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The Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

By P. (Moscow).

The session which has just been concluded of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C. P. of Russia took place on the eve of the new economic year. For this reason the work of the Plenum acquires special importance.

It is true the prospects of the new economic year now commencing are not yet sufficiently clear. The basic facts however, the good harvest which will bring with it a special advance in all our national economy, are no longer in doubt. In spite of the delay in the purchase of corn, in spite of the unusual movement in the price of cereals this year, in spite of the shortage of industrial goods and the falling off of the revenue from taxes at the beginning of the economic year, we have no reason for rejecting those calculations for the commencing economic year which are contained in the so-called control figures of the Institute of Planned Economics. The basis for our calculations will probably be quite clear by the end of December, at the time of the holding of the Party Congress of the R. C. P.

As regards the next tasks, all speakers were agreed that a large-scale regulation of the purchases of corn, the prevention of competition between the various buying organs is necessary. It was emphasised that one of the most important tasks of the approaching period is the necessity of developing industry. Only by increasing the industrial output will we be able to cope with the shortage of goods and to induce the peasantry to sell

their grain. Special emphasis was likewise laid upon the responsible rôle which the co-operatives are called upon to play. The co-operatives must, in view of the prevailing shortage of goods, become the chief sources for supplying the villages with industrial products. This must be done by means of reasonable prices and without that speculative raising of prices which private capital practises under the present relations of supply and demand.

Based upon our economic revival, foreign trade is gaining greater importance every year. Upon the development of foreign trade depends the further extension of agriculture, as well as the development of industry, as a portion of the surplus of agricultural production can only be placed upon the foreign markets, and industry requires the import of plant and machinery, raw materials etc. In the course of the current economic year the turnover of our foreign trade will show a considerable increase as a result of the good harvest. After the acceptance of the report of the Central Control Commission on the organising of Foreign trade, the Plenum recorded the fact that the monopoly of foreign trade had produced magnificent results and must remain in the future one of the inflexible principles of the Soviet State. At the same time there was emphasised the necessity of a greater elasticity and a greater specialising of the apparatus of foreign trade, a closer connection between this apparatus and the inland economic organisations.

With the growth of our industry and the increase of the number of workers the importance of the trade unions will become continually greater. The Central Committee of the Plenum records an indisputable strengthening of the trade unions, which finds expression in the increase of the number of members and in the development of numerous branches of work among the masses (clubs, relief funds, physical culture etc.), but also in the improvement of the trade union apparatus. The Plenum declares, however, that now, as a result of the higher economic and cultural level of the masses, the bureaucratism which has not yet been entirely overcome in the trade unions, and their "administrative" and "economic" shortcomings, as well as the insufficiently deep and all-round connection of the trade unions with the masses, are making themselves felt more acutely than ever. Meanwhile, the trade unions must especially now, when the activity of the masses not only in the towns but also in the villages is growing, when we are setting ourselves the task of developing soviet democracy, carry out their chief slogan: "into the masses" and become real organs of workers' democracy.

A ruthless fight must be conducted against the methods of excessive administration, of direct interference by the Party organisations in the current work of the trade unions (questions of conditions of work, of wages, and of collective treaties). The exercise of the leading role of the Party in trade union work must be much more elastic. The trade unions must devote far greater attention to the fulfillment of their chief task, the protection of the economic interests and the raising of the level of culture of the working masses. The trade unions must do still more for the development of the activity of the masses. They must do everything in order that every non-party worker shall regard the trade union as his organisation, an organisation whose duty it is to furnish him with reports and which he can control. Only under these conditions can the trade unions fulfil their function as "schools of communism".

One of the most important questions for our Party is the question of raising the standard of living of the working class. The Plenum declares that the revival of industrial and agricultural production offers the possibility of taking a further step in raising wages, of course, only so far as our economic possibilities permit and in accordance with the increase of the productivity of labour. The Party must devote special attention to improving the position of the transport workers and of the workers in heavy industry, as well as in other branches of production in which wages are on a relatively low level.

There is hardly a single meeting of our Party at which the question of the relations of the Party to the peasantry is not raised in one form or another. The XIV. Party Conference which took place a few months ago adopted a number of decisions which assure the development of peasant economy and the strengthening of the alliance of the proletariat with the middle peasants, and adopted various measures for supporting and organising the village poor. The improvement of the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, the growing confidence of the peasantry in the Soviet power and in our Party, the fact that the best elements of the village poor and of the village peasants are rallying to our Party — all this proves the correctness of the line laid down by the XIV. Party Conference, all this proves that the Party is following the correct path and that it must continue to follow this path.

This year's good harvest, the increase in the means at the disposal of the proletarian State, and at the same time the increasing differentiation in the village which is partly promoted by the good harvest, has induced the Central Committee to undertake a number of further practical steps to support the village poor. Without losing sight of the central task of strengthening the alliance of the proletariat with the middle peasantry, the Party is at present adopting various practical measures in order, upon the basis of the decisions of the XIV. Conference, to render it possible for the village poor to participate practically in the co-operatives and to support their undertakings, on the basis of the decisions of the XIII. Party Conference, by granting cheap credits. On the other hand the increase in the activity of all sections of the peasantry and the development of soviet democracy in the village has caused the Party to devote greater attention to consolidating the organised influence of the village poor in the co-operatives, at the elections of village soviets, in the relief committees etc. The increasing activity of the big peasants, their attempt to create a united front with the middle peasants, must be opposed by our Party organisations by establishing organisations of the village poor and creating a bloc between the village poor and the middle peasants.

Both the trade union question and the question of the organising of the village poor are links in the chain of development of Soviet Democracy. One of the fundamental conditions for realising Soviet democracy, however, is the strengthening of inner Party Democracy. One cannot combat bureaucratism in the Soviets and in the trade unions, if the bureaucratic degenerations in the Party organisations which conduct the work of the trade unions and of the Soviets are not overcome. The Plenum of the Central Committee has therefore decided to issue an appeal to all Party organisations, and to call upon them to build their entire work upon the basis of the principles of inner Party democracy laid down by the Party. The XIV. Party Conference which meets in December, must be prepared in the spirit of these principles of Party democracy and of the Leninist unity of the Party. The Party Conference must be preceded by a careful discussion in the various Party organisations of all the questions placed on the agenda, and the elections must be carried out in such a manner that the Congress constitutes the most exact and complete reflection of the views and the mood of the entire Party.

POLITICS

The Commercial Treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany.

By P.

Moscow, 13th October 1925.

After eleven months of persevering and arduous work the Treaty was signed yesterday between Germany and the Soviet Union. This Treaty embraces the most various problems, which reach far beyond the limits of purely commercial questions.

Up to now the economic and commercial relations between Germany and the Soviet Union have been regulated by the Treaty of 6th May 1921. This Treaty was concluded at a time when international capital had made its great retreat from the front of open blockade and intervention and had adopted the attitude of partial resumption of relations with the Soviet State. It was the period of *de facto* recognition of the Soviet power. The German bourgeoisie blindly followed the English example in this respect. The Treaty of 6th May 1921 did not restore normal relations between the two States, but only constituted a half political, half commercial agreement. It was not until April 1922 that political relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were set up by the Treaty of Rapallo. At the same time there were laid down in the Rapallo Treaty the fundamental principles of friendly economic relations between the two States.

In the course of the last four years it has become clear that the Treaty of 6th May 1921 is no longer suited to the new development. During these four years the Soviet Union has re-established its economy, greatly developed its foreign trade and extended its connection with world economy.

The economic relations between the Soviet Union and Germany have developed at the same rate as the Soviet economy has grown. From the point of view of economics, each country supplements the other. The Soviet Union requires the industrial products and the technical achievements of Germany. Germany on the other hand requires the products of Russian agriculture and other goods exported from the Soviet Union. Before the war German exports to Russia represented 47.5% of the total Russian imports, while the imports from Russia to Germany represented 30% of the Russian exports.

After the war Germany was deprived of a considerable portion of her former markets. In addition there were many difficulties in the way of her importing the necessary foodstuffs and the raw material for industry. The Russian market offers great advantages in this respect. Germany is able to pay for the goods imported from Soviet Russia with her own products without having to draw on her gold reserve or stock of foreign bills. It must also be borne in mind that the market conditions for Germany have still further worsened since the acceptance of the Dawes Plan. Germany can only make reparation payments from the surplus of her trade balance. All these considerations forced German business circles eagerly to seek a settlement of political and business relations with the Soviet Union.

The difficulties in the way of an agreement lay chiefly, of course, in the difference in the social-economic and social-political

legislation of both countries. The German bourgeoisie, so far as its attempts to force through a complete or partial abolition of the foreign trade monopoly, did not lag behind the bourgeoisie of the remaining countries. Every one will remember the raid of the Berlin police on the Berlin Trade mission on 3rd May 1924. The German bourgeoisie at that time attempted to make a breach in the solid system of our foreign trade monopoly.

The German capitalists would not reconcile themselves to the fact that imports to the Soviet Union are regulated by a strict plan and are subject to a strict control, that the Soviet Union only permits such goods to be imported as satisfy the real requirements of the broad masses and promote the further development of our socialist construction. During the negotiations the German bourgeoisie endeavoured to obtain for itself a whole number of privileges which would have amounted to a partial surrender of our foreign trade monopoly, but without result.

