



bulletin 19
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vietnam solidarity campaign

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Editorial

The demonstration on October 27th represents a sweeping vindication of the work of our campaign, and a significant contribution to the world-wide movement of support to the fighting people of Vietnam. Elsewhere too, the movement has made gains, most notably in Japan where 800,000 people took part in demonstrations.

It is worthwhile recording some facts about our own demonstration which have been widely overlooked by the mass media. Firstly, there were 100,000 demonstrators, not as "peace" marchers, but by and large in support of slogans which unequivocally expressed support for the victory of the National Liberation Front. Secondly, the fact that the demonstration did not become a riot was due to the fact that the authorities conceded our right to occupy the whole street unhindered. This did not happen on previous demonstrations, and only happened on the 27th because the authorities were daunted by the scale of the demonstration and the knowledge that the marchers would not tolerate interference.

This said, we must turn our attention to the future of the campaign. The National Council has called for a new National Conference of the V.S.C, and has adopted some proposals as recommendations to the conference. These are reproduced in this issue of the Bulletin; they are controversial proposals, and in the period up to the conference, which we expect will be held in January the Bulletin will carry contributions to the ~~discussion~~ discussion on the future work and development of the campaign.

Our immediate problems are quite clear, and do not require much discussion. They are simply that we are spending cash faster than it is arriving, the immediate need being that we must find about £100 by the end of the year in order to pay the rent which will then fall due. In addition, if we are to expand or to diversify our activities at all in the next few months we will need an income to match the job.

Please regard the enclosed appeal as more than just a routine matter, the future of the campaign depends on an increased income.

Telegrams sent to October 27th Mobilization.

Every success on October 27th demonstration. confident that tremendous international response will help force U.S. withdrawel.

Vietnam Mobilization Committee Toronto.

Young socialist in the U.S. salute your massive turnout today against war in Vietnam neither Wilson scare campaign against you nor Johnson or Humphrey or Nixon or Wallaces pressing of the war will stem the growing tide of international solidarity with Vietnamese and G.I. victims of the war we will continue to march with you venceremos.

Young Socialist Alliance. New York.

United with you in European working class struggle for victory N.L.F.D.R.V. over American aggression in Vietnam and imperialist policy in world.

Comitato Vietnam Sezione Italiana Tribunale Russell. (Milan)

Your actions are important sources of strength for the defense of the Vietnamese and defense of the G.I.'s forced to fight against their own interests. Together with anti-war G.I.'s, our Japanese brothers and sisters and all others throught the world opposed to U.S. Government aggression in Vietnam we join you protesting aggression in Vietnam. We look forward to joining you in future actions.

The national Mobilization Committee. Chicago.

We active duty G.I.'s who stood together in San Francisco on Oct 12th and voiced our opposition to our nations policy in Vietnam, send greetings on this day of international unity against war. We cannot be with you, but we are with you in spirit and purpose.

The G.I. Association. San Francisco.

Vietnam people extremely gratefUl to British people for anti-war activities. Let your Oct. 27th demonstration be crowned with success in uniting broad masses of people in favour of Vietnam people's just cause against U.S. aggression and for National Salvation.

Vietnamese Delegation in Paris.

In addition, the Radical Student Alliance recieved a telegram from the N.L.F. student organisation.

Messages of support were also recieved from the Unity Movement of South Africa, and also the League for Demoracy in Greece.

THE OCCUPATION OF LSE

DAVE SLANEY

On Thursday, 24 October, students of LSE began to occupy their school in open and explicit solidarity with the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. The school was kept open until the evening of October 27, after the demonstration, in spite of the attempt of the Director to close it. As an example of local action on the issue of Vietnam, the occupation deserves at least a brief analysis.

The occupation, as originally conceived, had three purposes. The first was to mobilise the maximum number of students in LSE for the demonstration on the 27th. The second was to make available to the demonstration and the demonstrators whatever physical assets LSE had to offer. And the third was to increase the level of consciousness of LSE students. All of these purposes were achieved, but with varying degrees of success.

