

# Workers ACTION

No. 28  
February 2005

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## Iraqi elections – free and fair?

Building the Welsh Labour left *Respect: left party or single-issue campaign?* Domestic violence *The West's response to the Asian tsunami* How Bush got re-elected *Tension rises in the Ivory Coast* The Ukrainian elections *Broad Front takes over in Uruguay* The left-wing socialist movement in Galicia by Roman Rosdolsky

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Above: Stop the War demonstration in Whitechapel, east London, November 27, 2004. PHOTO MOLLY COOPER

Cover: A US soldier hands out information about the Iraqi elections during a patrol in Mosul, January 27, 2005  
PHOTO: PFC. ADAM SANDERS

## About Workers Action

Workers Action is a Marxist current in the labour movement.

Workers suffered a series of heavy defeats under the Tories from 1979 onwards. The Labour movement is only now beginning to show signs of recovery both in terms of the level of strike action and the election of left-wingers to leading trade union positions. But the Labour Party leadership is resolutely pro-free market and pro-business, and has yet to see a real challenge to its authority inside the party.

Workers Action believes that the most important task at the moment is a struggle to renovate the existing labour movement, politically and in the workplace, so that it can fight effectively in its own interests.

This requires a struggle in the Labour movement as it is, with all its problems and weaknesses. Workers continue to support the Labour Party far more than any other party in elections and by union affiliation. At present, attempts to get round this political fact by mounting electoral challenges to Labour are, in most cases, futile and sectarian, and are likely to lead to greater demoralisation. Most importantly, they represent an abandonment of any serious political struggle against the Labour leadership. Workers Action supporters are therefore active in the Labour Party as well as the trade unions and political campaigns.

Capitalism condemns millions to exploitation, poverty, disease and war, so that when its leading international bodies meet, they have to do so behind lines of police. However, Workers Action believes that the relative importance of the anti-capitalist movement over the last few years is a sign not of the strength of the left, but of its weakness and marginalisation. The new free market world order is based on 20 years of defeats for the international working class. Protests outside the conferences of organisations such as the WTO are a positive development in that they show that there is opposition, but must not be a substitute for building a socialist leadership in the working class.

Workers Action supports all progressive national struggles against imperialism, without placing any confidence in the leaders of such movements. Neither bourgeois nationalism, nor petty bourgeois guerrillaism, nor religious fundamentalism can advance the interests of the oppressed workers and peasants. We are for the building of a socialist leadership on an international scale.

The collapse of Stalinism in 1989, compounded by the move to the right of the Labour Party and the European Socialist parties, has resulted in an ideological crisis for the left. Some, like the SWP, deny that such a crisis exists: indeed, they claim that at the moment there is a realistic possibility of a serious electoral challenge to Labour. Others question whether the socialist project, fought for by the working class and its allies, is still viable. Workers Action believes that it is, but that to rebuild a fighting left relevant to the concerns of workers means rejecting the methods of sect-building and self-proclaimed vanguardism.

However, Workers Action has a non-dogmatic approach to this crisis of the left. We see it as an opportunity to evaluate critically many of our previously held conceptions in the light of experience. Marxism is a critical ideology or it is nothing. Socialists cannot march into the 21st century with their programme frozen in the 1920s.

If you are interested in joining us or discussing further, write to us at PO Box 7268, London E10 6TX or e-mail us at [workers.action@btinternet.com](mailto:workers.action@btinternet.com).

# Iraqi elections: legitimising plunder

On January 30, many Iraqis had the chance to vote in elections that were somewhat less than free and fair. George Bush claimed that 'the Iraqi people themselves made this election a resounding success', while Tony Blair said the elections were 'a moving and humbling experience'. What early reports clearly demonstrated was that the turnout had been high in Kurdish and Shia areas, but low in Sunni areas. In that sense, the occupying powers have had some success – success, that is, in dividing the resistance along ethnic and religious lines. But this is hardly unexpected and unlikely to go very deep, because although large numbers of Shias may well have voted, they also want the occupiers to leave.

Large sections of the Iraqi population have been disenfranchised, not through accident but precisely to ensure that a government sympathetic to US interests is elected. The occupying forces will only allow 'democracy' in as much as it legitimises the occupation and all that goes with it.

The elections seem to have been conducted according to a blueprint developed by the US in thoroughly rigged elections elsewhere in the past – exclude any candidates who might show signs of independence but create a veneer of democracy by encouraging as many parties and candidates to stand who will go along with the overall economic agenda approved by the US. For example, there might be differences between Kurdish and Shia parties, some of them quite serious, but none has yet opposed the economic shock therapy that the US is trying to impose on Iraq.

The elections selected 275 members of the Transitional National Assembly. There were no local or regional constituencies; candidates were elected on direct proportional representation across the whole of Iraq, thus ensuring that assembly members will not be subject to pressure from below. There were over 100 parties registered for the elections and around 8,000 individual candidates. Parties or individuals opposed to the occupation, or opposed to the privatisation of the Iraqi infrastructure, were not allowed on the ballot papers. In fact, most of the parties were grouped together in ethnic or religious 'lists'. Few parties published any policies, and most lists only published the names of the top few candidates, the rest of the slate remaining anonymous.

In a country where little is known about most of the parties and lists because of the absence of a recent democratic tradition, voters had to make their choice from a large number of parties, most of whose candidates and policies are unknown to them, and under conditions where meetings of more than five people are banned, thus ruling out the chance of campaigning except via TV and radio. It is clear that where people have voted in large numbers it is because they have been

told to, not because they are making any kind of democratic choice. Having flattened Fallujah, the US forces have only allowed a trickle of the 300,000 former residents back, and even then only if they agree to be fingerprinted, retina scanned, DNA tested and to carry ID cards around with them at all times. Not surprisingly, many residents have chosen not to take up this offer and have therefore not returned. It is clear that in Fallujah, at least, there was no chance of free and fair elections under US occupation. Early reports from Fallujah, Samara and Ramadi suggested that many polling stations didn't even open, and those that did only saw a limited number of voters.

The Transitional National Assembly will be charged with forming a government and electing a president and two deputies, who will hold the real power. The assembly will also be responsible for drawing up a constitution with the aim of holding new elections on December 15, 2005. Once these new elections have taken place under the new constitution, the UN approval of the military occupation runs out and the US-led coalition troops could only legally stay if invited to by the government, although it is unthinkable that the US would let any of this happen if there were the slightest possibility that the government would ask them to leave.

A broad alliance of groups and individuals under the name of the Iraqi National Foundation Congress (INFC) called for a boycott of the elections on the grounds that they did not reach even the most basic standards required to constitute free and fair elections. Indeed, it is difficult to see how elections could be free and fair when carried out under foreign military occupation and with the occupying forces deciding who can and can't stand for election, who can and can't vote, and the range of powers of the new assembly. The INFC demanded, among other things, that anyone except convicted criminals should be allowed to stand in the elections, that the occupying troops be confined to barracks, and that the elections be 'supervised by a commission of figures with known credentials of impartiality and integrity, internationally and in the Arab and Islamic world'.

Aside from the elections, the US is also using debt relief as a weapon against Iraqi independence. On November 21 last year, the Paris Club of creditor nations agreed to write off a total of 80 per cent of Iraq's debt (that is, the debt Saddam Hussein's regime built up in the 1980s when it was a Western ally), to be phased in over a number of years, in return for Iraq adopting the most stringent economic shock therapy imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. Effectively, Iraq will have to surrender its economic sovereignty and natural

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**19.3**

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resources, and open up its economy to the multinational corporations, or pay back billions of dollars that the Western banks lent the Ba'athist dictatorship.

While the US has claimed that Iraq's oil will be 'safe for the Iraqi people', everything else is to be sold off and the oil will only be safe as long as there isn't a government in place that the US can credibly claim is legitimate. Once Iraq has an elected government, the US can argue that this government has the 'right' to sell off its oil if it so chooses, while using pressure from the World Bank and the IMF to give it little option but to do just that.

The effects of neo-liberalism were dire throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 1980s and 90s. The plan for Iraq is much more wide-ranging and will be catastrophic for the Iraqi people. One of the first things to come under attack will be the system of food vouchers introduced under Saddam Hussein, which provides a rudimentary safety net for the population.

It remains to be seen whether the US will be able to achieve any or all of this as the resistance to the occupation becomes stronger and better organised by the day. The 'coalition of the willing' may have had the opportunity early on to win the hearts and minds of the wide sections of the population who detested the Ba'athist regime, but they have squandered that by their subsequent actions, and will not have that opening again.

The longer the occupation goes on, the more resentment to it will grow, and the less the occupying powers will have room for manoeuvre. At the same time, the US cannot afford to lose control of one of the world's largest oil reserves at a time when the world's supplies are running low. Eventually, the occupying forces will have to leave, but the question remains as to how much destruction and human misery they can wreak in the meantime. The stronger the Iraqi resistance, not just its military strength but the strength of the civilian population to resist the US/British coalition, and the stronger the anti-occupation movement in Britain and the US, the quicker the occupation will end. As at the start of the war, Britain could hold the key. If the British government is forced to pull out, that in turn could transform the anti-occupation movement within the US, and exacerbate the already considerable problems that the US military is experiencing with overstretch.

**WA**

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# In search of clearer, redder water

**Darren Williams** explains how and why Welsh Labour activists have formed a new rank-and-file organisation

Following the defeat of the miners' strike in 1985 and the third consecutive Tory election victory in 1987, Neil Kinnock and his allies succeeded in 'realigning' the Labour left, persuading many MPs, councillors and trade union bureaucrats who had previously supported the Bennite project that it was necessary to adapt to the 'new realities' of British politics. This gave rise to the 1987-89 Policy Review, which scrapped many of the party's longstanding policy commitments in the name of electoral expediency, and prepared the way for the more thoroughgoing revisionism of Tony Blair.

In response to the first couple of years of New Labour in government, however, a new process of realignment began within the party, which has partially reversed what happened in the 1980s. The 'hard' left had been worn down by a series of defeats over issues like Clause 4, and diminished by the departure of many activists – either into demoralised inactivity, or to join new left formations like the SLP or Socialist Alliance. Now, however, it found that it was able to work with many activists from the 'soft' left, the centre and even some who used to be considered part of the right of the party: longstanding mutual suspicions were cast aside in the name of defending Labour's post-war achievements, and any semblance of party democracy, against the Blairite offensive. In the first instance, the product of this rapprochement was simply an electoral pact for the purpose of contesting the NEC elections: the Centre-Left Grassroots Alliance. More recently, however, it has seen the creation of more substantial, campaigning organisations: Save the Labour Party and the Labour Representation Committee.

The revival of the left has taken different forms in different parts of the British state. Within the Scottish Labour Party, the Campaign for Socialism (CIS) was originally established to defend Clause 4; it adopted a newsletter, *The Citizen*, which had emerged out of the campaign against the poll tax. The CIS was, therefore, already well established when the first Blair government took office, and counted among its members a number of those elected to the Scottish Parliament in 1999 – although few of them have consistently supported a left political agenda. Wales is different again. Here, a centre left organisation – Welsh Labour Grassroots (WLG) – has come into being over the last 18 months. Popular perceptions of Welsh politics might suggest that WLG is pushing at an open door, yet – as I will show – this is a little wide of the mark.

## Welsh Labour: left policies without left-wingers?

Much has been made over the last year or so of the contrasts between the New Labour policies handed down from Westmin-

ster and the more traditional Labourism represented by Rhodri Morgan's administration in Cardiff – and with some justice. Welsh schools have neither selection nor league tables nor standard assessment tests (SATs). The private sector has little role in either education or health. PFI has effectively been abandoned, at least centrally, by the Assembly. Bus travel for pensioners and the disabled and access to museums and galleries are free of charge. NHS prescription charges are being phased out altogether. Free school breakfasts are to be made available to all schoolchildren. There is a (limited) student grant. Most recently, the Assembly government has published a consultation paper, *Making the Connections*, which explicitly rejects market competition and consumer 'choice' as a basis for improving public services, in favour of an alternative model based on collaboration and partnership. At the same time, it has belatedly begun the 'bonfire of the quangos' promised by Ron Davies several years ago. Rhodri famously summed this up in a speech in December 2002, in which he talked of putting 'clear red water' between Wales and Westminster.

All this might give the impression that the Welsh Labour Party as a whole is a bastion of the left. This, unfortunately, is not the case. Notwithstanding the proud record of militancy of the Welsh working class, its political representatives have tended to be part of the establishment. Three consecutive Labour leaders – Callaghan, Foot and Kinnock – represented Welsh constituencies and they rarely faced their toughest critics close to home. The rank-and-file Labour left has historically been weak within Wales. Bennism briefly flourished in the early 1980s – when there was even a *Cardiff Labour Briefing* – but was finally outmanoeuvred by Kinnock, with leading figures like Ron Davies co-opted into the leadership. In the 20 years of its existence, the Socialist Campaign Group has counted only one Welsh MP among its members: Llew Smith, whose politics are certainly not consistently 'left'.

The Wales Campaign Group – the 'official' organised left within Welsh Labour – slogged away through the dark days of the 1990s, but declined in size and influence and disappeared altogether at the end of the decade. Arguably its demise became inevitable when it shut down in 1995-97, unable to take a position on what was then the most important issue in Welsh politics – the Assembly – because of Llew Smith's opposition to anything that smacked of 'nationalism'.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, a new group, Welsh Labour Action (WLA), was formed to campaign for the strengthening of Labour's devolution proposals, seeking to achieve the same powers and electoral arrangements

for the Welsh Assembly as had already been promised to the Scottish Parliament. While many of its objectives remained unrealised, it made a significant contribution to the debate around devolution both within and outside the party. Politically, however, it was a heterogeneous group, united by little beyond the commitment to self-government. Moreover, the election of the first Assembly in 1999 saw several of its leading members become part of the new political establishment, and WLA too disappeared. Consequently, at the end of the first Blair government in 2001 – by which time dissent within Labour ranks at the British level had gathered significant momentum – there was no grassroots left body in Wales to turn members' discontent with New Labour into organised opposition.

### Palace politics

*Of course, there have been numerous political battles within Welsh Labour in recent years, over the policies of the Assembly, its future as an institution and the internal functioning of the party. But these have largely been fought out at the level of the political bureaucracy (often they remain behind closed doors, save for gossipy tidbits leaked to the lobby correspondents at the Assembly). Even where there has been significant rank-and-file discontent – as over the decision to form a coalition with the LibDems in October 2000 – ordinary members' views have been voiced publicly by dissident members of the bureaucracy (MPs, AMs, councillors or trade union officials), rather than by activist groups. At the very most, discontented members have tended to sound off within official party meetings, rather than building a more permanent vehicle for their views.*

The absence, until recently, of an organised grassroots left has meant that any socialist critique of New Labour and of the weaknesses in Welsh Labour have been overshadowed by political cleavages that are not strictly left-right in character. Principal among these has been the tension between the bureaucracy and activists, especially in south Wales valleys CLPs, over the selection of candidates. The bureaucracy is charged, as in England and Scotland, with imposing its own preferred candidates at the expense of local members' ability to exercise their democratic choice. There is certainly much substance in this, examples being the exclusion from the 1999 list of Assembly candidates of prominent left-wingers such as the Tower Colliery miners' leader, Tyrone O'Sullivan, and the WLA chair, Gareth Hughes, for blatantly spurious reasons such as 'lack of experience'.

The selection disputes that have proven most controversial, however, have been over the attempt to ensure gender balance. In

1998, the Welsh Labour executive committee adopted the policy of 'twinning' CLPs, introducing joint selection contests that required that a woman Assembly candidate be selected in every other constituency. This policy resulted in the Assembly having 30 women among its 60 members – which is all the more impressive in view of the fact that there have only ever been seven women MPs representing Welsh constituencies. At the time, however, twinning was highly controversial, and by no means all of its opponents were hardened reactionaries. Many activists who were 'left' on public service and economic issues saw it as more important to defend members' right to elect their own representatives, than to address the exclusion of women from political power in Wales. Moreover, the most vocal opponent of such attempts to ensure gender balance has been Llew Smith. When he announced his intention to retire at the forthcoming general election, Transport House insisted that his successor in Blaenau Gwent would be chosen from an all-women shortlist. Llew – predictably – denounced this as an attempt to impose a Blairite woman rather than a local left-winger, who might just happen to be a man. He and the constituency's Assembly Member, Peter Law, led a boycott of the selection process, which seems to have been supported by the majority of CLP activists. Maggie Jones, a Blairite Unison official and Labour NEC member, was duly selected – apparently confirming Llew's prognosis. Of course, a more robust socialist response to the issue would have been to put up a local, left-wing woman against Jones. Any idea that no such person could be found in a supposedly active, left-wing CLP could hardly have been credible.

Llew's 'left' credentials, and the bureaucracy's high-handed approach to the issue, have allowed him to represent the supporters – *any* supporters – of all-women shortlists as the right wing, which is palpably false. Others, however, who share his views on this issue but not, say, his support for re-nationalisation, do not even bother to cast the issue in such terms: rather, they see a remote leadership of metropolitan sophisticates in Cardiff using undemocratic means to foist their trendy liberal-feminist dogma on the common-sense, valleys working class activists. This is almost a *Daily Mail* worldview, but the situation is not helped by the failure of Rhodri et al to recognise that the argument for positive action to attack gender inequality – while it may have been won within the liberal intelligentsia in the 1960s, and in the metropolitan Labour left in the 1980s – still has to be patiently argued for within sections of 'Old Labour'. (The issue is unlikely to go away, as Peter Law has threatened to

stand as an independent parliamentary candidate against Maggie Jones. If he does, he will automatically be expelled from the party – and from the Assembly Labour group, thereby reducing Labour's representation from 30 to 29 of the 60 seats, and threatening the demise of Rhodri Morgan's administration.)

