

The New _____ **INTERNATIONAL**

OCTOBER-1945

DEADLOCK AT LONDON

The New Russian Empire vs. American World Domination

An Editorial

A. ARLINS:

The International Significance of the British Elections

P. KOSTER:

Carl Jung and the Nazi Superman

ROGER JUDSON:

Germany – The Political Vacuum

James P. Cannon as Historian	Albert Gates
The Italian Revolution and the Republic	Daniel Logan
The SWP and the WP on Unification	Documents
Politics of the International Working Class	New Feature

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The Politics of

THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING CLASS

"Oui-oui; Oui-non; Non-oui et Non-non"

General de Gaulle may not have much food or international diplomatic successes to offer the French nation, but of politics and parades he has no shortage. By "politics," we mean the word in the traditional French sense—confusion, corruption, demagoguery and a surplus of soul-stirring but empty slogans.

A shining example of the confusion now reigning in France, after more than a year of liberation and de Gaullist floundering, is the general referendum or plebiscite to be held on October 21, together with the election of the Assembly. The referendum is to decide the powers of the Assembly and the authority of the de Gaulle government in relation to it. The referendum poses two questions:

1. "Do you want the Assembly to be a 'constituent'?" (i.e., have the authority to write a new constitution).

If the majority vote "no" on this question, the old constitution of 1875 (Third Republic) will be in effect.

2. "If the majority has voted Yes on the first question, do you approve that—until the new Constitution goes into effect—public authority should be organized in accordance with the Government's project?" (i.e., shall the de Gaulle government remain in power independent of the Assembly).

The two questions are posed before the voters with no less than four possible ways of voting. It is the proud boast of *Figaro*, the newspaper of the organized Right, that nobody in France understands what it is all about—which is precisely what the Right desired to accomplish and, apparently, has.

However, the ability of the French worker to see through de Gaulle's maneuvers is not aided by the confused picture presented by the three Left parties that continue to function in a loose version of the 1936 Front Populaire—the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and the Radical Socialists. They present the following positions:

Socialists say "Yes" and "Yes," i.e., for a new constitution but meanwhile for de Gaulle in power.

Stalinists say "Yes" and "No," i.e., for a new constitution and the power of the Assembly over de Gaulle.

Radicals say "No" and "No," i.e., no new constitution and for de Gaulle in power.

It is the aim of de Gaulle and the conservatives generally to continue to rule France under the constitution written by the Versailles Assembly under the reactionary Thiers and triumphantly proclaimed over the ruins of the defeated Paris Commune of 1871.

However, the French workers and lower middle class are not reconciled to going back calmly to the pre-war Republic. The conservatives have little hope of defeating the popular sentiment for a new constitution. What is more, they also realize that the Assembly elected to write the new constitution will reflect the moods of the people and will, consequently, be a "radical" one.

De Gaulle, therefore, prepares his second line of defense, formulated in question two. This is intended to maintain the executive authority of the government while the Assembly is permitted to debate abstractly a new constitution. With no

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EDITORIAL COMMENT—

DEADLOCK AT LONDON

***The New Russian Empire vs. American World Domination—
What Was at Stake in the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers***

As the Foreign Ministers of the "victor" powers gathered around the now famous "green baize" table at London's Lancaster House last month, the peoples of a war-shattered world were just beginning to dig out of their rubble heaps and survey the devastation about them. From London to Stalingrad and from Narvik to Tobruk, the Old World was a scene of desolation and misery. Hunger, cold and disease were sending the mortality rate spiraling to new heights. Homeless millions—Poles, Sudetens, Russians, Germans, Jews, Austrians—continued to make the highways of Central Europe the scenes of the most utter wretchedness. Alongside them moved the new slave caffels of German prisoners of war—dreary, gray columns disappearing over the Eastern horizon into the vastness of Russia, or being transported to France to blow themselves up digging for land mines. On the other side of the globe American scientists were bringing their instruments to where Hiroshima and Nagasaki had once stood to test the earth for evidence of lethal radioactivity. The smell of death and devastation hung heavy over a smoking and ruined world.

The horror with which the war reached its climax in atomic mass murder was accentuated by the sober statements of scientists that atomic bombing in a future war would leave the world in a condition which would make the present one appear sane and orderly by comparison.

What the Conference Dealt With

However, if this background of havoc and threat of worse havoc to come made any impression upon the minds of the statesmen gathered at London, it was not apparent from the agenda before them or the reports of their discussions. The business that occupied the attention of the conference was "business as usual" for the imperialist powers. It was the diplomatic and political struggle over boundaries, spheres of influence, oil, bases, colonies, mandates, seaports, outlets to the sea, "life lines" of empire, peoples, nations, governments. The struggle at the conference table continued over the same issues over which the war had been fought. The place of artillery and bombers had been taken by the cant and hypocrisy of lying statesmen, backed by the armed might of their respective nations. History has, however, taught us that peacetime diplomacy is but a continuation of war by other means, just as, in turn, its end-result is once more to become transformed into a struggle with weapons of destruction.

The conference was to be a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Russia, England, the United States, France and China ostensibly to lay the foundations for a world of peace. Its agenda was to cover (1) a final peace with Italy; (2) peace treaties with the former German satellites, Finland, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria; (3) withdrawal of foreign troops from Iran; (4) internationalization of waterways; and (5) "also such matters relating to the Far East as it may be practical and convenient to discuss."

Actually the agenda could have been summed up under the heading: "Division of the loot." As it turned out, the robber chiefs could come to no agreement on the final division of the rubble heaps of the world which they, together with the Axis bandits, had produced. The horror of a new world war counted for little in their discussions when weighed against the domination of Trieste or the occupation of the Dodecanese Islands.

Once the conference got under way the press dropped reference to the "Big Five" and spoke of the "Big Three." The rôle of France and China was understood from the outset to be in the main that of spectators. France has been reduced by war to a third-rate power, at best; China is hardly even that, despite "victory." Both of them are economically, financially and militarily dependent upon the United States. They were present solely to provide a little "democratic" window-dressing, on the one hand, and to strengthen the Anglo-Americans against Russia, on the other.

Really Only Two "Big Powers"

However, the term "Big Three" was likewise inaccurate. In actuality there were two real powers at the table—the United States and Russia. Only they had come out of the war standing on their own feet instead of leaning on someone. The Russian economy, the vital rôle of lend-lease notwithstanding, had proved itself capable of supporting a military front in a modern war. The Russian régime had proved itself capable of grinding out of the people the last ounce of war-effort and still emerge as politically strong as before the war, if not stronger.

The Russian army had proved itself a formidable war machine, an equal of the armies of the strongest capitalist powers.

England, on the other hand, was on the ropes. It had only one course for the immediate future, to hang on grimly until things took a turn for the better. Its industry was exhausted.

Much of it was hopelessly obsolete, as the mining industry. It had accumulated a tremendous debt during the war, both internal and external. It had been forced to liquidate many foreign holdings, as in the United States. It had lost most of its foreign market, upon which it has to rely for a functioning economy. It was, in short, financially bankrupt. It had fallen hopelessly behind the United States as a naval power. Its merchant fleet, once the pride of the seas, was now reduced in size, largely over-age, and inferior to that of the United States. American competition was taking over the world's airways. Its vast Empire was a long series of headaches. India was once more stirring. China was opposing, with covert American support, no doubt, England's resuming her old status in that country. The Jewish-Arab problem continued to boil in the Near East. The satellite empires of the French and Dutch were likewise beset by colonial risings in Indo-China and the East Indies. American influence had suddenly appeared everywhere. Even in the Dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand a renewed American tide had set in. At home the working class had repudiated the direct political rule of the capitalist class in the form of the Tory party. If Bevin continued to talk tough at the conference, it was not a sign of British confidence but rather because the Empire had its back to the wall and there was nothing else to do.

New Position of the United States

The United States had emerged from the First World War as a dominant power, equaled and rivaled only by the failing strength of the British Empire. The United States emerges from this war as the triumphant heir of the capitalist world. Its power is felt everywhere. It has no formidable rivals up to boundaries of the Russian spheres. Europe lives on American rations today in the most literal sense and American economic and military power is unchallenged in the islands of the Pacific, including Japan, and the Asiatic mainland up to the Russian zones in Korea and Manchuria. Khaki-clad officers roll through the streets of Berlin and Paris, Brussels and Rome, Teheran and Cairo, Calcutta and Mandalay, Chungking and Seoul, Tokyo and Shanghai. Statesmen of large nations and small, European, Asiatic or Latin American, vie with each other to secure the favors of the State Department at Washington, favors which mean loans and UNRRA relief handouts. Wall Street has become the super-arbiter over the economic destinies of most of the world. American military might seeks bases half-way around the world: Iceland, Greenland, Bermuda, the Azores, Brazil, the islands across the length and breadth of the Pacific, including the Okinawas, on the very doorstep of Japan. Its fleets reach almost five-ocean proportions. Its ability to produce the atomic bomb gives it the power of life and death over other peoples.

Yet with all this vast power in its hands, American capitalism can achieve no stability and prosperity. Already the United States' home economy is beset by growing unemployment, loss of purchasing power, threatened inflation, and a growing wave of strikes. Its inability to master the economic contradictions at home drives American imperialism to further efforts to master the contradictions of world economy. In order to "organize" the domestic economy, American imperialism seeks to "organize" world economy. The successful stabilization and exploitation of the world becomes the only means toward the stabilization and exploitation of the United States.

Russia's Imperialist Expansion

The only nation which remains beyond the reach of the American world octopus is Russia. Basing itself upon a fundamentally different economic order—bureaucratic collectivism—Russia has maintained a monopoly of foreign trade and achieved, by sweating, starving and bleeding its own people, a comparative economic self-sufficiency adequate to remain independent from the economic domination of world capitalism. Basing itself upon its bureaucratically planned economy, its natural resources, its vast territory, its tremendous human reservoir, and its strategic geographic location, Russian military power has everywhere erupted beyond its old boundaries. Helsinki, Warsaw, Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Sofia, Bucharest resound to the tread of Russian boots. The Russian battle star appears in northern Iran, Manchuria, Korea, southern Sakhalin, the Kuriles and stands poised over Turkish Armenia and the Dardanelles.

