

vietnam

**solidarity
campaign**

**bulletin 17
sixpence**

DIARY OF FORTHCOMING EVENTS: SEPTEMBER - OCTOBER

- 7th September V.S.C. NATIONAL COUNCIL meeting at 2:00pm, Sheffield University Union, Western Bank, Sheffield 10. If you want transport arranged, phone 480-6789.
- 7th September C.N.D. DEMO, Caerwent. "U.S. Troops Quit Wales!" Contact Bill Hyde, Bruuklyn, Creigan, Cardiff.
- 11th September. NORTH LONDON AD-HOC COMMITTEE for October Mobilisation 7:30pm at 602a, Holloway Road.
- 17th September MASS MEETING OF V.S.C. AND SUPPORTERS OF OCTOBER MOBILISATION to discuss the war and the mobilisation. CONWAY HALL, Red Lion Square, Holborn 7:00pm-10:00pm.
- 21st September C.N.D. DEMO Schevuly (CS gas) 1:30 pm Queens Square, Crowley.
- 22nd September Boat to Boulogne to meet reps of D.R.V. Organised by B.C.P.V.
- 29th September Sunday before LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE-DEMOS, Blackpool.
- 12th October DEMO at NANCEKUKU (nr Portreath, Cornwall) where CS gas produced. Mini bus going from London. Contact N.W. KENT V.S.C., 83, Gregory Crescent, London, S.E. 9
- 18th October THE GREATEST EISTEDDFOD AND HAPPENING IN WALES!
The fantastic LIVERPOOL SCENE!
The BOTTELES from London!
The local DRUIDS & DRUNKS!
7:30pm -1:00am Adm 6/- at Estonian Club, Charles St. Cardiff
- 19th October MEDICAL AID COMMITTEE -T.U. Conference. Enquiries to T.U. Committee, P.O. Box 100 36, Wellington Square, W.C.2
- 27th October AUTUMN MOBILISATION 2:00pm EMBANKMENT

NOW AVAILABLE FROM V.S.C.

International War Crimes Tribunal -Report, Testimony and Findings. 2/-ea.

The Nature of Mass Demonstrations by John Berger 6d each 45/- ; : 100 per 100.

We hope soon to have: Programme of the N.L.F., posters, leaflets and stickers for October 27th -price list is being prepared.

STOP PRESS: 5th September HAMPSTEAD V.S.C. Old Town Hall, Haverstock Hill
8:00pm

CONTENTS.

Calendar of Forthcoming Events.....	2
Editorial.....	3
Proposals for October, Geoff Richman.....	5
Proposals for October, R. Matgamma.....	9
Proposals for October, Leeds V.S.C.....	11
Proposals for October, Hull V.S.C.....	11
V.S.C. Press Release.....	14
Proposals for October, N. London Ad Hoc Cttee.	14

EDITORIAL

A subdued discussion has been conducted in the movement about the position which V.S.C. occupies in the development of the left-wing in Britain. It has been subdued because of the confusion surrounding the stated purpose of the Campaign, and the objective role which is evolving for it. It would not be premature to make a conscious intervention in this evolutionary process to bring this discussion into the open, however ill-prepared we may be.

There is virtual unanimity that V.S.C. should remain, at this time, a single issue movement. This corresponds to the belief that the traumatic impact of the Vietnam war still has an enormous potential in mobilising new forces. There is also, I suspect, an element of guarding, jealously, the prerogatives of the revolutionary factions. It is time that the last rites were intoned over these primitive fears. If the movement is to satisfy some of the demands placed upon it, its organisational character and its place in the hearts of militants are going to have to change dramatically.

The demands placed upon the campaign range far beyond the desire for well-organised, large demonstrations at a moment's notice. The necessity for sustained action and agitation on Vietnam throughout the year is clearly seen. The simple belief that radicalisation was the product of militant action when people were placed in a confrontation situation, is now reserved for the unreflective, loud mouthed fraternity. Not that people wish to return to a discredited pacifism, but the faltering progress of integrating new forces into the movement emphasises the inadequacy of the 'experience' alone. By now it should also be evident that the propaganda of the existing revolutionary formations cannot perform this function, as the major attraction of V.S.C. has been its united character. The aspiration to carry this united action into other fields of concern to the left; to break the isolation bred of our traditional fragmentation and a moribund Labour Party, leads us to an apparently insurmountable dilemma. We either move the Campaign from the concentration solely on Vietnam (rejected) or initiate similar campaigns on many other issues (absurd). It is characteristic of the British Left that these frustrating problems have produced rather more despondency than critical analysis. People withdraw uneasily from a discussion which may result in a challenge to conventional perspectives.