### Red or pink water?

The failure on the part of some Welsh 'Old Labourites' to see Rhodri as much better than Tony Blair may be partly due to the fact that he initially seemed to promise little that would make a material difference to their lives. His development of 'Welsh Labour' as a current politically distinct from New Labour was initially associated with constitutional/democratic – rather than social and economic – issues: the *right* to pursue a distinctive Welsh agenda, rather than a clear idea of the *substance* of such an agenda.<sup>1</sup>

Although several of Welsh Labour's flagship policies were introduced early in Rhodri's premiership, it was more than two years after his ousting of Alun Michael before he publicly suggested that there was a coherent, social democratic philosophy behind his governmental programme. In retrospect, it is difficult to know how far such a philosophy preceded the concrete policies, and how far Welsh Labour was 'making it up as it went along'. Either way, the immediate impetus for the 'clear red water' speech was surely the need to distance Welsh Labour from the Blair government's policies to avoid another disaster in the 2003 Assembly elections.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, the focus of the Welsh Labour project has subsequently been very much on 'bread and butter' issues (the exception this year has been the debate around the Richard Commission on the Assembly's powers and electoral arrangements – but this was established at the behest of the Liberal Democrats, as part of the coalition deal). The fact that pensioners can travel the length and breadth of Wales by bus without paying a penny, or that NHS prescriptions will soon be free for everyone – as they already are for those under 25 or over 60 – can only bolster Labour's popular support. In most aspects of public service, people in Wales know that they benefit from a more supportive and inclusive approach than in England – the major exception being Wales's persistently lengthy NHS waiting times, which have tarnished Welsh Labour's image considerably and recently forced Rhodri to sack his long-serving Health Minister, Jane Hutt.

The members of the Cardiff cabinet are pragmatists but, given the choice, they will generally take the social-democratic – not the Blairite – approach to any issue that

confronts them. This kind of muddling along, armed with good intentions and a progressive worldview, is all very well but it lacks any real transformative edge. In short, it is not – and does not pretend to be – a roadmap for socialism. More immediately, it has no real strategy for tackling some of Wales's real social problems. For example: while unemployment is officially lower than it has been for 30 years, there is massive 'hidden unemployment', particularly in former heavy-industrial areas like the Rhondda, where many thousands – predominantly middle-aged men – have given up looking for work. Part of the problem is that the scope for radical policy-making is seriously constrained by the Assembly's limited powers and by the neo liberal inclinations of Welsh Labour's watchful big brother in Westminster. Rhodri's strategy for exempting Wales from Blairism is to plead Welsh exceptionalism – 'different problems require different solutions' – and hope that Blair won't smell ideological unorthodoxy and start clamping down. Yet a truly radical programme for Wales would require a direct challenge to Blair – not least to demand extra powers for the Assembly. Rhodri's unwillingness to take this approach strengthens the need for an organised, rank and file left within Welsh Labour – a need that Welsh Labour Grassroots aims to meet.

### Rebuilding the Welsh Labour left (almost) from scratch

WLG was established on an ad hoc basis in the summer of 2003 by a handful of key left activists from Swansea and Cardiff. It was a response both to the unprecedented unity of Labour's left and centre at a British level, in opposition to Blairism, and to the recognition that Rhodri's invocation of 'clear red water' had opened up a debate in which Welsh socialists could intervene. After gradually accumulating a network of supporters over the next few months, WLG raised its profile at the 2004 Welsh Labour conference. On the conference floor, it attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to demoralise conference standing orders; on the fringe, it held a joint meeting with Save the Labour Party, addressed by the Friction Dynamex strikers and by two members of the Welsh Assembly government (with two more in the audience). By the time of the group's formal launch, at its inaugural AGM in October 2004, it had established a clear centre-left agenda, to which activists from some 11 CLPs across Wales had responded. The platform at the AGM consisted of: John McDonnell MP, bringing fraternal greetings from the Campaign Group and the Labour Representation Committee; Gower MP Martin Caton, probably Wales's most consistently socialist parlia-

mentarian; the Assembly deputy health minister, John Griffiths AM; Stevie Stevenson, a leading lay official of the TGWU; and two veteran left-wing members of the Welsh Labour Executive, Fran Griffiths and former MEP Dai Morris. The meeting passed two motions – one pledging to work with the rest of Labour's centre-left, and the other committing WLG to tackle a broad range of political issues (see box).

The task now facing WLG is to re-establish a cohesive socialist current in Welsh Labour politics, positioning itself as a critical friend to the social-democratic leadership while also reaching out to a rank-and-file membership that often feels marginalised. It must be able to add depth to Rhodri's 'clear red water', defending the break from New Labour and arguing for a still bolder, more decisive turn. This can only succeed if it involves activating a much broader section of the party membership. There is a large potential base in Wales for a more progressive, egalitarian and collectivist alternative to New Labour, but much of it consists of people who have lost the habit of doing anything more than turning up to meetings – or who never acquired more dynamic habits in the first place.

A big obstacle to success, however, is the democratic deficit within the party, which is as great a problem in Wales as in England, excluding members from any real say in democratic decision making or policy formation. In addition to the constraints imposed by the 'Partnership in Power' process, there is the prohibition of contemporary resolutions on anything other than devolved or administrative issues. Thus, at the 2003 Welsh Labour conference, five

motions on the then-impending Iraq war were ruled out of order (as foreign policy is non devolved), preventing the Welsh Labour Party from even talking about the one issue of obvious concern to everyone in the world – Wales included.<sup>5</sup> At the following year's conference, a rule change submitted by WLG supporters, which would, if passed, have relaxed this restriction, was itself ruled out of order by the Standing Orders Committee – a truly Kafkaesque development. Equally ridiculous was the September 2004 special conference to discuss Labour's response to the Richard Commission report: delegates from all over Wales travelled to Cardiff, where the only item on the agenda was a single document, presented by the leadership on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

Despite such frustrations, WLG members have become increasingly confident about our ability to take the initiative and begin to set the political agenda within Welsh Labour. A further attempt to open up the conference agenda will be made at this March's Welsh Labour conference in Swansea, and WLG supporters are also pursuing a number of contemporary resolutions: opposing housing stock transfer, defending public services, challenging the BNP and improving the political representation of black and Asian people. We may not win all the battles, but we will at least ensure that a clear socialist voice is heard. In the fight against Blairism, the Welsh Labour left is already punching above its weight.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> This was not the only occasion when Ilew Smith has been responsible for 'disorganising' the Welsh Labour left. In November 1998,

### Motion passed by Welsh Labour Grassroots AGM

Welsh Labour Grassroots aims to pursue a broad range of issues and campaigns that will contribute to our objective of a democratic socialist society. In the first instance, our priorities should include:

- Support for the anti war movement and for an end to the occupation of Iraq;
- Support for a just and lasting solution to the problems of the Middle East, including the establishment of a viable and democratic Palestinian state and the right of return of Palestinian refugees;
- Practical solidarity with movements of workers, indigenous peoples and the poor throughout the world, support for a fair and democratic world trade system, and for an internationalism not based on capitalist globalisation;
- Opposition to all forms of privatisation and commodification of public services, including PFI and housing stock transfer;
- Solidarity with refugees and asylum seekers, and opposition to all forms of racism and fascism;
- Support for a strengthening of the powers of the Assembly, to enable it to pursue more effectively policies to address Wales's social and economic problems;
- Promotion of a more equal and inclusive Welsh politics, in which women, and black and Asian people are represented at every level, and in which no-one is disadvantaged by race, gender, age, disability, religion, nationality, language or sexual orientation;
- The democratisation of the structures of the Welsh Labour Party, in which the Welsh conference is able to debate and take decisions over all issues affecting Wales and its people;
- Protection of health, the environment and animal welfare.

Blaenau Gwent and Merthyr Tydfil CLPs, probably at Llew's instigation, called a meeting in Ebbw Vale to establish a 'Campaign for Labour Party Democracy in Wales'. A number of issues were cited in the letter circulated to publicise the event, including the undemocratic practices involved in the selection of candidates for both the Assembly and the European Parliament. Although this was only 18 months into the New Labour government, the call obviously struck a chord, as some 80 activists turned up, from all over Wales. Moreover, the discussion revealed a wide spectrum of political views and a disparate set of grievances. There was clear potential for a significant rank and-file body, yet Llew seems to have been jittery about his own inability to set the agenda for such a large and politically diverse group. He showed little interest in building on the success of the initial meeting, and within a month or two the initiative had been wound up. Readers from outside Wales, who may be familiar with Llew's record as a left-wing backbench MP, may well be surprised by this. It should, of course, be acknowledged that Llew is a sincere and principled person, who has campaigned tirelessly against the Iraq war, as well as previous examples of imperialist aggression, and who has been a reliable friend of workers in struggle. Nevertheless, his conception of 'socialism' is a very particular and idiosyncratic one, and he shows little tolerance for those who differ with him over any issue that he considers important, however sincere their own views.

<sup>2</sup> Another high profile bust-up over all-women shortlists is getting underway in Newport East, following the retirement of its Thatcherite-turned Blairite MP, Alan Howarth. This case again provides backing for the Llew Smith view that attempts to ensure gender balance are a cover for the machinations of the Blairites, this time because Welsh Labour general secretary, Jessica Morden – who comes from nearby Cwmbran – is hoping to be selected for the seat.

<sup>3</sup> This has allowed right-wingers like the Blairite AM Huw Lewis to employ (quite cynically) the language of 'social justice' and even 'class', counterposing this to the 'crypto-nationalist rubbish' (incredibly, a direct quote from one of Lewis's speeches) of a 'Welsh agenda'.

<sup>4</sup> This tactic appeared to succeed: in 2003, Labour won back key seats like the Rhondda, Islwyn and Llanelli, which Plaid Cymru had captured in 1999. Ironically, however, fewer people actually voted Labour in the 'victory' of 2003 than in the 'disaster' of four years earlier. Plaid generally suffered more than Labour from the reduced turnout (from 46 to 38 per cent of the electorate) – although it lost far less ground, in historical terms, than most commentators imagined. See Ed George's compelling analysis in 'Murky Brown Water', *Workers Action* No. 22, Summer 2003.

<sup>5</sup> This was despite the fact that the motions were couched in terms of the likely impact of a war on Wales (i.e., budget cuts to pay for the war, heightened ethnic and religious tensions, increased risk of terrorist attacks). **WA**

## Respect

# Party or single-issue campaign?

A year on from the Respect coalition's founding conference, **Neil Murray** assesses what progress has been made in building a party to the left of Labour

In the wake of his welcome victory over the *Daily Telegraph* in the libel court at the beginning of December, George Galloway announced that he would be contesting the parliamentary seat of Bethnal Green and Bow for Respect at the next general election.

In itself, this is no great surprise; it had been flagged up for months. However, it has to be asked why Galloway should choose to stand in Bethnal Green and Bow rather than Glasgow – where he is currently an MP – or against Blair himself or one of his war-supporting ministers.

Having been expelled by the Labour Party bureaucracy essentially for his opposition to the war, then either of these two options would seem to be the best opportunity to show that his position is more popular than that of the warmongers. While Oona King, the sitting Labour MP in Bethnal Green and Bow, is a supporter of most things Blairite, including the war, she is hardly as enthusiastic about these as many others.

Galloway's declaration says a lot about the nature of the Respect, if not about his belief that he has a right to the rich earnings of our elected representatives. In the elections to the European Parliament and Greater London Assembly in June 2004, Respect came top of the poll in Bethnal Green and Bow. It has since won a council seat there and outpolled Labour in another (although this meant that the Tories won their first-ever seat on Tower Hamlets Council).

### Targeting the Muslim vote

Bethnal Green and Bow, with its large population of Bangladeshis, has one of the highest proportions of Muslims of any constituency in the country. In fact, there is a very close correlation between Respect's election results around the country and the proportion of Muslims present in the constituencies in question.

Outside areas where there is a concentration of Muslims, its vote has not been significantly higher than that achieved by the Socialist Alliance on previous occasions.

This, in itself, is not very surprising. While opposition to the war in Iraq is high among the population in general, it is particularly hard felt by Muslims, who see it not just as a war over oil and control of the region, but also as a war against Islam, a feeling reinforced by statements by the likes of Bush about 'crusades', and the treatment suffered by Muslims under various 'security' measures in Britain and the US.

However, it is one thing to recognise this perception and to solidarise with Muslims against repression, it is quite



another to forego an attempt to win over working class Muslims to socialism in favour of a cross class 'community' approach, which is what Respect has been doing.

Leaflets have been produced in elections describing Respect as 'the party for Muslims'. Yvonne Ridley, one of Respect's star recruits, has likened the Taliban to the International Brigades that fought against Franco's forces in Spain.

Respect has said that it will only stand in a limited number of seats in the general election – those where it can expect a reasonable result. It will hardly be a surprise if the majority of these seats are ones where there is a large Muslim population.

### Self-censorship

Respect's first conference, over the weekend of October 30-31, revealed some of the problems of this communalist approach. About 70 per cent of the delegates were members of the Socialist Workers Party, underlining the problem that has dogged all attempts to form a new party to the left of Labour in recent years: an inability to attract significant numbers of those not already committed to far left organisations. In the absence of real forces arguing for a watering down of its policies, the SWP did the job itself, claiming that clear socialist policies would deter such forces from joining. Thus it argued against – and voted down – motions calling for an 'open borders' policy on immigration, republicanism, the more principled motions on abortion rights (because they would alienate anti-abortionists) and even a motion about get-

ting rid of multi-national corporations and dismantling monopoly capitalism. This latter motion was opposed by Lindsey German, who said: 'Respect is more than just socialists, and so dismantling the apparatus of monopoly capitalism would be going too far and would alienate people.' Who the people are who would be alienated by such a policy remained a mystery. A motion demanding that elected representatives should only take a 'workers' wage' was described as 'too extreme'.

Perhaps the most telling debate was around a motion affirming that 'Respect is a secular organisation'. Chris Banbery of the SWP opposed this, saying that in all his years in the movement he had never been asked to vote on such a motion. Perhaps no one had thought it necessary before now.

### Disdain for internal democracy

The SWP and Respect's attitude to democracy and serious debate was on full display at the conference. The SWP went out of its way to ensure Respect branches did not elect delegates who would be too critical, or put forward motions they didn't like

– although they could not come up with arguments against motions being put if they had the support of 20 members.

Much of the conference was taken up with workshops, with time for motions so limited that it was only possible to have one speaker for and one against. Many motions were remitted under pressure from the organisers. A proposal for a members' discussion bulletin was defeated, as was one on the right of self-organisation within Respect for oppressed groups. This got farcical when a meeting was then called of Muslim members of Respect!

A motion from Socialist Resistance arguing for the right of platforms within Respect (a right which the SWP takes advantage of inside the Scottish Socialist Party) was defeated and the mover, RMT militant Greg Tucker, rewarded for his pains with accusations of being a vile sectarian, despite the fact that he and his organisation have been enthusiastic supporters of Respect.

This disdain for democracy resulted in two members who had put themselves forward for election to the Respect executive – John Nicholson from Manchester (who had been on the interim executive) and Kath Owen from Yorkshire – not only withdrawing their nominations, but resigning from Respect in disgust.

### Could Galloway be hedging his bets?

In a rather bizarre intervention soon after his libel victory, Galloway told the Scottish *Mail on Sunday* that he would dearly

like to contest the next Scottish parliamentary elections for Respect in 2007. Previously, Galloway has ruled out standing in Scotland, partly because he could not be sure of winning a Westminster seat in Glasgow again because of constituency boundary changes, along with the fact that his constituency activists, who supported him against the witch hunt, nevertheless refused to leave the Labour Party with him, and partly because, although he does not agree with the SSP on key issues, he has not wanted to conflict with them.

Respect has given support to the SSP, and the SSP has reciprocated. However, the SSP is currently going through difficulties, with Tommy Sheridan, their most high profile MSP, having stood down as leader. Perhaps Galloway is looking ahead – if he does not manage to win in Bethnal Green and Bow in the general election, he would have a good chance under proportional representation of winning a seat in the Scottish parliament. His intervention has caused consternation in the ranks of the SSP, which is demanding clarification from Respect.

### Another dead end

Galloway *might* win Bethnal Green and Bow; he certainly starts with a reasonable base of support in the constituency. Of course, a general election is more polarised than the European or Greater London elections, with support tending to focus on the main parties, although victory for a protest or special interest party – which is essentially what Respect is – cannot be ruled out, as was shown by the 'defend the local hospital against closure' candidate in Wyre Forest in 2001. Things will also have moved on – one way or another – in Iraq by then, and Galloway cannot be sure feelings will be running as high as they were in June 2004.

He might also split the vote sufficiently to allow the Tories or Liberal Democrats to win, an outcome to which he seems indifferent. Galloway, the SWP and Respect have consistently put self-promotion ahead of any strategic view of taking the movement forward, as when Respect insisted on standing against left Labour candidate Lucy Anderson for the Camden and Barnet seat on the Greater London Assembly, despite Anderson winning the support of the RMT.

Whether or not Galloway wins Bethnal Green and Bow, or goes on to challenge for a place in the Scottish Parliament, Respect looks destined to be yet another in a long line of failed attempts to bypass the fact that the Labour Party continues to retain support among the working class. Carving out support among one minority community is no answer. **WA**

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# The crime that goes unheard

Louise Whittle

In the summer edition of *Safe*, the Women's Aid journal, there was a Home Office report by Professor Sylvia Walby, who says that up to half of all UK women have experienced domestic violence at some time in their lives. The official accounts are based on a lower estimate.

The findings make grim reading and what is apparent to me is that they are the tip of the iceberg. Thirty one per cent of women survivors of domestic violence had not told anyone other than the survey about their experience. The police were informed in only 23 per cent of cases of domestic violence to women. Reasons for not informing the police included believing the incident was too trivial (41 per cent) and that reporting it would only increase the violence (seven per cent). When the police were indeed informed they arrested the perpetrator in 21 per cent of cases, but in 29 per cent of cases the perpetrator was either not found, not spoken to, not arrested, or not sent to court. (Sylvia Walby and Jonathan Allen, *Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault and Stalking: Findings from the British Crime Survey*)

The reality is that domestic violence is still a crime which goes unheard. The stereotypes and myths surrounding domestic violence are still firmly entrenched within this society. The official statistics say that one in four women experience domestic violence over their lifetime and ten per cent suffer domestic violence in a given year (Council of Europe, 2002). Probably the most appalling statistics of all are that two women a week are killed by their current or former partners, that nearly 22 per cent of violent crimes reported are domestic violence, and that no other form of violent crime has such a high rate of repeat victimisation as domestic violence (Home Office 2002). In a study by Shelter, 40 per cent of all homeless women stated that domestic violence was the reason for their homelessness (Shelter, 2002).

I'm sure that readers of this article will know of someone who has experienced, or is still experiencing, domestic violence. I know a number of women who have suffered domestic violence and I, too, have experienced it. It is harder to encounter someone who has never known domestic violence in their lives. It is a fact of life and fact which is still hidden.

The number of times I have heard people say things such as 'Why doesn't she leave?', 'Does she enjoy it really?', 'She must have done something', and so on. As Dee Dee Glass argues, 'The real question we should be asking is: how on earth do some women manage to leave? Why do we never ask that question?'<sup>1</sup>

Indeed, how do some women leave when everything is stacked against them? The

threat of finding themselves homeless, or of facing financial problems, deprivation and problems with childcare, social pressures from family and friends, the promise that he will 'change his behaviour'. It is not as simple and straightforward as some would have us believe.

