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ADVANCING THE ARMED STRUGGLE
IN THE VIZCAYA-ISABELA-QUIRINO REGION

COMMUNIQUE OF THE EXPANDED PLENUM
OF THE MINDANAO COMMISSION

ON THE SEPTEMBER THESIS
OF THE PEASANT SECRETARIAT

MESSAGE TO ALL WORKERS
IN THE PHILIPPINES AND ABROAD

ON THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD SITUATION
AND THE VITALITY OF MARXISM

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LESSONS FROM ADVANCING THE ARMED STRUGGLE IN THE VIZCAYA-ISABELA-QUIRINO (VIQ) REGION (1986-90)

In December 1990, the Military Conference for Isabela was convened to review and draw lessons from the region's rich experience. The original plan was to call only a command conference in line with the directive of the Northern Luzon Commission (NLC) and the Northern Luzon Operational Command (NLOC) to learn lessons from the region's experience in building the army and its operations, especially since the region had already reached a certain level in army building and in facing large enemy operations in 1987-89 (Oplan Red Buster IV and subsequent brigade-size operations of the enemy's Oplan Lambat-Bitag in Northern Luzon).

Because the region reached a peak in its advance in 1987 that was unprecedented since Isabela bore the standard of armed struggle nationwide in the early '70s, and then experienced a rapid downswing in revolutionary work especially after 1988, there was a strong demand among the cadres to review the overall work. It was in this spirit that the original objective of the conference was broadened to include the review of overall work in armed struggle. The body was in a position to do this since nearly the entire regional committee was in the conference aside from some responsible cadres from Vizcaya and one member of the NLOC.

Immediately after the conference, the Regional Committee met immediately to discuss the lessons in the revolutionary mass movement and the Party, and the results of a conference which was then described as a military conference.

The results of the conference and the Regional Committee meeting to review the experience since 1986 was documented by the Executive Committee (of the Regional Committee) and again submitted to the Regional Committee in January-February 1993 as a summing-up document guided by the rectification document drawn up by the Central Committee, "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors" in July 1992. The same summing-up document will further serve as a draft for the Party Conference of the VIQ regional Party organization which is being prepared.

We shall focus on the important lessons in advancing the armed struggle, although we cannot separate this from the general lessons in advancing the entire revolutionary work in the region. In order to put the lessons in their proper historical context, we shall identify these according to the concrete circumstances prevailing at that time. Thus, the document consists of two major parts. The first describes the major events mainly in Isabela and the decisions and analysis of the Isabela Party Committee at that time. The second consists of the main lessons from the summing-up made by the Regional Committee and the Military Conference of 1990 (Kommil 90).

(Note: The first part of this document is omitted because most of the data are too detailed and may still have tactical value for the enemy and anyway the general sequence of events is reflected in the discussion of the second part of the document, below.)

MAJOR LESSONS IN ARMED STRUGGLE, 1986-90

Revolutionary work in the Isabela-Vizcaya region reached a peak in 1987 to 1988, unprecedented since Isabela bore the standard of armed struggle in the whole country in 1972-74. However, after only a short while, at the beginning of the latter part of 1988, revolutionary work rapidly declined and with this, the revolutionary forces and

masses suffered severe setbacks, bringing about widespread demoralization that persisted until the early 1990s.

This is a definite experience from which we can draw both positive and negative lessons if we sum it up in accordance with Marxism-Leninism and the basic principles of the Party.

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE LESSONS

It is positive thing that from 1986 up to the greater part of 1987 we were able to exploit the easing of the objective situation due to the shift in the political situation nationwide and in the province. Our areas of operations in Isabela as well as in Nueva Vizcaya/Quirino continuously expanded. We were able to lay the ground for revolutionary work in the strategic areas, especially the newly reopened areas (Forest Region-West).

These positions were consolidated step by step in accordance with the general method described in "Our Urgent Tasks" and through the process of step-by-step implementation of the minimum program of agrarian reform in the form of an anticorruptor movement to attain benefits for the peasants in the pricing of products. These further strengthened the masses' grasp of the overall line of the people's democratic revolution.

The mass movement was further raised to the level of waging mass campaigns carrying national issues, aside from issues pertaining to the peasant masses' problems. Some organs of political power were also set up at the level of the guerrilla zone. In some zones also, there were land occupations undertaken of lands already abandoned for some time by landlords through efforts of the Party, which led and arranged these.

The people's army was able to break out of the previous level of "gathering momentum" in launching tactical offensives and was able to spread guerrilla war to a large part of the operational areas in the province. This was carried out through small-unit or "commando" operations along the highway and in the plains of Isabela. At its peak, 100 tactical offensives were tallied, and eventually the level was

raised further and extended to attacks on larger targets, such as raids on detachments and other targets in town centers. A large number of weapons were seized from the enemy, and the enemy attack on our bases was pinned down and roundly clobbered, a definite indicator of the rise in the capability of our people's army in warfare against a better-trained and militarily superior enemy.

The gain in momentum in armed struggle and in overall revolutionary work encouraged many to join the people's army, which became the basis for building units and formations, to the extent that in each guerrilla front, an oversized platoon or undersized company could be formed as its full-time fighting unit, aside from the forces engaged in territorial work.

All these constituted a definite advance in revolutionary work. However, from 1987 there had been a shift in the stress of work, from step-by-step strengthening of the people's army and expansion of our mass base, we pushed instead for an intensification of the struggle. Let us review this period in particular, through analysis of the tasks and the concrete circumstances prevailing from 1987 to 1990.

In order to place these lessons in their proper historical context, we shall discuss these according to the concrete circumstances prevailing at that time. We shall focus on matters relating to the armed struggle and, in particular, the corresponding related tasks and analyses drawn up by the Isabela Party Committee (IPC).

1. From 1986 to early 1987

a. The efforts in 1986 to expand and consolidate the zones which had a basis for being consolidated, especially those targeted as favorable, were in the main still correct. However, the setting of far bigger tasks in 1987 and higher targets in base building and in intensification of the war was already marked by undue haste and a one-sided consideration (overestimation) of the capacity of the forces and the people led by the Party in the province.

We can say definitely that the tasks set by the Central Committee in connection with the "strategic counteroffensive" as well as in connection with the tasks and assessments of Pepito (1985), Exotica

(1986) and Unicorn (1987) exerted a big influence. Nonetheless, the IPC bears responsibility for its own analysis of the level of work in the province, for setting particular tasks and the related stresses in areas of work that still needed to catch up and be strengthened.

For 1987, the target was the "comprehensive intensification of the struggle leading to an intensification of guerrilla warfare and popular uprisings while completing the positioning and strengthening of revolutionary forces" (Discussion on the situation, 1986).

The principal focus of work was the "intensification of struggle" and the principal basis then for assessing the level reached by our mass-base building had been the big open mass mobilizations carrying national and political issues. In fact, aside from the mass movement related to the mass campaign we conducted in early 1981, we did not succeed again in launching mobilizations as large as those achieved in the anticomprador movement before 1986. The open mass movement during this period could be considered to be regaining momentum. Even the anticomprador open mass campaigns undertaken had been relatively easy to achieve due to the favorable political situation prevailing then, and the compradors who were targeted were relatively easy to reach from the guerrilla zone.

It was also pointed out that "our position in TFR (Tumauini Forest Region) and in West Isabela had passed the critical stage of positioning", meaning to say that we had been continuously operating in these zones since they were recovered. In fact, we were still at the level of reestablishing the foundations in these areas, where since the mid-1970s we could not continuously operate. It would have been correct to say that we had passed the critical stage of positioning if the stability of the mass base had been relatively tested in confronting and overcoming the enemy's intense assaults.

In the actual count of barrios where we could operate, only nearly 10 percent were consolidated; and if the number of consolidated and semiconsolidated barrios were combined, these would come to only 1/3 more or less of all the barrios. (Consolidated barrios were then defined as those already on the BOC (Barrio Organizing Committee) level with full-fledged mass organizations being built, while semi-

consolidated barrios can be described as practically the entire zone having organizing groups and initial formation of organizing committee and full-fledged mass organizations.)

We can also say that the people's army had reached the stage of gaining initial momentum in military work during that time when commando units could operate along the highway. There were some factors that enabled the unit to achieve victories — first, the relative freedom of movement in the area and the numerous targets open to a small unit, thus the numerous firearms seized through disarming the enemy; further, the comrade who led the unit possessed daring and flexibility that was absent in one guerrilla platoon that needed to regain momentum after both the commanding officer and political officer were killed in a single tactical offensive.

It is only proper to aim to raise the level of the struggle for a subsequent period, but this can be done only if the mass base has sufficient breadth and the people's army has the relative capability to implement or operationalize the corresponding tasks demanded by the intensification of the struggle; and there is due consideration of the following: strength of the Party leadership, level of political consciousness of officers and fighters, adequacy of training in tactics and techniques, a good and workable command system and political system at the provincial and unit levels, territorial units that can carry on the work in the face of intense attacks by the enemy, and others. These do not come spontaneously. These, we must strive to achieve consciously and step by step.

Under the actual conditions then, what should have been stressed were: painstaking consolidation of the mass base over a wider scope to ensure a wider area of maneuver for the people's army; and at the same time, further tempering of the mass base in struggles against the ruling class through the movement to attain concrete benefits for the masses while continuing with expansion work.

In relation to strengthening the people's army, stress should have been placed on strengthening the Party organization within, this being the key to raising the will and capacity to fight; on solving the low level in tactics and technique by undertaking tactical and technical training;

on the widespread building of the people's militia especially in the consolidated areas so that there would be a broad base of ready reserves for recruitment; on building a wide intelligence and communication system among the masses so that they could be mobilized in warfare; and on raising the combat capability of the people's army step by step by launching small but widespread tactical offensives especially against enemy troops who are on foot and are isolated and, only with adequate preparation and capacity to achieve victory, launch raids against the relatively less fortified enemy camps.

However, because of the propensity to be carried away by initial victories and the absence of an adequate analysis of the concrete situation of the subjective forces, the correct tasks corresponding to the concrete situation could not be laid out.

b. In Vizcaya, in 1986, it could be said that revolutionary work had borne initial results due to the relatively relaxed situation. Mass work reached the level of organizing groups/organizing committees, with some initial experience in leading spontaneous mass actions.

Fighting units could also be formed initially, since there were already those who could be freed from mass work for this purpose. One platoon of the district guerrilla unit and one partisan team were formed.

The effort at step-by-step organizing through which work had progressed since early 1983 had begun to bear fruit. But when this experience was reviewed in one conference convened and presided over by the new secretary, the tendency to belittle painstaking mass work and to rush emerged. The responsible comrade considered that the previous process was too slow, and pointed out that the methods in "Our Urgent Tasks" were no longer appropriate. Aside from this, in the analysis of the past enemy attacks in the latter half of 1986 (police action type), this was seen as a "loss of initiative" which he rooted in the shortcomings of the previous leadership ("no steady leadership") due to the secretary's focus of attention on Ifugao which was given greater stress at that time.

2. The Period of a Shift in the Situation: Red Buster IV

Because by early 1987 the regime had been able to consolidate and had been alarmed by the rapid advance of armed struggle in the entire Northern Luzon, the enemy attacked immediately after the ceasefire period had elapsed. It first attacked the Cagayan-Apayao-Ilocos Norte region (CAIN) with Red Buster III and promptly followed this up with Red Buster IV, of "division-planned brigade-size operations" type in Isabela and, subsequently, Delta Buster in Vizcaya-Quirino.

The 1990 Military Conference (Kommil 90) analyzed these events of 1987 and saw that they followed one another but under various situations that had to be analyzed more thoroughly by the Isabela Party Committee.

"First, in early 1987," the enemy's stress was on CAIN while the situation in Isabela was relatively relaxed and tactical offensives mostly in the form of disarming actions were gaining momentum.

"The second stage was when the military situation intensified". From CAIN the 48th IB-PA and the 21st IB-PA arrived and immediately launched battalion-size strike operations in Ilagan and then in San Mariano.

"The third stage was the deployment of the Philippine Army (PA) in various parts of the province" for positioning. The 21st IB positioned itself in the northern part of the province up to Maconacon and Palanan while the 3rd Scout Ranger Battalion (SRBn) was positioned in the south, from San Mariano up to San Agustin. The 48th IB that was used in San Mariano was shifted to a different area of responsibility (Vizcaya?)."

Kommil 90 pointed out that a new situation had developed after the ceasefire such that, although the situation in Isabela was still relatively relaxed, the level reached by the revolutionary struggle gave rise to the strong possibility that it would be the next target to be attacked by the enemy. (It will be recalled that since 1983, no PA troops had been deployed in Isabela and the enemy's stress had been on CAIN.) Thus, preparations should have properly been made for the enemy attack.

The second stage encompassed the first part of RB IV, which were enemy strike operations aimed at encircling, throwing off-balance, and clearing out the revolutionary forces and thereby securing a position in this area.

