

UNIVERSITY

LIBRARY

PHILIPPINE SECTION

39/04.03

AUG 29 1997

REBOLUSYON

Theoretical and Political Journal
of the Central Committee
of the Communist Party of the Philippines

**RED SALUTE
TO THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY,
PERSEVERE IN PROTRACTED
PEOPLE'S WAR**

**By Armando Liwanag
March 29, 1994**

**Number 2
Series 1994
April-June
*English Edition***

CONTENTS

RED SALUTE TO THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY, PERSEVERE IN PROTRACTED PEOPLE'S WAR

I.	Basic Principles of the New People's Army	2
II.	Forward March of the New People's Army	12
	A. Formative Period of the NPA, 1969-79	12
	B. Rapid Advance, Two-Line Struggle and Rectification ...	19
III.	Favorable Situation for Protracted People's War	29
	A. The Economic Situation	29
	B. The Political Situation	40
IV.	Revolutionary Tasks of the New People's Army	49

Articles and communications may be sent directly to the Editorial Board of *Rebolusyon* or coursed through any organ or unit of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Published by the Central Publishing House, Luzon, Philippines

RED SALUTE TO THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY, PERSEVERE IN PROTRACTED PEOPLE'S WAR

BY ARMANDO LIWANAG
CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL COMMITTEE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
MARCH 29, 1994

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines formulated and approved the Rules of the New People's Army (NPA) and subsequently established the NPA on March 29, 1969, in line with the 1967-68 basic rectification document, *Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party*, the *Party Constitution* and the *Program for a People's Democratic Revolution*. Since then, 25 years ago, the NPA under the leadership of the Party has made great advances and won great victories in the Filipino people's armed revolution against foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

Today, the NPA stands as the largest, strongest and most tempered army ever nurtured and developed by the revolutionary proletariat and the other exploited people in Philippine history. It has surpassed the army of the old national democratic revolution of 1896 to 1902 in terms of revolutionary content and direction and in terms of strategy and tactics, nationwide scope and perseverance. It has also far surpassed the old people's army that was established in 1942.

The NPA is a revolutionary army tested and tempered in the crucible of 25 years of fierce revolutionary struggle. It resolutely combated the U.S.-Marcos regime from 1969 to 1986 and was a major and indispensable factor for its overthrow. The imperialists and the local reactionaries decided to remove the fascist dictator in order to preempt the advance of the revolutionary forces. But the NPA has continued to fight and win brilliant victories against the succeeding big comprador-landlord regimes of Aquino and Ramos and overcome every escalation of armed counterrevolution, including the most deceptive propaganda.

657

We salute the heroic and valiant New People's Army, the proletarian revolutionaries, the Red commanders and fighters for their great achievements. They have scored great victories by pursuing the correct revolutionary line under the leadership of the Party, through hard work, courageous struggle and sacrifices. We pay our highest respects to the revolutionary martyrs who have made the supreme sacrifice by selflessly giving up their lives in the service of the people. The broad masses of the people cherish and support the NPA because it fights for their national and democratic rights and interests.

Through the twists and turns of the armed revolution, errors in line, erroneous tendencies, shortcomings and setbacks of varying scales have occurred at different times. But these have always been overcome through criticism and self-criticism and through comprehensive rectification as a process of clarifying and implementing the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought.

The current rectification movement has won overwhelming and resounding victory. The reaffirmation of basic revolutionary principles and the rectification of accumulated gross deviations, errors and shortcomings have raised to a new and higher level the fighting will and capabilities of the revolutionary forces and the entire people against foreign monopoly capitalism and the local exploiting classes of big compradors and landlords.

I. BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

In line with the current rectification movement being conducted by the Party, let us uphold the basic revolutionary principles that have correctly and successfully guided the NPA. Without these basic principles, it would have been impossible for the Party even only to establish the NPA and start the people's war. The concrete semicolonial and semifeudal conditions that impelled and justified the establishment of the people's army have persisted and worsened. The people's war continues until the ruling system is overthrown and national liberation and democracy are achieved.

The establishment of the NPA along the proletarian revolutionary line was the fruit of the struggle between those who upheld Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and those who peddled modern revisionism in the Philippines and internationally. Only after the establishment of the CPP on the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought was it possible to establish the NPA and overcome the long train of Right and "Left" opportunist errors of the Lava revisionist renegades in the old merger party of the Communist and Socialist parties and the gangsterism of the Taruc-Sumulong clique among the roving remnants of the old people's army.

In applying Marxism-Leninism on the concrete conditions of the Philippines, the Party correctly analyzed and described Philippine history and circumstances. In *Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party*, the *Party Constitution*, *Program for a People's Democratic Revolution*, *Rules of the New People's Army* and *Philippine Society and Revolution*, the Party clarified the character of Philippine society as semicolonial and semifeudal, the new democratic character of the current stage of the Philippine revolution, the motive forces and targets, the strategy and tactics, the tasks and socialist perspective of the revolution.

Since the very start, the Party has clarified that correspondent to the semicolonial and semifeudal character of Philippine society, the new-democratic revolution for achieving national liberation and democracy is necessary. The basic social conditions have not changed but have deepened and worsened under the weight of neocolonialism. The ruling system is in chronic crisis. The crisis has plunged from one level to another since 1969. It has consistently and increasingly made the ground ever more fertile for protracted people's war.

Under the pretext of looking for an easier and quicker way to power, the "Left" and Right opportunists have discarded the Marxist-Leninist analysis of Philippine society. They have metaphysically credited U.S. imperialism and the Marcos fascist dictatorship with having industrialized and urbanized Philippine society to the extent of

negating the strategic line of protracted people's war and validating putschism or reformism as the way to power. In the early 1980s, it became fashionable for some petty-bourgeois dilettantes to adopt or be swayed by either the official development theory promoted by the U.N., IMF and World Bank or the theory of dependent capitalism promoted by the neo-Kautskyites and to disregard the analysis of the particular mode of production in the Philippines.

As Lin Piao had erroneously extrapolated that the fate of the world was one-sidedly to be decided by the countryside of the world, there were those who extrapolated that the fate of the world was to be one-sidedly decided by the metropolis of the world. This latter extrapolation most suited the Right opportunists who argued for bourgeois reformism against the line of protracted people's war in the Philippines. On the other hand, the "Left" opportunists grabbed the claim of a high degree of industrialization and urbanization in order to propose shortcuts to the seizure of political power. Uprisings abroad, irrespective of historical context and social content, were touted as models to emulate.

The NPA is under the absolute leadership of the CPP. This is in accordance with the Marxist-Leninist principle that the working class through its advance detachment is the leading class in the current new-democratic stage and in the subsequent socialist stage of the Philippine revolution. The Party must command the gun in order to use it as an instrument for overthrowing the exploiting classes, effecting national and social liberation, empowering the working people and ensuring the rule of the working class in socialist society until communism is attained.

The Party is at the head and at the core of the NPA. It sets the line of the NPA ideologically, politically and organizationally. The Party's organs of leadership lead the NPA at various levels of command. Within the NPA, there are Party units and Party cadres to ensure the absolute leadership of the Party over the NPA. The principle of democratic centralism guides the Party as well as the people's army.

It is wrong to propagate and carry out the line that the NPA is independent of the Party and that it must have an independent and

separate machinery. This was the noxious line pursued by the renegades Romulo Kintanar and Arturo Tabara while they were still in commanding positions within the NPA. It was their license for *converting certain parts of the NPA into their independent kingdoms, engaging in militarism, gangsterism and gross malversation of funds, together with Filemon Lagman. All the aforementioned criminal gangsters had the same political and organizational line as Ricardo Reyes and Benjamin de Vera in whipping up the "Left" opportunist line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism.*

It is likewise wrong to counterpose the revolutionary armed struggle to the revolutionary united front, misrepresenting the former as *purely military and the latter as purely legal and political. The Right opportunists sought to convert certain legal organizations into their independent kingdoms and sought to use the united front as a vehicle for liquidating the vanguard role, the independence and initiative of the Party and for misleading the revolutionary forces into parliamentarism, reformism and pacifism.*

Armed struggle is the principal form of revolutionary struggle in the Philippines today and until political power is seized nationwide. The legal form of struggle is secondary even as these are important and indispensable. The revolutionary armed struggle, like the legal forms of struggle, runs along the revolutionary class line of the united front. The united front is principally for promoting the armed struggle and secondarily the legal struggle. And there can be no revolutionary united front without the class leadership of the proletariat through its advance detachment.

In building the people's army in the countryside under the current social circumstances, the Party is performing the proletarian revolutionary duty of wielding the most effective weapon for overthrowing the enemy and seizing political power. After all, the central task of any revolution is the seizure of political power. The genuine proletarian revolutionary party does not shirk the responsibility of waging armed revolution where and when conditions permit.

There is revolutionary class logic in pursuing and carrying out the

strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside and accumulating strength over an extended period, until it is possible to seize the cities in a nationwide offensive. The protracted people's war allows the working class and its party to forge the worker-peasant alliance as the foundation of the united front and victory; and to build the organs of democratic power even as the enemy is still entrenched in the cities.

The majority of our people are peasants. They are the main force of the new-democratic revolution, while the proletariat is the leading force. The agrarian revolution is the main content of the democratic revolution. This must be accomplished. Otherwise the proletariat and the Party cannot gain the mass support of the peasantry and base the strengthening of the people's army and the advance of the protracted people's war on this support.

Revolution is a mass undertaking for the seizure of political power and for the radical transformation of the society by the revolutionary class. The revolutionary forces and the people in the Philippines have no choice but to wage a revolution that decisively puts an end to oppression and exploitation by foreign monopoly capitalism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism and proceeds to socialist revolution.

So long as the objective of the Party and the NPA is to carry out the new-democratic and socialist stages of the Philippine revolution, there is no other way but to pursue the people's war. The Philippine revolution differs fundamentally from liberation movements seeking decolonization through negotiated neocolonial compromise. It also differs from those seeking mere bourgeois democracy against despotism through popular urban uprisings. Certainly, it differs from the coups d'état engineered by Soviet social-imperialism in Ethiopia, Afghanistan and other countries.

As a result of people's war, there is now dual political power in the Philippines. The reactionary state is still entrenched in the cities. But Red political power has arisen and will continue to grow until it displaces and overthrows the reactionary state all over the country. Only upon nationwide seizure of political power is the new-democratic

revolution basically completed and the proletariat acquires the ground and opportunity for commencing the socialist revolution.

Without the people's army, the people have nothing. This was true of China when Comrade Mao first said it. This is still true of the Philippines. Without the people's army, there would be no Red organs of political power, no revolutionary mass organizations and no effective land reform campaign and other campaigns for the socioeconomic benefit of the people in the guerrilla fronts. Without the revolutionary armed struggle as a powerful coordinate, even the legal democratic mass movement would weaken.

Were the people's army to be liquidated or made completely passive by capitulation, prolonged ceasefire or a truce, the Party and the revolutionary mass organizations would become as marginal, inconsequential and vulnerable to reactionary manipulation or suppression as the puny pseudoprogressive and reformist groups all clamoring for peace under the terms of the ruling system. The long-time Lavaite revisionists, the Gorbachovites, the bourgeois populists, liberals, Christian social-democrats and Trotskyites have not grown any larger nor any more powerful by their line of thinking and activity. In fact, they are no more than special agents of the principal reactionaries in opposing the revolutionary forces.

After being frustrated with their line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism, the incorrigible "Left" opportunists have become blatantly counterrevolutionary Rightists and joined up with anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups along the line of liquidationism, reformism and pacifism. Some of them still speak of uprisings in the vague future, while others have plunged into private business or have openly become psy-war and intelligence agents of the enemy. As the results of the rectification movement comes into full play in advancing the revolution, these scoundrels will further expose their degenerate counterrevolutionary character.

The NPA is the main mass organization of the Party. It is the instrument of the Party for waging the principal form of revolutionary struggle and for integrating the armed struggle with land reform and the building of the revolutionary mass base (organs of political power

and the mass organizations). It is the type of mass organization that now has the highest concentration of Party members.