For the time being, I too will withdraw, and revert to an action programme which may alter the context of the debate.

1) The Bulletin has been inundated with analyses of the Mobilisation, now inundate it with analyses of the future of the Campaign, (Not a list of demonstrations, please!!)

2) Build an infrastructure to the Campaign. Recreate the united

action of the demonstration at a local level. Individual members, and affiliated organisations, form local V.S.C. branches with which new comrades can associate without immediate introduction to 'sophisticated' factionalism.

3) Make these branches of sufficient size to be able to take effective local action (public meetings, leafleting, street corner agitation development of local projects, factory gate agitation, adoption of a particular factory, housing estate, etc. Sensitivity to special local situations.)

4) Publication of local material designed to make an impact on the local community and to involve all members and all talents.

5) Let everyone accept equal responsibility for maintaining unity, in their own interests.

6) Utilise this new association -growing with explosive force!-for concerted action on whatever other issues the members may desire.

7) Recruit new members like mad -we need money urgently. Each branch support the movement with a bankers order, based on regular contributions - accompany every demand on the organisation with a cash donation!

8) Don't moan about the lack of initiative in the Campaign after March 17th, unless your record is much better before, and after October 27th.

Ed Guiton, Secretary V.S.C.

LOCAL AD-HOC COMMITTEES

If anyone does not know their local Ad-Hoc Committee, contact Ed Guiton at V.S.C. Office, phone 480-6789, and he can put you in touch with your nearest Ad-Hoc Committee.

It would be a great help in this respect if all Ad-Hoc Committees set up could inform of us of their existence, and the address of their secretary.

Comrades are reminded that printed N.L.F. flags, for attaching to sticks, are available from the office. Price 1/- each, reduced rates for larger quantities.

CAST FILM PRODUCTIONS have released their first film
"OCTOBER 67"

a 16mm 17minute sound film

produced by the Cartoon Archetypical Slogan Theatre.

The film centres around the weekend of October 22nd anti-vietnam war demonstration in London.

Featuring.... ADRIAN MITCHELL
C.A.S.T. in action
THE CRITICS GROUP
TARIQ ALI
ALAN KREBS
POLICE BRUTALITY

Bookable from CAST FILM PRODUCTIONS, 161 West End Lane, London N.W.6
TEL: (01)-328-2409.

PLEASE BOOK WELL IN ADVANCE OF SHOWING

THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE OCTOBER DEMONSTRATION. Geoff Richman.

The decision on the goal for the mass demonstration on October 26th and 27th should flow from the politics of the war in Vietnam, and the needs of the movement in Britain. Since the problems of British people relate to an international system of imperialism, with the war as the expression of the most intense and developed struggle against imperialism, the two political aspects, of support for the N.L.F. and of revolutionary development here, must re-inforce each other.

To begin with, we should try and assess the state of the war in relation to the Paris talks. It is clear that the D.R.V. has not opted for less than victory, their representative continues to denounce U.S. aggression, call for a halt to the bombing, and offers no concessions. Thus the talks have made no progress, the U.S. leak rumours that the real discussion occurs in the coffee-breaks, which are consistently denied. Meanwhile the N.L.F. continues to be successful, holding the countryside, surrounding the towns, and keeping them insecure with constant rocket attacks. Creighton Abrams admits that Saigon cannot be protected, that it will be 1970 before the U.S. can think of decreasing its commitment. No summer offensive has been launched, nor could it be without Westmoreland's extra 206,000 troops. Khe Sanh has been abandoned, and North Vietnam troops and supplies continue to arrive. The bombing of the D.R.V. though it has intensified during the talks, is a failure, for the D.R.V. economy is successfully decentralised, production is rising. According to W.H.O. there are no major health problems such as infection or dis-organisation of medical care, in marked contrast to South Vietnam, and this is always a good test of the stability of a country.

