

The Communist

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1942

THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND NATIONAL UNITY
EARL BROWDER



THE WAR AND LABOR UNITY
WILLIAM Z. FOSTER



STRATEGY FOR VICTORY
R. PALME DUTT



STRENGTHENING COMMUNIST COLLABORATION IN
NATIONAL UNITY
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MR. HOOVER AND "THE PROBLEMS OF LASTING PEACE"
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INFLATION AND ECONOMIC WAR MOBILIZATION
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By Earl Browder

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THE COMMUNIST

A MAGAZINE OF THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MARXISM-LENINISM


EDITOR: EARL BROWDER



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THE INDIA CRISIS

Statement of the National Committee of the Communist Party

IT IS zero hour! The United Nations must fight the enemy!

The nation has been warned by the Office of War Information that our country is in danger, that the common cause of the United Nations is imperiled.

Hitler's panzer divisions have cut through our Eastern Front in Europe to within striking distance of the Caucasus oil fields and the gates of India, where they hope to join forces with the Japanese. The Nazis have been able to do this only because they could concentrate overwhelming forces at the point of their own choosing. Meanwhile the armies of Britain and the United States are, with few important exceptions, still in training and maneuvers, not engaging the main enemy, Hitler Germany, the heart of the Axis.

The mounting stream of materiel of war from American factories piles up unused except for important naval fighting in the Pacific Islands, sporadic air raids, limited assistance to heroic China, and a trickle of supplies to aid our only active land front in Europe, where our mighty ally, the Soviet Union, fighting with epic heroism, is left in isolation. We face the zero hour, but the United Nations are not yet fully fighting; only one part is fighting.

In this moment of crisis, when the future of all mankind is at stake, we are confronted with the tragic events in India. Our United Nations armed forces at that crucial point, which should be killing Japanese, and inspiring and organizing the people of India to defend their country from Axis aggression and enslavement, have instead turned their guns upon the Indian people in the streets of Bombay. It is not Japanese who are dying at India's border, but Indians in the heart of India.

It is time to put an end to all this muddle and danger, which is bringing our common cause to one disaster after another. It is the grave duty of all military forces in India—British, Indian and American—to halt the Japanese advance at all cost. Behind these troops the rear must not be thrown into chaos.

It is time to enforce the rule: Everything for victory over the common enemy of mankind: Nazism-Fascism.

It is time to open the Western Front against Hitler without further delay. This is the way to victory. This is the way to smash Hitler's Axis.

We must strike the enemy, and not our Indian friends who are demanding nothing but *the right to*

organize themselves for the fight side by side with us against our common foe and to realize their right to national freedom.

The Second Front to defeat Hitler and his Japanese accomplices is not in India against the Indian peoples. The Second Front to defeat Hitler is in Europe.

Even the most stupid blunders and costly mistakes in the high places of United Nations command cannot change the character of this war. It is and remains a peoples' war of national liberation.

These blunders and mistakes cannot wipe out our vision of the eventual victory of the peoples over the Axis monsters. The peoples will fight on and will win.

But let us not therefore complacently resign ourselves to the "inevitability" of these catastrophic weaknesses in our United Nations, nor ignore their terrible cost.

Every day's delay now in opening the Second Front in Europe is prolonging the war, adding hundreds of thousands to the future American casualty lists, is endangering the outcome of the war.

The United Nations guns turned on the citizens in Bombay streets killed not only the defenseless Indians, they also added a million or more to the number of American lives that will have to be spent for that future victory.

At this moment, it is a double tragedy that American public opinion is being misled, even by such a responsible organ as the *New York Times*. In its editorial on India of August 11, it says the negotiations between London and the

Indian National Congress broke down over the "communal issue" and the future form of government for India. That is simply contrary to fact. Sir Cripps never even discussed the "communal issue" with the Indian leaders, and the Indian demand which was refused was the demand for the right, at this moment, for the Indian people to organize and carry on the defense of their own country as a nation, in unity with the United Nations. We cannot win the Indian people to active participation in this war by telling lies about them, and scandalous lies at that.

At this moment all the rats of the Hitler Fifth Column are scurrying around to add to the confusion, and spread even deeper and more dangerous conflict. Typical of the propagandists of defeat is a sinister columnist writing in the *New York Sun* of August 10, the most vicious Axis propaganda yet to appear in a supposedly respectable newspaper. This journalist openly declares that the United States and Britain are preparing to abandon the Soviet Union to Hitler. This shameful slander reveals the "hell's brew" of the Fifth Column that is stewing behind the scenes, fired by Hitler's advances on the military front and the blunders of the United Nations on the diplomatic front, eagerly awaiting the moment to strike in the back our own United States and the whole United Nations.

We have received a cable from the recently legalized Communist Party of India. It gives a sober and responsible account of the situation

and the issues in India. It correctly places responsibility for the crisis in India on the British rulers. It rejects Gandhi's appeasement policy and the dangerous tactic of civil disobedience. It calls for the defense of India against the fascist invaders and for the establishment of a provisional National Government of the Indian people to actively cooperate with all the United Nations.

The message from the Communists of India makes a suggestion that has already been voiced in responsible circles of all political opinion in this country, such as the recent appeal of the famous writer, Pearl Buck, that the moment has arrived when President Roosevelt must be urged to intervene in this dangerous and fratricidal struggle, which is absolutely unnecessary and destructive of all interests except those of Hitler and the Japanese imperialists, and bring about serious negotiations which can and must result in complete unity of all peoples' forces in India against the Axis aggressors, and the formation of a representative National Government for common victory.

All honest citizens of every political tendency must agree with and applaud this proposal. It was already endorsed in substance last week in the resolution of the United Auto Workers Convention in Chicago. It is the course of plain common sense. It is the necessary demand of every person who puts the cause of victory over the Axis above everything else.

Urge upon President Roosevelt to throw the great moral influence of

our country into the scales to save India as a whole for the United Nations!

Let the entire American labor movement speak out and call upon our government, the British Cabinet and the British Trade Union Congress to help bring about a solution of the Indian crisis in the interests of the victory of all the United Nations, which is as indispensable to the freedom of India as it is to the freedom of all mankind. Let American labor cooperate with the British and Soviet Trade Unions, and the workers of all countries, to strengthen our common struggle against our common enemy—Hitler and Hitlerism.

Strengthen our national unity around our nation's Commander-in-Chief! Strengthen labor's unity and action to support and implement our nation's war policy! Rout the defeatists in the Congressional elections and everywhere!

Raise high the fighting spirit of the American people for the all-out assault upon the hordes of Hitlerism!

Away with inaction and delay!

Carry out the American-Soviet-British Agreements!

Open up the Second Front in Europe Now!

Everything for the destruction of Hitler and the Axis!

NATIONAL COMMITTEE,
COMMUNIST PARTY,

William Z. Foster,
National Chairman

Earl Browder,
General Secretary

HISTORIC DOCUMENTS

THE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE CHURCHILL-STALIN CONFERENCE HELD IN MOSCOW, AUGUST 12-15, 1942.

NEGOTIATIONS have taken place in Moscow between the President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, J. V. Stalin, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Winston Churchill, in which Mr. Harriman, representing the President of the United States, participated.

There took part in the discussions: People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V. M. Molotov and Procureur General Marshal K. E. Voroshilov from the Soviet side, British Ambassador Sir A. Clark Kerr; Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir A. Brooke and other responsible representatives of the British armed forces and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State

for Foreign Affairs, Sir A. Cadogan, from the British side.

A number of decisions were reached covering the field of the war against Hitlerite Germany and her associates in Europe.

In this just war of liberation both Governments are determined to carry on with all power and energy until the complete destruction of Hitlerism and any similar tyranny has been achieved.

The discussions, which were carried on in an atmosphere of cordiality and complete sincerity, provided an opportunity of reaffirming the existence of the close friendship and understanding between the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States of America in entire accordance with the Allied relationship existing between them.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND NATIONAL UNITY

BY EARL BROWDER

[Editorial Note: The following is a chapter from a forthcoming book by Earl Browder, a work of great significance to our nation for the attainment of victory by the United Nations over Hitler and the Axis and for securing a just peace. The book will be issued by International Publishers in October, under the title Victory—and After. The selection is here presented by courtesy of the publishers.]

SINCE I am writing as a spokesman for the Communist Party of the U.S.A., it may be expected that I deal with my own party in relation to national unity, before speaking in detail of other parties. This is especially necessary because Hitler, with his agents and sympathizers in every country, has made the creed of "anti-communism" his chief secret weapon for disrupting the national unity of all nations in preparing to conquer and enslave them. And nowhere has Hitler made more effective use of this weapon than in the United States; he has mobilized his forces directly against President Roosevelt himself, openly under the slogans of the fight against communism.

Recently I received an eloquent letter, running to about six thousand words, on this subject, from an ardent New Dealer whose social status may be inferred from the embossed letterhead on fine linen paper. The crux of this gentleman's proposal for settling the issue of the Communist Party and communism was that the party should dissolve itself and each ex-member should commit suicide.

Communists are expected to give serious answers to all proposals, even this one. Let us therefore begin by explaining to the gentleman, and those who think along similar lines, why the Communist Party cannot agree to the desirability of suicide as a means of disarming Hitler.

Ignoring the obvious answer, that universal human experience has long demonstrated the futility of suicide as the solution of any problem, we will explain why the measure would fail in this particular case.

Thomas Jefferson was denounced as a communist and red by the Federalists, before and after his elevation to the Presidency, and it was no answer at all to point out that

there was no Communist Party.

Andrew Jackson was denounced as a communist and red, and he had to fight through the issues of his day on their merits despite the fact that there was then no Communist Party in the United States.

Abraham Lincoln was denounced as a communist and red, both by the slave power and by Northern Copperheads. In his time there were American Communists, as well as an international Communist organization, but Lincoln did not ask them to commit suicide. Instead he commissioned their American leaders as officers in the Union Army, and expressed his gratitude to the international Communist organization (the First International) for its help to the Union cause in Europe. It clearly would have done him no good for the Communists of his time to commit suicide.

Jefferson, Jackson and Lincoln were the chief figures in establishing the American tradition of a self-governing democracy. All three were the victims of "red-baiting," but not one of them ever himself descended to red-baiting.

There is no reason today for any attempt to revise the tradition of these three great Americans. The Communist Party has its place in the great American tradition, and our democracy would only be the poorer without it.

Why then the outcry against the Communist Party? Why the near-hysteria with which this question is surrounded in our public life? Why are so many persons ready to exclude American Communists

from the rights and privileges guaranteed to all citizens under the Constitution, solely on the grounds of their political opinions? Why are they ready to proclaim the bankruptcy of the democratic process in dealing with communism?

We have already indicated in an earlier chapter what is the real power behind the anti-communist campaign. I intend to show even the most sceptical reader that it is Hitler Germany.

Surely, every patriotic American knows by this time that Hitler's great campaign against the German Communist Party was part and parcel of his campaign to conquer the world. When other German political parties joined in Hitler's war cry, they gave Hitler the help he required to seize complete power, but in so doing they sealed their own death warrant, only a few months postdated.

Surely, every patriotic American knows that Hitler's boasted "crusade against Bolshevism" on an international scale had its final aim to conquer and loot the United States itself. When other nations allowed themselves to be divided on this issue, they fell victim to Hitler's panzer divisions.

When France reached her supreme crisis, the Laval and Pétains, agents of Hitler, seized power from within for their master, under cover of a campaign of expelling the French Communists from the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, and arresting Communists wholesale, with the agreement and cooperation of all other parties. But when the smoke cleared away Hit-

ler's agents were in complete control of the country, the other parties had also been destroyed, and France had been laid prostrate under the Nazi regime.

The issue of communism, in this Hitlerian form, is beyond the slightest doubt Hitler's secret weapon for world conquest.

Still, there are many innocent dupes of Hitler. For the benefit of these, the issues must be explained again and again. And no one has appeared as yet who can explain it better than the Communists themselves. That is one of the great services we Communists have to render the United Nations.

When did the "anti-communist" war cry begin to rise to frantic tones in the United States? Remember? It was in 1933. It was at the moment when the real menace, Hitler, had just come to power in Germany. It drugged the world to the real danger.

Who began the job in the United States? Remember? It was Mr. Hamilton Fish, together with sundry associates, *openly acting as a branch office of Hitler's Berlin propaganda bureau!*

In 1933 Hitler set up what he called the "General League of German Anti-Communist Associations," with headquarters in Europa House, Berlin. This organization initiated an "International Committee to Combat the World Menace of Communism," with its connections in all countries—the original form of the "Antikomintern Axis." This committee had a section in the United States. This American Section published Hitler's first big propa-

ganda gun in this country—openly as his agents. They distributed this book throughout the United States in enormous quantities, free of charge. Here is a photostatic reproduction of two pages from the book, which furnished the model for Martin Dies' report in 1940, and for Fritz Coudert's report to the New York Legislature in 1942 (New York Legislative Document No. 49):

"We are informed that it is intended to publish an official collection of the judgments of the Supreme Court in connection with the Communist conspiracy. It is to be hoped that the General League will be able to exhibit these documents in an Anti-Communist Museum which is shortly to be established in Berlin. By means of this and other works and publications the General League will be able to enlighten the German nation and the international public opinion with regard to the real aims and doings of the Communist Internationale and to invite attention to the terrible danger which it represents for all nations.

"General League of German Anti-Communist Associations, Europa House, Berlin."

"At the beginning of this year there were weeks when we were within a hair's breadth of Bolshevik chaos."

"Chancellor Adolf Hitler

"In his proclamation of the 1st September, 1933.

"Why Americans Should Read This Book

"The question of Communist propaganda and activities is of im-

mediate importance to the American people in view of the consideration now being given to the question of recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the Government of the United States.

"Here is a challenging book. It should be read by every thoughtful citizen because it presents the history of the life-and-death struggle Germany has been waging against Communism. It reveals that the subversive methods and destructive objectives of the Communists in Germany are the same as are employed in the United States by those enemies of civilized nations.

"This book is not a defense of anti-Semitism nor is it a defense of the principles or measures of the Hitler government. The bitter opposition of many to some phases of the Nazi domestic program should not blind us to the reality of the Communist threats.

"The value of this German exposé as an object lesson to other countries has led our committee to place it in the hands of leaders of public opinion throughout the United States.

"The lessons to be gathered from this book, *Communism in Germany*, should lead our citizens to demand more effective measures of defense for our system of government, and our moral and social standards.

Walter L. Cole
 John Ross Delafield
 Ralph M. Easley
 Hamilton Fish, Jr.
 Elon Huntington Hooker
 F. O. Johnson
 Orvel Johnson
 Harry A. Jung
 Samuel McRoberts
 C. G. Norman
 Walter S. Steele
 Archibald E. Stevenson

John B. Trevor

Josiah A. Van Orsdel

"For the American Section of the International Committee to Combat the World Menace of Communism."

Eight years later, on January 14, 1942, a secretarial employee in the office of Hamilton Fish, Jr., Congressman of the United States, was sentenced to prison. The government describes his activities as follows:

"The defendant Hill is an important cog in the most vicious propaganda machine, the most effective propaganda machine that this world has ever seen, so effective and so diabolically clever that it is able to reach into and use the halls of our own Congress as a sounding board for its lies and half truths, by which they are trying to defeat and conquer us just as they defeated and conquered France, Belgium, Holland, Poland, and all those other nations in Europe. . . ." (*Trial Transcript*, p. 850.)

On December 11, 1942, President Roosevelt, in a message to Congress and the country, declared:

"The long known and the long expected has taken place The forces endeavoring to enslave the entire world now are moving toward this hemisphere.

"Never before has there been a greater challenge to life, liberty and civilization."

From Hamilton Fish to George Hill, to Germany's war against the United States, is a clear line of political preparation for the climax of military aggression. Whether they intended it or not, everyone

who helped develop this campaign was working for Hitler.

The United States is at war against the "Antikomintern" Axis, Germany, Italy and Japan, with their satellites. In this life-and-death struggle it finds its most powerful friend, ally and protector in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Up to December 7, 1941, Hitler's agents in the United States made their hysterical "anti-communist" campaign almost entirely upon the argument that American Communists were a "menace" only because they were "agents" of the powerful Soviet Union which was out to "destroy the United States Government." Now that this is exposed as one of Hitler's "huge lies" which he loves so well, a new version is projected. Now the "new line" is, the Soviet Union is O.K. as a military ally, but American Communists are all the more a menace, because "after the war" the United States will then have to lick the Soviet Union, and American Communists will then become the "Fifth Columnists" against their own country. This is the same huge lie in a more insidious form. It is like the "delayed bomb" which Hitler invented while destroying the Spanish Republic. It is aimed to keep our alliance with the Soviet Union from being effective, sow doubt and suspicion among the allies, break up the United Nations—and at the same time continue the old campaign within the country to break up our national unity.

But is it possible that Hitler's secret weapon is the weapon of

truth in so far as his description of the "menace of communism" is concerned?

Unfortunately, many sincere American patriots and convinced anti-Nazis still think as Hitler wants them to think on this question. They are ready to give everything, their property and life itself, to the defeat of Hitler—but they are not ready to give up the "anti-communist" phobia they have accepted from Hitler. With them it has become a fixed idea, a mania, beyond the reach of reason and argument based on facts.

Let us, however, attempt once more to bring such persons to face facts and draw conclusions from them.

Do American Communists themselves, by their own uncompromising and intransigent stand for their particular program, force everyone else to become either "pro" or "anti" communist? No, that is not the case. In fact, we are accused of the opposite; the complaint against the Communists is that we go into all sorts of organizations and help in their worthy objectives, without even speaking of the fact that we are Communists—and this is made the beginning of a new scare about "conspiracy," "boring from within," "secrecy," and so forth. Like most of the "anti-communist" arguments, it is one which works both ways—we are damned if we do, and if we don't we are doubly damned. There is no possible way of reasonable argument with a mind which is set in this groove. It is essentially irrational, it is the victim of a fixed idea, a form of insanity.

Do American Communists themselves help feed Hitler's "anti-communist" crusade by warring against American democracy and its traditions? No, that is not the case. American Communists have long been cooperating with all the democratic forces in our country which will accept such cooperation, and have been actively propagating that American democratic tradition, reviving the study of American history in the light of today's problems. It was out of this revival of American tradition by the Communists that there was born the greatest song of our time, Earl Robinson's *Ballad for Americans*, popularized by the greatest singer of our times, Paul Robeson, which captured our country so completely that the Republican Party used it in its 1940 convention, and the great corporations of Ford Motor Company and International Telephone and Telegraph produced it on their radio programs. But does this make the Communists any more acceptable in the living room of American democracy? On the contrary. If we spoke against American democracy, that would prove Mr. Dies' and Ham Fish's and Hitler's diatribes; when instead we speak most eloquently for American democracy, that is seriously cited as the proof that we are doubly a menace. When anything and everything is taken to prove and double-prove a single pre-conceived idea, is it not the universal lesson of human experience that such "proof" really demonstrates the opposite, that the idea is entirely false?

In defending the Communist

Party against these fixed ideas of the anti-communist crusade I am not interested in establishing for it any record of infallibility. Communists, being human beings, make mistakes like everyone else. And who, in these days of disaster for the world, is not forced, even if it is against his will, to search his own conscience to root out and correct every mistake, even the slightest, which has contributed to bring cataclysm upon mankind? Is there a single American who dares boast of his self-righteousness? Is not the greatest need today for us to find humility and modesty, all of us, nationally?

It would be no aid to victory, however, for the Communists to plead guilty to the Hitler charges, even when they are echoed from the mouth of an American liberal. We are ready to assist these liberals, patiently and painstakingly, to liberate themselves from the Hitler obsessions.

A typical expression of this obsession, the last stronghold of the "Antikomintern," was carried in the *New Republic*, June 22, 1942, in the column of T.R.B. (Kenneth Crawford). His central thought, which has found a thousand other expressions elsewhere, is contained in the following sentence:

"So long as the American Communist Party's disgraceful record during the life of the Russo-German Pact is remembered, the party's existence will remain a source of irritation and danger to the Roosevelt administration and its friends in their on-going struggle for domestic support of the war."

Now what is that "disgraceful record"? We Communists prefer to talk of the problems of the present and future rather than of the past. But the persistence of T.R.B.'s echo of Hitler makes of the past also a problem distorting the present and future. Therefore, we are forced into this discussion against our will. We will face fully and frankly every charge of "disgraceful record" against us. We ask for nothing except an honest acknowledgment of proved facts, and a reasonable judgment on facts, not prejudice.

In August, 1939, the Soviet Union signed a pact of non-aggression with Germany. American newspapers denounced that pact in hysterical terms; American Communists declared that the Soviet Union had no possible alternative, that it also strengthened the position of the United States, and therefore must be supported in its action. That is point one of the "disgraceful record."

Who was right? The sober afterthought in the light of history of practically every responsible statesman and institution in this country now confirms that American newspapers (including the *New Republic*) were wrong in 1939, and the American Communists were right. The evidence is overwhelming. I can take space for only a few citations, but every reader can confirm the matter for himself by mountains of evidence—including the fact that T.R.B. himself, and all his type, refuse to discuss the facts but only recall the prejudice of 1939.

Typical is the sober discussion, issued in 1942 by the Foreign Policy

Association, which certainly is not sympathetic to communism, in the pamphlet *Russia at War* by Vera Micheles Dean. I select her sentences which directly answer T.R.B. (recommending her pamphlet for a complete reading, without agreeing with it entirely):

"Unlike the British, the French, and many Americans, the Soviet leaders never underestimated the military strength and determination of the Nazis. They offered again and again to collaborate with the Western powers in maintaining collective security. . . . But, rightly or wrongly, they did not trust men like Chamberlain. . . . Their fears were confirmed at Munich. . . . From that moment on, the Kremlin placed no further reliance on the good faith of France or Britain. The Soviet leaders were henceforth concerned only with the task of preventing, or at least delaying, a German attack on Russia through Czechoslovakia and Poland. . . . The British and French governments had undergone a change of heart with respect to Germany—although not with respect to the U.S.S.R. . . . Mr. Chamberlain reversed his previous policy, and in April gave guarantees of protection . . . to Russia's border states, Poland, Rumania and Turkey, as well as to Greece. Now many people in Western countries feel that Stalin should have taken these guarantees at face value . . . and come to terms with Britain and France. . . . But we must remember two things. First, Stalin had little reason to trust the British and French. Not only had they, in his opinion, sold Czechoslovakia 'down the river' at Munich, but they had been more or less continuously hostile to the Soviet regime since its

establishment in 1917, and had given many indications that they would welcome its downfall, even at the price of Nazi expansion. The Russians did negotiate with British and French military missions in Moscow during that fateful summer, but the negotiations ended in failure. The chief reason was that Russia demanded the right to acquire bases in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Finland for the purpose of perfecting her defenses against Germany. . . . Second, we must also remember that the Russians did not have a high opinion of the military preparedness of Britain and France—and in this they turned out to be right. . . . It looked as if Russia would have to fight Germany alone. . . . So Stalin . . . signed a non-aggression pact with Germany. . . . It would be difficult to maintain that Stalin had 'betrayed' the Allies by signing his pact with Hitler."

Let us add to this 1942 estimate from a conservative source not sympathetic to the Soviet system the judgment of Winston Churchill himself, uttered in June, 1939, at the time of the negotiations:

"I have from the beginning preferred the Russian proposals to either the British or French alternatives. They are simple, they are logical and they conform to the main groupings of common interests."

Now why, in the light of these judgments which T.R.B. will not publicly dispute, does he find it possible to speak of a "disgraceful record" of the Communist Party in this country because it established

those truths in 1939 and 1940? Was it "disgraceful" to recognize the truth in 1939 but "graceful" to do so only in 1942? Or is T.R.B. still yearning for the "success" which Chamberlain promised but failed to gain? Is he still, in his heart, a partisan of the Munich policy?