The Soviet Union chiefly exports agricultural products. The German government, out of political considerations and under the pressure of agrarian capital, endeavoured to restrict the free entry of our exports into Germany.

Every Treaty between two countries is the result of a compromise. Each Party must make concessions to the other. Just as Germany so we ourselves could not carry through everything we wished. Nevertheless the Treaty contains a number of agreements on principle which are both economically and politically of the greatest importance. Before all the Treaty establishes the **inviolability of the Rapallo Treaty**. It is, so to speak, the continuation and realisation of the principles contained in the Rapallo Treaty. **Germany recognises the inviolability of our monopoly of foreign trade and guarantees at the same time the ex-territoriality of our Trade Missions.** Moreover, the Treaty provides as a basis for the regulations of all trade relations the **principle of most favoured nation treatment for both parties.**

The Treaty of 12th October 1925 opens up broad possibilities for the future development of the political and economic relations between both countries. The real significance of the Treaty, however, will depend upon what extent it is fulfilled by Germany. The Soviet Union will welcome this Treaty as an understanding which is necessary in order to **expedite the building up of our socialist economy.** The outcome of the **Conference of Locarno** will show us how sincerely Germany intends to fulfil the Treaty by giving it a solid economic import.

The Parliamentary Elections in Czechoslovakia.

By A. Neurath (Prague).

The Coalition government is bankrupt; it has decided upon fresh elections to the National Assembly and the Senate, which are to take place on the 15th of November. The new election of these two representative bodies is taking place before the expiration of the legal term. The coalition parties are simply unable to carry on any longer. Since the last parliamentary election they have accomplished a great deal — against the interests of all sections of workers in Czechoslovakia. The so-called social achievements of the revolutionary period have all been abolished by the coalition government, with the exception of the eight hour day, which in the most important branches of industry only remains on paper. The social-democrats have been the foremost in this work of abolition. Following the notorious example of the German social patriots, the workers' councils, for example, were "embodied" in the legislation, that is to say, they were completely deprived of their political content. With the help of the "elastic" tactics of the reformist trade union leaders and of those social-democrats who belong to the Coalition government, the Czechoslovakian exploiters were able greatly to reduce wages in all branches of industry and to worsen working conditions. For a considerable time the prices of all food stuffs and articles of mass consumption have been increasing. The Coalition government has flung thousands of civil servants on the street, and as the bourgeoisie was able to worsen the working conditions of all categories of wage workers, it was also possible to carry out enormous reductions of the staffs of private capitalist undertakings. No wonder therefore that a great portion of the petty bourgeoisie has lost all confidence in the Coalition government.

Czechoslovakian Foreign policy has been carried on entirely in the interests of French imperialism, that is against the econ-

omic interests of the entire population of Czechoslovakia. In the judging and handling of national problems the incompetence of the Coalition government has been revealed, so to speak, in its totality. Under such circumstances, it would appear to have been best for the Coalition parties to postpone the elections as long as possible. But as a matter of fact the present situation, although it cannot be regarded as very optimistic from the standpoint of all the Coalition parties, is still relatively the most favourable for the following reasons: the Coalition parties, and in the first place the social democratic leaders, anticipate that during the next few months still greater burdens will be placed upon the Czechoslovakian proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie and peasantry than has been the case hitherto. At the Marseilles Congress of the II. International the Czech social-democrat, Habrmann, who occupied the position of Minister for Education and also Minister for Labour in the Coalition government, openly pointed out that the eight hour day could not be retained in Czechoslovakia unless it was re-introduced in Germany. That means, the Czech national socialists, as well as the two sections of the II. International in Czechoslovakia, consider that the Czechoslovakian bourgeoisie, in view of the present European situation, is about to deliver fresh economic blows against the whole working population of Czechoslovakia. The bourgeoisie argues that if Czechoslovakian industry is not to be driven from the field by German industry, then the conditions of work and wages of the Czechoslovakian working class must be still further worsened. Things are developing in this direction as a result of the stupid foreign policy of Czechoslovakia which, in the interest of French policy, renders impossible any serious and comprehensive economic connection with Soviet Russia. In addition to the reactionary tariff policy adopted by the old parliament, the Czechoslovakian bourgeoisie wishes to overcome its economic difficulties by means of fresh wage reductions. The Social-democrats fully realise that, as hitherto, they have not only to act as a screen behind which the bourgeoisie can realise these sinister plans, but that they have to fight directly on the broadest front as guard-troops of the Czechoslovakian counter-revolution against the economic and politic interests of the entire proletariat of this State. The Czechoslovakian bourgeoisie does not wish to lose any time. The whole economic and political situation throughout Europe demands prompt action. If the approaching rigorous measures against the working class are carried out with the help of the social-democratic leaders before the new elections, then the social-democrats will lose their last supporters among the working class. And for this reason, in spite of the almost hopeless situation, they are in favour of the new elections being carried out as soon as possible.

One can understand that the social-democrats, along with their coalition accomplices, in such a depressing time are resorting to everything which they consider can in any way shake the position of that party which they all fear: that is, the C. P. of Czechoslovakia. In the summer the government and social-democratic newspapers were jubilant; they considered their success and the defeat of the C. P. of Czechoslovakia as certain. And in fact before the meeting of the Enlarged Executive of the Communist International they had no little cause for looking to the future with hope. But now they are confronted with the collapse of their policy as regards their intention to shatter the C. P. of Czechoslovakia. All other measures of the Coalition heroes have been wrecked, they finally only served the propaganda purposes of the C. P. of Czechoslovakia.

The situation of the Czechoslovakian bourgeoisie can be judged by the following data: The National Assembly consists of 19 parties comprising in all 294 members. The 5 coalition government parties have altogether 167 mandates, that is barely 3/5ths of all the votes. It is only with the help of the Czech traders' party that they obtained the 3/5ths majority.

The Czechish social-democrats will lose a number of seats, which will go partly to the Communist Party and partly to the Czech bourgeoisie. The remaining Czech Parties will just about maintain their present strength, while the clericals and national socialists will gain a few seats. In addition to the Czech social-democrats the National democrats will also sustain losses. The German social-democrats will suffer considerable losses, of which the C. P. of Czechoslovakia on the one hand and the German nationalists on the other will derive the benefit. The German bourgeois Parties will set up a so-called Sudetes united election list. The German social-democrats bargained for weeks with the Parties of the German manufacturers for the purpose

of setting up their all-inclusive national united front. Finally, nothing came of the negotiations with their German kinsmen. It is possible that the Coalition Parties as a whole will emerge from the election campaign as strong as they are at present. But should they not even maintain their present strength, then they will not hesitate for a moment to include representatives of the German bourgeoisie in their coalition, whereby they will be able to throw over the German social-democrats altogether. The latter will be forced to beg in order to be included in the Coalition. In this respect we shall witness a very entertaining spectacle.

The C. P. of Czechoslovakia is ready for the contest. All preparations have been made for the election campaign. On Saturday the 17th of October the National Assembly and the Senate were dissolved, and on the following day our newspapers printed the election Manifesto of the C. P. of Czechoslovakia and published the list of our candidates in all the constituencies of the Republic. In all the other Parties a furious quarrel is going on over the candidatures. The German social-democrats have convened a Party Conference, from which the public is to be excluded, in order to decide on the candidates. In four weeks, that is on the 15th of November, the revolutionary working class of Czechoslovakia will show the real strength of the so-called collapsed Communist Party.

After the General Protest Strike in France.

By M. O. (Paris)

The general strike which was carried out a few days ago throughout France as a protest against the Moroccan war, was the most imposing demonstration on the part of the workers which France has witnessed since the great revolutionary strikes of the year 1920.

The aim of this 24 hours strike was to lead the working class against the imperialist policy of the French government and to organise the resistance against the financial policy of Caillaux, which is continually increasing the cost of living of the workers. Contrary to the wilful lying of the bourgeois press, it must be said that the strike was a magnificent success. The powerful demonstration of the proletariat aimed at by the Central Committee of Action and the seven Workers' Congresses, which had rallied to them throughout France seven millions of workers of all categories (factory workers, clerks, small peasants), has been realised. The bourgeoisie now perceives what it has to expect from the mood of the working masses regarding the Moroccan war and the financial policy of the Painlevé-Caillaux government.

It is true the strike was not general in the sense that it revealed the complete unanimity of the working class. It could not do this for several reasons. Firstly, because the reformist organisations (Socialist Party and C. G. T.) did their utmost in order to sabotage the strike and to divert the working masses who still support them from revolutionary action. (These workers were promised parliamentary action to end the Moroccan war etc.) Secondly, because the Moroccan war is regarded by a certain portion of the working class as a simple colonial war, which is confined to a very limited area and does not immediately threaten their interests. Thirdly, because the French working class, both economically and politically, is split up into several organisations which are continually fighting each other, and because the greatest portion, about four fifths, is entirely unorganised. Under these circumstances it is quite clear, and the Committee of Action was certainly aware of it, that the strike could not reveal the complete unanimity of the working class.

In spite of everything the strike was an extremely imposing demonstration of power. Throughout the whole country and in all branches of industry a considerable portion of the workers ceased work. In a number of branches of industry the strike was general. The summons to strike, both in Paris and in the provinces, was followed not only by the supporters of the Communist Party and of the C. G. T. U., but also by a great number of socialists, members of the reformist C. G. T. and non-Party and unorganised workers. The strike was more extensive than that of the 1st of May, when, as is known, the two trade union organisations issued a joint order to strike.