The NPA is principally a fighting force. At the same time, it is a force for propaganda, mass organizing and production. Without painstaking mass work, it cannot win the participation and support of the people in the armed struggle. The notion that the NPA is solely a military force or the purely military viewpoint is anathema to the theory and practice of people's war. However, to deny the necessity of having a military force is wrong in view of the necessity of smashing military and bureaucratic machinery of the state. The theory of spontaneous masses, which exaggerates the importance of sweeping mass campaigns (or street activism) without painstaking mass work and solid mass organizing is detrimental to the armed revolution.

Only by building the people's army and carrying out the people's war in stages is it possible to seize, keep and consolidate political power and carry out social revolution. The probable course of the protracted people's war involves three strategic stages: the defensive, the stalemate and the offensive (or counteroffensive). There is no other probable course for the successful development of a people's army that starts from being small and weak against an antipeople army that is big and strong.

In the strategic defensive, tactical offensives are waged to accumulate armed strength. Extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare is carried out on the basis of an ever expanding and ever deepening mass base. As our experience in the past 10 years has shown, it is disastrous to rush into regular mobile warfare when the general level of development of the people's war is still guerrilla warfare. The premature formation of larger units of the people's army is destructive to the mass base. When the people's army fails to expand and consolidate its mass base, the situation takes a purely military character and becomes favorable to the militarily superior enemy forces. Thus, the "Left" opportunist line of premature regularization and "strategic counteroffensive" and the line of combining insurrectionism and military adventurism have been disastrous.

To be able to build the mass base and fight effectively, the NPA

maintains a correct and well-balanced force structure. A higher level of command can have a concentrated force acting as the center of gravity but should echelon the forces in such a manner that lower levels of the revolutionary forces can develop and that the work of expanding and consolidating the mass base is not adversely affected. In every guerrilla front, there is a center of gravity (rallying point or strike force) which is in relative concentration when there are no operations requiring absolute concentration. At the same time, there are the more dispersed small units which can do mass work on a wide scale, expand the room for maneuver of the center of gravity and impede the ability of the concentrated enemy forces to occupy territory.

It is self-destructive for a people's army to put certain larger units into constant absolute concentration at the cost of having to eliminate or drastically reduce the necessarily bigger number of small units which are dispersed on a wider scale for mass work. To create a prematurely large center of gravity is to separate it from the mass base, impose a heavy logistical burden on the people and offer a visible target to the enemy. The center of gravity cannot function as such if it is not surrounded and supported by the dispersed small units, militia and self-defense units, and, of course, by the local organs of political power, the mass organizations and the broad masses of the people.

So far, in the NPA's entire 25-year history, the small units (armed propaganda teams, squads and platoons) closely linked to the masses have been the most effective in annihilating enemy units and most responsible for seizing most of the firearms from the enemy. In sharp contrast, the prematurely formed companies in Mindanao in 1983-84 and nationwide in 1985 onward were capable of only a few dramatic actions until they were bogged down by logistical problems and exposed to enemy counterattack due to the loss of mass base. Were it not for the erroneous lines of premature regularization and "strategic counteroffensive", combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism and all their variants, the people's army would have made steadier, greater and cumulative advances and would not

have suffered serious losses.

In leading the NPA, the Party pursues the antifeudal revolutionary line. It relies mainly on the poor peasants and farm workers; wins over the middle peasants, neutralizes the rich peasants, and takes advantage of the contradictions between the enlightened and evil gentry in order to destroy the power of one despotic landlord clique after another. The degree of enlightenment among the exploiters is measured by their willingness to negotiate and conform to the laws and regulations of the people's revolutionary government

Until now, the minimum land reform program of land rent reduction and elimination of usury is being carried out. Certainly, the maximum land reform program of land confiscation and free distribution of land to the tillers shall be undertaken at the appropriate stage. Agrarian revolution is the unwavering objective of the new-democratic revolution even as we are against premature outbursts of peasant insurrections or uprisings, which expose the organized peasantry and thrust the peasant masses to a level of struggle beyond their capacity to win. In this regard, we have thoroughly studied and drawn lessons from instances of premature confiscation of land in our own experience and from the peasant uprisings in Asia from the 1920s to the Naxalbari movement in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The antifeudal line is within the framework of the general line of the people's democratic revolution. The Party upholds the leading role of the working class; builds the worker-peasant alliance as the foundation of the revolution; wins over the petty bourgeoisie as one more basic revolutionary force; further wins over the middle bourgeoisie as a positive force, upholding its legitimate interests while being on guard against its dual and vacillating character; and takes advantage of the contradictions among the reactionaries, isolates and destroys the power of one big comprador-landlord clique in power after another, until the entire ruling system is defeated.

The united front policy of the Party has the objective of arousing, organizing and mobilizing the people in their millions. It serves mainly to promote the revolutionary armed struggle. At the same time, it involves various forms of alliances, including the local organs of

political power, the National Democratic Front and the legal alliances. It promotes all forms of *revolutionary struggle* even as it promotes the *armed struggle* as the principal form of revolutionary struggle.

The NPA is the instrument of the Party and the people for destroying the political power of the reactionaries and clearing the way for the establishment of the *local organs of political power* until the power of the reactionaries that is entrenched in the cities can be completely overthrown and replaced with the people's democratic state. There is no other way to achieve the basic completion of the new democratic revolution. Subsequently, *socialist revolution and construction* can be undertaken in the Philippines. The unwavering perspective of the NPA is to become the pillar for the defense of socialist society.

The NPA carries out the armed revolution in accordance with the *principle of self-reliance*. In its 25-year history it has grown in strength and advanced because of the people's participation and support. The Red commanders and fighters have learned to fight and increase their fighting capacity in the course of revolutionary struggle. Nearly all their weapons have been accumulated through tactical offensives against the enemy. All previous attempts to import weapons have either resulted in little or no benefit and even adverse consequences. Under the present international circumstances, the NPA recognizes that it has to wage *revolutionary armed struggle more self-reliantly than ever before*.

The NPA is guided by the principle of proletarian internationalism. By waging protracted people's war under the leadership of the Party, the NPA is performing the *internationalist duty of fighting* — in common with the proletariat and people of the world — against imperialism and all reaction and for the bright future of socialism and communism. By waging the revolutionary struggle self-reliantly, it can contribute significantly and substantially to the cause of world proletarian revolution. It is self-defeating to be dependent on material assistance from abroad.

The Philippine revolution stands to benefit from the rise of revolutionary movements led by the proletariat all over the world and

from the political and moral support of the proletariat and people of the world. The revolutionary forces in the Philippines will always welcome material assistance from abroad but will never become dependent on it. The victory of the Philippine revolution cannot depend on any other but the revolutionary consciousness, strength and struggle of the Filipino proletariat and people.

II. FORWARD MARCH OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

Soon after reestablishment in 1968, the Party deployed proletarian revolutionary cadres to the countryside to resume the armed revolution. They took a decisive step in upholding Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, carrying forward the general line of new-democratic revolution through protracted people's war and repudiating both the Lava revisionist renegades and the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique.

A. Formative Period of the NPA, 1969-79

The proletarian revolutionary cadres conjoined with the good part of remnants of the old people's army and formed the NPA 25 years ago today. The NPA started with only 60 guerrilla squad leaders and fighters armed with nine automatic rifles and 26 single-shot rifles and handguns and had a mass base of some 80,000 people in the second district of Tarlac province in Central Luzon.

The Party inherited what it could from the previous armed revolutionary movement and sought to raise this to a new and higher level guided by Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought. From the very outset, the Party Central Committee led and directed the strengthening of the NPA through revolutionary education, mass work, land reform and tactical offensives against the enemy in the initial guerrilla front; and immediately trained cadres for nationwide expansion, particularly for Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon and the Visayas.

In April 1969, the Party militated thousands of peasants from Tarlac to join the workers and youth in a demonstration of 15,000

people in Manila against U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. This served to further put into the hands of the reestablished Party the highest initiative in the legal democratic mass movement and at the same time squelch the Lava revisionist renegades' taunt that the Party was Maoist but had no peasant following.

In May 1969, the Plenum of the Party Central Committee focused on the application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought on the concrete conditions of the Philippines, summed up the revolutionary experience in Central Luzon, further clarified the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war and integrated into the Party the veteran peasant cadres and Red fighters from the old revolutionary movement.

The need for nationwide expansion was stressed. Strategic points in the country and terrain more favorable for guerrilla warfare than the plains of Central Luzon were identified for the deployment of expansion cadres. At the same time, plans were laid out for expansion in Central Luzon, for overcoming the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique and for using the region as the resource base for nationwide expansion. The Plenum also decided to seek foreign military assistance.

The Party vigorously reproduced and propagated the founding documents of the Party and the NPA and the works of Comrade Mao Zedong and his great predecessors in the international communist movement. Before the end of 1969, *Philippine Society and Revolution* was produced and it served as the basic text for Party and mass education on Philippine history, the basic problems of the Filipino people and the new-democratic revolution.

From early 1969 to the end of 1970, tactical offensives brought NPA armed strength in Central Luzon to 200 automatic rifles. The mass base expanded rapidly in Isabela in Northern Luzon, while the expansion cadres assigned to Negros island in the Visayas met with failure in 1969 due to premature show of firearms before they could start organizing a mass base. While successful, the armed struggle in the initial guerrilla front in Central Luzon served as a powerful

inspiration to the legal democratic mass movement that peaked with the First Quarter Storm of 1970. In the series of mass actions, each participated in by 50,000 to 100,000 people, the streets of Manila-Rizal reverberated with the slogan, "People's war is the answer to martial rule!"

In reaction to the resounding successes of the revolutionary forces, the U.S.-Marcos regime sought to nip the NPA in the bud by launching the very first campaign of military suppression — codenamed "Operation Prophylaxis" — in the middle of 1969, carrying out a number of massacres, concentrating a full division (Task Force Lawin) against the small NPA force and organizing paramilitary forces called "barrio self-defense units". The mass base of the NPA was relatively deepgoing because of the long revolutionary experience of the people and the upgrading of the barrio organizing committees along the antifeudal class line. But it was narrow. By late 1970, the enemy succeeded through sheer concentration of forces in disrupting the mass base and the revolutionary forces in the initial guerrilla front.

After capturing the weapons of the NPA main unit in a raid on its encampment in the Tariat-Zambales mountain, the enemy boasted of having wiped out the NPA. But unknown to him, Party and NPA expansion cadres had already developed a far larger mass base of some 150,000 in Isabela province in Northern Luzon by 1970, which was an achievement because for the first time, the revolutionary forces led by the proletariat gained wide ground in Northern Luzon. As a fitting riposte to the enemy's boast that he had wiped out the NPA, an NPA force raided the armory of the Philippine Military Academy in Baguio City on the last day of 1970 and seized scores of automatic rifles in a special operation directed by the Party Central Committee.

In 1971, NPA guerrilla warfare started in the Partido district of Camarines Sur in Bicol and caught national attention. By the middle of 1971, the NPA guerrilla zones in Northern Luzon had spread to Aurora subprovince, Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino and Ifugao. In late 1971, the NPA in Isabela had some 200 automatic rifles, some 500 shotguns in the hands of the militia and a mass base of 300,000. The

disintegration of the Taruc-Sumulong gangster clique in 1971 also opened the whole of Central Luzon wide for NPA expansion.

In the period of 1969-71, the Party skillfully adopted the united front policy of cooperating with allies and taking advantage of the splits among the reactionaries to gather military and financial resources, neutralize the local officials of the reactionary government and municipal police forces and facilitate the growth of the NPA, especially in Tarlac, Isabela and Ifugao. This was possible because the ruling system is always breached by concrete political and economic contradictions among the reactionaries themselves.

In June 1971, the Party Central Committee Plenum summed up and drew lessons from the revolutionary experience in Central Luzon, Northern Luzon, Manila-Rizal, Southern Luzon and Negros island. Party cadres were assigned to form or firm up regional Party committees and expand guerrilla warfare in seven regions covering the entire country. From the experience summed up and the lessons drawn, the Plenum finalized the *Organizational Guide and Outline of Reports (OG/OR)*. On the basis of discussions and consensus in the Plenum, the Party central leadership formulated and issued the *Rules for Establishing the People's Revolutionary Government and Revolutionary Guide to Land Reform (RGLR)*.

