

to the Communist Party of Poland. In lieu of this perspective we find in the theses of the said group a perspective of the passive decline of the toiling masses.

Domska's standpoint consists in a hurried-revolutionary, mechanical denial of the serious character of the stabilisation efforts, in reliance on automatic collapse and on the inner struggle in the ranks of the bourgeoisie itself.

Both these standpoints condemn the Party to political passivity.

The third standpoint - that of the minority of the C. C. - is identical with Comrade Bukharin's standpoint which sees in stabilisation not only an objective process, but also an object of the class struggle. In the draft theses brought forward by us at the September Plenum of the C. C. of the C. P. P., we use the following arguments:

"The attempts to stabilise capitalism will be frustrated by internal differences and class antagonisms, by the subordination of the interests of the productive forces of Poland to the interests of the capitalist big powers, or else they must be inevitably frustrated by the revolutionary forces aroused through these differences and antagonisms."

In accordance with this perspective, the minority of the C. C. places into the forefront the struggle of the workers and peasants against the stabilisation efforts of the bourgeoisie and against Pilsudski's Fascist dictatorship, and also the active role of the Communist Party in this struggle as the main factor militating against stabilisation.

The opportunist estimate of the stabilisation in our case is a phenomenon with a historical basis, and is the outcome of the Right policy of the Varski, Kostcheva, Brandt, etc. group which the Party has not yet overcome. It is closely connected with that appraisal of the driving forces of the revolution which ascribes to the petty bourgeoisie an independent role in the first stage of the revolution (theory of two stages), it is swayed

by disbelief in the revolutionary forces of the proletariat and has no faith in the capacity of the proletariat to bring the petty bourgeois masses under its leadership. Moreover, this standpoint is connected with a whole series of tactical questions which refer to the commission for further consideration.

(J. Lenski)

TO THE PRESIDUM OF THE VII ENLARGED EXECUTIVE OF THE C. I.

In connection with Comrade Lenski's declaration, the Polish Delegation wishes to make the following statement:

1. This declaration presents a very distorted picture of the attitude of the C. C. of the C. P. P. to the question of stabilisation in general and to its prospects in Poland in particular. Our Delegation has explained the standpoint of the C. C. of the C. P. P. with regard to Comrade Bukharin's and Comrade Kuusinen's reports in the speech of its representative, Comrade Pruchniak, and has identified itself completely with these theses.

2. Comrade Lenski's attitude on this question amounts to an ultra-Left denial of any stabilisation, which viewpoint found expression in his articles in the "Novy Psheglond" (January-February, 1926) and in the "Communist International" (April 1926), as well as in a number of his speeches.

From this same viewpoint Comrade Lenski considers the draft theses which Comrades Kostcheva and Brandt placed before the Polish Commission of the E. C. C. I. in June, and he distorts the sense of these draft theses.

3. In the Commission we will throw light on all the other false assertions made by Comrade Lenski.

On behalf of the Delegation of the C. P. P. (Vysotski).

After several announcements by Comrade Rennele, on behalf of the Presidium, the Tenth Session was declared adjourned.

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The Prospects of the Revolution in China.

(Speech delivered in the Chinese Commission of the Enlarged E. C. C. I. on November 30th 1926.)

By J. Stalin.

Before I enter into the question, I consider it necessary to say that I have not had at my disposal exhaustive material on the Chinese question, such as would be necessary to unfold a complete picture of the Chinese revolution. I am therefore compelled to confine myself to a few general remarks of a fundamental nature which are directly connected with the question as to the main trend of the Chinese revolution. The theses of Comrade Petrov, the theses of Comrade Mif, two reports of Comrade Tang Ping Shan and the remarks of Comrade Raife on the Chinese question are in my possession. In spite of their excellence, all these documents have in my opinion, the great defect that they evade a number of the fundamental questions of the revolution in China. I think that our attention should be above all directed to these defects, and for this reason my remarks will at the same time be of a polemical character.