The second part of RB IV was its "clear-hold phase" characterized by the formation of CAFGU detachments accompanied by intensive patrolling to further clear the area and complete the process of securing the enemy's position.

The tendency to underestimate the enemy attacks once again prevailed when the Isabela Party Committee reviewed the change in the situation but then could not immediately understand the enemy's character and objective. The Committee pointed out that "an enemy brigade can concentrate on only one front at one time", not immediately recognizing that the enemy was deliberately pressing and focusing its attack then on relatively stable and/or consolidated areas in order to put the mass base in a passive position, or else to throw these off-balance so that the enemy could position his troops according to his "forward deployment strategy".

Even the reference that "we were able to frustrate the enemy attack" was a manifestation of an overestimation of our own strength, which in the Kommil 90's analysis of what actually happened, was referred to as the timely arrival of the unit from CAIN which enabled us to launch a joint operations and deal a hard blow at the strike operations of RB IV.

Kommil 90 in its analysis also came up with the observation that there was indeed a failure to effectively employ the units when the enemy attacked, and there were cases of other units being surprised by the sudden enemy attack and turning passive. Even the platoon (Security Unit) under the (provincial Party) center at that time could not be effectively employed because the chain of command in the Security Unit was not clear.

A lesson which should have been grasped then was that the mass base and people's army were not adequately prepared for the sudden enemy attack, and therefore the tasks in this connection should have been undertaken. Yet the tasks drawn up for 1988 were for further

raising the level of the struggle, with little importance being given to further broadening the mass base and the necessary consolidation and training of the people's army.

Albert, the Isabela Party Committee meeting after RB IV registered and pointed out the indications and problems that needed attention such as "only a few guerrilla zones are contiguous" and "expansion was overdone", "the company-size blockade of the enemy is already a problem", and with respect to strengthening the people's army, "significant number of dropouts, lack of training of cadres", existence of unwholesome behavior in the people's army such as coarseness in dealing with the masses, and others.

Still according to the Kommil 90's analysis of this period, there were enough lessons to show that the following are essential in preparing for intense enemy attacks: the formation of a relatively concentrated force to be directly taken charge of by the (provincial Party) center and to serve as the center of gravity of the units because it no longer sufficed just for the guerrilla front to have a combat unit; and of an appropriate command structure for the people's army to administer more closely the burgeoning tasks of consolidating and strengthening the people's army and to direct the operations. Such tasks are:

- a. conducting more intensive, orderly and continuous political-military training;
- b. consolidating the people's army politically and supervising this task closely;
- c. directing the operations;
- d. deriving lessons from operations;
- e. setting up the rear, combat service support and combat support, especially intelligence;
- g. systematizing recruitment, aside from other questions needing close supervision especially because of the growing urgency of confronting the intensifying enemy attacks.

3. Vizcaya-Quirino in the period 1987-88

Because of impatience and the desire to accelerate revolutionary work, the target was set in 1987 to achieve "tactical stalemate in Vizcaya-Quirino". This was the outcome of a misreading that "... the enemy will not pay attention to Vizcaya-Quirino. Cagayan Valley is more strategic for the enemy" because it is in Cagayan Valley where the bigger interest of the class enemy lies. A study of the history of the second world war, however, shows that the fiercest battles were fought in Vizcaya-Quirino because it is here where the Sierra Madre and Cordillera mountain ranges join. Moreover, this is the gateway to Cagayan Valley, and at once overlooks and threatens Central Luzon.

Those who study Amado Guerrero's "Specific Characteristics of People's War in the Philippines" and even "Our Urgent Tasks" know that there is no such thing as "tactical stalemate". Parity will be attained in the process of the entire war. Due to the characteristic of our country and the superiority of the enemy, he can concentrate his forces at any place he chooses.

Also because of impetuosity, the importance of combining work in the mountains and in the plains was not properly considered. Due to the relatively sparse population in the mountains, greater attention was given the plains, or the "stress is on the exterior", where the mass organizations of the national peasant movement (OMs/PKM) had been built, albeit haphazardly. Even in army building, recruitment was rushed, with targets set for each unit and disciplinary actions meted out to cadres and COs (commanding officers) who failed to meet these. As a result fighters who did not measure up to standards were recruited, if only to satisfy the quota and avoid the disciplinary actions. The notion was to "just catch up on consolidating the recruits", which in turn was not effectively done. This opened up the people's army to undesirable elements, aggravating the problem of infiltration and unwholesome behavior.

Army training was also rushed through a two-week "crash course", so that the unit could be employed immediately. This had been the case when eventually, a unit was deployed near Quirino to recover the area blockaded by the CAFGU. But the cadres in the area were

not sufficiently capable of rebuilding the mass base, so that recovery work took a "purely military" form, which was called "expansion by fire".

The biggest manifestation of the desire to advance prematurely without considering the concrete level of work and the overall advance of the revolutionary movement was the open challenge to the class enemies through the issuance of "Proclamation No. 1" whereby all class enemies were lined up as targets of the revolution without distinguishing the most rabid from those who could still be neutralized, and, in connection with it, the ostentatious implementation of the maximum program of agrarian reform and the launching of "insurrectionary actions", which actually consisted of a few from the masses who went along with the people's army unit in carrying out the confiscations.

In addition to these was the tendency of the (provincial party) secretary to belittle the capability of other comrades in his desire to prove his own capability to lead. The regional operational command was formed and the secretary installed himself as the commanding officer, which was an anomaly since Vizcaya is not a region, being only a province, and there were other comrades with experience in directing operations who could have performed the task.

The arrangement gave way to monopolization by the secretary on one hand, and confusion of other comrades on the other in distinguishing between matters to be decided on by the Party and those by the people's army. This fostered the secretary's arrogance, which eventually manifested itself in his making of such arbitrary decisions as imposing disciplinary actions on comrades who failed to meet work targets, accusing other comrades of being enemy infiltrators without strong basis, and the like.

4. The Further Worsening of the Situation in Isabela and the Tasks Set for 1988

Because the consideration of the problems that emerged in 1987 were not given due importance, despite the fact that these were already being felt, (although the NPA still continued to register some

growth, there were victories in launching tactical offensives, and the mass movement within the guerrilla zones was still alive), the IPC further called for an intensification of the war in its December 1987 meeting, in accordance with the overall direction of the "strategic counteroffensive".

In line with the task to prepare (maikasa) and train (mahasa) all the revolutionary forces for more intense and comprehensive struggles to be able to march in step with the tactical offensives nationwide, widespread tactical offensives were launched, which at any rate, were successful from January to March 1988. A provisional revolutionary government in one guerrilla zone could also be set up during this period.

By then, the enemy had completed the process of securing his position and had begun company-size operations in the guerrilla zones that were being consolidated, so that the IPC convened again to consider the new situation. There was a repeat and a heightening of the overestimation of our own strength in the meeting; the basis considered were the initial victories, especially in tactical offensives, while the problems continued to be glossed over and, if at all mentioned, were belittled.

It was foreseen that during summer the enemy Task Force Timberland (TFT) would attack the consolidated guerrilla zones. But due to overconfidence in our capability, overestimation of our victories, and also the view that "the tactic of letting the enemy punch the air had been outmoded", the view prevailed that the correct tactics against TFT was to "launch a comprehensive political and military campaign with the objective of reducing the effectiveness of the enemy attack and/or decisively defeating it" The next program would contain greater stress on military actions and further raising the level of struggle, with the view of making these lead to insurrectionary actions and intensive tactical offensives in town centers once the enemy reaches the strength of two battalions continuously launching operations in our guerrilla zones.

With the objective of accelerating consolidation and PRG-building and letting this work catch up with the military campaign, the meeting

came up with the "triad approach concept" which considered that the "requisite for PRG-building is building the Party, the people's army and people's militia, and in the plains, building the NDF, all of which if we review "Our Urgent Tasks" have all been described as a process of step-by-step organizing "even in the early stage of forming the organizing group, initial studies in Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought should be given"... to prepare for the setting up of the local Party branch; also mentioned is the training of the people for the local militia. Why then had this been made to appear as a newly discovered concept, unless ...what one wishes to refer to in the concept had been the acceleration of building the Party, the people's army and the NDF in order for these to catch up with the military campaign to be launched and with the impending enemy attack?

The tendency to overestimate our own strength entails a corresponding tendency to relax. This is obvious in the disregard of the previous methods of categorizing the organized masses. In this period, the IPC pointed out that the previous method was no longer appropriate. In its experience, the masses, especially in the interior areas, could be mobilized according to the general calls of the Party and people's army even if they did not belong to the organizing groups, organizing committees and the mass organizations. Thus, entire populations in the interior barrios were categorized as organized, and all those in the mass organizations were categorized as activists.

Of course, this categorization would immediately inflate, in the assessment, the number of organized masses and activists, which had the effect of misleading and making us overestimate our own capability. Worse, the substandard recruits further aggravated our problem of shallow political work and the absence of a strong Party organization within the people's army.

At any rate, let us look at the actual flow of events in 1988, especially when the TFT attacked, to point out the manifestations and negative outcome of the overestimation of our own strength and underestimation of the enemy.

1. In the first part of 1988, the IPC launched Military Campaign I (MC-I), with the main part in West Isabela. This was marked by attacks on town centers, which in the main could be considered successful, but subsequently resulted in losses for the mass base. After MC-I, the building of the enemy's CAFGUs was accelerated in West Isabela and the Regional Special Action Force (RSAF) was brought in. This is not to mention the huge losses that we suffered by attacking fortified enemy strong points.

The part of MC-I for the Forest Region was not fruitful either. The Kommil 90 analysis noted that during this period, the enemy was launching SOT-type operations and gradually the area was being constricted by the setting up of the CAFGUs. This escaped the IPC's attention because the intent was to strike at regular troops or detachments, even if no sufficient reconnaissance had been undertaken.

The main lesson pointed out by the Kommil was the premature launching of big operations in the plains, especially with the town centers as target, when the underground movement was not yet sufficiently broad and strong in the guerrilla front. While it was true that there were consolidated areas, most of these were in the mountainous portions. Most of the big mass mobilizations were open and mainly on national and political issues. The broad and solid foundation for the underground movement which is the backbone of the open mass movement had not yet been laid out. Moreover, the conduct of the guerrilla company and the launching of company-size operations in the plains ran counter to the previous orientation that only small unit operations were appropriate in the plains.

While it is true that the Kommil reviewed the MC-I, the analysis was purely military and limited to lessons with respect to the conduct of operations such as lessons in preparation of intelligence, operationalization of command, etc. The overall effect of MC-I especially on the mass base was not thoroughly analyzed.

In addition, the Kommil also analyzed the heightening of problems resulting from the shallowness of the political work of the people's army in this period (1988). Many personal problems as well as

limitations in seizing opportunities due to the lack of training in tactics and techniques emerged, especially during periods of difficulties.

Good political work and political-military training within the people's army are important factors in maintaining high combat capability and a sense of sacrifice. The Kommil's analysis was: had the IPC given this work enough importance, it should have attended to it first, while the situation was still relatively relaxed as the enemy attack abated in early 1988. If, in launching even only a tactical offensive, a good dry run was required, what then of preparing our forces for a huge military campaign, with importance and attention not being given to political and military training of the troops? Because this work had been deferred and scheduled for the latter part of the year, it was overtaken by the enemy attack. No training could be held until only lately in 1991.

2. In September-November 1988, the enemy launched his next strike operations focusing on areas where the PRG had been set up and where the IPC center had been. The political-military training had also been scheduled then, with almost all cadres and troops already assembled in the training area.

Because there had been no assessment of the enemy's impending attack and where and what were the possible targets and objectives, the overall defense of the area was not planned; and the center's camp was attacked. Although there were no casualties, some high-powered weapons were seized by the enemy. Although the secretariat remained intact, for some unknown reason, the secretary assessed the situation and decided on military matters all by himself as though he had wanted to prove something, instead of convening a meeting to collectively discuss the situation and take appropriate measures to deal with the enemy attack.

The training had to be canceled and the enemy had to be confronted. Because our forces were concentrated, the enemy received a trouncing and eventually retreated due to the rains and overflowing of the rivers.

After November the IPC called a military consultation to assess the situation. The enemy attack and the MC-I counterattack were

reviewed. In a purely military manner of assessment, the revolutionary forces were considered victorious in the first quarter of the year (January-March 1988) when the enemy was still preparing for its attack, and up to April-August when MC-I was being launched; but the revolutionary movement suffered setbacks when the enemy attacked and our forces were assembled for training.

Accordingly, the problems previously noted were again noted, such as lack of skills in tactics and techniques especially when the enemy had attacked, which should have been relatively minimized if early on attention had been given to the necessary political and military training.

One solution perceived in order for us to be able to confront the enemy was the formation of a company-size unit for the province and platoon-size units or higher for each front, and the related setting up of the intelligence network, which should have been formed earlier, especially since the IPC had called for raising the level of struggle in 1987. In this consultation, the military solution to facing the enemy attack became even more pronounced.