In order to apply further the theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought and the general line of the new-democratic revolution on concrete conditions, the regional Party committees were required to make social investigation and preliminary reports. These were necessary for laying the ground for the people's war. These followed the example of the Preliminary Report on Northern Luzon written in 1969. Using the OG/OR, Party cadres and Red fighters in the guerrilla units undertook concrete social investigation and class analysis in their particular areas of operation in order to grasp the class line in arousing, organizing and mobilizing the masses in mass campaigns against local tyrants and bad elements.

From 1971 to 1974, the general trend was to form regional Party and NPA organizations from the Party members and revolutionary mass activists and to start mass work and guerrilla warfare at

strategic points. The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in 1971 and the declaration of martial law in 1972 did not cow the revolutionary forces and the people but goaded them to wage *revolutionary armed struggle*. The U.S.-Marcos regime, using its own agents and some renegades, attempted to put the blame for the 1971 Plaza Miranda bombing on Benigno Aquino and the Party but failed because its intended scapegoats vigorously made denials and the public saw clearly that the massacre was calculated to destroy all kinds of opposition and pave the way for the Marcos dictatorship.

Despite some gross setbacks in 1972-74, the principal fact was the significant growth in strength and advance of the Party, the NPA and other revolutionary forces from year to year. The nationwide expansion of the revolutionary forces far outweighed the setbacks which occurred at different places and different times. The armed propaganda teams became the most important means for carrying out mass work and implanting the Party and the NPA in the terrain most favorable for conducting guerrilla warfare all over the country.

All regional organizations of the Party and the NPA (outside Manila-Rizal) took deep roots and expanded at an unprecedented rate. The Party and NPA organizations in Northwestern Luzon (Ilocos, Mountain Provinces and Pangasinan), Central Luzon, Southern Tagalog, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas and Mindanao were steadily developing. In 1974 the Party Politburo decided to streamline the Manila-Rizal-based central staff organs and to dispatch an unprecedented number of Party members and revolutionary mass activists (in the hundreds) to the countryside because of the greatly increased capacity of the Party and NPA regional organizations to absorb them.

Three NPA companies were formed in Isabela in 1971-72 in connection with a plan to receive imported firearms in 1972. After the failure of the importation plan, the three companies were wrongly kept in absolute concentration. Two of these became isolated in the Isabela forest region, which had been depopulated by the enemy since the latter half of 1972. The third company disintegrated in Nueva Vizcaya. In 1972-73, the initial armed propaganda teams in

Mindanao were all wiped out because they bypassed the Visayan peasants on lower ground and went directly to the armed hill tribes. But the revolutionary forces learned their lessons and took roots better in subsequent years.

In Western Visayas, incidents with losses in armed strength occurred but the armed struggle continued in 1973-74. In Sorsogon, an ill-armed platoon grew into a company also in 1973-74 but the company disintegrated in 1974 as a result of "Left" adventurist errors. A platoon remnant of the company which had broken up in Nueva Vizcaya grew into a company through tactical offensives in 1974-75 in Aurora subprovince. But the company had to break up into platoons in 1975, with one of the platoons marching to Nueva Ecija and becoming a force of Central Luzon.

In accordance with the decision of the May 1971 Central Committee Plenum, another arms importation plan was implemented in 1974 and again failed with worse results within its own scope. As in 1972, the failure was promptly and thoroughly assessed and criticized. The two arms importation plans did not involve any change of line and their adverse effects were inconsequential to the principal achievement of the Party and the NPA, which was their nationwide expansion and consolidation.

In 1974, *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines* further integrated the theory and strategic line of protracted people's war with the concrete conditions of the Philippines and summed up the rich experience acquired so far in the revolutionary armed struggle. It was adopted by the Party Central Committee in 1975 and it comprehensively guided the further development of people's war.

The document related the geographic and social conditions as well as the international conditions to the protracted people's war in the Philippines. It further clarified the correct strategy and tactics in class and operational terms. It put forward — among several points — the principle of centralized ideological and political leadership and decentralized operations; the line of major islands first, minor islands next; the need for self-reliance in developing the armed struggle; and the use of both the armed struggle and the united front to break

enemy blockades. It raised the revolutionary confidence of the Party and the NPA in the conduct of people's war.

By the end of 1975, at the time of the Party Central Committee Plenum, the number of NPA Red fighters armed with automatic rifles had risen to a full thousand, excluding the far more numerous militia and self-defense units. All regional organizations of the Party and the NPA had become basically self-reliant. The central leadership no longer gave subsidies to the regional Party committees. On the other hand, it urged them to deliver their surpluses to the Party center for assisting weaker regional committees and the administrative and educational work of the Party center. In terms of its significant agenda and the replenishment of the Central Committee through nominations and election, the Plenum had the weight of a Party Congress.

On the basis of the discussions of the 1975 CC Plenum, the Party Executive Committee formulated and issued *Our Urgent Tasks* to guide in a comprehensive and deepgoing way various aspects of revolutionary work along the antifascist, anti-imperialist and antifeudal line. The document summed up the experience of the revolutionary forces until 1975 and set the tasks for advancing the revolutionary struggle to a higher level. It spelled out the processes and phases of mass work, from social investigation to the building of the mass organizations, organs of political power and the Party branches. Together with *Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines*, it would serve as an effective practical guide to the development of the revolutionary forces.

Throughout 1976, the guerrilla zones were multiplying nationwide. In an increasing number of regions, these zones were cohering into guerrilla fronts, consisting of well-consolidated guerrilla zones or stable guerrilla bases and a bigger number of guerrilla zones. The center of gravity was typically a guerrilla squad surrounded by widely dispersed squads, each responsible for a guerrilla zone equivalent to the size of a municipality and divisible into armed propaganda teams. The number of platoon-size tactical offensives increased significantly.

From 1977 to 1979, platoons emerged as the centers of gravity in some regions and guerrilla fronts in line with *Specific Characteristics*

of People's War in the Philippines and Our Urgent Tasks. Tactical offensives by NPA units ranging in size from a platoon to two or three platoons further increased. It was in this period that the NPA forces in Eastern Visayas, especially in Samar island, caught nationwide attention for their successes in guerrilla warfare and mass work. The guerrilla forces grew in strength even as the enemy was concentrating larger forces against them.

Following the arrest of the principal leaders of the Party in 1976 and 1977, a new central leadership assumed responsibility in November 1977. As early as 1978, certain elements in the central leadership and some staff members, without benefit of concrete social investigation, started to put forward and propagate the notion that the Philippines was more urbanized and industrialized than China at the stage of its new-democratic revolution and thus urban struggle was of greater importance in the Philippines than in China. Some of these elements spread the "Left" opportunist view that urban uprisings would be the key to effecting a leap from the early to the advance substage of the people's war even as the NPA had no more than 2000 automatic rifles. Others spread the Right opportunist line that urban legal struggle was of decisive importance but that the Party was neglecting it.

B. Rapid Advance, Two-Line Struggle and Rectification

From 1980 to 1983, the chronic crisis of the semifeudal and semicolonial system deepened further and rapidly worsened. This propelled the advance of the revolutionary movement. Under the guidance of *Our Urgent Tasks*, the Party and the NPA accelerated the building of the guerrilla fronts and guerrilla units and the launching of tactical offensives nationwide. Until 1981, a significant number of Party cadres and mass activists from the cities were deployed to the countryside.

The number of barrios covered by organs of political power increased yearly by more than 1200. Hundreds of thousands of peasant benefited from the open and underground implementation of the minimum land reform program. Guerrilla fronts covered almost

entire provinces and big chunks of provinces. Those in Mindanao, Samar, Negros and Bicol spanned two-thirds to three-fourths of the total land area and number of barrios. They extended to well-populated areas, including environs of town centers, along highways, seashores and plains.

In 1981 NPA fighters armed with automatic rifles were around 3000. NPA platoons had been formed in the most advanced guerrilla fronts and grew to 34 for the entire country by 1982. The NPA squads numbered more than 200. The NPA paid attention mainly to mass work. The squads and platoons could confiscate from the enemy an average of 900 automatic rifles annually from 1981 to 1983.

However, during the same period of 1980-83, the opportunist line became assertive in the Central Committee. Exactly when the chronic crisis of the ruling system was becoming more virulent than ever and more favorable for the people's war, the opportunists of both "Left" and Right variety used the 1980 Central Committee Plenum to cast doubts on the Party's correct analysis of Philippine society as semicolonial and semifeudal and float the idea of modifying the strategic line of protracted people's war in order to shift the emphasis of work to urban-based legal and insurrectionary struggle and thereby effect a leap from the early to the advance substage of the strategic defensive. Albeit, the 1980 CC Plenum continued to express adherence to the ideological and political line of the Party and to the strategic line of protracted people's war, replenished the ranks of the Central Committee and defined 16 regional Party committees and army commands under interregional commissions called territorial commissions.

In 1981, the Political Bureau decided to push the "Left" opportunist line of making a leap from the early to the advanced substage of the strategic defensive through insurrections in third and fourth class municipalities and projected the line of "strategic counteroffensive" as the third and final stage of the strategic defensive through the "regularization" of the guerrilla forces and intensification of the war. On the assumption that the Philippines was 40 per cent urban and 60 percent rural, the formula was set that the existing number of Party

cadres and armed personnel were to be deployed in accordance with such a proportion. This laid the ground for the urban-basing of the Party central leadership and the reverse flow of cadres from the rural areas to the urban areas.

Urban-basing of the central leading and staff organs in turn further encouraged the Right opportunists to exaggerate their urban-based assignments and increase their clout through their access to and use of funds from foreign funding agencies. They created more city offices and absorbed young Party members and mass activists who would otherwise have gone to the countryside to serve in the people's army. They dared to promote the line of liquidating the leadership of the Party in the united front, particularly through the proposal to convert the National Democratic Front into the so-called "New Katipunan" under the pretext of making the revolutionary movement more attractive to the anti-Marcos sections of the bourgeoisie.

From 1981 onwards, the Right opportunists circulated the draft of the "New Katipunan" program which drastically departed from the Party's Program for a People's Democratic Revolution and spread the line of giving away the initiative to the anti-Marcos reactionaries and petty-bourgeois liberals and delivering to them the masses organized by the Party. The proletarian revolutionary cadres, especially from the regional Party committees and organizations, strongly criticized the Right opportunists and compelled the withdrawal of their draft.

In 1982, the central leadership dismantled the Education and Propaganda Commission and the National Instruction Bureau of the Central Committee. Handling of the basic and intermediate Party courses was passed on to the interregional commissions and regional committees while that of the advance Party course and the theoretical organ was given to the Executive Committee of the Central Committee. The result was that Party study courses and study materials, including basic Party documents, dwindled and disappeared as the Party and the NPA were pushed at all levels to concentrate attention and resources on military and other practical tasks in the political struggle.

Marxist-Leninist theoretical and political education was neglected

exactly at a time that Party members and NPA commanders were being promoted to higher positions in the drive to "regularize," complete the "advance substage" of the strategic defensive and reach the final substage of "strategic counteroffensive". Resources were easily made available for purely military training and for the purchase of ammunition, firearms, radio equipment, computers, cars and other urban underground facilities; but not for theoretical and political education and the production of study materials.

Under the influence of the wrong line set by the 1981 Politburo meeting, key members of the Mindanao Commission and its Executive Committee designed their own "Left" opportunist line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism in 1982. They had the erroneous presumption that the Party's strategic line of protracted people's war precluded giving due importance to work in the White areas, urban-based legal political struggle and international work (especially with regard to seeking military and financial assistance from the Soviet Union and Soviet-related countries). They adopted and spread the line that urban insurrection was the highest form of politico-military struggle — to be achieved through sweeping propaganda, urban mass actions and armed city partisan warfare — and that the NPA was a purely military and secondary force in the service of urban insurrection.

From the assassination of Benigno Aquino in 1983 to the downfall of Marcos in 1986, the revolutionary armed struggle and the legal democratic mass movement surged forward in an unprecedented manner. In the main, the NPA carried out guerrilla warfare nationwide. Through tactical offensives, NPA guerrilla forces seized an average of 1000 automatic rifles every year, including mortars and machineguns, captured or killed high-ranking military and police officers (including generals) and extensively used radio communications, land mines and other explosives. The level of military training, technique, intelligence and medical work rose but the "Left" opportunists had started separating the military aspects of the struggle from the ideological and political line of the Party.

