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Eight Years of Revolution

(Speech of Comrade Zinoviev at Celebration Meeting of the Leningrad Soviet, November 6, 1925.)

The Ranks of the Old Bolsheviks Become Thinner.

COMRADES, in referring to the twentieth anniversary of the 1905 Revolution, which, in the words of Vladimir Ilyitch, was a dress rehearsal of the 1917 revolution, and, simultaneously, in celebrating the eighth anniversary of the proletarian revolution in our country, we naturally remember before anything else those innumerable fighters for the workers' cause, who, in the literal sense of the word, have almost strewn with their corpses the path along which our revolution traversed during these years. We cannot count the comrades who have perished during the last twenty years in the struggle for the workers' cause. We cannot count the members of our beloved Party who during these last two decades have given their lives for the revolution in prisons, in exile, on the gallows, in penal servitude, on the battlefields of the civil war.

For the second time we are celebrating the anniversary of the October Revolution without Vladimir Ilyitch. And finally, only just recently, we have suffered a terrible loss: one of the best workers for the proletarian revolution, one of the prominent members of the Central Committee of our Party, Mikhail Vassilievitch Frunzé, has died. I ask the Soviet to stand in honour of our comrade.

Comrades, it just happens that to-day certain figures have been published concerning the composition of our Party. These figures provide extremely valuable material concerning the old revolutionary generation, which has shown the way to the working class of our country. Out of 930,000 members and candidates of our Party, there are still alive out of the old guard of workers who belonged to the Party before 1905—however many you might think—only 2,213 or 0.2 per cent. of the entire forces of our Party. Of those who joined the Party before 1916 there remains but 6,281 or 0.7 per cent., and finally of those who joined in 1917 (including the whole of 1917), altogether 3.3 per cent. You

thus see, comrades, that of the old generation of Bolshevik revolutionaries—unfortunately we have not the same records concerning non-Party revolutionary workers who naturally played a great role in the 1905 movement—you see that only about 2,000 of the old Bolsheviks are still living. But if we take the members of the Party even for the whole of 1917 they now only comprise a tiny handful in our huge Party—*i.e.*, 3.3 per cent.

It goes without saying that this thinning of the old Bolshevik ranks is explained above all by the tremendous sacrifices which they underwent in the many years of revolutionary struggle. We know that already in 1905, our Party, even if we only take its Bolshevik fraction, was already a powerful, numerous organisation, embracing tens of thousands of members in its ranks. At the time of the Stockholm and London Congresses in 1906 and 1907 we had at least 150,000 organised members. We had in Leningrad alone—Petersburg in those days—tens of thousands of Bolsheviks. Where are they all? Why is it that only 2,000 of them are now left? Of course, some of them—although of such there are not many—were blown away by the storm of the revolution, quit politics, left the revolutionary movement. Others perished in the interval between the two revolutions. Yet others—and of these there were all too many—sacrificed their impetuous Bolshevik heads during the process of the 1917 revolution. And now in the eighth year of the dictatorship, after the year 1925 (which has been unusually tragic in this sense), we have been losing dozens of the best workers from among the old guard; now, as you see, there remains only a small handful of old Bolsheviks.

Of course, we are not wont to complain about this. The country is growing, the revolution is growing, the proletariat is growing and a new generation of workers for the proletarian revolution is also growing. You see the “rejuvenation” of our Party, the rejuvenation of the first phalanx of the proletarian revolution proceeding, one might say, fairly rapidly. Sometimes the still immature shoulders of young workers already bear tasks of colossal import. We need not complain that the revolution retains for too long a time the young workers in a preparatory stage. Soon the opposite will happen. Tremendous responsibility lies on the new and younger generation of revolutionaries. This young generation quite justifiably demands for itself the possibility of active participation in all our constructional work—economic, cultural, Soviet, Party and trade union work. This is quite

a justifiable phenomenon. But it will be equally justifiable if the Party, if the working class, tells this young generation that in the proletarian revolution there are no rights without obligations and that on the new generation, on the young generation of revolutionaries, on the generation of youth who are maturing under our very eyes, there rests a tremendous historic responsibility.

In a few more years' time only a few hundred will remain of this group of 2,000 old Bolsheviks. A historic succession in the work of leading the proletarian revolution is necessary. This heritage must be protected at all costs. For this there is no better method than training, not by words but by deeds, all workers of the proletarian State, the entire generation of younger revolutionaries in the spirit of Leninism.

Eight years have flown by! Sometimes it seems that they have flashed by in the twinkling of an eye; sometimes one thinks that a whole century has passed. Many things have changed during this time. The very composition of our Party is changing unnoticed and the very composition of the vanguard also changes unobserved. This circumstance imposes tremendous historic responsibility on the "middle" (in the sense of age) generation of revolutionaries, let us say on the generation of workers of Leningrad and other towns which was brought up on "Zvezda" and the "Pravda" in the years 1910-12. This also places tremendous responsibility on the front ranks of the Young Communist League. Those young comrades who were 12 years old at the commencement of the October revolution are now 20. They already stand in the forward columns and in a few years time will be in the foremost ranks of the revolutionary fronts. Every loss, particularly of such workers as comrade Frunzé was, every memory of the 20 years lying behind us, should make every revolutionary of the "middle" generation, and every worker of the new generation forged in the very process of the proletarian revolution, ponder over the tremendous responsibility which now lies on these workers—when the ranks of the "old 'uns" are becoming thinned, when we have lost Vladimir Ilyitch, and when we are entering the new epoch of the Proletarian Revolution.

Twenty years of revolutionary development lie behind us. These 20 years may be divided up approximately as follows: (1) three years of the rising revolutionary wave—1905-1907 inclusively; (2) the six years of the wildest and

blackest reaction—1908-1914; (3) the three years of the imperialist war—1914-1917, and (4) the eight years of the proletarian dictatorship. These last eight years may in turn be divided up equally into two halves: (a) 1917-1921, the four years of civil war, and (b) 1921-1925, the four years of economic regeneration and struggle on the economic front.

It stands to reason that these 20 years represent the most substantial period in the history of Russia and in the history of all humanity. During these two decades our country has marched forward from monarchy, from feudalism, to the proletarian dictatorship. During these two decades the locomotive of history has worked with particular success in our country. At any rate these two decades are worth any other two centuries. Without 1905, 1917 would have been impossible. Without the Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies (1905), which was imprisoned by the Tsarist Government, there would never have been the Leningrad Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies. Without the defeat of 1905 the victory of 1917 would have been impossible. Without those sacrifices which were borne by the preceding generation of revolutionists, whose blood flowed like water at times, the victory of the proletarian dictatorship would have been impossible.

Capitalist "Stabilisation."

What has the past year brought in the most important field for us? When we were celebrating the seventh anniversary of the proletarian revolution one year ago, MacDonald was in power in England, although, at that time, it is true he was on his last legs. During this last year the bloom of the so-called peaceful pacifist era has definitely faded. This year has been a year of the blackest bourgeois world reaction. Beneath this reaction a number of countries have bent, in particular those countries who suffered defeat in the imperialist war. It is only our country that has not bent beneath this reaction. During the past year only against our columns have the imperialists broken their teeth.

There is not the slightest doubt but that the coming few months will bring a still further development of world bourgeois reaction. Nor is there the slightest doubt that within a short period the reactionary blast will strengthen. There is no doubt whatsoever that the attempts to tear up the

treaties with the Soviet Union, encircle us with a ring of enemies, perhaps even directly to force a new war on us and bring about a blockade—these will be continued also in the future. The basis for this is the relative stabilisation, the partial stabilisation of the bourgeois order in a number of States. After all the events which we have experienced during this past year, it becomes absolutely clear that this stabilisation is partial, that it is relative, that it would be the greatest mistake to exaggerate it, and that it is temporary and may even be of short duration.

We already have a few statistics on the question of the economic condition in Europe and America. The last year has shown that if we leave out America, which has also not improved very much recently, practically all European countries showed a much worse economic situation in 1925 than in 1924. The most important countries of Europe are approximately at the same percentage of pre-war level as we are. A very important and curious phenomenon is the fact that the political events in our country and those in their countries are absolutely different; but the economics are so difficult, represent such a difficult proposition, are so slow to move, that it would appear, after eight years of struggle for dictatorship in our country and after a relative stabilisation of the bourgeois order in Europe, that the percentage of restoration of economy, taken in round figures, is practically at the same level both in our country—about 80-85 per cent. of the pre-war level—and in theirs with, however, this essential difference, that in the most important bourgeois countries the economic situation has recently not been improving but declining, whilst we are now advancing by leaps and bounds. Whereas, in our country there may still be doubts with regard to the actual "tempo" of growth, with them there is still doubt with regard to the **fact of growth**.

In this respect the situation in England is particularly interesting, and I will cite a few figures in this connection.

This year in Great Britain there has been a decline in quite a number of the most important industries. For instance, last year the coal output was 94 per cent. and this year it is 86 per cent. In the metal industry production was 72 per cent. while it is now 60 per cent. The general index figure for the growth of her industry was 94 last year whereas this year it only reaches 87. At the same time a great increase in unemployment is to be observed there (almost

one and a half millions) whilst there is also a noticeable decrease in the workers' wages.

I will not refer to figures of other countries, as this would take us too far away from the point. But I have not taken Great Britain just by chance; Great Britain dominates on the European continent. It is precisely Great Britain, if, I repeat, we leave out America, which to a considerable extent determines modern European politics. It is indeed Great Britain which is competing with us in the East, and it is also Great Britain which at the present time to a certain extent stands at the centre of the international Labour movement. These statistics show that the state of industry in European countries is very fluid, very nervous, very sensitive and in places (as for example in England) it is actually declining. Nevertheless, comrades, we must not deceive ourselves in respect to the fact that in the near future a wave of the blackest reaction in Europe still faces us. The past year has been a year of such a wave, and next year, if particularly important events do not take place, will in this sense be no less severe—perhaps even more so. There is only one force against which the wave of world reaction is beating as against a rock. This force is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Three Channels of International Revolution.

What has the present year brought us in the field of the international Labour movement and in the field of international revolution? To-day I can only refer to the most important points. The most important thing in the field of the international Labour movement is above all the revolutionising of the British proletariat. This is an event of the greatest world importance; it is an event the commencement of which, and hints toward which, we saw last year and which now has already begun developing quite lucidly beneath our very eyes. The British Labour movement after the Chartism of the forties, after long years of stagnation, is now for the first time entering a broad revolutionary path.

For years on end people such as Karl Marx and Engels sought the clue to the revolutionary movement in Great Britain but did not find it. Revolutionary Marxism never had a mass influence in England. For the first time in the history of the international Labour movement, the British working class is commencing, though slowly, but in an organised and decisive manner, to enter on a phase of revo-

lutionary Marxism. This phenomenon is closely bound up with the economic situation of Great Britain. Those few important figures which I cited to you give a slight hint at how the revolutionising of the British working class may be explained. The British bourgeoisie has lost its predominant position in the world's market and is losing it more and more. It is commencing to lose the colonies and apparently is commencing to lose the possibility of receiving the surplus profits with the aid of which it bribes its Labour aristocracy. In general, the British workers are dropping to the same material position as that occupied by the workers of other countries. This situation in Great Britain is certainly connected with the general position in Europe, with the results of the imperialist war, with the development of the revolutionary movement in the East and with the growing influence of our revolution.

Philistines do not yet understand what is taking place. Philistines still seek explanation in that some big bug or other from among the leaders of the British Labour movement has come over to our side. Philistines seek explanation in small facts, but that is why they are Philistines. A real revolutionary should understand that in Great Britain tremendous economic and political factors have found their lawful development; that in England a new historical phase is commencing. We, therefore, believe that a most important result of the past year is the more clearly discernible revolutionising of the British Labour movement.

In close connection with this aspect, there is the question of the delegations who are coming to our country. This is also a phenomenon which is extremely important and symptomatic. Through these delegations we are obtaining closer and closer contact with those strata of the European proletariat which are still under the influence of reformism. These strata are very extensive and in places are still growing. Real contact with these strata of workers is important and intercourse with them is necessary for the subsequent development of the international proletarian revolution. This contact is being established with the greatest of difficulties, but it is really being brought about.

I was speaking a few days ago to a member of the French textile workers' union, an old worker who has belonged to the French revolutionary movement for 25 years. He explained to me the process of development of the Labour movement in France. He told me, among other things, about

the anti-war strike that recently took place there. We have heard very little about this. It would appear that in response to the Communists a **million workers struck** against the war. This is no small figure. You remember in the "Socialist" circles, in the old days, many people chattered about a revolutionary strike against war, many gave fine promises in connection with this. But the first really clearly expressed political strike against the war in Europe took place only just recently, and, what is more, only in response to the call of the Communists.

This comrade endeavoured to explain to me also the reason for the reformist influence which is still very considerable in France. He somehow seemed to make excuses, saying: "You must understand that in France the worker does not know 'poverty'; he is not a beggar. After the war the French bourgeoisie, although experiencing a financial crisis, nevertheless was able to register, side by side with this, an improvement in industry. In France, there was not only no unemployment, on the contrary she is employing about two million foreign workers. For the most important group, for the French workers, tolerable material conditions have been created." This comrade, in telling me this, saw in this fact of the absence of poverty an explanation why the reformists still retain a section of the workers in their clutches.

Comrades, we will still see in the next few years a rise of the Labour movement in Europe on a new basis, despite the absence of absolute "misery," absolute poverty. We have by no means made this a condition that the Communist movement has only grown up out of poverty—it can grow, must grow and will grow on a new basis and under "stabilisation." For an **active** revolutionary process, for an immediate rising, an economic crisis, a war, etc., are certainly important. Among those conditions which gave birth to the October revolution, the existence of misery and poverty in the country played a very substantial role. But it does not arise from this, that an upward wave of the Labour movement in general is only possible on the basis of increased poverty within the country. We know from our past that a great and powerful strike movement commenced in our country just at a time of industrial prosperity. Did not the heyday of the Labour movement in our country commence after the Lena strikes, in connection with the general industrial boom in Russia of those days? Have we not seen a few similar examples in other countries, when an industrial boom, the decrease of unemployment, growing demand,

for labour power, increased in the workers the consciousness of their strength and brought about strikes? The strike struggle which commenced under such conditions developed into a political struggle.

I think that if in the near future there will be no direct revolutionary process, no direct risings, there will nevertheless be an increase in the economic struggle of the workers, which will turn into a political struggle. In the process of this growth, we can also and ought to oust the reformists.

In this connection the workers' delegations about which I spoke are of tremendous significance. They do not represent a mere episode, a chance, or a parade, they do not amount to an unexpected meeting of friends, but are commencing to enter into a system; they are becoming an everyday occurrence in the life of our epoch, and in the future they will acquire a yet more perfected and organised expression. We are becoming more and more linked up with the dense columns of workers who are still under the influence of reformism, and who, in the coming years, even if only in connection with the growth in the economic movement of their countries, will approach us still nearer and nearer. That is the second result, which is very significant and important.

And, finally, there is a third point—the movement in the East. This movement has recently grown with unusual force. The events in China, the events in Morocco, the events in Syria, the shooting of many thousands of people in the town of Damascus alone (we are informed of tens of thousands who have been shot and hung there by Messieurs the French imperialists, of thousands of women killed, and all this is taking place in "peace time," where there are absolutely no very great crises of any kind)—these events go to show that the national liberation movement of the oppressed peoples is ripening with tremendous force.

The influence of our revolution in the East is gigantic. Our revolution of 1905, although suffering defeat, nevertheless led to revolutionary outbreaks in Turkey, Persia and China (first revolution in China); even that revolution aroused the East. But our 1917 Revolution, which has become strengthened and developed during eight years, and which is conducting quite a conscious and definite international policy, is naturally exercising a far more tremendously powerful influence over the entire Orient.

Events of the greatest importance are now taking place in China. The American gentlemen are sparing no resources; they are hiring generals in China and forming their armies there. The Japanese imperialist gentlemen are also not stinting themselves; they are also looking for generals, supplying them with machine guns and cannons, etc. The French imperialists are doing the same thing. But the Chinese national revolutionary movement is so strong that it affects all the imperialist plans. For instance, they imagined that everything in the garden was lovely; they hired General Chang-Tso-Lin, provided him with a tremendous army, armed him to the teeth and let him loose in a definite direction, but the national revolutionary movement is like a seething cauldron. This same Chang-Tso-Lin, in the summer of this year, came into the most important centres of the Chinese movement in order to strangle and suppress it, and instead of this he was compelled to sacrifice 100,000 dollars for the national-revolutionary movement.

In the present case history is repeating itself. On a certain occasion foreign imperialists also sent us some fine tanks through Wrangel. Now they are sending money to the Chinese through Chang-Tso-Lin. But what do these facts signify? Why are they taking place? They have arisen just because the national revolutionary movement in China is introducing modifications, bringing corrections into all the calculations of its enemies. It is as if everything was traced out according to plan. They sent reliable generals, armed them, etc., but the revolutionary movement is seething and bubbling so strongly and is dominating the entire situation to such an extent that it is sweeping down in its wake all the barriers of world reaction. The imperialists say: "We are doing just the same as Russia. Soviet Russia is also helping China with people, arms, etc." Of course, these speeches, as you very well know, are absolute lies. But the imperialists, in ascertaining that they are acting in the same way as the Soviet Union, are surprised to see they are reaping such cheerless results. They are wasting enormous funds in order to influence Chinese events in a desired direction, but things turn out differently. Their machine is not going whither they are driving it, because subterranean stimuli of the national revolutionary movement are drawing hundreds of millions of people into their orbit and are knocking the tiller out of their hands.

China has already her Red Army. Comrade Lapse, who was recently there, gave us his interesting first-hand im-

pressions of Canton. He told us that Canton resembled Leningrad or Moscow: the trade unions there are in the best buildings, Red Guards watch the premises of the trade unions and parades are held in honour of arriving representatives of Russian trade unions. Canton is a small Leningrad, or a small Moscow. And not so small as all that, for the population of China is larger than ours and in Canton itself there are nearly 1,500,000 inhabitants. One need not be a prophet in order to predict some sort of surprise for the imperialists. It may happen that out of the pottage which they have brewed there, a second centre of the revolutionary movement in China—Red Shanghai—may arise. We think this threat is imminent

Such, comrades, are the most important points in the development of the international revolutionary movement during the present year. We may say that the international proletarian revolution is now developing along three channels.

The first channel is the East. I think this channel by its importance is now particularly significant. Streams are now running along it with headlong force which are undermining the very foundation of world, and in particular British, imperialism.

The second channel is the revolutionising of the reformist detachments of the European Labour movement—in the first place, the British. The Anglo-French trade union rapprochement has historic significance in this respect.

The third channel is the old general Party channel of forming and taking care of separate nuclei of the world proletarian revolution, the Communist Parties.

The entire tactical art of the coming years should be to merge these channels into one powerful stream. The entire work of the Comintern should be directed at tying together these three channels with one general tactical knot. We must struggle against certain moods which will inevitably become apparent: they will say the Left trend of the British Labour movement is everything, or else demand all attention for the reformist detachments which are gradually coming over to us. Such tactics would be incorrect. At the same time it would also be incorrect to act in an old-fashioned manner, to be confined to the framework of the one task of forming Party nuclei in the countries of international capital. Both one and the other are necessary.

There is not the slightest doubt but that the international revolution is developing more slowly than we expected and than Vladimir Ilyitch expected. Definite conclusions arise from this, about which we will speak later. One must not close one's eyes to this fact. But at the same time **we are living in an epoch of world revolution.** The world revolution is proceeding along various paths. For the time being it possesses three channels and perhaps the great river of revolution will dig new and unexpected channels. These three channels will become more and more extensive. The task of Lenin's pupils, the tasks of our Party and the Comintern, should be to grasp this peculiar situation and to be capable of effecting an appropriate combination of all these three points in the present national revolutionary development.

On the Alliance with the Peasantry and the Guiding Force of the Revolution.

What has the present year brought us in the economic field? We are coming to the end of the restoration process—that is the main result of the past year in this field. We are sometimes told that we are now living through the last year of this restoration process. Perhaps this statement is not very prudent. It is possible that in this respect the coming year will prove to be not the last, but the last but one. But undoubtedly we have come close to the end of the restoration process in a number of fields of our economic construction. We are getting ready to overstep the pre-war level, which is by no means an ideal for us. It is a fact that our stabilisation is moving forwards and is not going backwards.

It is true we are still poor, we have not yet displayed all the magnitude of our wealth, we have not yet finished the first series of our electrification works, in the field of metal we still lag behind; nevertheless, the restoration process is coming to an end. And this fact, comrades, taken together with the retarded growth of the proletarian revolution in Europe and throughout the whole world, creates quite a peculiar situation for us, which we must be able to understand properly.

What does this amount to, roughly speaking? The development of the world revolution has slowed down. What conclusions arise from this fact for the first victorious revolution in our country? The first main conclusion is that we

must **gain time**. Why must this be? Simply in order that new proletarian detachments may be brought up. Of course, we must gain time without folding our arms. While gaining time we must construct Socialism, utilising every span and every possibility. What does it mean to gain time in a peasant country? It means the necessity of adopting an attitude towards the peasantry whereby the alliance with them (which **in general is necessary** for us **and for every** proletarian Revolution and which is thrice necessary for us now) should grow, be strengthened and increase daily. That is roughly the main conclusion to be drawn from the present international situation. With this conclusion we approach the question of our attitude to the countryside and our relations with the peasantry.

I remember that exactly a year ago, when in my speech before our Soviet on the Seventh Anniversary of October I had mainly to deal with the question of the peasantry, I was asked by some comrades who were near friends: "Are we not talking too much about the peasantry? Has this question really such a great significance? Are we not over-stepping the mark?" It seems to me that this last year which one might say has been a year of the peasantry, of the countryside, has shown that it was indeed necessary to present the question in that manner.

When we commenced NEP,* Vladimir Ilyitch, in one of his most brilliant articles—I should remark that the most dialectic and gifted of Vladimir Ilyitch's writings were his works on NEP; this was the most difficult transition stage, and the genius of Ilyitch developed then with particular lucidity—in an article summing up the results of the first four years of the revolution, he wrote that the past revolutionary period falls into four stages: the first stage—purely political, from October 25th to January 1st, up to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly: the second stage—the Brest Litovsk Peace: the third stage—the civil war up to 1920 inclusive: and the fourth stage—"the unprecedentedly ruined country hardly commencing to set itself right." "The enemy is not this horde of White Guards. **The enemy is the inevitable everyday economics in a petty peasant country with a ruined heavy industry.**" We have not pondered over these words, but we should think particularly profoundly and carefully over them. "The enemy is the inevitable everyday economics in a petty peasant country." This is put, as usual with Lenin, in a very concise and terse manner.

* New Economic Policy.

This was said at the commencement of NEP and it remains true to a large extent even now: the enemy, the danger, which warns us, is embedded in the inevitable everyday economics in a petty peasant country with a ruined heavy industry. This last proviso: "With a ruined heavy industry" is now not quite valid; heavy industry is not now so ruined, as it is gradually beginning to get on its feet, but the remainder retains for us its strength and significance to the full. We are operating in a petty peasant country and in the inevitable everyday economics serious dangers for the proletarian revolution are involved. What are these dangers? They are the dangers connected with NEP.

In a recently-published summary of an undelivered speech drafted for the fifth anniversary of October—Vladimir Ilyitch was ill and could not speak then—Ilyitch wrote: "How should we attain Socialism?" (in our peasant country), and replied to his own question: "There is no other way than through NEP." And at the same time a year before that, he had been speaking about the dangers of the inevitable everyday economics in a petty peasant country. NEP has tremendous positive progressive sides: it is not possible to proceed with the construction of Socialism in a peasant country or to make short cuts to Socialism "other than through NEP," particularly when there is a slowing down of the international revolution. **"We are alone, but we will pull through; and it is absolutely necessary that we pull through."** Thus wrote Ilyitch in the same summary of his undelivered speech. That is the kind of situation in which it is necessary for us to pull through, and we will pull through alone under such a situation, when the main background of such a situation is petty peasant economy—in such a situation the inevitable everyday economics of our petty peasant country are difficult and at times dangerous for our proletarian State. We must understand these thoughts of Lenin's particularly clearly now because, comrades, it is just this understanding which gives us the key to the peasant question and to the solution of all these vital everyday questions facing us.

The slogan "Face to the Villages" was absolutely correct. Now it is commencing to penetrate into the masses. Here and there they are even commencing to overdo it in their application of the slogan and this is the best proof of the fact that the slogan has apparently caught on: this is always the case with us—once they commence overdoing it, this means the question has reached the consciousness of the majority of workers. In some places they understood this as follows: if you say "Face to the Villages" this almost

means "our backs to the towns." But "Face to the Villages" presupposes that the face should be unambiguous, that the face should be proletarian. This is an important explanation that must be added to the formula "face to the villages" in order that we may be safeguarded from any errors whatsoever in this field. And the Party, through the Central Committee, which recently met, warns against this incorrect understanding of the question by a resolution which is known to you all.

The splitting up of the countryside population during the past two years continues. We have had one bad harvest year and another year with a good harvest. The year of bad harvest lowered the poor peasant, whilst the good harvest raised up the upper elements. The differentiation after a great crop failure and a good harvest following in such a country as ours always has a fairly decisive significance. Thus it also happened with us, that the alternate bad harvest and good harvest, on the background of a general improvement in the economy, increased the differentiation in our countryside. This differentiation should not be exaggerated, but neither should it be under-estimated.

In such a situation, the question as to the leading force of the revolution is of the greatest importance for us just now.

I have many times had occasion to say, but there is no harm in repeating still once more, that Lenin did not simply preach an alliance of the working class and the peasantry "in general." He preached an alliance of the working class with the peasantry in which the leading role would belong to the working class. It is necessary to emphasise this conception with particular force now, when we are approaching the end of the restoration period. The question as to the "rails" along which the revolution will develop in the near future, the question as to the nature of our economic restoration process, as to what extent the Socialist elements will dominate, as to what extent the working class leadership will leave a decisive imprint on all the subsequent economic development—this question now becomes most vital.

Lenin in one of his last works, in developing the conception as to the relations which should be established between the working class and the peasantry, put the question: "Will not this mean the domination of peasant backwardness?" and he immediately replies "No." If we preserve the leadership for the working class, we will be enabled, with the greatest economy in our State administration, to secure that

even the smallest saving may be preserved for the development of our large machine industry, for the development of electrification, hydro-peat, for constructing Volkhovstroi and similar undertakings." The question is clear. If we maintain the leading role of the working class with regard to the peasantry, then our Socialist elements will become strengthened, then our country will not become a realm of peasant backwardness, then we will have a proletarian revolution in a peasant country, developing slowly but all the time moving ahead, capable of constructing its policy with regard to the peasantry in a period of lull in the international revolution, then we will construct Socialism even more successfully.

Increase of the Political Activity in the Country.

What has this year brought us in the field of the general political life of our State? It has brought us an unusual livening up and increase of activity both in the countryside and in the town among practically all strata of the population. We should not imagine that this activity that we are now witnessing is a maximum, or that it has reached its culminating point. No, this activity is still developing and is acquiring another nature, whereby our economy is being recuperated. At the present time our working class is, of course, more active than a year or two ago. But after we have rested another year, when new forces will have been gathered, when the workers' houses will be lighter and more roomy, when our children will live better, and when we will really be able to rest after the deprivations and experiences which were engendered by the past few years of heavy struggle, then our activities will become still more full-blooded, then we will acquire more initiative, our capacity will become greater, and the worker will want to take a greater part in the social life of the country than he now does. We regard this increase of activity as the commencement of a great process, as a great phenomenon in our revolutionary life. This activity will increase not only in quantity, but what is of the most importance, in quality. The extent of new construction will be still greater. The workers will begin to participate in social construction as the real owners of the country. Now we are face to face with the commencement of a revival of the trade unions, of the industrial conferences, which are of great significance, and a vitalisation of the Young Communist League. It is particularly necessary to stress the importance of raising the activity of the Party as the organisation of the leading detachment of the working class, which is linked up with the necessity for more extensive democracy within our own ranks.

I think, comrades, that the time has already arrived when we should issue the slogan for gradually drawing all or nearly all the active workers into the Party. There are still considerable sub-strata of the active workers, who have not yet joined the Party. Of course, the quantitative growth of the Party should be on a level with its quality. There is no reason for hurrying. But during the coming period it will be necessary for us gradually to bring into the Party that section of active workers which still remains outside its ranks.

The growth of the political activity of the country is a sign of the times in the field of general State construction.

The second point is that of improving quality. More than at any other time we must emphasise the necessity of improving quality, not only in the field of industrial production, but also in the field of our entire State construction, in the cultural field—in short, in every field of our work. If we are able to bring the entire mass of active workers into the ranks of our Party, if we are able to absorb like a sponge all that is alive in the working class, if we are able to guarantee full participation of the proletariat in the direction of the country, then we will be able to ensure that the leading class can really and successfully take into account the evident “everyday economics of a petty peasant country.” Only our working class is capable of strongly conducting the subsequent development of the revolution along Socialist lines. It is only this working class which is capable of successfully overcoming the growth of middle class, petty bourgeois tendencies.

Leningrad and the Eighth Year of the Revolution.

Finally, comrades, what has the past year brought for Leningrad? I will not enumerate here statistical data which are known to you all. It is sufficient to say that in the field of industry and our entire economy we have made a tremendous step forward. The working class is growing. Comrade Feodorov told me that the number of metalworker members of the union in Leningrad has reached 100,000. Two years ago it seemed difficult for us to attain such a position. The number of workers in Leningrad is growing and our capacity for organising is also increasing. The past year has brought forward a number of new forms of organisation of the working masses. In the realm of the Party, we have the institution of branch organisers—a very substantial achievement which shows that we are really capable of constructing our own ranks so that every Party member is really active. A great future

awaits this institution of branch organisers. In the economic field we have been able to promote the idea of production conferences, which also have a great future before them; these must be improved and perfected, for they are of extreme importance. We have been able to promote from among our own ranks an extensive stratum of skilled and semi-skilled mechanics in the realm of production which is also of great importance for us. There is no doubt but that the mass creative work of tens of thousands of workers and Communists of our town would promote still further new and live forms of organisation, which will render us tremendous services.

We may point out with the greatest of pride that during the past year we did not have one economic conflict in our enterprises, not one strike. This circumstance is of great significance. We know the Leningrad workers, they are capable of protesting to a larger degree than others. In order that the year should run absolutely smoothly, in accordance with our economic revival, our organisation had to give proof of soundness and power, and we had tensely to feel the pulse of life. For this we had to live the life and breathe the air of the working class. The Leningrad Soviet and all our other organs succeeded in doing this, led entirely by our Party organisation, and our great pride lies in this accomplishment

We have commenced here the construction of new houses, still small as yet, but beyond the Narvsky Gate we have already constructed the first few workers' houses, and whole quarters are now growing up there of which we could not even dream two years ago. Of course, very little has been done as yet, but the foundations have been laid and these foundations are by no means bad. They inspire hope and show that the Leningrad workers under the leadership of their organisations are capable of pushing forward the work of Socialist construction.

It seems to me, comrades, that in summing up the totals of the last year's work, we should remember what Vladimir Ilyitch said about the Leningrad worker. A book has recently been published, "Lenin on the Leningrad Worker," which I should advise all of you to get, who have not yet got it. You all know that Ilyitch was not very liberal in his praises, in fact he was very sparing in this respect. This is what he wrote: "Petrograd is not Russia. The Petrograd workers are only a small section of the workers of

Russia. But of the working class detachments and of all the toilers of Russia they are some of the best, the most advanced, the most conscious, the most revolutionary, the firmest, the least amenable to empty phrases, to weak-willed despair, or to be frightened by the bourgeoisie." Such a characterisation from the lips of Vladimir Ilyitch is worth a great deal to the Leningrad worker who should know his own biography and his "nomenclature."

The vanguard of the revolutionary workers and soldiers, the vanguard of the toiling masses of Russia and of the whole world—that is what Vladimir Ilyitch wrote six years ago about the Leningrad workers on the occasion of the second anniversary of the October Revolution—"Vanguard of the toiling masses of Russia and the whole world!" "In Petrograd" he wrote, "the workers have already for a long time had to bear the brunt of greater burdens than the workers in other industrial centres. Both famine, military danger, the drawing away of the best workers for Soviet posts throughout the whole of Soviet Russia—the Petrograd worker suffered more from all these causes than the workers of other places. Nevertheless, we see that there is not the slightest despondency, not the slightest decline in forces among the Petrograd workers. On the contrary they became tempered, they found new strength. They sent forward fresh fighters. **They superbly fulfilled the task of the front rank detachments, sending assistance and support wherever it was most needed.**"

When the question arose as to the villages, Vladimir Ilyitch wrote: "Can we not form an initiative group of workers in Petrograd for selecting 300 to 600 workers with good recommendations from the Party and trade unions to be sent out in ones and twos throughout the whole of Russia? Without a group of such absolutely reliable and experienced Petrograd workers, we will not obtain any substantial improvement in the countryside." No matter whether it were a question of the front, of the economic field, of administration, or of the countryside—Vladimir Ilyitch first of all turned to the Petrograd workers as the vanguard of the working class of Russia and of the whole world. I need not add anything, comrades, to this testimonial. It stands to reason that the Leningrad Soviet has no need for compliments, especially from one of its members who is, of course, more or less partial. I consider that Vladimir Ilyitch's words were absolutely right. I am certain that in the future the Leningrad proletariat will prove not once but scores of times the correctness of these words at every step of our revolution.

Our Main Tasks.

Let me say just a few words more, comrades, in conclusion. What is especially important for us and what must we realise first of all?

We must still establish closer contact between the working class of our country and those of other countries. At the present stage of the revolution, in the struggle against the evident everyday petty peasant economics, in the struggle against the negative sides of NEP, we must bring the working class of our country in closer touch with its own State. The question as to the leadership of the revolution, in a **class** sense of the word, is now a central question for us. In the future it is the **working class**—the growing consolidating, recuperating working class—which must take all the greater, the surer and the more successful part in leading the revolution, as we progress further. The first task facing us at the present stage of the Revolution is to **strengthen and improve the proletarian leadership of all future construction.**

The second thing that we must do is to **pay more attention to the poor peasants in the country-side.** The poor peasant is our main support, the middle peasant is our main ally. You know the decision of the Party, in this respect, a decision that is absolutely correct: "More attention to the poor peasants in the countryside, who, in view of the way things are now shaping in the villages, have need of our support and who will still repeatedly render the revolution considerable services."

Thirdly, we need **the firmest alliance of the working class and the poor peasantry together with the middle peasantry against the kulak** (rich peasant). A real alliance—not merely neutralisation—but a strong compact union and collaboration with the middle peasants.

In an article devoted to the eighth anniversary of October I cited the following words of Lenin:

"The highest principle of the dictatorship is to preserve the alliance of the proletariat and peasantry."

Comrade Lenin explains why: "So that the proletariat can maintain the leading role and State power." Now, comrades, at the time of a slowing down of the international revolution, we must maintain more than at any other time a firm alliance with the peasantry and with its main mass, i.e.,

the middle peasants. We must establish this alliance on an economic basis, because any other foundation is not worth anything. It can only be constructed on an economic foundation. We must push aside all those who irritate the peasants, who do not know how to approach them, and who do not know how to win their trust on an economic basis. As hitherto a revolutionary pace must be maintained, but we must remember: "we are alone, and we will pull through, but we must be helped through." That is what Ilyitch wrote at the end of 1922. We are faced with the slowing down of the international revolution. A more attentive attitude towards the main masses of the peasantry is necessary, while preserving our proletarian physiognomy, and while preserving and improving the proletarian leadership.

Fourthly: we must pay **assiduous attention to the growth of the kulak**. Of course, there is nothing to make us lose our heads about in this and there can be no question of any panic. We will be able to deal easily with anyone who dares encroach on the proletarian revolution. We know that very well. But we must pay close attention to the evident everyday economics in a petty peasant country, the economics from which up to the present the kulak has been developing. There must be assiduous attention to such a phenomenon as divisions in the countryside—without exaggeration, but also without under-estimation, and without overlooking the sharp corners we must review all problems of village life as Lenin taught us. We must clearly see the dangers as soon as they arise: we must look the truth fearlessly in the face and be able to draw the necessary conclusions.

And, finally, in the sphere of the international Labour movement, tremendous work faces us in **merging the mighty streams which are moving among three channels**, which must be merged under the banner of the Comintern, under the banner of Leninism. That is what we have to do; that is how I summarise the tasks of our revolution at its next stages.

The struggle for Communism is proceeding throughout the whole world. We now see cruel, unprecedented persecution of Communists in all capitalist countries. In Italy the prisons are full. Two and a half thousand Communists were arrested there in one night. In Poland, in Bulgaria, in Roumania, hundreds of our comrades are being shot. During times of strikes, hundreds and thousands of Communists are seized, workers are arrested and sometimes killed on the spot. In England a heroic detachment of the young British Communist Party, which is growing and has a tremendous future


before it, stands before the bourgeois court. To-day we send them and to all the fearless heroic fighters for Communism throughout the entire world our warm greetings.

We must not make any mistakes, the approaching period will probably be marked by fresh desperate onslaughts of international reaction against Communist Parties. If things have got to such a stage in Great Britain, in a country praised for its democracy and freedom, that repression is meted out to the Communists, then you may well imagine, comrades, what awaits Communists in other countries. A great deal is now being said about the Locarno settlement of the European crisis. I do not believe the imperialists will be able to overcome the crises which are likely to be their undoing. In this respect they will not come to any agreement and will still fight among themselves on more than one occasion. But I do believe that they will come to an agreement as to how they may jointly suppress the Communists. (They have probably already three-parts come to an agreement on this question.) No exploits will satisfy these gentlemen. There will be a certain division of labour—"Socialist" leaders will "morally" hound down the Communists and the bourgeoisie will hang them and shoot them. The Communist Parties of capitalist countries are awaiting an unprecedented onslaught on the part of the bourgeoisie. They will need particular support from us and they may rely on that support.

I believe we have every reason for meeting the eighth anniversary of the Proletarian Revolution and the 20th anniversary of 1905, which was the dress rehearsal of the great victorious Revolution, with heads aloft. We greet with respect and with warm love the pioneers of the workers' movement, the little group of members of the First Petersburg Soviet which is now here and through whom we have a live contact between 1905 and 1917 and with 1925.

One need not be a prophet to foretell that by the tenth year of the proletarian dictatorship, which will be in two year's time, and which we hope we will live to see, we will be at the height of Socialist construction and of great battles for international Communism. We cannot tell whether many of this first group of 2,000 will live to see this tenth year anniversary. At comrade Frunzé's funeral—and we usually meet all our old guard at funerals—we saw that these years have seemingly sprinkled their beards and hair with flour; the old Bolsheviks are growing grey, are falling away, but the Revolution is growing and will go on growing.

A tremendous task lies before our detachments of Leningrad workers. There was once the Petersburg Soviet, now there is the Leningrad Soviet of Workers' Deputies. We bear Lenin's name. The Leningrad Soviet has a particular bounden duty in this respect before the working class of our country and the whole world. Our task is to introduce Leninism not only in the Party schools at political lessons, but to introduce it into real life. We must all of us build up the Lenin cause wherever the Party has placed us and on whichever sector of the struggle for the international revolution we may find ourselves. Every one of us should follow the path of Lenin. Every one of us should remain to the last an international proletarian revolutionary who is ready to die at any minute for the Republic of Soviets in his own country, and who will display the same readiness to sacrifice when matters come to a proletarian revolution in any country whatsoever.



M. V. Frunze and the Red Army

OUR military structure has proceeded approximately through the same stages as our economic policy. It is well-known that we commenced to introduce what is termed the "New Economic Policy" (NEP) as far back as 1918. The civil war which commenced in the autumn of that year compelled us in our economic policy to resort to "Military Communism."

