

INTERNATIONAL PRESS CORRESPONDENCE

Vol. 10 No. 32

10th July 1930

Editorial Offices and Central Despatching Department: Berlin C 25, Bartelstrasse 1/5, III. Postal Address, to which all remittances should be sent by registered post: International Press Correspondence, Berlin C 25, Bartelstrasse 1/5, III. Telegraphic Address: Inprekorr, Berlin. Telephone: Berolina 1169 and 2886

CONTENTS

Politics	Against Colonial Oppression	
E. R.: The Disintegration Crisis in the Fascist Camp in Germany	Klaas Verschragen: More Oppression for the African Masses. The Riotous Assemblies Act	
W. Gallacher: The Shettleston Bye Election in Great Britain	566	571
Ludwig Freund: The Political Situation in Czechoslovakia	567	
	567	
India	Socialist Construction in the Soviet Union	
V. Chattopadhyaya: Increased Imperialist Repression in India	Mirov: How the Working Class Builds for Itself	
568	572	
1st August: International Fighting Day Against War	The Children's Movement	
Nemo: A World Air Fleet against the Soviet Union	Resolution of the Presidium of the E. C. Y. C. I. on Questions and Tasks of the Communist Children's Movement	
569	573	
The Labour Movement	XVI. Party Congress of the C. P. S. U.	
To the Aid of the Mansfeld Strikers! (Appeal of the R. I. L. U.)	The Political Report of the Central Committee to the XVI. Party Congress of the C. P. S. U. Comrade Stalin's Address. II.	
Federico Lopez: Political Mass Strikes in Spain	575	
570		
571		

The Fascist Dictatorship in Finland.

By Paul Braun.

Events in Finland have developed with surprising rapidity. Only a few weeks have passed since the fascist Lappo movement announced with aggressive sharpness its claims to power and by an almost unprecedented campaign of terror against the revolutionary workers lent emphasis to its demands, and now it has already come into power through its nominee, Svinhufvud. The fascist march on Helsingfors on the 7th of July has sealed the provisional conclusion of the first stage of the fascistisation of Finland.

The march on Helsingfors revealed a number of peculiar features which excellently illustrate the character and aims of the fascist movement in Finland. The demonstration was directed exclusively against Communism. Priests appeared as the chief speakers and with all the eloquence possessed by these gentry, called for the extermination of Bolshevism, whereby they had in mind not only the „enemy at home“ but referred with cynical candour to the neighbouring Soviet power. The government, with the Prime Minister Svinhufvud at the head, participated in full strength in the demonstration. The president of the Republic, Relander, likewise did not let slip the opportunity of welcoming in a speech the black-blue fascist bands.

Simultaneously with the fascist march in Helsingfors there appeared in the official government gazette a decree declaring the Communist deputies to be outlawed and ordering their immediate arrest. In Parliament, meanwhile, there took place the second reading of the „Bill for the defence of the Republic“, which was passed by a great majority.

The events in Finland are of international importance. The „bloodless“ fascist upheaval which has just been carried out means for the country the opening of a new period of permanent civil war. The new government is formally a bourgeois coalition government in which all bourgeois Right parties, from the radical wing of the Lappo movement to the Right wing of the progressives, are represented. The fascist dictatorship appears here in the shell of a coalition which in all decisive questions can rely on the support of the bourgeois-peasant centre parties and the social democracy. At its head there stands the bloody hangman Svinhufvud, who in the year 1918, with the Finnish white guard bands and with the auxiliary troops supplied by German imperialism, drowned in blood the revolutionary rising of the Finnish working class. The name of the Prime Minister alone suffices to characterise the programme of the new government.

The official government declaration leaves nothing to be desired in the way of clearness of language. The programme consists of two essential points: **extermination of Communism** and energetic development of "national defence". These two tasks, which the Svinhufud Cabinet has set itself, are most closely connected. They are nothing else but two sides of one and the same political line.

The dominating aim of this policy is **war against the Soviet Union**. Feverish military armaments with the open support of English and Polish imperialism — that is the one side of this policy. Brutal crushing of the revolutionary working class, stifling of their resistance, shattering of the Communist Party, which in spite of the most oppressive illegality is steadily deepening and extending its influence among the Finnish workers and for whom the severe economic depression opens up the most favourable prospects of growth—that is the second direction in which fascism is pushing forward in order to create the pre-conditions for a war adventure.

In the carrying out of this policy the Svinhufud government has all the means of power of the State apparatus at its disposal — the well-organised army, the police and the defence corps, numbering 150 000 men, and the old civil-war guard of 1918. It relies on the one hand on the fascist **Lappo movement**, which with its terror keeps the country in check, and on the other hand on the **social democracy**, from whom it expects that it will not only keep a curb on the strong Finnish working class and hold it back from fighting, but will also and before all demoralise, split and render it incapable of fighting.

The Finnish social democrats have already furnished proof that they are determined to carry out with the greatest zeal the task allotted to them. In the name of „democracy“ and of „peaceful stabilisation“ they have, in the fierce struggle between revolution and counter-revolution, which is now entering on a new stage in Finland, placed themselves openly on the side of counter-revolution. It is from the social democratic arsenal that the fascists took their slogan: „shatter Communism!“ In the name of „democracy“ they calmly tolerate the ravaging of the fascist terrorist bands among the workers and revolutionary small peasants. In the name of „democracy“ they accept the reactionary law for the Defence of the Republic, which is intended to destroy the influence of the Communists. In the name of „democracy“ they welcome the fascist dictatorship of Svinhufud as a government of „order“ and of „stabilisation“. On the pretext of upholding the „Republic“ and „democracy“ they preach passive endurance to the workers and do not even shrink from open counter-revolutionary service for fascism.

The Finnish workers, who have taken up the fight against fascism with heroic self-sacrificing courage, are approaching a period of severe persecution. Of still greater importance, however, are the effects of the events in Finland on an **international scale**. Finland is a gateway into the Soviet Union, and as such is of great strategic importance for the war plans of world imperialism. It forms the basis for the North Eastern war front against the Soviet Union. In the imperialist war plans the Finnish Soviet-Russian frontier plays a role hardly less important than the Polish-Rumanian frontier and Bessarabia.

The upheaval in Finland is not an isolated event. It is closely connected with the fascist coup d'état in **Rumania**, with the concentration of troops in the North West of India, with the feverish war preparations of the English in Western Asia, with the flood of lies against the Soviet Union which is once again sweeping through all capitalist countries.

The old plan of the English for a firm block of anti-Soviet border States under the leadership of Poland, the realisation of which has hitherto been frustrated owing to the strong antagonisms between the Baltic countries, once again assumes concrete form with the upheaval in Finland. All these events and their effects mean a great increase of the war danger.

The setting up of a fascist dictatorship in Finland completes the East European sector of the imperialist war-front against the Soviet Union.

POLITICS

The Disintegration Crisis in the Fascist Camp in Germany.

By E. R. (Berlin).

A disintegration-crisis has commenced in the Hitler Party. The "Victors of Saxony", who announced with great triumph the tremendous growth of fascist votes, find themselves suddenly confronted with a bitter struggle in their own camp. In the question of the future policy of the N. S. D. A. P. (National Social-Democratic Labour Party) there developed an open breach between the Hitler-Goebbels leadership, financed by ministers and heavy industry, and that wing gathered round the brothers Strasser, which propagates "national socialism" in order to win the workers and the proletarianised middle classes.

The N. S. D. A. P. gained its recent election successes thanks only to the "radical" social-demagogic propaganda as represented by the Strasser wing. In Saxony the party succeeded in winning a part of those workers who hitherto voted for the bourgeois parties, and who now, discontented and blinded by the sham radicalism of the fascists, have turned away from the traditional bourgeois parties. But the greater part of the votes polled by the national socialists were given by **petty bourgeois**. Plundered by the Young Plan, uprooted from their existence and economically ruined, an **anti-capitalist** fighting spirit prevails among these petty bourgeois electors. For the Brüning bourgeois block government, which is shaken by the blows of the revolutionised masses, the growth of the fascist party serves as a means of pressure for accelerating the legal fascistisation of its entire methods of rule and its whole policy of plundering the population.

The growth of the masses of electors who support the fascist Party, however, inevitably places the **questions of the material demands of its petty-bourgeois and proletarian followers in the forefront of its whole policy**. Its inability to carry out a real anti-capitalist policy in favour of the workers, employees and unemployed is bound to become apparent every day in its political practice. The official slogan of the N. S. D. A. P., which it issued on the instructions of its financiers, the trust capitalists: "Into the State!, participation in the government by fascist Ministers in the provincial governments, and, after a general election, in the government of the Reich", is bound to reveal more clearly the contradiction between the capitalist-lackey service of the Hitler leadership and the appalling material misery of its electors. With the beginning of the fascist coalition negotiations in Saxony there commenced a fierce quarrel within the N. S. D. A. P. leadership. The followers of the Strasser wing openly rebelled; **Hitler gave the order: throw the destructive elements, ruthlessly and without exception, out of the party.**"

Before the expulsions were carried out, the head of the national socialist press correspondence, **Mossakovsky**, and the head of the Brandenburg party school of the N. S. D. A. P., **Wilhelm Korn**, withdrew from the party. The editor of the Strasser paper, „Der Nationale Sozialist“, the most widely circulated fascist paper in Berlin, **Herr Schapke**, was then expelled from the Hitler party. At a meeting of members of the N. S. D. A. P. of Greater Berlin the opposition leaders were flung out of the meeting with the aid of armed fascist troops, acting on the orders of the Berlin leaders.

Meanwhile, the opposition, which is led by **Otto Strasser**, **Mossakovsky** and **Schapke**, has been officially repudiated by **Gregor Strasser**, a member of the Reichstag. He appears to adopt a conciliatory attitude between the two fronts within the N. S. D. A. P.

In the Strasser organ of 3rd of July the opposition makes the first steps to found an independent group against the N. S. D. A. P. It publishes a big appeal to all readers, party comrades and friends of the paper under the heading: "The socialists abandon the N. S. D. A. P."

This declaration is interesting in many respects. It is directed **against** the support officially given by the fascist party leadership to international capitalism and intervention-

war against Russia carried on by Western imperialism. It proclaims "its approval of the fight of the Indian people for its freedom from English rule and capitalist exploitation", and at the same time sharply rejects Hitler's pro-English policy. It opposes the "intentional republican-monarchist ambiguity" and stigmatises the flunkeyism of Hitler in the service of the trust magnates.

The declaration also attacks the Thuringian coalition policy of the N.S.D.A.P., with its approval of the head tax, raising of rents etc.

The declaration is signed by the publisher of the paper, Der nationale Sozialist, Otto Strasser, Major Buchrucker, notorious for the part he played in the Kűstrin putch, Mossakovsky, Schapke, and 20 former functionaries of the N.S.D.A.P. in Berlin and the Brandenburg province. According to the reports of the capitalist press, this group, which has strong connections in various parts of the Republic, is planning the foundation of a "National revolutionary Labour party".

The disintegration of the Hitler party means a serious crumbling of the fascist reserves of German trust capital, as was bound to come in the course of the intensified class struggle. The CP. of Germany will, in the fiercest ideological and defensive fight against fascism, as well as in the sharpest Marxist-Leninist fight against the new "national revolutionary" party, gather round its flag the revolutionised working and petty bourgeois masses. It is not without cause that leading trust papers such as the "Kölnische Zeitung" are now giving expression to their fear that the apparent successes of the Hitler party will "inevitably be followed by Communism, strengthened by the whole of the working class." Even the opposition leaders of the N.S.D.A.P. will not be able to check this development.

The Shettleston Bye Election in Great Britain.

By W. Gallacher (London).

The Shettleston bye-election is a further outstanding indication of the growing disillusionment of the workers.

The drop in the Labour Party vote, amounting to almost 9,000, and this in a constituency where the pseudo-lefts were dominant, is of the greatest significance for our Party.

True, we failed to win these thousands of disillusioned workers to our banner but there is no doubt whatever that our campaign played a considerable part in winning them away from the revolutionary phrase-mongering of the Maxtons and Co.

Right from the beginning of the campaign large masses of workers turned out to hear our speakers and especially our candidate Comrade Saklatvala.

Many of these workers understood the significance of Saklatvala's fight, as a fight to bring out clearly the unity of the Indian and British workers against the common enemy — the robber imperialists of Britain.

Thus the leading issues of the campaign were mass unemployment, wage-cuts, support of the Indian Revolution and the prisoners of Meerut and the Defence of the Soviet Union, the Fatherland of the workers.

Along this line the rotten character of imperialism and the drive for rationalisation were fully exposed in contrast to the mighty advance of Socialist construction in the USSR. With a fighting programme and a clear class policy of war against capitalism — of Class against Class, Comrade Saklatvala registered 1,459 votes. But this vote gives no proper picture of the interest aroused in the constituency, nor of the influence we wielded in the decisive stages.

Unfortunately in Glasgow, wherein the constituency is situated, our Party has been very inactive for a considerable time. Passivity has been evident in all directions. This has seriously militated against any effective work in any of the constituencies in Glasgow, several of which are represented by Maxton and his sham-left colleagues. These constituencies ought obviously to have had special attention, but in Shettleston when the bye-election came on we had no party local, the party being represented in this particular constituency by one member.

Thus we had to start off the campaign without having had any preliminary work from which to start as a basis.

This was bad enough, but added to this, was the fact that the passivity persisted during nearly all the time of the fight. It was only in the week-end prior to the polling day that the party in Glasgow came alive and entered effectively into the fight.

One could feel the difference right away. During that week-end and the latter days of the campaign there was a livelier atmosphere all over. It is not too much to say that if the Glasgow comrades had entered the field at the beginning in the same spirit as they did at the finish—Saklatvala would have doubled his vote and a terrific blow would have been struck at the Labour Government and the sham-lefts through a decisive defeat inflicted on their candidate.

As it was the Labour candidate scraped through with a few hundred of a majority. This is anything but a victory for the Labour Party.

We, on the other hand, have come out of the election with about 1,500 votes for a Communist candidate in the face of every kind of unscrupulous opposition political and religious and with a good party local established in the constituency.

The lesson for the Glasgow comrades and for the Party as a whole is evident. Pessimism and passivity must be driven out of our midst. With revolutionary fervour we must drive ahead with our work.

To the factories, to the streets, to the Labour Exchanges amongst the masses employed and unemployed, rousing them to action, to struggle against wage-cuts, unemployment and starvation, to the fight against war and the enslavement of the colonial peoples, organising and leading them against the Labour Government of capitalism, towards the mass party and the Revolutionary Workers' Government.

The Political Situation in Czechoslovakia

By Ludwig Freund (Prague).

It is scarcely a year since the present coalition of the Czech bourgeois parties with the German and Czech Social Fascists took the helm. And yet this coalition is already passing through a severe crisis. The minister of finance, Dr. Englis, is in a situation similar to that of his colleague in Germany, Herr Moldenhauer. In the course of one of the past weeks he offered his resignation twice. But whilst Moldenhauer has gone and the parliament has remained, in Czechoslovakia Englis has remained, whilst the parliament has broken up for the vacation earlier than usual, without being able to accomplish the tasks in hand.

The growing economic crisis is at the same time steadily aggravating the antagonisms within and among the bourgeois parties, paving the way, in Czechoslovakia as in other countries, for a general political crisis.

The question raised by the economic crisis for the Czechoslovakian government is in its essentials as follows: On the one hand the capitalist class demands financial aid from the state, whilst on the other the state revenues are diminishing in consequence of the crisis. The intensifying crisis requires at the same time increased expenditure on the part of the state apparatus, for the suppression of the masses of the workers and peasants moving towards radicalisation, and to this must be added the ever greater sums engulfed by war preparations. The whole situation is further complicated by the participation of the Social Fascists in the government, which involves the granting of a few crumbs to certain strata of the working population. And all this is finding utterance in a financial crisis which will prove the beginning of a political crisis.

The figures just published on the tax returns in Bohemia for the 1st quarter of 1930, forming 65 per cent of the total taxes of the Czechoslovakian Republic, show how detrimentally the state revenues have already been affected by the economic crisis. In the 1st quarter of 1930 the tax revenues in Bohemia totalled 1529.5 million Kc as compared with 1736.5 million Kc in the 1st quarter of 1929, a falling off of about 12 per cent in the year. Calculated for the whole of Czechoslovakia, and for the whole year, the diminished receipts are over one milliard Kc.

How much this is the immediate result of the economic crisis is shown by the fact that the income tax minus is 61 million Kc, and the special trading tax paid by the trading and industrial companies has declined from 70.5 millions to 24.5. The lessened imports involve a minus of about 30 millions in duties, and the turnover and luxury taxes have fallen off by more than 46 millions. The government has however presented the bankrupt great banks with 300 million Kc, and the big agrarians with 100 million Kc, in the form of the import licence bill.

An item of the utmost importance in this connection are the plans for the further development of Czechoslovakian militarism, promoted conjointly by all the government parties. Here the development of the Czechoslovakian air service plays the leading role.

This finds its most ardent advocates among the Czech Social Democrats and National socialists. At the present time the budgets for the coming year are being drawn up in the ministries, and, as the semi-official "Prager Presse" states, the expenditure for both the Ministry for National Defence and that of the Ministry for Public Air Service are being increased. With respect to the total amount of the budget, the expenditure envisaged is reported to exceed, for the coming year, that of the present year by half a milliard Kc.

The whole situation is best characterised by the case of the bill submitted for a Christmas bonus for civil servants. This caused the premature adjournment of parliament. The civil servants being bitterly discontented, and all the governmental parties having made great promises to the civil servants before the elections, the government brought in a bill which however only very inadequately met the demand of the civil servants for a 13th month's salary.

The great indignation aroused among the state employees by this bill obliged both the Social Fascist parties, and the National Democratic Party of the extreme right wing, to demand an improvement of this bill. Upon this the minister of finance demanded, as prerequisite for the passing of the bill, but in reality for the purpose of covering the deficits and the fresh expenditure, that an increase should be agreed to in the trading tax which would have affected at the same time the capitalist class, as also an increase in the turnover and beer taxes. The Industrialists' Union on the one hand opposed its categoric "No" to the increase of the trading tax, whilst the "left" Social Fascists (the Pilsen wing of Czech Social Democracy), having granted the starvation duties, the import licences, the fresh reparation burdens, and other anti-labour measures, were not willing to agree without considerable manoeuvres to the beer tax.

