

"The idea becomes power when it penetrates the masses."
—Karl Marx.

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The Report of the Party's Executive

Alexander Bittelman reported to the convention of the Workers (Communist) Party for the Central Executive Committee as follows:

PERMIT me to preface my report with a few remarks as to how the report of the Central Executive Committee should be approached and how it should be considered. We have heard a good deal during recent months about Marxism and Marxian methods and I think that the convention here should approach the report of the Central Executive Committee from the point of view of Marxians and not in the manner in which the C. E. C. has been dealt with so far by some comrades in our party. What I mean by this is that the final result of the sum total of activities of our committee should be judged and analyzed on the basis not only of the policies of the committee but also on the conditions, of the objective conditions in which the party had to carry on its work. It is very important before we proceed any further to keep clearly in mind the following facts: That the objective conditions in the United States during the last 20 months were extremely unfavorable for the quick growth of our party. It is sufficient for me to mention only a few of the more important facts. One of the most outstanding is the fact that American capitalism succeeded in stabilizing itself to a certain extent, to liquidate, truly, at the expense of the masses, but to liquidate the very severe agrarian crisis and also to stabilize partially the industrial situation. This, comrades, is the basic fact. During the 20 months in which the present C. E. C. was in office, there were no severe crises, no severe disturbances and no big mass struggles of the American working class. It is this background that must be kept in mind continually when we analyze our activities during these 20 months.

A SECOND fact, of secondary importance, is the depressed mood of the American workers. Now this is a factor which nobody can overlook and surely not a Communist Party. Communist policies, or in the formulation of Communist policies, the mood of the working masses, their readiness to fight and struggle is a basic factor and when you realize and when you understand, comrades, that during these 20 months the general characteristic of the mood of the American masses was one of depression, was one of unwillingness and unreadiness to offer real resistance to the attacks of the capitalists, you will understand that this second factor considerably influenced the progress, the development of our own activities. The third factor, is the sweep and then the going down of the LaFollette movement. In my report I will go into detail and will analyze what this movement meant as far as our party was concerned. But it is without doubt that this sweep of LaFollette movement and its comparative defeat in the presidential elections, seriously hampered the progress also of the Communist movement of the country. Then the very severe attacks and persecutions against our party and our comrades in other labor organizations.

These four outstanding objective facts in the situation created an extremely unfavorable condition for the development and quick growth of the party. Having this in mind and if you add to this a continual internal fight that lasted nearly 20 months, you will understand with what conditions and difficulties our party and central executive committee had to contend with during these 20 months.

FOR the purpose of my report, comrades, I am going to divide my re-

port into a number of sections. I will divide the period of these 20 months into several sub-periods. The division is not going to be arbitrary because it so happens that during these 20 months we have been passing thru four quite distinct periods. The first period. It lasted from about January, 1924 to May, 1924. That was the period when our party was laying the basis and preparing itself for the June 17, convention, for the St. Paul convention. Now that was the main strategy of our party during those months between January and May, 1924? The main strategy was to bring about a united front of labor and the poor farmers in the presidential elections of 1924. The main objective that our party pursued during that period was to bring about if possible the formation of farmer-labor unity. If impossible, at least united political action in the presidential campaign, to unite as large a number of workers and poor farmers as could be organized on a certain program or partial demands. This was our basic strategy and undoubtedly,

tain crisis, a crisis which resulted primarily because of our break of the split which occurred on July 3, because of the failure of the Federated farmer labor party and because of the growing power and influence in those months of the LaFollette movement. When the present Central Executive Committee got into office it realized that it is dealing with a very difficult situation. We found ourselves isolated to a very large extent in the industrial centers of the country. We found that in practically none of the important industrial sections of the country was there in existence a farmer labor movement of any importance at all for us to ally ourselves with and to continue our strategy for a farmer labor party. The only places in the country where there were any organized groups of any substance at all that our party could ally itself with and continue its policy for the farmer labor party were to be found in the agrarian north west and comrades, it is not the present Central Executive Committee that switched itself to the northwestern


main objective of the party which was to bring about a united front in the presidential elections was compelled to refuse to continue along these lines which resulted in the June 17 convention in St. Paul.

Now comrades, it is very important for the party to know that during the months of January to May, 1924, when our party was preparing and building the June 17 convention, there were very serious difficulties of opinion within the Central Executive Committee on the methods and tactics to be pursued in preparing the June 17 convention.

Those of you who think that the Central Executive Committee in those months was united on this question will be greatly surprised to learn that the meetings of the C. E. C. in those months were far from being peaceful on the question of how shall we prepare for this convention. The basic tactical principle that the majority of the Central Executive Committee was insisting upon during those months was that we do not repeat again the mistake of July 3; that we do not go to the St. Paul convention with the same tactics that we brought with us in the convention of July 3; that we take all necessary measures to prevent splits on issues and bases as compelled them in July 3.

THE first question as I remember, a question of importance, that arose in connection with the June 17 convention, was its date. There was very serious disagreement because our party, the Workers Party, and our allies of the farmer labor parties in the northwest, particularly the leaders of the Minnesota farmer labor party. Differences of opinion on policy and tactics and objective. And at one period in the development of our work, the question arose as to postponing the convention until after the July 4 convention of the C. P. P. A. Our opponents, the so-called progressives in the farmer labor movement, were very much determined to make this convention postponed and the question was, can our party compromise on this point? So our party made efforts to come to an agreement with these so-called progressives. Another question that created in the Central Executive Committee very heated and serious debate was under what conditions our party would demand the immediate formation of a farmer labor party. And again we saw in the Central Executive Committee two main tendencies. One was that the main task of the Workers Party in the labor party policy is to create a farmer labor party and to seize leadership, irrespective of whether the party created is a mass party with mass support or is only our own party and a little group of sympathizing organizations. The other tendency in it was that in our labor party policy our main objective is to get a mass party. And there is no use to be impatient about it. A labor party which does not bring us into contact with large masses, does not really satisfy our main objective in the policy. It is true and it must be said now, that while we were fighting in the Central Executive Committee between January and May, 1924, on these questions, some comrades of the minority one or two, Comrade Ruthenberg, one of them were at times taking the position of the majority, agreeing with them on the tactics to be pursued in connection with the convention. But this, comrades, is not an important thing, or at least not the most important. The most important thing is that during these months the struggle between the majority and minority was along this central line, i. e. what kind of labor party we are going to fight for. This was the main substance of every political discus-

THE WRITING ON THE WALL



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correct strategy in every respect. The second question is how successful were we in that strategy and what means did we employ to achieve our objective. This main objective of our party was defeated.

OUR party did not succeed in bringing about such a united front in the presidential elections. We failed in spite of the fact that we were successful in bringing about quite a well attended convention in St. Paul.

It is very important for us to understand why our party failed in realizing this objective. Last night in our debate on the labor party controversy the question of our northwest orientation was brought in. This is also an important fact in the discussion of our report. When the present Central Executive Committee came into office, what did it find? It found that the labor party policy of our party was undergoing a cer-

orientation. The present Central Executive Committee, beginning with January first, found this switch already made by the previous Central Executive Committee. It found in other words, two factors—one of objective nature and the other one was a policy that was pursued and laid out by the previous Central Executive Committee. The objective factor was that there was no mass movement in the industrial centers for a farmer labor party. There was no basis for political strategy along the lines of a farmer labor movement in the industrial center, but there was some basis for it in the agrarian north west.

THE second factor was the policy pursued by the previous Central Executive Committee, the policy of orientating itself on the agrarian northwest. The present Central Executive Committee in pursuit of the

sion in the Central Executive Committee.

NOW, as I said before, the main objective of the party in bringing about the united front for presidential campaign was defeated. Why? The answer is very simple. Because the forces that were bringing to the surface the LaFollette movement, the economic and political conditions that made this movement big and influential in those months, were much stronger and much more powerful than the influence that our party could exert. I do not need to go here into detail to explain why those conditions were more powerful than our party. The LaFollette movement as it functioned in those months found great sympathy, had great attractive power precisely among those sections of the workers who were beginning to think politically. Precisely among those sections of workers whom our party was trying to attract and it goes without saying that in those months and even now at the present state of development of capitalism in America, the petty bourgeois, progressive, liberal movement which has the backing of the official labor movement, will be much more successful in winning the masses at the present moment than a Communist Party can be. And so the June 17 convention did not produce what our party was striving for. Thus in May, 1924, our party was confronted with a very serious proposition. But before I come to that I must recall to your attention a very important event that took place in the life of our party in May, 1924, something that must not be overlooked when you are studying the report of the Central Executive Committee. Namely, the decision of the Communist International which nullified our proposition for a third party alliance. This is very important. Why? Because from January until May, until the Communist International decision became known to us our party was basing its policy on the third party alliance. It is true that the last party convention referred the matter to the C. I. but that did not help matters very much from January until May for the reason that the Central Executive Committee and the party as a whole had to function. Political life does not stop for a Communist Party to make up its mind and the Central Executive Committee had to function during those months politically and the only basis on which it could function was on a policy in which it believed in. The Central Executive Committee was nearly unanimous in believing that the policy of the third party alliance was the policy to apply under these conditions. All our tactics all our literature, all of our slogans formulated during the months of January to May were based on this general idea of the third party alliance and then at a certain moment the Communist International said to our party, you cannot do it, and the Central Executive Committee was confronted, comrades, with a very critical situation. I am sure every member of the Central Executive Committee will be able to recall now very vividly the situation we found ourselves in at that particular moment. We were confronted with the necessity of completely reorientating ourselves practically within 24 hours, and comrades, a reorientation which was to take place was in the close study of your library, not in your own room, a reorientation of a political party on the open political arena, under the very fire of the enemy, because you must remember that at about the same time LaFollette and Gompers opened their attack on the June 17 convention and against the Communists. We maintain that the ability of our party to reorientate itself quickly under these conditions is a tribute to the Communist quality of our party. To have changed within one day, almost, fundamentally, our main political line under the very fire of the enemy without in the least demoralizing our ranks, was proof not only of the political flexibility of the Central Executive Committee, but also of the discipline and Communist quality of the party as a whole.

