end and complete the historic task entrusted to them by the UN.

The colonialists were able to destroy some villages, schools and hospitals and were able to burn large quantities of crops of two villages. Although they created some insecurity in the border area of Balana, and despite sacrifices we had to bear, the colonialists made a positive contribution to the work of the Mission. Because of intensive bombing and frequent terrorist assaults, we had to prolong their visit and take them further inland, up to the zones of

Cubacare in the region of Catio.

Obviously, we didn't fall into the trap of pitched battle so as to insure the Mission the necessary safety to complete their work. While deploying the bulk of our armed forces on the Balana and Catio fronts to protect the lines of communication and the members of the Mission, we used small groups specially armed local forces, to harass the terrorist aggressors. Other units of our armed forces launched artillery attacks against entrenched Portuguese camps. This tactic, which inflicted important losses on the enemy, made the search for the UN members impossible; like using planes and helicopters to find a needle in a haystack....

We were able to frustrate the essential objectives of the aggression, which were: the control of the lines of communication between the border and the liberated areas (military plan); demoralisation of the population (moral and political plan). The success of the work of the Special Mission was therefore guaranteed. Certainly the enemy was able to inflict on us some loss of human life, principally among civilian population, and able to destroy some of our social and cultural achievements. But at the same time the colonialists gave the UN Special Mission the most convincing proof of this new reality in our country: the fascist Portuguese colonialists are today nothing but terrorist aggressors against a free and sovereign people who have decided to put an end once and for all to foreign domination on the soil of the motherland.

5 - The action of the aggressors

The terrorist act launched by the colonialists in the southern liberated area against the UN Special Mission was the largest and most intensive military operation ever undertaken by the enemy during its colonial war against our people. This fact shows clearly the importance that the Lisbon Government and the Portuguese staff attach to the UN Special Mission.

For 22 days (from March 18th to April 9th) the colonial army resorted to all means at its disposal in the South, to stop the Special Mission from entering our country on its fact-finding mission as directed by the United Nations General Assembly. The aggression which was intensified from March 28th onwards (after the Special Mission's departure from New York) was, with the exception of the battle of Komo which lasted 75 days, the longest continual confrontation between the colonial forces and our people's armed forces.

Air raids reached an unprecedented level, taking place day and night. We must point out that it was the first time for a year that the enemy resumed night bombings with P-2V bombers and even jet planes. Napalm was used widely. Daily air raids averaged about 15, with a maximum of 23 and a minimum of 5 (in the first days). Air operations were concentrated mainly on the villages, but random bombing of bush underbrush, forests and river ports were daily and frequent machine-gunning of houses and everything that moved was fierce.

During the aggression the enemy carried out 18 landings of helicopter troops. These were aimed at terrorising the population, destroying social and cultural achievements (in particular schools and hospitals), burning the harvest, placing anti-personnel mines on roads and paths, and occupying key positions on the roadways and waterways. The number of helicopters used, both overall and in each single operation, was larger than ever before. Sometimes 14 helicopters were used in a single operation, making several sorties between the landing points and the Portuguese camps (Catio, Bolama, Kebo, etc.). In some instances the enemy was able to remain on the ground for a few days without being discovered by our forces, (specially in Unal, Botche-Bunhe, and on the right bank of the river Balana near the villages of Nhacoba and Ntuane). But in general the enemy was forced back to their helicopters by our troops who harrassed them and caused serious losses.

There were six troop landings from boats in the area of Tombali and Cubacare, but after suffering losses the enemy were forced back to their boats by our forces. Steady firing of canons (day and night) from every enemy camp still remaining in the zones under attack were aimed at blocking the route of the Special Mission, and to make as much noise as possible to cover the flight of helicopters to assault points. Thousands of shells were also fired on the territory of the Republic of Guinea near the border. Because of the safety measures that we had taken, this enemy shelling was shown, in the words of the Chairman of the Special Mission, to be 'ineffectual, ineffective'.

The enemy placed hundreds of anti-personnel mines on certain roads and paths in the bush, which they considered would at some time be used by the Special Mission. Two of our scouts, from the unit that was protecting the Mission, were killed by these mines.

6 - Chronological account of the aggression

March 18 - Intensive bombardment of the zones of Balana and Kitafine. In the latter damage was not very great, with bombs landing mostly in bushes supposedly sheltering our fighters. In the zone of Balane, the village of Farabate was severely damaged. While the village was under intensive bombardment, helicopter-troops landed in the zone, trying to advance towards a clinic nearby, with the clear aim of destroying it. Located by the fighters of our local armed forces, the enemy hastily reboarded the helicopters, avoiding a confrontation.