Let us recall the words of the military consultation held after November 1988: "let us confront the expected enemy offensive... let us launch successive offensive-defensive campaigns ... creatively apply the principle of fighting while consolidating". Under the actual prevailing situation, these were easier said than done, especially due to the big backlog in the work of consolidating the army and the mass base in the face of intense enemy attacks.

Had the urgency of consolidating, strengthening and expanding the mass base and consolidating the people's army been thoroughly studied and recognized, great efforts could have been exerted in this regard, considering that in the *Kommil's* judgment, this could have been done with the (provincial Party) center focusing on it and with contingency plans and forces allocated to deal with the enemy attack.

Although it may be pointed out that there were efforts to consolidate the forces during this period as there were studies conducted on the Basic Party Course and Basic Party Cadre Course, in which the "Basic Problems and Situation of the People of Isabela"

were also discussed, the Kommil viewed these as inadequate. Furthermore, the cadres who attended these were secondary cadres and not those actually tasked to consolidate the mass base and deal with the enemy.

Also, the stress had been on "refining the concept of preparing (pagkakasa)" thus, the concrete problem with regard to the situation of our forces and mass base, which by then had become a major, if not the principal concern, had been overlooked. Moreover, the concept that they wished to refine was itself the one that should have been rectified, because it was this principally that did not correspond to the actual needs for advancing the revolutionary work in this particular stage of people's war and the concrete level reached by revolutionary work in the province.

Let us look at the results of the IPC meeting in March 1989 to assess the work in 1988:

It was noted in the meeting that "the breadth and density of the mass base and the position in the guerrilla zones have been maintained" and the strength of the people's army was still at xxx. As to problems, it was pointed out that "consolidation of the mass movement is lagging behind compared to the breadth of expansion and to the military initiative". But even earlier, the CAFGU blockade of the guerrilla zones had been widening and the people's army was already registering very large numbers of drop outs. In fact, this had almost equaled the number of recruits, which clearly indicated a problem that had not been solved or had not been given sufficient attention.

By overestimating the victories and underestimating the growing problems and in the absence of a correct assessment of the capability of the mass base and the people's army and the extent of the damage inflicted by enemy attacks, the concept which was called "prepare, train, propel" (maikasa, maihasa, maibulwak) the revolutionary power of the people's army and the masses and march in step with the SCO" was once again "refined". "Propelling" was defined as having accumulated sufficient skills in fighting and readiness to enter into a decisive engagement until the achievement

of a tactical stalemate, set as a target to be achieved within two years, with the objective of establishing the liberated area in Isabela.

According to this concept, it was estimated that we could accelerate the frequency of our tactical offensives by 3-4 times in order to train the people's army as well as "turn the entire province into a battle front". Even only from the concept itself, we can already say that the dialectical relationship and process of strengthening the people's army and of expanding and consolidating the mass base which accumulates strength step by step, as well as the development of the entire struggle nationally in order to reach a higher level, especially because our people's war is still at the stage of strategic defensive, had been ignored. It is obvious that tactical stalemate or parity cannot be achieved in one province in isolation of the struggle in the entire country.

It was in this meeting that the provincial unified command (PUC) system was finalized, with counterparts up to front and district level in order to respond to the need for an operational command. The Party secretary assumed the command despite the fact that there were other comrades who had been assigned to assume this task as early as 1987. This system whereby the Party secretary also assumes the army command continued until corrected in December 1989.

It is not our practice to pile up two heavy responsibilities on only one person, and only under special circumstances is the command of the army given to the Party secretary. This is to avoid monopoly in decision-making and to allow the secretary to perform his heavy responsibilities in the Party.

Concretely, the Party secretary and the whole Party organization should have paid attention to the over-all consolidation of the forces — Party and army — and the mass base. Either the secretary had little faith in other comrades, or he had wanted to prove something. Whatever the case, as events would show, it was difficult for one person to hold on to two heavy responsibilities.

The second military campaign was set in line with the view of creating pressure areas to prevent the enemy from focusing on relatively consolidated guerrilla zones in the east, whose role in turn

would be to put up an active defense. A second military campaign was launched in the west, resulting in successive defensive actions and the gradual diminution of our forces.

When Kommil 90 assessed this, it pointed out that aside from the principal weakness that MC-I in the plains was untimely, what had not been perceived then was the tightening of the situation in the west which had not been the case when the first military campaign there was launched. The company formation that was set up eventually turned passive, and as it dwindled it devoured other units while straining to compensate for manpower losses, if only to maintain the company-size formation.

The command center committed the error of entirely entrusting the implementation of the operation to the front unified command (FUC), which from the lack of proper supervision, lost flexibility as it aimed for big targets. The tactics of concentration and dispersal were not effectively used, instead all units were concentrated, thus these were easily detected and pounced upon by the enemy, and were forced into successive defensive actions and eventually, complete passivity.

The enemy resumed its brigade-size strike operation (Highlander) targeting the Party center when the IPC was convened in a meeting (March) and one enemy battalion was deployed in the area. (The enemy attack in 1988 was called off due to the onset of the rainy season.) This attack at its initial stage was even effectively trounced by the Security Unit, but after the meeting, the Party secretary/CO came to personally direct the defense of the base. The entry of the secretary was exposed to the enemy, which thereupon launched a another attack.

Subsequently, the battles were carried into the forest and the Party center became isolated from the masses, eventually ran out of supplies and was forced to retreat to the coast to get supplies. It is still unclear why the Party center did not leave the area despite having turned passive. It could have shifted to the adjoining guerrilla zone or else left the forest and gone to an area where supplies were not a problem and where it could better discharge its responsibilities as a command center.

The Kommil called this as loss of flexibility and falling into the enemy's design. Not getting out of the enemy encirclement and allowing itself to be isolated from the masses is a repeat of the past experience in the Forest Region where, despite the unit's clear passivity, the leading cadre had insisted on remaining there for "sentimental reasons" on the part of the leading cadre that the "place was closest to his heart".

After the enemy strike operation, the intense attacks on the area of the Party center abated and the enemy only employed intensive company-size patrol and continuous widespread SOT operations. The enemy's stress shifted to the South (Jones, San Agustin and neighboring towns). After having been pursued, the Party center could no longer undertake the planned military campaigns, which had been aimed at "significantly blunting the enemy operations and cause the enemy to doubt his own strategy".

5. Nueva Vizcaya-Quirino During the Period of Delta Buster

The accelerated raising of the level of the mass organizations and the rapid raising of the level of the struggle, which at first appeared to be correct and inspiring, were put to a test when the enemy attacked.

The enemy launched Oplan Delta Buster (ODB) in Vizcaya and Quirino in mid-1988. Battalion-size troops of the 48th IB and elements of the 4th Scout Rangers under Col. Blando himself were employed.

The 48th IB was brought into Vizcaya in late 1987 as part of the enemy's overall positioning in his "forward deployment strategy" in line with the "gradual constriction" scheme. This was not seriously analyzed because of the view that "Vizcaya is not important to the enemy".

The enemy first struck in the plains of west Vizcaya to which we had put our stress in our work relative to the minimal work in the mountainous portions. At once, a unit was hit and the enemy then swept southwards. Our units in the area attacked by the enemy were forced to move east since they could not maneuver towards the mountains which by then had also come under enemy attack. Because the enemy movements had not been assessed, a general

plan to actively confront the enemy attacks had not been formulated. The secretary/command was then in Isabela intending to set up a new regional organization (which did not materialize anyway) and was unable to give or define a plan of action to guide the units remaining in the area. Instead, he tasked the vice commanding officer (VCO) to prepare a place for a meeting.

When the enemy swept the plains after sweeping the mountainous areas, the peasant mass organizations (PKM) which had been haphazardly set up crumbled easily or became passive, thus, the area for maneuver of the units in the plains became narrowed. There were instances where units got hit because they had stayed too long in the few places where they had mass support, or where the foliage was dense enough to hide in.

By the time the secretary arrived, the mass base had already suffered severe losses and the mountainous portion of Vizcaya had been abandoned. Immediately the guerrilla unit, divided into three squads, was ordered to go back to recover the area. But the CAFGUs had already been set up in the area and the recovery unit's commanding officer immediately got killed, thus the unit completely lost the capability to recover the area. The Party leading committee that was preparing for a meeting was also unmindful of its security, belittled the indications that the enemy had already targeted the area and thus the center itself was attacked, resulting in the death of six committee members. After this incident, the secretary/CO wrote all by himself the analysis of the conduct of work since 1986, in brief judging it "Left" opportunism and describing it as "forced ripening method" (kinalburong paraan). Rather than review the lessons that have already been drawn from the long running practice of building the mass base and strengthening the people's army in Cagayan Valley and Northern Luzon, or review the principles elaborated on in "Our Urgent Tasks", the secretary swung from "Leftist" thinking and actions to rightism and subsequently formulated conservative policies, such as the "elliptical flowerlike movement" and "burrowing" method of limiting links with the masses or reluctance in linking up with the

masses in some barrios while overstaying in a few barrios rather than daring to expand and recover lost areas.

Eventually, because the process of assigning work in the province was marked by arrogance arising from the secretary's excessive regard for his own capability, this arrogance swung to deep demoralization. Before long, after formulating his policies, the secretary left the area and the work to secondary cadres who were not qualified for such heavy responsibilities.

In sum, the document "General Review of Important Events and Decisions of the Central Committee" pointed out the important lessons from the Nueva Vizcaya experience:

"The Nueva Vizcaya committee prepared a plan for achieving *strategic stalemate in the area, under the illusion that the enemy was no longer capable of large redeployments of his forces... after a few spectacular actions, the AFP sent in one infantry battalion, targeted exposed mass organizations in the barrios and towns, and relentlessly pursued the small units of the people's army. The mass organizations which had been haphazardly set up rapidly crumbled, and eventually a meeting of leading front cadres was detected and encircled. After a series of setbacks, the leadership veered towards a Right opportunist policy of retreat, limited links with the masses, and individual recruitment.*"

6. The Period After the Intensive Strike Operations Tasks of the Regional Party Committee for 1990

The IPC met again in December 1989, reviewed the events of 1988 and set up the Regional Committee which had been put off in 1987. Vizcaya and Isabela were combined into one region.

In the assessment it was noted that we had lost control of strategic areas and that even in the areas which we considered as our bases, the enemy had taken hold of the lines of communications, and had set up blockades between guerrilla zones. Also noted were the *slowing down of recruitment for the people's army and the big reduction in our forces. But what was not well noted during the period was that the people's army, which, in the first place, lacked training*

and political consolidation, had started to feel the exhaustion from fighting battles successively.

If a deeper analysis of the overall situation in this period had been made, we would have seen that indications were then obvious that "definitely the enemy forces are still considerably superior to ours in the overall course of the war, with immensely superior capability to launch massive and prolonged attacks against the revolutionary forces and our bases in encircle-and-destroy type operations."

To guide itself in making a deeper analysis of its own experience, the IPC during this period studied the Party statements on its anniversary (AB December 1988) and on the anniversary of the New People's Army (AB March 1989), and the *Political Report of Northern Luzon* wherein lessons drawn from a previous understanding of the stage and the course of advance of protracted war to the next strategic stage were pointed out. However, these lessons had not been grasped thoroughly and related to the region's own experience.

It was not realized that the entire basic concept guiding the tasks had to be corrected. The concept of "prepare, train, propel" was still endorsed although no longer given a time frame. The tasks were merely adapted to the problems of consolidation. Identified as the immediate task for 1990 was: "Consolidate and prepare while fighting"

Essentially, the task of aiming for a tactical stalemate remained, with the objective of pushing the enemy to a defensive position in the entire province (the meaning of "propelling") although greater importance had then been given to the need to consolidate the forces. Correspondingly, the new Party regional committee, targeted the setting up of a regional guerrilla unit (RGU) that had long been overdue and the front guerrilla units (FGU). The Regional Operational Command (ROC) and its initial staffs were set up to correct the Party secretary/command system. A Basic Military Course training was scheduled for the units operating in the plains in order to raise their knowledge of army tactics and technique.

As a response to the tightening of the enemy blockade especially between Jones/San Agustin and between Jones/San Guillermo, a

military campaign was planned to "preempt the enemy attack". As a step towards recovering the mass base, a plan was made to relaunch the antifeudal and anticomprador campaign (MALAY Campaign).

However, most of the plans for 1990 and the efforts to "preempt the enemy" could no longer be implemented. The combat capability of the RGU had been reduced when nearly all of those with combat skills were brought to Quirino to reinforce the 30 fighters remaining from the previous oversized company formation in Nueva Vizcaya. And when this unit stayed too long in a logging area supposedly to prepare for an attack in San Agustin, it became exposed to the enemy, whereupon it was shelled and pursued.