WHEN we came to the June 17 convention, we found that our main objective, the objective of solidifying the farmer labor movement into a party for the presidential campaign, will not succeed. Why? In the con-

vention, one of its basic features or main features, was the predominance of farming elements over the elements from the industrial centers. That was one feature. The second feature was that nearly everybody in the convention, with the exception of our own delegates was in favor of LaFollette being the presidential nominee. And when we came there and established for ourselves these main facts, we realized that there is hardly a chance to fulfill or reach our main objective. And during the convention (the whole Central Executive Committee was in St. Paul) a meeting of our committee was held and this question was raised by Comrade Foster.

IS there any use of our continuing with this convention? Would it not be better perhaps to right here realize that we cannot form this farmer-labor party, that the basis is not here, that the forces outside this convention are so strong and powerful against the realization of our proposition that it cannot be realized? The proposition was that we establish this fact right there and do not proceed on the basis that we can form such a united front. But the majority of the committee, and by the way, on this proposition the factional lineup broke up completely, the majority of the committee, which included comrades from the majority and the minority, decided that if eventually we must give up the idea of forming a united front for the elections, this should not be done at the convention. This should be postponed until after the convention and particularly after the July 4th conference of the C. P. P. A. I will not go into detail as to the arguments. The fact of the matter is that the Central Executive Committee decided to go thru with the convention and watch developments further. But when the July 4th convention was over and our delegates came back from there to report to the Central Executive Committee, it then became clear, at least to some of us, that the Workers Party might be compelled to enter the election campaign under its own banner on its own program and with its own candidates. And that, comrades, was the decision of the Central Executive Committee—it was nearly unanimous, I think, two or three comrades voting against it. Why did the Central Executive Committee make the decision. It made the decision for two reasons. One reason was that inasmuch as the formation of a labor party, or its continuance is justified only if it is a real united front between our party and wider masses of workers, and inasmuch as this primary condition for a united front was lacking, therefore there is no reason why we should pretend that we have a farmer-labor party, there is no reason why we should pretend that we do have a united front and base our policies on a wrong basis.

THE Central Executive Committee was determined not to fool itself and not to fool the workers. When we realize that the objective conditions being stronger than our party defeated our main objective, we drew the only possible conclusion, and the conclusion was that our party will take the field in the elections as the Workers Party, on its own program and with its own candidates. The Communist International found that this decision was correct. It found that that was the only possible decision to make under the conditions as they existed then.

Now, comrades, as to the election campaign. You are already familiar with how we carried on the campaign, and what it resulted in. Some comrades of the minority, I think the minority as a group, have found it possible months after the election campaign to bring forward a number of criticisms on the methods and policies pursued by us in the campaign. I do not maintain that there is nothing to criticize in the policies of our party during that campaign. Every act of every Central Committee, even of the best of our parties, can be criticized and should be criticized. But the point to remember is that during the election campaign the minority in the Central Executive Committee made no propositions, no motions, no recommendations that they were opposed to policies of the majority. Or still

better, that the Central Executive Committee during the election campaign was unanimous as it never was before and never was afterwards, in the manner in which the election campaign should be carried on so that in this convention today, whether the minority or the majority are going to criticize the shortcomings of our election campaign policies, it should be understood that these were policies of a unanimous Central Executive Committee.

I might perhaps indicate one or two shortcomings of our election campaign not its policies so much, the policy was correct, but the defects and shortcomings in the carrying out of these policies. One is that the party for one reason or another was not fully successful in linking up our presidential campaign with the immediate issues that were disturbing the minds of the masses during those weeks. The policy provided for it, our election program, our pamphlets, our resolutions, our instructions, all provided for that, but in the carrying out of it the party was not successful, and when I say the party, I do not mean the Central Executive Committee, I mean the entire party organization. Every city committee and district committee, our organizers, speakers, writers, etc. The fault was not with the resolutions, not with the policy but with something else which I am not ready to explain. The party did not seem to be able to fully link up its campaign with the labor struggles that were going on in those months. This is one shortcoming which must be criticized and avoided in the future.

THE second difficulty was that one of the main instructions, organizational instructions of the Central Executive Committee for the campaign was not fully carried out in the party organization, at least not with enough enthusiasm and determination. I refer to the decision that in every city and in every district the party should call together conferences of labor to endorse our ticket and election campaign and to organize supporting committees for our election campaign. As a general rule this was carried out but the results we believe could have been much bigger even in spite of the LaFollette sweep, if our party had shown more determination in carrying out this part of the program.

As to the results of the election campaign, not much need be said here. The party succeeded in winning about the maximum that it could under the circumstances. The election campaign in our opinion established the fact that American capitalism at the present time has immense resources, immense and tremendous resources to break up, to demoralize and to temporarily defeat opposition movements of the petty bourgeoisie. This is a very important factor. I am sure that all of us as well as the entire country not only the Communists, were disappointed partly in the results of the election as far as LaFollette movement was concerned. Everyone believed, even the capitalists themselves, that in view of the acute agrarian crisis that prevailed for so long a time, in view of the severe defeats of and attacks on the workers by the capitalist, in view of the general disturbed situation, that the LaFollette movement would be able to muster much more strength than it really had and when the count was made after the election, everyone realized that what the LaFollette movement actually achieved was much below that which was expected by everyone. It proved a number of things, but the point I wish to make in this connection is that it proves the immense resourcefulness, economic primarily and then political, of American capitalism in fighting opposition movements.

THE second point proved to us, and it is very important for our future policy, is that, that in spite of the temporary defeat of the third party movement, this movement has not been totally destroyed. This movement will come into existence again and will again roll up much power and influence as conditions develop in the United States.

The LaFollette movement was not destroyed in the elections. It did not emerge from the election as strong

as some expected, but the results produced proved that the awakening sections of the American working class in the industrial parts of the country and the poorer sections of the farmers were willing and ready to proceed into a third party movement and actually in the formation of a third petty bourgeois party. And when we are going to adopt our policies for the future, we must keep in mind this very important factor, confirmed again by the results of the election campaign. The basis for a third petty bourgeois party is here. Eventually it will materialize and develop into a power in the United States. And a third fact established in the election campaign proved to us that in the face of this sweep of the LaFollette movement the labor party movement in its present stage could not retain its independence. As we have foreseen so it has happened. The labor party movement was nearly totally disintegrated and then swallowed up by the LaFollette movement. What conclusions one should draw from this fact is another matter, but it must be established that the labor party movement was not strong enough, was not politically conscious enough to be able to withstand and successfully resist this rising sweep of the petty bourgeois ideology. And the fourth factor that the election campaign established is that our Workers Party, tho small yet in numbers, is already quite firmly established. The number of votes that were actually cast for our presidential candidate should be considered as we have been considering them, in view of a number of other conditions. First, that the most exploited sections of the American working class, those whom our appeal reaches quickest, are disfranchised and could not therefore take part in the election campaign. The second thing to consider in connection with analyzing the result of the elections, as far as we were concerned, is this fact that the LaFollette movement had captured the minds not only of those that just began to awaken politically but even those who thought they were politically class conscious. And if in the face of these two conditions the Workers Party could carry thru its election campaign with the result that it actually scored, I believe it is safe to state that the Workers Party has already firmly established itself. It has a basis wide enough to proceed with confidence and energy in building its power and strength for future larger campaigns.

Now, confronted with this result of the election campaign, the Central Executive Committee was beginning to give serious consideration to what the situation really meant as far as our policy was concerned. Soon following the election campaign our party published its statement on the results of the election campaign, there we made it known for the first time that we no longer believed in the usefulness and appealing force of the labor party slogan. This question was discussed at great length last night, therefore I will not now go into detail about it. What I do wish to emphasize is that the comrades of the minority up until this very moment, still refuse to understand what the real position of the Central Executive Committee was beginning with that statement and following it. I have mentioned a few moments ago the outstanding facts or lessons that we should derive from the election campaign. And what were they, comrades? We must know them in order to understand what has moved the Central Executive Committee following the election campaign to reorientate itself or to change was policies as far as the labor party was concerned. The Central Executive Committee in those months saw the situation as follows. We knew the labor party movement was disintegrated. There was no longer to be found in those months a labor movement in the country, distinct either politically or organizationally from the general third party movement. Second, the Central Executive Committee saw that the disappointment caused by the failure of the LaFollette movement to bring results expected by the masses will militate very seriously against any attempt to promote a movement for a new party in the United States, for a labor party in the

United States. This was the true situation and on the basis of this, or from this, the Central Executive Committee concluded that the slogan for a labor party had no appealing force under these conditions and could not be employed by our party with much use in the immediate future. This was the situation when the change in policy was made and these were the reasons why the change was made. This precipitated in our party the now famous labor party controversy.

COMRADES, without going into this matter again in any way, I wish to say that whether this violent struggle in our party was justified or not, whether it was necessary for our party to pay the price that it did for having its policy corrected, the fact remains that never in the history of our movement did a party pass through a fight of such dimensions, bitterness and violence. Most of the delegates here are not novices in the Communist movement. A good number of them have been founders of our party. Most nearly everyone of us participated in all the internal struggles since 1919 and every one will agree that never did our party have a fight of this kind. And I say that if our party succeeded in withstanding this fight without splitting into about ten or fifteen parts, this again is a tribute to the growth of the Communist quality of our party. We all remember the old days. We know that every fight on a big issue produced a split. In those days we did not seem to know any other way of settling our difficulties than just to part ways and go asunder and then begin a campaign for unity.

A Central Executive Committee of a Communist Party which functions in the face of such an opposition, should not and cannot be expected by anybody to have taken care fully of everything that a Communist Party must take care of.

Now do you know, comrades—I suppose you do—that during these months of factional struggle, party discipline practically lost its meaning for about one-third of our party. It did not mean anything. A decision of the Central Executive Committee would be received and filed. It would be accorded the courtesy of being received and filed, but as far as results were concerned, every minority district organizer, Comrade Jakira, Comrade Ballam, for instance, would be the judge of whether the Central Executive Committee instructions should go into effect or whether it should just be disregarded. This example set by district organizers was followed practically by every minority comrade in the ranks. In the old days a Central Executive Committee would do what? It would initiate a series of disciplinary measures against every one guilty of breaking party discipline, which would result in a split. The recent Central Executive Committee of the party did not want a split. And it was for this reason that the Central Executive Committee overlooked many and many things for the sake of retaining the unity of the party, of enabling it to outlive its crisis and proceed further in a unified manner.