Something rather similar took place also in the construction of our armed forces. At our second Party Congress in 1903 our Party programme already favoured substituting a permanent and regular army by a system of arming the people, a People's Militia. Immediately after the October Revolution, our Party drew up a programme for militia detachments. During the period of the October Revolution, the revolutionary creative force of the working masses, under the general leadership of our Party, was expressed in the formation of detachments of the militia type. The detachments of Red Guards formed around separate factories were the first embryo of this system of the armed people in the Workers' State. Great numbers of partisan detachments, which sprung up in the first year of the Civil War, thanks to the revolutionary military creative force of the working class and peasant masses on the Eastern and particularly the Southern front, resulted in the same militia system.

But the commencement of the Civil War transformed our militia structure. It was necessary to organise immediately a defence of the October gains, and this was only possible by forming a regular standing army on the "bourgeois" type.

It is true that we still retained the militia structure of our armed forces, but almost all the Party workers who were mobilised at the front and all the military specialists were drawn into the regular army and our militia structure almost completely disappeared during the years of Civil War.

What is more, after the end of the three years' Civil

War a long period of almost three years was necessary before our Party could decide to change over from a permanent army to an extensive militia-territorial structure for our own forces. This difficult swing round to "NEP" in the construction of the Red Army, which demanded the greatest courage and maximum of delicacy, was conducted on the initiative and under the guidance of comrade Frunzé.

Comrade Frunzé appeared on the fighting front of the Civil War at the commencement of 1919. Until then he was not very well-known in the army as a military worker. It came as a great surprise to the leaders on the Eastern front that Frunzé, who had never been in command, had led no operations whatsoever, passed through no military school, but had been an underground Bolshevik since 1905, with a long prison and exile record, should prove to be not only a most brilliant military organiser and administrator, but also an excellent commander who from the very first displayed great art in "leading" the troops and in guiding military operations. It is true that before Frunzé appeared on the front we also had quite a number of able commanders from among the workers and peasants, who ably coped with their military task. But in Frunzé we discovered quite exceptional military talent, a comrade with first-rate strategical capabilities, to which were added striking organisational talents tempered with the strongest Bolshevik theory and practice. Such a rare combination made Frunzé a hundred per cent. Communist military specialist. It was not surprising, therefore, that in the counter-attack against Koltchak in April, 1919, Frunzé was appointed commander of a group of three armies. This group was entrusted with the main strategic task of the entire operations—to smash and out-flank the left flank of Koltchak's army, to make it impossible for him to withdraw this flank from our attack and compel him rapidly to direct the entire front towards the East. This operation was conducted by Frunzé in a brilliant manner and the capture of Ufa showed his excellent judgment; his capability of calculation was apparent when he had command of three armies and had to remain at headquarters and then again when he had to appear in the fighting front lines in order, by means of his personal influence and example, to urge on the troops against the stronger numbers of the enemy and to beat them. Indeed, at the decisive moment of the capture of Ufa, Frunzé was in the first attacking lines of the Red Army. This decided the fate of that decisive struggle and gave us a tremendous advantage in time.

After this came a period in the military work of

Frunzé that lasted for almost 18 months. This was his organisational fighting work in Turkestan, where he had to re-organise almost completely our armed forces and to conduct a difficult struggle against the Basmachis.

The long drawn-out operations against Wrangel compelled the Central Committee of the R.C.P. to send Frunzé to the Southern front. Here his brilliant organisational and strategical capabilities became even more clearly apparent. Within a very short period he succeeded in beating off the attack of Wrangel who had an overwhelming superiority of numbers in "machine-like" cavalry. Taking away the initiative from the latter, he broke through Perekop—the Crimean Verdun. Here again at the decisive moment Frunzé, commander of the Front, appeared in the Perekop positions just before they were stormed, and only his personal presence in direct proximity to the fighting line assured the rapid termination of the storming of this strongest of positions.

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The civil war ended with the smashing defeat of Wrangel. Red Army life entered the demobilisation period, which was a painfully long-drawn-out process of some years. In the field of our economic policy the swing round to "NEP" was conducted under the leadership of Lenin rapidly and decisively. Our Party proceeded with much more cautious steps in the work of re-organising our armed forces and in the demobilisation of the Red Army. The danger of new intervention still hung over the Soviet Republic. On the other hand, the transition to a militia system, at any rate before 1923, was also politically dangerous for internal reasons as well. In the theses written by me jointly with comrade Frunzé for the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P., i.e., **before** the Kronstadt Rebellion, it is stated:

"With regard to the present period of the Russian Revolution the resolution passed by the Ninth Congress of the R.C.P. remains in full force, viz.:

(1) The transition to the militia system should have the nature of the required gradation in accordance with the foreign diplomatic situation of the Soviet Republic and under the strict condition that the defensive capacity of the latter remains at the necessary level at any moment, and (2) while developing towards transformation into an armed Communist people, the militia, at the present period, should preserve in its organisation all the features of working class dictatorship."

“The most fervent supporters of the transition to the militia system at the present time are not proposing anything more than the introduction of this system in one or two districts, with the simultaneous preservation of permanent armies on all threatened sectors of the State frontiers. However, during the present difficult period of the proletarian dictatorship, even such an introduction of the militia system in home districts must be treated with the greatest caution and discretion, for it must be remembered that territorial troops on the one hand are not a sufficient guarantee for the external safety of the Republic under the present conditions, and on the other hand might easily become a support for local partisan aspirations to the damage of the general interests of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Republic. Therefore, under present conditions, the militia system must only embrace the proletarian and semi-proletarian masses of the town and countryside and should be based on the closest contact of the territorial detachments with the Party (detachments for special destination) and the trade unions.”

Kronstadt confirmed the correctness of this view and the Tenth Party Congress agreed with comrade Frunzé’s viewpoint.

A little later, at the end of 1921, Frunzé, in an article “A Single Military Doctrine and the Red Army,” wrote the following :

“In organisational respects the basis of our armed forces for the coming period can only be a permanent Red Army. The transition to the militia system on the basis of universal training is only permissible to the degree whereby it will allow definite savings to be made in the expenditure of State resources without undermining the capacity of the Red Army for the solution of its actual objects.”

This view, which was typical for the entire Party and the military workers, acquired the force of a tradition and a long time after still reigned in the army through inertia. We may even say that it has not been completely outlived to this very day. Our entire militia structure up to 1924 was restricted to a few territorial divisions of significance only as an experiment. At the same time the long-drawn-out demobilisation in the Red Army and the innumerable re-organisations connected with it led to its extreme dislocation and weakening.

The tremendous services of comrade Frunzé lay in the

fact that he was the first to understand, even in 1925, that in such a situation there was no other way out than a decisive transition to territorial divisions, and that this transition to the system of militia construction was not only inevitable but also politically possible.

This was a very courageous and what seemed to many a very risky step. The political centre of gravity of the entire issue was the question of political guarantees, the question as to how great was the power of the Soviet order, to what extent the peasantry support the Soviet regime, how far the alliance between proletariat and peasantry has been consolidated and how safe politically would be the formation of local territorial sections.

"Will we not be forming in these territorial troops," comrade Frunzé was asked, "a military force which will turn against the Soviet Power, or which simply in the hour of trial will refuse to act?"

And Frunzé replied to this question :

"Ours is a Workers' and Peasants' State in which the workers have the leading role. All the power of the State, including military force also, is maintained on the basis of the alliance and mutual support of these two classes. A rupture of this alliance would also mean a rupture of the Soviet system. Moreover, the working class cannot govern the State nor can it fight without the peasants or against the peasants. And here no system whatsoever will help, no organisational sleight of hand. That is the A.B.C. for one and all: both for the Communist Party, for the widest masses of the working class and peasantry of all the nations in our Union. Our entire Soviet policy is based upon and has its origin in this. We are conducting our State by winning the confidence of the masses, by strengthening the alliance of the main forces of the country—the workers and the peasants. Only recently the Communist Party and the entire State apparatus, by realising the slogan: "Face to the Village," pointed out the paths along which our State construction should develop. On these paths we have no reason to fear a rupture in the camp of the toilers, we need have no fear that the peasantry will not execute its duty to the workers' and peasants' fatherland. In the hour of trial the militia workers' and peasants' regiments will undoubtedly prove to be no worse than the regular troops." ("Questions of Territorial Construction": "Military Herald," No. 24.)

Frunzé frequently returns to this main political question in connection with the transition to a militia system of armed forces. "The entire strength and power of the Red Army is founded on the idea of the fraternity and rigidity of the alliance of workers and peasants"—he said in his article "The Red Army Executes Lenin's Behests." ("Military Herald," No. 2.)

As soon as the leadership of the Red Army actually came into his hands, Frunzé courageously effected the transition from a small militia experiment to the re-organisation of the Red Army on a militia basis on a wide scale. Such an audacious step appeared very dangerous to many comrades; but behind this fear and mistrust there was hidden what we may simply term lack of faith in the strength of the Soviet order and the possibility of a firm alliance of the workers and peasants.

The plenary session of the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R., which took place at the end of November, 1924, appreciated the results of the militia structure effected by comrade Frunzé during the year 1924 in the following words:

"In the process of experiment in territorial formations and non-regular training, we have made great achievements: on the one hand in the sense that the territorial system has been entirely recognised in principle by the working and peasant masses and on the other hand its extension gives every ground for believing that this system, combined with the existing regular troops, will undoubtedly guarantee the formation of reliable fighting troops and will guarantee the capacity of the Soviet Union for defence."

The plenary session of the Revolutionary Military Council further stated:

"The territorial structure forms a basis of the armed forces of the Soviet Union."

This first success in the militia-territorial structure was emulated by comrade Frunzé in his subsequent steps in this field which were of a still more audacious nature.

By this time already half of the Red Army divisions had been re-organised on a territorial-militia basis and Frunzé set about the task of bringing the number of territorial divisions up to three-quarters of the total number of

divisions of the Red Army. This task was rapidly and successfully executed.

Now it was a question of turning from quantity to quality.

"I believe," wrote Frunzé in March, 1925, "that the psychological moment has arrived for us to be completely re-constructed on a new basis. I think now it is time to say that our Red Army should not be understood in the sense of a 'regular' army, but should be understood as an armed nation of working peasants, who are obliged and are ready to bear arms and fight the enemy at any moment. I think we should organise our entire worker and peasant masses in this manner." ("Territorial Construction and Work in the Countryside," "Military Herald," No. 9.)

Of course, the militia which we have formed during the last few years is still far from being the militia of a proletarian State about which Engels and Mehring wrote. For this we will still lack a number of pre-requisites, and above all "such a situation of peaceful economic labour which forges in the civil population a sentiment of cohesion, mutual trust, or in other words all those sentiments which are at the basis of military unity. With the existence of such conditions, which are particularly easily produced if there be a developed industrial system, and with collective labour, there is a possibility of creating the necessary basis for a powerfully disciplined and well-armed force on a militia basis."

"Our agriculture," continues Frunzé, "has produced only the embryo of collective forms of economic management. In the main it is the individual farm which still predominates in our country."

Nevertheless we have a number of pre-requisites for a militia army: "Power is now in the hands of the working class. The most important means of production are in the hands of the State. The State, in control of the apparatus of persuasion both political and cultural, is enabled to mould public opinion and is capable of influencing the psychology of the toiling masses."

Finally, "with regard to strengthening the ties between the working class and the peasantry—these two main forces of our revolution and our proletarian State—we have very favourable prospects." The force and strength of the entire militia-territorial units "will be fully and completely

based on the force and strength of the alliance of workers and peasants.”

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Our armed forces have entered on a new period of their existence. The army of civil war, a permanent regular Red Army whose general leadership and control were in the hands of the working class (through the vanguard, the R.C.P.), has been replaced by an army of the period of the rapid growth of our economic system, an army which is 75 per cent. militia. Whereas in the first period, comrade Frunzé came on the scene as a most talented strategist and organiser of the armed forces of the Republic, during the second period he stood at the head of the entire re-organisation of the Red Army and changed it on to a militia basis. He is the moral inspirer and practical guide of an entirely new organisation constructed on new lines—an army of the proletarian State.

But with this re-organisation of the Red Army many very important problems are bound up. Above all there is that of re-organisation of the administration of the Red Army.

The plenary session of the R.M.C. in October, 1924, already mentioned, in summing up the results of the re-organisational work conducted under the direct control of Frunzé, stated: “The organisation that has been done has completely justified itself in the experiences of the first few months’ work. Despite the difficult conditions of a curtailed budget, all measures were introduced so that the raising of the fighting capacity and mobilisation preparedness of the Red Army and Fleet were taken into full consideration.”

Solid organisational forms were constituted for subsequent work. The fighting capacity of the Army and Fleet grew despite the numerical reduction. A normal system of army recruiting was introduced. The length of term of service for the commanding, political and administrative-economic staff was regulated. The fluidity in the composition of the Red Army has been outlined. The economic position of the units has been improved. The material position of the commanding, administrative-economic and political staffs has also been increased.

Such are the results of the re-organisation in the administration.

The problem as to the transition of the Red Army to a system of single command is closely bound up with the transition to the territorial system. This question has been frequently spoken and written about since almost as far back as 1919. But practically nothing was done for the solution of this problem. Perhaps this was because the appropriate time had not arrived; because there had not been sufficient courage and sufficient decisiveness to take a step forward in this field through fear of political complications.

To go over to a single command system—this means abolishing the system of Commissars and transferring all work (except the work of politically educating the Red Army men, which would remain in the hands of the political organs of the Red Army) into the hands of a commanding staff consisting of a small number of Party members and large numbers of non-Party commanders.

“But what would happen if they could not cope with their task—?” people might argue. “What would happen if there were to be sudden treachery or betrayal?”

Here also comrade Frunzé courageously took the initiative on this question. The question was brought up at the aforementioned Plenum of the R.M.C.

“The institution of Commissars,” wrote Frunzé, “during the general process of the civil war played a tremendous role. Its original functions, which consisted of being the eye of the Soviet State, under the influence of naturally developing events, rapidly became extended, and our military Commissars became transformed into organisers and administrators. This process was inevitably linked up with a certain belittling of the rights and functions of the commanders, particularly when the latter were non-Party men. Here the other side of the medal already became apparent, the commanders gradually began to deteriorate as such (to ‘de-command’ themselves) and began to lose the most valuable attributes of a good commander: the will and capability for making independent rapid decisions.”

Then comrade Frunzé arrived at this conclusion (having in view that 90 per cent. of the commanding staff of the Red Army were workers and peasants) “that it was necessary and timely to go over to the single command system.”

And after a year, Frunzé in one of the articles which he wrote just before his death (“Immediate Tasks of Political

Work," "Military Herald," No. 24), in which he summed up the results of the experiences in introducing the single command, wrote:

"Already a year has passed since the official order concerning the single command was issued. During this time sufficient material had accumulated to enable us to give an estimate now as to the reform which we have instituted from the point of view of information of experiences. These data decisively and definitely bear witness to the correctness of the decision we have taken. The system of a single command undoubtedly justifies itself. . . . the transfer to a single command has led to a great increase in the initiative of our commanding staff, both of the Party and non-Party comrades (particularly the latter), and has increased in them the feeling of responsibility, has attracted them into the wide circle not only of purely special military-technical questions, but also on live questions of military-political and cultural work. The system of a single command will still more strengthen unity and cohesion in the ranks of the Red Army."

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In order to characterise the work of comrade Frunzé in the Red Army we must also refer to the question he brought up concerning "militarisation of the work of the entire civilian apparatus in the rear."

"A most important result of the experience of the imperialist war is an over-estimation of the question as to the role and significance of the rear in the general process of military operation: the centre of gravity of military operations was transferred from the front to behind—the rear. The transformation of aviation into a decisive type of military force, the perfecting of chemical means of warfare—all these factors essentially turn upside down the very idea of "front" and "rear" in the old sense of these words. Now the rear is taken jointly with the front. From this we have new tasks and new methods of preparing the defence of the country and in particular a new role for the rear itself as an open participant in the struggle. Once the direct weight of conducting the war falls on the entire people, on the whole country, once the rear acquires such a significance in the general process of military operations, it is natural that the task of an all-round and schematic preparation of this rear in peace time, comes to the forefront." (From an introductory article by Frunzé to a work by Karatygin—"Mobilisation of Industry for the Needs of War.")

Such was Frunzé's line of conception. He also ex-

plained by a number of examples as to what this peace time work in preparing the rear for warfare really signified and arrived at the following conclusions:

“The militarisation of the rear civil apparatus is quite attainable, but under two obligatory conditions: firstly, there must be clear consciousness on the part of the rear—and particularly of the civil apparatus—as to its role in future wars and the necessity of a timely preparation for them, and secondly, live direct control between the military and civil apparatus must be established.

“In this respect our economic directors have to play a particularly important role. They have to remember that war causes the mobilisation of the entire economic resources of the country—industrial, agricultural and financial—which have also to be organised, co-ordinated and directed by means of strategy just as the operations of purely military forces are directed.

“Work should be treated in exactly the same way as it is handled in the general staffs in respect to the purely fighting elements of warfare. Just the same operative plan for the development of the economy of the country during the war should be drawn up as we draw up for the movement of troops. In this plan all the demands on our resources should be accurately calculated: this work is incredibly complicated, but it is necessary and can be done. It should be remarked that the realisation of this task is greatly facilitated in our country by the State nature of the main branches of industry. Therein lies our tremendous advantage compared to bourgeois countries and it would be unforgivable not to be able to utilise this advantage as it behoves us.”

It was only under comrade Frunzé that this most important work of preparing the rear, which formerly had been of a spasmodic and casual nature, became really schematic and all-embracing.

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The surgeon's knife, which was used during his operation, at the same time cut off the work of comrade Frunzé just at a moment when he was developing an extensive plan for re-organising our armed forces on new lines, and when the first audacious and successful steps in the execution of this plan revealed truly immense perspectives for the formation of an armed Communist people.

The Party hardly understood to the full what a great and really irreplaceable military worker it lost in the person of comrade Frunzé.

C. I. GUSSEV.

After the White Terror

THE blows which the Hungarian bourgeoisie inflicted during recent months on the Communist Party, now gaining in strength, and on the advanced detachments of the revolutionary Hungarian proletariat in general, did not penetrate to the roots of the movement. The new wave of persecution has neither been able to shake the foundations of the Communist Party nor to abolish the political and economic opposition organisations. On the contrary, all these repressions will speed up the decision of public opinion on a question which for the working class is already one of the vital questions at the present moment: this is the question as to the legalisation of the Communist Party.

This might seem contradictory, but first we already have the fact of a new wave of persecution against the Communists and the entire Labour movement, which has acquired the nature of a real class war: secondly it is a well-known fact that six years ago the Hungarian proletariat suffered a defeat unprecedented in its dimensions; after this defeat and after the temporary disappearance of an organised Communist movement—not only legal, but also underground—the Hungarian workers and peasants began to organise themselves although but slowly, with great difficulty and by terrible sacrifices.

In the interesting social process which has taken place in Hungary since the commencement of the liquidation of the counter-revolution, we may find a detailed explanation of this fact now on the horizon, which, as a circumstance capable of giving results of an international significance in various of its aspects, certainly deserves attention.

1. Hungarian Stabilisation.

The move to the Left in the Hungarian Labour Movement has taken place in face of the economic (primarily financial) and political stabilisation of Hungary. The system of militant counter-revolution, which prevailed after the revolution, was directed, in certain respects, against the large landowners and big capital; as a result of its romantic militant foreign policy, it also became an intolerable obstacle to

the realisation of the interests of landlordism and big business. The uncertainty caused by the abrupt appearance of the counter-revolution in the field of economic and legal rights made it impossible for the large landlords and industrial capitalists to settle down, even if relatively quietly, to conditions similar to those existing prior to the war. The military detachments and the fabulously inflated bourgeois-bureaucratic apparatus of counter-revolution swallowed up colossal sums. The restoration of the financial balance of State economy, therefore, became impossible. With this parasitical militarist apparatus of counter-revolution, the latter became a political burden on the shoulders of those classes who rallied in defence of private property which had been shaken by the revolution. In search of a social basis the counter-revolutionary military-bureaucratic apparatus attempted to find support in the peasantry who were discontented in their pretensions to the land and in the petty-bourgeoisie, who adopted an oppositional attitude against large and banking capital. The counter-revolutionary regime was ultimately compelled by necessity to maintain a militarist orientation in the field of foreign policy in respect to the so-called "succession States" (Roumania, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria), which were formed on ruins of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire and included tremendous masses of Hungarians. The export interests of the Hungarian big landowners and the budding heavy industry were already reduced to nought in advance by such an orientation.

This circumstance compelled the large landowning and capitalist classes, who to a large degree were united by bank capital, to steer the course towards political and economic stabilisation of State finance by means of liquidating the militarist counter-revolutionary regime.

This aspiration found its expression above all in the liquidation of illegal military and semi-military formations, which represented a power more or less independent of the Central Government, under the direct leadership of the Regent—the counter-revolutionary Horthy. In the foreign political field, these detachments, as the organised embodiment of the Hungarian irredentist aspirations, supplied a constant source for the aggravation of the States of the Little Entente. Furthermore, the stabilisation was expressed in the so-called "sanitation." The national economy—officially with the exclusive aid of foreign capital, but really by means of an unprecedented regime of enforced taxation—became restored to such an extent, that instead of the expected deficit to the amount of one hundred million kronen, there was

a budget surplus to the extent of sixty million gold kronen and even the possibility of introducing certain new State investments. The liquidation of the land reform, which the peasantry endeavoured to force the Government to introduce at the expense of the large landowners at the time of the height of the counter-revolution, is also linked up with this economic and political stabilisation. Another phenomenon implying stabilisation is also the fact that large landlordship and large capital secured a modification of the aggressive irredentist foreign policy and the conclusion of trade agreements with the neighbouring countries. This phenomenon became particularly felt during the present year.

The counter-revolutionary regime made sweeping reductions in the workers' wages and the entire standard of living. Utilising this fact, and also the colonisers' policy of the Czecho-Slovakian Government in Slovakia and the Roumanian Government in Transylvania, the large capitalists (with foreign assistance, of course, and with the appropriate customs' policy) began to develop industry on a large scale. According to information which comrade Eugene Landler furnished in the central organ of the Communist Party of Hungary, "New March," no less than 70 new metal factories were established in Hungary between 1921 and 1924. During the same period Hungarian finance capital set up 55 factories for building materials and 43 cement works; also glass, porcelain and pottery works and 40 companies in the mining industry. The electro-technical industry shows great progress and has developed to such an extent that the goods it produces have already become objects of export to the markets of Central and Eastern Europe, whereas Hungary still needed imports of these goods not so very long ago. The textile industry, which has been very insignificant in modern Hungary, with the assistance of Swiss, American and Dutch capital is beginning to oust the Czecho-Slovakian and Austrian industry and is already steering a course towards the export of certain goods of this category. During this period the capital of heavy industry has become highly concentrated in the banks who have also endeavoured to extend their influence to the large landed estates. Through the banks a powerful alliance of large capital with the large landed estates has been formed. There are two interesting facts which go to show the nature of this alliance. Firstly, the large Hungarian flour mills, which are exclusively in the hands of the big banks, have commenced to establish their own wheat-production centres, leasing large estates. The second characteristic fact is that the Hungarian Federation of Industries which pursued before the war, during the war

and even after the revolution a customs' policy hostile to the interests of the large landowners, has recently joined up with the Hungarian Economic Corporation, which represents the interests of the large landowners, and has offered to take part in all negotiations on the basis of a united front for the conclusion of trading agreements. In this alliance of the large landowners and capitalists, the importance of heavy industrial capital had definitely grown. What is more, big industrial capital absolutely abandoned its endeavours to make the internal market more capacious by means of distributing the land among the landless peasantry. In this manner the class-ties which could have united the peasantry with the bourgeoisie were broken. The Hungarian large bourgeoisie played no small role in sabotaging the law on the land reform.

One of the most essential political factors of stabilisation—the decrease in the state of organisation and in the political importance of the entire working class and poor peasantry as compared with the increased organisation of the big landowners and capitalists—was already created during the period of counter-revolution as a result of the common efforts of the State apparatus and the Social-Democrats. In this manner the possibility naturally arose of introducing stabilisation at the cost of unprecedented oppression of the toiling masses (with regard to this we need cite only one fact: before the war the tax burden amounted to 35 kronen per inhabitant; after the “sanitation” it amounted to 76 kronen). In exactly the same way it became possible to introduce the land reform in such a way that it did not in the least degree modify the feudal nature of land distribution. Among 1,200,000 absolutely landless Hungarian peasants, and 332,000 peasants with dwarf farms of less than 10 morgen, 748,000 morgen of land were distributed according to official statistics on April 8th, 1925; a considerable part of this quantity of land was used for making supplementary grants of land to the richer peasants or the members of their families. As a result, almost half of the landed property in Hungary remained in the hands of 1,500 large landowners.

Politically, the efforts at stabilisation were also expressed in the curtailing of the powers of the leader of the counter-revolution, Horthy. In respect of Horthy and the wavering ranks of counter-revolution, stabilisation was expressed in the aspirations of the legitimists to restore the Hapsburg Dynasty. At the present time, real power is already in the hands of this dynasty. The legitimists received the majority in Parliament and now there are only obstacles

of an international nature in the way of the restoration of the Hapsburgs to the throne. This process, socially, means the restoration of the rule of the alliance of large landlordism and large capital, with the simultaneous growth of the importance of large industry within this alliance; as compared with pre-war times, this regime was only hindered by the preservation of the remnants of the fascist counter-revolution. However, there is no doubt that stabilisation, or as they say in the Hungarian jargon, consolidation, has made such progress that the condition of Hungarian economics and politics may be called stabilised not only in comparison with the period of revolution and post-revolution, but even in comparison with the position during the war.

It would be superfluous to add that stabilisation has been introduced at the expense of the working class and also at the expense of the lower strata of the peasantry and the urban bourgeoisie.

2. Stabilisation and the Move of the Working Class to the Left.

The acute counter-revolution, the soil of which—as Marx said—is also revolutionary soil, became a stimulus for an extensive process of disorganisation of the working class. This process commenced and developed partly under the influence of the terror and partly under the influence of and as a result of pressure of the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party, one of the detachments of the White Terror. It is true that the counter-revolution did not succeed in disintegrating the unity of the trade unions, organising them under the Christian Socialists or under a national flag. But on the other hand, it succeeded in partially lessening the state of organisation of the workers with the aid of the Social-Democratic Party and with the direct aid of the terror against whole categories of workers, such as the railwaymen and agricultural proletariat. Accordingly, the position of the working class during the period of counter-revolution both economically and politically became such, that it was as if the Hungarian ruling classes aimed at re-establishing the conditions of that epoch when the workers had in general not commenced to organise. The 8-hour working day became a rare exception.

In the textile and the chemical factories, the 10-13-hour working day was a usual occurrence. The electoral franchise, established at the commencement of the counter-revolution by administrative measures, was doomed in proportion to

the rate of growth of consolidation. The trade union bureaucracy, which through the Social-Democratic Party had concluded an alliance with the Government of Bethlen, quickly disarmed any movement of the working masses.

This stabilisation is naturally relative. The pre-war conditions were not restored, as is first and foremost apparent from the fact that the numerical strength of the industrial reserve army, the number of unemployed, increased to greater dimensions than in peace-time. Skilled workers comprise a considerable part of the unemployed, but the reserve army has also been increased by the influx of workers from the countryside. The most extensive unemployment occurred and still prevails in agriculture. One of the substantial changes in the structure of the working class was the fact that the period of counter-revolution was used by the Hungarian bourgeoisie for lowering the wages of skilled workers. In this manner, the small strata of the labour aristocracy in Hungary also disappeared and a great process of equalisation commenced within the ranks of the working class. At the same time it should be borne in mind that the working class was augmented by means of the influx of a large number of labouring elements from the countryside into the new branches in industry, primarily the textile and chemical industries. These elements brought with them into the towns the discontent of the countryside and in particular that of the landless peasants. Unemployed skilled workers also tried to get settled in provincial agricultural work and in petty industry. As a result of all these phenomena, the urban and rural workers came into closer contact with one another to a very large degree.

During the acute period of counter-revolution, the trade union bureaucracy, whose personnel closely coincided with the political leaders of the Social-Democratic Party, succeeded in convincing a considerable section of the working class masses that there remained only one thing to be done: to save everything possible. They succeeded in convincing them that the Social-Democratic Party and the trade union bureaucracy, after the defeat of the revolution, by obstructing any movement for wage increases, be it ever so insignificant, were saving the trade unions. Under the pretext of the economic position of the market, they declared in advance every movement of an economic nature to be hopeless. The trade union leaders themselves drove a wedge in between the unemployed and the employed workers. They exploited the political terror in order to implant the conviction among certain strata of the workers that during the time of the revolu-

tion the working class had "gone too far" and should, therefore, behave themselves properly at the present time.

The political consolidation, the liquidation of the White Terror detachments, once more aroused the most advanced elements of the Hungarian proletariat. With the weakening of the pressure of the White Terror, the pressure on the working class through the Social-Democratic Party and the leading trade union bureaucracy also slackened. This was all expressed primarily in the livening up of the political movement of the working class. This also unloosened the forces of the working class on the economic front. The inflated position of the market, which had for a long time been fictitious, changed the hopeless moods of the workers and the demands on the economic front broke the resistance of the trade union bureaucracy. At the commencement of 1924 we witnessed a number of fights on the economic front which met with more or less success. In the majority of cases, the fight broke out after the resistance of the trade union bureaucracy had been overcome. In this manner a fighting-opposition leading stratum came to the fore in a number of trades and took into their hands the organisation of the oppositional tendencies within the trade unions and afterwards within the Social-Democratic Party. The denunciation of the pact concluded with the Bethlen Government already took place during the period of consolidation and in this manner the workers already decided to raise a voice of loud protest against this precedented fact, which not only betrayed the elementary rights of the workers, but placed the forces of the working class directly or indirectly at the service of the Government. The second pact concluded by the Social-Democratic Party with the so-called "Democratic bloc," and, through the latter, with the extreme Right-wing of the legitimists, i.e., with elements not content at the rate with which the Government was pushing forward the restoration of the Hapsburgs—this pact raised up oppositional waves within the Social-Democratic Party to such a height that there was a split in the ranks of that Party in the spring of this year. During the same period, the leaders of the economic struggle, which had been successfully conducted in the trade unions in spite of the bureaucracy, got possession of a number of leading posts in the trade unions. The attitude of the working class towards the government became more courageous, this regime having gradually changed in the process of stabilisation as the exclusive counter-revolutionary measures gave way to more normal measures of suppression. The workers also grew more courageous in their attitude towards the bosses, whose profits still remained far behind the profits which they had been

able to amass during the pre-war economic situation. Thus stabilisation led to results widely differing from those expected by the workers and reformist leaders, who, as a result of the liquidation of the exclusive governmental regime, had hoped for a slackening of the class struggle and under this impression made promises to their capitalist allies.

Thus the consolidation created a large and extensive mass movement in the Hungarian working class. This mass movement which was not only directly nourished by economic and political problems, remaining as a heritage of the revolution, but also upon the traditions of the Hungarian proletarian revolution, did not set itself direct revolutionary political aims. Even with regard to strategic aims, it did not display any clear understanding. The mass movement was excellent soil on which the Communist Party, now re-organising, could link up its struggle with the everyday questions of the Labour movement, breaking down if only a section of the barrier of legality and emerging from underground to the greatest degree possible under the given circumstances.

3. Two Problems of the Fighting Leadership of the Communist Party.

Under these conditions, the Communist Party was faced with the following political problem: who will overthrow the rule of Horthy, or rather under the direction of what class will the overthrow of this regime be conducted?

The Social-Democratic Party, as may be seen from the preceding, aimed at removing the leadership of this struggle from the hands of the working class. The leadership of the struggle for the liquidation of the reactionary regime and for bourgeois democracy, it completely ceded to the legitimists who were striving for the liquidation of the Horthy regime and the restoration in its place of the rule of the large landowners and capitalists, with the restoration of the Hapsburgs. The legitimists preached the viewpoint that legitimism not only implied the restoration of the Hapsburg rule, but also the rule of legality. This linked them up with the parties of the so-called Democratic bloc. The views of the Communist Party of Hungary on this are as follows:

“The struggle for the liquidation of counter-revolution and for consolidation—of which the false struggle for democracy is only a part—is not led by the Party of the working class and petty bourgeois democracy, but by those classes, who in place of the acute form of counter-revolution are endeavouring

to restore their own firm rule—the class of the large landowners and big industrial capitalists. They are endeavouring to restore their power under the flag of legitimism and the restoration of the Hapsburgs. They employ the slogans of democracy as auxiliary slogans only where they need the support of the masses of the people outside their own class.”

This same document establishes :

“That the petty bourgeois democracy, including the Social-Democratic Party, has in this manner once more found itself following in the wake of the large landowners and big industrial capitalists. It has become a weapon of the anti-revolutionary policy of these classes and has once more betrayed bourgeois democracy and all its demands—from the general franchise to land reform—to those classes whose interests directly oppose these demands. They are not only opposed to them in general but particularly at the present time. After the revolution the classes offer all the more resistance to the solution of these problems in that the imprint of the previous revolutions has been left on every individual question.”

Thus the Communist Party was faced with a direct problem—should it regard the struggle for questions of the revolution which public opinion considers as the special problems of the bourgeois revolution passively, or must it intervene in the struggle, which is being waged for the liquidation of Horthy rule, and endeavour to preserve for the proletariat the leadership of this struggle?

In the afore-mentioned document, the Communist Party of Hungary considers that “as a general strategic task, the March programme remains in force—‘the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat in closest alliance with the poorest peasantry as all the problems of the October revolution just as of the March revolution remain unsolved.’ ” But it also considers “that the Communist Party of Hungary cannot pass by those problems which the toiling peoples of Hungary are now engaged upon as questions of democracy or the everyday economic questions of the working class and peasantry.”

The leadership of this struggle is the task of the working class and of its political Party. This struggle, which under the leadership of the Communist Party should make for the liquidation of the autocratic regime and for the so-called democratic liberties, is to be distinguished from the struggle of the Social-Democrats and other petty bourgeois parties for democracy, not only in that the struggle of the Communists is not merely a seeming struggle, and will not end by a change in

the demands, but also in that the Communists place the demand for so-called democratic liberties in unbroken contact with their general revolutionary demands and with their revolutionary agitation among the masses.

Thus the problem facing the Communist Party amounts to the struggle for democracy as a partial struggle for partial demands within the framework of general revolutionary strategy and for the general revolutionary aims in the struggle for the revolutionary dictatorship. This problem is rather complicated, especially when it is borne in mind that in Hungary a relatively lengthy dictatorship of the proletariat has already existed. Tracing the main trend of Party policy, one of the most important documents on the policy of the C.P.H. replies to this question in the following manner:

“The object and direction of the partial struggle in this strategic framework are: isolation of the Parties of petty bourgeois democracy—including above all the Social-Democratic Party and the various peasant Parties, who are endeavouring to liquidate the revolution and are at any moment ready to make compromises with the ruling classes—from the masses; winning and mobilising for the revolutionary struggle the main forces of the revolution—the majority of the industrial proletarians, a considerable section of the agricultural proletariat and of the socially decisive strata of the peasantry.”

In the present phase of the revolution, the idea of hegemony (class leadership) of the proletariat stands out before the Hungarian Communists with classic clearness. In this connection the above-mentioned document says:

“The idea of an alliance with the peasantry and in general of the hegemony of the proletariat, this conception that the struggle of all oppressed and exploited classes should be led by the working class under the leadership of the Communists—must be ingrained by all manner and means in the mind of every individual Communist and advanced worker.”

The Communist Party of Hungary gave a concrete reply to this question not only in its general application, but also in all fields of economic and political struggle. It is just this reason which enabled it to utilise the short breathing space arising from the slackening of the White Terror in order to stand at the head of the movement of the Hungarian worker and peasant masses.

4. Persecution—Legalisation.

The extensive swing of the Labour Movement to the Left and the gradual increase of the Communist Party natur-

ally made new impressions inevitable. The policy of the Party was free from all romanticism; therefore, neither the governmental authorities nor the Social-Democratic Party were in a position to provoke a plot or attempt a "putsch." The political policy so clearly proved that the Party was endeavouring to win over the majority of the working masses at all costs and that its tactics were entirely directed at this aim, that even the fabrication of forged documents proved to be inappropriate, since such documents would in no way correspond with the nature of the Party's political activity.

The examples of repression demonstrated with extreme clarity how deeply the Communist Party had struck root among the masses and how strong was the swing of the Hungarian Labour movement to the Left. The heroic conduct of comrade Mathias Rakosi met with a colossal response among the general masses of the workers; there is no doubt that the realistic revolutionary mass policy of the Communist Party prepared the ground for this repercussion, during the period of the new wave of White Terror. With regard to the impressions caused by the Terror, it is necessary to note one circumstance, the serious political significance of which is indisputable. At a moment when police persecution had become most savage, when the Social-Democratic Party threw a whole number of opposition trade union leaders out of the trade unions and betrayed them to the police, at that moment a strange conception emerged in the Social-Democratic press and even in one of the bourgeois papers: this was that the Communist Party of Hungary should be legalised. The Social-Democratic Party generously announced that it did not pretend to the **formal** monopoly of legality; freedom for Communistic organisational work should also be permitted. A representative of the Hungarian intellectuals, one of the leading reactionary organs of the Hungarian-Jewish capitalists, speaks in the same sense. It would be dangerous self-deception, if, at the present juncture, the Communist Party on the basis of similar or even more important declarations were to make its only tactical task the struggle for breaking down the barrier to legality. But just as dangerous as would be the inception of legalist illusions among the workers, or of a liquidationist mood in the Party, so, on the other hand, would it be equally incorrect not to pay attention to those voices which had propounded the idea of legalising the Party, for this idea has arisen for the first time during the period of counter-revolution. It has arisen just at a moment when the police and Social-Democratic apparatus has been directed with all force not only against the Communist movement, but also against the opposition movement of the working masses in general. These persecutions have rallied, to a degree unpre-

cedented since the counter-revolution, not only the entire Hungarian working class into a united front against the White and Social-Democratic Terror, but also the entire international Labour movement.

There is no doubt but that the talk about legality on the part of this Social-Democratic Party is something in the nature of a manœuvre. But even the idea of such a manœuvre does not arise by chance. As far as one may judge at the present time, the idea of this manœuvre has arisen in the Social-Democratic press for a threefold reason:

First, because the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party have fallen under the direct pressure of the masses—a pressure caused by the ever-growing sympathy of the workers for the Communists and the conduct of comrade Rakosi and the remaining arrested comrades.

Secondly, the leaders of the Social-Democratic Party, by putting forward the idea of legalisation, are trying to detract the attention of the workers from the role they (the S.D.) play as direct allies of the police in the persecution, not only of the Communists but in general of the entire movement of the workers who adhere to the platform of the class struggle.

Thirdly, because the conclusion of an alliance of the Social-Democratic Party with the bourgeois parties is threatened by the circumstance that within the Social-Democratic Party there still remain Communist elements who can only be openly and roughly dealt with in the case of such elements coming out in the open as Communists.

The Communist Party of Hungary is avoiding legalist illusions by continuing to strengthen its illegal organs, but it continues to struggle for legality as **one** of the forms of its revolutionary policy, while using all legal possibilities. The swing of the Labour movement as a whole to the Left, its definite sympathy for the Communists, the live motive forces of revolutionary tradition are a new proof that it is in vain that the Parties of the Second International point to the banners of the revolution which, having met with failure, are covered in blood, as a proof that the Hungarian working class is not in a position to rise up once more under the leadership of the Communists.

The unsuccessful Hungarian revolution was a “dress rehearsal” of the new Hungarian revolution in no less a degree than the Russian Revolution of 1905 was a “dress rehearsal” of the victorious October Revolution. BELA KUN.

The 1905 Revolution and Bourgeois Europe

EVERY great revolution affects not only that country in which it has taken place; it affects a whole number of countries. In so far as revolution has not yet taken place in these countries, in so far as the ruling classes there consider it a catastrophe that is looming up and threatening them, these ruling classes endeavour to avert the disaster, to extinguish the fire in their neighbour's house, while their own roofs have not yet caught fire. Any big revolution, therefore, brings about **intervention**. This was the case in France in 1792, in Central Europe in 1848-49, in the countries now comprising the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics in 1918 and, finally, the same thing is now taking place in China.