1. The Character of the Revolution in China.

Lenin said that the Chinese would soon have their 1905. Some comrades took this as meaning that exactly what took place with us in Russia in 1905 would necessarily repeat itself in China. This is wrong. Lenin certainly did not say that the Chinese revolution would be a copy of the Russian revolution in 1905; he merely said that the Chinese would have their 1905. This means that, apart from the features which the Chinese revolution would have in common with the revolution in 1905, it would have its own specific peculiarities, which would stamp its special features on the whole revolution in China.

What are these peculiarities?

The first peculiarity is that the Chinese revolution as a bourgeois-democratic one is also a revolution for national freedom directed against the rule of foreign imperialism in China. This is the chief feature which distinguishes it from the revolution in Russia in 1905.

lution in Russia in 1905. The position is that the rule of imperialism in China expresses itself not only in military power but above all in that the imperialists have the power of disposal over the main threads of industry in China, the railways, the factories, the mines, the banks etc. The result is that the questions of the struggle against foreign imperialism and its Chinese agents play a predominant part in the Chinese revolution. This is exactly what links the Chinese revolution directly with the revolutions of the proletarians of all countries against imperialism.

Another peculiarity of the Chinese revolution arises out of this peculiarity and that is that the national large bourgeoisie in China is extremely weak, much weaker than was the Russian bourgeoisie at the time of 1905. This is easy to understand. If the main threads of industry are gathered in the hands of foreign imperialists, the national large bourgeoisie of China cannot but be weak and backward. In this respect Comrade Mif in quite in the right when he remarks that the weakness of the national bourgeoisie in China is a characteristic symptom of the Chinese revolution. From this results that the part of initiator and guide of the Chinese revolution, the part of leader of the Chinese peasantry must inevitably get into the hands of the Chinese proletariat, which is better organised and more active than the Chinese bourgeoisie.

Neither should the third peculiarity of the Chinese revolution be overlooked; it is that, in addition to China, the Soviet Union exists and is developing, the revolutionary experience and help of which cannot but facilitate the fight of the Chinese proletariat against imperialism and against the feudal-medieval remains in China.

These are the fundamental peculiarities of the Chinese revolution which determine its character and its trend.

II. Imperialism and Imperialist Intervention in China

The first defect of the theses before us is that they avoid or underestimate the question of imperialist intervention in China. If we read the theses correctly, we might imagine that there is no present in China no actual imperialist intervention, that there is nothing but a struggle of the North against the South or of one group of generals against another group of generals. We are apt to understand under intervention a condition which foreign troops march into Chinese territory and, if this does not take place, then there is no intervention. This is a serious error, comrades, intervention is by no means exhausted by the entry of troops, and the entry of troops is by no means an essential characteristic of intervention. In the present circumstances of the revolutionary movement in China, in countries where the direct entry of foreign troops might cause a number of protests and stir up conflict, intervention has assumed a more elastic character and a more masked form. In the present circumstances imperialism prefers to intervene against the revolution by organising civil war within the dependent country, by financing the counter-revolutionary forces against the revolution by moral and financial support of its Chinese agents. The imperialists tried to represent the fights of Denekin and Kolschak, Yudenitsch and Wrangel against the revolution in Russia as an exclusively internal struggle. But we all knew, and not we alone but the whole world knew, that these counter-revolutionary generals were backed by the imperialists of England and America, France and Japan, without whose support a serious civil war would have been quite impossible in Russia. The same applies to China. The fight of Wu Pei-Fu and Sun Tchuang-Fang, Chang Tso Lin and Chang Tzun-Chaa against the revolution in China would be quite impossible were it not that the imperialists of all countries had inspired these counter-revolutionary generals and had supplied them with money, arms, instructors, "advisers" etc. How is the power of the Canton troops to be explained? By their having an ideal, a passionate enthusiasm, by their being inspired in their fight for liberation from imperialism, by their wanting to give China her freedom. How is the power of the revolutionary generals in China to be explained? In that they are backed by the imperialists of all countries, the owners of the possible railways, concessions, mines, banks and business houses in China. For this reason it does not depend alone, it does not even depend to any large extent on whether foreign troops enter the country, but on the support given by the imperialists of all countries to the Chinese counter-revolution. Intervention by using other people—that is the kernel of imperialist intervention at present.