Now about the activities of the Central Executive Committee during that period. You are all supplied with copies of our written report. Those of you who have studied the report, have no doubt received a complete picture of what the party was occupying itself with these 20 months. I want to draw your attention to some specific features of our work during these 20 months. The party carried out a number of very important united front campaigns. I will go into some details discussing these campaigns, but before I proceed, I wish to say a few words about some of the "popular" criticisms that the minority has been hurling at the Central Executive Committee in connection with its united front campaign. One is that these united front campaigns were not real campaigns. That the Central Executive Committee was simply passing resolutions, publishing them in our papers, organizing a few meetings and let the matter rest at that. In short, that the Central Executive Committee failed to organize the sentiment and action of the mass-

es in favor of our slogans in these campaigns. If you want to discuss the failures of the present Central Executive Committee, there are many of them. For instance, we failed to seize power in the United States; we did not even elect Comrade Foster to the presidency. We have not yet captured the unions in the United States; but there is one thing comrades which we have not failed to do and that is, we have not failed to resist most energetically the attempts of the minority to drive us into fake united fronts. This we have not failed to do. The policies of the Central Executive Committee that were outlined in connection with every one of our campaigns provided for a united front policy, it provided for it.

IT instructed our organization to proceed to mobilize sentiment for our slogans and organize it jointly with other labor organizations for definite political acts. And if as a result of these campaigns we have not succeeded in creating large mass movements for our slogans, the Central Executive Committee cannot be blamed for that. For instance, during our period of office we were carrying on a campaign against wage cuts in the textile industry and in other industries. These campaigns did not produce a strike movement. There were several sporadic strikes here and there that were liquidated very soon and most of them were defeated. Our party issued the slogan: Strike against wage cuts. We carried on propaganda for these slogans. We took a number of organizational measures to bring about a united front struggle against wage cuts, but the results show that no big strike movement actually resulted. This is a fact. What does this fact prove? Does it prove that the policy of the Central Executive Committee was wrong? Not in the least. The policy was correct. But it proved the fact that I started out with, namely that the American working class still finds itself in a depressed mood due to many, many developments in the past two or three years which did not enable us to arouse them now at this moment for real big struggles against capitalism. And the conclusion to be drawn from this is that our party must be patient and persistent in carrying on its work until more favorable conditions will enable us to secure bigger success as results of our campaigns. But to conclude this, as some of the minority comrades are doing, that irrespective of whether you have succeeded in arousing the masses or not, you must rush headlong in building united front organizations which can have only a paper existence is to make a joke of the united front policy. This conclusion we cannot make. This conclusion the Communist International does not want to make. Some of our comrades in the minority have reached the point where they earnestly maintain that when the party wants to publish proclamations to the American workers, it cannot do that unless its forms united front committees. In the course of our discussion this idea was brought forward time and time again. So our contention is this. The criticism of the minority regarding our united front policy is invalid because the failure of our party to really create a mass movement for our demands is attributable almost completely to conditions outside of our control. Ballam is a minority district organizer. His district includes a good portion of the textile industry. He was doing his best to create a united front, so he says. He said he was doing his best to promote a strike movement and a united front movement. The result, comrades, is such that there is almost nothing to report to the party. As I said before, we had a number of sporadic strikes which we were not able to fuse together and organize into a big strike movement because of the existing objective conditions.

THE failure charged against us to create united front organizations where there is no mass support for them is no failure at all but is realism in carrying on Communist policies. The majority of the Central Executive Committee has maintained consistently that it does not believe in creating paper organizations and is

going to maintain their policy in the future.

Another angle of our work during these 20 months marks a beginning in a new field of activity. I refer here to the beginnings made by our party in the field of Negro work. Now this is not the first time that a Central Committee of a Communist Party in America is interesting itself in Negro work. In fact, I remember since the very first day of the Communist movement in America, the C. P. as well as the C. L. P. and then the U. C. P. and then the unified party and the Workers Party have always been interesting themselves in Negro work. Contacts have been established in those years but I maintain that it was only during the present period of the Central Executive Committee that our work among the Negroes was placed on a correct political basis and also on a more effective organizational basis. The advice of the C. I. quite naturally played a big part in the successes achieved by the party in this line of work. The fact is that at this moment our party is participating and exercising a great deal of influence in the organization of the Negro Labor Congress. There is a special report on the subject and I will not go into much detail. Suffice it to say that during the last five months the Central Executive Committee has been paying very close attention to work among the Negroes. Suffice it to say that nearly one-third of the membership of the Central Executive Committee was commissioned by the Central Executive Committee as a sub-committee to supervise this work of the party. And we say the party must realize the importance of this sort of work for the future growth of our Party.

DURING these twenty months there developed a number of controversies besides the controversy on the labor party. For instance, the controversy on women's work and how the work should be conducted among the working women in the United States. I understand that there is a legend going about in the party about the opposition of the majority to work among women. Comrades, a cool and calm listening to the facts will convince you that this is, to use polite language, bunk. Before I speak of the controversy let me establish the fact. The fact is that neither during these twenty months that we were in office nor during the four or five years before we came into office, was there any substantial Communist work among women. If the party is to be blamed for it, let the party be blamed for it; if the Central Executive Committee is to be blamed for it, give it all the blame, but remember that Communist work among women has not yet had its beginning.

Now as to the controversy. The party as a whole did nothing—very little was done for work among women. Individual members of the party, women and men, were engaged in a number of cities in work among women—notably in Detroit—the Federation of Working Class Women—in Boston and in New York. Groups of comrades were engaged in those organizations in organizing the working class women on various economic and political issues. Now the controversy in the Central Executive Committee arose over two questions. One point we were making there was that the main and central objective of the Communist Party in its work among women is work among working women—women actually employed in industry, not that we must neglect working class housewives, but the center of attention of our party and its main policies must be formulated on the basis of drawing into the struggle—economic and political—the women actually engaged in the shops and factories. And the main criticisms we were making against the minority comrades in New York was that they have entirely overlooked the central problem of our movement in connection with women's work.

THE second question of the controversy was what is and should be a certain organization of working class housewives in New York. The minority, for one reason or another, took a great fancy to a New York women's organization, called the United Coun-

cil of Working Class Women. They took such a strong fancy to it, that they were willing to make this the key to the women's movement in the United States, the basis of every maneuver and every campaign that the party is going to make among the working women. And we said we failed to realize this universal greatness and basic importance of the United Council of Working Class Women. Here is what we said. We said this Council of Working Class Women is in reality a very, very small organization of working class housewives. We said, we failed to see how such an organization can become the center . . . on which we can build and form our movement among the working class women. But the important thing, comrades, in connection with this controversy is that as a result of it, really nothing was achieved except factional capital against the Central Executive Committee.

NOW another point I wish to make, in connection with this, is that up until about one day before the Parity Commission adopted its proposal on women's work the minority still did not know that the main problem in our women's work was the organization of working class women. But it just so happened that the day before the Parity commission made its decision on the women's question, the Inprecorr brought a report of a decision passed by the women's secretariat of the Communist International which contains an elaborate outline, a detailed outline of work among women, and when the minority saw this, they saw the light, and then brought in a resolution which for the first time proposes a program of activity among women in factories.

Now reporting on the Central Executive Committee's work, I wish to say a few words on our right wing and the struggle against the right wing. This subject will be discussed at length under a special heading. But there is one point I wish to impress upon the comrades in connection with this. And the point mainly is this: That when the minority of the party and Central Executive Committee come to the party and party convention telling us about our alliance with the right wing, about our failure to fight the right wing, I say that there is not a particle of sincerity to all that stuff. I recall, and all of you know, that Lore and Loreism is not something new in our party, even Comrade Bedacht says that. You know Loreism for years, and various forms and shapes, and we knew for some time that Loreism was not a Communist tendency. Why, comrades, at one stage in the life of our government, on the event of the formation of the Workers Party, here is what took place. Something very important and significant. Negotiations were going on between delegates of the Communist Party and delegates from the Workers Council group. And who do you think was representing the Workers Council group in these conferences? Lore! And who do you think was Lore? He was also a member of the Communist Party of America. In other words Comrade Lore in those months was a member of the Communist Party and at the same time was organized jointly with a political group which was fighting our movement bitterly and was negotiating all kinds of terms with our party. And what did the Communist Party do in those days to Lore? Lovestone might tell you something about that. We knew it was bad but we could not do much. We felt we could not do much. And why could not we? Because we knew that to take strict organizational measures against Lore in those months, would prevent the Communists from fulfilling their main objective in those days—the formation of the Workers Party of America.

When Lore Was Respectable.
In the period of the Pepper-Ruthenberg regime in the Workers Party, what did they do to combat Loreism? Nothing! To be a friend of Lore in those months was an honor. It is a disgrace now, and rightly so. But it was no disgrace when Lovestone, Pepper and Ruthenberg were managing

(Continued on page 6.)

RUSSIA TODAY: Official Report of British Trade

(Continued from Yesterday's Daily Worker)

SYNOPSIS.—The official report of the British trade union delegation to Soviet Russia described the workings of foreign trade, transportation, industry, finance and agriculture in the Soviet Union. The trade union leaders concluded that foreign trade is increasing, and that in agriculture and industry the level of production is being raised. The finances have been placed on a sound basis, the report showed. Harm is being done to England by the absence of full diplomatic relations, the union leaders stated. Schools and universities, and literature, music and opera and the theatre were then discussed. Art collections, censorship, newspapers, wall newspapers, and freedom of the press were explained, with the conclusion that "the results of education are astounding." The report then took up hospitals, welfare work, sanitation, birth control, abortion, cleanliness and housing, rent regulations, family life, and prisons. "The Soviet government is achieving most remarkable results in respect to public health, housing, and the prison system," says the report. Regarding the trade unions and labor conditions, the report states, "The Delegation were much impressed by the position and activities of Trade Unions under the Soviet system." The report then described labor regulations, co-operatives, wages, and told of visits to various industrial works. The general conclusion on labor conditions reached by the commission was that, "The U. S. S. R. is a strong and stable state. The government is not only in every way better than anything Russia has ever yet had, but it has done and is doing work in which other older state systems have failed and are failing."