We Communists are proud of the fact that we proclaimed the truth in 1939, when the truth if recognized would have averted the disasters which followed.

Perhaps T.R.B. has something else in mind that made a "disgraceful record"? The next step in the record was that the Communist Party opposed United States entry into the war on the grounds that, as it had developed, it was a war for empire between rival imperialisms. One of the most recognized of American publishers, Mr. Henry R. Luce, and the president of the National Industrial Conference Board, Dr. Virgil Jordan, proclaimed it a war for empire in order to advocate entry into it, but that was not considered "disgraceful"; President Roosevelt proclaimed American neutrality and the intention to keep out of it but that was not considered "disgraceful." The Communists combined the judgment that it was an imperialist war, and that we should keep out—and regardless of one's opinion on the merits of each question, it is impossible to make anything "disgraceful" out of the Communist position without striking many other heads than ours, the heads of T.R.B.'s friends, whom he defends.

What was it that distinguished the

position of American Communists at that time, which no other political group shared in any important degree? It was this, that we always insisted that the United States, in its own national interests and that of the freedom-loving world, should combine with the Soviet Union, "to banish the forces of destruction from the earth." On September 11, 1939, ten days after the outbreak of war, the Communist Party addressed an open letter to President Roosevelt and to Congress, which was the foundation for its whole policy during the period T.R.B. finds a "disgraceful record." This entire communication is published in the appendix for the thorough and careful student. I quote from it a few key sentences:

"In this hour of world crisis, when the most horrible catastrophe is descending upon tens of millions of men, women and children in other lands, and is threatening our own country, American thought turns to the question of national unity, to the unity of the great majority of the American people, in protection of the national interests, in furthering the cause of peace, and in finding guarantees for American social and national security. . . . We place before those who are responsible for the welfare of our people and nation the firm solidarity of our party with the hopes, aspirations and desires of the great majority of the American people, and the ardent wish of our party and all its members to work harmoniously with this majority and its elected representatives for the common interest and common welfare. . . . We wish to place on record our firm accord

with the stand of the President of our country against American involvement in the war, or in the rivalries and antagonisms which have led much of Europe into chaos. . . . We pledge our party to cooperation with those who subordinate their personal, partisan or class interests in order to serve the interests of the nation. . . .

"Our country, most powerful in the world, occupies a position . . . similar in most respects to that occupied by the second most powerful nation, the Soviet Union. . . . This common attitude . . . reflects profound common national interests which must, sooner or later, and preferably sooner, result in common policy and action, together with all like-minded peoples and governments, to banish the forces of destruction from the earth, to establish orderly international relations, to secure world peace."

What is "disgraceful" about this position? The only thing that is unfortunate is this—that Hitler's fifth column had succeeded in effectively sabotaging United States foreign policy in this period, prevented it from following any clear line at all, and created an attitude of positive hostility to the Soviet Union that even dominated our entire government for the next period. But the Communist Party is proud of the fact that it never wavered in its considered judgment that United States national interests were inextricably bound up with those of the Soviet Union, and that an alliance must necessarily come, "sooner or later, preferably sooner." And we never wavered in working for this, even when our party leaders were

imprisoned on miserable pretexts and the party itself subjected to Hitler-like attacks.

Consider the position T.R.B. is in when he interprets this consistently understanding and friendly attitude to the Soviet Union by the American Communists as "proving" that we are "an organized Russian nationalist group operating in the United States." Disregarding for the moment the deadly insult this conveys against our most valuable ally in the war, and the fact that it echoes Hitler, let us concentrate attention on the alternative policy which it proposes for the Communist Party if we wished to obtain T.R.B.'s blessings. To "prove" to T.R.B. that we are not "agents of a foreign power," we should, by his logic, have joined in the hysterical denunciations which most American newspapers and commentators indulged in at that time, and of which most Americans are now ashamed. And we should, by the same logic, have more strongly than ever advocated American intervention in the war.

Ask yourself seriously, dear reader, what would have resulted if the American Communists had been as blind and stupid as T.R.B.! With the Soviet Union—the only nation seriously prepared to defeat the military might of Nazi Germany—thrust outside the pale of cooperation as an equal among the democratic powers and small nations, the American Communists should advocate that their own country throw itself into the war against the Axis—and not to speak of the fact that

the war at that time was led by the Chamberlains and Daladiers and was not then an anti-fascist war! History has already proved that even with the Soviet Union fighting the most magnificent battle of all history *on our side*, even now we are not yet assured of victory! What if the American Communists had helped throw the United States into this war *with the Soviet Union still neutral*! It is not American wisdom, but Hitler's stupidity, that directed the course of history otherwise! But imagine the terrible force of T.R.B.'s accusation against the American Communists that we are an agency of the Soviet Union, if we had helped bring about such a disaster to our country. And yet, such a course might conceivably have delayed Hitler's attack against the Soviet Union until he and his Axis partners had *disposed of* the United States!

We American Communists *knew* that the security of the United States depended upon its collaboration with the Soviet Union. We would have been traitors if we, with this knowledge, had helped throw the United States into the war before we were absolutely certain that we would have the Soviet Union actively on our side. But T.R.B. and his kind wish to prove us traitors because we *did not* do that very thing!

Such shoddy thinking, such twisted logic, leads to the very border of Hitler's fifth column, does its work for it, and is equally harmful.

Throughout the period T.R.B. finds "disgraceful," the American

Communists worked energetically and tirelessly to lay the foundations for the United Nations which we were sure would come into existence. Evidence? The biggest single job carried out by the Communist Party in this period was the distribution and sale throughout the country of two million copies of the book by a leading dignitary of the Church of England, Hewlett Johnson, Dean of Canterbury, published under the title *Soviet Power*. This book is today listed as one of the most important books "for winning the war"—so listed by the very persons who attacked the Communists for publishing and distributing it! Mr. T.R.B., did you help distribute the Dean of Canterbury's book, or were you not rather infatuated by the book of the Gestapo agent Jan Valtin, which brought joy to Berlin, or with the Trotskyite tool, "General" Krivitsky, who was dispatched to the United States on agreement between Trotsky and Hess, the special purpose of both "refugees" being to prevent the formation of the United Nations?

When the issue is raised without connection with the American Communists, strangely enough, all the T.R.B.'s admit, point by point, that these positions taken by us from time to time on the biggest political issues were correct ones. But when this correctness is connected with the Communists, they foam at the mouth and curse us as "irritating connivers." Evidently, what they demand is that we Communists, if we are to be accepted as Americans,

must make all the mistakes everyone else makes, make them simultaneously, and not correct ourselves until T.R.B. has already shown the way. But if we were that kind of Communists, no one would worry about us at all, for we would long ago have been politically dead, buried and forgotten.

Is it necessary to go through the long list? We were denounced because we supported the Soviet Union against "poor little Finland." Since Baron Mannerheim's fascist government, openly and without a qualm, merged with Hitler's, and now uses the American planes Herbert Hoover sent him in order to sink American ships, who dares to raise that issue against the American Communists?

We were vilified as "murderers" because we explained and justified the Soviet Union's purges of the fifth-column traitors, the Trotskyites and Bukharinites who had entered the service of Hitler and the Mikado. Who dares to raise this issue against the American Communists today? Why, the very ministers in our churches are calling upon their congregations to "thank God for Stalin and his foresight."

And so, point by point, the case built up against the American Communists, to make them despised and hated pariahs in our society, falls to the ground upon the first honest examination. But the hatred remains, the prejudices persist, the laws thus inspired remain on the statute books, the habits built up under such inspiration remain fixed—all poisoning the daily life of

American democracy and preparing for our nation new mistakes and new disasters; unless as a nation we are big enough and honest enough to wipe out this shameful page in our history and begin anew.

Perhaps the main trouble in many minds today, with regard to the American Communists, is the thought expressed by T.R.B., that we unfairly "bask in reflected Russian glory."

If that is the root of our difficulty it should be easy to remedy. Let T.R.B. and his kind demonstrate that they have really learned the lessons of Munich; let them stop speculating about hypothetical future hostile relations between our country and the Soviet Union; let them show they really understand the basis that exists for profound and lasting friendship between our two countries; let them help America to win its own share of the "glory" now too much monopolized by "Russia"; let us go forward unitedly to victory—then they can easily forget such picayune and sniveling and unworthy fear. The glory of the Soviet Union is something big enough for every American to share equally.

As for the Communist Party of the United States, it is demanding nothing for itself except the common rights of all citizens under our Constitution to participate in the democratic process. We have such profound confidence in the character of the global war, since the participation of the Soviet Union and the United States in it, and the formation of the United Nations, that, with the knowledge that vic-

tory can only result in a peoples' peace with freedom for all nations, we can declare:

1. The Communist Party of the United States has completely subordinated its own ideas as to the best possible social and economic system for our country, which are the ideas of scientific socialism, to the necessity of uniting the entire nation, including the biggest capitalists, for a complete and all-out drive for victory. We give the formal assurance, which is backed up by our deeds, that we will not raise any socialistic proposals for the United States, in any form that can disturb this national unity. To all those still haunted by "the specter of communism," we offer the services of the Communist Party itself to lay this ghost.

2. The Communist Party of the United States foresees that out of victory for the United Nations will come a peace guaranteed by the co-operation of the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and China, as the chief organizing forces of the post-war world organization. This will make possible the solution of reconstruction problems, with a minimum of social disorder and civil violence, in the various countries most concerned, especially the devastated countries where the problem will be most acute. We declare that our thoughts and deeds will be faithfully and energetically directed to realize this promised perspective for the world, and for our own country, to the utmost possible degree. We offer our cooperation to all like-minded persons and groups.

We have dealt only with a few and the most pressing of the questions involved in the role and position of the Communist Party in the United States. Other aspects of the problem must be dealt with as they

arise in connection with particular problems in the following chapters. And, after all, this whole book is an exposition of the American Communists' attitude to their own country and to the world.

STRENGTHENING COMMUNIST COLLABORATION IN NATIONAL UNITY

BY JOHN WILLIAMSON

ON THIS twenty-third anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party our nation is confronted with the most crucial moment in this people's war of national liberation. The supreme issue of the moment is the immediate launching of the Western Front and common fighting action with our allies, thus strengthening and making effective the pact between our country, the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

The Communist Party, as the party of the American working class, as the party of socialism, is in the forefront of the struggle to defend our country and to develop further those policies that will bring victory to our people and nation. Every honest person recognizes that our party is contributing its influence, manpower and activity to strengthen every phase of the war effort, whether it be arousing the people, especially labor, to the urgency of the Second Front, increased and uninterrupted production, the war labor policy, civilian defense activities, unity of all war forces, and exposure of the fifth column. Comrade Browder, as spokesman for the party, declared:

“. . . that we subordinate every issue to this one imperative necessity of national unity under the nation's Commander-in-Chief, to win the war at the earliest possible moment, which means at minimum cost. . . .

“From the moment this global war and our participation in it became inevitable, the Communist Party declared for the unconditional subordination of all issues to that one issue of winning the war.”*

What we are doing today is the result of our basic Marxist-Leninist principles and our experience as an American political party—a party whose Americanism is strengthened because of our belief in internationalism. From the earliest years the party has fought against fascism and reaction and for the unity and defense of labor and of our nation. Our struggle against fascism did not begin at Pearl Harbor. Let every worker recall our support of collective security, our struggle against Munich because we understood it as a danger to America, our consistent advocacy of an American-Soviet alliance, our support to Loyalist

* Earl Browder, *Victory Must Be Won*, Workers Library Publishers, pp. 7, 12.

Spain, our effort to establish collaboration between our country and China and Latin America. Similarly, in the field of domestic affairs, the Communists are remembered for their consistent and selfless efforts of collaboration in organizing the mass trade unions and defending the economic conditions and political liberties of the people, for their constant championing of Negro rights, and for their energetic efforts to achieve unity of the working class.

It is well to remember the policy of the Communist Party when Chamberlainism dominated the thinking and actions of the capitalist democracies. Comrade Browder declared on May 4, 1938:

"The greatest danger to the peace of the whole world is the retreat of the peace-seeking nations before the fascist offensive. The fascist menace has grown on its easy victories. If this scourge is not stopped, the fascist war aggression will soon be on American soil itself." *

When the policy of Chamberlain and Munich, with its rejection of the Soviet Union's proposals for collective security and realizable peace, resulted in the imperialist war, the party, still concerned with securing allies for our own nation's safety, again declared through Comrade Browder:

"Does this mean [the circumstance of imperialist war], however, that we shall not urge the American people to demand a correct policy toward both China and the Soviet

Union, a policy that would truly be in the interests of the peoples of all three countries, a policy of peace? Of course, it means that we *shall* urge and fight for such a policy. . . . The American people, the real nation, are truly the 'natural allies' of the Soviet Union and its peoples."*

Consequently, it was a mere extension and application of our basic democratic and people's policies for the Communist Party to declare subsequently (June 28, 1941):

"Hitler's attack upon the Soviet Union imparts a new and sinister aspect to the menace of Hitlerism for the American people, the British people and the peoples of the world. . . . In this struggle, the American people are by no means neutral or unconcerned. They cannot but strive for the defeat of Hitlerism. . . . We, on our part, speaking in the name of the Communist Party of the United States, pledge our all, to work and struggle as a part of the American people for the realization of this program."**

December 7, 1941:

"Japanese guns have fired upon the United States flag. . . .

"Never in the history of our country has the need for unity of the nation been so great as now. The Communist Party pledges its loyalty, its devoted labor and last drop of its blood in support of our country in this greatest of all the crises that ever threatened its existence. In the tradition of the Com-

* Earl Browder, "On Some Aspects of Foreign Policy," *The Communist*, January, 1941, pp. 36, 37.

** "The People's Program of Struggle for the Defeat of Hitler and Hitlerism!" *The Communist*, August, 1941, pp. 679-682.

* Earl Browder, *Fighting for Peace*, International Publishers, p. 102.

munist leaders who in 1861 joined the United States Army under commissions issued by President Lincoln, 100,000 American Communists today step forward to support the bigger war against slavery, a war in defense of the whole world's freedom." *

July 2, 1942:

"With full faith in the justness of the United Nations' cause, as a People's War of National Liberation; with full faith that our own true national interests coincide with those of other peoples; with pride and confidence in American labor's mighty contributions to our nation's war; with strict adherence to principle as the only sure guide to effective solution of all domestic and international problems; with the inspiration of the glorious achievements of our Soviet ally in this war; with confidence that British and American arms will earn their full share of the glory of final victory—we join our voices to the call to all Americans:

"Unite for victory!

"Open the Western Front now and smash Hitler in 1942!

*"Everything for the destruction of the Nazi-Fascist Axis!"***

Despite the full efforts of our party and its membership in every phase of war work, including the more than 7 per cent of our membership in the armed forces of our country, we are not satisfied. We know that we must do still better. Especially must we give fuller expression to our purposes among the

masses of the people—bring that clarity that will result in a tremendous all-out nation-wide groundswell from the grass roots of America for a Second Front now, create that understanding that will result in still higher production levels, mobilize energetic and united labor support to the President's seven-point program so as to guarantee that there will be sacrificing by all and war profiteering by none—and develop that patriotic fervor which will forge our national unity to a white heat and will expose and defeat all fifth columnists and their dupes who try to hurt our war effort by any and all means of division, including Red-baiting.

Every labor and people's organization, devoted to strengthening the war effort and wiping Hitlerism from the face of the earth, is obligated to analyze its experiences, take energetic steps to strengthen itself and extend its influence.

Realizing this responsibility, our efforts to date have resulted in a 14 per cent growth of the party for the first half of 1942, a 90 per cent average dues payment for the same period, and a circulation of 95,000 for *The Worker*.

Completely unsatisfactory, however, in recruiting are such important districts as Ohio, Michigan, New England, Eastern Pennsylvania and Connecticut. The Northwest District in Seattle has now become the fourth largest district, overtaking both Ohio and Eastern Pennsylvania. In our efforts to influence and help activate for the war the workers in the basic industries, some progress has been

* "Everything for Victory Over World-Wide Fascist Slavery," *The Communist*, December, 1941, pp. 1043-1044.

** Earl Browder, *Victory Must Be Won*, p. 15.

made in establishing the main issues; in developing mass win-the-war movements locally; in sharply emphasizing the need of increased production in the coal industry; in exposing the role of John L. Lewis in the mining, steel and rubber industries; in connecting the election campaigns with the struggle to win the war, defeat the appeasers, and elect a win-the-war Congress. In the course of this political activity some headway has been made, especially in securing *Worker* subscriptions by Illinois and Detroit in the automotive industry, by Philadelphia in the steel industry, and by West Virginia and Virginia in coal mining. However, in strengthening ourselves, we have fallen far short, to date, of our recruiting objectives, achieving only such increases as these: in the steel industry 14 per cent, in coal mining 10 per cent, in the automotive industry 13 per cent, and in shipbuilding 14 per cent. In this respect every district, but especially Illinois, Michigan, Pittsburgh and Ohio, is failing to meet its responsibilities. To bring about a rapid change in this situation is a major task of all districts.

At this crucial moment in the life of our nation and the world, when we are contributing our every effort to a United Nations victory; when our energetic collaboration with all forces of national unity is increasingly recognized; when our influence among the trade unionists, the Negroes, and the people generally is many times greater than ever before in our history; when the winning of the war makes it

incumbent upon us as a patriotic duty, as well as a responsibility to the working people, to help bring about clarity through increasing the circulation of the *Daily Worker*, and to strengthen our organization in order to fulfill better and more adequately all our war responsibilities—at such a moment as this, why is the growth of our party, the functioning of its lower organizations and the circulation of the press, especially the *Daily Worker*, still unsatisfactory? We might list the following main reasons:

1. *Shortcomings in Functioning as an American Political Party.* The party, while always alert politically to the needs of the workers and of our nation, too often clings to old methods and practices in its functioning that may have been necessary under previous conditions but are outworn today, and thus does not function in the localities with the generally accepted methods of political organizations. Consequently, the splendid activity of the majority of our membership as individuals in all phases of war work and in the shops, trade unions, neighborhoods, and various mass organizations, is not publicly known and recognized as the contribution of the Communist Party as an American political party. Since the problems of recruiting and of increasing the circulation of the press must be understood as vital to the winning of the war, they must be approached and developed in this light by every party committee. We must create the understanding that mobilization for the war means influencing and activating ten work-

ers at home for every soldier in the army. If we understand party recruiting and extension of press circulation in that sense, if every new recruit is so convinced and made effective for contribution to war activities, we shall recruit tens of thousands of new members. Everything that counts is war work, and everything is war work that counts.

2. *Proper Relation Between Party and Mass Movement.* As is well known, the Communist Party is only effective as an advanced political force because it is strongly rooted in and is an integral part of the working class. This makes it possible, not only to influence those several hundred thousands who look to us for guidance, but to go far beyond this among people who disagree with communism but who have learned by experience to know us as honest and sincere in our viewpoint. These deep roots in the working class, together with our study and absorption of the experiences of nations and peoples, enable us to follow a consistent policy in the interest of the workers and of our nation.

Our responsibility is to contribute our every effort to the strengthening of the camp of national unity especially by helping to unite and by clarifying labor in its participation—in furtherance of those policies without which a United Nations victory is impossible.

When examining the present-day role, activity and growth of the Communist Party, we must recognize the role of the trade union movement, especially the industrial

unions in the mass production industries, in contrast to the pre-C.I.O. period. Today the trade unions, especially the C.I.O., are not merely pure-and-simple economic organizations in the historical trade union pattern. They are a political force, especially since the American labor movement has not yet developed its own mass independent labor party. In growing instances the trade unions become also a cultural and sports medium for their membership. As a result of all these activities, especially the developing mass political activities, the time of the active union member is absorbed. Thousands of new working class leaders have been developed and are absorbed in numerous trade union responsibilities.

This development—of great historical significance to the working class, and also to all progressive America—to which we Communists are proud to have contributed, has also its significance for us. Whereas yesterday, in many localities, shops and industries the Communist Party was almost the exclusive medium of trade union activity—through fighting for adequate handling of shop grievances, issuing shop papers which served as rallying centers for action as well as union propaganda, organizing and leading protest movements and strike actions, organizing the workers in the mass production industries and collaborating in the building of first the federal A. F. of L. locals and later the C.I.O. unions—today all these functions are correctly handled by the trade unions themselves. Many workers, especially

among the local trade union leadership, who are today more experienced but also overloaded with union activity, while still agreeing generally with the Communist Party, nevertheless do not feel the same necessity for active party membership as they once did; nor have we adjusted our functioning or methods of work to make it possible for such trade union activists to participate fully in the political life of the party.

We cannot deny the existence of this problem or brush it aside. We must recognize it and adjust our methods accordingly. We must see that while the fundamental role of our party remains the same, we must learn to work under changed conditions. We must fulfill our responsibility as politically the most advanced section of the working class—and hence as a political party—on a new and higher level than heretofore. Every worker must see and understand the difference between the trade unions—including militant industrial unions—and the Communist Party. *Today our political leadership must be of such a quality, depth and timeliness that it will be indispensable for every advanced and thinking American, especially every trade union activist and leader, to treasure membership in the Communist Party.*

That, in turn, heightens the need of our understanding our relationship to the mass movement, the need of constantly enriching our Marxist-Leninist theory and adapting our party organization to each given situation. We should all draw

lessons for our guidance today from such statements as these:

“. . . the power of the masses lies in organization. The mass movement does not spontaneously organize itself, beyond the most primitive forms; consciousness and planning are of the essence of organization, and must be transmitted to the masses first of all by the Communists. This requires the constant review and revamping of our party organization to fit it to the rapidly changing situation.”*

“Mastering the Marxist-Leninist theory means being able to enrich this theory with the new experience of the revolutionary movement, with new propositions and conclusions; it means being able to *develop it and advance it* without hesitating to replace—in accordance with the substance of the theory—such of its propositions and conclusions as have become antiquated by new ones corresponding to the new historical situation.”**

To be a Communist Party of 100,000 members—a war-time need—means assuming political responsibility of a higher quality than in the pre-C.I.O. days and, above all, recognizing that in our methods of work and in the obligations of the average party member we must make many changes.

3. *Political Misrepresentation of the Communist Party.* The Communist Party is receiving growing recognition by all strata of the population as an effective although small political party which is part

* Earl Browder, *The Communist Party of the U.S.A.*, Workers Library Publishers, p. 25.

** *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, International Publishers, p. 356.

of the camp of national unity, as is probably best indicated in the statement of President Roosevelt in releasing Comrade Browder, when he declared "that the commutation of his sentence which brings about his release at this time . . . will have a tendency to promote national unity. . . ."

Nevertheless, there is much deliberate misrepresentation of the party, as well as honest skepticism and misunderstanding in regard to the role of the Communists. The former is best represented by the fifth columnists Dies and Rankin and by such die-hard anti-Soviet elements as John L. Lewis, Matthew Woll, Louis Waldman, and the Social-Democratic *New Leader* crowd, who charge the Communists with being "foreign agents" and call for anti-Communist suppression laws. An able characterization of them was given by Earl Browder when he declared:

" . . . these laws were largely the result of Martin Dies' propaganda, and therefore are shaped in a way to please and serve Hitler. They are the peculiar product of Hitler's technique of international conquest. . . . They are being used to disrupt national unity and hamper the war effort. They are the instruments of Hitler's hidden invasion of the United States. They must be wiped out, not in the interests of the Communists, but in the interests of winning the war."*

No doubt the deliberate misrepresentations, gag-law threats and miscellaneous Red-baiting of this

gang made certain less developed and less experienced workers, while agreeing with the party, hesitate to join. Once it becomes clear to such workers that this is Hitler's technique for disrupting our anti-fascist national unity, their hesitation disappears and their hatred of Hitlerism makes them more determined Communists.