Though following economic laws peculiar to its own collectivist economy, Russian imperialism, like that of the capitalist world, finds the solution to many internal problems beyond its national boundaries. The attempt to organize a self-sufficient economy within one country continually develops internal contradictions. Russian industry, even though part of a "planned economy," develops unevenly. This is so whether it is well planned or is bureaucratically mismanaged. Some industries have dire need of imports to prosper while others must dispose of surpluses abroad. In Russia, as elsewhere, economy drives incessantly to adjust itself to the world division of labor. The addition of Poland, the Balkans, Finland and Asiatic territories to the Russian economic sphere affords the Russian rulers the opportunity to lessen the strains and tensions upon their autarchic economy.

Beyond the urges born of the needs of Russian economy, the bureaucracy is driven on by those motives of power, prestige and revenue that have been the motive forces of predatory expansion by ruling classes throughout the ages. The same motives carried the flag of the Czar to the Pacific and beyond it to Alaska, across Finland to the border of Sweden, across the deserts of Central Asia to the borders of Afghanistan and, in countless wars with Turkey, beyond the Caucasus. These are the motives of plunder, of taxation, of the building of mass conscript armies, and of the securing of strategic points of "national defense." The present generation of Russian political, economic and military functionaries have been brought up in the tradition of a fervent nationalism. The place of "Holy Russia" and Pan-Slavism has been taken by the mission of Russia to bring Russian "socialism" to the "dark peoples" of the border lands. Russian "socialism" includes, of course, the political and economic domination of the Russian ruling bureaucracy over the new territories, whether directly annexed or ruled through puppet régimes.

The New Russian Empire

By means of this imperialist aggrandizement, the Russian bureaucratic class is fashioning a new Eurasian empire covering a tremendous, continuous land block with a quarter billion population. The Russian rulers have revealed that they have no self-limitations upon the boundaries of their empire. They insist upon pushing them as far as American and British resistance permits. Their westward expansion must, for the present, rest at the western limits of the Russian zone of occupation in Germany. Here they are up against what is rapidly becoming a well-knit "western bloc" of the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Belgium and France, basing itself upon

Anglo-American support. The major present objective of the Russians appears to be the Near East and the Mediterranean. This drive seems aimed beyond the age-old Russian desire to control the Dardanelles. It casts the long shadow of the Russian bear over the sensitive "middle zone" of the British Empire, the Mediterranean and the Arab world on its southern and eastern shores, including Iraq and oil-rich Iran, now occupied by both Russian and British troops.

It is a different Russia and a different world from that of ten years ago when Litvinov appeared at Geneva to plead for "collective security." It is likewise a far different world from that of Munich, where the "Big Four" implicitly told Russia that Europe was none of its business. (Of that "Big Four" only Britain counts today.) Russia today considers its "business" to involve the fate of Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Germany, Austria, the Balkan states, Hungary, Greece, Czechoslovakia, Italy, Spain, Tangier, the Italian colonies in Africa, the Dodecanese islands, Turkey and the Dardanelles, Iran, Mongolia, Manchuria, Korea and the Kuriles.

World War II has, therefore, simultaneously brought to birth the new Russian empire, based upon bureaucratic collectivism, and the final and complete supremacy of America in the world of capitalism. In between the two giants, the ancient British Empire is being subjected to a tight squeeze. The logic of the situation forces it to reconcile itself to a rôle of junior partner to American world domination. The more pressure Russia exerts upon British spheres, the more must Britain cling to the United States and subordinate its interests to those of America. It is this relationship of forces that must be understood to understand what took place at London.

The Conflict Over Voting Procedure

The bourgeois press correspondents and columnists, as usual, occupied themselves at great length with the superficialities of the controversy at London, in particular the matter of voting procedure. After an initial agreement that all five powers participate in the discussions, Molotov, on September 22, suddenly demanded the exclusion of France and China from the discussions of peace treaties with the former German satellites: Finland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary (now Russian satellites). The technical grounds upon which he based the demand was that the Potsdam agreement had limited treaty-making powers only to those nations that had been at war with these former German allies. The pro-Russian commentators explained that Molotov grew irritated over the fact that nearly all questions brought a four-to-one line-up, with Russia standing alone. Samuel Grafton, who has been properly dubbed the "theoretician of the air-raid wardens," explained that Russia was quite proper in its approach, since the "world of communism" had one vote and the world of capitalism had four. If the discussions were only confined to the "Big Three" it would result, he explained, in a two-to-one vote against Russia and its bargaining power would therefore be greater. The logic of this position is, of course, that if the "world of communism" and the world of capitalism were each given one vote, Russia's bargaining power would be *still* greater. And, with proper corrections, this approach is not incorrect. Stalin, as boss of the bureaucratic collectivist world, would prefer to do business vis-à-vis the American bosses of the capitalist world. At least, he would not be out-voted.

The points of conflict which stymied the London discussions all involved the trouble spots where the frontiers of the new Russian empire pressed upon the capitalist world.

Trieste and Italy's Colonies

(1) The final peace treaty with Italy ran into the problem of Trieste. In a sense, Trieste has a double importance for Russia. First, it is the westernmost extension of the Russian sphere. Second, it is the only port at present through which the Russian world has an outlet to the Mediterranean.

The discussions went through all the old mumbo-jumbo of the ethnic, juridical, historical and socio-economic claims of Italy and Yugoslavia upon the territory. A reading of the claims of both sides is, by itself, convincing proof of the hopelessness of any kind of durable solution under capitalism. The mixture of the population of Trieste itself, the crazy-quilt pattern of Italian, Slovenian and Croatian settlements in the adjacent area, the pivotal importance of the port for world power politics, all indicate that the minority problem will continue to fester regardless of any solution short of a freely-determined place in a United Socialist States of Europe.

Russia stood adamant in support of the claims upon Trieste advanced by its puppet Yugoslavian régime, headed by Tito. (Reports have it that the failure of the Yugoslavian Foreign Minister, Subasitch; to appear at London were due to his confinement under house arrest.) The Italian claims were supported by Bevin, with just as much insistence. The real nature of the dispute over Trieste is to be seen in the fact that the British Foreign Minister takes upon his shoulders the defense of Italian interests in Trieste, about which Togliatti, Stalinist Minister in the Italian Cabinet, has only a few pious and innocuous remarks to make. Bevin, spokesman of British imperialist interests, is free to speak out on Italian interests. Togliatti, Russian spearhead in the Italian government, finds himself compelled to dodge the issue.

The peace treaty with Italy also involved the disposition of the Italian colonies. Britain had favored individual trusteeships, with an eye toward taking the best for herself and giving what was left to France. The United States had favored international trusteeships, which would give it a dominant voice without direct responsibility for colonial administration. Russia threw a bombshell into the discussions by favoring individual trusteeships and calmly indicating that it was prepared to take "responsibility for" Tripolitania and, perhaps, Eritrea. Russia's demand was a bombshell precisely because the thinking of the Anglo-American world cannot quite adjust itself to an international situation in which Russia proposes to become a Mediterranean and an African power. Whether Russia is serious in its demands or is seeking to bargain for concessions like the Dodecanese Islands which it can use to guard the approaches to the Dardanelles is difficult to say at this time. Byrnes and Bevin dodged the question by postponing it until the UNO trusteeship council has been set up.

Iran and the Dardanelles

(2) The withdrawal of the troops from Iran involved an attempt by the British to advance the date of withdrawal from that of the treaty provision with Iran (that the occupation continue until "six months after the defeat of Japan.") Molotov insisted upon the maximum time for occupation in accordance with the treaty provisions.

(3) The discussion of the internationalization of the waterways bogged down because this involves the problem of the Dardanelles. Russia opposes renewal of the 1936 Montreux Convention or any form of internationalization of the straits which does not permit Russia to have free use of them and control them in time of war. Molotov took the aggressive on this question, as on all others. When Bevin raised the question

of the Dardanelles, Molotov raised the question of control of the Suez Canal. When Byrnes interjected to support Bevin, Molotov said that the United States was as much involved in the matter of the Dardanelles as Russia was in the matter of the Panama Canal. Here too the result was a deadlock.

(4) Molotov utilized the addition of the apparently harmless point attached to the end of the agenda referring to "matters relating to the Far East" to spring a diplomatic coup by suddenly raising the question of control over the occupation of Japan. The Russians cleverly manipulated the discontent expressed by the Chinese, Australians and Dutch over the position which the United States had taken that the occupation of Japan was solely an American matter. Byrnes was maneuvered into a corner where he found himself isolated. Bevin stated that he was obligated to support the views of the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand on the question. The Americans have since countered with a move to establish an advisory council which involves not only Russia but also Britain, China, France, the Netherlands and the Philippines. The effect of the maneuver is to accept the principle of a joint council which the Russians advanced but to restrict severely its powers and to include sufficient nations to reduce Russia's specific weight again.

(5) The peace treaties with Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary raised the question of the internal régimes in these countries. This question brought to the fore the profound discovery by the correspondents that the Russians and Anglo-Americans had different definitions of democracy! The present governments of these states are maintained by internal political terror organized by the native Stalinists under GPU direction with, of course, the bayonets of the Russian army of occupation in the background. They are Russian puppet governments in the same sense that the present government of Greece is a puppet of Britain and the present government of the Philippines is a puppet of the United States.

Molotov, smarting under the inquiries about "democracy" in these countries, finally blew up and demanded the exclusion of France and China from the discussions. What is more, he asked that the minutes showing his agreement at the beginning of the conference to French and Chinese participation be expunged. Bevin referred to this as a "falsification of history." Since the latter has long been state policy in Stalinist Russia, Molotov was no doubt puzzled by what was meant by this objection. The final sessions of the conference grew increasingly tense. At one point Bevin accused the Russians of using "Hitlerian tactics." When this was translated to him, Molotov gathered up his papers and prepared to leave. An apology by Bevin saved the conference at this point. On September 28 the session lasted exactly ten minutes because the conferees could not agree on procedure. At one session, it is reported, Molotov, bound by rigid instructions from the Kremlin, nearly drove Byrnes and Bevin to distraction by repeating the same answer to their questions some thirty times. At another point, Bevin, ex-dock worker, lost his temper and shouted at Molotov, ex-bookkeeper, "Mr. Molotov, I am from the proletariat."

How the Conference Ended

The conference can hardly be said to have adjourned. It is more accurate to say that it simply broke up. The last days were spent over the adoption of the minutes of the conference. Molotov refused to sign the minutes without the deletions referred to above. When the conference was about to break up over the deadlock, the Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Shih-

chieh, quoted the philosophers of the East and recommended that everyone go home and have a good night's sleep to improve their dispositions and, perhaps, have greater success the next day. Whether they slept well or not is not known. However, the next day's session was the last. The conference ended in a deadlock and in utter futility.