Why did the D.R.V. enter the talks? The key to this lies in a main objective of the Tet offensive, destruction of the civilian (puppet) administration—hence the continued attacks on police stations, resettlement camps etc. The nerve of the puppet regime is badly shaken. Both Thieu and Ky have made anti-American statements, and the new 'liberal' regime is an attempt to maintain a hold on the urban population. There is discussion of the need for secret talks with the N.L.F. Defections from the A.R.V.F. have increased, and the attempt to impose national conscription has been signalled by vast queues of young men claiming exemption. U.S. sources, on the other hand, admit that N.L.F. defections (under the amnesty provisions) have never been lower. The new Alliance of Democratic and Peace Forces, many of whose members remain secret, is of great significance here—the N.L.F. now speak of themselves as the "true", but no longer the "only" representatives in South Vietnam, and thus they clearly see the possibility of further extending their influence.

Their strategy will be to continue the encirclement of the towns, whilst the U.S. strikes out more and more wildly and ineffectively.

The U.S. position is less clear. It can be argued that they have recognised defeat, and are escalating the war only to improve their negotiating position for a face saving formula. As the Korean talks lasted for two years, whilst fighting went on, this is not unreasonable. However no section of the ruling class has in fact suggested withdrawal- the most 'liberal' position amounts to defending the cities (as against going all-out for victory) and "sit it out ", though this strategy is covered by a rhetoric which admits that a solution of the war will be political, whilst insisting that negotiations must protect the legitimate interests of the Saigon regime- and this precludes a solution. The war is intensifying in Laos and Thailand, and thus what is at stake is the whole S-E Asia policy. The military- C.I.A. complex has increased its predominance over the civilian administration, signalled by the fall of McNamara in January (whose strategy was to use aid and not military means to prevent Revolution). The pressure from the Pentagon not to publicly 'lose' a war is certainly greater, since the overall gendarme role the U.S. plays in the world is incompatible with a demonstrable defeat for U.S. policy.

Why were talks started? In order not to "bugger up the elections" - that is to have them held in a crisis atmosphere. Afterwards, the nation will be more readily unified for the sacrifices ahead. Johnson is too discredited by four years of failure, but his successor will be able to carry on, claiming that no alternative is left. Significantly, the mass base of the student anti-war movement has been (temporarily) captured by the McCarthy and Kennedy campaigns. This down-turn proves how vital political education is, it can never be assumed that activity alone will provide it.

The conclusion we should draw is that negotiations are not just a fraud, but a logical expression of the balance of forces in the war. It calls for a much more ambitious analysis of the relation of the war to imperialism than V.S.C. has yet undertaken. The complexity and long term nature of the struggle implies the building of a movement, which grasps and acts upon an analysis of imperialism, rather than a small organisation which can call out large numbers from time to time.

We should now look at the Vietnam movement here. It is a mistake to suppose that peace talks have caused a "lull" in the V.S.C. work. If there is any down-turn, or problem, it must be understood by first asking why people come into V.S.C. at all. Unlike the U.S.A., Vietnam is not an immediate issue for ordinary people-though the majority probably oppose the U.S. Young people join V.S.C., rather than some other section of the left, as an expression of disgust with society, including family, college and work authoritarianism, and because electoral conventional politics offers nothing. This is a marked revolutionary shift compared say with C.N.D., the most recent upsurge in political life. Vietnam is not only the clearest example of oppression, like that imposed by the British State, it is also a place where that oppression is being successfully fought. V.S.C. thus attracts the already committed left, and those young people who come into politics every year, (the spring-crop) and who find the Vietnam

movement a place where there is action.

So far, the mass of the working class, and its trade union section, though disenchanted with social democracy (the Labour Government) has not yet abandoned it. Moreover the relation between Vietnam and domestic issues is complex, and at an intellectual level in advance of present-day political consciousness. Thus the problem of developing V.S.C. from a two-demonstration a year organisation to the vanguard of a movement has so far not yet been solved. Indeed the solution depends on the generation, through the militancy and unity around V.S.C., of movements more directly arising from the life problems of sections of society - and this has indeed begun with the students over student power.

In consequence, V.S.C. is still faced with the difficulties of the tenuous base on which it rests, the excessive organisational responsibility resting on a few people, their commitment also to other single-issue political struggles, and to building parties or tendencies, and the lack of clarity about how to build a movement, or whether this is the correct path to Revolution. Although tens of thousands may come out under our slogans, as on March 17th. we have not yet forged this energy into an instrument which will seriously challenge the State. It is the discovery of their commitment which alone can liberate us from our isolation.