Simultaneously in their respective ways, the "Left" and the Right

opportunists were at work in undermining and opposing the ideological and political line of the Party. The "Left" opportunists in Mindanao implemented their line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism and brought disaster to the revolutionary movement. The Right opportunists preoccupied themselves with building legal coalitions under the leadership of anti-Marcos bourgeois personalities, watering down the program of revolutionary struggle and obscuring the vanguard role of the Party; and, like the "Left" opportunists, neglected to build the Party core in the militant mass movement. The line of the Right opportunists tended to be obscured by the real need to broaden the range of forces for bringing about the downfall of the fascist dictatorship.

From 1983 to 1985, the drive in Mindanao was to raise the number of NPA companies to 15 by forming 10 new companies. The formation of these companies meant the absorption of previously widespread squads and platoons into the absolutely concentrated main and secondary regional guerrilla units separated from mass work. The term "full-time fighters" was reinterpreted to mean complete concentration on military tasks and separation from mass work. For Red fighters to attend to mass work was deemed as conservatism and "detracting" from what should be the principal task of the NPA.

The neglect of mass work resulted in the thinning out and narrowing of the mass base. At the peak of the drive to form companies, about 70-80 percent of the fighters were concentrated in main and secondary regional guerrilla units and only 20-30 percent were deployed as squads and platoons for mass work. By 1984, all the companies were in isolated and passive positions and suffered gross setbacks as the enemy escalated his strategic and tactical offensives in a purely military situation resulting from the "Left" opportunist error.

The "Left" opportunists in the Mindanao Commission ascribed the gross setbacks in 1984 to "deep-penetration agents" (DPAs) and they spread panic within the Party and the NPA. Upon the approval of the Executive Committee of the Mindanao Commission, its so-called Caretaker Committee launched in 1985 the anti-DPA campaign.

codenamed Kampanyang Ahas. This involved the murder and torture of hundreds upon hundreds of Party members, Red fighters, mass activists and allies who were suspected of being DPAs. The rights of the victims were trampled upon in complete violation of the Bill of Rights in the *Rules for Establishing the People's Revolutionary Government*, the *Party Constitution* and the *Rules of the NPA*.

For the first time in the history of the reestablished Party and the NPA, simultaneous losses in several regional organizations in Mindanao caused in 1985 a decline in their national growth. By 1986, Party membership in Mindanao fell from 9000 to 3000, the fifteen companies and 30 platoons fell to two companies and 17 platoons and the mass base shrunk by more than 50 percent. Despite the debacle in Mindanao, however, the overall growth rate of the NPA was an average of 1000 rifles each year from 1983-86 due to the advances of the regional Party and army organizations in the Visayas and Luzon.

The objective conditions for advancing the armed revolutionary movement was exceedingly favorable. The fascist dictatorship was undergoing its most severe crisis and was disintegrating as a result of popular outrage over the assassination of Aquino. The legal democratic mass movement and the armed revolutionary movement were both striking lethal blows at the regime. Although opportunist lines had started to undermine the revolutionary movement, these could not yet overcome the correct line and the accumulated strength of the revolutionary forces nationwide.

In the 1985 CC Plenum, the "Left" opportunists who had caused the disaster in Mindanao strutted about as if they were victorious strategists and tacticians and dared to demand the liquidation of the line of protracted people's war. The person who led the attack on the correct line of the Party was the same individual (Ricardo Reyes) who had written in 1984 — in the name but without the approval of the Mindanao Commission — the document further elaborating on the line of combining urban insurrectionism with military adventurism.

The central leadership rebuffed the attack on the line of the Party by invoking the Party and NPA founding documents but upheld the

line of "regularization" and "strategic counteroffensive" which parented the line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism and which pushed for a quick shift to regular mobile warfare and spread the notion of toying with urban insurrections. The 1985 Plenum drew up the three-year program of achieving the "strategic counteroffensive" by forming many more companies (regular and guerrilla) and even battalions, raising the level of guerrilla warfare to regular mobile warfare and intensifying the war.

The tasks and objectives drawn up were far beyond the given level of development and actual capacity of the revolutionary forces. These included aiming for decisive revolutionary overthrow of the entire reactionary state together with the U.S.-Marcos dictatorship. Furthermore, the Plenum promoted the principal architects of the "Left" opportunist line in Mindanao (Romulo Kintanar, Benjamin de Vera and Ricardo Reyes) to key positions in the central leadership of the Party and the national military staff of the NPA as these scoundrels kept the Central Committee ignorant of the gross setbacks (which started in 1984) and Kampanyang Ahas (which started in 1985) in that island.

From 1985 onward, the Political Bureau and the Military Commission already packed with the "Left" opportunists — and the national military staff (renamed general command in 1988) pushed the disastrous line of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism nationwide. From 1986 onward, various regions at various times suffered setbacks as a result of their own adaptations of the "Left" opportunist line.

These included: the Southern Luzon Commission's "victory in three years" concept of "fast-track/slow-track insurrection" in 1986; the Southern Tagalog regional Party committee version adopted also in 1986 (patterned after the Mindanao "pol-mil" approach), setting seven cities and provincial capitals as "insurrectionary flashpoints" and targeting 1990 for local insurrections; the concentration of guerrilla units under the regional command in Bicol in 1987; the Northern Luzon Commission's "preparation of the SCO requirements" in 1986-88, with the Cagayan- Apayao-Ilocos Norte (CAIN) version of "carving

out the solid North" and the Vizcaya-Quirino version of aiming for "localized strategic stalemate"; the "play to win, victory in one year" through insurrection in Central Luzon as late as 1991; the "second Edsa uprising" or "bugso" of the Manila-Rizal regional Party committee under Lagman from 1990 to 1992; and so on.

The nationwide implementation of the wrong line peaked in the drive to form 36 companies and several battalions from 1986 to 1988. This meant putting more than 60 percent of the Red fighters into the prematurely large formations which were absolutely concentrated for military tasks and leaving less than 40 percent of them in small units for mass work. In the Visayas, the chief purveyor of "Left" opportunism, Arturo Tabara, pushed the rapid formation of 15 companies and one battalion until 1988, which caused the drastic contraction of the mass base by more than 50 percent. In the worst cases in particular regions and guerrilla fronts, 80 percent of the Red fighters were put into main guerrilla units divorced from mass work and only 20 percent were in small units for mass work. In 1987, a significant number of NPA companies were already experiencing serious problems of discipline and coarseness among their personnel.

There was unevenness in both the adoption and implementation of the "Left" opportunist line in various regions. The correct line could still continue in the gap between decision and implementation of the wrong line. And more importantly, when the line was proven wrong in practice, comrades sincerely committed to the armed revolution usually made their own adjustments and rectification. Without these, it would have been more difficult for the central leadership to launch a comprehensive rectification movement in 1992.

Until sometime 1987, the guerrilla fronts in Northern Luzon expanded even as they bore the main brunt of enemy campaigns of suppression. The number of barrios under local organs of political power were more or less maintained in the Visayas. In 1987, the national military staff unsuccessfully launched an anti-"low-intensity conflict" campaign and "nationally coordinated offensives" consisting of more than 600 major and minor mainly attritive operations targeting enemy hard points, and thus wasting ammunition and other

resources. The urban insurrectionists of Metro Manila and a few other cities also accelerated operations of armed city partisans at a rate prejudicial to the legal democratic mass movement, especially to the urban poor communities. In 1988, in the wake of the costly extravaganza of the militarists and urban insurrectionists in 1987, there was widespread realization within the Party and the NPA that a lot of wrong had transpired and that these had to be rectified.

In 1988, the enemy mounted an intensive attack of unprecedented scale against the revolutionary forces in both rural and urban areas. This was a high point in his campaign of suppression which had been escalating since 1984. The urban-based central Party organs and the NPA general command were hit hard by enemy raids. Also in 1988, the proletarian revolutionaries in the Party central leadership noticed the 12 percent drop in the rural mass base of the revolutionary movement and the dwindling of NPA tactical offensives and they began to see the sabotage wrought on the legal democratic mass movement by the exponents of urban insurrectionism.

As a result of the enemy raids on its urban underground houses, the NPA general command lost a lot of its personnel, documents, funds, stock of electronic equipment, vehicles and seagoing vessels. An arms importation project went to naught at a cost far higher than that in the failed projects of the same nature in 1972 and 1974, excluding the high cost of the project of befriending Soviet-associated parties and soliciting arms donations since 1986.

The 1988 Party anniversary statement started to criticize the opportunist lines, the imbalances in work and the adverse results. The opportunists opposed many portions of the statement and made amendments according to their stand. However, the 1989 Politburo meeting decided to scale down the target for the verticalization of forces and to redeploy the forces for expansion, recovery and consolidation of the mass base. The proletarian revolutionary cadres in the regional organizations of the Party and the army welcomed the corrections and adjustments.

In the 1989 Party anniversary statement, the Party central leadership issued the call to carry out rectification, further strengthen

the Party and intensify the people's revolutionary struggle. The opportunists opposed the statement even more strongly than they did that of the previous year. In its 1990 meeting, the Politburo withdrew the erroneous line of "regularization" and "strategic counteroffensive" but inconsistently approved the erroneous resolutions of the 1989 NPA National Command Conference. This inconsistency manifested the two-line struggle intensifying between adherents of the proletarian revolutionary line and those "Left" opportunists opposed to it.

In 1991, however, the First National Conference on Political Work in the NPA identified some of the major errors and shortcomings and pointed out the extent of the damage caused by these. The report on the political work of the NPA (Refer to *Rebolusyon*, Series 1993 #2, April-June) and the conference itself took up the Party Central Committee's call for rectification in its 1988 and 1989 Party anniversary statements and made an assessment of the major problems besetting the people's army and adopted resolutions for solving them.

Even as corrections and adjustments were being made by the proletarian revolutionaries in the central leadership from 1988 onward, the "Left" opportunists intensified their opposition to the proletarian revolutionary line from year to year. They spread intrigues in particular units, organs and territories where they were, tried to convert these into their independent kingdoms, prevented the distribution of the Party's central documents and disrupted communications between the central leadership and the lower Party organs and organizations. They tried to paralyze and liquidate the central leadership by claiming that the Executive Committee of the Central Committee had no authority between meetings of the Political Bureau. They pushed lines diametrically opposed to the line of the Party and usurped authority for themselves.

Frustrated in implementing their wrong line, refusing to rectify their grave errors and afraid of being held to account for these errors and the consequences as well as for the crimes of bloody witchhunt and gangsterism, the ringleaders of "Left" opportunism increasingly conspired with long-running Right opportunists against the Party and

the central leadership from 1990 onward. Together, they spoke and acted along the line of liquidating the Party ideologically, politically and organizationally.

One of the scoundrels (Ricardo Reyes) was a promoter of the line of urban insurrectionism and military adventurism and the bloody witchhunt, *Kampanyang Ahas*. He had a long record of flip-flopping from "Left" to Right opportunism or combining both types of opportunism in one big error. He played the key role in swinging the "Left" opportunists to a liquidationist and counterrevolutionary Rightist line by using Gorbachovite arguments.

He was among the Right opportunists who sought to negate the character of the National Democratic Front as a united front organization and to degrade it into a mixed-up federated and unitary organization with a program of bourgeois nationalism, pluralism and mixed economy. These Right opportunists interpreted the united front as a framework for liquidating the Party and the NPA and for capitulating to the enemy. They pushed the line of going Right to reach the "Left" objective of insurrection in the medium term combined with Filemon Lagman's line of inducing urban insurrection through agent-provocateur actions by a few armed city partisans during mass actions and sabotaged the legal democratic mass movement.

Later in 1991, the central leadership of the Party had gathered enough facts to assess comprehensively the state of the revolutionary forces. From 1987 to 1990, the Party membership declined by 15 percent, the number of Red fighters by 28 percent, the number of barrios covered by the local organs of political power by 16 percent and the number of organized masses in the countryside by 60 percent. The automatic rifles and other high-powered weapons of the NPA increased but the rate of increase dropped to the 1976-78 level.