Never has a diplomatic gathering revealed in such stark and dramatic terms the utter inability of the exploiting classes of the world to organize world peace. All those pious hopes that the atomic bomb, with its promise of total destruction for civilization, would somehow frighten the statesmen of the world into agreement have come to naught. Likewise with those misplaced confidences that the United Nations Organization would succeed where the old League of Nations failed. Even while the "Big Five" were maneuvering at Lancaster House, the United Nations Council sat in session a few blocks away. Its deliberations were properly ignored by world opinion. Its agenda was filled with the meaningless items of structure and procedure for the world organization while the real essence of world power was being decided elsewhere.

No one can now hazard a guess as to how long it will take for the conflicts at stake in the conference to be transformed into a Third World War. But no one can deny that they are moving in that direction with an irresistible logic. Molotov is supposed to have quipped that when Byrnes is pushed to the wall he begins "dangling the bomb." It is inevitable that Russia will, sooner or later, also have "the bomb" to dangle.

The hourglass of history is running out. The time still allotted to mankind to build a world of socialism grows increasingly short.

STATEMENT OF THE OWNERSHIP, MANAGEMENT, CIRCULATION, ETC., REQUIRED BY THE ACTS OF CONGRESS OF AUGUST 24, 1912, AND MARCH 3, 1933

Of The New International, published monthly except June-July at New York, N. Y., for October 1, 1945.

State of New York, County of New York, s.s.

Before me, a notary public in and for the state and county aforesaid, personally appeared Paul Bern, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that he is the Business Manager of The New International and that the following is, to the best of his knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in Section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor and business managers are: Publisher, New International Publishing Co.; Editor, Max Shachtman; Managing Editor, Ernest Erber; Business Manager, Paul Bern; all of 114 West 14th Street, New York, N. Y.

2. That the owners are: New International Publishing Co., Max Shachtman, Albert Gates; all of 114 West 14th Street, New York, N. Y.

3. That the known bondholders, mortgagees and other security holders owning or holding one per cent or more of total amount of bonds, mortgages or other securities are: None.

4. That the two paragraphs next above, giving the names of the owners, stockholders and security holders, if any, contain not only the list of stockholders and security holders as they appear upon the books of the company but also, in cases where the stockholder or security holder appears upon the books of the company as trustee or in any other fiduciary relation, the name of the person or corporation for whom such trustee is acting, is given; also that the said two paragraphs contain statements embracing affiant's full knowledge and belief as to the circumstances and conditions under which stockholders and security holders who do not appear upon the books of the company as trustees, hold stock and securities in a capacity other than that of a bona fide owner; and this affiant has no reason to believe that any other person, association or corporation has any interest, direct or indirect, in the said stock, bonds or other securities than as so stated by him.

PAUL BERN, Business Manager.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 27th day of September, 1945.

ADELAIDE COATS, Notary Public.
(My commission expires March 30, 1946.)

The International Significance of the British Elections

The official Fourth International has been living in recent years upon effusions which are grouped in the main around four points:

1) Unconditional defense of the Soviet Union. 2) The *objective logic* of the Red Army achievements in the war against the Nazis, regardless of the officially declared aims, is profoundly revolutionary (formulation of Comrade Martin of the SWP). 3) The United Socialist States of Europe. 4) The "certainty" of the victory of the proletarian revolution in Europe (as the *inevitable* result of the war).

It is understood that these partly false, partly abstract points were, in addition, dealt with in a manner that was on a level with the liberation of India by the Pope. J. P. Cannon proclaimed, for example, that the Warsaw insurrectionary movement ought to subordinate itself to the command of the "Red" Army (which would surely have substantially facilitated and accelerated the slaughtering of all the revolutionary elements). The English organization, while it did not go along with such madness, nevertheless (even after the Warsaw experience) hailed the "Red" Army that marched into Germany as the *pioneer of the socialist revolution*.

Accordingly, the rest of the "defense of the Soviet Union" was a grotesque spectacle which the Fourth (absolutely impotent in practice) performed every day for its own recreation. Whoever approached the national question in Europe in any way could not avoid ruining it through the defense of the Soviet Union. A French resolution by the *Regional Committee of the Unoccupied Zone* in November, 1941 (see *Fourth International*, March, 1942), said: "The national question *dominates* today every other political and social problem. Even the defense of the USSR, a slogan par excellence of class action, is presented by the Communist Party *merely as a national task*." (Our italics.) In clear words this means: The "Communists" are forced, in view of the sentiments of the masses, to smuggle in the slogan *par excellence of class action* incidentally instead of running it as their first horse. As is known, the "Communists" owe their whole "success" to their skillful (and perfidious, treacherous) exploitation of the national question in Europe. These people are politically clever enough to know what it means when the national question *dominates every other political and social problem*. Only the medicine men of the Fourth run around with Soviet-Union-blinkers on their eyes, and are incapable of thinking through their contentions. Thus the resolution referred to promptly forgets every other political and social problem and declares with great assurance: "The attractive power of the Communist International flows from the very existence of the Soviet Union and the *necessity for defending it...*" (our italics). The ritualistic wishing-phrase is thus regarded as an "analysis" and political reality is thereby sent to perdition. No wonder that a resolution which is on the very best road in many points (precisely in the "national question"), concludes by pouring out all its wisdom into this recipe:

We must orient the organizations of the Fourth International toward the proletariat, toward the Communist parties. We must

find our way to the factories. Everything, literally everything, depends upon the success of this policy.

To the misfortune of all of us, this atrocious recipe is the quintessence of all the "activity" of the Fourth. And because it is devoid of all activity, of all content, of all *politics*, its success in France consisted in the occupation of "deserted factories." Upon the *success of this policy* naturally depended *literally everything*, including the total political fiasco of the Fourth. This incapacitated formation consumed its "revolutionary" opium, while "the" proletariat or the much-summoned masses scorned its recipes and fought with arms in hand against their enemies (Vichy included) and for their freedom. That is what happens when the national question dominates every other political and social problem, and the Fourth proceeds to search for the "right" policy, that is, "orients" toward the proletariat and cannot find it.

"Perspectives" in a Vacuum

So, with bandaged eyes, but armed to the teeth with the stratospheric slogan of the United Socialist States of Europe, the official Fourth ran smack into the European Revolution. Fever dreams like the following out of the theses of the European Executive Committee of the Fourth International, in February, 1944, linked New York with Paris:

The German proletariat, stronger than ever in numbers [which is false!], more concentrated than ever [which is false!], will from the first [!] play a decisive role. [Which is patent madness!] Soldiers' committees in the Army and workers' and peasants' councils in the rear will rise to oppose to the bourgeois power the power of the proletariat.

In short: from New York to Paris, Germany was the "key to the situation," a key which opened the door right into the stratosphere. Compare this with what an analysis, free from "revolutionary" puberty fantasies, could do.

We have pointed repeatedly to the enormous significance of the fact that Hitler and Stalin smashed the politically organized labor movement in Europe. England constituted an exception, while the United States of America has not even known a politically organized labor movement to the present day. In addition, we estimated the Fourth unmistakably for what it still is: non-existent or a mass of confusion composed of scattered individuals and groups (see our "Three Theses"). We said that the Fourth is absolutely incapable of exerting any influence upon the course of events (apart, of course, from the "occupation" of deserted factories and similar "influencing" of the stratosphere). Only with the aid of the SWP (as the organization of the Fourth which possessed the richest means and the greatest prestige), only on the premise of the most serious work on its part, could a remedy be created and the mass of confusion be stood up on political legs. Again only the English section constituted a relative exception with certain hopes.

Out of the totality of all the given objective and subjective factors, we drew the conclusion that the politically organized labor movement as such *would not be able to make its appear-*

ance in the first place in the European events. Even the "general" or bourgeois labor movement would first have to be re-established. For the next stage (until liberation from fascist foreign rule), it is impossible to find so much as a single essential difference between the popular resistance movement and the labor movement (even where fragments of it remained).¹

Theoretically, we epitomized all this as the result of the "retrogressive movement" of capitalism in the last decades. Germany received an especially unfavorable place in this movement, which deprived it of any immediate revolutionary perspective and kept the masses in political paralysis. We said, therefore, that the retrogressive movement (especially also that of the labor movement) would reach its end in *England* and *make possible* a positive turn there.² At the same time we emphasized unremittingly: "The strategical transitional point for the victory over Hitler, the Allies and Stalin is the national question." "The national question is one of those historic episodes which *necessarily* become the strategic transition point for the reconstruction of the labor movement and the socialist revolution. Whoever does not understand this historically necessary episode and does not know how to use it, knows and understands *nothing* of Marxism-Leninism."

The English Elections As the End-Point of the Retrogressive Movement

The value of an analysis based upon "the real course of the historical movement," in contrast to the absurd speculations of the Fourth, may be seen clearly from the results of the English elections. The retrogressive movement has come to an end in England, just as we (soberly) foretold:

But having arrived in England, the retrogressive movement must come to a halt. On the same grounds which were valid for the upswing, the decline must get stuck *politically* where the upswing began, not in order to begin the same game all over again but in order to give way to the socialist upward movement. It *must*, otherwise mankind can bury its hopes for a long, long time.

England had the earliest democracy and the earliest revolutionary labor movement, and she is becoming... the country with the last democracy and the last revolutionary labor movement. Up to here the "natural order" is strictly in line with the retrogressive movement and the movement itself is therewith at its end. [We call to mind that America, as the catastrophic epilogue of capitalism, is not a part of the special retrogressive movement.]

The result of the English election now shows with exceptional clarity the fundamental significance of the fact that (conditioned by the laws of the retrogressive movement itself) it was not Stalin, Hitler or Mussolini who destroyed the labor movement in any form. Whereas all political movement even in France is still a formless, undifferentiated pulp (in spite of the alleged labor movement), the English labor movement appears upon the scene as an organized force on a scale that far exceeds our most "optimistic" expectations. It is a fact, dismal with bitterness over the sorry state of the Fourth but nonetheless "self-conscious," that prognoses based upon a correct analysis have, as a rule, two advantages. First, they are confirmed by the events; second, they are exceeded by the reality. We would give anything if the Fourth had made so much as a single revolutionary prediction that was something else but blooming nonsense.

1. Around this point there was a good deal of "polemic" against us (in quotation marks because it was on a sorry level), but at the end all that anyone could say was that what we had was a **people's movement**, as a matter of fact "somewhat reminiscent of that of the nineteenth century revolution" (D. Logan). Unfortunately, not a single one showed the courage to acknowledge, in the interests of political clarification, that his analysis was false and ours right.