The training courses could not also be undertaken as a result of the failure of the responsible comrade in the ROC to attend to it promptly. Neither could the training for the unit in the plains, which had been overtaken by increasing enemy pressure in the west and had suffered a gradual diminution of forces.

Aside from those already mentioned, another reason for the failure to implement the program had been the exhaustion and demoralization among the cadres. After the meeting, a number of key cadres, including the regional secretary, left the guerrilla zone to visit their families. Some did not return or stayed out too long, thus reducing the capacity of the remaining cadres to implement the program for internal consolidation.

The entire year of 1990 can be described as one of being on the brink of a downswing and of a reluctance to advance due to exhaustion and demoralization. Concretely, this could be seen in the drop out of cadres and the reluctance of those who remained to accelerate the work due to apprehensions about the enemy. Isolationist attitudes, such as nestling in the forests and reluctance to go down to the masses, prevailed. Even the combat unit, with its relatively more concentrated forces, overstayed inside the forest, thus pulling along the units doing mass work in order to bring in supplies. Nestling in the forest and reluctance to approach the masses further aggravated the problems in the people's army which had earlier become prevalent such as overdependence on the logging

companies for its needs, coarseness in dealing with the masses, violations of discipline, etc.; and also the rise to prominence of personal problems which even in the past had caused many to drop out and which had been cursorily rooted to shortcomings in "correct handling".

In December 1990, the Military Conference (Kommil 90) was convened, originally planned only to derive lessons from the conduct of operations. The discussion was broadened to review the 1986 experience. Immediately, the Regional Committee also made a summing up. One point that was noted in the summing up was the fact that the secretary had not attended a single meeting of the (Northern Luzon) Commission (NLC) to participate in the discussions on the review of policies and direction of overall work in Northern Luzon. In the NLC meeting in 1988, the tasks set for the Unicorn (1987) had been rescinded and tasks were reset according to the line of "extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare with a continuously expanding organized mass support".

According to the lessons drawn from the summing up, the regional Party committee reassessed the overall level of revolutionary work and noted the further constriction of our areas of operation, the uncertainty of whether the mass organizations were still functioning, the widespread demoralization in the ranks both of the Party and people's army, the very weak composition of cadres especially those in charge at the district level, and the near decimation of the first line of cadres.

The general direction of the tasks was defined as: "breaking through the enemy encirclement and reaching the more populated plain., expanding our position to reach the people, creating breaches on and easing the enemy encirclement, strengthening the Party organization within the people's army, raising its political level and its will to fight, improving the organization and command structure according to the general line of extensive guerrilla war with broadening mass support".

It was recognized that the task of recovery was relatively heavy, especially because the region's cadre composition had thinned out

and a great deal of effort had to be exerted to consolidate the Party and the people's army in order to achieve initial successes in the work; and that nevertheless, so long as the lessons drawn from experience are grasped firmly, the revolutionary struggle in the region was bound to advance further.

SUMMARY OF THE LESSONS

The errors and weaknesses in Isabela and Vizcaya did not differ from each other but were in fact essentially similar. In both cases, the tasks were guided by Exotica in 1986 and Unicorn in 1987. Generally, these operational plans were marked by a tendency to force the advance of our overall revolutionary work. The tendency resulted from a one-sided underestimation of the enemy and overestimation of our own strength. It also resulted from the lack of a correct analysis of the particular situation of our mass base, the people's army and the Party's capability to provide firm leadership; and also of the enemy's strength and the current objective situation in order to be able to set the correct tasks necessary for advancing the revolutionary movement in our particular area. Of course, this is not to understate the confusion wrought within the whole Party at that time by the concept of "strategic stalemate" which interfered with our correct understanding of the strategy and tactics of protracted people's war.

Let us quote from the document of the Central Committee "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify our Errors" of July 1992 regarding the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside for us to understand the course that we shall take in advancing the armed struggle:

"There is a gross lack of understanding of the theory of people's war and the strategic line of encircling the cities from the countryside. This strategic line is not an arbitrary edict for a permanent condition. It simply means that when the people's army cannot as yet seize the cities, the revolutionary forces have to accumulate armed strength first in the countryside where reactionary power and control is relatively weaker and where there

is a wide area of maneuver for the people's army to launch tactical offensives, accumulate armed strength and engage in mass work.

"Conditions in the future will arise to allow the people's army and the people in mass uprisings led by the Party to finally seize the centers of municipalities, provincial capitals, minor cities and major cities, in that probable order. But it would be foolhardy to believe that Metro Manila could fall in an uprising led by the Party earlier than the time that the backbone of the enemy forces is broken in the countryside or before they go into a process of final disintegration."

Let us quote further to point out the correct view and method of facing the massive enemy attacks in his so-called "gradual constriction":

"Many among us express mystification over the enemy's "war of quick decision" and "gradual constriction" and are dumbfounded because of the telling effect these seem to have had on our mass base and armed struggle. But these are in fact old terms and old enemy strategy and tactics as anyone who has studied Mao's teachings on people's war should know. Indeed, the "war of quick decision" and "gradual constriction" we have been confronting since 1987 have certain peculiarities like the simultaneous deployment of enemy divisions and brigades in the main guerrilla fronts all over the country, the heightened determination of the enemy to pursue the level of concentration of enemy troops and offensives on areas targeted for relatively long periods, the widespread and systematic building of vigilantes and CAFGUs, and the advantage of Aquino's popularity during the early years. But we have overcome the same enemy strategy and tactics in so many places in the past. And even now, we have learned to cope with, adjusted to and gradually overcome it generally and in many places.

"It suits the enemy forces to go on a war of quick decision or strategic offensive in view of their military superiority — in the number of troops, weapons, logistics and training. But at the tactical level, where they wish to win battles, they fail because

they lack popular support [underscoring, ours]. So, they resort to what they call "gradual constriction" or "blockhouse" warfare (lines of camps and fortifications to encircle and control an area) combined with "special operations teams", organizing paramilitary forces and undertaking a sham kind of mass work."

The document also pointed out the NPA's method of confronting this, and the related tactics at the present stage of our people's war:

"On the side of the NPA, the correct response is the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive of the enemy forces. Concretely, we render them deaf and blind on a wide scale by gaining the **people's participation and support** [underscoring, ours]. At the tactical level, we launch guerrilla warfare by assembling a superior force to carry out tactical offensives on enemy units that we are capable of wiping out by surprise. The enemy forces can also concentrate on any point and take away particular areas from us but they would be giving up far more space elsewhere. We can and must always cover territory much wider than the ring of large enemy forces and offensives while we combine annihilative and tactical guerrilla actions and mass mobilizations to resist and punish him in the areas of his concentration.

"... Painstaking mass work and guerrilla warfare are still our winning line at this stage of our people's war. These lay the horizontal foundation for the vertical growth of the people's army in due course...

"It is wrong to say that luring the enemy in deep, letting him move around blind and deaf, and letting him punch the air when we cannot fight to win are outmoded tactics just because our people's war has grown increasingly more intensive as we advance. These are useful at any stage of the people's war. The winning line is to fight only the battles that we can win. The losing line is to stick out our big heads or to overreach. Another losing line is not to fight even the battle that we can win. All the way we assume that we expand and consolidate the mass base.

"We cannot induce our advance to the stage of regular mobile warfare because it would mean feeding our army and our mass base to senseless attrition or to self-destruction by prematurely rushing into strategically decisive engagements. ..."

**Vizcaya-Isabela-Quirino
Regional Party Committee
February 1993**

(Translated from the original in Pilipino)

COMMUNIQUE OF THE EXPANDED PLENUM OF THE MINDANAO COMMISSION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

MAY 1, 1993

The Expanded Plenum of the Mindanao Commission of the Communist Party of the Philippines was held in April 1993. It was attended by all members of the Commission and other leading cadres in Mindanao. It took up the following agenda:

- 1) *Assessment of the current situation of the areas in Mindanao;*
- 2) *Summing-up of the experiences in Mindanao, including the Aho Campaign, (1980-1993);*
- 3) *The 10th Central Committee Plenum;*
- 4) *"General Review of Important Events and Decisions";*
- 5) *"Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors";*
- 6) *Decisions of the 10th CC Plenum;*
- 7) *"Stand for Socialism Against Modern Revisionism";*
- 8) *Criticism and Self-Criticism; and*
- 9) *Other matters.*

The meeting was successfully completed amidst enemy military operations and current internal problems faced by the Party and the revolutionary movement. The discussions were democratic, characterized by contention of ideas, clashing of positions and mutual understanding to achieve a principled and firm unity. The proletarian attitude prevailed during discussions. Criticism and self-criticism were conducted. The Plenum accomplished following:

1. Assessment of the current situation. We reported and studied the quantitative data and the qualitative assessments of the present situation at the levels of the entire Mindanao territory, the regions and the units below in the fields of armed struggle, base building, agrarian revolution, the revolutionary mass movement in the principal cities and towns, the united front, and the Party. We identified our successes, failures and weaknesses.

Our victories still surpass our failures and weaknesses, although these are still many. We have thousands of activists working in wide areas in the countryside, in mountainous areas and the cities. We recovered some of our areas of operation while a few others of these continued to contract. We still enjoy broad popular support. Victorious tactical offensives still outnumber the defeats suffered by our people's army units. Some open and legal protest actions could be launched in the big cities. Our allies are increasing and through contacts we are able to do political work within the armed forces of the enemy. The Party continues to hold on to the ideology of the proletariat; it is able to conduct Party education, systemize its organization, and it is determined to lead the revolutionary struggle and rectify errors. But the revolutionary forces in their entirety are still small and weak in comparison to the enemy forces; and the areas we control are still small in relation to the entire territory.

The enemy's "gradual constriction" campaign has failed. The Party remains intact. Not a single full guerrilla unit was destroyed. We could not be driven out from the greater part of our territory, although we lost some parts and our organized forces decreased. The "gradual constriction" succeeded and became effective only because of our own past errors.

2. The summing up of experiences in Mindanao, including the Apos Campaign (1980-1993). We analyzed the history and development of the revolutionary movement in various fields of work and struggle at the Mindanao, the regional and the lower territorial levels. We identified the advances and reverses; the victories, defeats and failures as well as their root causes. We drew lessons from our experiences. We focused our attention principally on questions of line,

strategy and policy; the style and method of analysis; and the performance of the organization and the leading organs of the Party.

In the course of the discussions, we studied the political situation in the country and the corresponding policies and decisions of the higher leading Party organs. We also studied some documents of the Mindanao Commission, especially the "Basis for Development and Role of the Movement in the White Area in the Entire Strategy of People's War in Mindanao," "Draft Summing-up in the White Area in Mindanao (1980-1985)", "Draft Summing-up of the United Front in Mindanao", drafts of "Summing-up of the Apos Campaign in Mindanao", "Draft Summing-up of the Revolutionary Movement in Mindanao (1980-1989) and other papers.

We traced the development of the revolutionary movement from 1980 to 1984. The reverses from 1985 to 1987 were sudden, swift and drastic although as early as 1983 and 1984 there was initial weakening in certain areas. From 1988 to 1992, the decline continued but some degree of recovery and advance was achieved in some areas.

Among the errors that clearly came out as the internal cause of the decline of the revolutionary movement were the militarist tendency and the overstraining in pursuit of gigantic legal mobilizations from 1983 onward. The militarist tendency was exemplified by the orientation of the Regular Guerrilla Unit (GYG) as full-time fighting units, the building of too many company formations which could not be sustained, and the military actions taken without regard for the situation of the mass base. The overstraining in pursuit of gigantic legal mobilizations through frequent and massive transporting of the organized masses from the countryside to city and town centers became clear. There were also the numerous military actions by the city partisans that unnecessarily attracted enemy attacks and militarized the cities.

The insurrectionist Red Area-White Area (RA-WA) line was systematized in 1984 during the White Area Conference led by the center of the Commission and attended by cadres coming mostly from the urban areas. This is shown by the document "Basis for

Development and Role of the Movement in the White Area ... published in *Talamdan*, official publication of the Mindanao Commission. This deviation from the line and the strategy and tactics of people's war emerged because the comrades allowed themselves to be misled by the extremely favorable situation and because their understanding of our basic principles was poor. Although in fact the document was not discussed collectively by the entire Commission and the regional committees then, it was widely implemented by the white area committees and some leading cadres of the Commission and the regions.

The insurrectionist line was not firmed up nor fully implemented because it was overtaken by the Ahos campaign, the change in the political situation, and the strong enemy operations. The Commission undertook, from 1987 onward, the initial rectification of some aspects of the errors and undertook further rectification in 1988 and 1990. It is, however, only now that we have made a comprehensive analysis and resolution to further launch an all-round rectification.

The review of our experiences also showed that, had we not made adjustments according to the concrete situation as well as some corrections, we would have suffered graver failures and defeats.