For these reasons imperialist intervention in China is an undoubted fact against which the point of the Chinese revolution is directed.

Anyone who eludes or undervalues imperialist intervention in China eludes or undervalues that which is most important and most essential.

It is said that the Japanese imperialists show a certain amount of "good-will" towards the Cantonese and towards the Chinese revolution as a whole. It is said that in this respect the American imperialists are in no way behind the Japanese. This is self-deception, comrades. We must know how to discern the true nature of the policy of the imperialists, including the Japanese and American imperialists behind their mask. Lenin used to say that it was difficult to win over revolutionaries with a stick, with fists, but that at times it is very easy to win them by kindness. This truth, spoken by Lenin, should never be forgotten, comrades. In any case it is clear that the Japanese-American imperialists have pretty well understood the significance of this truth. For this reason we must make a definite distinction between friendliness and compliments addressed to the Canton people, and the fact that the imperialists, who distribute their friendliness most liberally, cling most desperately to "their" concessions and railways in China, from which they do not wish to be "liberated" at any price.

III. The Revolutionary Army in China.

The second remark in connection with the theses before us concerns the question of the revolutionary armies in China. The point is that the question of the army is evaded or undervalued in the theses. This is their second defect. The advance of the Cantonese towards the North is generally regarded not as the growth of the Chinese revolution but as a fight of the Canton generals against Wu Pei Fu and Sun Chuan Fang, as a fight

for supremacy of one group of generals against another group of generals. This is a great mistake, comrades. The revolutionary armies in China are not most important factors in the fight of the Chinese workers and peasants for their liberation. It is a mere coincidence that until May or June of this year the situation in China was regarded as the rule of the reaction which had set in after the defeat of Feng Yu Hsiang's army, but that in the summer of this year it was only necessary for the victorious Canton troops to advance northwards and occupy Hpe in order to change the picture fundamentally in favour of the revolution? No, it was not a coincidence; for the advance of the Canton troops meant a blow aimed at imperialism, a blow aimed at its agents in China, it meant the freedom of assembly, freedom to strike, freedom of the Press, freedom of coalition for all the revolutionary elements in China, in general and for the workers in particular. It is this, the regularity and the greatest importance of the revolutionary army in China.

In former times, in the 18th and 19th century, revolutions began in such a way that usually the people rose, for the greater part unarmed or badly armed, and encountered the army of the old regime. They made every effort to break up this army or at least to win it over as far as possible to their side. This was the typical form of the revolutionary explosions of the past. The same thing occurred with us in Russia in 1905. In China things developed on different lines. In China, it is not the unarmed people against the troops of their own government, but the armed people in the form of its revolutionary army. In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the peculiarities and one of the advanced stages of the Chinese revolution. This also explains the special significance of the revolutionary army in China.

It is therefore a reprehensible defect of the theses before us that they underestimate the revolutionary armies.

In consequence of this however, the Chinese communists ought to devote special attention to work in the army.

First of all the Chinese communists must use every means in their power to intensify political work in the army and must succeed in making the army a real and reliable support of the ideas of the Chinese revolution. This is particularly true at the present moment because the Canton troops are being joined by all kinds of generals who have nothing in common with the Kuomintang who join it as a force which overthrows the enemies of the Chinese people and who, by joining the Canton troops, introduce disintegration into the army. It is only possible to neutralise such "allies" or to turn them into genuine adherents of the Kuomintang by intensifying the political work and by organising revolutionary control over them. Unless this is done the army may get into a most difficult position.