In one sense, the first purpose was somewhat superfluous. Unlike the situation before previous demonstrations, when the LSE Socialist Society had to devote tremendous efforts simply to inform students that a demonstration was taking place, it became immediately clear that the capitalist press had done our job for us in this respect. There could hardly have been a student anywhere in England who did not know about the 27th. The occupation was successful in getting more people out for the 27th however. It achieved this in several ways. The first was to create, both within LSE and without, a certain excitement, a feeling of strength, an impression that "things were happening." To a limited extent, the events at Lse compensated for the failure of VSC to carry out a week of activities before the 27th. The second way in which the occupation mobilised people for the 27th was by making the issue of Vietnam more immediate to people. The occupation of LSE, in solidarity with the NLF, helped bring the war to Britain. Apathetic students at LSE, and other students in general, were confronted with the issue: students had occupied LSE, what would other students do?

The second purpose turned out to be the least important. A medical centre was set up in LSE and it did treat many demonstrators for minor injuries. Such a centre would seem to be a good idea in any case, even though it was not absolutely vital on the 27th. The school also served as a place to sleep for several thousand demonstrators. Finally, it had been intended that the school be used as a place for serious and continuous discussion about the strategy and tactics of the demonstration. In the event, only one such discussion took place, for two hours, on Saturday evening. As many as a thousand demonstrators attended, but the discussion, with a few exceptions, never got beyond the slogan shouting stage. The British left has still to develop the political maturity necessary for genuine public discussion of such issues.

The third purpose in occupying the school was well realised. This occupation and the debate surrounding it, provided an opportunity for intensive political education. At the largest students' union meeting

ever held at LSE (1200 students came to discuss the occupation), the case for the occupation was put with telling arguments. Speakers related Vietnam to LSE (directly, by pointing out the complicity of some of the Governors; and indirectly, by showing that the ideas and theories taught at LSE mystified and obscured the real causes of the Vietnam war, supported the status-quo of imperialistic neo-capitalism, and hence perpetuated a system in which Vietnams are inevitable.) Speakers argued that the issue at LSE was the same as that in Vietnam: do people have the right to control their own lives and their own institutions. If people opposed American aggression in Vietnam (and no one at LSE has ever publicly supported it) then they must do all they can to convert pious resolutions of opposition into active expressions of solidarity. It was our school, and we should use it to express our feelings. At the end of the meeting, 600 students supported this radical program.

Events then conspired to reinforce the lessons learned at the union meeting. On Friday morning, the director, acting in the name of the Court of Governors, attempted to close the school. The administration had exposed itself; it showed that it, and not the students, was the small and dangerous minority. By its arbitrary and revealing action, the administration convinced hundreds of doubting students of the correctness of the occupation. By the time the occupation was over, students had increased their awareness of the nature of capitalist society and of the role of LSE in that society. Support for the Vietnamese in their struggle against American aggression became more meaningful as it was linked with the students own struggle within LSE.

The final success of the occupation is less tangible than those successes listed above, but it is perhaps the most important. It concerns the effect which the occupation had upon those who took part. To have been inside LSE during that weekend was to participate in a socialist experience. There was a feeling of solidarity, of comradeship quite unlike anything which capitalism engenders.

There were the continuous discussions and debates on the real issues that concern us, in place of the stale academic rhetoric about unreal situations that characterise education in this society. There was the feeling that we were, in a small way, taking control of our own lives, that we were "liberating" a part of our lives. It is true that there was much to be criticised in the occupation: the low explicitly political level of much of the weekend; the failure to organise many of those LSE students who were engaging in their first political act, the lack of a clear idea as to what to do after the 27th. But in spite of these faults, the occupation of LSE still stands as a model for political action. By taking control of their own institution, on a revolutionary (rather than reformist, or economist) basis, the LSE students showed the way for students and workers in all the capitalist institutions.

SEVEN SIMPLIFIED ARGUMENTS

BY RIP BULKLEY

- 1 If V.S.C. is to act, it must exist.
To exist, a political campaign must recruit, both by presenting a case on the issues it is concerned with, and then by organising actions which positively promote desirable outcomes on those issues.