The Ahos campaign was shown to be a grave political error and a crime. It was not within the authority of the caretaker group of the Mindanao Commission to launch the campaign. In our review, we saw that there were no solid and sufficient bases for launching it; there was sudden panic arising from extreme subjectivism. Serious violations were committed and victimized a great number of comrades in the Party, the people's army and the mass organizations. The campaign led to the drastic weakening of the revolutionary movement.

The summing-up of experiences has deepened our understanding of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of our Party. We have arrived at a correct view of the course of our practice and the lessons that we have drawn from can guide us.

We are exerting every effort to issue the summing up document as soon as possible. We call on the lower Party organs to make their

own comprehensive summings-up so that we can further concretize and enrich the summing up of the experiences in Mindanao.

3. The 10th Central Committee Plenum. We discussed circumstances and processes with regard to the convening and conduct of the 10th CC Plenum. The arguments of those who claim that it was bogus, as well as of those who take the stand that it was legitimate, were put forward. The entire Expanded Plenum of the Commission united in acknowledging the legitimacy of the 10th CC Plenum. The arguments bandied about by those who claim that it was bogus are not valid. They make a travesty of the truth and they have no authority to make those claims.

The Party organization in Mindanao firmly adheres to the principle of democratic centralism. We will not allow anyone to split the organization and decapitate our Party. Let us not give the enemy a cause to mock us and to rejoice. The Party cadres and members throughout Mindanao must firmly unite to oppose and fight all moves to create splits in our organization. Let us strengthen our resolve to confront these attacks against us. This is not the time for middling or indecision because what is at stake are the interests of the people, the revolution and the Party. Let us defend the integrity of our organization.

Concerning comrades who are confused and who have committed ultra-democratic acts, we are ready to dialogue and hold principled discussions with them. An important requirement in this regard is adherence to correct organizational processes. We need to resolve this within our ranks and not to bring the discussion out in public or the mass media. The dissemination of documents without going through proper Party organs as well as proper processes is being prohibited because it creates confusion inside the organization.

4. "General Review of the Important Events and Decisions (1980-1991)." We studied the national situation over the past years, including the situation of the subjective forces of the revolution. The policies and decisions of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Executive Committee of the Central Committee were examined. We also studied the victories and setbacks. We devoted

considerable attention to the principal points involving the victories and the setbacks.

From the study we were able to comprehend the events affecting the entire country and their impact on Mindanao. With regard to the setbacks suffered by the revolutionary movement, we saw the respective roles played by the central Party organ (e.g. the concept of strategic counteroffensive or SCO) and the leading organ in Mindanao (e.g. the insurrectionist RA-WA line).

This placed the next topic in its correct historical context.

5. "Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify Errors." We discussed the basic principles and whether or not we should continue to hold on to them. We studied every topic in the document. We enlightened each other with regard to the points and information that we could gather involving matters being debated in "Reaffirm..."

Unity was quickly and easily achieved during the discussions. On the basis of the circumstances in Mindanao and the experiences of other areas, the principal conclusions in "Reaffirm..." were shown clearly to be correct, concrete and objective. The summing-up of our experiences proved to be of great benefit. The data were clear. The truth cannot be denied.

Nevertheless, there are some data in "Reaffirm..." that needs to be corrected. But these do not in any way affect its principal conclusions.

It was the feeling of the majority of comrades present that these conclusions should have been identified, formulated and issued a long time ago.

Thus, all agreed to continue propagating the study of the document and to firmly implement it. None among those present objected. The comrades are determined to uphold the document and deepen their understanding of it by relating it to their own summing up in Mindanao.

With regard to the process of writing the document, all were agreed that the national Party center had the right and obligation to process it as it did. It also had the power. It went through a democratic process. It was pointed out that "Reaffirm" is based on reports,

assessments, documents, consultations, representations and direct investigations.

6. Decisions of the 10th Plenum. We discussed the resolutions and memoranda issued by the 10th CC Plenum. These served to deepen our understanding of the contents of the "Reaffirm" document.

Discussions on them further clarified many points.

7. "Stand for Socialism Against Modern Revisionism." We studied the theory and principles of Marxism-Leninism regarding the building of socialism. Then we discussed the document and clarified the points raised against it. We collectively discussed these points.

This helped a lot in our understanding of the events in the former Soviet Union and the countries in Eastern Europe. It enlightened us in understanding socialism and the serious damage caused by modern revisionism. And it also enlightened us in understanding the direction of our two-stage revolution.

The entire plenum also agreed to popularize the study of the document and to have more studies on socialism.

8. Criticism and Self-Criticism (CSC). Two CSC sessions were conducted. Criticisms of each one and of the leader of the conference were brought out. The discussions were open and free. We collectively discussed the weaknesses and the proposals to improve our style and methods of work and our conduct of meetings.

Self-criticism of the performance of our tasks in advancing the revolutionary movement had already been identified in the assessment and summing up that was done earlier. We did not fear to identify our errors and weaknesses because this serves the interests of the masses, the revolution and the Party. This does not weaken but even strengthens our struggle.

Criticism and self-criticism helped in further cementing unity among the comrades.

All of the above that we discussed and united on are big victories for our Party and our revolutionary movement. Based on them, we expect to advance our revolutionary struggle. However, they are only a beginning. The next decisive step is our united and resolute implementation of our decisions.

Today, May 1, is the day of the proletariat. Thus, the victories that we have achieved lend more significance to this day. This is the day of the leading class in society and in the revolution. It is also our day of reaffirming the basic principles of our Party, which is the advance detachment of the proletariat.

As the advance detachment of the proletariat, we pledge to hold on to and stand for our historic mission to eliminate the exploitation and oppression of man by man. Let us wield the theory and principles of Marxism-Leninism, the ideology of the proletariat.

We pledge to struggle more vigorously in order to defeat the "total war" policy of the regime and overthrow the reactionary U.S.-Ramos regime in order to achieve freedom and genuine democracy. Let us implement the correct line and the strategy and tactics of people's war. And let us firmly adhere to the principle of democratic centralism. Let us stand for the principled unity of the Party. It is the interest of the proletariat and the oppressed masses that we serve!

Comrades, let us unite and proceed along the correct path in the struggle for freedom and genuine democracy! ●

ON THE SEPTEMBER THESIS OF THE PEASANT SECRETARIAT

A REPORT BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE (EC-CC) *

1. The Circumstances Behind the "September Thesis" of the Peasant Secretariat (PS)

The "September Thesis" ("Septhe") was submitted by the Peasant Secretariat to the EC-CC in January 1991, whereupon the latter disapproved it. The EC-CC severely criticized the insurrectionary direction that clearly departs from the Party's policy of advancing the mass movement in the countryside within the framework of building guerrilla fronts and comprehensively accumulating strength through a protracted people's war. The PS wanted to replace this with a policy of legal and sweeping organizing with stress on the plains and geared towards uprisings.

The editorial of *Rebolusyon*, Issue No. 2, 1991, further clarified the criticism on the PS proposition. The insurrectionary proposition of the PS is among the types of insurrectionism criticized by Party Chairman Armando Liwanag in his article, "Five Kinds of Insurrectionism".

According to the PS, the "Septhe" is their position paper opposing the document, "The Tasks of Advancing the Peasant Movement in the Decade of the 90" by the EC-CC.

The "Septhe" was issued by the PS last September 1990 but the EC-CC was given a copy only on the last week of January 1991. This paper was discussed in a consultation of cadres under the PS along with a "discussion" of the EC-CC document on the peasant movement. The "Septhe" has also been circulated among other cadres and units that the PS chose to consult before giving the EC-

* This is a report submitted to the Tenth Plenum of the Central Committee, with follow-up notes in April 1993.

CC a copy of it. Even before it had been reported to the EC-CC, the orientation for peasant organizing in the countryside as laid down in "Septhe" had already been given for implementation to cadre teams deployed by the PS to various regions.

The cadre consultation was called not for the purpose of really understanding and propagating the official and existing Party policy for advancing the revolutionary peasant movement, as laid down in the EC-CC document. It was called for the purpose of opposing the document of the EC-CC and consolidating the forces behind the PS on the basis of the "Septhe".

The process by which the "Septhe" had been formulated, finalized and propagated violates the Party's democratic centralism. The PS overstepped its rights and authority as a staff organ and arm of the central leading organ. Instead of behaving as an assisting organ, the PS acted independently and in opposition to the authority and policy of the EC-CC. Instead of submitting to the EC-CC whatever objection or recommendation they had with regard to the policy, they made and propagated their own policy.

2. The "September Thesis"

The "Septhe" advocates peasant uprisings concentrated in the plains as the immediate orientation of the peasant movement, and as a main factor for realizing the desired popular uprisings or insurrection to be triggered in the event of an anticipated convulsion of the ruling system. The supposed objective of such an uprising is a shift in the strategic balance of forces between revolution and counterrevolution, if not the total victory of the people's democratic revolution and the establishment of a coalition government.

The proposition is based on the belief that the situation in 1990 was heading towards the ripening of an insurrectionary situation within one or two years, and shortly before this, the outbreak of peasant uprisings.

The "Septhe" dream of a rapid eruption of uprisings is premised on a spontaneous outbreak of the masses' anger and the success in "seizing opportunities". The main stress of mass work in the

countryside was to be shifted to the plains, to legal and sweeping organizing, and to the rapid intensification of open mass struggles focused on tactical economic and political issues. In desiring to influence and mobilize the peasant masses rapidly, the "Septhe" stressed coalition tactics and giving big concessions to rich and middle peasants.

The "Septhe" failed to grasp the concrete situation and the main issues and problems discussed in the EC-CC document. In the estimate of the PS, the key question in 1991-1992 was "how to win" the revolution through popular uprising.

The "Septhe" did not consider the problem of the big reduction in the size of our mass base in the countryside, the severe imbalances between military and mass work, as well as between our vertical and horizontal forces, and the weaknesses in building the Party in the countryside. Above all, the "Septhe" ignored the immense superiority of the reactionary forces in strength, organization, finances and foreign support despite the intensification of their internal crisis.

Evidently, the people's army and the revolutionary masses do not yet have enough strength to rush into implementing the maximum program for revolutionary land reform, much less to seize political power in the cities. To seek strategically decisive engagements with the enemy in this situation is foolish and suicidal.

The "Septhe" claims to recognize the strategic and tactical principles of protracted people's war. But such principles are not understood and are often attacked and presented in a distorted and negative way. The strategy and tactics proposed by the PS in "Septhe" are claimed to be more correct and better.

The PS attacks the principle of advancing people's war in stages because it purportedly hinders the daring to seize opportunities, which is supposed to bring the revolution to a quick victory. In the PS' view, the principle of advancing by stages is erroneous and is merely the result of a lack of determination and is a subjective desire that is not based on the objective situation and the balance of forces.

The PS misconstrues that it is the legal struggle in the plains which is decisive in the rapid buildup of the capability of the peasant masses

to mount uprisings. The PS has forgotten the most important lesson in the long history of peasant struggles — the necessity for armed strength, the step-by-step buildup of the power of the peasant masses, as well as the step-by-step weakening of reaction in order to change the balance of forces between revolution and reaction and advance to strategically decisive engagements in favor of the revolution forces.

Drawing the peasant movement to mainly legal and open forms of struggle is an unprecedentedly large setback for the peasant movement and the entire revolutionary movement nationwide. It is bound to squander the gains of the revolutionary movement in the countryside which have been paid for with life and blood over several years of hard struggle. It is bound to disarm the peasant masses and the entire revolution. It will throw the peasant movement into the quagmire of putschism, if not reformism. Thus, this constitutes a viewpoint that conforms with and serves the class interest and rule of the landlords in the countryside.

By relying mainly on popular uprisings or urban insurrection, the "Septhe" wishes to downgrade the armed struggle into a secondary and supportive position in relation to the open mass movement, which is being raised to the principal position. Meanwhile, the thesis demands that the open mass struggles should include military actions to compensate for the missing political ingredients, so as to accelerate the outbreak of uprisings.

The PS criticizes the EC-CC for failing to recognize the "innate potential of the revolutionary peasant movement to contribute to the People's Democratic Revolution politically" because the "basic premise of the EC-CC document is how the revolutionary peasant movement can serve the armed struggle". The PS has forgotten or does not understand that the armed struggle is a political movement and that the combined advance of the peasant movement and the armed struggle is the key to advancing towards victory. The PS likewise does not understand the political content and significance of building guerrilla zones and bases and establishing revolutionary political power in the countryside.

Because of their insurrectionary viewpoint, the political role and tasks deemed important by the PS are sweeping organizing and open mass struggles directed at inciting peasant uprisings and urban insurrections. The "Septhe" promotes rapid but sweeping building of the mass movement as the main support for the uprisings. And based on such strength, the revolutionary peasant movement is being hurried prematurely into strategically decisive engagements. Thus, instead of political gains, the "Septhe" proposition will certainly lead to disaster.