March 19, 20, 21, and 22 - Reconnaissance aircraft frequently circled above Balana, Kitafine and Cubacare. The first two zones were bombed from 9 am until 2 pm.

Extensive machine-gunning by planes of bushes and forests.

March 23- Generalised bombing of the zones of Balana (near the border) and Kitafine. The village of Fabarate was again bombed, as well as the nearby bushes, where the enemy thought that the clinic, which it had been unable to destroy during the assault on March 18, was located.

March 24- Generalized bombing of the zone of Balane; the village of Fabarate was once again the main target. Intensive bombing of the village of Unal and the neighbouring zones. Machine-gunning of the village by planes and helicopters.

March 25- Intensive bombing of the border areas. Planes dropped their bombs and machine-gunned along the banks of the river Balane, aiming mostly at ports.

A group of 4 Fiats dived over the village of Ndialial and the surrounding areas, bombing and machine-gunning. They had discovered signs of human life: the air attack killed 18 and wounded 23. Among the dead were 3 children and 8 women (among them a young nurse, Mariama Sanha). Among the wounded, 10 were seriously hurt, including a 13 month old baby, son of the nurse who was killed and of Mamadu Cassama, head of educational affairs for the zone of Tombali. Members of the Committee of 24 were later able to see the seriously wounded in our 'Solidarity' hospital.

On the same day (March 25) several other raids were carried out against the village of Unal and the surrounding areas.

March 26- Intensive bombing of the border area, with cannon fire on the Balana river. The enemy tried to land helicopter-troops near Balane, but were turned back. A woman was killed by shrapnel.

The enemy landed helicopter-troops near Campeane, in the area of Kitafine, destroying a hospital and a boarding school. Anticipating the aggression, the buildings had been evacuated earlier. The enemy was thus unable to inflict any loss of life.

March 27 - Frequent raids, lasting the whole day, against border areas (air raids and cannon fire) particularly against villages in the area of Unal.

March 28 - From dawn onwards, steady and intensive bombing of Unal and surrounding areas, followed by intensive cannon fire from the entrenched camps of Bedanda and Buba. At about 9 am the enemy made several landings of helicopter-troops at Unal; 14 helicopters were used for the first landing. Planes bombed the area continuously. During the bombing we lost one fighter and three others were wounded.

N.B. Unal, in the liberated region of Balana-Kitafine, is the key to the South, giving access to all the liberated regions (Catio, Kinara, Cubisseco). The enemy were determined to occupy it, to frustrate the work of the Special Mission. Because of its importance, the enemy hoped to draw us into a fierce battle in this zone. They waited three days in the open before being harrassed by our fighters. It will be recalled that March 28 was the day that the Special Mission left New York.

March 29 - Intensive bombing of the border areas throughout the day. The villages of Botche Djati, Botche Sansa, Botche Bedau and Fabarate were the main targets.

A few days later, on the night of April 3rd to 4th, the members of the Special Mission were able to see the damage to the village of Botche Djati, when they passed through it.

On the same day, March 29th, the enemy tried several helicopter and boat landings in the area of Tombali and Cubucare. Faced with fierce resistance from our fighters they had to turn back.

The bombing killed one man and wounded three others.

March 30 - Intensive, meticulous bombing against border areas, specially around Balana. Uninterrupted shelling of the borders and the banks of the Balana river.

Reconnaissance planes and groups of helicopters circled the sky. Nord-Atlas planes made several trips between Bissau and entrenched camps on the border (Bedanda, Kebo, mainly).

March 31 - Bombing, strafing and shelling beginning at dawn. At about 11 am the enemy landed helicopter-troops near the village of Botche-NBunhe, previously bombed on 29 and 30 March. The landing was covered by an intensive artillery barrage fired from Bedanda and Guiledje, followed by more protective bombing from squadrons of Fiat G-91 jets. An old man was captured and tortured: he was meant to tell his captors where "DONKA" hospital was located (the name is after a hospital in the Republic of Guinea). Before the arrival of our forces, the enemy was landed by helicopter in the bush near the hospital. For security reasons the hospital had been evacuated earlier. Enemy troops systematically destroyed everything in sight at the hospital, but did not burn the huts so as not to indicate their presence. The enemy spent

the rest of the night in the zone.

Other landing attempts were later repulsed. It was on this date that the members of the Special Mission arrived in Conakry.

April 1 - Intensive and large scale bombing continued. Our fighters located enemy troops that had landed the previous day in the region of Botche NBunhe. An ambush was immediately arranged, and the enemy took up a defensive position. After suffering heavy losses from constant harassment, they were forced to leave the area by helicopter. This was the failure of the enemy plans to control the area and prevent the Special Mission from reaching the more distant regions: Cubucare, Tombali and Como (region of Catio) and Cubisseco.