The strike of the 11th October is a stage in the struggle which the Communist Party and the C. G. T. U. have undertaken against the imperialist policy of the government of the "Democrat" Painlevé, and against the financial policy of Caillaux. This struggle will be continued under other forms. Thus in a Municipal elec-

tions the Communists captured two seats out of three. The two successful candidates are comrades Arrighi and Aucouturier. As regards the third candidate, Comrade Henry Lozeray, this comrade is certain to be returned on the second ballot.

When it is remembered that comrades Arrighi, Aucouturier and Lozeray are at present in prison and have just been given sentences of from 18 months to two years imprisonment on account of their letter against the Moroccan war, it is evident that these elections have far more importance than simple election victories and are really the expression of the will of the French workers to fight against the Moroccan war.

The Resignation of Pusta and the Foreign Policy of Esthonia.

By O. Volgin.

The Esthonian Foreign Minister, Pusta, has recently resigned. The resignation of a Foreign Minister of any of the States which play a leading role in international relations could hardly have called forth so much comment and discussion in the foreign press as the resignation of the Foreign Minister of this little State. What is behind all this? Why is the French press, and especially the "Temps", shedding tears over the resignation of Pusta from the post of Foreign Minister of Esthonia? The fact of the matter is; the Baltic States, and Esthonia in particular, have, since the first days of their existence, been accommodating tools in the hands of the politicians of now this, and now that great power. Right from the first days of his activity as Esthonian Foreign Minister, Pusta, under the appearance of an independent policy of the Esthonian Republic, carried on the policy of the French Foreign Ministry, regardless of the fact that this policy is opposed to the interests of Esthonia.

What were the reasons for Pusta's resignation? One of them, and obviously the chief, was Pusta's desire to draw Esthonia, and with it the whole of the Baltic States, into the orbit of Franco-Polish interests and to convert Esthonia into an appendage of Warsaw. Paris had spared itself no pains in order to have its protégé Pusta transferred from the position of Esthonian Ambassador in Paris to the post of Esthonian Foreign Minister, and by means of him to carry out its policy in the Baltic.

The policy of Pusta which was directed from Paris, sharply deviated from the deeply-rooted tradition of Esthonia to seek the protection of England. One of the first Foreign Ministers of Esthonia, Poska, had openly proclaimed the necessity of having an English naval base on the coast of Esthonia. Pusta had decided to depart from this tradition, and therein is to be sought the chief reason for his resignation.

The discontent with the policy of Pusta had long been increasing. One of his strongest and most prominent opponents was the President of the Commission for Foreign Affairs in the State Assembly of Esthonia, General Laidoner, a staunch supporter of England and of the English protectorate over Esthonia. England, who desired to strengthen her influence over francophile Esthonia, made skilful use of Laidoner by strengthening his reputation among the Esthonian public, and thereby rendered him a dangerous opponent of the francophile Pusta.

A glaring example of this is provided by the question of Esthonia's indebtedness to England.

All Esthonian's requests to England for further time to pay her debts were unsuccessful until the Esthonian government appointed General Laidoner to conduct these negotiations. Laidoner succeeded in obtaining in London a deferment of the payments for many years, signed a treaty to this effect and thereby delivered a shattering blow to the prestige of Pusta.

A still greater failure of Pusta was the non-success of the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Esthonia, Lettland, Finland and Poland in Reval. France had determined to create at the Conference of Reval a Baltic Alliance which should include Poland. The creation of such an alliance would have been a great success for French policy in the Baltic and would have greatly strengthened French influence. The agent for the creation of this alliance was Pusta, but to the great regret of France all his endeavours were in vain. England succeeded in setting all levers in motion and the Conference of Reval did not take place.

The failure of the Conference of Reval organised by France was a serious disaster for French policy in the Baltic, and at the same time an annihilating blow for Pusta, the agent of Paris in the Baltic.

But it would be incorrect to regard Pusta's resignation solely as the result of the struggle between London and Paris for predominance in the Baltic countries. Inner questions of Esthonia also played a very considerable role in bringing about Pusta's resignation, before all the very serious economic situation in Esthonia.

Pusta's policy aimed at undermining all economic relations between Esthonia and the Soviet Union. This policy, however, was diametrically opposed to the direct economic interests of Esthonia. This reacted very strongly upon the economic situation of Esthonia. A very severe economic crisis arose in the country, factories were closed down and unemployment increased. Public opinion in Esthonia was very indignant over the policy of Pusta, and the Esthonian press openly demanded his resignation and protested against the vital interests of the country being sacrificed to the political intrigues of this or that great power. Public indignation increased so greatly that it threatened to bring about a government crisis. This finally led to Pusta's request to be relieved of his post.

The whole affair once again confirms how empty and hypocritical are the gestures and the assertions of the Baltic politicians with regard to the independence and sovereignty of the Baltic countries. Pusta had made a great song about the sovereignty of Esthonia, but he himself at every step bargained away the independence of Esthonia and sold the vital interests of this little country at the first command of Paris. The resignation of Pusta shows in the clearest possible manner that the economic interests of the Baltic States in no way correspond to the policies which are dictated to them, now from Paris and now from London, and the example of Esthonia can convince the Baltic States that it is a far too expensive luxury for them to be vassals of this or that great Power.

The Political Development in Japan.

By S. Sijepak (Tokio).

The so-called democratic Kensekai Party had scarcely been two weeks in office when the liberal section of the bourgeois public gave open expression to its disappointment with the Party, and began to declare that, in the last resort, there was no great difference between the Kensekai and the reactionary Seijukai Party. What is the reason for this rapid decline of the love of the advanced bourgeois public for the Kensekai?

The chief reason is that the "sacred principles" of democracy, constitutionalism and parliamentarism of the broad bourgeois circles of Japan, are beginning to be denied by that Party which was the bearer of these principles, even when it meant spending ten years in opposition for their sake. How many brushes have been worn out (the Japanese do not write with pens but with brushes) in order to demonstrate to the people that in the Kensekai Party alone lies the only salvation of democracy from the dirty boots of the feudal militarists. And how great was the joy of the liberal bourgeoisie when the coalition gained a victory last year and the leader of the Kensekai was entrusted with the task of forming a coalition cabinet. This joy increased still more later, when the leader of the Kensekai, Viscount Kato, was again instructed to form a cabinet, which this time consisted only of followers of the Kensekai. The bourgeois public saw in this a fresh proof that the old was disappearing and its place was being taken by the long cherished ideal, to see the reigns of government, after the model of all the parliamentary "cultured" countries, in the hands of representatives of the "people".

All the greater, therefore, was the astonishment and disappointment of the liberal bourgeoisie when the Kensekai government began to seek support not in the people, but in the Upper House, in the same Upper House against which a fight had been conducted which had been one of the essential elements of the struggle for the principles of bourgeois democracy.

Only a week after his appointment Kato began negotiations with the strongest and most reactionary parties in the Upper House, the Keniukai and the Koseikan in order to bring some leaders of these parties into the government as parliamentary Under Secretaries and Councillors. These negotiations were successful, and three members of the Keniukai and one member of the Koseikan, all of them prominent leaders of these parties, accepted the posts offered them.

This action of the government was calculated to win for it a support in the Upper House, and thereby achieve the possibility of ignoring a future opposition in the Lower House. This opposition consists of the Seijukai and Seijuchonto Parties. It should be mentioned in this connection that should the Seijukai and Seijuchonto Parties unite, the two parties will have 248 members in the Lower House against 161 members of the Kensekai government party, which means that the opposition could on the first day of the session of parliament in December of this year, force the Kensekai government to resign. This explains the fear of the Kensekai Ministers, and their machinations which aim at securing support in order to avoid the dissolution of parliament and new elections.

The liberal elements also are dissatisfied with the draft of the new Budget for the year 1925/26, which amounts to 1600 million Yen and exceeds the previous year's budget by some dozen millions, while the government is continually asserting that expenditure is being systematically cut down. Meanwhile, the new budget does not even include the sums to be allotted to the various Ministries, including among these the War Ministry and the Admiralty (the last named is demanding 320 million Yen for the construction of an auxiliary fleet). Unemployment is growing at a disastrous rate and the liberal bourgeoisie do not believe in the capability of the government to grapple with unemployment.

The disappointment of the broad petty bourgeois and bourgeois circles with the present political Parties in Japan is due to the fact that all these parties, in their nature, represent the interests of big capital and the interests of the agrarians, and constitute a conglomeration of various tendencies, a political mixture which cannot completely satisfy any one of the social groups in the country. And this confusion is, in turn, attributable to the fact that hitherto the broad masses did not have the possibility of giving expression to their will and desires and of voicing their demands, as up to now there were only about 3 million voters in the whole country. When regard is also had to the serious economic conditions which prevail in Japan at present, the general discontent with the existing situation become quite understandable.

All hopes are centred in the new election law, and a new Party is being sought which would introduce a fresh breeze into the sultry political atmosphere of the country. This is to be seen in the fact that statements have recently appeared in the more advanced papers to the effect that the working and peasant masses who are endeavouring to form a proletarian party in Japan are accomplishing a good work, and that it is time that such a party made its appearance.