## The historical context

While researching this article I came across various texts and articles written by women historians on the history of domestic violence. There is very little documentary information regarding domestic violence in medieval times. This certainly does not mean it never happened; the most likely explanation is that 'certain kinds of domestic physical conflict were not defined as wrongdoing'.<sup>2</sup>

By the time of the Early Modern Period, there is fuller documentation from various civil and religious courts regarding domestic violence. As Susan Dwyer Amussen points out, 'this testimony reveals much more about attitudes to it, and also the responses of neighbours, family and friends'.<sup>3</sup>

She states that the family was more under public scrutiny, and that neighbours and friends intervened if they witnessed domestic violence and sometimes encouraged women to take their case to the courts, where instead of justice they were usually persuaded into going for 'mediation' where the local church played a role. Again there is much contradictory evidence on how domestic violence was understood and perceived. There was opposition to it and public intervention to try to stop it, yet mediation was the way to solve 'marital discontent'.

What Amussen argues is that 'as the family became more private, women were forced to rely on an ideology of individual respect and love for their protection - an ideology certainly no more reliable than community intervention'.<sup>4</sup>

By the 18th and 19th centuries there was a shift in ideology regarding the family. As Linda Gordon says, 'male supremacy is not the total, undifferentiated and predictable tyranny of men and helplessness of women but rather the complex series of struggles and negotiations which are historically specific'.<sup>5</sup> The shift was that the family had become a private affair and what a man did was his own business. Women were given protection in exchange for their obedience and patriarchal ideas continued to flourish.

'Legislators attempted to criticise wife-beaters as working class brutes to deflect feminist challenges to [patriarchy]. . . and indeed women's and working class men's claim to citizenship'.<sup>6</sup> For example, John Stuart Mill wrote in his book *The Subjection of Women* that domestic violence was

exclusively a working class problem and shunned any attempt to recognise domestic violence in the middle classes. Another writer, Frances Power Cobbe, wrote in 1878 that 'the dangerous wife beater belongs almost exclusively to the artisan and labouring classes'.<sup>7</sup>

Many women didn't press charges against violent husbands because they were economically bound to them. From reading some of the testimonies from this period, it appears that many women blamed themselves and internalised their oppression. One woman, Sarah New, testified in court that her husband, William, didn't mean to hurt her. Instead of supporting and empowering women to fight for justice, 19th century legislators decided that prosecuting violent husbands should be taken out of women's hands – though prosecutions of any kind for domestic violence were still frowned upon. Again, mediation was offered as an option for women.

At the same time, many women challenged patriarchal ideology and demanded justice. It cost them much to defy the status quo, 'these women who experienced male oppression at its most brutal and refused to submit'.<sup>8</sup>

What strikes me is that the political ideology shifted and patriarchy and capitalism became intertwined. It was fashionable to believe that it was a working class male phenomenon, but domestic violence transcends class.

## Reactions to domestic violence

Some years ago, I witnessed a woman being beaten by a man on the Underground. I don't want to make assumptions about who that man was, but the fact that nobody other than myself intervened worried me deeply. People walked past her as she was crying and with her face swollen, yet nobody stopped. Indeed, people looked straight through her as if she didn't exist.

I couldn't have forgiven myself if I had left the woman in that state, which is the reason why I intervened. I was appalled by the behaviour of those people hurrying by with their heads down and imagining that this wasn't happening, and I was probably remembering my own experience. I had to help her.

Why didn't those other people help her? The BBC interviewed 1,020 adults aged between 18 and 25 for their Hitting Home season of programmes in February 2003. Seventy-eight per cent of respondents, both male and female, stated that they would contact the RSPCA if a dog was being mistreated yet only 53 per cent of the same sample said they would contact the police if a woman was being mistreated.

And one in five young men and one in ten young women think that abuse or violence against women is acceptable (Zero Tolerance Charitable Trust, 1998). There's a paradox in people's response to domestic violence: they seem to condemn it but also turn away when it is happening in front of them.

When making her documentary *Partners in Crime: Policing Domestic Violence*, Dee Dee Glass came up against an aggressive detective who told her that domestic violence was not 'real police work'. She asked him why he thought that, and he said it was a waste of resources. 'If I was walking down the street and a stranger broke my jaw, you'd happily arrest him and see him charged with GBH,' she said to him. 'But... if my husband did it, you wouldn't be bothered.' The detective readily agreed.<sup>9</sup>

That was back in the eighties. Have things changed much... or at all? In 1999, *Womenspeak*, an internet questionnaire project organised by the All Party Parliamentary Group on Domestic Violence, Women's Aid and the Hansard Society, gave survivors of domestic violence a chance to put forward their views. Over 90 per cent of the women interviewed who had come into contact with the Criminal Justice System said that they didn't receive an adequate response. The police don't perceive domestic violence as a serious crime and the courts do not offer adequate protection. Also, the lack of legal aid is a serious obstacle to women pursuing their cases in the courts.

Another interesting piece of research, which concentrated on how the police are organised internally to provide a service dealing specifically with domestic violence, was published in 1998. It found that definitions of domestic violence differed from force to force; that line management of domestic violence officers differed; that there was no standard model for the domestic violence officer; that forces lacked a systematic approach to the management of information relating to domestic violence incidents; and that previous incidents of domestic violence were not passed on to relevant officers. (Joyce Plotnikoff et al, *Policing Domestic Violence*, Home Office, 1998)

Recently the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act became law. The measures include a strengthening of the powers of the police and the courts to enable them to respond more effectively to domestic violence. However, organisations such as Women's Aid believe it doesn't go far enough. They, along with Southall Black Sisters, lobbied the government over the fact that this piece of legislation doesn't change the law to make sure that family courts grant safe child contact with vio-

lent parents after separation, with mandatory risk assessments and supervised contact centres.

There should be equal access to justice for all women regardless of their immigration status; women experiencing domestic violence who are subject to immigration control cannot leave to get to a place of safety as they have no right to state benefits. Not only are they up against the racist immigration laws, but this is compounded by the sexism they face. The other problem faced by black women is police racism, which is institutionalised. (South Black Sisters, *From Homebreakers to Jailbreakers*)

Organisations which campaign on the question of domestic violence have called for the following measures: long-term public funding of refuges; access to information services in every community; proper training of all professionals; domestic violence to be seen as a criminal offence; immediate access to emergency housing; support, including emotional support, for women to be paid for by the state; a nationwide education programme for children about domestic violence. (See *Safe* 2002)

Marxists should support these demands. We have a duty to fight against all forms of oppression and violence within the family.

## A dedication

Finally, I would like to dedicate this article to my wonderful friend Dee Dee Glass (1948-2004), who died of complications due to leukaemia last autumn. She made one of the first documentaries on domestic violence in the early seventies when she stayed at Chiswick women's refuge. Her work reflected her politics and her desire to expose injustice and oppression. She was a Marxist and a committed feminist. She was a comrade and a friend, and one hell of a courageous woman, whom I miss deeply.

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Glass, Dee Dee, *All My Own Fault*, Virago, 1995, p.3.

<sup>2</sup> Salisbury, Eve et al, *Domestic Violence in Medieval Texts*, University Press Florida, 2002, p.9.

<sup>3</sup> Amussen Dwyer, Susan, 'Being Stripped to Much Unquietness', *Journal of Women's History*, 1994, p.71

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p.84.

<sup>5</sup> Hunt, Margaret, 'Wife Beating, Domesticity and Women's Independence in 18th-Century London', *Gender and History*, 1997, p.11.

<sup>6</sup> Clark, Anna, 'Humanity or Justice?', in Smart, Carol (ed), *Regulating Womanhood*, 1992, p.204

<sup>7</sup> Tromp, Marlene, *The Private Rod*, University Press of Virginia, 2000, p.72.

<sup>8</sup> Hunt, Margaret, *op. cit.*, p.29.

<sup>9</sup> Glass, Dee Dee, *op. cit.*, p.159.

# Acts of god ... and man

**Laurence Barrett** looks at the response of Western governments to the Asian tsunami

There have been two kinds of response to the Asian tsunami. There has been the response of millions of working people who have been moved by the death, destruction and threat of disease caused by the tsunami to give or to raise money. Because of the time of year, and because, according to surveys, working class people give proportionately more of their income to charity than the rich, this is money the donors can probably ill afford. Although under the supervision of influential charities such as Oxfam, this response has been largely spontaneous, reflecting the compassion and solidarity felt towards the victims.

'Big-hearted Britain', a phrase from one of the tabloids, sums up nicely the blend of hypocrisy and self-satisfaction that has characterised the 'official' response. This has focussed on the fatalities among the relatively wealthy tourists far more than on the 200,000 plus Indonesians, Sri Lankans, Indians and Thais who lost their lives. And when this official response *has* dealt with the Asian victims, it has often taken the form of a grotesque contest between newspapers, celebrities and governments, with each trying to outdo the other in the size of their donations. More significantly, the response is being used as a way of reinforcing and justifying the rich-poor, north-south divisions in the world.

The Asian tsunami is a marvellous argument for anyone trying to show that poverty, and all that goes with it, is the result of circumstances beyond anyone's control. How can an undersea earthquake be anyone's fault? Unfortunately, some people are unlucky enough to live in an earthquake zone, but when these things happen from time to time, the West is on hand to put things right.

Will all the 'pledged' aid get delivered? The chances are that it will not. The earthquake in Iran and the floods in Mozambique are two recent examples of pledged aid not being delivered.

Is the aid, assuming that it is delivered, really that much? The United Nations, and

even some of the notoriously insular US media, poured scorn on the paltry \$15 million initially offered by the Bush regime, shaming the White House into offering \$35 million, which for the richest country in the world was still a pitiful sum - considerably less than the \$50 million Bush was spending on his inauguration, or the \$1 billion per week the US spends on the war in Iraq. Only after eight days was US aid increased tenfold to a still relatively small \$350 million.

Despite the visibly destructive effects of the tsunami, the region's poverty is not primarily caused by natural disasters, and will not be solved by short-term aid. What keeps Sri Lanka poor, for example, is the international trading system that allows the US and the EU to levy import duties of \$244 million and \$77 million respectively on Sri Lankan clothing and textiles. For Indonesia, the corresponding figures are \$426 million and \$180 million. Sri Lanka and Indonesia are among the countries burdened with crippling debt repayments. Loans from the IMF to countries such as these have been conditional on 'structural adjustment' programmes: privatisation, and cuts in spending on health and education. Indonesia spends \$25 billion every year on servicing its foreign debt, ten times what it spends on healthcare. This is what kills people in poor countries. It is this which, every day, condemns 30,000 children throughout the world to death from poverty-related illnesses, and which kills 140,000 people from diarrhoea every month. On these catastrophic, regular, man-made tsunamis, the media, with a few honourable exceptions, stays silent. This is partly because stories like this pose too many awkward questions. It is also because they aren't 'news', just as the death of 3.5 million people in the civil wars in the Congo isn't really 'news'. Jeremy Paxman has referred to a 'horrible law' of journalism which meant that '100,000 dead in a Chinese earthquake equalled 100 dead in a continental plane crash equalled two injured in a car crash on the North Circular'.

But of course even so-called acts of god treat people in rich and poor countries differently. The four hurricanes that hit Florida in 2004 provoked \$13 billion dollars in aid. Even Puerto Rico, which, unlike Florida, was not a swing state, attracted \$385 million as a result of tropical storm Jeanne that killed precisely eight people. In contrast, when in 1972 an earthquake destroyed the centre of Managua, Nicaragua, it never got rebuilt, partly because the US puppet President Somoza siphoned off most of the aid money for himself and his family. The Sandinista government, which took power in 1979, had too many other priorities, among them trying to stop

the US-backed Contras from blowing up schools and clinics, and so to this day Managua has no centre.

The Bush regime sees every international issue through the prism of the so-called 'war on terror'. It will see the tsunami disaster as a perfect opportunity to strengthen military ties with Indonesia. The neo-cons are stepping up their efforts to remove restrictions on aid to the notoriously corrupt and brutal Indonesian armed forces, which are waging a civil war against separatists in Aceh, the province where the tsunami struck, cynically adopting the vocabulary of the 'war on terror'. The Free Aceh Movement reports that the Indonesian military are using the disaster as a pretext to go in hard against 'rebels'. In Sri Lanka, many tsunami-affected areas are Tamil-speaking, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam have been organising relief work. Tamil leaders complained that the Sri Lankan government restricted the movements of UN secretary-general Kofi Annan during his visit to the area.

Twenty years ago, the famine in Ethiopia and Band Aid were hailed as a turning point in how the rich world dealt with issues of famine and poverty. But since then, sub-Saharan Africa has got poorer, not just relatively but in some respects absolutely. Those hoping that the December tsunami will act as a catalyst should not hold their breath. Blair continues to blather on about Africa being a 'scar on the conscience of the world'. Brown at least has made specific proposals: the removal of some trade barriers to allow greater access to goods from poor countries (which will be opposed by France and the US) and debt relief for poor heavily indebted countries, most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa, although they may soon include Sri Lanka.

Specifically, Brown has proposed a debt moratorium for countries affected by the tsunami. He has also insisted that this will not be at the expense of aid earmarked for Africa. But a debt moratorium will give only temporary breathing space, and New Labour's record on aid has not been as good as they would like us to think. The 'ethical foreign policy' came unstuck with the sale of arms to, ironically, Indonesia, and aid has been made conditional on privatisation, or as a way of giving contracts to British companies.

Socialists should be demanding that all debts owed by affected countries be written off, in full and at once, and that any aid granted must be unconditional and without strings. Given the rampant corruption in Indonesia and the tendency for aid money to find its way into the pockets of the elite, it is essential that any aid is distributed by and for the benefit of the people of the affected region.

# The madness of King George II

Nick Davies comments on the  
US presidential election

'I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it.' These few words from the newly 're'-elected George W. Bush spell grim times ahead for millions of people in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and, whether they voted for him or not, in the United States. After stealing the 2000 election, Bush behaved as if he had the mandate of a landslide victory. Now that he has the popular vote, and a majority in the electoral college (although the suspicions of widespread fraud in Florida and Ohio won't go away), it will be payback time for the Christian right and the corporations which provided the Bush campaign with its foot soldiers and its money.

With the White House and both Houses of Congress under its control, and with the power to secure approval for ultra-right nominees to the Supreme Court, the Republican Party, under its present hard-right leadership, has every branch of government in its grip. The neo-conservatives, who were being lined up for political oblivion as scapegoats in the event of a Republican defeat, have emerged from the election stronger than ever, having a whole planet on which to act out their dangerous and demented fantasies. Condoleezza Rice, who is always prepared to tell Bush what he wants to hear, has replaced the neo-cons' antagonist, Colin Powell, as Secretary of State. Attorney General John Ashcroft, best described as a cross between Richard Littlejohn and Ian Paisley, has also been replaced, but by Alberto Gonzales, whose response to international outrage over Guantánamo Bay and the rest of the US gulag was to describe the Geneva Conventions as 'quaint' and 'obsolete'.

## The anti-Bush movement

The story of the 2004 United States election campaign is largely the story of two movements. The efforts of these movements to mobilise their supporters pushed the turnout up to almost 60 per cent, the highest since 1968. The first movement was the movement to kick out Bush. Some might question whether or not this was a 'movement' at all. After all, the people who voted for the Democratic ticket voted that way for many different reasons: in some cases because of traditional loyalty to the Democratic Party, or because of John Kerry's Vietnam war record. However, millions of US citizens made a determined effort to vote, in many cases for the first time ever, and to get their friends to vote, because the prospect of another four years of George Bush was so horrifying that abstention was not an option. For some, it was the war in Iraq, along with the lies that justified it and the war profiteering by Re-

publican Party donors, which drove them to the polls. For others it was the assault on civil liberties that is the Patriot Act, the threat to the right to abortion, the trillion dollar deficit, the tax breaks for the rich at the expense of the poor, or the fact that 45 million people are without health insurance.

On the whole, it was a combination of all these factors which prompted millions of black people, Hispanics, trade unionists and the poor - the very people who often don't vote at all - to stand in line for hours. Many of them were not so much voting for John Kerry as *against* George Bush. They knew Kerry's limitations. They did not harbour great illusions in him. It is unfortunate that they were lumbered with him and with the Democratic Party, but that is where US politics is at the moment: the mid-point of political debate is far to the right of Britain (and even further away from that in France or Germany); interest group or ethnicity outweighs class; trade union membership stands at about 10 per cent; and working people lack any independent political voice. In these extremely unfavourable conditions, millions of US voters decided to make a stand. For all its many limitations, this was a positive development, and socialists should see it as such.

## Was abstention a viable option?

Traditionally, the socialist position in US elections as regards the two big parties has been to abstain. But in this election, what would that have involved? Staying at home? Leafleting polling stations telling people not to bother voting? Asking them effectively to waste their vote on a socialist candidate who no one had heard of? As a way of making sure that socialists in the USA are not listened to by working people in the future, that takes some beat-

## Anti-war contacts

### Stop the War Coalition

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ing. It is vital that an independent workers' party or Labour Party is built in the USA. Those who advocate such a party will have far more chance of being listened to if they can show that the concerns of those voters who wanted to kick out Bush are their concerns also. They should have been saying to those voters (surely the bedrock of any future US Labour Party): 'Like you, we want Bush out, and we'll help you try to vote him out. With you, we'll demand that Kerry pulls the troops out of Iraq, repeals the Patriot Act, and reforms the healthcare system, but at the end of the day we don't think he will, and we think we need our own party to do these things.'

### The pro-Bush movement

Unfortunately, the mass movement, if it can be called that, was matched, at least, by another movement, which looked at the Bush regime and saw that it was good. Neither the lies, corruption and incompetence at the heart of the regime, nor any number of books and films by Michael Moore, made the damndest bit of difference to those in this movement, who were delighted that the White House was occupied by someone in their own image. Dominant in this movement to re-elect Bush was the religious right. There is a tendency in Europe to underestimate and patronise the US religious right as being eccentric and a bit wacky. This is a mistake. The religious right is a serious political movement, and an extreme right-wing one at that. Plenty of US Christians loathe the Bush regime and, conversely, the religious right treats former president Jimmy Carter, a committed, churchgoing Christian, with contempt. The noisiest element of the religious right is the evangelical Christians, but the campaign to re-elect Bush mobilised the most right wing in all religious communities. It can safely be assumed, for example, that the Catholics who voted for Bush were those who thought Kerry's support for a woman's right to choose was a mortal sin. The religious right is playing a role in US politics and society similar to that played by fascism in 20th century Europe, in that

it mobilises the most reactionary, right-wing layers of society in an offensive against the enemies, real or imagined, at home and abroad, of one faction of the ruling class. With its ready access to TV and radio, and seemingly unlimited funds, the religious right intimidates, smears and threatens all those who stand in its way.