Later, the Special Mission was able to visit and photograph houses destroyed during the bombing of Botche NBunhe.

In the afternoon, the areas of Balana and Cubucare were heavily bombed.

April 2 - Bombing continued throughout the day. Airborne troops tried again to land in Cubucare and Tombali but were repulsed. But they succeeded in landing near the village of Tchintchidari, which had previously been heavily bombed.

More helicopter landings were made on the Balana-Unal axis, where the enemy laid anti-personnel mines. Two scouts were killed by these mines, and two others wounded. They were from the advance party of the column marching with the Special Mission towards Balana. That evening the two

wounded scouts were seen by the members of the Special Mission, who had just entered our country. To allay any anxiety arising from the news that mines had been placed on the road they were to follow, they were told that the scouts had been wounded during a "bombing raid".

Harassed by our forces the enemy troops which had landed in Tchintchidari had to retreat with losses.

In the area of Cubucare, the villages of Catchamba and N'Tchangue were heavily bombed and then burned down by helicopter-troops, who also destroyed the crops. One person was killed by napalm and another seriously burned.

April 3 - The members of the Special Mission met some of the leaders from the Southern Front. They rested.

Intensive bombing of the area of Balana and Cubucare. The village of Botche NBunhe was again the main target of the Portuguese planes, an indication that enemy troops were again trying to make a landing. At about 2 pm helicopter-troops landed in the zone, about 2 km. from the base being visited by the Special Mission. In order not to put them at risk we avoided any engagement with the troops, but directed our fighters to follow their movements.

After burning the houses and some of the crops in Botche NBunhe (the population had already been evacuated to a safer place) the enemy camped in the area to prevent the Special Mission from moving towards the region of Catio. They stayed until 6 am when, harassed from several sides, they were forced to leave carrying their dead and wounded. (Later, the members of the Special Mission were able to see and photograph destroyed houses and burned crops, as well

as people who had lost both).

That night the decision was made to take the members of the Special Mission to the zone of Cubucare in the area of Catio where, despite the continued bombing, they would be able to do their work in better conditions.

The same evening the BBC in London announced that the Special Mission was in our country.

April 4 - The bombings continued and some attempts were made at landing on the left bank of Balana river. The planes were now concentrating on the Cubucare area. Intensive artillery was maintained in the area.

The Special Mission continued its work.

April 5 - After heavy bombing, helicopter-troops were launched against the village of Ien Kuntoi, from the Bedanda side. The village, which was totally destroyed, had been visited that morning by the Special Mission, which had been warmly greeted by the local people.

There were bombing, strafing and new landing attempts in Balana.

The Special Mission continued its work (meetings, enquiries, taking testimonies, watching social and cultural activities).

April 6 - Less intensive bombing. Enemy troops, harassed and suffering heavy casualties, withdrew from the zone of Botche NBunhe.

The enemy began to bomb the zone of Tombali.

That night the Mission, which had ended its work in the area of Cubucare, began the journey towards Balana.

April 7 - Sporadic bombing and strafing in the Cubucare area, but more intensive on the banks of Balana river. The enemy seemed to have lost all hope of capturing or killing the members of the Special Mission during their visit, but were now trying to do it during their return journey.

In fact, helicopter-troops landed near the villages of Nhacoba and Ntuane, on the right bank of Balana river. Their intention was to attack any small boats on the river during the night. They were sure that, being tired, the members of the Special Mission would be travelling by canoe. They waited there for two nights, after which they were expelled by our forces with heavy losses.

That evening, having finished their work and carried out their programme, the Special Mission started its journey back towards the border. For many hours on the way they could hear the explosion of shells fired by the enemy from the camp of Guiledje.

April 8 - Towards 8.30 am the members of the Special Mission crossed the border. Under the constant protection of our armed forces and accompanied by leaders of the Party they had spent one week in our country.

Enemy forces continued to bomb the region of Balana, Cubucare and Tombali, but only sporadically.

That evening, Radio Conakry broadcast to the world the return to the Republic of Guinea of the Special Mission,

after successfully accomplishing the task entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly.

April 9 - Two enemy air raids in the morning, in the area of Balana. In the afternoon a message from the Southern Front reached the General Secretariat of the Party: "Situation returned to normal".

We should point out that during the period of aggression, besides other operations carried out against enemy troops our armed forces made 28 attacks against entrenched camps, while engaged in many other activities on the various fronts.

