WORLD OUTLOOK

PERSPECTIVE MONDIALE

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Mao Takes Trotsky as Target

MOSCOW TRIALS PRAISED AS FORERUNNER OF "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

By Les Evans

A curious turn in China's "cultural revolution" was the publication May 16 of a circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party that had been drafted May 16, 1966, and kept secret for an entire year.

According to Hsinhua [May 22] the circular was "drawn up under Chairman Mao's personal guidance and put forward the theory, line, principles and policies of the great proletarian cultural revolution."

In itself the circular contains nothing remarkable and is in fact somewhat obscure. What is plain is that its publication was the signal for the opening of a new campaign by the Maoist forces. A whole series of articles on the "significance" of the circular have been given wide play in the Chinese press.

Most important is an adulatory review entitled "A Great Historic Document" signed by the editorial boards of Red Flag and the Peoples Daily, the theoretical journal and newspaper of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist party. This review of the circular was carried by all the Peking papers on May 18, and was printed by both Hsinhua and Peking Review on May 19. Since then Red Flag [No. 7] has even carried an article [released by Hsinhua May 23] offering "reference material" to supplement the review.

The review, "A Great Historic Document," searches for "theoretical" precedents in the Marxist movement for the "great cultural revolution." The only historical analogy the authors come up with of a similar event, however, is the Moscow frame-up trials of the thirties. In their eyes this does not constitute a damning exposure of the nature of the "cultural revolution"; to the contrary, they consider the analogy a most favorable one.

After a long diatribe denouncing Mao's factional opponents in the leadership of the CCP as "representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the party, the government, the army and the various spheres of culture..." the authors draw their comparison:

"Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist who actually cleared out a large number of counterrevolutionary representatives of the bourgeoisie who had sneaked into the party, including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Bukharin, Rykov and company."

The notes carried in Red Flag,
No. 7, bear the pretentious title, "Reference Material for 'A Great Historic
Document.'" In the guise of history, the
notes present slanders of the victims of
Moscow Trials that were definitively exposed as frame-ups thirty years ago:

"They were the deadly enemies of Leninism. They tried in a hundred and one ways to sabotage the Leninist line on a number of important questions concerning revolution, in an attempt to strangle the socialist revolution."

An especially lengthy section is devoted to rehashing Stalin's attacks on Trotsky, as if once again Lenin's martyred comrade-in-arms were the main enemy, to be disposed of at any cost and by no matter what method:

"Trotsky opposed Lenin's and Stalin's theory that the victory of socialism
was possible in one country, and set up
against it the reactionary 'Theory of
Permanent Revolution', stating that it
was impossible for one individual country
to break free from 'material dependence
on the world economy' and impossible to
carry out socialist construction through
self-reliance."

The anonymous Maoist compiler continues:

"He opposed the dictatorship of the proletariat, saying that it would inevitably come into 'hostile collision' with the broad masses of the peasantry. He slandered and attacked Stalin for turning the state machine into an 'unheard-of tool for force and for strangling the independence of the people.'"

The unnamed defender of Stalin's authoritarian methods goes on to say of the man who organized the seizure of power in 1917 and then organized and led the Red Army that successfully defended the first workers state in history:

"Trotsky also concentrated his attack on the leading force of the dictatorship of the proletariat — the Communist party. After Lenin's death, he opposed the correct leadership of the party's Central Committee headed by Stalin under the cloak of 'restoring inner-party democracy,' 'fighting bureaucracy' and 'building the collective leadership.' He tried in vain to turn the Communist party of the

Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) into a bourgeois-type party, that is, a revisionist party for restoring capitalism."

The Maoist author takes up the question of industrializing the USSR -- without mentioning that Trotsky was the one who proposed the first five-year plan:

"Trotsky also frenziedly attacked socialist industrialization and agricultural collectivisation in his desperate efforts to restore capitalism. He clamoured that without a developed industry in the Soviet Union, agricultural collectivisation was nothing but a 'blind, crude and adventurist method'; he put forward a so-called ultra-industrial plan, which would increase taxation on the peasants in an attempt to shatter the worker-peasant alliance, disrupt the economic bond between town and country and undermine the foundations of industry.

"Zinoviev and Kamenev also raised a hue and cry about the Soviet Union being technically and economically backward and being unable to achieve the victory of socialism. In the summer of 1926, Zinoviev formed an anti-party alliance with Trotsky on a number of important questions."

This Maoist purveyor of doctored "history" relies heavily on the ignorance of his readers: otherwise he would hesitate to repeat the more than 40-year-old charges of "super-industrializer." Stalin had to drop that one in 1930 when he himself became a "super-industrializer."

"Stalin wrote a number of works," we are told, "including The Foundations of Leninism, Concerning Questions of Leninism and Questions and Answers, sharply criticizing Trotsky's opportunist fallacies and defending Leninism. He pointed out: 'Lack of confidence in the socialist potentialities of our work of construction leads to liquidationism and to degeneration....' Stalin believed that the victory of socialism was possible in one country since Soviet power was supported by the strong worker-peasant alliance and backed by the international proletariat and the people of the colonies and semi-colonies. He pointed out that the essence of Trotsky's fallacies was to 'clear the way for a bourgeois-democratic republic....' Stalin exposed Trotsky's scheme of 'restoring inner-party democracy' by showing that it was aimed at undermining the unity of the party, breaking its backbone and disintegrating it. He pointed out that the Trotskyists were 'in words -- industrialisers, but in deeds -abettors of the opponents of industrialisation.'"

After an attack on Radek, Bukharin

and Rykov as "agents of the kulaks within the party," the Maoist spokesman extols the purges organized by Stalin in which all the outstanding figures of Lenin's time were imprisoned, driven to suicide or simply executed:

"Under Stalin's leadership, the Soviet party and people resolutely waged repeated struggles against Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin and other representatives of the bourgeoisie who had wormed their way into the party, utterly frustrated their opportunist line and finally purged them from the party."

Why has Mao decided to praise the Moscow Trials at this time? Is he seeking an example from history which he wants to apply to China now? Why has he singled out a series of issues with which he associates the name of Trotsky? The proportion of material denouncing Trotsky's struggle against bureaucracy and for inner-party democracy reveals more than the Maoists perhaps intended.

When the "cultural revolution" was launched wasn't it aimed at the "bureaucrats"? How did this objective happen to become "Trotskyist" and therefore highly reprehensible?

The sudden injection of "Trotskyism as a theme in the bitter factional
struggle against the political opposition
to Mao is of particular interest because
of the clear way in which the Maoists
associate it with the content of the "cultural revolution." The "cultural revolution" is directly linked by the Maoists
themselves to Stalin's monstrous purges
of the thirties!

And, as if to drive home the point, they repeat Stalin's foul slanders against his victims, trimming them only to meet the immediate needs of the current factional struggle in China. (They omit the themes about Stalin's victims having sold out to Hitler and the Mikado. This perhaps will come later.)

What does the reiteration of these ancient slanders by the Chinese leader-ship mean for the course of their own "cultural revolution"? Lenin's Central Committee, after being framed-up by Stalin, were shot. Is that what Mao plans for his opponents in the leadership of the Chinese CP? If not, why raise the example of the Moscow Trials?

The Maoist authors of "A Great Historic Document" are not entirely uncritical of Stalin. Their criticism however is a singular one. They maintain that Stalin did not carry the purges far enough!

"But where he [Stalin] failed was in not recognising on the level of theory,

that classes and class struggle exist in society throughout the historical period of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the question of who will win in the revolution has yet to be finally settled; in other words, if all this is not handled properly there is the possibility of a come-back of the bourgeoisie."

The reason for this criticism is rather obvious. It is intended to account for Khrushchevism, which the Maoists do not see as the continuation of Stalinism—which it really is. Since they are in conflict with Stalin's handpicked heirs, while they extol Stalin himself, they are faced with the problem of explaining the origin of Khrushchevism. In absolute contradiction to Marxist method and theory, not to mention the most obvious facts, they find part of the explanation in a lack of vigilance on Stalin's part.

This "explanation" also has the advantage of justifying Mao's current way of meeting critics of his regime and policies and of making it sound more plausible that anyone who opposes the great helmsman is obviously out to restore capitalism. They "sneaked into the party."

Where the logic of Maoism leads to is indicated by the fact that Marx and Engels are no longer accepted as authorities in this field. These protagonists of proletarian democracy, whom Lenin cited in his pamphlet State and Revolution, offer no help to the cult of Mao! Or, as the Maoist spokesmen put it in "A Great

Historic Document," the article laying down the line for 700,000,000 people in China:

"Marx and Engels could not possibly solve this series of major theoretical problems at their time...Lenin died early; he did not live to solve these problems in practice."

If this is not plain enough, more is offered:

"In the early years of the 20th Century, Marxism developed into the stage of Leninism; in the present era, it has developed further into the stage of Mao Tse-tung's thought." Or to be more blunt, where a contradiction is to be found, Mao's thought replaces the teachings of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

As to the new "theory" that it is "necessary to strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat for a long period of time," there is a straightforward announcement that this will entail more upheavals. In short the "cultural revolution" is just beginning:

"The present great cultural revolution is only the first, and in the future there are bound to be many others...if things are not properly handled, a capitalist restoration is a possibility at any time. All members of the Communist party and the people of the whole country must not think that everything will be alright after one or two great cultural revolutions, or even three or four."

DEATH OF OMOTOSHO -- A BLOW TO NIGERIAN SOCIALISTS

Ibadan

At a time when the crisis in Nigeria is deepening and the country stands on the brink of civil war, the Nigerian socialist movement suffered a grievous loss with the death of J.O.B.Omotosho on May 20.