We were also gratified to note the efforts which were being made to take care of the young. We visited the Baby Creche where babies from three to eighteen months are cared for by skilled nurses and doctors in premises kept scrupulously clean, furnished with small tables, toys, and all kinds of the special equipment required for this purpose. Workers have their own hospitals on the job, first aid equipment, schools for their children, gymnasiums and recreation grounds. Medical attention is provided for the workers and special efforts are made to protect the health of their children. Monthly reports are given regarding the progress of each child coming under the care of those in charge of the children's hospital and Baby Care Center.

The average wage paid is 60 roubles per month, the minimum monthly wage being 35 roubles on time work, but 80 per cent of the men are employed on piecework and are employed 24 days per calendar month. While the average piecework earnings during last October were 63 roubles per man, it was stated that in some cases the maximum earnings were up to 150 roubles.

In connection with this, as in the case of all large contracts, the men employed were members of the union, paying Trade Union contributions at the rate of 2 per cent of their wages. The only exception regarding union membership was made in the case of men who were brought into the contract for periods of short duration mainly from the peasant districts for special work requiring little or no skill; 95 per cent of the men were members of the Building Trade Union. In this connection we have to point out that for all grades employed on this huge contract there was only one union, with the exception of the medical and hospital staffs, who were members of the Medical Workers' Union.

The hours of labor were eight hours per day and a 48-hour week, with a fortnight's holiday with pay. In addition to which workers' clubs, film performances, plays and dramatic circle classes were provided at a very low price, together with all the conveniences in connection with the holiday, health and special benefits provided by the unions referred to in another portion of the report.

No rents are paid by the workers employed for the use of the wooden houses erected on the job, food and fuel transport is paid for, but for lighting and rent there are no charges.

For the maintenance of the hospitals and insurance convened for the purpose of providing special benefits the equivalent of 16 per cent of the total wages bill of the contract is taken for the institutions.

The workers subscribe monthly for newspapers and 11,000 copies of the monthly newspaper are purchased regularly.

On making inquiries as to the salaries paid to the administrative staff, we were informed that the chief engineer received 800 roubles per month and the five assistant engineers received 600 roubles per month.

The hospitals, schools, dispensary, and baths provided in connection with this huge electrical undertaking were in every way satisfactory and interesting to the members of the Delegation.

XII

A Visit to a General Engineering Shop

A visit was paid to a very up-to-date engineering works at Kharkov, which appeared to be exceedingly well organized and contained apparently all up-to-date appliances and machinery, and was of very considerable extent.

They were fully engaged in one large shop in building Diesel internal combustion engines, many of them a very large size, and were putting the completed engines through very severe tests.

In another shop were being made electric generators, the beds therefor and accessories. Many of the generators under construction were of very large type, including two being made to order of the Soviet for Turkestan.

In another shop they were building in large quantities four cylinder motor tractors for agricultural work, and from the

number under construction it would appear that the output was a fairly large one.

There were also under construction railway locomotive engines of quite a large design, eight wheel coupled with leading and trailing free wheels, specially designed for heavy goods or mineral traffic, and the Delegation was informed that they were designed to draw a train of 1,500 tons under normal circumstances.

Two engines had been completed, one of which was painted and had an exceedingly fine appearance.

In this shop also they had the most up-to-date machinery and many large scale machines, one of which was capable of cutting out five locomotive frames in one operation. The Delegation was informed that they were completing about twelve locomotives per month, but that they had the capacity, if necessary, of turning out 18 per month.

All the shops attached to the works, together with yard space, covered a very considerable acreage, and they were still building yet another large shop at the time of the visit.

With the exception of the electricity works and the aeroplane works in Moscow, the general up-to-dateness and efficiency of this works surpassed anything so far seen during the Delegation's visit to Russia.

In conversation with the directing engineer the Delegation learned that under the Soviet power and the new system of work management the men were working exceedingly well, and when any special order was received the men always exceeded the 1913 output.

In the apprentices' section there was one instructor to each 15 apprentices and working in a well-set-up part of the motor tractor building factory, the boys were busy making small accessories and tools, which were particularly well finished and very creditable to the young people. Several young women were noticed amongst the apprentices, who were being taught to make buckets, cans, and other liquid holding utensils. All the apprentices of both sections appeared to be quite cheerful and particularly interested in their work.

Generally speaking, the Delegation was struck with the whole organization and fittings of this works and with the personnel of the workpeople employed there.

XIII

A Visit to Aircraft Works

A visit was paid by the Delegation to the aircraft works. In these works, 1,800 workers are employed on wood and metal parts, except engines, which are either imported or made at their own engine works in Moscow. All workers are members of the Metal Workers' Union. The lavatory accommodation in the new premises is modern and a vast improvement on the old.

This plant in 1920 consisted of three rather old buildings, and at the same time the workers' share of corn was ground on the premises in a very old-fashioned apparatus. There is a most noticeable improvement in things, though a great many parts are still done by hand in the absence of much-needed machinery.

A very finely built factory is just on completion, the first, second, and third floors being occupied by workmen. The finished machines compare very favorably and are mainly of the D.H. 9 type.

Here, as elsewhere, there does not appear to be any intention to patch up the old building, but rather to rebuild entirely. In the small tubing works for landing bearers ordinary push cycles and a cycle radio machine are being manufactured.

A worker has built a small machine which saves a vast amount of labor in the cutting and shaping of the small parts of the cooling apparatus and aircraft.

There is a very fine set of schools where the lads are being taught (1) the Russian language; (2) physics, and the theory of engineering; (3) geography, etc.

There is also a (1) joinery apprentice shop; (2) blacksmith apprentice shop; (3) engineering and setting-out shop.

All of these seem to have their full complement, there being 30 lads in the latter.

There is a very fine club close by and it is still under reconstruction and extension. The theater is a really well got up place.

A huge building of the "Flat" type is now housing 620 families of metal workers.

XIV

A Visit to a Locomotive Running Depot

The Delegation visited one of the locomotive depots attached to Moscow City. The shed was an old one and consequently did not appeal to the eye as much as the latter-day depots of Great Britain with their excellent accessories. It was, however, quite up to the standard of the older depots in Great Britain, and the work appeared to be quite efficient, having regard to the lack of up-to-date appearance.

During a conversation with the engineer in charge of the depot in his office, before touring the shed, the Delegation was informed that the very high center of gravity of Russian locomotives was conceived in the belief that a less strain was put on the frame of the engine in rounding the sharper curves of the Russian railways. This high center of gravity struck us at once, as the fire-box foundation rests on the top of the framing bearing the axle boxes, whilst the smoke box is carried on a superstructure above the leading framework of the engine. Consequently, the boiler is raised several feet above the frame and necessitates rather long steam and exhaust pipes to and

"Who Is Who British Dele

HERBERT SMITH, J. years president Yorkshl deration. President, M tion of Great Britain sir president, 1907. Serve royal commissions. Pr national Miners' Comm of school board, West R county council and othe for many years. Memb ary committee, trades u 1913-16, and general co Appointed J. P. in 1915. tra) committee, miners' central committee, min board.

BEN TILLET, gen of trade unions sh ce of Dockers' Union w) from the Tea Coc)er Laborers' Union estab A pioneer of trade ur nationally. Contested mentary elections. Ele Remained dockers' ge) until amalgamation to General Workers' Unio ary of Political and In partment of Amalga Member of trades unio: eral council since 192 parliamentary comm union congress, 1892-04

JOHN TURNER, a socialist organizations timate with founders socialist thought, suc Morris, Belfort Bax, neers. Closely associa Kropotkin from 1886 to Russia in 1917. A hours legislation and f Assistants' Union. C union from 1898 until general secretary afte in this position until 1 general council, trades 1921; re-elected by con to 1924 for period to f

JOHN BROMLEY, 1 of railway trade unio many positions of tri pointment as branch sociated Society of Lo eers and Fireman, 15 ganizing secretary of Secretary also of con Elected general secret 1914. Elected membe executive, 1920 and member of trades uni eral council, 1922-24. bor party delegation t times candidate for 1924. Prominently as bor and socialist prop years.

ALAN A. H. FIND United Patternmake since 1893. Branch other offices. Electe eral secretary, execu 1913. Elected genera Formerly treasurer, Shipbuilding Trades three years, subsequ president, at presen position. Elected to gress general council each year until 1924, September, 1925.

A. A. PURCELL (g gation). Member F Union since 1891 mocratic federatio ber, Salford Boroug years. Sectional s quently organizer, f Parliamentary cand ford, 1910. Conteste 24. Elected 1923. S tor in co-operative at Elected to general union congress, 1919 year. Elected by tra tional conference, president. President union congress. Vic eral council. Appoi American labor conv companied the deleg 1920.

Union Delegation

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In the engineer's office was an exceedingly good half-section of the locomotive now in use for the general passenger service in Russia, from which the Delegation was able to gather that the Walchaert gear is generally in operation on the rail-ways of Russia, together with the piston valve principle. We learned that owing to the shortage of copper, whilst the tube face-plate was of copper, the walls and roof of the firebox were of iron, as were also the boiler tubes. Super-heating is the general practice on the Schmitt principle.

The Delegation also learned that the Swedish engines which we had seen at Sebej did not fur or cork the tubes, as we had been informed, but that owing to the grate construction being different from the general Russian principle, the clinker set on the bars of the Swedish engines, and consequently de-tracted from the steaming qualities.

In passing around the shed and repairing section of the depot, the Delegation found that the engines were not cleaned as is the usual practice in England, but that tubes were run with a rod, but on coal burning engines fire-box, ash-pan and smoke-box were cleaned in a similar manner to our own. Many of the engines, however, were oil burners, carrying a round tank of oil on the tender, which, owing to the intense frost of the Russian winters, was steam-heated to keep the oil in a usable fluid state. The foot-plate cabs of all these engines were especially built for protection to the men, being quite in the form of a small cabin entirely excluding all draft, consequent upon the running of the train. The Westinghouse brake appeared to be in general use, with quite up-to-date lubricators and injectors.

The axle boxes had quite good oil wells with the usual worsted trimming and worsted pads in the well of the box beneath the axle. Generally speaking, fitting and repairs appeared to be much on the same principle as in our own country.

