

The Danger of Destruction From Within

From a message sent in March 1972 by Amilcar Cabral, the Secretary-General of the PAIGC, to all those holding posts of responsibility in the Party. Translated from French.

Driven to despair in face of the victorious advance of our struggle and the defeats which they suffer everyday in our country as well as on the African and international fronts; convinced of the difficulty if not of the impossibility of buying or of bribing the leaders by means of work *outside of the party*; frightened by the name and prestige which our party is increasingly acquiring in Africa and the rest of the world; realizing that their policy in Guinea will not bring success, since the population of the urban centres is more and more interested in the struggle and in the party – the Portuguese colonial criminals and their representatives in Guinea have decided to establish a new plan in order to attempt to stop our struggle and in order to ensure the continuation of our people's exploitation: *they now wish to destroy our party from within*. They are determined to do everything – to pay whatever price so that they may sow confusion and division within the leadership of the party, in order to weaken the unity of the party, to destroy the party from within.

What is the plan of the Portuguese colonial criminals and of their representatives in our country?

According to the information which I have received from various reliable sources, this is their plan:

1st stage: Profit from the fact that a large number of our compatriots are presently leaving Bissau and other urban centres in order to join the party, by introducing within us some of their reliable African agents, to whom Spínola promises honours and money, were they to succeed in their mission. These agents, who may be either new or old party members, are trained by the PIDE in the techniques of political sabotage, provocation and the instigation of confusion within an organization. *In the first stage these agents must:*

a) pretend that they are good militants, and be devoted to the struggle of our people against the Portuguese colonialists.

b) make a detailed reconnaissance of the life of the party, its problems, and mainly of the weaknesses of our organization, so that they may be fully exploited; inform the colonialists of the situation within the party.

c) detect who are the 'dissatisfied' militants, and principally who are the 'dissatisfied' leaders; establish bonds of friendship and comradeship with such 'dissatisfied' ones, and always support their point of view in what concerns the leadership of the party, particularly the Secretary-General.

d) take advantage of every occasion to sow confusion in the minds of the militants and leaders, to provoke, and remove authority from and disrespect the leadership of the party, in particular the Secretary-General. In order to do so, these agents must always uphold a position as 'defenders' of the militants' rights, incite them into disrespecting the leadership, and create the spirit of indiscipline and division within the Party.

e) sow misunderstanding within the Party, on the basis of racism and, if possible, on the basis of tribalism, even on religious differences, in an attempt to pit the Guineans against the Cape Verdians, the latter against the former, the tribes one against the other, the illiterate against the intellectuals, the Muslims against the non-Muslims and vice-versa – all this in order to destroy the unity of our party and the unity of our people, which are the main

strength of our struggle.

2nd stage: After having created confusion and division within the Party and obtaining the support of the 'malcontents', after being certain that a certain number of militants and leaders would be willing to betray the leadership of the Party, the Secretary-General in particular, these agents would:

a) create an underground network of militants and leaders in every sector of our life and struggle, notably among the armed forces. To do this they would have to contact the leaders the militants, and the fighters who, for whatever reason may be 'dissatisfied' with the leadership of the Party. These contacts would have as their aim sabotaging the action of the real leaders who are loyal to the Party, and subsequently creating confusion and division all over.

b) create a 'leadership' parallel to the real leadership of the Party, composed of one or more agents and several 'dissatisfied' leaders. The agents would do everything in their power in order to make some of the present leaders of the Party participate in this underground sabotage group, in particular those who, on the basis of the errors which they have committed and the criticisms of which they were the object, are not 'happy' with the leadership of the Party, in particular that of the Secretary-General.

c) This underground 'leadership' of sabotage and destruction of the Party would then contact the parties and the governments of the neighbouring countries, notably that of the Republic of Guinea, in order to obtain their support against the real leadership of the Party, particularly against the Secretary-General. They would also, as far as possible, contact some ambassadors of friendly countries, in an attempt to create confusion, to show that there is 'division' within the party and to obtain the support of such countries.

d) At the same time as they are engaged in this work of internal destruction of the party and of its external support, the agents and their accomplices would do everything in their power to provoke and bring into discredit the Secretary-General of the Party, to sabotage his authority and prestige, to prepare the way for the elimination of the Secretary-General from the executive of the party, or even if necessary, his physical destruction. On the other hand, the agents and their colleagues would conduct a major propaganda campaign to popularize among the militants and fighters the names of other leaders (former and current), which they would present as being the sole and true leaders of the party, against the leadership of the Secretary-General.

e) In this second stage, in agreement with prepared plans, the colonialists and their allies will engage in a large campaign at the African and international levels about the 'divisions' within the party in order to discredit the present executive and in particular the Secretary-General. Within the country, the colonial troops, would launch major offensives in order to terrorize and discourage the populations and the combatants.