From the above it is clear that the enemy resorted largely to its air superiority to plan and execute its aggression against the United Nations Special Mission, knowing that our anti-aircraft defence is still rudimentary. On the ground, however, it faced tremendous difficulties: it was therefore not able to implement its plan of using helicopter-troops to prevent the successful conclusion of the work of the Special Mission. Once again, facts have shown that the people of the liberated areas are right when they sing:

" The guerrilla rules the land
The little Portuguese... in the clouds !"

III - A VICTORY FOR HUMANITY

The Lisbon Government and the Portuguese General Staff, were certain that their colonial troops would be able to capture or kill the members of the United Nations Special Mission during the visit. But the Portuguese authorities know better than anyone else that we have liberated most of our national territory, and that we are able to take there any guest we invite. They resorted to every available means to eliminate the UN Mission, and the extent of their defeat can be measured by these means and the criminality of their intentions.

In inviting the UN to send a Special Mission to our country, our objective was not to prove the fact that is well-known all over the world: the sovereignty of our people over vast areas of our country. We made a deliberate challenge to the colonialists, while erecting a still more concrete basis for the development of UN action against Portuguese colonialism. We have also inflicted the bitterest politico-military defeat of their colonial war on the Lisbon government. We have succeeded in showing UN representatives the abominable crimes perpetrated by the colonialists against our people.

Sure of the failure of the UN Special Mission, the Portuguese Overseas Minister arrived in Bissau in April and the purpose of his visit was to receive personally, in the capital of "the province of Guine, with all their due honours", as the Portuguese official paper 'Diario de Noticias' suggested, "the illustrious UN delegates who have come illegally to Portugal"... or their corpses. Unable to do this, the Minister was compelled to inaugurate three sections of a tarred road in enemy-controlled areas, and a broadcasting station which had been in operation since January.

The head of the Portuguese government, Mr Marcello Caetano, on the other hand, did not succeed in hiding his hatred of the UN and of the Special Mission. On April 11 (three days after the success of the UN mission was known all over the world), he made a speech and, speaking about the trip that the President of the Portuguese Republic had made to Brazil he declared:

"... If the UN had existed in 1822 what would have become of Brazil? How ridiculous to count the number of Indians, negroes, and whites; to descriminate by race and colour and to reclaim back America for the Indians! To scheme against a minority government and demand one vote for every people, one vote for each man! If the UN had existed in 1822 and it had become involved in the problem, with all its decolonisation and self-determination prejudices, it would have taken into consideration the first phantom movement and demanded that the Portuguese should leave. A commission of delegates from ignorant nations would make its report, would probably visit the Amazon to find out if the natives agreed or not, and the votes of the savages would prevail over the will of civilized men".(sic) Further, the head of the Portuguese government stated: "There exists in the UN a false conception according to which each continent belongs to the races which are considered as indigenous. This is why the UN tries to enforce the principle that in Africa states should be governed by negroes". And further: "... The case of Rhodesia could be a good example. Despite all the constitutional guarantees given to the black population, the United Nations refuses to accept the independence (of Rhodesia), because the government, as of now, does not serve mainly the coloured people. The whites, according to this conception, do not have any right to orient and lead the people of Southern Africa".

These words from the head of the Portuguese government, revealing all the frustration felt by the government at the success of the

UN mission, do not need further comment. For all that they show the racist character, the intentions and the most secret plans of Portuguese policy in Africa.

On the other hand, on April 20th the commander of the colonial army in our country released a communique stating: "Concerning enemy activity, there is an attempt to create secure conditions for the infiltration into the national territory of a small group of foreigners who form the Special Mission of the Committee of 24... The positions taken up by the enemy for this purpose have been completely destroyed..."

The commander does not even bother to explain how it is possible to conceive and establish safety measures from outside a territory since, according to the Portuguese authorities, our fighters only operate from the outside. The communique however does not deny that a small group of foreigners was able to infiltrate "national territory".

It is the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs who shamelessly denied this truth in a United Nations press release on 11 April 1972. In this communique, the Minister slanders the distinguished representatives of the UN and therefore of the international community, as poor dupes, victims of breach of trust on the part of our fighters, who "made them go walking in the Republic of Guine" for a week, under bombing and plane strafing, facing helicopter-troops and following paths sprinkled with land-mines.

Colonialism is a great evil. But as our people say: "The worst evil is having been colonised by Portugal" whose government can sink to such sordid depths.

The success of the United Nations Special Mission, despite the Portuguese aggression that hoped to destroy it, is certainly a major victory for our African people, under the leadership of our Party in defence of our inalienable rights. In view of the uniquely criminal nature of Portuguese colonialism and its contempt for African dignity and for the human being, this success is above all a victory for Africa and for Humanity.

AHS