J.O.B. as he was known to his friends and comrades was the founder and first editor of Advance, "The Nigerian Workers Newspaper." He was on the editorial board of Nigerian Socialist. He was president of the Nigerian Union of Democratic Journalists; and legal advisor to many trade unions, to the Nigerian Tenants Association and other peoples organizations.

J.O.B.Omotosho was killed in an automobile accident on the Ibadan-Lagos road. He was 48. His funeral was held on May 27 at Ipoti-Ekiti where he was the inspirer and organizer of a large collective farm and development project. His program of peasant organization was just

gathering momentum in the western region.

J.O.B.Omotosho was an attorney by profession, and was always to be found defending poor peasants, workers and those under attack by the government.

He was the advocate for Dr. Victor Allen and others against false charges of sedition and treason and was the attorney who saved the life of Celestine Bassong, a fighter of the Union des Populations du Cameroun [Popular Union of the Cameroons], who would have been sent to a firing squad in the Republic of Cameroun.

At the time of his death, J.O.B. was a member of the Nigerian Academy of Scientific and Technical Workers. His last paper before that body was a brilliant piece on "Marxist Attitude to Law in Developing Nations."

His death is a tragic loss to the peoples and socialist movements.

THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" AND THE JAPANESE LEFT

By S. Okatani

Outside of China itself, the "cultural revolution" has had its greatest impact in Japan. This is not surprising, since Japan, for more than a thousand years has been under the cultural influence of China. Chinese characters are still in use in the language; and the ethical and moral precepts of Confucianism have left as deep an imprint on cultural traditions as Puritanism has in England and North America.

In academic circles, interest has been especially high. A symposium of leading "sinologists" on "The Era of the Mao Dynasty," attracted widespread attention. Among the participants was Professor Shigeo Kaizuka, a dedicated Maoist and author of Mao's biography.

One of Japan's leading physicists, Shorthi Sakata, known internationally for his work in nuclear research, caused a sensation when he stated that the young Chinese physicists would soon lead the world because they followed the teachings of Mao.

Effect Upon the Japanese Communist Party

But the most important effect of the "cultural revolution," as was to be expected, has been on the left wing of the Japanese working-class movement, especially those groups which were traditionally pro-Peking in orientation and which have felt compelled to reverse themselves. Other groups, which had previously been very critical, have now swung much closer to China.

Up until recently the Communist party had been Peking's most loyal ally, particularly after the outbreak of the Sino-Soviet conflict. Now it has become an outspoken critic.

Its new attitude, it explains, follows from adherence to the principle that it is wrong for one Communist party to interfere in the internal affairs of another. But it seems that the CP leaders are a little embarrassed over their new role. They are reluctant to explain it. Little is to be found in their many publications dealing with the question.

In the January 24 Akahata, an article, "An Answer to Slanderous Charges Made by the Red Guards," sought to justify Japanese criticisms of the leadership of the Chinese Communist party and to rationalize the expulsion of members of the Japanese Communist party who had lined up with China. But not once did it venture into polemics over ideological

differences or reveal what went on between the top leaders of the CCP and the JCP.

This half-hearted attitude raises a very serious and urgent question for the JCP. If the party has difficulty in elaborating its own attitude toward China, how can it possibly influence workers keenly interested in the "cultural revolution"? How can the leadership expel members of their own party because they support China, yet refrain from explaining the relations between the JCP and the CCP?

The crisis in the relationship between the two parties first came to the surface last year as the "cultural revolution" developed. As early as January 1966 the JCP began to advance its "independent" position in the international Communist movement.

At the national congress of presidents of party prefecture branches, General Secretary Kenji Miyamoto is reported to have stated that the JCP was not supporting the CCP for two reasons. One was the CCP's view that the Russian proposal for an international united front against U.S. imperialism was nothing but a "compromise with imperialism." The other was the demand of the CCP that the JCP launch an armed struggle in Japan.

The withdrawal of the JCP from the orbit of the CCP is rooted in the same causes that initially compelled the CCP leadership to precipitate the "cultural revolution."

One of the most important of these, aside from those offered officially, was the terrible defeat suffered by the Indonesian Communist party, which was under the influence of the CCP. It is also widely believed that the JCP brass were angered at the attempt of the Chinese to intervene in the affairs of their party at the time of the nationwide strike action April 17, 1965, in order to compel the JCP leaders to change their policies.

There is no doubt, too, that the war in Vietnam is a contributing factor.

Last February 9, Akahata published an important article entitled, "For International United Action and an International United Front against American Imperialism." This stood in sharp contrast to the Chinese position of hostility to joint action with the USSR.

Immediately after this article was published, the leaders of the JCP visited China, North Korea and North Vietnam. This coincided with a trip by representatives

of the Cuban government to the same places at the same time. The purpose of this move soon became clear.

A statement, issued in common with the Vietnamese Workers party, took as its central point the urgent necessity to establish an international united front of the workers states to defend the Vietnamese revolution.

In a speech in Korea, Miyamoto insisted that the policies of the Russian leadership have a dual nature -- revisionist and a side that is shifting away from revisionism.

This proposal for an international united front was rejected by the CCP. It became clear to the Japanese leadership that a fundamental difference existed between them and their previous allies on the question of defending the revolution in Asia.

The conflict remained muted until the world peace conference in Japan last August when it flared into the open. Under the leadership of the JCP, the Gensuikyo [Antinuclear and Antihydrogen Bomb Association — the body which sponsors an international antinuclear conference each year] had indicated where it stood in the Sino-Soviet conflict when it first became intense by expelling the pro-Russian wing of the organization. Last August another split occurred. The pro-Peking faction walked out.

In a message of greetings to the conference, Chou En-lai condemned the "Russian revisionists" and "reactionary elements"; and, much to the anger of the JCP, levelled an indirect criticism of them. The JCP leadership replied to Chou En-lai in an article in Akahata, counterposing their own position of appealing for an international united front.

The crises that plagued the world peace conference were not confined there. All the organizations where the JCP had any influence at all underwent similar experiences. We will return to these further on.

The reversal in line caused members of the Communist party considerable difficulties. After publishing the article, "For International United Action and an International United Front against American Imperialism" — the article which first indicated that important differences existed — Akahata began to make oblique references to and criticisms of a "certain dogmatic group" which "blindly follows a foreign party."

A target outside the party against which to launch public attacks was chosen. This was a small pro-Peking group calling itself the "Communist Party (Liberation

Front)," concentrated mainly in the Osaka region, headed by one Shigeo Shida. Ostensibly the JCP leaders were replying to a sharp critique which this tendency had made of both the Japanese and Indonesian Communist parties, but from a pro-Peking point of view. Obviously, the JCP leaders were shooting at bigger targets since the group which they attacked is so small that it is difficult to obtain its literary material, its only available production being a circular addressed last February to all Communist organizations.

At the August 1966 world conference where the flare-up occurred, the pro-Chinese tendency was represented by the Yamaguchi Prefecture branch of the Communist party, which called itself a branch of the "Communist Party (Revolutionary Left)." In its three publications, this tendency had castigated the leaders of the party as "revisionists who flee when they face a crisis." They called the JCP itself "an opportunist party which is joining the anti-Chinese cabal." Leading members of the tendency were expelled shortly thereafter.

The new program of the party sought to codify for the first time "independence from Moscow and Peking." In the course of adopting it, two important Central Committee members were thrown out. One of them had voted against the new line and the other had abstained. This occurred at the Central Committee meeting of August 27-29.

The two involved in this were Ruji Nishazawa, well-known for his book, A Study of Mao Tse-tung's Thought, who voted against the resolution, and Yasuji Anzai, who abstained.

Members living abroad, many of whom were correspondents for Akahata, were not spared in the struggle over the new line. Expulsions took place in East Berlin and Hanoi and there were reprisals from the other side.

A supporter of the new line, living in Peking was subjected to hooligan treatment by resident Japanese students of the pro-Peking tendency. At the Tenth National Conference of the party, these students were accused of blindly following "foreign forces" and committing a "shameful counter-revolutionary action."

In all this, perhaps the most surprising to those in Japan who follow Chinese affairs was the news that Koichi Saionji had been expelled from the JCP. He is well-known, not only because he is a Communist who came from a family that ranks high in the Japanese aristocracy, but because of his activities during World War II when he gave assistance to Dr. Sorge, the Soviet intelligence agent executed by the Japanese militarist government.

Saionji had been in Peking for a decade as a representative of the Japan-China Friendship Association. Although it was evident that his interest in China was deep, it was relatively unknown, except in top circles of the party, that he held a party card.

Uninhibited by the harsh words uttered in the past, the Russian leaders have now made approaches to the JCP, attempting to take advantage of the break with the CCP. Their public attitude appears to be more fraternal than the one they display toward their own tiny ally, the pro-Russian CP of around only 1,000 members.

Socialist Party Also Under Influence of Chinese Events

Those who were surprised at the reversal of the line of the JCP were astounded to discover that groups that did not even pretend to call themselves Communist were polarizing into differing postures on the "cultural revolution," with factions moving closer and closer to the CCP. This could already be seen at the world peace conference last August.

Representing the Study Meeting for Socialism group in the Socialist party, Yanosuke Narasaki and five other members of the party visited China and publicly expressed support for the "cultural revolution."

After the break between China and the Japan-China Friendship Association because of the latter's refusal to sign a common communiqué with the Chinese representatives during the Chinese Independence Celebrations, another Socialist party group, including Toshio Kuroda and other members of the Heiwadoshikai (Comrades for Peace) intervened, getting in touch with the CCP and signing the communiqué in place of the JCP to the satisfaction of the CCP representatives. After that they began to organize a new Japan-China Friendship Association.