The well-established and publicly known position of the Communist Party was reinforced by the recent unanimous decision of the California Supreme Court, and further by the decision in Los Angeles, by Superior Judge Willis, who declared:

"Every time the charge has been made that the Communist Party advocates violence, it has denied it. To belong to the Communist Party that is on the ballot is to believe in Communism. Communism is a political belief that the agencies of production should belong to all the people and be equally distributed to the people as a whole. This is a far cry from believing in overthrowing the government by force. . . . There is no proof that Garner, the petitioner, was a member of any group advocating violence; his running for office on the Communist Party ticket is no such evidence."

It is unfortunate that, from time to time, under temporary pressure of the defeatist forces or through feeling insecure in their own position, certain liberals in the win-the-war camp relapse into moods of Red-baiting themselves. A current example of this is the recent letter of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt to the New York County Committee of the

* Earl Browder, *Victory Must Be Won*, pp. 11-12.

American Labor Party. Her letter was ably criticized in the *Daily Worker* editorial of August 7, which declared in part:

"Mrs. Roosevelt dragged the issue of Communism into the election campaign, and delivered an unwarranted attack against the Communist Party. By doing this, she supplied grist to the mill of the enemies of the nation's war policies. The Peglers, the Hearsts, the Martin Dies and the Coughlins will doubtless seize eagerly upon this in their war against national unity.

"She has unwittingly helped Mr. Farley in his fight to elect an anti-Roosevelt Governor in New York State.

"Surely Mrs. Roosevelt knows that Communism is not the issue. The issue is the unity of all the win-the-war forces in support of our government's war stand and in electing candidates to Congress and state office who will back it up.

"Will her intemperate remarks advance that unity? They most certainly will not. They will be used to the limit by the defeatists and obstructionists to try to smash that unity. . . .

"With all due respect to the First Lady, who has certainly contributed much to anti-fascist unity, we must reject her distorted conception of the Communist Party as extremely dangerous to the cause both of national unity and of the United Nations.

"Her concept that there can be no political unity between the Communists and the labor movement must also be rejected. It is this policy of the Blums and Daladiers in France that paved the way for the Pétains and Laval—the betrayal and enslavement of France. To ac-

cept such a policy here would lead to bitter tragedy for our democracy, as well."

Within twenty-four hours—as the editorial well declared—the Peglers, Sokolskys, Hearsts and other outright enemies of the unity of our nation and of the United Nations tried to utilize Mrs. Roosevelt's letter, not so much against the Communist Party, but against the policies of the Administration, against the win-the-war candidate Senator Mead and against Mrs. Roosevelt herself. This is precisely how the weapon of Red-baiting is made use of: to endanger the war effort through weakening national unity and undermining the growing collaboration of the United Nations.

All this emphasizes for us the need of a sober approach to all statements by uncertain liberal individuals, and the need of avoiding undue elation when they make correct statements, so as to avoid alarm when they are followed by counter-statements.

As regards those honest people who are insistent on raising today the problem of post-war relationships between the Communists and the other democratic win-the-war forces, let it be clear that we desire to continue, after the victory of the United Nations over the Axis powers, the same collaboration of all the broad progressive forces in our nation. Given a proper policy, by a democratic anti-fascist government, and by consistently carrying through these policies, the camp of national unity can well continue to

meet and fulfill all its responsibilities in the post-war period. The strengthening and building of the party and its press are clearly a war prerequisite and a further guarantee that this people's war can only bring about through victory a people's peace.

4. To Strengthen Our Collaboration in the Camp of National Unity It Is Necessary to Improve and Extend the Independent Activity of the Communist Party.

While the Communists actively collaborate with all the win-the-war forces and are being publicly recognized as an active participant in the national unity, their independent activities, as an American political party, especially as reflected in the branches and sections, are not today adequate. This weakness has its roots in certain mistaken notions and tendencies: (a) the notion that collaboration in the camp of national unity means losing the party's own identity and activity, leading to or (b) the failure of branches to function publicly as the forces of a political party and cast off all vestiges of outmoded functioning and methods of work that hindered our party from appearing as a public force—methods of work which were often forced upon us during days of repressive measures.

Our functioning more effectively as a political party can only strengthen the forces of national unity. We must not hesitate to speak out constructively when the Administration is slow to accept a fully correct policy or hesitant in carrying out an already-adopted correct policy. Such activities on our part

can only strengthen our democracy and our war effort. Our influence should not be limited to mere journalistic expressions but should also result in activizing the masses behind all progressive policies. Wherever it will not weaken unquestionable win-the-war candidates, our party must determinedly run its own Communist candidates and help clarify, activize and organize the people to speed up the war effort. All tendencies toward self-exclusion of the party from the ballot or easy capitulation to reactionary forces and laws must be combated.

All activities in the name of the Communist Party must contribute toward strengthening national unity and at the same time should popularize the program of the Communist Party as an American working-class political party. These independent activities should result in:

(a) Clarifying and activizing the working class as a vital and decisive win-the-war force in behalf of all the people in the nation;

(b) Organizing more active support for, and implementing of, the win-the-war policy of the Administration;

(c) Winning the country to accept the next and higher steps in the national policy directed toward victory;

(d) Strengthening the unity of the working class and its organizations, in defense of its own interests and to serve as the backbone of national unity; and

(e) Demonstrating that the party, with its basic socialist program, is simultaneously an active fighter and

collaborator on all win-the-war issues in this people's war.

The weakest link in all public political activity is the Communist Party branch. A majority of all Communist members are active in some phase of the war effort in addition to being production soldiers, or in the armed services—such as Civilian Defense, Home Guard, Red Cross, Allied Relief activities, blood donation, nursery schools, salvaging, war bond committees and rationing registration. However, the great majority of party branches do not yet appear publicly in their neighborhood as political clubs setting an example of patriotic activity. Too often the branch is bogged down in old practices and routines, and, while intensely active, separates its branch activities from the win-the-war neighborhood activities of the community. The branches which are exceptions to this general weakness, with their public participation in service flag dedications, salvaging metal and rubber scrap, setting up booths to sell war bonds (Comrade Cacchione has already sold over \$20,000 in War Bonds through his own activity), and mobilizing the neighborhood for blood donation, show the great possibilities for establishing the closest ties with their neighbors through serving their country's war effort.

It is urgently necessary for all party branches to learn to function more in accord with the established organizational forms of all political parties—with branch headquarters in the ward or assembly district, open meetings for the neighborhood, and local mass activities and propa-

ganda work which will make the branch chairman or organizer a well known and beloved public figure among the people. This will increase and improve our contribution to war work. It will make it possible to have 100 per cent membership participation in some phase of war work instead of 65 to 70 per cent as at present. All this requires a drastic change in the concepts of many branch leaders and members. To the extent that there is a fundamental understanding of the people's character of the war, this change will be easier to make.

Our responsibilities today demand from the branch initiative in issuing branch leaflets, just as in its mass work. They call for a sharp emphasis on the ideological front in the party, in order to combat all liquidationist or merging tendencies, and to strengthen our political activity. Greater attention must be given to literature and to the task of *convincing every member to read the Daily Worker*. For the members employed at night special methods are necessary to maintain political contact with them and to organize day-time branches.

The key to improving the mass political influence of the party in the interest of winning the war—and through this key to help strengthen the party and extend the circulation of our press—is at this moment the party branch.

It is also necessary for Communists in the trade unions—both leaders and rank-and-file members—wherever conditions permit, to let the workers know of their party membership and to prove by example that, instead of being a han-

dicap, as many anti-Communists say, party membership is of definite aid to the union, through the ability, understanding, loyalty and honest leadership which Communists are enabled to give to their unions. Such a situation will help break down the atmosphere of "mystery" which Red-baiters try to build up around the Communists, and will make us more authoritative with the broad masses of the workers.

The policy of national unity must be particularly applied in the trade unions, where all forces—from the most conservative to the Communists—have demonstrated their ability to collaborate on a common win-the-war program, which at the same time recognizes the need for safeguarding the workers' conditions and strengthens the trade unions. Sectarian digressions from this correct policy reflect failure to understand the changed situation we are working in and can only bring harm to both the union and the war effort. An example of these isolated sectarian tendencies which occasionally express themselves, among a few Communists as well as non-Communists, was uncovered recently in an unimportant steel town. At a meeting of the shop stewards a petition for the Second Front made its appearance. After more than half of those present had signed, the union organizer became inquisitive and began investigating what was taking place. Finding out the character of the petition he told the men to go ahead. The next day this organizer called in the Communist organizer of the town and after telling him of the incident,

said "If these brothers had come to me first, I would have signed my name at the top. That would have made it easier to get all the stewards. This way you don't get all the signatures and even make it appear that the union leadership is against the Second Front." While not all those who initiated the petition were Communists, the outlook of the union organizer was correct. This same organizer made another correct criticism of the local Communists in that union. He pointed out that Communist literature was left in the toilets of the union hall and remarked: "Do your members think this is a steel mill where you have to sneak around such literature? It is not dignified for party members to handle party literature that way. Let them put it in the union reading room." Let this criticism be recognized as correct and let every Communist establish the closest and friendliest relations with all union members.

5. *Improve the Functioning of the Party and Make It Easier to Be a Party Member.* Since the branch is the party link which must be strengthened, it is particularly necessary to adapt the functioning of the branch to our present responsibilities, *always remembering that our political leadership must be of a quality, depth and timeliness that correspond to our relationships with a politically maturing working class movement.* Today the average branch life is one of constant directives and exhortations to activity. Where political discussions take place, too often it is a political speech by some "top" functionary,

who delivers it with an air of finality, although observing the formality of asking for discussion. All this must be changed. The branches must become centers of intensive political discussion on all problems and activities. Branch political life and discussion will only be fruitful when it involves all members. The membership must participate in the formulating of the party line, through the interchange of political discussion. The party life must intercirculate—from top to bottom and from bottom to top. Only in this way will there be a rounded-out and united policy. This means establishing the closest connections between the party leaders and the membership. This is in accord with our fundamental conception of party democracy, long expressed in our party constitution, as follows:

“Article 6, Section 2. Every member of the party who is in good standing has not only the right, but the duty, to participate in the making of the policies of the party and in the election of its leading committees. . . .”

This will not interfere with branch activity. On the contrary it will extend and politically strengthen branch activity. It will more easily bring into the party many outstanding leaders among the workers. It will achieve activity by conviction and not by decree.

A party of 100,000 members—an immediate war need—must place greater emphasis on political discussion, simplified activities, greater leeway for the rank-and-file member, fewer financial burdens and in-

creased attention to the ideological front. All this will increase attendance at the branch meetings. Branch leaders must eliminate a conception of “party activity” limited exclusively to inner branch activity and *which automatically brands* the party member who is active in unions and other mass organizations as an “inactive” party member. The great majority of our members are active—some in the trade unions being our best and most effective workers. While they *should* attend branch meetings and fulfill their literature, press, recruiting and financial obligations in the course of fulfilling their political responsibilities, many times the branch life and the attitude of branch leaders have militated against this. We must strive to recreate energy and activity through political discussions and mobilizations.

The party branch should become the main party center, with some of its meetings public political discussions. The groups should occupy a subordinate place, although always retaining the Group Organizer as a medium of membership contact and mobilization, dues collection, literature distribution, etc.

Forward to a Mass Party— Our Next Tasks

In the midst of our active participation with all forces to help win the war, we must not only strengthen the party politically and improve its functioning, but also undertake speedily to increase the party membership and press circulation.

This is necessary because, while

the general party influence has been greatly extended, we have not correspondingly deepened our influence.

Twelve years ago, in a particular industrial city, we had an influence approximating 10,000 people, of whom 9,000 were closely connected with the party through various mass organizations and unions and through our press. The party membership of that city was then from 800 to 900. Thus, the party's strength and its general influence stood in a ratio of about 12 to 1. Nevertheless, we had a deep ideological influence over the great majority. Today, in that same city, with the party membership now about 1,000, our general political influence (not considering indirect influence) approximates 50,000, but the number over whom we have close and deep ideological influence has not appreciably increased (although they are generally in basic industry unions). The ratio of our organizational strength to general political influence is about 50 to 1. Thus our membership is spread much thinner and our close ideological influence is at the same time narrowed down. This gap must be closed through bringing into our party thousands of workers.

It is necessary to increase the party membership as a step toward strengthening our contribution to the war effort, because of the urgency of political clarity among the people and the need for strengthening the struggle of all forces within the camp of national unity who are determined to support those concepts of the Administration ex-

pressed in the well-known speech of Vice President Wallace, wherein he declared:

“. . . the century in which we are entering—the century which will come into being after this war—can be and must be the century of the common man. . . . No nation will have the God-given right to exploit other nations. Older nations will have the privilege to help younger nations get started on the path to industrialization, but there must be neither military nor economic imperialism.”

Whereas, in the period immediately after June 22, we decided, and correctly so, to forego any public activities which could be demagogically and incorrectly characterized as taking partisan advantage of the new situation, today the course of national unity is already charted and national unity is established, and our active participation and contributions are increasingly recognized.

However, the win-the-war forces, united behind the Administration, and in support of the pacts of the United Nations, are always under attack from the fifth column or their dupes, over the specific question of collaboration with the Communists (which to the Dieses and Hoovers means the five million members of the C.I.O. and all militant and progressive people). Unfortunately, not all Administration forces, as for instance Attorney-General Biddle and Mrs. Roosevelt, meet this attack squarely and properly—by rejecting it and branding those who raise such issues as forces interested in

dividing the camp of national unity and consequently weakening the war effort. That new thousands are learning how to counter such divisions is seen by the recent statement of 600 prominent Americans (among whom were Rev. Carlyle Adams, editor of *The Presbyterian Tribune*; Alice Stone Blackwell; Rev. J. F. Fletcher, Dean of Graduate School of Applied Religion in Cincinnati; John Green, National President of the International Shipbuilding Union; O. A. Knight, President of the International Oil Workers Union; A. F. Whitney, President of the Brotherhood of Railway Trainmen; Alfred Baker Lewis, Executive Board of Union for Democratic Action; and Professor F. O. Matthiesen of Harvard). That statement declared, in part:

"Whatever one conceives the political principles of the Communist Party to be, there can be no question of its unreserved support of the war program."

It becomes clear that the forces of national unity, while consisting of diverse classes, political opinions, and organizations, all united on winning this people's war, in alliance with the Soviet Union and Great Britain against the Axis powers, can only strengthen themselves through struggle against all forces, whether from the ranks of employers or labor, who try to divide the win-the-war forces and thus help Hitler and his friends in this country. And because of our particular role as a political party of the working class—which is the backbone of national unity—these new

conditions and the need of helping to strengthen the fight against all Red-baiters, who are playing Hitler's game, consciously or unconsciously, demand from us that we strengthen organizationally the Communist Party. A stronger Communist Party will not only contribute more politically but will be respected more because of its organizational strength. All this must inevitably help strengthen our collaboration with all anti-Hitler forces—now and in the post-war period.

From Great Britain we hear that the Communist Party, after undertaking a recruiting campaign for 15,000 new members in three months, finished with over 25,000 new members. From the news reports available it would appear that these successes were achieved because the Communist Party of Great Britain pursued a policy of political initiative and boldness—all within the structure of national unity—in support of a rounded-out win-the-war program which it brought to the workers in the shops, local unions, cooperatives, and local Labor Party Clubs.

From this we must draw the conclusion that the workers must see and understand the win-the-war program of the Communist Party—and be ready to join with us in the most active collaboration with *all* the win-the-war forces—even though they do not yet agree with the fundamental aspects of our program.

While striving to intensify all recruiting activities, so that the 14 per cent growth registered in the

first half of this year may at least be doubled in the second half, the center of all recruiting activities should still remain the industrial workers, especially in such industries as mining, steel, automotive, shipbuilding, and metal-electrical. In the three months from May to August serious efforts have been made to help influence the workers in these industries and to participate with them in all types of mass activities. While over 5,000 new 6-month press subscriptions were obtained in these three months outside of New York City—and the great majority were from industrial workers—the main concentration industries contributed only as follows: steel, 496; mining, 404; automotive, 928. Several times this number is possible and mandatory; it can be achieved if all party members prepare the ground in their shops and local unions and then follow up with Browder Brigade or home delivery subscriptions to these basic industry workers. While some substantial progress has been made in subscriptions (in the last six months 16,000 new 6-month mail subscriptions were obtained), nevertheless recruiting activities neither correspond to the objective conditions nor to the immediate contact already established through *The Worker* circulation. It is clear that every District leadership must politically evaluate this task and give it adequate attention. There can be a real influx of members into our ranks by making clear that, in the Communist Party, workers will increase their contribution to the war effort as a result of political clari-

fication and organized leadership and direction in all phases of mass work.

The Worker, which increased its circulation to over 100,000 and has leveled off at 95,000, can easily reach its next goal of 150,000 toward its half-million circulation level. Recognition by every District Committee of the role of *The Worker* in bringing political clarity to the workers will find expression in new organizational efforts by the District leadership through a subscription campaign and through rebuilding and strengthening the Browder Brigade. The increase in *Daily Worker* circulation, which is directed primarily toward party members, sympathizers and non-party trade union activists, is essentially a matter of political conviction. These are tasks whose fulfillment by October 1 will reflect the political appreciation and organizational ability of every District leadership.

The Preamble to the Constitution of the Communist Party will help the American worker understand the role and absolute need for a political party of the working class and to recognize what objectives the Communist Party actually has. The Preamble states:

“The Communist Party of the United States of America is a working class political party carrying forward today the traditions of Jefferson, Paine, Jackson, and Lincoln, and of the Declaration of Independence; it upholds the achievements of democracy, the right of ‘life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,’ and defends the United States

Constitution against its reactionary enemies who would destroy democracy and all popular liberties; it is devoted to the defense of the immediate interests of workers, farmers, and all toilers against capitalist exploitation, and to preparation of the working class for its historic mission to unite and lead the American people to extend these democratic principles to their necessary and logical conclusions.”*

* *Constitution of the Communist Party of the U.S.A.*, Workers Library Publishers, p. 5.

On the twenty-third anniversary of the Communist Party, which coincides with the 166th anniversary of the birth of our own country as a nation and also with the twenty-fifth anniversary of our valiant ally, the Soviet Union, every Communist, and especially every party committee, should approach the entire problem of party building and press circulation as a war task—a necessary patriotic duty for the achievement of victory.

THE WAR AND LABOR UNITY

BY WILLIAM Z. FOSTER

LABOR DAY, 1942, is the most crucial ever faced by American organized labor in its more than a century of stormy history. Our nation is facing a desperate struggle for national survival. For the workers, therefore, this Labor Day is not one of joyful demonstrations in the streets and in the parks, but of hard work in the war industries and bitter fighting on the battlefields. The American people, together with the rest of the United Nations, are confronting the most powerful and ruthless military aggressors in the long annals of war. Defeat would mean to sink into the deepest national enslavement, but victory would carry with it the smashing of fascism and the opening up of a perspective of a bright new world.

The supreme military necessity confronting the American and British peoples is the immediate launching of a great Anglo-American second front in Western Europe in cooperation with the Red Army. Failure to organize such a front promptly could have disastrous effects upon the whole outcome of the war. Already the United Nations' cause is gravely imperiled by the long and needless delay in opening the Western front. The fate of our nation, of all civilization, is tied up

with the matter of delivering a crushing attack against Hitler from the west. *To help create this second front and to provide it with all the means necessary for its success is the central task of organized labor and of the whole American people on this historic Labor Day.*

The workers, who have the most to gain by the defeat of Hitler and who would be the greatest sufferers by an Axis victory, are wholeheartedly resolved to win this war. They know that it is a people's war of national liberation, and they are determined that its outcome will be a decisive victory for the constructive, democratic forces of the world. Consequently, they are ready to make any and every sacrifice necessary for victory over Nazi Germany and Japan. Through their trade unions they are now setting our whole people an example of patriotic support of the nation at war. The whole import of Labor Day this year is to bring about the completest possible mobilization of the workers, with the rest of the American people, for all-out struggle against the Nazis and all their allies.

The Importance of Labor Unity

In order for the American working class to throw its full, militant,

fighting force behind the war it is indispensable that there be the highest possible degree of trade union unity, both on a national and an international scale. The divisions between the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O., between these two federations and the Railroad Brotherhoods, and between all of them and the independent unions (some under company influence) who are attempting to form a "federation" of their own, besides the separatist tendencies of the United Mine Workers—all constitute real handicaps to the most effective functioning of organized labor in this war crisis. And the same is true of the detached position of the American labor movement internationally. During recent months, as we shall discuss later, considerable progress has been made toward achieving unity of action in support of the nation's war program, especially for securing uninterrupted war production and around such issues as the second front, civilian defense, and the election of win-the-war Congressional candidates. But the situation is still highly unsatisfactory. It is most fitting, therefore, that trade union unity should be one of the central issues before organized labor on this Labor Day.

The achievement of a substantial degree of labor unity on a national scale will enormously increase the trade unions' war effort in all phases. It will greatly strengthen the position of the militant anti-fascist forces throughout the ranks of the trade union movement. As things now stand, the Hutcheson-Lewis defeatist, anti-Roosevelt ele-

ments are able to play a dangerous role. But with the establishment of closer cooperation between the C.I.O. and A. F. of L., not to speak of the achievement of complete organic unity, the loyal win-the-war forces would be consolidated and thus enabled to develop a more unified policy. This would surely express itself by a more determined demand of the entire trade union movement for the second front now. Trade union unity, in the measure that it is accomplished, will be a blow against the fifth columnists in labor's midst, who can best play their game of working-class demoralization and national paralysis in a labor movement torn by divisions, as ours is now.

A greater degree of labor unity would also facilitate the fight of the workers against the defeatists and the fifth column in general. In the crucial Congressional elections, for example, organized labor could then put up a far more effective struggle than it is now doing against the host of defeatists of the Ham Fish type who are insolently presenting themselves before the people for election. A united labor movement could and would also take up more energetically the fight against the copperhead press, the Hearst, Howard, McCormick, Patterson chains.

A labor movement, united organically or in closer cooperation on all war questions, could also do a far better job of stimulating production, for which it could readily adopt a uniform plan. It would also better prevent strikes than it is now doing, and it would give more real support to the President's seven-point anti-

inflation program. A united labor movement could also secure more adequate representation in the Government and on Government war boards.

By the same token, American labor could lend much greater power to the world war effort of the United Nations if it were linked up closely with the British and Soviet trade unions. Such unity of action among these three labor movements and allies is basically necessary to strengthen the alliance and common fighting action of the United Nations; to increase production on an international scale; and to provide additional guarantees for ensuring friendly collaboration among the United Nations and peoples in the organization of a just and lasting peace in the post-war period.

In short, at its every step, nationally and internationally, organized labor is handicapped in its war work by the prevailing divisions in its ranks. Every advance toward labor unity, therefore, is a step toward strengthening labor's and the nation's war effort. The achievement of the greatest practicable labor unity of action, nationally and internationally, at the earliest possible moment is a war necessity of major importance. It would also give a tremendous push forward to labor in every respect.

Steps Toward National Labor Unity

The present powerful trend, in official and rank-and-file trade union circles, for labor unity began to get well under way in the months

just prior to Pearl Harbor, when, after Hitler's attack on the U.S.S.R., the American people began to realize that they could not avoid being plunged fully into the war. The trade unions, top and bottom, realized from the outset that labor unity was a fundamental necessity for our nation to meet the great war crisis facing it. This growing unity spirit was fed by a feeling among the rank and file of the A. F. of L. that life itself, by the success of the C.I.O., has settled the controversy that caused the original split, whether or not the industrial or craft type of union was able to organize the mass production industries.

The first real get-together step of the union leaders, following the failure of the unity negotiations of a few years before, was taken in December, just after the Japanese imperialists attacked us. The A. F. of L. and C.I.O. officials at that time came together, with the employers and the Government, agreed upon a no-strike policy for the duration of the war, formed the National War Labor Board with its tripartite representations and decided to submit all wage disputes to that body.