Secondly, the Chinese revolutionaries, including the communists, must make a special study of things military, they must not regard military questions as something of secondary importance, for military questions in China are at present the most important factor in the Chinese revolution. The Chinese revolutionaries, of course including the communists, must, with this object in view, study militarism in order to advance gradually and to be able to occupy some leading post or other in the revolutionary army. This will guarantee that the revolutionary army of China will follow the right path, will keep its eye steadily fixed on its aim. Unless this is carried out, it is inevitable that there should be vacillations in the army.

These are the tasks which Chinese Communist Party has to fulfil with regard to the question of the revolutionary army.

IV. The Character of the Future Power in China.

The third remark concerns the fact that, in the theses, the question as to the character of the future revolutionary power in China is hardly dealt with at all or altogether disregarded. Comrade Mif, to his credit, has closely approached this question in his theses. But, when he was on the threshold of it, he failed to carry it out to the end, as though he had been frightened and did not dare to go further. Comrade Mif believes that the future revolutionary power in China will be a power of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie under the leadership of the proletariat. What does this mean? At the time of the February revolution in 1917, the Menshevik and social revolutionaries were also petty bourgeois parties and to a certain extent revolutionary

Does this mean that the future revolutionary power in China will be a social revolutionary Menshevik power? No, it does not mean this. Why? Because the social-revolutionary Menshevik power was an imperialist power, whilst the future revolutionary power in China must be an anti-imperialist power. This is the fundamental difference. The MacDonald Government was actually a "Labour" power but it was at the same time imperialist, for it was based on the maintenance of England's imperial power, for instance in India and Egypt. As compared with the MacDonald Government, the future revolutionary power in China will have the advantage that it will be an anti-imperialist power. What is important is not the bourgeois-democratic character of the Canton Government which forms the nucleus of the future pan-Chinese revolutionary power; the most important thing is that this power is an anti-imperialist power and can be nothing else, that every advance of this power is a blow aimed at world-imperialism and is therefore a stroke in favour of the revolutionary world movement. Lenin was right when he said that if in former times, before the beginning of the epoch of the world revolution, national movements for freedom were part of the general democratic movement, now, after the victory of the Soviet revolution in Russia and since the beginning of the epoch of world revolutions, national movements for freedom are part of the proletarian world revolution.

This peculiarity was not taken into consideration by Comrade Mif.

I believe that the future revolutionary power in China will, in its character, resemble the power which was spoken of in our country in 1905, i.e. a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but with the distinguishing feature that it will be predominantly an anti-imperialist power. It will be a power of transition to a non-capitalist or, to be more exact, to a socialist development of China.

This is the direction in which the revolution in China is likely to develop. This path of development which the revolution will follow, will be facilitated by three circumstances; firstly in that the point of the revolution in China, as a national revolution for freedom will be directed against imperialism and its agents in China, secondly in that the large bourgeoisie in China is weak, weaker than the national bourgeoisie was in Russia in 1905, which facilitates the hegemony of the proletariat, the leadership of the proletarian party against the Chinese peasantry; thirdly, in that the revolution in China will develop in circumstances which make it possible to make use of the experience and the aid of the victorious revolution in the Soviet Union.

Whether this method will with certainty lead to victory, depends on many circumstances. One thing is clear, that it is the chief duty of the Chinese communists to fight to prepare the way for the development of the Chinese revolution.

From this we may conclude what is the chief task of the Chinese communists in the question of their relations to the Kuo Min Tang and to the future revolutionary power in China. It is said that the Chinese communists ought to secede from the Kuo Min Tang. This is pure folly, comrades. It would be the greatest mistake for the Chinese communists to leave the Kuo Min Tang. The whole course of the Chinese revolution, its character, its prospects, undoubtedly indicate that the Chinese communists ought to remain in the Kuo Min Tang and intensify their work in it. But can the Chinese Communist Party take part in the future revolutionary government? If not only can, it must. The course of the revolution in China, its character, its prospects speak eloquently in favour of the Chinese Communist Party taking part in the future revolutionary government of China. This is one of the necessary guarantees for the hegemony of the Chinese proletariat, becoming a concrete reality.