In the face of these dismal figures, the Party central leadership decided to carry out a comprehensive and thoroughgoing rectification movement. The rectification movement is based on the information and decision arrived at through democratic interaction between the central leadership and lower Party organs and organizations through

direct investigation, consultations, letters, conferences, reports and recommendations. In 1992, the rectification document "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors" was approved in a series by the *Executive Committee, the Political Bureau and the Central Committee of the Party.*

Since 1992, the former "Left" opportunists have publicly swung to a blatantly counterrevolutionary Rightist and liquidationist position. They published vicious slander articles against the Party, the Central Committee and its 1992 Plenum, and the principal leaders of the Party. In so doing, they have openly combined with anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups and individuals in attacking Marxism-Leninism and the Party by using arguments drawn from Gorbachovism, bourgeois populism, liberalism, social-democracy and Trotskyism. They have cast anticommunist, anti-Stalin slogans against the Party, the NPA, the NDF and the progressive mass organizations. They have sought to destroy and discredit these forces of the people. And they are now openly working with the U.S.-Ramos regime and other anticommunist and antipeople forces in the country.

Although a two-line struggle between proletarian revolutionaries and bourgeois opportunists existed in the period of 1968-79, the deviations, errors and shortcomings were criticized and rectified promptly. However in the period of 1980-91, serious deviations, errors and shortcomings were allowed to run rampant for a long time. These even went into decisions of the central leading organs. The bourgeois opportunists violated the ideological, political and organizational line of the Party, the Party Constitution and Program. Fortunately, they failed to legitimize through a congress their violation of the line and basic revolutionary principles of the Party. They started clamoring for a Party congress under their terms only after the Party central leadership announced substantive preparations for a congress through a movement to criticize and repudiate major deviations and errors.

Notwithstanding the gross deviations and errors generated by the "Left" and Right opportunists from 1980 to 1991, the Party has upheld, defended and promoted the correct ideological, political and

organizational line. Under the leadership of the Party, the NPA has grown in strength and advanced in line with the new-democratic revolution through protracted people's war. The NPA could have won greater victories were it not for the long-running deviations and gross errors of the opportunists. The achievements of the proletarian revolutionaries and Red fighters were considerably reduced and sabotaged by the deviations and errors. The general level of development of the revolutionary forces had been set back to 1983-84 in several important respects at year-end 1991.

The NPA's sum total of Red fighters armed with automatic rifles is equivalent to 24 basic battalions or eight basic regiments, excluding the far more numerous personnel of the militia and self-defense units armed with inferior weapons. There are 15 regional commands which are under the leadership of the Central Committee and the regional Party committees. Guerrilla fronts cover about 10,000 or 25 percent of the 41,000 Philippine barrios and substantial portions of more than 60 provinces of the total 74 provinces of the Philippines. NPA guerrilla units can operate in more than 700 out of the 1540 municipalities and armed city partisans in many of the 60 chartered cities.

The NPA has been able to score its achievements by following the correct revolutionary class line and by paying special attention to giving full play to the role and initiative of women, youth, ethnic minorities, fishermen and progressive religious. The NPA has promoted the active participation of these sectors in the armed revolution to an extent and in a manner unprecedented in the entire history of the Philippines.

Since the rectification movement was launched, the NPA has become stronger than ever. The ideological, political and organizational leadership of the Party over the NPA has been consolidated. The Party core within the NPA is reinvigorated and growing. Revolutionary education has been promoted in all the NPA commands and units, through the reaffirmation of basic revolutionary principles and the rectification of the deviations and errors and shortcomings. The revolutionary experience of the NPA is summed up, lessons are drawn, criticism and self-criticism are conducted and

the revolutionary tasks are set forth.

The Red fighters and units are enthusiastically engaged in mass work. They undertake mass education and propaganda among the people and assist them in forming the mass organizations and in conducting land reform and other mass campaigns. They are helping to build the local organs of political power. They are expanding into new areas, recovering lost ones and consolidating them. They are doing everything to create a wider and deeper mass base in order to be able to conduct the protracted people's war and win ever greater victories.

Since the rectification movement, the NPA has launched tactical offensives according to its given level of development and has overcome the attempts of the enemy to take advantage of weaknesses wrought by previous opportunist errors. In the first quarter of this year, a series of successful tactical offensives has occurred in close succession at various points of the archipelago, serving notice that the NPA continues to fight in the interest of the people and that it can neither be crushed nor wished away by the enemy.

III. FAVORABLE SITUATION FOR PROTRACTED PEOPLE'S WAR

Since the establishment of the NPA, the objective conditions favorable for waging a protracted people's war have persisted. The oppression and exploitation of the broad masses of the people have become even more intolerable. The socioeconomic and political crisis of the ruling system has deepened and has been aggravated from the time of Marcos, through that of Aquino to that of Ramos.

A. The Economic Situation

The social economy remains agrarian, semifeudal and preindustrial. Agriculture is landlord-dominated, prevalently backward, nonmechanized, principally for subsistence and secondarily for domestic and foreign trade. The economy lacks basic industries that produce basic metals, chemicals, equipment and precision

instruments. It is dependent on the importation of equipment, raw materials (especially fuel) and semiprocessed components. The service sector revolves around the exchange of raw-material exports and manufactured imports.

The degree of urbanization in the Philippines is still around 25 percent, although official demographers artificially raise it to the level of more than 40 percent by simply adding up the total population of Metro Manila, the chartered cities, provincial capitals and town centers. In fact, conditions of rural poverty and backwardness have moved into the monster city of Metro Manila, with some 88 percent of the urban population dependent on odd jobs, living in shanties or as homeless occupying sidewalks and public places, and deprived of piped-in water and any sewage system.

The exhaustion of the land frontier since the end of the 1960s has created a huge army of surplus labor in the countryside, an excessive number of seasonal farm workers competing for odd jobs in the rural and urban areas. A great part of the oddjobbers in Metro Manila double as seasonal farm workers in nearby provinces. The overwhelming majority of the residents in the provincial "urban" areas are peasants. The huge emigration since the 1970s of six million Filipinos (mostly women, especially after the construction boom in the Middle East) or nearly ten percent of the population (mainly as overseas contract workers and secondarily as professionals) has been the result of the inability of the domestic economy to employ them.

In terms of estimated GNP, the size of the Philippine economy at current prices is around P/1.4 trillion or US\$51 billion. Averaging this figure with a population of 68 million to get an annual per capita income of US\$750 is a misleading exercise because the bulk of the GNP goes to the foreign monopolies and the local exploiting classes of big compradors and landlords, comprising less than one percent of the population. More than 40 percent of the GNP is accounted for by transactions involving foreign exchange. If we further subtract from the GNP what goes to the urban middle social strata, comprising no more than nine percent, what is left for the working class and

peasantry — that together comprise 90 percent of the population — amounts to intolerable poverty, deprivation and misery. According to independent estimates, those who live below the poverty line fluctuate between 75 and 80 percent of the people. Some 40 to 50 percent cannot afford even the barest nutritional needs.

The Philippines is dependent on the export of agricultural and mineral products whose prices have been depressed since the 1970s due to the global overproduction of primary products. The deteriorating terms of trade have continuously pressed down the export income of neocolonies like the Philippines. Low value-added manufactures for reexport (garments, semiconductors, shoes, toys and the like) fetch little or no net income due to transfer-pricing. At the end of 1993, the foreign trade deficit stood at US\$6.1 billion. Notwithstanding continued foreign borrowing and the increased dollar receipts from overseas contract workers, the balance of payments registered a negative US\$92 million.

As of August 1993, the acknowledged foreign debt of the Philippines is US\$34.4 billion, increasing by 16.3 percent from the previous acknowledged level. It is projected that 32.5 percent of the 1994 budget of the reactionary government will be spent on foreign debt service. More than nine percent is further allocated for military expenditures, excluding expenditures for the national police, the intelligence agency under the president, intelligence units under various government departments, and other military-related expenditures camouflaged under civilian accounts. According to understated projected figures, 41.69 percent of the 1994 budget will be gobbled up by foreign debt service and military expenditures alone. The actual expenditures for these usually go beyond 60 percent annually.

Deficit-spending by the reactionary government continues to rise. It is characterized by decreased spending on infrastructure and social services and increased spending on debt service and the military. Due to tighter foreign credit and the IMF dictation that highest priority should be given to debt service, domestic borrowing continues unabated and has pushed up the level of public debt to P/656 billion

or US\$24 billion at year-end 1993. In 1986, the year-end level of domestic public debt was P/123 billion. In 1992, the last year of the Aquino regime, it reached P/508 billion. The six-year Aquino regime outstripped by several times the 20-year Marcos regime in this regard. The Ramos regime is raising the domestic public debt at an even faster rate.

The principal multilateral agencies controlling and dictating the economic policy of the reactionary government are the IMF, World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the GATT and other agreements on world trade. The U.S., Japanese and other foreign monopolies compete and collude against the economic sovereignty and interests of the Filipino people. They extract superprofits mainly through transfer-pricing in trade and through debt service rather than through declared profit remittances from direct investments. The annual rate of investment inflow chiefly from US and Japanese transnational corporations is around US\$300 million. These investments, together with official "development aid" (ODA) and commercial loans, merely facilitate the sale of foreign manufactures and the production of raw materials and fringe processing of certain manufactures and do not promote but counter industrial development.

There is an accumulated unemployment of more than 50 percent among the 28 million people with the capacity to work. But official statistics make it appear that the unemployment rate is only eight percent (as of October 1993), thus beating on paper most of the industrial capitalist countries. The same statistics currently puts the unemployment rate in Metro Manila and Central Luzon at 16.4 and 11.2 percent, respectively. Independent analysts estimate the underemployment rate of 32.9 percent in addition to the officially acknowledged unemployment rate. Official statistics regarding employment are unreliable because they exclude from the range of reckoning those who have ceased to look for jobs and include as fully employed many of those who have no regular employment.

Unemployment in the Philippines has risen drastically in recent years because of the scarcity of foreign exchange for importing producer goods (especially equipment and fuel) and the resultant

breakdown of production in both industry and agriculture. Infrastructures and basic social services have also broken down. The destruction of the environment is worse than ever due to the exploitation of human and natural resources by the foreign monopolies and their big comprador agents.

The scarcity of basic consumer and producer goods has caused an inflationary spiral, victimizing the toiling masses and even the urban middle social strata. But official statistics claim an inflation rate fluctuating only between nine and eleven percent, a computation kept low by manipulating the content of the basket of basic goods. However, the consumer price index and the depreciation of the peso show the inflationary spiral. The legislated daily minimum wage in Metro Manila remains at P/118, which is normally not followed where workers are not unionized. The value of this amount shrank to P/63.72 in real terms in 1993. But the daily cost of living for a family of six is P/243.5. As a result of protest actions of the trade union movement, the regime was compelled to promise an increase of a measly P/25 in the daily minimum wage. But until now this has not been legislated.

Unemployment is rampant among the workers which comprise around 15 percent or four million of the labor force. Employers in the Philippines follow the world trend among capitalists of reducing the number of regular workers entitled to security of tenure and social security benefits. They do so by dismissing regular workers and taking in irregular workers under various terms, like agency workers, contract workers, casuals, part-timers, learners and apprentices. The devices to reduce the number of regular workers, press down wages and maximize profits are the same devices for breaking up organized labor. As before, the reactionary regime use yellow trade unions to preempt genuine trade unions. At worst, the military, police and paramilitary forces are used to harass and destroy genuine trade unions and to physically break up strikes and other concerted actions.

The peasant masses, especially the poor and middle peasants, comprising 75 percent of the population suffer severely from feudal and semifeudal conditions. Eighty percent of the peasants or sixty

percent of the entire population do not own the land that they till. Most of what they produce is for their subsistence whose level keeps on going down and their surplus product is appropriated by the landlords for exchange in the domestic and foreign commodity market. Since 1969, the surplus labor in the rural areas has rapidly increased and has been hemmed in due to the exhaustion of the land frontier and the lack of industrial development. Thus, there has been an explosive increase in the number of farm workers, urban oddjobbers and overseas contract workers.