The political goal for October should be seen as part of the whole week of solidarity and the weekend 26th/27th, and not in isolation. In this way both local targets, representing capitalism, complicity with the war, solidarity with trade union and other struggles, and militant actions which can be undertaken only by small numbers in highly organised groups, (e.g. which picks out the U.S. presence here) can all be undertaken as expressing the programme of particular sections.

They would not then feel so urgently that the major demonstration is the only test of success. That demonstration however must also provide for both mass numbers, and militant groups, supporting and not hampering each other.

The tactical goal must, if it is to develop the movement, be reasonable, achievable, and one we can organise for in such a way that the organisers have to take responsibility, and also involve the demonstrators (as far as possible) in discussion before, so that an organic unity is attained, and people understand what they are trying to do, so that successes and failures can be discussed rationally afterwards. The demonstration must show and develop power, i.e. actually do something. This involves an estimate of what we can reasonably expect to be able to do, as well as our long term aim in building power (that is masses of people united and conscious of their aims).

For these reasons, I am opposed to splitting the march - the organisers have not yet the experience to control this - we would not be followed. Nor do I think we should go to Grosvenor Square again. The large mass can only go there with an open question mark as to what we achieve (? a spontaneous insurrection?) - either to hand in a protest, which is silly

as it really appeals to the nonexistent goodwill of the U.S. State, to burn down the Embassy which we don't have the power to do, and had better face up to, or to walk past which is tame, and which militants won't accept. Tactically it is a death trap as a square. It confronts the police at their maximum power, not ours (contrast a sit-in) Politically, we have been there before, and people's minds are inhibited from fresh thinking by the conditioning of repeat performances. Also it is not clear to non-political people why we go there- the Embassy is a place where they go for visas.

I suggest we choose the South Vietnamese Embassy as the place which brings out our tactical goal. We begin by a political campaign demanding the removal of this disgusting presence of a puppet regime, which involves an explanation of the war, of how imperialism supports a puppet regime, and of the analogy between Saigon and the Labour Government to the U.S. The campaign concentrates on complicity, rather than an attack on the puppet Government. We should demand that the Government recognise the N.L.F. instead as the only true representatives of the Vietnamese. If they refuse, we should announce that we will immobilise the Embassy for a specified time, and raise an N.L.F. flag there. The march will have to understand this and organise for it, remaining cohesive and disciplined, protecting itself, and controlling its own route. Even if we cannot take the Embassy or hold it, the campaign could seriously embarrass the Government, and show ordinary people our power, as well as giving direct political aid to the N.L.F. Finally, tactically the Embassy is in an open street, and if blocked off, we are in front of Kensington Gardens and cannot be trapped.

After the demonstration, a mass meeting must discuss and initiate a continuing campaign.

OCTOBER THE 27th IS NOT AN END, IT IS A BEGINNING.

Preparations by the VSC for the October mobilisation will involve a great deal of office work and very big expenses, in addition to the crucial organising work of the local groups. Consequently, it is necessary that people (especially typists) volunteer to do some of the office work between now and Oct., and that all supporters of the VSC attempt to contribute financially to the national VSC to enable it to prepare for Oct. Local groups especially should carry out fund-raising activities for this purpose. Without the funds, the Oct. mobilisation will not be successful. (Office volunteers please call 430 6739.)

VSC 741383
1c per badge ... bulk orders from local VSC groups - 3c/badge

SOME POINTS ON THE AIMS AND METHODS OF THE OCT. MOBILISATION
)- from R. Matgamna, Worker's Fight, & Manchester VSC

- AIMS AND EFFECTS: (In order of immediat priority)
- 1) Solidarity with the NLF, and assistance, in the form of a morale boost, in their struggle.
 - 2) The radicalisation of the Left in Britain, the raising of the level of consciousness of both the demonstrators and the broad left. Most of us agree that this should lead on to the development of as many as possible of the people won to a solidarity position and solidarity action, as revolutionary socialists in the full sense, with a full knowledge of the wider issues.
 - 3) Radicalisation of the mass of the workers and labour movement.