2. See in particular our presentation of the development in "Capitalist Barbarism or Socialism," section before the last.

Foundation of the English Elections

The significance of the English elections as a world-political event can hardly be overrated. A case like this (in a highly developed country and without preceding revolutionary occurrences) is unique in all history. Here it was not only the organized working class (not even "the" proletariat will ever constitute an absolute majority for itself), but it was simply the people who presented the "savior" Churchill with the reckoning. And coming promptly behind the English people, Greece, Egypt and India reported with their claims. There are good grounds for saying that this is only the immediate and modest prologue of coming events.

To understand this assertion, we must know what the result of the English election is based upon. Just as all great shifts in mass consciousness are possible only on the basis of altered material conditions, so the expression of the will of the English people also has a very real material basis. The material fact in operation in our present case is the collapse of the British Empire. The present war carried to the end what the First World War (in spite of the outwardly "triumphal" balance-sheet for the Empire) began: the undermining of English world dominion by America. In addition to enormous economic losses, which decide the fate of the Dominions and thrust England into a subordinate position, England has finally lost its mastery of the Mediterranean. Once its "life-line" has been cut, English predominance in the Far East also passes into the limbo of history.³ Vanishing wealth and sinking power have slowly but surely released the English masses, whose consciousness did not succeed for a whole century in surmounting the confines of wealth and power. But the formation of the mass consciousness is a multi-millionfold molecular process which always groups itself with certainty around the next *possible* step. Just as the mass consciousness⁴ under the yoke of German fascism necessarily grouped itself around the national question, and concentrated itself only upon this next possibility, so the formation of the Labor government was the next possible step for England.

Main Features of the Present Situation

The English elections have created a situation such as existed in 1918 in Germany and in 1936 in France. With this difference, that this time a single workers' party has the absolute majority, the reformist experiment of a "peaceful" transformation of capitalism into socialism with the aid of a parliamentary majority can now be made once more. Theoretically, the possibility of such a transformation cannot be excluded and... the masses want the experiment to be made. For this, "only" two things are needed. First, the leaders of the Labor Party must take seriously the promises they made to the people and unconditionally respect the will of the masses. Second, these leaders must be determined to come out against any attempt at violating the *democratically-expressed* will of the majority and to *summon the masses themselves* in

3. The press has just brought the report that the President of the United States, in a detailed report on the Potsdam Conference, said "for the first time" that the United States would **retain** (!) or **acquire** (!) bases "necessary for the complete protection of our interests and world peace." (The same President declared a few days earlier in Potsdam that the United States had no appetite whatever either for the smallest bit of territory or a single penny.) It is of course speaking very sincerely to put the protection of the "interests" ahead of the protection of world peace, for that is precisely what it will mean in practice: the retained or acquired bases will "restrict" more visibly the domination of the world by England.

4. We speak of the development of the **mass consciousness**. The consciousness of minorities which take shape as a revolutionary party, as a sectarian rear guard (SWP), as ultra-leftist braggadocio (SWP), etc., etc., is another question.

its defense. If it then comes to acts of violence and bloodshed against *coups d'état*, putschistic attempts, etc., there will never have been a more clearly recognizable culprit. Then it is not the Labor leaders who have turned faithless to their peaceful ideal, but the bourgeoisie which has shown abundantly that "democracy" exists for it only in so far as its material interests as the ruling class are not restricted.

Nobody with five (or only two) good senses will have the slightest illusions about the future acts of the Labor leaders. Apart from some lamentable "reforms," they are there to guard the interests of the ruling class and in the end to surrender even their reforms. They will make reference, like the long line of Friedrich Stampfer and Consorts, to the "force of circumstances" (which unfortunately always allows only a turn to the worse and against their mandatories). Just like Stampfer and the "Communist" gang, they would rather be beaten black and blue, quartered and sent into "peaceful" emigration than to take up the struggle against the unbearable insanity of this society. At the end they (following the example of Stampfer and his "Communist" accomplices) will "demonstrate" with a new flood of lies and deception that although they had the absolute majority, the "people" failed and are "guilty" of the lack of success of their (oh so noble) aims. Under no circumstances can it be concealed that the Labor leaders have begun their new career promptly with a revolting deception. The signing of the Potsdam Declaration is the same kind of capitulation-without-a-struggle to the blackest imperialist reaction as that practiced by Messrs. Stampfer and Consorts from Berlin to New York. Democratic principles, Atlantic Charter, social-democratic "convictions"? Mr. Attlee-Stampfer (scientifically accompanied by Mr. Laski-Bauer) will weep, weep, weep. He will live and die with his signed convictions. In Russia (impossible, in principle, to get a socialist majority in a socialist country!) and America. The "immature" people forced him to stick his sacred principles into his left breast-pocket (right about the heart) and to find *Realpolitikal* reasons for their inapplicability under the given circumstances. Such principles prohibit the "violation" of the majority in Russia and America. It is necessary, on the contrary, to keep the principles pure and to *allow* yourself to be violated.

Two features of fundamental significance therefore remain. First we have the absolute majority of a single workers' party which could carry through any measure desired in practical politics. That is: *Objectively* the situation is more favorable than ever in the history of the labor movement and it opens up boundless possibilities. Second, however, the leadership of the Labor Party will travel with absolute certainty the Stampfer road of stamping under all the hopes of humanity *in so far as it is allowed a free hand*. That is: *Subjectively* the situation is full of the greatest dangers and can lead to the final catastrophe.

The end of the special retrogressive movement means, therefore, that this end opens up the *objective possibility* to shift it over to a new upward-movement and to solve the crisis of humanity. And this in turn means: if the subjective situation cannot now be rapidly improved, the *general* back-movement will force its way through at the end of the special retrogressive movement and bury the English labor movement beneath it (to say nothing of the Fourth and its phrases).

Negative Factors

The fundamental element of the crisis of humanity is and remains the crisis of the revolutionary leadership. The Fourth, which was supposed to overcome this crisis, has itself reached a crisis in the course of its work. Still worse: the Fourth, after hopeful beginnings, dissolved into nothing. Its "internationalism" is a legend, its international "organizations" are, in the great majority of the countries of the earth, simply non-existent. It must even be insisted upon that in the great majority of countries there are not even *individuals* who "in any way" represent the Fourth. The setting down of these facts is important, because it counters the insupportable and harmful boasting that goes on in "our" press, but it is not decisive. The Fourth is a *possibility* (latent power) given upon a theoretical foundation, it is in no single respect a practically effective reality. Its internationalism is a legend, because international spirit and international politics are absolutely alien to it. Politics in general is alien to it! Its attitude toward Marxism (Bolshevism, Trotskyism) is no better, in principle, than that of any social democrat who swears by socialism and then goes to the Potsdam Conference. Political sterility, confusion, theoretical and propagandist unscrupulousness, ludicrous phrasemongering and factional maneuver rule the field. In addition (in the SWP), unproved assertions, conscious calumny and bureaucratic methods of falsification are already so well up on the agenda that you would think yourself in the well-appointed house of Stalin. Not by accident does the SWP make "united fronts" with the Stalinists and is "irreconcilable" toward the Workers Party.

On the other side, the internationalism of the general labor movement is an equally great and "effective" fiction, like the existence of the labor movement and of the Fourth itself. As up to now, the politically-oriented labor movement (including the Fourth, which has a politically-oriented organization only in England, as the on-the-whole excellently conducted election campaign of our comrades there shows again) is confined to England. The Labor leaders "manipulate" this movement in the spirit of the most revolting betrayal of all international principles and ideas. They run a jubilant race with Stalin's creatures who eradicate international ideas through the "syphilis of the labor movement."⁵ In so far as we wish to

5. While a widespread indignation and protest is shown in England against the use of the atom bomb (so bestial an atrocity against the defenseless population in this stage of the war that a spontaneous sympathy for the "Japanese people" has been aroused and even incorrigible imperialist politicians find that America has outdone Hitler in futile atrocities), Stalin comes forward as the hyena of the imperialist battlefields. The "Red" Army proves itself to be the "trail-blazer of socialism" and liquidates an "aggressor" with whom Stalin still has an operative neutrality pact. The aggression upon the neutral aggressor takes place at the moment when this aggressor is already "liquidated" by a single atom bomb. For the "Red" Army, this is just the right moment to cover itself with "immortal" glory and to bring "freedom" to Asia. The Khabarovsk radio calls for the "merciless extermination of the enemy." On August 9, a special broadcast to the Far Eastern forces exhorted them to bend every effort to smash the (!) Japanese "so that mankind can breathe freely after getting rid of aggression" (from the neutral!). It called the (!) Japanese the "worst [neutral] enemies of our people and all the peace-loving peoples of the world" (represented by the "peace-loving" Generalissimo Stalin). Therefore: "With the name of Stalin on our lips we went into battle and conquered in the great patriotic war against fascist Germany" (not against German *fascism*, as some "unpatriotic" neutral enemy may think!). "With the name of Stalin on our lips [don't the lips suffer from such a weighty name?] we shall also conquer [you surely will!] in the battles against the accomplices of the Hitlerites, the Japanese imperialists. Forward to the complete rout of the enemy!" All that is now lacking is that the Fourth should **unconditionally** defend the "Soviet" Union against the imperialist aggression of Japan. Or perhaps Comrade Martin calls upon the population of Manchuria to subordinate itself to the command of the "Red" Army, instead of twisting the neck of **both aggressors**? We shall now surely experience again great "class actions" of the SWP. "Independent" actions to be sure!

speak *today* of a labor movement in France, Belgium, Holland, Italy, etc., it has not yet taken on any flesh and still less (thanks to Stalin) does it have international blood in its veins. Moreover, the world, from Manchuria to Berlin (God be with ye, my dear Renner!) lies under the dictatorship of our beloved Generalissimo, whose boots trample under all movements. A full-blooded idiot may believe that the parties and trade unions "allowed" by Stalin are anything different than in Russia itself. That kind of "labor movement" the Germans also had in the Labor Front of Dr. Ley, in the "*Kraft durch Freude*" (Strength Through Joy) and so forth. The situation of the workers themselves under Stalin is far worse than under Hitler. They now find themselves in the iron vise of the Stalinist "*Front ohne Freude*" (Front Without Joy) and "Forced Labor Without Strength." The rest is taken care of by deportations, shootings, concentration camps and speeches about "freedom." In a word, outside of England, there is no labor movement in the world. In this direction, internationalism has been completely dissolved. Our first task consists in finding the elements out of which internationalism and the labor movement can be reconstructed.