### The rise of the religious right

The religious right first made its appearance as a political force during the cold war. Despite the guarantee in the US constitution of freedom of religion and freedom from religion, the words 'one nation under god' were added to the pledge of allegiance in 1954, and in 1956 'In God We Trust' became the national motto. The next phase of the religious right's war on US civil society was in the campaign to elect Ronald Reagan in 1979 and 1980, which saw the founding of Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority and the drive to register the previously non-voting evangelical Christians. The end of the cold war and the defeat of George Bush senior saw the movement run into the sand somewhat, only for new demons to emerge in the form of 'liberals' (an elastic term which seems to encompass most people who live in cities, and even secular-minded members of the Republican Party), the Clinton presidency and so-called 'Islamic terror'.

When it suits them, Bush and his followers cast themselves as the political descendants of the Founding Fathers of the American Revolution. This is surely a grave injustice to one of the great achievements of the 18th century Enlightenment. The core of Bush's support believes, as does Bush himself, in the literal truth of the Bible. They would have been given short shrift by Thomas Jefferson, who dismissed what now appears to be a key foreign policy text, the Book of Revelation, as 'the ravings of a maniac, no more worthy, nor capable of explanation than the incoherences of our own nightly dreams'.

A well-known part of the religious right's strategy is its campaign against evolutionary biology, and for its replacement in schools by the Book of Genesis, renamed 'intelligent design' to make it seem like a respectable scientific theory. In case anyone believes that the vast cultural differences within the USA are anything new, back in 1922 ex-president Woodrow Wilson declared his belief in evolution, adding that 'it surprises me that at this late date such questions should be raised'. Only three years later, in the famous Scopes trial, a schoolteacher was prosecuted and convicted by the state of Tennessee for teaching evolutionary biology and fined \$100. Urban Americans laughed themselves hoarse at the buffoon-

ery of the Tennessee hillbillies, and when evolution returned to Tennessean school textbooks in the early 1960s, the Scopes trial was widely regarded as an embarrassing throwback. Now the hillbillies, so to speak, have their man in the White House, and unlike their 1920s counterparts, they have the capacity to blow us all up.

The growth of the religious right is not, therefore, a pragmatic, short term piece of electoral expediency, like New Labour's targeting of 'Worcester woman'. The religious right is part of a coalition built by the Republican right in a long term project to move US politics drastically and irreversibly to the right. As well as fundamentalist Christianity, there's a need for a secular arm, in the form of any number of well-funded think tanks, pressure groups and charitable foundations, all, it appears, with the ear of the White House.

### Science made to serve business

Where the religious right and the corporations find common ground is in the growing harassment of scientists and interference with their work. Obvious areas for such behaviour are Aids, stem cell research, environmental health and workplace safety. On global warming, any number of charlatan scientists in the pay of the oil and auto industries have succeeded in making millions in the USA believe that the issue is a dastardly European plot to sabotage the US economy. Official government websites have been altered to remove material deemed detrimental to the extreme right or industry. In a sinister echo of Stalin's refusal to listen to 'bourgeois' scientists, government committees on, variously, lead poisoning in children, environmental pollution and public health are being packed with scientists with links to industry, at the expense of independent or critical voices. A professor of psychiatry and psychology was asked to join the National Advisory Council on Drug and Alcohol Abuse, but was then grilled about his views on faith-based initiatives, abortion and the death penalty for drug dealers, and was asked whether he voted for George Bush. He was not appointed. The Bush regime is now funding sexual health projects which peddle fairytales such as HIV can be contracted through sweat and tears, condoms fail to prevent the transmission of HIV in 31 per cent of cases of straight sexual intercourse, and 43-day-old foetuses are able to think.

### The campaign against 'big government'

Crucial for this long term, rightward shift is Americans for Tax Reform, the meetings

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of which invariably include a representative from the White House. Its aim is the abolition of taxes, particularly estate taxes and capital gains taxes. It also wants to see the end of the minimum wage, health and safety regulations, environmental laws and affirmative action. It is in favour of the privatisation of medicare, education and social security. Its leader, Grover Norquist, has declared that the intention is to 'cut government ... down to the size where we can drown it in the bathtub'. The motivation is not merely the rich person's traditional irritation with paying taxes. Norquist's aim, apparently, is to reduce government revenue, cutting off funds to the interest groups that represent Democratic Party voters. As fellow ultra-rightist David Horowitz has put it: 'The goal is not to refute your opponent's arguments, but to wipe him off the face of the earth.' This task is made all the easier by the numerous radio and TV stations peopled by poisonous right wing extremists such as Rush Limbaugh, Bill O'Reilly and, possibly the most deranged of the lot, Ann Coulter, repeating over and over again that taxes and 'big government' equals the Soviet Union, liberals are un-American, and environmentalists are 'eco-terrorists'.

### Democrats have no answer to the right-wing onslaught

The Democratic Party cannot cope with this. While the Republicans are treating politics as a war, the Democrats treat it merely as a debate. Take, for example, a 'values' issue such as gay marriage which, from the Republican point of view, was a brilliant way of taking a marginal issue, making it big, mobilising its base on it, and wrong footing the Democrats. The Democrats could either go along with it, but without it being 'their issue', and run the risk of alienating their liberal supporters, or oppose it and face a mauling by the right-wing attack dogs. On other issues, such as tax, it's the same. While the Democrats are still chasing the middle ground of voters, as is the case in most European elections (and used to be the case in the USA), the Republican Party has found, and is mobilising, a new base on its right, and so is shifting the political mid-point further to the right all the time. The point is not to

feel sorry for the Democratic Party for the bind it is in. As one of the two big parties of US capital, it is incapable of mounting a consistent attack on the Republican agenda or of appealing to US workers on a class basis. And it cannot challenge the corporations because it depends on corporate donations.

The Republican leaders are no longer prepared to play the civilised, bourgeois-democratic game with the Democratic Party. If the mobilisation of the Republican base had not been enough to win the election, fraud and intimidation would have been employed. If the Republicans had lost, Kerry's administration would have been buffeted by attacks on its legitimacy from day one.

### What's wrong with America?

The aim of the Republican Party is the weakening of US democracy and of civil society. Anyone visiting the USA today must find it a frightening, sinister and yet comically surreal place. While the US military commits mass murder of civilians as it pounds Fallujah to dust, the religious right mounts a campaign against the forthcoming bio-pic of the 'immoral' 1950s sex researcher, Alfred Kinsey. While the mainstream media refuses to report the truth on Iraq, it obsesses about Janet Jackson's nipple. While anyone criticising the Iraq war in a conversation at their local gym can expect a visit from the FBI, french fries are renamed 'freedom fries'. On both sides of the Atlantic, there has been frustration and despair. Why was such a repulsive, corrupt and incompetent candidate even in the race? Why are so many Americans content to get their information about the world from the cartoonishly biased Fox News? How can a country that is capable of sending a probe to Saturn apparently be in danger of being taken over by flat-earthers? What is wrong with America?

Quite a lot, as it happens. However, while it is a mistake to assume that the USA is just like Europe, we should avoid the opposite error, which is to see it as some kind of political freak show. This is only a left-wing version of that part of the USA's own national mythology that believes the country cannot be judged by the same standards as the rest of the world. Is the USA the only country with a large working class that does not have its own party? Is it the only country where workers have voted against their economic interests for a candidate of the rich? Is it the only country where the people have been terrified out of their wits by politicians and a compliant media? Is it the only country to suffer from an aggressive nationalism? Is it the only country where reactionary ideas are far more common

in rural, isolated areas than in cities? The answer to all these questions is no. But what *is* special, and dangerous, is that it is the only advanced capitalist country where all these factors are present, and which possesses overwhelming military might.

### Socialists must relate to progressive forces

So what can be concluded from all this? The Republican right is attempting to make the USA a one-party state and take society back to a 1950s future. This is not making the Democratic Party more liberal; in fact, it is pulling the Democrats to the right. However, as long as those workers who wish to defend their living standards and civil liberties against the Republicans, and who are opposed to the Republicans' wars and invasions, express this through electoral support for the Democrats, then socialists have to relate to that opposition as best they can. If a dialogue between socialists and progressive popular opinion in the USA involves those socialists sometimes supporting a vote for the lesser evil, is that not preferable to them merely continuing to talk to each other?

Of course, the Republicans may not be able to take the USA where they want it to go. In 2008, without the advantage of incumbency and at the mercy of events, they may lose so comprehensively that they have no alternative but to surrender power. The electoral coalition they are building may split. Already, Republican Majority for Choice is calling the religious right a 'monster' which 'has the party by the tail'. On the other hand, the Democrats' move to the right in search of the centre ground may open up a space in which a Labour or Socialist Party can make its voice heard among Democrat supporters and independents on the need for a change in foreign policy, for a progressive taxation system, for environmental protection, for socialised health care, and for a woman's right to choose.

**WA**

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# Tension rises in the Ivory Coast

**Bob Wood** looks at the ongoing conflict in the Ivory Coast, where events have recently taken a turn for the worse

The once peaceful, economically relatively successful and rather obscure West African country of Ivory Coast hit the headlines last November when rampaging mobs attacked, looted and burned French property in the capital, Abidjan. Some 9,000 Europeans, predominantly French, were forced to flee.

France has about a 1,000 soldiers in the country, which operate separately from a UN force of 6,000, under a 'mutual defence' pact signed in 1960. The force is ostensibly intended to keep the two sides in an unresolved civil war apart. After a month's fighting in September 2002, a cease fire was agreed, leaving the north in the hands of the rebel New Forces, and the south under the control of the official government of President Gbagbo. But France has extensive economic interests in the Ivory Coast. There are traditional interests in cocoa and coffee, many plantations being owned by French landlords. And the privatisation of state-owned assets under the Structural Adjustment Programme, enforced by the IMF and the World Bank, has left utilities like electricity in the ownership of mainly French companies. All in all, 27 per cent of company assets in the Ivory Coast are French-owned. The links between the Ivory Coast and France run very deep. For many years after independence, the pro-French dictatorial president, Houphouët-Boigny, preferred French bureaucrats, finding them more malleable and less likely to develop a power base of their own than native Ivorians.

## Attack on rebels

Since the cease-fire two years ago, President Gbagbo has been steadily building up his armed forces, purchasing extensive new armaments including helicopter gunships. In a reckless bid to break the stalemate, he launched an attack on rebel positions in the north. Unfortunately, and it

appears to have been accidental, French forces also came under fire and nine French soldiers were killed. President Chirac of France responded by ordering the destruction of the entire Ivorian air force. It was then that President Gbagbo unleashed the so-called Young Patriot militias of Abidjan on European residents in the city.

This received wide coverage in the Western press, for whom European lives and property are of course much more valuable than African lives. The publicity accorded the events in November 2004 stands in stark contrast to the way in which the events of the previous March were virtually ignored by the same press. The opposition – or rebel – parties organised a demonstration on March 25 calling for the full implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, of which more later. A presidential decree was immediately issued, banning demonstrations until the end of April. On the day of the demonstration the army and police violently attacked demonstrators and the areas where supporters of the opposition lived. At least 100, and possibly as many as 400 people, were killed.

## Deliberately orchestrated

The United Nations ordered an inquiry into the events of that day, and the official report concluded that the attacks by the security forces were not in response to an unruly demonstration, but had been deliberately orchestrated at quite high levels in the government. 'What actually happened on 25 March and afterwards was the indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians by the security forces,' the report says. It continues: '... these killings were mostly unprovoked and unnecessary to deal with the demonstrators. In addition it is also evident that certain community groups were specially targeted, i.e., individuals from the north of the country or from neighbouring countries (especially Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) who were subjected to major violations of human rights, including summary and extra-judicial execution, torture and arbitrary detention and disappearance, that had little or nothing to do with the march.' The report says that at least 120 people were killed, 274 wounded and 20 disappeared, and adds that these figures are by no means final – other sources estimate the number of dead at as many as 400. Many of the killings did not take place on the street but in dwellings. Innocent civilians were targeted on the basis of their name, origin or community group. Throughout, the security forces acted in concert with the 'parallel forces' of the Young Patriot militias.

In January 2003, all ten main political parties in the Ivory Coast signed an agreement at Linas-Marcoussis in France. The

agreement set up a Government of National Reconciliation, in which all the parties were represented in a power-sharing arrangement. It welcomed the cease-fire and reiterated 'the need to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ivory Coast'. The key tasks of the new government were in two areas. The first task was the revision of Article 35 of the constitution, which discriminates against northerners by insisting that any candidate for the presidency must have both parents born in the Ivory Coast. The second – perhaps the most contentious – was related to the vexed question of land tenure, and called for 'true security of tenure'. The agreement also called for 'the regrouping and subsequent disarming of all forces' and for steps to 'ensure that no mercenaries remain within the country's borders'. But the Government of National Reconciliation has never lived up to its name. Ministers appointed by a united group of seven opposition parties have at times refused to serve, citing obstruction by President Gbagbo or fears for their safety.

The land question is particularly explosive. Coffee and cocoa production first started in the south east of the country, gradually spreading west as forest was cleared. Local elders granted land use rights to smallholders, often to people from outside the area (foreigners or 'strangers'). By the 1950s, 28 per cent of the population in the south east were foreigners, a figure which in some areas reached 50 per cent. Following the abolition of forced labour in 1946, there was also an influx of 'strangers' into the centre west, mainly Baoulé from further north, in many cases reducing the indigenous Dida, Gouro and Bété to ethnic minority status. Unregistered land sales to immigrants were often not seen as final by the sellers. As long as land remained relatively abundant, and there was still forest to be cleared, this did not create a problem. But by 1970, ethnic tensions reached boiling point in Gagnoa, pitching indigenous Bété against immigrant Baoulé and Dyula, and some 4,000 lost their lives. It is significant that during the recent disturbances in Abidjan, many Ivorians fled from the west of the country to neighbour-

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ing Liberia, almost certainly as a result of similar ethnic tensions.

Under the Code Domaniale of 1963, neither customary land rights nor private property was recognised – as President Houphouët Boigny was fond of saying, 'the land belongs to the one who cultivates it'. Now that land is becoming scarce, and in the absence of any really clear land rights, conflict over land ownership is almost inevitable.

### Racist to the core

Out of a total population of about 17 million, as many as 40 per cent are from groups originating outside the country, including three million Burkinabè, two million Malians and up to a million Ghanaians. The concept of *Ivorité* (the Ivory Coast for the Ivorians, narrowly defined) would deny to any of these immigrants the possibility of citizenship however long their residence. As the Ivorian singer Alpha Blondy noted, *Ivorité* is nothing less than 'black Nazism', racist to the core. It ignores the long history which binds the Ivory Coast to Burkina Faso, known as Upper Volta under French rule. The two territories were jointly administered from 1932 to 1947.


The denial of citizenship to groups who are not the original inhabitants of an area is an increasing phenomenon in Africa in recent years. The Banyamulenge people of eastern Congo, for example, many of whom migrated from Rwanda as much as a century ago, have had their right to Congolese citizenship questioned. Ethno-nationalism is on the rise throughout Africa, a sad legacy of the colonial practice of indirect rule.

President Gbagbo has come under increasing international pressure for failing to implement the Linas Marcoussis Agreement, which he alleges was imposed by the French. Following the serious disturbances in Abidjan in November, Kofi Annan has announced an increase in the UN forces deployed in the country, and Thabo Mbeki, the South African president, has emerged as a mediator between the government and the rebel New Forces.

A federal solution, with separate administrations in the north and south on a permanent basis, is out of the question since it would expose northerners in the south to the very dangers that the rebellion was designed to forestall. While there are no good guys in the Ivorian conflict, there are no equivalents in the north to Gbagbo's fascist Young Patriot militias. These unemployed lumpenproletariat youth, fuelled by a hate-filled xenophobic media, would only need a nod from Gbagbo to launch into full-scale ethnic cleansing, and that remains an entirely possible scenario.

WA

## FIGURING IT OUT



**REGIONAL POPULATION PROJECTIONS:** The population of England is predicted to grow by nearly ten per cent to 54.5 million by 2028. While the population of the north east is expected to shrink, much of the southern areas of the country will steadily grow, with the east and south west set to grow by 16 per cent. London and the south east are predicted to have the next largest rises of just over 15 per cent and 14 per cent respectively, closely followed by a rise of 13 per cent in the east midlands.

**MIGRATION:** Record numbers of people are leaving Britain in search of a better life abroad. In 2003, 190,000 Britons went overseas with the intention of staying away for at least 12 months, with the largest numbers going to EU countries, headed by Spain, Germany and France. Australia was the next favoured destination. However, Professor John Salt of University College London commented: 'It's not like the old days when people sailed away from the UK never to come back.' The number of people arriving in the UK for at least a year in 2003 was 513,000 – the same as in 2002 – compared with 326,000 in 1997. Of these, 277,000 were British citizens.

**HOUSEHOLDS:** The age at which young adults set up home independently is steadily rising. Currently, 56 per cent of men and 37 per cent of women aged 20 to 24 live at home with their parents. There has also been a rapid growth in the number of single person households. By 1991, there were 2.2 million single person households in Britain, and that figure is set to grow to five million by 2011. Currently, about ten per cent of households consist of one person. A third important demographic, which has only begun to be studied recently, are LATs – adults in long term relationships who live in separate households, known as Living Apart Together.

**PARENTS:** Contrary to popular belief, London has fewer unmarried parents than many other areas of Britain. In 2002, there were more births outside marriage in Tunbridge Wells than in Tower Hamlets. In England as a whole, about 40 per cent of the babies born in 2002 were to unmarried mothers, while in London the average was between 30 and 35 per cent across inner and outer boroughs – lower than Kent, East Sussex, Suffolk and Worcestershire. The average age of a first-time father today is 31, compared with 27 five years ago. The average age for first-time motherhood rose from 26 in 1992 to 27.3 in 2002.

**REAL WAGES:** Wages have increased by an average of 34.6 per cent since 1997, while prices have risen by 18 per cent over the same period.