We must consider our tactics in relation to these aims, and consider our priorities in cases where there may be or appear to be a clash. An example of this, perhaps the most important is the clash between the appearance of the demo and its achievements. For the sake of appearance (which would be important in relation to aim no. 3) the demo is best kept together; but for the sake of effectiveness (which, as I shall try to show, is the most important in relation to aims nos. 1 & 2) it is better policy to split up the demo, to have greater effect in the following ways:

No. 1 For solidarity and morale (internationally) the greater the commitment of the demonstrators, their level of militancy, determination etc., the better. This must be made apparent. Also, such an achievement as the occupation of the streets, though in itself it is of little value, can have enormous value in its effects on the morale of the NLF and other combatants facing imperialism directly. Thus when viewed in relation to the aims of morale and solidarity, the meaningless conquest becomes an actual conquest - and not only that, but it serves to prove in a tangible way the commitment of the demonstrators. Therefore the demo should be deployed so as to achieve actual success, not merely token protest. Tactics must allow for a maximum development and use of the total potential strength of the demonstration.

No. 2 The methods and tactics for this coincide with those for 1). The higher the level of involvement of each demonstrator, the more likely is there to be a polarisation, with the best of them turning their experiences of struggle against the state into a drive towards revolutionary socialism.

The needs of these two aims both conflict with the simple showing of number, which requires massing in one place. This massing, as on March 17th, tends to minimize both the total achieve-

ment of the whole demo, and the involvement of the maximum number of people; (the two are of course inseparable: only by involving everyone to the utmost can any objective be achieved.) On March 17th there was a narrow front line, with the mass of demonstrators almost immobilised behind it. Therefore, I would propose that the ad hoc committee adopts tactics which will enlarge the front of the demo to the maximum. This could be a matter of splitting up; or a matter of converging on one place from, say, 6 directions or more.

Here the conflict arises with the demands of 3). All this is not calculated to get the best press in the Mirror. But on the whole it must be said that in political consciousness this mobilisation is a long way ahead of the political level of the mass of the workers. We should not assume that, if only we 'play our cards right' (ie have a huge demo in one place) then a repeat of the French events will inevitably result. There is still sympathy for the police, etc, and we must face the fact that even some militant workers will be alienated rather than won by the demonstration. Nevertheless, the demo has many other things to gain. It is not a sectarian binge by a handful of hoary old revolutionaries. It will be composed of tens of thousands of young people (students and workers) who are moving towards revolutionary socialism. And after solidarity, the main priority must be the demonstrators themselves, many of whom are the 'raw material' for the building of the future revolutionary party - and many of whom, having become committed through action, will move on to more complex propaganda activities (as outlined below) as well as demonstrations.

There is a danger in wanting to do too much in one go: if there is a conflict of interest between effectiveness and impressiveness, a choice must be made, according to priorities. Compromise will achieve neither. We will have achieved much if we can show a real, active solidarity with the NLF and at the same time continue the radicalisation of the Left which began in the October mobilisation last year. The aims of No. 3 will not be achieved in demonstrations (although there will be an interaction between demonstrations and propaganda): and any demonstration which sets out to replace propaganda and the direct experience of the class in this matter is only likely to undermine its effectiveness on the other two fronts, as outlined above. We must recognise that, though connected, demonstrations and propaganda are different. If we want to link the two, there are ways of doing so without weakening the demonstration by compromise.

To this end, the following proposals are useful:

- 1) Route: demo should come through working class areas from different starting points, passing such areas as East London, Brixton, Clapham, Battersea, Notting Hill, Islington, Camden, etc. These routes should

be thoroughly leafleted beforehand, explaining why the demo is being held, etc, and asking people to join. In areas, eg. Brixton, Notting Hill, where there are large numbers of immigrants the leaflets could be specially drafted to link up with the colonial and black struggle (immigrant organisation sympathetic to the ad hoc committee could be responsible for this). In other areas a general solidarity line.