Therefore, V.S.C. must argue the case for support for the N.L.F. and then do things which actually help the N.L.F. towards the desired military and political victory over U.S. aggression and domestic reactionary forces.

- 2 A sterile and verbal campaign is one which exists only in order to present a case in order to get verbal support from people to help spread the case still wider in order to get verbal support from still more people in order to spread the case even wider etc. etc., one in which faith is an acceptable substitute for action.

V.S.C. should not be such a campaign.

Therefore, V.S.C. militants must organise actions intended not just to celebrate their own militancy and to draw in other militants, but actually to contribute to the approaching N.L.F. victory, by weakening in every possible way the economic and military ability of the U.S. to resist the N.L.F. on the ground in Vietnam.

- 3 Besides propoganda work and symbolic actions intended to build the power of V.S.C., we must put that power to some use, before it atrophies, in work which actually hampers the local components of the U.S. war effort.

Forms of such work are: Campaigns of harassment, direct action and general bloody nuisance to firms in Britain producing for the war, and to laboratories doing research for the war. Assistance to deserters who deprive the U.S. of manpower for the war. Resistance to repressive economic measures partly resulting from the war and supporting an international financial system which helps the U.S. to afford the war.

Therefore, while automatically carrying on propoganda and occasional symbolic actions, V.S.C. must begin to organise these more positive actions on behalf of the N.L.F., if it takes its political commitment seriously. (Propaganda and symbolic actions are only the breath of the campaign. You don't live in order to breathe - you breathe in order to live.)

- 4 Positive actions like these require strong and militant local branches, in close touch with and control of the centre. V.S.C. is not properly organised in such branches.

Therefore it should be.

- 5 By trying to work positively for the victory of the N.L.F., by trying to cost time, work and money to those who are helping the U.S. to resist the N.L.F. instead of just issuing expressions of spiritual solidarity, we will naturally be directly involved in the fight for socialism in our own society. But on any analysis, positive work we can find to do for the N.L.F. will be a much more short-term fight than the overall struggle for socialism.

Therefore, the distant revolution cannot be a means towards the imminent N.L.F. victory; but, although as V.S.C. we are simply looking for any help we can give to the N.L.F., if we take that programme seriously it makes us very much part of the fight for socialism in our own society.

- 6 V.S.C. is neither ready nor suitable to organise violent action against U.S. supply lines in Britain. But the three distinctions - positive/symbolic : legal/illegal : violent/not-violent - are each quite independent.

Therefore positive actions need not be violent or even illegal; that we choose not to be violent at this stage does not mean we are restricted to symbolic actions.

- 7 Fifth column activity against the local contributions to the U.S. war effort will be modest and piecemeal; we will not be given the chance to win the war all by ourselves. But almost all actions which are part of a real war, especially one of attrition, have this piecemeal character. It is only in our theoretical armchairs and our symbolic actions that we can play at being the whole world-wide movement now in action against the U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Therefore, we would be wrong to expect a central and spectacular role for ourselves in assisting the N.L.F. to victory, and equally wrong to despise the modest and piecemeal opportunities we do have to make slight but real contributions to their work.

In short, militancy on the war is not a matter of what we shout, or how loud we shout it, while waving our little N.L.F. flags from high up on the terraces. Rather, it's a matter of how seriously we take the occasional unspectacular opportunities to get the odd boot in ourselves. No doubt the N.L.F. find our cheers mildly encouraging, but no doubt also they could use something a bit more solid in the way of solidarity by now.

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This document was adopted by the National Council for recommendation to the National Conference, with the deletion of the bracketed section.

Assessment of Demonstration

It is hardly necessary to reiterate the spectacular achievement of mobilising 100,000 people on the basis of a principled support for the N.L.F.. However, the demonstration revealed possibilities which the movement has failed to realise. It was hoped that prior to the demonstration new people would be involved in the local committees and would participate in the political preparation for the demonstration. This failed to materialise in any significant degree, particularly in London. As a natural consequence our local organisation has made only marginal progress, and our aim to provide an alternative view of Oct. 27th to that disseminated by the news media, has proved largely illusory. On the demonstration itself, a latent power was manifest but never given expression. The debate on violence, which led to a simplified polarisation between Grosvenor Square and passivity, resulted in a demonstration well within the tolerance threshold of bourgeois society, for which we were applauded by the establishment, though not by many demonstrators.