The PS grossly underestimates, if not completely dismisses, the gains achieved in building guerrilla zones and bases in the countryside, and the gains in agrarian revolution wherever the NPA operates and organizes the peasant masses. For the PS, such gains cannot be considered political advances of the people's democratic revolution unless they are redirected towards peasant and urban uprisings.

Solid organizing is also erroneously equated by the PS to slow and difficult organizing and is said to obstruct the organizational dynamism because it is "geared to armed struggle and base-building". The concept of solid organizing was explained in 1976 to rectify the haphazard style of organizing long proven to be wrong. Solid organizing creatively uses various methods, including legal and traditional organizational forms, in order to continuously expand, consolidate and strengthen the mass movement in the countryside.

—December 1991

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

The PS persisted in pushing the "Septhe" and the insurrectionary line, despite disapproval by the EC-CC in January 1991. Also in January 1991 the EC-CC approved the PS plan for a national people's caravan (*lakbayan*). The caravan could not materialize because it was beyond the capacity of the mass movement. Neither could several open peasant struggles planned and promoted by the PS in 1991 because these were extremely precipitate, relying on

sheer coalition tactics and bravado about triggering an explosion of open mass struggles. Moreover, the EC-CC learned from reports received only recently that the PS had intended to transform the caravan into a massive confrontation around Malacañang, whose objective was to trigger an explosion towards an insurrectionary situation.

Since September 1992, the PS has been actively involved in the factionalist and anti-Party campaign pushed by some elements opposed to the rectification movement. The PS has aligned itself with former Party elements who have blatantly put themselves out of and violated the Party structure, processes and rules of democratic centralism. Among the serious violations of democratic centralism are:

1. Illegal use of their position to convene a "cadre conference" in order to promote and consolidate their opposition and attack against the rectification movement, the Central Committee and instigate gross violations of democratic centralism. Despite the severe criticisms by the EC-CC of ultra-democratic convening of the first cadre conference to discuss the "Septhe" in 1991, without consulting, coordinating or even simply informing the EC/CC, the PS continued to act independently by holding two more cadre conferences, and worse, for the purpose of winning over, mobilizing and inciting the forces under them to an all-out anti-Party factional campaign. In these conferences, the discussions, presentation of issues and facts and formulation of positions were dominated by factional and anti-Party views and elements. The central leading organs were shut out and the analyses, stand, and policies of the Party were presented and discussed in a distorted, fragmented, cursory and inadequate manner.

2. Refusal to meet and clarify matters with the EC-CC despite repeated summons. Instead, the PS collected and disseminated disinformation and distortions issued by anti-Party factional elements.

3. Use of funds of the Party and the movement for printing articles that blatantly attacked the Party and the central leading organs of the

Party, and for distributing these in violation of the structures, rules and security of the Party.

4. Actively campaigning inside and outside the scope of the PS against the rectification movement, the line and policies of the Party in order to insist on and promote their insurrectionary line and their ultra-democratic anti-Party views and actions.

5. Signing and campaigning for signatures to the petition whose purpose and objective effect is the decapitation, disorganization and liquidation of the Party.

6. Persisting in factional activities and intrigues, distortion and attacks against the central leadership and the rectification movement despite the prompt attention and communication by the central leadership.

7. Using the name of the PS to call meetings, conferences and discussions with units in the peasant movement from various regions for "critical study" with no other objective but to spread the attacks against the rectification movement and the central leadership, and to instigate others into undertaking anti-Party factional activities.

8. Spreading the lie that the central leadership is in crisis and correspondingly, insisting on independent actions purportedly due to the prevailing crisis in the central Party leadership.

On the basis of such factional and anti-Party activities, the EC-CC has decided to disauthorize the present PS from acting as a legitimate Party organ. The PS shall be reorganized in order to bring back the units and elements under it into the structures and processes of the Party and so that the rectification movement and other policies of the Party can reach them. However, the EC-CC enjoins the former members of the PS to meet and clarify matters with the EC-CC and to stop their anti-Party activities. Party cadres and members who were misled and deceived by the former PS members should immediately dissociate themselves from any factional and anti-Party activity and subordinate themselves to Party processes.

—April 1993

APPENDIX: THE 'SEPTEMBER THESIS' OF THE PEASANT SECRETARIAT

A. Premises (7 points)

1. The immediate direction of the revolutionary peasant movement is geared towards the launching of peasant uprisings as part of the popular uprisings during convulsions of the ruling system.

2. The peasant uprisings are the contribution of the revolutionary peasant movement to the overall effort to achieve a strategic shift in the balance of forces.

3. Guerrilla warfare and some elements of regular mobile warfare should also serve to advance the revolutionary peasant movement and peasant uprisings.

4. The revolutionary peasant movement in the mountains must actively participate and serve as the rear for the revolutionary peasant movement in the plains.

5. Peasant uprisings are both armed and unarmed.

6. Our immediate task is to bring about an upsurge of peasant struggles as preparation for uprisings.

7. At present, the open and legal peasant movement is the key to rapidly creating an upsurge.

September Theses Reformulated

The first paper propounding the September Theses was in the form of notes made during a meeting of the Peasant Secretariat last September 1990 and a follow-up expanded meeting last December 3. Obviously, the contents of the first paper has (sic) yet to be organized and refined to meet the standards of a Party document. This is what we intend to do in this paper.

OUTLINE:

Thesis 1: The immediate direction (or objective) of the revolutionary peasant movement is geared towards launching peasant uprisings as part or aspect of popular uprisings or

insurrections that are bound to erupt during convulsions of the ruling system.

Thesis 2: The launching of peasant uprisings is at the same time a major contribution of the peasant movement to overall efforts at achieving a strategic shift in the balance of forces in our people's war.

Thesis 3: Guerrilla warfare and some elements of regular mobile warfare should also serve to advance the revolutionary peasant movement and help launch peasant uprisings.

Thesis 4: Peasant uprisings consist of intensified armed and unarmed actions by the peasant masses to achieve major political and economic gains, weaken and eventually capture local power and implement basic reforms in the countryside.

Thesis 5: Peasant uprisings could and should be launched both within and outside guerrilla zones in populated areas in the countryside.

Thesis 6: The peasant movement in the plains and other populated areas in the countryside comprise the main force of the entire revolutionary peasant movement.

Thesis 7: The peasant movement in less populated hilly and mountainous areas should actively participate and serve as the solid rear of the peasant movement in the plains.

Thesis 8: Our most immediate task is to cause an upsurge of peasant mass struggles within and outside guerrilla fronts and thereby lay the grounds for peasant uprisings in the immediate future.

Thesis 9: Developing the open, legal peasant movement is the key link at the moment in rapidly creating the conditions for an upsurge in peasant mass struggles.

Thesis 10: The combined sweeping-legal and solid-underground organizing is the principal method in building the revolutionary peasant movement in the plains and populated areas in the countryside.

Thesis 11: Even inside guerrilla fronts located in less populated mountainous areas, legal organizations in the form of peasant coops and other economic organizations are needed not only as cover for illegal activities, but as vehicle for socioeconomic work, accessing

outside support and resources, and for initiating or participating in legal mass struggles inside and outside guerrilla fronts.

Thesis 12: Sweeping-legal organizing takes off and is sustained by issue-mobilizations aimed at obtaining immediate, tangible gains for peasants and other rural masses while continuously projecting their long-term demands.

Thesis 13: Sweeping legal organizing should not be limited to putting up LPO (legal political organization) chapters but should include the transformation of traditional peasant associations, establishment of cooperatives and other economic organizations, and building coalitions and alliances at various levels.

Thesis 14: Solid-underground organizing consists mainly of building the Pambansang Kilusang Magsasaka (PKM-National Peasant Movement) to serve as backbone of the open, legal peasant movement, spearhead of illegal/pol-mil actions and support base of guerrilla warfare.

Thesis 15: In view of current realities, the bulk of personnel in regional/provincial white-area peasant machineries of the Party should engage in direct organizing in strategic peasant localities while a skeletal force should be left to administer urban-based region/province-wide campaigns and legal formations.

Thesis 16: Regional Party organs for the peasant movement should be established the soonest possible to oversee and provide political leadership to the peasant movement both within guerrilla fronts and white areas in the countryside.

—3 December 1990

MESSAGE TO ALL WORKERS IN THE PHILIPPINES AND ABROAD

BY THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
1 MAY 1993

On behalf of the entire Communist Party of the Philippines, the revolutionary advanced detachment of the working class in the Philippines, we express to all the workers in the Philippines and abroad our warmest greetings of comradeship and solidarity on the occasion of the International Workers' Day.

We solemnly commemorate today the sacrifices of the working class and at the same time joyously celebrate its victories in fighting for all the democratic rights of the people against the capitalist system of oppression and exploitation and for the realization of the world historic mission of overthrowing the bourgeoisie, building socialism and preparing the way for communism.

As the revolutionary party of the proletariat, the Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to complete the national democratic revolution through the armed seizure of political power and proceed to carry out the socialist revolution.

To accomplish the national democratic revolution in the era of modern imperialism and proletarian revolution, the working class must be the leading class, must rely mainly on the worker-peasant alliance, win over the urban petty bourgeoisie and the middle bourgeoisie and take advantage of the splits among the big compradors and landlords in order to isolate and destroy the power of the most pro-imperialist and most reactionary force at every given time. At the moment, the U.S.-Ramos ruling clique is the enemy.

As a matter of principle, the CPP is resolved to lead the Filipino proletariat and people in carrying out the two stages of the Philippine revolution in a self-reliant way. It is also a matter of principle that the

CPP adheres to proletarian internationalism and seeks to contribute to the world proletarian revolution and welcomes the support of the proletariat and the oppressed peoples of the world.

We are happy to announce to the world that the CPP has won resounding victory in its movement to reaffirm basic revolutionary principles and rectify errors in an all-round way. All honest and loyal members of the CPP are united to raise higher the fighting will and capabilities of the Party and the people through revolutionary armed struggle and the united front.

We uphold, defend and promote the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the vanguard role of the proletariat, the line against modern revisionism, the class analysis of current Philippine society as semicolonial and semifeudal, the general line of the national democratic revolution, the strategic line of people's war, the revolutionary united front, democratic centralism, the socialist perspective and proletarian internationalism.

As a result of the rectification movement in the spheres of ideology, politics and organization, the CPP and the mass movement of the workers and other people are raising their revolutionary strength to a new and higher level. The CPP, the New People's Army, the National Democratic Front, the legal and illegal mass organizations and the organs of political power are consolidating and expanding.

Only a handful of elements are misrepresenting themselves as belonging to the revolutionary movement and yet they preoccupy themselves with attacking the rectification movement as well as the central leadership and entirety of the Communist Party of the Philippines. They engage in name-calling the CPP and its proletarian revolutionary principles as "Stalinist" in the cold war anticommunist sense.

These anti-CPP elements are special agents of the enemy. Their activities are directed and financed by agencies of the U.S. and the Ramos puppet regime. They seek to decapitate, disintegrate and demolish the Party and the entire revolutionary movement of the people. The ringleaders wish to cover up their grave errors in line and their crimes against the Party and the people.

Those who have arrogantly and recklessly pushed the line of militarism and insurrectionism as well as committed crimes in bloody witchhunts (especially the monstrous Kampanyang Ahas) and crimes of gangsterism and corruption are collaborating with the promoters of Gorbachovism, populism, liberalism, petty-bourgeois socialism or social democracy, pacifism and capitulationism in attacking the CPP and the revolutionary movement and in raising a hue and cry about "democracy" (in fact ultrademocracy and anarchy) against the CPP, the working class and the worker-peasant alliance.

The history and objective conditions in the Philippines are such that no national and social liberation of the people from foreign monopoly capitalism and the local exploiting classes can be achieved, unless the working class through its party leads the people in the process of armed revolution. The crisis of the Philippine semicolonial and semifeudal society, now jointly dominated by U.S. and Japanese monopoly capitalism, is continuously worsening. The Filipino people can liberate themselves only through the new democratic revolution.

The anti-Marxist and anticommunist ideological offensive which has been pushed by the imperialists and their petty bourgeois lackeys, in connection with the 1989-1991 crisis and collapse of the revisionist parties and regimes of bureaucrat monopoly capitalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, has been overtaken and blunted by the conspicuousness and increasing virulence of the crisis of the entire world capitalist system.

This crisis of overproduction is accelerated by high technology, the increasing cutthroat competition among multinational firms and industrial capitalist countries, the extraction of higher superprofits by the winning capitalist firms at the expense of the proletariat and people, the untenable abuse of domestic and world financial systems, and the intolerable exploitation of the neocolonial client states, including the numerous traditional underdeveloped ones (like the Philippines) and the later ones with some industrial base, like the former socialist countries and the few "newly industrializing countries".

The Filipino proletariat and people are undergoing unprecedented oppression and exploitation. So are the proletariat and peoples in the

rest of the third world, in the former revisionist-ruled countries and in the long-running industrial capitalist countries.