**MINIMUM WAGE:** Some 272,000 jobs – about one per cent of the workforce – are being paid below the minimum wage. This figure includes exempted categories such as those jobs offering training, apprenticeships or free accommodation.

**GENDER PAY GAP:** Using figures for median earnings, new research shows that women earn 14 per cent less than men. Using average earnings, the gap is 18 per cent. Even among teenagers in their first jobs, young women earn 16 per cent less than their male counterparts. Fourteen per cent of young men aged 16 and 17 work in manufacturing, compared to six per cent of women. Public service jobs employ ten per cent of young women and just four per cent of men. A similar report from Incomes Data Services measures the gender pay gap at 19.5 per cent for full time workers and 40 per cent for part-timers. According to the Department of Trade and Industry, women who work part time earn 22 per cent less per hour than women who work full time – the largest pay gap in Europe.

**ETHNIC MINORITY PAY AND EMPLOYMENT GAP:** According to the first report from the Ethnic Minority Employment Task Force, non-white people of working age are twice as likely to be unemployed as the overall working age population. While there has been some narrowing of the employment gap in recent years, the pay gap remains significant, with weekly earnings for white people averaging £376, which is £29 ahead of non whites. Among ethnic minorities, the poorest are Bangladeshis, earning an average £235 per week.

**QUALITY OF LIFE:** According to a survey published by the *Economist*, Britain has the worst quality of life of any major European nation. It ranked the UK 29th in a list of 111 countries for the 'general well being of people', using data such as health statistics, and divorce and unemployment rates. Researchers said that despite the UK's relatively high per capita income, its lowly position was due to its climate, poor health outcomes, high divorce rates and lack of community life.

'Empiricist'

# Neither faction will defend workers

Viktor Yushchenko was inaugurated as president of Ukraine on January 23. **Nick Davies** looks at the differences between the 'orange' and the 'blue-and-white' factions

As the demonstrators were starting to establish themselves in central Kiev following the disputed presidential election run-off on November 21, and the rest of the world began to notice the unfolding political crisis in Ukraine, that tell tale phrase 'people power', last heard in Georgia and before that Serbia, began to make a reappearance. George Orwell would have liked the expression 'people-power'. It describes what in another context would be called a 'mob'. Whether demonstrators are part of 'people-power' or part of a 'mob' largely depends on what the US and west European media think of them. That, in turn, depends on whether the government that is the target of the demonstrations is an ally of the USA, or a regime the USA would like to see replaced.

The demonstrators in Ukraine must have thanked their lucky stars that they were on the right side. If they had been protesting against a rigged election in US client state Azerbaijan, they could have expected rough treatment from the police, and utter indifference from the Western media. If they had been in Uzbekistan, for example, unspeakable horrors would have awaited them. But the USA wants a more reliable ally in the strategically important Black Sea region, as part of a chain of friendly states on Russia's southern flank including Georgia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. For this reason, presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko and his supporters, such as the youth organisation, Pora, were drenched in Western money. Crucially, US organisations funded exit polls showing Yushchenko as the clear winner on November 21, thus increasing suspicions that the 'victory' of Viktor Yanukovich was rigged. The USA then had the brass neck to lecture Ukraine on the conduct of its elections (although even the Republicans had not gone so far as to try to poison John Kerry).

## Post-Stalinist mafia

But as with Georgia in 2003, just because the USA and its hangers-on say an election was rigged does not mean that it wasn't. Even if only half the stories about multiple voting and 100 per cent turnouts are true, there is overwhelming evidence that the post-Stalinist mafia which has run Ukraine since independence in 1991 and provided its first two presidents, Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, tried to fix the presidential election. And why not? Surely after the looting of state-owned assets and the bumping off of journalist Georgi Gongadze, who had criticised Kuchma on the internet, fixing the election, and thus easing into office the former prime minister Victor Yanukovich, while the rest of the world was preoccupied with

Iraq and the US elections, would have been no big deal.

As well as being corrupt, and a possible accessory to murder, outgoing president Kuchma is, apparently, paranoid and anti-semitic. It follows that the tens of thousands of demonstrators thronging the streets of Kiev were not there, as is alleged by supporters of Yanukovich, because they had been bribed by the USA. Their wish to get rid of the self-serving and corrupt elite is genuine enough. But some of the 'Orange' revolutionaries are not much better than those they despise. Some protestors are steeped in the reactionary, anti-semitic nationalism of western Ukraine, regarding the Russian speakers in the south and east as not 'real' Ukrainians, or a potential fifth column (in fact, they have been there for decades, since Ukraine industrialised). Yulia Tymoshenko, a right-wing politician, former gas tycoon, and a popular figure among the 'Orange' faction, is not above a bit of sharp practice herself, having been investigated for corruption and money laundering.

At the same time, not everyone among the opposing blue-and-white wearing supporters of Yanukovich had been bussed in by their local mafia chief or factory director. Whereas supporters of Yushchenko are, on the whole, from the Ukrainian-speaking west of the country, supporters of Yanukovich come primarily from the predominantly Russian speaking south and east. This is the industrial heart of the country, which produces 80 per cent of its wealth. The economy of the south and east is dominated by steel, which is exported eastwards and is profitable, and by coal, which is not and depends on subsidies. Many workers fear that under a Yushchenko presidency the subsidies will end and the mines will close. Also, they don't want a Ukrainian government, eager for brownie-points from the USA, to allow multinationals to run Ukraine's manufacturing and service sectors for the benefit of their shareholders.

In order to mobilise their supporters, both factions are using the fear factor: fear of unemployment and insecurity, or fear of living in a Belarus-style Russian satellite. While these fears are by no means groundless, both factions are also feeding their supporters a colossal and cruel illusion. Industrial workers in the east are being asked to put their trust in a member of the post-Stalinist elite, whose interest in preserving jobs will last only as long as it is consistent with preserving his. On the other hand, if supporters of Yushchenko think that he will make Ukraine 'part of Europe' they should take a walk to the border with Poland. There they will see the 'welcome' signs in the form of the fences and watch towers of fortress Europe.

It has been said that independent Ukraine is still a project under construction. Parts of the east are thoroughly Russified. Parts of the west, notably the city of Lviv, were under Austrian and then Polish rule until the USSR expanded westwards after the Second World War. The east and west are divided by language, history and religion. The differing architectural styles, the landscape, and the contrast between the urban east and the more rural west means that at times they look like two different countries. However, the talk of secession by the Yanukovich supporters is almost certainly no more than a scare tactic, designed to recover some of the advantage lost to Yushchenko's more visible support, and to present the Yushchenko faction to the rest of the world as a destabilising influence. Neither Russia nor the West wants Ukraine to break up. Yushchenko has promised to mend fences with Moscow, and the supporters of Yanukovich seem to be content with working towards the 2006 parliamentary elections.

### Agreement on market economy

The 'orange' and the 'blue-and-white' factions offer different perspectives of what an independent Ukraine should look like, and on where it should align itself internationally. Where they agree is that Ukraine has to have a market economy, meaning that one faction or another of the ruling class will be exploiting Ukrainian workers, and making a fortune out of privatising Ukraine's economy. It follows that neither faction offers any way forward for the working people of Ukraine, east or west.

Socialists in Britain should not be taking sides with either of the two factions. Some in Britain have leant towards Yanukovich, contrasting his working class base to the more middle class supporters of Yushchenko. They are making the same mistake as their Ukrainian counterparts. What socialists should be in favour of is free and fair elections, even if, as was the case in the re-run election on December 26, Yushchenko is the beneficiary. This does not indicate any political support for Yushchenko. His supporters may have fiddled some of the votes in the original and the re-run elections, although according to the Supreme Court none of the irregularities alleged by Yanukovich supporters, if they occurred at all, were serious enough to affect the outcome. Yushchenko may well try to fix the next election just as Yanukovich tried to fix this one. The call for fair elections must be a key demand of an independent socialist party, the aim of which must be to challenge all of the clans and factions of Ukrainian capitalism. **WA**

# Uruguay is not for sale

Uruguay has joined the list of South American countries where voters have rejected neo-liberal policies. **Nick Davies** looks at last October's election

Voting is compulsory in Uruguay, but most voters didn't have to be asked twice to give market-fundamentalist economic policies the boot. The Frente Amplio (Broad Front) won the presidential and congressional elections held on October 31, giving Uruguay its first left-wing government since independence, and the first government of any kind with a majority in parliament since 1966. So anxious were Uruguayans for a break with the recent past that between 300,000 and 500,000 turned up to the Frente Amplio's closing election rally, making it the biggest party political demonstration in Uruguay's history. The Frente Amplio's presidential candidate, Tabaré Vázquez, gained 51.94 per cent of the vote, making a second round unnecessary. So discredited is the ruling Colorado Party that its candidate, Guillermo Stirling, managed only a miserable 10.58 per cent.

For all the goodwill behind it, the new government will have a tough job picking up the pieces of Uruguay's economy, shattered by a decade of IMF-dictated slash-and-burn economic policies. A recession which began in 1998 was followed by a wholesale economic collapse in 2002, linked to those in the neighbouring giant economies of Brazil and Argentina. Production plummeted by more than 15 per cent between 2000 and 2002, and in 2002 the Uruguayan peso fell from 15 to 29 to the US dollar. Unemployment reached a historic high of 20 per cent; real income shrank 25 per cent and the number of people living below the poverty line doubled. Fifty-four per cent of all Uruguayan children live in poverty. Although the economy has started to recover due to the more favourable terms of trade brought about by the devaluation of the peso, neither incomes nor employment have shown a corresponding growth, although unemployment is down to 'only' 13 per cent.

Both Uruguay's capitalist parties have felt the backlash from the voters. The Colorado Party, which historically has dominated Uruguayan politics, suffered an electoral wipe-out, outgoing president Jorge Batlle's friendship with the Bush family and his admiration for Argentina's IMF star pupil Carlos Menem clearly doing him no favours. The centre-right National Party, which was in government from 1990 to 1995, was also punished by the electorate, receiving 34.9 per cent of the vote. The Colorado and National parties jointly designed the unpopular amnesty for those responsible for torture and other violations of human rights during the 1973-85 military dictatorship, when Uruguay had a higher number of political prisoners in proportion to its population than anywhere else in the region.

Military dictatorship and economic collapse had not previously been a feature of Uruguayan history. The country used to be called the 'Switzerland of Latin America' because of its tradition of stable, democratic government and its developed welfare system. It went into crisis in the late 1960s and early 1970s due to the end of the post-war boom, pressure from the USA as a result of the cold war, and the emergence of the Tupamaro guerrilla movement. As a response to the failure of the two capitalist parties to offer any way forward, and as a conscious alternative to guerrillism, the Frente Amplio was founded in 1971, as its name implies, as a broad front of socialists, social democrats, communists, left Christian democrats and independents. At that time, one of its founders, Liber Seregni announced: 'What our front is proposing is not only a profound change in the structures, but the replacement of the classes that are in power, by displacing the oligarchy from power and bringing the people to govern.'

Since then the Frente Amplio has got broader, with the inclusion of former Tupamaro leaders (whose party list in this election received more votes than the entire Colorado list!), and has controlled the capital, Montevideo (where half the population lives), since 1990, but its vision has got narrower. Land reform and the nationalisation of the banks were jettisoned from the Front's programme in the 1990s and, more recently, attempts to include rejection of the Free Trade Area of the Americas and refusal to pay the foreign debt were not successful. Indeed, Vázquez travelled to Washington to assure the IMF that Uruguay's debt would be honoured.

So what will the Frente Amplio government actually do? It has promised an emphasis on fighting poverty, a more just distribution of wealth and a strengthening of the role of the state in the financial sector and in production. Before the election, Vázquez promised an attack on corruption, a purge of any remnants of the military's dictatorial past, and an emphasis on human rights questions.

What these policies will look like in practice remains to be seen. Some may well constitute a genuine break from neo-liberalism, some can be achieved without challenging the economic order, and some smack of 'triangulation' - attempting to reconcile the free market and social justice. What is significant is the immediate attempt to deepen the relationship with the governments of Argentina and Brazil, Uruguay's partners in the Mercosur trading bloc, at the expense of the close relationship with the USA enjoyed by Batlle. The new government sees Argentina and

Brazil, as well as Chile and Venezuela, as allies.

The degree of opposition to the 'Washington consensus' among these governments is uneven. In Argentina, Kirchner was clearly only the least worst option in the eyes of many workers and poor. The Chilean leader Lagos is seen at 'third way' summits with the likes of Blair and Schröder, and while the Lula government in Brazil is more deserving of support, albeit of the very critical variety, its treatment in the US media tells us that it constitutes very little threat to the economic order.

In Venezuela, Chávez combines verbal attacks on neo-liberalism with a talent for being able to face down and out-manoeuvre his opponents, while producing the goods in terms of health, education and land reform. Like Chávez, the Frente Amplio emphasises 'participatory democracy' based on grassroots organisations. As with Brazil, the fact that there has not been a run on the peso following the election suggests that the new government has earned Washington's trust for now, but at what price?

As result of a referendum held at the same time as the election, Uruguay is now the first country in Latin America to guarantee the right to drinking water and sewerage services in its constitution. The state now has exclusive control over water and sanitation, making access to them a fundamental human right. This victory was the result of a campaign by social movements and public sector unions, but

is supported by Vázquez. It amounts to a declaration to the IMF, the banks and the WTO that Uruguay is not for sale. It follows the 'water war' in Bolivia, which resulted in the cancellation of Bechtel's contract to run the city of Cochabamba's water supplies.

The paradox of the present period is that Uruguay, like many countries in the region, has passed from military dictatorship to democracy only for the Uruguayans to find that their 'democracy' has the authority to do little more than issue a passport. Nevertheless, the modicum of participatory democracy and citizenship which now exists in some Latin American nation states constitutes a form of opposition to the dictatorship of the multinationals and the IMF. Governments which claim to oppose neo-liberal policies must be supported when they keep their promises, and called to account when they don't, but we must understand that they are confronted with enormous pressures. Previously, they faced being drowned in blood, as happened in Chile. Now, the kill is a little cleaner. A run on the currency can destroy a country's economy in 48 hours. The Cancún summit showed that a bloc of countries has more chance of facing down the IMF and the multinationals than a single nation state. National leaders, whatever their good intentions, cannot be relied upon to do this, and so, in a further paradox, it is workers' solidarity across Latin America which can best ensure that the promises of Uruguay's new government are kept.

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# Caricature of socialism

**Stasiland: Stories From Behind the Berlin Wall**

By Anna Funder

Granta, 2004, 304pp, £7.99

Richard Price

'Unconditional defence of the degenerated and deformed workers' states against imperialism' thundered hundreds of orthodox Trotskyist proclamations in the decades before the fall of the Berlin Wall. But 1989 knocked on the head any lingering idea that the myriad squabbling groups laying claim to Trotsky's legacy formed a kind of extended Fourth Internationalist family. At one pole lay groups hoping for a Stalinist military crackdown to save the workers' states. At the other were those who cheered on the collapse of Stalinism as the democratic prelude to political revolution.

To defend something, it ought to be axiomatic that you need a fairly clear idea of what it is you are defending, why you are defending it, whom you are defending it against, and how you are defending it.

Although Trotskyism came into being primarily as a revolutionary critique of Stalinism, as time went on it became a symbiotic relationship. It surely wasn't accidental that when Stalinism imploded, almost all of the significant Trotskyist and semi-Trotskyist groupings also went into a tailspin. When the Berlin Wall fell, most of the Trotskyist left kidded itself that the revolution was advancing in eastern Europe, while some of the smaller groups allied themselves with remnants of the old Stalinist parties. If Trotskyist groups survived, it was only by reinventing themselves as something fundamentally different. While the Trotskyists can hardly be blamed for the trajectory taken by events, their failure to anticipate the extent of the rot prior to 1989, and their inability to make an honest accounting of what took place afterwards, has wiped out swathes of the very forces who believed that after Stalinism it was their turn.

At the heart of this theoretical failure lay a series of wildly false estimates: that political revolution could be carried out by the surgical removal of the upper layer of Stalinist cadres; that it was desirable to preserve the main structures of the 'planned economy' (at the point where the

Stalinist controlled economies were creaking to a halt); that significant numbers of workers could be mobilised to defend states from which the working class was profoundly alienated; that the workers of eastern Europe were in a state of revolutionary readiness, the only (!) thing missing being revolutionary leadership.

The perspectives of state capitalists like the SWP have hardly stood the test of time any better, whether it's been their initially upbeat estimate of the potential for anti-capitalist revolution, or the theoretical gymnastics of insisting that the restoration process merely involved a transition from one form of capitalism to another. Fifteen years on, political parties of every description exist in the former eastern bloc, but Trotskyists have failed to put down significant roots anywhere, so the claim to have inherited the mantle of the Russian revolution would seem to have definitively hit the buffers.

Looking back to the fevered debates on the left after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, I'm reminded of a discussion with a member of Workers Power - then campaigning with its usual disdain for political realities for the 'revolutionary reunification' of Germany - in which he expressed horror that mobs of East German workers had besieged a state building. It turned out that the state building in question was the headquarters of the ubiquitous state security police, the Stasi. It illustrated the nub of the problem. How could socialists, at the moment when the old bureaucracies crumbled, call upon workers to defend the *state*, as distinct from *state-owned property*? By any standard Marxist definition, the 'state' includes the very repressive apparatus of the state that the workers hated.

While it might have been possible to carry out an anti-bureaucratic political revolution in the Soviet Union in the mid-1920s without a root-and-branch purge of large sections of the apparatus, by the late 1980s the aim of winning over any significant wing of the Stalinist apparatus to revolutionary socialism was a bizarre fantasy, to which only some Trotskyists subscribed. (Others called for the 'independent' action of the working class - as if even embryonic leadership was unnecessary, or could somehow be improvised overnight.)

For their part, the workers didn't believe this was possible. Neither did the Stalinists nor the imperialists. In retrospect, the possibility of the kind of political revolution Trotsky envisaged rested to a large degree on two factors: a working class imbued with a socialist consciousness; a split taking place in the ruling party, in which a section (the 'Reiss faction') would take the side of the workers. Both 'conditions' were present to some extent in Hungary in 1956

and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. But by 1989, the workers were so alienated from the 'workers' states' that the lure of capitalism proved irresistible, and the search for a non-existent Reiss faction had degenerated into an unseemly farce. If anything, the elite of the KGB was ahead of the restorationist game, pushing forward the most pro-capitalist wing of the Soviet apparatus, and sorting out its own future by depositing as much as it could in numbered Swiss bank accounts. In many former eastern bloc countries, the Stalinist nomenklatura was in the forefront of management buyouts of state property, or arms trading.