The growing resistance of the working masses on the one hand, and the resistance of the capitalists against any fresh burdens on the other, rendered the parliament incapable of accomplishing anything, a condition temporarily "solved" by its adjournment. The clerical "Lidové listy" characterise the present situation as follows:

"The series of proposals for the increase of taxes, including the actual increase of the trading and turnover taxes, that is, of taxes burdening production, and of the beer tax, which raises the price of one of the main foods of the people; further the raising of the railway tariffs: all this has so agitated the public opinion of all the parties, that there is no courage left to put all these plans for increased prices into practice."

All the coalition parties have at once staged a violent campaign in the press, accusing each other and the finance minister of being to blame that the civil servants receive no Christmas bonus for the present. The press resembles a pre-election press. At the same time efforts are being made in favour of a policy "in the interests of economics", without consideration of party. This agitation is to prepare the soil for solving the difficulties of Czechoslovakian capitalism by means of a dictatorship.

The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is mobilising the broad masses against the policy of impoverishment pursued by the Social Fascist government, and is organising the united front, including in this the Social Democratic workers. It is drawing the attention of the masses to the danger that the crisis may be solved by a dictatorship, and to the steadily growing war danger, and is preparing for the struggle against the Fascist dictatorship and the threatening war.

INDIA

Increased Imperialist Repression in India.

By V. Chattopadhyaya.

Even before the publication in India of the Simon Commission's first volume, the "Indian Daily Mail", an organ particularly well-informed regarding the intentions of the British Government, stated in its issue of June 10th. that there were "reasons to anticipate the strengthening of the policy of repression."

The prediction has been speedily realised. The Working Committee which is the "General Staff" of the Indian National Congress has been declared an unlawful association, its President, the seventy year old Pandit Motilal Nehru, has been arrested along with the General Secretary of the Congress, Dr. Syed Mahmud (a Mohammedan) and sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment. Pandit Madan Moham Malaviya, the moderate Nationalist leader, calls this measure of the Government "the crowning act of a policy of repression pursued for two months", and has offered his services as a member of the forbidden Committee to Vallabhai Patel (the leader of the Bardoli peasant movement of 1928), who has been nominated by Nehru to be acting President of the Congress. The Panjab and Andhra Provincial Congress Committees had already been declared illegal, and now a number of other Congress Committees have met with the same fate.

The Naujawan Bharat Sabha (Revolutionary Youth League) has been forbidden in all its branches and anyone suspected of belonging to it is subjected the summary imprisonment and in many cases to torture. The petty-bourgeois youth leagues, that more or less constituted the youth section of the National Congress and that have taken an extremely active part in the anti-imperialist struggle, especially in conjunction with workers' and peasants' organisations have been suppressed.

The press is being increasingly silenced, heavy securities under the new Press Ordinance having been demanded of 70 newspapers and 97 printing presses, leading to the closing down of 67 newspapers and 55 presses.

In addition the Viceroy has just issued his seventh ukase, known as "The Unauthorised News-Sheets and Newspapers Ordinance, 1930". And the reports that appear in these publications more than confirm the reports that reach us from private sources, as to the enormous increase in the frequency and intensity of the torture of political prisoners in the police under the orders and supervision of British officials.

Much speculation has been aroused as to the real intentions of the Government in arresting Motilal Nehru, about whom it was generally felt both by the British and by the moderate Indian politicians that he was "the last leader left at liberty who could reasonably be regarded as the intermediary who might bring the Congress back to reason" ("Times", July 1st.) In fact, almost on the eve of his arrest, he had indicated that there was still a possibility that the Congress might on conditions participate in the coming Round Table Conference. Nevertheless his arrest was considered necessary to enable the Government to carry out its policy of crushing the growing revolutionary movement of the workers and the peasantry with all the armed forces at the disposal of a "Labour" Cabinet, and to demonstrate its "strength" "before the Round Table Conference begins, so as to avoid the impression that it had yielded to "force and intimidation".

There are reasons to believe that the crushing of the revolutionary unrest among the peasantry before it has become too dangerous is a policy not entirely unacceptable to certain Congress leaders.

It is fear of the revolution, coupled with the desire to retain their hold on the masses, that constitutes the leit-motif of the speeches and actions of all the important Congress leaders, almost without exception, and if they are in gaol today — without any of the terrible hardships that working class leaders have to undergo — it is because the Government has

to get them out of the way for carrying out a naked policy of repression and torture, while at the same time it makes them more popular as national heroes so as to add to their prestige and their influence when the inevitable negotiations begin.

In the meanwhile, while the policy of repression is being carried out by the Labour Government, the various political agents of the Government in India among the so-called minorities are being mobilised to make the Round Table Conference "a success". The preliminary session of the **All-India Moslem Conference** was opened on July 4th, in **Simla**—from where the Viceroy and his staff are at present carrying on the Government of India—and it is sufficient to point out that the Conference was convened by **Malik Feroz Khan Noon**, Finance Member in the Panjab Government. The two traitors to the cause of independence, **Mohamed Ali** and **Shaukat Ali**, are of course playing an important part at the Conference.

In **Burma**, which British imperialist interests find it essential to separate from India, the Government is not finding it quite so easy to mobilise political opinion in its favour. The Burmese commercial bourgeoisie and richer intellectuals who had allied themselves with British shipping interests and heavy industry to agitate for the separation of Burma, now find that they are not going to get the "Free State" which they had expected.

As far as the movement itself is concerned, it is certainly growing among the masses, and the arrests of Congress, youth or working class leaders have had no deterrent effect upon them. In the Panjab and elsewhere, even according to enemy reports, "proscribed associations have developed an awkward habit of springing to life under another name". Revolutionary leaflets have been printed in various Indian languages and systematically distributed among the police and the army, with the result that "sedition" among them has become a source of alarm to the Government, in consequence of which the very severe Police Act of 1922 has now been revived and put into action, without, however, producing any appreciable effect.

In Bihar and Orissa where the peasant movement is beginning to cause alarm among the zamindars, the Government has been obliged to increase its police force by 400 new men.

In **Sholapur**, where military rule during nearly two months had committed sufficient havoc among the workers, martial law has been withdrawn, but the National Congress flag has been prohibited.

In **Bombay** there have been a number of hartals of protest against the arrest of Motilal Nehru as well as a number of students' strikes. During a students' procession through Hornby road the police charged them several times with their clubs and wounded a large number. **Mrs. Perin Captain**, President of the Bombay Provincial Congress Committee, and **Mrs. Munshi**, Vice-President of the Committee have both been arrested and sentenced to three months' imprisonment each, while two other Congress officials and the editor of the forbidden "Congress Bulletin" have been sentenced to 5 months' rigorous imprisonment each.

In the village of **Khersai**, near the border of the Balasore District a party of police opened fire on the peasants killing one person and wounding several. The police had gone to the village to carry out attachment of property for non-payment of taxes, and were resisted by 2000 peasants who defended themselves with brickbats against the onslaughts of the police.

There have been also hartals in **Calcutta** and stormy demonstrations in **Allahabad**, the headquarters of Congress Working Committee.

The revolutionary ferment among the railway workers is becoming extremely intense, and the reformist Labour leader, **Giri**, General Secretary of the Indian Railwaymen's Federation, declared that the Federation "may have to decide in favour of a more active participation in the national movement". The object of the reformists is obvious.

The immediate development in India is likely to be a considerable intensification of the revolutionary struggle, accompanied by a regime of imperialist terror.

In the meanwhile the **MacDonald Government** is contemplating a translation of the Simon Report into a number of European languages, in order to poison European opinion in favour of its policy of repression.

1st AUGUST: INTERNATIONAL FIGHTING DAY AGAINST WAR

A World Air Fleet against the Soviet Union.

By Nemo.

The threat to the Soviet Union by the swollen air armaments of its neighbouring countries is assuming ever clearer and more dangerous forms. With the assistance of England and France, strong air fleets are being created and at the same time a big air-craft industry is being established in the Border States, in Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. On the western frontier of the Soviet Union alone about 2,500 modern war-planes are stationed, consisting for the greater part of offensive formations (bombing and fighting planes), and which can at any time be reinforced by the air fleets of England and France, consisting of 5,000 modern aircraft.

The imperialist war-mongers are quite aware that the centres of production and industry in the Soviet Union can be reached and destroyed most easily by squadrons of bombing planes, and they are therefore already today organising the co-ordination of all the existing air forces in order to be able to carry out a concentrated air attack on the Soviet Union. This purpose is to be served in the first place by the **creation of a special League of Nations Air Fleet**, as decided by the Security Committee of the League at the beginning of May last.

The idea of creating a world air fleet under the aegis of the League of Nations is not new. Already at the meeting of the League at Lugano the American president of the International Airmen's League, **B. Harmond** submitted to **Briand** a comprehensive plan for organising a world air fleet. According to this plan, the League of Nations is to set up a world air fleet, at the disposal of which every State belonging to the League of Nations should place a number of its best military and civil airmen, as well as suitable aircraft material. Even in peace time every nation should hold ten per cent. of its most experienced airmen in readiness for „police purposes“ of the League of Nations, such „police purposes“ to include a „**demonstration of the air police in the event of danger of war threatening, so as to nip any hostility in the bud.**“

Harmon's plan, which was inspired by England, was taken up by the French government, who in September 1929 submitted an official decision to the League of Nations, emphasising the necessity of a free uncontrolled air service „for those cases in which the interests of the League of Nations are immediately concerned.“ A report by the Telunion from Geneva dated 18th September 1929 stated "that in regard to this proposal the French have in mind **the possibility of sanctionary measures by the aircraft in the service of the League of Nations**". The Spanish government was also one of the first to declare itself ready to place an aircraft squadron at the disposal of the League of Nations. It must not be forgotten, however, **that in this question the social democrat Paul Boncour** played a leading role, by energetically supporting the idea of creating a world air fleet.

The last meeting of the Security Committee of the League of Nations has shown that the plan of the French and English imperialists will shortly be fully realised. Under the pretext of securing the air connections of the League of Nations in „time of war“, the question was debated whether or not the League of Nations should have its own air fleet in the sense of an international air fleet. It became evident that this question always plays a role **in connection with the security and sanction measures**, from which is to be clearly seen the aggressive character of the future world air fleet as an instrument of war, in spite of all the hypocritical declarations. The draft decision submitted by the Security Committee met with the general approval of the meeting, **the Polish delegate Sokol energetically advocating the creation of a world air fleet.**

As soon as the decision of the Security Committee is confirmed by the next meeting of the League, the general secretary is to adopt all measures for creating a world air

fleet, negotiate with the various governments and solve the question regarding the regulation of traffic for the aircraft of the League of Nations in time of war and peace. The question whether the League of Nations shall maintain its own aircraft or solely charter the aircraft of the member States in time of war, still remains open. As far as can be judged from the work of the preparatory Committee, there can be little doubt that the League of Nations will approve the decisions submitted and that **already in this year the creation of a world fleet of the League of Nations will be an accomplished fact.**

In this connection the attitude of **Germany** to the proposed establishment of a world fleet deserves special attention, as the air fleet of the League of Nations will in any case have to fly over German territory in order to reach the East.

The German representative on the Security Committee, Herr Göppert, expressed agreement to the creation of a League of Nations air fleet and raised no objection to the airships of the League of Nations flying over German territory.

It is certainly no mere chance that the decision of the Security Committee on the creation of a world air fleet was adopted on the same day on which the agreement regarding financially supporting a State which is "attacked" was adopted. In both cases we have to do with imperialist war preparations which are all too obviously directed against Soviet Russia.

THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

To the Aid of the Mansfeld Strikers!

The Executive Bureau of the R.I.L.U. has addressed the following appeal to all Workers and Women Workers of Germany:

Comrades!

The workers of all countries have been following up with strained attention the heroic struggle of 1,400 Mansfeld workers. Having replied to the employers' demand of a 15% reduction in wages with a unanimous militant strike led by the Revolutionary T.U. Opposition, the workers of Mansfeld have come to the front ranks of the struggle against the unprecedented pressure brought to bear by the capitalists on the living standards of the wide proletarian masses.

The endeavour to reduce the wages of the Mansfeld workers is by no means an incidental or local phenomenon—it is one of the links in the chain of the widespread offensive waged by the German bourgeoisie against the working class. By means of mass dismissals which daily tend to increase the million-army of unemployed, by direct reductions of wages which have been going down as it is thanks to the high cost of living, by decreasing the miserable amount of relief issued to the unemployed and by lengthening the working day, the capitalists are trying to unload the difficulties of the economic crisis and the Young Plan onto the backs of the working masses. The employers' demand that the Mansfeld workers' wages be reduced has already been followed by a decision to reduce the wages also of 200,000 miners and metal workers of the Ruhr. Similar demands and decisions are being brought forth, and will be brought forth to the millions of workers throughout all other industries and regions of Germany.

This furious attack of the bourgeoisie upon the living standards of the German proletariat must be duly repulsed!

The working masses of Germany must reply with a powerful counter offensive movement to the offensive of the capitalists. By means of militant manifestations, by means of mass strikes under the leadership of militant organs of struggle elected by the workers themselves, they must struggle for the introduction of the 7-hour working day with full pay, which will make it possible for hundreds of thousands of workers to return into industry; must fight for higher wages and for raising the living standards of the wide working masses. Only in this way is it possible to ward off the attack

of the consolidated forces of the bourgeoisie, its State apparatus and its Social-Fascist lackeys!

This is the road of struggle taken by the workers of Mansfeld. Their strike is the cause of the whole German proletariat, for the victory of the Mansfeld workers will serve as a serious hindrance for the further attacks of the employers, while a defeat of the Mansfeld workers will be a signal for even greater and more furious pressure to be brought to bear on the wages of ever-larger divisions of the working class of Germany.

The struggling Mansfeld workers are compelled to suffer from the attacks not only of the employers, but also of the police apparatus of the bourgeois Government, which defends the blacklegs and arrests the strike pickets, as well as of the reformist T.U. bureaucracy and Social-Democratic Party, who have come to terms with the employers about suppressing the struggle and are straining all efforts to break the united front of the organised and unorganised workers who have come out hand in hand in the struggle.

The whole working class of Germany must render immediate help to the Mansfeld miners in their difficult fight. The widening of the front of the struggle to new factories and workshops, to new districts and industries, will be the most effective support to the Mansfeld strikers and the finest reply to the offensive of the bourgeoisie. Workers of the Ruhr, metal workers of Berlin, chemical workers, shipbuilding, transport, and workers of all other trades, organise immediately militant manifestations against reduction in your wages, consolidate your ranks under the leadership of the Revolutionary T.U. Opposition for warding off and showing due resistance to the capitalists and their reformist agents, elect your Fighting Committees, follow the example of the Mansfeld workers and in this way also support their heroic struggle! Organise the collection of funds at all enterprises for the striking workers, guarantee all prerequisites for the victory of the Mansfeld workers!

The struggle in Mansfeld and your guarantee for its victory is of vast significance for the workers of all countries. With regard to the attacks on wages and to the lowering of the living standards of the working masses, the German capitalists stand in the front ranks of the international bourgeoisie. The example set by it is already being followed and will be followed by the capitalists of other countries. By organising proper resistance to the attacks of the German bourgeoisie, and by guaranteeing the success of the Mansfeld strike, you are in this way helping the workers throughout the world to wage a successful struggle against the capitalist offensive.

The Ruhr workers, under the leadership of the Revolutionary T.U. Opposition are already preparing for a struggle. They must not and will not permit the capitalists and T.U. bureaucrats to realise their decision of lowering wages. The millions of proletarians throughout the country should immediately line up in the front of the struggling workers, to repulse the offensive of the bourgeoisie and Social-Fascists and get their demands granted.

For the victory of the Mansfeld Miners!

Forward to the extension of the Front of the Struggle!

Against mass dismissals, against wage reductions, against decreased unemployment relief!

Against the strikebreaking Social-Fascist T.U. Bureaucracy, negotiating with the capitalists for general wage reductions!

For higher wages!

For the Seven-Hour Working Day with full pay!

Down with Arbitration!

Down with Police Terrorism against the strikers!

Long live the proletarian solidarity in the struggle for the interests of the working class!

R.I.L.U. Executive Bureau.

Political Mass Strikes in Spain.

By Federico Lopez (Madrid).

A few days ago a strike broke out among the oil workers of Seville, with the demand for higher wages and shorter working hours. The workers chose a Strike Committee from their own ranks. The armed forces were immediately employed against the workers with the greatest brutality. On the occasion of strike meetings the police savagely fired on the workers, killing and wounding many. These fascist brutalities of the police evoked tremendous excitement among all the workers. The trade union organisations and fighting committees standing under the leadership of the Communists and the revolutionary trade unions proclaimed a general strike, which was completely followed by the whole of the workers and is still going on at the present time. Neither the taxicabs nor the tramcars are running; traffic in the harbour is completely at a standstill; the bakeries are closed. Under the revolutionary slogans of the Communist Party the workers are marching in powerful demonstrations through the town. Martial law has been proclaimed. Machine-guns have been posted at all the strategic points in the town.

At Bilbao the building workers have been on strike for over a week. All attempts of the reformist trade union bureaucracy to get the workers to resume work have proved vain in face of the determined attitude of the workers, who are following with the greatest discipline the instructions of the strike committees elected by themselves. Negotiations are taking place among the various categories of workers for calling a solidarity strike of the miners and metal workers, and particularly of the workers in the smelting works. Bilbao also resembles a military camp.

From many parts of the country reports are arriving as to smaller and larger movements of the land workers and revolutionary actions of the small peasants.

The latest happenings in Spain, especially, however, the general strike in Seville, show how exceedingly serious is the whole situation in this country. All attempts of the Berenguer government to bring about a normalisation of Spanish economy have failed. The economic and political crisis is becoming more acute every day. The Peseta is steadily sinking; exports are falling off at an alarming rate; the impoverishment of the workers is assuming enormous proportions; unemployment is increasing beyond measure; as a result of the agrarian crisis the small peasants and land workers are falling into deeper poverty. Under these conditions there is taking place a very rapid revolutionisation of the toiling population.

The bourgeoisie clearly perceives this development and is endeavouring to hold the growing revolutionary movement in check by means of fascist violence. In spite of the most rigorous censorship the press is no longer able to preserve silence regarding events and the growing influence of the Communist Party, which is leading an illegal existence. All the struggles of late, especially the general strike in Seville, were under the leadership of the Communist Party and of the revolutionary trade unions.

At the same time the bourgeoisie is making its preparations. The King is at present in Paris in order to negotiate with Santiago Alba, a liberal leader who was formerly expelled from Spain. Alba is regarded as the coming man who will form a Conservative-Liberal block government, a government which will unite all the forces of the bourgeoisie for a common fight against the revolutionary movement. There is no doubt that sooner or later Spain will experience serious revolutionary events. The effects of the steadily increasing international crisis, along with the difficulties on the national market, are creating a state of affairs out of which a revolutionary situation is bound very soon to develop. The present events, especially the happenings in Seville and Bilbao, signalise the coming serious and decisive class struggles in Spain.