It must nevertheless be said that the possibility exists that the hopes which are entertained that the new election law will result in the number of electors being increased in the near future by 9 to 10 millions, which would create the possibility of reforming the existing parties or of bringing a new party into the political arena, will not be realised. The Kensekai government is endeavouring by various intrigues to postpone such a threatening danger which the extension of the franchise to a further 10 millions citizens would mean for the Kensekai government and also for the other parties.

In its intrigues the Kensekai Party enjoys the support of those reactionary circles who, regardless of their mutual struggle for power, are held together by the common fear of new unknown electors, and before all by the fear of the possible rise of a proletarian party in the political life of Japan.

Espionage and High Treason.

By A. Neurath (Prague).

The Czechoslovakian Government has extraordinarily bad luck with its social democratic auxiliary troops, bot with those whose representatives are in the Government, and with the others (German social democrats) who, outside the Government, are wearing themselves out in their efforts to maintain peace and order in the Czechoslovakian Republic. On the other hand it may be said that the Social Democrats for their part have no luck with the Coalition Government. At first the Government was fairly confident that the Bubnik group in the CP. of Czechoslovakia would succeed, in intimate alliance with the Czech and German Social Democrats in destroying the CP. of Czechoslovakia. As

things did not work out as they expected; the Coalition Government was justifiably ill-tempered and the Social Democrats themselves by no means in the best of humour. The Social Democrat leaders then hoped that the Government would find means of accomplishing that in which the Social Democrats had failed.

The Coalition Government has for some time been persecuting the Communist Party with a relentlessness which leaves nothing to be desired. This method has not brought the Coalition Government a single step forward. Anyone can see that the CP. of Czechoslovakia has not forfeited any of its influence over the broad masses, that on the contrary their sympathy for it has increased just because the Coalition Government persecutes it in such an absurd way. Trials for high treason and espionage are being staged against the party or against whole groups of persons in confidential positions in the party as the case may be. In addition to smaller performances of this kind, two elaborate lawsuits against our party have been carried on in Prague. A few weeks ago, several comrades had to vindicate themselves against an accusation of high treason in the spirit of the ill-famed law for the defence of the State, in the so-called Wodicka case. In spite of all the efforts of the Czechoslovakian police, the Civil Court had no alternative but to acquit the accused. The boon companions of the Coalition however refused to leave go. In the summer, Comrades Jilek and Houser were arrested and, on the basis of material found in the possession of Dr. Houser, an action for high treason or espionage, as the case may be, was brought against Houser, Jilek, Neurath & Co. As to how this action was brought about, Comrade Smeral, in the Czechoslovakian National Assembly gave some data which are unparalleled in the history of the persecution of the Communists in capitalist States. Smeral narrated in the National Assembly:

"On July 30th, the Council of the Criminal Court unanimously expressed the opinion that the reasons given by the first denounciators were insufficient and that in consequence Comrade Jilek would have to be acquitted. The Supreme Court of Appeal was to decide the point on Tuesday and, in view of the situation at the time, there was hardly any doubt that it would unanimously confirm the resolution of the Council. But at that moment a second accuser dropped from the skies. On this occasion it was Grossmann, the Ostrow secretary of the Bubnik party. And that he was simply a model assistant, is evident from the fact that this gentleman with his denunciation did not go to the police but was introduced straight into the reception room of Mr. Malypeter (Minister of the Interior) in the Ministry for Internal Affairs. And he arrived there exactly on July 30th, a few hours after Malypeter had learnt the resolution of the Council."

Thus we see that the most influential factors in the coalition fraternity have exerted themselves in the second lawsuit directed against the Communist Party. The members of the Coalition engaged in the trial and of course the social democratic editors were already rejoicing in anticipation of the great sacrificial feast. The German "Social Democrat" immediately, in the very first days, acted as a blind to the Government, by writing that the Communists had no right to complain of the persecution if they had really fabricated plans of high treason. This case was expected to provide the Coalition parties and the Social Democrats with cheap election placards and election manifestos. And, as a matter of fact, the case will have such a result, but the placards which are produced on the basis of the lawsuit will not be against the Communist Party.

The trial began on Wednesday Oct. 7th. Even the results of the first day's proceedings spoilt, for the whole bourgeois Press, the taste of the lawsuit, from which they had expected a great deal, if not everything. On the second day, the Coalition Press took hardly any notice of the trial, and on the third day it merely announced that the case had been broken off and was not to be resumed for a week. Only the social democratic newspapers, those watch-dogs of the journalist pack behave as though they could make use of this trial to the detriment of the Communist Party; they do this out of political narrow-mindedness, which at least we may put to their credit. They have not yet grasped what has already become clear to their masters and employers, i. e. that this great offensive in the field of high treason and espionage will end with a pitiful exposure of the Coalition Parties and the Social Democrats, their allies in the Bloc.

It is difficult to anticipate all that the Coalition Parties or the Social Democrats will attempt before or during the election in order to shake the position of the Communist Party. The wire-

pullers of the anti-Communist international united Bloc in Czechoslovakia no longer have an easy task. As a matter of fact they have already put to the test everything that the counter-revolution has tried elsewhere against the Communists. An attempt on the life of President Masaryk, two trials for high treason, one plan of espionage, Comintern letters (if not quite an actual Zinoviev letter) — everything has been tried but without result, or, to tell the truth, with a fairly important result — for the Communists. Only let us have patience for a few days longer. The workers will settle the account in the election campaign.

THE WHITE TERROR

The Hungarian C. P. on the Torturing of Workers in Horthy Hungary.

The following is taken from the leading article which appeared in a recent issue of "Uj Marcius", the official organ of the Communist Party of Hungary.

We write these lines on the 10th day of the heroic hunger strike of Mathias Rákosi and his fellow-prisoners. They commenced a hunger strike when in the police prison, because during examination they were subjected to tortures which even surpassed the horrors of the years 1919/20. They continued the hunger strike when transferred to the prison of the Public Prosecutor, as the latter refused their demand that a record be taken of their complaints of mishandling.

The Horthy hangmen wish to stifle the heroic protest of our comrades with such unheard-of brutal means, that we shudder even as we write them down. The prison doctor instructed the prison warders how to carry out artificial feeding. The notorious Public Prosecutor has hired nine bloodhounds to carry out this "work". With the vilest insults, continuous mishandling and yells of fury, these cannibals carry out the "commands of the highest authority" in such a manner that the feeding tube is first thrust into the rectum and then immediately into the mouth. Even with such treatment they could not succeed in compelling a single comrade to abandon his decision. In spite of all the lying rumours, the hunger strike is still being continued.

It is in such a condition that in a few days, these fighters will be brought before a Special "Court" — these champions of the workers, who at a time of the most fearful reaction and of vilest treachery on the part of the social-democratic leaders, formed a new workers' party based on the principles of the class struggle, and whose aim it is to carry on communist propaganda, and thereby organise the Communist Party.

The appearance of our comrade Rákosi in Budapest has caused tremendous anxiety to the Hungarian bourgeoisie, which has been "steeled" in the bloody sea of white terror. The courageous, unshakable and heroic behaviour of comrade Rákosi and of the other comrades has had an enormous effect upon the working class and the peasantry. The fire of hope is blazing up in the breast of hundreds of thousands. Thousands of social-democratic workers, both in meetings as well in their wretched homes, have expressed feelings of genuine working class solidarity regarding the "mission of the courageous communists", so that the "Nepszava" has been forced to change its tone as a result of the elementary pressure of the masses.

The international revolutionary working class, headed by the Russian proletariat, has risen like one man in order to wrest Mathias Rákosi and his fellow prisoners from the clutches of their hangmen.

The Hungarian land-owners and great capitalists and the Hungarian social-democracy did not expect this. They believed that the Hungarian proletariat would be intimidated; they believed that the rescuing of the native country by means of the castration knife, with fire and sword, would not rouse any response on the part of the international working class.

Now when, all their hopes have been disappointed, they stand frightened and uncertain what to do in face of the great problem. The memory of the 4½ months rule of the Hungarian proletarian dictatorship has destroyed like a flash of lightning their feeling of undisturbed security. In their confusion they resort to making terrifying examples as a warning, and hide

their fear behind inexorable severity. In their cowardice they console themselves with the assurance that the Special Court cannot do otherwise than sentence these victims to be hanged.

By means of 42 gallows they wish to consolidate the ground which the heroic behaviour of Rákosi and his 41 comrades has rendered insecure. The first products of the terrified imagination of the bourgeoisie: the stores of arms and the lists of those whom it was intended to kill, have proved to be without foundation. They are only confronted with the "confession" of comrade Rákosi: "I came to Hungary in order to organise a Communist Party and to propagate Communist ideas here at home."

The charge of rebellion, on account of which one can be brought before a Special Court, consists, according to the law, in the formation of an "armed group". The first return of a Communist People's Commissar, unarmed and without an amnesty, in order to organise a Communist Party, the proud declaration of the People's Commissar of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, the word "at home", is, in the minds of the terrified Hungarian bourgeoisie, more than the formation of an armed group. That is a shining example, an indicator, which every one knows, in the present stage of the revolution, is the only effective weapon against the terrible reaction. For this reason the terror-stricken bourgeoisie is having the 42 gallows erected.

We believe that the word of command of the international revolutionary proletariat will be stronger than the will of the terrified hangmen. We firmly believe that today the Hungarian proletariat will not be among the last when it is a question of seeing that the way to its emancipation is not lined with any new Horthy gallows.