On a propaganda level, attempting to rally workers in defence of 'workers' states' which were universally recognised as oppressing the working class was doomed to failure, so divorced were they from any connection with 1917.

By 1989-91, the category of 'deformed workers' state' had also lost any theoretical value. Even quite sophisticated attempts, like that of Workers Power, to establish watertight theories of what constituted such a historical mule were overthrown by reality.<sup>1</sup> Part of the explanation lies in their origin. Marx and Engels had never anticipated that workers would form a distinct *state* as such. At most, they foresaw a fairly brief transitional regime ('the dictatorship of the proletariat') before the working class began the business of destroying the state and establishing a classless society, which by definition would be stateless. This is the theory of the state that Lenin pushed insistently in *The State and Revolution*. The Bolsheviks' subsequent use of the term 'workers' and peasants' government' was at best a term of convenience, rather than a scientific category. The 'people's democracies' of eastern Europe lacked even distant revolutionary origins, and were deformed from birth rather than through a process of counter-revolution. As regimes installed on Red Army bayonets, they lacked any legitimacy.

Stalin hurled the charge at the Russian Opposition that they sought to remove his faction by civil war. From the Stalinist purges of the 1930s - if not earlier - it was clear that the Stalinist leadership could not be removed *by the working class* except by force, and that this would mean civil war. With the complete removal of the regime from working class accountability, and the rapid social stratification that took place, the *political* revolution that Trotsky envisaged increasingly took on a *social* dimension.

While the Trotskyists tended to underestimate the social tasks of an anti-bureaucratic revolution, they tended to overestimate the degree to which the Stalinist bureaucracies were wedded to nationalised

property. There was also a propensity to overestimate the achievements of 'centralised planning' in these wasteful, inefficient and mis-planned economies. The assumption that the Stalinist bureaucracies would, if it came to the crunch, defend nationalised property – if only because it was the source of their privileges – and that capitalist restoration would not be possible without civil war was proved spectacularly wrong. (Of course, the collapse of Stalinism has led to all sorts of nationalist and religious conflicts, but that is another issue.)

This reflected a failure to understand the degree of autonomy the state had acquired under Stalinism. Because the state was accountable neither to workers nor capitalists, the personnel directing the regimes and the policies they pursued acquired decisive importance.

Throughout eastern Europe in 1989-90, regimes which had ruthlessly monopolised power for decades, sitting on top of largely nationalised economies, abdicated to pro-capitalist forces, in most cases without a fight. A combination of a collapse of confidence in their own regimes and their faltering economies, combined with massive unpopularity and a desire to save their own necks, led the bureaucracies everywhere to capitulate.

In historical terms, Trotsky's denial that the bureaucracy had become a new class has been vindicated. No ruling class in history has ever departed the stage without a fight across such a vast geographical area. The Stalinist bureaucracies remained a temporary phenomenon, not a lasting development, even if there is a strong argument to suggest they became something weightier than a mere caste.

It was precisely their transitory nature that made it difficult to fit them into a watertight theoretical category. All attempts to establish a checklist of features that defined a 'deformed workers' state' failed.

Some Trotskyists thought that workers' states could be defined as states in which nationalised property predominated, and began to enrol some unlikely new candidates – countries like Burma, Syria, Algeria and South Yemen. They tended to confuse matters further by speaking of property *forms* and property *relations* interchangeably. But this approach also raised a serious problem. What had been the nature of the Bolshevik regime between late 1917 and the wave of nationalisations in the summer of 1918?

For some the nature of the political leadership was the decisive factor. A deformed workers' state was one ruled by a communist party. But this raised the problem of defining Cuba before Castro discovered Marxism-Leninism, and presumably means that China, currently the engine of capital-

ist development in the Far East, is still some type of workers' state.

Others tried to define the workers' state in purely economic terms, only to run into exceptions to every rule. Some stressed the establishment of centralised planning and the monopoly of foreign trade. But Yugoslavia had neither. Soviet Russia didn't have centralised planning until 1928. Some countries like Poland had private agriculture, while many others were largely collectivised. Even Workers Power's attempt to link the existence of a workers' state to the suppression of the law of value was full of holes. It ignored the fact that nationalisations in general, whether capitalist or anti-capitalist, tend to distort the law of value, and that the law of value was never entirely suppressed under the Stalinist regimes, which was reflected in the existence of both legal and illegal markets alongside the command economies.

There was a further logical contradiction, because there was an implication that the regime that implemented a planned economy would remain bourgeois up to the moment that its measures finally succeeded in suppressing the law of value.

So what should have been the attitude of socialists in countries like the GDR where Stalinist dictatorships crumbled in 1989? What was there to be gained in defending the state as such, rather than state property, which was overwhelmingly what the socialist minded minority of workers wanted to salvage from the debacle? Surely 'the defence of the workers' state' could only serve to identify you in some way with the regime and its hated apparatus?

To be sure there are other elements of state power beyond the repressive apparatus. In the GDR, there was the issue of its sovereignty, under threat of reunification. But that issue could only have had a different outcome within the context of a widespread struggle to defend state property.

But this in turn was undermined by the 'socialist' economies of eastern Europe falling further and further behind their Western counterparts. Once East German workers had been exposed to Western affluence, they could not readily be won to a defence of the existing order. Any defence of nationalised property had to be coupled with a root-and-branch revision of the centralised planning model.

Many of these debates were conducted at such a level of abstraction that the conditions of life that framed workers' consciousness were left almost entirely out of the equation. At this distance, it might be argued that this is all water under the bridge. There are new struggles to be fought, and yesterday's dusty debates are only of academic interest. Yet to be so

wrong about one of the most important episodes of modern history puts a question mark over the left's ability to analyse and intervene in events, so to grapple with the unresolved theoretical issues of Stalinism's collapse does have a continuing relevance.

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Anna Funder's *Stasiland* has no theoretical pretensions. Instead, it concentrates on how the omnipresent secret police of the GDR – the Stasi – affected people's lives. An Australian journalist living in the east after reunification, she interviewed former Stasi men and their victims. Out of her experiences, she has woven a book which gets to grips with the paranoia and banality of Stalinism better than many elevated sets of theses. You can't help thinking that many on the left could benefit from reading it.

On the face of things, the GDR wasn't the worst place to live. In fact, in Stalinist terms it was something of a success. It had the highest standard of living in the eastern bloc. It had relatively advanced health services and childcare, and liberal attitudes to sexual morality and abortion.

It also had the highest ratio of secret police to population of any state in history. The GDR's population was 17 million. The Stasi had 97,000 employees and 173,000 paid informers, and if unpaid informers are taken into account some estimates put the ratio of the Stasi and their informers as high as one to every 6.5 citizens – considerably higher than Stalin's Russia or Hitler's Germany. The Stasi even reckoned to have 65 per cent of church leaders in their pocket. In its 40 years of existence, the GDR generated as many documents and files as the whole of German history since the Middle Ages. Placed side by side, the Stasi's files would have stretched 180 km. Funder accurately describes the Stasi as 'the main stay of state power'.

Such a forest of paper didn't only mean a lot of oppression. It created a system of paranoid, but at the same time drab and banal, bureaucracy. Large numbers of citizens were invited in for questioning so that small samples could be collected from their clothes! Popular culture was frowned upon, and the Stasi made it their job to create a socialist realist pop culture. Alcoholism flourished and housing was in short supply.

Roneo copiers, typewriters and, later on, photocopiers were licensed, lest people express themselves in writing. Even children's printing sets were withdrawn from shops to prevent Samizdat publishing. The angle of television aerials was checked to see if they pointed west. Even the fairly relaxed attitudes to morality had a bureaucratic twist. Stasi men were allowed to have

affairs, but were expected to report them to their superiors. Such sinister and absurd restrictions were held in place by a gerontocracy of Maoist proportions.

In the end, this vast apparatus of repression was powerless. 'I think at the end the Stasi had so much information,' comments one interviewee, 'that they thought everyone was an enemy because everyone was under observation' (p.266). In June 1988, Gorbachev renounced the use of force to prop up the eastern European regimes. The Stasi had contingency plans to arrest 85,000 people in the event of a crisis. But they were paralysed, caught between fear of the regime going down and fear of reprisals if it did. In October 1989, with mass demonstrations on the streets, Gorbachev gave the leadership of the East German communist party, the SED, a dressing down, warning them that unless they moved with the times they were doomed. From there, it was a short step to the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and of the regime itself. On January 15, 1990, demonstrators stormed the Stasi headquarters.

From the outset, the GDR fostered the myth that east Germans were the good Germans, liberated from Nazism by the Red Army, while west Germans were the ones responsible for fascism: '... almost overnight the Germans in the eastern states were made, or made themselves, innocent of Nazism. It seemed as if they actually believed that Nazis had come from and returned to the western parts of Germany, and were somehow separate from them' (p.161). (Of course, this myth was entirely at odds with the historical record. The Red Army had used great brutality in its advance through eastern Germany, holding all Germans responsible for Hitler, culminating in the mass rape of women in Berlin in 1945.) In a similar vein, the Berlin Wall, erected in 1961, became the 'anti-fascist defensive measure'. A wall to keep people in became a wall to keep fascists out. This didn't stop the GDR selling 34,000 malcontents to the Federal Republic in exchange for hard currency.

*Stasiland* isn't political history so much as a collection of personal histories. The saddest concerns Miriam, who distributed leaflets in 1968, aged 16, naively calling for 'consultations, not water cannon'. She was arrested, held in solitary confinement for a month, and released pending trial. She made her way to Berlin and tried to get over the Wall. After a trial at which she was accused of nearly starting a third world war, she served 18 months in prison. After her release, she moved in with a boyfriend, whom she subsequently married. He died in custody in 1980, and following a long-running wrangle with the authorities in an attempt to reclaim the body, she was regu-

larly called in for questioning for the rest of the life of the GDR.

Frau Paul was separated from her sickly baby when the Wall went up. She refused to go through with a deal which would reunite her with the child if she agreed to work for the Stasi, because she wouldn't shop opponents of the regime. Mother and child were separated for five years. Funder also met Klaus Renft, 'the Mick Jagger of the eastern bloc', who was unable to record after he went to renew his licence to perform in 1975 and was told his band no longer existed. Julia, a young woman whose misfortune it had been to have an Italian boyfriend, also found her life blighted by the capriciousness of bureaucracy. On one memorable occasion, a clerk at the employment office shrieked at her that she was not unemployed, she was *seeking work!* – obviously an unconscious pupil of Margaret Thatcher!

A steady trickle of former Stasi men responded to an advert that Funder put in a local newspaper. Some are hardened reptiles of the old regime, still justifying themselves. Some are trying to build a life under reunification. Others organise mutual support through the sinister sounding *Insiderkomitee*. They are said to have links to the PDS, which arose out of the ashes of the SED, and access to some of the SED's missing millions. Then there is the story of the Stasi man brought up as a model socialist because, he found out later, his father had stood as mayor for the Liberal Democrats in 1946, and had been forced to join the party on pain of imprisonment.

Funder also tries to probe the phenomenon of *ostalgie* – nostalgia for the GDR. While some of it emanates not surprisingly from former stalwarts of the regime, there are many workers who compare the uncertainties of today's economy with the certainties of yesterday. What's the point of having the freedom to travel abroad if you can't afford it, as someone puts it.

The GDR combined equal quantities of Kafka, Orwell and kitsch. It was inevitable that a regime that elevated the cult of surveillance above any sense of social solidarity would collapse like a house of cards once its Soviet protector called time. The history of the GDR doesn't have positive lessons for socialists. Instead, it reminds us of everything socialism shouldn't be. We have paid a very heavy price for Stalinism's monstrous caricature of socialism. In rebuilding a socialist tradition, we cannot afford to be nostalgic for Stasiland.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See Richard Price, 'Workers Power: Ten years in the pit of centrism', *Workers Action* No.11, March-April 2001.

<sup>2</sup> See Antony Beevor, *Berlin: The Downfall 1945*, Penguin, 2003. **WA**

# Sicilian vespers

## The Leopard

Directed by Luchino Visconti  
(1963)

DVD BFIVD595

178 minutes + extra material  
2004, £19.99

## Richard Price

Examples of great books that have been lost in the course of translation to the big screen are too numerous to mention. On the other hand, there have been cases of pulp fiction ending up as quality motion picture – parts one and two of *The Godfather* spring to mind. Since so many films aren't adapted from novels in the first place, the number of outstanding novels that make it to celluloid in one piece is very small. Although *The Leopard* fully qualifies on both counts, it has had a tortuous history.

The author, Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, born in 1896, was a Sicilian prince, the last of an illustrious line of nobles who could trace their ancestry back to Tiberius I, the sixth-century Emperor of Byzantium. Although opposed to Mussolini and anti-clerical, he played no active part in politics, devoting much of a fairly uneventful life to the contemplation of history and literature. His study of Russian, French, German and English literature resulted in a few carefully crafted essays and he began writing his only novel, *The Leopard*, in 1955, having mulled it over for 25 years. He completed it shortly before his death in 1957, but was unable to find a publisher. When *The Leopard* was finally published the following year, it rapidly became a huge international success, and its popularity helped make the breakthrough for other contemporary Italian writers.

The director of the film of the book, Luchino Visconti (1906-76), was a member of an outstanding generation of post-war Italian directors that included Federico Fellini, Pier Paolo Pasolini, Roberto Rossellini, Vittorio De Sica and Michelangelo Antonioni. Born into a very wealthy northern aristocratic family, his early political sympathies were pro-fascist, but when he gravitated towards film he came into contact with members of the clandestine Communist Party, and was further radicalised by the German occupation of

Rome in 1943-4. Parallel to his work as a filmmaker, he directed both plays and opera.

Visconti's best known films in this country are probably *Death in Venice* (1971) and *The Damned* (1968), both starring Dirk Bogarde. At the risk of upsetting dyed-in-the-wool Viscontiites, I find *Death in Venice* – his lugubrious essay on mortality and unconsummated homoerotic desire based on Thomas Mann's novella – tedious in the extreme. *The Damned*, which deals with an industrialist family's role in the Nazis' rise to power, is occasionally shown on television, and has worn rather better.

When he came to film *The Leopard* in 1962, Visconti was at the height of his powers. His technical mastery is evident from the opening shots. As Claudia Cardinale explains in an accompanying interview, he left nothing to chance. His meticulous style of direction was strongly influenced by his theatrical work and he knew precisely what he wanted from each scene, not only in terms of acting, but also in the minute recreation of 1860s Sicily. Wide screen photography is used to great effect, enabling Visconti to use large numbers of actors simultaneously, notably in the ballroom scene which occupies the final quarter of the film.

It's no exaggeration to say that Visconti draws career best performances from each of his three leading actors. He had hoped to cast Lawrence Olivier as Don Fabrizio, Prince of Salina – the leopard of the title, who is based closely on di Lampedusa's great grandfather. Instead, United Artists insisted on Burt Lancaster. Visconti was initially hostile to Lancaster, whose CV included playing cowboys and trapeze artists. But Lancaster is a revelation, apparently basing his aristocratic gestures and mannerisms on observing Visconti himself! Alain Delon rises above the cold, emotionless characters he tended to play in French *policiers* to portray Fabrizio's dashing but opportunist nephew, Tancredi, while Claudia Cardinale is perfect as the beautiful daughter of Don Calogero, the grasping mayor who represents the rising mafia-friendly bourgeoisie.

Like the novel, the film was an immediate success when it was released in 1963, winning the Palme d'Or at Cannes. But at three hours long, it was considered uncommercial. Its US premier was, according to Cardinale, 'a disaster', with critics unwilling to accept Lancaster playing against his tough guy image.

For a short time it circulated in a version butchered by United Artists, before disappearing almost without trace. By the time I first saw the film in the mid-1980s, it had hardly been shown for 20 years. Even after its critical rehabilitation, screenings were few and far between until a run in London

last year, and until very recently it remained unreleased on either video or DVD.

But *The Leopard* is much more than a beautiful period piece. It manages to be a profound meditation on class relations, historical change and continuity that is both ironic and full of pathos. The story is ostensibly straightforward. It opens with Garibaldi's landing in Sicily in 1860 – an event that threatens to shake the decaying established order to its foundations. Compounding Don Fabrizio's painful foreboding that Sicilian history is at a dead end and that his own class is doomed, his favourite nephew, Tancredi, joins the rebels.

But Tancredi's impetuosity is balanced by his insight that 'if we want everything to stay as it is, everything has to change'. The nobility must execute a compromise with the forces of change, represented locally by the oily political embrace of Don Calogero, the acquisitive mayor of the Prince's summer residence of Donnafugata. More fortunately, the mechanism for the compromise is a love match between Tancredi and Calogero's daughter, Angelica, to which the Prince gives his blessing. The political side of the deal is the Prince's support in the plebiscite to decide Italian unification under the Piedmontese monarchy. Calogero delivers the result in Donnafugata – 512 votes in favour and none against – in a manner worthy of Saddam Hussein.

While the film is faithful to di Lampedusa's novel, it is not a carbon copy. In drawing out a novel of barely 200 pages into a three hour film, Visconti expands some of its elements, and discards others. The ball scene, set two years after Garibaldi's landing, forms a chapter of less than 20 pages in the book. In the film, it becomes a 45 minute epic, and in many ways is the most important section of the film. Where di Lampedusa's focus is Sicilian history, Visconti seems to be extending its central metaphor to the sweep of Italian history. While superficially the ball is a showpiece for the new political alignment, as the night draws on the Prince's intimations of his own mortality blend with pessimistic conclusions about the future. For while the nobility may have bought itself a reprieve, the new relationship of forces only serves to compound Sicily's historical impasse. As the Prince wearily leaves the ball and walks home, the last of the rebels of 1860 are shot at dawn by the new royalist army, whose officer corps Tancredi has joined.

Like the novel, the film drew hostile comments from Communist Party intellectuals. Di Lampedusa was attacked for traditionalism and setting out a reactionary philosophy; Visconti was accused of harbouring secret sympathies for the old aristocracy –

something he strenuously denied.

In fact, while di Lampedusa was nostalgic for some of the culture of the past, he was certainly no backward looking romantic when it came to history. Visconti, meanwhile, brought to *The Leopard* insights derived from the Marxist analysis of the southern question. But *The Leopard* doesn't work better than, say, Bertolucci's sprawling epic of 20th-century Italian history, *1900*, just because its historical insights are more subtle – even though they are. Where Bertolucci's people are crude caricatures of class types, right up to Donald Sutherland's comedy fascist, Visconti's history lives through the ambiguities of its characters. These are real people facing genuine dilemmas. *The Leopard* is a great film, not because it's a superior history lesson, but because it works as drama.