The coming government of the Liberal-Conservative block, in spite of some democratic phrases, will be a government of White Terror against the workers and peasants. In its fight it will, just like the Berenguer government, enjoy the eager support of its agents in the camp of the working class: Republicans, Social-fascists, Anarcho-syndicalists and Anarchists. In addition to these traditional traitors and agents of

the bourgeoisie in the camp of the working class, a number of Communist renegades are rendering assistance to the bourgeoisie. These are the Trotzkyists, who also in Spain are fishing in troubled waters. Under the protection of the legality accorded them by the fascist government, they are seeking to discredit the Communist Party in the eyes of the workers. The Party must proceed ruthlessly against these dirty agents of the bourgeoisie of the type of Lacroix.

The situation in Spain and the fights resulting therefrom, which are giving rise to a revolutionary situation, confront the Communist Party of Spain with tremendous tasks. There is every sign that the C.P. of Spain has profound influence among the masses. This will enable our Party to take over the entire leadership of the approaching big fights, and to prepare the ground for the victorious proletarian revolution.

AGAINST COLONIAL OPPRESSION

More Oppression for the African Masses.

The Riotous Assemblies Act.

By Verschraegen.

One more law adorns the statute book of South Africa already overcrowded with slave legislation.

Not contented with the already existing oppressive legislation against the Africans, Pass Laws, Master and Servant Laws, land robbery, Colour Bar Acts, cruel taxation, urban areas etc. etc., the South African bourgeoisie led by Hertzog, Pirow & Co., representing the backward agrarian elements, inspired by Smuts and the South African Party, and assisted by Creswell and the Labour Party got the Riotous Assemblies (Amendment) Act passed which in effect means that not only must the Africans remain slaves as hitherto and be further enslaved, but should they or anyone else dare even to protest in a constitutional manner against any oppression, a criminal offence is committed punishable by imprisonment, banishment from certain centres or deportation. Before analysing the contents of the new monstrosity in detail, a few words may not be out of place in connection with the origin of and circumstances which led up to the Principal Act passed in 1914.

During the years 1913-14 South Africa was convulsed by a wave of strikes in all the important industries of the country, mining, engineering, railway etc. culminating in the shooting of a score or more of defenceless workers on the Market Square, Johannesburg, and the illegal deportation of a number of strike leaders.

As its provisions clearly show the act was designed principally to afford the utmost protection to blacklegs and strike-breakers, and to make unlawful actions which are inevitably connected with the conduct of strike.

The following became criminal offences punishable by long terms of imprisonment and deportation:

- a) the least interference with scabs (e.g. calling a scab "scab");
- b) compelling a non-union worker to join his union even by ordinary trade union methods;
- c) blacklisting scabs;
- d) picketing even if peaceful.

In addition the Minister of Justice is given special powers to prohibit meetings, and a section is included, providing for special tribunals without juries—a kind of courts martial to try offences under this Act.

In the subsequent years different provisions of the Act have been rigidly applied against workers and workers' organisations and many were severely punished for contraventions thereof. In 1927 the infamous Native Administration Act was passed in spite of widespread opposition and a clause inserted making it a criminal offence to promote feelings of hostility between Europeans and Natives. It seems really farcical that the Hertzogs, the Smuts, the Creswells and the other oppressors who are the chief promoters of hostility between Africans and Europeans by oppressing the former, by the issue of public manifestoes calling on the whites to rally against the

black menace should pass such laws, but of course it was directed against the Communist Party and no one else.

Some time later Comrade Bunting, the chairman of the Party, was convicted under this Act for "promoting hostility", but on appeal the Supreme Court held that the section did not apply to the Communist doctrines as such and the conviction was set aside. Immediately Smuts, that darling of British Imperialism and Mac-Donald's Labour Party, raised the matter in the Union Parliament pointing out the seriousness of the situation resulting from the Supreme Court judgement, and urging that legislation be passed instantly curbing the activities of the Communist agitators. Pirow, the Minister of Justice, the representative of coffee-drinking, pipe-smoking, parasitical feudal landlordism, joyfully accepted the opposition leaders' warning and promised to introduce early legislation with a view to curbing the activities of the agitators amongst natives, and the outcome was the present amendment of the Act which is law now. The new Act is not only a fiendish outrage on the very meagre rights of the Africans, but has even "outraged" liberal bourgeois opinion in and outside South Africa, assigning as it does all powers of obtaining evidence, trying, convicting and punishing of offenders exclusively to the Minister.

He is vested under the new Act with wider powers regarding the prohibition of meetings, prohibiting certain persons from attending meetings. He may in addition prohibit any book, foreign magazine, pamphlet, manifesto, foreign newspaper, handbill or poster, article, advertisement or cartoon, picture or drawing.

He may further exclude any person from any area, and deport any foreign-born person who is convicted of any contravention of this Act.

He and he alone decides who is guilty, and he passes sentence, he is responsible to no one except himself, and even the courts have no say in matters.

It was this that so much upset the liver of the Liberals. Suppress working class papers? Banish and deport working class leaders? Prohibit meetings? By all means, but take the authority away from the courts of law, transgress the sacred constitutional principle of the supremacy of the law, terrible! Outrageous! The bourgeois elements, however, were really upset about the transgression of a constitutional tradition. The most important question to them is the subjection and exploitation of the Africans and, although they desire to do it in a more "decent" manner, in the good old British imperialist nice way of merciless exploitation in a gentle way, making the slaves believe that they are absolutely free citizens of the British Empire and subjects of His Majesty, they readily fell in with Pirow's uncouth and rather crude method.

It is interesting, although not surprising to note that Creswell, the leader of that stinking corpse commonly known as the Creswellish Section of the S.A. Labour Party, Minister of Defence and Labour, and Sampson an old trade union leader and until lately President of the South African Typographical Union, and their followers, except two, have supported Pirow's Act and voted in its favour. A motion at the annual conference of the same body protesting feebly against the measure was not even discussed. The Trades Union Congress and many of its affiliated unions have sent strong protests, and a special meeting of joint executives also adopted a strong resolution against the new law, but Pirow's reply was very curt and blunt. He was not prepared to give any consideration to Trade Union representation except on purely trade union matters.

In Parliament the only opposition came from two members of the National Council Section of the Labour Party. Some South African Party members opposed the methods, but wholeheartedly supported the principle—a united front of the white imperialists to crush the African masses.

The Communist Party organised mass demonstrations against the Bill in various centres. In Cape Town a march on Parliament resulted in several windows being broken and a number of arrests, but the call of the Party to all workers to down tools as a protest against the eniquitous measure received no response. The African masses, however, are gradually awakening from their slumber. Their yoke is becoming unbearable, and when they rise, British Imperialism and white domination will have to answer a long list of foul crimes against Africa.

SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION IN THE SOVIET UNION

How the Working Class Builds for Itself.

By Mirov (Stalingrad).

When the American engineer Calder, who superintended a section of the building of the "Tractorstroi" machine works, was asked his opinion of the Russian workers, he answered:

"When they want to work, they work better than anybody else. For the Tractorstroi they wanted to. . ."

The engineer Calder, who had the opportunity of observing the workers of the Soviet Union, straightforwardly placed a fact on record. Today, at the moment when the "Tractorstroi", the greatest tractor works in the world, erected in only 8½ months, and with a yearly productive capacity of 50,000 tractors, has completed its first tractor, the news of a fresh victory arrives, the news of the completion of the "Selmashstroi"; and it is only six weeks since the Soviet Union celebrated the opening of the Turksib Railway. Every day brings fresh reports of victories won by the workers of the Soviet Union in the various sections of the work of building up socialism. Therefore we can add to the words of the engineer Calder that work is being carried on in the whole of the Soviet Union with the greatest enthusiasm, and not only in the "Tractorstroi", and that this enthusiasm is working miracles.

They are real miracles! On 25th September the first gang of building workers set to work. The autumn was already upon them. One winter and one spring . . . and on an area of 540 hectares a giant has sprung up overnight, ready to compete with its like in any part of the world.

It is especially remarkable that the terms set for the completion of the building all proved too long. Four times they had to be shortened: At first the final term was fixed for October 1931, then April 1931, then November 1930, August 1930, and finally, thanks to the heroic efforts of the working class, the 17th June 1930, the day crowning the work.

The Titanic will of the Soviet proletariat has been victorious, has realised Lenin's legacy, his dream of 1919, that some day "one hundred thousand first-class tractors" should flow in a broad stream over the fields of Russia. The dream is more than fulfilled: from the gates of this one Stalingrad factory alone 50,000 tractors will roll yearly.

Today the workers exchange reminiscences of the days of the building fever. Solnayshkin, a foreman mason, and the joiner Kolesnikov, remember how they were first sent to the then perfectly desert site, in order to measure the boundary lines of the factory. How then later on thousands of workers took part in the building work, how the mighty undertaking roused the enthusiasm of even the most backward, and conquered the unbelief of those of little faith. Out of the midst of the masses there came workers filled with ardent enthusiasm, who took up the work at a frenzied speed. These were champions of the revolution. The masses followed their example. Wherever they lent a hand, the work seemed to melt under their fingers.

There were many who did not know how to work. They learnt it. They learnt feverishly. The foreman Solnayshkin was one of the workers allotted to the American engineer. Solnayshkin did not understand a word of English, the engineer not one of Russian. But a way out of the difficulty was found. Solnayshkin made a drawing, putting notes of interrogation at the places which he did not understand. The engineer gave his explanations in the form of rapid sketches.

One day a workman called Grizenko was engaged. The engineer proposed that he should begin work the next day. Grizenko had no great confidence in his own capabilities. He wanted to get an idea of the work first. He went to the building to see the matter for himself . . . and came to the conclusion that the work was being done "from the wrong end". Without considering long, he went to the engineer and demanded an "American crane". The engineer looked at the workman attentively, thought it over, and replied: "Alright, you shall have it!" And what happened? Within a few days Grizenko had carried out a perfect revolution in the working

methods of his gang, the output of work was greatly increased.

In the winter, at a temperature 30 degrees below zero, the main factory building had to be covered with a glass roof. There was a shortage of glaziers. A shock troop entirely inexperienced in this work volunteered. Unskilled as they were, the workers cut their hands, suffered from frost-bite. But they carried out the work they had undertaken. The glass roof was completed.

Another case. In the repairing workshop the electric current suddenly broke down. Two experimental tractors were just being fitted. They had to be ready by a certain time. The transmission gearing would not move. Again it was a shock troop which saved the situation, keeping the transmission gearing going for three hours by hand.

One newspaper wrote of the builders of "Tractorstroi" that they had conquered time by their competitive efforts. This is true. The young communist Berdikov, proposed for the Order of Labour, narrates: A wood pavement had to be laid. It was thought that we would not manage it, but we insisted on its being left to us. We made a competitive agreement with the older workers, who undertook to lay 8 metres per day, but demanded that the clearance work be done by others. We undertook an output of 5 metres, but did our own clearance work. During the first few days we managed 3 metres, then 5 metres, then 8 metres, and finally 17 metres.

Machinery from America arrived in the harbour of Novorossiysk. This had to be unloaded in the shortest possible time. A delegation from "Tractorstroi" went to Novorossiysk, applied to the harbour master, and inquired how long the unloading would probably take. At least until 28th May, was the reply. The delegation was not satisfied with this. It appealed to the Novorossiysk workers to accelerate the unloading. A competitive agreement was made, according to which the unloading was to be completed by 25th May. On 22nd May the machines were already loaded onto railway trucks, and were rolling in the direction of "Tractorstroi".

Endless tales could be told of the heroic deeds of the builders of "Tractorstroi". Endless tales could be told of pieces of work which were supposed to take 20 days, but were completed in four, and the like. But what is of the greatest importance is that we have a long and difficult stage behind us.

"Tractorstroi"—one of the greatest "organisers" of collective agriculture—is completed. It may be said that to-day the fate of Soviet agriculture is being wrought in the tractor factories. The news of "Tractorstroi", and of the tractor factories in course of construction in Chelyabinsk and Kharkov, has long since reached all the villages of the broad Soviet Union. When the village of Ilovlo, not far from "Tractorstroi", first heard that a tractor factory was being built in the vicinity, the organisation of a collective farm was discussed. The kulaks were opposed to this. But to the peasant the tractor is a most convincing argument. To this the kulaks replied: It is pure nonsense about the tractor factory. In words the Bolsheviks can build a great deal.

Confused by the kulak agitation, the peasants decided to send a delegation to the site of the factory. Each farm contributed 50 kopecks. The delegates made their way to Stalin-grad. There were 5 of them. They examined every beam, made endless inquiries of the building management and the works council, talked to nearly every workman. They returned to their village with the news that the factory was actually being built, and was springing up at lightning speed. With this the question of the collective farm was decided.

There are many such Ilovlo in the Union. Not only the press spreads the tidings of the "giant" of the Volga steppes, but thousands of seasonal workers have carried the news of this wonderwork to every part of the Soviet Union.

Here the work was soon in full swing. The workers overcame the greatest difficulties. The fact must be realised that a technically backward country entered into competition with America. The difficulties were of many kinds; the import of machines, the securing of qualified workers, the organisation of the necessary cadres of expert workers. The head engineer Ponomarev and his assistant Schacht turned out to be saboteurs, members of a counter-revolutionary organisation. But in spite of all this the proletariat, by engaging the aid of the most competent experts in the Union and from America, has gained a complete victory.

The reason is certainly not that—as the American engineer Calder said—the Russian workers can work better than any others when they want to. The American, German, or Belgian workers have more technical knowledge and experience than the Russian workers. But one thing is true: The victory was possible because the workers were willing. And they were willing, because they were not building for the capitalists, but for themselves, for the socialist country, for the interests of the international proletarian revolution.

THE CHILDREN'S MOVEMENT

Resolution of the Presidium of the E. C. Y. C. I. on Questions and Tasks of the Communist Children's Movement.

(Confirmed by the E. C. C. I.)

1. The Presidium of the E. C. Y. C. I. declares that at the present time the Communist children's movement is going through a serious crisis. This crisis is characterised mainly by continuous decline in the membership of the Communist Children's organisations in a number of the most important countries, by the isolation of the children's leagues and by the inability to satisfy the needs of children of the various elements and of various ages.

2. The causes of the crisis are: 1. An unmistakable misunderstanding which exists in the Y.C.L. of the character and tasks and concrete forms of work amongst children. Instead of bringing the children together on a large scale in the most varied forms, the children's organisation was built on almost the same lines as the Party and the Y. C. L., mechanically carrying over the forms of Party and group work, which inevitably led to a transformation of the children's organisations into a children's Communist Party. At the same time we find also restrictedly cultural work with outright social democratic tendencies. 2. Absolutely inadequate guidance and attention by the Y. C. L. and the Party in connection with the children's movement. The necessary cadres of tested leaders were not released by the League Committees of the Y. C. L., and prompt energetic measures were not taken to ward off the clearly maturing elements of the crisis in the children's movement. The resolutions adopted in this connection, even including the resolution of the November Plenum of the Y. C. L., were inadequate and even to some extent erroneous, so that they did not point out the way to improve the situation and therefore, only contributed to making conditions worse.

The crisis of the children's movement in a number of most important countries arose on the one hand in a situation of radicalisation of the working masses, general growth of the influence of the Communist movement and increase in the activity of the proletarian child masses and on the other hand under conditions of extensive development of the social democratic and bourgeois children's organisation. This contrast in development shows clearly that great mistakes have been made in our children's work.

3. The Presidium, therefore, considers it necessary to radically reorganise the Communist children's movement and transform it into a real Communist mass organisation of proletarian and working children.

The task of the Communist children's movement consists in making the broad masses of proletarian children understand their class situation and recognise the necessity for the class struggle, thus training them in a spirit of Communism on the basis of the participation of the children in the class struggle of the proletariat. All of this can occur only on the basis of the development of the widespread activity and self-sacrificing individual work of the children, utilising the various organisational forms and live methods of work and satisfying and organising the various needs of the different elements of proletarian children within the children's movement.

Consequently, it is entirely wrong to identify the attitude of the Communist children's organisation towards the mass of proletarian children and the existing mass organisations with the attitude of the Communist Parties towards the big mass

organisations (trade unions, Y. C. L., Cooperatives) etc., or with the attitude of the Y. C. L. to the so called transmission belts (sport and cultural organisations), for example, the view that special auxiliary children's organisations, such as Red Lancers, proletarian Boy Scouts, etc., should be built up side by side with the Communist children's movement, can only be considered as an expression of sectarianism.

4. The varied forms and methods of work among children must correspond to the various organisational forms applied to the masses of children under Communist influence. We must utilise all opportunities for organising the masses of children, i. e. establish school, sport, industrial, tourist, cultural, general educational, music organisations and such like, which even if they vary widely in character, nevertheless form a united Communist children's movement under the united leadership of the YCL and the Party, with common Communist principles and duties.

5. As a result of the varying capabilities and requirements of the children the nature of the work of the Communist children's movement must be many-sided. The work of the various organisations must be based on a common character according to the following guiding points: participation in the struggles of the adults, mobilisation of the child masses on the basis of children's demands around the general slogans of action, and adapting all activity to the understanding of the children.

Economic and school struggles of the proletarian children and all wage-earning children (for example against corporal punishment, for hot food, for school supplies and clothing, against reactionary teaching, against the application of disciplinary measures to revolutionary teachers etc.).

Struggles against national, religious and military training in and outside the schools.

Popularising the life and attainments of the children of the Soviet Union, and Socialist construction, contact with the children of the Soviet Union and other countries, popularising the experiences of common struggle, preparation for constant readiness to defend the Soviet Union.

Systematic work in the rival camp to disrupt its ranks and win over the proletarian children for the Communist children's movement.

All organisations must have common features, such as badges, oaths and regulations, which are suitable for all children. For all organisations the support of the struggle of the proletarian children of the schools and factories, as well as participation in the activities of the entire organisation, in the demonstrations and struggles of the Y. C. L. and the C. P. and also of the working class, distribution of the children's press, etc. must be made obligatory.

Contacts and exchange of experience between the organisations must be established and collective work must be carried on in the organisations themselves.