With regard to the foot-plate men the engine driver is made by commencing an apprenticeship to the fitting, followed by a period of riding as third man, and attending to oiling, etc., until practical driving were acquired. They were also, if necessary, given a course of instruction in firing, but firemen as such were not promoted to the position of engine driver but remained firemen throughout. Drivers had to pass both technical and eye-sight examinations, the latter being repeated every year.

At this depot, there were installed baths for the men with attached dressing rooms so that working clothes could be donned at the shed, and put off after the day's work, when, following the bath and change of clothing, the men could go home quite clean and decently dressed. There was also a restaurant with very fine kitchen arrangements and ample floor space for seating some 200 diners at the same time. In addition to this a co-operative store was attached to the depot, where all necessities of food and clothing could be purchased on production of the union card at little above cost price, and members were even allowed a credit card which permitted them to pay for the most expensive articles by instalments over a fixed period of time. There were also attached to the depot dwelling houses for the men, such as we had seen at factories and other works. The working hours were eight per day, and, generally speaking, the Delegation was given to understand that the conditions of the men employed were a great improvement on the old conditions in Russia. Nor was the social side forgotten, as a club, or institute, was also attached with reading rooms, library, lectures, and other educational facilities in addition to facilities for social intercourse.

XV

The First State Boot Factory Established in Russia

This factory, prior to the war, was utilized as a munition factory for the purpose of producing shells. Since the Revolution, it has been turned into a well-equipped modern boot factory. The process of transfer commenced in 1921, but the factory was formally opened and named the Paris Commune Boot Factory on the 12th of March, 1922, the day upon which the Commune is celebrated all over the world.

The factory started with 87 workers. The total number now employed is 632, excluding the administrative staff, numbering 56. The output is 1,400 pairs of boots per day.

Passing from the manager's office to one of the departments, the Delegation noticed a display of colored posters on the walls and were particularly interested in one dealing with the care and training of children, including a very amusing section showing a demonstration of babies demanding the right to be born of healthy parents.

One hundred and eighty women are employed in this factory and the Delegation was informed that men were excluded from their particular kind of work unless there were no women capable of doing the work unemployed. Any vacancies, subject to this provision, could be filled by a male operative.

Special provision is made for the medical care and attention of the employes and in the first-aid department, the Delegation was introduced to the fully qualified doctor in charge, assisted by a fully qualified nurse and an experienced assistant. A factory dentist is also employed to care for the teeth of the workers.

The Delegation was permitted to see the records of accidents in this factory and our inspection showed that the total number of accidents during 1923, and up to the 1st October, 1924, was 83. None of these were very serious and the majority of minor importance.

On the walls of the manager's office, copies of the factory laws and labor laws which had been accepted and signed by the Trade Union representatives for the employes in this factory

were noticed. The manager in charge of the factory is appointed with the consent of the union.

The stockrooms and stores rooms for materials were in perfect order, and the finished articles were of a very high order. The leather used in this factory, in addition to Russian supplies, is imported to the extent of 40 per cent from America, Germany and France. Some of this material is very valuable and great care has to be exercised in cutting up the skins that waste should be reduced to the minimum. In order to discourage waste, calculations are made as to what the skins should produce, and a bonus is paid to the worker if there is any increase in the number of leather sections taken from each skin.

Machinery utilized in this factory is mainly imported from America, some of it comes from Germany and the remainder is supplied by Russian engineering establishments.

The Delegation was very much impressed by the utility and finish of the goods being produced in this factory. As far as could be seen, nothing but leather was being used for the soles and there was no evidence of shoddy work. Making comments on this, the Delegation was informed that an effort was being made to defeat private traders by producing goods of a better design and a much more durable quality.

Our inquiry into wages elicited the following information. The wages per employe during the year 1923, to October 1924, per quarter were as follows:—

	Wages per month.	
	Roubles.	Copecks.
January	78	10
April	79	24
July	52	52
September	91	81

The average wage per worker as shown for the July quarter was low on account of the fact that this quarter represents the holiday period. Holiday wages are, however, paid, there being no reduction, but these payments do not appear in the books of the factory.

XVI

Rubber Works

The Delegation visited the Leningrad State Rubber Works, where motor tires, goloshes, toys, and surgical appliances were being carried out and several new machines were being laid down, and it was observed that these were from Manchester and that more were to be installed. At present 8,000 workers are employed, the pre-war number being 13,000.

The factory was well organized, though the air space was rather less than that obtaining in such British firms as Macintosh and Dunlop, but this will speedily be changed, as some very extensive new building are being constructed.

Connected with this undertaking is a set of very fine dining rooms. Electrical equipment is used in the cooking of food and even in the cleaning of utensils. The meal times at the works are practically arranged to suit the accommodation at the dining buildings. Thus, the first meal is timed for 11:30 a. m., and two others intervening the last commencing at 1:30 p. m. The meal consists of a fair sized piece of meat and soup, with a portion of sweet pudding and a supply of bread, black or white, or both. The meal is served up ready, but the soup is placed on the table in a number of fair sized basins, and each worker serves himself with a second helping should he need to.

This meal works out at about 7d. per head, and is quite comparable with anything obtainable for 1s. in this country.

The Delegation partook of a meal and served themselves from their own selected positions.

The institution is managed by workers from, and the initial costs borne by the rubber undertaking.

Apart from the dining rooms there is a cafe and bar, and both alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages can be obtained. There are reading rooms, a club room, and library, a wireless installation, together with a music room and a very fine "Red Corner."

All these are at the disposal of the meanest worker employed at the Rubber Works in Leningrad.

XVII

Visit to a State Tobacco Factory in Moscow.

Each department was taken in turn, cigaret making apparently being the main occupation. The Delegation saw the paper cigaret cases being made and subsequently filled with the tobacco by machinery, and afterwards went into the tobacco-cutting department and were shown some English machines, which, though smaller than the Russian, are considered to be the best, and do more work in the same time.

In respect to machinery, it was stated that more was required, particularly for filling cigarets in the packets, a good deal of which is being done by hand on account of the lack of machinery. There is no doubt English machinery is considered the best, and if it were possible, would be largely used. A good deal of the machinery gave evidence of wear and, in the ordinary way, under other circumstances would be replaced by new. In spite of these difficulties, it was stated the production of the factory was now 95 per cent as compared to pre-war. When it is remembered that the conditions of employment and hours of labor have been immensely improved since then, it certainly appears, under all the circumstances, a remarkable achievement.

(To be continued in next issue.)

(Continued from page 3)
the affairs in the party. Lore was in the political committee, Lore had to be in the steering committee at the convention of July 3. Because the minority, then majority, believed him to be a good Communist. Is the minority ready to recognize and admit their mistake?

I say, on what ground can the minority blame the present Central Executive Committee for the failure to completely exterminate the Loreist tendency in the party? That we have fought Lore and Loreism is beyond the shadow of a doubt. Let me bring to your attention two or three facts. You speak about the majority having been in alliance with Lore. Can you point to a single instance where the majority of the Central Executive Committee sacrificed or compromised its program or policy to satisfy the Lore group in the party? On the contrary, in the last convention of the party the Lore group, or part of them, demanded as price of their support to the majority, that we discard our third party alliance and the only reply we made was that we cannot do it because we believed in the correctness of that alliance.

Not So Backward.

Another fact, a very important fact. Much talk has been made here about the backwardness of the majority followers, particularly about the support of the Finnish Federation. Do you know, I am sure the minority leaders know, that the Finnish Federation, its predominant majority, was against dropping the farmer labor party slogan? Nearly every Finnish branch that went on record on the labor party issue during the discussion, went on record for continuing the labor party slogan and according to those Finnish comrades we were wrong. Did we sacrifice our position to please the Finns? No! It is sufficient merely to enumerate some of these facts to show how ridiculous your assertions are about the alliance between Lore and the majority. You cannot disregard the fact that in our everyday activities, wherever we came in contact with right wing deviations, whether they called themselves Loreism or not, the Central Executive Committee was always very quick in calling down and combating them. I need refer only to a few instances. Our fight against the right wing deviations in the needle trades; our fight against opportunist mistakes in a number of other unions. The reasons why our main struggles against opportunism can be seen mainly on the trade union field is this: It is on the trade union field that these mistakes become very quickly apparent,

and because the center of our work is in the trade unions. The C. E. C. was always quick to act the moment it saw the manifestations of any right wing deviation, and therefore the C. E. C. never failed to make clear its position and to fight against all these deviations.

In the time that has been left me, only a few words on our main resolution. Our main resolution dealing with the present situation and our immediate tasks has been adopted by the Party Commission unanimously. Most of you comrades, in fact all of you, are familiar with this resolution. There is nothing exceptionally new for our party in that thesis. Nothing exceptionally new except a few basic economic and political facts.

No Immediate Crisis.

The basic economic fact is that there is no immediate crisis in the economy of American capitalism. No prosperity, very far from that. Industry is proceeding very slowly. In fact even the most optimistic capitalist papers when they speak of the present economic conditions, cannot work up any optimism at all for the economic outlook of the United States. There is a quiet depression. American industry lives from hand to mouth. No big projects, no big developments and no considerable growth of home industry at present. Is there any outlook for an immediate, severe crisis?

Our thesis says this cannot be detected. We are probably in for a long period of hesitating development on a downward scale with occasional severe disturbances, aggravating still further the conditions as far as the workers are concerned. This is one of the new factors in the thesis.

As to the political conditions in the United States, naturally the biggest feature is the tremendous growth of American imperialism. The contrast between the growth of imperialism and the slow development of home industry is very striking. Whereas the investments abroad are reaching tremendous proportions, whereas American capitalism manifests tremendous initiative and aggressiveness in penetrating industry and finance in Central Europe, Asia and Latin America, the home industry does not show any such big designs and projects. Imperialism and the growth of it is one of the main determining factors of home economy and policies. And when you analyze the policies of American capitalism of the present day you will see how these are determined by the imperialist designs of big capital. I already mentioned the

tremendous growth of the export of capital and imperialist expansion generally. The second major policy is the development of militarism in the United States—something that we must be aware of and something we must react to in a very effective manner.

Trying to Win Farmers.