The bureaucratic nature of the VSC organisation and the gulf which separates the organisation and the mass support which it has, leads us to register our opposition to any further mobilisations such as the last, until such time as they express the real, determinable, needs and aspirations of the movement. To this end we propose the following re-organisation and action programme.

Organisation

(Abolition, within a specified time, subject to ratification by a National Conference, of affiliation facilities. Membership to be individual, organised in local branches. Delegates to National Council appointed by local branches and subject to recall. Numbers of delegates, dependent on size of branch membership. Regional organisation dependent need decision of local groups.) (Deleted)

This re-organisation makes possible the incorporation of supporters into an identifiable movement, it gives us a democratic organisational framework within which we can develop the politics of participation and challenge our authoritarian heritage of bureaucratic manipulation. Local groups will be able to undertake any activities on which they agree. Even a minority should be able to utilise the association to facilitate their own projects. The conflict between multi/ single issue movement can in this way be resolved in practice according to the manifest desire of the membership.

Some suggestions for local work

1) Each group to produce and sell a bulletin consistently, dealing with any aspect of the war, propaganda, dealing with British complicity, or any topic expressing the thinking and activity of the group. On one such experiment contact with working class youth (18- 30 yrs old) was found remarkably easy. There is a big potential for recruitment of literally hundreds in every area through readers meetings etc.. The bulletin also helps to develop collective activity, in its compilation and sale, helping to educate members in facts and methods.

2) In London particularly there is an urgent need to contact the people who were on the demonstration. This can be done through a bulletin, surveys, audacious adverts for the group.

3) Direct involvement can also be obtained through the use of the "Wall Poster" discussion, simultaneous street corner meetings etc..

4) Collection of information on firms producing for the war. A policy of harassment should be conducted against these firms by propaganda, exposure on any issue to which they are sensitive, telephone calls etc. Individuals, especially politicians, businessmen, police commissioners should have their opinions and activities held up to public scrutiny

National Campaigns

1) National Campaigns of harassment by propaganda and direct action against Dow Chemicals Elliot-Automation and Shell B.P. (A campaign to 'black work' on war production is unrealistic at the present)

2) Campaign against censorship by the B.B.C. demanding ---
N. L. F. spokesmen
Presentation of evidence of war crimes Tribunal in a series of unadulterated programmes.
Showing of Vietnamese films

3) Campaign against presence of puppet representatives in Britain and for the South Vietnamese Embassy to be handed over to the N.L.F.

4) Provision of sanctuary in Britain to U.S. draft resisters and deserters. These campaigns could lead to regional demonstrations e.g. Scotland, N.E., North Midlands and London. Their success is dependent upon knowing the demonstrators. They require only 2 to 3 weeks intensive preparation. Ad Hoc committees do not lead to a broadening of the base, eg, the demonstration but only to a proliferation of committees, arguing over trifles.

The advantages of these proposals can be summarised----

- 1) They provide a continuous campaign of which demonstrations are only a part
- 2) Demonstrations are more likely to reflect real consciousness of the movement. They will be better organised politically and tactically.
- 3) The 80% waste of time involved in the endless meetings during the summer will be avoided.
- 4) Success or failure will be determinable both on the day and in relation to a previously established audience.

The movement is at a very critical stage, It is impossible to maintain the status quo (and in this context 200,000 people on the next demonstration represents the status quo, although a more likely consequence would be a smaller demonstration). The decline of the movement could easily be as spectacular as its growth. If this realisable programme conflicts with established theories of the nature of an "anti-war" movement then the theories must give way. Our movement is not the creation of the factions which constitute a large proportion of its membership, but the reflection in Britain of the Vietnamese revolution. Socialist revolutionaries have not

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Notes on the Vietnam War.
Extracted from I.F.Stone's Weekly.