It is our unshakable conviction that the Hungarian working class has realised that the heroic example of Rákosi and his 41 comrades is the only possible way.

The Hungarian counter-revolution also knows this quite well: this way of self-sacrifice means more than armed conspiracies. This sacrifice is the firm foundation for the strengthening of the Communist Party of Hungary.

Max Goldstein.

By A. Dobrogeanu-Gherda.

A few days ago there died in the prison of Doftana, Max Goldstein, as a result of a hunger strike which he carried on for 50 days.

I met Max Goldstein at the first great Communist trial in Roumania, the so-called "Deabul Spira" trial. A day before the commencement of the trial we accused from Jilave and Bucharest were transferred to a barracks in the centre of Bucharest.

The majority had been arrested during the first half of 1920 in various localities in Roumania. The overwhelming majority of the participants at the socialist Congress, which took place in May 1920 and which pronounced in favour of affiliation to the Communist International, were arrested. Already at that time the bourgeoisie saw in Communism its real and most dangerous enemy. Apart from this hatred against the Communist Party which had just appeared in the political arena of Roumania, the authorities could not bring forward any concrete accusations. The proceedings were adjourned from month to month.

Finally, something unexpected occurred: Max Goldstein, who was already known as the one guilty for the explosion in the Senate, was arrested after having illegally crossed the frontier. In spite of the fact that the investigation of our case had already been concluded, the military Prosecutor connected our case with the explosion in the Senate. There existed not the least legal connection between these affairs, but the government and the military command found therein a way out of the difficult situation.

There began therefore at the end of January the trial of 275 accused, which then dragged on for over six months.

In the early dawn Max Goldstein was conveyed to the wash-room. He indicated to us by signs which he made through the window that he had been ill-treated during the night. When the trial began he was transferred to our department, to the "dangerous criminals" department.

In order to cow us, among other things, prison cells were employed in which one could not make a single movement. They were nothing else than standing coffins. Among them there was a special one, known as the "Max" prison cell, which had been especially constructed for Max Goldstein and was even smaller than the others, although Max Goldstein was tall and stout. In

this prison cell one could not even turn round. The first time I sat in this cell I began after half an hour to suffer from the lack of air and was seized with uninterrupted fits of nervous yawning.

The prison warders never waited for any pretext in order to impose disciplinary punishment. Every evening the names of those were called who, in accordance with a list prepared by the Military Prosecutor, were to undergo punishment. As a rule the prisoners were placed in these punishment cells for some days. Comrade Max Goldstein was kept in such a cell for ten days, ten days and nights of terrible torture. When the court proceedings took place he was brought out, and at the conclusion of the proceedings he was again brought back to his solitary cell. Behind the doors of these punishment cells (which were called "coffin lids") officers used to lay in wait for Max Goldstein. As soon as he came out they flung themselves upon him, struck and beat him, flung him to the ground and kicked him. When he protested he was beaten in the face, on the teeth etc. with sticks. As soon as his ten days punishment expired he was sentenced to another ten days.

Comrade Max Goldstein, tortured and loaded with chains, with his pale face and incredibly swollen limbs, was dragged each day to the proceedings of the military court. But no tortures could terrify him. He boldly exposed the Ministers who appeared as witnesses for the Prosecution as the ones who were really responsible for the acts of revenge of the working class, whose patience had been tried beyond endurance; he regarded himself as an instrument of this revenge.

And in fact he was nothing else. The man whom the bourgeoisie described as blood-thirsty anarchist was of a kind and gentle nature, full of concern and sympathy for the sufferings of other comrades. Against all the attempts of the secret police to represent the Communist Party as having participated in the explosion in the Senate, he courageously and steadfastly maintained the truth, the innocence of the Communist Party of this act of individual terror. He enthusiastically took part in our struggle, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that we persuaded him not to take part in our hunger strike after all the sufferings he had endured in the "coffin".

But the jailers were not satisfied with inflicting physical suffering on Max Goldstein. They endeavoured to subject him to moral suffering. Thus, for instance, they tried to prevent me from playing chess with him, in order not to give him the possibility of forgetting his sufferings, even for a short time.

Not infrequently, when all the others in the cell were asleep, I heard how deeply he sighed and groaned. Suffering himself, he was full of anxiety for his loved ones and all who were near and dear to him. Many a time he said to me: "It is bad here, but how will it be in the Doftana prison!"

His gloomy forebodings have proved to be true. The cruelties in Doftana were such that he went on hunger strike, and died of starvation, in order by this sacrifice to awaken the fighting spirit of the Roumanian proletariat to whom he had devoted his whole life.

IN THE INTERNATIONAL

For the Line of the Comintern.

The Discussion in the Communist Party of Germany.

By L. Berger (Berlin).

Six weeks ago there was published the letter of the Executive Committee of the Communist International to the Communist Party of Germany which forms the basis of the present discussion. The publication took place six weeks after the 10th Party Conference, a Party Conference which had outwardly presented the appearance of complete unity. This unity was not a bolshevist unity, it was not based upon agreement with the Comintern or with the membership, it was the expression of a system which, the longer it lasted opposed more frequently and openly the Comintern and was bound to lead to a greater isolation of the Party functionaries from the membership and of the whole Party from the working masses.

That this state of affairs in the Party could not last was realised by many of the members; the letter of the ECCI clearly and openly expressed this: it provided the basis for the clarification within the Party which the Party Conference had not

given and — precisely because of the system within the Party — could not give. Immediately after the publication of the letter, a broad discussion set in, which again raised all the principles of the Comintern, the course and result of which is of undoubted importance for the whole of the Communist International.

The Chief Problem.

In the negotiations between the Executive and the Delegation of the Communist Party of Germany it was declared with full seriousness and with perfect right (in Bucharin's report):

"It is a question of the fate of the German Party. All our proposals, all our criticism follow the same line, the line of getting into contact with the masses: more effort must be made to convince, there must be more democracy within the Party, another language must be adopted towards the social democratic workers, the leading bodies must have a greater sense of responsibility, there must be a greater accessibility to the party membership in order to train leaders from the ranks; every one of our proposals has the same object and belongs to the same complex. And this complex of our proposals has one centre point: normalising of the Party, the slogan to the masses etc. We have brought forward a system of proposals which is in accordance with a correct reaction to the new turn in the national and international situation. You have done nothing or do not wish to do anything with this, or have forgotten to discuss it."

The problem of developing the greatest recruiting power of the Party in order to develop and strengthen the Eastern orientation, the red front of the proletariat against the Western orientation, against the black united front of the bourgeoisie, in connection with the normalising of the Party life, in attracting and making use of all the honest forces prepared to co-operate in the work of the Party, in carrying out a real inner Party democracy and in creating the closest relation with the Comintern — that is the crux of the whole Party discussion. The clearer and more thoroughly this problem is put in the foreground, the more unequivocally the question stands: for or against the Comintern!

Since the Frankfurt Party Conference the demand to normalise the life of the Party has been rejected, that is to say, sabotaged by the leading Ruth Fischer-Maslov group, as well as from the Ultra-Left, as an attempt on the part of the Comintern to push the Party to the Right. The fear of the "new people" found expression in the various disastrous mistakes of the Party Central:

1. In the Party in the neglect to reorganise the Party on the basis of factory nuclei, in the abolition of the trade union department and the expulsion of valuable party forces who held different opinions, up to the exclusion of inner Party democracy, to the carrying out of mechanical over-centralisation, up to a system of personal dictatorship in the Central Committee. This entirely false attitude towards the Party (rejection of co-operation and control from below) was accompanied by the attempt,

2. to carry on an independent policy within the Comintern. For this purpose emissaries were sent to the various Parties and, theoretically as well as practically, the attempt was made to revise Leninism in the Western European sense (Maslov's polemic against Lenin and the III. World Congress) and at the same time there were reservations and passive resistance against the policy of the Comintern in the most important question: bringing about of trade union unity. To the false attitude to the Party and the Comintern there necessarily belongs

3. the false attitude towards the masses, the incapability to judge at the right time the process of differentiation among the social democratic workers and the revival of the trade union movement, and energetically to take advantage of and obtain a leading influence over the same. No wonder that the incapability to get into real contact with the masses and rightly to understand and to apply the tactics of the united front (repudiation of the III. World Congress) led to the over-estimation of the parliamentary "actions" and thereby to right deviations (therefore it was not the Comintern but the rejection of the proposals of the Comintern that led to the Right!).

The head of the Central Committee of the C. P. of Germany, the Ruth Fischer-Maslov group has

"erred in the most decisive questions (trade union work, approach to the masses, the question of the wall between us and the social-democratic workers, the relations to the Russian revolution, to the International etc.), it has not

stood the fiery test in these vital questions". (Comrade Zinoviev in the session of the German Commission on 13th August 1925.)

The Discussion.

The discussion which is to create the basis for the removal of all errors has up to now passed through two stages:

a) the discussion in the leading bodies of the Party — the general posing of the problem — the formation of groups;

b) the discussion among the membership — the treatment of the separate questions, the separation into a fraction of the ultra-Left.

The more the practical questions and tasks are discussed, the more concretely the questions are put, the less scope is there for activity for the fraction makers, ultra Left and Right.