These are but examples. In every mass organization in the country which is having internal difficulties because of the change in relations between the JCP and the CCP, there are strong pro-Chinese tendencies.

The present attitude of the Chinese Communist party to the Japanese Socialist party stands in glaring contrast to that of the period when the Sino-Soviet conflict first broke into the open.

Although formally the SP took a neutral position due to its sympathy for the line of "peaceful coexistence" and the program of structural reforms, it was partial to Moscow's side in the dispute. For example, Seburo Eda, general secre-

tary of the Socialist party and Hiroo Wada, head of the SP's international affairs department, were denounced by the CCP as "colleagues of the American imperialists and the revisionists." There now appears to have been a switch on this.

The formal attitude taken at the SP's annual conference was that the "cultural revolution" in China was too unstable for a definitive position to be adopted; nevertheless, under the leadership of Kozo Sasaki, president of the party, who has always been sympathetic to China, the party is moving much closer to the CCP.

The shift is due in part to the change in the SP leadership with the defeat of the Eda faction. This group had been in extreme opposition to the Communists and had bluntly refused to participate in any united-front organization around such questions as the Japanese-South Korean pact, etc. When the struggle erupted in Gensuikyo during the Sino-Soviet conflict, they seized the opportunity to abandon that organization, setting up their own antinuclear bomb association, the Gensuikin. They also split from the Japan-Soviet Friendship Association.

The Eda wing lost power to the Sasaki tendency at the national conference of the party in 1965. The Sasaki wing has a record of being more sympathetic to the Japanese and Chinese Communist parties. Because of the struggle now going on between these two parties, and because the SP is looking for new allies, the Chinese have adopted a very friendly attitude toward it.

As a result, the leadership of the SP has been subjected to severe attacks by the JCP and is being engaged by it in a factional struggle inside those mass organizations which are affected by the new line.

And what is remarkable in the midst of all this is that the old Eda faction's right-wing criticisms of the Sasaki SP leadership find a parallel in the criticisms the JCP leadership make against the pro-Chinese tendency.

What Will Be the Long-Term Effects on the Japanese Left?

At first glance, it appears very peculiar that each time turmoil is seen in a mass organization and a split occurs, the split is due to the pro-SP group pulling out and setting up a new organization, despite holding a majority in the old organization.

This was the case when Gensuikyo and the Japan-Soviet Friendship Association split at the time of the Sino-Soviet conflict. SP groups under Eda's

influence walked out.

And the same was true when the Japan-China Friendship Association and the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee split during the recent Sino-Japanese Communist party division. Jiichiro Matsumoto, the president, and many other well-known leaders of the committee, such as Haruo Okada, walked out.

Why, since they held the majority, did they not expel the minority that supported the line of the JCP? The answer is simple. They knew they would have difficulty controlling the ranks, many of whom were Communist militants.

Now that the JCP has broken from the Chinese camp, the most serious problem before it will be its ability to keep its supporters on the "independent" line.

It is now more than likely that the JCP will become integrated into what has become known today in the international Communist movement as "the third tendency," which includes the Cuban and North Korean Communist parties. Its participation in this tendency will give new scope to the colonial revolution.

But it is necessary to pay close attention to those features of the Japanese Communist party that distinguish it from the other "third tendency" parties. For instance, nationalism as a program to mobilize the masses is possible in Korea and other developing countries. In Japan it is impossible. Yet the JCP is committed to this position, a legacy of the Stalinist influence upon it and the ideological basis of its reformism.

The JCP leaders are quite unlike the Cubans, who are firm internationalists. Unlike the Cuban CP, the JCP will be unwilling to participate wholeheartedly in international campaigns.

In the past, a mainstay of JCP strength was its depicting itself as the most reliable and loyal ally of the Russian and Chinese Communist parties in Japan. Will it be able to hold onto its support and maintain its prestige among militants now that it does not have the support of either Russia or China?

The difficulties that will confront the JCP can be foreseen when one looks at Gensuikyo. First there were the expulsions of "the revisionist delegates" who were under Russian influence; then came the turn of "the dogmatists" who supported the pro-Peking tendency.

As Gensuikyo is an international body, dependent on support internationally on Stalinist connections in the various peace committees and CP front groups all over the world -- a large proportion of the delegates in the past came from this source -- which foreign delegates, and how many, will be inclined to come to the next conference? How can it keep the conference going every August without the presence of substantial foreign delegations? Isn't it possible that its competitor, Gensuikin, which is under the control of the Socialist party, and which has kept a somewhat neutral posture on the questions that presently divide the world Communist movement, will be supported by many more foreign delegations?

And Gensuikyo will be unwilling to have delegates attend its conference if they have already participated in Gensuikin. The only solution, it would seem, that could ensure adequate representation from abroad would be to unite the two organizations. If this were to occur, the CP would lose whatever degree of leadership it has been able to maintain in this field.

In comparison to the Communist party, which is monolithic, the Socialist party now consists of several factions, some of them being strongly pro-Chinese and pro-Russian. The SP leadership now has important influence in most of the left mass movements, in the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, in the Japan-China Friendship Association, in Gensuikin and the Japan-Soviet Friendship Association, to name a few.

It is obvious that at each new level of development of the Sino-Soviet conflict and at each new stage in the antagonisms between the CCP and the JCP, the Socialist party is going to be deeply affected by the differences; and it, too, is going to be rent by factional struggles.

CUBAN CAPTURED IN VENEZUELA "FOUND" HANGED IN CELL

The Venezuelan government claims that Pedro Cabrera Torres, a Cuban national who was captured in a landing made May 8 by Venezuelan guerrillas, hanged himself in his cell while awaiting trial. His body was found by a guard June 2 and the news was released the same day. The circumstances recall the death of Fabri-

cio Ojeda a year ago June 21. He, too, according to the Venezuelan government "hanged himself" in his cell shortly after being captured. In Mexico, where there is no death penalty, prisoners are shot "while fleeing." In Venezuela, it seems, they don't even flee. They just conveniently strangle themselves.

THE FUTILE EFFORT TO BAN PROLIFERATION OF THE BOMB

By Henri Valin

More than mere coincidence was involved in Lyndon Johnson's attendance at the funeral services for ex-Chancellor Adenauer. His visit to Western Europe came precisely when, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, West German foreign policy was publicly pitted against the State Department line on a crucial issue in international politics.

The coincidence can be taken as symbolical of the end of the Adenauer era, an era marked by the closest collaboration between Washington and Bonn. And, if the professional politician from Texas required no genuine grief to produce a few tears as he left the cathedral at Cologne, there is not the slightest doubt that the State Department sincerely mourned an epoch when it was considered axiomatic for American and West German foreign policy to take an identical view.

Extent and Limits of Rebirth of West German Imperialism

Amidst the chorus of encomiums accompanying the old ex-chancellor to his grave, a theme running throughout the statements of all the commentators, both East and West, was that his role had been to win back a place in the world for German capitalism after the most crushing military defeat suffered by any state in modern history.

And all the commentators were agreed that it was clearly the "cold war," the extension of the Second World War, which gave the German bourgeoisie this unexpected opportunity to make a rapid comeback. Adenauer's "genius" was nothing more than his ability to understand both the reasons for this opportunity and its limitations, while avoiding any false steps which would have made Washington suspect his loyalty to the Atlantic alliance.

In the same spirit, most German bourgeois commentators blame the State Department for the relative cooling-off in German-American relations which has occurred in recent months. They remind us how hard the West German capitalist class has tried to remain Washington's most faithful champion in Western Europe; what an effort it made to resist the temptation of a "German Gaullism" under Chancellor Erhard; the extent to which it took on itself the role of the lone European standard-bearer of the dirty war in Vietnam, which is running into more and more general condemnation in European bourgeois circles.

If this unconditional loyalty is questioned today, they say, it is because Washington has clumsily and contemptuously disregarded the vital interests of West German capitalism both in its relations with Moscow and in the sphere of nuclear armaments. The proposed treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear armaments drafted in Geneva by the Americans, Soviets, and British is said to be the source of the trouble.

In reality, the Johnson administration's policy of a "détente" in Europe is not so much the result of a deliberate choice by the State Department to loosen the ties with its "favored ally" as it is an inevitable consequence of the Vietnam war. Having opted for a policy giving top priority in the present world situation to halting and turning back the colonial revolution, the American imperialists must consequently strive to avoid a "war on two fronts" and to secure their European rear. This is the underlying meaning of the "détente."

The Chinese are correct in accusing the Soviet Union of objectively promoting aggression in Vietnam by falling into the trap of a "détente" which has already enabled the Pentagon to withdraw its troops from West Europe in order to send them straight to Vietnam.

But what the West German bourgeois commentators fail to mention in their analyses of the present cooling in German-American relations is the fundamental ambiguity which has hung over these relations since the founding of the Bonn Republic.

The American imperialists deliberately encouraged the rebirth of a great capitalist industrial power in West Germany in order to halt the advance of "Communism" in Europe. They thus helped to create a formidable competitor which has already taken more than a few markets away from them. But they had no choice, or rather, they preferred a West German capitalist competitor to a Germany completely closed to capital.

However, having learned from the experience of two world wars, the American imperialists kept some trump cards from the beginning in order to avert the build-up of a great military power in Germany. Their principal trump for this purpose was their monopoly of nuclear arms, later replaced by the treaties of Bonn and Paris which forbade the Germans direct access to nuclear arms.