In sharp contrast to previous regimes, which made big promises of land reform with token results, the current Ramos regime unabashedly assures landlords of continued possession of their estates and likewise the foreign transnational corporations of their privilege to use land and exploit the natural resources through 75-year lease contracts. The preponderant types of exploitation in the countryside include the traditional forms of sharecropping, the fixed rent system, the hiring of cheap seasonal farm workers, usury and the use of imported inputs (mechanical and chemical) to extract a bigger share of income for the landlords and merchant usurers. Because of the huge surplus of labor, the landlords and farm capitalists do not find it necessary to mechanize or use harvester combines.

Aside from economic exploitation, the peasant masses suffer the most violent forms of oppression in the form of military campaigns against the guerrilla fronts and against peasant associations, even if these are formed legally. From 1984 to the present, the reactionary armed forces have concentrated full divisions and brigades (regiments) on selected target areas to depopulate and devastate them over extended periods of time. From the time of Aquino to Ramos, a series of nationwide strategic offensives called Oplan Lambat Bitag (I, II, III) have been launched to attack the revolutionary forces, the peasant masses and the ethnic minorities. But these have all failed to suppress the armed revolutionary movement. The peasant masses serve as the inexhaustible reservoir of the armed resistance.

Contrary to the claims of the opportunists that the Philippines has become industrialized and urbanized, crediting the U.S.-Marcos

regime with having developed it, the U.S.-Ramos regime admits the underdeveloped preindustrial character of Philippine society and promises to turn the Philippine into a newly-industrializing economy before the year 2000 through his so-called Medium Term Development Plan (MTDP). Now, the opportunists who have blatantly become counterrevolutionary Rightists make a hullabaloo about seeking convergences with the regime, hailing Ramos as an anti-oligarch and endorsing his bid for a "strong state" as well as his propaganda about "peace" and "economic development". They argue for the liquidation of the revolutionary armed struggle.

The MTDP is premised on the "negotiated" capitulation as well as the violent suppression of the revolutionary forces and the people, the preservation of the interests of the imperialists and feudalists, the increase of antinational investment incentives for the foreign transnational corporations, import liberalization, tax exemptions, unrestricted profit remittances, privatization of the state corporations and the suppression of workers' rights in order to carry out the declared policy of low-wages and union-free and strike-free areas. The plan is bound to fail. Industrial development for the Philippines is simply impossible without the determination to carry out land reform and national industrialization. The broad masses of the people, especially the workers and the peasants, can never accept increased oppression and exploitation and can never agree to stop the revolutionary armed resistance.

The imperialist countries themselves are now in the throes of a crisis of overproduction (both industrial and agricultural) and are carrying out policies that will not increase any kind of productive investments in the Philippines. Conditions of prolonged recession, widespread unemployment and even depression have struck the imperialist countries. High technology has brought about large inventories of unsold industrial and agricultural goods. The abuse of finance capitalism through corporate speculation and neocolonial operations has struck the limits because effective demand has shrunk in a world of excessive public and private debts and imposed austerity in both the neocolonies and the industrial capitalist countries.

Winning monopoly firms tend to adopt ever higher technology to wipe out their competitors and in the process kill employment. While the individual monopoly firms increase their productivity, that of entire economies have decreased. Rising unemployment, social cutbacks and therefore underconsumption have led to a further shrinking of the market and profit rates in industrial capitalist countries and are adversely affecting the "economic tigers" of East Asia, including the coastal provinces of China that produce cheap manufactures.

The centers of world capitalism, the United States, Japan and Western Europe, are competing for a redivision of the world, consolidating their national and regional positions and restricting the flow of direct and indirect investments to the neocolonies, which have long become unable to repay their loans. To assure itself of a regional market contiguous with its national economy, the United States has called into existence the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In the coming years, this will tend to cut down orders for cheap manufactures from East Asia. The United States expects cheaper manufactures from Mexican cheap labor.

In this connection, Japan and the economic "tigers" of Asia (including China's coastal provinces) will tend to intensify the exploitation of the Philippines and prevent its economic development under the Japan-dominated ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). At the same time, the United States is bent on keeping its economic and military supremacy in the entire Pacific area through an Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC). In the years to come, the trade war between the United States and Japan will have the effect of further preventing the industrial development of the Philippines. Surplus manufactures will be dumped on the country not only by the two economic superpowers but also by the four "economic tigers" and China. The crisis of the world capitalist system coincides with the ever-worsening crisis of the domestic ruling system in the Philippines.

B. The Political Situation

The economic ground for mutual accommodation among political factions of the reactionary classes in the Philippines is narrower than

ever and continues to shrink. There can only be temporary lulls in the violent contradictions between any current ruling clique in the Philippines and its rival factions. The conflicts among the reactionaries cannot completely be contained within the frame of electoral competition but will increasingly find expression in the ruling clique's drive to wield authoritarian power and in the armed factionalization of the exploiting classes and the reactionary armed forces.

The Ramos ruling clique is a bureaucrat big comprador-landlord clique and is as rapacious as the Marcos ruling clique. Its dummies are cornering the contracts (especially energy and infrastructures) generated by foreign loans and the skyrocketing domestic public borrowing. Driven by its own greed and afraid of its own rivals within the ruling system, the Ramos ruling clique has taken every measure to consolidate and entrench its power by pursuing and shaking down rival big compradors.

As the socioeconomic crisis worsens, so does the political crisis. Every time that there is a dramatic confrontation between the ruling clique and the oppressed masses, the rival factions of reactionaries will try to make their own political gains. So will the reactionary ruling clique try to keep and accumulate its power with the coercive apparatuses of the state. Even before the revolutionary mass movement is able to demonstrate fully its renewed strength through extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare, the U.S.-Ramos clique has been maneuvering to lull both the revolutionary and reactionary opposition with calls for "peace and reconciliation" while at the same time steadily preparing for a Marcos-type power grab through control of the legislature and so-called constitutional reforms.

In the most recent upsurge of the legal democratic mass movement, particularly the nationwide mass actions in February this year, which broke out as a result of the attempt of the U.S.-Ramos regime to impose a higher oil levy (causing higher prices and higher electricity and transport rates), the legal progressive forces, the revolutionary forces and the broad masses of the people stood up and stood out. In addition, the reactionary rivals of the ruling clique

(including those in the Armed Forces of the Philippines) stirred against the ruling clique, notwithstanding their previously well-publicized cooptation.

The general tendency of the semicolonial and semifeudal ruling system to disintegrate arises from the internal contradictions among the reactionaries as well as from the perseverance of the revolutionary forces in protracted people's war. Notwithstanding the grave errors and setbacks due to "Left" and Right opportunism, the current strength of the armed revolutionary movement is still formidable and has high potential for accelerated growth as a result of the rectification movement and the worsening crisis of the ruling system. The revolutionary forces and the people are in fundamental and serious contention with the entire ruling system. They wield and continue to develop and accumulate the power necessary for ultimately replacing the current social system with a new one to make the Philippines truly independent, democratic, just, prosperous and peaceful.

From year to year since 1987, the Aquino regime and General Ramos had boasted of achieving strategic victory over the revolutionary forces before the end of the Aquino regime as they escalated the military campaigns of suppression. But the enemy forces have miserably failed to achieve their military objective, even after scaling it down to mere "strategic control". The revolutionary forces continue to flourish nationwide. The dwindling of armed resistance by the Moro organizations and the lull in coup threats from anti-Ramos military factions have allowed the regime to deploy more troops against the guerrilla fronts of the NPA. But the total size and capability of the enemy forces are not sufficient to cover the entire country, especially because the enemy forces try to maximize their effectiveness by applying the principle of concentration and prolonged occupation of territory.

It is self-defeating for the regime to further increase troops, spend more money and commit more atrocities. The political and financial limits of the ruling system can be seen by considering even only the understated amount of money spent since 1969 for the military. The

amount is at least P/ 750 billion or US\$25 billion, excluding U.S. military assistance, equivalent to at least US\$ 15 billion or 60 percent of it. Notwithstanding the dismantling of the U.S. military bases, the United States maintains access to military bases and extends military and military-related assistance to the reactionary government. But the United States and its imperialist allies are being drawn unprecedentedly to so many turbulent parts of the world.

The escalation of military onslaughts under the total war policy has resulted in massacres, assassinations, torture, illegal detention, looting, arson, bombardments, forced mass evacuation and the destruction of the people's livelihood. All these have alienated the people from the ruling system and have driven them to persevere in and intensify the protracted people's war. In the last 25 years, tens of thousands of people have been tortured and killed and millions of people have been deprived of their homes and land by the enemy.

Upholding their just revolutionary cause, the people and the revolutionary forces have defended themselves and the NPA has launched tactical offensives, wiping out tens of thousands of enemy troops in the last 25 years. The reactionary government has failed to provide sufficient compensation to those killed as well as hospitalization and rehabilitation to the wounded among its own troops, while corrupt military officers cheat their own troops and engage in criminal operations for themselves. Thus, demoralization among the enemy troops is widespread.

Military spending is high for equipment and operations but official compensation is low for officers and men of the reactionary armed forces and the national police and even far lower for the paramilitary forces. Thus, the armed personnel of the enemy are characteristically engaged in criminal activities, including illegal logging, robbery, kidnap-for-ransom, extortion, and maintaining or protecting gambling and prostitution dens. The most notorious criminal syndicates are run by military and police officers. The military and police establishment is factionalized not only into political groups but more predominantly into criminal syndicates.

In consonance with its superiority in number of troops, equipment

and training, the reactionary armed forces undertake strategic offensive by concentrating divisions and brigades on a few selected target areas for long periods of time, supposedly in order to "hold, clear, consolidate and develop" these areas. Within the strategic encirclement, special operations teams (SOTs) are deployed and paramilitary forces are organized to create an artificial or coerced "mass base" against the NPA. Then within the strategic encirclement, the enemy uses companies and battalions to conduct search-and-destroy or mopping-up operations.

It suits the enemy to carry out what it calls the strategy of the "war of quick decision" and the tactics of "gradual constriction", including the tactics of prolonged intelligence and civil deception. In the face of such offensive strategy and tactics of the enemy, it is wrong to abandon the strategic defensive by absolutely concentrating the overwhelming majority of Red fighters into a few large units and giving up the mass base. The loss of mass base means playing into the hands of the enemy and ultimately losing initiative and failing to launch tactical offensives. The "Left" opportunists have practically served the enemy under the pretext of hastening victory.

From start to finish, the enemy forces lose if the proletarian revolutionary cadres and fighters of the NPA respond with a defensive strategy and launch tactical offensives along the line of extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare with an expanding and deepening mass base. The failure of the enemy is essentially due to the fact that he is fighting for the interests of the imperialists and the local exploiting classes and that, when he concentrates his forces on a target area, he gives away space elsewhere. Only when they operate in an ever expanding and ever consolidated mass base can the guerrilla forces seize the initiative by shifting, dispersing and concentrating at will. With the active participation and support of the people, the NPA can muster a superior force to wipe out an enemy force part by part — by using the element of surprise — in tactical offensives even if the enemy force is ten times stronger than the NPA at the strategic level.

In its 25 years of revolutionary experience, the NPA has preserved and accumulated its armed strength because the proletarian

revolutionary cadres and Red fighters have adhered to the strategic line of protracted people's war by carrying out extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare with an ever-expanding and deepening mass base. On the other hand, the "Left" opportunists drastically reduced the number of cadres and small units for mass work, prematurely built absolutely concentrated companies and two battalions, sent experienced cadres and fighters to the urban areas to become armed city partisans and thereby reduced and sabotaged the further development of the people's war.

Both the "Left" opportunists — who pushed the line of "regularization" and "strategic counteroffensive" and combining insurrectionism and military adventurism — and the Right opportunists — who pushed bourgeois reformism and parliamentarism confined themselves to foreign-funded offices and paper coalitions — based themselves in Metro Manila and other urban areas and drastically reduced the flow of Party members and mass activists from the urban to the rural areas. The two types of opportunism laid stress on urban-basing throughout the 1980s, exactly when the U.S. and Philippine intelligence agencies were improving their system of intelligence and surveillance in the cities and ironically when the accumulated armed strength of the NPA required direct and close leadership of the most responsible Party cadres and provided the best possible basing for the Party leadership and NPA command.