Was this the case in Russia in 1905? To reply to this question practically means replying to the question as to whether the Russian 1905 was a local phenomenon or an event of world importance. It is true we have many other means of gauging the importance of the Russian revolution of 1905; its reflection on the events taking place in other countries in the West such as Austro-Hungary, and in the East such as Turkey, Persia and subsequently China. We have also the influence upon the tactics of the largest Labour Parties of Western Europe—the tactical discussions which arose in connection with the October strike of 1905 among the German Social-Democrats, who then had a strong Left-wing. But these facts, although well-known in their general form, could be much better pictured and studied in detail by those comrades of the Western European countries, and countries of the East, who have been witnesses and participators in the movements caused by the Russian Revolution, which were a reflection of it. What I want to speak about here seems at first sight to be less important and at any rate less well-known. But it deserves the attention of every Communist.

At the summit of the Russian Revolution, by December, 1905, the financial position of the Tsarist Government had become desperate. Already at the commencement of the Russo-Japanese war the hope was expressed in opposition

circles of Russian society that the war would break the backbone of Tsarist finance. At first these hopes were not justified—the 380,000,000 roubles of “cash in hand” proved adequate to cover the first expenditure, and afterwards, while the fortune of war still vacillated, they were able to “make up” from abroad; however, they did not as yet attempt to organise any serious loans. But when good fortune definitely turned its back on Nicholas II. it had already become impossible to “make up.” At the end of February of the same year a real scandal took place: the French bankers who had gathered in Petrograd to sign an agreement for a new short-term loan, on reading the telegrams on the Mukden rout, simply took to their heels. Only the evening before they had dined with the Minister of Finance, but the next day no one turned up to sign the agreement, and the Minister who had anxiously awaited them (this was Kokovtzev) found out that instead of coming to his Cabinet the “guests” had left for the railway station.

Three months later Count Witte, who had gone to Portsmouth, heard the categorical declaration of the French Premier Rouvier: “Until you conclude peace—not a centime.” But the war had hardly ended when the revolution commenced. After the October strike things became even worse with Nicholas II.’s credits than after Mukden. And the next day after the smashing of the Moscow barricades, it already smelt of catastrophe. “Perhaps it is better **simply to close down the Exchange**” telegraphed Witte to Kokovtzev in Paris on December 25th of the same year (January 7th, 1905).

The war used up the last remnants of gold, and the appeal of the Petersburg Soviet of Workers’ Deputies to worker depositors to demand gold everywhere and to take out deposits from the savings banks also had its effects. “The run on the savings banks in Petersburg, Moscow and the centre has stopped,” they telegraphed the same day to Paris, “**but in the districts it is continuing.**” The question of gold became a question of the fate of the Romanoff dynasty. The closing down of the exchange, the fall of the rouble and the rise of all prices connected with it, were bound to draw into the revolutionary movement wide masses of the petty bourgeoisie, in whose neutrality and political passivity Tsarism had placed all its hopes. At the same time, the elections to the State Duma were drawing nearer.

“As far as money is concerned, once having accepted power, I set myself the task of not only saving up money,

but of doing so **before the summoning of the State Duma**, before the new state of Governmental affairs had entered into force; since, of course, it was clear to me that if the first State Duma (which undoubtedly was bound to be unequally balanced and to a certain extent revengeful) was summoned before the Government of Nicholas II. had a good reserve of money and troops, and began treating for a loan in the Duma, the loan would not be floated rapidly, although time was pressing: it would be unsuccessful as the bankers would present more difficult conditions, and then the Government, without money, would be absolutely deprived of that freedom of action in general necessary to a certain extent, but which in the disturbed times being experienced was particularly necessary.”*

The “bourgeois monarchy” had to start its first example by writing letters to “benefactors.” Quite a large number of draft letters have been preserved in the archives: the letter to Rouvier, the letter to the German Chancellor, Von Bulow, to the Paris Rothschild (there is a note in brackets: “Find out from the credit office what his initials are”), and to the London Rothschild. As is wont in letters of request, first the “difficult situation” is alluded to, then the hopes for the “near future” which, however, can only materialise if money be given, while there was a fairly transparent hint that in the event of further stinginess the creditors of Nicholas II. might pay from their own pockets. By way of example, we will cite an extract from a letter to Rouvier where the argument is most fully developed. “In order to guarantee a better and, I venture to believe, nearer future, it is necessary to prevent and overcome this crisis, which, acting ruinously on the economic position of Russia, will inevitably spread beyond her frontiers. I mean, of course, that this is a financial crisis. This question deeply interests the Imperial Government, and His Majesty, my most august sovereign, has been pleased to entrust his State Secretary, member of the State Council, the Privy Councillor, Kokovtzev, who has recently occupied the post of Minister of Finance, with a Commission to go abroad with the aim of taking the necessary steps for removing the unfavourable consequences of the present financial position of Russia. The State Secretary, Kokovtzev has been furnished with the necessary powers by His Majesty.”

Kokovtzev was not sent to Paris without reason. He was a rival of Witte with regard to the administration of

* “Memoirs of Count Witte,” Berlin edition. Vol. I. p. 193.

Russian finance, and Witte was not loth to compromise him, so he set out for Paris on a cause that Witte knew to be hopeless. "As the situation got still worse," wrote Witte in his "Memoirs," "I proposed Kokovtzev, as I saw that he wanted to go abroad and try floating a loan, although I knew that until the Moroccan question had been settled a loan was impossible. I did not consider it possible to acquaint members of the Financial Committee as to the financial position, but as some of them expressed the opinion that a foreign loan might be possible, I proposed that Kokovtzev should go abroad, with the necessary powers."

In January, 1906, Kokovtzev really found that in Paris the absence of any desire to negotiate with him seriously was very apparent. He himself gave a very curious explanation of this according to which the directors of the Paris banks were too old (it so happened that old men of more than 80 years were at the heads of all the banks), that they were absolutely ignorant of financial problems, but he complained in particular about the Paris press. A characteristic of the morals of this press given not by a radical journalist in a slashing feuilleton, but by a Tsarist Minister in a business report is so interesting that we will cite it in full.

"In preparing for a new loan on the Paris Stock Exchange, it is the French press which should play an important role. Extremely influential, as a weapon of public opinion, the French press is at the lowest level from the point of view of honesty and worthiness. It is corrupt from the biggest organs down to the ordinary gutter sheets inclusively. Everything is calculated on money, although those services that are desirable are not always received for money. It is even difficult to imagine to what degree of impudence this business is carried on in Paris and what a complicated organisation of bribery and intermediaries exist in this respect. Everyone loudly complains about the press, from the President of the Republic down to the last banker; everyone suffers from its lack of conscience, and to the question, 'What is to be done?' people simply reply 'Pay,' and to the query as to how at any rate to ensure that the payment was made for reliable services, people only helplessly shrugged their shoulders. During the whole time of the war we acted according to the recipe 'Pay' and we paid a lot. As to whether we gained a lot, it would be difficult to say, but to my remark that all these tremendous sums were expended unproductively, they all replied to me with one voice, no matter whom I consulted, that it would have been difficult to imagine what would have happened with our funds if the press had not been made use of with our permanent sops.

"Nevertheless, as the war ended and internal disturbances entered apparently into a phase of certain quietness, I would have been decidedly in favour of immediately cutting down expenses on this inauspicious 'publicity' if we had not had to borrow money in France, and what is more borrow it in the near future, having immediately made preparations for this operation.

"With this necessity in view, there is nothing to be done but go on paying a little longer, and only try to take steps to ensure that the expenditure be less unproductive."

These complaints about the "lack of conscience" of the Paris newspapers are extremely comical: they purposely paid them to deceive the public, and still they write the truth about Russian affairs although only occasionally. "In quite a number of press organs receiving our subsidies," writes Kokovtzev further, "not only do articles sympathising with our credit fail to appear, but very unfavourable comments even frequently appear, as a result of which, however, the subsidies do not cease and even do not decrease." "Le Matin" is distinguished for its particular impudence. "Pay attention to the 'Matin'" telegraphed Witte to Kokovtzev. "Again this libellous newspaper harms our mission, publishing extremely alarming information." We had to ask "Le Temps" to print something in the way of a denial. "The conversation appearing in to-day's 'Temps' was a result of the insistent request of the Embassy," telegraphed Kokovtzev in reply to this telegram of Witte.

It is worth noting the role of the "Matin" as the position of this paper is extremely characteristic: it was already then the favourite organ of the **petty bourgeoisie**. And by this symptom, one could guess that the main question did not rest so much with the bankers or the French Government, who could not give Nicholas II. anything out of their own pockets, but that what was essential was "public opinion" created just by this petty bourgeois press, which prepared the mind of the chief buyer of foreign loans, the small investor. Witte, in his "Memoirs" attaches tremendous significance to the conflict which was then brewing between France and Germany over Morocco: the French Government, desiring to ensure the support of Russia, which had just been vacillating (more was known in the diplomatic circles of Western Europe about the Treaty between Nicholas II. and Wilhelm II. at Björk in the summer of 1905 than among the Tsarist ministers), decided to subject its dear ally and friend to a kind of diet, adding to the former for-

mula : "Not a centime until peace be concluded," a new formula : "Not a centime until the Morocco crisis is settled in favour of France." According to Witte's assertion the Algieras Conference was arranged under this pressure, the Russian representative there having been "given instructions to vote for France" (Witte's words).

There is no doubt that the blackmail of the ruined Russian Tsar on the basis of the Moroccan question took place at the hands of the French Government and in particular on the part of Rouvier. Kokovtzev described his first impressions of Paris in the following manner : "All the bankers unanimously and most decisively announced their complete inability to effect immediately a proper credit operation, no matter whether it be a long-term consolidated loan, or a loan for a period of 6 to 10 years. There were two reasons for this : firstly, lack of faith in our internal situation, despite the order that had been established, and further the absence of any prospect that the public might now be in favour of a loan ; another and no smaller reason was the fear of a collision with Germany over Morocco. In financial and administrative circles there were much greater fears than one might judge from the newspapers. It is stated that Germany is making preparations on the frontier and that France is preparing for any event. Serious people, of course, do not believe there will be a war, but the mood of the public is restless."

But it is already evident from this telegram of Kokovtzev, that the situation with Morocco was by no means so serious. It can be seen from Witte's telegram in reply that he also, in a business-like way, did not estimate the Morocco question at such a high level as he does in his own "Memoirs." "The French Government, taking advantage of the negotiations for a loan, tries in every way to compel us to support them not only at the Moroccan Conference, but directly with the German Emperor. In this respect we have rendered them great support and it is even proposed to bring pressure on the Emperor. But I fear that it is hardly likely that relations between France and Germany will improve, and then the French will not favour a loan and will refer to our internal situation."

The whole crux of the matter, to use the terminology of Kokovtzev, was the "cowardice of the bankers" and, to speak more exactly and openly, the complete loss of credit in the West by Nicholas II. and the absence both in French financial circles, and on the part of the petty bourgeois public, of

any consciousness that Russian affairs concerned them in any way. Witte understood that indifference to Russian affairs, i.e., the recognition of the Russian Revolution as a fact of local significance, was the main hindrance to the Tsarist Government receiving financial support, but, extremely ignorant himself in political affairs, he did not conduct them in the direction he should have done. He mainly tried to convince the German Emperor that the Russian Revolution was dangerous for Europe. This is what he wrote to Prince Eulenburg, with whom Wilhelm II. was "on more than intimate relations": "The revolutionaries have chosen Russia for testing their forces and, if they do not suffer defeat, the revolution will extend beyond our frontiers; the French Revolution is an example of this. Therefore, it is desirable that tranquillity reign in our country. For this it is necessary to liquidate the war which necessitates a loan before the summoning of the Duma, i.e., in a few week's time at the very latest."*

But Wilhelm, who had intended utilising the Russian Revolution for the military occupation of Poland and the Baltic provinces, for which preparations were already being made, was the least receptive object for such agitation. "The German Emperor deigned to reply evasively," asserted Witte in a semi-official note with regard to his letter to Eulenburg.

Kokovtzev managed to receive altogether a hundred million roubles "for his trouble" which, in the words of Witte, "could not render any assistance," and which actually made it possible only to scrape through for a few weeks. The spectre of closing down the Exchange, and the inevitable downfall of the autocracy which would accompany this, continued to be suspended like a threatening cloud. At that time a banker was found in Paris who was not quite so ancient and a little more courageous—the director of the "Banque de Paris et de Pays Bas," Netzlin. He found the courage to come to Russia. The fact that he came "under a pseudonym" and lived in a secret apartment with the Grand

* Urgent letter of Foreign Affairs Ministry to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin: "The German Government is also well aware that with the successful termination of the Algeciras Conference, the extremely important question for Russia of financial operations is closely bound up; only by realising the latter, will the Imperial Government be in a position to take all necessary steps for finally stamping out the revolutionary movement, which has already had a repercussion in the neighbouring monarchist States, who recognised that it was necessary to act in common against the oncoming danger on the part of anarchistic international societies."

Duke Vladimir, at Tsarskoe Selo, is sufficient testimony of the atmosphere in which negotiations were conducted. The plan proposed by the conspirative banker bore all the features of a very high-falutin adventure. "As the entire concession [loan] was not based upon direct distribution [of loan obligations amongst the public] but on a tremendous speculative movement, on an appeal to all the appetites in Europe and outside Europe," wrote Netzlin, "it was necessary not only that all cogs of the operations such as the banks, members of syndicates, middlemen, press, etc., be unresistedly attracted by the profits in view, but that also the world **speculating public** perceived direct and extensive advantage. It was a question of interesting in the fate of the operations not the cowardly capitalists, who up to now had willingly listened to advice from all sides, [i.e., let me add, not the petty saver, hitherto the main buyers of Russian loan—M.P.], but entirely new strata of a much more sceptical world. . . . This can be achieved not by discussions, but exclusively by hope of real profit."

Thus, the Tsar Nicholas, who had been drawn into the Manchurian disaster, as is well known, through hopes on the Chinese Chunchuses, had to be guaranteed from disaster by the "speculative public," who were another kind of money exchange Chunchuses. It was already decided not to appeal to the "normal" capitalist, frightened by the Russian Revolution.

But just as the lack of understanding and formalism of the official Russian diplomacy barred the road, in the way of the Manchurian adventure, to Nicholas II. and his "Left-handed Minister for Foreign Affairs," Bezobrazov, so the same qualities of the new French Government hindered the chase for the new kind of Chunchuses. (The Rouvier Cabinet, with which everything had been arranged, fell at the commencement of March, 1906.) The new Finance Minister of Clemenceau's Cabinet, the now famous and courageous Poincaré, was still as timid as a novice. He had heard something about the manifesto of October 17th and the State Duma, and he imagined together with Russian cadets and Mensheviks that this meant European Russia, and expressed the fear that the issue of new loan obligations without the sanction of the Duma "would infringe the rights of the [Russian] legislative assembly." After the rumpus with Morocco and Wilhelm II., Witte also had to look after the calming of Poincaré's alarmed juridical conscience. (Poincaré would probably roar with laughter now if someone reminded him of this "youthful sin"!) "In order to solve

the doubts of the French Government indicated in this letter," wrote Witte in his "Notes," "I telegraphed Raphalovitch* on March 20th [April 2nd] that irrefutable proofs as to the legality of the loan will be presented by the representative of the Russian Government on the signing of the agreement. On the question of the legality of the loan a convincing note was drawn up, at my instigation, by the well-known professor and member of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Martens, who enjoyed tremendous authority, particularly abroad."

Nevertheless, two months later, the loan was floated on fairly ordinary conditions. What was the matter here?

The sources which we have utilised up to the present† do not give us a reply to this question. We will have to turn to sources of another nature, but of the same period, to the columns of that same paper "Le Temps," which had already rendered friendly services to the Tsarist Government, as we have seen, in December. At first, this paper tried to bring pressure on its readers by "commentaries," the futility of which from a sober business point of view was correctly appreciated by Netzlin. On April 4th, this esteemed paper wrote in its leader: "In the light of the erroneous comparisons which the French and German Socialists draw for the sake of the convenience of polemics, they liken the position of Russia in 1906 with that of our country in 1789. Without enumerating all the differences which distinguish one country from the other, we must refer to one of the most essential: In Russia, i.e., with the Russian people, there is no political understanding in the exact sense of the word." (!!)

But soon the "Temps" (which had at the same time taken up a pronounced anti-Witte position, which is very significant—the fall of the Premier was evidently known at least two weeks in advance, among those who received Russian subsidies) was able to take up another kind of argument. A number of serious strikes had taken place—postmen, printers, barbers, etc.—and a big Labour movement was developing in the North of France. The "Temps" did not merely have at its disposition commentaries, and the bourgeoisie read with alarm in its columns a startling kind of picture.

* Russian Financial Report in Paris.

† "Memoirs" of Witte, vol. 1, and his "Notes on How the 1906 External Loan was Concluded, which saved the Financial Position of Russia" (Confidential edition in limited quantity of numbered copies) and secret documents on the journey of Kokovtzev to Paris, being prepared for publication by the Central Archive.

In an article on April 20th entitled "La Revolution en Marche," it was stated: "The situation has become very serious throughout the whole region of the Nord and Pas de Calais. Bands of strikers have taken possession of the streets. They set on anyone they want, and compel women, who almost die with fright, to carry red flags. They break into houses, rob shops and smash up private apartments. The gendarmes are restoring order from time to time with great difficulty, but the disorders immediately break out again. All that can be done is to prevent the strikers finishing off on the spot gendarmes or soldiers who have fallen from their horses, or who have been knocked down by blows from stones. They are carried away covered with blood, wounded and dying. One officer has already died." On April 22nd (in an article "Bad Strategy"—of course, the strategy of the Clemenceau Government) it stated: "The rising is becoming more and more violent, the sphere of its action its extending, and the methods of action are becoming perfected. Every day a new victory of the revolutionary strategists is to be noticed. Yesterday morning at Avelieu they put to flight two squadrons of dragoons, seriously wounding a captain and several cavalry men. In the evening they invaded the Commune of Levin; they occupied the railway, tore down gas brackets, overturned telegraph poles and on the ruins of burnt houses raised the red flag!"


The first of May was awaited in Paris like the end of the world. Many people left the city, others got in stores of provisions and began to barricade their houses. And during all this panic the Russian loan was signed. The audacious plan of the Netzlin adventure was not needed at all—they managed to pull through without the Chunchuses of the Bourse in the best possible way. Just what Netzlin had considered impossible in February was now realised: "Direct distribution of obligations in small and large blocs" through the institutions "bound up with the petty capitalist world by thousands of ties. Speculation remained absolutely out of it and finished by leaving Russian funds alone." Here Netzlin attached particular honour to the "Credit Lyonnais," which during the previous period had been subjected to a special diatribe and to the obligingness of the latter to the Russian Government. But it is true "the expenses for the press were tremendous."*

Lenin called the elections to the State Duma which were

* All quotations from Netzlin's letters are given in "Notes" of Witte.

taking place during those same days in Moscow and Petersburg "the voting of befooled petty bourgeois." But the befooling of the petty bourgeois was taking place at the same time two thousand kilometres farther to the West. The efforts of the French Government alone, however grateful it was for the Algeciras services, would have been but little to give Nicholas II. a mouthful of gold that could save him from them. From this it was necessary that the spectre of revolution should appear directly before the masses of French small holders. And this panic of the French bourgeoisie, which jumped at the possibility of helping out the Russian Tsar in saving its own skin and endeavouring to assist in extinguishing the fire in the East in order that the West would not catch light, gave the loan of 1906 all the features of real **intervention**. Everybody who could interfere, did so: Wilhelm II. by sending destroyers to Peterhof, the French rentier by sending his gold louis to the treasury of the Russian Finance Ministry: but everyone understood more or less that the red flags which were appearing on the streets of the Russian towns were reminding them all of their death. A forecast of October, 1917, was already felt in December, 1905 and even in April, 1906.

M. POKROVSKY.



Party and Leader Crises in the C.P. of Germany

EDITORIAL NOTE.

The article by comrade Pieck on the history of the crises in the leadership of the C.P.G. is of considerable interest. Wilhelm Pieck is an old Spartacist, one of the founders of the C.P.G., has been continually a member of its Central Committee and is very well acquainted with the history of the Party. Furthermore, he loyally strives to carry out the policy of the E.C.C.I. Therefore, this article is very informative: it reflects with certainty the view of a definite section of the Party on the new policy. This is a sufficient ground for dwelling on the details of this article.

The author correctly remarks that all the Central Committees of the C.P.G., which have replaced one another, have suffered from one defect: they have too eagerly resorted to methods of mechanical suppression within the Party and have paid too little attention to educational work within the Party ranks. The Central Committee of the Party already displayed this lack in respect of educational work in regard to the first "Left" opposition which led to the formation of the K.A.P.D. (Communist Labour Party of Germany). The Central Committee, led by Paul Levi later, suffered from the same defects. The Brandler Central Committee also endeavoured to suppress this Left opposition by mechanical means. Finally, the last Central Committee, led by Maslov and Ruth Fischer, suffered from these defects more than any of the others.

That is where the author perceives the main reason for the Party crises which the C.P.G. has experienced. The author points out that to avoid crises in the future, the Party leaders must satisfy a whole number of conditions, of which, judging by the whole trend of the article, he places main weight on the fact that within the Party the leader should be able to preserve all useful forces of the Party within the framework of a single collective collaboration, and thus place the Party leadership on as wide a basis as possible. Only in this way can the necessary permanent control and correction of its splits and activities be guaranteed. The isolation

of the leadership from the Party officials is as dangerous for it and particularly for the Party, as the isolation of the Party from the masses. On the ground that all the Central Committees of the Party which have replaced one another have not observed this condition, the author arrives at the conclusion that all the internal Party crises and the crises in the leadership of the C.P.G. are explained by analogous reasons and consequently their errors also, properly speaking, are the same. Thus, the author **formally** and mechanically identifies the errors of the Ruth Fischer-Maslov group with those of Brandler, and with the errors of all preceding Central Committees, an identification in which all the **qualitative** distinctions between these errors are drowned. What is more, since the Central Committee led by Maslov and Ruth Fischer—as the author correctly points out—more than any others have had recourse to the mechanical suppression of opinion within the Party, comrade Pieck logically comes to the conclusion, that the errors of Maslov and Ruth Fischer were not only akin to the errors of Brandler, but in their essence were more serious and more crucial.

We see that the author takes for his basis in estimating the political work of the various Central Committees their attitude to internal Party democracy, and regards this factor as the **main** criterion of correctness or incorrectness of political leadership, and as a result ends in minimising the errors of Brandler as compared with the errors of Ruth Fischer. It is true that he acknowledges the political errors of Brandler and even enumerates a majority of them, but he endeavours to mollify them and he practically perceives Brandler's main fault in that the latter, by his mechanical suppression of the Left opposition, only gave them superfluous material for their "democracy."

We can on no account agree with this estimation of the Brandler errors. The author himself points out that Brandler under-estimated the revolutionary nature of the political situation, particularly commencing from the middle of August, when the Cuno Government was compelled to resign. He points out that Brandler failed by means of an energetic and persistent campaign to rouse the working masses to such an extent that matters would lead to a revolutionary insurrection, and that instead of a revolutionary mobilisation of the wide masses of the workers, he began making panicky efforts to encourage the Party when it was already too late and impossible to regain what had been lost. Comrade Pieck also points out that in the participation in the Saxon Government, again, all kinds of errors were made; that this

was the prologue to the tragedy, which began to be enacted in the middle of October and culminated in the isolated Hamburg rising. To this we could add that the Brandler Central Committee set more value on connections with the heads of the "Left" wing of the Social-Democratic Party than with the revolutionary working class masses at Hamburg, Berlin and the Ruhr. We might also add that he understood the preparation for an armed rising in a purely bureaucratic manner, that he turned to the Saxon experiment not with the Communist method of approach, but with a Social-Democratic approach, etc. As a result of all this the October capitulation occurred, for which the blame lies, if not entirely (here, of course, objective conditions also play a part) then to a considerable extent in the opportunist policy of the Brandler Central Committee. The sum total result was not individual errors, but almost a crime. In view of this we may agree with Pieck's assertion that in January, in Moscow, the results were summed up and the reasons for the October defeat established, but, owing to the fractional struggle, **the objective treatment of the matter seriously suffered** (black type ours) and the Party did not gain anything from this. The decisive condemnation of the Brandler policy at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern and the absolute isolation of the Brandlerists at the Frankfurt Party Congress had a fully **objective** basis.

What has led comrade Pieck on to this false track? It is his incorrect **starting point**. For him the realisation of internal Party democracy is the main guiding principle in the policy of our Party. For him this is the measure of all things. We do not doubt that the complete lack of internal Party democracy in the last Party crises of the C.P.G. played a very serious role: therefore, the E.C.C.I. paid particular attention to changing the internal Party regime in the C.P.G. in order to overcome this last crisis. But we should always endeavour to estimate correctly the concrete political position and the existing correlation of social forces; for this we should every time endeavour to disclose the apparent contradictions, which push forward the social process, find the reflection of these contradictions in the working class, in which revolutionary tendencies struggle with bourgeois influences, and having sensed the revolutionary tendencies among the working masses, we should push the masses forward towards the revolution. For us, Party democracy is important above all as a necessary condition for the close approach to the masses, the best handling of the moods of these masses and for the best control of their movements. For us, the slogan "To the masses" is only a means

of drawing the masses into the revolutionary struggle. However, Pieck is apparently apt to interpret internal Party democracy in another sense—as meaning the method of finding equal basis for action among the various shades of thought within the Party, in the sense of “correcting” by this means “one-sided” leanings of the Central leadership.

The course proposed by the E.C.C.I. is not one that makes for balanced activity, but is the only possible revolutionary path. This course does not in the slightest degree represent a turn “to the Right,” but on the contrary the “Leftism” of the old Central Committee of the C.P.G. has already denounced itself as a tactic which has acted as a brake on the revolutionary movement of the German proletariat, and which has played into the hands of the Social-Democratic leaders, who have taken up a stand behind the bourgeoisie in the West, in favour of the Guarantee Pact and the League of Nations.

1. Introduction.

THROUGH the Ruth Fischer-Maslov-Scholem group, which was elected at the Frankfurt Party Congress in April, 1924, to lead the Party, the Communist Party of Germany was driven into a crisis which created a situation extremely dangerous for the existence of a revolutionary party: complete isolation from the working masses. In the seventeen months preceding the Berlin Party Congress in August, 1925, this group entirely ignored the lessons which the Party should have drawn from the errors of the former Brandler Central Committee. What is more, this group exceeded these errors to such an extent, that an extremely serious Party crisis was conjured up with respect to the relations between the Party and the masses and also with respect to the relations between the Party and the Communist International. The Open Letter, which the Executive Committee of the C.I. addressed on September 1st, 1925, to all the organisations and members of the C.P.G. tore away the veil which was to conceal this crisis from the members. By means of a thorough discussion, which lasted two months, the entire membership of the Party was enabled to take up a definite attitude to the errors of the Party leaders exposed in the Open Letter, having almost unanimously identified itself with the criticism and the demands raised in the Open Letter. The Ruth Fischer-Maslov group was immediately relieved of its leading position in the C.C. This was an absolutely necessary measure, but by itself it

does not offer a sufficient guarantee that the Party will profit by the errors which were committed and will avoid their repetition. The Party must get to understand the causes which gave rise and must of necessity give rise to these errors. A careful examination of these causes will show that all Party and leader crises in the C.P.G. arise pretty well from the same causes, with the result that the errors committed are very much the same errors as before. To put it in a nutshell, the causes are failure to understand the political situation and the role of the Party and also the relation of the latter to the masses and the Communist International. Another cause is the policy adopted within the Party. It is in connection with these questions that the problem of the revolutionary leadership of the Labour movement and also the problem of leaders and masses culminate.

2. Leaders and Masses.

The problem of leaders and masses is never so acute as during the organisation and process of the proletarian revolution. In this respect individual leaders and leader-groups are confronted with tasks of such magnitude that only specially qualified comrades can do justice to them. Although it is extremely desirable that a revolutionary party should not entrust leadership to one comrade, but to the collective body of comrades, practice will show that individual comrades, be it because of their special qualifications or because of the nature of the tasks assigned to them, begin to play a more important role in the leadership, taking thereby upon themselves a maximum of responsibility. A leader of the revolutionary movement must have a thorough knowledge of the economic and political precepts of Marx, Engels and Lenin; he must be well informed about the economic and political situation and also about the balance of social forces both in his own country and in all other countries; he must continually add to his knowledge on these fields and must above all endeavour to see clear in the possible and probable further development; he must, through close contact with the masses, be fully informed about the workers' frame of mind and must thoroughly understand the tasks confronting the Communist Party with respect to the capture and struggle of the working class and peasant masses. Within the Party too a leader must be able to draw together all the suitable forces for collective collaboration, placing thereby the leadership of the Party on as broad a basis as possible. To a leader this is the necessary guarantee for continuous control and rectification of his decisions and actions. Isolation from his collaborators is as dangerous for him and especially for the

Party as the isolation of the Party from the masses. He must also be able to establish and maintain close contact with the Party members. These are only a few of the essential premises for a Party leadership, desirous of steering clear of serious errors. Lenin gives us the highest possible example of a revolutionary leader. He had in him, in addition to the aforesaid premises, all the other scientific, political, pedagogical and human attributes which endowed him with sufficient strength for the supreme action of a revolutionary leader—to lead the proletariat to victory.

In the revolutionary movement the leaders' and masses' problem implies also the problem of the Party's relation to the masses in its capacity of leader in the class struggle, namely the role of the Party in the revolution. In this connection the problem is magnified into the task to endow as soon as possible the whole Party—if possible every one of its leaders—with the qualifications designated for the individual leader or leader-groups. This will, of course, only be possible on a restricted scale, but if the Party is to be really the kernel, the leading cadre in the revolution, this is the most important pre-requisite. Thus the scientific political and tactical education of the Party members is closely connected with this problem of the capture and leadership of the masses towards revolution. In this respect, too, the Russian Communist Party, trained and led by Lenin, has set the highest example for revolutionary leadership of large working class and peasant masses.

From the example of Lenin and of the Communist Party of Russia, the other sections of the Communist International and their leaders can study the pre-requisites for the successful capture of the proletariat for the revolutionary struggle and for the achievement of ultimate victory by the latter. Wherever the creation of these pre-requisites is neglected or ignored mistakes are bound to be made, mistakes which paralyse the recruiting power of the Party, which impede the development of the class struggle and which cannot but lead to the liquidation of the Party, to its extinction as revolutionary leader of the masses.

It is only by recognising its mistakes in time that the Party will be able to remove the causes of these mistakes. If this does not happen, there will be a crisis such as convulsed the C.P.G. last year and which has almost deprived it of all its influence over the workers. In the following chapters we will deal more fully with this and will give a retrospect of the former Party and leader crises in the C.P.G.

3. Former Party and Leader Crises in the C.P.G.

Since its inception in December, 1918, the Communist Party of Germany has gone through a series of crises. But only the last of these has seriously endangered the position of the Party. At the time of the other crises the Party recognised in time the errors committed and thus prevented a serious dislocation of Party life and the weakening of the recruiting powers of the Party. This applies to the crises which led to the formation of the Communist Labour Party and of the Communist Workers' Fellowship (Arbeitsgemeinschaft) and also to the leader-crises of Levi and Friesland. In all these crises the Party very soon got rid of the rebellious elements and came out of the discussions of the errors committed with renewed strength. We will record here quite briefly the main factors in these various crises.

(a) The K.A.P.D. Crisis.

Already at the constituent Party Congress of the C.P.G. it became evident that the majority of the Congress delegates were at sea concerning the political situation and entirely misunderstood the role of the Party. On the supposition that the revolutionary movement would lead rapidly to the victory of the proletariat, the Party Congress, in opposition to Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, rejected participation in the elections to the National Assembly, dissociating thereby the Party from an important decision of the masses. The assassination of Rosa and Karl and the illegality to which the Party was driven through the declaration of martial law made it impossible to rectify these mistakes by a comprehensive political education of the young Party. Therefore the anti-parliamentarian and syndicalist conceptions, which found their expression in the decision, rapidly took the upper hand in the Party and led to serious liquidatory tendencies also with respect to other questions, for instance the trade union question. To set up in lieu of the Party an economic organisation—this was the idea very emphatically represented by Wolfheim, Laufenberg and Rühle. The Party crisis became so acute that it led at the Party Congress in Heidelberg, in October, 1919, to the expulsion of 25 delegates who had voted against the principles and tactics resolution moved by the Central Committee. The organisations which had delegated these comrades were invited to take up a definite attitude with respect to this. At the Third Party Congress at Karlsruhe in February, 1920, the district organisations Great Berlin, North (Hamburg), North-West (Bremen), Lower Saxony (Hanover) and Dresden were expelled from the Party because they had identified themselves

with the vote of their representatives at the Heidelberg Party Congress. Thus this Party crisis had originated in the failure to understand the role of the Party. That it could assume such dimensions was the fault of the C.C., which, certainly hampered by the state of illegality, failed to counteract the anti-Party and the anti-parliamentarian tendencies by means of an energetic educational campaign among the members of these districts, either before or after the Heidelberg Party Congress. This Party crisis was up to that time the only crisis in which the Party, in addition to a few leaders, lost also a considerable number of members who at Easter, 1920, formed the K.A.P.D. The efforts of the E.C.C.I. to win them back for the Party within the framework of the Comintern failed because of the narrow outlook of the leaders of the K.A.P.D. which prevented them also from attracting large sections of workers to themselves. The K.A.P.D. no longer exists as a political factor.

(b) The Levi Crisis.

After the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, Paul Levi became the leader of the Party, although he took on this burden very unwillingly. He made repeated efforts to get rid of it because contact with the masses was not to his taste, being a student more than anything else. In view of this, Levi did not hit upon the right tone with the members who had turned their backs on the Party during the C.P.G. crisis. When at the Second World Congress the E.C.C.I. invited the leaders of the K.A.P.D. to an open discussion of their attitude and the K.A.P.D. was received into the Comintern as a sympathising group, Levi threatened to leave the Congress immediately. Just as he failed to understand the attitude of the Party to the Comintern, so he also failed to understand the necessity of the 21 conditions adopted by the Second World Congress concerning the admission of Parties to the Comintern, and hence also the role of the Party in the revolution. It was inevitable for a crisis to develop out of all this which led to his expulsion from the Party.

The unification of the Party with the Independents in December, 1920 brought certain additions to the leading group which took upon itself the leadership of the amalgamated Party. But at the same time it imperilled the leadership of the Party as the comrades lacked all the prerequisites for their position.

In connection with the Party split in Italy in January,

1921, the Levi crisis became so acute that the breach with him seemed inevitable. He was joined by a few more comrades who like himself looked upon the necessary formation of a revolutionary nucleus and the repulsion of Reformist leaders as something which would weaken and not strengthen the Party for the tasks which were before it. They only saw the necessity of mass organisations, but they failed to see that these organisations are powerless without revolutionary leadership. Levi took advantage of this opportunity to relinquish his leading position in the Party and took up a very hostile attitude towards the Party and also towards the Comintern. When the rising broke out in Central Germany in March, 1921, Levi thought the time opportune for an open attack on the Party and on the Comintern whom, because of the March rising, he accused of Putschism, publishing a special pamphlet "Our Way" to justify this accusation. This made his continued membership of the C.P.G. impossible, and on April 15th the Party expelled him. Although he formally protested against this, he gave us to understand that membership in the C.P.G. was of no account to him. Levi was no doubt right in some of his criticisms, especially with respect to the offensive theory invented by a few comrades for the justification of the March action. It is for this reason that Lenin endeavoured to preserve Levi for the Party. But Levi did not understand the Party and its role in the revolution, and, therefore, Lenin's effort was bound to meet with no success.

A number of leading comrades solidarised with Levi. With a few exceptions, all of them had come over from the U.S.P.D. (Independents) to the C.P.G., a fact which they proclaimed in their public solidarity declaration. Because of this they were asked to relinquish their parliamentary mandates, with which request they refused to comply. The Jena Party Congress in August, 1921, called this leader group to order, but did not expel all of them from the Party. The Third World Congress in July, 1921, dealt also with these contentious questions and endeavoured to make at least some of the leaders who had rebelled against the Party relinquish their attitude. At first it seemed that this attempt would succeed. But when soon after they had to stand the first serious test they failed to do so. The Levi crisis, however, did not develop into a Party crisis, it did not create any differences among the rank and file members of the Party; it remained a leader crisis, a rebellion of leaders against the Party.

(c) The Friesland Crisis.

When in November, 1921, the Social-Democratic Central organ, "Vorwaerts," published revelations about the March action with the documentary material placed at its disposal by the police and the material taken away from comrade Zetkin on a journey to Russia and initiated a campaign of incitement against the C.P.G., the rebellious leader group around Levi showed itself in its true colours. Just like Levi after the March action they now made a concerted attack on the Party and supported the Social-Democrats in their campaign of incitement against the C.P.G. At this juncture they were also joined by Friesland (Reuter) who had been elected in Jena to the C.C. and had also been appointed General Secretary of the Party. Up till then Friesland, as the leader of the Berlin organisation and of the Left-wing, was wont to indulge in radical language. But he manipulated the slogan adopted by the Third World Congress "To the Masses," in such a stupid reformist manner that the Berlin members lost all confidence in their former leader. On the strength of the campaign of incitement in "Vorwaerts" Friesland demanded the expulsion of several comrades from the C.C., comrades against whom the attacks of "Vorwaerts" had been particularly virulent. In connection with this Friesland gave vent to his hostility towards the Comintern, and at the session of the Central Committee in November, 1921, it became evident that Friesland misjudged entirely not only the political and economic development but also the role of the Party. He spoke of the development of capitalism, of the necessity of a rapprochement between the Party and the Independents and S.P.G. and against the 21 admission conditions of the Comintern. When thereupon 28 leading comrades issued together with Friesland a manifesto against the Party they were expelled from the Party by the Central Committee in January, 1922. When together with Paul Levi they formed the Communist Workers' Fellowship which, however, could not get any supporters, the leaders of this fellowship lost all political importance. A section of the comrades expelled at that time has in the meantime returned to the C.P.G.; others have landed in the S.P.G. without playing there any special political role.

4. The Brandler-Central Committee Crisis.

The C.C. of the Party, which was elected at the Leipzig Party Congress at the end of January, 1923, took up its work under extremely difficult conditions. Already at the Jena Party Congress there was violent opposition against the

conception represented by the majority of the Party Congress concerning the transition demands and especially the questions of taxation. This opposition under the leadership of Maslov, Ruth Fischer and Scholem imagined that it represented the revolutionary policy of the Party against opportunism, of which they accused the C.C. of the Party. Lenin and the E.C.C.I. addressed special letters to the Party Congress, expressing themselves against this tendency, so that the latter did not find many followers at the Congress. But those who adhered to it made use of the period preceding the Leipzig Party Congress for strong fractional acting against the C.C. whose leading brain was Ernst Meier and whose political secretary Brandler had become on his return to Germany in the autumn of 1922. Making capital out of the weak points and errors of the C.C., the opposition gained many followers in the three large districts, Berlin, Hamburg and the Ruhr Basin. The C.C. on the other hand failed to carry on the necessary intensive political and pedagogical work which could have won these districts for the policy of the C.C. This enabled the opposition to appear in considerable strength at the Leipzig Party Congress and to demand for itself participation in the Party Executive. However, the reports and the co-report of the opposition were not such as to imply acute differences, but the opposition reproached its co-reporter Maslov vehemently with not having made enough of the difference between the policy of the opposition and that of the C.C. The right thing would have certainly been for the Party Congress to elect an adequate number of opposition members to the C.C. in order to deprive it of the argument of violation of rights with which it carried on a violent agitation against the C.C. after the Party Congress. Moreover, the treatment meted out to the opposition by the C.C. and especially by Brandler was not of a nature to take away the ground from under its feet within the Party. The brutal but far from clever manner of fighting against the opposition, which is a peculiarity of Brandler, brought only more followers into the opposition camp. Even the "agreement" conference in May, 1923, was unable to provide a satisfactory result. The C.C. also failed to get into close contact with the members of the opposition districts and limited itself to explanation with opposition leaders at various conferences. It also happened that wrong formulæ, adopted haphazard at these conferences, provided the opposition with more material for their attacks on the C.C. Thus the differences between the C.C. and the opposition districts were only made more acute, conjuring up the peril of a Party split.