Positive Factors

The first factor is of course the clearly expressed will of the English masses, who have been deprived of the imperialist perspective by the end of British world domination. Like the collapse of the English Empire itself, the shift in the consciousness of the English people occasioned by it also has repercussions upon the colonial people who want to shake off the imperialist yoke. But the influence of the English elections is not exhausted by this. Italy and France in particular are obviously approaching a new crisis in which the result of the English elections will play a rôle. Much speaks for the prospect that in connection with the coming elections in France and Italy, the labor movement will also be developed and the political-programmatic differentiation will be carried through that separates the oppressed masses from the dead reaction. Here are given the beginnings of the restoration of the internationalism of the labor movement.

Simultaneously, the internationalism of the labor movement has received, through the retrogressive movement, a broader and more mighty foundation than ever before. The end of the special retrogressive movement coincides with its completion in the rest of the world. This completion leaves behind it a fact of enormous world-historical significance. In addition to the Baltic states, Poland, the Balkan countries, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the colonial countries, two big imperialist countries (Germany and Japan) are now eliminated and drawn into the national oppression. In practice this means: *the whole world* (including England) has fallen into direct or indirect dependence upon the two big remaining imperialisms, America and Russia. This means further: in by far the largest part of the world, this dependency expresses itself as *direct* political-military oppression. And this means finally: in fact, the world, both today and in perspective, will have no other choice but this—to unite against American-Russian imperialism. Russia and America will get to feel the consequences of their national oppression policy in the same way as Germany and England did. The great negative movement ends, therefore (as always) with a positive result. The shattered internationalism of the labor movement is beginning to take shape again, on the one side. On the other side, it receives an unprecedented basis through the interna-

tional union of the oppressed *peoples*, who must turn against the two big remaining imperialisms. The development enters into the stage, in an *immediately practical* sense, in which the realization of socialism is no longer chiefly the task of the working class but the equally *immediately practical task* of *humanity itself*. The liberation of atomic energy can and must only underscore the absolute necessity of socialism. It is a remarkable coincidence that this frightful force should be unleashed at the end of the retrogressive movement and seem to say: The time has come, you have no other choice! Like all the great material achievements, the application of atomic energy will also revolutionize thought and communicate itself to the mass consciousness as the necessity for decisive changes.⁶

Joining with all the oppressed of the earth are of course the masses in the imperialist ruling countries (America and Russia) themselves, suffering in the face of vast wealth and senseless destruction. The Russian masses, after decades of strict isolation, have come into direct contact with international life as a result of Stalin's conquests. The totally altered international relationships and the newly-opened-up development which is bound up with them, are laden with great events. In contrast to the hollow speculations of the Fourth (based upon the "workers' state"), they will be truly *revolutionary* events. Whatever the "class nature" of the Russian state is: the relationship between oppressors and oppressed remains. It will be accentuated in the same measure in which Russia develops through the plundering of the conquered countries and enriches the ruling stratum. With his entry into Berlin, Stalin (like many conquering upstarts before him) crossed the peak of his bloody career, even if he still "triumphantly" concludes his Manchurian and other adventures. He became a Generalissimo only to perish like Hitler or Mussolini.

In America we may reckon, given the present status of technical development, with a serious crisis in 2-3 years. The Latin-American, as well as the Negro question, will be posed more clearly. Even if the American crisis should require five years for its preparation, the decisive interval is brief and of inestimable educational value. During this interval, the "Communist" and Social-Democratic leaderships (especially the leadership of the Labor Party) will be under angry pressure and find it hard to maneuver. The English elections offer the masses a "chemically pure" opportunity of learning on the basis of their own experiences.

The last and most important positive factor is the latent power of the Fourth. The sharp criticism which we make of the Fourth is absolutely necessary to bring it to consciousness: as in the case of all subjective factors, it depends upon its honesty, its will and its determination whether it will turn overnight into a real political force or become a new betrayer. The historical responsibility and the possibilities that the Fourth has are equally great. Outside of it, there is no power capable of filling out the political vacuum which keeps Stalinism alive. What it requires above all else for the fulfillment of its historical task is: theoretical and political rearmament.

How Orient Ourselves?

With all the perspectives, prognoses, "theories," theses, resolutions, "editorials," etc., of the official Fourth (with always valid modifications for England) having proved themselves to be simply a dead alphabet for the feeble-minded, as a waste of paper and as malicious bureaucratic stupidity with disas-

6. As soon as possible we will present a separate article on the problems in connection with atomic energy.

trous consequences, the question of the future orientation boils down in the first place to the question:

Is the Fourth, on the basis of the experiences now before us, finally prepared to examine if we gave a correct or false orientation when we wrote in "Capitalist Barbarism or Socialism":

The rebellion of the working class, which has been hurled back by the mechanism of imperialism into a state of *unorganization, dismembered, atomized, split up, counterposed to each other in its various strata, politically demoralized, internationally isolated and controlled... likewise assumes a new form under the new conditions*. It becomes more *comprehensive and general*; it finds a mighty prop in the *rebellion of the peoples and nations who are suppressed, thrust back, oppressed, enslaved and levelled through the monopoly of the few nations, but by the same token also united against this monopoly and schooled by its mechanism*; and it restores the *shredded internationalism* of the movement upon a *more universal plane*. Still more: it prepares the ground for the "classic ideal" of the labor movement, for the accomplishment of the proletarian revolution as a simultaneous world-revolution. The centralization of the means of production and the socialization of labor reach a point where they *invade the foundations of the capitalist mode of production itself, where the capacity of accumulation collides with its internal limits and convulses the whole social structure from top to bottom*. They become incompatible with the *co-existence of developed capitalist nations*. They burst their international integument and prepare a further step in the material self-abolition of capitalism by "transplanting" the important industries of the subjugated nations to the subjugating "motherland" and converting capitalist nations into a "hinterland" in a colonial and semi-colonial sense. (NEW INTERNATIONAL SUPPLEMENT, p. 333. Only the words "internal limits" were put in italics there.)

We did not write our study then in order to perform theoretical-sporting exercises. The aim was to find a political platform and corresponding political guide-lines. We must now follow up concretely, in the light of controllable details which have since appeared, that which it was possible to give at that time only "in its broad features" and which had to delineate the development "abstractly." These details will help overcome the difficulties (including those of translation) which are unavoidably presented to an "immediate" understanding by a more theoretical presentation, and to fill out the "broad outlines" with the flesh and blood of now available data. The practise can be approached from a theoretical standpoint and the theory from a practical standpoint. There is nothing to be gained by disputing over "theory for its own sake," on the contrary, a clear answer must be given. For example: Is Germany being deprived of its "dispensable" industry and machinery by the Allies, or not? The same question for the incompatibility of the capitalist mode of production (on the present level of development) with the co-existence of *developed capitalist nations*. The same question for our contention that the peoples and nations are being *enslaved and levelled by the few monopolistic nations*.

The Decentralization of the Proletariat

Such questions could be asked endlessly, but anyone who answers just one of them will also be able to tell us: Has the national question been eliminated by the victory of the Allies or (as we contend) has it thereby *only entered into its second (sharpened and more general) stage*? We insist emphatically that the national question just as before and even more so, remains the strategical transitional point for the reestablishment of the international labor movement and the victory of the socialist revolution. Anyone who wants merely to play at revolution and who cannot orient himself along this line for it, had better collect postage stamps, but not come forward as the instructor of "the" proletariat and the masses. It is precisely the English elections that show the rebellion of the

working class becomes more *comprehensive and general*. In contrast to the mechanical conception of an advancing "concentration" of the working class, the modern development provides the directly contrary result. The new quality, which forces its way through more and more in imperialism, is called the *decentralization* of the proletariat, atomization, splintering.⁷ But the same process engenders at its other pole the concentration of peoples and nations who are compressed into an oppressed mass by the "few nations." In brief: it is now easier than then to understand:

The masses of the people in these (few) countries, like the masses of the other peoples, are violently thrust back by it (the transformation process) into those conditions from which the development of capitalism once redeemed them (in great part by the use of violence): *out of slavery, bondage, lack of national independence, industrial dependency and backwardness, into industrial backwardness and dependency, lack of national independence, bondage and slavery*.

Every political concept that does not know how to base itself upon this process and its new revolutionary possibilities, is doomed to sure bankruptcy. There is good ground for the fact, and it should stimulate reflection, that neither in "Capitalist Barbarism" nor in the "Three Theses" or anywhere else did we occupy ourselves with "proletarian" revolutionary prospects. Except for scorn and contempt, not a single word will be found in our writings about all this revolution-rubbish of the Fourth. On the contrary, we insisted on treating the national question and the concrete political questions in general, which would have made the Fourth a propagandistic factor with great political-moral prestige and even (at least in France) a genuine political force properly equipped for the tasks of today. Only when we had reached England with the retrogressive movement (and well-prepared by the national question) did we declare:

Yes, the disintegration of capitalism opens up a broad revolutionary perspective. There is much evidence that the English people themselves will get into motion when Germany wavers [Note: when *Germany* wavers and not when the *German proletariat*, which is not capable of doing so, "arises."] Consciousness, will, clarity, boldness must see to it that the perspective is brought forward and acquires an irresistible attractive power. We have long held that with "classical" German fascism, fascism itself has reached its limit and lost its power of attraction. This is not contradicted by the fact that the enslavement of mankind is unavoidable if the revolution fails again. Around this point—the leadership—revolves everything. The birth of the new society is a difficult operation. It is not a matter of cheap optimism—in every crisis it is a matter in the last instance of the operating physician. Boldness and elasticity, the overcoming of paralysis and of habit-forming phrases without concrete ideas, are what the revolutionary movement needs most.⁸

7. This, by the by, is one reason why we point out as often as possible the danger of a one-sided or even only a predominant "policy" based on the trade unions. The so-called trade-union policy has already yielded *nothing* in Europe, because, in view of the lack of any other policies, it was simply no... policies. Under certain circumstances, many members can be won by trade-union politics, but that is all that will be won. It is not through the factory that you get to politics, but through politics that you get to the factories.

8. The European Executive Committee of the Fourth finally seems to have been struck by the ray of better insight, for it declares in a new resolution of January, 1945: "The EEC emphasizes the *urgent* necessity for all sections to *abandon* propaganda which is pure theoretically but which remains abstract and incomprehensible to the masses, and to *immediately elaborate a plan of action*, keeping in mind the *real situation* in every country and securing themselves *every single lever capable of setting the masses in motion* and accelerating their revolutionary maturity."—Although the abstract propaganda of the Fourth is in no wise "pure theoretically," but rather (misfortune upon misfortune!) simply false, nonsensical, ridiculous and harmful for the most part: the EEC gives the right name to the evil and to the immediate need. Unfortunately, the new resolution does not take its own counsel very much to heart, and we are all "tense" to know if the F. I. noted that it laid a trap for itself in publishing this resolution. If anyone has to abandon abstract phrases and miserable propaganda, it is the SWP.