This, however, was only a first step. There remained the keenest need for all sections of the labor movement—A. F. of L., C.I.O., Railroad Brotherhoods, independent unions—to cooperate in support of the Government in carrying out the myriad tasks of our expanding war effort. Consequently, there swiftly developed one of the most remarkable rank-and-file union movements in the history of this country.

In dozens of important industrial cities and states cooperative movements sprang up between the A. F. of L. and C.I.O. unions (usually upon the initiative of the latter and its Councils) in support of one or more phases of the Government's war program. All these local movements surged with a spirit of unity, and many of them directed appeals to the headquarters of both the A. F. of L. and C.I.O., urging these bodies to call a general conference of all trade unions and to work out labor's general win-the-war program. Communists and progressive forces generally gave active support to this wide and significant mass unity movement.

The top leaderships of the labor movement, especially of the A. F. of L., were generally slow to respond to this urge from the bottom. They failed to take prompt action for closer war cooperation between the two federations. Whereupon the wily John L. Lewis, seeking to take advantage of the prevailing unity sentiment and to fish in troubled waters, made his proposal in May of this year that negotiations for organic unity be resumed between the standing committees of the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. He completely ignored President Philip Murray of the C.I.O. in making this move. This attempt by Lewis to create bad blood and further division in the labor movement was not without results, as his dramatic proposal was followed by much confusion in labor's ranks. Only with the formation of the Combined Labor Victory Board soon thereafter, made up of three representatives each from the

A. F. of L. and C.I.O., and with President Roosevelt acting as chairman, was the disruptive maneuver of Lewis defeated.

The Victory Labor Board also, like the War Labor Board, is only a step in the right direction. It by no means satisfies labor's urgent need for unity in the war crisis. The board has many limitations. First, it meets more or less in secrecy, as a sort of advisory body to the President, and the rank and file of labor know little about its transactions; second, it has never developed a rounded-out win-the-war program nor undertaken broad activities to mobilize the great trade union rank and file for an all-out war effort; third, it has served as a sort of makeshift, and a very unsatisfactory one, for the representation that organized labor should have received in the President's Cabinet and on all Government war boards.

The unsatisfied demand for labor unity persisted among the masses. The next big move at the top came from the Executive Council of the A. F. of L., which, upon the initiative of the defeatist W. L. Hutcheson, a friend of Lewis and animated by a similar disruptive purpose, proposed on June 23 to the C.I.O. that negotiations be reopened between the two federations for the establishment of organic trade union unity. The C.I.O., always eager to advance the cause of labor unity, replied by proposing instead that the two bodies take the next practical steps toward eventual complete unity by developing a more intense collaboration on all war issues. It

suggested the calling of an all-inclusive labor trade union conference, the formation of a win-the-war program, and the establishment of a United Labor Council to include all branches of organized labor. This plan was intrinsically practical, since it would have led to a much closer and more effective war cooperation between all branches of labor, and would have tended generally to bring all sections of the labor movement nearer together. It was, however, rejected curtly by the A. F. of L. leaders, many of whom were still hoping for the day when they could carve up the powerful C.I.O. industrial unions.

The Present Unity Negotiations

Despite the above-indicated neglect, half-hearted measures and slippery maneuvers by the Lewis-Hutcheson-Woll clique, the question of trade union unity, which is so burningly necessary for the war effort, remained burning. On August 1, Philip Murray, on behalf of the C.I.O., in accord with the growing cooperation between the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. organizations locally and in many states around most win-the-war issues, directed new unity proposals toward the A. F. of L. Press dispatches stated that President Roosevelt had also privately indicated previously to both William Green and Philip Murray that the Government considered labor unity to be absolutely necessary to the most effective prosecution of the war.

There are two general aspects to the new C.I.O. unity proposals. The

first of these is that they provide a means to increase the present cooperation of labor in support of the nation's war effort; the second is that they propose to explore the problem of establishing actual organic unity. This complicated unity process is to be advanced among three committees: (a) the Combined Victory Labor Committee, whose general work of uniting labor behind the war would be intensified; (b) a special A. F. of L.-C.I.O. committee, with an impartial arbitrator, would dispose of all jurisdictional disputes that might cause strikes; and (c) the existing negotiating committees would take up in detail all problems connected with organic trade union unity. It is significant that Mr. Murray, in a later statement, also raised as a condition for trade union unity the abolition of all discrimination against Negroes by A. F. of L. unions.

The C.I.O. unity proposals are sound ones, like the earlier ones made by that body. In line with them it is clear that, regardless of the outcome of the negotiations for organic trade union unity, the present war collaboration between the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. must not be lessened, but intensified. This the C.I.O. proposed to accomplish through enlivening the Victory Labor Board. It is also obvious that C.I.O.-A. F. of L. jurisdictional disputes should be arbitrated and not be allowed to cause stoppages in war industries (as has been the case in several recent instances). In view of the fact that the War Labor Board has not assumed jurisdiction over such inter-union dis-

putes, a new committee, such as President Murray suggests, should be set up to handle them. Finally, the C.I.O.'s proposal is a practical one for the negotiations committees of three each from the two federations to examine concretely the complex problems attendant upon actually establishing organic unity.

As this article is being written, the A. F. of L. Executive Council is in session in Chicago and it has not yet made known its full answer to the C.I.O. unity proposals. President Green has stated, however, that the Council is ready to have its committee start negotiating with the C.I.O. for organic unity. He has expressed the hope and belief that, whatever the outcome of the attempt to establish organic unity now, the trend toward closer A. F. of L.-C.I.O. cooperation for winning the war should continue and be intensified. As for the matter of adjusting jurisdictional disputes between unions of the two federations, Mr. Green takes the wholly unsatisfactory position that these shall be handled directly by the A. F. of L. unions immediately concerned.

Whether or not the A. F. of L. Executive Council finally overrides the disruptive Hutcheson-Woll clique and accepts the present C.I.O. unity proposals, it is safe to assume that the progress toward trade union unity will continue, probably with faster tempo. The war situation demands it, the C.I.O. desires it, the Government is encouraging it, the rank and file of labor want it, and the more progressive A. F. of L. leaders are working for it.

In envisaging negotiations for na-

tional trade union unity, therefore, the champions of genuine labor unity should keep four things clearly in mind: First, they must be on guard not to let the deep differences over the problems of organic unity prevent an intensification of A. F. of L.-C.I.O. war cooperation; for the more such cooperation we have the faster we shall be traveling toward complete unity; the very committees that grow out of this war cooperation may well be the basis for the committees that will finally organically unite the whole labor movement; and it is quite probable that labor unity may be eventually achieved rather by this gradual coming-together process of the big groups of unions than by some general settlement of all jurisdictional problems in each industry and the amalgamation of all overlapping unions. Second, they must not let craft-minded A. F. of L. leaders split up the industrial unions of the C.I.O., for that would bring about not labor unity but chaos and a general weakening of the labor movement. Third, they should seek to involve the Railroad Brotherhoods and the bona fide independent unions in all plans of organic unity and especially of the unity of action to support the war. Fourth, they must see to it that the rank and file are given every encouragement to speak out on the trade union unity question, and to display the fullest initiative in developing war cooperation among all the groups of unions in the various localities and industries. If these four propositions are borne in mind, the movement for national

trade union unity will make real and rapid advances. Undoubtedly, important steps can be taken toward the welding together of the 12,000,000 members of the A. F. of L., C.I.O., Railroad Brotherhoods and independent unions into a unified force capable of exerting still greater and more gigantic power for winning the war.

The Question of International Labor Unity

One of the striking expressions of the people's character of this war is the strong movement for international trade union unity to which it has given birth. The workers realize the tremendous importance of labor solidarity, internationally as well as nationally, both for winning the war and winning the peace. An internationally united labor movement can be a strong backbone for the whole United Nations. To establish and carry through speedily the vitally necessary Western Front the question of promoting international trade union unity is especially urgent.

Almost immediately after the Nazis invaded the U.S.S.R., on June 22, 1941, the leaders of the British and Soviet trade unions began to negotiate for establishing closer working relations. This resulted in the formation of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, the exchange of labor delegations between the two labor movements, and generally the development of better cooperative relations mutually beneficial to the British and Soviet peoples and the United Nations' cause.

The involvement of the United

States in the war in December, 1941, gave a strong impulse to the development of sentiment in this country for international trade union unity. A number of C.I.O. unions spoke out, demanding American affiliation to the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee, and a spirit friendly to the Soviet trade unions and in favor of united labor action internationally developed widespread throughout the American labor movement. At first neither the A. F. of L. nor most of the C.I.O. top leaders took definite action, however. The formal initiative was finally taken by the British Trade Union Congress, which, early this year, sent its General Secretary, Sir Walter Citrine, to the United States with a proposal for closer Anglo-Soviet-American trade union cooperation in the war.

Then followed many weeks of mysterious back-door conferences and comings and goings. Citrine did not make public exactly what his proposition was. The C.I.O., it turns out, was not included in his plan. The A. F. of L. Executive Council met in high secrecy on the matter, arrived at its decision, gave Citrine his answer, and he departed to England, without the great rank and file of the American labor movement being allowed to express its opinion in any way on the questions under discussion, or even to know what was being decided about them. From cryptic hints in the press and through other devious channels, however, the general impression was left that the A. F. of L. had given some sort of a negative answer to the British proposal.

The reason for all this surreptitious maneuvering and dark-of-the-moon stuff became apparent later when the substance of the A. F. of L.'s proposition on international solidarity was first made known, many weeks afterward, by the unheard-of method of an unsigned article in the *Journal* of the Teamsters Union. The project was not something that American labor could be proud of. In brief, the majority of the A. F. of L. Executive Council rejected the British proposal for American-British-Soviet trade union cooperation and proposed instead that the British and Americans should set up a committee among themselves and that, by some means of indirect "liaison," the decisions of this committee could be conveyed to the Soviet trade unions. The British Congress later accepted this grotesque and most undesirable proposal.

In short, the majority of the top A. F. of L. leaders, under the influence of Hutcheson and Woll, refused to sit in conference with the representatives of the Soviet trade unions, and insisted on dealing with them through intermediaries. To these individuals it matters not that the Red Army, supported in the factories and in the trenches by the Soviet trade unions, is worthily carrying on the defense of all civilization, as General MacArthur said; it also matters not that the American Government has an alliance with the Soviet Government and deals constantly with its representatives; in spite of all this the arch-defeatist W. L. Hutcheson, the fair-haired boy of the racketeering gang-

ster elements in the whole labor movement, ganged up his forces in the A. F. of L. Council and brazenly refused to allow American labor to confer with the heroic Soviet trade union representatives. The A. F. of L. Executive Council's decision is not only a disgrace to the American labor movement and a blow against our national war effort and against international labor solidarity, but it is also an insult to our war ally, the Soviet people.

Opposition to the A. F. of L. Decision

The roundabout and long-delayed announcement of the A. F. of L.'s decision against Anglo-American-Soviet trade union cooperation has evoked much opposition in the labor movement. The C.I.O., which, in accord with the position adopted at the last meeting of the National Council, evidently would have welcomed genuine American-British-Soviet trade union cooperation, took exception, through its president, Philip Murray, to the A. F. of L. proposal, primarily on the ground that the A. F. of L. thereby was attempting to speak in the name of the whole American labor movement and to prevent the C.I.O., Railroad Brotherhoods and other unions from securing representation. The National Maritime Union condemned the A. F. of L. proposal and indicated that it would make its own contacts with the Soviet union for seamen, and with the maritime unions of the United Nations. The convention of the United Automobile Workers, following

much the same line, called upon the C.I.O. to initiate a conference of the trade unions of the United Nations, and its president, R. J. Thomas, was instructed to extend his coming visit to England to take in the U.S.S.R. Other C.I.O. local, state and national bodies are expressing themselves in favor of the immediate establishment of American-Soviet-British trade union cooperation and affiliation. A. F. Whitney, president of the Railroad Trainmen, wired fraternal greetings to the railroad workers of the Soviet Union, expressing hope for an early Second Front.

In the A. F. of L., too, there is much opposition to the Executive Council's stupid and reactionary decision. In the Council itself there is a strong minority, led by William Green, for friendly collaboration with the Soviet trade unions. A few weeks before the decision became known, President Green roused the whole labor movement by his glowing praise of the Red Army and his stirring appeal to the American and Soviet workers to work and fight side by side. President Flore of the Hotel and Restaurant Employees Union has declared that "the workers of Russia, the United States and Great Britain and all their allies must stand and fight together." Also symptomatic of the position of the A. F. of L. membership and local leaders is the fact that 150 officials of the A. F. of L. unions in the New York area have formed the "Committee to Promote Unity of the Trade Union Movements of the United Nations" and are proposing a world

trade union conference to be held in the United States.

The question of international trade union unity will not be disposed of by the shameful decision of the A. F. of L. Executive Council. The need for labor solidarity in the war, particularly in the furtherance of the Second Front, is so urgent that the fight for it is bound to intensify on an international as well as a national scale. In the A. F. of L. there is a strong opposition that will be heard from more and more, and it is evident that the C.I.O. does not consider itself to be bound by the Executive Council's action. On this matter the *C.I.O. News*, official national organ of the C.I.O., says, August 10:

"The A. F. of L. leaders should be reminded that our country is one of the United Nations. . . . And labor's interests, as well as our country's interests, demand an all-inclusive unity for war of all labor in all the United Nations."

The millions of American trade unionists should militantly demand international trade union unity as a basic war necessity. Among the things they can do at this time toward this end is to insist, by resolutions and delegations, that the A. F. of L. decision be rescinded. Likewise, the proposal of many C.I.O. leaders should be encouraged, namely, that the C.I.O. promote direct connections with the Soviet and British trade unions, that individual American national trade unions get into direct touch with corresponding British and Soviet trade unions,

that an all-inclusive American labor delegation be sent to Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., and that a general win-the-war conference of the trade unions of the United Nations be called.

The Lewis-Hutcheson Anti-Unity Axis

The profound importance of national and international unity to our nation's war effort is well demonstrated by the character of the opposition in the unions to such unity. This opposition is led chiefly by W. L. Hutcheson, president of the powerful Carpenters' Union, and John L. Lewis, president of the still more powerful Miners' Union. These men, obstructionist Republicans, unreconstructed America Firsters, and defeatists in their whole line of policy, are the strongest and most dangerous opponents of American trade union unity. Enemies of the Roosevelt Administration and of the nation's war effort, these two, erstwhile bitter foes but now cheek-by-jowl collaborators, are directing their efforts toward trying to keep American labor divided against itself and disconnected from the labor movements of the rest of the United Nations. Nothing is more destructive of the national war effort than such sowing of disunion in the ranks of union labor.

Lewis and Hutcheson, of course, camouflage their anti-war and anti-United Nations policies behind lip service in support of the war, while at the same time endlessly sniping at the government. They are likewise also demagogic champions of

"labor unity." In the A. F. of L. Executive Council Hutcheson hides his disruptive course behind pleas for "organic unity," a formulation by which he hopes to throw the trade union movement into endless jurisdictional quarrels, or, if luck is with him, to slash the C.I.O. unions to pieces. Lewis, who is far cleverer than Hutcheson, has a more complicated "unity" (for splitting purposes) campaign. He has lately become not only a great stickler for "organic unity" of the Hutcheson type but his "unity" menu contains also such items as: Splitting the C.I.O. by withdrawing the Miners' Union from it; confusing the labor movement by bringing farmers directly into its ranks; carrying through wholesale membership raids against A. F. of L. unions; building up the hodgepodge District 50, U.M.W.A.; disrupting the Miners' Union by removing Philip Murray and other win-the-war leaders from office, and conducting violent Red-baiting campaigns against them. Regarding unity with the Soviet trade unions, both Lewis and Hutcheson, avowed enemies of the U.S.S.R., feel less need to obscure their aims—they are against such unity outright.

The danger from Lewis and Hutcheson to the movement for labor unity, for the Second Front now, and for the national war effort in general is intensified because of the powerful positions they hold in the labor movement. Lewis, with a gigantic union treasury under his control, rules the Miners' Union like a despot, 75 per cent of the union membership living under

“provisional government” and “protective custody” without the right to elect their district officers, all of whom are appointed by Lewis. Hutcheson, who, with the help of Matthew Woll, is dictating to the A. F. of L. Executive Council its policies on the questions of national and international labor unity, also dominates his organization like a tyrant, having suppressed union democracy no less completely than Lewis. These two domineering labor leaders are the darlings of the Coughlins, Hearsts and other defeatist elements, who hope through them to cripple labor’s mighty role in the war.

Lewis and Hutcheson must be resolutely unmasked and fought, if national and international labor unity is to be achieved and labor enabled to play its full role in the country’s war effort. They must be combated in the labor movement at large, and especially in their own unions. Hutcheson, deeply entrenched in the conservative building trades, is difficult to reach through rank-and-file pressure but Lewis is more vulnerable. The coal miners have a long record of struggle against reactionary and corrupt union officials. Despite his demagogic playing with the economic grievances of the workers and his lavish use of union funds to pay hand-picked organizers, Lewis can be dealt a real blow at the coming U.M.W.A. convention, particularly upon the burning inner-union question of district autonomy and upon the central question of active and all-out support for the win-the-war program and policies

of the Government as well as of the C.I.O.

Unfortunately, the Lewisites, Trotskyites and other defeatist elements are all too often enabled to derive fuel for their disruptive tactics by the fact that prompt and energetic action is not always taken by the War Labor Board in settling the pressing grievances of the workers, which are frequently allowed to accumulate to provoking proportions before the government agencies act. Sometimes this is due to delaying action by the War Labor Board or its field representatives; at others, to inadequate machinery. On top of this, some of the decisions of the War Labor Board have been inadequate, indicating failure to take a strong stand against certain employers who seek to take unfair advantage of organized labor’s no-strike pledge. These flagrant shortcomings, including the inadequacy of apparatus, of the War Labor Board and its field representatives must be corrected promptly, with proper steps taken by the Government to guarantee fair and quick adjustment of the workers’ grievances.

As the war deepens, as the national peril of our country grows more obvious, as the need for an Anglo-American front in Western Europe becomes more acute, the question of national and international labor unity and cooperation assumes an ever greater importance. Labor’s unity of action is necessary in order to win the war. The great rank and file of union labor, as well as the loyal, win-the-war officialdom, realize this. Nor can all the

Lewis, Hutchesons and their paid henchmen prevent labor unity from being achieved.

The Communists and Labor Unity

In this situation, today as in the past, the Communists are bending every effort to achieve united labor action and the complete unity of labor. The position of the Communist Party on labor unity was concisely set forth in the notable editorial in *The Worker* of August 9, 1942, from which I quote here in conclusion:

"The Communists have always fought for the unity of labor. For a long time the main objective in furthering this goal was the campaign to organize the great mass of the unorganized, the workers in the basic industries. The Communists pursued this goal and supported all those who undertook its realization whether this meant with and through the A. F. of L. or outside the Federation. When it became inevitable and necessary that the C.I.O. be formed outside of the A. F. of L. the Communists supported the C.I.O. campaigns to organize the unorganized. At the same time they gave full support to those unions in the A. F. of L. which had established organizations among the workers in their industry and helped those A. F. of L. unions which undertook campaigns to organize the unorganized.

"Under the then existing conditions this policy was truly a policy of promoting labor unity. It helped overcome the biggest split of all, the split between a handful of organized workers and the great millions of the unorganized. Today a higher form of unity is possible. Today it

is possible to bring together the more than eleven millions of organized workers into one great organization around the basic principles of the C.I.O.—those principles which have made possible the organization of the unorganized, the advances of the labor movement in recent years.

"Such a united labor movement would be able to attract the millions still outside the trade union movement and would block and defeat the new attempts of certain open shop interests to revive the company union drive under the guise of a new so-called 'independent labor federation.' It would defeat the new attacks against labor now under way on the part of certain employers and their reactionary stooges in Congress. Above all such a unity of the trade union movement would be the greatest impetus to the full mobilization of the nation for the war effort. It would give new strength in pushing the necessary offensive to smash the Axis and to defeat the appeasers and defeatists at home. Such a united labor movement will become one of the greatest factors in helping our country, together with the other United Nations and the trade union movements of the world, to win the war and to win a real people's peace.

"Already in September, 1939, the great anti-fascist and General Secretary of the Communist Party, Earl Browder, declared:

"We believe that unity of labor, unity of the working class, unity of the trade union movement, must be the backbone of any really effective unity of the people. Workers of the A. F. of L. and C.I.O., who agree in the great majority on all the most

crucial issues of the day, must find the way to act together as they already think together, to defeat all the enemies of unity, and make labor a great power in the life of our country, above all, in these days of danger and emergency.'

"Today, with the danger to our country so great, with the tasks confronting us demanding the maximum national unity and the unity of labor, the Communists are by their very beliefs and principles prepared to do all in their power to help bring about organic unity of the A. F. of L. and the C.I.O. on the

basis of those principles and organizational forms that will be acceptable to the millions of the trade unionists in both organizations. The Communists will do their part toward this end, whether they are in the A. F. of L. or C.I.O. organizations, working as loyal members of their union and under its discipline. They will advance this unity on the basis of those principles which have made possible the growth of the labor movement and that are indispensable to genuine unity and the further growth of the role and influence of the trade union movement."

STRATEGY FOR VICTORY

BY R. PALME DUTT

[*Editorial Note: The following is a selection from a forthcoming book by R. Palme Dutt, entitled Britain in the World Front, soon to be published in the United States by International Publishers. Although written prior to the American-Soviet-British Agreements for the creation of a second front in Europe in 1942 and the signing of the Soviet-British Twenty-Year Mutual Assistance Pact, as well as before the Nazi summer offensive on the Eastern Front, the analysis and conclusions so effectively set forth in the selection here presented remain today in their full validity. We print this section by courtesy of the publishers.*]

BY THE autumn of 1940 Hitler reached the decision, as he stated in his speech in January, 1942, that he would have to destroy the power of the Soviet Union if he wished to win the war. He recognized that all his military victories would be in vain, and his hopes of world domination doomed to failure, so long as the independent power of the Soviet Union on his flank grew daily in relative strength, while Britain and the United States were still undefeated and preparing eventually superior forces. He ac-

cordingly calculated that if by a lightning thrust he could smash the Soviet Union in a speedy war he could then turn, with his rear secure and with renewed resources, to settle finally with Britain and the United States. He recognized that such an attack, with Britain still in the field, raised the danger of a two-front war; but he hoped, as the Hess mission indicated, to be able so far to divide and confuse opinion in Britain and the United States as to paralyze their action and to secure, if not their support, at any rate their passivity and the absence of a second front.

But Hitler's calculations were doomed to frustration no less than the previous calculations of the Munichites. His treacherous attack on the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941 did not win the speedy victory before winter which he had promised; instead, he found his forces locked up in the most dangerous campaign he had undertaken, while, despite gains of territory, he had not won the hoped-for new resources. His appeal to reactionary circles in Britain and the United States did not win the response intended; instead, the attack on the Soviet Union led to the establishment of the alliance of Britain, the

United States and the Soviet Union. For by the summer of 1941 the political situation in Britain was profoundly different from the time when the Munichites ruled the roost. There was now universal recognition, by ruling class opinion no less than by popular opinion (which had always been in favor of the British-Soviet Pact, as the 87 per cent poll for it in the spring of 1939 had shown), that the interests of Britain and the interests of the Soviet Union were united in opposition to Hitler's aggression. The British-Soviet Pact, which had previously been turned down, now received unanimous support, with not a voice raised against it. At last the political conditions had been established for that two-front strategy which means the doom of Hitlerism.