6. Communist children's organisations can be set up in factories, clubs, mass organisations of the adults and on a residential basis wherein strong leadership on the part of the party and the Y. C. L. must be assured. In the effort to reach the broadest possible masses of children we must utilise also the influence and the opportunities offered by the revolutionary mass organisations (Red Aid, W. I. R., trade unions, sport organisations, etc.). Therefore, insofar as we are not in a position to bring all workers' children directly into our organisation at once, the establishment of children's organisations and groups in these other organisations is permissible. These sections and groups must be considered as friendly organisations, and the way must be paved for unified leadership (through common agreements, common regulations, etc.). The question of the formal amalgamation of these organisations with our children's league can be worked out in individual cases according to the circumstances.

7. In connection with the tasks of the basic change in the children's movement, the entire system of leadership must be radically transformed and made elastic and many-sided so that a true leadership and development of the Communist children's Movement is assured. The following concrete measures are necessary:

a) Reorganisation of the Pioneer Bureau of the Y. C. L., transforming it into an organ of leadership over all organisations, which issues slogans at the proper moment, makes

use of experience and extends it, works out methods and character of the activity of the various organisations, organises the training of leaders and makes the immediate live support of the organisations its chief task. The bureau is to draw into its work specialists in the various fields, adult workers, mothers and members of the revolutionary workers organisations.

b) The active children must be drawn into this work on a large scale, their importance in the leadership is to be increased and special meetings, conferences, meets, courses, etc. are to be organised both for the movement as a whole and for the individual organisations.

c) The children's press must be developed in various forms on a broader scale, and the printing of children's papers must be guaranteed. Furthermore, artistic publications and fiction are to be issued for the children. In every country there be a uniform publication for the entire movement.

d) The reorganisation of the Communist Children's Movement calls for the providing of reliable Y. C. L. members. The Presidium of the Y. C. L. proposes to all C. C.s of the Leagues a mobilisation of League members for the work among children. Such leaders must be systematically trained in schools, correspondence courses, etc.

e) The Central Committees of the Communist Children's organisations in all countries must be strengthened. The instructors and representatives of the Y. C. L. must include instruction for the children's movement in their own activity. The Secretariat is instructed to take the necessary measures for carrying out this decision.

f) The work of the International Children's Bureau must absolutely be reorganised on the same principles. This work must be brought near to the masses in the Pioneer Leagues by a serious study of the various problems of the children's movement. The I. C. B. must work out before the world rally the main practical and organisational questions of the new line.

8. The Presidium of the Y. C. L. considers it necessary to carry on serious systematic work among the Communist Parents. The Presidium instructs the Secretariat to work out corresponding instructions for the Communist Parties in conjunction with the I. C. B. and the Org. Department of the C. I.

9. The mobilisation of the proletarian children in all countries on the occasion of the Rally and the Second International Congress must be made the starting point for carrying out the change in the work among children.

10. The Presidium instructs all League organisations to start on the reorganisation at once in the spirit of this resolution and to develop a discussion on this basis in the international press and in the Communist Children's Organisation on the practical questions of reorganisation, for the purpose of preparing for the international leaders conference which is to be held at the close of the Rally. On the basis of this discussion the international conference of the leaders of the Communist Children's Movement must adopt the necessary resolutions for giving concrete form to the present resolution.

TO OUR READERS!

The monthly subscription rates for the "Inprecorr" are as follows:

England	2 sh.
Germany	1.50 marks
Austria	2 sh.
Norway	1.50 crowns
Denmark	1.50 crowns
U. S. S. R.	1 rouble

For other countries the subscription rate is six dollars for one year.

Readers in the United States will please note that the sole agents for the "Inprecorr" in the U. S. A. are the **Workers Library Publishers, 39, East 125th Street, New York, N. Y.**, to whom all subscriptions should be sent. The **subscription rates in the U. S. A. are, 2 dollars for three months, 3.50 dollars for six months and 6 dollars for one year.**

The Business Manager.

XVI. Party Congress of the C.P.S.U.

The Political Report of the Central Committee to the XVI. Party Congress of the C.P.S.U.

Comrade J. Stalin's Address on 27th June 1930.

(Continued)

II. The Increasing Progress of the Building Up of Socialism and the Inner Situation of the Soviet Union.

I pass on to the inner situation in the Soviet Union.

As opposed to the capitalist countries, in which **economic crisis and growing unemployment** prevail, the inner situation of our country shows an increasing progress of national economy and a **progressive diminution** of unemployment. The tempo of big industrial development has been accelerated. Heavy industry has been strengthened. The socialist sector of industry has considerably increased. In agriculture a fresh force has grown up — the Soviet and collective farms. Two years ago we had a crisis in grain production, and were chiefly dependent on the small producers for grain supplies, but now the centre of gravity has been moved to the Soviet and collective farms, whilst the grain crisis may be regarded as essentially solved. The main masses of the peasantry have now finally turned towards the collective farms. The resistance of the kulaks has diminished. The inner situation in the Soviet Union is more firmly established.

This is the general outline of the inner situation of the Soviet Union at the present moment.

Let us examine the actual figures:

1. The Growth of National Economy as a Whole.

a) In 1926/27, that is, at the time of the XV. Party Congress, we had a gross production in the whole of our **agriculture** — including forestry, fishing, etc. — of 12,370 million pre-war roubles or 106.6 % of the pre-war level, in the following year, 1927/28, we had 107.2 %, in 1928/29 109.1 %, and in the present year, 1929/30 we shall reach, to judge by the development of agriculture, at least 113 to 114 % of the pre-war level.

We observe an uninterrupted, although comparatively slow, growth of agricultural production as a whole.

In 1926/27, at the time of the XV. Party Congress, the **gross production of all industry** — both small and large industry, and including the mills — amounted to 8641 pre-war roubles, or, 102.5 % of the pre-war level, in the next year, 1927/28 this had risen to 122 %, in 1928/29 to 142.5 %, and in the present year — to judge by the course taken by the development of industry — we shall reach at least 180 % of the pre-war level.

We have to record an enormously rapid growth of the production of industry as a whole.

b) In 1926/27, at the time of the XV. Party Congress, the **goods traffic** on the whole of our **railways** totalled 81.7 milliard ton kilometres, or 127 % of the pre-war level, in the following year — 1927/28 — this rose to 134.2 %, in 1928/29 to 162.4 %, and will increase in the current year — according to present data — to at least 193 % of the pre-war level. With respect to the new railway lines, these have been extended in the period under report — since 1927/28 — from 76,000 to 80,000 kilometres, equivalent to 136.7 % of the pre-war level.

c) If the status of the **trade turnover** in the country in 1926/27 is taken at 100 (31 milliard roubles), we find the increased turnover to amount to 124.6 % in 1927/28, to 160.4 % in 1928/29, and may estimate — to judge by all data — that

this will rise in the current year, 1929/30, to 202 %, or double the turnover of 1926/27.

d) If the **balances** of all our **credit institutions** on 1st October 1927 is taken at 100 (9173 million roubles), we find the increase up to 1st October 1928 to amount to 141 %, and up to 1st October 1929 to 201.1 %, or double the amount of 1927.

e) If the **state budget** of 1926/27 is taken at 100 (6371 million roubles), the increase by 1927/28 is 125.5 %, by 1928/29 146.7 %, and by 1929/30 204.4 %; this means that the budget of 1926/27 has been doubled (12,605 million roubles).

f) Our **foreign trade** (export, import) had reached 47.9 % of the pre-war level in 1926/27, rose by 1927/28 to 56.8 %, in 1928/29 to 67.9 %, and will, to judge by the data, attain at least 80 % of the pre-war level in 1929/30.

g) To sum up, we may place on record the following survey of the increase of the national income in the period of this report (the unaltered prices of 1926/27 being taken as standard). The data issued by the State Planning Commission show the national income in 1926/27 to have been 23,127 million roubles; in 1927/28 25,396 million roubles, an increase of 9.8 %; in 1928/29 28,596 million roubles, an increase of 12.6 %; in 1929/30 the national income, to judge by the data, will rise to no less than 34,000 million roubles, the increase during the past year being 20 %. The average annual increase in the three years under report is therefore 15 %.

When it is taken into account that the average annual increase of national income in such countries as the United States, England, Germany, etc., is not more than 3 to 8 %, it must be admitted that the national income of the Soviet Union is increasing at a **record speed**.

2. The Successes of Industrialisation.

In our country the growth of national economics does not proceed on anarchist lines, but runs in a definite direction, in the direction of industrialisation, with the aim of increasing the specific weight of industry in the total system of our national economy, with the aim of converting our country from an agrarian into an industrial country.

a) The dynamics of the proportions of all industry and all agriculture, seen from the standpoint of the specific weight of industry in the gross production of the whole national economy, are as follows for the period under report: Before the war the share taken by industry in the gross production of the national economy of our country amounted to 42.1 %, the share of agriculture to 57.9 %; in 1927/28 the share of industry was 45.2 %, that of agriculture 54.8 %; in 1928/29 the share of industry was 48.7 %, that of agriculture 51.3 %; in 1929/30 the share of industry — to estimate by all data — will amount to no less than 53 %, whilst the share falling to agriculture will be 47 %.

This means that the specific weight of industry is already beginning to preponderate over agriculture, and that we are on the eve of the conversion of the country from an **agrarian land** into an **industrial one** (Applause).

b) We find an even more decided preponderance in favour of industry when we regard the matter from the standpoint

of the specific weight of industry in the goods production of our national economy. In 1926/27 the share taken by industry in the goods production of our national economy amounted to 68.8 %, the share of agriculture to 31.2 %; for 1927/28 the corresponding figures are 71.2 for industry and 28.8 % for agriculture; for 1928/29 72.4 % for industry and 27.6 % for agriculture; and for 1929/30 — according to all data — 76 % for industry and 24 % for agriculture.

This unfavourable situation in agriculture is caused in part by the small peasant type of agriculture, producing few goods. It is obvious that this situation will change to a certain extent, in proportion as agriculture adapts itself to the Soviet and collective farm system, and in proportion as it increases its production of goods.

c) But the development of industry in general gives no complete idea of the tempo of industrialisation. In order to gain this complete idea, the dynamics of the relative proportions of heavy and light industry must be ascertained. Here the clearest sign of the growth of industrialisation is the steady increase in the share taken by the production of the means of production (heavy industry) in the total production of industry. In 1927/28 the share falling to the production of articles of consumption 72.8 %; in 1928/29 the share of the production of the means of production had risen to 28.7 % as compared with 71.3 %; in 1929/30 the share taken by the production of the means of production will increase, to judge by all data, to 32.7 % as compared with a 67.3 % production of articles of consumption.

If we do not take the whole of industry, but only the planned industry controlled by the Plan of the Supreme National Economic Council, embracing all the leading branches of industry, we find here the proportions of the production of the means of production and of articles of consumption even more favourable. In the planned industries the share falling to the production of the means of production in 1927/28 amounted to 42.7 % as compared with 57.3 %; in 1928/29 to 44.6 % as compared with 55.4 % and in 1929/30, as may be estimated from the data, the proportion will be at least 48 % as compared with 52 %.

The development of our national economy is going forward towards industrialisation, towards the consolidation and development of our own heavy industry.

This means that we have already laid the foundations of our economic independence, our heavy industry, and shall now continue to build.

3. The Dominant Position of Socialised Industry and Its Rate of Growth.

The development of our national economy is moving forward towards industrialisation. But what we need is not any kind of industrialisation. What we require is an industrialisation securing the growing dominance of the socialist forms of industry over small private industry and above all over its capitalist forms. The characteristic feature of our industrialisation consists of its being a socialist industrialisation, ensuring the victory of the socialised sector of industry over the private capitalist, the small trading and capitalist sector.

Now a few data on the growth of capital investment and on the gross production of the sectors:

a) A survey of the growth of capital investment of the sectors yields the following: **Socialised sector:** In 1926/27 1270 million roubles; in 1927/28 1614 million roubles; in 1928/29 2046 million; in 1929/30 4275 million. **Private trading and capitalist sector:** in 1926/27 63 million roubles; in 1927/28 64 million; in 1928/29 56 million; in 1929/30 51 million roubles.

This means, in the first place, that capital investment on the part of the socialised sector of industry has **more than tripled** in this time (335 %).

It means in the second place that the capital investments of the private economic and capitalist sector have **declined by one fifth** (81 %) in the same time.

The private economic and capitalist sector is living at the expense of old capital and is moving onward to decay.

b) A survey of the growth of the gross production of the sectors shows the following: **Socialised sector:** In 1926/27

11,999 million roubles; in 1927/28 15,389 million; in 1928/29 18,903 million; in 1929/30 24,740 million. **Private economic and capitalist sector:** in 1926/27 4043 million roubles; in 1927/28 3704 million; in 1928/29 3389 million; in 1929/30 3310 million roubles.

This means, firstly, that the gross production of the socialised sector of industry has **more than doubled** in three years (206.2 %).

It means, secondly, that the gross production of the industry of the private economic and capitalist sector has **sunk by almost a fifth** (18.9 %) in the same period.

If we consider, not the whole of industry, but only the **large scale industry** (census industry), taking this again in sectors, we find the following proportions between the socialised and the private sectors: The specific weight of the socialised sector in the production of the large scale industry of the country: in 1926/27 97.7 %; 1927/28 98.6 %; 1928/29 99.1 %; 1929/30 99.3 %. The specific weight of the private economic sector in the production of the large scale industry of the country: 1926/27 2.3 %; in 1927/28 1.4 %; in 1928/29 0.9 %; in 1929/30 0.7 %.

It will be seen that the capitalist elements have fallen to a very low level in large scale industry.

It is clear that the question of "Who whom?", the question of whether socialism is to defeat the capitalist elements in industry, or vice versa, has now been fundamentally answered in favour of the socialist forms of industry. It is finally and irrevocably answered (**Applause**).

c) The data on the tempo of development of the state industry controlled by the Supreme National Economic Council, during the period under report, are especially interesting. If we take the gross production of the socialist industry systematically planned by the Supreme National Economic Council for 1926/27 at 100, we find that in 1927/28 the total production of this industry had reached 127.4, in 1928/29 158.6, in 1929/30 209.8.

This means that the Supreme National Economic Council has **more than doubled**, within three years, the production of its systematically planned industry, which comprises all the main branches of industry and the whole of heavy industry.

It must be admitted that there is no other country in the world able to record such a speed of big industrial development.

This circumstance justifies us in speaking of the realisation of the Five-Year Plan in four years.

d) Some comrades are sceptical about the slogan: "Five-Year Plan in four years!". It is not long since that some comrades regarded the Five-Year Plan confirmed by the V. Soviet Congress as fantastic. Not to speak of the bourgeois writers who are simply beside themselves at the mere mention of the "Five-Year Plan". But what do we actually see, when we regard the Five-Year Plan from the standpoint of what has been accomplished in the first two years? What does the examination of the realisation of the Five-Year Plan, from the viewpoint of its optimal alternative, show us? It not only shows that we can accomplish the Five-Year Plan in four years, but it shows at the same time that in a number of branches of industry we can accomplish it in three or even two years. This may appear improbable to the sceptics in the opportunist camp. But it is a fact which it would be foolish and ridiculous to deny.

Judge for yourselves!

According to the Five-Year Plan, the **naphtha** industry was to supply products to the value of 977 million roubles yearly by 1932/33. In actual fact it is supplying already, in 1930, an output to the value of 809 million roubles, or 83 % of the production envisaged for 1932/33 by the Plan. Hence we shall fulfil the Five-Year Plan, as far as naphtha is concerned, in about two and a half years.

For the **peat industry** the Five-Year Plan lays down a production to the value of 122 million roubles for 1932/33. In actual fact its output is already, in 1929/30, something over 115 million roubles, or 96 % of the production laid down by the Five-Year Plan. Hence we shall accomplish the Five-Year Plan in the peat industry in two and a half years, if not earlier.

In accordance with the Five-Year Plan, **general machine building** is to supply products to the value of 2058 million roubles by 1932/33. But already, in 1929/30, it is supplying products to the value of 1458 million roubles, or 70 % of the output laid down for 1932/33 by the Plan. Hence we shall accomplish

the Five-Year Plan, in general machine building, in two and a half to three years.

According to the Five-Year Plan, the **building of agricultural machinery** is to reach a value of 610 million roubles by 1932/33. But in actual fact the output is already, in 1929/30, 400 million roubles, or something over 60 % of the production envisaged by the Plan for 1932/33. We shall therefore realise the Five-Year Plan, as far as the construction of agricultural machinery is concerned, in three years, if not earlier.

According to the Five-Year Plan, the production of the **electro-technical industry** is to reach a value of 896 million roubles by 1932/33. It is already, in 1929/30, supplying to the value of 503 million roubles, or something over 56 % of the production laid down by the Plan for 1932/33.

These are the unheard of tempi of development of our socialist industry.

We are advancing at an accelerated speed, and are out-distancing, technically and economically, the advanced capitalist countries.

e) This does not mean that with respect to the quantity produced we have reached in our industry the level of development of the industry of the advanced capitalist countries. No, it does not mean this by any means. The tempo of development of industry and the level of development of industry must not be confused with one another. Among us they are frequently confused by those who assume that since we have attained a tempo of development hitherto unheard of, we have already reached the level of industrial development of the advanced countries. But this is entirely wrong.

Let us take for instance the production of electric energy, in which we evince a very high tempo. Between 1924 and 1929 we have attained an increase in the production of electric energy by almost 600 %, whilst the United States have increased their production of electric energy by only 181 % in this time, Canada by 218 %, Germany by 241 %, Italy by 222 %. We have thus attained a tempo far exceeding the tempi of all other states. But if we take the level of the development of the production of electric energy in these countries, in 1929 for instance, and compare it with the level of development in the Soviet Union, the result is not very favourable for the Soviet Union. In spite of the unheard of development in the production of electric energy, this production had only reached 6465 million kilowatt hours in the Soviet Union by 1929, whilst the United States have 126,000 million kilowatt hours to show, Canada 17,628 million, Germany 33,000 million, Italy 10,350 million kilowatt hours, and so forth.

It will be seen that there is a colossal difference.

We are behind all these states, as regards the level of development.

Or let us take for instance the output of cast iron. If the output of 1926/27 (2.9 million tons) is taken at 100, we find that the output increased in the three years from 1927/28 to 1929/30 by 190 % (5.5 million tons), thus almost **doubling**. The tempo of development is therefore fairly rapid. But if we look at the matter from the standpoint of the level of the development of our output of cast iron, and compare this with the production of the advanced capitalist countries, the result is somewhat sorry. In the first place we do not reach and pass the pre-war level of cast iron production until the present year 1929/30. This in itself forces us to the inexorable conclusion that unless we further accelerate the speed of the development of our smelting works, the fate of our whole industrial production is endangered. With respect to the level of development in the cast iron industry in our country and in the West, the following are the figures: In the United States the output of cast iron in 1929 was 42.3 million tons; in Germany 13.4 million; in France 10.45 million tons; in Great Britain 7.7 million tons; but in the Soviet Union the total output of cast iron by the end of 1929/30 is only 5.5 million tons.