The world is on the eve of a social revolution at a new and higher level. The current social turmoil sweeping several countries and continents at the same time are making the ground fertile for the world proletarian revolution. The disintegration of the revisionist parties and regimes has cleared the way for the reemergence and resurgence of genuine Marxist-Leninist parties of the working class and the revolutionary mass movement.

In days to come, on May 5, 1993, we shall be celebrating the 175th birth anniversary of the great proletarian thinker Karl Marx. To make the celebration meaningful, we review the basic principles of materialist philosophy, his critique of the capitalist political economy and the theory of scientific socialism, which he worked out with Frederick Engels, and comprehend the continuing vitality of Marxism through the revolutionary struggles of the proletariat and the further development of this science by succeeding proletarian revolutionary thinkers and leaders up to the present time.

The CPP has always upheld the greatness of Lenin in founding the first socialist state and Stalin in building socialism and defending the Soviet Union and has criticized and repudiated modern revisionism and the restoration of capitalism from the time of Khrushchov through that of Brezhnev to that of Gorbachov.

As we anticipate the 100th birth anniversary of Mao Zedong on December 26, 1993, we are elated to declare that his further great development of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice has been confirmed by the disintegration of the revisionist parties and regimes, the ceaseless aggravation of the crisis of the world capitalist system and the crying need for socialist revolution to overthrow the class dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the private ownership of the means of production.

Mao Zedong's development of the theory and practice of socialist revolution and construction illuminates the Philippine road to the socialist future. His critique of neocolonialism and modern revisionism and the theory and practice of continuing the revolution under the

dictatorship of the proletariat, combating revisionism and preventing the restoration of capitalism point the way to the ultimate goal of communism.

The hope for the eventual victory of socialism arises from the ever graver and deeper crisis of capitalism and the resultant revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and people for their own liberation from oppression and exploitation. The call for the workers and oppressed nations and peoples of the world to unite and fight their oppressors and exploiters is as valid and true today as when it was first made by the proletarian revolutionary fighters.

Uphold proletarian internationalism!

Long live the workers of the world!

Long live the Filipino proletariat!

Long live the Communist Party of the Philippines!

Carry forward the Philippine revolution

under the leadership of the working class!

—Central Committee

Communist Party of the Philippines

ON THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD SITUATION AND THE VITALITY OF MARXISM

CONTRIBUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO THE INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR OF COMMUNIST PARTIES
MARKING THE 175TH BIRTH ANNIVERSARY OF KARL MARX
SPONSORED BY THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)
MAY 5, 1993

We are highly honored to be invited to the International Seminar on the Contemporary World Situation and the Vitality of Marxism.

We express our deep gratitude to the Communist Party of India (Marxist) for their fraternal invitation. And we convey our warmest greetings of comradeship and revolutionary solidarity to all participants in this seminar.

The most meaningful celebration of the 175th birth anniversary of Karl Marx is being held now through this seminar, in addition to the ceaseless daily revolutionary work and struggles of the working class parties and peoples against monopoly capitalism and all reaction.

We appreciate the international seminar as a form and method of learning from each other and arriving step by step at a common understanding of the situation and problems that face the world's proletariat. Marxist working class parties and all serious adherents of the revolutionary science of Marxism.

We are of the view that the international seminar is the best possible mode for the widest possible convening and participation of working class parties that are committed to Marxism-Leninism and that have a track record of opposing modern revisionism from varying angles and in varying degrees or are reemerging from the countries ruined by modern revisionism and actual capitalist restoration.

These parties can make a diagnosis of both the diseases of bureaucrat monopoly capitalism and modern revisionism and make a

prognosis on the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat and people. The ceaseless struggle against monopoly capitalism, modern revisionism and all reaction demonstrates the vitality of Marxism. Under the guidance of Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary struggle is bound to rise to a new and higher level of consciousness, militancy and achievement.

A LARGE VIEW OF THE HISTORY OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROLETARIAT

Before we take up the contemporary world situation, let us have a large view of the history of the revolutionary proletariat.

This history is a spiraling process and follows a zigzag course with its ups and downs. The cause of the revolutionary proletariat has repeatedly gone from one level to a higher level. There are the periods of descent from which a new and higher level of revolutionary struggle arises.

First of all, Marx and Engels gave us the fundamental principles of Marxism in the spheres of philosophy, political economy and social science. Proceeding from the thoroughgoing analysis and critique of the laws of motion of capitalism, Marx and Engels laid the basis of scientific socialism, with its requirements of proletarian class dictatorship against the bourgeois class dictatorship, public ownership of the means of production against the private ownership of these and planned economy against the capitalist anarchy of production.

In the era of free competition capitalism, Marx and Engels extricated the concept of socialism from the utopian socialists and put it on a scientific basis. They pointed to the contradiction within the capitalist mode of production: which is that between the *social* character of large-scale commodity production and the *private* ownership of the means of production. They demonstrated that the workers must reclaim the surplus value which they create but which is appropriated by the capitalists in the process of exploitation. The relations of production must be made to correspond to the social character of largescale commodity production.

Occurring 23 years after the writing of the *Communist Manifesto*, which had been issued in the year 1848 of the workers' uprisings coopted by the bourgeoisie, the Paris Commune of 1871 occurred as the prototype and harbinger of proletarian revolution and proletarian class dictatorship. It was a fleeting victory for the proletariat but it served to prove that the proletariat is capable of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and establishing proletarian class dictatorship.

It would take 46 years from the failure of the Paris Commune before the Great October Socialist Revolution of 1917 could take place under the leadership of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. They learned well from the lessons of the Paris Commune and from Marx' critical study of it.

The decades preceding the October Revolution were characterized by the rapid expansion of capital, the rise of modern imperialism and the degeneration of the major working class parties of the Second International into what we now call classical revisionism and into becoming the adjuncts of the big bourgeoisie in approving colonial projects and increasing war budgets.

Lenin's great role was that of further developing Marxism in the era of modern imperialism and proletarian revolution. He carried forward the study of materialist dialectics by contending with and debunking bourgeois subjectivism as an extension of idealism and metaphysics.

He made the correct analysis and critique of modern imperialism and led the Great October Socialist Revolution to establish the first socialist state. It would have been impossible to win the revolution without the Bolsheviks being able to contend successfully with the czarist autocracy, the big bourgeoisie and the classical revisionists.

Socialist revolution and construction were carried out in the Soviet Union under severe difficulties, under conditions of interimperialist war, the civil war and interventionist wars; the ceaseless overt violence and covert sabotage by the reactionaries, including the rich peasants and bourgeois nationalists; and the economic blockade and aggressive threats and actions of the imperialists.

Stalin succeeded in undertaking socialist revolution and construction. He built and expanded the industrial foundation of the

Soviet Union, collectivized and mechanized Soviet agriculture, educated the largest corps of scientific, technical, cultural and administrative personnel in the world and raised the people's standard of living in so short a time. Stalin demonstrated the superiority of socialism over capitalism, especially when the latter was being beset by the worst depression ever and was afflicted by fascism in several countries.

But there was no straight road in the advance of socialism in one country. Neither was there such a road for all workers of the world. The world capitalist system increasingly unleashed the monster of fascism against the communist and working class parties and ultimately all-out aggression against the Soviet bulwark of socialism, destroying the lives of 20 million people and devastating the Soviet economy.

From one more dismal period for the socialist cause, culminating in an interimperialist war which involved the fascist objective of destroying socialism, several socialist countries would emerge and the national liberation movements in colonies and semicolonies would surge forward in the period after World War II.

Stalin was grudgingly honored by the capitalist powers for his successful defense of the Soviet Union and counterattack against the Nazi forces of aggression until the potentates of capitalism declared the cold war. Stalin reconstructed the Soviet economy, raised higher the material and cultural standards, strengthened the internal and peripheral defenses, completed the reversal of the ratio of urban-rural population prior to 1917 and supported the cause of national liberation and socialism abroad.

But after the death of Stalin, exactly in a period when more than one third of the world's population were in several socialist countries, the monster of modern revisionism would arise, especially in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev totally negated Stalin in order to promote modern revisionism and to split the international communist movement.

The petty bourgeoisification of the large mass of bureaucrats and new intelligentsia had already given rise to a monopoly capitalist

bourgeoisie. The waning of the proletarian class standpoint started in 1936 when it was proclaimed that there were no more exploiting and exploited classes in the Soviet Union and no more class struggle, except the ever intensifying one between the Soviet people and the external enemy (i.e., the imperialists and their agents).

Our Party has already approved and issued the document, *Stand for Socialism Against Modern Revisionism*. To cut short this part of our presentation, we refer you to this document. In this, we trace the path of modern revisionism and capitalist restoration from Khrushchev through Brezhnev to Gorbachov.

For 35 years from 1956 to 1991, the modern revisionists masqueraded as Marxist-Leninists and restored capitalism until they shed off their masks and revealed the face of monopoly bureaucrat capitalism. The revisionist parties and regimes disintegrated and even the Soviet Union collapsed.

THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD SITUATION

We are confronted today with a world situation which has ceased to be a bipolar one between two superpowers in the erstwhile protracted cold war.

The Soviet Union has imploded due to internal factors, mainly the *all-round restoration of capitalism* and misallocation of domestic resources to the new bourgeoisie and the arms race; due to overextension in social imperialist activities; and of course due to ceaseless external pressures and subversive work of the U.S.-led alliance of capitalist powers.

The United States appears now to have a singular hegemony over the entire world. But this is an imperialist power which has also misallocated and wasted resources in the abuse of finance capital, in overconsumption and high speed spending for hightech weaponry.

The United States continues to slide in a strategic decline. Strenuous efforts are being exerted to put a brake on this slide by stepping up the production of tradable goods and reducing budgetary and trade deficits. But such efforts can only have adverse

consequences to the other global centers of capitalism, Japan and Western Europe, and to the so-called newly-industrializing economies which have become dependent on the American market.

At the same time, the U.S. attempt to reduce military spending through "burden sharing" and military sales tends to favor the resurgence of nationalism and militarism in Japan and Germany. The trend of multipolarization among the three global centers of capitalism will accelerate as the crisis of overproduction intensifies.

The United States is still at the head of the world capitalist system through the Group of Seven, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other mechanisms with respect to political, economic and financial domination; and through the U.N. Security Council and the multilateral, regional and bilateral military alliances with respect to political and military domination.

The crisis of overproduction in the world capitalist system is generated and accelerated by high technology, a far cry from the productivity that preceded the crises and interimperialist wars of the past. The centers of world capitalism are increasingly at odds with each other over issues regarding industrial and agricultural production, investments, markets and financial policies.

The current prolonged recession or in fact depression (if we take into account the job-killing character of new investments and reequipment and the continuing bloat in the service sector and military spending) in the industrial capitalist countries has been preceded by the longer running depression in the general run of raw-material exporting countries in the third world and the Soviet bloc countries since the late seventies and by the colossal U.S. deficits.

The internationalization of capital after World War II has been unprecedented in the entire history of capitalism. After the reconstruction of the industries of Western Europe and Japan, large amounts of capital were deployed by the transnational banks and firms to favor infrastructure-building, raw-material production, high consumption of imported manufactures and military spending in the third world since the sixties; and, through West Germany and other West European countries, also high consumption by the new

bourgeoisie and fringe-processing enterprises in the Soviet bloc countries since the seventies.

Thus, for a while the crisis of overproduction in the industrial capitalist countries was temporarily relieved by sales which were generated as a result of profuse lending to the less developed countries. Neocolonialism through economic and financial dominance and manipulation eventually became a more profitable and effective weapon than outright wars of aggression as those in Korea, Vietnam and other countries.

As early as 1969, it became clear to U.S. strategic planners that the U.S. could not win the war in Vietnam and the rest of Indochina and that it was more profitable to sell weapons to other countries than for U.S. personnel to use them (unless of course the U.S. can use mercenaries in low-intensity conflicts or sell the hightech weapons and still control and use them as in the Gulf War of 1991).

There is no doubt that neocolonialism has been successful in dominating third world countries and in getting a handle on countries that continue to call themselves socialist. But there are limits to neocolonialism. When the limits are reached, there are too many countries overloaded with foreign debts, exporting types of products in oversupply in the world market and not earning enough hard currency to service the debt and to keep buying the products of the industrial capitalist countries.

At this point in time, the longrunning depression in most third world countries and in the former Soviet bloc countries is recoiling upon the very centers of world capitalism. The global market for the industrial capitalist countries has shrunk.

Swamped by their own deficits and by bad debts on a wide scale, the centers of world capitalism are trying to consolidate their national and regional positions and are in sharpening competition among themselves. Within the industrial capitalist countries themselves, there is cutthroat competition in which the winning firms adopt high technology, throw personnel out of their jobs in large numbers and undermine their own domestic market.

There is unprecedentedly high productivity available due to high technology and the higher skills of better educated workers. But the production growth rate of entire capitalist economies has fallen down. There are large inventories that cannot be sold from previous production. And the losing firms in the capitalist competition reduce the work force, cut production or go into bankruptcies.