....and the Vietnam War is very unpopular. Even the hawks are merely people who want to get it over with. Normally in a war the chief of state is the prisoner of popular enthusiasm - because wars are usually popular, unfortunately. But this is a very unpopular war, and while the vocal peace people are a minority, the vocal hawks are even smaller. The great mass of people are confused, disturbed, and they will go either way. So that an American President has never had as much power to change things as the President does in this war. He could press a button and give us a world war or he could go to peace. He's not a prisoner in his office. Johnson though is an imperialist from way back - he's Texan, and what we're doing in Vietnam is what we've done in Latin America for over half a century: always in the name of liberty, we've imposed dictatorship. All this business about Green Berets and civic action is an old story and we did a lot of good things, we dug wells and built schools and wiped out the yellow fever in Latin America and many other places. But the cost was the imposition on the people of the most terrible collection of Neros the world has ever seen-Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Batista in Cuba, and the rest. The difference is that now we're in Asia and we're up against a wonderful people of great spirit. The Vietnamese are a great people: they're a civilised people and a very humane people. They don't even hate us they forgive us, and they're giving us a heck of a fight. The real reason that the war goes on is it's very hard to admit a mistake. If you're a man or a nation. It took De Gaulle to admit a mistake in Algeria. Also how does the biggest military machine in the history of the humane race come back to Washington and admit they can't win a lousy fifth rate war? They're not afraid of people like me, but what do they do when the Southern conservatives, the economisers, say: How come you guys with 80 million bucks a year couldn't beat a bunch of colliers out in the jungle without a navy or an air force-what's wrong with you guys? That's what they're afraid of, and they'd rather gamble more of our honour our wealth, our integrity, and impose terrible suffering.

cont./

the power to initiate a fundamental change in consciousness but they can give it a form and expression by their audacity in theory and activity. They can ensure that the gains made are permanent only if they ally themselves with the internal dynamic of this developing consciousness. Otherwise they will destroy the movement by imposing upon it their own stagnation.

(submitted by Romula and Ed. Guiton, Henry and Sheli Wortis, Geoff. Crossick, Geoff and Marie Richman)

With the deletion of the section in brackets, this document was passed by the National Council to be recommended to the National Conference of VSC which will be held in January. Discussion documents for publication in future issues of the Bulletin should arrive not later than December 15th.

AUSTRALIANS AND NEW ZEALANDERS AGAINST THE VIETNAM WAR

PRESS RELEASE:

On July 18th 1968 members of the London based ANZAVW had a two hour discussion with an official spokesman of the Vietnamese delegation at the Paris peace talks, Mr. Nguyen Thanh Le. Two other members of the Vietnamese delegation staff were also present.

Initially Mr. Nguyen outlined the Vietnamese position on the talks as contained in the statements released by them after each meeting. Their general view is that the talks to date have been quite unproductive, due to the US failure to meet the essential precondition of a cessation of the bombing of N. Vietnam. Mr. Nguyen quoted figures to show that since the so-called "restriction of the bombing" the actual tonnage dropped in the southern area of N. Vietnam had been continually increased. In view of this the US demand for "reciprocal gestures" such as the ending of attacks by the NLF on Saigon (the US command centre in Vietnam!), or the curtailment of Vietnamese troops and supply movements was quite unrealistic. He saw the US participation in the talks as arising out of the need of the Johnson administration to mislead and confuse US public opinion, especially in election year. Nevertheless, while seeing no evidence of the US preparedness to halt their aggression in Vietnam, and hence little hope of real progress in the talks, the Vietnamese will continue to participate and put their case.