It was possible for the contradic-

tion between West German imperialism's economic revival and its military weakness to remain veiled as long as NATO seemed all-powerful; the decline in NATO's military strength brought it out into the open. If German-American relations have cooled as a result of the draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear arms, it is precisely because the West German bourgeoisie's impatience to overcome this contradiction is mounting year by year, if not from month to month.

The Arms Race and Capitalist Competition

Knowing that its nuclear rearming is an extremely unpopular cause, not only with the working masses but even in capitalist circles in West Europe, the West German bourgeoisie has deftly stressed not the military but the economic side of the draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear arms drawn up by the Americans and the Soviets.

They claim, not without reason, that the treaty's provisions give the Americans a formidable advantage in the race for the celebrated "World Nuclear Market of the Seventies," which all the spokesmen of big capital speak of with all the more delectation since the present world market appears to be contracting singularly at their expense.

They voice the fear that surveillance of nuclear reactors by the Vienna International Nuclear Agency's "inspectors" would enable the Americans and the Soviets to conduct industrial espionage on a grand scale.

However, the Germans with their "rapid feeder" are in process of scoring a big advance not only over their European competitors but even over the USA and the USSR, at least in the industrial sphere (and tomorrow doubtless in the military realm -- which again proves that it is impossible in the long run to separate industrial potential from military potential). They suspect Washington of wanting to retard, if not to halt, this sensational advance of the West German nuclear industry.

These arguments have been accepted by virtually all the capitalist powers in Western Europe. An anti-American bloc won such an overwhelming majority of the votes on this question in the last two meetings of the NATO Council that Washington, recognizing its defeat, was forced to simply withdraw its draft treaty and reopen negotiations with the Kremlin on a new, heavily amended version of such a treaty.

In Asia, India and Japan also rebelled against the proposed treaty, claiming that it left them defenseless

against a "nuclear attack" (the intimation is by China), since no American nuclear guarantee is extended to these two countries.

There was even talk of the revival of a Bonn-Tokyo Axis on this occasion, or of one going from Bonn to Tokyo via New Delhi. In the case of the Japanese imperialists, concern over industrial competition doubtless plays a much more important role than preoccupation with military "security." As for the Indian bourgeoisie, it is holding fast to its criminal policy of siphoning off the tensions of its internal social contradictions, which are approaching the point of a revolutionary explosion, into conflicts with neighboring countries.

The New Delhi leaders have gone so far as to threaten to build a nuclear bomb, and thus of squandering resources which could save millions of people from famine.

Washington's retreat before the combined pressure of almost the entire world bourgeoisie is quite significant. Doubtless, the amended version of the treaty will take better account of the particular interests of the other capitalist powers. This affair pointed up more than a cooling in the relations between Bonn and Washington. It also revealed the fact that American imperialism by itself can no longer speak in the name of the entire international bourgeoisie.

Capitalist solidarity in the face of the "Communist menace" is still intact; neither NATO nor SEATO is going to collapse. But within the context of this solidarity, the problem of competition is becoming more and more extensive; and the deterioration of the international economic conjuncture is not without its role in this development. The same can be said of the altered economic relationship of forces among the big capitalist powers.

Nuclear Arms and the World Revolution

Opposition to the draft treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons came not only from the other capitalist powers aside from the USA. The People's Republic of China also opposed it. On its part, this opposition is understandable and legitimate. The Maoist leaders can be criticized for their irresponsible opposition to an international united front for the defense of the Vietnamese revolution; but one must understand their concern over self-defense in the face of the ever more clearly emerging threat of a nuclear attack against them by American imperialism.

In principle, it would certainly be preferable if the various workers states were not forced to waste their resources on manufacturing weapons of such immense cost as nuclear arms. It would be prefer-

able if Soviet arms could serve as a nuclear shield for all of the workers states.

But this ideal solution is dependent on two conditions: first, that the Soviet bureaucracy extend a nuclear guarantee to all the workers states; secondly, that it effectively internationalize control of, and access to, these arms within its own "camp."

Narrowly nationalistic and conservative, the Kremlin bureaucracy is not prepared to fulfill either of these conditions. As yet it has not even publicly declared its determination to defend China with nuclear weapons in the event of an American atomic attack and thus it objectively encourages such an aggression.

In these circumstances, the preoccupation of the workers states with self-defense, including nuclear arms and, if necessary, independent manufacture of them is perfectly legitimate. In the absence of the above-mentioned conditions, to forbid such manufacture would be equivalent to denying them the right to defend themselves effectively against the American nuclear threat.

Scientists and pacifists describe their anguish at the perspective of the proliferation of nuclear arms in the hands of governments, or even private organizations which are increasingly "irresponsible."

It is easy to understand that the idea that the government in Pretoria — to cite only one example! — or the Franco dictatorship could have such weapons in their hands tomorrow is the sort of thing that makes for real nightmares. However, those who conclude from such an agonizing perspective that the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear arms must be approved at any cost arrive at two particularly illogical conclusions.

In the first place, can it really be claimed that "extremist" and "irresponsible" governments in some small countries are the source of the principal danger of a nuclear conflagration? This is forgetting rather quickly that it was the American imperialists who first dropped nuclear bombs on Japan and that they alone, to this day, have committed such a crime —that the <u>principal</u> nuclear threat comes solely from them and their aggressive policy.

The claim that atomic or hydrogen weapons in the hands of South Africa, India, Pakistan, Israel, or Egypt could drag Washington into a world war "against its will," by an inexorable "chain reaction" is a gross sophism. The proliferation of nuclear weapons increases the risk of localized atomic conflicts; but the danger of a world war rests with Washington and with it alone.

Secondly, it is a delusion to think that the danger of proliferation can be curtailed by a treaty. Such a treaty would have the same effect as the celebrated disarmament treaties of the interwar years: that is, in practice, no effect at all.

It would require the creation of a genuine world police force; i.e., the abolition of sovereignty for all states, to make it effective. This is unrealizable under present conditions.

Thus it follows that attempts to build nuclear weapons would continue behind the veil of such a treaty and that it would simply add the risks attendant on redoubled secrecy to those already existing.

In the long run, the only way to avert the danger of nuclear destruction of the human race is universal nuclear disarmament, starting with the United States. Such disarmament implies the political and military disarmament of the imperialist bourgeoisie. Unless the world revolution goes forward, unless the American working masses acquire an ever clearer antimperialist and anticapitalist consciousness, no progress will be made toward this goal.

It will be won the day the American workers take their destiny into their own hands.

JOHNSON PLANS ELECTRONIC WALL FOR VIETNAM

Johnson's camarilla of braintrusters have come up with a new one: an "electronic barrier" to seal the border of south Vietnam.

Rowland Evans and Robert Novak writing in the June 1 New York Post describe the projected barrier as made up of "electronic mines that transmit the

slightest movement in the surrounding terrain to a central detection receiver." This would touch off a "heavy air attack on the trespassers."

Planned for the Demilitarized Zone, they suggest it could also be used on south Vietnam's border with Laos and Cambodia. The cost? A mere \$3,500,000,000.

ALARM IN JAPAN OVER ESCALATING DANGER OF WORLD WAR

The bombing of Hanoi and the advance of U.S. troops into the Demilitarized Zone set up between the two halves of Vietnam touched off fear in Japan that the world may be standing close to the brink of catastrophe.

A typical reaction was the one voiced by Tensei Jingo, a columnist in the Asahi Shimbun, whose article appeared in an English translation in the May 23 Asahi Evening News.

Now that the Demilitarized Zone has become an arena for ground fighting, he declared, "the U.S. and Saigon forces probably will reach the Ben Hai River -- the ultimate boundary. Then only the 100-meter-wide river will separate the opposing forces."

These forces may start firing at each other. What happens if the ground fighting next crosses the narrow river into the northern part of Vietnam?

"An advance into North Vietnam," continues the Tokyo columnist, "is the short fuse which would light the dynamite of an all-out clash -- in a flash, the world would be hit by a terrible situation.

"And at present, sparks are flying in the vicinity of the fuse."

In an editorial in the same issue, this influential newspaper expressed its apprehensions:

"It is true that the war in Vietnam has now reached a critical stage. The expansion of the bombings of North Vietnam has posed the danger of seriously influencing the U.S.-Soviet and U.S.-China relations, while the killing and injuring of 'innocent' people and the utter destruction of villages and fields through the 'scorched earth' strategy in South Vietnam have brought about a stage that can no longer be left alone notwithstanding the premise that 'this is war.'

"Moreover, huge American troops reinforcements are reported.

"The vicious circles of aggravation and escalation have been repeatedly carried out in this struggle, making this a war termed a 'fight without strategy.' Hence, any further escalation of the present hostilities must be thwarted by all possible means."

JOHNSON FLOUNDERS IN MIDDLE EAST CRISIS

By Joseph Hansen

In the tense crisis over the Middle East, two strange reactions in American ruling circles have caught international attention.

One is the cautious posture suddenly adopted by the Johnson administration. This stands in remarkable contrast to its trigger-happy attitude in the Dominican crisis when the policy was to shoot first and ask questions later.

The other is the display of belligerence in sectors of the capitalist class which have been expressing increasingly sharp opposition over Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam. These circles, which have insisted on the tactical inadvisability of the escalation in Vietnam and the danger that it could touch off World War III, have abruptly switched. They are insisting — and in no mild terms — that Johnson take a "firm stand" against Nasser's assertion of the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic over the Gulf of Aqaba.