A philosophy, a doctrine, an ideology which conveys no enthusiasm and no impulses is worthless and must fail.

It is not necessary to linger over the "frenzied epilogue" of imperialism, America. It is necessary that the American revolutionists arrive at an all-sided system of political propaganda and activity, that they thwart the "epilogue" and hasten to the aid of the English working class, the colonial peoples and Europe. Then there can be no doubt that:

Churchill will fall and with him the colossal structure of the British Empire. Then will the seed come up which England everywhere sowed and it will grow over its grave.

What Is to Be Done Now?

The first problem now is to place the leaders of the Labor Party under a still sharper pressure. They must be forced before the eyes of the whole world (and first of all, of the colonial peoples), either to discredit themselves hopelessly or else to go forward with the masses in the sight of the whole world. Without continual cries about "betrayal," the deeds of the labor leaders must be critically illuminated, but in a more thorough and objective way. The fascist "aggressor" no longer exists — the world bourgeoisie has one excuse the less. The masses must be shown concretely, in every question that arises, that it is child's play to get together the same enormous sums that the war swallowed up for mere destruction, and use them for the welfare of human beings. It must be insisted upon, and public opinion must be mobilized for it, that the "Allies" keep their promises, especially those of the Atlantic Charter. On the basis of the Allied measures (in the first place, those of the Russians, for there still exists a difference between Fascism and democracy!), it must be shown why their disadvantages, even for the "victors," are greater than their alleged advantages.

The Fourth learns, finally conscious of its responsibility, to work politically and expertly. It educates itself in order to be able to educate others. It learns to work its way from the rear-end of history to the "leadership" and to *deserve* the leadership. It prohibits itself for two years (just as a test!) from even speaking of the "proletarian" revolution and its leadership by the Fourth. This prohibition will force it to turn to political questions and to answer every question concretely. It studies the national questions and inscribes political liberation (national independence and right of self-determination of all peoples) unconditionally on its banners.

The Fourth must become clearly aware that it itself (this

applies also to the S.W.P. minority, with D. Logan at its head) has lost only an "excuse" in the national question. We mean the *excuse* that after all we "were in the imperialist war" and after all we could not support a movement under the "leadership of the bourgeoisie."⁹ The Fourth itself must begin anew the struggle for the national question and seek to organize it anew everywhere in the world. It has the absolute possibility of carrying its propaganda throughout the world and firing the courage and fighting spirit of the oppressed peoples. The Negroes of America will hearken if, for example, the SWP does everything seriously possible for the *organization* of the colonial (in general, of the national) struggle of liberation. But again: the Fourth conducts its propaganda concretely. It concentrates its senselessly squandered forces on the *material proof* that no country of the earth can any longer draw an economic advantage out of the national and colonial oppression of other peoples. This too is a material factor, which comes to our aid and must be exploited decisively.

All in all, the command of the hour boils down to a radical break with the past of the Fourth. The level of our periodicals (that of *Labor Action*, too) is absolutely inadequate *in content*. On this level, we will never succeed in training a party capable of action and equipped with sufficient knowledge. The banning of all theoretical works, for example, from the papers is a vice that has ruined every organization. Lenin did not know this separation (theoretical organ and newspaper).

Yes, we agree unreservedly with the E.E.C. An immediate program of action is necessary. But this program of action too will be worthless if it is not based upon a total reform of the working methods and of the press. The English elections, all the coming crises and revolutionary events will take place without yielding results if the Fourth does not come to its senses. The retrogressive movement has come to a halt in England, yet the "key to the situation" lies there no more than in Germany. The key to the situation lies in America. This also in the sense of the Fourth, which continues to have there its richest bastion, equipped with the greatest possibilities.

A. ARLINS.

London, August 12, 1945.

9. Why this was an unbelievably blundering excuse, in the best case, but in reality a downright betrayal of the internationalism, we will set forth in the "Balance-Sheet of the European Question."

Carl Jung and the Nazi Superman

Day by day the myth of the German monster grows. To give it credence, well known scientists along with big names in the field of art and literature are gratefully welcomed into the crowd of accusers.

The doctrine they expound is difficult to distinguish from the Nazi racial theories they supposedly condemn, and it is just about as scientific.

Articles are written describing the infamous German character. All Germans are arrogant, sadistic, cowardly, etc. The word "German" rather than the word "Nazi" has become a symbol for all that is to be despised.

The latest addition to these preachers of hatred is Carl Jung, one-time associate of Sigmund Freud. Like Thomas

Mann, Jung's zeal in attacking the German nation is of recent vintage.

Jung's past championship of the Nazi system has been conveniently overlooked or forgotten by the American daily press. A few weeks ago the liberal, New Deal *Chicago Sun* reported an interview held with Jung in Zurich, Switzerland. Describing him as the "noted psychoanalyst," the *Sun* gives the following high points of the interview:

Ten per cent of the German population today are incurable psychopaths.

Today the German resembles a drunkard awakening with a hangover, not knowing or not willing to know what he has done. He will try frantically to rehabilitate himself in the face of the world's accusations and hate, but this is the wrong way; the only right way is unconditional acknowledgment of his guilt.

The psychologist cannot make any distinction between the mentality of the Nazis and their opponents. In the treatment of two anti-Nazis, analysis of their dreams revealed that behind their decency there swelled in them the most pronounced Nazi psychology with all its violence and cruelty.

Glib distinctions between decent and non-decent Germans are naïve.

The sole salvation of mankind is minute individual educational work. Mass conversions cannot succeed. Man to man persuasion is the way we must go.¹

A scientific eyebrow might well be raised at Jung's wholesale condemnation of the German people and at his statement that there is no psychological difference between Nazis and anti-Nazis.

The unscientific nature of Jung's analysis leads one to question its objectivity. One wonders if his own guilty feelings color his opinions; and if his inability to distinguish between "decent and non-decent Germans" is actually a rejection of the entire German nation because it failed to justify his theories of the Superman.

The daily press is currently using articles of this nature in its hate campaign against the German people. The fact that these articles lay claim to a certain scientific authority makes them exceedingly dangerous.

The dishonesty of the campaign is illustrated in the use made of the interview with Carl Jung. The lay public, which knows little of Jung except that he is important in the field of psychotherapy, is inclined to accept his statements without hesitation. A knowledge of his record would certainly cause these same readers to be far more critical in their attitude.

In January, 1934, the following notice appeared in the *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*:

It will be of interest to the American reader to know that after a suspension of publication for six months, following the resignation of Prof. Kretschmer last spring, the *Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie* resumes publication under the editorship of the former psychoanalyst, Dr. C. G. Jung of Zurich. In his foreword to the December, 1933, issue, with which the new state-regulated editorial régime assumes control, Dr. Jung lays down the new policy of the magazine, which will differentiate between the "Germanic" and "Jewish" psychologies—"die Tatsächlich bestehenden und einsichtigen Leuten schon langst bekannten Verschiedenheiten der germanischen und der jüdischen Psychologie sollen nicht mehr verwischt sein." ("The definite distinctions between Germanic and Jewish psychology long apparent to sensible people shall no longer be obliterated.") This introduction is followed by a communication from the leader ("Reichsführer") of the reorganized German Medical Association for Psychotherapy, Prof. Dr. jur. Dr. med. M. H. Göring, declaring that the society "expects all its members who are actively engaged in writing or lecturing to have made a serious scientific study of Adolf Hitler's fundamental book, *My Battle*, and to recognize it as a basic work. The society will cooperate with the Chancellor's work in educating the German nation to a heroic, self-sacrificing state of mind."²

In answer to the many unfavorable criticisms of his connections with this Nazi journal, Jung is said to have admitted that he had made a serious mistake—that he was unaware at the time of the political character of the *Zentralblatt*.

Jung's ivory tower naïveté might conceivably have been believed if he had immediately resigned the editorship of the *Zentralblatt*. On the contrary, Jung continued as chief editor until 1936, at which time he became a co-editor.

1. *Chicago Sun*, May 10, 1945. Page 2, col. 1.

2. *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly*, Vol. III, No. 1, Jan., 1934. P. 150.

The first issue of the *Zentralblatt* in 1934 contains an article by Jung that raises grave doubts as to his scientific integrity.

Jung's Racial Unconscious

In this article, Jung distinguishes between the "Aryan" and "Jewish" unconscious. In analyzing the "Jewish" unconscious, he says that the Jew as a relative nomad has never and will probably never create his own cultural forms. His instincts and abilities make it necessary for him to settle in a country that is already more or less civilized.

There are far greater potentialities lying dormant in the as yet undeveloped "Aryan" unconscious.

It is the mistake of German psychotherapy up till now (i.e., until the establishment of National Socialism) that it has applied "Jewish" concepts to the psychology of "Christian" Germans.³

The next issue of the *Zentralblatt* contains a report on the Seventh Congress for Psychotherapy held in May, 1934, at Bad Neuheim.

Jung in his speech to the Congress mentions the difficulties that arise in Switzerland because of his German connection. These difficulties occasioned personal sacrifices which, Jung states, were made. Because of Germany's influence over the intellectual life of Switzerland it is necessary, says Jung, to maintain connections with German psychotherapy.⁴

Dr. Göring's concluding speech to the Congress again stresses the need to study *Mein Kampf*, whose value lies not in its scientific terminology but in the intuitive nature of its inner content. Dr. Göring calls upon all National Socialist doctors to give full support to the Fuehrer and his ideas.⁵

The same issue contains an article by K. Gauger on psychotherapy and world politics.

Praising the Nazi state, Gauger writes that Adolph Hitler, through National Socialism, has pointed the way to a restored mental health for the German nation.

Seit Adolph Hitler sind die Worte Volksturm und Heimat, Zucht, Treu und Ehre in Deutschland wieder Worte von biologischen Wert! (Since Adolph Hitler the words people and homeland, breeding, fidelity and honor have again become words of biological value in Germany!)⁶

Medicine in the new Germany has a political meaning. This is demonstrated by the Fuehrer's political plans concerning the German population. These plans, especially his exceedingly significant measures in regard to race hygiene, are under medical direction.