Up to the present four groups can be distinguished in the discussion:

The group of the former Right opposition has not up to the present come forward openly as a definite group. In various districts: Halle-Merseburg, Erzgebirge-Vogtland and Württemberg isolated attacks have been made, partly in order to remove the present leadership which does not offer any guarantee for an honest carrying out of the line of the Comintern.

The Ruth Fischer-Maslov group. The chief disputes are raging round the Ruth Fischer-Maslov group and the Ultra-Left group. The Ruth Fischer-Maslov group occupies an untenable position. It is true, it has an influence in some of the important districts (Berlin, Ruhr area, Middle Rhine); sooner or later it must decide whether it will come over to the majority of the Party against the Ultra-Left or form a Block with the Ultra-Left against the majority of the Party and against the Comintern. As an independent group it has no basis. It is to be expected that, along with a portion of the Ultra-Left, the overwhelming majority of the Ruth Fischer-Maslov group will abandon resistance to the policy of the Comintern and join the majority of the Party. The attitude of the Berlin District Committee is characteristic of the untenable position of his group. At first this Committee rejected the Letter of the ECCI. by bringing forward all sorts of objections; after a great portion of the Berlin membership had turned against this standpoint, a new decision was adopted which unconditionally accepted the letter; but even after this a declaration was put to the vote in which the objections to the letter of the ECCI. were again introduced.

Ruth Fischer and Maslov did not take part in the discussion themselves. Their followers put forward the following standpoint:

a) the criticism by the Executive of the German Party is completely justified; but so far as a Ruth Fischer-Maslov group, which cannot be separated from the German Left, is made responsible, it is false;

b) the responsibility lies with the entire Central Committee and the entire Party; the immaturity of the Party is one of the chief sources of its failures and shortcomings;

c) only a strong Left leadership can preserve the Party from opportunism; without Ruth Fischer-Maslov there can be no strong Left leadership;

d) the criticism of Maslov and his attitude to the III. World Congress is an attack upon the basis of the German Left in its fight against Brandlerism.

The Ultra-Left skilfully take advantage of the weakness of the Ruth Fischer-Maslov group. Under the slogan of rallying the old Left against opportunism, and at the same time rejecting the persons of Ruth Fischer and Maslov, they are conducting an eager campaign against the Comintern. Thus Rosenberg at a meeting in Berlin brought forward the thesis: the Letter of the ECCI. is a platform of the Right for splitting the Comintern.

The chief points of the Ultra-Left are:

a) the criticism of the Executive — so far as it has been taken up by the so-called Ultra-Left — is perfectly correct;

b) the mistakes are shared by the Executive itself — only the Ultra-Left have not participated in them;

c) the Policy of the Comintern is tending to the Right;

d) the Comintern is wrongly informed regarding the Ultra-Left;

e) the Party and the Comintern can only be preserved by the "old Left" from opportunism and splitting;

f) every normalising in the direction of attracting former Right comrades is to be rejected; on the other hand, all Left comrades who have been subjected to Party discipline are to be restored their full rights.

The Effects in the Party and on the Working Class.

The discussion is embracing the entire membership. The political activity of the Party has been considerably revived. As the ECCI. Letter very rightly says: the carrying out of the letter must be the first great propagandist work of the Party. This also means that workers outside of the Party, particularly in the Socialist Party of Germany, are being affected by this discussion, especially in connection with the reports of the first workers' delegation which has returned from Soviet Russia.

The Social Democratic Press, as well as the entire bourgeois press, is endeavouring to prove to the workers the bankruptcy of the policy of the C. P. of Germany. It must be stated however, that the fears which were expressed from the commencement, before all on the part of the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group, of open discussion, which would furnish political capital to the S. P. of Germany, have proved to be quite groundless. It is true the Party has not completely succeeded in discussing openly and properly with the social democratic workers regarding the political problems of the Letter which extend beyond the limits of the Party; it has not yet succeeded in safeguarding the unity of theory and practice with regard to reorganising the Party for trade union work etc. With regard to the whole Party development, one can be thoroughly optimistic; it is moving consciously in the direction of the Comintern, in the direction of Bolshevism.

The six weeks party discussion in the Party prove that the Executive has intervened in a proper manner against the mistakes of the Ruth Fischer-Maslow group and has preserved the C. P. of Germany not only from great injury, but at the same time has rendered the Party more capable of fulfilling its tasks towards the Comintern and the proletariat.

Internal Situation of the Workers Party of America.

By P. Green.

The report of the New York membership meeting makes it urgent for me to give the party a short report of the work of the Parity Commission on the basis of unquestioned facts and documents.

At the beginning of the work of the Parity Commission (beginning of July) there existed a split in the party; in Cleveland there were two organisations; a similar situation existed in Philadelphia; in Chicago and New York the situation was extremely sharp. The party had two central committees, two independent organisations with their own finances and connections and their own internal discipline.

This actual split was liquidated by the Parity Commission.

The Parity Commission did not detect any fundamental differences in political questions between the two factions. All political resolutions were adopted unanimously.

The election campaign before the party convention was the basis for an extreme sharpening of the factional struggle. The dangers of a split grew to a high pitch.

The representatives of the minority foreseeing the possibilities of a split, made the proposal to the Parity Commission to settle the most touchy questions of the individual composition of the Central Committee and the District Committees. They agreed to form a minority in the Central Committee although the result of the elections was not yet clear. By these means they hoped to avoid a split. The proposal was accepted by the Parity Commission. The number of members in the Central Committee for the Foster group was fixed at 13 while 8 were assigned to the Ruthenberg group. Irrespective of this decision there developed an actual split in three districts. The Parity Commission succeeded in liquidating this split.

The decision of the Communist International coincided in the most important practical proposals and decisions with those of the Parity Commission, not less than 40% for the representatives of the minority of the Central Committee (the decision of the Parity Commission was 38%), maximum of the parity principle in all executive organs, (the decision of the Parity Commission was not less than one-third for the minority). But the political appraisal of both factions by the Comintern, contained in the resolution of the E. C. C. I., created a crisis within the majority faction. The faction split in two parts; first the group of Comrade Foster which in the beginning declared itself for non-participation

in the Central Committee and later proposed not to take the majority in that committee, and second, the group of Comrade Cannon which made the proposal to organise the Central Committee on the basis of the parity principle. The view of Comrade Cannon was victorious and his proposal was accepted unanimously by the faction after a long discussion.

A new session of the majority faction designated as candidates for the politbureau Comrades Foster and Bittelman. (During all this time Comrade Bittelman supported Comrade Foster.)

In the meeting of the new Central Committee—thanks to my vote—the majority of the politbureau and the secretariat was secured for the Ruthenberg group and instead of Bittelman, Cannon was elected to the politbureau and the secretariat for the Foster group.

Let us try to analyze the above cited facts.

The first thing one is impressed with is that the party has gone through a very severe crisis and that it had sufficient strength to overcome the danger of a split between the former majority and minority. That does not mean that the danger of a split is completely eliminated or even considerably lessened. It only means that the crisis of the party has been moved onto a new track; the former divisions in the party are giving way to new divisions. It is no secret in the party that there are serious differences between the Foster and Cannon groups. These differences are not less serious than those that had existed between the former majority and minority. The formal division of the former majority group into two groups is only a question of time. That is the first thing.

Second: The differences between the new groups in the party follow a new line. That does not mean that the former differences are fully overcome. It merely means that new questions arise as the centre of the inner party controversy. Now it is no longer the question of the labour party that is being discussed but the question of Bolshevization and reorganisation of the party and first of all the question of the relation of the party to the Communist International.

Therefore, if a split does come, it will take place on a new line; only part of the former majority will split off from the party.

Third: What importance can be attached to the fact that the former majority faction accepted unanimously the resolution of Cannon but proposed as members of the politbureau and the secretariat Comrades Foster and Bittelman?

Here we find a tremendous irreconcilable contradiction between the words and the deeds of the former majority. It has long been established that judgment of political parties and groups must be based not upon their words, their declarations, their promises, their resolutions and their programmes, but upon their deeds, upon their practical activities. The resolution of Cannon was accepted (for the C. I.) but as candidates for the politbureau there were selected Comrades Foster and Bittelman who took a position against the C. I., against the decision of the Comintern. In words therefore, they were for the C. I., in action against it, in words for Cannon, in deeds for Foster and Bittelman.

The last membership meeting of the New York party organisation where Comrades Zack, Krumbain and Aronberg made open declarations against the C. I. declaration, and declared themselves openly against cooperation with the Ruthenberg group, has clearly proven that part of the former majority have begun to travel a road that does not lead toward the Comintern, but in an entirely different direction. A number of facts from party life after the party convention prove that the contradictions within the former majority which has never been a homogeneous group are sharpening. From the one side the social democrat and Loreist elements begin to raise their heads and openly oppose reorganisation. On the other hand, part of the former majority is fully aware of the impossibility of following the road selected by Comrades Foster and Bittelman, the road which does not lead toward the Comintern. This part of the former majority is beginning to desert its leaders and to approach the Ruthenberg group.