But the real cause of this crisis was an inadequate

appreciation by the C.C. and particularly by Brandler of the political situation which was created with the occupation of the Ruhr in January, 1923, of the relations between the C.P.G. and the S.P.G. and also of the role of the Party. Already at the Leipzig Congress Brandler had used in his report and in the resolutions placed before the Congress formulæ which were ambiguous and also partly incorrect, and which naturally provided the opposition with excellent agitation material against the C.C. For instance, that the S.P.G. from being the Left-wing of the bourgeoisie could be made the Right-wing of the Labour movement, or that the workers' government is an attempt to practise labour politics by methods of bourgeois democracy. Although Brandler said that this attempt was bound to fail, these formulæ were made full use of by the opposition for energetic demagogical attacks on the C.C., which presumably was aiming at reconciliation with bourgeois democracy and the S.P.G., and thereby at the liquidation of the C.P.G. But much worse than these formulæ was the C.C.'s failure to cope with the situation created by the occupation of the Ruhr. Although in her speech of welcome at the Leipzig Party Congress, comrade Zetkin pointed out the possible consequences, the Party Congress failed to take up a definite attitude on this question. Although in the course of the year the C.C. made the effects of the Ruhr occupation, especially the May strikes in the Ruhr Basin, an occasion for demonstrations and instructions to the districts, it nevertheless failed to arouse the workers by an intensive and continuous campaign to the pitch of a revolutionary rising at the time when the inflation crisis was at its height. This was certainly the case when the Cuno Government was compelled to resign in the middle of August, the general strike of the workers having considerably contributed to this resignation. At that time there was so much unrest among the peasants and the lower middle class that it led to great peasant disorders in various parts of the country and even to risings in Upper Baden. After the fall of the Cuno Government the seriousness of the inflation crisis abated somewhat. The entry into government of the Social-Democrat, Hilferding, and the promise of the stabilisation of the mark, which had sunk to a billion, aroused the hopes of the workers for a turn for the better. But the general political crisis was made still more acute by the preparations of the Bavarian and North German Fascists for an attack, the complete failure of the Government of the Reich to assert its authority in the case of the flagrant infringements of the constitution by the Bavarian Government and the Governmental crisis in Saxony and Thuringia. When, therefore, in the middle of September, the E.C.C.I. invited

the representatives of the German C.C. to come to Moscow in order to discuss the situation with them, it was already too late to remedy all the crimes of omission. The result was certainly a hysterical whipping up of the Party, but not a revolutionary mobilisation of large sections of workers. Even entry into the Saxon and Thuringian Government was no longer able to bring about this mobilisation, all the more so as in this respect, too, many serious mistakes had been made. This is what led to the tragedy which began in the middle of October with the entry of the C.P.G. into the Saxon and Thuringian Government and ended with the isolated Hamburg rising.

The C.C. crisis which followed the October events of 1923 was the inevitable result of the causes and errors arising out of them as indicated in the aforesaid arguments. In addition to many other mistakes, Brandler as leader of the C.C. committed also during his stay in Moscow, in September, the mistake of giving a wrong picture of the situation in Germany and of the forces and possibilities of a revolutionary rising. Probably he was himself not aware what the Party had missed and could no longer make good. But the main cause of the October defeat was that the C.C. underestimated for a whole year the revolutionary character of the situation created by the occupation of the Ruhr and by inflation, with the result that the Party did not play the role assigned to it. It is this which must be considered, to pass a correct judgment on the October defeat, and not the opposition's trump card against the C.C.—that the latter betrayed the revolution.

But it was Brandler's attitude in the C.C. which made the C.C. crisis a Brandler crisis. He managed to become almost entirely isolated, the C.C. disintegrating into three parts which did away with any possibility of preserving the leadership of the Party. The struggle in the C.C. was carried on in a wild panic atmosphere with the result that under the fire of reaction and persecution, the Party was almost four months without leadership. In the negotiations between the representatives of all the three tendencies in the C.C. and the E.C.C.I., the causes of the October defeat were certainly summed up in January in Moscow, but through the effects of the fractional struggle the objective correctness of this summing up suffered considerably and did not benefit the Party very much. Up to the Frankfurt Party Congress in April, 1924, the Party was entirely dominated by the struggle of the opposition against the old Central Committee, and the political lessons of the October defeat were entirely ignored.

Thus the result of this struggle could, of course, not benefit the Party. Nevertheless, the crisis was confined to the C.C. of the C.P.G.

5. The Party Crisis of Last Year.

At the 11th Party Congress in Frankfurt-on-Main in April, 1924, the Ruth Fischer-Maslov-Scholem group took the leadership into its hands. The middle group which had hitherto existed was represented at the Party Congress, but during the explanations it had lost all authority. The Brandler group was no longer represented at the Party Congress. The opposition had been victorious all along the line and took the leadership into its hands with the full consent of the Party. But the circumstances under which this victory had been won by the opposition were also to lead to the undoing of this leader group. It had failed to understand the causes of the Brandler crisis and could, therefore, learn nothing from former mistakes; neither did it make any effort to educate the Party politically in order to avoid a repetition of the mistakes. Instead of this, this leader group endeavoured to establish its authority by removing from collaboration and expelling all comrades who held different views from its own. A regular heresy-hunting set in and the gross tactlessness of the upper stratum was repeated in an exaggerated form in the districts. This leader group did not endeavour to educate the Party members for revolutionary agitation among the workers in factories and trade unions, but supplemented its own lack of understanding by a mechanical application of Party discipline. Within the Party it created an atmosphere of intolerance to any other shade of opinion than that represented by this leader group, and the entire authority of the C.C. rested on the dictatorship of a few comrades. Mutual distrust, incapable people in responsible posts, sham-radical phraseology, complete passivity and Party inertia, such were the inevitable consequences of this policy with the Party. This leader group lacked all the attributes which could endow the leadership of the revolutionary Party with the capacity to attract the masses to the Communist Party and to arouse in them the will to fight.

The atmosphere which prevailed in the Party could not but have its effect also outside the Party, paralysing the recruiting power of the latter. The hopes of the workers for an improvement in the economic position stimulated by the stabilisation of the mark certainly relaxed at first the tension in the political situation. But this was exactly the time for the Party to increase its recruiting power in the factories and

trade unions, which, of course, had to be done with other slogans and by different methods than in an increasingly revolutionary situation. But the Party leadership lacked understanding and determination for this. It shunned revolutionary practice in order not to be suspected of opportunism and Brandlerism. At the Frankfurt Party Congress and also later the E.C.C.I. had continually warned the C.C., which it supported in every possible way, of the perils with which such a policy was fraught. But this leader group imagined that its historical role did not so much consist in the winning over of the masses in Germany for the struggle and for their amalgamation into a revolutionary united front, as in the protection of the Comintern against Right perils and Brandlerites. The Fifth World Congress, in the summer of 1924, certainly brought a certain amount of success to this group, in so far as it was able to make it appear that the decisions of the Congress and the rectifications introduced into the decisions of the Third World Congress had come about under its influence. Just as Maslov, in his articles and works, represented the decisions of the Third World Congress, made under Lenin's leadership, as the expression of opportunism and extolled the decisions of the Fifth World Congress as a victory of the Left, so also did this leader group in Germany fail to understand the revolutionary slogan "To the Masses," and consequently sabotaged it. The result of all this was that the recruiting power and the prestige of the Party visibly dwindled from month to month, and that the S.P.G. increased its influence. This fact was shown in a truly appalling manner by the result of the Reichstag elections in December, 1924. Whilst the Communist vote, as compared with the May election, 1924, dwindled from 3.7 million to 2.7 million, the Social-Democratic vote increased from 6 to 7.9 million. At the Presidential election in 1925 the Communist vote dwindled even more to 1.8 million. Thus the Party had lost over one-half of its vote, whilst the S.P.G. had increased its vote by almost two millions. But in the factories and trade unions the prestige of the Party had suffered still more. Whilst at the Leipzig Trade Union Congress in 1922, the Communists had a representation of 90 to 138 opposition Independent Social-Democrats, there were only two Communist representatives at the Breslau Congress in 1925! This showed that the Party had become so isolated from the masses that its existence was at stake unless the Party changed its policy. The Tenth Party Congress, in the middle of August, 1925, should have brought about this change, for the crisis within the Party was no secret to anyone. But "unanimously" the Party Congress ignored the problems confronting the Party. Internal unity was simu-

lated whilst in reality there was torpor. This made the Open Letter of the E.C.C.I. a necessity in order to get the Party out of this crisis. While the Brandler crisis was only the crisis of a leader group—although there was a time when a Party split was not out of the question—last year's crisis was a leader and Party crisis at the same time.

6. The Open Letter of the E.C.C.I. and its Effect.

The Open Letter of the E.C.C.I. which was published in the German Party press on September 1st, 1925, took the members unawares, and suddenly brought about an utterly different situation within the Party. The members were surprised to see that this letter did not only bear the signatures of the representatives of all the sections affiliated to the Comintern, but also the signatures of the German delegation and of the C.C. of the C.P.G., including the signature of comrade Ruth Fischer. The members learned also from the Open Letter that since the Frankfurt Party Congress the E.C.C.I. had repeatedly proposed to the C.C. to change its course, which proposals were, however, ignored by the leader group of the C.C. As already stated in the introduction a comprehensive Party discussion on the Open Letter took place, with the result that with considerable unanimity the members identified themselves with the criticism of the work of the C.C. contained in the Open Letter. The Ruth Fischer-Maslov leader group had made itself so impossible by its work that just as with the Brandler leader group, it could be relieved of its post without creating serious difficulties within the Party. The Party Conference of October 30th brought to a conclusion the discussion on the catastrophic policy of this leader group and set before the Party tasks which in the present situation it must carry out without fail. The Party is, of course, not yet perfectly united, there is still within it an ultra-Left tendency which is intent on the continuation of the catastrophic policy of the Ruth Fischer-Maslov leader group and which fails to understand the Party's tasks. The Tenth Party Congress, and also the Party conference, were perfectly justified in energetically attacking this tendency, the chief representatives of which are comrades Scholem, Katz, Rosenberg and Korsch, as it constitutes a great peril for the Party. There are also Right perils in the Party, but it would be misleading if one were to look for these Right perils only among comrades who in the fraction struggle were dubbed Brandlerites. The cause for the Right peril is the same as for the ultra-Left peril, namely, failure to understand the political situation and the role of the Party.

These shortcomings are pretty well equally distributed among all the tendencies within the Party. It is only by paying special attention to the education of Party members that the Party will be able to exorcise these perils. But there are also other great tasks and the situation is very favourable for the Party. The result of the municipal elections in Berlin and of the Landtag elections in Baden bear testimony of greater activity by the masses and increasing confidence in the Party. The effects of the Dawes Agreement together with the taxation and tariff policy make from day to day the life of large sections of workers and small peasants well-nigh unbearable. There are in addition the attempts and measures of the capitalist forces amalgamated in the big Trusts to raise their profits by increased exploitation, reduction of wages and a longer working day. Then there is also the peril of war-like intervention with regard to Soviet Russia to which the Locarno Conference was no doubt the preliminary. Against all these perils, the C.P.G. must bring the workers together in a powerful revolutionary united front. The ever-growing sympathy for Soviet Russia, greatly fostered by the workers' delegations to that country, is the best basis for the establishment and consolidation of this united front. It goes without saying that all the measures of the Party require serious scientific analysis of the present economic and political situation and also the prospect of its further development. It is only by means of such clear orientation that the Party will also be in the position to avoid the mistakes which have led hitherto to the various leader and Party crises. If the Party recognises the causes of these crises and learns from the errors which were committed, then last year's crisis will become a turning point in the history of the Communist Party of Germany and thereby also an important lesson for the other sections of the Communist International.

WILHELM PIECK.

Ways and Obstacles to the World Revolution

THE main lines of development of world economy and world politics—which in their turn determine the course of the world revolution—may in our opinion be summarised in concise form as follows:

1. Soviet Russia **already** rising upon a proletarian basis;
2. America **still** rising upon a capitalist basis;
3. Asia in an anti-imperialist revolutionary ferment;
4. Europe, despite temporary stabilising tendencies, on the decline.

We will examine the individual points more closely; only the fourth is open to doubt.

The U.S.S.R.

Soviet Russia economically and world-politically is in process of rapid ascent. In the economic year 1925-26 the pre-war level will almost be reached; in the economic year 1926-27 it will certainly be far exceeded—provided the capitalist powers do not disturb this development by a military attack. Economic improvement signifies internal political strengthening of the Soviet machine; ever firmer shaping of the class alliance between the proletariat and the working peasantry. The world-political weight of the Union grows from day to day. With the narrowing of the world market for industrial products the growing market of the Union becomes of great importance to the capitalist countries of Europe. The sharpening diplomatic antagonisms (inherent in the stabilisation tendency) between the imperialist powers compels them to reckon with Soviet Russia as a world political factor. The mighty masses of Asiatic workers and peasants now in revolutionary ferment see their natural ally in Soviet Russia. The best part of the working class in the capitalist countries—not only the Communists—looks

upon Soviet Russia as its own State, the champion of the liberation of the working class, the beginning of the realisation of the "final goal" of the Socialist-Labour movement, the beginning of the realisation of the future Socialist State as dreamed of by the great Utopians. Every day means further progress: economic, inner-political and world-political.

The economic flourishing of Soviet Russia shows by experience that the productive forces created by capitalism can be mastered by the proletariat itself, without the capitalists! The capitalist system is not eternal or inseparable; the working class can not only rule production without capitalists but, with the aid of its planned economy, will outstrip capitalist economy. This fact forces the enemies of the revolution—first of all Social-Democracy—to a fundamental change of strategy in the struggle against the Communists, as we shall show later.

The U.S.A.

The counter pole of Soviet Russia in the capitalist world is the United States of America! It finds itself—like Soviet Russia—in an economic and world-political ascent, but on a capitalist basis! The **tempo** of the ascent is much slower than in Soviet Russia, but in the absolute it is to-day naturally still much greater.

Just as Soviet Russia is the fortress of the revolutionary proletariat of the entire world, the centre of gravity of all anti-capitalist revolutionary forces, so the United States is the natural centre of all anti-revolutionary capitalist forces. America and not Great Britain, as is generally assumed! It is true that Great Britain is actually the most anti-revolutionary, most hostile country to Soviet Russia, because the rule of the British bourgeoisie is already immediately menaced by the world revolution. For British imperialism is a decaying structure: the overseas Colonies are cutting loose: the British working class is already in mighty revolutionary ferment: the oppressed Colonial peoples are in rebellion. The British bourgeoisie has lost its traditional political assurance vacillatingly, gropingly it seeks internally and externally a way out of the crisis which has already lasted five years. The British bourgeoisie is, perhaps, still strong enough to organise a predatory attack against Soviet Russia: but the real leadership of the international bourgeoisie no longer rests with the British but with the American bourgeoisie: because only American capitalism is still moving—jointly with the

British overseas dominions—on an ascending line. Hence although in this moment the British bourgeoisie remains the chief enemy of Soviet Russia and the instigator of the struggle against Communism, **in the future the final struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat on an international scale will be carried out under the leadership of the United States and of the Union of Soviet Republics.**

The leadership of the entire capitalist world already today rests with the United States. As the only big money-lender it compels all bourgeois states and cities, banks and enterprises, merchants and landowners, to come to it for credits. The big British Overseas Colonies: Canada, Australia, South Africa are becoming more and more detached from decadent Britain and seek affiliation to the ascendant United States. Central and South America are becoming colonial fields of the United States. Even in Europe itself the will of the American bourgeoisie is decisive: Washington Conference, Dawes Plan, London Agreement, Locarno, Debts Agreements, are the most obvious results of this assumption of influence . . .

The world bourgeoisie is entirely under the ideological influence of America. In rapid sequence books appear in Europe describing and praising the technical and organisational methods of the American bourgeoisie. "Taylorism," "Fordism," "Standard Production," "the moving platform," "financing of consumption," etc., have become most popular slogans of the European bourgeoisie. Just as Soviet Russia is the centre of the world's revolutionary movements, the ideal of the revolutionary workers, so the United States is the centre of all the supporters of the capitalist social order, of all counter-revolutionary forces,* the ideal of the bourgeoisie of the entire world.

Of course, there exists—despite the parallels—a fundamental difference between the relationship of Soviet Russia to the revolutionary forces and the relationship of the United States to the counter-revolutionary forces of the world. The Soviet Union, because of its class character, furthers the liberation of all oppressed classes and peoples for its own sake! The United States must, because of its capitalist character, subordinate its policies to the profit interests of the bourgeoisie. Its relations to other countries can be an-

* The visit of the German Trade Unionists at the expense of the American Government is characteristic, as also their efforts to win the A.F. of L. for Amsterdam, and to introduce American methods in Germany.

tagonistic in principle only. When it makes loans to other countries, when it supports the bourgeoisie of any country, then under duress it brings them into dependence upon itself, turns that country into its colonial field, exploits that land. Hence the United States can never become the centre of the capitalist forces in the manner in which the Soviet Union is the centre of the revolutionary forces. In our camp there reigns a unity based upon absolute equality of interest; in the capitalist camp an antagonism based upon the difference and divergence of interests. This, in the long run, is one of the foundations of our victory: for the bourgeoisie can never internationally consolidate its forces as uniformly as we can our forces.

Asia.

Asia—with which we include in this case also the North African colonies—**finds itself in an anti-imperialist revolutionary ferment** (Revolutionary civil war in China, colonial wars in Syria and Morocco, ferment in India). The class character of this anti-imperialist movement has not yet become crystallised. In the to some extent already capitalistically developed vast empires: **in China and India, bourgeoisie and proletariat are fighting for hegemony in the leadership of the peasantry.**

While the proletariat can unrestrainedly follow the national-anti-imperialist line the bourgeoisie is held back by its fear of the proletariat. As a national bourgeoisie it can join all other classes in the fight against the **foreign** bourgeoisie, against imperialism: as **bourgeoisie** it has interest in common with the foreign **bourgeoisie** in subjecting the national proletariat. Hence it cannot wage the anti-imperialist struggle to its final end, but must come to a compromise on a bourgeois basis! If then the leadership of the anti-imperialist revolutionary movement falls to the bourgeoisie, China and India would become formally free **Bourgeois** States after the victory, like Japan and Turkey, but would remain economically heavily exploited "semi-colonies" of the imperialist powers.

If the leadership of the struggle falls to the proletariat there is the possibility that the **national** liberation struggle will be fused in the **social** liberation struggle. The result of the fight would be an actually free worker and peasant State with a structure very similar to that of the Soviet, etc.

Whether the bourgeois or the proletariat will gain the leadership depends upon the attitude of the peasant class,

which in all Asiatic States is numerically decisive. Unfortunately our knowledge of the Asiatic peasantry is by far too insufficient to risk a prognosis as to its attitude.*

Whether the present revolutionary ferment ends, under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, with the formation of "independent" bourgeois states or, under the leadership of the proletariat, with the formation of really independent worker and peasant states, the period of unrestrained exploitation of Asia by the European imperialist powers has passed for ever. This strengthens the world political weight of the Soviet Union, as the natural centre of all anti-imperialist forces; thereby collapses also one of the columns which support capitalist dominance in Europe!

Decline or Stabilisation of European Capitalism.

Four years ago we already indicated emphatically that within capitalism there were at work inherent tendencies as well as conscious efforts towards overcoming the special post-war crisis of capitalism, for the creation of a new balance upon a capitalist basis.

About a year ago Communists—on the basis of unmistakable facts—were obliged to recognise a certain "stabilisation" of capitalism. A stabilisation in the sense that no "acute revolutionary situation" prevailed, e.g., that promising struggles for the conquest of power were not at hand. Since then a year has passed; we will try once more upon the basis of a year's experience, to ascertain what this stabilisation process really means, how deep it has penetrated and for how long a continuance it may be appraised.

When we speak of stabilisation, we have naturally only the **European capitalism in mind!** Capitalism in America and in the British overseas colonies (Australia, South Africa) during the war as well as in the post-war period, developed on an ascending line; it has never been so seriously damaged that acute revolutionary situations arose. . . .

If we examine the period of actual revolutionary situations in Europe at the end of 1923 after the October defeat of the German workers—that "period of stabilisation" may be generally designated in the following manner:

* In my last quarterly report (Inprecorr, No. 151, 1925), I tried to clarify this problem somewhat in reference to China.

Objective tendencies and the conscious efforts towards restoring capitalist equilibrium have led to the outward situation of European capitalism approaching very near to the situation in pre-war days, but the changes of structure during and after the war have been so profound, that the restoration of pre-war equilibrium of world economy, when Europe was the centre of world capitalism is impossible. Internal contradictions of capitalism become apparent to a still greater degree with the changes in its structure, and finally in the near future will lead to a collapse of the stabilisation.

The Elements of Stabilisation.

If we compare the present position of European capitalism with its position three years ago, we may find the following elements which make it resemble pre-war days. In the field of economics the capitalist mechanism of circulation has for the most part been restored. The majority of European countries (with the exception of France, Italy, Poland and a few small countries) stabilised their currency. Certain countries—Great Britain, Holland, Sweden—have returned to a free gold circulation on an international scale, to a real gold currency. The credit apparatus, both internally and on an international scale, in most cases functions normally. As a result of this, those obstacles in the way of production which arose from the interruptions in the mechanism of credit circulation are removed; this creates an outward possibility of accumulation and reproduction on an extensive basis.

This "normalisation" of capitalism in the main has a quieting effect upon the European proletariat. The tremendous elementary revolutionary wave of the first post-war years in part broke in futile struggles for power; in part ebbed as a result of the normalisation of the circulation mechanism. Portions of the proletariat—strongly inspired in this sense by the Social-Democracy—succumbed to the illusion that a steady advance in living conditions similar to that of pre-war times was again possible. This illusion was consciously fostered by the capitalists by the extreme widening of the gap between the wages of the skilled and unskilled workers. The subjective factor of the revolution, the proletariat, in this way lost most of its driving force which again contributed heavily towards the disappearance of the acute revolutionary situation. At the same time the ruling classes—temporarily united under the leadership of the great bourgeoisie against the proletariat—began to recover their formerly seriously

shaken self-assurance. Only very recently we again see a powerful upsurge of the Labour movement which, however, for the present does not tend toward conquest of power but toward the improvement of the conditions of the worker within the capitalist system, like before the war. Only by the experience that as the result of the proceeding structural alterations European capitalism is incapable of satisfying these economic demands, will this struggle be driven by necessity on to the political field.

Of special importance is the fact that the **stabilisation of European capitalism, especially the restitution of a normal circulation and credit mechanism did not proceed from Europe's own strength.** The stabilisation resulted from the aid rendered by that part of world capitalism which still remains on the upgrade.

Each and every valuta stabilisation was carried out with the aid of American credit, even the British. The only country that tried to effect a valuta stabilisation without big foreign credits was Poland. The attempt ended in fiasco; the Zloty by the end of November had already sunk to half its gold value.

American "help" although cloaked in humanitarian ideology and in part actually dictated by the interests of the American bourgeoisie itself not to permit the emergence of a revolutionary situation in Europe, is, of course, not given for nothing. Not only must good interest be paid: but the world capitalist role of the European debtor countries is hereby fundamentally modified.

Post-War Structural Changes of European Capitalism.

The history of capitalism thus far knows two periods: the period of capitalism based upon free competition which was analysed by Marx; and the period of imperialism analysed by Lenin. The question still to be theoretically discussed is whether the present crisis period is to be interpreted merely as a part of the imperialist period; or as the **"period of decline"** of capitalism, as I have called it. The decision of this question carries with it the determination of the character of the current "stabilisation" of capitalism: is this a transitory episode within the period of decline or is it rather the beginning of a new "normal" epoch of imperialism?

We shall now try to point out certain "structural" changes which support the thought that we really have to deal with a new period of capitalism and that the stabilisation is only a transient episode.

1. With the arising of the Soviet Union an important part of the world, a sixth of its territory, a tenth of its population, has already divorced itself from capitalism.

2. The foundation of European imperialism, the monopolistic exploitation of the colonies and semi-colonies, is in process of disappearance! Independent Turkey, self-liberating China, the battles in Morocco and Syria, the revolutionary ferment in India and Egypt are proof of this. Even where the colonial relationship still persists the colonial super-profits are eaten up by the increased cost of the suppressive apparatus and by the forced concessions to the oppressed peoples.

3. **The social basis of the mastery of the European capitalist class narrows itself from day to day.** The circles of those interested in the maintenance of capitalism become ever smaller. The really ruling class becomes objectively ever more isolated.

The economic basis of the phenomena is the following:

a. **The concentration processes of capitalism**—a phenomenon which proceeds likewise in the periods of free capitalism, imperialism, the world war and the decline, means generally the tendency of ever sharper separation of the capitalist class from all other classes. The concentration has two forms: **concentration as the result of the accumulation of capital, and concentration as the result of the centralisation of capital.*** The former means that a part of the profit is converted into capital and production proceeds upon a higher stage. The second means that already formed smaller capitals are incapable of survival in the competitive struggle and are absorbed by the greater capitalists.

An important structural change of European capitalism in the period of decline, therefore, consists in that the concentration process goes forward in first line through cen-

* See Capital, vol. I, page 590: "Centralisation is . . . concentration of already formed capitals. Cessation of their individual autonomy, expropriation of capitalist by capitalist . . . it differentiates itself from the former (concentration) in that it involves only changed distribution of the already existing and functioning capitals."

tralisation and not through accumulation: further that the extent of the effect of the centralisation process involves a much broader field.

Prior to the war the centralisation process did not go forward in all capitalist spheres but only in those in which an immediate competition for a market prevailed: industrial, commercial and agricultural capital. Loan capital remained free: if anyone had even the smallest stake in a financial institution or in interest bearing stocks and bonds (governmental, municipal bonds, commercial stocks, etc.), this was safe from absorption via centralisation.

Inflation signifies an extension of this centralisation to the field of loan capital: and actually an expropriation that took in almost 100 per cent. of all values of this category. (Great Britain and certain neutral States are exceptions.) **The entire class of people with private incomes—one of the most reliable and broadest supports of capitalism—has almost entirely disappeared.**

The expropriation of the savings of the peasantry through the inflation has extremely hastened the process of centralisation in agriculture—where for special reasons the tempo under normal capitalism is a much slower one, and has greatly reduced the portion of the peasantry interested in the maintenance of the existence of capitalism. In the same way the savings of the labour aristocracy were expropriated along the road of inflation.

b. The successive disappearance of colonial exploitation deprives the bourgeoisie of the possibility of splitting off a part of the working class as a labour aristocracy from the whole proletariat through their participation in the Colonial Super-profits and thus draw them over to its side.*

One of the foundations of imperialism, the juncture of a part of the workers with the bourgeoisie, disappears.

c. The supremacy of Western European capitalism was based not only upon the immediate exploitation of the colonies and semi-colonies but also upon its predominance as the “industrial workshop of the world.” European commodities

* It is true that the bourgeoisie increases the gap between the skilled and unskilled workers; but this is not so much by actually raising the living standards of the skilled workers as by depressing the standard of living of the unskilled workers.

produced with a capital of higher organic composition—since the tendency toward equal profit rates required exchange at production prices—contained less labour time than those goods produced with lower organic capital composition in the economically less developed countries. In normal commodity exchange with other parts of the world industrial Western Europe received more value than it gave. Expressed otherwise: the labour hour of the Western European worker was evaluated higher internationally than the labour hour of other workers.

This advantage of European capitalism through the **progressive industrialisation of former agrarian fields is likewise disappearing.**

Finally, Western European capitalism as a whole—with the exception of Great Britain—has been transformed from a capital export field to a capital import field. Contrary to the past when it drew profits from foreign investments of capital it is now compelled to turn over to America a large part of the surplus value extracted in Europe, as interest on war debts and loans, as profits on American capital invested here. One after another the European countries fall into financial dependency upon the capital of the United States, they become actually—even though not formally—American colonies.

The result of this structural change is a **gaping contradiction between the production and the realisation possibilities of West European industry**: the great industrial productive apparatus as a result of the centralisation process of the war and post-war periods has been extraordinarily expanded. (Especially technically through the re-organisation of war industry for peace production and the heaping up of “material values” during the inflation period). But there are no possibilities of disposing of its products. As a result of the proceeding centralisation process, the low wages and the severe unemployment, the inner market has little absorption power for mass consumption commodities. Export is hindered through the industrialisation of the former agrarian countries, through the competition of the United States whose bourgeoisie throws industrial commodities upon the world market in the form of capital export, through the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the ranks of bourgeois States, and through the revolutionary ferment in Asia. Hence a large part of the industrial productive apparatus stands idle and there is widespread unemployment—not only as a crisis phase but as a permanent phenomenon.

The structural changes which have taken place in European capitalism (disappearance of the private income class; rapid shrinkage of really all middle strata, loss of industrial preponderance, loss or diminution of colonial profits, change from a capital export field to a capital import field) **do not tend to a retroactive development.** They are not parts of a cyclic movement but instead a process that is irreversible. In judging this question this seems to us to be of a decisive importance.* Only the disproportionality between European industry, production and realisation possibilities could be theoretically overcome by a wholesale closing of industrial productive enterprises—as is momentarily actually happening in Germany—through mass emigration or mass starvation of the “superfluous” part of the industrial proletariat, through the destruction of a large part of the productive forces developed during imperialism. But this means precisely the decline of capitalism, and implies such a strain on the capitalist system as could hardly be borne.

Upon the basis of these points we are of the opinion that the present stabilisation constitutes not the beginning of a new period of ascent but only a transient episode in the decline of European and—at a remote distance—world capitalism.†

The Economic Situation in Europe in 1925.

We will now briefly draw a comparison between the European economic situation at the end of 1925 and at the end of 1924, in order to see whether or not the stabilisation process has made progress during the year. We shall only give general outlines; ample statistical material may be found in our quarterly reports.

When we compare the current economic situation in Europe with that of a year ago we find no improvement worth

* Therefore we do not mention those serious crisis phenomena which originate in disproportionality, but which, however, inherently contain an equalisation tendency: coal crisis, shipping crisis, etc.

† The thought has been mooted that European capitalism might, with the aid of American capital, achieve a new renaissance similar to that which American capitalism in the 19th century attained with the aid of European capital. We believe this idea to be entirely erroneous. America could develop with the aid of European capital because it was a field of tremendous natural resources, with “unbounded” possibilities, and because the ascent proceeded within the frame of ascending world capitalism. For shattered Europe, dismembered by imperialistic antagonisms, robbed of its industrial and imperialist preponderance, feverishly jolted by most severe class struggles, haunted by the ghost of Soviet Russia—there exists no such possibility.

mentioning. No uniform market trend for all European countries has as yet developed. It is still impossible to decide whether the year 1925 is to be considered as a conjuncture phase or a crisis phase. This circumstance naturally makes the consideration much more difficult whether stabilisation is progressing or not, since a correct comparison is possible only between similar phases of the market cycle. In the main it may be recorded.

Europe had an exceptionally good harvest this year and it might be expected that as a result industrial production would show marked improvement. But this did not occur. Single industrial branches: textiles, building, did show improvement, but on the other hand heavy industry did not. This is apparent from the following comprehensive data on the industry of Europe (exclusive of Soviet Russia):

		Production of Coal, ¹		Iron, ²	Steel, ³	Shipbuilding. ⁴
		Million Tons		Million Tons		1,000 tons.
1924	Monthly Average	...	43.7	2.51	2.70	(30-9-24) 2,205
1925,	January	...	46.4	2.69	3.00	(31-3-25) 2,041
1925,	August	...	37.7	2.46	2.54	(30-9-25) 1,863

¹ Belgium, Germany, France, Great Britain, Saar Valley, Czechoslovakia.

² States mentioned above plus Luxemburg and Sweden.

³ Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Holland.

Probably the exact situation is best identified by the unemployment figures. When we compare the latest percentage data of unemployment with the corresponding months of 1924 we get the following picture:

	Gt. Brit.	Belgium	Denmark	Germany	Holland	Norway	Sweden
1924, Aug.	...	5.5	—	—	—	—	—
Sept.	...	—	—	—	8.2	5.2	7.0
Oct.	...	—	7.0	8.4	—	—	—
1925, Aug.	...	3.9	—	—	—	—	—
Sept.	...	—	—	—	8.3	12.8	8.5
Oct.	... 11.3	—	12.0	5.8	—	—	—

These figures are already out of date: in certain countries, especially in Germany, there has since set in a very rapid deterioration of the labour market. Certain countries with comparatively very great unemployment are also missing, such as Poland, Austria, Hungary, etc. It may be recorded that the total number of unemployed in Europe at the end of 1925 is in no event smaller than at the end of 1924.

With regard to valuta conditions, the British and Dutch valuta in the course of the year were put upon a gold basis, through the reintroduction of free trading in gold, on the other hand the Polish valuta stabilised in the beginning of 1924 has lost its stability and by the end of November fell to one-half its gold value. The French and Italian valutas are also at present decidedly lower than a year ago. On the other hand important progress in the funding of the inter-allied debts has been achieved, as also an improvement in total foreign trade.

Considering very briefly the economic situation of the various most important capitalist countries we find the following:

In **Great Britain** continuation of the chronic crisis. The absolute number of unemployed receiving doles is smaller only by some ten thousands than a year ago; this diminution is for the most part merely fictitious because the conditions for issuing unemployment assistance have become worse. The improvement in heavy industry is chiefly due to the already month's old strike of the American anthracite miners which makes possible an increased coal and iron export from Great Britain. The textile industry still continues to work short time,* machine construction, shipbuilding, etc., main in serious crisis.

In **France** a progressive inflation resulting in an apparent industrial revival with great competitive power on the world market and a favourable foreign trade balance: phenomena that are well known from the German inflation period. The stabilisation of the franc will bring with it a crisis similar to that of Germany and Great Britain, perhaps in an even more acute form.

In **Germany** improvement in the economic situation in the spring and summer months under the influence of the influx of foreign capital; severe deterioration which already assumes a crisis character, in the autumn months. The number of maintained unemployed rose during the first half of November from 107,000 to 471,000 which, in view of the extremely stringent conditions for the issuance of unem-

* The damage to the British cotton industry by the Chinese liberation struggle and the boycott against British goods is shown by the following figures: The export of textile goods from Lancashire to China in million square yards amounted to: 1925, January 27.8; August 8.6; March 17.7; September 8.5.

ployment assistance in Germany, really means the double or triple, actual unemployment. Wholesale closing of factories, bankruptcy and business closures show that Germany has entered upon a new extremely severe crisis phase.

In **Poland** catastrophic fall of valuta. Daily kurse vacillations up to 25 to 30 per cent. Complete destruction of economic life. Wholesale unemployment, complete helplessness on the part of the bourgeoisie.

A somewhat better economic situation in **Italy** and in certain neutral countries: stabilisation crisis and great unemployment in Norway, Denmark, Austria, Hungary.

To summarise it may be said that the entire picture of the European economic situation at the end of 1925 cannot be judged as being more favourable than a year ago. Stabilisation—apart from the debt funding and the improvement of foreign trade—has made no apparent progress whatever. A more exact verdict can be given only after the economic-statistical data are available up to the end of the year.

Social-Democracy and White Terror.

The structural changes in European capitalism outlined above lead automatically to the isolation of the great bourgeoisie, to a successive reduction of those elements of the population that are economically interested in the maintenance of capitalism. With the expropriation of the holder of private incomes, with the systematic squeezing and expropriation of the small proprietor in industry and trade, with the impossibility of the European bourgeoisie's allowing even a part of the working class an improved standard of living, the bourgeoisie is becoming more and more isolated from the other elements of the population, and class antagonisms become objectively ever more acute. On the other hand it must be recognised that the combat force, the subjective factor, of the revolutionary part of the proletariat has gone back as compared with the years immediately following the end of the war. The non-existence of acute revolutionary situations, is, in our opinion, to be looked for to a far greater extent in the subjective factor than in economic conditions.

The bourgeoisie concerns itself with weakening the forces of the subjective revolutionary factor especially by two means: the Social-Democracy and the White Terror. The two methods do not exclude one another, but can—as

is shown in the example of Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria—be used simultaneously. We will try to characterise, though it be but sketchily, the manner of the effect of these two forces.

In the Social-Democratic tactics toward us there proceeds at present—we believe—a far-reaching change as a result of the already outlined change in the world situation. It is necessary to analyse thoroughly this change which is now only in its beginnings. The following puts forward certain viewpoints towards this end:

The change is closely connected with the economic ascent of Soviet Russia which can no longer be concealed from the European working class. Until now the basis of the tactic of Social-Democracy toward us was:

“Dictatorship of the proletariat means misery and hunger for the working class, economic and cultural decay.”

With this slogan they sought—not without results—to divert many honest revolutionary working class elements from the revolutionary path, to hold them from affiliation to the Communist Party, to keep them in their own camp. In view of the rapid ascent of Soviet Russia this platform can no longer be employed. Social-Democracy is now about to work out a new platform with the following content:

(1) **The economic ascent of Soviet Russia is the result of a return to capitalism.** In Soviet Russia there no longer rules the working class but a new bourgeoisie in the form of a clique of former labour leaders, greedy for power. In Russia there is no “dictatorship of the proletariat,” but a primitive, uncultured “**bad**” capitalism which exploits and oppresses the workers even more than the “cultured” capitalism of the old capitalist country.

(2) **The victory of the working class is possible also within capitalism.** The way to this is:

(a) The conquest of the parliamentary majority through the winning of the peasantry;

(b) **The extension of political democracy into “industrial democracy.”**

The conquest of the political majority demands the win-

ning of broader peasant strata for the Social-Democracy. This is now being sought with full consciousness of goal especially by the S.P. of Austria. Otto Bauer—whom Lenin in a private conversation with the writer once characterised as **“The smartest, therefore, most dangerous Menshevik,”** prior to the recent Party Congress of the S.P.A. wrote:*

“A further industrialisation of Austria which will make the industrial workers and employees alone the majority of the population cannot be expected. Hence it is among the most important tasks of the Party to win as allies of the industrial workers and employees those united with whom they will first be able to break the mastery of the bourgeoisie over the republic. To formulate our recruiting work in the villages, hitherto conducted without any clear uniform principles, a uniform, goal-conscious and hence effective agrarian programme comprehensible to the masses of the country folk and expressing their practical needs, will be the most important task of the present Party Congress.”

In order to win the peasants he assures us that :

“Socialism cannot think of expropriating the mass of the peasants ; Friedrich Engels, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Karl Kautsky have repeatedly agreed on this.”

He described the relationship of the peasantry to a proletarian controlled State fairly correctly in the following :

“The Socialist society will be founded through a series of expropriation acts, which will deprive the capitalists of the large industry, the great landed estates, wholesale trade and banking, which will be taken over by the community. By means of these expropriation acts the power of the community over agricultural economy will, of course, immediately be strengthened ; since as soon as the community with its great industry on the one hand furnishes the peasants with machines, tools and articles for use, and through its control of wholesale trade on the other hand disposes of the products of agriculture, then the community will have the power by means of determining prices, the real income of the peasantry, to regulate their share in the real income of the entire people.”

* “Der Kampf,” November, 1925, page 403.

We see: Otto Bauer has learned much from the Bolsheviks. But what he has not learned, and probably will never learn, what he avoids like the Devil does holy water, is the question: How is power to be conquered? Here he only gets as far as the faltering question:

“Mind and force, democracy and dictatorship—what are their functions in the process of the conquest of power?”