The article ends with a quotation from Adolph Hitler in which he says that Germans must recognize the ills of the times and that it is the purpose of National Socialism to gather together those forces in the people which herald a new "Weltanschauung."⁷

Today Jung calls upon the German people to acknowledge their guilt; yet in 1934 as editor of the *Zentralblatt* he was responsible for articles that came out in praise of Hitler's vicious Nuremberg laws!

Jung and the Leader Principle

Jung's Nazi connections should not come as a surprise to anyone who has seriously studied his writings, for following

3. Jung, C. G. Zur Gegenwertigen Lage der Psychotherapie *Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie*. Band 7, Erstes und Zweites Heft. 1934 (62).

4. *Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie*. Band 7, Drittes Heft. 1934 (63). Actuelles. P. 130.

5. *Ibid.*

6. Gauger, K. Psychotherapie und Politisches Weltbild. *Ibid.* P. 168.

his break with Freud, Jung turned toward a mystic philosophy embracing Nietzsche's Superman.

Some psychotherapists, among them the more tolerant of the Freudians, are apt to dismiss Jung's mysticism as harmless. They regret the fact that it weakens his more concrete contributions to psychoanalytic theory, but that is all. They have unfortunately failed to understand the essence of Jung's mysticism which lies, not in its astrological charts and palmistry, but in its fascistic character.

In *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, Jung refers to the German soul as distinct from that of other nationalities in its desire for a leader.

Could we conceive of anyone but a German writing *Faust* or *Also Sprach Zarathustra*? Both play upon something that reverberates in the German soul—a "primordial image"... the figure of a physician or teacher of mankind. The archetypal image of the wise man, the savior or redeemer, lies buried and dormant in man's unconscious since the dawn of culture; it is awakened whenever the times are out of joint and a human society is committed to serious error.... These primordial images... come to light in the dreams of individuals... thus restoring the psychic equilibrium of the epoch.⁸

The modern man to whom Jung dedicates his book is by no means the average man.

He is rather the man who stands upon a peak, at the very edge of the world, the abyss of the future before him, above him the heavens, and below him the whole of mankind....

He and his kind, few in number as they are, are hidden from the undiscerning eyes of mass men.... It cannot be helped, the "modern man" is questionable and suspect, and has always been so.⁹

It is this leadership ideology, gradually concretized into political theory, that marks Jung's transfer from the land of harmless dreamers into the realm of very dangerous reality.

It is high time that psychotherapists grasp the full significance of Jung's theories, especially those of his followers who continue to deny his Nazi connections. It is possible that they do not want to recognize an unpleasant truth, but whatever the reason for their blindness, it is unhealthy and dangerous. They should be made to realize that Jung's anti-democratic scheme finds its embodiment in fascism.

Jung, in his analysis of the individual man, speaks of his inferior or archaic self, which is confined to his unconscious—rather than evil, this archaic self is only primitive, unadapted and awkward. Man's problem arises from the fact that, less good than he wants to be, he continues to suppress this side of his personality.

The Theory of the Social Elite

The innocuous character of this analysis changes considerably when applied to society as a whole where, Jung states, psychological problems are represented on a grand scale. The "élite," the "aristocrats" of society, represent man's conscious self, while the masses are identified with inferior, primitive man.

The educated public, the flower of our actual civilization, has lifted itself from its roots and is about to lose its connection with the earth. There is no civilized country nowadays where the lower strata of our population are not in a state of unrest and dissent.¹⁰

The man who wrote—

Not for nothing is it just our own epoch that calls for the lib-

8. Jung, C. G. *Modern Man in Search of a Soul*, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1933. Translated by W. S. Dell and Carl F. Baynes. P. 197.

9. *Ibid.* P. 228.

10. Jung, C. G. *Psychology and Religion*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1938. P. 95.

erating personality, for the one who distinguishes himself from the inescapable power of collectivity... and who lights a hopeful watch fire announcing to others that at least *one* man has succeeded in escaping from the fateful identity with the group soul. The fact is that the group, because of its unconsciousness, has no freedom of choice... The people always long for a hero... when it feels the danger of psychic forces.¹¹

is not far in spirit from the man who wrote—

One thing we must and may never forget: a majority can never be a substitute for the Man.¹²

Jung writes—

As a Swiss, I am an inveterate democrat, yet I recognize that nature is aristocratic, and what is even more, esoteric.¹³

Hitler writes—

By its denial of the authority of the individual and its substitution of the sum of the mass present at any given time, the parliamentary principle of the consent of the majority sins against the basic aristocratic principle in nature.¹⁴

It should not be hard to understand why Jung wrote, "The pæan of the Italian nation is addressed to the personality of the Duce, and the dirges of other nations lament the absence of great leaders."¹⁵

Or why he added the following footnote:

"This chapter was originally given as a lecture... in November, 1932. Since then Germany, too, has found its leader."¹⁶

In Adolph Hitler, Jung saw the truly modern man—the man for whom the German masses had waited.

Hitler, Jung's Medicine Man

In 1936, Jung still saw Hitler as the great leader of the German people. Distinguishing Hitler from Roosevelt, Stalin and Mussolini, he speaks of Hitler as the medicine man type of leader ruling by revelation. The other dictators are of the practical, chieftain type. In America, Russia and Italy, the people no longer dream. In Germany, because of the mystic kind of leadership offered by Hitler there is still a place for dreams.

Hitler is the medium through which German policy is revealed. He is the mouthpiece of the gods of old.¹⁷

For the struggles of the masses, Jung continued to express great contempt:

Communist or socialistic democracy is an upheaval of the unfit against attempts at order.

He lists as examples the stay-in strikes in France and the former socialistic upheavals in Germany and Italy.

This state of disorder called democratic freedom or liberalism brings its own reactions.¹⁸

After the dictators there will be an oligarchy in some form. "A decent oligarchy, call it aristocracy if you like, is the most ideal form of government." It depends on the quality of the nation whether it will form a decent oligarchy. Jung was not sure of Russia, but he felt that Germany and Italy had a chance.¹⁹

Apparently the quality of the German nation underwent a very rapid change in the years from 1936 to 1945! Or perhaps Dr. Jung needs to have his memory refreshed as regards his past political prognoses.

11. Jung, C. G. *Integration of Personality*. New York, Farrar & Rinehart, Inc. Translated by Stanley Dell. P. 294.

12. Hitler, Adolph. *My Battle*. Boston and New York. Mifflin Co., 1933. Translated and abridged by E. T. S. Dugdale. P. 35.

13. Jung, C. G. *Integration of Personality*. P. 294.

14. Hitler, Adolph. *My Battle*. P. 35.

15. Jung. *Integration of Personality*. P. 281.

16. *Ibid.* Fn. 2, p. 305.

17. *Time Magazine*. November 9, 1936. P. 15.

18. *Living Age*. December, 1936.

19. *Time*. November 9, 1936. P. 15.

In 1936, Jung referred to the SS men as being transformed into a caste of knights ruling sixty million natives.²⁰

This is rather fanciful language to describe a political army of sadists and degenerates, and by 1936 not even Carl Jung could plead ignorance to the incredibly brutal acts committed daily by his "caste of knights"!

Jung ends his political utterances for the year with the statement:

The dictatorships of Germany, Russia and Italy may not be the best form of government, but they are the only possible form of government at the moment.²¹

In 1939, Jung's voice was heard for the last time before the cataclysm of total war descended upon Europe.

"Adolph Hitler belongs in the category of the truly mystic man." Instinct should tell the Western statesmen not to touch Ger-

20. *Ibid.*

21. *Ibid.*

many in her present mood as she is too dangerous. As an alternative Jung suggests they turn Hitler's attention to Russia.²²

Today Jung's Superman presents a sorry figure before his real accusers—the tortured and the dead—the ghosts of the concentration camps—members of the German and other European masses who refused to bow before the altar of the Superman.

They, not the former editor of the *Zentralblatt*, are the ones whose opinions are worth listening to.

As for Dr. Jung, who now tells us how to handle the German people, let him reread what he himself once wrote:

... For who can educate others while himself uneducated? Who can enlighten his fellows while still in the dark about himself, and who can purify if he is himself unclean?²³

P. KOSTER

22. *Time*, May 8, 1939, P. 22.

23. Jung, C. G. *Modern Man*, P. 89.

James P. Cannon as Historian—

Or How to Tailor Facts to Fit Politics

This work will not rely in any degree upon personal recollection. The circumstance that the author was a participant in the events does not free him from the obligation to base his exposition upon strictly verified documents. The author speaks of himself, in so far as that is demanded by the course of events, in the third person. And that is not mere literary form; the subjective tone, inevitable in autobiographies or memoirs, is not permissible in a work of history.—Leon Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*.

In the light of the above what is one to say about James P. Cannon's, *The History of American Trotskyism*?¹ It violates Trotsky's whole method of historical writing, i.e., the Marxist method. The book would be bad enough if it were presented as memoirs or autobiography. But as history it is almost worthless. Had the head of the Socialist Workers Party written his memoirs, a review of his book would have to take that into account in surveying critically a series of anecdotes which are highly personalized and subjective. One could show where they were factually or interpretatively wrong and dismiss the rest as opinions of the author and the book as the product of particular views which the author held.

Since the book is presented as a history such a conclusion is out of place. The author has a totally different responsibility for his work. As a history, Cannon's book is shallow, totally devoid of ideas, of theory and the politics which flow from it. The only politics which concern Cannon are in-party, factional politics.

There is hardly a page in the book which does not contain a false reference, a partial fact, an incomplete tale, a conspicuous omission or direct misrepresentation. Coupled with these is a complete lack of objectivity and historical grasp.

The most important objections to the book relate to its omissions. These are of such magnitude as to condemn the author for the butchery he committed to a theme which is so rich and instructive. Cannon replaces ideas and theory with platitudes, clichés and homilies which make wearisome read-

ing. He replaces analysis and history with disconnected but selected events in which the author plays the rôle of hero against opponents who are all villains.

A reading of the book will make it immediately obvious why it is impossible to review it in the ordinary sense of a book review. A whole book is required to reply to this misrepresentation of the history of Trotskyism in America. But it is necessary to indicate more precisely what is wrong with Cannon's work. And we shall do this in several ways. It is important first, however, to understand something about the author in order to understand why he wrote this kind of history.

Cannon entered the workers' movement when he was quite young. He was a member of the pre-war Socialist Party, the IWW, a founder of the Communist Party and one of its early leaders. He immediately revealed a distinctly revolutionary temper and desire. His interest and understanding of theory aside, Cannon was one of the pioneers of the revolutionary Communist movement in this country. Cannon exhibited an easy talent for leadership and a deftness at inner-party politics. This he joined with good native instinct and experience. In the infant days of the Communist movement, these qualities enabled him to rise to the top leadership of a growing party.