The fourth remark concerns the question of the peasantry in China. Comrade Mif believes that we ought at once to issue the slogan of the formation of soviets, of peasant soviets, in the open country. I believe that this is a mistake. Comrade Mif is in too great a hurry. It is out of the question to form soviets in the country and to leave out the industrial centres in China. The question of organising soviets in the Chinese industrial centres, however, has not yet been raised. Furthermore, we must not forget that the soviets cannot be considered independently of

their connection with the whole situation. It would only be possible to organise soviets, let us say peasant soviets, if China were passing through a period of a flourishing peasant movement which would break down the old power and create a new one, under the assumption that the industrial centres of China had already broken down the barrier and entered on the phase of forming a soviet power. Can it be said that the Chinese peasantry or the Chinese revolution as a whole has already entered on this phase? No, it cannot be said. It is therefore trying to outpace evolution to speak of soviets at the present time. At the present moment, we must not raise the question of soviets, but of the formation of peasant committees; I mean committees, elected by the peasants, which are capable of formulating the fundamental demands of the peasantry and of taking all the necessary measures for realising these demands by revolutionary methods. These peasant committees should form the axis round which the revolution in the village can unfold.

I know that there are people amongst the adherents of the Kuo Min Tang and even among the Chinese communists who do not consider it possible to let loose the revolution in the village lest the enlistment of the peasantry in the revolution should disrupt the united front against imperialism. This is the greatest error. The anti-imperialist front in China will be all the stronger and more powerful the more quickly and thoroughly the Chinese peasantry is persuaded to join in the revolution. The authors of the theses, especially Comrades Tan Ping Shaa and Rales are perfectly right when they maintain that the immediate satisfaction of a number of the most urgent demands of the peasantry is an essential preliminary for the victory of the Chinese revolution. In my opinion, it is high time to do away with the indifference and "neutrality" towards the peasantry which is noticeable in the activity of certain elements of the Kuo Min Tang. I think that both the Communist Party of China and the Kuo Min Tang, including the Canton Government ought, without delay, to pass from words to deeds and immediately to raise the question of satisfying the most vital demands of the peasantry. What prospects open up in this respect and up to what limits an advance can and should be made—that depends on the course of the revolution. I think that it should finally be carried as far as the nationalisation of the land. In any case we cannot dispense with the slogan of the nationalisation of the land.

What path should be pursued by the Chinese revolutionaries in order to mobilise for the revolution the peasantry of China which numbers many millions?

I think that in present circumstances there are only three alternatives.

The first way is that of forming peasant committees and of introducing Chinese revolutionaries into them in order to influence the peasantry. (Interjection: "And the peasant leagues?") I believe that the peasant leagues will group themselves round the peasant committees or that the peasant leagues will turn into peasant committees possessing this or that competence which is necessary in order to carry through the demands of the peasants. This way has already been discussed, but this way is not enough. It would be ridiculous to suppose that the number of revolutionaries is sufficient to carry this out. The population of China is roughly 400 millions. Of these 350 millions are Chinese, and more than nine tenths of them are peasants. It is a great mistake to assume that a few tens of thousands of Chinese revolutionaries are enough to permeate this ocean of the peasantry. Well then, we must seek other ways.

The second way is that of influencing the peasantry through the apparatus of the new national revolutionary power. It cannot be doubted that in the newly liberated provinces a new power will arise after the pattern of the Canton Government. It cannot be doubted that this power and the apparatus of this power will have to satisfy the most urgent demands of the peasantry if it wishes to advance the revolution. The task of the communists and of the revolutionaries in China, together is to penetrate into the apparatus of this new power, to bring this apparatus nearer to the masses of peasants, and to help the peasant masses to satisfy their most urgent demands by means of this apparatus, whether it be by expropriating the landowners of their land, or by reducing taxation and rents—whatever the circumstances demand.