Answering a question about US charges, and Vietnamese denials, of aggression against S. Vietnam by N. Vietnam in the shape of the infiltration of N. Vietnamese troops, Mr. Nguyen recapitulated that Vietnam was one country, as the Geneva agreements recognized, and that large numbers of Viet Minh fighters who had regrouped in the North, according to the Geneva agreement, came from the South where their families still lived. He added that if, even in Australia, many people supported the National Liberation struggle in S. Vietnam, the people of N. Vietnam could hardly be expected to remain aloof. Questioned about the ultimate political reunification of Vietnam and the political programme of the S. Vietnamese National Liberation Front, August 1967, Mr. Nguyen said that conditions in North and South Vietnam were different. The two regions had developed differently since 1954; in the North, there was a socialist society but in the South it was not possible to establish socialism immediately. The programme of the NLF recognised this situation, and looked for the reunification of the two regions as a gradual process, but for the present they would remain separate. Mr. Nguyen was asked if in these circumstances the "neutralisation" of S. Vietnam would be acceptable to the NLF and DRV (the previous week Wilfred Durchett had told a meeting of ANZAVW that it would be). Mr. Nguyen said that if one meant by "neutralisation" the exclusion of all foreign troops and bases, they were for it.

Asked to comment on reports by the 'Times' correspondent in Saigon (Bonavia) that, according to rumours in Saigon, secret contacts had been established already between the NLF and some members of the present regime, Mr. Nguyen discounted such reports. He said that in the eyes of the NLF,

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the Saigon regime had no legitimacy whatever, and the only contact possible was for individual members, if they abandoned the regime.

If and when a settlement was reached in Vietnam, what guarantees for its observance by other parties were the NLF and DRV looking for, in view of the US failure to observe the provisions of the Geneva agreements? (Mr. Nguyen was himself at Geneva in 1954). In the final analysis, Mr. Nguyen felt, the only effective guarantee was the Vietnamese people's demonstrated readiness to defend themselves.

The question of the foreign policy which would be adopted by an independent socialist Vietnam was raised. Mr. Nguyen was asked if his government believed it was possible to 'build socialism in one country'. He felt that the question did not arise as there existed already a large group of socialist countries. Following from this it was asked: assuming Vietnam's principal economic and diplomatic ties would be with the socialist countries, what relationships did they envisage with the non-socialist countries of S.E. Asia, including Australia? Mr. Nguyen said the Vietnamese would seek friendly relationships, on a basis of equality, with all the countries in the region. They would be prepared to establish trade relations and technical exchange programmes with non-socialist countries such as Australia. He thought Australia could help in the reconstruction of Vietnamese agriculture after peace, by the exchange of technical knowledge, and possibly the training of Vietnamese in techniques of animal husbandry in Australia.

The Australian group suggested that barriers to the establishment of friendly relations between an independent socialist Vietnam and Australia might arise from Australian policies and attitudes. It was pointed out that, nonsensical though it might seem, many Australians saw Vietnamese communism as a threat to Australia, an attitude which the present government found it useful to foster; and that the acceptance of a communist Vietnam by Australia would be very unlikely given the existing (and likely to continue) Australian social and political structure. However, Mr. Nguyen still expressed the hope that a friendly relationship was possible between Vietnam and a non-socialist Australia. As for Australian fears of Vietnamese communism, he said that while the Vietnamese would of course welcome the establishment of socialism in other countries, its possible establishment in Australia was purely a matter for the Australian people with which the Vietnamese people had no concern.

Mr. Nguyen was asked if he saw the military alliance between the non-communist states of S.E. Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Japan, Australia, NZ etc.) which it was Australian policy to encourage, as a threat to Vietnam. He said that if it was, then the Vietnamese people had already shown their determination to resist all such threats.

A question was put on the future economic relationship between Vietnam and Australia. The general character of economic relationships at present seemed to be that Australia was increasingly reliant on the export of primary products, especially minerals, to Japan which in turn depended on favourable markets for its manufactured goods in S.E. Asia. To a lesser extent, Australia also sought markets for its own manufactured goods in S.E. Asia. Would a socialist Vietnam fit into this pattern? Mr. Nguyen

replied that in so far as this system of economic relationships operated against the interests of Vietnam, it would not involve itself in them.