The third major policy of American capitalism is the systematic effort that is being made by American capital—by big capital primarily—to win over the farmers, particularly the rich and middle farmers to the cause of capitalism in the United States. Those of you comrades who are following events closely have probably noticed that within the last two months President Coolidge has held several conferences, probably dozens of them, with congressmen and senators from the agrarian section of the country. What were they discussing? One thing. And the thing is how to win the farmers of the United States, the rich and middle farmers particularly, to the cause of capitalism in America, how to prevent a new solidification of the farmers in America for a third party movement on the political field.

The fourth major policy of the American capitalist class is to break the morale of the American workers by wage cuts and various other cuts and to prevent by all possible means the political awakening of these workers and their organization for independent political action. These to us, comrades, seem to be the four major policies of American capitalism at the present day. And the thesis that we submit in the name of the Party Commission and the Central Executive Committee on our immediate tasks are policies and tactics that our party must pursue in order to combat in a Communist way these policies of American capitalism.

United Party Needed.

In conclusion just a few remarks. The basis of our work in the future, as has been stated here repeatedly in the convention, is a united party. We will adopt in this convention all the thirteen or fourteen resolutions that we submit to you from the Party Commission, but without Communist unity no effective work will be possible. If, following the convention, we cannot show a united front of all the Communists in the party for carrying out these resolutions, these will not be worth the paper on which they have been printed. I do not speak here now of something that can not happen. To come here and demand the immediate and complete liquidation of the factional struggle is something that no one can expect to happen irrespective of the intentions of

any comrade in our party. The impetus of the struggle that accumulated during these twenty months has not spent itself yet, and there is no use in complaining about it. It has not spent itself yet. It may take the party another couple of months before this impetus will spend itself. But I say, comrades, that every member of this convention, every delegate of this convention, must keep this thing before his eyes, to apply all efforts and to take all necessary measures that this factional struggle spend itself and liquidate itself in the shortest possible time.

We have been speaking here about the danger of the right wing. Comrades of the minority have been trying to establish a case here against the majority of the party that it is the right wing. I say as far as I am personally concerned, I am not going to waste a single second to convince anyone of the minority that we are not the right wing, because they know we are not. The question that is of more importance is how soon and by what means can we really unite our party? I have no prescription and no particular means to propose. But there is one thing of which I am convinced, that if the minority and the majority leave this convention with this idea, that the factional struggle, altho' it may continue for a while, cannot and should not continue for any length of time, the factional struggle will be liquidated. It will come to an end.

Factional Struggle Must End.

And when it does come to an end, it is then and only then that the resolutions that we adopt in this convention, that the motions passed in this convention, will take life and become part and parcel of the work of our party, of its activities and its future successes. I wish only one thing, that the comrades of the minority realize as much as we do that the factional fight cannot continue, no matter what you say in your caucus meetings, no matter what slogans you throw out. In Cleveland in the city convention someone read a caucus document of the minority which contained the following saying: "If you give your opponent the right name you have won half the battle." When you will stop to believe that your main objective is to find names for the majority, when you come to the conclusion that the party imposes upon you more earnest duties than to find quotations as to how you can most effectively brand the majority with names, when you come to the conclusion that you cannot continue this fight without ruining this party and ruining yourself in the process, our party will be able to proceed to work in an effective and successful manner.

Ruthenberg Replies to Bittelman

C. E. Ruthenberg, speaking for the minority of the Central Executive Committee, replied to Comrade Bittelman as follows:

COMRADES: As for Comrade Bittelman's closing remarks, I suggest that he should have thought of that before yesterday in his caucus, when the caucus made its decision as to whether the minority in this convention was to have what it won in the party or have a policy of extermination directed against it.

The main basis which Comrade Bittelman laid for the failure of the work of the C. E. C. during the last twenty months was in objective conditions. He told us that in the work during the term of the present C. E. C. the conditions, political and economic, were of such a character as not to be fruitful for effective progress of our party work. Then Comrade Bittelman told us a little later in his discussion in relation to the La Follette movement, that everybody in the United States expected that the La Follette movement would make a much greater sweep, a tremendous sweep in the presidential elections, and everybody was disappointed because of the results. Now, comrades, there could be an expectation that the La Follette movement would make such a sweep, there must have been the conditions among the workers of this country to create such a movement, and Com-

rade Bittelman was either wrong when he said the objective conditions were not favorable, or otherwise he was wrong in what he said about the La Follette movement.

LET us see if in 1924 we had in the industries of this country favorable conditions. Unemployment existed to a greater degree than for any period since the depression back in 1921. 1923 was a period of the upgrade in industry. 1924, on the other hand, was a period of increasing depression with increasing unemployment, with increasing difficulties for securing a livelihood for the workers; and does Comrade Bittelman expect us to believe that a condition in which the workers are unemployed to the extent of millions is not favorable for the work of our party? If Comrade Bittelman has such an opinion, then under what conditions will our struggle reach its climax if not exactly in such conditions as we had in 1924. There was unemployment, the workers had a difficult time, being forced to fight for food, clothing and shelter. As I declared at the outset that the analysis which says that the conditions were not favorable for the progress of the work of our party has no basis and the C. E. C. majority cannot have such an alibi for its failure in the last year and a half in the work of our party.

Comrades, there is quite a different reason for the failure of the work. Quite an equally important factor in

relation to the success of the work of our party, which Comrade Bittelman very easily ignores in his report, and that is the question of what kind of policy did our party follow in relation to the objective conditions? That, Comrade Bittelman, is as decisive for our party as are the objective conditions. If we have favorable conditions for Communist work, Communist agitation, and have the wrong policies, we will not make any progress with our work, and it is our contention, which I am going to prove, that it is because you had the wrong policies that you did not make progress during the past year and a half.

NOW let us deal with the factor which had a great deal to do with the character of the policies which the C. E. C. followed, that is, the makeup of the majority group in our party, the relationship of that group to the Lore group in our party.

We know that at the last national convention the majority won its majority thru the support of the Lore group in our party and that its main additional prop was the Finnish Federation of our party. In other words, its basis in the party is that group which is the right wing of our party and which is not yet developed as a Communist group, that has not yet learned its Communist principles and policies, and, I say, irrespective of the leading group of the majority's different view point, different orienta-

tion, the fact that it had such a basis in the party was sure to carry it into the mistakes which it made in the last year and a half. And I say the fact that it has chosen in this convention to again rest itself in the next year on the same basis is also certain that it will make similar errors in the year to come in relation to the work of our party. You can't, comrades, get away from the character of your support. It will have its influence in the shaping of your policies.

YOU will shape those policies to satisfy that particular group which has given you a majority, and that means that you have wrong policies and we will not build this party of ours. We found this support of the majority's influencing its action, I say not only this support but also the development of the majority's itself, at the very beginning of the work of the C. E. C. in 1924. This was on the first political question which we had to decide in the C. E. C. The question of what is our attitude towards Trotskyism. That was the first political question of importance that came before the C. E. C. for decision. Did the majority of the C. E. C. have a clear understanding of the struggles in the Russian Communist Party and make a decision? Was it able to go on record in support of the Bolsheviks in the Russian Communist Party without hesitation? Comrades, quite the contrary Comrade Lore had tele-

graphed to his paper from Chicago, at the end of the convention, that "the Trotskyites have won the party." Our majority wasn't quite sure for five months whether they were Trotskyites or not!

In January, comrades, in the editorial board of the Liberator, Comrade Pepper made a proposal that he write an article for the Bolshevik group and against Trotskyism in the Liberator. Comrade Cannon opposed it, saying he did not yet sufficiently know the facts and wasn't ready to make a decision.

In March there was a full meeting of the C. E. C. and our group offered a resolution to endorse the old group in the Russian Party and Comrade Foster answered by a motion that we take no position but print the material in the party press, and then, comrades, what happened? Along in April when Comrade Foster was already in Moscow, a telegram came to me from Comrade Scott saying that our party should send a telegram to the Russian Party convention endorsing the Bolshevik group, and I was compelled on my own responsibility to send that telegram and put the party on record, while the C. E. C. had refused to take action on it before. (Applause.)

Comrades, on the first of June Comrade Foster came back from Moscow. He had seen the situation there, and then the C. E. C. did endorse the Bolshevik group with a vote of 12 to 1; in other words, it took five months to get an understanding of the situation into the minds of the majority group and get them to act on this question. We say this was not a chance, this was not a happenstance. It was due to the fact of their relationship to the Lore group that made it impossible to get earlier action from them, to get action until after the decision had been finally made in Russia.

Now, comrades, on the issue of Loreism. Loreism developed in our party in a violent form when Lore became part of the majority of the C. E. C. He thought he was part of the leadership of the party now and he could speak. He could express himself, and he did express himself in writing an article on the fifth anniversary of the C. I., a very bad article. The minority said, "We must correct it. The C. E. C. must issue a statement condemning this editorial." It moved to that effect, but the C. E. C. said "No, we will not issue such a statement. Let Comrade Lore write a new editorial in which he corrects these ideas. In other words, they had to protect the member of the majority—Lore—from a public condemnation by the C. E. C. of the party.

NOW we cite these two facts about Loreism and the Trotsky matter to show what the connection was, and I say that it is due to this connection this basis of the majority, that during the year that followed that it successfully moved step by step to a Loreist policy, that it went toward right wing sectarianism in our party. It was the influence of this support in the party reacting on the majority of the C. E. C. that brought about these mistakes, in addition, of course, to the mistaken conceptions of the members of the majority itself, and I am going to cite some of those mistaken conceptions.

During the first half of 1924, our party was still working under the policies that were formulated by the present minority. The policies of 1922 and 1923 were accepted unanimously by the last convention. Our policies. And we continued those policies during the first six months and our party continued to make progress. It was when the majority had to formulate its own policies on main political events that errors began to appear, and the results for the party you know. Let me show you what happened as to figures.

CERTAINLY we must estimate the successes of the work of the party by the results it has attained and how are the results registered. Influence among masses and drawing the most advanced elements into our own party as members of the party. These are the two indications of whether our policies are correct and whether they are being carried out and the results for us. I cannot estimate the influence among the masses by statistics because we have none, but we know that our influence increased during

1922-1923. In 1923 we brought into our party as new members 6,532 members. For the six months of 1924, with the same policies effective we brought into the party 4,658 members. And then suddenly the results collapsed in spite of the fact that we were in the presidential campaign under our own name, in spite of the fact that that was a good opportunity for propaganda for Communism, direct appeals for the Workers Party. During the next six months' period, the figures were 50 per cent of the new membership taken in and as compared with the first six months of 1924 and 1925, we took in 4,600 in 1924 and 2,000 in 1925.