It will be seen that the difference is no small one.

We see that the level of development of our cast iron production falls behind that of all these states.

What does all this show?

It shows that:

1. The tempo of development of industry **must not be confused** with the level of that development,

2. We lag frightfully behind the advanced capitalist countries with respect to the level of development of our industry.

3. Nothing but a **further acceleration** of the tempo of development of our industry will give us the possibility of overtaking and outstripping the advanced capitalist countries, technically and economically.

4. Those people who chatter about the necessity of reducing the tempo of development of our industry, are enemies of socialism, agents of our class foes. **(Applause.)**

4. Agriculture and the Grain Problem.

I have referred above to the situation of agriculture as a whole, including forestry, fishery, etc., without dividing agriculture into its main divisions. If we now consider the most important branches of agriculture, for instance grain growing, livestock rearing, technical plant cultivation, we find conditions as follows, according to the data furnished by the State Planning Commission and the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, of the Soviet Union.

a) If we take the **area sown** with various grain sorts in 1913 at 100, the comparative figures for the areas under grain cultivation during the period of this report are as follows: 1926/27 96.9 %; 1927/28 94.7 %; 1928/29 98.2 %; and in the current year, 1929/30 — according to the data — 105.1 % of the pre-war level.

The fact of the falling off in the grain area in 1927/28 must receive our attention. This falling off was not due to a retrogression in agriculture, as assumed by the dolts of the Right opportunist camp, but by the ruination of the winter crops, to the extent of 7,700,000 hectares (20 % of the total winter sown crops of the Soviet Union).

If we take further the **gross production of grain** in 1913 at 100, we obtain the following: 1927: 91.9 %; 1928 90.8 %; 1929 94.4 %; and in 1930 — according to all data — 110 % of the pre-war standard.

The falling off of the gross output of grain in 1928 must also be given our attention. The explanation lies in the failure of the winter sown crops in Ukraine and North Caucasia.

With respect to the part of the gross production of grain **which reaches the markets** (sales outside of the village), the results are even more instructive. If we take the amount of grain reaching the markets in 1913 at 100, we find our market production to be 37 % in 1927, 36.8 % in 1928, 58 % in 1929, and in the current year, as the data lead us to anticipate, we shall attain at least 73 % of the pre-war level.

It will be seen that in regard to sown area and gross production of grain, we are reaching the pre-war standard, and shall go somewhat beyond it this year.

It will be further noted that with respect to the production of **market grain** we have by no means regained the pre-war standard, and fall behind this standard by 25 % even in this year.

These are causes of our grain difficulties, felt with special acuteness in 1928.

And here is the essence of the grain problem.

b) With respect to **livestock**, the records are similar, but the figures give more cause for uneasiness.

If we take the amount of livestock, including all kinds of animals, existing in 1916, at 100, the following are the comparative figures for the next years: 1927 we had 88.9 % horses, 114.3 % draught animals, 119.3 % sheep and goats, 111.3 % pigs; 1928 94.6 % horses, 118.5 % draught animals, 126 % sheep and goats, 126.1 % pigs; 1929 96.9 % horses, 115.6 % draught animals, 127.8 % sheep and goats, 103 % pigs; 1930 88.6 % horses, 89.1 % draught animals, 87.1 % sheep and goats, 60.1 % pigs, calculated on the standard of 1916.

You will observe — taking into account the figures for the last year — clear signs of a retrogression in livestock breeding.

In the matter of the **commodities** produced from livestock, the figures are even less satisfactory, especially with respect to meat and fat. If we take the gross production of meat and fat in each year at 100, we find the amount reaching the market to be 33.4 % in 1926, 32.9 % in 1927, 31.4 % in 1928, 29.2 % in 1929.

We have here the distinct symptoms of the instability and economic weakness of livestock production, which is small and yields few commodities.

Instead of outstripping the livestock standard of 1916, the past year shows a distinct tendency to fall behind it.

The grain problem, which we are already successfully solving, is thus followed by the meat supply problem, in a form requiring urgent solution.

c) A different prospect is opened out by a survey of the development of the cultivation of the **technical plants** required as raw materials for our industry. If we take the **area under cultivation** for technical plants in 1913 at 100, in 1927 **cotton** stands at 107.1 %, in 1928 131.4 %, in 1929 151.4 %, in 1930 217 % of the pre-war level; **flax** in 1927 86.6 %, in 1928 95.7 %, in 1929 112.9 %, in 1930 125 % of the pre-war level; **sugar beets** in 1927 106.6 %, in 1928 124.4 %, in 1929 125.8 %, in 1930 169 % of the pre-war level; **oil plants** in 1927 179.4 %, in 1928 230.9 %, in 1929 219.7 %, in 1930 at least 260 % of the pre-war level.

The figures referring to the **gross production** of technical plants are equally satisfactory. If we take the gross production of 1913 at 100, the figures for **cotton** are in 1928 110.5 %, in 1929 119 %, in 1930, according to all data, 182.8 % of the pre-war level; **flax** in 1928 71.6 %, in 1929 81.5 %, in 1930, according to all data, 101.3 % of the pre-war level will be reached; **sugar beets** in 1928 93 %, in 1929 58 %, in 1930, according to all data, the gross production will probably reach 139.4 % of the pre-war level; **oil plants** in 1928 161.9 %, in 1929 149.8 %, in 1930, according to all data, 220 % of the pre-war level will be attained.

With respect to technical plants the situation is therefore more favourable, apart from the destruction of the sugar beet crops in 1929 by a sort of butterfly.

In the sphere of technical plant cultivation serious fluctuations and symptoms of instability are possible and probable in the future, as in other branches of agriculture. This is due to the preponderance of the small farm, and the fluctuations and symptoms of instability will be similar to those shown in the above figures with reference to flax and oil plants, whose production is least influenced by the collective and Soviet farms.

We are therefore faced by the following agricultural problems:

1. The problem of the consolidation of the cultivation of technical plants by ensuring that the districts concerned are supplied with sufficient cheap grain products.
2. The problem of increasing livestock breeding and solving the meat supply problem, by means of securing cheap grain products and fodder for the districts concerned.
3. The problem of the final solution of the question of the grain supplies, this being the main question in agriculture at the present moment.

It will be seen from this that the grain problem is the most important link in the system of agriculture, and is the key to all the other problems.

And it will further be seen that the solution of the grain problem is the first of the tasks set by the agricultural problems.

But the solution of the grain problem, and therewith the accomplishment of an effectual step towards the advance of agriculture, means that the backwardness of our agriculture must be liquidated from top to bottom; it must be supplied with tractors and agricultural machinery, given fresh cadres of scientific workers, the labour productivity of agriculture must be increased, its production of commodities enlarged. Unless these pre-requisites are provided, the solution of the grain problem cannot even be dreamed of.

Is it possible for us to provide these pre-requisites on the basis of the small individual peasant farm? No, it is impossible. It is impossible, for the small peasant farm is not able to utilise the latest technical aids, nor to make its own of them; it is not able to increase the productivity of its labour to a sufficient degree. Only **one** path lies before us, the path towards the **consolidation** of agriculture, towards the growth of the great undertakings with up-to-date technical equipment. But the land of the Soviets cannot undertake the organisation of great **capitalist** undertakings. It can and must undertake only the organisation of great agricultural

undertakings of a **socialist** type, fitted with modern equipment. Our **Soviet and collective farms** are such undertakings.

Hence the task of founding Soviet farms, and the gathering together of the small peasant farms in great collectives is the **only** way to solve the problem of agriculture in general and the grain problem in particular.

This path has been pursued by the Party in its daily practical work since the XV. Party Congress, and especially since the first appearance of serious grain difficulties at the beginning of 1928.

It must be observed that this fundamental problem was placed on the agenda as practical task, by the Party, after the XV. Party Congress, before any serious grain difficulties had arisen. In the well known resolution of the XV. Party Congress on "Work in the Village" it is stated in so many words:

"In the present period the task of uniting and reorganising the small individual peasant farms in large collectives must be set the Party as its **main task** in the village."

It is perhaps not superfluous to adduce the corresponding passage from the report of the C.C. at the XV. Party Congress, in which the problem of the liquidation of the backwardness of agriculture on the basis of collectivisation is again stated definitely and decisively:

"Where is the solution? The solution is to be found in the transition of the small and scattered peasant farms to large and united undertakings on the basis of the common cultivation of the soil, in the transition to the collective cultivation of the soil on the basis of the new and more developed technics. The solution lies in inducing the small and smallest peasant farms, gradually but insistently, not by compulsion, but by example and conviction, to combine on the basis of the joint co-operative collective cultivation of the soil, utilising agricultural machinery and tractors, and employing scientific aids for the intensive methods of agriculture, in great agricultural undertakings. **There is no other solution.**"

5. The Turn of the Peasantry towards Socialism and the Tempo of Development of the Soviet and Collective farms.

The peasantry has not turned suddenly towards collectivisation. It is a turn which indeed could not be taken abruptly. It is true that the slogan of collectivisation was issued as early as the XV. Party Congress. But the proclamation of the slogan does not suffice to ensure that the masses of the peasantry follow it. To accomplish this **one** other point is necessary, and that is to convince the peasants themselves of the correctness of the slogan proclaimed, so that they adopt it as their own slogan. Therefore this turn has been gradually prepared. It has been prepared by the whole course of our development, by the whole development of our industry, above all of the industry producing machines and tractors for agriculture. It has been prepared by the policy of determined combat against the kulaks and by the course taken by our grain collecting campaign in their new forms in 1928 and 1929, placing the kulak undertakings under the control of the masses of the middle and poor peasantry.

This turn has been further prepared by the development of the agricultural co-operatives, which have taught the peasants of the individual farms the art of collective work. It has been prepared by the network of collective farms enabling the peasants to recognise the advantages of collective forms of economic undertakings as compared with individual undertakings. And finally, it has been prepared by the network of Soviet farms which are spread all over the Soviet Union, and are equipped with up-to-date technical aids, enabling the peasants to convince themselves of the powers and advantages of modern technics. It would be wrong to see in our Soviet farms solely a source of grain supplies. In reality the Soviet farms, with their new technical equipment, with the help which they give the peasantry, with their hitherto unknown economic range, are that leading force which has facilitated this turn among the masses of the peasantry, and led them onto the path of collectivisation.

Upon this basis the mass collectivisation movement of millions of poor and middle peasants has come into being,

beginning in the second half of 1929, and opening the period of the great transformation in the life of our country.

What measures were taken by the C.C., that it might meet this movement in a state of perfect preparedness, and might place itself at its head?

The measures of the C.C. have been along three lines: along the line of the organisation and financing of the Soviet farms, along the line of the organisation and financing of the collective farms, and finally along the line of the organisation of the construction of tractors and agricultural machinery, and of the provisioning of the village with these machines by means of machinery and tractor stations, by means of tractor gangs, etc.

a) As early as April 1928 the Political Bureau of the C.C. resolved upon the organisation of **new Soviet farms** within three to four years, and calculated that by the end of this term these Soviet farms would put at least 100 million poods of grain on the market. This decision was then confirmed by the Plenum of the C.C. The grain trust was organised, and received the order to carry out the decision. At the same time a decision was passed on the consolidation of the **old Soviet farms**, and on the extension of the cultivated area. The Central of the Soviet farms was founded, and was commissioned with the carrying out of this decision.

It must be observed that these decisions were made against the resistance of the opportunist section of our Party. It was suggested that the money invested in the Soviet farms was "thrown away". Criticism came too from "scientists" — supported by the opportunist elements of the Party — who regarded the organisation of large Soviet farms as impossible and senseless. But the C.C. kept to its line, and carried out its decisions in spite of all this.

In 1927/28 65.7 million roubles (apart from the short-term credits) were expended on financing the Soviet farms. In 1928/29 185.8 million roubles. Finally, in the current year, 856.2 million roubles. During the period under report 18,000 tractors with a total of 350,000 HP were placed at the disposal of the Soviet farms.

What have been the results of these measures?

In 1928/29 the **area cultivated** by the **Grain Trust** was 150,000 hectares, in 1929/30 1,060,000 hectares, in 1930/31 4,500,000 hectares, in 1931/32 the area will be 9,000,000 hectares, and in 1932/33, by the end of the Five-Year-Plan, 14 million hectares. In 1928/29 the sown area of the **Soviet Farms Central** was 430,000 hectares, in 1929/30 860,000 hectares, in 1930/31 it will reach 1,800,000 hectares, in 1931/32 2 million hectares, and in 1932/33 2,500,000 hectares. In 1928/29 the area cultivated by the **Association of the Soviet Farms of the Ukraine** amounted to 170,000 hectares, in 1929/30 280,000 hectares, in 1930/31 500,000 hectares, in 1932/33 it will be 720,000 hectares. The area cultivated (for grain) by the **Association of the Sugar Beet Soviet Farms** was 780,000 hectares in 1928/29, 820,000 hectares in 1929/30, 860,000 in 1930/31, and will reach 980,000 hectares in 1931/32 and 990,000 hectares in 1932/33.

This means in the first place that by the end of the Five-Years all Soviet farms, taken together, will be growing grain on an area one million hectares **greater** than that now cultivated in Canada. (Applause.)

With respect to the **gross production**, and the production of **market grain**, by the Soviet farms, the last few years have brought the following developments: In 1927/28 the gross production of all Soviet farms amounted to 9.5 million hundred-weights, of which 6.4 million cwt were market grain; in 1928/29 12.8 million cwt, of which 7.9 million cwt were market grain; in 1929/30, according to all data, 28.2 million cwt will be reached, of which 18 million cwt (108 million poods) will be market grain; in 1930/31 we shall have 71.1 million cwt, of which 61 million cwt (370 million poods) will be market grain, etc. etc.

These are the results already obtained and to be expected from the Soviet farming policy of our Party.

According to the decision of the Polbureau of the C.C. of April 1928, on the organisation of new Soviet farms, we should have received at least 100 million poods of market grain in 1931/32. In reality we shall receive from the new Soviet farms alone more than 200 million poods in 1931/32. This doubles the actual programme.

Those who ridiculed the decision of the Polbureau made nobody but themselves ridiculous. According to the Five-Year Plan confirmed by the Soviet Congress, we were to attain a cultivated area of 5 million hectares in the whole of the Soviet farms of all systems by the end of the five years. In reality we have already in this year reached a cultivated area of 3.8 million hectares, controlled by the Soviets, and next year, the third of the Plan, the area will be 8 million hectares.

This means that in three years we carry out and outdistance the Five-Year programme of Soviet farming development. According to the Five-Year Plan, we should have a gross production of grain in the Soviet farms of 54.3 million cwt. In reality the Soviet farms have already reached a gross production of grain of 28.2 million cwt, and next year we shall have 71.1 million cwt.

This means that in three years we carry out and outdistance the gross production of grain as laid down in the Five-Year Plan.

The Five-Year Plan in three years.

Now let the bourgeois journaille and their opportunist spokesmen cavil that it is impossible to realise and outstrip the Five-Year Plan of Soviet farming development in three years.

b) With regard to the development of the **collective farms**, the status is even more favourable.

In July 1928 the Plenum of the C.C. passed the following decision on collective farming development:

"The task of uniting and reorganising the small individual peasant farms in large collectives, set by the XV. Party Congress, is to be carried on steadily, in the form of **voluntary associations**, established on the basis of up-to-date technics, and representing a higher form of the grain farm, both in the sense of the socialist reorganisation of agriculture and in the sense of a radical increase of its productivity and production of commodities." (See resolution of the July Plenum of the C.C.: "The grain supply policy and its connection with the general economic position", 1928.)

Later on this resolution was confirmed by the decisions of the XVI. Party Conference and in a special resolution of the November Plenum of the C.C. in 1929, on the collective farming movement. In the second half of 1929, when the fundamental turn of the peasantry in the direction of the collective farm became observable, and when the middle peasantry joined the collective farms in masses, the Polbureau of the C.C. passed a special resolution on 5th January 1930: "The tempo of collectivisation and the measures of aid taken by the state for the development of the collectives."

In this decision of the C.C.:

1. The existence of a **turn on the part of the masses** of the peasantry towards the collective farms was placed on record, as also the possibility of out-distancing the Five-Year Plan of collective farming development by the spring of 1930.

2. The existence of the material and other prerequisites necessary for the **replacement of the kulak farms by collective production** was placed on record; in this connection the necessity of the transition from the policy of the restriction of the kulak system to the policy of the abolition of the kulak class was declared.

3. The perspective was laid down according to which the grain area to be jointly cultivated was to **increase to considerably over 30 million hectares** by the spring of 1930.

4. The Soviet Union was divided into three regional groups, and for each group the **general orientation given for the term** within which the collectivisation was to be completed.

5. The **methods of soil cultivation** were revised to the advantage of the collective farms, as also the forms in which agriculture is to be financed, and a credit of at least 500 million roubles allotted to the collective farms for the year 1929/30.

6. The **artel** was established as the **main form** of the collectivisation movement, as the **main link** in the collective farming system of the present time.

7. The opportunist elements in the Party, who sought to

hamper the collective farming movement by assertions of a lack of machines and tractors, were replied to.

8. Finally, the Party warned the workers against possible mistakes in the collectivisation movement, and against the danger incurred by the collectivisation movement being developed by a decree from above, this threatening to replace the real mass collective movement by a collectivisation game.

It must be observed that this resolution of the C. C. was received with more than unfriendliness by the opportunist elements of our Party. There was much whispering and talk to the effect that the C. C. had become a body of visionaries, and that it was "wasting" the people's money on "non-existent" collective farms. The Right elements rubbed their hands and were delighted in advance at the "certain" collapse. But the C. C. resolutely pursued its line, and followed it to its end, in spite of the continued Philistine giggling of the Right, and in spite of the deviations and fits of dizziness of the "Left".

In 1927/28 76 million roubles were expended for financing the collective farms, in 1928/29 170 million roubles, and finally in the current year 473 million roubles. Besides, 65 million roubles were given to the collectivisation funds, privileges were granted to the collective farms, increasing the financial resources of the collectives by a further 200 million roubles. The confiscated property of the kulaks was transferred to the collective farms to the value of over 400 million roubles. No fewer than 30 000 tractors with a total horse power of more than 400 000 were secured for the use of the collective farms, apart from the 7000 tractors of the Tractor Central in the service of the collective farms, and apart from the help given by the tractors belonging to the Soviet farms. In this year the collective farms have received aid in the form of 10 million cwt. (61 million poods) of seed corn. Finally, immediate organisational aid has been given the collectives by the creation of a basis of machine gangs, numbering over 7000, and utilising no fewer than 1 300 000 horses.