The New York Times, which has campaigned persistently over the past two years for a tactical modification of U.S.

policy in Vietnam, and which has argued that Johnson's concentration on a war in Southeast Asia has caused him to slight more important interests elsewhere, especially an unparalleled opportunity to exploit the weaknesses revealed by the current government in the Soviet Union, dropped the sedate tone normally employed in its editorial columns and resorted to language not far from that to be found in the most chauvinistic gutter sheets.

On June 2, the <u>Times</u> scored de Gaulle, "who is apparently willing to throw Israel to the Egyptian sharks." It fulminated over "Nasser's illegal attempt to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba." And it did not hesitate to rattle the war drums against Moscow because of the encouragement from there to Nasser.

"Russia's present rulers are more cautious than Nikita Khrushchev," declared the editorial, "but the game they are now playing in the Middle East could prove almost as risky as the Cuban missile adventure that nearly incinerated the world and ultimately cost Khrushchev his job."

After this dark reference to the possibility of the world being incinerated and the game costing the present rulers of Russia their jobs, the Times dragged in the ancient theme about "the historic Russian expansionist drive toward warm water." This is "a kind of imperialism," we are informed, which "the capitalist nations have long since abandoned." (Are we to conclude that the capitalist nations long ago seized all the warm water they require and now reserve their expansionist drive only to warm land like Southeast Asia?)

The <u>Times</u> hints in the final sentences of the editorial at the true causes of its emotional outburst:

"Combined with this is an effort [by Moscow] to achieve a position astride West Europe's vital oil sources that could be exploited for blackmail purposes in the future. It suggests that Moscow's sweet talk in Europe may be another effort, as in 1955, to put the Allies off guard while attempting to turn NATO's critical southeastern flank."

C.L.Sulzberger, the <u>Times'</u> expert on foreign affairs, put it with notable succinctness in explaining how it happened that the U.S. which "never even pretended to have a Middle East policy prior to World War II" was "forced" to "become interested in the area."

"American oil concessions along the Persian Gulf began to show signs of incredible wealth. The region's former suzerains, Britain and France, were respectively debilitated and destroyed. Finally, Hitler's diabolical persecution drove Europe's surviving Jews to Zionism and produced dynamic Israel. Petroleum, a power vacuum and political concern over Jewish Palestine thus brought the U.S.A. into the Middle East."

To be observed is the fact that in Sulzberger's list of U.S. interests oil comes first. This is a sufficient tipoff on the reasons for the sudden transformation of the New York Times from a dove into a hawk.

Johnson, we may be sure, is not less interested in the "incredible wealth" of the Middle East than the publishers of the <u>Times</u>. Why then didn't he react to Nasser's moves with his own famous "lightning draw?"

There are several reasons. The most obvious one is that he is bogged down in Vietnam.

The <u>New York Times</u> is keenly aware of this and has been drawing some lessons about it for the edification of those entrusted with the destiny of U.S. imperialism. These make very interesting reading.



GAMAL ABDEL NASSER

For instance, in a long editorial May 31 we learn:

"It is neither accidental nor illogical that many of the same Americans who are calling for descalation and unconditional negotiations in Southeast Asia also call for firmness on the part of the United States in insisting on freedom of passage to the Gulf of Aqaba and on honoring American commitments to defend the sovereignty and independence of Israel."

According to the <u>Times</u>, no genuine commitments were ever made with respect to South Vietnam; but in the Middle East the situation is totally different. As it views the historic record, every American president since Truman has committed the U.S. both legally and morally to a firm stand in the Middle East. (The <u>Times</u>, of course, does not ask if the American people were consulted about this.)

Besides the legal and moral factors, American interests are involved. "The Middle East is the crossroads of the world, between Asia and Europe. It has been a strategic goal of Russia since Peter the Great."

Moreover, power politics must be weighed:



GAMAL ABDEL NASSER



GAMAL ABDEL NASSER

"In its great-power aspect the Middle Eastern crisis shapes up as a confrontation of the Soviet Union versus the United States. As the British and French were gradually forced out of the area following World War II, the United States took their place. The region is now of paramount strategic importance to this country, whereas until escalation of the Vietnam war, Southeast Asia was only a marginal power factor for the United States."

Last -- but not least -- a lot of
dollars are at stake:

"The Persian Gulf area produces 27 per cent of the world's petroleum and has proved global reserves of 60 per cent. American firms have a gross investment in the region of more than \$2.5 billion. There is nothing comparable in American interests that can be said of the Southeast Asian peninsula."

The <u>Times</u> concludes: "If Washington now argues that it cannot afford to take on two crucial commitments at the same time, this would be another good reason to say it is time to descalate the war in Vietnam."

The concomitant conclusion, which this influential voice of the powerful Eastern sector of the American ruling class leaves unsaid, is that Washington should escalate the crisis in the Middle East.

Here we come to another reason for Johnson's hesitation. The very extent of U.S. involvement in exploiting the oil of the Middle East dictates caution. Both Washington and London had a sobering experience on this in 1956.

When Secretary of State Dulles sought to blackmail the Egyptian government by withdrawing aid in building the Aswan dam, Nasser responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal. And when France, Britain and Israel answered this with their version of a Pearl Harbor attack on Cairo, the Soviet Union intervened very vigorously on the side of Egypt.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal was an especially traumatic experience for Western imperialism. No doubt in the discussions now going on in London and Washington over the situation, this painful memory is very much present. If Johnson and Wilson move in the Middle East along the lines of the action in the Dominican Republic, the retaliation at the expense of the U.S. and British oil interests could prove to be quite unpleasant.

Still another consideration is giving pause to Johnson. By backing Nasser, the Soviet government has committed its prestige in a way it has not yet done in Vietnam. The circumstances of this Soviet move suggest that it was done only after long consideration. A reply by Johnson involving any bluff has probably been discounted in advance.

The Pentagon must therefore weigh whether or not the crisis in the Middle East is not connected at least in part to Johnson's reckless escalation of the war in Vietnam. Did the pressure on the Soviet government finally reach such degree as to compel a counterthrust? Is this it?

The Pentagon, the State Department and the White House must surely be pondering if it would not be wise to now engage in a retreat rather than a wild plunge ahead.

When Johnson escorted Wilson into the White House, it was noted that in the accompanying ceremonies the British flag was being flown upside down. Amid laughter, this was ascribed to an error.

But the heads of the two biggest "maritime powers," two old salts who came up through the hawsehole, knew perfectly well, of course, that this is the traditional signal of distress on the high seas. No doubt they put the British ensign upside down in order to catch the attention of the other maritime powers.

In any case it symbolized their situation in the Middle East crisis.

U.S. SOLDIER CONVICTED FOR ANTIWAR OPINIONS

Pvt. Andrew D. Stapp was convicted by a U.S. army court-martial June 1 for refusing to obey an order to turn over his antiwar and socialist literature.

According to the Associated Press, the literature included copies of The Militant, works by Karl Marx and Malcolm X, and other radical publications.

"I refused to let them take my

literature," Stapp declared, "because the First Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right of all Americans to free speech...[including] the right of revolutionary socialists to organize within the Army..."

Stapp was sentenced to a reduction to the lowest pay grade, unconfined hard labor, and forfeiture of two-thirds of one month's pay.

REPORT REGIS DEBRAY BEING STARVED

Régis Debray, the French journalist seized by the Barrientos dictatorship in Bolivia, has finally been charged with something definite after being held incommunicado since April 20.

Colonel Robert Flores Becerra, who heads the permanent military tribunal in La Paz, ordered that Debray and Carl Andrew Roth, the English journalist arrested at the same time, be tried together with seven others on charges of being "authors, coauthors and accomplices" in crimes covered by twenty articles in the military code and five articles in the criminal code.

The specific charges were to be made public later. It was reported these would include "murder, incitation to subversion and violation of Bolivian sovereignty."

The names of the seven additional defendants were not reported in the press and nothing was said about Carlos Alberto Fructuoso, the Argentine journalist arrested with Debray and Roth, until May 27 when it was reported in the press that he had entered Bolivia under a false passport, that his real name was Carlos Alberto Bustos, and that he would be tried with the others.

The order to try Debray before a military tribunal was given May 22 but not announced until May 24 the day before the hearing on a writ of habeas corpus filed by Debray's attorney, Walter Flores Torrico.

Debray was not produced by the state at the hearing and the writ was denied.

Agence France-Press reported that it had learned in La Paz May 24 from "a good source" that Debray's condition is "alarming" and that he may be in danger of dying.

The same agency reported May 26 that it had learned from sources in touch with individuals who know Debray's guards that he is now in a pronounced state of weakness, alarmingly emaciated. "According to this source, the daily ration allowed those detained is one-half that of soldiers in the Bolivian army."

Meanwhile, an international campaign in behalf of Debray has been developing on a broad scale. Its biggest scope up to now has been in France where Debray is a well-known intellectual. Even de Gaulle felt compelled to intervene, although he did it in the form of a private letter to the Bolivian dictator Barrientos.

The slowness of the French Communist party in joining this campaign became something of a national scandal. Finally, forty days after Debray's arrest, l'Humanité, the organ of the French Communist party, published an article on the case by Jean Marcenac.

On May 30 some 2,000 persons, according to Le Monde, turned out at a solidarity meeting in Paris. Daniel Mayer, chairman of the League for the Rights of Man presided. Speakers included Jean-Paul Sartre and a long list of prominent figures of the French left.

In Canada a petition demanding the release of Régis Debray is being circulated and plans are in progress for a public meeting in Toronto.

In the United States fourteen professors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard University issued an appeal May 12 declaring:

"The case of Régis Debray has been singled out by Bolivian authorities because of his intellectual sympathies for Castro. He is threatened with a death sentence in his imminent judgment before a court-martial, held within a remote 'military zone.' Régis Debray, now 26, is an alumnus of the prestigious Ecole Normale Supérieure, and an 'agrégé de philosophie,' one of the most talented young French intellectuals.