3rd stage: If the colonialists' agents who penetrated our ranks were not to be discovered and exposed in time, and if they would succeed in accomplishing their mission, above all if they were to obtain the cooperation of

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some of our most important party leaders as well as the support of the neighbouring countries, particularly the Republic of Guinea, then there would begin the third stage during which they would:

a) strike a blow against the present party executive, in order to eliminate the Secretary-General and all the leaders loyal to the line of our party, to the unity and struggle of our people in Guinea and in the Cape Verde Islands against the Portuguese colonialists, for the total independence of our African country. If they are not able to accomplish this, they will try to assassinate the Secretary-General as well as some other leaders.

b) form a new party executive based on racism and on tribalism and religious beliefs if necessary, in order to ensure the division of our people and its demobilization and capitulation to the colonialists. They would change the name of our Party.

c) stop all the activities of the struggle both inside our country and abroad, notably in the Republic of Guinea; take possession of all the goods of the party, with the support of the traitors, in order to paralyse all the activities of the struggle and to prevent resupplying the armed forces; arrest and destroy all members loyal to the party.

d) contact the Portuguese Government, with Spínola as the intermediary, for the purpose of false 'negotiations', with the aim of obtaining the 'internal autonomy' of Guinea (Bissau), for a so-called 'self-determination under the Portuguese flag'. The creation of a puppet 'government' of Guinea, which would from then on be called 'State of Guinea' and which would belong to the 'Portuguese Community'.

e) In line with the promises and plans of Spínola and the Portuguese colonialists, important posts in the political scene and within the armed forces would be assigned to all those agents who would accomplish this mission, as well as to all the leaders of the party who would be their accomplices and who would help carry out the plans. Moreover, they would all be well remunerated for their betrayal of our great party.

may become possible in internal Portuguese politics, particularly in regard to the style of government and repression. In the long run, these changes might become more significant, as a consequence both of the increasing pressure of new phenomena which have taken place and will continue to do so in the life of Portuguese politics, conditioned and traumatized as it is by a colonial war, and of the need for the progressive affirmation of the personality of the new Prime Minister. From this perspective, some claim that Mr. Marcello Caetano, younger than his predecessor, and more sensitive to the historical realities of our times, will be able to understand the irreversible character of our national liberation struggle and the inevitability of our African peoples' access to national independence, the only possible conclusion of the war which Portuguese colonialism has forced upon us.

Last November 27, in the speech read to the Portuguese National Assembly, the new Prime Minister was able to give a peculiar emphasis to the desperate situation of the war in our country. In so doing, he not only gave indirect homage to our people and our party, whose prestige is a reality on an international scale, but he also showed that he had an acute knowledge of reality. The fact that he resorted to Salazar's jargon, to a certain patriotic demagogy as well as to the dramatized evocation of the scarecrow of 'Communist subversion', does not significantly limit the scope of the speech, and could be explained by the imperious necessity of appeasing the *ultras* and of moderating the action of those Portuguese who, from all strata of society, notably from the students and the youth, have dared to manifest their hostility towards the colonial war. Although proclaiming his decision of maintaining our people under the colonial yoke 'at whatever price', the leader of the Portuguese Government is well aware of the fact that, besides the enormous and irremediable losses in Portuguese lives and supplies, at the worst our people may sweep from the soil of our country any kind of Portuguese presence, too stained by the crimes of the colonial war and the attempts at genocide of our populations. It would be better to be realistic, to face up to the *vultures* of the colonial war courageously, and to obey the demands of history: to negotiate with our party for the accession to independence of our people, who are already in control of over two-thirds of the national territory, and thus preserve the possibility of useful cooperation between our countries.

The Methods of the Portuguese

Iko Carreira

*Response of Iko Carreira of the MPLA to interview questions of Aquino de Braganca, published in AfricAsia, 25 April 1971.
Translated from French.*

Braganca: What did the Portuguese do to try to recuperate the lost territory?