The third way is that of influencing the peasantry through the revolutionary army. I have already spoken of the extraordinary importance of the revolutionary army to the Chinese revolution. The revolutionary army of China is the force which first penetrates into the new provinces which first becomes known

The reactionaries of the A. F. of L. left the sting of the defeat as deeply as they engineered an investigation of the conduct of the strike carried out in fatal-chamber fashion in hopes of finding some excuse for reorganising the union.

About 15 months ago another big needle trades union was won by the left wing, the New York organisation of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union. The communists and left wing leadership of this union had carried through a number of mass organisation campaigns, which inaugurated entirely new methods of organising the unorganised masses. In August this movement culminated in a strike of 40,000 cloakmakers for the five-day, 40-hour week and other demands. Three months of struggle in which mass picketing demonstrations were participated in by tens of thousands of workers, and in which the strikers were subjected to severe police repressions and brutalities, has already won a partial victory for 25,000 strikers, with 15,000 still continuing the struggle. Here, as in the furworkers union, the policies and leadership of the left wing greatly increased its support among the masses, which quite naturally added to the worries of the reactionaries.

Then there were the developments in Passaic. Here were 14,000 textile workers in a mill during a strike, which had seemingly been wanted immunity from organisation by the reactionary union leaders. Beginning with a small strike of one mill, organised and led by communists, this quickly developed during February of this year into a great mass strike involving all textile workers in Passaic. The story of this strike, and the police attacks by means of armoured cars, gas bombs, and all modern instruments of warfare, has become internationally famous, and the name of the communist leader, Weisbord, has become known throughout the world. The strategy of the strike leadership, and the strike relief organisation set up all over the country by the communists, constitute a real contribution to working class experience. The trade union bureaucracy joined in the outcry of the employers against the communist leadership and the demand for the retirement of Weisbord from the strike. In this they were successful only to the extent of forcing Weisbord out, but they could not break the ranks of the workers who continued to accept the leadership of communists and left wingers; the A. F. of L. bureaucracy were forced to accept the new union into the United Textile Workers. Under pressure of mass sentiment the reactionaries were compelled to assume responsibility for the successful continuation of the strike. The left wing has stood guard vigilantly against threatening betrayal, has maintained the strike until now, and but recently won a settlement in one Passaic mill. Next to the developments in the garment trades, this great success of the communists in Passaic was the bitterest pill which the reactionary bureaucracy had been compelled to swallow.

The latest cause for a panic of fear among the bureaucrats was the crystallisation of a broad opposition movement in the United Mine Workers Union elections now taking place. This opposition movement grows out of a crisis in the mining industry, and the unbelievable corruption in the union officialdom. Farrington, one of the big leaders of the union, has just been exposed as being on the payroll of the Peabody Coal Corporation at a salary of 25,000 dollars per year. It is generally believed that Lewis, president of the Union, has similar relations with the coal owners. As a result of the treacherous policy of Lewis' reckless inner-union warfare against the left wing, and of the crisis in the industry, the Union has been shaken to its foundations and is threatened with destruction. The growing resentment among the miners, which even two years ago was crystallised into a movement by the T. U. E. L., which received the support of one-third of the membership, has now broadened into a combination of left-wingers, progressives, communists, and militant trade unionists with a programme of ousting the Lewis machine, or-

ganising the unorganised miners, nationalisation of the mines, etc., under the general slogan of "Save the Union." The opposition in the union election is headed by an ex-socialist, John Brophy, and includes several revolutionaries of long standing, such as Howatt, Tumulty, and others. This movement, which undoubtedly has behind it a majority of the miners, is driving the Lewis machine to desperation. Lewis will not stop even before splitting the union to save himself from destruction.