The putting of this questions **plays with the thought of dictatorship**: but thereby only reckons with the sentiment of the Austrian industrial proletariat, the poorest paid in all Europe, oppressed by unemployment, and beginning to doubt the correctness of the democratic-parliamentary path. Actually, however, the S.P. of Austria at its Party Congress adapted an agrarian programme with an openly admitted aim of winning the 300,000 votes they lacked for a parliamentary majority among the petty peasantry.

The example of the Austrian Social-Democrats will soon be followed by other Social-Democratic mass parties. The essence of this tactical trend is: **the small peasantry which begins to tire of the leadership of the agrarians and rich peasants, are to be retained for the bourgeois social order by means of a Social-Democratic ideology in order to keep them from entering upon a revolutionary road under the leadership of the Communist Party. In the struggle for the peasantry between revolution and counter-revolution, Social-Democracy, as always, stands on the side of counter-revolution.**

This is the general sense of this tactical turn of Social-Democracy.

The “Left” S.P.A. serves as the pace-setter for the new peasant policy of Social-Democracy (its new policy runs entirely parallel to that proposed by Lloyd George for the Liberal Party of Great Britain), so does the most reactionary of all Social-Democratic mass parties, the S.P.G. for the policy of industrial democracy.

This new policy is built upon the economic theory of Hilferding that a long period of ascent still confronts European capitalism. It is composed of two elements: of the slogan of industrial democracy which in essence is the transfer to the economic field of the Kautskian theory that in the present period the political form of joint control of the State by bourgeoisie and proletariat is the **coalition government** of the

Social-Democratic and bourgeois parties. When we seek the sense of the speeches and discussion on economic democracy at the Breslau session of the A.D.G.B.,* we find the following train of thought:

The capitalists' power is to be systematically reduced through the Factory Councils, through the activity of the workers' representatives in national, provincial and municipal bodies, through the extension of the workers' co-operatives, through the workers' dwelling movement, through the maintenance and extension of the enterprises of the open hand, through the creation of an industrial parliament and labour chambers, etc., and that through the creation of an "industrial parliament" an equality upon economic-juridical fields will be reached between worker and capitalist. It is in essence nothing other than a rejuvenation of the system of labour communes in the hope or with the prophecy that through these institutions a lasting improvement in the situation of the workers may be possible.

The second element is the attempt to transfer to Germany the ideology and methods of the American Labour movement.

Social-Democracy faithfully copies the trend of the European bourgeoisie toward America. As a prominent counter-revolutionary factor it likewise orientates towards the centre of all the world's counter-revolutionary forces: toward the United States. The standard of living of the American Labour aristocracy is put forward as ideal: the American Federation of Labour, as a conservative counter-balance against the British who have become "unreliable" are to be inveigled into entering the Amsterdam International.† Combatting the Communist Party and revolutionary ideology with the reflection that revolutionary methods demand too many sacrifices and are superfluous since in the road of "industrial democracy" and through the extension of Labour banks, co-operatives, dwellings, etc., a successive "**absorption**" of capitalism by the proletariat is possible.

This new platform of Social-Democracy against Soviet Russia and the Communists is much weaker than the for-

* "Industry and the Trade Unions"; two speeches by Professor Doctor Hermberg—Leipzig and H. Jäckel, Berlin, Verlag A.D.G.B., Berlin, 1925.

† In a later article we will try to develop in detail this American orientation of the European, and especially the German, Social-Democracy.

mer: "proletarian dictatorship means hunger and misery." It is weaker because it entirely lacks a material foundation.

The falsehood that capitalists rule Soviet Russia can have but a short life in view of the ever greater contact between the Russian and non-Russian workers. The former platform had a material basis; want and misery actually did prevail in Soviet Russia for many years.* The fairy tale of present day capitalist rule in Soviet Russia has no basis whatever.

But with regard to the platform of industrial democracy on the economic absorption of capitalism, this is also untenable for the European working class in the present period. **It is the ideology of the Labour aristocracy in the period of ascending capitalism.** Only in countries in which the bourgeoisie is in a position to assure to at least an important part of the working class a steadily rising standard of living can this platform serve in the struggle against the Communists. This is to-day still the case in the United States, in Canada, Australia, South Africa, largely upon the basis of the super-profits secured through the intensified exploitation of the lowest strata of the workers (immigrants, negroes, Colonial peoples) in the country itself or outside its borders (imperialism). In Great Britain a peculiar change has taken place: while, in the full bloom of British imperialism, the workers in the export industries formed the Labour aristocracy, to-day the workers in these branches of production not subject to foreign competition (sheltered industries) enjoy a relatively higher standard of living. For the great mass of the proletariat of the European countries a steady raising of the living standards in the present period is out of the question. **Thereby also the material foundation for the effectiveness of this new Social-Democratic tactic falls!** The progressive revolutionisation of the European working class cannot be stayed by this tactic.

Among the factors of the revolutionisation of the working class the position of the standard of living plays a great role. Not the **absolute level**, but its trend of change is de-

* In my book "The Economic-Political Problems of Proletarian Dictatorship" (II. Edition, Library of the Communist International), I pointed out on the basis of the Hungarian experiences that in the beginning of every dictatorship the actual living conditions of the proletariat must sink because production sinks. This production declines, however, because with the cessation of class rule there stops also class discipline; thereby labour discipline is also severely shaken until a new form of labour discipline develops upon the basis of the new social relationships. But this requires longer time.

cisive. A working class with extremely low but **steadfast** or **ascending** living standard is—*ceteris paribus*—**much less revolutionary than a working class with an absolutely higher but falling standard of living!** The same holds true for single strata of the working class. Not the worst paid proletarian strata form the advance guard of the revolution; far sooner the skilled workers. The skilled workers as such are not counter-revolutionary as a whole, but rather those strata which enjoy a certain ascending, even though it be a minimal income: State and communal workers, those who have a little home and a plot of ground and the like. The existence of a well-paid Labour aristocracy is no guarantee against the revolution when the bourgeoisie is no longer able to assure them an **ascending** standard.

But for this the European bourgeoisie is already incapable despite the stabilisation tendency as a result of the world economic trend of development described in the first part. The liberation movement in the Colonies and semi-Colonies deprives European capitalism of the colonial super-profits. The economic preponderance of America ousts Europe out of many markets. The debts to America compel the European bourgeoisie to contribute a part of its surplus value to America. The imperialist contradictions that are coming to a head, the fear of the revolution, drive the bourgeoisie to the maintenance of an expensive military and police force apparatus. Under these circumstances how can the economic possibility exist for assuring the workers a steady improvement of their living standard? For this reason the new Social-Democratic tactic of "**industrial democracy**" must also fail to render any lasting protection to the bourgeoisie which utilises the defeat of any section of the working class in order to establish a system of White Terror.

E. VARGA.



The Revolutionary Movement in the East

Questions at the Coming Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

SINCE the Fifth Congress of the Comintern questions respecting the revolutionary movement in the East have occupied an ever-increasing place in the general development of the world proletarian revolution and accordingly attract greater attention both on the part of the Comintern as a whole, through its Executive Committee, and also of its separate sections. During the last half-year we observe a very serious move forward in this respect in the work of the Communist Parties of Great Britain, France and (to a certain extent) Holland. The Communist press has commenced to pay more attention to questions of the revolutionary struggle in the East. The Parties are seeking connections and contacts with the national-revolutionary organisation of the Colonial countries of "their own" imperialism.

We should in particular notice two most important political phenomena: in the first place the courageous struggle of our French section against the Moroccan war and the decisive support of the demands for independence for the rebelling Riff tribes. This move will have very great influence on all the subsequent developments of the national-revolutionary movement in the Near East; secondly, there is the openly and clearly anti-imperialist resolution of the last Congress of the British trade unions in Scarborough, accepted on the proposal of the British Communists, which opens up to the revolutionary vanguard of the British working class new paths for its rapprochement not only with the working masses of the colonies under the rule of British imperialism, but also with all the toiling masses drawn into the revolutionary struggle against British imperialism.

The coming Plenum will undoubtedly allude to these indisputable conquests in the work of our Western European Communist sections; it will not do so merely for the sake of so doing and be content with that, but in order to give decisive support to this progress in the work of the Communist

Parties in imperialist countries and to expedite them still further forward along the path that has been indicated. This is all the more necessary as the Second International, seeing the steady growth of Comintern influence in the East, is making the first attempts together with the Amsterdam trade unions at entering into organised connection and uniting the insignificant groups of reformists in all countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean.

The revolutionary movement in the East can itself point to a number of very important achievements in respect to its extensive development, the inclusion of more and more new countries in the revolutionary movement, as to organisational formation and reinforcement, and in the acquirement of greater accuracy and definiteness in the political aims and tasks of the movement.

For quite a long time we have not been faced with a united "East"; for a long time it has been split up. In accordance with the level of economic development attained in each country the national-liberation movement bears a special imprint in each country, dependent upon which social forces in them have the control of the movement. But with all this differentiation in the movement, the general growth of the national-liberation movement in the East (notably the events in China, Morocco and Syria) on the one hand, and the merciless attacks against this movement on the part of the imperialist powers on the other hand, were bound to reflect on the tactics of even the moderate national organisations urging them along the path of more decisive struggle. We may see this in the general Leftward trend of all the national organisations in Egypt. We see the same phenomenon in Indonesia, where the moderate-national organisation "Sarekat-Islam" in the process of the struggle is being pushed along the path of collaboration with the Indonesian Communists. We see an isolated exception only in the case of British India, where we may observe the continuous process of the political decomposition of bourgeois-nationalist organisations, which still quite recently were the irreconcilable enemies of British imperialism. In this country, which has already been the scene of great economic strikes of the proletariat (as witness the recent protracted strike of the Bombay textile workers, which ended in a victory for these workers), in which hundreds of millions of peasants are living under intolerable conditions of misery and oppression, in this India it would seem that all the conditions were ripe for the formation of a mass national-revolutionary Party, which would unite the Indian proletariat, the peasantry and

the revolutionary sections of the urban petty bourgeoisie. The next task of the Communists in India is to test the new political and organisational steps which might hasten the formation of this revolutionary Party and guarantee therein the leading role to the proletariat.

In the two adjacent countries of the Near East—Turkey and Persia—we are faced with a similar process of formation of a national-bourgeois State. The struggle for independence conducted by these countries is carried on under the banner of a struggle against British imperialism, which in its very substance is connected with all the feudal groupings interested in preserving feudal backwardness and dismemberment of these countries.

In Turkey, whose social-economic development has proceeded far ahead in the process of internal struggle, the young bourgeoisie under the leadership of the Kemalists is being thrust more and more into a struggle with all the remains of feudalism along the path of bourgeois-republican State activity. The divergencies between Turkey and British imperialism are becoming more acute and inevitably force Turkey to adopt the policy of developing friendly relations with the U.S.S.R. But at the same time the Turkish Government persecutes the Party of the Turkish proletariat and the toiling masses—the Turkish Communist Party. These persecutions naturally cause discontent among the advanced sections of the Turkish proletariat. But it would be a grave error to determine one's tactics with regard to the present regime in Turkey only on the basis of this one symptom—its persecution of the Communists. Our Turkish comrades must continue to support persistently and unwaveringly all steps of the Kemalist Government directed towards strengthening the revolutionary conquests and towards establishing firm and amicable relations with the U.S.S.R. At the same time, however, the Turkish Communist Party, despite all interdictions and obstacles put forward by the Kemalist police officials, must carry on serious work among the masses of the urban proletariat and peasantry in order to become an independent political mass Party, which does not desire the revolutionary process to stop at the conquest of bourgeois order alone, but wants to push the revolution forward along in the direction of satisfying the social needs of the toilers.

In Persia the national-liberation movement stands at a serious crossing as a result of the leader of this movement, Riza Khan, who, supported by a strong national army, having renounced the republican path of development and over-

thrown the Kadjar dynasty, proclaimed himself the hereditary Shah. This coup d'état is to a certain extent the result of the real weakness of the organised social strata which could have developed into a support of the republican movement. There is nothing surprising in the fact that in preparing to proclaim himself Shah, Riza Khan first attacked the small Communist Party and liquidated its semi-legal existence. The Persian comrades will be faced with very serious differences, both of a political and an organisational nature. The next few months will make it possible to define with more accuracy the international orientation of Riza Khan after the coup d'état, the real influence and role of Great Britain in this event, which in turn will have a very great importance in determining the position of our comrades and also of wider republican groups of the national movement in Persia.

In this section of our review we do not propose to refer to the separate problems of the national-revolutionary movement throughout the whole East. We will deal specially with the most important countries later in this review. Here we think it necessary to point out yet another substantial circumstance. We have in view the process of political and organisational moulding of our Communist groups and Parties, which is becoming more and more clearly marked. We may follow this process particularly distinctly in China where it is a result of the powerful independent political activity of the proletariat. From this example in China, we may realise how complicated is this process and what persistence is demanded from the leaders of the movement and the entire mass of Party members, in order to become conscious of their own class tasks and determine their mutual relations with contending forces, which as allies of the proletariat participate in the general struggle. But this process is developing without a stop. We stand on the road towards the formation of mass Communist Parties in the more developed countries of the East.

Let us turn to a survey of the position and task of our Parties according to individual important countries.

1. CHINA.

General Characteristics of the Tasks of the Movement.

Here we are faced with an extremely complicated situation—the powerful movement against imperialism under conditions of far-reaching internal struggle and division of the classes.

The most important and immediate historic tasks facing the national revolutionary movement in China are to liquidate the domination of the imperialists within the country, the struggle for national independence, for the unity of the country around a general national-revolutionary democratic regime and for the free development of the productive forces of the country. These tasks in their dimensions are the tasks of a bourgeois-democratic revolution, and they can only be achieved in a decisive and consistent struggle against imperialism and in close alliance with all forces of the world proletarian revolution. The inevitability of compromising tendencies and open treachery to the people's interests by the Chinese bourgeoisie, which is economically tied up (and in the future will be still more closely bound up) with imperialism, and which politically will seek the support of imperialist reaction against the revolutionary worker and peasant masses, very definitely promotes the Chinese proletariat as the most decisive fighter for the democratic revolution and as the leader of the national-liberation movement, at the head of a revolutionary bloc of the proletariat, peasantry and radical section of the urban petty bourgeoisie. The Party must from day to day enlighten the toiling masses as to this perspective of the national-revolutionary struggle which is now developing, by denouncing the ambiguity of all movements of the capitalist groups and by preparing the vanguard of the proletariat for its future leading role and in conducting incessant propaganda among the workers and peasants for the task of strengthening the alliance of the proletariat with the hundreds of millions of peasants.

But it would be a most serious error to be restricted by this characteristic of the **perspectives** of the movement and to build up the whole tactics of the everyday struggle on this alone. The factors directing the whole movement (the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China, etc.), are far from being "irresponsible oppositions," while the international menace to the movement is too real. The present-day situation must be taken into account.

The present stage of the national-liberation movement, even after the decline of the "Mukden" counter-revolutionary clique, must by no means be estimated as a period already mature for the domination of revolutionary-democratic forces. The task of uniting China around a single regime is so vitally necessary for the trading and industrial bourgeoisie, that during a fairly long period considerable strata of the Chinese bourgeoisie will take active part in the general

national-liberation movement. At the same time the Chinese bourgeoisie will endeavour to solve this national-bourgeois task of the Chinese revolution in its own class interests, i.e., by establishing a national-bourgeois military dictatorship, which would guarantee the satisfaction of her economic needs and at the same time prevent the development of the revolutionising struggle of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban poor. Permanently faced with this danger of a bourgeois military dictatorship, and struggling against it by a revolutionary mobilisation of the masses, the C.P.C. should at the same time utilise to the greatest possible degree the struggle of the bourgeois strata for unity and independence of the country. This is all the more necessary as the forces of the revolutionary-democratic bloc have not yet been developed on a large enough scale, have not yet been prepared for ruling the country, and, under cover of the struggle of bourgeois forces and in denouncing them to the masses, the forces of the people's revolution can be prepared and organised and by this means a decisive collision with the imperialist world can be put off until such time as all the reserve of the Chinese national-liberation movement can be mustered.

Tasks of our Party.

The young Chinese Communist Party has already carried through some important political campaigns during the past year and become linked up with the masses, and during the period of the Shanghai events was the real leader of the general-national movement. It lacks clearness, however, in ideology and organisation, without which it certainly must lose a great deal in the task of leading the movement, and is itself not assured against internal crises.

The entire political work of the C.P.C. should be based on a strict scientific Marxist analysis of all social forces and groupings in modern China. It is necessary to present an analysis of the economic and political influence of each group of imperialists in the various Chinese districts, of the changes in this field, also a study of the economic connections of the Chinese ruling circles and the Chinese trading and industrial bourgeoisie with the individual groups of imperialists. There must also be a social analysis of the entire population and in particular the petty urban population and town poor and, what is most important, the most detailed study of the peasantry according to separate districts, with its social differentiations, its separate sub-strata and finally a study of the proletariat itself according to separate branches of in-

dustry. The C.P.C. and the A.U.C.P., with the collaboration of the Comintern, should appoint a group, if only a small one, of such theoretical workers as could prepare a scientific basis for a future programme of the C.P.C. The C.P.C. having a strong social basis—the industrial proletariat occupied in national, foreign and mixed enterprises, should first complete the process of its formation as an independent class Party—the Chinese Section of the Communist International. This process of self-determination has made considerable progress, thanks to the extensive political and economic strikes of the proletariat within the last year. But it is not completed organisationally, throughout the whole country. In particular, in Canton and throughout the whole Kwan-Tung province, the C.P.C. has not yet got its own separate Party organisation acting as a leading Left-wing of the Left Kuomintang. But even where an organisational delimitation has taken place (in Central China), it has not been ideologically reinforced and the general mass of the Party members has not become conscious of it. The youth of the Chinese proletariat and its connection with the peasantry, the political and organisational proximity between the C.P.C. and the Kuomintang, the community of immediate revolutionary-democratic tasks—all these factors will for a long time foster “Narodniky” moods, particularly with the intellectual nature of the entire staff of Party leaders at the centre and in the localities. The Party must do serious internal political work in order to hasten this process of self-determination. It is especially essential to simplify before the masses of Party members the reasons for the affiliation of the C.P.C. to the Comintern and the role of the A.U.C.P. and the U.S.S.R. in the struggle in the East.

Side by side with these “Narodniky” tendencies, we will inevitably have in the ranks of the C.P.C. a “Left” deviation, which already made itself apparent during Shanghai strikes and which will reveal itself in all political moments of the movement. The substance of this “Left” deviation, will be the effort to skip over the present phase in the national-revolutionary struggle against imperialism, to the tasks of proletarian dictatorship and Soviet power, and over-estimation of the forces of the proletariat and neglect of the peasantry, the basic and decisive factor in the Chinese national-revolutionary movement. Despite all the peculiarities in the situation, the problems of the Chinese movement resemble very closely the problems which faced the Russian proletariat during the first revolution of 1905. The assimilation by the Chinese Communist Party of the lessons of the

first workers' revolution will considerably aid in forewarning and overcoming the various digressions in its midst, both from the Right ("Narodniky") and from the "Left."

International Situation.

It would be the gravest error on the part of the Chinese comrades if they were to ignore the **concrete** relations between the imperialists and to base their tactics on the supposition that the imperialists were a "united reactionary mass."

The national-liberation movement in China is not confronted with a compact united front of the world bourgeoisie. At the present time the imperialist camp is at every moment split up as a result of the general contradiction of their economic interests throughout the whole world and in China, and also as a result of the peculiarities of the political and strategical position in China of each of the imperialist groups. The tactics of the national-revolutionary movement in China should be directed towards carefully avoiding steps which might unite against China all the groups of imperialists. The tactics should be strictly manœuvred each time taking into account the general and concrete international situation.

The policy of the U.S.S.R. has already at the present time turned the first country of the proletarian dictatorship into a political ally of the Chinese liberation movement, having given powerful support to China in its struggles. The C.P.C. should, therefore, endeavour in its tactics to observe continuously the international situation of the U.S.S.R., and correspondingly adjust its own tactics to those of the A.U.C.P. This is necessary in order to obviate in time the imperialist threats of military attacks on China and the U.S.S.R. and also in order to ensure that they are not left isolated before the common enemy.

Practical Problems—Kuomintang, The People's Armies.

We have given above a general characteristic of the perspectives of development of the national-liberation movement and the immediate tasks of our Party. Among the practical problems, one of the most serious questions is that of the mutual relations between the C.P.C. and the Kuomintang. By means of continual political contact and pressure it is necessary to urge the Kuomintang Party along the path of political self-determination, as an ally of the proletariat

in the struggle for national liberation. The Kuomintang is the national-revolutionary Party whose duty it is to unite the urban bourgeoisie, the radical intellectuals and considerable strata of the peasantry in the interests of the struggle for a revolutionary-democratic regime. The Kuomintang should not endeavour to spread its influence over the working class and the strata of the poor peasantry near the working class, although a certain amount of influence over these strata is inevitable. It is necessary to bring about a social delimitation of these two allies of the Chinese revolution. For the development of the democratic revolution it is harmful and dangerous to have an extreme "Left" digression within the ranks of the Kuomintang, striving to imitate the forms and methods of struggle of the C.P.C. and thus thrusting considerable strata of the urban petty bourgeoisie into the arms of the greater bourgeoisie. With the inevitable formation of a bourgeois national Party further to the Right than the Kuomintang, it is necessary to retain the petty bourgeoisie in the revolutionary camp. The Chinese Communists should enter the Kuomintang and its leading organs, at the same time denouncing before the proletariat the "Narodniky" illusions of the Kuomintang. The Communist Party as a Party should support the activities of the Kuomintang in every way, at the same time reserving for itself liberty of agitation and independent action.

The Chinese national-revolutionary movement can only be victorious if the struggle and structure of the democratic regime will be under the permanent protection of real national armies whose entire commanding and personal staffs will be ready to struggle for the slogans of the national-liberation movement. It is in a military struggle that the small groups of militarists, who, during the development of the revolution, might frequently serve as a weapon of the Vandeis and a support of the imperialist forces, can be abolished (the neutral groupings or remnants of "Chili-ites"). This democratic army by its class structure and tasks is not a proletarian class army. But by participating in the organisation of the national-revolutionary army, the proletariat should stamp thereon the largest possible imprint of its class influence, so as to prevent to the utmost degree possible the utilisation of these armed forces against its own subsequent struggle, or as a weapon of imperialism and of the Chinese bourgeoisie against the U.S.S.R. For these reasons the C.P.C. should participate organically in the work of military construction, utilising to the maximum degree the lessons of the October revolution and the forms of its military construction.

2. JAPAN.

General Situation.

Since the time of the earthquake no Communist Party has existed in Japan, there being only a few Communist groups. These groups and various elements are permeated with a single desire, and, on the basis of a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the facts of Japanese life and taking correct account of the Comintern experiences, can play a very large role in the subsequent destiny of the development of the Japanese Labour movement. The general political situation in the country is such that could not be more favourable for the working class to free itself from the pernicious influence of the reformist leaders and gain the support of the peasantry and urban democracy in the struggle for its general political demands.

The development of the national-liberation movement in China has made the already existing economic crisis become much more acute. By last autumn the total number of unemployed reached the tremendous figure of $1\frac{1}{2}$ millions. The international situation of Japan is steadily becoming worse.

The unrestricted arbitrariness of the governmental agents, increasing with the growth of discontent within the country, supplements the action of economic factors and brings up in all its magnitude the question as to the necessity of an extensive democratisation of the political structure of the country.

The new electoral law, which the Government was compelled to promulgate under the growing pressure of public opinion, has extended the electorate from three to 12 million persons.

The Proletarian Party.

Thus the question as to the formation of a new political grouping reflecting the interests of the masses of the people has sprung up of itself. The initiative fell to the share of the Peasant Union (50,000 members). The appeal of the Peasant Union for the organisation of a Party of "propertyless" (proletarian) workers, at first met with response from the Left trade unions, united in the Council of Trade Unions, and the Society for Studying Social Sciences, while afterwards the organisation of the "pariahs" (Suheisia) joined in, and finally the reformist trade unions, despite the fact that the leaders of the latter at first firmly intended not

to participate in any way whatsoever in this affair. Thus, by December at the Inaugural Congress of the Party up to 150,000 people were gathered together—members of the trade unions, of peasant organisations, of the “pariah” organisations and of the advanced intellectuals.

The entire bourgeois-Liberal public opinion of Japan foretold great success for the new Party. The Liberal newspapers amiably wrote that the masses of the Japanese people would follow the new Party as the country had lost faith in the Kenseikai and Seiyukai Parties and as life was urging them onwards to struggle against the present economic and political conditions in Japan. But these predictions had been made without taking into account the Japanese police and Japanese social-reformists.

The reformists, after their unsuccessful attempts to baulk the formation of the Proletarian Party by refusing participation, decided to achieve their sabotaging work by drawing up a programme provoking the Left to a split. The latter took up a firm position and acquiesced in making every concession if only to obtain the organisation of a legal mass Party. In their desire to preserve the legal physiognomy of the new Party, the Left went so far that they abandoned without any reserves the demand for the independence of the colonies (they agreed to autonomy) and agreed to the abandonment of the demand for the confiscation of the land without compensation. But the reformists, who had previously come to an agreement with the police, quit the Inaugural Congress of the Proletarian Party, declaring that they did not desire to be a weapon in the hands of the Left. The Lefts, continuing their policy of guaranteeing legality to the new Party at all costs, also left the Congress. The delegates of the Peasant Union and the Suheisia (“Pariah” organisation) remained in the Congress. They expressed regret at the exit of the Left and thanks for the work they had done in forming the Party. Then a programme was accepted which in the opinion of the bourgeois press was very moderate (we have not yet the exact text) and an Executive Committee elected. Nevertheless, the police closed down even this semi-castrated Party, under empty pretexts. The leader of the reformists, Suzuki, expressed full satisfaction at the order of the Minister for the Interior as to the liquidation of the Proletarian Party and stated that now it would be possible to start forming a Party in which only the respectable elements will be represented. Apparently in order to ensure the representation of the “respectable elements” required by Suzuki, the Japanese police has-

tened to explain that the new Proletarian Party could only be organised on the basis of individual membership.

But the reformists will not enjoy their victory for long. Even at first the Proletarian Party did not have a programme of action worked out according to all the rules of Lenin, etc. Even if in its programme it made opportunist reformist false steps, all this is not so essentially important. What is important is the fundamental fact that the working and peasant masses are being brought into the Proletarian Party and it is also important that the objective situation of the country unrestrainedly urges the Japanese workers and peasants to decisive acts and big tasks.

The Japanese police can temporarily smother the movement which is overflowing the banks of the river of the national life in Japan, but as a result the river will overflow all the more and root up all the obstacles standing in its path.

The Immediate Tasks.

The Japanese workers are at present faced with the following important tasks:

1. To organise their class party despite all artifices of the police and reformists.
2. To utilise the discontent and excitement that have arisen in classes of Japanese society in connection with police measures and to see that this discontent expands into an extensive social movement for the democratisation of the entire political order in the country.
3. To apply extensively the united front tactics; to put forward in the near future such demands as may unite the entire mass of the proletariat, bringing into the movement the so-called independent workers' organisations, such as the unions of seamen and arsenal workers; to develop a campaign around the slogan of unity for the trade union movement.
4. In the process of this work to prepare by systematic and patient crystallisation the organisation of a conscious vanguard of the Japanese working class, the real leader of the entire political struggle of the Japanese proletariat and peasantry.

3. THE COLONIES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN SEA.

The rising and war in Morocco sharpened and deepened the national-revolutionary aspirations in the whole ring of Mediterranean colonies (Algiers, Tunis, Egypt, Palestine, Syria). The first result of the heroic struggle of the little Riff people against the 200,000 French army was to weaken extremely the military-material authority of **French imperialism** throughout the whole French colonial empire.

This fact was above all to be seen in the case of the "youngest" French colony, in Syria.

In two or three months this movement became transformed from a **local** rising into a **general-national struggle** of Syria for its independence. The economic and social backwardness of the country go to explain the fact that the leaders of the movement are moderate elements of the large bourgeoisie and even of the feudal aristocracy. But one may even now observe two main tendencies in the movement: a moderate reconciliatory attitude and a radical tendency.

These two tendencies, in view of the backwardness of the country have their reflection in the formation of two regional military-political centres: (1) the more moderate in the centre of the country (the Hams district) led by Bakri and Iben-Shalashem and (2) the more radical in the Jebel-Druse, led by Sultan Atrash and members of the "People's Party" (Dr. Shakhbandar and others). The main demands of the movement are: (1) evacuation by the French; (2) convention of a national conference; (3) the creation of a democratic republic.

The peasant demands have so far not found any expression whatsoever in the movement.

Small strata of the Syrian proletariat have been drawn into the movement to a small extent; this is mainly because the movement has so far only reached the districts least developed in an industrial sense. The immediate aims of the movement are undoubtedly as follows: (1) formation of a common and united military-political centre; (2) determination of its political and social programme; (3) drawing of the North-Western regions of the country into the movement; (4) more extensive attraction of the peasant and proletarian elements and (5) formation of a centralised national-revolutionary Party.

The Communist Party of Syria must in fact conduct its work in this direction, taking thorough account of the economic and social backwardness of the country. All Left digressions (over-estimation of the role of the proletariat, slogans for Soviets, etc.), will undoubtedly isolate the Syrian Communists from the main stream of the national movement.

The Moroccan war has sharpened and deepened the process of national self-determination not only in Syria. The North African colonies of France, Algiers and Tunis, are following the development of the Moroccan events with particular attention. But both in Algiers and Tunis the growth of national aspirations is proceeding on quite a different background of social and economic relations.

Algiers is the oldest and most advanced French colony with a population of 5,800,000. There is a considerable proletarian class (native and European) and numerous agricultural workers. Sharp contradictions prevail in the Algerian countryside: on the one hand there is the primitive and declining agriculture, and on the other hand growing capitalist estates, belonging to French capitalists and limited companies and adapting the latest mechanical technique. In the towns of Algiers there is a considerable native **trading** bourgeoisie and a numerous intellectual class. Finally it should be noticed that there exists a stubborn effort on the part of France to colonise the country, i.e., to settle in Algiers the greatest possible number of French peasants (there are at present 500,000 French people in Algiers out of a total population of 5,800,000).

That is the internal situation of the country. This complicated and variegated nature of the social relations has been reflected more clearly than anything on our Communist Party.

By the middle of 1925, there were about 1,500 Party members in the Algerian Communist Federation. In the "Red" trade unions in Algiers there were up to 25,000 organised workers by that date. But in these two proletarian organisations there was a serious internal defect: their social composition and particularly their national composition. There were 98 per cent. Frenchmen in the Party and only 2 per cent. Arabs. The percentage in the trade unions was the same. In this manner the Party and the trade unions were almost completely isolated from the Arab proletarian masses.

But the social composition of the Party was also profoundly unsatisfactory: the Party contained 30 per cent. employees and officials, 25 per cent. colonists, (i.e., French-peasant settlers), etc.

The commencement of the national-liberation movement in Algiers caused particularly hostile relations among these strata in the Party. The Party had to meet this resistance through a profound internal crisis (which has not been overcome even now). At the same time the Party must solve one of the most difficult tasks: to bring in the advanced native workers and to bring about a radical change in its social and national composition. In the near future, the Party will have to determine accurately its programme as to the national and agrarian questions. Without this, the Party would be isolated from the national-liberation movement, which during recent months has begun to emerge from underground and come into the open. This movement, which even last year still put forward only democratic-reformist demands, is now, under the influence of Syria and Morocco, coming on to the path of the national-revolutionary struggle. Whilst there is not as yet a national party in Algiers, one can only judge as to this swing-round in the movement from various separate symptoms (manifesto of the thousands of native intellectuals, appeal of 256 students, etc.).

The task of the Communists in Algiers is to support this movement in every way and to bring about a united revolutionary front with it. But the internal re-grouping of the Party to which we have already referred, is a prerequisite for this.

In Tunis the national movement is becoming radicalised with exceptional rapidity. The National Party, the "Destur," which has nearly 10,000 members, is quickly coming over to the position of national-revolutionary struggle. The reason for this process is the failure of all the peaceful attempts of the Destur to obtain any serious reforms by means of negotiations with the French government. The Moroccan and Syrian wars have hastened this process. At the end of 1925, an extraordinary congress of the Destur Party was to have met at which the subsequent paths of struggle were to be planned out. Judging by the growth of the Left-wing of the Destur which is seeking connections with the Labour and Communist movements of Tunis, one may assume that the Destur congress will decide to form a united front of all radical elements in Tunis.

The Tunis Communists, despite acute persecution, have been able to establish sound contacts with the Labour movements. In the Tunis trade unions (illegal) there are up to 20,000 members. The most important unions work in contact with the Communist Party. The Tunis Communists have also struck their roots deep down in the national movement. Their appeal for a united front has met with a warm response in the Left-wing of the Destur Party.

Such is the general aspect of the revolutionary movement in the French colonies on the Mediterranean.

If we add to this the undoubted ascendancy of the national movement in Egypt and Palestine, we then have a complete picture of the growth and development of the national-revolutionary movement all around the Mediterranean. The resumption of military activities in Morocco next spring, and the growth of the insurrection in Syria, will undoubtedly give a new stimulus to the development and extension of the movement throughout the whole of this circle. The consolidation of these movements within and their co-ordination outwardly, is now the most important and responsible task of the French and British Communist Parties just as it is of the Communist organisations of these colonial countries.

The general situation in the colonial circle of the Mediterranean Sea is fraught with revolutionary prospects.

4. INDONESIA.

The Communist Party of Indonesia has already behind it great experience in the leadership of a national mass revolutionary movement. In the years 1919-20 the revolutionary movement was conducted under the slogan of "Soviet Power." Then the wave subsided. The Communist Party did not succeed in adapting its political and organisational policy to the new conditions of work.

The present day political position in Indonesia may be characterised by the following three points:

(1) A general move to the Left among the nationalist organisations; (2) the influence which the national-revolutionary movement in China and in the Mussulman countries is having on the liberation struggle in Indonesia; (3) the increased governmental terror not only against the Communist Party and the revolutionary-nationalist "Sarekat Rakyat," but also against the moderate nationalist movements.

The reduced economic position of the masses of the people and the powerful rise of the national-revolutionary movement in almost all countries of the East, is reflected on the moods of those masses of the Indonesian population, who up till now still adhere to the moderate nationalist groupings. The slogan for a united anti-imperialist front put forward for Indonesia by the Colonial Commission of the last Plenum of the E.C.C.I. finds a more and more live response among the lower organisations of the moderate-nationalist Sarekat Islam, Budi Utomo and others. Under pressure from the rank and file, the leader of Sarekat Islam, Yuokro-Minoto, in the summer of this year was compelled to start negotiations for a united bloc against Dutch imperialism with the leaders of the Communist Party of Java. Up to the present, the negotiations have not yet led to any results, but locally the slogan for a united front is already beginning to be put in force. The radicalisation of the movement is also observable in the organisation of the Java intellectuals—the Budi Utomo, which till recently stood quite aside from politics.

One must say, however, that our Java comrades have not sufficiently actively reacted to this process. The Communist press devotes too little attention to the idea of a united front and to a platform on which all the national-revolutionary elements could be united. Methods of approach to those masses which are still under the influence of the reformist leaders, have not yet been worked out. Meanwhile, the revolutionary elements of the nationalist organisations, despairing of the reformist tactics of the leaders, are forging ahead of the Communist Party and are going over to acts of terror. For instance, the latest papers report that the "Section B" of Sarekat Islam—the terrorist group which operated up to 1920—has renewed its activity. In a whole number of towns attempts on the lives of prominent Dutch officials have been made. The increase of terrorist activities is thus the second considerable fact which should be observed.

The influence of the victorious struggle of the Chinese people for independence is directly apparent in the masses of Chinese workers and petty bourgeoisie who number altogether nearly one million in Indonesia. These masses are organised around the Indonesian Section of the Kuomintang. Since the time of the Shanghai events, the Kuomintang has displayed increased activity in Java and the other islands of the Archipelago. They have collected 50,000 dollars in aid of the Shanghai strikers and are conducting a campaign for propagating and popularising the idea of the national-revolu-

tionary movement in China. The success of Kuomintang propaganda may be judged by the governmental oppression directed against the activities of the Kuomintang. During the past few months four editors of Chinese (Kuomintang) newspapers have been deported from Java and one imprisoned. The collection of donations in aid of the Kuomintang is forbidden. The Government is responding to the general Leftward trend of the nationalist organisations, to terrorist acts, and to the activities of the Communist Party by increasing the colonial police regime and the White Terror.

A regime of martial law reigns in the country. All revolutionary and opposition organisations are being liquidated. The Dutch satraps in Indonesia are not restricting their activities to open terror. With the blessings and immediate participation of the Government, Fascist organisations are being formed for armed struggle with the "Communist danger." Sarekat Khidyo—as the Fascist organisation is called—kills Communists, breaks up meetings and terrorises peasants who participate in the Sarekat Rayat movement.

Such is the difficult situation in which the Communist Party and the Sarekat Rayat organisation which it leads, have to operate and struggle. The absence of good contacts with far-off Java and the actual outlawed position of the Party, according to the separate disjointed information that reaches us, hinders the establishment of a general Party policy on the questions of the peasantry, trade unions, etc. The Party continues to work energetically both in the peasant organisation, Sarekat Rayat, and in the Labour movement. During the last few months, many strikes have been conducted with the participation of the Communists: the strikes of printers, metal workers, seamen, etc. Not a day goes by without the cadres reporting the breaking up of a Sarekat Rayat meeting and the arrest of Communists—the organisers of the meeting. Communist propaganda is also penetrating into the ranks of the troops, as may be seen by the arrests of Communist soldiers.

Separate facts, however, go to show that the Indonesian Communist Party despite all its activity, has not yet got properly down to its work among the peasantry and drawing the latter into the channel of the national movement. The errors of the Indonesian comrades with respect to the national organisations are repeated with regard to the peasantry. The resolution of the last Plenum of the E.C.C.I. concerning the gradual breaking away of the Sarekat Rayat from

the Party and the turning of it into an independent national-revolutionary organisation, which should be linked up with the wide masses, have not yet been put into force. If the Party does not adopt a correct policy towards the peasantry in time, the political movement of the latter will pass by the Party, as is to be observed to a certain extent in respect to the radical-nationalist elements. Only a complete and unconditional enforcement of the resolution of the March Plenum of the E.C.C.I. can put an end to the isolated position of the Party and make it an indomitable mainstay around which all the active anti-imperialist forces of the Indonesian people will rally.

“ X. ”



Position and Perspectives of Socialist Industry in the U.S.S.R.

IT has become generally acknowledged in our economic literature that the national economy of the Soviet Union in the year 1925-26 is concluding the process of restoration and is approaching practically 95 per cent. of the 1913 production both in agriculture and industry. The perspectives of development of the national economy are traced out in the control figures of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan)—a work which remains a document of extreme importance despite the number of errors, inevitable in such a complicated work as tracing out an economic plan for a whole number of years in advance.

Of late a great deal has been said with regard to the serious miscalculations of the Gosplan control figures and the press hostile to us speaks of the crisis and failure of Soviet economy. Actually the miscalculations of Gosplan are not serious to such a degree that one could talk of any stoppage in the economic development of the country, let alone of a crisis. It is merely a question of a certain retardment in the tempo of development of our industry.

The basis of all the Gosplan miscalculations amount to an over-estimation of the 1925 harvest. Rain injured the quality and quantity of the harvest, which led to a decrease in the harvest and consequently reduced grain purchases and grain exports.

The situation became complicated through the preliminary State plan for grain purchases being estimated at 780,000,000 poods, arising from an over-estimation of the harvest. Correspondingly the export plan was also over-estimated and also the financing of grain purchases. As a result the demand on the grain-purchasing organs exceeded supply. In the chase for wheat, grain prices doubled. Industry had not sufficient reserves of commodities, hence the peasantry having received money, was unable to purchase in sufficient quantities the goods it needed.

All this taken together led to a serious intensification of the goods famine which was reflected in the big increase in retail prices on the most important industrial goods.