From this point the decisive question for Britain has been and remains the speediest execution in action of that two-front strategy which means victory over Hitlerism. Yet the necessary revision of strategy corresponding to the new political conditions of the war has been delayed. This delay reflects the survival of past conceptions still lurking in the present. This is not only a question of the still influential, though no longer dominant role of the remaining Munichite forces, who are still strongly entrenched in many leading political positions and in the High Command and whose outlook was expressed in the notorious indiscretion of the Minister Moore-Brabazon, when he expressed the hope that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union would

destroy each other, leaving the British Empire on top.*

These representatives have been weakened; some of them have been removed from political leadership, though others still need to be removed. But, in addition to this, there remains the still strongly entrenched tradition of the defensive strategy; the underestimation of the strength of the Soviet Union; the lack of confidence in the possibilities of combined offensive action with the Soviet Union; the conception of waiting for the United States, or for an ultimate overwhelming preponderance of forces, without calculating what happens in the meantime; the myth of the invincibility of the Nazi forces; the disillusionment through previous failure and reverses consequent on an entirely different situation and the wrong policy; the fear of the initiative.

We need now fearlessly to draw the lessons of these months in order to determine the necessary strategy for the future. The Nazi attack on the Soviet Union provided the most

* This poisonous Munichite conception, seeking to disrupt Allied solidarity against fascism, and thus working for fascist victory, is also expressed by the remaining bourgeois relics of continental Social-Democracy. Thus the declaration of the German Social-Democratic Party Executive in July, 1941:

"From the Arctic to the Black Sea the world's strongest armies are locked in battle. Should one of the two achieve a quick victory, that army would henceforth be irresistible on the continents of Europe and Asia. It is only by exhausting each other in prolonged struggle that the nations of the continent can be relieved of oppression, and that the power of Anglo-American democracy can become the dominant factor in shaping a new world order."

After ten years of Hitler's power, and the destruction of the German working class organizations through the refusal of the united front, the lesson of unity against fascism has not yet been learned by these surviving exiles.

favorable opportunity for immediate maximum offensive action against Hitler in the West, while his forces were inescapably locked up in the East against the fresh Soviet armies. This opportunity was not taken, owing to underestimation of the strength and capacity of resistance of the Red Army (the fantastic reports of the military correspondents in Finland a year earlier were producing their boomerang effect). The initial strategy following the adoption of the British-Soviet Pact was based on the assumption (1) that the Nazi attack would speedily smash the Soviet resistance, or at best lead to a retreat beyond the Volga; (2) that in consequence any British action in the West would be speedily faced with the main Nazi forces and would as a result be in an untenable position; (3) that in consequence preparations should be concentrated, not on action, but on equipping the front in the Caucasus and the Middle East to receive the Nazi forces after they should have broken through the Soviet Union.

The outcome proved the incorrectness of this calculation. This basic strategic error, which governed the first phase following the British-Soviet Pact and prevented the second front in the West in the autumn of 1941, has since been officially admitted. The Soviet successes, declared Mr. Churchill on January 27, 1942, were "unhoped for, undreamed of by us, because we little knew the Russian strength." The Government would have sent more help to the Soviet Union, declared Mr. Noel Baker in the same debate, "but for the dis-

astrous advice which they received about the power of Russia to resist." But the consequences of this basic strategic error have not yet been corrected.

What was the consequence of this strategy? Official circles in this country in the summer of 1941, after having seen the French Army, "supposed to be the strongest in Europe," collapse in six weeks before the Nazi onslaught, were convinced that the Nazi forces would inevitably defeat the Soviet Union in a matter of weeks, or, at best, of months. From this followed the universal official opinion in the opening phase that the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union represented, not an opportunity for action, but a short "respite," a "lull," a welcome relief from air raids, an opportunity to rest and re-equip ("Chiefly, it has given us a lull to re-equip and to rest. . . . It has given us valuable rest here."—General Wavell in a press interview, *London Times*, July 5, 1941). Hence also the delay for three months before the conference was held in Moscow to organize supplies. Hence the utilization of the time gained, not for maximum endeavor, but to ease off; the utilization of the improved shipping situation, not to establish a second front in the West, but to pile up food reserves in Britain.* Alongside the most terrific fighting of any war ever known on the Eastern front,

* "During the second half of 1941, however, a substantial improvement occurred in the supply position, with the result that the total for the year rose to a very satisfactory level. The Ministry of Food has taken advantage of this improvement to build up stocks of essential foods, and the stocks in December, 1941, were 30 per cent higher than in December, 1940." (Major

the British people were offered "better Christmas dinners" as their share in the fight.

What were the further consequences of this strategy? For five months, until the campaign in Libya in November, 1941, not a single British soldier was fighting a Nazi soldier. Hitler was enabled to concentrate his forces against the Soviet Union in isolation and thus to fulfill the Nazi strategic principle of "one at a time." Not only this, but the open proclamation of this passivity by Lord Halifax's declaration in America that there would be no question of a second front in Europe in 1941 passed the tip to Hitler and enabled him to transfer additional forces, estimated at from twenty-five to thirty divisions, from the already depleted garrisons in Western Europe to the East. Thus this passivity not only denied to the Soviet Union the advantage of allied fighting forces; it actually reinforced Hitler's forces against the Soviet Union by close to half a million men.

The Libyan campaign after five months represented a welcome be-

ginning of action.* But the scale of the campaign was still limited, in relation to the total forces on both sides. In the whole Libyan campaign "we have never had in action more than 45,000 men" (Churchill in the House of Commons on January 27, 1942)—or one-fifth of the forces which Rumania put into the field alongside Hitler against the Soviet Union. What of the remaining millions of the British armed forces? Apart from the limited forces dispatched to the Far East, no less than 1,500,000 of the regular forces, or 3,000,000 including the Home Guards, were held immobilized, according to Lord Halifax's broadcast in the United States on March 18, 1942, for the defense of the British Isles. Three-quarters of a million, according to Mr. Alexander's statement, were concentrated for the armies of the Middle East. The best forces and the best equipment which could be shipped overseas were gathered, according to Mr. Churchill's statement, for the "front from the Levant to the Caspian"—that is, for the defense of the Caucasus and the Middle East in the

G. Lloyd George, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Food, in the House of Commons on March 3, 1942.)

Thus the shipping, which might have been used to help equip the second front in Europe, was used instead to expand food reserves in Britain and to equip the hypothetical front in the Caucasus and the Middle East. The main difficulty in the way of the second front in the autumn of 1941 was not the lack of shipping. The main difficulty was the defensive strategy, which used the available shipping for other purposes. It should be borne in mind that, according to military experts, "the tonnage necessary for carrying a single division to a Red Sea port and maintaining it there would carry and maintain twenty-six divisions if landed on the Continent within a radius of three days' steaming from a home port." (Major Philip Gribble, *News Chronicle*, March 23, 1942.)

* The Libyan campaign was misrepresented by the Munichites as already fulfilling the role of the second front in the West, urged by Stalin a fortnight before its inception. "By starting an offensive against Libya Britain has opened a second front against the Axis. . . . In his latest speech Stalin emphasized the importance of a second front, and in some quarters it was wrongly assumed that he was referring to Western Europe" (*Daily Telegraph* Diplomatic Correspondent, November 20, 1931). In fact Stalin had stated in his speech of November 6 that "one of the reasons for the setbacks of the Red Army consists in the absence of a second front in Europe against the German fascist troops" and that "the appearance of a second front on the Continent of Europe—and it must appear in the nearest future—will render substantially easier the position of the Red Army to the detriment of the German Army."

event of the hypothetical breakthrough of the Nazi troops and collapse of Soviet resistance. Hence, as explained, the shortage for the Far East.

What was the further consequence of this strategy? Japan watched the situation for six months from June to December, 1941. Had the second front been established in Europe in the autumn of 1941, with the consequent extreme weakening of Hitler's position, since the division of his forces would have established effective Soviet superiority already in the autumn of 1941, it is evident that Japan would have exercised extreme caution in the consequent new international situation before committing itself to the sinking fortunes of the Axis. The passivity in the West encouraged Japan to open its initiative in the Far East.

Thus the situation at the opening of 1942 presents at once new dangers and new possibilities. On the one hand, the extension of Japan's offensive in the Far East and the loss of sea power in this region have led to the loss of important bases and territories, involving the loss of important sources of raw materials, without any prospect of speedy effective counter-action. The setback of the Libyan campaign has reopened the danger of a new Axis offensive in the Mediterranean or the Near East. The effects of these developments and of the intensified attack on shipping sharpen the problems of supplies, and thereby further weaken the ground for the present passive waiting strategy. On the other hand, the center of the

world situation at the opening of 1942 has been dominated by the successes of the Soviet counter-offensive on the decisive Eastern Front, the consequent heavy losses of the Nazi forces, and the declared aim of Soviet strategy to advance to the general offensive for finally driving out the Nazi forces from all Soviet territories in the course of the year. The Nazi rear in Europe is becoming increasingly unstable. The United States, with all the gigantic strength that it represents, is now a full partner in the war against Hitlerism. All these developments, and the improved relative position of Anglo-American production and preparations, have strengthened the position for successful offensive action in Europe by Britain and the United States to coincide with the Soviet offensive. The question of the possibility of the complete defeat of Hitler in 1942, given the correct strategy, has become a burning practical issue.

The conclusions to be drawn from this situation for the strategy for victory to be followed in the period now opening are inescapable. Both President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill have made abundantly clear their recognition that, grave as are the events in the Far East, the decisive sphere of the world war is and must be on the Continent of Europe for the defeat of Hitler, whose defeat is the indispensable condition of success against the remaining elements of Axis power. But Hitler can only be finally defeated, not by the blockade alone, not by air bombing alone, but on land by the destruction of his

armies, by the action of the Allied armies in collaboration with the European peoples and finally with the German people. The logical conclusion of this strategic line, the necessity of the second front on the continent of Europe, not at some remote future date, but in the period immediately now opening, when the maximum forces are being thrown into the field on both sides in Eastern Europe, requires now to be accepted as the basis of strategy.

At present there is a dangerous divergence between two alternative strategical perspectives being held out by the official spokesmen of the Governments of the United Nations: the perspective of decisive action in 1942, and the perspective of decisive action in 1943 or later. Such a divergence is a denial of the very conception of a unified Allied strategy. It means the weakening and division of the forces whose combination and combined action should be their strength. A common planned strategy of the alliance, reached and agreed by the Governments and general staffs, is essential and must be reached.

What are the two alternative strategies thus put forward, between which the choice must be made by the people of this country?

One is the passive, waiting, defensive strategy which sets the perspective for decisive action in 1943 or later. This strategy opposes present action as risky and inadequately equipped, and defines the present task as (1) maintaining the main forces on the defensive in the British Isles and remaining bases of the

British Empire in readiness for invasion or attack; (2) maintaining the blockade; (3) maintaining supplies to the Soviet Union; (4) confining offensive action principally to air bombing over Germany and the occupied countries, with possible occasional minor Commando raids and diversions; (5) accumulating war material and preparations with a view to awaiting a decisive superiority before attempting any general offensive with the main forces in 1943, 1944 or 1945. This is the policy so far indicated in Government statements.

The other is the policy of offensive action for victory over Hitler in 1942, by opening up the second front in Europe this year to coincide with the Soviet offensive and unite with the Soviet strategy of throwing all the main forces of the alliance into action in Europe against Hitler this year, with a view to securing victory in 1942. This is the strategy officially proclaimed by the Soviet Union, and advocated by many leading military and political representatives in this country, the United States, Canada and other countries of the alliance, as well as representatives of the European Allied Governments.

Between these two main lines of strategy the decision must be made.

The policy of the offensive can in the present situation only be the policy of the second front in Europe. This is the decisive ground. In the Far East for the time being only a defensive policy is possible; the main immediate task here is to mobilize Indian resistance by the free collaboration of the Indian peo-

ple, and to develop the cooperation of India, China and Australia with Britain and the United States. But the pivot of the war is in Europe against Hitler. Hitler must be defeated, and Hitler can only finally be defeated on land, by the combined action of the land armies of the alliance.

Can the old arguments against the second front be regarded as valid?

It is argued that the difficulties now arising on other fronts, in Libya and the Far East, rule out the possibility of a new front in the West. But this argument cuts both ways. In fact the diversion of Hitler's forces in Europe would represent the best aid to the front in Libya and Northern Africa, and the best insurance against a new attack toward the Middle East, while the weakening of Hitler is the indispensable condition for strengthening the position against Japan in the Far East. The defensive strategy, by leaving the initiative to the enemy to concentrate his forces where he chooses, opens the way to reverses; and then these reverses are used as a further argument for the continuance of the defensive strategy. Only the policy of the offensive, given the concentration of forces at the right place and the right time, can break this sequence and bring a new situation.

Again it is argued that the policy of maintaining supplies to the Soviet Union is more important as the best practical help to the main front against Hitler rather than the use of war material to open a front in the West. But the policy of supplies to the Soviet Union cannot be

a substitute for military action alongside the Soviet Union. We cannot fall back on the old formula, favored by the ruling class of this country in the past, by which other nations are expected to bear the brunt of the fighting, while Britain supplies the equipment. The call of the Soviet leaders themselves for the second front in the West shows that they are ready to face any diversion of supplies which the opening of such a front might necessitate, because they understand very well that the direct use of British arms, tanks and planes on such a front, drawing off a portion of Hitler's forces, would be the most effective help of all to their fight on the Eastern Front. The maintenance of the maximum possible supplies to the Soviet Union and the maintenance of the supply routes are of vital importance for the critical battles developing in 1942. But the situation still remains, so long as the second front in the West has not been opened, that, as stated in Stalin's Order of the Day on the Red Army anniversary on February 23, 1942, "the German fascist army is directly supported at the front by the troops of Italy, Rumania and Finland; the Red Army so far has no such support." This advantage on Hitler's side it is necessary to wipe out, and to show in action that a more powerful coalition is fighting against him.

Similarly with regard to the question of arms, equipment and shipping. The successive postponement of action on the grounds that it is first necessary to accumulate an overwhelming superiority of equip-

ment to guarantee success overlooks the fact that in the meantime Nazi production is also being expanded; and it further overlooks the fact that in the meantime the action of the enemy, in consequence of the passive defensive policy, may vitally change the balance of resources and supplies for production, and thus defeat the very purpose for the sake of which action was postponed. The successive miscalculations on the relative production position have illustrated this. The crucial question is not simply the amount of arms and shipping available, but their use. The holding of large stocks of arms and war material immobilized and unused in the midst of critical battles is a gift to the enemy. We have seen how the available shipping was used in the second half of 1941 to increase very greatly the imports of food into this country, rather than to establish the second front, and to send troops and equipment overseas for the hypothetical front in the Caucasus, when the same tonnage could have transported and maintained twenty-six times the number of divisions for the Continent of Europe.

Undoubtedly the most intensified drive on production must be an integral part of the strategy of the offensive. But the fighting front is the indispensable stimulus to intensified production. The policy of passivity demoralizes production. The enthusiastic response to "Tanks for Russia" Week powerfully demonstrated the truth of this. The people of this country will undoubtedly be ready for every sacrifice that is necessary, for the further restric-

tion of consumption imports into this country, and for the most intensive effort in production, when they feel that their efforts and sacrifices are immediately directed to delivering the heaviest blows against the fascist enemy for the aim of winning victory this year.

Finally, with regard to the argument that the attempt to establish the second front in Europe involves the risk of "another and worse Dunkirk." Risks are inescapable in war; without risk, no victory; and the real question is whether the risks of the passive waiting policy are not in fact greater. But the analogy with Dunkirk is out of place. Dunkirk was the disastrous consequence of the collapse of an ally, the liquidation of the French Army, and the passing over of the French state to the enemy. Such an analogy has no bearing on the question of cooperation with the advancing Soviet armies for the common offensive for the destruction of Hitlerism, when these Soviet armies are in fact already engaging nine-tenths of the Nazi forces, and the remaining one-tenth is thinly dispersed over a wide territory amidst a hostile population.

The defensive strategy plays into Hitler's hands by leaving him the initiative. A strategy which aims at the maximum concentration of forces at a well selected point to deliver there the heaviest blows compels a corresponding disposition of the enemy's forces, and is thus in fact the best defense of every other front. On the other hand, the policy of maintaining the defensive on every front until such future

time as an overwhelming accumulation of strength will make possible an ultimate general counter-offensive at a distant date means in practice that in the crucial present phase the existing available strength is dispersed to cover every point, with the inevitable consequence of inadequacy at every point to meet the enemy's attack. While delay is being maintained to secure the ultimate advantage of the potential superiority of resources, the basis of the superiority of resources is being meanwhile lost through the action of the enemy. Victory depends on the decisive concentration of forces at the decisive point, and the conditions of modern war have demonstrated that this is above all a question of the initiative and speed in action.

The defensive strategy has further unfavorable results in maintaining passivity, weakening morale, sowing doubts among the people of the intention of the Government, demoralizing armed forces held too long inactive, discouraging our allies, spreading doubts and criticism in the Dominions, in the United States, in the Soviet Union, among the colonial peoples, and depressing and damping down the unrest and activity of our potential allies, the European peoples, who look anxiously for the signs of our action.

It is a measure of the cunning of Hitler's strategy that he has been able to calculate on the British defensive strategy for his own purposes. At the relatively inexpensive cost of maintaining invasion barges and other equipment in the French

ports, and without having sea power, he has been able to hold immobilized 3,000,000 trained British soldiers for two years. This is in itself equivalent in its strategic effect to a major victory. At the same time, faced with an opponent in possession of sea power, and with air parity since the autumn of 1941, and with a much longer sea coast to defend, he has been able to denude the occupied territories of troops in order to concentrate all his forces on the single Eastern Front.

Military opinion is increasingly in revolt against this fatal defensive strategy.

"If we lose the spirit of adventure, the will to attack—Heaven help us! I cannot believe that the descendants of those who fought under Marlborough and Wellington are going to be condemned for long to the ignoble role of sitting in trenches and pill-boxes round the shores of Britain." (Major-General Sir Andrew McCulloch, K.B.E., D.S.O., D.C.M., in the *Volunteer for Liberty*, October, 1941.)

The emphatic declaration of the United States Army Chief of Staff against the policy of immobilization for home defense had its significant point not only for the United States:

"The time has come when we must proceed with the business of carrying the war to the enemy. We must not permit the greater proportion of our armed forces and our valuable material to be immobilized in the United States." (General George C. Marshall, U. S. Army

Chief of Staff, letter to the Senate, March, 1942.)

No less emphatic has been the declaration of the Canadian Overseas Army Commander for the offensive in Europe:

"We Canadians believe in the offensive in Europe. We are building up our forces in Britain. We did not send them simply to move them across the Atlantic. . . . None of us hopes to win the war simply by sitting in Britain." (Lt.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, Commander of the Canadian Overseas Army, interview in Washington, March 10, 1942.)

The question of the second front in Europe is no longer, as in the autumn of 1941, the question of action to relieve the pressure on the Soviet Union during the initial retreat before the blitzkrieg offensive. It is now a question of cooperation with the Soviet strategy for throwing all forces into the field in order to press forward the offensive to complete victory over Hitlerism in 1942.

Such a strategy must be planned and united strategy of the alliance, and not an isolated action. Close collaboration, political and diplomatic as well as military, between Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, is the indispensable condition of an Allied strategy for victory. It is essential to establish close military collaboration. It is essential to establish close political collaboration. . . .

Politics cannot be separated from strategy. Full collaboration and the mobilization of all forces for victory can only be achieved on the basis

of an unhesitating democratic and anti-fascist policy. It is essential to clear out of the way such obstacles to full collaboration as the continued hesitation to recognize even such an elementary aim as the restoration of all Soviet territories invaded by the Nazi forces. The survival of the old pro-fascist tendencies, shown in the protracted delay in declaring war on Finland, Rumania and Hungary, even when these were fighting side by side with the Nazis; the appeasement of Franco and dispatch of loans and supplies which became loans and supplies for Hitler; or the appeasement of Vichy France and discouragement of the Free French forces; all of these weaken the anti-fascist front and cut across any strategy for victory. It is essential to take decisive steps to break these influences. Above all, in the sphere of political propaganda, it is necessary to establish firmly the line of democratic anti-fascist appeal to the enslaved European peoples and the German people against Hitler, and to end the reactionary racial policy of threats against the German people as a whole, including against a future people's anti-fascist Germany, which only helps to consolidate the German people around Hitler.

A united strategy for victory must set itself to mobilize all the forces of the peoples against fascism. It must win the confidence and collaboration of the Indian people and all the colonial peoples, and promote the organization of their full resources and manpower for the common struggle. It must win the

confidence and collaboration of the European peoples under the Nazi heel, who are looking anxiously for our action to assist their struggle. Not only propaganda, but direct organizational help, arms, and above all military action through the establishment of the second front represents the most practical help to stimulate and rally the action of the subjugated European peoples, the vast army of potential allies whose heroic struggle is playing an increasing role and will play a yet more decisive role in the final destruction of Hitlerism. It is necessary to win the confidence and collaboration of the German people against Hitler and the Nazi clique as an integral part of the democratic strategy of disintegration of Nazism in unison with military action against the Nazi armies. The success of such an approach can only be achieved on the basis of an unqualified democratic anti-fascist outlook and policy, repudiation of all aims of domination of the Versailles type, and full recognition of national self-determination and the right of every people to determine their own political and social regime.

We need to organize all our forces and action for the aim of speediest victory, for the aim of victory, not at some distant future date, but in this year of decision in 1942.

Can we achieve this aim? Yes: provided that we carry out the necessary conditions:

1. Coordination of Allied strategy, with concentration on the immediate aim of two-front war in Europe

for the speediest defeat of Hitlerism;

2. Strengthening of collaboration, political, diplomatic and military, with the Soviet Union and the United States;

3. Winning the confidence and collaboration of the subject peoples in Europe and assistance to their struggle;

4. Winning the confidence and collaboration of the German people;

5. Freedom for India, and the free collaboration of all the peoples in the colonial countries for the common struggle;

6. Maximum production, mobilization of manpower and womanpower, readiness for sacrifice, unity and the will to victory in Britain.

To carry out this policy it is necessary to strengthen the Government, the political and administrative leadership and the military, naval and air command by eliminating all elements which hamper an active anti-fascist strategy, and promoting the most capable and energetic democratic anti-fascist representatives.

The pursuance by the Government of such an active all-out strategy for the aim of speediest victory over Hitlerism, with the avowed objective of achieving it in the coming decisive year by the maximum operation of all our forces, would win the full confidence of the people in the Government, dissipate all existing doubts and hesitations, and rally their unhesitating support and readiness for every sacrifice and effort to achieve this great aim.

THE WAR AND THE NEW YORK ELECTION PRIMARIES

BY ISRAEL AMTER

Communist Candidate for Governor of New York

Address broadcast over Station WQXR, August 16, 1942.

IN THESE grave days, perhaps the most serious in our national life since the Civil War, every American must take stock of the developments on our political scene. What happened in Tuesday's primaries and what will happen in the November elections may decide the policies which our government will pursue for many years. Just as events on the battlefield affect the returns at the ballot-box, so do the results of the elections affect military developments.

Did Tuesday's primary elections constitute a defeat of President Roosevelt's win-the-war policy?

Do the primary results indicate a trend back toward so-called isolationism?

What was the real meaning of Tuesday's primaries?

Let's face the facts squarely. Our nation, "only ankle-deep in the war," according to Elmer Davis, was relatively disinterested in the primaries. With few exceptions, the vote was relatively light—from 10 to 20 per cent of the enrolled voters

turned out. Generally, the incumbent won. In some cases the incumbent won in spite of charges of "pre-Pearl Harbor isolationism." It is this latter fact which some sections of the press and some commentators construe as a repudiation of President Roosevelt's win-the-war policies.

Take the case of Representative Hamilton Fish. He has been in Congress a score of years and has built up a powerful machine through the countless errands he has run for his own constituents. Can it be said that his constituents endorsed his policy of appeasement and collaboration with Nazi agents? This will be a gross libel on Mr. Fish's constituents.