2) Factories and TU branches: each ad hoc or VSC group in the country should 'adopt' as many factories (beginning with those that already have a militant record) as it can cope with properly. Between now and Oct. these should be regularly pumped with a barrage of leaflets covering all the different aspects of the Vietnam war - facts, figures, quotations, etc, to deal with the nature of the war, what imperialism has at stake, how it is fighting (War Crimes Tribunal evidence), what the NLF is, etc, how it links up with a) British workers' struggle and b) British economic situation. Finally, a leaflet immediately after the demo to give the real facts of what happened on the demo, publicise the real role of the police, and announce a) a local public meeting at the end of the week and b) that a collection will be made at the factory gate at the end of the week to help towards payment of fines. These activities might cover only one or two factories in each area or town, but on this basis may be built for further work, and experience will be gained. At the end of it all, reports should be sent in to the Bulletin summing up the operation in each area, so that the lessons will be available to everyone.

Thus the demonstration and propaganda should be complementary: a demonstration which is as lively and as effective as possible on its own terms will achieve its own aims and lend impetus to the propaganda; and the propaganda should attempt to win the workers to understand and support the demonstration.

Finally, it will be a blot and a disgrace in the eyes of all its supporters if VSC does not have, as its main slogan VICTORY TO THE NLF. To give those responsible the benefit of the doubt, one can only assume that they took it so much for granted as to forget to specify it. The omission must be rectified immediately.

NEW VSC LITERATURE

"The Nature of Mass Demonstrations" reprint of an article by John Berger. An analysis of the philosophy and strategy of demonstration, and their relation to revolutionary uprisings.

6d. per copy - bulk orders: 45/- per 100

LEADS SOLIDARITY CAMPAIGN.

Resolution of National Council of V.S.C.:-

"It should be reiterated that the main aim of the October demonstration will be to win support from the working class in Britain for the N.L.F. struggle in Vietnam;

We propose that:-

1. There must be only one unified march;
2. We should take responsibility for policing our own demonstration, and if necessary mobilise our own cordons etc.;
3. A code of conduct should be published and circulated to branches before the demonstration, and this leaflet should give a guide to attitudes towards police, traffic etc. and should stress the real purpose of the demonstration;
4. We should march from Trafalgar Square to a rally in Hyde Park; this should entail marching past several places that serve to relate the demonstration to the struggle against imperialism and capitalism;
5. The route should be chosen so as to avoid any possible bottlenecks or direct confrontations with the police."

Resolution passed by 17 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions.

OCTOBER MOBILISATION: LOCAL GROUP ACTIVITY. HULL VSC.

The sooner the details of the October demonstration are fixed, the sooner this can be developed. A revival of local group activities will probably hinge on whatever national leaflets, stickers and posters are produced for the national demonstration. It seems that most V.S.C. groups will have to sort out their financial problems before they can embark on any ambitious local mobilisations.

We must make another, more sustained, effort to get support from more of our local trade union and labour movement organisations. We must all get an address list of all trade unions branches, local Labour, Liberal and Communist Parties, Trades Councils etc., and make personal contact with as many of them as possible. Shop steward contacts at the main local plants are vital. At the least all these people should get a leaflet about the October demonstration and they should all know their local V.S.C. address and arrangements for getting to the demonstration. It might be worthwhile local groups producing local leaflets linking Vietnam to local problems such as unemployment, low wage rates, take overs etc.

University students will probably find it easier to organise themselves for late October. The big target will be the freshers.

The more that university supporters can link up with local education authority students in the cities and towns the better. (At the moment the first tentative links are being made between University, College of Commerce, College of Technology and College of Education activists in Hull.)

It seems clear that all local V.S.C. groups should be having weekly meetings (at least committee meetings) by the end of August right through until late October.

TUC AND THE LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCES.

These two weekly conferences will be taking place at the Winter Gardens, Blackpool - the TUC the first week in September, the Labour Party September 30th to October 1st.

At the very least all delegates to these conferences should get our leaflets and we should lobby any delegates we know. Should we try and can we afford any activities more ambitious at Blackpool? A march? A public meeting? Perhaps V.S.C. support in the North West e.g. Manchester, Salford, Liverpool, Lancaster and Preston could consider initiating some action.

Press statement of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign
on the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

August 21st 1968.

The Vietnam Solidarity Campaign utterly condemns the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armed forces of the Soviet Union. We regard the occupation as a gross violation of the peoples right to self-determination.

We express our unconditional support for the struggle of the Czech people against the invading forces. This vile and treacherous action can only have the world-wide support for the Vietnamese struggle for self-determination against American aggression and is a set-back for the socialist forces throughout the world.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia in no way justifies the American invasion of Vietnam, as both are acts of counter-revolutionary repression.