The market became a prey to jobbing, which affected even a section of the State and Co-operative trading institutions which adopted the policy of re-selling at a high profit.

Such a situation confronted the Soviet Government with the problem as to the necessary measures for improving the conditions of the market and of the whole economic life of the country.

These measures amounted in the first place to re-estimating the harvest and in accordance with this the plan of State purchases and also grain export.

The work of the State grain-purchasing organs became limited, purchases and exports curtailed.

Measures were taken for the improvement of the conditions of the market, credits to trade organisations were curtailed, re-selling by State and co-operative organs discontinued and the question raised as to fixing limits to profits in retail trade. All these measures and a number of others should lead to a considerable recuperation of the economic life of the country.

Let us now examine the perspectives for the industry of the Soviet Union arising after all the indicated alterations in the original Gosplan figures.

The decrease in the harvest brought a decrease of wheat purchases by State purchasing organs from 780 million poods to 600 millions. About 300 million poods remain as the share of private and local State and Co-operative purchasers.

This reduction is reflected in the export-import plan. According to the preliminary variant of Gosplan, export for 1925-26 should have been 1,100 million roubles, as against 462 million roubles in 1924-25, and import 950 million roubles against 600 million roubles in 1924-25. According to the curtailed plan, exports will give a little more than 800 million roubles and imports about 700 million roubles.

Last year we had an unfavourable trade balance and the deficit had to be covered out of the gold and valuta reserves.

In a year with a good harvest we should without fail have a favourable balance, in order to secure an accumulation of valuta and gold reserves. But we get such an accumulation at the cost of a certain restriction to our foreign purchases—both raw materials and equipment for industry.

A number of branches of Soviet industry are working on foreign raw material, and for most branches the complicated equipment demands foreign machinery owing to the poor development of our own machine-construction. That is the heritage of capitalist Russia. The textile industry also, both cotton and wool, the leather, rubber and a number of other industrial groups with secondary raw materials and semi-manufactures are dependent upon foreign raw materials.

The high purchasing power of the peasantry in the first place creates a demand for articles of general consumption for the use of the peasantry. The country presents tremendous demands, and we must admit we cannot adequately fully satisfy these demands. For this we would need to have a more rapid tempo of growth of State industry than at present but the curtailing of our import plan compels us to moderate this tempo somewhat.

What are the limits of industrial development within the framework of the curtailed import plan? The tempo of growth of our heavy industry (mainly State industry) has been very extensive during the past few years. The annual increase as against the preceding year has been as follows: 1922-23, 31 per cent.; 1923-24, 32 per cent.; 1924-25, 62 per cent.; (in the control figures of Gosplan according to a non-schematic calculation, for the second half-year the figure of 54 per cent. was given, which according to report data appears to have been surpassed); for 1925-26, an increase of 34 per cent. was indicated, and according to the plan of the S.E.C. a growth of 45 to 50 per cent. was expected. In accordance with this it was estimated that heavy industry would reach 97 per cent. of the pre-war level.

To what extent can one consider that this level of production has been attained?

A reply may be obtained to this question by the actual level of production in State industry obtained in October, 1925. This group does not quite coincide with the group taken by Gosplan under the heading "Heavy Industry," but it comprises 90 per cent of this group.

State industry during the past few months has grown gigantically. For instance, in September production showed a growth of 12 per cent. and in October of 10.5 per cent.

This monthly growth corresponds with the growth of a good year of industrial expansion and the October production comprises about 87 per cent. of pre-war production in the material sense. The production of October as against the average monthly production for 1924-25 shows an increase of about 35 per cent.

Thus, the October production of the first month of the economic year 1925-26 already gives the level of production estimated by the control figures of Gosplan for 1925-26. In order to fulfil the production programme for 1925-26 drawn up by the S.E.C. we do not need a further rapid expansion of industry, but in the main to maintain an adequate level of production with a slow advance of the backward branches, especially of the metal industry.

The production of pig-iron in October, 1925, still comprised only 44 per cent. of the pre-war production, whereas according to the plan it must be raised to 60 per cent. This programme must be fulfilled without fail, the more since it only depends upon the import plan in respect to a part of the equipment.

Can we maintain the level that has been attained? This mainly depends upon whether the import of raw materials, and the proposed curtailments of the import plan for raw materials and semi-manufactures, with the exception of separate groups of the light industry (partially provisions and fats) enables us to maintain the level of production that has been reached. We ought not to descend below this level, if the export plan should prove to be unfulfilled we should have to curtail still more our plan for import of raw materials and manufactures.

For the time being the overhead expenditure on industry must be reduced. This year the S.E.C. proposed conducting a tremendous work in structural repairs, re-equipment and rationalisation of the State industry, and the building of new factories and works for a sum of about 950 million roubles. Of this amount 650 million roubles were to be devoted to structural repairs and re-equipment of the existing factories, about 200 millions to the construction of new ones (the complete cost of the new factories intended is

about 620 million roubles) and 100 millions on the construction of workers' housing.

The following sources were taken into consideration for covering this expenditure :

1. Resources from industry itself (amortisation fund, profits with the exception of the part transferred to State budget and others), i.e., about 500 million roubles; from the State budget 120 million roubles; from loans for economic restoration 175 million roubles; credit of municipal bank 50 million roubles (for housing construction); and 100 million roubles transfer payments for 1926-27 (including also foreign credits for equipment).

This programme cannot be carried out both because of insufficiency of resources within the country and also import considerations. It is most probable that the sum of plant expenditure for industry will amount to 800 to 850 million roubles. For the new construction programme it will be necessary to relegate to a secondary plan a number of factories that had been contemplated (for instance, tractor factory and a part of the textile and glass factories and others) and it will also be necessary to postpone until probably the first months of 1926-27 the re-equipment of a number of factories and works. Meanwhile it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that by the second half of the year the export plan will show an excess over the rather cautiously drawn up export estimates, and then it will be possible to raise the question of extending the imports of equipment.

But even according to the reduced plan of equipment, purchases will be made abroad for the sum of about 150 million roubles and, on favourable credit conditions, considerably more.

The financial situation within the country does not evoke any special fears as to financing the reduced programme of plant expenditure on industry. From the budget and the loan for the economic restoration of industry, about 300 million roubles are expected, which with the resources of industry itself will give about 800 million roubles. To this must be added credits for housing construction, foreign credits for equipment and the transfer payments and as a result we get 850 million roubles.

As may be seen from all the above, particularly gloomy conclusions need not be drawn.

The growth of industrial production in 1925-26 within the limits of about 35 per cent. is almost assured, with the achievement of about 90 to 95 per cent. of the pre-war production.

At the same time we are starting new enterprises and re-constructing old ones in order to guarantee our subsequent growth. It is true, we will achieve this only by means of great exertions of the entire forces of the country.

Various enterprises will experience difficult periods, financing will be strained.

We will balance up the State budget without deficit to a sum approaching 4 milliard chervonetsi-roubles (probably 3,850 to 3,900 milliard roubles) with a considerable increase of both expenditure on wages in general and cultural expenses in particular. This is a sign of the growth of the well-being of the country.

But it is just because of this increase in the well-being of the workers' and peasants' country that demands are increasing still more rapidly, and we are still far from being able to satisfy the primary needs of the country.

In particular, despite the rapid growth of production we have alluded to, industry cannot catch up to the needs of the country at the present time.

The goods famine is a reflection of this discrepancy, whilst at the same time the goods famine is one of the most serious hindrances to the strengthening of Soviet economy, as it might undermine the finances of the country and lead to a straining of political relations between the peasantry and the working class. The further growth and strengthening of State industry which is one of the main commanding summits of Socialist construction, will help us to overcome these difficulties.

What I have said also applies with regard to State industry.

But our economic system is comprised of the elements of various economic systems.

Vladimir Ilyitch enumerated these elements as:

1. Patriarchal, i.e., to a considerable extent natural peasant economy.
2. Petty commodity production (this includes the majority of those peasants who sell grain).

3. Private capitalism.
4. State capitalism.
5. Socialism.

Our State structure is of a transition nature towards a Socialist structure, and is not really Socialistic just because within it, side by side with the Socialist elements, there exist capitalist and pro-capitalist elements which also must be transformed into Socialist forms before Socialism can be fully established.

What are the results of the struggle of these elements during the years of the New Economic Policy, during which the economic struggle of the capitalist elements with the Socialist elements openly took place?

Lenin in his article on the food-tax and in the last article on Co-operation clearly defined **what** he referred to in the economic groups pointed out.

The greatest doubt may be evoked by the group referring to State capitalism. In the pamphlet on the food tax Lenin speaks of four forms of State capitalism: (1) concessions; (2) co-operation; (3) utilisation of the private trader for commission sales of State goods; (4) industrial lease on concession lines.

We see that Lenin in 1921 still regarded Co-operation as State capitalism, but already, then, in the above-mentioned pamphlet on the food tax Lenin emphasised that liberty of Co-operation means freedom for capitalism "**under the given conditions in Russia,**" i.e., under conditions of extreme weakness of the State industry. However, even then Lenin pointed out that "Co-operation facilitates the unity and organisation of millions of the population, and eventually of the entire population, and this circumstance in turn is a gigantic plus for the viewpoint of the subsequent transition from State capitalism to Socialism." Later on in 1923, under conditions of regeneration of industry, Lenin, in his article on co-operation, already definitely places co-operation in the group of Socialist enterprises, while he reduces the State capitalist growth to concessions. Let us make a few quotations:

"An order of civilised co-operators with common owner-

ship of the means of production and with the class victory of the proletariat—this is Socialist structure.”

“Co-operation in our condition almost always coincides with Socialism.”

“Now we have the right to say that the simple growth of co-operation is for us identical (with the ‘slight conception’ already indicated) with the growth of Socialism.”

“Under our conditions, concessions would undoubtedly be a pure form of State capitalism.”

Thus only concessions should be placed in the group of enterprises of a State capitalist type, as industrial leases of a concession type and private commission trade have not developed in our country. One need not deal particularly extensively with regard to concessions. The most important—Harriman (Chiatura) and Lena Goldfields are only commencing to work, and the number of workers engaged in them does not exceed 2 per cent. of the number of workers in industry.

Therefore, one can only talk about a struggle of Socialist, State and Co-operative industry with private-capitalist industry, which also includes handicraft.

The Gosplan data give the following table :

Year	Total Production in Millions of Chervonetzi-Roubles and p.c.					
	State & Co-operative		Private		Total	
	Absolute	in p.c.	Absolute	in p.c.	Absolute	in p.c.
1923-24	... 5,562	76.3	1,728	23.7	7,290	100
1924-25	... 7,550	79.3	1,970	20.7	9,520	100
1925-26	... 9,186	79.7	2,334	20.3	11,520	100

It is clear from this table that nationalised Socialist industry is growing more quickly than private capitalist industry.

This table, thereby, supplies the answer to Lenin’s question, “Who’s who?”

In the field of industry Socialist forms are prevailing, although slowly, over private capitalist elements.

The perspectives for the new industrial construction go to show a subsequent increase of this process, despite the fact that the rate of this construction has slowed down somewhat.

At the same time it should be pointed out that the goods famine and the inadequate expansion of large State industry give a strong impetus to the development of petty private industry and handicraft production.

With the intense economic situation lasting for a long time, private industry is able to grow at practically the same rate as State industry as is shown by the fact that in 1925-26 a very insignificant decrease of the percentage of importance of private industry in the total production of the country is expected.

On the other hand it should be taken into consideration that only in 1924-25 were agreements for larger concessions signed, and that with the growth of national economy of the country, the influx of concession capital will increase. Negotiations have been going on lately in respect to a number of large industrial concessions, which upon conclusion will already occupy a more considerable place in the industry and in the national economic life of the country.

All this goes to show that with the growth of the national economy of the country special difficulties and dangers of Socialist construction are also growing.

Despite all these present and future difficulties, we are building and will build up Socialism on the basis of the economic successes already achieved, and with strong belief in our cause.

E. KVIRING.



Persecution of C.P.G.B. and Offensive Against the Working Class

THE arrest, trial and subsequent imprisonment of the twelve well-known Communist leaders in Britain cannot be viewed as an isolated incident. To obtain a clear conception of the importance of this event it is essential to consider it in relation to, and as part of, the general attempt of British capitalism to steal a new lease of life at the direct expense of the living standards of the working class.

For some years past industry in Britain has been in a sorry plight. An industrial system which once boasted of being the "workshop of the world" found itself being steadily, but none the less surely, relegated to the position of a secondary economic power. Exports, the life blood of an industrial country like Great Britain, were steadily on the decline. Unemployment was widespread and intense. The trade outlook for the future held out no hope.

In the first half of 1925 the capitalist class decided on a campaign to cheapen "costs of production." This was absolutely necessary, it was claimed, if British products were to compete successfully with those of other nations produced under conditions which featured low wages and long hours. With the usual capitalist method of reasoning and without any thought of curtailing profits or of more scientifically organising industry, it was claimed that "costs of production" could only be brought down to a competitive level if the workers were prepared to accept an all-round drastic reduction of wages and in some cases (mining, textiles, etc.), if the number of working hours was extended.

The Attack and Subsequent Retreat.

The miners were singled out as the first section to be subjected to the depression of living standards. The capitalists reasoned as follows. If the well-organised miners' trade union, with its 900,000 members and its comparatively ad-

vanced working class outlook, can be isolated and defeated, then it is only a matter of time before the same treatment can be meted out to every other section of industrial workers.

Unfortunately for the plans of the attacking force the most class conscious elements in the British Labour movement saw this also. This argument was at once given prominence by the Communist Party and its ally, the National Minority Movement. A clear call for National Trade Union Unity was sounded, the masses responded. On July 31st (Red Friday), the date fixed by the coalowners for the operation of their proposals, the miners were sure of the active support of all other important unions. If the coalowners had forced their threatened lock-out it would have meant plunging the country into the throes of a general strike.

The governing class was hardly prepared for such a contingency. A retreat was ordered. Government money was forthcoming to subsidise the coal industry as a temporary expedient and a truce was called to extend over a period of nine months.

The New Attack.

The retreat was necessary in order that more detailed consideration could be given by the governing class to the new situation and that new plans could be laid prior to returning to the fray. It was, of course, decided that the unity of the Labour Movement must be smashed if it was within the power of the governing class to do so. Failing this, then the way must be prepared for the whole force at the disposal of the capitalist class to be mobilised and held in readiness to be thrown into the battle at the opportune moment.

In furtherance of this alternative policy of "mobilisation" the government got busy at once. Official sanction was given to the creation of a huge blackleg organisation (Organisation for Maintenance of Supplies) for the purposes of keeping the essential services running during a general strike. This organisation is officered by well-known "pillars of the capitalist state" and is busy enrolling recruits from the ranks of the bourgeoisie and the higher-paid professional classes. The Government is also recruiting large forces of special police, none of whom must be trade unionists. A census is being taken of the technical qualifications of soldiers, sailors and other State servants. The Fascisti are openly encouraged and their offences against the law con-

done. In short, the governing classes are preparing for a new type of struggle, never previously experienced, for which they may need to bring up all their forces, economic, political, legal—and illegal—and military. They are making these preparations openly and busily. Here it is important to note that the only party which is demanding that the workers shall take a realistic view of these preparations and organise Workers' Defence Corps, to protect the Labour organisations from Fascist and State violence, is the Communist Party.

To Smash the Unity of the Workers.

Whilst all these preparations for the use of force are being completed the governing classes are pushing forward with an endeavour to break up the united working class front. For this purpose they have two lines of attack. The first is waged **inside** the Labour Movement and is led by Ramsay MacDonald and supported by Rothermere and Beaverbrook, the Lords of the Capitalist Press. This is the campaign against "extremism" within the Labour Movement. The second line is the campaign **outside**—the campaign of Joynson-Hicks supported by the legal—and illegal—State apparatus with its Courts, police and political spies. The Communist Party standing as the vanguard of the British working class is, of course, exposed to bear the brunt of both these attacks.

MacDonald chose the Liverpool Conference of the Labour Party as the occasion to launch his attack. Supported by the well-organised official elements of the Right-wing he was able to record a large measure of success. Resolutions were passed aimed at the expulsion of the Communists from the Labour Party as individual members and at crippling the activities of Communists who were delegates from the trade unions.

This in itself would not be of very great consequence had the conference settled down to a real consideration of the vital problems which were confronting the working class movement. But in his campaign against "extremism" MacDonald carried the fight a definite stage further. He challenged the whole working class policy of the Left-wing. By careful manipulation of the trade union delegations prior to the conference and by expert management during the Conference proceedings, a political programme, which is completely based upon the continuity of the capitalist system, was foisted on the Labour Party.

Liverpool was claimed as a great victory by the whole of the capitalist press—even the Stock Exchange rejoiced. Since Liverpool the Head Office of the Labour Party, which is completely dominated by the Right-wing, has joined hands with the capitalist press in directly inciting not only to the expulsion of Communists but of whole local Labour Parties, trade union branch and district committees which refuse to endorse the Liverpool decisions.

Joynson-Hicks Follows MacDonald.

Liverpool cleared the way for an open attack on the Communist Party. A few days after the Labour Party Conference, the Conservative Party met at Brighton. They complimented MacDonald for his fight against the extremists at Liverpool and called upon the Government to take further action.

The raid upon the offices of the Communist Party, the National Minority Movement and the National Unemployed Workers' Committee followed. In addition to the arrest of twelve comrades the police systematically set to work to smash the central leading organs of these three important working class movements.

All books, pamphlets, documents and files were confiscated. The technical staffs were intimidated and everything possible was done to prevent a recovery to normal routine work.

The positions held by the men arrested are also an indication that choice was made, not with reference to responsibility so far as the actual charges were concerned, but because of their holding key positions in the advanced working class movement. For instance, comrade Pollitt was included in the list, not because he had written or spoken seditious words, but because he is the leader of the fraction of Communist elements at all National Labour Party and Trade Union Conferences and because he is the acknowledged leader of the rapidly-growing Minority Movement. Comrades Inkpin and Rust are chief officials of the Party and Y.C.L. respectively. Comrade Gallacher, as head of the Parliamentary Department, was arrested because he is responsible for the contacts between the Party and the political working class movement. Facts could be produced to show similar reasons for the arrests of all the other comrades. The raid and arrests were prompted by the sole desire to

put the Communist Party, the National Minority Movement and the Unemployed Workers' Committee Movement into a weak or non-functioning position during the troubled times immediately ahead. With these out of the way the Government would have been able to concentrate its repressive force upon the Left-wingers of the industrial and political Labour movement.

The Trial of the Twelve.

The attempts of the Crown lawyers, which included the Attorney-General, Hogg himself, to limit the trial to a purely legal one of conspiracy to preach sedition and mutiny failed. The three spokesmen of the Communist Party—comrades Campbell, Gallacher and Pollitt successfully prevented its achievement. In addition to a fine defence of the principles of the Communist International they, with the aid of telling facts and examples, proved conclusively that the attack upon the Communist Party was part of the widespread operations against the whole working class.

But it did not even need the excellent speeches of our comrades to bring out the real nature of the trial. So intent was Hogg upon his task of bringing the bourgeois jury to a sense of its class responsibilities that he stated:

“What would happen if troops were ordered to suppress a strike, if these men were allowed to continue the work of seducing soldiers from their duty?”

Later, when challenged by comrade Campbell on the legality of such an order, he tried to explain it away as a slip of the tongue. He asked permission of the Judge to insert the word “mutiny” instead of “strike.” Of course, the obliging Judge—a notorious enemy of the Labour movement—willingly agreed. But no amount of verbal juggling can alter the fact that, for once in a while, this spokesman of the old order spoke the truth as to the future intentions of the Government.

The case for the prosecution was one of the weakest ever propounded in a British Court of Law and this is admitted by even bourgeois legal spokesmen. But in spite of this the twelve were found guilty and those with previous political convictions against them sentenced to one year in prison. The Judge, during the concluding scenes, furnished a final illustration of the real purpose of the prosecution. To the remaining seven comrades he made the following pro-

position. If they would **agree to renounce the Communist Party and undertake not to preach its doctrines amongst the working class** they would be given their freedom. Of course, they scornfully and indignantly refused and the greatest trial in modern political history in Britain closed as they were sentenced each to six months' imprisonment.

What are the Results of MacDonald's Campaign?

It is one thing to manipulate a conference into accepting a programme of capitalist continuity and another to get the working class which control the local organs of the Labour Movement to accept it. The pressing need for unity in face of the capitalist offensive, a unity based upon a working class consciousness is making the MacDonald resolutions of Liverpool scarcely worth more than the paper they were printed on. Even before the arrest of the Communist leaders nearly 50 important city or Divisional Labour Parties had refused to operate the Liverpool decisions. In all parts of the country Left-wing blocs of Communists and sympathetic trade union delegates have been formed to carry on a campaign for unity. The net result of Liverpool is to have translated tendencies towards working class unity into definite organs pledged to fight for unity and a reversal of the Liverpool decisions of disruption.

Without the arrest of the Communists the pressing urges of the economic situation would have forced unity in face of Liverpool but the situation now after the arrests leave MacDonald in a pitiable position. No wonder he writes to the London "Times" asking: "What good is it our fighting Bolshevism if it is to be manufactured by the Government?"

What are the Results of the Offensive against the Communist Party?

The reaction in the Labour organisations and amongst the workers generally is of such a character that (to quote a leading conservative referring to MacDonald): "he who was the enemy of the Communists at Liverpool now perforce must be their friend." One might add that this is necessary to keep his position as leader of the Labour Party.

The trial and conviction of the Communists has raised a tremendous storm of protest from all sections of the Labour Movement. Hundreds of resolutions are to hand from all

parts of the country. The release of the prisoners is demanded officially by the following organisations:

- The Labour Party;
- The Trade Union General Council;
- The Communist Party;
- The Independent Labour Party;
- The E.C. of the Miners' Federation;
- The Parliamentary Labour Party.

The Labour organisations in all important cities associate themselves officially with the campaign. Over £2,000 has already been subscribed by the rank and file to defray legal expenses and maintain the dependents of our comrades. The mass demonstrations called to demand the release of the prisoners equal in size and determination those which are peculiar to times of urgent national crisis.

Finally, the volume of support is so great that the British Communist Party, although declared an illegal organisation in the courts of law, carries on its work openly with confidence in the determination of the workers to prevent it from being driven out of existence. The attack of the Government in the open has failed more signally than the subversive attack of MacDonald.

The Crystallisation of the Left-Wing.

The period just prior to and since the arrests is marked by the tendency of the various Left-wing groups to come out into active opposition against the disruptive tactics of MacDonald and Joynson-Hicks. Cook, Lansbury, Wheatley and Wedgwood have all declared that Liverpool was the prologue, and the arrest of the Communists the first act in the process of splitting the Labour Movement. Forty-six leaders of industrial and parliamentary Labour have joined hands in issuing a manifesto complimenting the Communists for their fine working class stand and pledging themselves to carry on a campaign to preach the class war and to call upon the soldiers to refuse to shoot the strikers during times of industrial dispute. The columns of the "Workers' Weekly," the "Sunday Worker," and the Labour press generally are crowded with letters from all quarters in which Left-wing leaders and rank and file workers vie with each other in suggestions and programmes for the formation of a national Left-wing bloc. The burden of all these

letters is that all working class elements should unite to turn the Labour Party and the trade unions into real instruments of the workers in the class struggle.

But during November a further stage was reached. Ten London Labour Parties sent fifty delegates to a Left-wing Conference. Here it was decided to form a provisional Left-wing Committee charged with the task of formulating a working class programme of action and to organise an all-inclusive London Conference for January. Attempts are also being made in other large cities and negotiations are proceeding to unite them all in a National Left-wing bloc.

The Task of the Communist Party.

Obviously the Communist Party cannot stand apart from all this work. We must, by every means possible, assist the formation and participate in the work of these Left-wing blocs and endeavour to secure a united Left-wing association. The situation becomes so acute that the most important task of the Party is to mobilise all these elements to fight the attack of the governing class. At present these groups of the Left-wing are not united. We must obtain an organisational basis and a programme of action on which all those groups can make a common fight. The strength of the Left-wing would be great, as the following list of present groupings will show.

- (1) The Communist Party;
- (2) The National Minority Movement;
- (3) The Unemployed Workers' Committees;
- (4) The Left-wing blocs in the Labour Party;
- (5) The Left-wing trade union group (Purcell, Hicks, Cook, etc.);
- (6) The Left-wing Parliamentary group (Wheatley, Wedgwood, Maxton, etc.);
- (7) The Plebs League;
- (8) The Lansbury group (G. Lansbury, Postgate, Price, etc.).

Of course, it may not be possible to obtain an organisational basis wide enough to include them all, but a programme of action could be hammered out which would guarantee joint fighting against the attacks of the Government and its allies, the Right-wing reactionaries.

Need for a New Leadership.

The need for this mobilisation becomes more important everyday. The attack of the governing class covers a very wide field. It is crystallised in its international policy in the Locarno Pact against the first Workers' Republic and in its national policy in an attack upon the whole working class. The attack on the miners and railwaymen as a preliminary to an offensive on other sections; the Communist prosecutions; the organisation of Fascism and the utilisation of the Right-wing against unity—these are all parts of this national offensive. The success of the workers in resisting this offensive revolves, to a large extent, round the question of a new leadership.

The need of the present period is to secure this new leadership through the consolidation of the Left-wing forces on the basis of an immediate programme of action. Slowly the workers of Britain are awakening to the full measure of the attack which is threatening them. They are beginning to realise another thing also, and that is, that the promises of legal protection and peaceful progress which the old leaders have held out to them are not allowed when it comes to the test; that the law exists for the rich and not for the poor and that those who advise them to trust only their own working class organisations may be right after all. The changing conditions and the growth of this revolutionary consciousness are providing the basis for a mass Communist Party in Britain.

E. H. BROWN.



The Elections in Czecho-Slovakia

THE result of the elections which took place in Czecho-Slovakia on November 15th provides material for the consideration of the following two facts: (1) that the present stabilisation of capitalist countries is in reality only a very relative stabilisation; (2) that during a period which is not strictly revolutionary, in a period between two revolutions, it is possible for Communist Parties to establish themselves firmly as real mass parties, as the leading parties in the Labour movement.

Czecho-Slovakia is a small State. When the last census was taken (February 15th, 1921), it had a population of 13,368,683. As an independent State it has existed since October 28th, 1918. It is easy to survey the development of all the conditions in the country because of the small size of the territory and because of the short period of its existence as an independent State. We can test here by the concrete living conditions of a concrete country the question: "How far has the method of bourgeois democratic government during seven years been able to solve the most important problems of State and social life?" Has the method of the bourgeois-democratic construction in the State in Czecho-Slovakia achieved greater results in the last seven years than the proletarian-revolutionary method, the system of government of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia? Is the development of conditions in Czecho-Slovakia, taken as a whole, on an upward grade or is the total balance of the "democratic" regime a passive balance, in spite of some signs of improvement and "stabilisation"? Is the lability* of economic, financial and consequently also of political conditions in some respects the same or even greater than during the former elections in 1920? Here, apart from the mutual international influences and interdependence of the capitalist States, we will examine in this article those symptoms of the stability or lability of Czecho-Slovakia which arise out of its own internal life, selecting among them those which found an expression in the figures of the last parliamentary elections.

* Lability means liability to displacement or change, (Chem.) from "labile."

First of all just a few words about the election itself. The present-Czecho-Slovakian parliamentary elections are the second parliamentary elections since the establishment of the Czecho-Slovakian State. The first elections took place on April 15th, 1920. During the first two years of the existence of the State there was in Czecho-Slovakia not a democratic regime but an open and avowed national dictatorship of the minority—the Czech bourgeoisie supported by the Czech Social-Democrats. The constitution and all other fundamental laws of the newly-created State were decided not by an elected parliament accessible to all the sections of the population, but by a body nominated by the executives of the Czech political parties, whose members could be recalled any day and replaced by others by a decision of the Central Committee of the respective party. All those whose national interest was not identical with the national interest of the Czech “nation” (the Czech national bourgeoisie) which had been victorious in the “National Revolution” were forcibly kept out of any participation in the creation of the foundations of the new “national” State. It was only when all the foundations of the new State (constitution, electoral rights, security of private property by legislation, consolidation of political power in Czech hands by law) had been firmly established with the help of the “national dictatorship” and the latter had been concluded, that the door was left half-open for democracy and on April 15th, 1920, the first parliamentary elections took place. This election inaugurated the political collaboration in the country of the minority nations, Germans, opposition Slovaks, Hungarians and Poles, who comprised nearly one-half of the population. But sub-Carpathian Russia was not admitted even then to the election or to representation in Parliament. At the time of the first parliamentary election the Communist Party was not yet constituted as an independent party; it still existed as the “Left” of the Czech and German Social-Democratic Parties. The Communist vote was at that time given for the candidate lists of the Social-Democratic Parties. Since April 15, 1920, there have been municipal elections in Czecho-Slovakia in 1923 (but not everywhere) and in 1924 there was a supplementary parliamentary election for sub-Carpathian Russia. The present election is the first which can be considered a real general election. Out of a population of thirteen and a half million, 7,105,276 voters have participated in the present election, that is to say more than one-half of the population. As long as the bourgeoisie has the entire State apparatus in its hands, it can, of course, influence the result of elections. This was to a great extent the case in Czecho-Slovakia. But in spite of this fact

one can say that the figures of the election results give expression to all the most important internal problems which abound in Czecho-Slovakia. Moreover these figures also give expression to important problems in the Labour movement of this country.

As to the basic figures concerning the result of the present election, no less than 31 parties participated in the election campaign. Fifteen of them polled enough votes to be represented in the new parliament. The new Chamber of Deputies (the basis of the franchise is suffrage at the age of 21 and in addition to the Chamber of Deputies there is the second Chamber—the Senate, for which one can vote only at the age of 27) is composed as follows:

PARTIES OF THE GOVERNMENT COALITION.

Name of Party	No. of Deputies	No. of votes polled
Czech Peasant Party ...	45	970,498
Czech Clericals ...	31	691,238
Czech Social-Democrats ...	29	630,894
Czech Socialists ...	28	609,195
Czech Artisans and Tradesmen ...	13	289,928
Czech National Democrats ...	13	284,628
Total ...	159	3,476,382

THE OPPOSITION.

Name of Party	No. of Deputies	No. of votes polled
International Communists ...	41	922,711
Slovakian Clericals ...	27	604,695
German Peasant Party ...	24	571,198
German Social-Democrats ...	17	411,040
German Clericals ...	13	314,440
German Nationals ...	10	240,879
German National-Socialists ...	7	168,278
Polish People's and Workers' League ...	1	29,884
Autonomous Peasant Party in Sub-Carpathian Russia ...	1	35,674
Other 16 smaller parties ...	—	323,090
Total ...	141	3,628,896

What do these figures convey concerning the “stabilisation” of conditions in Czecho-Slovakia? The question of the formation of a Government on a parliamentary or democratic

basis usual in capitalist States is to-day much more difficult than was the case after the election of 1920. Formerly the Government coalition consisted only of five parties (the Artisans' Party with its six deputies was in the opposition right up to the present election) and the ratio of the Government majority in the opposition minority was 164 against 136. At present there are six Parties in the Government and the numerical ratio of forces when the vote is taken is 159 against 141. Moreover the present "majority" must realise that even with the addition of the Artisans it polled only a minority of the total vote at the elections. It is hardly possible that six different groups, every one of which has to represent quite different social needs and requirements, can be united whenever there is an important legislative proposal before parliament. Even to-day, one can see that the process of the formation of the new Government is rather difficult. Already there is a rumour that eventually a Ministry of officials or a "mixed" Ministry of "experts" and parliamentarians will have to be formed. People also speak quite openly about more far-reaching measures—the introduction of the plural vote to the detriment of the workers and national minorities, about the dissolution of the present parliament and about another election in the spring. Are these symptoms of a greater stabilisation in comparison with the parliamentary situation of five years ago? Certainly not!

The plain facts of the election figures draw our attention also to other circumstances which show how complicated and unnatural the present situation is in Czecho-Slovakia. I will give a few examples.

Firstly: in an over-industrialised country where the majority of the population is engaged in industry and only a minority in agriculture, the Party of the capitalists and bankers is the weakest Party in the Government coalition. The National Democrats led by Doctor Kramacz had 20 deputies in 1920 and have now only 13. Many artisans have left the National Democrats who in 1920 still had this capitalist Party behind them. The main reason for this is the question of taxes. Two months before the election, by splitting off from the National Democrats, a new Czech "**National Party**" was formed which began to agitate particularly among intellectuals and higher State officials. This Party managed to poll no less than 98,240 votes. Because of the artificial adaptation of the franchise to the requirements of the governmental Parties this Party remained without representation in Parliament. Yet another internal differentia-

tion is taking place in the circles of big capital. Differences are coming to light between the old "privileged" factories and banks and the younger ones. There are also differences between the finance-capital pure and simple of the banks and the "producing" capital of the manufacturers.

Secondly: in an over-industrialised country the biggest party is that of the Czech agrarians who are under the leadership of the class-conscious wealthy peasants; next to them and very near to them as far as size goes come the Communists as the second greatest Party. If we add to the Czech Peasant Party (970,498 votes) the German Peasant Party (591,198 votes), if we further consider that at least two-thirds of the Party of Slovakian Clericals and at least one-third of the Party of the Czech Clericals consist of the rural population, it becomes as clear as daylight that the peasant question will play an extremely important role in the further development of Czecho-Slovakian conditions.

Thirdly: it is the parties whose political basis is decidedly petty bourgeois which attract the largest number of voters. The Social-Democrats must also be included in this petty bourgeois camp, whose chief characteristic is its sub-division into a very large number of independent Parties. There are for instance, in Czecho-Slovakia four independent Social-Democratic Parties (the German, Czech, Polish and Hungarian Parties) every one of which has a different policy, yet all the four being members of the same Second International. This splitting up of the petty bourgeois camp, intensified by national differences, has greatly contributed to the fact that no less than 31 political parties have participated in the election campaign of this small country and this splitting up is by no means a symptom of stabilisation but rather of social insecurity, political perplexity and vacillation among large sections of the population.

Fourthly: the surprising growth of Catholic Clericalism (Czech Clericals with 691,238 votes, Slovakian Clericals with 604,695 votes and German Clericals with 314,440 votes). This is a country whose struggle for national emancipation is linked up with the traditions of the Hussite and Taborite Revolutions against Popish Rome. The present strength of the politically organised Catholic Clericalism is well able to complicate conditions here in the same manner as political conditions in Germany were complicated at the time of the Bismarckian struggle between the State and the Roman Catholic Church through the strength of the Catholic Cen-

trum. These four circumstances, which became particularly evident in the election figures, must be appreciated in connection with three fundamental and permanent acute factors which in themselves alone make conditions in Czecho-Slovakia extremely complicated: firstly, that the country is over-industrialised; secondly, that because of the enormous national debt it is faced financially with an inconceivable future (if the capitalist system is retained); thirdly, that this is the question of a country with six different nationalities, five of whom are oppressed, in other words, a national question which is still unsolved.

Moreover, what do the election figures convey concerning the Communist Party and especially concerning the Labour Movement in Czecho-Slovakia?

The Communist Party polled 933,711 votes. It has 41 deputies in the new Chamber. This is a very satisfactory result. This means that every eighth voter and every fourteenth inhabitant of the country voted for Communism. We will not, of course, be guilty of exaggeration by looking upon all these electors as Communists. The Party has 104,000 organised members, but what is this as an expression of the profound dissatisfaction of the masses with the present bourgeois "democratic" system of government, and what a field for our future propaganda of Leninism, for our organisational activity and our campaigns! This success of the Communist Party becomes even more apparent if one takes into consideration under what circumstances it was achieved. The date of the election was fixed by the Government. It selected the moment which it considered most favourable for its parties. It calculated that at a time which on our own admission was not directly revolutionary we would not be able to retain under our influence those sections of the population who formerly followed us, animated by great hopes and possibilities. The election took place immediately after Locarno which was described as a great step towards general international relaxation in Europe, as the stabilisation of present conditions for 20 years. The election was held in the late autumn when the sugar industry which is very important in Czecho-Slovakia is working at full speed; when unemployment, which was not so great this year, was reduced to a minimum. The Government and the ruling parties had been preparing for a whole twelvemonth for this election struggle with us. They endeavoured to disintegrate us from within (the Bubnik affair). With the help of the police and class justice they persecuted our Party officials, agitators and organisers. According to the incomplete in-

formation of the Red Aid (I.C.W.P.A.), 211 active Party members, mostly officials, were sentenced to 24 years and four months' imprisonment just before the election, chiefly because of their utterances. Orders for arrest were issued one after the other against three central secretaries who were to carry on the organisational preparation of the electors in the Central Committee of the Party. Two of them, Jilek and Houser, were actually thrown into prison, and Zapotocky had had to maintain an illegal existence since May. It was at first intended to try the imprisoned comrade Jilek for military espionage. After a couple of weeks this plan was given up and with a great hue and cry the press arranged a pogrom campaign on the plea that comrades Jilek and Houser had organised three years ago an attempt to assassinate President Masaryk, having received orders and money from Moscow. This campaign ended to the great discredit of the Government. It was publicly proved that it lacked foundation, but although this was fully realised it was nevertheless prepared in the drawing room of the Minister of the Interior with the help of a faithful follower. All the same, the imprisoned secretaries were not set free. Yet another, a third, indictment was brought forward against them and comrade Neurath also became their companion in the dock. The indictment was based on the assertion that the accused had been guilty of high treason by accepting money from "Moscow" and carrying on military espionage for Soviet Russia. With much bolstering up and sensational working up of public opinion through the coalition press it came this time to Court proceedings which were to last a whole week. But after three days it came to light that even the most important documents of this trial were nothing but forgeries. The Government dared not allow it to become known before the election through court proceedings who was the originator of these forgeries. The court proceedings were, therefore, broken off and postponed indefinitely.

Internally the Party went through a severe crisis in the year preceding the elections. There was discussion, change of leadership at the Party Congress, violent fractional struggles and finally the Bubnik treachery. Bubnikism was a dread growth. Nine deputies (out of 27) and over 30 people well-known in the Party and very popular, some of them occupying important posts in the Party apparatus as secretaries or representatives, had to be expelled from the Party. Bubnik published a daily and threw himself into the election campaign against the Party with the energy of a desperate traitor who begins to feel that he has staked everything on one card. It should also be borne in mind that

it was barely before the election that the Party re-organised itself on a factory nucleus basis and that at the same time important personal changes took place everywhere in the Party apparatus. Considering that under these circumstances the Party polled 933,711 votes and that Bubnik—who in addition to his former treachery had entered into an election alliance in Sub-Carpathian Russia with the orthodox Clericals (!)—polled throughout the State only the paltry figure of 7,854 votes, this goes to show how firmly rooted the Communist Party in Czecho-Slovakia is. It is not dependent on individual personalities, no matter how popular they may be. It has taken deep root in the social conditions of the country, in the elementary class instinct and in the consciously revolutionary convictions of the advanced sections of the proletariat, in the confidence in the leadership of the Communist International in which the old guard of the Russian Party plays an important role, this confidence being based not on mere sentiment, but on the practical experience of the mutual collaboration of the last four years.

We are satisfied with the result achieved by our Party at the elections. We know that the E.C.C.I. too and all its sections have welcomed this result. The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia is the strongest among Labour parties. As far as numerical strength is concerned it takes the leading position in the Labour movement throughout the country. But we do not intend to under-estimate or conceal the fact—on the contrary we want to emphasise it—that with us too a very considerable portion of the workers still adheres to the Second International or so-called National Socialism (although in principle there is to-day not much to choose between the Reformist Social-Democrats and the National Socialists). In spite of all the crimes of their bourgeois governmental policy the Czech Social-Democrats still polled at the election 630,894 votes, the Czech Socialists 609,195 votes and the German Social-Democrats 411,040 votes. The reformists still hold strong positions in politically and strategically important districts, which is difficult to explain if one compares the distribution of forces in other districts. In the Pilsen Constituency where heavy industry is centred (the big Skoda-Creuzot works) the Czech Social-Democrats polled 95,441 votes while we polled 20,830. A similar weak point is the pre-eminently German Karlsbad Constituency, where the German Social-Democrats polled 84,026 against our 27,345 votes. These partially unfavourable results we will consider as a serious warning and they will not remain without effect on our further work.