Mr. Nguyen was asked if he had any information about the operation of Australian forces in Vietnam, and if he could say to what extent the Vietnamese people generally were conscious of their presence. He replied that he himself had heard of the shelling of the coastal areas by the Australian warship 'Hobart'; of the use of RAAF Canberra bombers in the bombing N. of the 17th parallel, Vinh Linh province, and also of the operation of Australian Army units in the Nui Dat area. The NLF representative would be able to give more details of the use of Australian troops, in S. Vietnam. He thought that it was widely known in Vietnam that the Australian government had troops there, but that the Vietnamese did not therefore feel enmity towards the Australian people. He also said that he and others knew of the existence of strong opposition to the war in Australia, and he had heard of demonstrations against it.

The ANZAVW group told the Vietnamese that many Australians wished to dissociate themselves from the action of their troops in Vietnam. One way of doing this was to offer what help they could to the victims of these actions. The Australian government had sought to prevent people in Australia doing this by the passing of the Australian Defence Forces Protection Act. The ANZVW had collected some money for 'Medical and Civil Aid' for the NLF mainly from Australians and New Zealanders in London, and hoped that others at home would add to this despite the threats of government prosecution. Mr. Nguyen said that he was sure the NLF representatives in Prague and Algeria would be very pleased to receive such aid and see that it was appropriately used. He agreed with the feeling of the ANZVW group that such aid should be thought of as an act of 'solidarity' towards the NLF, rather than as an act of charity.

Asked for his views on what opponents of the war should do, at this stage in their own countries, Mr. Nguyen said the immediate necessity was to press for the complete cessation of the American bombing in the North. It was suggested that this might appear as a partial demand and therefore retrogressive to those who had already adopted a more forthright position of 'solidarity with the NLF'. Mr. Nguyen said he had not meant by emphasising this immediate demand to exclude more definite statements of 'solidarity', and that other actions, particularly the collection of aid, and urging youths to resist the draft and men in the army to desert, were also of great importance.

At the conclusion of the discussion, the ANZAVW proposed a toast to the victory of the Vietnamese Liberation Front, but the Vietnamese preferred to drink to the friendship of the Australian and Vietnamese people.

Extracts from a Statement by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Hanoi November 2nd

Under the clear-sighted leadership of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, our Southern compatriots have fought with admirable heroism, repeatedly dealt heavy blows at the enemy, recorded ever greater victories especially since the general offensive and simultaneous uprisings of Spring 1968, driving the U.S. imperialists deeply into a passive and defensive position, and further shaking the puppet administration and army.

The people in North Vietnam have carried out a heroic fight against the war of destruction waged by the U.S. imperialists, the latter have thus failed to obtain the objectives of this war, and have suffered very serious setbacks, losing over 3,200 modern aircraft.

Confronted with an irretrievable situation in Vietnam and big difficulties arising from the Vietnam war, and under the pressure of world and American opinion, the U.S. government has been compelled to declare a total cessation of air, naval, and artillery bombardments against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

After the unconditional cessation of U.S. bombardments on the entire territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will discuss with the U.S. side "other problems of concern to the two sides" with a view to finding a solution to the Vietnam problem. In agreement with the Central Committee of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares its readiness to participate in a conference comprising the Representatives of South Vietnam front for Liberation, The Representatives of the United States and the Representatives of the Saigon administration. The presence of the Representative of the Saigon administration at this conference does not mean that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognizes that administration.

The South Vietnam National Front for Liberation is the organizer and leader of the South Vietnamese people in the struggle against the U.S. aggression, for national salvation. It has liberated 4/5 of the South Vietnam territory with over ten million inhabitants. It possesses mighty armed forces, and enjoys great prestige at home and abroad, it is the genuine representative of the South Vietnamese people. It is competent to settle all problems concerning South Vietnam.

It is clear that the present Saigon administration is an instrument of the U.S. imperialist aggressors for carrying out neo-colonialism in South Vietnam, It is pursuing a policy which runs counter to all legitimate aspirations of the South Vietnamese people. It represents nobody.