"He wrote a series of articles on Cuba, and recently published a book, Revolucion en la Revolucion?, Habana and Paris 1967. Undoubtedly, Debray had sympathies for castroism, but this does not constitute prima facie evidence of his leading a guerrilla band. Whatever the facts may be, the Bolivian government has not so far brought forth any evidence establishing his activity in the guerrilla movement."

"We, the undersigned, join the appeal made by leading moral, religious, and intellectual French personalities, to request the Bolivian government to make public a full statement of the accusations, to grant the accused journalists the right to counsel, the right to see their respective ambassadors, a public and fair trial by civil authorities and the basic guarantees of due process as required in the Articles 9, 10, 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."

The initial signers of the declaration include Latin-American specialists Frank Bonilla, Albert O. Hirschman, Juan Marichal, David H.P. Maybury-Lewis, Max F. Millikan and A. Kimball Romney.

UNREST IN MEXICO

Mexico City

Things are becoming grim in Mexico. A year of repression culminated spectacularly May 15-16 with the military occupation of Hermosillo, the capital of Sonora. The mass movement there had developed even more broadly and militantly than in Morelia last October.

The struggle became acute in April when the electoral campaign opened and the question of candidates came up for decision in the Partido Revolucionario Institucional.

The local bourgeoisie, one of the richest in Mexico, had its own candidate for governor, Fausto Acosta Romo, who was defeated in the battle for nomination by the PRI six years ago. The federal government, which is closely linked with U.S. imperialism, had a different one, Faustino Félix Serna.

The present governor, Luis Encinas Johnson, popularly known as "Johnson, el pequeño" [Johnson, the little], was of course with the machine.

The struggle within the PRI was very sharp. The local bourgeoisie, aware of its disadvantageous position in the bureaucratic apparatus of the official party, turned to the popular sectors in order to exert pressure on the functionaries who were to decide on the nomination.

The students in Hermosillo, ranging from the university down to the grade schools, responded unanimously to the appeal and went out into the streets in big demonstrations. The upshot was that the populace in the city and later the entire state repudiated the "central" government and its political instrument, the PRI.

Johnson, "el pequeño," replied with repressive measures. This included asking the neighboring U.S. state of Arizona for arms, a move that had decided impact on public opinion nationally.

The popular demonstrations spread in face of the provocation, reaching the level of a semi-insurrection as the police invaded the campus, seeking the centers of political opposition. The fury of the public was such as to frighten the bourgeoisie who had touched off this chain reaction.

Acosta was called into Mexico City for consultation. He left at the beginning of May and the most consistent students in his own movement turned increasingly in the direction of uncompromising

opposition to Johnson, "el pequeño.".

The demonstrations reached such a pitch that the local government lost control. An appeal for help was sent to the federal government.

Troops were sent in and they took over everything, including the schools. A curfew was decreed in Hermosillo. The other communities in the state found themselves in virtually the same situation.

Thus, in less than a year, the Diaz Ordaz government did what even the "gorilla" Ongania has not yet done in Argentina — use troops to occupy the centers of primary and secondary education.

Among those taken in the raids was Ramón Danzós Palomino, the candidate of the Mexican Communist party. On May 28 it was reported that he was being held in the penitentiary at Hermosillo.

On the same day that Sonora underwent military occupation, at Querétaro the regime pompously commemorated the centennial of the victory of the Mexican people over Emperor Maximilian.

The secretary of public education, the novelist Agustín Yáñez, said in an official speech in the presence of President Díaz Ordaz: "The negative explosions of juvenile groups are attributable in great part to lack of civic education and the spirit of solidarity."

He said further: "Any disorders, any loss of time and energy infringing the law, slows down progress and conspires against the nation."

These were obvious allusions to the student movement in Mexico, particularly in Sonora, which is the only sector of the populace at the moment expressing the discontent existing throughout Mexico.

Only a few days after the repression in Sonora, the army had to intervene in a state in the south, Guerrero, in an area near the tourist center at Acapulco. The reason -- protests against police brutality.

A week after the repression in Sonora, university students in Campeche, at the opposite end of the country, demonstrated against the governor there.

Luis Echeverría, the secretary of the interior, said May 23 in referring to these events: "I am of the opinion, in the first place, that these incidents are much smaller in scale than those that occur normally in all countries in the world. In the second place, I believe that they have

no interconnection whatsoever, that they have no common denominator." [Emphasis added.]

The government is thus disinclined at the moment to engage in red-baiting. It wishes to avoid giving the impression that these demonstrations in widely separated regions were due to revolutionary forces. Discontent is much too general to attribute it to the left which would thus appear stronger than it really is.

However, this did not persuade the most reactionary journals to give up McCarthyism. For example the May 29 issue of the weekly <u>Tiempo</u> [Time] carried the following headline: "Mao and Castro in Mexico."

The article, a review of the many student actions in the past year in all parts of the country, offers the conclusion that what is happening in Mexico is due to "a semi-occult or subterranean power...[which] is taking advantage of every incident in Mexico -- if it doesn't create them -- in order to perpetrate excesses, resort to violence and accustom the youth and adolescents to cultivate, as the best of atmospheres, indiscipline and violence, and, basing itself on this, to resort to the use and abuse of multitudinous aggression." [Emphasis added.]

This "semi-occult power" is, natu-

rally, exposed at once: "Isn't the conclusion justified that Mexico has already become subject to the action of the obscure forces -- obscure in name but quite clear in actuality -- which, as in those areas of the world (Africa, Asia and the Americas), where the social situation offers elements favorable to the objective of undermining democracy, when it exists, are trying to open step by step, when they can't do it in giant strides, the road to subversion oriented toward a regime analogous to the one in Castroite Cuba, the Soviet Union or Red China?"

Reference is then made to Mao's "four stages" for "overcoming the democracies": agitation, terrorism, guerrilla struggles and military action to overthrow the government. The conclusion is then posed: "Is Mexico in the first stage?"

Tiempo is a semiofficial magazine. It thus reflects the thinking of the top circles of the government, presumably including the president himself. If Echeverría's declarations at the moment contradict Tiempo's hypothesis, perhaps only a matter of tactics is involved. The government is not yet prepared to resort more extensively to the McCarthyite "explanation" for living conditions that are becoming more and more insupportable to the Mexican people.

BALAGUER GIVES PAPER CONCESSION TO DOMINICAN DEPUTIES

Santo Domingo

President Balaguer conceded on the guarantees demanded by the legislators of the Partido Revolucionario Dominicano [PRD] as a condition for their returning to the legislature.

The demands of the legal opposition were:

- (1) Creation of an atmosphere of absolute democratic rights for all citizens, political parties and trade-union organizations.
- (2) The right to make radio broad-casts in the country so that the democratic parties and trade-union organizations are able to obtain time for their programs without any kind of pressure being exerted as a result against the enterprises that sell them time on the air.
- (3) Guarantees likewise for the rights of the Constitutionalists in the army and their reintegration in the regular armed forces.

The PRD deputies returned to their

seats in the legislature.

Nevertheless, three leaders of the revolutionary June 14 movement were arrested May 26 at Azua, a city west of Santo Domingo, upon returning from the capital.

Various organizations and the family of a former second lieutenant, a Constitutionalist, who was arrested and beaten by the police May 25, are afraid that he may have been killed.

Although the police deny it, the Movimiento Popular Dominicano, the Partido Comunista Dominicano and the wife of the arrested man state that he was arrested.

The PCD declares that the agents who seized the former Constitutionalist fighter belonged to the secret service of the police.

The MPD says that Valera Portes "disappeared mysteriously and none of the police headquarters will indicate where he is being held."

In Villa González, in the suburbs of Santiago, the second largest city in the country, a youth was arrested for passing out leaflets for the PCD.

In addition, a circular issued by the Asociación Dominicana de Abogados [Dominican Lawyers Association] holds that the change introduced into the law on habeas corpus represents a "dictatorial situation."

The circular indicates that "because there is no assurance that human rights are guaranteed, still less a separation of powers, we are confronted practically with a dictatorial regime and lack a constitution."

COST OF LIVING CONTINUES TO CLIMB IN BRAZIL

The real wages of Brazilian workers have fallen by 40 percent since April 1964 according to a report in the Brazilian underground workers bulletin Comitê de Emprêsa [Factory Committee], No. 8, May 1967. At today's prices it would be necessary for workers to put in eleven hours a day to maintain their 1964 standard of living. But employment is down, many factories having shifts of less than six hours.

The following table, taken from the bulletin, represents the decline in purchasing power of workers salaries in detail, comparing the amount of working time necessary to earn the price of the basic necessities in 1964 with the time now necessary.

As Comitê de Emprêsa notes, the workers standard of living was already low in 1964. Furthermore, the entries in this table do not take into account the decline of Brazilian currency vis-a-vis the dollar, which produced price rises in imported items, especially wheat and gasoline.

The table is in cruzeiros. One U.S. dollar is equal to 2,220 cruzeiros. The 1967 prices have been converted to 1964 cruzeiros to compensate for the devaluation of the currency.