During the election we gained a great deal of experience connected with the organisational and administrative activity of the Party. This experience is naturally being utilised. There is one question which in my opinion is mature enough to be considered on an international scale. I mean the question how our newspapers are to be conducted during a temporary lull, between two revolutions. In times of battle it is but natural that Communist newspapers turn their attention almost entirely to fighting slogans, hints for the development of the struggle, that they concentrate on keeping up the fighting spirit and fighting mood of the masses and that thereby information on the numerous details of the other, the ordinary life, begins to take a back seat. Our election experience has shown that the press of our opponents gained the ear of large sections of the population just by its informative portion, which made it very difficult for us to paralyse the opponent newspapers when it came to the actual election struggle. It was found out also with respect to people politically near to us that in addition to the Party organ they also subscribed to another paper. They assert that they are obliged to do this if apart from the life of our Party they are also to have a survey of everything that is happening in the country and throughout the world. The Czech Socialists owe their success in the capital, Prague, mainly to the predominating influence of their evening paper.

It is impossible for me to describe in this article all the consequences of the elections in Czecho-Slovakia. In conclusion just a few more thoughts: the elections have shown that the national and democratic illusions which played an important role among the Czech population after the World War are rapidly disappearing. The practical results of seven years of coalition policy are showing to large sections of the population—not only to the industrial workers—that the bourgeois democratic method of Government and of State construction on the basis of capitalism has not been able to bring the most important problems nearer to a solution. Bourgeois democracy has been unable during its seven years of power to contribute anything to the development of the productive forces in the country to the solution of the industrial problem. It has shown itself impotent with respect to the solution of the national question and of the peasant question (abolition of the relics of feudalism, satisfying the poorer rural population). The epoch of the Government of bourgeois democracy is the epoch of the great decline of culture and science and of the great triumph of clericalism and reaction. Moreover, large sections of the population are becoming more and more aware that in spite of the relative

temporary stabilisation we have not gone back to "normal" conditions. On the contrary, even if one cannot deny certain symptoms of stabilisation the situation shows in other directions more lability than for instance in 1920. Large sections of the population are full of indignation against big capital and against the Government. There exists a very favourable psychological atmosphere for a clear and uncompromising propaganda of Leninism among the masses, including the peasantry and the urban middle class. Czecho-Slovakian experience also shows that in the interval between two revolutions there is no fear of the Social-Democratic Party growing impetuously and of our Party declining. The Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia is already the strongest of Labour Parties. But its aim shall be to increase further its mass character without thereby falling into the morass of reformism. We will grow quantitatively, because we will at the same time do our utmost sincerely and energetically to progress with the Bolshevisation of the Party. I consider the following measures are necessary in the period immediately after the election: (1) A big campaign for the propagation of Leninism; (2) tactics, form of speech and agitation capable of exercising a convincing influence on Social-Democratic, National Socialist and also on clerical workers; (3) to combine the struggle for all everyday demands and against reaction; (4) to devote special attention to concrete everyday and partial demands with respect to the national question; (5) to support in parliament any proposal for the improvement of the conditions of the poor, regardless from what quarters these proposals come and to take ourselves the initiative in this direction; (6) to make our Party press and particularly the daily organs a source of full information and a reflex of the entire life of the country; (7) to carry on the struggle against clericalism not by means of superficial "cultural" agitation, but by means of a struggle against the social root of this reactionary power, carrying on this struggle much more systematically and on a much larger scale than ever before; (8) to keep up animated political activity in the nuclei; (9) but it seems to me that the most important point in the light of the election results in Czecho-Slovakia is a well thought out and generously planned activity for the united front, the unity of the trade union movement and unity with respect to the peasant question.

B. SMERAL.

Nature and Forms of Agitprop Work

A DEFINITE position on the question of agitational and propagandist activity of the Communist Parties was adopted for the first time at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern. The resolution passed by the Fourth Congress brought forward the question as to Communist training activity and tested the ground as to the possibilities of the Marxist and practical Communist training of Party members. The organisational condition of the Communist Parties at that time, and even later at the time of the Fifth Congress and after, have not permitted an **organised application** of Agitprop work under a single direction in the general work of the Party and its organs. The Fifth Congress of the Comintern placed on the Agenda the question as to the **general organisational instructions** which had to be realised in order that the Communist agitational and propaganda activity "might be considered, if only in the most developed Communist mass Parties, as a special branch of work of the Party apparatus." Naturally, there could only be a question as to the organisation of this work and formulation of its organs, where the Communist Parties **in general worked in an organised manner** and had reached a definite stage in the distribution of work. But in these Parties, also, the organisation of agitation and propaganda activity in the centre and localities, the establishment of a more or less single direction and application first went through an "agitational stage," i.e., a period devoted not only to agitation among the wide Party masses, but also among active workers so as to make them recognise the necessity of building up Party organs and Party institutions, whose duty it would be to organise and lead Communist agitational and propaganda activity.

This "agitational stage" has not yet been passed through everywhere. On the whole, however, it may be asserted that in those Parties which began reconstructing their organisation on Bolshevik lines, organs for leading and organising agitational and propaganda work also grew up gradually. In this sense one may already say at the present time that in accordance with the decisions of the Fifth Congress, the

phase of real organisation of agitational and propaganda work has been achieved.

The Question of the Apparatus.

In the majority of Communist Parties, until quite recently, efforts were inadequate in respect of organising Party work, building up the organs of this work systematically and on the basis of division of labour. This phenomenon has its causes in the more or less chaotic methods of work which are characteristic for Communist Parties during the stormy periods of revolution and during the transition from the stormy period to the "siege period." The Parties were **entirely** propagandist or agitational organisations, 80 per cent. to 90 per cent. of their work being Agitprop activities, for the most part unorganised. Only with the organisation of Party factory nuclei did the Parties begin to deal with their own internal organisational questions. The majority of Parties understood these tasks as being the exclusive task of the more or less formal organisation of nuclei. The organisation of agitation and propaganda in the majority of Parties did not figure amongst the organisational tasks.

Thus, the leading organs for agitational and propaganda work were only created with great difficulty. The institution of Agitprop departments in the apparatus of the Central Committees of the most developed mass Communist Parties after the Fifth Congress should be considered already as progress. Agitprop commissions have been formed in the majority of districts and provincial committees. With the organisation of factory nuclei, the corresponding leading organs for agitation and propaganda have been gradually organised in the latter also (commissions, Agitprop organisers, etc.).

In the organisation of the leading organs for agitational and propaganda work the following **most substantial** defects and misapprehensions should be noted:

(1) Absence of contact between Agitprop departments and the remaining organs of the Party apparatus, with the political leadership or with general organised work. The Agitprop department or commission exists almost entirely independently, receives no political guidance and in their decisions on the organisational realisation of political leads, the Party committees do not give instructions as to the organisation of agitation. A member of a central or local Party

committee is in charge of the Agitprop Department (Germany, France), but this is only on paper, for in reality the department is run by comrades not adequately connected with the political leadership of the Party. This circumstance allots a quite undesired "independence" to Agitprop activity with regard to the political work of guiding the Party. Indeed, this independence often means absence of the political policy, or inadequate execution of political decisions of the Party.

The same applies in connection with the general organised work of the Party. The organisation of nucleus Agitprop groups does not in a sufficient degree go hand in hand with the construction of the nuclei themselves. A result of this defect is revealed in the re-organisation of the Party by the fact that the nature of the nucleus work is poor, incomplete, uninteresting and ultimately brings with it a decline of Party nuclei. (The revelation of this defect compelled the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany to place on the Agenda at the autumn conference of organisational secretaries the question of organising Agitprop work, from nuclei right through to the provinces.)

(2) Lack of comprehension of the tasks of Agitprop work and the nature of Agitprop organs. We may cite as an example of this the speech of a Party worker of the German C.P. on the tasks and organisation of Agitprop Departments and commissions. We will cite the following extracts from his speech:

"In the future we will in general make no boundaries between departments. The work of the department is only to work out the special forms of agitation and propaganda. Agitprop work is not limited to a special field of work, but embraces the whole field of activity of the Communist Party."

This point of view which liquidates all kinds of division of labour in the Party apparatus, which makes the restriction or responsibility of Agitprop organs impossible, is absolutely incorrect for two reasons. On the one hand a tendency appears here for turning the Agitprop Department into a "Mädchen für Alles" (maid of all work) wherever the division of labour is an inevitable necessity, particularly in **actual everyday work**. On the other hand the above-cited viewpoint completely deprives the Agitprop Department of a substantial proportion of its work, deprives it of the ideological content and limits it to the determination only of the

forms and methods of work. According to this outlook the Agitprop organs have no concern as to the **nature** of agitation and propaganda, and, for instance the determination of the nature of propaganda in accordance with the political position is not its task; the drafting of political decisions and slogans for the Party in a form appropriate for the masses is not its work. With this viewpoint, the object and task will not be attained, despite all the apparent closeness to the necessary organisation of petty work in the Communist Parties, as thereby the Agitprop organs are not brought more closely to the masses.

(3) From this viewpoint, which incorrectly determines the tasks of Agitprop work and the position of its organs in the Party apparatus, an excessive inflation of the Agitprop apparatus arises at any rate on paper.

The Central Agitprop Department of the Communist Party of Germany consists, on paper, of **seven** sub-departments. The Agitprop Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia has approximately the same number of sub-departments. From financial considerations alone, the creation of such an apparatus is impossible. It is quite sufficient to divide up the central Agitprop departments into three sub-departments (agitation, propaganda, press and publications), to unite the direction of these branches of work and preserve contact with other branches also engaged on work of an agitational nature (trade union, co-operative, sport departments, Y.C.L., etc.).

(4) An incorrect selection of departmental heads or leaders of commissions. In the majority of cases the selection of these leaders is guided by the fact that they are experienced agitators or more or less educated people with a literary trend. The question as to their organisational capability is ignored. This naturally leads to the heads of the Agitprop Department **not organising** agitational propaganda, but **themselves conducting agitational work or carrying on training work** while neglecting the organisation of this branch of work. There is no doubt that a Marxist-Leninist education and certain literary and agitational abilities play a certain role in selecting leaders for Agitprop work, but the main attention should be paid to **organisation capabilities, to political and mass instinct.**

Finally,

(5) In forming Agitprop departments or commissions and in the work of the apparatus inadequate attention is paid to the mass aspect. The point of view of the Agitprop organs of the C.P. of Germany with regard to **propaganda** and training would serve as a most characteristic example of this. Here they understand propaganda as **internal Party work** and thus training work should be restricted to Party members. A direct continuation of this view afterwards leads to limiting agitational and propaganda work to Party workers and this naturally lessens to a considerable extent the contact of the Party with the masses which are its main force.

The Agitprop apparatus—while not removing all bounds to its organisational functions—should become a **mass apparatus** which is a weapon for the gradual realisation of the duties of Party members in Party work and training, and through it, a weapon for strengthening the unbrokenness of a close and extensive contact with the masses. In small Parties (such as the British) this aim is comparatively easily achieved. The British Party has indeed got near to this aim. In the large Parties it meets with considerable organisational difficulties.

A special difficulty in organising the Agitprop organs is the **transition condition** in which most Parties find themselves as a result of the reconstruction of the organisational basis. The transfer from the territorial basis to a basis of factory nuclei and the change as a result of this, of the old cadres of workers, the small contact of a whole number of educated forces with the factory nuclei—all this naturally means an obstacle (even if temporary) on the part towards forming lower Agitprop organs. It is only possible to overcome definitely this obstacle after the transitional organisational stage has come to an end.

Agitational Activity.

What is most important in valuing the agitational activities of the Communist Parties is to determine to what degree they have been able to apply this agitation, as far as its nature, methods, form and organisation are concerned, to the policy first traced out by the Third Congress of the Comintern, concretised by the Fifth Congress and the Spring Enlarged Executive: "To the masses through Bolshevising the Party."

The problem of winning the masses, of course, greatly depends upon the policy of the Party, but agitational activity which brings this policy and its slogans to the masses themselves also plays no small role here.

In stormy periods the agitation in the Communist Party is naturally characterised by certain **generality, absence of concrete form, concentration on a small number of questions, feverish method and lack of organisation**. However severely we may judge these defects and errors, it would be unjust to assert that this agitation for the revolution, for the dictatorship and for Communism did not bring many valuable results. Many of these characteristic features of the agitation of the Communist Party at such a time have remained in the new period and have become an evil instead of a benefit.

The period of partial demands and partial activities cannot allow of any general agitation which becomes aimless. The struggle for partial demands of necessity requires a differentiation in the nature of agitation. For instance, to carry on agitation for paying wages in gold currency should not be restricted to slogans and a few general simplified phrases. The working masses should be shown **concretely** and by figures what is the meaning of realising the demands for wages to be paid in gold currency as compared with existing conditions. In exactly the same way it is necessary to conduct agitation on the tax question more substantially, more concretely and with more complete statistics.

In this field the agitation of the French Communist Party evidences more extent than content. The agitation of the German Party on the question of tactics and other partial demands, despite the great progress made by the Party, leaves much to be desired in respect to its content and concreteness. A convincing force in agitation for partial demands is not improving the negative character (impatience with the present position) but a positive one for formulation of demands (what are the concrete advantages in case of realising the demands).

During the present period of the revolution the main aim of agitation is **the approach to the Social-Democratic and non-organised** working masses. This approach, the winning of the masses, is impossible other than by an appropriate concretisation of partial demands. The agitation for recognition of the U.S.S.R. in certain countries is

also characteristic for its lack of concretisation. We may cite as an example the October campaign of the American Workers' Party, its circulars and manifestoes. The whole contents and tone of the manifesto recall the period of direct armed intervention against Soviet Russia. In this manifesto no emphasis is given to the **real interests** connected with the recognition of the U.S.S.R. by America and capable of mobilising American Labour against the viewpoint of the A.F. of L. which takes up a standpoint against recognition. Practically nothing is said in the manifesto about the great economic progress of the U.S.S.R. (Only some incorrect statistics are cited.) Such information without statistics, would be much more capable of arousing sympathy among the politically untouched masses than hymns in favour of the revolution.

The absence of concreteness and of a real basis for agitation is only one of the expressions of its **superficial** nature. Another no less characteristic feature is that in our agitation **propagandist profundity** is also absent. There is an absence of connection between agitation for partial demands on the one hand and the general aims of the Communist Parties on the other. It is often the presentation of the Party policy which is to blame for this, but in many cases it is through the lack of methodical agitation.

As a characteristic example one should allude to the agitational campaign of the C.P. of France on the financial question. At the commencement of the campaign, the entire Party press put forward exclusively slogans **not having the nature of everyday demands**, but containing **general strategic aims** of a longer period of struggle (nationalisation, etc.). During the subsequent phase of the campaign quite correct partial demands (payment of wages in gold currency, etc.), which had dropped out of the strategic plan of the Party, formed the centre of agitation apart from the agitational slogans. (Similar examples may be cited from the experience of the electoral agitation of the Czechoslovakian Party, which earned a great compliment on the part of the bourgeois press which announced that "the Party had proved to be a master at petty work.")

The problem as to the combination and concentration of slogans is also closely bound up with the points mentioned above.

In this respect two kinds of agitation in the Communist

Parties exist. The Communist Party of Germany in its agitation has still not been able to free itself from **accumulating slogans**; it has not been able to reach the degree of **concentrating slogans** and thereby increasing their driving force.

The French Party in its Morocco campaign in general avoided the accumulation of slogans, thereby increasing the driving force of its agitation. An analysis conducted when the Morocco campaign was reaching its full height showed on the other hand that its lack of concentration and the incorrect combination of agitation slogans and slogans of action smashed the campaign before it had reached its completion.

This is proved by the following brief analysis of the campaign (in which a young Communist Party has shown its tenacity) against the imperialist colonial war:

1. The general estimation of the war was correct. The C.P.F. considers the Moroccan (and Syrian) war to be **imperialistic**, whereas the Lorient group and the Socialists regard it as a **reactionary** war. This difference arises from the difference in the general view of colonial policy. On this question the French Communists adopt the Lenin viewpoint (independence, self-determination), while Lorient and his group, just as the Socialists, still follow the Jaurès slogan of peaceful penetration, i.e., they do not deny colonial policy in general, but they only arm themselves against the "reactionary" methods of this policy.

2. The main slogans of the French Communist Party were:

- (a) Immediate peace;
- (b) Fraternisation;
- (c) Evacuation.

3. The first slogan was carried out and is being carried out **untiringly and consistently** and the next two **with certain vacillation**. This was partially caused by the fact that the slogan "evacuation" was badly understood by the masses and even the workers.

As a section of the French masses was interested in colonial policy, this slogan needed an extensive and profound

propagandist preparation amongst the masses and even, we may say, among Party members.

The opponents of the Communists represented "Fraternisation" as being an appeal to the soldiers to mutiny, which would bring down upon the soldiers themselves all the severity of military courts martial.

At the same time it was understood as something "lowering" for Frenchmen (fraternisation with "savages").

Both "Evacuation" and "Fraternisation" were rejected in principle by the Socialist leaders, and to a certain extent prevented the formation of a united anti-war front.

It seems that because of this the Communist Party of late has not renewed this slogan "Evacuation." As far as the slogan for fraternisation is concerned, one may agree with the following criticism: "The Communist Party committed an error in making the acceptance of the slogan for fraternisation as a definite condition for the realisation of a united front. Slogans which put forward demands that may be immediately satisfied should gradually bring the toilers to accept revolutionary slogans."

The Communist Party of France committed the error of placing the slogan for immediate conclusion of peace (i.e., a slogan of action) **on the same basis** as the slogan for evacuation, (i.e., a propaganda slogan). At the same time whereas the first was fully comprehensible to the working masses, the second demanded prolonged and energetic propagandist and agitational preparation. Without this preparation the slogan put forward for evacuation, being correct in its essence but incorrect in agitation, undoubtedly hindered the formation of a united anti-war front of the working class and peasant masses, a fact which the French Communist Party will in all probability itself acknowledge.

These examples clearly show that the Communist Parties have not yet reached these methods of agitation which Lenin developed to an art: differentiation and combination of slogans, ability to restrict and correctly combine propagandist and agitational slogans and slogans of action. Side by side with the main defects in methods of agitation, organisational defects also are very striking. The most substantial organisational defects are as follows:

1. Organisational lack of concentration. Too many campaigns. Before one has hardly had time to finish, another one commences, while campaigns on an international scale have even hindered campaigns of a national nature. Consequently the Party is not in a position to concentrate campaigns so that by extending one of these campaigns it can really reach the widest masses of workers. Therein lies the origin of this non-differentiation of campaigns in a sense that the Party does not pay sufficient attention to agitational material for the various strata of the toilers (workers, peasants, urban, petty bourgeoisie).

The election campaign of the Czecho-Slovakian Party is an exception.

2. Inadequate planning of campaigns. In this respect very considerable progress is certainly disclosed. A few years ago it was only the Communist Party of Germany which published agitational material at the centre on an all-national scale, sent to the local delegates political, organisational and agitational-methodical instructions. At the present time agitational campaigns are already being more or less systematically prepared in quite a number of Parties (Great Britain, Czecho-Slovakia and America) and agitators supplied with material. However, there are two aspects of planning which are not sufficiently represented in the agitation organisation.

(a) An appropriate distribution of forces and sections of the Party among the fields of agitation and a concentration of all their work during a campaign. It is very rarely pointed out in agitation circulars that the various sections of the Party from the trade union fraction, let us say, to the Parliamentary fraction and sports organisation, assisted with one object in agitation and in bringing the masses into the movement. An agitational campaign can neither have sufficient volume, nor adequate driving force, if the Party as a whole and each separate branch of all the organisations do not receive definite tasks for participation in the campaign.

(b) The task of forming organs for developing agitation outside the confines of the Party and a proper leadership of these organs.

These two defects hinder to a considerable degree rapprochement with the masses and the conquering of them which are the main tasks of agitation. It is very character-

istic of the present organisational state of the Communist Parties that there is almost a complete absence of any endeavour to realise the most important vital task—organised participation at public meetings of the Social-Democratic Parties and social organisations. During the stormy period of the revolution this participation amounted in most cases to breaking up meetings and later was turned into any “collision with the opponents.” At the present time when the sympathy of the working class masses is directed towards the U.S.S.R. and through the latter to the Communists, one of the most essential tasks would be organised and prepared participation in public meetings organised by the Social-Democratic Party, by petty bourgeois or peasant organisations and engaging into an ideological struggle with the speakers (question of unity, etc.).

By this means another object is also brought nearer—the formation of organisations for agitation and action outside the confines of the Party. These organisations were special formations of a direct revolutionary period, but when the working class is striving for unity, it is possible and necessary to form them also in the present though not direct revolutionary situation. The French Party commenced work in this direction with considerable successes in connection with the campaign for the united front, and subsequently in the Morocco campaign (joint trade union action, non-Party workers’ and peasants’ conferences). The subsequent fate of these organs, however, shows that the Party has been incapable of developing sufficiently far enough.

The proletarian unity committees ceased their development as the Party was unable to put any substance into them, or to turn them into organs of agitation and action based on everyday questions.

One may say practically the same thing with regard to the **committees of action**. These latter sprung up in connection with the anti-war campaign and the workers and peasant congresses (the first of which was in Paris, July 4th).

The Committees of Action which were first enthusiastically welcomed, great hopes being placed in them, soon began to exist only “on paper.” The main reason for this was that the Committees could not live on anti-war slogans alone, and the Party was unable to link them up with the general everyday struggle, make them respond sufficiently

to the living conditions of the working masses and what they were fighting for.

As the war became long-drawn-out and the French proletariat, unfortunately, began to "get used" to it, the Committees of Action with the Central Committee at their head, began more and more to lose significance.

The formation and possible development of such organs of agitation and action have great significance and are a necessary task, for over the "no man's land"—if we use the language of strategy—which has resulted during recent years between the Communist Party and the Social-Democratic masses, particularly in Germany, it is possible to build a bridge with the aid of such organs.

Finally, a few remarks concerning the tone of agitation. In accordance with the period of desire for a united front the tone had also to be changed. The feverish tone of appropriate hatred has been outlived. The tone of agitation has become more worthy, better thought-out and appropriately restrained and calmer. Side by side with this, however, the preservation of an insurrectionary tone in agitation is frequently disclosed, and superficiality in content is accompanied by superficiality in tone. There is no doubt that for agitation directed at winning the sympathy of the Social-Democratic masses, the appropriate tone should be resorted to for the sake of success, no concession being made, of course, in essential criticism.

"Propagandist Work."

The organisation of propaganda has taken the Communist Parties still more unawares. This is revealed both in the field of ideology and in the field of organisation. The last Enlarged Plenum emphasised in its decisions the necessity for ideological enlightenment, but did not draw the proper conclusions with regard to the arrangement of the organisational work of the Party.

The difficulties of propagandist work in the ideological field are mainly based on the following:

(a) Low conditions of general theoretical level, expressed in inadequacy of propagandist cadres;

(b) Lack of generalities and consciousness of the Party's own revolutionary political experience.

It is only possible to raise the theoretical level of the Party as a result of persistent and prolonged work. The Marxist-Leninist courses, which are to open in the first quarter of the coming year, are the first step towards nearing this goal. The Parties themselves have disclosed very little initiative in this field. As far as generalisation is concerned, acquaintance with the Party's own experience, much greater progress may be reported in this field.

The last crisis of the Communist Party of Germany assisted in the diffusion and assimilation of rich revolutionary experience of the political trials of the Party and a thorough acquaintance with them on the part of the leading elements and Party members. In all probability it will be possible to remove also the erroneous generalisation of the "ideology" which is a mockery of Leninism, which the Party apparatus diffused on the surface with the aid of loud advertisement. In the journal of the C.P. of France "Cahiers du Bolchevisme," one may also observe an endeavour to treat questions of Leninist policy on the basis of French economics and politics. This may be said even to a larger degree with regard to the journal of the British Party, the "Communist Review," and to a much smaller degree with regard to the journal of the Workers' Party, the "Workers' Monthly." Since the Enlarged Executive there is no doubt that progress may be observed in this field in almost all Parties. The work of the educational institutions of the Parties (courses, schools) is moving ahead, though slowly, and at a different pace in various Parties.

Two tasks faced the Parties:

- (a) Training cadres;
- (b) Mass propaganda.

It would be difficult to establish single forms in the organisation of the solution of both these tasks; but with regard to the difficulties in their realisation, one may allude to approximately analogical difficulties, especially in the way of mass propaganda.

1. General lack of propagandists;
2. Lack of material resources of Parties;

3. Lack of text books;
4. In view of re-organisation of Parties it was impossible to find firm organisational ground for mass propaganda, it was difficult to establish as to whether propaganda should be organised territorially or in factories;
5. Hesitation on the question as to the aims of the training work of schools.

In the field of organising propaganda work three parties were to the fore: the British, French and Norwegian Parties.

The British Party has completely prepared the organisation of a Central Party school with six-months' courses. The task of the school is to train leading cadres. The French Party is already finishing the second course of its Party school with two-months' courses. The Norwegian Party school has organised still shorter courses.

Such Party schools naturally can reach only a small number of Party workers and give them but a meagre training. There is no complete clarity on the question as to the aims and tasks of the schools. The question as to whether the schools should give training on general elementary questions of Communist theory and the Party practice or whether they should undertake special training for Party workers leading various branches of work, has not yet been solved in practice. This is seen also in the school curricula.

The solution of the question as to how to construct the curriculum of the central schools of our Parties still needs certain experience. Both in the field of entire propagandist activity and in the sphere of school trading the main difficulty is to combine practical everyday material with the theoretical foundations of Marxist-Leninism. For there is no doubt that the schools should immediately introduce the pupils to the vital current problems of political Party life and that the pupils should not regard Marxist-Leninism as dry theory, but as being a real guide to action. We have two draft programmes before us. One of them (of the British central school) suggests as the main subjects the following six themes: (1) Historic Materialism; (2) Trade Unionism; (3) Political Economy; (4) Political Theory; (5) Organisational Questions; (6) Imperialism and the Colonial Question. We may counterpose to this the draft

programme of the French central school, containing five main subjects: (1) Introduction on the Importance of Theory; the Conference of the Communist Party of France; (2) Marxism-Leninism. Part I. Political Economy, Historic Materialism, Imperialism, Leninism. (3) Introspective treatment of present-day situation on a national and an international scale; (4) Preparation of revolution (Leninism Part II.); (5) Tasks of the Communist Party of France.

What is common to both programmes is the absence of any single and systematic construction of the programme. We might sum up the special critical observations thus: both programmes suffer from a certain overloading of material. The connection between the separate themes is unlimited. With such an accumulation of material, partial repetitions can hardly be avoided. But the main thing is that there is no central theme around which all the remaining ones could be grouped. Only by using all themes around the central theme of Leninism can the entire programme be organically divided into three main parts. These parts are: (1) Political Economy and Economic History; (2) Leninism (Imperialism, teaching as to the active forces of revolution, agrarian and national question, etc.); (3) Organisational and the Tactical questions of the Party. By way of a generalisation of the entire material, the courses should be ended with an excursion into the realm of historic and dialectic materialism.

It stands to reason that such a diversion of material, in order to acquire live and concrete treatment, should be linked up with current political problems. Here, just as in historical problems, it is necessary to emphasise anew that only by a schematic and smoothly-organised arrangement of the school plan can the study of Marxism-Leninism be safeguarded from the dangers of an academic deviation or narrow sectarianism.

Of the forms of training of Party workers we must allude to the quite short courses of two or three days or courses arranged at week-ends (Saturday and Sunday), comprising one or two lectures.

The main methodical defect of these courses (just as with the central school) is the **lecture method** which does not permit of any serious examination of the material for study.

It is difficult to fit into the system of scholastic insti-

tutions the half-and-half system of the Leninism circles of the German Party. This system has met with failure. The so-called "Reichs Leninzirkel" (Lenin circle on a nation-wide scale) from the organisational, curriculum and methodical points of view is an abnormal formation which becomes a soil for the scholastic exercises of certain German Communist academics (Korsch and Co.) under the label of Marxism-Leninism, and an institution for expounding all kinds of anti-Marxist theories, often exceeding the bounds of naiveté.

For the time being there is still little to say about Party training institutions called upon to train the wide masses of Party members. We have very little material on the German circle system. It is also difficult for the time being to estimate the results attained up to now from the work of the elementary courses arranged by the Norwegian and French Parties. There are certain activities in the Austrian, American and Canadian Parties deserving of attention. The Italian Party, in accordance with its illegal position, has determined correspondence training as the form of its propaganda. In certain spheres of the Czecho-Slovakian Party periodical lectures for wide strata of Party members are arranged. **A mass propagandist organisation, embracing all the Party masses, only exists in the British Party.** Here attempts were also made to organise Party schools and preparatory courses for workers desiring to join the Party. With this aim groups of not more than ten are organised. The bases of these groups are the factory nuclei; however, groups may also be organised where there is no nucleus. The group leader receives the following instructions: the first task is to explain to the workers the essentiality and role of the Communist Party. Then the difference between the Communist Party and other bourgeois and proletarian parties is explained. Distinctive features and the general political policy of the Party are taken from local experiences by practical examples from factories, etc. These elementary courses contain eight lectures of serious discussion material: (1) Why you joined the Communist Party; (2) Organisational structure of the Communist Party; (3) Organised work and centralised leadership of the Party; (4) The Party and the factories; (5) The Party and the Labour Party; (6) The Party and the trade unions; (7) Party work as a whole.

There is no doubt that in such a small Party as the British it is easier to form a propagandist organisation em-

bracing the whole Party than it is in larger parties. There is no doubt, however, that the Communist Parties of Germany or of Czecho-Slovakia have no less need for the formation of an organised propagandist network.

Having left behind the period of preliminary exploration in the field of mass propaganda, the most important task is to enter on the wide road of organising mass propaganda proceeding hand-in-hand with the formation of Party factory nuclei.

A Few Concluding Remarks.

With regard to the third important sphere of agitation and propaganda—control of the press and publishing activity—we will have to deal with this on another occasion, in connection with the Agitprop Conference which is to be held at the conclusion of the Enlarged Executive. We hope that the Enlarged Executive, which will have established the limits of agitation and propaganda in the form of the political policy of the Communist Party, will issue instructions:

1. To point out once more still more energetically and definitely the absolute necessity for all sections of the Comintern to pay special attention to the ideological strengthening of the Party in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism—especially bearing in mind the Left and Right dangers of the present period of the revolution.

2. It is necessary to establish a policy of reconstructing the Parties such as will guarantee a wider scope to this work than limiting it to the organisation of Party factory nuclei in the narrow sense of the word. It must be pointed out concretely and definitely that the building up of the Party on the principle of factory nuclei leads towards winning over the masses and that the factories will only become our fortress if the organisation of the Agitprop activity of the Party goes hand-in-hand with the work of its reconstruction and does not lag far behind. It is necessary to emphasise that the formation of organs for Agitprop work is an inseparable and integral part of the Party reconstruction.

All Parties which have reached a definite degree of division of labour should form organs for agitation and propaganda at the centre, in the districts and in the localities (from the centre right down to the Party nuclei).

3. It should be pointed out that at the present period of revolution in accordance with the tactics of the united front and partial demands, agitational work should be made more profound and extensive, should be systematised and its nature and tone be rendered capable of convincing wide social democratic masses and of attracting their sympathy to the Communist Parties.

4. The Enlarged Executive should point out the changes in the structure of the working class that have taken place on an international and national scale and that, by virtue of these changes, elements from among the workers are coming forward in an ever-increasing extent who have not passed through the school of pre-war life, of workers' organisations and who have not taken part in the fights of the post-war revolutionary period. The revolutionary training of these workers who comprise a considerable number inside the Parties, and also outside, is a vital problem for the Communist Parties.

Arising from this point, the duty of every separate section is to develop its propagandist organs extensively. The Party nuclei and local territorial organisations should provide an elementary Communist training **at least to their own members** and gradually build up a network for mass propaganda in accordance with the demands of the non-Party masses. It should be energetically pointed out that it is necessary to form central Party schools for sections which have not sufficiently valued the importance of training Party workers.

If all these tasks are not fulfilled, all swearing of allegiance to Leninism remains but empty phrase-mongering.

BELA KUN.



On International Party History

(By Way of Discussion.)

I.

THE Bolshevisation of the Comintern Sections marks an epoch of the extension of internal Party training work. It is no mere chance that just as this moment propaganda questions are beginning to attract the attention of the Comintern Sections more and more.

A foremost position in this general system of training work is occupied by increasing knowledge of the past experience of the class struggle in general and in the activity of the Party in particular. Leninism, which is permeated with dialectic materialism, demands a fundamental knowledge of the stages the class struggle has passed through. Leninism rejects the metaphysical abstract approach in defining strategic tactical tasks; it demands a **concrete** approach. The latter can be worked out all the more easily, the more thoroughly we know the accumulated experiences. It was no mere chance that Lenin in decisive polemical encounters (polemics with the Mensheviks in 1905, with the Otzovists in 1908-9, etc.), drew on the experiences of the past, made a review of the concrete conditions of past stages, which have certain analogies with the present epoch. (One may recall his excursions into the history of the 1848 revolution, the thorough analysis of the stages of boycott tactics, etc. From the war epoch the well-known work of comrade Zinoviev, "War and the Crisis of Socialism" is a memorable "Party history" approach of Bolshevism to political problems.)

The question of studying the tasks of past experience in the Comintern is also of great importance for other reasons. In the ranks of its sections there are classes of workers who came into the movement **during and after** the war.

What is more, even the leading staff of many of its sections or at the best, a part of the leading circles of the various sections grew up in the post-war epoch. The experience of the class struggle, the tactical differences of the

pre-war and war epochs are, to a large extent, only superficially understood in these circles. As a result of this, and for other reasons also, which we do not intend to discuss here, the question of ideological heritage often becomes a very painful question in the sections and, therefore, the necessity to study this problem becomes vital.

On the other hand, the history of the Labour movement of the post-war epoch has been so stormy, and the accumulated experiences have become so extensive, that even now, in drawing up the immediate tasks, one cannot get along with a thorough study of these experiences.

All these factors in their ensemble dictate the necessity of systematising the work of studying the Party's past. A practical worker be he as wise as Solomon, even by an independent detailed study of this past, could never master even a rooth part of the latter. It is necessary to form an apparatus which would be specially engaged on studying Party history, i.e., to establish an **International Party history institution**. The work of the latter should be (during the coming period at any rate) of a vigorous nature, and its activity should not be considered to be that of an archive, but as propagandist and at times even agitational. All work devoted to past history should, to a greater or lesser degree link up this past with the present.

II.

Arising from what we have already said, we have practically speaking, the following fields of work in **International Party history**: (1) the pre-war epoch; (2) the war; (3) the post-war epoch; (4) historic experience of Bolshevism.

The following questions belong to the first group: firstly—study of ideological heritage in pre-war Socialism, finding out what Communist Parties can take, with what they should struggle, both with regard to prejudices and errors. In Germany, this is in the first place linked up with the study of Luxemburgism, of Left radicalism and in the second place connected with the strong points in the work of the German Social-Democrats, led by Bebel (recall for instance Lenin's estimation in "Left-wing Communism"). The Communist Party of Germany should by no means concede all the pre-war past to the Scheidemannites and Kaut-

skians and give the latter the right to come before the masses with the halo as successors of Bebel and the older Liebknecht. Work, which by means of comparisons would explain the entire degree of distinction between the present practice and political statements of German Social-Democrats and the revolutionary struggle by word and deeds of the founders of German Social-Democracy, would greatly aid the process of disintegration commencing among the Social-Democratic masses.

In France it is first of all necessary to establish clearness with regard to Jaurèsism. It often occurs that in the literary work of Communists, Jaurès is estimated as a revolutionary Socialist. While not denying Jaurès's characteristics as a fighter for peace, it is nevertheless necessary to give an extensive criticism in his entire opportunist system of views. This is all the more necessary in the epoch of the Left Bloc. On the other hand, there has not been sufficient work done to connect the present tactics of the Communist Party with the revolutionary tactics and theoretical conceptions of Guesde and Lafargue. The fall of Guesde as a revolutionary with the commencement of the war enables the French Socialist Party to speculate with his name. To counter-balance this, it is necessary to produce a number of works (utilising the latter in the agitational field) which would explain from all sides the succession of the Communist Party tactics from what was preached by Guesde (and Lafargue) during a number of decades. We will not refer to all countries, as we have taken France and Germany only by way of illustration. But there is hardly a country where the question as to pre-war inheritance has not played a substantial role in the general system of Bolshevising the Party. In Czecho-Slovakia for instance, it is particularly connected up with the pre-war views on the national question, in Holland with the explanation of the left hand and the right hand of the radical opposition of Gorter-Pannekoek, etc., etc.

Of no less importance and interest is the general question as to the ideological heritage of the Second International. It is not correct to think that it may be covered by the general problem of Luxemburgism. It is connected both with Guesdism, as an international tendency (we may recall for instance, the 1900 Paris Congress) and with German Left radicalism in its entirety.

Secondly there is the question of studying the evolution of syndicalism and anarchism. Here the task is to show the

historic narrowness of the epoch of syndicalism and anarchism and their inevitable collapse into a revolutionary and a reformist wing. Even before the war, both in Italy and in France (as well as in other countries) this process of converting Jouhaux, D'Aragona and others into ordinary supporters of class truce and offshoots of the revolutionary tendency, which should inevitably merge with the revolutionary wing of Socialism, was very clearly apparent.

For a number of countries (France and Spain in particular), where the convictions as to the possibility and necessity for the existence of pure syndicalism and prejudices as to the neutrality of the trade union movement were still strong, critical work concerning pre-war syndicalism and anarchism would play a great role in the work of Bolshevising both the Party and the revolutionary trade unions.

Thirdly we have a number of general problems of the pre-war Labour Movement, the study of which is important both in the struggle with the Second International and for internal training work. The criticism of the old **parliamentary** tactic of Social-Democracy (positive work in Parliament), the incorrect views on the **agrarian** question, the half-and-half colonial policy of the Second International and the German Social-Democracy, problems of immigration and emigration in which the narrowness of the European and American Labour aristocracy is shown, the errors of the national questions—such is the main circle of questions, the explanation of which has value in the practical (and in particular in the agitational) work of the sections.

The second group contains questions at times extremely vital for both the present day and the immediate future. Firstly, there is the question of a thorough study of the days immediately **before** and immediately **after** the commencement of the war. The importance of this work is clear in itself. Secondly, it is necessary to record the history of the **treacherous activities of the Social-Democratic Parties** and the reformist trade unions **during the war**.^{*} The description of what was done (and why) by Scheidemann and Renaudel, Jouhaux and Legien, Henderson and Vandervelde, will be the best reply to the question torturing honest Social-Democratic workers: how will these leaders or their deputies behave in the event of a new war. Thirdly, it is necessary to

^{*} This was to have comprised the third part of Zinoviev's book, "War and the Crisis of Socialism." But the question has not lost its importance even now.

produce critical work as to the dangers of Left Centrist phrases on the question of war. The experience of Longuetism, Kautskyism, MacDonaldism, etc., in 1914-18 is too instructive to be merely cast aside. Fourthly, it is necessary also to study the activity of revolutionary groups, combining this work with that of self-criticism. Fifthly, finally work in connection with the problem as to **how the war was prepared** has substantial significance. To disclose to the masses the whole history of the diplomatic preparation for the world war that went on behind the scenes, the secret military-topographical preparation, the growth of armaments unnoticed by the masses and the simultaneous torrent of pacifism both on the part of Socialist and bourgeois politicians, to disclose these things and to draw the analogy with the same processes of our day—to do this with the necessary thoroughness and seriousness means greatly facilitating the agitational-propagandist anti-war work of the entire Comintern.