Notwithstanding the grave errors in line committed, that resulted in a considerable degree of criminal degeneration among the opportunists, such as bloody witchhunts, gangsterism and corruption, the proletarian cadres and fighters of the NPA have held their ground and have prevailed. They have defeated the opportunists by launching the current rectification movement. The rectification movement further strengthens the revolutionary forces ideologically, politically and organizationally. It has raised the NPA's revolutionary integrity, fighting will and capabilities and the determination to do mass work and engage in production. Now and in time to come, the NPA can inflict deadlier blows on the enemy forces and at the same

time enjoy ever greater militant support from the broad masses of the people both in the rural and urban areas.

Following the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party, the regional and lower organs and organizations of the Party and the NPA have made summings-up of their experiences, drawn positive and negative lessons, criticized and repudiated deviations and errors and set forth their revolutionary tasks. Only a few incorrigible opportunists have opposed the rectification movement and have gone over to the enemy side to become shameless agents of counterrevolution. There were pockets of opportunists in rabid counterrevolutionary opposition to the rectification movement in only three of the 17 regional Party organizations and in only two central staff organs. These incorrigible opportunists have been roundly defeated by the revolutionaries and have been driven by their own wrong line to the side of the enemy.

The reactionary state has always used deception combined with brutal terror against the revolutionary movement. Having fought the NPA since 1969, the counterrevolutionary chieftain General Ramos knows that he cannot destroy it frontally by military means alone. In fact, the total war policy, which he has been carrying out under the Marcos and Aquino regimes and now, is not simply an all-out military warfare against the revolutionary forces. It includes psychological warfare as a form of outflanking tactics. Thus, the Ramos regime has launched propaganda campaigns to drum up illusions of peace and reconciliation and in seeking to discredit the revolutionary movement and to disintegrate the revolutionary forces.

In this regard, the U.S. government (especially its intelligence agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence and the Bureau of Foreign Intelligence of the State Department) has closely collaborated with General Ramos since 1985 to bring about the replacement of Marcos by another reactionary figure and restore bourgeois democratic institutions and processes; and, at the same time, to preempt and seek to destroy the revolutionary movement not only by force of arms (military actions against the NPA and the "political infrastructure" of the revolutionary

forces) but also by propaganda in what has been termed as "low-intensity conflict". The psy-war scheme includes the drumming up of rumors of "peace and reconciliation", the attempt to confuse the masses and alienate them from the revolutionary forces, and the coddling of renegades in a bid to split the revolutionary movement.

From 1986 to the present, the scheme is reflected in the articles of known "academic" analysts of the CIA and DIA, an increasing number of Filipino, American and other foreign bourgeois journalists; Filipino academic and journalist assets of Philippine and U.S. intelligence agencies; and certain foreign and local bureaucrats of some foreign funding agencies and so-called nongovernmental organizations. Their common line is that the restoration of "democracy" and "economic reforms" in the Philippines leave the revolutionary forces no choice but to capitulate and go for parliamentary struggle or else suffer marginalization.

By correctly stressing the line of new-democratic revolution as the line for a just and lasting peace, the National Democratic Front has prevented the enemy from confusing the people and making the revolutionary forces appear "terrorist". In the process, it has also exposed and frustrated the Right opportunists and counterrevolutionary renegades as well as those who misrepresent themselves as "third force" and pressure or induce the revolutionary forces to capitulate to the enemy. The Party has thwarted the most insidious attempts to impugn and undermine the just revolutionary cause. These attempts include sham multisectoral alliances for peace and the so-called medium-term plan for insurrection.

The psy-war and intelligence agents of the imperialists and reactionaries have combined with certain renegades and an array of anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups to push the anticommunist, anti-Stalin line, against both the revolutionary forces and the legal progressive forces, to drum up and organize new anticommunist formations and hold rallies in concert with organizations associated with the U.S., the Ramos ruling clique and the religious Right wing. In the rallies of July 26 and November 30, 1993, the renegades and anticommunist petty-bourgeois groups blared out their anticommunist

and anti-Stalin slogans.

The new anticommunist groups whipped up by the renegades carry such names as *Suriang Sosyalista*, *Sanlakas*, *Siglaya*, *Kapatirang Anakpawis*, *Bukluran ng mga Manggagawa para sa Pagbabago*, *National Confederation of Labor of the Philippines*, and *Demokratikong KMP*. They collude and compete with earlier anticommunist petty-bourgeois formations like Movement for Popular Democracy, the Christian "social-democrats," Forum for Philippine Alternatives and the like in conducting anticommunist campaigns and getting funds from the reactionary government and from foreign agencies.

The anticommunist, anti-Stalin line originated from the U.S. and Philippine psy-war mill and intelligence agents, the Gorbachovites, the Trotskyites, bourgeois populists and the religious Right wing. The incorrigible "Left" opportunists who were criminally most responsible for Kampanyang Ahos (like Benjamin de Vera, Ricardo Reyes, Salvador Bas, Frank Gonzales and Nathan Quimpo) as well as such criminal practitioners of urban terrorism and gangsterism (like Romulo Kintanar, Arturo Tabara, Filemon Lagman and Antonio Cabardo) spout the anticommunist and anti-Stalin line and misrepresent themselves as champions of democracy and due process. The charges against these malefactors have been published.

As a step towards rendering justice, Kampanyang Ahos has been declared a criminal offense against the victims, the Party and the people. Party disciplinary action of expulsion has been taken against those principally responsible for the atrocity such as Benjamin de Vera, Ricardo Reyes, Salvador Bas, Frank Gonzales and Nathan Quimpo. In addition, these individuals are criminally liable and subject to prosecution and trial before the people's court.

This late, the counterrevolutionaries are still trying to ride on the imperialist ideological offensive, which misrepresents the revisionist parties and revisionist-ruled regimes as communist and socialist and gloats over the disintegration of these as the hopelessness of the anti-imperialist and socialist cause. They concentrate their vicious slander on the founding chairman of the Party whom they compare to

the great Stalin and the Party and its Central Committee which they describe as Stalinist. They believe that if they can discredit the Party and its leadership, they can destroy the entire revolutionary movement of the people.

The rectification movement has effectively foiled the ideological and political offensive of the imperialists and the reactionaries with their retinue of anticommunist petty-bourgeois. The reaffirmation of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought has raised higher the level of revolutionary consciousness and militancy of the revolutionary forces. The worsening crisis of the domestic ruling system and the world capitalist system necessitates and favors the armed revolutionary movement. The revolutionary forces have a higher confidence now in waging the protracted people's war in order to achieve victory in the national-democratic revolution and prepare the ground for socialist revolution and construction.

The fall of the revisionist ruling parties and regimes has served to verify the antirevisionist critique pioneered by Comrade Mao Zedong. The proven betrayal of socialism by the revisionists for nearly four decades can only incite the genuine revolutionaries to fight imperialism, revisionism and neocolonialism more resolutely than ever before. Mao's theory and initial practice of continuing revolution under proletarian dictatorship to combat modern revisionism, prevent the restoration of capitalism and consolidate socialism gives the proletarian revolutionary cadres and Red fighters a clear view of the long revolutionary struggle still to be waged.

The rectification movement has strengthened the ranks of the revolutionary forces comprehensively and profoundly. The proletarian revolutionary core of the NPA is ever stronger. So is that of the legal progressive forces. The urban legal democratic mass movement has demonstrated its strength on May 1, 1993 and on February 9 and 25 1994 against the U.S.-Ramos regime and its anticommunist petty-bourgeois hirelings. The armed revolutionary movement is expanding and consolidating its mass base and is developing it for extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare.

The Party and the NPA do not announce any time schedule for

winning total victory. On the other hand, they are determined to wage the protracted people's war for as long as it is necessary in order to overthrow the ruling system and to develop and fulfill the comprehensive requirements for total victory. They can only be sure of the extent of victories already gained and aim for victories that the level of strength of the revolutionary forces and the circumstances permit.

IV. REVOLUTIONARY TASKS OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

Under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the NPA must take advantage of the favorable objective conditions provided by the ever worsening crisis of the domestic ruling system and the world capitalist system.

The current rectification movement must be carried through to the end. It must enhance the ideological, political and organizational strength accumulated through 25 years of revolutionary struggle and overcome the accumulated serious deviations, errors and shortcomings, especially those which have caused serious damage and reduced the growth of the revolutionary forces.

The rectification movement is essentially a movement of education in revolutionary theory and practice. The proletarian revolutionary cadres, commanders and Red fighters must study and apply the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, the general line of the new-democratic revolution and the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war. Revolutionary education is necessary for developing a high level of conscious discipline, fighting morale and revolutionary spirit of service to the people.

Selected articles of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao must be propagated within the NPA. A focus on the works of Mao on protracted people's war and guerrilla warfare is appropriate. The basic documents of the Party and the NPA that have correctly and successfully guided the revolutionary movement must be studied. At the same time, it is appropriate to focus on the current rectification documents and summings-up of the Party Central Committee.

Theoretical and political education is facilitated when it is linked to the concrete conditions of the people and the actual revolutionary work and struggle. The proletarian revolutionary cadres and the Red commanders and fighters must link themselves closely with the people, especially the toiling masses of workers and peasants; carefully assess their strength and work; practice criticism and self-criticism; and militantly carry out their fighting and other tasks.

The fine tradition of having a high concentration of Party members in the NPA must be carried forward. There must be a Party group in every squad. The Party branch may be based in the platoon or company. Literate Party members must raise the literacy level of Red fighters who cannot read and write or who can barely read and write. Simplified study materials and methods must be used for the benefit of those who are barely literate.

There can be a higher ratio of Party members in the NPA than in other forms of mass organizations because the Red fighters are constantly together in study and work and are engaged in the most intense form of revolutionary struggle, which is the best learning process. Even during periods of frequent battles and accelerated recruitment, the proportion of Party members among the Red fighters can be more than 50 percent. Every time a new NPA unit is formed, there must be Party members at the core coming from a previously existing unit.

In keeping with its distinctive character as a fighting organization, the NPA must engage in military training to raise its fighting ability and level of military technique. But this military training should always be linked to and never divorced from political education. Thus, we always call for politico-military training. To speak of strategy and tactics or training and upgrading technique in purely military terms is to fall into bourgeois militarism, criminal gangsterism and counterrevolutionary turncoatism as such renegades as Romulo Kintanar and Arturo Tabara have fallen into.

The NPA must resolutely adhere to the strategic line of protracted people's war. It should never be led astray either by the importuning of the "Left" opportunists about an easy or quick way to victory

through premature regularization, urban insurrectionism and military adventurism, scorning painstaking mass work and development in stages; or by the importuning of the Right opportunists about *parliamentarism or reformism as the comfortable and painless way to power*

We must encircle the cities from the countryside until we accumulate enough strength to seize the cities. For an extended period of time, we are on the strategic defensive but we must launch tactical offensives on the basis of the people's participation and support. We must militate the peasant masses as the main force of the revolution and strengthen the basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry as the foundation of the new-democratic revolution.

Peasant associations must be built and must be constituted essentially and mainly by the poor peasants and farm workers. NPA Red fighters must be recruited mainly from their ranks. Consequently, the middle peasants can be won over and the rich peasants can be neutralized. Further, the contradictions between the enlightened and evil gentry can be taken advantage of. The result must be the isolation and destruction of the power of the evil gentry. This antifeudal line is the main component of the general line of the new-democratic revolution.

The Party must attract and deploy revolutionary workers and educated youth to the NPA. It must coordinate the urban-based legal democratic mass movement and the rural-based armed revolutionary movement and thus be in a position to make the two forms of struggle complement and help each other in advancing the revolutionary cause. It must combat both reformism and urban insurrectionism because these derail the revolution. These have discouraged and prevented the flow of Party cadres from the cities to the countryside.

The urban insurrectionists and reformists falsely accuse the Party of having neglected the legal democratic mass movement in the urban areas by pursuing the strategic line of protracted people's war. Let us remind these charlatans that the proletarian revolutionaries have been the ones responsible for developing the legal democratic mass movement from the 1960s to the present, that the reformists

and insurrectionists are merely little tails of the reactionary forces and that their foreign models have gone into a dead end. Let us repudiate these charlatans, especially those who have become anticommunist hirelings, criminal gangsters and thieves of resources belonging to the Party and the people.