D	Duda - 1 - 1004	Dut in 1000	Minutes of	Working Time
Product	Price in 1964	Price in 1967	1964	1967
Milk	95	330	27	38
Cheese	1,000	3,000	286	343
Fish	360	1,200	103	137
Beans	185	600	53	69
Rice	280	1,000	80	114
Potatoes	90	400	26	46
Fruit	130	500	<i>3</i> 7	57
Bread	_8	50	2.3	6
Eggs	170	1,100	48	126
Beef	660	2,800	188	320
Sugar	140	420	40	48
Lard	600	2,000	171	229
Salt	90	270	26	31
Vegetables	130	450	<i>3</i> 7 46	51 44
Coffee	160	390		
Codfish	1,100	4,500	314	514
Pork	780	3,400	223	389
Wheat flour	80	420	23	48
Onions	100	400	29	46
Butter	1,200	4,000	34 3	457
Oil	600	2,300	171	265

CORRECTION

In the June 5 issue of World Outlook, the line of poetry on page 561 that reads:

"Then all the men of the earth surrounded him; they looked at the body, said, filled with emotion;" should read as follows: "Then all the men of the earth surrounded him; they looked at the body, sad, filled with emotion;"

"CASTRO'S CUBA, CUBA'S FIDEL"

By Harry Ring

CASTRO'S CUBA, CUBA'S FIDEL, by Lee Lock-wood. Macmillan and Company, N.Y. Illustrated. 288 pp. \$9.95.

Like many of today's books, this one is expensive. But relative to what you usually get, it's worth scraping up the money for.

It is indicative of the changing political climate in the U.S., perhaps, that a major house like Macmillan felt free to publish a serious, honest work about Cuba. And, it must be said, they've done a technical job that's worthy of the skilled photography and objective reporting characteristic of Lee Lockwood at his best.

The book's principal feature is a probing, seven-day interview with Castro. About one-third of the interview was chopped out and published in the January issue of <u>Playboy</u> magazine along with stupid and tendentious interjections made by <u>Playboy</u>'s editor -- interjections that some unwary readers thought were Lock-wood's.

This was a particular injustice, since Lockwood is an honest reporter who seeks objectivity. He was an early partisan of the Cuban revolution but regards himself as anti-Marxist. He believes that socialist revolutions diminish individual freedom although he is hopeful that perhaps Cuba will escape this fate.

The one frustrating thing about the book is that the interview took place 21 months ago, just prior to a new period of significant political developments in Cuba.

Since the interview, the Cuban leaders have declared their virtual independence politically from both Moscow and Peking. They have sharpened their revolutionary line abroad and stepped up the struggle against bureaucracy at home.

The battle against bureaucracy has been accompanied by a deepened sociological analysis of the problem. The narrow concept that bureaucracy is largely a technical problem is being replaced by the concept that it's a matter of coping with a privilege-seeking, politically conservative strata that acts as a brake on the revolution.

Despite the time lag, the book is of the highest political value. Lockwood is familiar with Cuba. He happened to be

there on January 1, 1959, and reported on Castro's triumphal march to Havana. He made additional trips there for major U.S. publications in 1959 and 1960. Then, after four years, he returned in 1964. That visit prompted him to return in the spring of 1965 to gather material for this book.

Lockwood describes his reaction after a four-year absence:

"Almost immediately I was amazed at the apparent discrepancies which existed between what was popularly being said and believed about Cuba in the United States and what I actually saw. There had been considerable changes of course. Yet, after three weeks of traveling, including a seven-day, cross-country taken in Castro's company, I could find little evidence of the standard image of Cuba so luridly painted by American newspapers and magazines -- that of a crumbling economy, a populace in tatters and near starvation, and a political regime that had lost its popular support and was maintaining itself in power through oppression and terror. Instead, I found that, in spite of rationing, people were well-clothed and adequately fed, nearly everyone was working and had money, and -- contrary to all pronouncements by our State Department --Castro still enjoyed the support, even the affection, of the great majority of Cubans.'

Lockwood spent 14 weeks in Cuba before Fidel sat down in front of a tape recorder for a scheduled one-day interview that stretched into a record-breaking seven days. During those 14 weeks, Lockwood gathered much valuable information.

He gives fascinating descriptions of personalities whose names are known to partisans of the revolution but about whom little is known outside the country. These include portraits of Fidel's closest personal and political associates, Célia Sanchez and Dr. René Vallejo, the gifted surgeon who has been Fidel's constant companion since the days they fought together in the mountains.

There are absorbing odd bits of political information strewn through the pages. At one point Lockwood asks Fidel about the charge that he was really a Communist when he took up the struggle against Batista. Fidel tells him neither he nor Che had been Communists.

Lockwood asks: "Nor your brother Raul?"

Castro replies: "Raúl, yes. Raúl, completely on his own, while he was a student at the university, had joined the Communist Youth. But it should be said that when he went to the Moncada attack he was not behaving in a particularly disciplined way, properly speaking."

Lockwood: "You mean he broke party discipline?"

Fidel: "Exactly."

The facts, together with photos, presented by Lockwood provide an inspiring insight into the special program to train teachers for every area of the country, no matter how remote.

The training begins at a special school high in the mountains, where young men and women learn to teach while they complete their high-school education. Physical comforts are at a minimum and the schedule is rigorous. But, Lockwood reports, "In spite of the harshness of the life, the long school hours and the short vacations (90 days a year), the discipline and the morale of the students are exceptionally high."

Equally impressive is his testimony on the state of the arts in Cuba:
"Under the loosely administered patronage of the Revolution, the arts have flourished in Cuba and remained refreshingly free of the ideological influence or restraint common in other socialist cultures...Unlike other socialist countries, Cuba has not so far attempted to coerce her artists to produce only such art as can serve as propaganda for the Revolution and it shows no sign of doing so."

Lockwood's description of the rehabilitation program for political prisoners is one of the most fascinating
chapters in the book. Only those who specifically request it are enlisted as participants in the program. They are given
useful work and, where warranted, special
training. They go to school three hours a
day for a combination of regular courses
based on previous education and courses
in political education. These are described by Lockwood as "indoctrination."
But, he adds, "It is not brainwashing."

Once every 45 days, each prisoner in the program is given a pass to visit his family for three days, plus necessary travel time. The trips are on the honor system, with the prisoner simply given money for fare and meals.

On the basis of what he saw first-hand, Lockwood accepts Fidel's statement that thus far not a single prisoner has failed to return from home on time.

The interview with Fidel is wide-

ranging and difficult to treat adequately in a review. It covers Cuba's domestic policies, progress and problems; Fidel's political evolution, his view of the. world in general and of the U.S. in particular.

For this writer, Fidel's views about the political perspectives for the U.S. have been of particular interest. I have argued against his assertion in the interview, as presented in the Playboy excerpts, that there is little prospect for a revolutionary development in the U.S. At one point, as printed in Playboy, he told Lockwood:

"It would be absurd to speak at this moment of a revolution there. Perhaps there will never be a revolution in the United States in the classic sense of the word, but rather evolutionary changes. I am sure, for example, that within 500 years North American society will bear no resemblance to the present one."

In the full text this is stated less categorically. Also, Fidel concedes further on that his dim view of immediate prospects in the U.S. "perhaps is due to our great pessimism about whether the American people have much opportunity to express their own opinions, or to change a situation...we have no faith in the government of the United States and that could also have led us to a certain degree of underestimation of the people of the United States."

Elsewhere Castro showed lack of an adequate picture of the U.S. by stating that it takes the qualities of a revolutionary simply to be a liberal there.

This is an erroneous notion shared by many revolutionists around the world. They do not fully grasp that while many aspects still remain, McCarthyism has lost force in the U.S.; and, despite the best efforts of the capitalists and their government to keep McCarthyism alive, radicalism is again on the rise in the U.S. today.

It was, of course, nearly two years ago that Fidel expressed the abovequoted views about the U.S.

Since then he has seen the development of a vigorous antiwar movement from California to Maine. Its significance has not escaped him. Following the giant April 15 demonstration against the Vietnam war, he declared in a speech that the demonstration showed that the world revolutionary forces now had a worthy ally right in the United States, one that would sooner or later develop into a powerful revolutionary force. [See excerpts from Castro's speech in World Outlook May 12, p. 499.]

Much of the interview takes the form of a near debate, with Lockwood posing all of the questions that are usually thrown at defenders of the Cuban revolution. (Weren't the original aims of the revolution "betrayed"? What about free elections? And so on.) Fidel's answers show how strong his desire is to stand on well-reasoned grounds in defending the revolution.

Cuba made a deep positive impres-

sion on Lockwood. He concludes:

"There is in Cuba today much of the same spirit of excitement, of a sense of purpose, of a moral momentum, of a people making their own destiny, that charged the air when Castro's Revolution swept into power seven years ago. The fact that this spirit, this <u>élan vital</u>, has been preserved through all the years of difficulties is one of the surest signs of the revolution's health."

BOMBS AT CARNIVAL ANGER HAITIAN DICTATOR

[The following report, datelined Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and signed by Roger Tilangingue, has been translated from the April 27 issue of the Haitian underground paper, the Voix du Peuple (Voice of the People).]

* * *

Duvalier celebrated his sixtieth birthday and the tenth anniversary of his dictatorship at the same time. Everything was done to make the festivities dazzling. And the government which maintains that it doesn't have the means to undertake necessary public works nevertheless found money to underwrite an ambitious advertising campaign for tourists, for decorating the city, making up floats, hiring carnival bands, etc.

As things began, leaflets signed by our party appeared throughout the capital and its suburbs. A little tonton macoute* voiced the anger of his cohorts when -- believing it was a program for the festival -- he saw that it was really a political declaration. He said: "This PEP [Parti de l'Entente Populaire] thinks it owns the country."

In the evening of the first day of the carnival, two persons tried to seize Mrs. Max Adolphe, a deputy and executioner of Fort-Dimanche. This was a repetition of an unsuccessful attempt a few days earlier.