From the vantage point of the 1960s, what political or artistic purpose could an upbeat, optimistic version of the 1860s have served? And why, in any case, shouldn't an artist influenced by Marxism inhabit the world view of a 19th-century prince, if by doing so he could illuminate deeper truths?

The historic compromise between the old and new rulers not only sustained the political domination of the north. It ensured the subjection of the peasantry of the south for a century after Garibaldi. If the failure of the Risorgimento to carry out a clear 1789 style break with the old order didn't predispose Italy to fascism, it certainly provided one of its historical preconditions. Gramsci and the Turin communists of *L'Ordine Nuovo* understood well enough in 1920 that the only progressive solution to the impasse was a revolutionary one:

'The Northern bourgeoisie has subjugated the South of Italy and the Islands, and reduced them to exploitable colonies; by emancipating itself from capitalist slavery, the Northern proletariat will emancipate the Southern peasant masses enslaved to the banks and the parasitic industry of the North. The economic and political regeneration of the peasants should not be sought in a division of uncultivated or poorly cultivated lands, but in the solidarity of the industrial proletariat. This in turn needs the solidarity of the peasantry and has an "interest" in ensuring that capitalism is not reborn economically from landed property; that Southern Italy and the Islands do not become a military base for capitalist counter-revolution.' The alternative was two decades of fascism.

Through this fully restored version on DVD, *The Leopard* has not only earned a new lease of life. It is one of a select number of films that deserves to be recognised as a masterpiece.



# Jack Firestein

## 1917-2004

Lifelong socialist  
and Labour  
activist

To have been active in the Labour movement for seven decades is no small achievement in itself. To have done so and remained on good terms with many other activists is rarer still. Jack Firestein, who died on November 15 at the age of 87, embodied many of the best traditions of the old East End of London of the 1930s, where poverty, anti-semitism and radical ideas bred thousands of committed socialists.

Born in Whitechapel in 1917 to an eastern European Jewish family, Jack joined the Communist Party in the 1930s like many others of his background and generation. After working briefly as a tailor, he took up bookselling – a trade he kept up for most of his life. In 1936, he took part in the famous Battle of Cable Street, when Mosley's Blackshirts were routed by a massive mobilisation of East End workers. Phil Piratin, the Communist MP for Stepney from 1945-50, referred to Jack in his book *Our Flag Stays Red* as the 'lad' who bravely held the banner when, at the time of the Czechoslovak crisis in 1938, a contingent from Stepney broke through the police cordon surrounding the German Embassy – an action that resulted in a pitched battle on the steps of the embassy.

During the Second World War, Jack was seriously injured at the Battle of Anzio in 1944, and captured by German soldiers. When Allied forces advanced, he walked out past the guards of his POW camp, found his way to northern France, and was subsequently awarded the Military Medal for bravery.

His bookselling took him from the East End to Willesden and Soho, originally working for a Communist outlet, then running an independent bookshop. In latter years, Jack's bookstall outside the Camden Labour Centre was a fixture. He was closely associated for many years with the Unity Theatre, a branch of the workers' theatre movement linked with the CP. After it burned down, Jack never lost hope that one day it would be re-established with Labour movement support.

He left the CP after the traumatic suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. As his long-time friend Gloria Lazenby notes, he left without making a big fuss, but unlike many contemporaries, he didn't see it as a political shipwreck from which he was unable to recover. While his political evolution took him away from Stalinism, he remained a committed left-wing socialist for the rest of his life.

Having moved to Camden in the late 1950s, Jack joined the Labour Party a few years later, and for the next three decades he remained active in its ranks. He was involved with the Camden Town Neighbourhood Advice Centre, helping people with welfare problems. He also worked as

chauffeur to Clive Jenkins, the leader of ASTMS, and in this capacity he regularly put the flamboyant and rightward-moving union leader straight on the issues of the day.

I knew Jack well in the first half of the 1980s, as a delegate to Camden Trades Council. The CP still had a strong trade union base in Camden in those days, particularly in Ueatt, ASTMS, and among trade union headquarters officials, even though the Stalinists were split into three warring factions – four if you counted a lone Maoist. With 15-20 delegates, the Stalinists' control of the Trades Council seemed impregnable, until the WRP locally decided to give them a run for their money. Within a year or so, the opposing sides were almost equal, with a smaller number of Labour Party members in the middle, divided between CP fellow travellers, and independent-minded activists like Jack. In the battles that ensued, which ranged over all manner of domestic and international issues, Jack worked closely with us. To the Stalinists' intense annoyance, we took up issues such as the military coup in Poland, and the Jaruzelski government's scabbing role during the miners' strike. At one memorably heated AGM, the CP lost the chair by 26 votes to 25.

With all its faults, the WRP's intervention in Camden was a sort of Healyism with a human face. At the time of the rate-capping struggle, Jack strongly supported the proposal to establish a borough-wide assembly to unite the council and health service unions with anti-cuts councillors and tenants' groups – an initiative the Stalinists did everything they could to sabotage. In spite of the baggage of Healyism, this broad approach was far more positive than the CP's bureaucratic syndicalism, or, for that matter, the SWP's pessimistic analysis of the 'downturn', according to which socialists had to retreat from public campaigns to rebuild workplace organisation. After some successful conferences, the Camden Assembly fell apart with the rate-capping debacle.

Jack's loyalty to the Labour Party was strained to breaking point in 2002, when Gloria was deselected as a councillor in a right-wing manoeuvre. He supported her subsequent campaign to get re-elected as an independent. Despite her winning a strong vote, the Liberal Democrats took the seat. Apparently phased by his unexpected success, the Lib Dem candidate refused to take his seat, triggering another by-election in which Gloria's vote went down. Although by now his health was failing, Jack was so disgusted by New Labour's evolution that he joined Respect – although he also kept his Labour Party card.

**Richard Price**

# Introduction

Chris Ford

The memoir that follows was written in 1951 by the Ukrainian Marxist Roman Rosdolsky<sup>1</sup> (1898–1967), author of *The Making of Marx's Capital* and *Engels and the "Nonhistoric" Peoples: The National Question in the Revolutions of 1848*. Published here for the first time in English, it is a rare chapter in the history of the socialist movement that has been long forgotten. Rosdolsky was the sole known survivor of the tragedy that consumed pioneers of whom he writes. It is a fitting time to re-publish this memoir for once again the Ukrainian question is placed on the agenda of the day by the resurgent masses. Yet it is also a time when knowledge of the Ukrainian Marxist tradition is at its lowest ebb, no more so than in Galicia, the region to which this account relates. The intellectual Bohdan Krawchenko once commented that 'we are called a non-historic people, and we are in that we have forgotten our history'; in publishing this work we may make a modest contribution to the recovery of Ukraine's lost left.

The period which this account covers is one of great relevance to the current generation of Marxists – that of the First World War. The debates that ensued within international socialism in the period before and during that conflagration have been long examined for their lessons and guidance to socialists in their relationship to contemporary conflicts. For the socialist movement which had begun its journey at the start of the 19th century this was a time in which it faced a near catastrophe. For this reason those few revolutionary internationalists who stood against the tide and ensured the survival of socialism hold a unique and proud place in our history.

The socialist movement of the early 20th century was united in the Second International, which was committed to opposing the imminent war and utilising the crisis to promote revolution to 'hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule'. Then in August 1914, when the first cannon shots were heard, the socialist parties of nearly all the belligerent countries capitulated before their governments. Ukraine, which became a main arena of the war, was the largest oppressed nation in Europe, its territory partitioned between the Russian Empire, and its western provinces of Galicia and Bukovyna where some four million inhabitants lived under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In these territories the more liberal

policies of the Austrian Habsburgs stood in contrast to the Tsarist despotism across the border, with its police state backed policies of Russification. For this reason, Galicia played a major role in the development of the Ukrainian movement, and was known as the 'Ukrainian Piedmont'.

The Ukrainian socialist movement was divided organisationally along the lines of the country's partition: The Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers Party (USDRP) in Russian-ruled Ukraine and the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (USDP) in Galicia and Bukovyna in Austrian-ruled Ukraine. Most USDRP leaders such as Lev Yurkevych opposed the war, the exception being Symon Petliura whose Moscow-based paper *Ukrainskaia Zhizn* (Ukrainian Life) represented the 'Russian orientation'. In a mirror image, an 'Austrian orientation' took hold, but in the case of the USDP it was supported by the majority of the leadership, who formed a bloc with rival Ukrainian parties in the Holovna Ukrainska Rada (Supreme Ukrainian Council). Its manifesto declared that 'The victory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy shall be our own victory'. The exception to this tendency was the leading USDP theorist Volodymyr Levynsky, who teamed up with Yurkevych in Geneva as an internationalist bloc raising the voice of authentic Ukrainian Marxism.<sup>2</sup> In the now dire conditions of the war-torn territories of Galicia another force of young socialists emerged opposed to the war outside of the official USDP. The Internatsional'na Revoliutsiina Sotsial Demokratychna Molod' (IRSDM – International Revolutionary Social Democratic Youth), engaged in conspiratorial activities, was the first distinctly 'internationalist' organisation to make its appearance in this region, providing the nucleus around which the Komunistychna Partiiia Zakhidnoi Ukrainy (KPZU – Communist Party of Western Ukraine) took shape. The role of this group was largely ignored, a fact made worse because many of its former members were expelled from the KPZU in the late 1920s.<sup>3</sup>

The IRSDM was very much within the vernacular revolutionary tradition of Ukraine: after the defeat of 1848, political life in Galicia was dominated by pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian intellectual camps, both of which excluded the masses from politics. This changed in the late 1870s under the impact of the anarcho-socialist Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–1895), a political exile from Kiev who energised a generation of Galician youth, and from whom the IRSDM initially took their name.

Drahomanov can be considered the pioneer of Ukrainian socialism. Exiled in

1876, he published in Geneva the first Ukrainian socialist journal, *Hromada* (Community). His work was a major turning point in the Ukrainian movement. According to his niece, Lesya Ukrainka, his ideal was a 'peasant state with anarchist production'. He sought to move the national movement from purely cultural endeavours towards a political challenge. He was convinced that any revolutionary listening to the voices of revolt from below would hear this cry for self-determination: 'In every country, in each human race, in every community and even each individual, there have to be separate approaches to the attainment of the same solutions. These are the lessons drawn from the efforts of the International Workingmen's Association.' The programme of Drahomanov was influential on subsequent Ukrainian socialist ideas and even on his critics. Notably, he argued the inseparability of national liberation from social emancipation.

In 1890 his followers in Galicia had formed the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party, and after his death in 1895 the Radicals underwent a transformation which witnessed the crystallisation of three distinct elements, from which emerged a Marxian social democratic wing headed by Yulian Bachynskyi. It was under these circumstances that, once again, a younger generation of Galicians emerged, organising at first in secret Drahomanov societies, the Drahomanivka, from which evolved the IRSDM.

These youth adhered to a myriad of views: populist, anarchist, socialist revolutionary and Marxist. Myroslav Irehan, a member in Lviv described it as 'an admixture of the theories of all the revolutionary parties. More concretely, the "Drahomanivka" was an illegal "open revolutionary rostrum" for the youth'.<sup>4</sup> Rosdolsky is writing in the period in which this underground network had to be rebuilt in war-time conditions. It is difficult to imagine just how awful the conditions were for these young socialists. Most of Galicia and Bukovyna was occupied by Russia from September 1914–June 1915, during which it was subjected to a vicious campaign to Russify the region. Thousands were imprisoned and Ukrainian organisations suppressed, the returning Austrians in turn engaged in their own repressions. The organisation was rebuilt along revolutionary Marxist lines after the Russian withdrawal. The bulk of the work was done by Osyp Krilyk (Vasyl'kiv) who would later emerge as leader of the KPZU. The group's most erudite theoreticians were Roman Kuz'ma (Turians'kyi) and Roman Rosdolsky, both of whom also assumed

important positions in the KPZU. Within six months of its reorganization the IRSDM had approximately 500 members in all of the major Galician cities. Rosdolsky does not mention all of his own contributions: the IRSDM's organ, *Vistnyk*, was edited by him and he developed two curricula of instruction for the IRSDM's lecturers. The first of these, the 'Curriculum for a Free Socialist School', aimed at 'liquidating religious superstitions and formulating a monistic materialistic world outlook'. The second programme involved a thorough grounding in the socialist classics and was geared for 'party-political training'.<sup>5</sup>

The IRSDM also succeeded in establishing ties with an underground movement of the Zimmerwald Left active in eastern Ukraine. The IRSDM publicised the activities of Liebknecht and Luxemburg and saw the war as a prelude to international socialist revolution. The October Revolution in Russia was warmly greeted by the IRSDM: 'It has shaken the proletariat and its party,' wrote *Vistnyk*, 'from its long war-time lethargy. Now powerful secret forces are beginning to emerge.'<sup>6</sup>

As early as December 1918 elements of the IRSDM were advocating forming a communist party in Galicia. The IRSDM could rightly claim to have prepared the groundwork for the emergence of the communist movement in Galicia. Under conditions of the blackest reaction and absolutism, they were first to take up the struggle against nationalism, social opportunism, and chauvinism; first to come out against the war; and first to defend the great proletarian revolution. They had done so in the face of Russian and Austrian repression and at a time when socialism appeared to have collapsed across the world. This account by Rosdolsky therefore provides an inspirational message for a rebirth of Ukrainian Marxism at a time when the legacy of Stalinism appears to have doomed it to the past.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Published by the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party in their organ, *Do istorii ukrains'koho livo-sotsialistичnoho rukhu v Halychyni (Pidchasoieni 'Drahomanivky' 1916-1988)*, *Vpered*, 1951, No. 3-4.

<sup>2</sup> See the serialised history of Ukrainian Marxism by Chris Ford in *The Hobgoblin* issues 4 (2002) and 5 (2004).

<sup>3</sup> The best history of the Communist Party of West Ukraine is Janusz Radziejowski, *The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919-1929*, CIUS Press, Canada.

<sup>4</sup> A full account of this organisation can be found in Roman Solchanyk, 'Revolutionary Marxism in Galicia Before 1918', *East European Quarterly* Vol X, No.1, 1976.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

## A contribution to the history of the Ukrainian left-wing socialist movement in Galicia

The Wartime, 1916-18, 'Drahomanov Organisation'

Roman Rosdolsky

*Where are you, my old-time friends?  
You are dispersed, like paths in the forest.*  
L. Ukrainka

*Out of the graves, voices are heard:  
'Comrades!' What kind of comrade are you to us?  
What we were doing – you only dream about.*

A. Strzyz

It is impossible to write about the beginnings of the Ukrainian left-wing socialist movement in Galicia without mentioning the so-called 'Drahomanov Organisation' (*Drahomanivky*).

The reader of our time knows, probably, little about these underground, self-educational groups of young people whose network covered nearly all of the gymnasiums<sup>1</sup> and teacher seminaries of Eastern Galicia on the eve and during the years of the First World War, 1914 to 1918.

From the historical point of view, the Drahomanov Organisation was a successor to the previous secondary school student groups (Hromady), which existed from the 1860s through the 1880s. However, as the name itself indicates, the Drahomanov Organisation was from the outset a movement with a more or less distinct leftist, progressive colouring. This differentiated it from the former populist, Ukrainophile Hromady.

I was myself fortunate enough to be a member of the Drahomanov Organisation in Lviv from early 1912. I was at first a participant in the so-called 'Preparatory Group' (a candidate as we would call it today), and later a full member of the Senior Group. From these times there are two names particularly dear to me, two long-deceased friends: Osyp Danylovych and Andriy Mekelyta. The former, already a university student, was the leader and the perennial instructor to his audience – which consisted of more than 20 students attending the fourth and fifth gymnasium classes – of the basic tenets of the modern scientific world outlook, and primarily of Darwinism, and to liberate them from clericalist prejudices. Even today, I am amazed how easily Danylovych succeeded in his task. Already after two or three months most his listeners – who of course didn't know about the existence of the Senior Group and of the Drahomanov Organisation as such – became convinced free-thinkers, and enthusiastically espoused socialistic ideas. Danylovych was, indeed, a remarkably gifted, convincing speaker. No wonder that his weekly talks meant more to us than the dull and trite admonitions of our schoolmasters and religious instructors, who time after time cautioned us against the 'pernicious' consequences of atheism and so-

cialism. The poor fellows didn't realise how sweet the forbidden fruits taste from the eternally green tree of free human thought!

It has to be emphasised that Danylovyeh himself was a socialist of the Drahomanovian type, and this is why he often ardently opposed the many 'Marxists' of the Senior Group. In spite of this, thanks to his tireless and consistent anti-clerical propaganda, he accomplished a most important job: he paved for us the road which led beyond Drahomanov's ideology towards scientific, Marxist socialism! As a person, Danylovyeh was unusually high-minded and dedicated; this is why we were deeply hurt by his death in the Ukrainian Sharpshooters' Legion (Sichovi Striltsi) in 1915.<sup>11</sup>

In contrast to Danylovyeh, the 17-year-old A. Mekelyta – a native of the village Butyn Velyky, Zhovkva district – was a convinced social democrat and Marxist! He had recruited me to the Preparatory Group and supplied me with socialistic literature in Ukrainian, Polish and Russian. Under his influence and guidance, I began to read avidly the more popular works of Engels, Kautsky, Lassalle, Bogdanov, and before long I became a determined, although still a very hazy Marxist.

During the next two years I was, as a matter of course, a constant guest at the boisterous and cheerful lodgings, in Virmenska street and later in Teatynska street, where Mekelyta lived together with four other 'Drahomanovians'. The places were also frequented by Danylovyeh, Ohonovsky ('Kovbas'), I. Rosenberg ('Chorny') the 'anarchist' Kvas, the 'Marxist' Flash, E. Palashechuk (Komar),<sup>12</sup> the Didushok brothers<sup>13</sup> and sundry 'citizens

and rebels'.<sup>14</sup> It seems hardly necessary to stress that the discussions which took place there were incomparably more interesting than the lectures of our *gymnasium* pedagogues. The life of these discussions was the perennially hungry and the perennially enthusiastic Mekelyta, who supported himself by giving private lessons. However, he spent the major part of his income on books and, consequently, he often had to dine on a roll and a bottle of lemonade. Unfortunately, he, too, perished futilely, in 1918 on the Italian front. Only his last letter remained with us, in which he dreamed of the forthcoming socialist revolution.