Comrades Foster, Bittelman, Krumbain, Aronberg and Zack declared that they are for the Comintern, while in fact they are following a political policy against the Comintern. Such a system of double accounting, where one account belies the other, cannot be continued for any length of time. Already the unanimous acceptance of the political resolutions in the Parity Commission was somewhat suspicious. This unanimity smelled very much like double accounting. The acceptance of the Cannon resolution and the election of Foster and Bittelman into the politbureau has clearly brought to life this double accounting. It became clear then that a parity policy in the C. E. C. was impossible. One

cannot give equal rights to that group which is for the Comintern and that group which carries on a policy against the Comintern. It is necessary to preserve the leading role in the party for that group which stands for the Comintern not only in words, but also in deeds and which was characterized by the Comintern as being "nearer and more loyal to it."

Objectively the situation in the party is as follows: Lore accepted the resolution of the party congress about his expulsion from the party with a light heart. He did not make any attempt to protest against this decision to the C. I. which only proves that the Comintern is thoroughly foreign to him. Now he is openly working against it. Though Lore alone is not a big power, yet we must not forget that he is the spokesman of those social democratic Loreist and half-Loreist elements which are still very numerous in our party.

Foster and Bittelman are actually following a line against the Comintern although they declare that they are for the Comintern. They are gathering the right wing of the party around them. The elections to the convention prove that.

By remaining longer in the Foster faction, the Cannon group, which is supported by the healthier part of the former majority, which actually is for the Comintern, risks in this situation to be thoroughly discredited. Neither the party nor the Comintern could interpret such a further adherence in any other way than as a support to the Foster-Bittelman group. After the New York membership meeting which has proved that the Foster-Bittelman group has made a further step against the Comintern, a firmer formal unity of the Cannon group with the Foster-Bittelman group is objectively a support of the right wing of the party.

There is a lot of talk in the party at the present time that the last decision of the Comintern was the result of incorrect information and of foreign influences. The talk goes around that the Comintern will annul this decision. This is ridiculous humbug. But facts are stubborn things. No rumor can eliminate or hide them. Is it not a fact that Comrades Foster and Bittelman are now taking a position against the C. I.? Is it not a fact that they are supported in the Party by the right elements? These facts cannot be hidden by any resolution and even the C. I. does not have the power to do that.

The party has still many difficulties ahead of it until it stands on the firm ground of Bolshevism. But it will overcome these difficulties if it learns to judge the groups and factions not by their words but by their deeds. This is all important.

Montreal, Sept. 30, 1925.

FOR THE UNITY OF THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT

The Anglo-Russian Unity Committee and the Right Amsterdamers.

By A. Losovski.

I.

Scarborough — a New Defeat of the Amsterdam International.

The British Trade Union Congress at Scarborough had to decide who was in the right, the Left or the Right Wing of the Amsterdam International. All the Amsterdam reactionaries had set their hopes on their English friends — Thomas, Clynes, Cramp, etc. — who were expected to lead the English trade union movement, which had exceeded the bounds set by the Amsterdam International, back into the fold. The social democratic Press had maintained in a demagogic manner that the resolutions of the General Council indicated merely a change of attitude of some trade unionists, but not of the English trade union movement. The Congress was called to decide this question.

The most prominent leaders of the Amsterdam International (Jouhaux, Oudegeest, Leipart etc.) did not appear at this Congress, as they obviously could not hope to be received with approval. This was declining the fight before the battle began. This foreboding did not mislead the Right leaders of the Amsterdam International; the Congress in Scarborough, in spite of many weaknesses, was a brilliant demonstration of the anti-Amsterdam tendency. Has such a thing ever happened as that the Amsterdam trade unions declared themselves in favour of supporting the struggle of the colonial peoples even should they declare them-

selves independent States? Do not German Social Democracy and German trade union bureaucracy dream day and night of receiving colonies, and here was what might be described as a Bolshevik attitude towards the most delicate question of world imperialism.

In comparison with the Congress at Hull, this Congress took a step forwards in the question of trade union unity. In Hull the unity was provided for by the Amsterdam International and round the Amsterdam International. In Scarborough it was a case of the creation of an all-embracing trade union International, which is only thinkable through an International Unity Congress. In the question of shop stewards the Congress also took an attitude opposed to that of Amsterdam. Let us bear in mind that the French Reformists have frequently declared the abandonment of shop stewards to be a prerequisite to unity. Finally the Scarborough Congress took an openly revolutionary attitude towards the question of the Dawes plan, the pet of the 2nd and the Amsterdam International.

Scarborough represents a defeat of the Amsterdam International not only in the question of unity, but in a number of other questions which are of the greatest significance for the whole English and International Labour movement. Whether it likes it or not, Amsterdam must now take this decision into consideration, for the English trade unions represent a third of the whole Amsterdam International.

The Congress at Scarborough further brought to light the deep-reaching differences of opinion which exist between the English trade union movement and the leaders of the English Labour party. A curious phenomenon may be observed in England; the political party lags behind the trade union movement. This must inevitably lead to a struggle which would mean a most serious upheaval in the British Labour party.

Apart from objective cause which are drawing the Labour movement to the Left, the systematic and deliberate tactics of the C. P. of Great Britain and of the minority movement played an important part in the move towards the Left of the English trade unions. Before the trade union Congress, the Conference of the adherents of the Red International of Labour Unions took place. At this Conference, 750,000 workers were represented; this necessarily had an influence on Scarborough; with the growth of the revolutionary wing, the Right and Left wings had to take up a definite attitude.

As far as the Red International of Labour Unions is concerned, we cannot but rejoice at the results of the Trade Union Congress. The resolutions of the Scarborough Congress have already borne fruit; the Anglo-Russian Committee has begun to function and this is of enormous significance for the fate of the whole International Trade Union Movement.

The Amsterdam Right is still obstinately resisting the International Unity Congress and the creation of a united International. The only result that they will obtain by their tactics is that they will detach themselves from the International Trade Union Movement. The unity of the International Trade Union Movement has taken a serious step forwards at the Scarborough Congress, whether the Amsterdam Right wished it or not.

II.

"A Disgraceful Document."

This description is taken from the "Vorwaerts", the central organ of German Social "Barmatism". It refers to the last proclamation of the Anglo-Russian Committee which, as is well known, was finally constituted after the Scarborough Congress. The "Vorwaerts" is extremely disconcerted at the "remarkable paths" along which the English trade unionists are marching towards unity. The "Vorwaerts" quoted the most important passages from the proclamation published by the Anglo-Russian Committee and adds:

"One cannot lay down this document without a feeling of shame; the fact that the Russians could demand that the English members of the Committee should accept such a manifesto, is an irrefutable proof of how completely the latter were under their thumb. The analysis of the present economic situation is Russian, the inclusion of the Dawes plan is Russian, the formulation with regard to the guarantee pact in the West as a military alliance is also Russian as is finally the echo which the Anglo-Russian discussions are said to have found among the workers throughout the world, the description of which in no way corresponds to reality. It is anyhow a piece of impudence merely to record enthusiastic

assent and to quote this as an incontestable "proof that the way taken was the right one, and not to breathe a word of the fact that millions of organised European trade unionists have looked on at these negotiations for unity with a mixture of incredulity and horror and have only observed silence because they wished to avoid giving the British bourgeoisie the chance of exploiting their protest against the English workmen."

With the latest document however, the British trade union representatives have allowed themselves to be manoeuvred by the Russians into such a position that it should be impossible for the international trade union movement to maintain silence any longer. It is high time that the other trade unions organised in the Amsterdam International should give emphatic expression to their dissentient attitude; for there is good reason to suppose that the members of the British Trade Union Executive are no longer in the least aware how far they have already alienated themselves from their colleagues on the continent for the sake of their friendship with Russia." (All italics by me A. L.)

These expressions of opinion of the "Vorwärts" with regard to the approach between the trade unions of the Soviet Union and of Great Britain deserve very serious consideration. The "Vorwärts" had no feelings of shame at the time of the Barmat scandal. The "Vorwärts" had no feeling of horror when Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were murdered, with the moral participation of German Social Democracy. The "Vorwärts" felt neither shame nor horror when thousands and thousands of German proletarians were thrown into prison; the "Vorwärts" never lost its sangfroid when the German proletariat, helped by German Social Democracy, lost day by day, one after its other of the positions it had conquered and gradually became a European collee.

No, this is all in order, this is all as it should be in accordance with the new Heidelberg programme. When however the trade unions of the Soviet Union and of Great Britain come to an agreement on the basis of mutual concessions, when a way is found for the creation of a united International, when the English Labour movement gets on to the lines of class war, then the "Vorwärts" becomes hysterical and is overcome by feelings of "shame" and "horror".

Simultaneously with the demand that pressure should be exercised on the English trade unions, German Social Democracy is making endeavours to draw the reactionary bureaucracy of the American Federation of Labour into the Amsterdam International through the Delegation of the A. D. G. B. which is at present in the United States. The cynical venality of the reactionaries in America produces no feeling of horror in German Social Democracy, but the move of the English trade unions towards class war produces a feverish attack in the whole Social Democracy, the most secret thoughts of which are so crudely expounded by the "Vorwärts".

The appeal of the "Vorwärts" to the Right wing of the Amsterdam International has not failed to take effect. Amsterdam has appeared on the scene with explanations which explain nothing except the feeling of horror of the Amsterdam Right for the growing will of the masses for unity.

We are proud of this "disgraceful document" which causes German Social Democracy to shudder with horror.

UNION OF SOVIET REPUBLICS.

The Proposed New Family Law of the Soviet Union.

By D. Kursky, People's Commissioner for Judicial Affairs.