On the second day, a bomb exploded some 200 meters from the national palace. General panic. To halt the fleeing spectators, the <u>tonton macoutes</u> and soldiers

found no better means than to shoot into the crowd, thus increasing the number of victims.

After the explosion, Duvalier took his submachine gun and, with an escort, left the palace. His presence, it was soon clear, did not bring back those who had fled and did not prevent a second bomb from exploding a few minutes later in the parade route, near the cemetery. Once again the tonton macoutes fired their guns.

Many arrests were made. Duvalier could not contain his rage. The most disquieting occurrence for him was that the same evening, shortly after the explosions, the subcommander of the militia at the national palace, Jacques Lysius, was visited at his home by a commando group of patriots.

There was a heavy exchange of gunfire between the commandos and the tonton macoute entrenched in his house. By the time government reinforcements arrived, the assailants had retreated.

Fearfully, Duvalier sent out an emergency call for detachments of macoutes from the provinces to protect him, mainly from Artibonito and Arcahaie. He declared Port-au-Prince an occupied city and, as always, issued threats over the radio.

On the third day of the carnival the crowds were few and the number of participants considerably reduced.

We warmly salute these patriots who sabotaged Duvalier's carnival and tried to punish the worst butchers in the country. Forward to new actions to develop "panic in the year X."

^{*}Tonton macoutes -- bogeymen, the strong-arm squads maintained by Duvalier. -- W.O.

PHILIPPINE FREEDOM LEADER GIVEN LIFE SENTENCE

A Philippine court has handed down a savage sentence against a leader of the Huk resistance movement. Laging Una, "The Voice of the Filipino People," published in Los Angeles, reported on May 15:

"Silvestre Liwanag, Huk leader captured by Philippine government forces seven years ago, was sentenced to life in prison April 22 under the Anti-Subversion Law of 1957. This compounded a 10-year sentence imposed in 1963 for rebellion.

"Described as No. 3 in the hierarchy of the rebel movement, and known as Commander Linda Bie, Liwanag was betrayed by an informer out to collect a reward of 50,000 pesos [US\$12,754].

"Judge Tito V. Tizon of the court of first instance of Balanga, Bataan, found Liwanag guilty on a charge that he had continued to be a member of the central committee of the Communist Party after passage of the Anti-Subversion' Law which makes such membership a crime."

The judge rejected a defense contention that the trial placed Liwanag in double jeopardy. The judge ruled that membership in the Communist party's highest body was punishable separately from the previous trial for rebellion. Laging Una continues:

"Liwanag was captured June 21, 1960, in barrio Kalunasan, Orion, Bataan province, together with his wife Rosita. He was suffering from tuberculosis and complained that he had been given rough treatment to force him to confess to crimes.

"Judge Tizon could have imposed the death sentence, but found as a 'mitigating circumstance' the fact that the rebel leader was 'a simple farmer and has no formal education.'"

NICARAGUA -- U.S. COMPANY STORE

By Tom Sanders

The clerks running the U.S. company store in Central America known as "Nicaragua, Incorporated" realize that they will soon face new problems. The light from the fires lit by guerrilla forces in neighboring Guatemala are sufficient to throw frightening Vietnameselike shadows on Nicaragua's store windows.

However, it is nothing new for the people of Central America to be involved in wars of this kind.

William Walker's North American filibusters in the 1850's were the first to give Nicaraguans the baptism of U.S. firepower; but their visit was brief, although it met little opposition. The first invasion of Nicaragua by United States forces in the twentieth century took place in 1909; and by 1926, during the third invasion, there was major resistance.

The second occupation by U.S. troops started in 1912 and lasted for fourteen years.

It was very profitable for the foreign owners of the property and investments the soldiers "protected." The principal business venture of the New York bankers was the purchase of a modest 51% of the stock of the Pacific railway from which they enjoyed a fantastic 20.75% return annually upon their origi-

nal investment.

As a sideline, and in order to "help" the Nicaraguan government with its so-called fiscal reforms, the friendly American bankers founded the National Bank of Nicaragua as called for by Nicaraguan law, but organized the bank as a Connecticut corporation under a charter certified by the Connecticut secretary of state on June 7, 1912, the very year this occupation began!

It opened for business two months later with a board of directors composed 100% of North Americans. But the board was democratically minded and only one year later permitted the Nicaraguan government to appoint two members.

A further step towards the solution of Nicaragua's financial crisis was made by the friendly American bankers when they discovered that it was within Nicaraguan law to make the notes of the bank legal tender, eliminate import duties on necessary supplies, gain tax exemption and maintain their reserves on deposit in U.S. banks. The bankers more than showed their sense of fair play by agreeing to a time limit to their bank concession, a conservative 99 years!

Banking is difficult for people to understand, especially in a country like Nicaragua where the national literacy rate is 33%. But treaties are another

matter.

In 1926, a Liberal party revolt, headed by General José María Moncada, attempted to overthrow the regime of President Emiliano Chamorro, a general who owed his position to the U.S. marines and who showed his appreciation by signing the Bryan-Chamorro treaty.

This ceded to the United States "in perpetuity and for all time" (Article I), "free from all taxation or other public charge, the exclusive proprietary rights necessary and convenient for the construction of a canal, by way of any route over Nicaraguan territory," together with the perpetual privilege of fortifying the Corn Islands and of constructing a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, for a price of \$3,000,000 (Article III) that must remain in the U.S. to cover Nicaragua's debts and credits.

The treaty was immoral, because Nicaragua was not a free agent, and illegal because her 1905 constitution specifically forbade all public servants from signing any treaty unless authorized to do so by Congress.

In 1917 the Court of Central American Justice also declared the treaty to be illegal.

In order to maintain legality, the government cancelled the constitution and convened three constitutional congresses in a row. Each time, however, Congress retained the treaty regulation article.

The U.S. opposed Moncada in his attempt to overthrow Chamorro in 1926 and to make sure that the revolt failed, U.S. Secretary of State Kellog denounced Central America and Mexico as centers of Communist propaganda and sent the U.S. marines.

The marines soon had the situation well in hand and imposed a new election plan which was contrary to Article 84, paragraph 2, of the Nicaraguan constitution which states that Congress shall "regulate the votes, judge and declare the election of President and Vice President..."

But one of Moncada's lieutenants, a farmer and mining engineer named Augusto César Sandino, refused to acquiesce in abrogating his country's constitution. On May 24, 1927, five days after his thirty-fourth birthday, he wrote Moncada that he would not surrender his arms to the marines. He then departed, with his small band, for the northern mountains in order to resist the invasion.

Several hundred volunteers were attracted to Sandino's cause from many Latin-American countries, swelling his

effective fighting force to about 1,000 men.

The marines were so frustrated by the guerrilla tactics used that they systematically bombed the Nicaraguan villages in the guerrilla zone -- 70 in all (including Las Timas and other villages in Honduras by "mistake").

The American commander, sick of chasing shadows through the rain forests and mountains, attempted a concentration policy at Ocotal in May 1930. All inhabitants of specified areas were ordered into six designated villages by June 1, 1930. All persons found in the restricted area were considered enemies and dealt with accordingly.

By December 1932 command of the Nicaraguan National Guard, which had been operating under the marines, was entrusted to Moncada's under-secretary of foreign affairs, Anastasio Somoza, a former mechanic and storekeeper, who had received his college education in the U.S.

Somoza proved to be the kind of storekeeper the Nicaragua company store needed. On February 21, 1934, one year after the marines gave up and left Nicaragua, he sprung a trap (approved by U.S. Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane) and murdered Sandino and his chief assistants long after they had disbanded their army and established a government-sponsored cooperative farm.

With Sandino dead there was no one capable of stopping Somoza, who ruled and looted Nicaragua with a Liberal party terroristic military dictatorship for over 22 years.

Anastasio Somoza was assassinated in 1956. His two sons -- Luis, an agricultural engineer (a graduate of the University of California) and Anastasio Jr. (a graduate of West Point) -- continued the dynasty.

Luis died, reportedly of a heart attack, in April of this year. The San Francisco Chronicle reported in its obituary that he was "credited with having helped write a social security law enacted in 1956 which benefited 30,000 workers."

In 1962, as president of the country, Luis Somoza did push reform measures through Congress. The working day of domestic servants was drastically cut to 14 hours a day and they were given the legal right to one day off a week.

In June 1963 he set the minimum daily wage for any job at six córdobas [seven córdobas = U.S.\$1].

This brilliant record was not un-

marred. In June 1962, after months of futile negotiations, teachers unions in the Federación Sindical de Maestras de Nicaragua struck for higher pay. They asked for \$71 [U.S.] a month; Somoza's best offer was only \$57.

This writer tried to live in the cheapest boarding houses he could find in León and Managua, the capital, on \$100 a month and found it to be impossible.

The recent "election" was won by Luis' brother Anastasio. It remains to be seen what "reforms" he will undertake; but it can confidently be predicted that they will not be much.

That part of the "free world" known as Nicaragua is in the firm hands of a leader who heads the National Guard, who knows how to manage both police and army as well as the postal, telegraph and telephone services, and who has had experience in chasing the shadowy figures of the various Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional groups through the rain forests and mountains.

One of these days Somoza's soldiers will catch up with the Sandinistas—and then we shall see whether or not they will prove receptive to the idea of a new perspective for their country. For the Sandinistas, like Che Guevara, say:


"Wherever death may surprise us, let it be welcome if our battle cry has reached even one receptive ear and another hand reaches out to take up our



AUGUSTO CESAR SANDINO

arms, and other men come forward to join in our funeral dirge with the chattering of machine guns and new calls for battle and for victory."

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