To reach a correct political settlement of the Vietnam problem, the U.S. Government should give up all schemes of intervention and aggression against Vietnam, and respect the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights. So long as the United States pursues its aggression against Vietnam the Vietnamese people will fight on till final victory.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam warmly commends the compatriots throughout the country who, united as one man, have fought with boundless heroism and recorded glorious victories. The fact that the United States has had to unconditionally stop the bombing on the entire territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam constitutes a big victory, but it is only an initial victory in our entire people's struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation.

The heavier the U.S. imperialists' defeats the greater their cruelty and perfidy. They are still threatening North Vietnam, intensifying their aggression against South Vietnam and daily committing new crimes against our Southern countrymen.

The entire Vietnamese people are resolved to strengthen their unity to heighten their vigilance, to overcome all hardships and sacrifices, to fight and defeat the enemy in response to the appeal of President HO CHI MINH and that of the Central Committee of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation with a view to liberating the South, defending the North, advancing toward the peaceful reunification of the country and contributing to the maintenance of peace in Asia and the world.

The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam expresses its deep gratitude to the fraternal socialist countries, the peace and just loving Governments and peoples, the progressive people in the United States and the Democratic organisations in the world for having constantly supported and assisted the Vietnamese people in their struggle against U.S. aggression, for national salvation.

The Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam calls on brothers and friends over the five continents to increase the support and assistance to the Vietnamese people till total victory, and to wage a resolute struggle to demand the U.S. to stop its aggression against Vietnam, give up for good all encroachments on the sovereignty and security of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, withdraw all U.S. troops and satellite troops from South Vietnam, liquidate all U.S. military bases there, and let the South Vietnamese people settle themselves their own affairs in accordance with the political programme of the South Vietnam National Front for Liberation, without any foreign interference.

The Vietnamese people will surely be victorious.

The U.S. imperialist aggressors will inevitably be defeated.
Long live peaceful, reunified, independent, democratic
and prosperous Vietnam.

Local V.S.C. Groups

Several new branches of the VSC are to be formed in Scotland. Anyone interested should contact ; Glasgow V.S.C. at 156, Wilton Street, Glasgow N.W.

In the next issue of the Bulletin we intend to publish more local groups addresses, for the benefit of comrades not attached to Local organisations which have recently changed addresses, or which have not yet notified us that they are functioning should send the relevant information to us as soon as possible. Many organisations which campaigned actively for the demonstration dealt with us through individuals who did not indicate that they were in an organisation. It would help us considerably to have up to date records of addresses of such organisations.

Local VSC groups are urged to press for organisations with which they are in contact to affiliate to VSC. This costs £1 per year, or 10/- for youth or student organisations.

V.S.C. FUTURE ACTIVITIES.

DECEMBER 20th Public Meeting at Conway Hall W.C.f. to celebrate

the anniversary of the National Liberation Front.

Chairman Ernie Roberts. Speakers include Malcolm Caldwell. Starts 7-30 pm.

Tuesday December 3rd A right-wing group is holding a meeting in the

Town Hall Kensington in support of U.S. Vietnam policy. Intending

hecklers are urged to meet in good time at 6-45 Kensington High St. Tube.

A meeting to discuss the matter in more detail is being considered, and anyone interested should ring 480 6789.

£200 BY JANUARY

V.S.C. must have £200 by January if it is to continue in existence. We have £100 rent to pay next month and no money in the bank. We've also the secretary's wages to pay and telephone bills, electricity bills, stamps and stationery.

PLEASE HELP US NOW!

Help us by giving us a regular income. We need a regular income of at least £30 a week and the best way you can help us is to make out a BANKERS ORDER (a form is printed on the back of this appeal) All you have to do is fill it in and hand it in at your bank. The bank does all the work; it will transfer the sum you want monthly or quarterly to our account at no cost to you.

IF EVERY MEMBER GAVE US 5/- A MONTH WE WOULD HAVE A REGULAR INCOME OF £250 A MONTH.

If you haven't a bank account please send as big a donation as you can to V.S.C. 120 COMMERCIAL RD, LONDON E 1
P.S. Nearly all your sub. of 10/- is needed to send you the bulletin.

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