The meaning of all these developments is obvious. In three important sections of the labour movement, the communists and the left wing have won leadership, in some cases including organisational control of strategic districts of the unions, due to dislocations and crises in the mining, textile, and garment industries. While this situation is not characteristic of the labour movement as a whole, it has opened up an entirely new perspective in America, and has become a serious menace to the bureaucracy of the A. F. of L.

In view of the above, it is not surprising to find in the Las Vegas reports mentioned at the beginning that at the anti-communist conferences were in attendance Lewis, who is facing defeat in the Miners Union at the hands of the aroused miners led by the combined progressive communist opposition, MacMahon, president of the Textile Workers Union, who was compelled to admit the new left-wing led union of the Passaic strikers, thus creating the basis for a mass opposition to his continued rule; and the old officials of the garment unions, some of them already ousted from office by the left wing. In all these cases the strikers attended Doubtless among them are Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Sigman, president of the Garment Workers, and Kauffman, who was ousted from the presidency of the Furriers Union. The pressure under which these particular officials work doubtless forces them to take the initiative in organising this anti-communist movement; but at the same time it is becoming more and more a pressing requirement for the entire A. F. of L. class collaboration programme that the growing left wing shall be exterminated.

The manoeuvre of the reactionaries which threatens to split the trade unions, in order that they may rid themselves of the growing left wing, imposes upon the American workers, particularly upon the T. U. E. L. and the communists, the task of mobilising the broadest possible mass resistance, in order to preserve the unity and the very existence of the trade unions as militant class organisations, and to continue the struggle for their complete revolutionisation.

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VII. Meeting of the Enlarged E. C. C. I.

Eleventh to Thirteenth Session.

Full Report.

Eleventh Session.

Moscow, Nov. 28, 1926.

Comrade ROY (Chairman)

Today's session is opened. The order of business consists of the report of Comrade Tan-Ping-Shan on the situation in China. Before proceeding to this point, Comrade Remmele will make an announcement.

The Situation in China.

Comrade TAN-PING-SHAN (China):

A written report has already been submitted to the Plenum. But since too little light has been thrown upon the Chinese question I consider it desirable that the situation in China be characterised briefly, in such a manner as to bring into relief the principal questions.

1. The entire period prior to the Shanghai events in May of last year can be divided into three stages:
 1. From the Shanghai events to the victory of Kwo-Sung-Lin against Chang Tso-lin. This was a period of full revolutionary offensive against the Imperialists.
 2. From the defeat of Kwo-Sung-Lin up to the time of the northern expedition of the Canton troops. This period might be described as the counter-attack of the Imperialists against the Revolution.
 3. From the northern expedition of the Canton troops down to the present, during which the revolutionary forces are retreating and the offensive against the Imperialists.

It is not necessary to discuss the first and second of these stages, these are already sufficiently well known.

While we are meeting here today, a general meeting is being held in the Bolshevi Theatre for our late Comrade Krassin. The Presidium of this Plenum has sent a delegation to the meeting, consisting of Comrades Bell (Great Britain), Eberlein (Germany), and Bernard (France). Comrade Bell will speak at the meeting in the name of the Presidium.

With the third stage the Chinese Revolution has entered upon a new period in its development. Many important changes in the situation are to be noted, among them being:

1. The occupation of Wuchang and Hankow by Cantonese troops, whereby the revolutionary forces have spread out in Central China.
2. Consolidation of the Left wing of the Kuomintang. Thanks to mass pressure, the G. C. of the Kuomintang has adopted a resolution in favour of Wang Ting-wai to resume his position.
3. A leftward turn of the Kuomintang centrist as a result of which there is the chance that this wing can work together with the Left.
4. The movement for the re-admission of the expelled Kuomintang members who formed a group, a fraction, last year in Szechuan and Yunnan.
5. The official organisational relationship between the Peoples Army of Feng-Yu-shiang and the Canton Government.

The victories of the H. H. and V. Douglas Aunio and the liquidation of Kiangsi province and its capital Shanchai.