In the present world situation, the proportion of people falling below the poverty line has increased by 10 percent, from 70 percent to 80 percent, during the last ten years. By this measure alone, it is understandable why the world has become more volatile and explosive since the end of the cold war.

There is social turmoil in so many countries and continents at the same time. There is no new world order. There is greater disorder now than before the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe, especially the former Yugoslavia, and the former Soviet Union are hotbeds of nationalist, ethnic and religious armed conflicts.

The peace settlements arranged by Gorbachov with Reagan and Bush in several regions have gone into shambles. There are revolutionary armed struggles and mass protest actions led by Marxist-Leninist parties and anti-imperialist movements. There is also spontaneous mass violence in the absence of a capable Marxist-Leninist party. Civil wars, cycles of coups d'etat, ethnic or communal conflicts, criminality and senseless street violence abound in the world today.

The social turmoil afflicts not only the general run of underdeveloped third world countries and the former Soviet bloc countries but also the longer running industrial capitalist countries. The complicated civil wars in Yugoslavia and some former Soviet republics are now the most intense and lethal in the world and are drawing in the foreign interventionists, principally the imperialists.

If we may try to sort out the main contradictions in the world today, they are the following:

First is the contradiction between the monopoly bourgeoisie and all reaction on the one hand and the proletariat and people on the other hand;

Second is the contradiction between the imperialists and the anti-imperialist independent states, some of which strive to hold high the red flag of socialism (Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Cuba and the like);

Third is the contradiction among the major capitalist powers which have consolidated themselves as the three most powerful capitalist centers, the United States, Western Europe and Japan; and

Fourth is the contradiction between the major industrial capitalist powers and the lesser industrial capitalist countries, including those ruled by bureaucrat capitalist regimes.

The foregoing contradictions are in motion and are running at a pace dictated by the worsening global crisis of overproduction. It must be noted that in the world today countries that consider themselves socialist assert themselves and act in the global arena more as independent and anti-imperialist states rather than as socialist states and proletarian internationalists, with the exception of DPRK and Cuba.

The social turmoil that is already occurring on a widescale makes the ground fertile for the rise of genuine Marxist-Leninist parties and the resurgence of the revolutionary mass movement for independence, democracy and socialism and against imperialism and all reaction.

THE VITALITY OF MARXISM

There is no better way than Marxism to understand the internal laws of motion, the wholeness and crises of capitalism. Free competition capitalism has extended itself into monopoly capitalism or modern imperialism and further on to neocolonialism, characterized by the use of high technology and the most wanton use of finance capitalism. But Marxism has continuously developed both in the

critique of capitalism and in the theory and practice of socialist revolution and construction.

If in the time of Marx and Engels largescale machine production had a social character in contradiction with the private character of appropriation, the high technology that is now at hand has a greater social character and is in sharper contradiction with the private character of appropriation by the supermonopolies.

The big bourgeoisie has warded off the proletariat from seizing political power in industrial countries and from making socialist the relations of production to suit the social character of production by engaging in global capitalist exploitation in a manner as to undermine and dominate economically and financially the newly-independent states and the revisionist-ruled states and enlarge the labor aristocracy and the white collar work force in the service sector in the industrial capitalist countries.

But now high technology, the excessive use of finance capitalism and the neocolonial deployment of capital have far exceeded the limits of effective world market demand, set in the first place by the capitalist rule of maximizing profits. As the debt-ridden countries languish in depression, the centers of world capitalism are hit by an unprecedented crisis of overproduction.

This crisis is becoming more and more obvious as the supermonopolies are trying to raise their competitiveness and profitability by disemploying large numbers of blue collars and white collars in favor of automation, robots and computers and by wiping out a large number of unprofitable enterprises. Like the general run of third world countries, the former Soviet bloc countries are not getting the productive investments and technology that they have expected. They are either retaining the same outdated plants or closing them down and are being reduced to penury and misery.

In the course of the 1989-91 events in the former Soviet bloc countries, the unprecedentedly severe crisis of the world capitalist system was obscured by the powerful triumphalist propaganda of the imperialists over the supposed victory of capitalism over socialism for

all time. Even the crank idea that history has ended with capitalism and liberal democracy was celebrated as true and sophisticated.

An anticommunist ideological offensive was carried out misrepresenting either as Stalinism or real but flawed socialism the bureaucrat monopoly capitalism that was shedding off its socialist mask.

Now, the imperialist ideological offensive, assisted effectively for a while by the anticommunist ideologues and publicists from the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie, is well overtaken by the public recognition of the crisis of the world capitalist system, which includes the monopoly bureaucrat capitalism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

With factual and scientific certitude, we declare that the basic principles of scientific socialism laid down by Marx and Engels remain valid and true and are superior to capitalism. These have been proven correct by Lenin, Stalin, Mao and other communist leaders in actual socialist revolution and construction. Among these basic principles are proletarian revolution and class dictatorship, the public ownership of the means of production, economic planning, full employment and rising standards of living and culture on the basis of expanded production.

But there are certain questions that must be answered well by Marxist-Leninists if Marxism is to remain vital and to further develop. What is the point in winning the new democratic revolution and the socialist revolution if at some future time in socialist society revisionism, self-interest and capitalist restoration would prevail?

In view of the current international situation, is the new democratic revolution through armed struggle in the Philippines one of the dying embers in a receding period of revolutionary struggle in the world or is it one of the flaming torches of a new period of revolutionary struggle?

Again specific to the Filipino communists, how can they make socialist revolution and construction in a medium-sized and archipelagic country like the Philippines upon the basic completion of the national democratic revolution through the seizure of political power in an international environment in which there is no socialist

country as formidable as China or the Soviet Union that is directly and materially of help? Since the Philippines does not have the scale of either Russia or China, will it not be excessively vulnerable to imperialist strangulation when it shall embark on socialist revolution and construction?

With these few questions alone being posed by comrades, honest friends as well as by the mocking enemy, it is no longer enough to say that the new democratic and the socialist revolutions are necessitated and justified by the intolerable oppression and exploitation inflicted by the imperialists and reactionaries and that Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin provide us all the essential answers.

The first question can be answered only by taking up Mao Zedong's theory of continuing revolution, combating revisionism and preventing the restoration of capitalism for the entire historical epoch of socialism. There is a whole set of principles clarified by this theory, which must be thoroughly studied even if its application in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution failed after a longer period of success than the Paris Commune.

In philosophy, Mao further deepened and extended our understanding of materialist dialectics, particularly the unity and struggle of opposites, which Lenin first pointed to as the most fundamental law of development. Consistent with his grasp of materialist dialectics, Mao identified on the eve of victory of the Chinese revolution the main contradiction in socialist society, which is that between the proletariat and bourgeoisie.

Subsequently, he clarified the correct handling of contradictions among the people in socialist society and distinguished these from those between the enemy and the people. He had the high distinction of coming to the defense of Stalin and yet analyzing his demerits and launching a counteroffensive against modern revisionism centered in the Soviet Union.

When the proletariat wins political power, the bourgeoisie merely shifts to a secondary position in socialist society. It does not disappear so soon. It can even regenerate itself and reappear in various spheres of social life. The class struggle proceeds. It must

proceed with the proletarian class dictatorship upheld and bourgeois rights restricted. Otherwise, modern revisionism can arise and capitalist restoration can occur. It is not true that once socialism is established it is irreversible.

Building socialism is not simply a matter of liberating and strengthening the forces of production and increasing the ranks of the proletariat through industrialization. But more important is strengthening the socialist relations of production, putting proletarian revolutionary politics in command and revolutionizing the superstructure.

In our view, the cultural revolution is not something to be waged every ten years or periodically; it must be waged continuously in a resolute and protracted but persuasive manner so as to avert ultra-Left excesses and keep the Left well in alliance with the Middle. This is the big lesson to be learned from the failure of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

At any rate, Mao Zedong extended and further developed our understanding of the problems to pose and solve beyond those previously pointed to by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, such as the vestiges of the exploiting classes; the contradictions between the workers and peasants, between town and country and between manual and mental labor; the problem of petty commodity production generating the bourgeoisie; and the force of old habits and customs.

Despite all his great achievements in socialist revolution and construction and the consolidation and defense of the Soviet Union, Stalin had serious demerits. He had a lot of mechanical materialism and metaphysics. He thought of the bourgeoisie in terms of socioeconomic and legal definition alone. He could not see that the old bourgeoisie can be deprived of their properties but not of their ideas and influence and that the bourgeoisie can rearise from the bureaucracy and new intelligentsia if the bourgeoisie were considered only in terms of being the external enemy in the shape of the imperialists and their local agents.

He relied too much on administrative measures and imagined that the relations of production can fully, rather than basically, correspond

to the forces of production, and the superstructure, also fully to the mode of production. The full correspondence can never be enforced but, upon the recognition of basic correspondence and the differences, the contradictions can be handled properly from stage to stage.

Let us answer the second question. The Filipino communists are certain of the viability and growth in strength of the new democratic revolution through armed struggle in the Philippines because of the ever worsening crisis of the semicolonial and semifeudal system and of the world capitalist system. In this tropical archipelagic and mountainous country, the hightech weaponry used in the Gulf war cannot be effective against the people's war. The main thing is that the proletariat, the peasantry and the rest of the people are engaged in the armed revolution.

It is not only the armed revolutionary movement that faces tremendous odds in the Philippines. In fact, the puppet regime in the Philippines is now constrained by the dwindling of resources that it can extract domestically and draw from abroad. The crisis of the world capitalist system has a tremendous adverse impact on the Filipino reactionaries and their social system.

We are of the view that the Filipino proletariat and the people are carrying the flaming torch of armed revolution from an old to a new period of revolutionary struggle in the world. We uphold the Marxist-Leninist theory of state and revolution and are confident that in due time revolutionary armed struggle led by Marxist-Leninist parties will increase in the world.

Let us answer the third question. We have no timetable for winning the new democratic revolution. After expressing a number of times our desire to win it in ten or twenty years, we now declare that we are willing to wage armed resistance in the spirit of Dagohoy and his descendants who fought Spanish colonialism for eighty-five years without letup. Without the cumulative effect of the Filipino people's armed resistance in more than 300 years, Spanish colonialism would not have been overthrown. There would be no end to foreign and

feudal domination if the Filipino people ceased to wage armed revolution.

After all, while the enemy is still entrenched in the cities, our Party, our people's army, our united front and our mass organizations build organs of democratic political power in our guerrilla fronts. These guerrilla fronts started as small guerrilla zones. These shall eventually join up in larger and more stable liberated areas.

We shall certainly have serious problems and difficulties in building socialism if so soon we shall have seized political power nationwide and basically completed the national democratic revolution. But fortunately, we are engaged in a protracted people's war and we are still in the stage of strategic defense and tactical offensives to accumulate all-round strength.

When we shall build socialism, we shall make sure that the proletariat is at the helm of the socialist state, shall have hegemony in all spheres of society, shall rely mainly on the worker-peasant alliance and shall engage in socialist construction in a self-reliant way. We shall avoid dependence on the world capitalist market or any foreign country, even if socialist or anti-imperialist. We shall rely on all the patriotic and progressive classes and strata and take advantage of the rich natural resources of the Philippines and the available skills and means of production.

The strategic enterprises, sources of raw materials and main lines of distribution shall come under public ownership. Agricultural cooperation and mechanization shall be carried out stage by stage. We shall pay attention to agriculture as the base of the economy, basic and heavy industries as the leading factor and light industry as the bridge between agriculture and heavy industry. All these shall be developed in a planned, well-proportioned and well-balanced manner to serve the basic domestic needs and rising standards of living.

We shall learn the positive and negative lessons from the Soviet experience, Mao's critique of Soviet economics and the self-reliant Chinese experience of socialist revolution and construction under Mao and from the disastrous "reforms" of modern revisionism and capitalist restoration.

We shall conduct the socialist revolution in an all-sided way, politically, economically and culturally. Advances in every sphere shall interact with and promote advances in other spheres. We shall be able to build socialism continuously in our country but we can never establish communism, unless imperialism and all reaction are defeated on a world scale. Thus, we shall uphold proletarian internationalism and cooperate with the proletariat and people of the world in advancing the anti-imperialist and socialist cause.

We shall strive to apply the science of Marxism-Leninism on the concrete conditions of the Philippines and to contribute what we can to the great treasury of Marxism-Leninism. In this way, we perform our internationalist duty of contributing what we can to the vitality of Marxism, which must be reinvigorated until mankind is liberated from imperialism and the ultimate goal of communism is reached.

We are hopeful that by the time that the Filipino proletariat and people shall have basically completed the national democratic revolution and commenced the socialist revolution, the international environment shall have been more favorable, with the world capitalist system in more serious crisis and the anti-imperialist and socialist cause stronger on a wider scale than now.

**Central Committee
Communist Party of the Philippines**