Comrades, how do we explain that sharp change in the results for our party? Why this sudden change in the number of members we could win for our party? Was it objective conditions as between the first half of 1924 and the second half, the first half of 1924 and the second half of 1923, or was it a change in the orientation of the line of policy which our party was pursuing? Comrades, we maintain that it was a change in the line of policy made by the C. E. C. that is responsible for this failure to secure results for our party.

I am going to tell you now the conception that is fundamental to this error which was made during the period in question. Comrades, we do not always in these speak our innermost thoughts, and Comrade Bittelman may have written part of the main thesis before this convention, and done it after a C. I. decision and after a bitter struggle in the party and formulation of the policies correctly after this struggle. But I am going to submit to you Comrade Bittelman speaking spontaneously, his own ideas, his own conceptions, before the convention of the Russian section of our party, in February of this year. And what did Comrade Bittelman say then? Here it is: I have quoted it before and I will quote it again to show what cannot be the policy of a Communist Party. "It is becoming clearly apparent that the only real opposition that will ever be developed in the United States against the rule of big capital in distinction to opposition to capitalism as a whole, will come only from the movement that the Workers Party will be able to create."

I SAY, comrades, that is not Communism; that is not Marxism; that is not Leninism; that is something that is alien to every fundamental conception of our movement, and I say further, if you have that thought in your mind you will be opposed to the labor party policy of our party. If you have that thought in your mind you make errors. You abolish united front women's organizations. If you have that thought in your mind, Comrade Bittelman, you bring in a report to make the International Workers' Relief openly a part of our party.

Let us see how it worked out. This conception that the Workers Party itself must create the movements which developed against capitalism, that our party as a party is the basic condition to the creation of opposition not against capitalism as a system only but even a movement against big capital. Comrades, my conception, and I am sure the conception of every member of those who sit on the left of this convention, is that capitalism because of all its contradictions, because of its exploitations and oppressions, brings resistance on the part of various groups of the capitalist social order. That it brings revolts of the petty bourgeoisie. It even brings struggles between two groups of capitalism of very bitter character. It brings the revolt of the petty bourgeoisie against capitalism and is the basic reason for the revolt of the working class. Yes! This capitalist social order, Comrade Bittelman, which you say our party only can build the movement against, this capitalist social order, has created our party. Its conditions create the party, the leader of the working class in the struggle, and you have put it topsy turvy, turned the whole thing around and with that conception you will continue to make your errors on policy.

COMRADE BITTELMAN told something about the struggles in the first six months in the C. E. C. and he mentioned the fact that there was

a struggle over the date of June 17th convention. Whether it should be held on May 30th or whether we should change the date, and he said that on this question that I supported the majority. Well, comrades, I would say that the majority supported me on that question (applause) because I initiated it, I proposed the policy and fought for that particular policy.

We also, comrades, had differences in relation to the labor party policy in relation to the C. P. P. A., and it was our view during that six months period the C. E. C. majority showed a hesitating, vacillating attitude, that it did not know where it was going, that it had no clear lines of development. We feared at one time after the St. Louis convention that it might want to call off the May 30th convention and go into the C. P. P. A. convention. There were differences of attitudes in which we believe that our viewpoint showed the right line of policy for our party.

There were distinct differences of attitude in which we believe that our viewpoint showed the right policy for our party and the Communists after the June 17th convention. The C. E. C. majority, in its statement regarding the labor party policy, tells us that it was after the elections that it formulated that policy. It is a fact, comrades, that the policy was abandoned before the November elections; it was abandoned in the middle of October when the fight began over the question of what policy we should pursue in the A. F. of L. convention. We said we must continue to fight for independent political action, to raise the slogan of a labor party, and they said, let us bring in a proposal for a labor congress, and voted down the proposal to bring in a resolution for the labor party. And where is the labor congress that we propagated in the A. F. of L.? It was offered and then forgotten. And that is typical of the attitude of our C. E. C. majority.

We were told, comrades, that after the elections the labor party movement was no longer in existence. Now, that again shows the fundamental un-Marxist way of thinking of our majority. Because in the election campaign the workers who were favorable toward the labor party had been swallowed by the La Follette movement, because of that the labor party movement was no longer in existence. That is the thing the Communist International criticized as basing policies upon superficial conditions. It was a superficial conception of the situation to say that the labor party movement was no longer in existence. The labor party movement might be wholly in the La Follette movement and a part of it might still be in existence. The majority could not understand that and therefore they made their errors and said that we must no longer advocate the labor party slogan.

AND comrades, we had some discussions here as to whether the majority was opposed in principle to the labor party. Comrades, I ask you if the majority could write this thesis on the immediate party tasks, whether they can now disclaim such opposition in principle. Here is the section on the right deviation of farmer-laborism in our party. Comrades, I say to you, I repeat for your benefit that in your own thesis and Comrade Cannon said yesterday, if you believe that farmer-laborism is right-wingism, then you cannot support the farmer-labor policy. If you believe the advocacy of the building of a labor party in the United States was ever right-wingism in our party, then you must be against it and fight it now as you thought it when you wrote this thesis. That is the conception here. And this is a continuance of what Comrade Bittelman wrote in this article. We find this statement in their thesis: "The position taken by the comrades of this tendency (the minority—the farmer-labor tendency, they called it) is the only way to utilize independent action of workers and poor farmers is thru a farmer-labor party. Forgetting the existence of the Workers Party as the political class party of the workers and poor farmers. These comrades also take the position that the only way to build a mass Communist Party in America is thru a farmer-labor party, thru announcing a new princi-

ple that the Workers Party can never become a mass Communist Party except thru organizing and working within a farmer-labor party." And then later on: "This non-Communist conception of the role of our party manifests itself particularly in the tendency to resort to all kinds of new political organizations, substitutes for the Workers Party, wherever an opportunity presents itself to appeal to large masses of workers on concrete issues of everyday life."

This, comrades, is the reverse of what Bittelman said in his Russian Section speech. Not in contradiction, but the reverse side of the picture. In his article he says that you can only build a movement against capitalism if the Workers Party creates that movement, and here we have a refusal to build united front organizations for the purpose of carrying on a struggle against capitalism. If you believe that the Workers Party must create a movement itself, then you must be opposed to creating a labor party. You must be opposed to organizing the women's councils for a fight against capitalism. You must be opposed to non-party organizations thru which the party carries on its struggles. This, comrades, shows that this was not merely an error on the labor party issue but was a fundamentally wrong policy, a fundamentally non-Communist conception in the minds of those who were in the leadership of our party. (Applause.)

COMRADES, that conception has manifested itself thruout the party work. Comrade Bittelman has spoken of our criticism of the united front policy of the majority group. And here is a very significant thing in relation to that criticism. We have a section in the written report starting "other united fronts and special party campaigns" (other than the labor party, is the meaning), the Save the Lansutzky Campaign, Anti-Abramovich, Unemployment, World Trade Union Unity, the Release of Crouen and Trumbull. Not one of these campaigns, supposedly initiated as united front campaigns, were they actually organized, on any important scale, thru united front committees for the struggle for these policies. Not one, comrades! Yet they are listed here as examples of the united front. And then, comrades, we had one campaign during the regime of the present C. E. C. which succeeded in uniting half a million workers in a common struggle, in carrying on an aggressive fight, and that is not mentioned in this report. What was that campaign? That was the campaign first initiated in 1922 by our group, for the protection of the foreign born, and carried on in 1924 against the new laws with the successful uniting of at least half a million workers in that struggle, as the reports of the national office show, and yet this is forgotten, and these campaigns which fall short of correct application of the united front is used to show how the united front tactic is applied.

That, comrades, shows the line of thought, the line of thought manifests itself in issuing manifestos but yet we do not go to the point of organizing support, of organizing groups, uniting groups of workers, for the struggle in support of these campaigns which we initiate. Comrades, the task of a united front campaign is to draw other organized groups of workers into struggles with us thru delegates or committees and carry on the campaign thru these committees and thus the CEC has not sufficiently understood and has not sufficiently and aggressively carried on the campaign for such committees because that would be the organization of all kinds of new organizations between ours and the masses against which they protest in their last thesis.

AND now, comrades, let us carry the argument a point farther. The CPPA policy of the majority group, and we will get a further light on the conception of the united front of the majority of the CEC. The CPPA had called its conference for February 21 here in Chicago and our Party was to take action. We proposed the labor party slogan in relation to this convention. We proposed, the minority, to elect our delegates in the trade unions and send them thru to fight under the slogan of the Labor Party, against La-

Follettism, against Hillquitism, to go into the organization and make the struggle there. That was a correct policy. That's the policy the C. I. decided was the correct policy but what did the majority do. They issued a manifesto and a resolution which our comrades were to introduce in the trade unions which said "boycott the CPPA convention." Boycott the CPPA convention! Comrades, that was de-leonism coming to life in the W. P. Boycott a mass movement of workers. Boycott a movement that is a step forward to progressive struggles against capitalism. Boycott a movement of the workers, which typified the development of the American working class since the end of the war, the development toward a fight as a class in their own interests. That was the acme of sectarianism and that was the policy which was offered in place of going to the CPPA convention. The policy offered in CEC resolutions, as a substitute, was that we should ask the workers in the trade unions to fight in a united front struggle with the Workers Party! To join in a united front struggle with the Workers Party! What was that. An application of the united front tactic of the C. I.? No, no, comrades, that was making the tactic of the united front a sectarian principle. Making it a principle to propagate in place of making it a tactic for action of the masses. If we urge the workers to go into a united front with us, we must say "united front against wage cuts, united front against child labor, united front against La Folletteism, the use of injunctions, united front on concrete issues and not a sectarian united front with the Workers Party."

That, comrades, was the policy in Bittelman's article, and the thesis of the majority which was offered next year, opposing in principle organizations between the Workers Party and the masses of workers.

And now, comrades, we turn to the next development of that policy. I thought we would have this discussion in relation to the discussion of women's work, but since Comrade Bittelman has raised the issue, I must answer.