Previously I have mentioned two Jewish comrades, Rosenberg and Flash. They were, regrettably, the only two non-Ukrainian members of the Lviv Drahomanov Organisation. Otherwise, the organisation had hardly any contacts, either with the young Jewish socialists, or with the analogous Polish movement, Promienisci ('The Radiant Ones').<sup>15</sup> But how was it possible to collaborate closely with an organisation which, despite its self-proclaimed leftist character, stubbornly maintained the plat-form of a 'historical' Poland, and whose members were in the best case, only followers of Pilsudski?

As already stated, the Drahomanov Organisation did not have a clear cut socialist outlook; consequently, it could even less be considered as Marxist. Nevertheless, the socialists, being the most active, gave a socialistic tone to the movement's activity. This was demonstrated at the national congress of the Drahomanov Organisation in 1913, where a significant non-socialist, or rather nationalist, opposition emerged which the socialist leaders found difficult to deal with. Moreover, even declared socialists among the Drahomanovians were not free from nationalistic inclinations; this was the time when a young social democrat, Dontsov,<sup>16</sup> stepped forward with his propaganda in favour of an Independent Ukraine supported by German and Austrian bayonets ('the Austrophile orientation').

Therefore, it wasn't surprising that upon the outbreak of the World War, in 1914, the Drahomanov Organisation fell apart and the majority of its members found themselves in the Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters. Similarly, the majority of the Promienisci joined the Polish Legions organised by Pilsudski.

When we began to rebuild the organisation in Lviv in 1916 we were able to establish contacts with only two senior members of the pre-war Drahomanov movement; Halushchak and Kandyak. But, to our surprise, they both energetically opposed the renewal of the organisation, and

especially giving it a socialist character. So we were obliged to start ourselves; the circumstances, however, were favourable! First of all we had a group of active and ardent leaders! The following merit to be named above all: R. Kuzma (Turyansky), O. Krilyk (Vasylykiv), I. Khlon (Iko), O. Berezytsky, T. Prokopovych, S. Pankivsky, and V. Syroizha.<sup>17</sup>

Secondly, in the course of the years 1915-1916 the pro-Austrian sympathies of the Galician Ukrainian community cooled down considerably. The protracted, inextricable war provoked a mood of muted dissatisfaction, and caused an increase of radicalism in the whole society. This enabled us to give at once to the Drahomanov Organisation a socialist, or more accurately a social-democratic, outlook. Here it must be said that our brand of socialism had basically little in common with that of the 'official' Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party (USDP).<sup>18</sup> From the very beginning, we sharply criticized the Austrophile orientation, and the infamous Union for the Liberation of Ukraine,<sup>19</sup> while the bosses of the USDP let themselves meekly be led on the leash of Austrian imperialism. I remember well, as if it were today, how comically the leader of the USDP, Mykola Hankevych,<sup>20</sup> backed away from us, when we on account of our naiveté presented to him, in 1917, our first, hectographically duplicated, anti-war publications! Indeed, what could such a respectable parliamentarian and 'realistic' politician as M. Hankevych have in common with 'kids' who were fascinated by the anti-war activities of K. Liebknecht, by the assassination of Count Sturgkh<sup>21</sup> by Friedrich Adler,<sup>22</sup> and who placed all their hopes on the coming proletarian revolution?

But I am running ahead of my story. I would like to say first a few words about the development of the revived Drahomanov Organisation. Thanks to the tireless efforts of O. Krilyk and O. Berezytsky, we possessed, within six months, quite a strong organisation with branches in Lviv, Stryi, Drohobych, Sambir, Ternopil, and Peremyshl. We also began to publish a small, 16-page journal, which we duplicated on a hectograph, *The Herald of the Drahomanov Organisation* (Visnyk Drahomanivskol Orhanizatsii); the editor and the chief contributor was Prokopovych. Only six or seven issues of *The Herald*, each in 200 copies, appeared throughout its publication. It was later superseded by *The Watchwords* (Klychi, two issues), and *The Free School* (Vilna Shkola, one issue).<sup>23</sup>

These last two journals came out after the national conference, in spring 1918, at which the Drahomanov Organisation was transformed into the International Revolu-

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tionary Social Democratic Youth Organisation (IRSDM). Concerning the political tendency of *The Herald* and *The Watch words*, they were fully dedicated to anti-war propaganda and the combating of the 'Austrophile Concept'. This is confirmed by all the issues of both little journals, which are preserved in the library of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv. In this connection we can refer to an appeal, a photocopy of which was printed later, in 1928, in *Our Truth (Nasha Pravda)*. It concluded with the following words: 'Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg are in prison . . . How does the German Social-Democratic paper, *Vorwärts*, dare to call Friedrich Adler's deed an act of insanity?'

To give the reader an even more explicit illustration of the frame of mind of the war-time Drahomanov Organisation, I will reproduce in full the text of a poem, 'Let's Persevere!', which appeared in *The Herald*.

Let's persevere! The cause is just,  
And the idea good.  
How often in my sleepless nights  
My mind has dwelt upon it.  
Of this I thought while keeping vigil,  
And dripping wet with sweat.  
I'm sure that great Hindenburg himself  
Would be surprised at this.  
Now let me shout for all to hear:  
Long live Herr Hindenburg the Great!

And let us persevere!  
Let's persevere in our war,  
And our marching units,  
In skirmishes and combat duties,  
And all the other things,  
In bellies, lungs, and our hearts,  
And hospitals, and drills!  
Let's persevere in tears!

Don't lament for the life that was,  
Endure the pangs of grief!  
Woe be to those who in distress  
Lay hands upon themselves!  
Don't be a sinner from despair,  
And for the good of men - let's perse-  
vere!

When you go through the suffering,  
The time will come to strike:  
Another bloody war to fight!  
Now let the butchers tremble!  
We may all perish in this struggle,  
But *our* cause will win  
The victory. Then it is our turn to tell;  
Let's persevere!

Hide if you can, you moneybags,  
You dirty canine spawn!  
The ire of people will be strong.  
You will be stoned to death like dogs,  
While we rejoice at vernal feasts,  
Which you will not attend, because

You do not persevere.

As poetry, this does not amount to much! The piece should not be judged by literary standards, and the author himself did not raise such claims. But this poem is indicative of the moods and the hopes of the leaders of the Drahomanov Organisation at that time.

No wonder that our organisation enthusiastically welcomed the outbreak of the February Revolution in Russia, and, even more so, the unfolding of revolutionary events in Ukraine. The revolution, with its fervour, brilliant oratory and dramatic happenings, could not fail to capture the hearts and the imagination of the young Drahomanovians. It necessarily appeared to them as the lone star which would show to suffering mankind the road out of the war trenches, and onward to social equality and fraternity among nations.

The Drahomanovians were, of course, hardly aware that the supposedly united front of the 'All Russian democracy' was from the very outset disrupted by the struggle among classes and parties. The best proof of our confusion was the fact that our organisation published in Lviv, in 1918, the pamphlet of the well-known leader of the Austrian Social Democrats, O. Bauer<sup>viii</sup> (H. Weber), entitled *The Russian Revolution*.<sup>9</sup> Its author manoeuvred between Menshevism and Bolshevism, and attempted to reconcile reformism with revolutionary Marxism, and a bourgeois revolution with a proletarian one. It is hardly necessary to stress that the chaos which reigned in our heads was even worse than that. But who among the Ukrainian, Polish or Jewish socialists in Galicia had, at that time, a better comprehension of the content and the motive forces of the Russian Revolution?

In any case, the Drahomanov Organisation was the *only* Galician group which in its press organ took notice and gave welcome to the October coup. The later march of the Red Army on Kiev, however, caused dissensions among the leaders of the organisation. Under the influence of V. Syroizha, later supported also by Prokopovych,<sup>10</sup> *The Herald* expressed itself in favour of the Central Rada,<sup>ix</sup> and called the Red Army in Ukraine a force not of liberation but rather of occupation. But did not the Bolsheviks' Ukrainian policy at that time, and especially the behaviour of the Russian Bolsheviks in Ukraine, give grounds to such controversies?<sup>x</sup>

I emphasise all these points for the sake of historical truth, since there were attempts to present the war-time Drahomanov movement, and especially the IRSDM, as a near-Bolshevik organisation. This has been done by O. Krilyk in a speech during the

trial of the so-called St. George's group (see *Nasha Pravda*, 1928). These attempts were motivated by the naive desire to prove to the factional opponents within the regional Galician branch of the Polish Communist Party, i.e., to Polish and Jewish communists, that we also had a revolutionary past, even a more distinguished one than theirs. Of course, the IRSDM was not, and could not possibly have been, 'Bolshevik'. Let's not forget that even in highly industrialised Bohemia, with its numerous proletarians, a Communist Party was formed only in 1920. But, discarding all exaggerations, Krilyk's statement contained also a large grain of truth. It was a fact that in Galicia only the Ukrainian socialists were able to create during the war years, from 1916 to 1918, a revolutionary organisation.

This was not accidental. As a 'non-historical' nation with underdeveloped dominant classes, we had then a small chance to realise a bourgeois Ukrainian state! On the other hand, the unsolved and essentially profoundly dynamic peasant problem, connected with the issue of national oppression, made our soil favourable for the spread of the ideas of revolutionary socialism. This is the reason why we already in 1916-18 had people such as Vasylykiv and Turyansky; and this is why the former members of the IRSDM, including Maksymovych,<sup>11</sup> Orlovsky,<sup>12</sup> Rudyk<sup>13</sup> and Rosenberg,<sup>14</sup> succeeded in forming the Communist Party of Eastern Galicia; to which the International refused recognition until 1925, and which later became the nucleus of the official Communist Party of the Western Ukraine.

I do not feel, however, qualified to write about these later events, of which I was only an outside observer: the emergence of the Ukrainian communist movement in Galicia, and the extermination of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine by Stalin's henchmen. Maybe there survives still some of the direct participants and members of that party to record for the future generations its story written in blood.

#### Author's notes

<sup>1</sup> Killed by Stalinists in 1940.

<sup>2</sup> Killed by Stalinists in 1932.

<sup>3</sup> Shot by Stalinists in 1934.

<sup>4</sup> These words are a quotation from the Ukrainian Sharpshooters' song:

When Europe started that bloody war,  
The Ukraine wanted to have an army of her own,  
In the city of Lviv, on the Supinski and Kurkova streets,  
There gathered sundry citizens and rebels.

<sup>5</sup> To the *Promienisci* group in Tarnow belonged, at one time, the well-known Polish communist, K. Radek.

<sup>6</sup> The other members of the central board of the Drahomanov Organisation, besides those

mentioned in the text, were the following: O. Dmytrovych (died in 1920), S. Kopertynska and M. Zizhkovska (a defendant at the trial of the St. George's group, and a victim of the Stalinists, in 1940)

<sup>7</sup> On the occasion of F. Adler's attempt, the Lviv branch of the Drahomanov Organisation called a special meeting, at which the participants – many of whom were in Austrian military uniforms – after R. Turyansky's formal speech honoured the deed of Adler by rising from their seats.

<sup>8</sup> Further issues did not appear because of the mishap which occurred in June 1918, the seizure of the papers of V. Syroizha, and of the members of the Perenyshl branch. Fortunately, this did not lead to any serious consequences because before the police were able to finish the investigation the Austrian Empire collapsed.

<sup>9</sup> The pamphlet was printed in 1,000 copies. The present writer, who at that time was a soldier in the Austrian army, carried 200 copies to Kiev, during the Skoropadsky regime.

<sup>10</sup> An opposite stand was taken by O. Krilyk and S. Pankivsky. (The latter perished in 1919 in the Ukrainian-Polish war.)

<sup>11</sup> Liquidated by Stalinists in 1943

<sup>12</sup> Liquidated by Stalinists in 1932.

<sup>13</sup> Liquidated by Stalinists in 1940.

<sup>14</sup> Liquidated by Stalinists in 1940.

#### Additional notes by Chris Ford

<sup>1</sup> Gymnasiums were a general education secondary school. In 1867 the Austro-Hungarian Empire conceded to the Poles the control of Galicia's provincial government and educational system; Polish replaced German as the language of instruction. Ukrainian classes could not be established without a determined political struggle. At the time Ukrainians accounted for 42 per cent of the province's population yet by 1910 there was one Polish gymnasium per 60,400 Poles and one Ukrainian gymnasium per 666,000 Ukrainians. Their access to public funding blocked by Polish authorities, Ukrainians turned to organising privately funded schools. Ukrainian gymnasiums were closed down during the Russian occupation of Galicia (1914–17).

<sup>2</sup> Ukrainki Sichovi Striltsi – the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen was raised by the General Ukrainian Council in Lviv formed by the Ukrainian parties in Austria in 1914. It called on Ukrainians to fight for Austria against Russia. Polish influences on Austrians restricted its number to 2,500 men. The vast majority of other Ukrainians who served on the Habsburg side were inducted into regular Austrian units.

<sup>3</sup> Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973). A member of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers Party, in 1913 he attacked the Ukrainian movement in Russian-ruled Ukraine, calling for a federation with Austria. In response, Lev Yurkevych was instrumental in his expulsion from the USDRP. In 1914 he was founding leader of the Austrian-funded SVU – Union for the Liberation of Ukraine. In the 1920s he abandoned any remnant of democratic, never mind socialist, ideas, becoming a leading ideologue of integral nationalism, and in the 1930s was a major

influence on young Ukrainian nationalists and the rightist and fascistic elements which gained strength at the time. He was a journalist in Nazi Germany, fleeing to Canada in 1945 where lived until his death.

<sup>4</sup> *Ukrainska sotsial-demokratychna partiia* (Ukrainian Social Democratic Party). A socialist workers' party founded in 1899, the USDP was a section of the federated Social Democratic Party of Austria. It held an Austro-Marxist programme and advocated a pan Ukrainian independent republic. It had close ties to the USDRP in Russian-ruled Ukraine. Its leaders included Y. Bachynsky, Vityk Hankevych, V. Levynsky. It engaged in trade union work among the rural and urban workers, prominently organising strike committees in the 1902 peasant strike wave. A strong opportunist and pro-Austrian tendency emerged and the USDP joined the Ukrainian General Council in 1914. In 1921, however, the USDP adopted a pro Soviet-Ukrainian unification platform. The USDP was outlawed by the Polish regime in 1924 and most of its members joined the Communist Party of Western Ukraine.

<sup>5</sup> *Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy* (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine). A notorious front founded in Vienna in 1914, it called for an independent Ukraine and a constitutional (Austrian) monarchy. It was supported by the Austrian government as part of its wartime espionage. To gain influence, the SVU established fake socialist organisations as fronts, which included renegades from the Ukrainian socialist movement. The internationalist USDRP journal *Borotba* (*Struggle*) waged a campaign against the SVU (see *Borotba*, Feb. 1915, 'A Shameful Affair', by Lev Yurkevych). An extensive account of the SVU was published by Rosdolsky. *Do istorii Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy, Ukrainy skyt samostinyk*, May 1969, with the subtitle *A Historical Textbook for Today's East European Liberation Committees*.

<sup>6</sup> Mykola Hankevych (1867–1931). A founder of the USDP, Hankevych was a socialist and trade union leader and played a leading role in organising Ukrainian workers. In the 1890s he published the paper *Robitnyk* (*Worker*) and edited the main USDP organ *Volia* (*Freedom*). He was a main proponent of co-operation between Ukrainian and Polish socialists. In 1914 he took a pro-war Austrophile position and was vice-president of the Supreme Ukrainian Council in Lviv.

<sup>7</sup> Count Karl von Sturgkh (1859–1916). An ultra conservative and clericist, he served as Austria's Minister-President from 1911 until 1916. Governing by decree, Sturgkh's political and public popularity plummeted from the effects of his anti democratic policies. On the night of October 21, 1916, Sturgkh was assassinated, shot dead by Friedrich Adler, son of the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Austria, Viktor Adler.

<sup>8</sup> Otto Bauer (1882–1938). A leading member of the Austrian Social Democratic Party and theorist of Austro-Marxism. His seminal work *The Question of Nationalities and Social Democracy* (1907) provoked widespread

debate in the socialist movement. A prisoner of war in Russia during the First World War, he led the left wing of the SDP, presenting them as a third force between the Communists and nationalists in the revolution of 1918. The failure of a socialist workers' revolt (1934) led to his exile abroad. He died in Paris.

<sup>9</sup> Central Rada (Rada is the Ukrainian equivalent of council) was founded on March 17, 1917, as an all-Ukrainian coalition of workers, peasants and middle class parties in Ukraine. Later, the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, of December 1917, proclaimed its support for the Rada. It became the key body of the Ukrainian People's Republic, driving the Ukrainian Revolution from autonomy to independence. Mykola Porsh, a leader of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Workers Party, wrote in *Robitnycha Hazeta*, organ of the USDRP, in October 1917: 'At first the Central Rada was a bloc of parties united around the slogan of autonomy and federation. When our party entered the Rada, it replaced its class orientation with a national one. Some of our comrades said quite plainly that until we achieve the goal of unity there can be no class struggle in the Central Rada.... As far as I am concerned, Ukrainian social democrats had no right compromising on class interests in deference to general, national ones.' A major attempt supported by the USDRP left and sections of the Bolsheviks sought and failed to reconstitute the Rada on new foundations. The USDRP and Bolsheviks split, the country plunged into civil war and foreign interventions. A tragic war broke out between Soviet Russia and the Rada ending after the Rada signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk inviting in the German army, which in turn backed a coup dissolving the Central Rada.

<sup>10</sup> In Ukraine the Bolsheviks only started to organise as a separate Ukrainian territorial entity after Brest-Litovsk. Before then they (and the Mensheviks) had organised in the most modern sections of the proletariat, which were predominantly Russian. They remained outside, and even antagonistic to, the Ukrainian Revolution. The first Soviet government relied on troops from Russia under command of Antonov, who refused to recognise this government, considering a Ukrainian nationality a fantasy. He entrusted Muravev, formerly a colonel in the Tsarist Army, to take Kiev and defeat the Rada, which was done with practices of outright Russian chauvinism. A large faction of the Bolsheviks in the east even sought to partition the country. The warnings of other Bolsheviks, especially those who were ethnically Ukrainian, were ignored and the second Soviet government under Christian Rakovsky was an even bigger disaster. Rakovsky, from the Balkans, was imposed by Moscow. A self-styled expert on the national question he considered that the Ukrainian nationality did not exist and was invented by the intelligentsia. He proclaimed the 'dictatorship of Russian culture' with 200 decrees against the Ukrainian language. His regime was subsequently brought down by a wave of insurrections.

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