What have been the results of these measures?

In 1927 the area cultivated by the collectives was 0,8 million hectares, in 1928 1,4 million hectares, in 1929 4,3 million hectares, in 1930 at least 36 million hectares, including summer and winter crops.

This means, firstly, that in the first three years the grain area of the collective farms has increased by more than forty times. (Applause.)

It means, secondly, that our collective farms now possess a cultivated area as large as that of France and Italy together. (Applause.)

With respect to the gross grain production and the market grain production, the following are the figures: in 1927 the collective farms yielded 4,9 million cwt. of grain, of which 2 million cwt. were market grain; in 1928 8,4 million cwt., of which 3,6 million cwt. were market grain; in 1929 29,1 million cwt., of which 12,7 million cwt. were market grain; in 1930, according to all data, we shall have 256 million cwt. (1550 million poods), of which at least 82 million cwt. (more than 500 million poods) will be market grain.

It must be admitted that in no other branch of our industry, which is developing at a sufficiently rapid rate in general, is there such an unheard of rapidity of advance to be recorded as in the collective farms.

What do all these figures signify?

They signify, above all, that the gross production of grain in the collective farms has increased more than fiftyfold within three years, and the production of market grain by more than fortyfold.

These figures signify, secondly, that we have the possibility of obtaining from the collectives more than one half of the total market grain of the country.

Thirdly, these figures signify that the fate of agriculture and its leading problems will be decided from now onwards, not by the individual undertakings, but by the collective and Soviet farms.

Fourthly, these figures show that the process of the liquidation of the kulak as class is going ahead among us with full steam.

Finally, these figures signify that economic shiftings have already taken place in the country, fully justifying us in claiming that we have succeeded in leading the village into the new path, the path of collectivisation, and have thereby secured

the successful building up of socialism, not only in the city, but in the village.

The Polbureau of the C. C. in its resolution of 5th January 1930, laid down the programme of cultivated acreage for the collective farms for the spring of 1930. The area to be thus cultivated on socialised lines was fixed at 30 million hectares. In actuality we have cultivated 36 million hectares, exceeding the programme laid down by the C. C.

Again those who ridiculed the decision of the C. C. made only themselves ridiculous. Neither petty bourgeois anarchy nor the mistakes of the collectivisation movement have aided the opportunist chatters of our Party.

According to the Five-Year Plan, the collective farms are to be cultivating 20,6 million hectares of land by the end of the five years. But in reality we have already reached 36 million hectares.

This means that we have exceeded the Five-Year programme of collective farming progress, within two years, by more than one and a half times. (Applause.)

According to the Five-Year Plan, by the end of the five years the gross grain production of the collectives is to be 190,5 million cwt. In reality we shall attain in this year a gross production of grain by the collective farms of 256 million cwt.

This means that within two years we have exceeded the Five Year programme of collective grain production by more than 30%.

The Five-Year Plan in two years. (Applause.)

And now the opportunist gossips may assert if they like that it is impossible to carry out and outstrip the Five-Year Plan of collective farming development within two years.

6. The Improvement of the Material and Cultural Situation of the Workers and Peasants.

We see, therefore, that the gradual growth of the socialised sector, both in the sphere of industry and in the sphere of agriculture, is a fact admitting of no doubt.

What can this mean from the standpoint of the material position of the workers?

It means that therewith the foundations are already laid for the fundamental improvement of the material and cultural position of the workers and peasants.

Why, and in what manner?

Firstly, because the growth of the socialised sector implies, above all, the diminution of the exploitive elements in town and country, a lessening of their specific weight in national economy. And this means that the share of the workers and peasants in the national income is bound to increase steadily at the expense of the share of the exploiting classes.

Secondly, because a growth of the socialised sector means that that part of the national income hitherto falling to the exploiting classes remains in the productive process from now onwards, and is employed to increase production, to build new works and factories, to improve the lives of the workers. And it means that the number and power of the working class must increase, whilst unemployment decreases and is absorbed.

Finally, because the growth of the socialised sector, inasmuch as it leads to an improvement of the material situation of the working class, means a gradual increase of the receptive powers of the home markets, a growth of the demand for industrial products on the part of the workers and peasants. And this means that the growth of the inner markets will outdistance the growth of industry itself, and will urge this forward to uninterrupted expansion.

All these and similar circumstances lead to the uninterrupted improvement of the material and cultural situation of the workers and peasants.

a) We begin with the question of the numerical growth of the working class and the lessening of unemployment.

Whilst in 1926/27 the number of wage earners (without unemployed) was 10 990 000, by 1927/28 it had risen to 11 456 000, by 1928/29 to 11 997 000, and in 1929/30, according to all data, it will reach at least 13 129 000. Of these the number engaged in manual work (including agricultural and seasonal workers) counted 7 069 000 in 1926/27, 7 404 000 in 1927/28, 7 758 000 in 1928/29, and 8 533 999 in 1929/30. Of these

the workers employed in large-scale industry (not including employees) counted 2 439 000 in 1926/27, 2 632 000 in 1927/28, 2 858 000 in 1928/29, and 3 029 000 in 1929/30.

This means that we have before us a steady growth of the numbers of the working class, in which the proportion of the number of persons working for wages amount to 19.5% in the three years, and the proportion of the growth of the number of persons performing manual labour forms however 20.7% of the 24.2% increase in the number of industrial workers.

Let us pass to the question of **unemployment**. It must be said that in this sphere much confusion exists both in the People's Commissariat of Labour and in the Central Council of the Trade Unions of the Soviet Union. On the one hand the data issued by these institutions show that we have about a million unemployed, 14.33% of which are the least skilled workers, whilst about 73% are persons performing the so-called intellectual work and not qualified workers, the greater part of these last being women and youths who have nothing to do with production. On the other hand, we are suffering from a frightful shortage of skilled labour, the labour exchanges fail to satisfy to 80% the demand made by our undertakings for workers, and we are therefore forced to re-school entirely unqualified workers, with the utmost rapidity, literally in passing, and to transform these into qualified workers, in order to meet even the most urgent demands of our works and factories. It is difficult to find a way through this confusion. One thing is however clear, and that is that our unemployed do not form a **reserve** army — and still less a **permanent** reserve army — of unemployed, for our industry. What then? Even the data of the People's Commissariat of Labour show that in comparison with last year, the number of unemployed has **sunk** at the present time by more than 700 000. This means a diminution of unemployment by more than 42% by 1st May of this year.

This is a further result of the growth of the socialist sector of our national economy.

b) We arrive at an even more impressive result if we regard the matter from the standpoint of the distribution of national income among the classes. The question of the distribution of the national income among the classes is a fundamental one from the standpoint of the material and cultural situation of the workers and peasants. It is not for nothing that the bourgeois economists of Germany, Great Britain, and the United States are striving to confuse this question to the advantage of the bourgeoisie, by means of the publication of their "completely objective" researches in this direction.

According to the data issued by the German State Statistics Office, the share falling to wages out of Germany's national income amounted to 70% in 1929, the share of the bourgeoisie being 30%.

According to the data of the Federal Trade Commission, and of the state office for economic research, the share falling to the workers of the United States of the national income amounted to something over 54% in 1923, the share of the capitalists being something over 45%. And finally, according to the statements of the economists Boley and Stamp, the workers' share of Great Britain's income in 1924 was something under 50%, and the share of the capitalists something over 50%.

The results of these researches must however not be accorded full credence, for not only sins of a purely economic nature are committed in the course of these researches, but sins of another kind, aiming at concealing or giving a smaller appearance to the incomes of the capitalists, and in part at puffing up the incomes of the workers, and making these appear greater, by means of counting to the workers many officials receiving enormous salaries. And this apart from the fact that these investigations frequently ignore the incomes of the farmers and of the whole of the rural capitalists.

Comrade Varga has subjected these data to a critical analysis. It appears that the share of national income falling to the workers in town and country who do not exploit foreign labour power, is 55% in Germany, 54% in the United States, 45% in Great Britain; but the share of the capitalists is in Germany 45%, in the United States 46%, in Great Britain 55%.

This is the state of affairs in the greatest capitalist countries.

What is the status in the Soviet Union?

The data of the State Planning Commission show the following:

a) The share falling to the **workers and working peasants not exploiting foreign labour**, of our total national income, amounted in 1927/28 to 75.2% (of this the share of the city and rural workers formed 33.3%), in 1928/29 to 76.5% (of this the share of the city and rural workers formed 33.2%), in 1929/30 77.1% (of this the share of the city and rural workers formed 33.5%).

b) The share falling to the **kulaks and city capitalists** amounted in 1927/28 to 8.1%, in 1928/29 to 6.5%, in 1929/30 to 1.8%.

c) The share falling to the **home workers**, most of whom belong to the working class, amounted to 6.5% in 1927/28, to 5.4% in 1928/29, to 4.4% in 1929/30.

d) The share falling to the **state sector**, whose revenues are the revenues of the working class and the working masses, amounted in 1927/28 to 8.4%, in 1928/29 to 10%, in 1929/30 to 15.2%.

e) Finally, the share falling to **other categories** (pensioners are here referred to) amounted in 1927/28 to 1.8%, in 1928/29 to 1.1%, in 1929/30 to 1.5%.

We therefore see that whilst in the advanced capitalist countries the share taken of the national income by the exploiting classes amounts to about 50%, and even exceeds this at times, in the Soviet Union the exploiting class does not receive more than 2% of the national income.

This explains the impressive fact that in the United States, in 1922, as the American writer **Denney** points out, one per cent of the owners concentrate in their hands 59 per cent of all national wealth, and in Great Britain, in 1920/21, as this same **Denney** observes, less than 2 per cent of all owners possessed 64 per cent of the total national wealth. (See **Denney's** booklet: "America conquers England".)

Can such things occur among us in the Soviet Union, in the land of the Soviets? It is clear that is impossible. In the Soviet Union there have long been no such "owners", nor can there be.

But if in the Soviet Union, only about 2% of the national income falls to the exploiting class, what becomes of the rest of the national income?

It is clear that this remains in the hands of the workers and working peasantry.

This is the source of the power and the authority of the Soviet power among the millions of the working class and the peasantry.

This is the basis of the systematic growth of the material welfare of the workers and peasants of the Soviet Union.

c) Seen in the light of these decisive facts, the systematic increase of the real wages of the workers, the growth of the budget of the social insurance of the workers, the increased aid accorded to the poor and middle peasant farms, the greater grants for the building of houses for the workers, for the improvement of the worker's conditions of living, for the protection of mothers and infants, and in addition the steady increase of the population and the steady decrease of mortality, especially infant mortality, in the Soviet Union, are perfectly comprehensible.

It is for instance a well known fact the **real wages** of the workers, when we take into account the social insurance and the deductions from profits in favour of the funds for the improvement of the workers' standard of living, have increased by 167% as compared with the pre-war level. The social insurance budget of the workers alone has increased in the last three years from 980 million roubles in 1927/28 to 1400 million roubles in 1929/30. During the last three years (1927/28 to 1929/30) 494 million roubles have been expended on the protection of mothers and infants. In the same period 204 million roubles have been spent on pre-school training (kindergartens, creches, etc.). 1880 million roubles have been expended for the building of workers' houses.

This does not by any means signify that every necessary step has already been taken towards a decided increase of real wages, or that it would be impossible to raise the real wages to a higher level. That this has not been done is the fault of the bureaucracy of our apparatus of supplies in general, and of the bureaucracy of the cooperative societies

in particular. According to the data of the State Planning Commission, the socialised sector embraced more than 99 % of the wholesale trade, and more than 89 % of the retail trade, of inland commerce, in 1929/30. This means that the cooperatives are systematically supplanting the private sector, and are becoming monopolists in the field of commerce. This is of course an excellent thing. But it is bad that in many cases this monopoly is detrimental to the consumers. The cooperative societies, although almost monopolising trade, prefer to supply the workers with the more "profitable" goods bringing in larger gains, (fancy goods, etc.), and avoid supplying the less "profitable" goods, even though these are more needed by the workers (agricultural products). Hence the workers find themselves obliged to cover about 25 % of their requirements in agricultural products by recourse to the private markets, thereby paying higher prices. I need not refer further to the fact that the apparatus of the cooperatives concerns itself chiefly about the balance, and is therefore slow in approaching the question of the reduction of retail prices, in spite of the categorical instructions of the leading centrals. We see that in this case the cooperatives do not function as a socialist sector, but as an individual sector infected by the spirit of the Nepman. It is a question who needs such cooperatives, and what benefit the workers derive from the monopolist position of the cooperative societies, if these fail to fulfil the task of decidedly improving the real wages of the workers?

That in spite of this the real wages continue to rise steadily in the Soviet Union from year to year, shows that our structure, our system of distributing the national income, and our whole attitude with respect to wages, are such that they are able to paralyse and cover all and any minus caused by the cooperative societies.

When we add to this circumstance a number of other factors, for instance the extension of the rôle played by the public dining rooms, the cheapening of the workers' dwellings, the enormous numbers of stipends paid to workers and workers' children, the work accomplished in cultural advance, etc., we may state boldly that the raising of the wages of the workers is taking place in a much higher degree than might be inferred from the statistics of some of our institutions.

All this taken into consideration, and besides this the transition of more than 830,000 industrial workers (33.5 %) to the seven hour day, the transition of more than 1½ million industrial workers (64.4 %) to the five-day week, the existence of an extensive network of convalescent homes, sanatoria, and health resorts for the workers, where more than 1,700,000 workers have been able to recuperate within the last three years, all this has created a situation in the work and life of the working class which offers us the opportunity of forming a new generation of workers, healthy and rejoicing in life, able to increase the power of the land of the Soviets to its due strength, and to protect it against the assaults of its enemies. (Applause.)

With respect to the aid given the peasantry, both to the individual peasants and those joining the collectives, and including the help given to poor peasants, the total of this aid within the last three years (1927/28 to 1929/30) is no less than 4 million roubles, granted from the state budget and in the form of credits. It is a well-known fact that in seed corn alone the peasants have received no less than 154 million poods of grain in these three years.

It is not to be wondered at that in general our peasants and workers do not live badly, and that the mortality of the population has sunk, in comparison to the pre-war level, by 36 % in general and by 42.5 % among infants, whilst the **yearly increase** of our population is more than 3 millions. (Applause.)

As regards the cultural position of the workers and peasants, we have accomplished certain achievements, but these are too inconsiderable to satisfy us in any way. Apart from the workers' clubs of every description, the reading huts, the lending libraries, and the centrals for the liquidation of illiteracy, reaching 10½ million human beings in this year, our cultural and educational institutions are the following: During the current year the elementary schools are attended by 11,638,000 scholars; the secondary schools by 1,945,000; the industrial technical schools, the transport service and agricultural schools, the courses of instruction in production for mass qualification, by 333,100; technical colleges and the

vocational schools of like rank; the universities and the technical high schools, by 190,400. All this has made it possible for the percentage of those able to read and write in the Soviet Union to be increased to 62.6 % as compared with the 33 % of before the war.

What is most important at the present time is the transition to obligatory elementary instruction. I say "most important", for this transition means a decisive step in the work of the cultural revolution. It is however high time for us to take this step, for we have already all that is needed for the organisation of general elementary instruction in the overwhelming majority of the regions of the Soviet Union. Up to the present we have been forced "to save, even on the schools", in order "to save and restore heavy industry" (Lenin). But now we have restored heavy industry, and are advancing it. Hence the time has come when we must take up the task of organising general obligatory elementary instruction.

I believe that the Party Congress will do right if it makes a clearly defined and perfectly categorical decision on this matter. (Applause.)

7. Difficulties of Growth, Struggle of the Classes, and Offensive of Socialism on the Whole Front.

I have spoken of our achievements in the development of our national economy. I have spoken of our achievements in the sphere of industry, of agriculture, of the reconstruction of the whole of our national economy on the basis of socialism. And last I spoke of our achievements in the task of improving the material situation of the workers and peasants.

It would however be an error to suppose that these achievements have been won "quietly and easily", so to speak in the natural course of events, without any special efforts or exertion of will, or without struggles and convulsions. In reality we have gained these achievements in the course of a determined struggle against difficulties, and have undergone many a serious and lengthy struggle in the overcoming of these difficulties.

These difficulties are discussed among us by everybody. But not everybody seriously considers the nature of the difficulties. And yet the problem of the character of the difficulties is of the utmost importance. Hence the question arises: What are the characteristic features of our difficulties, what hostile forces are concealed behind them, and how are we to overcome these?

a) A characterisation of our difficulties must take into consideration at least the following circumstances.

First we must take into account that our present difficulties are those of the **reconstruction period**. What does this mean? It means that they differ fundamentally from the difficulties of the **restoration period** of our economy. During the restoration period the work in hand consisted of utilising the old works and factories to the utmost, and in aiding agriculture on its old basis. But now it is a matter of reconstructing both industry and agriculture from top to bottom by means of changing their technical basis, and furnishing them with modern technical equipment. This means that we are confronted with the task of rebuilding the whole technical basis of our national economy. And this demands fresh reliable investments in national economy, and fresh and experienced cadres of workers capable of utilising the achievements of up-to-date technics, and of carrying them further.

Secondly, it must be taken into account that the reconstruction of national economy in our country is not confined to a rebuilding of its technical basis, but on the contrary involves at the same time a reorganisation of social economic relations. I refer to agriculture in particular. In industry, already assembled and socialised, the technical reconstruction finds its social economic basis ready in all essentials. Here the chief task of reconstruction is to aid as far as possible the process of supplanting the capitalist elements in industry by socialist. In agriculture matters are not so simple. The reconstruction of the technical basis of agriculture pursues, it need not be said, the same aims. But the peculiarity of our agriculture lies in the preponderance of the small peasant farm, unable to make use of the new technics; this means that a reconstruction of the technical basis of our agriculture is

impossible without the simultaneous reconstruction of the old social economic structure, without the combination of the small farms in large collectives, without digging up the very roots of capitalism in agriculture. It is easily comprehensible that these circumstances are bound to complicate our difficulties, and our work in overcoming these difficulties.

Thirdly, it must be taken into account that our activities towards the socialist reconstruction of our national economy, tearing apart all the old ties of capitalism, and turning topsy-turvy all the forces of the old world, are bound to arouse the desperate resistance of these forces. Facts show this to be the case. The malicious damage committed by the **bourgeois intelligentsia** in every branch of our industry, the brutal struggle of the **kulaks** against the collective forms of economics in the village, the sabotage of the measures of the Soviet power by the **bureaucratic elements** of the apparatus, who represent an agency of the class enemy—these are at the present time the main forms of the resistance of a class becoming extinct in our country. It is clear that these circumstances cannot facilitate our work towards the reconstruction of our national economy.