THE OCTOBER MOBILISATION: Proposals of the North London Ad Hoc Committee.

- 1) North London Ad Hoc Cttee suggests that Grosvenor Square is not the target of the demonstration for both tactical (e.g. for the actual demo) and political reasons.
- 2) In view of this North London Ad Hoc Cttee suggests that the demonstration takes the form of taking control of the streets and of marching past a number of targets high - lighting American Imperialism (e.g. Dow chemicals) and past targets showing British complicity.
- 3) The Cttee suggests that the march should avoid Grosvenor Square but march past such targets as named above and disperse in Parliament Sq.
- 4) The demonstration on Oct. 27th must be considered as a beginning of a larger campaign and the National Ad Hoc Cttee and local Ad Hoc Cttees must continue to meet and plan for further actions throughout the winter.
- 5) Support for arrested comrades must be expressed by further demonstrations of solidarity in the streets and not by merely setting up a board of lawyers or a defence fund to take care of the fines (although the Cttee welcomes such moves).
- 6) North London Ad Hoc Cttee suggests that the Trade Union Congress is called upon to honour resolutions passed in the Conference 1967 calling upon the Government to dis-associate from U.S. war effort in Vietnam and also calls upon Labour Party branches to support the demonstration.

Various suggestions have been made for the October demonstration - Grosvenor Sq., occupying a building, control of the streets. We are going to argue in favour of the last of these. Both political and strategic arguments must be considered.

Objectives of the demonstration

- 1) Act of solidarity with the Vietnamese. Obviously the amount of publicity we get is important here but we should not go all out for maximum publicity irrespective of its other costs.
 - 2) To affect the consciousness of the general population - this must be seen as part of a long campaign.
 - 3) To affect the consciousness of the actual participants of the demonstration. An important point must be made here - that although VSC is a single-issue organisation, the vast majority of its supporters (unlike CND) do not see Vietnam as an isolated issue. There is a growing awareness of the connections of imperialism and capitalism and the need for a revolutionary alternative.
- It is possible that there could be a clash between the desire for publicity at any cost and the need to build up a long-term revolutionary movement; for instance, spectacular

exploits might get publicity but might have adverse effects on the movement as a whole at this time.

Review of March 17th

1) March from Trafalgar Sq. to Grosvenor Sq. better than the events in Grosvenor Sq. itself. There was one hundred per cent agreement among demonstrators on marching 20-30 abreast down streets, not allowing the police to split up march, etc. In contrast, once we arrived in Grosvenor Sq. no one knew what the objective was and most of the demonstrators hung around as confused spectators.

2) Because there was the one major objective the police were able to concentrate all their forces in the Square which is an obvious trap. Because of this and because so many people were milling around the police were able to make hundreds of arrests. As there was no organised dispersal (obviously connected with vague objective) many arrests were made of stragglers. The tactic of linking arms would be fine if demonstrators knew where they were going - it is pointless when nobody knows which direction they are going in.

Lessons of March 17th

We cannot expect victories on demonstrations but on the other hand the objective should not be so unrealistic or undefined as to leave most participants feeling confused and demoralised. A demonstration should, by its show of solidarity and militancy lead to the supporters feeling encouraged and determined to continue to work. This does not mean that a demonstration should not be militant. But we must avoid the type of unorganised violence which is demoralising and leads to many arrests.

Form of Oct. 27th

Our objectives should be made clear and explicit. The demonstration should take the form of a march around central London passing various symbols of American imperialism and British complicity. Almost any street in London has these, but some suggestions are Oxford St. (Dow Chemicals), Park Lane, Whitehall, etc. (these are all good, wide streets). Everyone on the march should know the course of the demo so that if the police try to stop it they will be able to continue in the right direction. We should not allow ourselves to get trapped. Having several objectives along the route will help. We should have a controlled dispersal point and time - at that people should be told to go home as quickly and inconspicuously as possible. The dispersal point should be chosen for its tactical convenience rather than its political significance - for instance, Hyde Park Corner

There should be two major principles on the demonstration - CONTROL OF THE STREETS and NO ARRESTS. Demonstrators should march 30-40 abreast, linking arms. The French idea of the cordon might be used. The march should continue on its planned route avoiding provocations by the police or individual demonstrators.