WE had motions in the C. E. C. in regard to work among women. Comrade Bittelman tries to tell you that the issue was whether we should carry on work among women in the factories. Comrade Bittelman, here are the extracts from the minutes of

the C. E. C. which you yourself had made. I challenge you to show anything in your motion which shows work among women in the factories and ours which says work among housewives. That was never the issue. What was the issue? Not that, comrades, but we had in New York the United Council of Working Class Women. It was an organization of a united front character; first, delegates from existing organizations, and, second, it had, in addition, individual membership—and the question was, what we were to do with this organization. Your proposal, Com. Bittelman, as it is here, is that the United Council of Working Class Women shall become the Women's Department of the Workers Party. In other words, you wanted to liquidate a non-party organization and take a few of its members and make it the Women's Section of the Workers Party. In answer to that, our proposal was that we shall continue, that we shall build the U. C. W. W. and try to develop it into a mass organization. And, comrades, the minutes went to the C. I., and here we have some letters from the C. I. on a question of party policy, which the C. E. C. has refused to publish for the benefit and education of our membership, has refused to give you the benefit of this advice. (Applause; "Shame! Shame!") And why did they refuse? Listen to this (quotation from C. I. letter):

The Secretariat of the E. C. C. I. has carefully examined, together with the Women's Secretariat of the Comintern, the Bittelman and Ruthenberg resolutions and has adopted a definite attitude towards them. Both organs have come to the unanimous conclusion that the Bittelman resolution adopted by you, although the voting resulted in a tie, is in several decisive points contrary to the decisions and directions of the Comintern. The rejected Ruthenberg resolution represents, on the contrary, and precisely in the points in which it differs from the other resolution, the viewpoint formulated clearly and unmistakably in the resolutions and theses of the Third International Conference of Communist Women in Moscow, which were endorsed by the Executive of the Comintern.

AND then, comrades, what next? Well, our majority has had the habit in the past, when it makes political mistakes, of accusing the Execu-

tive Secretary of having falsified the minutes of the proceedings, and in this case they proceeded to say the minutes had not correctly explained their position and their viewpoint, and they sent a letter to Moscow—two letters, in fact, one on Feb. 11 and the other on March 14—in which they explain their position to the Women's Secretariat and the Executive Committee, and here I have the answer of the Executive Committee to their explanation dated May 5, 1925. They say on the question of women's sections, it was not the issue between us. The matter is cleared up, but on the main issue, which was the issue between Comrade Bittelman and myself, between the majority and the minority, they continued to say the following: "This settles that question, but the main question of which the International Women's Secretariat differed from the majority of the C. E. C. was the question of the role of the United Working Women's Council and the party's relation with the same." In other words, after their explanation, they get an answer which says they were just as wrong as before that explanation.

WE declared that our party suffered in the last year from a leadership which, because of its incorrect policies, could not mobilize the party nor could it bring the masses of workers under the leadership of the party to any great extent. We say that our membership, which was 16,000 when the present minority was in the majority of the C. E. C. and grew to 17,000 during the first six months of 1924, was again reduced to 16,000 during the first six months of 1925, so that we stand exactly today where we were a year and a half ago, and we say that a C. E. C. which comes to the party with a year and a half of struggle, of work, of expenditure of our forces in the work of our party, and cannot show progress in building the party, does not deserve leadership. (Applause.)

We say, comrades, that the C. E. C. has chosen to follow the same course to unite itself in the party with the same elements which were the basis of its support in the past and which will again influence it in the wrong direction. We say the majority group in this convention made that choice when it chose to use its power to override the minority in the fact that it took from it the positions of leadership in the party work which it won by vote of the majority in the districts

of New York, Philadelphia and Cleveland. Our group sees in that policy of the majority of the C. E. C. a policy of persecution. It made its protest, it made its fight against it. It came back into the convention and said, we will not split this party. It is our party and we will stay in it and fight in it until it is a party which will continue a correct line of Communist policy. (Applause.)

WE say that we will not split this party. No, but we will continue to fight against the policies which were adopted in the past year. We will continue to fight against misapplications of policies which may be correctly worded and resolutions which may be correctly stated but which the C. E. C. majority will not apply in practice so as to gain results for our party. We say present conditions show Comrade Bittelman, that you have chosen to make the continued basis of your support the right wing elements of our party, the Finnish Federation and the Loreist group in the Jewish Federation, in the German Federation and elsewhere, we say to you that you have not any substantial support in this party beside these groups. We say a majority based upon that support cannot lead this party and formulate correct policies for the building of this party. You have chosen to follow a line of extermination and elimination. We say while you have chosen, we made the offer otherwise, we desired something otherwise, we desired that you break with these elements and join us as the leadership of the party based upon the Communist elements of this party and having the support of these Communist elements.

YOU have chosen the other road, and as you chose to be the representative of the right wing of this party, base yourself on that right wing, we have no other recourse than to say that you are the right wing of the party and that we must fight against you. (Applause. Cheers.)

We say that this condition is not the best solution and might have been alleviated yet but you made the decision. You give us no other solution, and therefore there is no other road open for this minority to carry on a militant struggle against those elements which are not yet Communistically developed and which will give you the wrong policy and force us to continue to fight against it, and that we will do. (Tremendous cheers and applause.)

Cowderly Tells How to Keep from Growing Old

By P. B. COWDERLY.

The comrades everywhere want to know about touring the country in an auto. The sign, "Frisco to Chicago—Subscribe for the DAILY WORKER," inspires numerous questions, and everyone, even strangers incidentally attracted, are invariably friendly and interested. When we handed out sample copies of the DAILY WORKER they have always said, "Good, we are with you."

"We" are the comrades from San Francisco, Oakland, California, who have already reported in the DAILY WORKER our meetings in Sacramento and Salt Lake City, also Fallon, Nevada. At all of these places we were treated royally. In Denver we held a street mass meeting Aug. 16, with 500 attending and 73 copies of the DAILY WORKER sold, and another good meeting in the Labor Lyceum Aug. 17.

Stoppage of the oil line in our engine on the nineteen-mile climb out of Salt Lake City ruined our engine. Temporary repairs enabled us to reach Denver. Here comrades overhauled the engine completely, thus ending our engine trouble. This unavoidable delay put us a day behind our schedule and made it necessary for Comrade Dolsen to proceed by train to Kansas City and St. Louis, where he held meetings on the dates advertised.

Fall into a Mudhole.

As to road conditions, the highways are still far from being boulevards, yet each year sees a tremendous lot of new construction. This year serious washouts have occurred in Nevada and Wyoming. Detours are numerous

due to construction work. Rain on detours and new grades necessitates frequent use of a towline. In Wyoming we went into the ditch. A towline merely attached our towline and the first machine passing pulled us out. In western Kansas a thunder storm struck us at 6 p. m. We were on a new grade. The storm so blinded Comrade Dobkin, who was driving, that he failed to avoid a bad mudhole. We camped right there until 8 a. m. During the evening several machines tried to pull us out but could not get traction. After the coming of daylight and a partial drying of the road a big machine with chains easily pulled us out. Fortunately our tin Lizzie was equipped for bunking and the three of us got a good night's rest which we badly needed. To make meeting dates required that we drive night and day. This fourteen-hour delay compelled us to miss our Pittsburgh date. We found that the storm was local and only extended about five miles and we had landed in the only hole that could have delayed us. Our schedule of ten meetings in twelve days between Frisco and Chicago, had we experienced no delay, was found to be possible except the lap between Pittsburgh, Kansas, and St. Louis, Mo. Here we were compelled to travel two nights and one day. Missouri roads are still in very bad condition, especially for night driving, being poorly marked, often narrow and rough and full of sharp turns without warning signs. But rapid progress is being made in road building, even in Missouri. Except for occasional delays, motoring on the main highways is very practicable and enjoyable.

They Drive Auto—Convention Drives Them.

The trip to Chicago was too hurried to be completely successful. After the convention Comrades Cowderly and Roberts plan to take more time returning and secure many subscribers for the DAILY WORKER and Workers Monthly. Comrades Dolsen and Dobkin plan to remain in Chicago. Much has been learned on this trip to demonstrate the economy and effectiveness of using a Ford auto in distribution of literature and obtaining of subscribers. We expect to visit many towns before returning to California and we expect to convince the comrades in these towns of the necessity of circulating these publications. In California we now have two autos on this job year in and year out. Sometimes, as on this trip, excessive expense compels us to accept assistance from comrades and sympathizers who realize the value of our work and are in a position to help us. We ask this only when necessary, and only on condition that we are giving value received to the movement. Our only pay is the regular commission on the subscriptions we obtain. Plenty of energy, accompanied by sheer economy, gets us by. As an example: Between Denver and Chicago, the three of us spent just \$2.75 for eats, and for sleeps nothing. We had to save our meager funds for gasoline. We had just 13 cents on arrival. But we landed among friends. And we could have found friends in any town had we stopped to look for them.

A Wide Awake Crew.

As to driving night and day: We seldom stopped either to eat or sleep.

Only when we became tired out did we succeed in sleeping in the moving machine. Three of us took turns driving the machine. At the wheel we soon became sleepy. While reclining for the purpose of sleep we remained wide awake. This was the experience of all of us. We found, however, that we obtained sufficient rest even though we seemed not to sleep at all. It will be easily possible for a crew to drive a machine from San Francisco to Chicago in five days and nights in the near future. One more year, or at the most two more years, will find the highways all graded and dependable.

Why do not comrades use their evenings, Sundays, holidays and out-of-work vacation periods more for the social process of circulating our literature and less for the personal process of mere pleasure seeking? Hunting subscribers is far more exciting and interesting than hunting fun for fun's sake. Learn to put all you meet on record. Let your friends know how disgraceful it is to waste their time and money. Hold them up to some degree of scorn and ridicule if they fail to take the DAILY WORKER and read it. Extend your circle of friends to all you meet. Then meet all you can. Don't let them get away with the idea that it is smart and the thing to be ignorant and wasteful in relation to working class problems. Put up a fight. Nothing short of this can give you any real zest in life. Use your auto to a purpose.

If you want to thoroughly understand Communism—study it. Send for a catalogue of all Communist literature.