Fourthly, we must take into account that the resistance of the class thus dying out in our country is not carried on isolated from the outer world, but receives the support of the capitalists all round. The capitalist surroundings mean that the Soviet power is encircled by hostile class forces, ready to give both moral and material support to the enemies of the Soviet Union within the country itself, ready to organise either a financial blockade or a military intervention as occasion may offer. It has been proved that the acts of damage committed by our specialists, the anti-Soviet actions of the Kulaks, the attacks made by arson and infernal machines on our undertakings and buildings, have been subsidised and instigated from outside. The imperialist world has no wish to see the Soviet Union flourishing, and attaining a position enabling it to overtake and out-distance the advanced capitalist countries. Therefore it aids the forces of the old world in the Soviet Union. It is again comprehensible that this circumstance too cannot serve to facilitate our reconstructive work.

The characterisation of our difficulties would however not be complete without due consideration of still another circumstance. This relates to the special nature of these difficulties. It relates to the fact that our difficulties are not those of **decay** or **stagnation**, but of **growth**, of **progress**, of **forward movement**. This means that our difficulties are fundamentally different from those of the capitalist countries. When difficulties are spoken of in the United States, difficulties of **decay** are referred to, for America is passing through a crisis at the present time, a crisis of economic decline. When difficulties are spoken of in England, they are difficulties of **stagnation**, since for several years England's economy has stagnated, that is, its forward movement stagnates. But when we speak of our difficulties, we are not referring to either a decline or a stagnation of our development, but to the **growth** of our powers, their **upsurge**, the **forward movement** of our economy. How many points shall we **advance** by a certain term, to **what extent** shall we increase production, how many **more** hectares of land shall we cultivate, how many months **earlier** shall we complete industrial undertakings and railways, than we had planned — these are the questions we are thinking of when we speak of difficulties. Consequently our difficulties differ from those of, let us say, America or England, in being difficulties of **growth**, of **advancement**.

And what does this mean? It means that our difficulties **contain in themselves the possibility of their solution**. It means that the characteristic feature of our difficulties consists of the fact that they themselves furnish the basis for their solution.

What is the final result of all this?

Above all, the result is that our difficulties are not trifling and accidental "disagreements", but difficulties of the class struggle.

Secondly, the result is that our class foes lie in ambush behind our difficulties, that these difficulties are complicated by the desperate resistance of the classes condemned to extinction in our country, by the support given to these classes from outside, by the existence of bureaucratic elements in our own institutions, by the lack of faith and ossification in some strata of our Party.

Thirdly, the result is that the overcoming of the difficulties requires above all that the attacks of the capitalist elements be repulsed, their resistance broken, and the path therewith cleared for a rapid advance.

And finally, the result is that the very character of our difficulties, since these are difficulties of **growth**, gives us the **possibilities** of repulsing our class enemies.

But if these **possibilities** are to be utilised and **realised**, and employed to break the resistance of our class enemies and to overcome the difficulties, only **one** means can be used: the organisation of the **offensive** against the capitalist elements **on the whole front**, and the isolation of the opportunist elements in our own ranks, who disturb our attack, rush in a panic from one extreme to another, and sow doubt of our victory in the Party. (**Applause.**)

There is no other means.

Only people who have lost their heads can seek a solution in the childish formula of Comrade Bukharin, of the peaceful merging of capitalist elements in socialism. Our course of development does not run, and never has run, according to Comrade Bukharin's formula. Our development has been, and continues to be, in accordance with Lenin's formula of: "Who — whom?" Shall we defeat and crush the exploiters, or will they defeat and crush us, the workers and peasants of the Soviet Union — this is the question, Comrades.

Therefore — the **organisation of the socialist attack along the whole front** — this is the task that sprang into being for us when we took up the work for the reconstruction of our **whole** national economy.

And it was thus that the Party interpreted its mission when it organised the offensive against the capitalist elements of our country.

b) Is an offensive thinkable while the Nep exists, especially an offensive along the whole front?

There are some who believe that the offensive is incompatible with the Nep, the offensive is in itself a retreat, the Nep must be abolished in so far as the retreat has been brought to a halt. It need not be said that this is a piece of foolishness, a foolishness originating either with the Trotzkysts, who have not grasped Leninism and believe that they could abolish the Nep "in a twinkling", or with the Right opportunists who have grasped as little of Leninism and believe that they can bargain for the renunciation of the offensive by means of talk about the "threatened abolition of the Nep". Had the Nep been exhausted with the retreat, Lenin would not have declared at the XI. Party Congress, when the Nep had been carried out among us with perfect consistency: "The retreat is ended". Did not Lenin declare simultaneously, when speaking of the end of the retreat, that we intend to maintain the Nep "seriously and for a long time?" The mere putting of this question suffices to reveal the complete hollowness of the chatter about the incompatibility of the Nep and the offensive. It is a fact that the Nep presupposes not only the **retreat** and the permitting of a revival of private trade, the permitting of a revival of capitalism under the security of the control of the state (initial stage of the Nep). It is a fact that the Nep simultaneously presupposes at a certain stage, the development of the **offensive** of socialism against the capitalist elements, the **restriction** of the sphere of activity of private trade, the relative and absolute **limitation** of capitalism, the growing **preponderance** of the socialised sector over the non-socialised, the victory of socialism over capitalism (present stage of the Nep). The Nep was introduced to aid the victory of socialism over the capitalist elements. When passing forward to the offensive on the capitalist elements, the circulation of commodities and the traffic in money still exist, but we definitely abolish the initial stage of the Nep, by means of developing its next stage, the present stage of the Nep, which is its last.

In 1922, one year after the introduction of the Nep, Lenin said:

"We are drawing back, but are doing this in order to gain a start for an even greater spring. Now, under this condition, we have retreated in the carrying out of our New Economic Policy. Where and how we shall have to rearrange our ranks, adapt ourselves, reorganise ourselves, in order to take up our determined advance, after the retreat, we do not yet know. In order to carry out all these actions in a normal manner, we must, as the

proverb says, make one hundred trials before deciding once." (Vol XVIII, second part, p. 103. Russian.)

This is sure! The question is now: Has the time already come for passing forward to the offensive, the moment ripe for the offensive? In the same year, 1922, Lenin spoke in another place of the necessity of:

"Joining the ranks with the masses of the peasants, with the working peasantry, and to begin the advance essentially and infinitely more slowly than we had intended, so that the whole mass actually moves with us . . . Then when the hour comes there will be such an acceleration of this movement, as we do not even venture to dream of at this moment." (Vol. XVLLL, second part, pp 29/30. Russian.)

It is always the same question: Has the time already come for such an acceleration of the movement, for the acceleration of the tempo of our movement; did we choose the right moment when we passed on to a determined attack along the whole front in the second half of 1929?

The Party has already given a clear and definite reply to this question.

Yes. The moment has come.

Yes. The Party chose the right moment to pass forward to the attack along the whole front.

This is shown by the growing activity of the working masses, and the hitherto unexampled growth of the authority of the Party among the million masses of the workers.

This is shown by the growing activity of the poor and middle peasant masses and the determined turn taken by these masses towards the organisation of collective farms.

This is shown by our achievements both in the development of industry and in the development of the Soviet farms and collectives.

This is shown by the fact that we have now the possibility of not only replacing kulak production by the production of the Soviet and collective farms, but of widely exceeding kulak production.

This is shown by the fact that we have essentially solved the grain problem and have accumulated certain grain reserves, by means of transferring the preponderance of the production of market grain from the sphere of individual production to that of the Soviet and collective farms.

We find here the proof that the Party chose the right moment to take up the offensive all along the line, and to advance the slogan of the liquidation of the kulak as class.

What would have happened had we lent an ear to the Right opportunists of Comrade Bukharin's group, if we had renounced the offensive, throttled the speed of industrial development, hampered the development of the collective and Soviet farms, and depended on the individual peasant farms?

Certainly we should have shattered our industry, annihilated the socialist reconstruction of agriculture; we should have remained without corn, and have smoothed the rule of the kulak. We should have been left with our hopes destroyed.

What would have happened if we had lent an ear to the "Left" opportunists of the Trotzky-Zinoviev group, and had opened the offensive in 1926/27 at a time when we possessed no possibility of replacing kulak production by that of our Soviet and collective farms?

Certainly we should have come to grief in this undertaking, we should have demonstrated our weakness, strengthened the position of the kulak and of all the capitalist elements, thrown the middle peasant into the arms of the kulak, destroyed our socialist structure, and found ourselves without grain. We should have been left with shattered hopes.

The result would have been the same.

It is not for nothing that our workers say: "If you go to the 'Left', you come to the Right." (Applause.)

Some comrades believe that in the offensive of socialism the reprisals are of decisive importance, and that unless the reprisals increase there is no real offensive.

Is this right? Of course it is not.

The reprisals are a necessary element of the offensive, but they are an auxiliary and not a leading element. Under our present conditions the most important point in the offensive of socialism is the acceleration of the rate of development of our industry, the acceleration of the rate of development in our

Soviet and collective farms, the acceleration of the rate of the economic supplanting of capitalist elements in town and country, of the mobilisation of the masses against capitalism. It is possible to arrest and banish dozens and hundreds of thousands of kulaks, but if the necessary steps are not taken at the same time to accelerate the establishment of the new forms of economics, to replace the old capitalist forms by new ones, and to uproot and liquidate the forms to which the kulak owes his existence, then the kulak system will arise and grow once more.

Others believe that the offensive is a blind advance without proper preparation, without regroupings of forces during the offensive, without a consolidation of the positions already won, without a utilisation of the reserves for the development of the successes; and when symptoms are observable, for instance, of a return current of a part of the peasants out of the collectives, then this means that we have already the "ebb-tide" of the revolution, the decline of the movement, a stagnation of the offensive.

Is this right? Of course it is not right.

In the first place no offensive can be conducted, even the most successful one, without some breaches or too hasty actions at some sections of the front. To use such factors in support of the assertion that the offensive is becoming stronger, or is a failure, shows a lack of comprehension of the nature of the offensive.

In the second place, there can be no **successful** offensive without regroupings of forces during the attack itself, without the firmer establishment of the positions won, without the utilisation of the reserves for the development of the success gained and for the completion of the offensive—without this there never has been a successful offensive. A blind assault, ignoring these conditions, must inevitably drive the offensive into empty space, and condemn it to failure. The blind assault is the death of the offensive. The many lessons taught by our civil war are ample proof of this.

In the third place, how can an analogy be drawn between an "ebb-tide of revolution", generally originating in the **decline** of the movement, and the return current of a section of the peasantry out of the collective farms, an occurrence originating on the basis of the steady **advance** of the movement, of the steady **advance** of our whole work of building up socialism, both in industry and agriculture, and on the basis of the steady **advance** of our revolution? What can these two absolutely different phenomena have in common?

c) Of what does the essential character of the Bolshevik offensive consist under present conditions?

The essential character of the Bolshevik offensive consists, above all, in the mobilisation of the class conscious watchfulness and the revolutionary activity of the masses against the capitalist elements of our country, in the mobilisation of the creative initiative and energy of the masses against the bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations, against that bureaucracy which causes the enormous reserves contained in our structure to lie idle and unutilised, and in the organisation of the competitions among the workers, the upsurge of labour energy among the masses, for the increase of the productivity of labour, and for the advancement of the work of socialist reconstruction.

Secondly, the essential character of the Bolshevik offensive lies in the organisation of the adaptation of the whole practical work of the trade unionist, co-operative, Soviet, and other mass organisations, to the needs of the period of reconstruction, in the formation of cadres in these of the most active and revolutionary co-workers, in the isolation and setting aside of the opportunist, narrow trade unionist, and bureaucratic elements, in the elimination of all foreign and degenerate elements, and their replacement by new workers from below.

Further, the essential character of the Bolshevik offensive lies in the mobilisation of the maximum of our means for the financing of our industry, our Soviet and collective farms, and in the participation of the most capable elements in our Party in the work of promoting this cause.

Finally, the essential character of the Bolshevik offensive lies in the mobilisation of the Party itself for the organisation of the whole cause of the offensive, in the consolidation and intensification of the Party organisations by means of the elimination of the bureaucratic and degenerate elements, in the isolation and pushing aside of the representatives of the Right

and "Left" deviations from the Leninist party, and the placing in the foreground of the real and steadfast Leninists.

These are the bases of the Bolshevik offensive at the present moment.

How is the Party realising this plan of the offensive?

We know that the Party is carrying out this plan consistently.

The first step taken by the Party was to undertake **selfcriticism** on a broad scale, and to concentrate the attention of the masses on the faults of our constructive work, on the faults of our organisations and institutions. As early as the XV. Party Congress the necessity of intensified self criticism was recognised. The Schakhty affair, and the sabotage committed in our various industries, revealing the lack of revolutionary instinct in some of the sections of the Party, gave fresh impetus to self-criticism on the one hand, whilst on the other this impetus was supplied by the struggle against the kulaks and the deficiencies of our village organisation thereby incurred. The C.C., in its appeal of 2nd June 1928, laid down the final lines of the campaign of self-criticism, calling upon all the forces of the Party and the working class to exercise self-criticism, "from top to bottom and from bottom to top", "without respect of persons". The Party, drawing a line of demarcation between itself and the Trotskyist "criticism" coming from the other side of the barricade, and aiming at the discrediting and weakening of the Soviet power, declared that the task of self-criticism is the ruthless exposure of the faults of our work, to the end that our work of building up socialism may be **improved** and the Soviet power **more firmly established**. It is a well-known fact that the appeal of the Party roused a far-reaching echo in the masses of the working class and peasantry.

The Party further organised a comprehensive campaign for the struggle against **bureaucratism**. It proclaimed the slogan of **purging** the Party, trade union, co-operative, and Soviet organisations of all foreign and bureaucratized elements. The continuation of this campaign was the well-known decision of the C.C. and the C.C.C. of 16th March 1930, on the participation of the workers in the work of the state apparatus (management of the undertakings). It will be remembered that this campaign brought about an enormous upsurge and an enormous activity among the working masses. The result of this campaign was a mighty enhancement of the authority of the Party among the working masses, the increased confidence of the working masses in the Party, the entry of hundreds and thousands of fresh workers into the Party, the resolutions passed by the workers to join the Party in whole departments and factories at one time. Finally, the result of this campaign was the liberation of our organisations from a number of petrified and bureaucratic elements, the liberation of the Central Council of the Trade Unions of the Soviet Union from the old opportunist leadership.

The Party further organised comprehensive socialist **competitions**, as also the **elan of the masses** in the factories. The appeal of the XVI. Party Conference set the stone rolling. The shock brigades advanced. The Leninist Young Communist League and the young workers under its leadership supplemented by their decided successes the work of the competitions and the shock troops. It must be said that our revolutionary youth has played a great part in this campaign. At the present moment there can be no doubt that one of the most important factors of our economic reconstruction, if not the most important, is the socialist competition going on in our works and factories, the appeal made to hundreds and thousands of workers by the results of the socialist competitions and the wide-spread activities of the **shock troops**. Only the blind can fail to see that in the psychology of the masses, and in their attitude towards work, an enormous change has taken place, fundamentally altering the character of our works and factories. Not long ago opinions were heard among us that the competitions and shock troops were "overdone subtleties" and already "bankrupt". To-day these "wise" people are not even accorded a derisive smile. They are simply regarded as people whose "wisdom" is out-of-date. To-day the competitions and the shock brigades are positions already won and established. It is a fact that among us at least two million workers have been reached by the competitions, and more than a million by the shock troops.

The most remarkable point about the competitions is that they have brought about a radical change in the views held

with regard to work; for they have changed the conception of work from a degrading and heavy burden to a matter of **honour, of fame, of virtue, and heroism**.

In the capitalist countries there can be nothing similar to this, and there is nothing similar. In these countries, among the capitalists, the object most worth striving for, the object universally approved, is to possess a pension, to live on the interest of one's money, to be free of the work which is regarded as a despicable occupation. Here in the Soviet Union the matter is reversed, and the universal wish, the wish approved by all, is to become a hero of work, a hero of the shock troops, to lead in the work which casts an aureole of honour over millions of workers.

Another no less remarkable point about the socialist competition is that it is beginning to extend to the village, and has already reached our Soviet and collective farms. The numerous facts of real working enthusiasm among the million masses on the Soviet and collective farms are known to all.

Who would have dreamed, two years ago, of such successes on the part of socialist competition and the shock troops?

The Party further mobilised the financial resources of the country for the development of the Soviet and collective farms, supplied the Soviet farms with the most capable organisers, sent 25,000 class conscious workers to aid in the collective farms, placed the most capable peasants in the collective undertakings at the head of these, organised a network of courses of instruction for the members of collective farms, laid herewith the foundation for the training of experienced and steadfast cadres for the collective farming movement.

Finally, the Party reorganised its own ranks to be ready for the fight, re-equipped the press, organised the struggle on two fronts, shattered the remains of Trotskyism, swept aside the Right opportunists, isolated the conciliators, thereby securing the unity of their ranks on the basis of the Leninist line, a unity necessary for the successful offensive, and organised the correct leadership of the offensive by calling to order both the "cunctators" from the Right camp and the "Left" sectarians of the collective farming movement.

These are the fundamental measures taken by the Party whilst conducting the offensive along the whole front.

It is well-known to all that this offensive has been crowned with success in every sphere of our work.

We see here the reason why we have been successful in overcoming a large number of the difficulties arising in the reconstruction period of our national economy.

We see here the reason why we have been successful in overcoming the greatest difficulty of our reconstruction, the difficulty of bringing about the decisive turn of the peasant masses towards socialism.

Foreigners sometimes inquire about the inner situation in the Soviet Union. But can there be any doubt that the inner situation of the Soviet is firm and unshakeable? We only need cast a glance at the capitalist countries, the growing crises and unemployment in these countries, the strikes and lockouts, the anti-governmental demonstrations — how can any comparison be drawn between the inner situation in these countries and in the Soviet Union?

8. The Capitalist or the Socialist Economic System.

We have gained an idea of the inner situation in the Soviet Union. At the same time we have gained an idea of the inner situation in the most important capitalist countries.

Involuntarily the question arises: If we compare these pictures, what are the results?

This question is the more interesting as the bourgeois politicians of all countries, the bourgeois press of every degree, from the notoriously capitalist to the Menshevist-Trotskyist, shriek as from one throat about the "prosperity" of the capitalist countries and about the "decay" and "financial and economic collapse" of the Soviet Union.