The issue in the Fish election was far greater than the loose term "isolationism" implies. That term has been too carelessly used. Many honest people in America sincerely thought it was possible to be isolated from the conflict in Europe. For many historical and geographical reasons isolationism had a con-

siderable basis in our country. But these honest Americans who agreed with the isolationists and felt it was possible for America to remain at peace even though the rest of the world was in flames were by no means appeasers. There is an extremely important distinction there.

France did not fall because of her isolationists. France fell because of her appeasers. France fell because many of her leaders in government, finance and industry preferred collaboration with Hitler to an alliance with the Soviet Union and the freedom-loving peoples of the world.

If you scrutinize carefully the public records of Representatives Fish and William Barry, Congressmen who were re-nominated despite charges of "pre-Pearl Harbor isolationism," you find what?

You find that Ham Fish had business relations with George Sylvester Viereck, a convicted Nazi agent. Ham Fish flew in Von Ribbentrop's airplane when he was in Europe—and then returned to preach that we could do business with Hitler. Barry spoke on the same platform with Laura Ingalls, the convicted Nazi agent. He even expressed the wish that she go to Congress.

All that is a matter of public record.

And the record adds up to one thing—and it's not isolationism. It's something worse: it's appeasement. These people didn't seek to be "isolated" from Nazism. They appeased it, cultivated it, collaborated with it.

And it's this policy of appeasement, which reflects itself today in obstructionism and defeatism, and

may soon break out openly in the demand for a negotiated peace with Hitler, which must be fought. It's for this reason—not simply "pre-Pearl Harbor isolationism"—that these men must be defeated by patriotic Americans.

Fish and his supporters declare that there can be no question of Fish's loyalty to our country. They point to his First World War record. That proves nothing. It is a fact that Congressman Fish dickered with the fascist dictator of Santo Domingo, Trujillo, and then made a trip to Germany, where he met high Nazi officials and returned with the highest praise for Hitler. It is a fact that he dealt with the Nazi agent George Sylvester Viereck, who is now in prison, and allowed his Congressional frank to be used by Viereck to spread Nazi propaganda throughout the country. Does this prove Fish's loyalty? Does he represent the loyal people of his district? We think not.

Or take the defeatist Congressman Barry, the outspoken supporter of Laura Ingalls, since convicted as a Nazi agent. Does Barry represent the loyal people of his district? We think not. The electorate of these districts, as the bulk of the nation, want no trafficking with Hitler or Hitler's agents. They want to see Hitler smashed without delay.

The issue in the Fish and other elections was not one of isolationism versus the Roosevelt policies but one of appeasement versus the win-the-war policies of the President. If that issue had been drawn sharply the primary results might have been different.

The primaries and even the general elections in November will not *directly* win or lose the war. But they will decide whether the President will have support or will be sabotaged in the carrying through of his military and domestic program for victory. The defeatists and appeasers have torn to pieces President Roosevelt's seven-point program on taxation, wage stabilization, farm aid, price control, rationing, etc. This the voters did not see.

Secondly, the issues were not everywhere presented sharply. Where the issues of the win-the-war policy, the second front, the seven-point program, etc., were sharply brought into the open, as in Representative Vito Marcantonio's district, the people responded. Thus, Marcantonio overwhelmingly won the nomination in all three primaries. In addition, the primary vote was a substantial one.

Let's look at the Marcantonio election. We may disregard for the moment as simply nonsense the *New York Sun's* editorial judgment last Thursday that Marcantonio's 20th Congressional District is "a corner of Moscow." Why is it that this laborite Congressman won the primaries overwhelmingly in all three primaries—Republican, Democratic and American Labor?

Marcantonio won not only because he was loved for his work in his district. In our judgment Marcantonio won because he placed the most vital issues of the day squarely before the people of his district—and campaigned with an effective organization around these issues.

Above all, Marcantonio cam-

paigned on the issue that all the world feels is most crucial: the opening of a second front in Europe by America and Great Britain so that the United Nations may smash Hitler in 1942 and win the war speedily. With the Nazi monster and his mechanized legions entering the Caucasus and the blood of our gallant Soviet allies tinging the rivers of Russia a bright crimson as the Red Armies battle fiercely, Americans of all shades of opinion are restless. They want the Roosevelt-Molotov-Churchill agreement for a second front carried through now. The American people, disregarding some so-called military experts, sense that failure to open a second front now will cost us millions of lives later and, perhaps, freedom itself. That is why the voters are so profoundly stirred by the call for a second front now. That is why the voters of the 20th Congressional District rallied so magnificently to the banner of Representative Marcantonio, shattering party lines and making local political history.

The primaries are not the final elections. The primaries determine the candidates of the various parties, but, outside the poll-tax states, they do not decide who will be elected.

We must immediately prepare for the November elections, using the same yardstick with regard to candidates for the state executive, who will be nominated at the state conventions, and for the state legislature. Representatives Fish, Barry, Kennedy, Hall, Reed, State Senator Coudert and others like them must be defeated. Gubernatorial candi-

dates Bennett and Dewey also do not measure up and should be defeated. How can this be done? As I stated in my broadcast on July 4:

“What is needed in our state is a coalition of all the win-the-war forces—the powerful labor groups, the New Deal Democrats and win-the-war Republicans, who place nation above party, yes, a grand coalition of the people from the conservative to Communist.”

We Communists will do everything in our power to bring this about. We will continue to do our part for achieving victory for our country and the United Nations, by opening the second front in Europe to smash Hitler in 1942.

Time is short. The freedom of the people is at stake. The issue is: Liberty or slavery; independence or vassalage to Hitler!

I appeal to the trade unions, to the leaders and rank and file. I appeal to the win-the-war Republicans. I appeal to the New Deal Democrats. I appeal to all public-spirited citizens, to all lovers of democracy, to all patriots. I especially appeal to all members, leaders and supporters of the American

Labor Party, to all groups within the A.L.P., to unite before or at your state convention, to drop all differences in face of the common danger that confronts each and every one of us.

The war must be won. The second front is the surest way—not for the sake of the Soviet Union, but of ourselves and the whole world. Unity, courage, boldness! Ruthlessness toward our enemies, abroad and at home. Clean up the spies and fifth columnists in the United States. Suppress all anti-Semites and anti-Catholic bigots. Back up President Roosevelt—not only because he is President, but because he is right. Speed up production. Open up the industries to the Negroes; give them full rights in all phases of life, including the armed forces. Open the doors of industry to women, Negroes and youth—give them the necessary training. Support the Food-for-Victory program.

If we want to keep our freedom, we must unite and fight for it. We must prepare *now* to defeat every appeaser, every defeatist, every fifth columnist in November. Forward to victory under our Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt!

INFLATION AND ECONOMIC WAR MOBILIZATION

BY RALPH V. BARNES

THE trouble with the exaggerated and oversimplified presentation of the so-called "inflation danger," to which many have fallen victim, is that the real economic difficulties and the unsolved problems of economic war mobilization tend to become obscured and distorted. The result is that the special job in this field is not always tackled effectively—the job of painful and unified direction of the economic war mobilization. Inevitably, the national war effort must suffer on that account.

Is there an inflation danger? Of course there is. Inflationary tendencies have been present in the economic situation ever since the national economy began moving to a war footing. And, if left uncombated, these tendencies could become uncontrollable to a point where they would seriously interfere with the war effort. But the fact is that this did not happen. Not yet, even though we have had a considerable rise in prices followed by a much slower rise in wage levels in certain industries. And the chief reason that the inflationary tendencies did not as yet get out of hand was the introduc-

tion by the Administration into our economy of strong elements of planning and unified direction for the needs of the war. To overlook this fundamental point is to misunderstand completely the present economic situation and to deny ourselves the opportunity of meeting effectively in the future the very real danger of a serious inflation.

The things to remember in these discussions are, first, that the danger of inflation is only one part of the problem of economic war mobilization. Secondly, that it is neither the most important nor the most difficult part. Thirdly, that it is inseparable from all the other parts of economic war mobilization. One of the chief virtues of President Roosevelt's seven-point program of economic policy is precisely the recognition of this fact, even though the recognition is only partial. Unfortunately, the exponents of profits-as-usual have succeeded to a certain extent in building up the "inflation danger" as something that has no relation to such problems of economic war mobilization as conversion, planning, unified direction, rationing, curbs on profiteering, etc. But the relation is

there, and it is very close; only by fully recognizing it will we make further headway on the economic front.

The profits-as-usual crowd has a very simple and "attractive" way of presenting the problem of inflation, which has now become quite familiar. It is this: the people will have in their hands a purchasing power in excess of available goods during the current year to the amount of about \$18,000,000,000. If left with them, this excess of money over goods will create a catastrophic rise in prices—a "crisis" of inflation. Hence, this money has to be taken away from them by direct taxation, sales taxes and other means. Hence, also, no more purchasing power must be allowed to get into the pockets of the people, by the freezing of wages and other methods. And this, according to the oversimplifiers, will solve the problem of inflation. Simple and sweet.

But the people keep on asking questions, nevertheless. It is recognized that a growing mass purchasing power in the face of a diminished supply of goods tends to push prices upwards, thus feeding inflationary tendencies. But why must this become catastrophic and create an inflation crisis? If we keep on developing and expanding the mechanism of *price fixing*, thoroughly and effectively, and mobilize democratically the people themselves for the enforcement of this policy, there need be no catastrophic rise in prices and no inflation crisis, even though the price curve would continue upward.

What is wrong with this kind of a policy from the standpoint of the national war effort? Nothing at all. It is the best policy under the circumstances.

Not so in the eyes of the exponents of profits-as-usual. These have what they call very serious objections to a democratic and national policy of price fixing. One objection is that this policy would call for the building up of a big governmental bureaucracy and a system of regimentation that will penetrate all phases of economic life. Another objection is that "black markets" and illegal speculation in goods will become rife everywhere, undermining continually the government system of price fixing and calling for still more government bureaucracy and regimentation to combat law violations.

Still another objection is that consistently developed price fixing will lead inevitably to a universal and rigid system of rationing and that this will mean the complete regimentation of the nation's economic life. Having presented these objections, the profits-as-usual exponents proceed to inquire: why do we need to call down upon our heads all these dangers of regimentation when there is such a simple and easy way as removing from the pockets of the people their excess purchasing power?

To which the answer is: *this is war*, a war for survival, a people's war for our national existence and democratic liberties. Is that news? No; but some people have apparently still to learn what it means for our national economy. It means

that all economic life, all without exception, has to be placed at the service of the war effort and completely subordinated to it. And since the war is waged by the nation through its government and not by private enterprise, it is clear that the old bogey of "regimentation" has lost all meaning.

The government is "regimenting" the nation's youth for the armed services, and the people approve. The government is "regimenting," steadily and more rigidly, the nation's man power for war production, and labor itself comes forward with plans and suggestions of how best to do it, and the people approve again. The government has taken a number of steps (too few as yet) to "regiment" industry for the war, and the people are all for it, including large numbers of nationally minded employers and businessmen.

The government is trying to integrate more fully the nation's agriculture and farming into the economic war mobilization, and the bulk of the farmers, as of the people generally, are in complete agreement. What then is the sense of objecting to an economic policy such as *universal price fixing*, on the ground that it means more "regimentation"? No sense at all from a national standpoint. The only way it can make sense is from the standpoint of profits-as-usual and damn the war. Would the oversimplifiers and exponents of "cut the excess purchasing power" care to discuss the question from this standpoint?

Undoubtedly, the whole process

of economic war mobilization, under our social and political set-up, carries with it strong tendencies toward bureaucratic regimentation; and none feel that more pressingly than the masses of the people. But the answer to this is: make the process more democratic. Give labor, the farmers and small business a greater share in the organization and direction of war production. Enroll the activities of the masses of the people themselves in the development and enforcement of price fixing and in combating "black markets" and illegal speculation. This will also *speed up* the whole process of economic war mobilization, giving us more planes and tanks and ships.

It is also true, very true, that a consistently developed policy of universal price fixing leads to a universal system of rationing. But what is wrong with that from the standpoint of winning the war? Nothing at all. *Everything in the present situation speaks in favor of rapidly expanding the system of rationing.* And those who look at the matter from the national standpoint, as distinct from the standpoint of profits-as-usual, have seen rationing coming from the very beginning. Not as a misfortune but as a very effective and democratic way of tackling a fundamental problem of economic war mobilization. It is the problem of distributing a diminishing supply of consumers' goods in such a way as to do most good to the nation's war effort, which means to make sure that first call on these goods is re-

served to the man behind the gun and—next—to the man behind the man behind the gun: to the armed forces and to the nation's toilers in the war economy. What is wrong with that as a way of winning the war? Nothing at all. It is the best way that is known.

This question of the diminishing supply of consumers' goods has been treated by the profits-as-usual boys almost exclusively from the standpoint of its relation to the expanding mass purchasing power. And this, too, very one-sidedly. They ignore, for instance, the established fact that mass buying continues very conservative, that there are no serious indications at all of any wild or reckless spending, that the pressure of purchasing power upon prices is almost normal, as testified by many authoritative merchant organizations (*The New York Times* itself ran a story on July 19 headlined "Retailers Discount Talk of Inflation"). They also ignore the even more significant fact that increasing masses are investing a progressively larger part of their income in War Bonds, thus themselves solving a large portion of the problem of "excess" purchasing power. In other words, the profits-as-usual boys are completely ignoring the fact that the masses are patriotic, and wherever there is a way, they are trying voluntarily to help combat the danger of inflation. But these oversimplifiers have apparently little faith in the patriotism of our people. All they know is: take away their "excess" money.

Yet the diminishing supply of consumers' goods has also other re-

lationships, in addition to that of excess buying power, and more important ones. It is the question of feeding, clothing and housing our people—next to insuring the needs of our armed forces—in the face of a diminishing supply of consumers' goods. What about this question? How is it to be solved from the standpoint of winning the war and saving our nation from destruction by fascism? And, curiously, it is precisely this question that bothers least the heralds of an "inflation crisis." Why? It is generally agreed that there is a progressively diminishing supply of consumers' goods, resulting primarily from our developing war economy. This is, in the main, inevitable. But the fact is that we are moving into a crisis of *consumption*; we are moving to a point where the people will be able to acquire about as much (or little) consumers' goods as they did in 1932, the year of severest economic crisis.

And this is the thing that should bother us, because it is so obviously the main thing. It involves the health of our people, their ability to carry successfully the burdens of the war, especially in production. But the criers of "inflation crisis" do not see that. They only see the "excess" money in the pockets of the people, and this they want to take away, as though the taking away of the excess money will give us more goods to go around or will insure a proper distribution—from a national standpoint—of the goods available.

We can postpone and seriously retard the arrival of a consumption crisis by a more planful and unified

democratic direction of the economic war mobilization. This will give us more weapons for the battlefields and provide the means of subsistence for the war workers at home. And we can almost completely obviate the arrival of a consumption crisis by opening immediately a second front and crushing Hitler in 1942. We can also insure a proper distribution of the goods available by universal democratic rationing and price fixing. This, together with democratic taxation and patriotic mass buying of war bonds, will take ample care of the inflationary danger. If only those in the anti-Hitler camp who cry "inflationary crisis" would look at the matter from the national standpoint of winning the war, they would see the thing just as clearly.

Money for Financing the War

However, these profits-as-usual fellows are not easily converted. They come back with lots of other arguments. They want to know how is the war going to be financed, where is the government going to get this year the \$77,000,000,000 for the war budget, if the working people of America continue to keep their "excess" money in their pockets. Even such a solid financial paper as *The New York Times* asks this silly question. But the answer to this one has already been clearly suggested, in part, by the Treasury of the United States and, more fully, by the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L. What was the answer?

First, the working people of America do not keep all of their "excess" money in their pockets.

They pay taxes and will continue to pay more. They buy war bonds and will buy more. And they save a little, that is, those who still have anything left to save. Already the present income tax reaches all families earning more than \$2,000 a year and all individuals earning more than \$1,000. This includes large masses of working people whose "excess" purchasing power is thus well taken care of, while those who are not included in the tax law simply have no "excess." Clearly, the government will get all the money from the working people that can possibly be gotten from this source through the present tax proposals of the Treasury.

Secondly, high incomes and large capital accumulations have not yet been really tapped by taxation. Let us adopt the President's proposal for a \$25,000 limit on net incomes. Let us tax effectively heavy capital accumulations. Let us also tax drastically excess profits, bringing under it all profiteering resulting from war contracts. This will bring the government plenty of money.

From both these sources, the government can secure \$10,000,000,000 this year, according to the unchallenged estimates of the C.I.O. It would probably bring in much more.

Thirdly, the sale of war bonds could be stepped up to undreamed of heights. The July sales reached the high figure of almost \$1,000,000,000, and this is only an indication of what could be done by mobilizing the masses to the fullest extent for the win-the-war program, and by following a truly national

and democratic policy in all matters of economic and financial war mobilization. True, such feelings cannot easily be aroused in the face of widespread and brazen profiteering aggravated by the attitudes of profits-as-usual. But it has to be done and it can be done. The movements among the masses for a self-imposed 10 per cent tax with which to buy war bonds contain great promise and possibilities.

Are the criers of "inflation crisis" silenced by these considerations? No; not they. They continue to be hypnotized by the "excess" money in the pockets of the people. Hence, they call for a sales tax, even though it had been demonstrated that this will most surely create an inflationary price spiral. And it is precisely here that the sales tax advocates expose their real position. It becomes evident that it is not inflation that bothers them but the fear of having to pay adequate taxes on their high incomes and large capital accumulations. Nothing is surer to bring on the much advertised inflation "crisis" than the projected sales tax, yet the self-appointed guardians against inflation are precisely the ones to demand a sales tax. Curious, isn't it?

The advocates of a sales tax insist that heavy taxation of high incomes and capital will undermine the profit incentive, discourage capital accumulation for peacetime production and thus weaken, if not destroy, the system of "free enterprise." All of which is plain nonsense. From the purely economic standpoint, heavy taxation of war profits and capital accumulations

cannot affect the so-called profit incentive, under the existing social and political set-up. We must remember that nearly one half of the national economy is producing today, not for the free market, but directly for the government. This means no capital "risks" and no competition but an income on capital that is virtually secured and guaranteed by the government. Hence, there exists plenty of incentive for making profits.

As to accumulation of capital, the fact is that most of the capital for war production is now either directly supplied by the government or is underwritten by it. No capitalist engaged in war production has any worry today about capital because the nation supplies most of it and, in many cases, all of it. And the big capitalists themselves demanded that this should be the arrangement. The same or a similar arrangement will most certainly continue for a considerable period after the war, since no capitalist or any group of them will be able to tackle the tremendous problems of economic readjustment and reconstruction without government backing and support. For, no matter how large the amount of private capital accumulation will be at the end of the war—and it will be considerable—it couldn't suffice for the tasks of economic reconstruction, and many big capitalists themselves have already admitted that much in public.

But there is still another point to this economic argument. If we should follow the fiscal policies of the sales tax advocates, then the end of the war will find the masses

of the American people high and dry, financially speaking, with no money at all to sustain a market for "free enterprise." Would not the government have to step in and "prime the pump" again, as in the years following the crisis of 1929? Of course it will. And since those sections of the employers who put profits before patriotism do not like the idea, they out to be a bit more far-sighted and allow the masses of the people to save up a little something for post-war buying, otherwise government intervention and "regimentation" will be absolutely certain.

So much for the economic side of the matter. But what about the patriotic phase of it? The masses of the people in all walks of life are moved powerfully, not by profit incentives, but by patriotism. Large numbers of employers, businessmen and managers are moved in the same manner. Shouldn't patriotism be a sufficient incentive for the profits-as-usual people? We know that it isn't as yet, but it should. It has already been said that a lost war will be infinitely more expensive, also in terms of profits and capital accumulation, than the costliest war that has been won. The capitalists of France and of the other Nazi-occupied countries know that only too well.

What About Wages?

But the profiteers keep on talking about wages; and, strangely enough, even such publications as *The Nation* and *The New Republic* have lately been worried about wage increases stimulating inflation.

We can well understand and share the concern of these publications for the inflationary dangers, but we cannot understand how they swallowed so easily the inflation bait of the sales-taxers.

Again, considering the question first from the purely economic standpoint, there are two main phases that are relevant to our present discussion. One is the relation of wages to production costs and to prices. The other is the relation of wages to the national income. As to the first, it has been demonstrated time and again that there is no direct relation between wages and prices. We have been having periods of high price levels accompanied by low wage levels, and vice versa. Moreover, in periods of rising prices, wages are always lagging far behind. This is demonstrably the case today. The cost of living has risen more than 15 per cent since the outbreak of the war in 1939, but most wage earners are still trying to catch up with it and are meeting with great difficulties. Besides, it has also been demonstrated that labor costs per unit of production continue to *decline*, even in industries which had wage increases, because of the rapidly expanding volume of production and particularly because of the greatly increased intensification and efficiency of labor.

The price rise in the present period is accounted for primarily by the rapid diversion of our industrial resources to war purposes resulting in a diminishing supply of consumers' goods. This is a basic economic tendency in our growing war econ-

omy, which can be counteracted effectively only by *universal rationing* and *price fixing*. *Profiteering aggravates seriously the inflationary tendencies. Hence, profiteering must be curbed.* But wages have nothing to do with it. These are facts that are well known.

Furthermore: wage increases today in all war industries are affecting profits only to a slight degree, if at all. The National War Labor Board has proven, in the case of "Little Steel," that a large part of the projected wage increase would come out, not of the companies' income but of a decrease in taxes. And still the profits-as-usual crowd continues dissatisfied.

As to the relationship of wages to the national income, the outstanding fact is the following. Our national income is increasing today at the rate of about 21 per cent. Payrolls are increasing at the rate of about 11 per cent. Consequently, no significant changes are taking place in the distribution of the national income that are favorable to labor. There certainly are no signs of any radical changes that might disturb the adherents of the status quo.

But here is a little sidelight on the question that is particularly revealing. The argument generally goes that wage increases stimulate inflation by increasing "excess" buying power. We have already shown that this is not the case. But assume for a moment that it is. Then, if wage increases were to be granted in the form of war bonds, no additional buying power would result. The wage increases would go into

savings and remain there for a considerable time. Such an arrangement should meet fully the position of those who "fear" that wage increases will intensify the inflation dangers. But, curiously enough, it does not. Here was the case of "Little Steel" before the N.W.L.B. The labor members proposed to the board "that \$1 a day be awarded in the form of war bonds and, after this was voted down, that 56 cents be paid in war bonds and 44 cents in cash, which was likewise voted down." (*New York Times*, July 17.) Isn't that strange? Doesn't it suggest that the inflation "fears" of some of these people (and, surely, of all the wage-freezers) are very much synthetic?

Most conclusive on the question of wages and inflation is the latest report of the Department of Labor (Aug. 1). It deserves thorough study, which space does not permit here. In substance, it demonstrates that labor has been saving, on the average, 66 per cent of wage increases. But it shows more than that. Because of this tendency to save—for increasing taxes and for war bonds—the standard of living even of those workers who received wage increases is *deteriorating*. They buy cheaper foods and less, because of higher prices and living costs. And the workers who have not received wage increases in this period have now greater difficulty in making ends meet. There the situation is very serious. But the wage-freezers seem to care very little about that—even though it directly affects our war effort. It is high time, therefore, that the at-

tacks on wages should cease, and that a true national policy of safeguarding the health and well-being of the working people be consistently followed in practice. We need that badly for winning the war. We need it for the strengthening of our national unity.

The Lewis-Hutcheson defeatists, who are indeed working hand in glove with the wage-freezers, are trying to arouse the workers against the national war effort because of the antics of these selfsame wage-freezers. This is an old game, and it will not succeed with the masses of labor. But there are dangers which the camp of national unity must not ignore. The workers are obviously dissatisfied with the growing profiteering, with the hesitant manner in which price fixing is handled, with the soft and tolerant attitude to business and profits-as-usual, with the failure to stamp out tendencies of economic sabotage by defeatist elements.