The third group of questions is connected with the **post-war epoch**. The main points in this field of work are:

Firstly, studying the history of the treachery of Social-Democrats and "Labour" Parties. In the coming period, the Comintern and its sections will be faced with the question as to more profound work among the Social-Democratic masses. An important point in this work is to explain to these masses the treachery of the leading Social-Democratic circles in past years and in the 1908 revolution in particular. The Social-Democrats have already produced a number of works and memoirs on the 1918 revolution (Bauer, reminiscences of German Social-Democrats, etc.), while the Communist Parties have produced nothing. The working class suffered a number of defeats in the mass struggle, also in the victorious countries. Everyone still remembers the defeat of the Italian workers in the autumn of 1920, "Black Friday" of the British miners, and the failure of the July general strike in 1919. Meanwhile, the time is not far off when the British miners will once more enter the gigantic struggle with capitalism, and the Italian workers with Fascism. Who can maintain that the causes and lessons of past defeats have been studied by the Communist Parties, in fact that they could stand up fully armed for the struggle with the new treachery, the inevitability of which on the part of the Right trade unionists, Italian Maximalists, D'Aragona and Co., is quite evident? We do not for one moment exaggerate the momentousness of a knowledge of the past

in the current class struggle. But who can dispute the fact that year by year the masses following the Social-Democratic Parties begin to forget the past betrayals? Was it not for this that last year the Comintern carried through a wide agitational and propagandist campaign in connection with the tenth anniversary of the world war, in order to remind the workers of past lessons?

Secondly, we should study our own errors in the mass movements. In the first place this concerns the consideration of the reasons and the lessons of the defeats of the Soviet Republics (Hungary, Bavaria). Up to now we have practically nothing on these lines (if we exclude literature on the fractional struggle). It is first and foremost important to expound the problems of mutual relations with the peasantry which played such a great role in both these countries and will continue to do so in a number of European countries. The experience of blocs with Left Social-Democratic elements so bitter in Hungary and no less instructive in Bavaria (and Saxony in 1923). The experience of these republics in relation to general tactics (for maintaining power) directly after the seizure of power, is no less important.

On the other hand, in the past there existed a number of errors in the mass movement which did not lead to victory. It is sufficient to recall the March events of 1921, which were to a large degree a turning point in the tactics of the Comintern. We may and should already now commence a calm study of the experience of the 1923 defeat.

Thirdly it is necessary to summarise in a more thorough manner the tactical experience of the Comintern itself and of its sections. We experienced an epidemic of the infantile malady of Left-wing Communism in 1920-21, which we may say, constituted a whole historic phase in the European Labour movement. Without exaggeration one may say that the great number of lessons from this epoch saved the Comintern from a new epidemic of the Left-wing malady in 1923-24, thanks to the fact that the leading section, the R.C.P. firmly recalled the Leninist counsels of the 1920-21 epoch. We have already had occasion to point out that the German Party also understood the full value of reproducing Lenin's works of that epoch, republishing "Left-wing Communism." The ultra-Left movement provides rich material both in respect to practical errors and in respect to theoretical conceptions. It is complicated, it covers the most widely varied countries (Germany and Italy,

Holland and Great Britain, etc.). To sum up the experiences of this ultra-Left movement in the near future is a work of great practical importance in the light of the present recurrences of this Left-wing malady. For a number of countries (Italy, for instance), a study of the errors of this movement is a most important factor in the general process of Bolshevising the Party.

To review the experiences of the **united front** question is not a historical, but a practical question. It is no secret that in a number of sections there are frequently misconceptions in the interpretation of this problem even to this very day. Meanwhile, we have already experience of both the successful and of the unsuccessful united front. The theoretical discussion which took place in the Comintern and its sections commencing from 1922, also requires summing up. Work in this field should not only be interesting as work in connection with the past, but for quite a number of sections would be absolutely vital for current questions.

We cannot enumerate (and neither is there any need) all the problems which should be studied under the section, Comintern. But we cannot omit reference to the necessity of studying the historic experience which is connected with the "Centrist" elements in the Comintern. The zigzags of Serrati and of the Frossardites in France, the experience connected with the evolution of groups such as Levi in Germany and Höglund in Sweden if all linked together would provide rich and instructive material capable of greatly aiding the work of Bolshevising a number of sections (for example the Czech and to a certain extent the American Parties, etc.).

Finally, the fourth group of questions is comprised of work **transferring the historic experiences of Bolshevisation to the sections of the Comintern**. Up to now, this work has been approached in a very inadequate manner. Suffice it to say that the work of publishing a complete edition of Lenin's works has only just been commenced. But the work of transmitting the experience of Bolshevism (even if only literary) is not exhausted by publishing the complete works alone (the publication of this complete work is certainly one of the most important tasks of the Party History Institution). The sections of the Comintern are at present experiencing periods to a large extent analogous to the pre-war epoch of Bolshevism. The Chinese Communist Party is faced with tasks analogous to the tasks of the Russian Party

in 1905. The Italian and a number of other sections are in a situation largely identical to the epoch of 1911-14. (Illegal Party and semi-legal possibilities of work.) The Spanish, Bulgarian and other sections are experiencing a period to a certain degree analogous to the 1907-10 period in Russia. The Parties which formally are in a legal position (Czecho-Slovakian, German, etc.), come up against a number of problems in their work which also troubled the Bolshevik Party during the pre-war epoch. There are many tactical and organisational problems upon which the R.C.P. accumulated substantial experience, which are at the same time vital everyday questions for almost all sections of the Comintern. Such problems include combination of parliamentary activity with the mass struggle, illegal forms of work with legal work, the struggle with Left deviations (Otzovism and Ultiamtism). The forms of agitational work for an illegal and a semi-legal apparatus, including the press forms of leadership of the economic struggles of the masses under a semi-legal existence of the Unions, illegal work of factory nuclei, combination of everyday current tasks with the strategical tasks and many other questions.

The 10th Anniversary of October already looms on the horizon. And who can say that the experience of the Bolshevik struggle for power has been assimilated even by the leading circles of the Comintern sections? Not one but many works are necessary in order to transfer, not in the Russian language (i.e., unsteretyped) the experiences of the struggle for power to the entire Comintern. Up to now we have not had even a summary of the work (as a matter of fact it does not even exist for the Russian comrades.*) In other words it is impossible completely to Bolshevise the Comintern sections, without transmitting to them the experience of Bolshevism, including what can be transmitted by means of the activities of the Party-History Institution.† In this field it will be necessary to co-ordinate the work with the Russian Party History Institution which has already five years' experience in research work.

* In all the work in connection with the fourth group of questions we must not forget a similar reproach which Lenin once made with regard to the organisational resolutions of the Third Congress of the Comintern. (See Lenin's speech at the Fourth Congress, pp. 98-99, vol. xviii., Lenin's Collected Works, Russian Edition.)

† For it stands to reason that the main way of transmitting the experience of Bolshevism is the political leadership which the R.C.P. retains in the Comintern.

III.

Not all the questions we have alluded to are of equal importance for the present day. The assimilation of the after-war experience and the historical experience of Bolshevism are more important than the work of studying the pre-war epoch. The reinforcement of this experience in a number of forms of work certainly demands no short period. But the Comintern in this activity has caught up to a period when revolutionary enthusiasm alone and a fighting mood are but little in the preparation of work of the proletarian revolution. A knowledge of past experience, of past errors and of one's enemies is necessary. This important and responsible work can be executed by an organ uniting the veterans of the Russian and International Labour Movements, the literary forces of the entire Comintern. This is episodic work and should be done in a schematic manner; the importance and current significance of the various problems should be taken into account. Concentrated, in the hands of the Party-History Institution this work should be conducted by the latter with the aid of local, national Party-History organs, on the formation of which it is necessary to start work after the organisation of the International Party-History Institution.

The International Party-History Institution will have an endless field of work. But with the active assistance of the sections and their active workers, it will develop much more quickly than would seem at first glance. This work should not be of a casual nature.


IV.

Bauer recently wrote (in his article on the Marseilles Congress), that the strength of Communism, i.e., of the Comintern, lies in its active internationalism. This is not true only in respect to current politics, but also in respect to studying past international experience. The Second International has avoided and still avoids remembering the errors of its sections and tendencies, for it is a mechanical amalgamation of parties each connected with its own imperialist fatherland. The Parties of the Second International do not desire and are not able to present the question of studying their past (on a national and international scale) experience in its full dimensions, from the aspect of taking stock of errors. The objective trend of history compels

them to avoid the burden of this task, as the latter is filled with treachery to the cause of Socialism. The Comintern and its sections, true to the behests of Marx and Lenin, and having frequently pointed out the necessity of systematically studying the past history of the struggles as an important factor for improving current activities, have not and cannot have any fear of the Parties of the proletarian revolution thoroughly revealing their past errors. For from these errors all the present-day and what is more also the future workers of the Communist revolution will learn.

In September it will be the 10th anniversary since the summoning of the Zimmerwald Conference, at which the first foundation stones of the future edifice of the Comintern were laid. We believe that the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C. of the Comintern which is to meet shortly will celebrate this jubilee in the best manner possible by carrying a decision to form an International Party-History Institution.

N.L.



Asiatic and Pacific Ocean Labour Conferences

AT the Third Congress of the Profintern (R.I.L.U.) a resolution was passed on the necessity of calling a conference of workers' organisations of the countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean to regulate questions appertaining to the trade union movement in the East, emigration and immigration in Eastern countries and problems of "Black" and "Yellow" labour power. Only recently, due to the relentless struggle which the Chinese proletariat has been compelled to wage, has it become possible to make a beginning in the realisation of this idea. The necessity for such a Congress has become apparent in nearly all Eastern States and Colonies, having a more or less considerable working class population.

This idea has now been taken up by the Japanese Federation of Labour and its representative in the Labour Office of the League of Nations, Bundju Suzuki, and by the Labour Council of the Australian trade unions.

Suzuki, or, as the "Japan Advertiser" calls him, the Japanese Gompers, was recently in Europe and received a lesson from his Amsterdam brethren. In an interview concerning his activity at the Labour Conference in Geneva, he said that he was convinced there that the Labour representatives of all States always strive to make their activities coincide with the interests of their nations and that almost all representatives were ready to promote the interests of the capitalists of their own State. He thereupon draws the conclusion, quite correct from the reformist viewpoint, that the Asiatic representatives should also maintain such principles. The old Japanese slogan "Asia for the Asiatics," has been translated by him into Labour language—the All-Asiatic Labour Conference.

Suzuki proposes forming an Asiatic International which should counter-pose the White International. In the words of Suzuki, the representatives of Amsterdam regard this pro-

ject more or less suspiciously, seeing in it a threat to the white workers. He proposes convening the Conference in 1926; invitations to participate have been sent to Japan, China, Siam, Afghanistan, Baluchistan, the Philippine Islands, India, Egypt and Turkey. Thus we see, not all Asiatic countries are invited, including Russia, which embraces a tremendous section of Asia. The latter is probably not invited, because this would not be in the interests of the Japanese capitalists, whose interests the conference is called upon to defend.

The representatives of the Australian trade unions have opposed the convention of such a Conference and have even refused to discuss the project, deeming that a conference, which, according to Suzuki's plan, is in opposition to white workers, is incapable of solving problems troubling the organised workers of these States.

For their part, they brought up a project at Geneva for the convention of a Pacific Ocean Conference, which was not accepted. Despite this, the Labour Council of New South Wales decided to call such a conference in Sydney. The countries invited to this conference include: China, Japan, Canada, the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, Singapore, India, South America and United States, while China will not be given a decisive vote as the workers in China "are not yet sufficiently organised."

The Australian unions are the most organised and revolutionary in the Far East. The recent revolutionary activity during the seamen's strike (when nearly all the leaders of the unions made a stand against the Right-wing leaders of the British seamen's union), the moral and material support for the strikers, the threat to declare a general strike if the Bruce Government carries out its intention of deporting the Left-wing leaders of the Australian Seamen's Union from Australia, their policy during the railway strike in Queensland and their attitude towards the "Labour Government" fully prove that there are many representatives of a Left-wing current among the leaders of the Australian trade union movement. The decision regarding the restricted composition of the conference they have summoned is, therefore, all the more surprising.


Up to the present the final agenda of the conference has not yet been published. It is only known that the questions

of emigration and the formation of a committee to regulate all questions concerning Labour organisations will take first place at the conference. When we consider that the Labour organisations in the Eastern countries are not only fighting for the improvement of the workers' conditions, but also participate in the struggle for national liberation, we have serious grounds for fearing that these conferences, if they do not allow of the participation of revolutionary organisations, may do more harm than good. Suzuki—as the real Gompers of his own State—states from the very first that his aim is to form an Asiatic International to counter-balance the White International. But one cannot believe that the Australian unions are aiming at this. Perhaps, there is a certain amount of pressure here on the part of the Australian Labour Party, which is calling an independent conference for the preservation of peace in the Pacific Ocean. The Australian Labour Party holds the reins of government in five Australian States (out of a total of six States) and is preparing to stand at the head of a Federal Government in the near future. In the past, the Australian "Labour Government" has fully proved its loyalty to the British crown, and therefore the British bourgeoisie has acted quite calmly and loyally with regard to the "Labour Government" of Australia. The summoning of a conference for "the preservation of peace in the Pacific Ocean" by the Australian Labour Party in no way worries the British Conservative Government. It is not yet known who will be invited to this conference, in exactly what way the "preservation of peace in the Pacific Ocean" is to be understood. Should this mean the status quo in the policy of the imperialist States in China, or does it mean that India should not fight for the right of self-determination, or finally, is this to mean that Great Britain should abandon the construction of a naval base at Singapore? It is a well-known fact that the plan for constructing a naval base at Singapore was discussed and adopted by the former Labour Government of England, which is in close contact with the Australian Labour Party. It is true that the leaders of the Australian trade unions, are more "Left" than their British colleagues and, therefore, it is very interesting to see how they intend settling the Pacific Ocean problems at the "Labour Conference" and the "Peace Conference."

It is quite clear that the above-mentioned attempts are a reflection of the real desire of the masses to regulate the acute questions of the Labour movement in the East. This desire is expressed in various forms; the revolutionary

organisations of the East must vigilantly follow the trend of events and participate in all the congresses summoned, irrespective of the character which Suzuki or others may attach to them. At the same time a congress must be summoned at which it will be possible to bring up the problems of the Labour movement in the East in its full dimensions, in an objective and revolutionary manner, and without any pressure whatsoever on the part of the imperialist States.

J.P.



Book Reviews

“AROUND ROBESPIERRE.”—Paris, 1925.
(Mathiez).

NO matter how much has been written about the French Revolution, we are always able to find something new. This is so, firstly because the writing of history is almost entirely in the hands of bourgeois scholars and because the most valuable material has either not been touched, or has been entirely misinterpreted. Secondly, the French Revolution is much more comprehensible and more instructive for us who have experienced two revolutions than for the former generations.

The fact is also very instructive for us that the victorious classes took up with enormous vehemence and perseverance the task of calumniating the vanquished, of morally destroying those who had already been physically destroyed. Of what were not the leaders of the Revolution accused and how many lies were told and are still being told!

From the legends about Robespierre, Marat and many others, one can see what would have been the fate of the history of the October Revolution if the first proletarian revolution had to succumb—everything our enemies have spread and are spreading about us would be considered as impartially and “scientifically” established facts. The famous glass of blood, which Taine makes his heroine drink during the September murders and which still haunts the precincts of bourgeois “science,” would find worthy counterparts in the famous Chinese divisions of Moscow, Trotsky’s and Zinoviev’s “milliards” which they have accumulated abroad for all emergencies and finally in Kautsky’s socialised women. Kautsky’s “Works” alone would be the most valuable “scientific” contribution to the defamation of the first victorious proletarian revolution: the works of that Kautsky, who himself once upon a time had to champion the Anabaptists, Thomas Münzer and many others against the hatred and calumnies which were showered on them.

Fortunately, our proletarian revolution need not justify or defend itself by means of archival research work. Its deeds are firmly established and speak for themselves.

But very instructive for us are the disputes centred around Robespierre and the French Revolution, because there is a determination to forge weapons against us and the struggling European proletariat from the distorted and lying descriptions of those days. They are instructive for us also because many tactical problems of revolutionary technique and revolutionary leadership become clearer and more comprehensible for us through the analysis of great deeds and also of the tragic mistakes of our great predecessors.

For these reasons we must recommend the book of the well-known French historian Mathiez. Mathiez is an admirer of Robespierre who occupies a big place in all his works.

We have before us a collection of various articles, taken from periodicals, in which there is much interesting information.

Of course, Mathiez does not deal with the Robespierre problem in its full sense. The social background, the social structure of the Convention and the deeper motives of the Ninth Thermidor are entirely lacking. It has become traditional among French historians to keep on the surface of political history, and we find the same in Mathiez. But he has collected new material and has given us much that is interesting for a true understanding of the tragic Ninth Thermidor, its preparation behind the scenes and also of the events after the arrest of the two Robespierres, St. Just, Couthon and Lebas. He brings vividly before us the finely-spun intrigues against Robespierre. We are reminded of much from our own revolution when we learn how Robespierre junior, supported by his brother Maximilian, had to fight against the arbitrary rule of the petty tyrants in the provinces, how he is attacked as a "bad patriot" by the rabble which had joined the revolution out of fear and for low motives. The same people who on the Ninth Thermidor and in the Thermidor days destroyed all the followers of Robespierre with unprecedented haste and brutality, under the pretext of putting an end to Robespierre's and his followers' bloodthirstiness, were but the day before among the most bloodthirsty and Robespierre was too mild for them. The articles about the Ninth Thermidor and about Robespierre and Babeuf seem to us the most interesting. It is a well-known fact that most historians assert that after his liberation through the Paris Municipal forces led by Coffinthal and Henriot, Robespierre hesitated to place himself at the head of the Paris Commune in order to take up the struggle

against the Convention and to issue a manifesto to the Army and the Nation.

According to Aulard and others "legality scruples" made Robespierre hesitate. Mathiez makes short shrift with this legend. He points out that Robespierre never hesitated to place himself at the head of the insurrection against legality whenever he deemed it necessary. But it remains a fact which Mathiez does not dispute, that Robespierre let people wait several hours, that he could not for a long time make up his mind to sign the manifesto to the sections, that this meant a considerable loss of precious time which allowed the Thermidorians to rally, to force their way into the Paris Town Hall with the Convention troops and to bring to a conclusion the last act of the Thermidor tragedy. Mathiez' explanation for this is as follows: After his arrest, Robespierre was discouraged all the more so as Henriot's attempt to liberate him failed and Henriot himself was arrested and bound. He, therefore, believed for the time being only in parliamentary methods of struggle, in "legal" struggle and wanted to submit to his fate. He under-estimated his influence and popularity in the sections and also under-estimated the revolutionary energy of the Commune and the effect of his arrest, in fact he did not contemplate that it would come immediately to an armed outbreak. Although much of what Mathiez says here is correct, we do not think this explanation adequate.

How could Robespierre seriously think of "parliamentary" action in the Convention where they would not let him speak and would have immediately decided upon his arrest? What could he expect from his defence before the revolutionary tribunal when he knew perfectly well that the Thermidorians would do their utmost to make any kind of defence impossible for him as the famous law of the 22nd Prairial allowed them to do? Here space will not allow us to deal more fully with this highly interesting question. We would only like to point out what we already pointed out against Aulard: the motive for Robespierre's vacillation was certainly not personal cowardice or "legality scruples"; it was the tragic fate of the revolutionary "petty bourgeois" who lacks the social basis, which paralysed Robespierre and made him vacillate. Mathiez was certainly right when he asserted that Robespierre had not foreseen the immediate armed rising of the Commune, just because he was instinctively afraid of this revolutionary weapon, because he could not and would not go in the direction where it would necessarily drive him, where later on Babeuf wanted to go.

How instructive for us and for every revolutionary Party preparing for the seizure of power are the following lines:

"It might have been 9 p.m. when Coffinthal burst into the premises of the **Committee of General Security**, took away Henriot from his guards and took away with him all the forces protecting the Convention, even to the gendarmes of the tribunals. The Convention, left without a defender, was at the mercy of Coffinthal and Henriot. The members of the Committee fled in great confusion.

" 'Citizens,' cried Collot, the President of the Convention, 'this is the moment to die at our posts.' **But the victors instead of** carrying this operation to its logical conclusion, restricted their activities to bringing back Henriot to the Town Hall. And yet nothing would have been easier for them than to seize the members of the Committees and to impose their will on a terrified Assembly. The lost opportunity never presented itself again." (p. 216.)

With this chance missed, all was lost. We read further on:

"At 10 p.m. nearly all the sections were represented by the detachments assembled in front of the Commune. On the other hand there was, so to speak, hardly anyone before the Convention. At 2 a.m. the contrary was the case. The Commune was almost deserted and the yards of the Tuileries were being filled with cannon and armed men." (p. 222.)

Thus the few hours between 10 p.m. and 2 a.m. were enough to change the situation completely. At 10 o'clock it would have been easy for the Commune to disperse the Convention and to overcome the Thermidorians; at 2 a.m. the Convention troops could without meeting any resistance enter the Town Hall; the most fateful hour in the history of the French Revolution was in the balance. The masses did not lack revolutionary energy, courage and determination, but the social basis under Robespierre's feet was giving way, and this was the main reason of his indecision. Deprived of leadership the masses left their vacillating leader to his tragic fate. The next morning the executioner brutally tore off the blood-saturated bandage from Robespierre's deep wound and the tortured man screamed with horrible pain.

The great figure of Robespierre certainly deserves to have a full and impressive monograph dedicated to it; this is still lacking. We think no one more fit for this task than our young Communist scholars. Perhaps these lines will help to draw their attention to this by no means thankless task. Mathiez' works might prove useful in this direction.

A. MALETSKY.



PROLETARIAN SOCIALISM (MARXISM).

(Werner Sombart.)

Tenth Revised Edition of the Work: "Socialism and the Social Movement."

THIS is the present pompous title of the well-known popular little work which owes its popularity first and foremost to its very readable style. At present this "little work" has grown into a huge volume of about 1,000 pages. Let it be understood that the value of the "work" is in inverse ratio to its volume. It would really not be worth while to mention this libellous work, written in such bad taste, if Herr Sombart did not enjoy in Germany and elsewhere a certain reputation, and also if this production did not bear testimony to the terribly low standard of bourgeois "science" in the field of social sciences. By his brilliant descriptive power and by his brazen flaunting of other people's ideas Sombart was able to confuse untrained and inexperienced minds, and even in Soviet Russia there appeared in a certain periodical a discussion of Sombart's "The Bourgeois" which was a sample of an uncritical and wrong appreciation of Sombart.

Whatever was interesting and valuable in Sombart's works either did not come from Sombart at all, or rested on secondary matter, on the manner in which things were presented and not on their scientific substance. For this clown had nothing in common with real science. Even his best work, "Modern Capitalism," cannot conceal this fact.

It was enough for Sombart to forego the usual routine—and he owes this to Marx whose brain he has picked and whom he has abused; it was enough that in his writings he adopted a style which was understandable to a certain degree, to make of him a shining light. Of course, in the Marxist camp this phrasemonger would have been at once exposed as a superficial thinker. Rosa Luxemburg called him very appropriately “the Socialist dandy.” At that time he was coquetting with Socialism.

Scientific “discoveries” were always Sombart’s speciality. He made many other “discoveries” before he at last “discovered” in his latest work what Marxism and “Socialism” really represent.

One interesting “discovery” consisted of giving vent to the following epoch-making idea:

“I rather assert,” says Sombart in his work, “German National Economy in the Nineteenth Century,” “that the contact between civilised nations through trade relations is not to-day as strong as before. The national economy of the various nations taken separately does not play as important a role in the world market as a hundred or a hundred and fifty years ago. Anyhow it is wrong to take it for granted that international trade relations are assuming a relatively growing importance for modern national economy. The contrary is the case.”

Like the true genius he is, Sombart follows up this discovery by another, namely that the big capitalist countries, which are not “export countries,” are more and more receiving their “imports” for nothing—i.e., as interest of the exported capital. For Professor Sombart, however—according to Rosa Luxemburg in her “Accumulation” (p. 236), from which we have culled these quotations—export of capital as well as industrial export of commodities do not count: The time will come, says Sombart, when we will import without exporting. “Modern, sensational and foppish”—says Rosa Luxemburg. A better definition in three words could hardly be found; “modern, sensational and foppish,” put it in a nutshell. This “discovery” of Sombart is, as we can see, a promising prelude to his new discoveries on the field of social science.

Having learned something from Max Weber of the importance of religion for economic life—Weber in his turn

found the inspiration for his work in Marx and Marxism—he published on the strength of it his book “The Jews and the Economic Life” with his usual sensational tom-tom. Not a single idea in the whole book which has any value belongs to Sombart, not a single idea which belonged to Sombart was correct or valuable, but the man had the art of advertising at his finger tips. If Max Weber, a serious, modest and meritorious student, was only known and appreciated in a narrow circle, the cheapjack Sombart knew how to make the most of borrowed plumes. The same was the case also with the perfectly valueless book “The Bourgeois” which even the modest Max Weber described as Sombart’s weakest book.

When he came into contact with Simmel he endeavoured to acquire a “philosophical-theoretical” touch. And nothing is more comical than the clumsiness, the fantastical misinterpretation of every philosophical idea than the manner in which Sombart handles philosophical terms. The whole thing is nothing but a mixture of many-coloured contradictory high-flown words. Sombart “philosophising” gives the impression of an uneducated peasant who has just acquired a few foreign words and puts them to the most comical use, as often happens in a farce. If he has read Nietzsche he must, of course, take something from him in order to make capital out of it. In the book with which we deal here he manipulates now and then with Nietzsche’s “Resentment.” In 1924 Sombart treated “German science” to his “proletarian Socialism” but his prolific “genius” made in 1923 a discovery on the field of Marxian research, which breathes a truly Sombart spirit. To the memorial edition for Max Weber, Sombart contributed an article entitled: “The Beginnings of Sociology.” Here it is said “The technological-economic social theory entered in the register of learning under the unfortunate heading ‘materialist conception of history’ is also to be found in an embryonic state in the works of many writers of the 18th century, to be brought to **final completion** by John Millnar. The 19th century had only to add a few details to his idea.” Then comes a quotation from Millnar which shows that the latter whilst speaking of the influence of climate and of geographical and economic conditions as was customary with the historians of this epoch, does not possess a vestige of Marxian thought. It is an enumeration of various coincident points, and after this “staggering” quotation Sombart says.

“One will admit that this formulation of the economic social theory is in its completeness and clarity superior to the Marxist theory.”

Thus equipped "economically," "philosophically," "sociologically," "logically" and well up in all other subjects—who is there able to enumerate what Sombart knows? This would take another Sombart, and such people are few and far between—Sombart tackled his new work in which we read:

"We want to understand proletarian Socialism, and immediately comes the query from the 'philosophical' brain, the strict logician, as to what 'understand' signifies; for an ordinary mortal would perhaps imagine that it is easy to 'understand' what 'understand' means; and this is precisely the fundamental error." And now you profane people are to be told. Listen to Sombart's message.

There is a noetic "understanding," a genetic understanding, a psychological understanding, a sociological understanding and a critical understanding. We are filled with awe and respect. Are we, lowly spirits, fit to understand so many kinds of understanding?

In Molière's "Malade Imaginaire" the irate Purgon threatens the poor Argan with the following euphonic afflictions: bradypepsia, from bradypepsia to dyspepsia, from dyspepsia to apepsia, from apepsia into lienter, from lienter to dysentery, from dysentery into lydropisy. The poor Argan as white as a sheet and in deadly fear repeats the names of the diseases given him by the cruel Purgon. We, poor sinners, are in the same position: Noetic, Genetic, Psychological, Sociological, Ideological, Critical.

Mercy on us! But do not let us despair and let us see what this mysterious understanding makes us understand. We confess that we ourselves have not the courage to analyse Herr Sombart's "understanding." We will, therefore, give our readers only part of the staggering results of this many-sided understanding:

Is there a "proletarian Socialism"? Certainly, says Herr Sombart. If you want to hear something interesting on the "idea" of Socialism, here it is: Socialism may be summed up in one word—"anti-capitalism." If this is not particularly new it is not at all bad for a Sombart. What then is capitalism? asks the enquiring mind of Herr Sombart, and then we learn that every social system, hence also the capitalist system, rests on three fundamental principles: power, reason and **love**. The power principle predominates

in capitalism. The ratio, to use the elegant expression of the philosophising Sombart, or reason is also there (capitalists are, of course, reasonable, that is quite true). But now comes the best, the third link—love. Is it absent in capitalism? Heaven forbid. We are told (on page 11): "Love too is allotted room in the capitalist social edifice. It reigns supreme in the smaller units, especially in the family; it finds expression as *caritas* in charitable institutions, and is fanned into a mighty flame in times of great national convulsions. **It is above all in times of war that love has a wide field of activity in our capitalist culture.**"

This is not a joke; Herr Sombart is in dead earnest. This is the tragi-comical element in him, the more serious he is the more comical the effect. Up till then no one knew to what degree the capitalist world practised love of humanity during the world war. Just imagine how many tears were shed and what stores of love were expended for the ten million dead and twenty million cripples! And it is this humane social system that the "**proletarian Socialists**" hate so much that they want to destroy it! A Russian wit once said that a Russian differs from other people in that he is not made up of body and soul alone, but also of a third ingredient—the passport! Sombart's capitalist also consists of three parts, power, reason and love! But whilst capitalists have love in their hearts, this commodity is, of course, totally absent in the hearts of "proletarian Socialists."

Hitherto everyone thought that love, just as other social instincts, is of social origin—for they spring up from society itself, they are in their intensity, tendency and manner the outcome of social conditions. Thus it was before Sombart. But henceforth it shall be different (p. 54): "Love is non-social; it concerns itself with the inner kernel of a person, paying no head to social position and connection. It concerns itself with the sub-human nature and also particularly **with God. The gift of love is independent of all constitutional talents of human beings. Love is a heavenly light which can illumine the soul of any human being whatever its nature, exercising, of course, considerable influence on it. A particularly striking characteristic of almost all the Socialist thinkers of modern times is that they were devoid of love.**" This noble spirit waxes poetical when he begins to preach of love, and when he comes to speak about the good god he actually sobs, overwhelmed by a fullness of love.

But the "heavenly light of God" deserts him when he begins to speak of the "proletarian Socialists." Why do Socialists hate so and know nothing of love? Herr Sombart knows the reason, he says: "They are all of them social failures, people thrown out of their course, be it that they became outcasts through their birth (as illegitimate children, such as Weitling; as Jews, such as Hess, Marx and Lassalle), that their lives somehow developed abnormally." Happy Sombart! He is neither an illegitimate child (the popular saying is that such children are particularly clever, and this is certainly not noticeable in Sombart), nor a Jew and his life has on the whole developed quite normally. He was lecturer and then professor extraordinary, now he is ordinary professor and that is why the good god has protected him from any false steps, he has not become a Socialist but love, much love was apportioned to him. Unfortunately the good god was rather niggardly with respect to him about ratio, to use Sombart's phraseology, that is to say, reason.

If you want to know something about Marx, well here it is: "The Marxian family was sick body and soul; a high-bred ghetto race." How could such parents bring something reasonable into the world? The inevitable result was such a miserable being as a Karl Marx. The father was an unbalanced association Jew, without any firm principles in life; the mother, a foreigner, who could not speak German properly to the end of her days. His other milieu: a christian aristocratic family, the von Westfalen. Is it not dreadful! What then is Marx like? "It is quite correct," says Sombart "to assume, as Prinz does now and again with particular emphasis, that the will to dominate was Marx' fundamental characteristic. The result of this with Marx, as probably with most domineering people, was hatred and vindictiveness towards enemies, envy and jealousy towards rivals, overbearing imperiousness towards followers and profound contempt for humanity in general. This is the picture which we get of Marx already as a young man, as shown, for instance, by a secret report in the documents of the Royal Police Presidium of Berlin in 1853."

Thus the "noble Sombart" gets his material for the ethical characterisation of Marx from this highly scientific "source." But this is not all.

"But in reality Marx was also non-political."

"Marx had no sense of the real forces in any given historical moment."

What is the Marxian style like: as vindictive as Marx himself. There was a time when Sombart praised the Marxian style, he regrets this and says: "The more one studies Marx, the more one notices his offensive harshness, his cavilling criticism, his slovenly nonchalance, his truly Jewish 'khutzpe' (cheek), which characterise his style." Is not this charming?

How did Marx come to the materialist conception of history, to the doctrine of class struggle? Nothing simpler than this. Because of the "commonness" of his nature he looked only for what was "common" in society and in people. "The conception of the trend of history which he develops systematically in his materialist conception of history and particularly in the doctrine of class struggle originated with Marx in his profound under-estimation of human nature. **For him it was quite impossible to believe at any time in noble motives.**"

Fortunately for mankind, gunpowder was invented before Sombart came into the world, for who knows if his genius would have been equal to the invention of gunpowder, and fortunately for us and for Sombart we owe it to Marx' "commonness" that the idea of class struggle came into the world. Sombart's truly "noble" nature could not certainly give birth to such a "low" theory.

If maybe you do not think that the idea of class struggle is something downright low, you have only to read Sombart's lecture at the meeting of the Socio-Political Society, Stuttgart, published—and this is very characteristic—in Harms' world economy archive. We found the following statement there: "The idea of class struggle contains that which could be called social pessimism, namely, the conception that men are scoundrels." Not all men, Herr Sombart, not all; but certainly some of them.

Another statement from the same source: "Finally one more word about ethical criticism. Just as the absolute class struggle theory does not bear scientific criticism, just as it crumbles to pieces in the face of the only truths of the human mind, so in my opinion it crumbles to pieces before the tribunal of ethical criticism. In our appreciation of it, what will be our accusations against it? Firstly: **It is base because it reduces all human action and every historical action to the action of a blackguard.** Moreover, it is only the historical expression of a certain period, it is the expression of

our period which is in its innermost nature vile, a period which has achieved the radio and the motor cycle."

This shows that as far as the noble professor is concerned, not only the idea of class struggle is vile, not only Marx is vile, but even radio and the poor motor cycle are also vile. It is also quite logical and characteristic of the complete disintegration of bourgeois ideology that Sombart calls upon the good god for protection against Marx and the radio, for neither moral nor material forces are at his disposal.

How did Rosa Luxemburg come to be a Socialist? This is very simple: "The most extreme Socialists are always people with strong resentment. A typical example: the bloodthirsty, venomous Rosa Luxemburg who, in Germany was afflicted with a fourfold resentment: as a woman, as a foreigner, as a Jewess and as a cripple."

Apart from numerous Jews, we meet with inter-marriages which produce, seemingly by nature, unbalanced people: Guesde (mother a creole), Lafargue (mother a creole), Karl Liebknecht (mother a Jewess).

It would be doing the noble Herr Sombart too much honour if, after these samples of the "noble" mind, practical knowledge and "Arian tact" of a legitimate German child and professor such as Sombart, I were to dissect every one of his arguments which are all of the same "high standard." One is really at a loss to know what one should admire most—the organic incapacity to understand anything of Socialism and Communism, or the unheard-of arrogance, ridiculous presumption and the truly pathological hatred which convert the former clown Sombart into a university hooligan. This does not mean that the problems which Sombart raises are of no importance. He touches upon the most important questions of the theory and practice of Marxism and of the Labour movement. But it would be useless to discuss these problems with Sombart. To make such a discussion profitable, one requires a minimum of understanding, command over the material and a minimum of scientific and other decency, and all these premises Sombart lacks completely.

In conclusion a few more samples of "science" à la Sombart. In the second volume of his work, Sombart gets to deal with Bolshevism. On p. 469 he deals with the

"Cheka." In this connection he uses a nonsensical compilation which the "Times" published in 1921, according to which, 6,575 professors, 8,800 doctors, 54,650 officers, 250,000 soldiers, 355,250 members of free professions, 192,350 workers, and the trifle of 815,000 peasants were supposed to have been shot during the first three years of Bolshevik rule! The noble Sombart's comment is: "The figures seem to me to be pretty high even under Bolshevik conditions. But, after all, a couple of hundred thousand more or less do not really matter in this case." This is the real Sombart—lifesize. The whole of history is nonsense, unless figures are correct, but our hero gets over this with the greatest ease, just as he gets over Marxism, the materialist conception of history, the attitude of Marx and Hegel, etc. What all these questions look like in reality does not trouble Sombart. It is quite enough for him to scold, raise hell and present an enormous array of disjointed quotations. The appearance of great "erudition" is there; the bourgeois public will even swallow these two volumes.

How has Bolshevism come into being, what is its effect? "The Jews invented the system, the Tartars put it into practice and the Slavs have hitherto put up with it."

And for this Sombart needed so much "neotical, geneetical, psychological and critical understanding"!

In one place, Sombart quotes Nietzsche:

"The soul too, must have its definite cesspools to drain its muck. Persons, conditions, classes or the fatherland, or the world serve this purpose." The question arises why was it necessary for Sombart's soul, illumined as it was by the "light of heavenly love," to use Socialism as the cesspool, and why is the muck which has to be drained so plentiful that two whole volumes of 1,000 pages were required?

That this "effusion" is opportune, that it can be put to political use is shown by the discussions of the Sombart slosh. The German "Juristenzeitung" contains the following statement:

". . . In the new form it is a magnificent and clever collection of material of enormous value, just as the biographical appendix of the first volume and the synchronistic historical table of the Socialist movement at the beginning

of the second volume are real scientific gifts, because here we find positive dates in spite of the lack of preparatory work." (Prof. Dr. C. Brinkmann, Heidelberg.)

The "Euckenbund": ". . . The new edition differs from the former not only by its greater volume—the substance has also undergone a change, in a direction which is highly interesting for all philosophers. Formerly Socialism was mainly represented as a social and economic phenomenon, in the present edition Sombart wants to show to what moral-historical conception it belongs. . . ." (Dr. Karl Heinrich).

The "Employer": ". . . He marshals the gigantic material in a wonderfully clear and ingenious manner; the accusation gains in volume and intensity from chapter to chapter by the wealth of material as well as by the clearness of formulæ." (Prof. Dr. Karl Dunkman.)

"Tagliche Rundschau": ". . . In this work Sombart gives an exposition of Marxism which is tantamount to an annihilating criticism. . . At the height of his life he sums up his studies and research in the present tenth edition of his work which is an eye-opener to every unprejudiced reader with respect to the nature and importance of Marxism. This is of particular importance to pedagogues who to-day must reckon with the possibilities of systems which do not only presume to establish a theory, but ordain in what direction peoples shall develop and which, through the numerical strength of their followers, want to assume power. From the shelves of libraries the Marxist system penetrates through the life of the people to dissect it according to its fundamental values. But to-day it is not so much a question of mine and thine, but rather a question of the to be or not to be of our people. In a position of such great peril it behoves all the friends of the people to concern themselves with the possibilities of the fundamental values which determine tendencies, which determine the moral development and the future of the people!" (Prof. Dr. W. Rein, Jena.)

Very characteristic and important.

And finally the former "Syndicalist," Prof. Michels, in the highly "scientific" archive for social science:

"Sombart's work is a rich source of socio-psychological knowledge, and in this form certainly the best, also internationally the best we possess. . . ."

This is the judgment of bourgeois newspapers and bourgeois "savants" with respect to a work which should be discarded by every unprejudiced and scientifically honest reader regardless of his political opinion with a feeling of disgust and indignant protest. This shows that the growing acuteness of the class struggle makes it impossible for our opponents to maintain decency and scientific impartiality towards our doctrine, a fact that is very important and very encouraging for us. If our young students could scan this work they would come to the satisfactory conclusion that only opponents who are weak and doomed to defeat can and must make use of such spiritual weapons. We would certainly know how to prevent anyone in our ranks daring to treat in this manner our opponents in the scientific struggle. That this is so is sufficiently shown by the earnestness, the true knowledge and the strict impartial criticism, which we exercise with respect to bourgeois social science and which has always been exercised by our great teachers who have been so besmirched by Sombart.

MALETSKY.



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