What, we ask, are the results of an analysis of the situation here in the Soviet Union, and there, in the capitalist countries?

Let us enumerate the most important and generally known facts.

Among the capitalists there prevails an economic crisis and a decline of production, both in industry and agriculture.

In the Soviet Union there is an economic advance and a growth of production in every branch of national economy.

Among the capitalists a worsening of the material situation of the workers, reduction of wages, increasing unemployment.

In the Soviet Union an improvement of the material situation of the workers, rising wages, decreasing unemployment.

Among the capitalists an increasing number of strikes and demonstrations, involving the loss of millions of working days.

In the Soviet Union an absence of strikes, and a growing enthusiasm for work among the workers and peasants, bringing our economic system millions of additional working days.

Among the capitalists the aggravation of the inner situation, the growth of the revolutionary movement in the working class against the capitalist regime.

In the Soviet Union the consolidation of the inner situation and the rally of the millions of the working masses around the Soviet power.

Among the capitalists increasing acuteness in the national question, the growth of the national liberation movement in India, Indo-China, the East Indies, in the Philippines, etc., developing into national wars.

In the Soviet Union the consolidation of the bases of national fraternity, secure national peace, and the rally of the millions of the peoples of the Soviet Union around the Soviet power.

Among the capitalists confusion and the prospect of a further worsening of the situation.

With us, in the Soviet Union, confidence in our own powers, and the prospect of a further improvement of the situation.

There is much talk of the "decline" of the Union, of the "prosperity" of the capitalist countries, etc. Would it not be more correct to speak of the inevitable decline of those who have been drawn so "unexpectedly" into the whirlpool of the economic crisis, and who are still unable to free themselves from the quicksands of their decay?

What are the causes of this serious failure among the capitalists, and of the striking success in the Soviet Union?

It has been said that the status of national economy largely depends upon the superfluity or shortage of capital. This is of course true. Are the crises in the capitalist countries and the rise of the Soviet Union to be explained by our surplus and their lack of capital? Certainly not. It is surely known to everyone that the Soviet Union possesses considerably less capital than the capitalist countries. Were it a question of the status of accumulation, we should have the crisis and the capitalist countries would be enjoying the upward trend.

It has been said that economics depend greatly on the organisational and technical training of the economic cadres. This is of course true. Are the crises in the capitalist countries and the rise of the Union therefore to be explained by their lack and our superfluity of technical cadres? Most certainly not. It is surely common knowledge that the capitalist countries possess much larger technically trained cadres than we do. We have never concealed the fact, nor intend to do so, that in the sphere of technics we are the pupils of the Germans, English, French, Italians, and above all and especially of the Americans. Therefore, the surplus or shortage of technical cadres is not the decisive factor here, although the problem of cadres is of serious importance for the development of national economy.

Perhaps the solution of the riddle is to be found in the fact that our cultural level is higher than that of the capitalist countries? Again this is not the case. Everyone knows that among us the cultural level of the masses of the people is lower than in the United States, England, Germany, etc. No, it is not the culture of the masses which plays the decisive rôle here, important as this is for the development of national economy.

Perhaps the reason lies in the personal qualities of the leading men of the capitalist countries? But again the answer is: No. The crises have arisen simultaneously with the establishment of the rule of capitalism. For more than 100 years there have been periodical crises in capitalist economy, recurring every twelve, ten, eight, or fewer years.

All the capitalist parties, all the more or less prominent representatives of capitalism, from the outstanding "genius" down to the average man, have tried their powers towards "preventing", or "remedying" the crises. But all have failed. Is it therefore any matter of wonder that Hoover and his disciples too have failed? No. It is not a question of the leaders or parties of capitalism, although these leaders and parties are of not inconsiderable importance in the matter.

What, then, is the reason? How is it that the Soviet Union, in spite of its cultural backwardness, in spite of its lack of capital, its lack of technically trained and experienced economic cadres, is in a state of economic advancement, able to record decided successes in the work of economic construction, whilst the capitalist countries, in spite of their surplus capital, their surplus of technical workers, and in spite of their higher cultural level, are in a state of growing economic crisis and are suffering defeat after defeat in the field of economic development?

The cause is to be found in the difference of the economic system in the capitalist countries and in the Soviet Union.

The cause is to be found in the bankruptcy of the capitalist system of economy.

The cause is to be found in the advantages of the Soviet system as compared with the capitalist system.

Of what does the Soviet system of economy consist? The Soviet system means that:

1. The power of the capitalist class is overthrown and replaced by the power of the working class;
2. The means of production, the land, the factories, works, etc., are taken away from the capitalists and handed over to the working class and the masses of the working peasantry;
3. The development of production is not subordinated to the principle of competition and the securing of capitalist profits, but to the planned economic organisation and systematic advancement of the material and cultural level of the workers;
4. The distribution of the national income is not made in the interests of the enrichment of the exploiting class and its numerous parasitic adherents, but in the interests of a systematic betterment of the material position of the workers and peasants and the increase of socialist production in town and country;
5. The systematic improvement of the material situation of the workers and peasants, and the steady growth of their requirements (buying powers), forming a constantly increasing source for increased production, secure the working class from crises, from greater unemployment, etc.;
6. The working class, which is the ruler of the country, works not for the capitalists, but for itself, for its own class.

Of what does the capitalist system of economy consist? The capitalist economic system signifies that:

1. The power in the country is in the hands of the capitalists;
2. The means of production are concentrated in the hands of the exploiters;
3. Production is not subordinated to the principle of improving the material situation of the working masses, but to the principle of securing high capitalist profits;
4. The distribution of the national income does not take place in the interests of the improvement of the material situation of the working masses, but in the interests of securing a maximum profit to the exploiters;
5. Capitalist rationalisation and the rapid growth of production, having as their object the securing of high profits for the capitalists, find themselves running against the barrier of the impoverishment and lowered material security of the millions of the masses of the workers, of the masses who have not always the possibility of satisfying even their minimum needs, a state of affairs inevitably preparing the ground for over-production crises, for increased unemployment, etc.;
6. The working class is a class of the exploited, working not for itself but for another class, the class of the exploiters.

These are the advantages of the Soviet system as compared with the capitalist system of economy. This is the reason why we in the Soviet Union enjoy a steady upward trend in our economy, whilst the capitalist countries suffer

under a growing economic crisis. This is the reason why in the Soviet Union the increase of consumption (the buying powers) of the masses steadily out-distances the growth of production, drives it forward, whilst among the capitalists, on the contrary, the increased needs (the buying powers) of the masses cannot keep pace with the growth of production, but lag continually behind, condemning production to constant crises.

This is the reason why among the capitalists it is counted as a perfectly "normal" procedure to destroy the "surplus" of goods, and to burn the "surplus" of agricultural products, in order to keep up prices and secure high profits, whilst with us the committers of such crimes would be consigned to a lunatic asylum. (Applause.)

This is the reason why among the capitalists the workers strike and demonstrate, and organise the revolutionary struggle against the existing capitalist power, whilst in the Soviet Union we see millions of workers and peasants competing with one another, and ready to protect the Soviet Union with their bodies.

This is the reason of the stability, of the consolidation of the inner situation of the Soviet Union, and of the instability and uncertainty of the inner situation of the capitalist world.

Truly it must be said that an economic system which finds itself choked by its "surplus" production and obliged to burn it at a moment when unemployment, starvation, and want rule among the masses—truly such an economic system as this pronounces its own death sentence.

The last few years have been a period of practical test, a period of trial of two opposing systems of economy, the Soviet and the capitalist system. During these years there has been no lack of prophecies on the "decline" and "collapse" of the Soviet system. And more than this, many paens have been sung on the "prosperity" of capitalism. And what is the true state of affairs? These last few years have shown once more that the capitalist economic system is **bankrupt**, and that the Soviet system possesses **advantages** of which no bourgeois state, even though it be a "democratic", a "people's" state, and so forth, can even dream of.

Lenin, in his address at the Conference of the CPSU, in May 1921, said:

"At the present time we exercise our influence over the international revolution chiefly through our economic policy. All the workers in all the countries in the world, without exception and without exaggeration, are today looking towards the Soviet Union. This has been attained. The capitalists can no longer cloak our existence in silence, can no longer conceal anything. Therefore they seek above all to discover our economic faults and our weaknesses. In this field the struggle is already being carried on on a world scale. If we solve this task, then we have won quite certainly and finally on an international scale." (Vol. XVIII, 1st part, p. 222, Russian.)

It must be admitted that the Party is successfully fulfilling the task set it by Lenin.

9. The Immediate Tasks.

A. The General Tasks.

1. Above all the problem of the **location of the centres of the industry in the Soviet Union**. However we may develop our national economy, the question of the right choice of location of our industry as the leading branch of national economy cannot be avoided. At the present time our industry and our national economy are substantially dependent on the coal and mining base provided by the Ukraine. It will be understood at once that without such a basis the industrialisation of the country is impossible. The Ukrainian fuel and metallurgic centre furnishes us with the required base. But when the country has developed further, can this one base suffice for both the South and the central regions of the Soviet Union, for the North and the North East, for the Far East and Turkestan? All signs go to show that it will not suffice. One of the new factors in the development of our national economy is that this basis already fails to suffice. It is a new factor that the all-round development of this basis must be accompanied by the simultaneous opening up of a second coal and metallurgic base in the Ural and Kusnetz district, enabling coal and coke to be combined with the Ural

iron. (Applause.) The building of a motor car factory at Nishninoigorod, of a tractor factory in Chelyabinsk, of a machine-building works in Sverlowsk, of factories for combines in Saratov and Novosibirsk, the existence of a growing non-iron industry (coloured metals) in Siberia and Kasakstan, demanding the organisation of a network of repairing workshops and metal works in the East; and finally the decision to erect textile factories in Novosibirsk and in Turkestan—all this imperatively demands immediate steps towards a second coal and metallurgic base in Ural.

We know that the Central Committee of our Party has spoken in this sense in its resolution on the metal trust "Uralmet".

2. There follows the **problem of the proper distribution of the decisively important branches of agriculture in the Soviet Union, the problem of the specialisation of our regions for various agricultural branches and cultures**. It need not be said that any real specialisation is impossible on a small peasant farming system. Impossible for the reason that the small farm is unstable, has not the necessary reserves behind it, and is obliged to cultivate various plants, in order to be compensated by the success of one crop for the failure of another. It is equally clear that unless certain reserves of grain are kept in the hands of the state, the organisation of specialisation is impossible. Now that we have gone forward to large-scale farming and the state secures its grain reserves, we can and must take up the task of an effectual organisation of the specialisation of the cultivation of different plants and of the various branches of agriculture. The point of departure of this specialisation must be the final solution of the grain problem. I say "the point of departure", for without a solution of the grain problem, without the organisation of a comprehensive network of elevators for the distribution of the grain reserves in the districts engaged in livestock rearing, or in cotton, beet, flax, and tobacco growing, it is impossible to secure the breeding of livestock, the cultivation of technical plants, or the specialisation of our territory into districts devoted to certain cultures or branches of agriculture.

It is our task to utilise the possibilities already opened out, and to further the work of specialisation.

3. Another problem is that of the **cadres** required for both industry and agriculture. The imperfect technical training of our agricultural cadres, our specialists, technicians, and economists, is well known. A further complication is the fact that a part of our specialists, having connections with the former owners, and receiving encouragement from abroad, have taken the lead in the commission of sabotage. And matters have been further complicated by the circumstance that a large number of our communist economists have here failed in revolutionary vigilance, and frequently fall under the mental thrall of the sabotaging elements. We are thus faced with the enormous tasks of the reconstruction of our whole national economy, requiring a great number of fresh cadres capable of grasping the new technics. In this connection the problem of the cadres has become an actually vital problem.

We are solving this problem on the following lines: 1. Determined combat against the saboteurs; 2. the accordance of care and consideration to the overwhelming majority of the technicians and specialists who have kept aloof from the saboteurs (here I do not refer to chatterers and jumping jacks of the type of an Ustryalow, but to real scientific workers, working side by side with the working class without any ulterior intentions). 3. The organisation of technical advice from abroad. 4. The sending of our scientists abroad to study and to gain technical experience. 5. The superintendence of the institutions for technical instruction by the corresponding economic organisations, in order that a sufficient number of technicians and specialists from the ranks of the working class receive training.

Our task consists of organising to its fullest extent the work for the realisation of these measures.

4. The problem of the **struggle against bureaucracy**. The greatest danger of bureaucracy lies in its liability to allow to run waste the enormous reserves contained in our economic structure, to prevent the utilisation of these, to crush the creative initiative of the masses, to paralyse by adhering too closely to the letter, to reduce every fresh effort of the Party to a petty fiddling attaining no good for anybody. The further danger of bureaucracy lies in its refusal to tolerate

a control of its methods, and in its attempt to reduce the fundamental instructions of the leading organisations to a scrap of lifeless paper. It is not so much the old bureaucrats who have remained in our institutions who represent the chief source of this danger, but at the same time — and especially — the new bureaucrats, the Soviet bureaucrats, among whom the "communist" bureaucrats by no means play the smallest rôle. I refer to those "communists" whose official commands and "decrees" — to them perfect fetishes — replace the creative initiative and the personal activities of the masses of the workers and peasants.

It is our task to destroy the bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations, to liquidate the bureaucratic "manners and customs", and to clear the path for the utilisation of the reserves contained in our economic structure, to the end that the creative initiative and personal activities of the masses be given the opportunity of development.

This is no easy task. It cannot be accomplished "in a twinkling". But it must be accomplished at all costs if it is our earnest will to transform our country on the basis of socialism.

In the struggle against bureaucracy the work of the Party extends in four directions. The development of **self-criticism**, the organisation of the **control over working methods**, the **purging** of the apparatus, and finally, the **inclusion** in the apparatus of co-workers devoted to the cause, out of the ranks of the working class.

It is our task to exert our utmost efforts for the accomplishment of these measures

5. The problem of increasing the **productivity of labour**. Without a systematic intensification of the productivity of labour, in industry and agriculture, we cannot fulfil the tasks of reconstruction, and not only are we unable to overtake and outstrip the most advanced capitalist countries, but we cannot even maintain our own independent existence. Hence the problem of the increase of labour productivity is of paramount importance to us.

The measures taken by the Party for the solution of this problem extend in three directions: the systematic **improvement of the material situation** in the industrial and agricultural undertakings, and finally, the organisation of **socialist competition** and of the **shock brigades**. And all this on the basis of perfected technics and rational organisation of labour.

It is our task to develop further the mass campaign for the carrying out of these measures.

6. The problem of **supplies**. In this problem we must include the question of **providing adequate supplies** of the necessary products to the workers in town and country, the adaptation of the **co-operative apparatus** to the needs of the workers and peasants, the systematic raising of the **real wages** of the workers, the **lowering of the prices** of industrial goods and agricultural products. I have already referred to the faults of the consumers' co-operative societies. These faults must be rectified and a **policy of reducing prices** pursued. With respect to the shortage of goods (goods famine), we are now in a position to extend the raw material basis of our light industry, and to increase the output of goods for the mass consumption of the towns. The situation is more difficult with regard to the supplies of meat, milk, and vegetables. This difficulty can, unfortunately, not be liquidated within a few months. At least a year is required. After the lapse of a year, the Soviet farms and collective agricultural undertakings organised for this purpose will afford us the possibility of guaranteed ample supplies of meat, milk products, and vegetables. What does the securing of supplies of these products mean, since we have already in our hands reserves of grain, manufactured articles, the building of workmen's dwellings, and the cheap communal institutions? It means that we control the whole of the decisive factors determining the household and the real wages of the workers. It means the guarantee that the real wages of the workers will rise rapidly and finally.

It is our task to develop the work of all our organisations in this direction.

7. The problem of **credits and the circulation of money**. The rational organisation of our credit service and the purposeful disposal of our money reserves are of serious importance for the development of our national economy. The measures taken by the Party for the solution of this problem extend in two directions: The concentration of all short-term credits in the State Bank and the organisation of non-cash transactions in the socialised sector. By these means the State Bank becomes a national apparatus for the control of production and the distribution of products, and in the second place a large amount of money is withdrawn from circulation. There can be no doubt that these measures will lead (and are already leading) to the regulation of our whole credit service and to the stabilisation of our chervonetz.

8. The problem of the **reserves**. It has frequently been stated, and a repetition is needless, that any state, and our state in particular, cannot manage without reserves. We possess some reserves of grain, goods, securities. Our comrades have already had the opportunity of convincing themselves of the favourable influence of these reserves. But "some" reserves do not suffice. We need solid reserves in every line.

Hence it is our task to accumulate reserves.

B. Industrial tasks.

1. The main problem here is the forced development of the **smelting** industry. It must be remembered that we did not regain and pass the pre-war standard of crude iron production until the current year 1929/30. This is a serious threat to our whole national economy. In order to do away with this threat we must resort to a forced development of our smelting industry. By the end of the Five-Year Plan we need, not the 10 million tons of crude iron of our original estimate, but 17 million tons. This is a task which we must accomplish at any price, if we are determined to ensure effectual progress for the industrialisation of our country.

The Bolsheviks must show that they are able to accomplish this task.

This of course does not mean that we must neglect **light** industry. Not by any means. Hitherto we have saved in every direction, including that of light industry, in order to build up heavy industry. But now we have restored our heavy industry. All that we now require is its further development. Now we can turn to light industry, and develop this at an accelerated pace. What is new in the development of our industry consists in part of our now possessing the possibility of developing both heavy industry and light industry at a greater speed. The outstripping of our planned programme for this year in the growing of cotton, flax, and sugar beets, the successful solution of the hemp and artificial silk problem — all this bears witness to the fact that it now actually lies in our power to promote our light industry.

2. The problem of **rationalisation, the lowering of the costs of production, and the improvement of the quality** of the products. The gaps in our rationalisation, the "non-fulfilment" of the plan for the reduction of the costs of production, and the inferior quality of the goods produced by many of our undertakings, can no longer be tolerated. These gaps and defects exercise a pressure upon the whole of our national economy and hinder its advancement. We ought to have wiped out this stain long ago.

The Bolsheviks must show that they are able to master this task.

3. The problem of the **sole power of command**. The violations of the sole power of command in the practice of our undertakings is intolerable. Again and again the workers complain: "There are no leaders in the undertaking", "there is no order in the work". It can no longer be tolerated that our undertakings are converted from centres of production into parliaments. Our Party and trade union organisations must at last realise that without the security of the sole power of command, and without insistence on strict responsibility for the course of the work, we are not in a position to solve the problems of the reconstruction of industry.