As we repudiate the "Left" and Right opportunists who have become outright counterrevolutionaries, we must increase and intensify our tactical offensives within the strategic defensive. We must wage extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare with an ever expanding and deepening mass base through painstaking mass work. The widescale participation and support of the people in the revolutionary war must determine the nature and direction of the NPA and other revolutionary forces and must render to naught the present military superiority and strategic offensive of the enemy.

With the people's militant participation and support, the NPA must keep the enemy deaf and blind and wage only the battles that it can win. It must destroy the enemy forces part by part. It must determine the time and place for wiping out enemy units by surprise. It can launch tactical offensives to annihilate the enemy by discovering his weak points and inducing him to commit mistakes.

At the tactical level, the NPA must assemble the superior force to ambush or raid the enemy unit it is capable of wiping out. Never should it put to risk its total strength in the entire country, in any region or any guerrilla front in any single decisive engagement. When the enemy force is well entrenched, the NPA does not rush headlong against the hard point but waits for the enemy force to divide or send out a part of itself.

When an enemy force comes out in superior strength and is looking for a fight, the NPA does not go for frontal collision but lets it punch the air or lures it further in until it falls into a trap or is compelled to divide itself and expose its weak parts. It is also possible to snipe at an advancing enemy force in order to delay, hamper or derail its advance.

The NPA can evade a superior enemy force in order to attack an inferior enemy force. It can induce the enemy force to move in a

certain direction so that it can attack in another direction or it can induce the enemy to fall into one trap after another in the same direction if there is certainty that there is no follow-up enemy force within a definite period. *Flexibility in guerrilla tactics can be achieved only if there is firm adherence to the principle and practice of expanding and consolidating the mass base.* Without such a mass base, the situation becomes purely military and favorable to the superior military force.

The enemy can always concentrate forces on a definite target area and deny the NPA access to the area for a long period of time. But the total capacity of the enemy to occupy territory has certain limits. He can seize any piece of territory but he leaves much wider space elsewhere. He cannot occupy even his target area without dividing his units. This allows NPA guerrilla units to attack such units one by one.

The NPA must cast away completely false illusions previously whipped up by the erroneous lines of "regularization" and "strategic counteroffensive" and of combining urban insurrectionism and military adventurism. It must make the correct and well-balanced deployment of the full-time Red fighters with automatic rifles. The force structure must be in consonance with the given strength of the NPA, with the balance of forces or the given level of development of the war and with the need to fulfill the comprehensive requirements of the people's war.

The center of gravity (rallying point or strike force) in a region may be a company or — in a guerrilla front — a platoon or company but must not absorb more than 30 percent of the total number of Red fighters and must be in relative concentration so that it can do mass work when it is not engaged in operations requiring absolute concentration. Relative concentration means a smaller radius for mass work of the unit acting as the center of gravity than that of the dispersed smaller units. In offensive operations, the center of gravity can augment its strength by assembling or joining up with the appropriate number of smaller and more dispersed units.

It is absolutely necessary to have smaller and more dispersed units in order to develop the mass base on a wide scale. These are the

horizontal force upon which the vertical force can arise and develop in stages. They must create the wide room for maneuver of the NPA. Under favorable conditions (when there is no enemy concentration), it is possible for an NPA squad to cover an entire municipality or its equivalent as a guerrilla zone. Such a squad can divide into propaganda teams to do mass work. It can be augmented by the militia and by the self-defense units in every barrio.

Armed city partisan and self-defense units must exist and operate to an extent and in a manner not harmful to the legal democratic mass movement and to the revolutionary armed struggle. The Party and NPA must have full command and control over these. Recruitment of armed city partisans must not be used as pretext for withholding from the countryside those in the urban areas who wish to join the NPA.

In fact, no one should become an armed city partisan without undergoing NPA politico-military training and service in the countryside. So as not to harm the legal democratic mass movement, armed city partisan actions must neither be a substitute for legal mass actions nor be openly and directly linked to them. Armed city partisan units must not be created or used to serve any opportunist line and must not be allowed to degenerate into criminal gangs such as those maintained by Romulo Kintanar, Arturo Tabara, Filemon Lagman and Antonio Cabardo.

Adequate social investigation should always be undertaken to lay the ground for mass work. Mass work by the NPA means arousing, organizing and mobilizing the people along the new-democratic line. Mass education, including propaganda and agitation, must accompany mass organizing and campaigns. The organs of political power and the various types of mass organizations for peasants, workers, youth, women, cultural activists and children must be formed. Mass campaigns must be carried out, especially the land reform campaign, so that the people empower themselves and gain social benefits for themselves. Under these circumstances, the local Party branches can arise.

On the basis of success in mass work, the organs of political power

can advance from the stage of the appointive barrio organizing committee to that of the elected barrio revolutionary committee. The latter is elected by representatives of the mass organizations or directly by the entire people (depending on the circumstances) and assisted by the working committees for public education, mass organization, land reform, production, finance, health, defense, arbitration and cultural affairs and supported by the various types of mass organizations.

The revolutionary armed struggle cannot flourish without being integrated with land reform and the building of the mass base. While the NPA is still engaged in guerrilla warfare during the strategic defensive, it is wise in general to carry out the minimum land reform program of land rent reduction, elimination of usury, raising of farm wages, raising the prices of farm products at the farm gate and promoting production in agriculture and sideline occupations. Building the mass base means building the organs of political power and the mass organizations.

It is the responsibility of the Party to clarify the functions of and direct the organs of political power and the mass campaigns. In this regard, the National Democratic Front can help the Party in drawing the broadest range of support and in making governance and mass campaigns more effective.

As the enforcers of revolutionary law and justice, the NPA as well as the militia and self-defense units must study the basic democratic rights of all individuals and must know the correct principles and methods in performing their appropriate functions in civil and criminal cases. The people's court, the court martial (in case of NPA personnel) or the arbitration committee (in minor cases among the people) decides the cases. The enforcers of revolutionary law and justice should at the same time know what constitutes a battle situation against enemy units and elements as well as against those considered by proper authority as armed and dangerous criminals who resist arrest and refuse to submit themselves to investigation by the people's prosecutors and to trial by a people's court.

The Party and the NPA can become more self-reliant than ever

and can gather more resources for strengthening revolutionary work by carrying out land reform, promoting production, collecting contributions from the people who benefit from land reform, production and other mass campaigns, applying a tax policy on the well-to-do and the enlightened sections of the exploiting classes and confiscating weapons and other resources from the enemy. Our tax policy allows certain enterprises to operate and prosper, provided these are not harmful to the people and the environment; safeguards and constructive action are undertaken to conserve or renew resources and keep a clean and healthy environment. If we have a well-formulated and well-implemented tax policy, revenues collected by the NPA on behalf of the Party and the people's revolutionary government would be far bigger than any inflow of foreign assistance. Our 25-year history proves this.

The incorrigible "Left" opportunists who previously put their hopes on foreign military and financial assistance have disoriented themselves and others and have degenerated into criminal gangsters. The incorrigible Right opportunists who have become dependent on Western funding agencies have become blatant anticommunists just like the former "Left" opportunists who opposed the line of protracted people's war and pushed the deviation from the Marxist-Leninist and antirevisionist line of the Party.

The Party and the NPA must be vigilant towards foreign funding agencies and other foreign entities that spread counterrevolutionary ideas and provide funds to groups that are attacking the CPP, NPA, NDF and other patriotic and progressive forces. Some Western funding agencies have spawned reformism, created NGO bureaucrats, encouraged some talented activists to stick to urban offices and spread the dole-out mentality in project areas. Countermeasures must be adopted and carried out. No foreign-financed organization and personnel whose character is not examined and approved by the NDF International Office should be allowed into the guerrilla fronts and other areas which we can interdict. Counterrevolutionary groups and projects must be kept out.

The Party and the NPA must not harbor any more illusion about

getting significant military and financial assistance from abroad. Previous efforts to bring this in have been disorienting, up to the point of causing a deviation from our Marxist-Leninist and antirevisionist line. The progress of the armed struggle does not necessitate arms importation. The enemy has always been our most reliable arms supplier. He transports the arms from the imperialists and we subsequently get them when we launch our tactical offensives.

By being self-reliant and by being able to raise higher the level of the revolutionary armed struggle, the Party and the NPA can better perform their internationalist duty. Their victories are tangible contributions to the world proletarian revolution. Their example inspire the people of the world to wage revolutionary struggle. By winning greater victories in their own country they are in a better position to cooperate with other revolutionary forces in the world.

The New People's Army is today one of the most outstanding among revolutionary armies led by Marxist-Leninist parties. It has been thrust into this position by the perseverance of the proletarian revolutionaries, Red commanders and fighters in protracted people's war. The NPA holds high the flaming torch of armed revolution as the proletariat and people of the world move from one period of revolutionary struggle to another, following the end of the bipolar world and the temporary strategic defeat of the world proletarian revolution due to the protracted workings of neocolonialism and the revisionist betrayal of socialism.

While the Party can be proud of the brilliant record and standing of the NPA, all proletarian revolutionary cadres, Red commanders and fighters must be vigilant, modest and ever more determined to fight because the forces of imperialism and reaction are hell-bent on destroying them.

Social turmoil is all over the world — in the homegrounds of imperialism and in the neocolonies. The world is once more on the eve of a great social upheaval and an upswing of the anti-imperialist and socialist movement. The NPA is in the special position of having come tested from an old period of revolutionary struggle to a new and more challenging period.

Long live the New People's Army!
Persevere in protracted people's war!
Long live the Filipino people!
Fight for national liberation, democracy and socialism!
Long live the Communist Party of the Philippines!



"The laws of war, like the laws governing all other things, are reflections in our minds of objective realities; everything outside of the mind is objective reality. Consequently what has to be learned and known includes the state of affairs on the enemy side and that on our side, both of which should be regarded as the object of study, while the mind (the capacity to think) alone is the subject performing the study. Some people are good at knowing themselves and poor at knowing the enemy, and some are the other way round; neither can solve the problem of learning and applying the laws of war. There is a saying in the book of Sun Wu Tzu, the great military scientist of ancient China, 'Know the enemy and know yourself, and you can fight a hundred battles with no danger of defeat', which refers both to the stage of learning and to the stage of application, both to knowing the laws of the development of objective reality and to deciding on our own action in accordance with these laws in order to overcome the enemy facing us. We should not take this saying lightly.

War is the highest form of struggle between nations, states, classes, or political groups, and all the laws of war are applied by warring nations, states, classes, or political groups for the purpose of achieving victory for themselves. Unquestionably, victory or defeat in war is determined mainly by the military, political, economic and natural conditions on both sides. But not by these alone. It is also determined by each side's subjective ability in directing the war. In his endeavour to win a war, a military strategist cannot overstep the limitations imposed by the material conditions; within these limitations, however, he can and must strive for victory. The stage of action for a military strategist is built upon objective material conditions, but on that stage he can direct the performance of many a drama, full of sound and colour, power and grandeur. Therefore, given the objective material foundations, i.e., the military, political, economic and natural conditions, our Red Army commanders must display their prowess and marshal all their forces to crush the national and class enemies and to transform this evil world."

— **Mao Zedong**

"The Important Thing Is To Be Good At Learning," Selected Readings, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1971, pp. 62-

For foreign subscriptions, please fill in the form below and send it to the **NDF International Office, Postbus 19195, 3501 DD Utrecht, The Netherlands**. Send your payment to: **NDF, Rabobank 39.44.28.102**.

PLEASE SEND ME _____ YEAR(S) SUBSCRIPTION TO **REBOLUSYON**

ENCLOSED IS _____.

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION RATES (INCLUDE BANK CHARGES):

- | | |
|---|---------|
| • EUROPE | US\$ 45 |
| • NORTH AMERICA, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, SOUTH KOREA,
SINGAPORE, TAIWAN, HONGKONG (SURFACE MAIL) | US\$ 45 |
| • NORTH AMERICA, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, SOUTH KOREA,
SINGAPORE, TAIWAN, HONGKONG (AIRMAIL) | US\$ 50 |
| • OTHER COUNTRIES | US\$ 30 |

NAME _____
(PLEASE USE BLOCK LETTERS)

ADDRESS _____