At the 2nd Conference of the Central Executive Committee of the RSFSR., which is at present taking place, the following draft bill is being dealt with. — Editor.

The Abolishment of Legal Marriage.

As early as in the first months of its existence, the Soviet Power, by its decrees "On Divorce", "On Civil Marriage, on Children, and on the Keeping of a Register of Births, Marriages and Deaths", which were published on December 19th and 20th 1917, introduced far reaching changes in the domain of legislation with regard to marriage and the family. As Comrade Lenin pointed out in 1919 in his speech at the Conference of the

Working Women of Moscow, civil law, even in the most progressive countries, has exploited the weaker position of woman particularly in the field of marriage law, by not giving her equal rights but putting her at a disadvantage. The indissoluble legal marriage with unequal rights, which according to the arrangement of bourgeois lawyers represents principally a community of goods in which the husband alone has the right of guidance and disposal, i. e. in which he has the right to force on the woman his place of residence, nationality and family name, the right to a decisive voice in the education of the children etc. — this marriage, as well as the "religious sanctification" of this slavery was abolished by revolutionary legislation.

The decrees mentioned as well as the law with regard to the registration of births, marriages and deaths in 1918 which was entirely based on them, determine the fundamental attitude of the Soviet Power as regards marriage and family law. The statute book of 1918 first of all deprived religious marriage of all legal significance and established civil marriage; it further established complete equality of rights of both parties to the marriage and of both parents, as well as the right of divorce in accordance with the will of one of the two partners, also the divisibility of goods, combined with mutual financial support and, what is most important, it assured complete equality in the position of the children of a registered and of an actual marriage. This law created a whole system of legal relations and was in force for about seven years without any changes worth mentioning — with the exception of the simplification of some entries in the register of births, marriage and deaths.

To-day some of the points in this statute book have proved to be out of date.

The Material Factors of Soviet Marriage.

The draft of the new code of law, regarding marriage, the family and guardianship, worked out by the People's Commissary for Justice — in accordance with the resolution passed at the last meeting of the Central Executive Committee — was previously sent out to the subordinate offices and dealt with in detail by the commissions of the Council of People's Commissaries and by the Council of People's Commissaries itself. Now that a number of changes have been made, it will be submitted to the next meeting of the Central Executive Committee.

The draft differs from the code of 1918 chiefly in its construction. Whereas the existing code concentrates attention in its very first paragraphs on the creation of organs for registration, in other words on the formulation of the circumstances of marriage and the family, the present draft puts these formal factors in their proper place and concentrates attention on the material factors, i. e. on the laws which determine the rights and duties arising from the circumstances of marriage and the family, regardless of whether these relations have or have not been sanctioned by form (registered).

The bill attributes to the official formulations of marriage no other significance than that of a testification to a definite fact, in order to facilitate the proof in cases where rights have to be protected, for instance when maintenance is demanded, when the right of inheritance has to be determined etc. In this way the foundation of the previous code, according to which only civil marriages which are entered in the register establish rights and duties, has now become superfluous. In the present draft the equality of material rights and duties resulting from matrimonial relationship, independently of its registration, is perfectly clearly determined.

The Registration of Marriage and of Divorce.

According to the bill "the registration of marriage is undertaken with the object of facilitating the protection of personal rights, the rights of property and the interests of the parties to the marriage and the children". (Paragraph 1.) In a number of paragraphs it is pointed out that persons between whom a matrimonial relationship actually exists, have the same rights as those whose marriage has been registered. The difference obviously exists that couples whose marriage is not registered, must prove that they are living together in marital relationship each time before the Court or some other functionary of the Government, whereas this is not the case for registered husbands and wives.

Either party to the marriage has still, as hitherto, the absolute right to divorce. In this respect, the bill simplifies the pro-

cess of divorce in that it transfers it to the **official registrar** of births, marriages and deaths, who is also entrusted with the registration of the marriage. In cases in which the divorce is undertaken at the instigation of one of the parties to the marriage, the mere notification of the completion of the divorce is substituted for the summoning of both parties. In order to avoid the necessity of applying to the Court or to the public notary to establish mutual understanding with regard to the consequences of the divorce in respect of the rights of possession and of the position of the children, the official registrar has been given the right to register the mutual agreement of the parties about these questions.

The Property of Married Persons.

According to the existing law, marriage does not imply any community of ownership. In the construction of the proletarian State, this formula is inadequate. As matrimony is freed from any factor of compulsion, contracting marriage has no influence whatever on the independence of the parties as regards the right of possession. In this respect, understanding between the parties must be given the fullest scope possible. This idea is also expressed in § X of the bill, which gives the contracting parties the right to enter into any contract they like as regards their possessions, but under the condition that there should be **no pre-determined limitation of the rights of the woman or man**, as this would not be legally binding.

Concerning property acquired by the couple in the course of their married life, the bill takes an exactly opposite point of view. Under the Soviet system, marriage represents in the first place a union of two workers, in which there is no possibility of dividing that which in this union is common property or of determining by whom it was earned and appropriated to the common use. It is therefore necessary from the standpoint of the law to recognise the **equality of rights of each of the parties to the marriage, to anything acquired by them in the period during which they lived together**. Our legal practice established as early as in 1922 that, even in cases where the work of one of the partners, usually the woman, is limited to the care of the family and the household, useful work has been performed, of no less value than that of the other partner and that, in case of a divorce, the partner in question has therefore a full claim to receive his or her share. This corresponds exactly with the customs and sense of justice of the peasantry, as it is expressed in those paragraphs of the code that deal with the land, when family property has to be divided. This is why in § 1. of the bill, **community of ownership is provided for as regards all property resulting from living together**.

Parents and Children.

In determining the judicial relations between children and parents, the bill maintains the fundamental features of the code of 1918. In the first place it emphasises in full measure the significance of **actual facts** in determining the rights of the child in an unregistered marriage, as well as complete freedom of proof for establishing the facts. The same applies to the **interests of the child** which must be the first consideration, always coming before the interests and wishes of the parents. The so-called parental rights are, according to the draft, by no means rights over the child, but rights in the name of the child, for the protection of the child. This principle is maintained in every paragraph dealing with parental rights.

The Re-Establishment of the Right of Adoption.

The law at present in force does not recognise adoption. (§ 183.) This is explained by the desire to avoid increasing the number of persons who, according to an earlier decree on the abolition of the right of inheritance would have a claim to a portion of land for cultivation, by making adoption possible; further the wish to prevent minors being exploited under the pretext of adoption and finally by the intention of applying in full measure the possibility of **communal education and guardianship**.

At the present time, conditions have considerably changed. On the one hand the work of the organisation for the care and guardianship of children shows that every means which contri-

butes to the welfare of children should be made use of, including that of placing them in families. On the other hand a large number of people have quite conscientiously declared that they wish to take children into their families, a desire which there is no reason to oppose. Finally the custom is widespread among peasants of taking children into their family in a way that is almost identical with adoption. The bill therefore provides that the question of adoption shall be decided from case to case by the authorities responsible for guardianship, and that anyone who has the right to be a guardian shall also have the right to adopt.

At the same time, the bill puts a limit on the number of persons who have a claim to maintenance and on their part are obliged to give it, by restricting these rights and duties to **parents and children** only. The regulations in the previous code, according to which needy relatives in a direct and descending line and also own brothers and sisters have a claim to maintenance from their prosperous relations (§ 172) are dropped out of this bill.

In this way, in accordance with the civil code, which only recognises a narrow circle of people who possess the right of inheritance, the bill breaks away in a decisive manner from the conception of legal marriage and the conception of legal relationship which is inseparably bound up with it, the essential foundation of the law of bourgeois society.

Guardianship.

The draft places the legal side of guardianship in the foreground and considers that the most essential task of guardianship is to see that alimantation is paid, that in certain cases parental rights are disallowed etc. Starting from these considerations, the bill provides that all forms of guardianship shall be concentrated in the **local executive committees**.

The bill entirely excludes the trusteeship of spendthrifts, as not in keeping with the present order of society. On the other hand there is no provision for trustees representing the interests of the property of persons whose place of abode is unknown.

The Official Procedure According to the New Code.

§ 4. of the bill only provides the foundations for the registration of the so-called civil records, those of birth, death, marriage, divorce, adoption etc., leaving out all technical details, which can be worked out or changed by regulations.

Among the individual clauses of this last part, the new regulations for the procedure of registering marriage are especially noteworthy. The bill deprives, it is true, the contract of marriage of all ceremony but nevertheless establishes a definite and necessary procedure as a minimum; registration cannot be undertaken by any chance technical worker at the office but must be performed by a responsible functionary; the deed of registration must be read to those present, and witnesses invited by the contracting parties may be admitted.

* * *

The bill differs also externally from the existing code in its volume and its appearance. It establishes the fundamental material laws with regard to marriage, the family and guardianship and leaves out everything that has to do with procedure which, in the existing code absolutely swamps the cardinal content. In place of the 246 paragraphs of the existing code of 1918, of which a large number are devoted entirely to guiding lines of a formal and technical nature, the present bill comprises about half the number of paragraphs and, both by its contents and the form of exposition, makes the law accessible to the broad masses of the workers.

To our Readers.

The present issue of the "Inprekorr." has been reduced to twelve pages, as during the next few days there will be published a Special Number, comprising 32 pages, devoted to the 20th Anniversary of the Russian Revolution of 1905.