The workers cannot understand why they are not given a larger share in the organization and direction of the economic war mobilization and why so few of their suggestions and proposals in the battle of production are being accepted by management and government, especially as our economic machine is still so far from being fully geared to the needs of the war. The workers are asking these questions and are demanding an answer. And when they add to the foregoing the still persisting hesitation to open the long awaited and promised offensive against Hitler, the workers become more than dissatisfied. They

begin to ask: is the war being properly conducted? Is the true national interest receiving the full right of way? The workers ask these questions as true patriots, as the backbone of our nation, determined to fight to the very end in order to preserve it.

Hence, any attempt by the wage-freezers (of all people) to impugn the patriotism of our working people and their trade unions plays directly into the hands of the defeatists and fifth-columnists. The most conclusive answer to all such insinuations, in which the Peglers specialize most particularly, is the outstanding fact that the working people of the country are the most ardent advocates of the second front now, knowing full well the sacrifices that this will entail. And the second front now would also be the best answer to most of our economic difficulties, since all of them arise from the fact that our national economy still lacks the necessary unified planning and direction for the fulfillment of the needs of a definite military strategy.

The full realization of the President's seven-point program of economic policy, for which the labor movement and the people generally are now fighting, will go a long way toward meeting many of the economic difficulties. But this will happen only on one basis—on the basis of a *complete* mobilization of our *entire* national economy for the strategic needs of an offensive war and of a *second front now*.

The country as a whole has got to recognize the truth of the charge made by labor recently—that the

economic sector of the war as outlined by the Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt, is being flouted and sabotaged, crippled by the actions of a group of defeatists and obstructionists, who are aided on this issue by many pro-war but profits-as-usual Congressmen.

It is no uncommon thing to see bitter enemies of the war program in Congress masking their real defeatist intentions behind an economic attack on the war while pretending support for its military phases, and helping to bring military disaster by hastening economic disruption at home.

The movement has already begun in a number of states for labor to single out for defeat such economic Quislings, and to unite all win-the-war sections of the population for such election action in November.

Thus every candidate should be tested by his stand, not only on the second front offensive against the enemy abroad, but also his stand on supporting President Roosevelt's offensive against inflation at home.

Signs and Symptoms Requiring Attention

In recent weeks there have begun to appear all too frequently new signs of various shortages, disproportions and bottlenecks of many kinds. Temporarily, production actually had to be stopped or curtailed in many war factories. In some cases it was a shortage of raw materials, in others it was a lag in the delivery of parts, in still others

it was manpower or the proper skills that were lacking. Part of the same picture was the sharp public debate of ships "versus" cargo planes, since here also the question of resources seems to be involved. Senator Truman once again drew attention to a number of shortcomings in war production, specifically the failure of a certain board in the Navy Department to plan and order a particular kind of ship for invasion purposes. Finally, the Office of War Information lets it be known that war production in June was behind schedule. What does all this mean?

First of all, it does *not* mean that we are failing to make progress in the economic war mobilization. We are making substantial progress. Secondly, it does *not* mean that we are actually short of raw materials, of plant capacity or of man power. We still have plenty of all of these. Then what is the matter? Several things are the matter, and they fall under the following headings: (1) Planning; (2) Centralization; (3) Unified Direction; (4) Control; (5) Making the national interest paramount; (6) Close collaboration between government, management and labor; (7) Subordinating completely the national economy to the needs of our war strategy—an offensive war against the Axis and an immediate second front against Hitler in Europe.

These are the things that are the matter. The facts are that so far only *a part* of our national economy has been mobilized for the war and even this part is only partially (and very inefficiently) centralized. That

is why the President said, in his message vetoing the special Rubber Board, that this is a time which demands "centralized control." That is exactly it: centralized control in the hands of the most resolute win-the-war forces. Because of only partial mobilization of our national economy, the planning too is partial and piecemeal. Hence, lack of balance, disproportions and relative shortages. Furthermore: because of weak centralization and control, because of the inadequate representation of labor in the government agencies, even good plans and complete ones remain on paper, their execution being delayed or actually stopped. Hence the relatively slow rate of progress. Hence the fact that war production in June fell below schedule.

But this is not all. Facts show that the job of converting our industries to war production (direct and indirect) is still meeting serious resistance not only from defeatists, but from certain sections of the bourgeoisie who want to win the war, that the national interest is still far from being paramount in the economic war mobilization. This endangers the war. It must quickly be overcome.

There is lack of harmony (in many instances there is conflict) between the War Production Board and the officials of the Army and Navy Departments. This is highly detrimental to the battle of production. It must be eliminated. And this calls for unified direction and control.

There are also indications that the official policy of establishing in

production close collaboration between government, management and labor is not being fully developed, even though experience has proven great benefits from such arrangements wherever they were made. The lag in this vital spot has to be overcome.

Finally, there are many signs that our economic strategy or plans have not been fully integrated with our changing military strategy which calls for opening a second front in 1942. If it were, we could not have at this late date a discussion on "ships versus cargo planes," or a charge by Senator Truman that we have neglected to plan for and build certain types of ships that are especially necessary for offensive warfare. This—in face of the established national strategy of *offensive* and of invasion. And we certainly should not have had a drop below schedule of war production in *June*—the month of all months which was more than favorable for starting the invasion period of the European continent against Hitler, when all preparations for the second front had to be speeded to the maximum, since our strategic military plans, in accord with the sacred agreement between President Roosevelt, Molotov and Churchill, and above all the urgency of the hour, call for the opening of the second front now.

It is therefore clear, even from these indirect signs (and the public has no others) that the major immediate task in the sphere of economic war mobilization is to integrate fully our economic plans with our military plans, making the for-

mer *fully subordinate* to the latter. This does *not mean* to subordinate the War Production Board to the Departments of the Army and Navy in matters of economic war mobilization. It means, on the contrary, that the agency of economic war mobilization must be fully centralized and supreme in its field, under the Commander-in-Chief. But it does mean that the economic plans of the economic agency must be completely determined by the military plans of the military agency, again under the Commander-in-Chief. Whether this calls for some new unified board of over-all strategy (military and economic), as suggested by some, is beyond the scope of this article. But that it calls for *unification* is beyond doubt.

These are not specialized problems only for experts. They are some of the crucial problems of the conduct of the war and of winning

the war—problems for the people. And, what is more, the people are discussing these problems and are reaching conclusions. The conclusions of the people are precisely along the lines of this discussion. What is necessary is for the people, and for labor especially, to assist the government in solving these problems, because it is evident that the government needs the help of the people. It needs this help in the economic field and it needs it for the opening of the second front. Let this help and encouragement continue to be forthcoming in ever increasing volume and effectiveness. Let this also determine the current election campaign and the coming elections, to mobilize the nation of patriots to elect a Congress of patriots, of Congressmen and Senators who are behind the economic war mobilization in the nation's program for the offensive for victory.

FOR VICTORY AND RECONSTRUCTION OF WORLD PEACE!

*Statement of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Occasion of the Fifth Anniversary of China's War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression**

THE beginning of the sixth year of the war of resistance coincides with the eve of the victory of the world anti-fascist struggle. On the side of the Allies we note victories on the Soviet front, consolidation of the rear, the heroism of the Red Army, enthusiasm among the people, extension of war production in Britain and the U.S.A., the growing of the peoples' will for resistance, the growing strength of the navy, army and air force, active preparation for the second front. The conclusion of the Soviet-British treaty of alliance and the Soviet-American agreement further consolidates the friendship of these countries.

The mentioned factors create the basis for a United Nations victory over Hitler and his European vassals in 1942.

Most encouraging is not only the certainty of victory, but also the fact that a precise policy has been adopted for the post-war world order. The Atlantic Charter of last

August, the joint declaration of the twenty-six nations last January, the recently concluded Soviet-British treaty and the Soviet-American agreement give us confidence that the post-war world will be democratic and free. There will be no territorial expansion, no interference with the internal affairs of other countries, peoples of all countries will have the liberty to choose their own political system, the possibility of the recurrence of fascist aggression is precluded.

* * *

All these principles have been accepted by China, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the U.S.A. and all other anti-aggression nations. They represent the common hope of the peoples the world over, including the Chinese people. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China declares:

We support these declarations, we are willing on the basis of the fundamental principles of these declarations, in joint effort with other Chinese patriotic parties and

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groups, to participate in the reconstruction of the post-war new world and new China.

In the present international situation, the Chinese war of resistance is confronted with two problems:

1. To win time to overcome the difficulties in order to win final victory over Japan.

2. To achieve complete agreement between all parties on questions relating to the present war of resistance and post-war reconstruction in order better to defend our country and consolidate our forces for its post-war reconstruction.

In other words, it is a problem of time and unity.

As to the question of time. If the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the U.S.A. have sufficient bases for considering the defeat of Hitler possible in 1942, then China, Britain and the U.S.A. have sufficient bases for considering the defeat of Japan possible next year. But we know, although the road to victory is very short, there are very great difficulties ahead. The least carelessness and looseness might endanger all past achievements. We must guard against such danger and determinedly face the trying period before us. Only thus can victory be won. Therefore, the whole nation must unite in an effort to gain time.

As to the question of unity, the Communist Party maintains that all anti-Japanese parties must cooperate, not only during the war of resistance, but also after the war.

Post-war China must be an independent state, live in a family of nations on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and not as a colonial, semi-colonial or vassal state. Post-war China must be a united and peaceful state and not torn by internal strife. It must be a democratic state, neither dictatorial, semi-feudal, nor Soviet or Socialist. Post-war China must make possible the economic well-being and prosperity of the entire population and not merely one section of it. It should not confiscate land nor factories by force. Post-war China must be a democratic republic on the basis of universal suffrage and the cooperation of all parties. In short, the new order in post-war China must be built on the principles of San Min Chui, Doctor Sun Yat-sen, on the Kuo-mintang program for resistance and post-war construction.

Since the beginning of the war, the Communist Party of China has been struggling for carrying on the present war and reconstruction by means of unified efforts. . . .

* * *

[After citing the contents of the declaration of the Communist Party of China of September 22, 1936, the statement continues:']

In the past five years, our party has proved its loyalty to its principles, not only in words, but in deeds. And we now reaffirm that our principles, our promises, program and policy apply not only to the period of the war of resistance but also to the period of post-war

reconstruction and that our party will work for their full realization.

When the war of resistance is approaching victory, the people of China must have common policies with regard to the struggle for final victory as well as the common policies for post-war reconstruction which must serve as a basis for mutual confidence and abolition of suspicion. This is the main guarantee for uniting all efforts in the struggle for final victory and for an independent China, a unified, peaceful, democratic and prosperous post-war China.

The Communist Party maintains that the military and civilian population of China must unitedly support Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as the leader of the war of resistance. The Communist Party

of China recognizes the Generalissimo, not only as the leader of the war of resistance, but also of the reconstruction of post-war China. Our party wishes to discuss and settle past disputes between itself and the Kuomintang through the latter's authorized representatives as well as to discuss also with other party representatives the questions relating to the winning of the war.

The Communist Party considers it its duty to strengthen confidence in victory among the military and civilian population, to help overcome pessimism and despair and wipe out opportunist and "biding-time" sentiments.

All for victory! All for carrying on our counter-offensive! All views and actions harmful to the war of resistance must be suppressed!

MR. HOOVER AND "THE PROBLEMS OF LASTING PEACE" *

BY HANS BERGER

WHAT will, or should, come after the present war? What will the post-war look like? Will there be a "lasting peace"? Will the national independence of all peoples be assured? Will a path be broken for further social progress? Will the subjugation and exploitation of man by man in every sphere of life be ended? How will the relations of the capitalistic world to the land of socialism be adjusted? What will be the relations of the victorious countries among themselves, and toward the conquered nations of the Axis and its satellites? What will happen to the former colonial and semi-colonial lands? How will the economic problems of the after-war world be solved? And what rôle will the various classes and social strata play in that world?

Upon these and similar questions an enormous literature is beginning to appear, a literature of varying merit and with various aims. Politicians, economists, professors, churchmen of various denominations, and ideologists of the most

diverse trends of thought are straining their minds to find the correct and desirable solution. Men of great knowledge and deep moral earnestness are casting their talents into the scales of this discussion. Charlatans and sectarians, reactionaries and progressive individuals are looking for the formula which, out of this present world, will enable them to fashion such an after-war world as shall correspond to their perceptions, their desires, and the interests that they hold at heart.

The soldier who goes to his death, the worker who labors at his bench to the point of exhaustion, the mother who sees her son, the wife who sees her husband go to war—in short, the people, who do the fighting, working and sacrificing—have no need to wait on the outcome of such discussions as these. For it is not true that, in order to fight today, we must first find an objective for the war *in the circumstances which are to follow it*.

It is not true that one must have a blueprint of the post-war world, in order to throw his whole life into it *today*. It is not true that the Catholic bishop must first come to an understanding with the "heath-

* *The Problems of Lasting Peace*, by Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson; Doubleday Doran, New York, 1942, 295 pp., \$2.

en" Chinese, or the Communist with the heads of the automobile industry, as to what their respective post-war status is to be, in order to find a common ground for a struggle until victory shall have been achieved. For we are not in the war for any such purpose as this: to struggle for a new world order; even though we Communists are the advocates of the eventual socialist transformation of the world which will ultimately put an end to all wars. Rather, we are in this war to defend our national existence, with all of the good and ill it may hold, by way of preventing our enslavement by fascism.

In this war we Americans have entered into an alliance with all who find themselves in a similar plight, or upon whom the terrible fate of Hitler-Axis slavery already has fallen. Together with Britain we have pledged to open a second front in Europe this year, which, if launched as a major offensive and in time, in conjunction with the epic fight of the heroic Red Army will rapidly crush the Nazi monster and the entire Axis. We know that, without victory, neither we nor the Soviet Union, nor the English, French, Chinese, Czechs, Poles, or any other people, will be able to find a satisfying solution for a single problem that regards the development of their or our national life.

That is the real reason that we Communists are against all such speculations as to the shape which the post-war world is to take, speculations which may serve to break the unity of our own nation or the

United Nations. The anti-Axis nations jointly must first save their lives, in order to be able then to decide how they wish to shape them. The freedom of nations must first be won and assured through the attainment of victory over Nazism-Fascism, before the nations decide what they will do with that freedom. The character of this war as a struggle for the freedom of the peoples, as an anti-fascist war, is in nowise dependent upon what is to follow the war, upon what directions or zig-zags history, and human beings who make history, may take along the thorny path to a golden age.

* * *

In saying this we are not in any way denying the tremendous forward-moving and clarifying impulse which a victory over fascism would bring to the struggle for human progress. But these conditions favorable to the cause of progress, to that "century of the common man" of which Vice-President Wallace speaks, must be created, they must be created through victory, an uncompromising victory over fascism. Every hammer-blow, every word, every deed that brings that victory nearer, helps create these conditions. The fact that we are engaged in a war for freedom, in an anti-fascist war, on the side of all those nations which like ourselves are struggling for national survival and liberation, carries with it a logic of its own.

Have not we Americans, within

the course of a few months' time, learned more about the other nations than we have in decades past? In these relatively few months have not decades-old prejudices been shattered? Has not Lidice taught us what manner of man the Czech is? Has not the struggle of the Chinese people shown America that a man need not be a white man in order to be a hero and possess all those qualities which many Americans all too frequently look upon as being peculiarly our own? Have not Americans begun to think a little differently of the Mexicans? And is not that frightfully reactionary prejudice against our own Negro fellow citizens beginning, even if all too slowly, to be broken down?

Are not the lies and calumnies of decades against our valiant and mighty ally, the Soviet Union, being spiked at last? Are not the American people beginning to grasp the true meaning and the true greatness of the world's first socialist state? Are not the broadest masses of the people learning to revise their judgment concerning the Communists and the progressive role of the working class? Are not workers, farmers, members of the middle class, and intellectuals uniting ever more closely in the struggle for national survival of their countries and the preservation of democratic liberties? The United Nations and the various strata within the nations are learning to understand and esteem one another, are learning to fight together, to work together, and, if needs be, to die together; they are learning that

in isolation man can only go to his doom.

And so, if we speak of conditions favorable to the development of a struggle for a lasting peace, and favorable to the development of human progress *after* victory; or if we cherish the vision of a happy humanity *after victory has been won*, it is precisely for the reason that the war for freedom brings with it this powerful education and re-orientation of the masses and all the other social strata within the various nations.

What is called for is a clear statement of aims, but no speculations and no puzzle-out formulas as to the forms and methods of organization of the post-war world. What is needed above all is an inflexible will to victory over the Axis enslaver of the peoples, through the common action of the peoples themselves. What is needed above all is a will on the part of the peoples to exterminate fascism and its allies, without compromise or vacillation of any sort. What is called for above all is an ability on the part of the working class, the progressive class, to familiarize itself with the problems of these times, and to act in so decisive a manner as to strengthen the anti-fascist unity of our nation, now and after victory, and to ensure the friendly collaboration of the U.S.A., the Soviet Union and Great Britain for the attainment of victory and the organization of peace, collective security and economic prosperity in the post-war world.

Whoever takes a clear and unequivocal attitude on the decisive

question of the unity of classes and nations for victory, thereby serves the struggle for freedom, whatever may be its implications for the morrow.

On the other hand, he who has much, and much, even, that is apparently useful, to say regarding the problems of a lasting peace, but who has nothing to say on this *decisive question*, is at best but a babbler, and much more likely a man who, behind the mask of a discussion of peace problems, has other business up his sleeve. All the more so, when the man in question happens to be Herbert Hoover, and when in a book of nearly 300 pages, he *devotes not a single page to a clear and definite statement of the character of the present war, not a single page to the further question as to why and how this war must be carried on to a complete and uncompromising victory.*

* * *

The authors of *The Problems of Lasting Peace* naturally pay lip-service to the fact that the prerequisite for peace is victory, and that in this war it is our national existence itself which is at stake. But these are mere fleeting gestures, mere formal bows. The thing that these gentlemen are interested in is a Vichy peace, and, of course, a "lasting" one. But before the military debacle, Pétain and Laval and all the scum of France publicly made a whole series of observations on the necessity of victory, while at the very time the thing they were working for, above all else, was an

understanding and a "peace" with Hitler and Mussolini.

Indeed, every one must ask himself as to why it is Herbert Hoover, former President of the United States, an America-Firster, a long-standing advocate of a "negotiated peace" with Hitler and the Axis, and an arch-enemy of the Soviet Union, should be publishing such a book on the problems of the peace, a book in which he has no word to say, no thought to utter, on the necessity of winning the war. For victory is far from being assured as yet! And the ominous delay in the opening of a Second Front threatens to remove it still further beyond our field of vision.

Herbert Hoover and the dubious circle of defeatists about him no longer dare openly attack our nation's foreign policy. They no longer dare openly assert that the causes of the war are to be looked for, not in the policy of the Axis, but in that of the United States ("Roosevelt's war"). They no longer dare come out openly for an agreement with Hitler and the Axis. They dare no longer indulge in their traditional drumming up of hatred against the Soviet Union. They dare no longer openly advocate the policy of "isolation"—"isolation" plus an agreement with Hitler. They dare no longer openly oppose the policy of collective security.

Life, the truth is, has passed them by, and passed over them. They are accordingly waiting for "better times." They are waiting for a crisis in this war, reckoning with the possibility that the Axis will once more

begin its peace maneuvers. They are counting, also, on the possibility that the increase in wartime burdens and sacrifices will lead to war-weariness and an opposition to the war. Their reasoning runs like this: The war has isolated us, and so we must appear before the people as specialists in peace, in order that tomorrow we may be in a position to launch a struggle for power, for a change of policy, and a new "America First" era. That is the tactical significance of Hoover's book. "America First," hard hit by the logic of events, now presents itself to the American people as the guide to peace. He who is opposed to the people's war against the Axis and is tired of this war is interested in "peace," and in place of "America First" there now stand these men who would lead the American people to a "lasting peace." If they write about the problems of the peace, it is *not to strengthen war morale*, but to impede the war effort.

These two authors, in the Introduction to their book, set forth their reasons for having written it: "Military victory alone will not give us peace. That was proved in 1918. Victory, however essential, is *chiefly important* for the privilege it gives of shaping an era of peace for the world. There must be some time a *cessation of hostilities*, following which some methods will be arrived at for making and preserving peace." (*Our emphasis—H.B.*)

The making of preparations for an enduring peace is "in many respects a much more difficult task than conducting the war." Natural-

ly, Hoover undertakes the "more difficult" task. The "lighter" task, that of carrying on the war and winning victory, he will leave to others. According to him, it is high time the American people were beginning to think of peace problems, and in a much broader fashion than heretofore, and this book proposes to help them do so. For otherwise, we are told, it will be another 1919 all over again: "We went to the Peace Conference in 1919 animated by the loftiest and most disinterested ideals, but we were totally unprepared for the specific problems that had to be met at the peace table. *We secured neither peace, freedom nor prosperity.*" (*Our emphasis—H.B.*) By this Hoover means to say: the present Administration has dragged us into this war; its policies will bring us neither peace, freedom nor prosperity; we are waging a futile struggle, even as we did in the First World War.

This comparison of the present single and indivisible global war against Hitlerism for national liberation with the imperialist World War of 1914-18 is a well known trick of Hoover's, one that runs throughout the entire book. He even carries it so far as to give a table in which Wilson's Fourteen Points are set over against the war aims of Roosevelt and Churchill (p. 91). The trick lies in the linking of the First World War, in which our national existence was not at stake, with the present war, which is a war of national survival. The trick lies in the comparison of an anti-fascist, a people's war, with an imperialist war, one in the interest of

the plutocrats. It lies in the attempt to mobilize the feeling of deception and bitter resentment which grew out of World War I, to revive the feeling against Wilson, in order that it may be directed toward Roosevelt. Translating out of this malicious politician's jargon, we find that the meaning is none other than this: Roosevelt is the new Wilson, the new bankrupt war-leader.

We are now in a position to understand why it is that Hoover & Company in their book so anxiously avoid going into the character of the war. For whatever Roosevelt may do or leave undone after the war, however he himself may turn out, *victory over Hitler and the Axis at all events assures us of one basic thing—our continued existence as an independent nation, safeguarding our democratic liberties.* Victory over the Axis at least assures us of the difference between a free nation and one in the position that France or any of the other conquered countries is today. It goes without saying that, after victory has been won, we should all like "prosperity"—a subject on which Mr. Hoover of Hooverville is unquestionably a proved specialist—we should like an enduring peace and many other things, and we shall certainly not cease to struggle for all these things, even against Mr. Hoover. We Americans are a forward-striving people. It is only people like Hoover and his pro-fascist crowd, who preach and insinuate that this war is not one that has been forced upon us for national survival—it is only they who, with a backward glance at 1919, can contemptuously speak as

if victory over the Axis in and of itself meant nothing.

Hoover & Company give us yet another reason why they are at present so urgently concerned with the problems of a "lasting peace." On page 2 we read: "In the first place, we must recognize that our allies in this war—Britain, Russia, China, and the others—will look upon the problems of peace through different eyes. We cannot know their conclusions at this stage. *In the second place, we cannot foresee the kaleidoscopic shifts in the relation of nations which will probably take place during this war.*" (Our emphasis—H.B.)

This book was written before the historic British-Soviet Pact and the American-Soviet Agreement. It is by now increasingly evident that the United Nations are coming to view the problems of the peace eye to eye. There are, no doubt, many questions, and some serious ones, that remain to be settled between the nations, but their solution will be the easier the more closely and loyally the United Nations, above all the U.S.A., Britain and the U.S.S.R., work together in carrying on the war against the fascist enslavers of nations, and the less the enemies of our allies here at home, such as Hoover and his kind, have to say about the matter. For that Hoover has remained the implacable foe of the Soviet Union and our other allies, his book clearly shows from the first page to the last.

What has Hoover in mind, when he speaks of those "kaleidoscopic shifts in the relation of nations during the war"? His meaning can only

be this: nations which are at present our allies will become our enemies. Or: nations which are at present our enemies will become our allies. How is this to come about? It will come about either because we desist from fighting against Hitler and the Axis, because we break off our pacts and agreements with our allies, as for example, the one with regard to the opening of a second front, or because certain nations among our allies for their part cease fighting the Axis and break off their pacts and agreements with us. It will either be because we betray certain of our allies, or because our present allies betray us. Hoover leaves it an open question as to what the causes are which will bring about this "probable" change in the relationship of nations in the course of the present war.

Hoover, who writes a whole book on "the problems of a lasting peace," which must include the problem of the relationship of nations—Hoover, who demagogically claims to have found a means of making a new war "impossible"—still has *no word, no thought, no advice* to offer as to what must be done *now* in order to strengthen the relation of the United Nations in the course of the war. England, China, the Soviet Union, and many other nations are our allies. Without us they cannot survive as nations, nor we without them. This is set forth, for instance, in the American-Soviet Agreement: "That the defense of the Soviet Union against aggression is vital to the defense of the United States of America." And the same is true of Great Britain and

China. Hoover and Company, however, have not a word to say on this life-and-death question of national survival—nothing more than that, in the course of the war, there may be "a change" in the relation of nations. That which Hitler and the Axis are hoping for, that which alone could guarantee an Axis victory, that is what Hoover, falsely, vilely and provocatively, declares to be the "probable course" of history.

After he has set forth in a couple of pages (see p. 2) the alleged *probability of this frightful catastrophe*, the "great engineer" has the brazenness to go on and discuss "the problems of a lasting peace" for nearly 300 pages more. If this war is not a war for national survival, then, ipso facto, according to Hoover, the alliance of the United Nations against Hitler and the Axis is of no decisive importance for our national life. It is, then, of small moment if we lose allies—we can always get them from the other side! Then, too, we could, also, if we followed Hoover's appeasement line, end the war without the annihilation of the Axis, we could even come to "terms" with the Axis. The whole question is so unimportant to Hoover that he devotes to it only a couple of pages; but those pages serve to make clear the basic meaning of what Hoover and Company are trying to say in the 300 pages that follow.

Hoover naturally means the Soviet Union. It is needless to state that, in the course of the entire book, he has not a favorable word to say for our mighty ally who is

"vital to the defense of the United States of America." It is needless to state that, in this book, under the guise of so-called "historical" exposition, Hoover carries on his old campaign against the U.S.S.R., placing it in even a worse light than he does Hitler Germany. For the development of German fascism he finds a host of objective causes in the mistakes of others—we shall speak of these later—while he can only point to the "crimes" of the Soviet Union.

A few examples of the manner in which Hoover seeks to turn "history" against the Soviet Union:

"And another form of imperialism [besides German imperialism—H.B.] emerged in this period: that is, the *political subjugation of nations by penetration of ideologies*.* By this means the Communists sought to extend the domain of Moscow influence and the Germans the domain of Berlin influence. By this means Russia at one time gained *temporary* dominion over Finland, Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania and reached into Hungary. She succeeded in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Outer Mongolia." (p. 137)

"Russia, Germany and Italy had a hand in creating the Spanish Revolution beginning in 1936." (p. 192)

"Communism and Fascism are both founded upon sheer *materialism*. They are both intensively militaristic and imperialistic. They both ruthlessly oppose intellectual and spiritual freedom. . . . *There is less murder and liquidation under fascism, but the moral base is no higher.*" (p. 125)

While the "idealistic" Hoover is writing these lines, the "materialistic" Red Army men are dying on the Eastern Front. We know what Hoover means by "materialistic." The millions of our own unemployed were "materialistic" because they asked for unemployment relief; Hoover was "idealistic" in denying it to them. The American soldiers who returned from fighting overseas demanded their bonuses; Hoover was "idealistic" in shooting them down.

These hate-filled attacks on the Soviet Union which run throughout Hoover and Company's book, without a single word being said about the heroic resistance and the historic role of our ally in saving mankind and world freedom, naturally have a very special political significance. By thus attempting to place the Soviet Union on the same level with fascism—and an even lower one, inasmuch as he is able to find for fascism a host of so-called "explanations"—by doing this, Hoover is giving the American people to understand that it is really foolishness to declare war on Hitler to the bitter end, while all the time we have as an ally a "criminal land" like the Soviet Union. He is trying to tell them that a "*lasting peace, through an alliance with a "criminal land" like this, is out of the question.*" He would have the American people believe that, if it is necessary to exterminate fascism, it is no less necessary to exterminate the U.S.S.R. There can be no doubt that this same Hoover, who has not a page to devote to making clear to

* Emphasis mine throughout—H.B.

us why it is that Hitler must be defeated, would be able to write volumes on why the Soviet Union must be annihilated, if tactical considerations at the moment did not render it inexpedient to do so. There can be no doubt that Hoover & Company are shedding no tears over the advance of the Nazis in South Russia, and that there is complete solidarity between them and those who are opposed to the opening of a Second Front, since for them the weakening of the Soviet Union is the most important objective of this war.

* * *

Is fascism, the terrible weapon of German imperialism, responsible for the present war? What a stupid question, the reader will reply. Hoover answers that question in the following manner (p. 10): "*It is too easy to attribute our present wars to individuals or a group of individuals or even to perverse nations.* [Emphasis mine—H.B.] It is easy to assure that lasting peace will come when these individuals or nations are punished as a flaming notice to future evildoers."

For Hoover & Company the answer that German fascism, under the leadership of Hitler, is responsible for this war, is an over-simplified one, is repugnant. In place of concretely calling the aggressors by name, they proceed to develop a whole new "theory of history." Since written history began, according to this theory, there are seven forces which go to determine war and peace, and which, in varying

admixture, are to be found at work in any given period. These forces are: 1. Ideologies; 2. Economic Pressures; 3. Nationalism; 4. Militarism; 5. Imperialism; 6. The Complex of Fear, Hate and Revenge; 7. The Will to Peace. Armed with this discovery, Hoover & Company proceed to stage a raid through history, by way of bringing out the following point: these seven forces "*will continue to shape the world; they will haunt the halls of the next peacemaking, and it will not be a new world after this war, it will be a different world.*" (Emphasis mine—H.B.)

Unfortunately, we have not the space in this article to go into details concerning the manner in which these new philosophers of history circumvent history; but the gist of their philosophy is the following: we find ourselves at this moment in the third crisis of history, regarding the outcome of which Hoover & Company do not possess sufficient information to be explicit, although they are in general extremely pessimistic. For as they show from the course of history as a whole, the seventh force is now being overcome by the other six. The first crisis of history produced the cultural, political and religious ideas which brought about the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation. As to what the causes of this crisis were, Hoover & Company know nothing beyond the fact that the seven forces were there operative from the start. From this period on begins a "shift in civilization from the dominantly religious and spiritual

basis prior to the Renaissance, to the dominantly materialistic basis that was to follow." (*My emphasis—H.B.*)

Like all reactionaries, Hoover cannot help sighing for a by-gone day, when (as he believes) the masses made no material demands. Slave and slave-owner, serf and feudal lord were not so materialistically inclined as are, for instance, the Russians, the members of present-day trade unions, and the whole of this "corrupted" world of ours. History, of course, has something quite different to tell us about this "spiritual," trade-union-less epoch, in which alms took the place of unemployed relief. It tells us that this whole era was filled with class struggles, and that the downtrodden masses, in other forms than today, kept up a stubborn struggle for the bettering of their lot. In the *Communist Manifesto* we read:

"Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open, fight, a fight that each time ended either in a revolutionary reconstruction of society at large or in the common ruin of contending classes."

From the Thirty Years' War down to the American Revolution we have, according to Hoover & Company, the second crisis in modern history. This is the period of the industrial revolution, which is particularly distinguished by its increasingly materialistic character.

The most outstanding idea of this era was that of the "Rights of the Individual," and alongside this dynamic concept the famous Forces make their appearance once more, all of them being destined to explode simultaneously in the French and American Revolutions. And so it goes: whatever we have in the way of wars, revolutions or peace treaties, the seven forces always show up to engage in conflict with one another, the will to peace (the seventh force) is defeated, and our troubles begin all over again.

As to what role in history revolutions such as the French and American, the German and the Russian, may have to play, or such wars as the Napoleonic campaigns, the World War, and others; as to what classes and social strata staged these wars and revolutions, and as to whether these various events objectively represented an advance or a backward step in human civilization—to all these questions Hoover & Company can give no answer. Those "forces" of theirs go on wandering through time and space, unmasking as visionaries all those who speak of a better world, or who cherish the dangerous idea that every child in the world is entitled to enough milk to drink.

Really, now! So the great economist—with the help of Hugh Gibson—must erect a whole "new" pro-fascist philosophy of history; but still he does not call the arch-enemy by his name, nor does he make it plain and clear that this is a war for our very national existence which we are waging against

Hitler, and not a war against those nebulous seven forces of Hoover and the "America First" Committee. This becomes especially clear when Hoover brings his seven forces to bear on that period of history which follows the First World War. For here Hoover & Company devote many pages of their book to making the point that the Versailles Treaty and the treatment accorded Germany were responsible for the rise of fascism and for the present war. They carefully enumerate every wrong that was done to Germany by France and England after the previous war. They speak of the history of disarmament, of the denial of the right of self-determination to Austria and the Sudeten Germans, and of the financial burdens of the Reparations Agreement: "Hitler came to power largely upon the indignation he had been able to arouse in Germany over real and fancied grievances. *Here we have another example of the inadequacy of concessions made too late.*" (Emphasis mine—H.B.)

Of course, every democratic-minded person, every anti-imperialist, and pre-eminently the Communists throughout the world, condemned the robber Versailles Treaty and foresaw that that treaty was no basis for peace but that on the contrary it was bound to engender new colossal wars. But that just condemnation of the Versailles Treaty has nothing in common with the demagoguery indulged in by Hoover, *et al*, who very belatedly have turned "anti-Versailles" as apologists for the advent of fascism, in order to

exonerate Hitler and Hitlerism, and who today are plotting a super-Versailles and a super-Munich against the democratic peoples of the world.

On the subject of anti-Soviet policy, the intervention and the blockade, and the effort over decades of reactionary imperialist circles in Britain and France with the support of powerful fascist-minded elements in America, to create a united front against the Soviet Union, and to make of German imperialism a gendarme against the U.S.S.R., on the subject of the Soviet Union's peace policy, the policy of collective security, and the meaning of Munich—on all this, Hoover & Company have not a word to say. The Soviet Union stands, so to speak, outside the province of history. The seven forces are operative only against Germany. Our authors do not go so far as to quote the old French proverb: "to understand all is to forgive all"; but they go quite far enough, as is shown by the following: "*How just was Germany's complaint about its treatment is not the whole question. When a nation is humiliated and becomes indurated with such beliefs and resentments, she becomes hopeless of reasoned action—and this regardless of real rights and wrongs.*" (p. 142, *my emphasis*—H.B.)

Can anyone longer doubt that the seven forces of Hoover & Company are an invention designed to absolve Hitler before the bar of history? So does an advocate plead his client's case in court, when he dwells upon the terrible, the under-

standable and pardonable state of despair which drove the accused to his crime. In this case, the advocate overlooks the fact that the Soviet Union was against the Versailles Treaty and expressly declined to take part in the Reparations settlement.

* * *

Hoover & Company in their book made the demand that a "fifth freedom," that is, "economic freedom," be added to the Four Freedoms of the Atlantic Charter. Just what do Hoover & Company understand by "economic freedom"? This demand assuredly had a meaning in connection with the struggle of the bourgeoisie against feudalism, but we know well enough that this struggle has long since been won; there are in America no feudal lords to rule over our economy and put a halt to economic progress. This demand does have a meaning today in the case of the conquered and the colonial and semi-colonial peoples; the demand for the right to control their own economic resources, which becomes a phase of the struggle for national liberation. This slogan has a meaning, if by it we understand that the peoples in their economic and trade relations are not to be cut off from one another, and that after the war a maximum of economic cooperation and mutual economic assistance is to be provided for, as outlined in the American-Soviet-British Agreements. So long as we understand all this, there is no room for disagree-

ment with anyone, not even with Mr. Hoover, on the subject of "economic freedom."

But Hoover & Company have something else in mind when they raise this slogan. When they speak of "economic freedom," what they really mean is the unrestrained freedom of the monopolies, trusts, and finance capital to plunder their own people. And by way of resisting any encroachment upon this tremendous economic power, which is accompanied by the political power of monopoly capital, they proceed to label the slightest attempt at control, the most insignificant and necessary reforms, as "totalitarian regimentation," as a fascistic, half-fascist, half socialistic movement on the part of the masses that represents a step toward fascism.

It is here, as our authors see it, that the threat to personal liberty lies, in a crass materialism; and Karl Marx, it goes without saying, is held up as the chief culprit: "Socialism and Communism were to guarantee security without risk and all human blessings *without the striving which the Lord laid upon Adam.*" (*My emphasis—H.B.*) Before the First World War things were on the right path: "The growth of ethical concepts within most economic groupings was maturing." Then came the War to disrupt this development of economic harmony; the War brought "materialistic thinking" into the world, as a consequence of which the peoples began looking to their governments for help in the economic as well as other spheres, and began exerting

an ever-increasing pressure for social reforms. This venomous curse of a "managed economy" laid hold even of the United States: "*The United States, impatient with recovery from the world depression the hard way*"—that is, the way of "economic freedom" à la Hoover—"became infected with managed economy in 1933." (*My emphasis—H.B.*) And this, according to Mr. Hoover, is the thing which more and more threatens our freedom.

The true course of events was something quite different. Germany did not become fascist and the German people did not lose their freedom, so long as the Weimar Republic continued to "regiment" Big Business. Just the other way around. Germany became fascist and the German people lost their democratic rights, when the Weimar Republic began permitting the most reactionary and chauvinist imperialist groups of finance capital, without hindrance, to exert their tremendous power against democracy. If the Weimar Republic went under, it was because it granted these fascist monopolists the "economic freedom" to plunder the people in the most frightful manner, shifting upon them the burdens of the war and the crisis, while it conspired with the Junkers, the generals, and the Nazis to overthrow the Republic itself.

The reactionary captains of industry in Germany were always against democracy, civil rights, trade unions, freedom of speech, and social reforms. They built up Hitler and the Brown Shirts and estab-

lished a fascist dictatorship in order to root these things out of the world and regiment the entire nation in their own interest, so that they might create the conditions favorable to world conquest. The big German monopolies are not by any means managed by the fascist state, but by the old-time capitalists, along with a handful of newcomers. The monopolies represented by Flick, Quandt, Otto Wolff, Mannesmann, Krupp, Haniel, Kloeckner, and others—all these great industrial empires are on a more thoroughly private-capitalistic basis in fascist Germany than they were under Kaiser Wilhelm or under the Weimar Republic. The power of the plutocrats in Germany, of the big private-capital monopolies, is neither menaced nor restricted under the fascist régime. The "economic freedom" of these monopolies is now all the greater, in that it has been extended over the conquered countries.

The course of events in Germany shows us that Hoover's thesis really ought to read: the more "economic freedom" the most predatory and reactionary monopolists attain to plunder the people without restraint, the more rapidly are the conditions for the victory of fascism in any country created. *The "hard way" of getting out of the crisis in Germany, the way taken by the Social-Democrats and by Bruening, was one of the powerful factors in bringing about the triumph of fascism there.* Had Hoover been able, in our own economic crisis, to follow out the "hard way" to the end, it is

more than likely that American democracy would have gone by the board, and that fascism would long since have reared its bloody head in this country.

Hoover & Company end their book with the summary of a set of principles and measures which they see as essential to the making of a "lasting peace." According to these counselors of appeasement and defeatism, before the end of hostilities, the victorious powers should arrive at a clear and unambiguous understanding as to the methods of peace-making. In the peace-making there should be three stages:

"First, immediate settlements of certain problems which will not brook delay.

"Second, an intermediate period for rebuilding of political life and economic recovery.

"Third, a subsequent period, of more or less indefinite duration, for settlement of the long-view problems which require a cooling off of emotions, liberation and development." (pp. 277-78.)

What is implied by the settlement of those "problems which will not brook delay" is indicated by the authors as follows: "To establish de facto governments, to maintain order, to restore national life." This shall be done "as soon as possible" through "freely" chosen parliamentary bodies, freely prescribed by Hoover & Company. But whatever methods for "peace-making" are adopted, the victorious powers must at all costs "maintain order in the world by military force."

However, all the proposals which Hoover & Company have to make

do not represent a single step toward the solution of the problems of a lasting peace; for their reactionary bias, their enmity toward the Soviet Union, and their hatred for the "materialistically inclined masses" could only lead, after the war, to fresh situations such as those which have brought on the present conflict. It is not by accident that Hoover & Company (p. 64) have this to say: "It is a mistake to think of the balance of power as belonging to the past or even to Europe. It dominated Europe after Versailles despite its presumed burial by the League of Nations, and it is alive today as it ever was." (*My emphasis—H.B.*)

Where would a "balance of power," upon the basis of the old enmity toward the Soviet Union, lead at the close of the present war? This can only mean that German and Italian fascism and Japanese imperialism would not be fought to the bitter end, would not be exterminated root, stock and branch; for without leaving "power" to these nations it would not be possible to achieve a "balance." It can only mean that in France, Poland, Jugoslavia and elsewhere such de facto régimes would be set up as would lend support to the old counter-revolutionary policies. It can only mean that "order in the world" is to be maintained "by military force," not against fascism and fresh imperialist designs, but against those forces which are really seeking to create the political and social guarantees for democracy—those forces which, out of this war, have learned

that men are not mere tools in the hands of the fascists, of imperialist warmakers, to be used against the Soviet Union, China, and other peoples.

We all know well enough how Hoover "maintained order"—and against whom he maintained it — when he drove the veterans by armed force out of Washington. We have but to translate this to a world scale to see what would happen. Hoover's various formulas for "peace-making" have not the slightest worth, for the reason that they have as their central motivating impulse, not the preservation of the unbreakable friendship between our people and the peoples of the Soviet Union, China, etc., but the old enmity toward the U.S.S.R.

There can be no doubt that Hoover and the forces he represents are all prepared, after a people's victory has been won, to betray that victory by organizing a "Holy Alliance" against the heroes of this people's war and those who have borne the brunt of the sacrifices.

When we speak of conditions favorable to the solution of the peace problems, conditions to be created by a victory of the peoples, it should be unnecessary to say that we do not for a moment harbor the illusion that a single one of these problems will "automatically" be solved in a positive sense. Should such a force as that represented by Hooverism in our own country—and other countries have their own variety of Hooverism—should such a force as this gain a powerful or decisive influence in the shaping of

the post-war world, then what we should have would be something quite different from a solution of "the problems of a lasting peace."

* * *

Hoover & Company's book, none-the-less, has one useful result: it shows us the enemy in our midst, in all his unreasoning implacability—shows him trembling at the storming of the Bastille of world reacton, just as his prototypes did at the storming of the original Bastille, at the time of the great French Revolution. This book shows us how extremely dangerous it would be, were we or other countries to underestimate or ignore this enemy's direct and indirect influence.

We Americans cannot win victory without unmasking, isolating and combating this enemy. He is nothing so spectacular as an open Nazi agent, but he is none-the-less dangerous for all of that. We cannot solve a single problem of the post-war period and obtain a truly lasting peace until we have shorn the Hoovers and other defeatists and appeasers of their influence. This is one of the inseparable tasks of this world-wide struggle for human freedom.

This book shows us yet another thing: *what a mistake it would be, if we Communists and other progressive individuals were to leave the discussion of peace problems to the reactionaries** who engage in such discussion in order to weaken and undermine the war effort of the

* See the article by Earl Browder in the July issue of *The Communist*.

people, the anti-fascist unity of our nation, and to sow discord and distrust between and among the United Nations.

A sufficient basis for such discussion is provided by the development of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, by the clarifications of the leading heads of state in this war of the United Nations, and above all by the realization and unfoldment of our own historic Agreement and the British Pact with the Soviet Union which declare respectively:

“. . . the governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declare that they are engaged in a cooperative undertaking, together with every other nation or people of like mind, to the end of laying the bases of a just and enduring world peace securing order under law to themselves and all nations.”

“[The Governments of the U.S. S.R. and the United Kingdom] declare their desire to unite with other like-minded States in adopting proposals for common action to preserve peace and resist aggression in the post-war period. . . .

“The high contracting parties, having regard to the interests of security of each of them, agree to work together in close and friendly collaboration after re-establishment of peace for the organization of security and economic prosperity in Europe.

“They will take into account the interests of the United Nations in these objectives and they will act in accordance with the two principles of not seeking territorial aggrandizement for themselves and of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.”

Let the living refutation of the defeatist peace-chatter of Hoover & Co. be the ever-strengthened unity of the nation's forces for action—action in support of the U.S.-Soviet-British Pacts, in support of launching and maintaining the Western Front—the heart of the Pacts—to ensure victory over the Hitlerite Axis, to ensure an enduring peace and the friendly collaboration of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain, in their common national interests and in the interests of all the United Nations.

PEDRO CHECA—ONE OF SPAIN'S BEST SONS

THE great leader of the Spanish workers—Pedro Checa, member of the Political Committee of the Communist Party of Spain and its Organizational Secretary, has died in Mexico at the age of thirty-five.

Pedro Checa fought in the ranks of the proletariat since his youth. When he was just a boy working in the building trades, he joined the Socialist Youth movement.

At that time Primo de Rivera was dictator, and the Spanish Socialist Party, led by Largo Caballero and Besteiro, followed a collaborationist policy. In 1930 Checa and others formed a group within the ranks of the Socialist Party to struggle against this collaborationist policy.

This group made no headway against the leaders who followed Largo Caballero and they finally withdrew from the Socialist Youth. Checa then joined the Communist Party. In the period from 1931 to 1935 Checa was one of the most selfless and valiant militants.

In 1935 he was elected Organizational Secretary of the Central Committee. In this capacity he took part in the great struggles against the invaders of Spain.

He was the leader named by the party to remain in Madrid, in November, 1936, when the center was removed to Valencia. He played a big part in the heroic defense of the city and was one of the organ-

izers of the glorious brigades which battled victoriously in Carabanchel, University City and Jarama and defeated the Italians in Guadalajara.

Later, first in Valencia and after that in Barcelona, he remained in the front of the struggle of the Spanish people, always as Organizational Secretary of the Central Committee. Still later he continued his work in exile, until 1940 in France and in Mexico until the very day of his death.

He was a fighter who neither lived nor worked nor fought except for, and in the party. All the hours of his life were wrapped up in the party, in the tireless struggle against fascism and for the freedom of the Spanish people. He was never discouraged by defeat. He had an unquenchable faith in the final victory. He died fighting. He is one of the great heroes of the Spanish people.

* * *

In a telegram to Angelita Checa, Earl Browder conveyed the condolences of the Communist Party of the United States on the death of her husband Pedro Checa. The text of the message follows:

“Angelita Checa,
“Mexico City, Mexico.

“We wish to convey to you and through you to all Spanish comrades the grief and condolences of

our entire party at the death of one of the best sons of the Spanish working class and a great leader of the heroic Communist Party of Spain, valiant and beloved anti-fascist fighter Pedro Checa. Checa's staunch, steadfast leadership in the fight of the Spanish people for their liberation and liberation of all humanity from Nazi-fascist tyranny placed him in the front ranks of world fighters for freedom. Countless heroes are carrying on the same fight in Spain, in China, in

the occupied countries, in the war zones where the British and our own Americans are now battling the fascist foe, and in the Soviet Union, which stands in the forefront of embattled world democracy as it stood solidly at the side of embattled democratic Spain.

"In the spirit of Pedro Checa let us advance through the speedy launching of a western front in unison with all United Nations to victory over Nazism-fascism.

"EARL BROWDER"

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