Cannon's knowledge of revolutionary theory and history is primitive and cursory. Of and by itself, this is fatal in one so anxious to be acknowledged as the leader of the Fourth International, the inheritor of the rôle of Trotsky. When it appears in combination with a deep-rooted antipathy to theoretical study, a "know-nothing" attitude toward history and politics, it is extremely dangerous. Inside the movement, it takes the form of open and covert attacks on people who are interested in theory and who realize that without proper theoretical training and understanding, it is impossible to build a revolutionary party.

Cannon covers up his attacks on theory and study with slashing indictments of "intellectualism," that paralyzing form of dilletantism which very often makes its appearance in the

1. *The History of American Trotskyism*, by James P. Cannon. Pioneer Publishers. 256 pp.

movement. The movement sometimes attracts intellectuals who have no solid interests in the program of the Party but who find membership in the revolutionary party a form of intellectual exercise. When Cannon attacks such elements it is, of course, impossible to disagree with him. But behind these attacks against intellectualism, he always wages a campaign against serious intellectuals capable of giving inestimable service to the movement.

Even more important than this, his attacks on "intellectualism" often cover up his attacks on ideas and theory and those who champion them inside the party. In so doing, Cannon, by his role and place in the movement, raises ignorance to a high plane and feeds the most backward prejudices against theory and theoretical pursuits. No wonder that at the 1939 convention of the Socialist Workers Party, one of Cannon's most trusted aides made a speech in which he demanded that the theoretical organ of the party, *THE NEW INTERNATIONAL*, be abandoned because it was of no interest or value to the workers in the party and the working class in general. That this speech went unrebuked by the leader of the party is not accidental. It was widely known by many party members that Cannon had little or no interest in the theoretical press.

These characteristics of the author are not recently acquired. They were present from the days when he was a leader in the Communist movement. There too, Cannon became known as an "expert" in factional conflict, inner-party politics. The "organization question" always held a fascination for him. It was so much like politics in America in general and it offered him a field of activity to compensate for his disqualification from more important fields of revolutionary thought. In the long run, Cannon's adeptness at organization politics has always proved his undoing. He was trained in the wrong school, the Zinovievist-Stalinist school of organization.

Time alone has served to smother the fact that Cannon was one of the exponents of "bolshevization" in the American movement—that corroding and degenerating influence on the Communist International. The "bolshevization" of the Comintern was the means by which the whole International was bureaucratized. The parties lost their independence of thought and action; they became dominated by the ruling group in the Russian party. It was the product of Zinoviev's fertile imagination, cunningly assisted by Stalin. It later served to hasten the downfall of Zinoviev as party after party was drawn into the net of an organizational system which bureaucratically subordinated them to the Stalin regime in Russia.

Cannon became known as the "captain of bolshevization" in this country, just as in other countries the reporters and advocates of this theory and practice were to become known. The "bolshevization" theory merely paid lip-service to Lenin's concept of democratic centralism. The essential idea of the "bolshevization" program was the creation of "monolithic parties," without factions and disputes—that is, without life. Bolshevism as a great theory and practice was reduced to a simple system. The young Communist parties came to learn now that Bolshevism did not mean essentially correct theory and practice, but "toughness," rigidity, inflexibility—in a word, bureaucratism.

Cannon and Zinoviev's Congress

In October, 1924, Cannon made a report to the New York Workers' School on "The Bolshevization of the Party." He was then heralding the decisions of the 5th Congress of the Comintern, sometimes called "Zinoviev's congress." Referring to the question of Bolshevization, Cannon said:

A particularly dangerous form of confusion and irresponsibility, which we must conquer by frontal attack without delay, is the formal and even frivolous attitude which is sometimes manifested in regard to the relations of our party and our party members to the Communist International. We hear the Bolshevization of the party spoken of here and there as though it were a joke, not to be taken seriously. The very utterance of such a sentiment is in itself an evidence of theoretical weakness... The very fact that any party members are able to regard the slogan of the Fifth Congress as a joke is a great proof of the need for this slogan in our party.

And what is this most important decision of the Fifth Congress? It relates to the Bolshevization of the party in this respect, which Cannon quotes approvingly:

It [a Bolshevik party] must be a centralized party, prohibiting factions, tendencies and groups. It must be a monolithic party hewn of one piece.

It would, of course, be unfair to say that Cannon subscribes openly to this theory and practice today. But it remains true that he was educated in this school, became saturated with its ideas and its practices and has never fully thrown off their detrimental influence. In one form or another, the Trotskyist movement, from its founding days, has had to struggle against Cannon's bureaucratic organizational practices which resemble so strongly those of the Zinovievist-Stalinist school. It is, for example, one of the strongest factors in the present struggle now taking place in the Socialist Workers Party.

With these preliminary observations, it is easier to understand how Cannon came to write this kind of history. But one other element is missing: it is Cannon's concept of his own role in the movement and his evolution toward Trotskyism and in the Trotskyist movement. We refer to the not-so-celebrated "gestation" theory Cannon propounded during the early factional struggles in the Communist League in which he developed the theme that, since "there are no accidents in history," his emergence as a Trotskyist and as founder of the Trotskyist movement was logically necessary and inevitable. Needless to say, this theory was rejected by the Communist League in 1930, '31 and '32, but Cannon has never given it up nor his determination to dominate bureaucratically the affairs of his party.

We have no doubt that in the SWP of today, the "gestation" theory is accepted in fact as one of the great contributions to Marxism, when as a matter of fact, it is merely the theoretical justification for Cannon's leadership under any and all circumstances.

The History of the CP

Cannon's chapter devoted to the great historical period after the First World War, when Communist parties emerged all over the world, is shallow. Here his lack of accumulated knowledge and an inability to carry out indispensable research has resulted in a completely jammed-up picture of those days, just as every other important stage of development in the history of American Marxism is jammed-up. What is not "telescoped" in the book, and which takes many pages, is the anecdotes, the platitudes and the clichés.

Certain events in the early history are accurately portrayed and the general problem of the young Communist Party are correctly stated. They give an inkling of deadening effect of the protracted factional struggles which paralyzed the party. But an objective analysis of the great issues of the time is missing. As in all other chapters, the theoretical and political questions are not even referred to. Obviously, Cannon has never made a full estimate of the period which so heavily influenced his own thinking and practices.

He speaks of the early struggles against the right wing

group of Ruthenberg and Lovestone. It was, without doubt, a progressive struggle on the whole. Until the end of 1923 this struggle was decided on the basis of the respective strengths of the Foster-Cannon faction and that Ruthenberg-Lovestone. Relations with the Communist International were then still primarily political. The struggle against Trotskyism had only begun and the transformation of the Comintern into an instrument of the Zinovievist-Stalinist bloc was still incomplete.

In 1924, however, a great change had taken place. From then on the lives of the parties in the Comintern were completely controlled by the Kremlin bureaucracy. Leaderships and policies were determined in Moscow and very often by the mere transmission of a cablegram. The American party was no exception, and one of the leaders of party expressed it accurately when he said that the party was "suspended by cables from Moscow." The Foster-Cannon leadership was itself removed by a cable at a convention where it had the support of the overwhelming majority of the delegates and the party membership. This did not end the factional struggles in the American party. They continued to be fought more sharply. But henceforth, no matter what the relationship of strength was between the factions, the leadership of the party was determined by the Kremlin. Except that where there had been two groups contending for the leadership of the party, after the transference of this leadership to Ruthenberg, there were now three.

Cannon makes note of this change in the factional line-up but he deliberately avoids the explanation of how it came to pass that the Foster-Cannon group split immediately after the Comintern decision which handed over the leadership of the CP to the right wing. He must evade this question because it conflicts with other things he writes about his role in the CP, and his theory of gestation.

How does Cannon explain his split with Foster? Well, the Foster group was made up primarily of trade unionists, people unschooled in Marxism and Bolshevik politics. The Cannon group was more a pioneer Communist group with a stronger Communist tradition. In a way, this is true. But during those stormy days Cannon justified the faction because in the party it represented the fusion of the Communist elements with native American revolutionary trade unionists. The fusion of these two basic elements which made up the Communist movement was necessary to the future development of the party.

By purely objective reasons, Cannon's explanation of the split is a mystery. He cites the difference in character between the two elements of the faction and then abruptly says that this "implicit division became a formal one." And that is all. Cannon passes on to other matters.

How Cannon Split with Foster

But the split in the Foster-Cannon group occurred over the attitude to be taken to the bureaucratic action of the Comintern (Zinoviev-Stalin bloc) in turning the leadership of the party over to the right wing and doing so in defiance of the will of the party membership and a convention of the party. For all its primitiveness and backwardness, the Foster group's reaction was healthy. It said: We will not accept the decision, but fight it.

Cannon thereupon split, not the party, but the faction. Cannon personally played the leading role in the fight to have the decision accepted. "You cannot fight the Comintern," he thundered at the Foster group. His fight was so determined that he finally broke down the resistance of the Fosterites who,

in turn, gave in to the persistent pounding of one of their ex-leaders.

Is Cannon to be condemned for having played a role which, when reviewed in the light of history, was wrong, but which at that time he could not have fully understood for a number of good reasons? No. But then he owes it to the movement to tell the truth about that period now when all the facts are known not only to him but an entire new generation of revolutionaries who did not live through the old days. This marked the beginning of the great degeneration of the Comintern and the American movement. Yet Cannon, in the rôle of myth-creator, cannot tell the whole truth about it lest it reflect upon past, present or future glory.

The story of the CP from that point until the expulsion of the Left Opposition is hastily sketched. Some of it is accurate, other parts are suspect. The factional struggle continued unabated. The split in the Foster-Cannon group was repaired by the final establishment of a new bloc against Lovestone who had taken over the leadership of the party following Ruthenberg's death. Prior to the reestablishment of the bloc, the Cannon group had made a short-lived but intimate bloc with Lovestone, and then another with dissident elements of the Lovestone group. The great problem in the party always remained: how to get rid of the deadening leadership of the right wing. It could never be effected even with a majority because the "Comintern would not permit it."

It became clear to all the factions that the way to change the leadership and policies of the party was by courting the "proper people" in Moscow. That meant continued rivalry and mad dashes to Moscow by the leaders of contending factions. There was obviously something wrong in Moscow. All the groups felt that way. What it was, namely, the struggle against Trotskyism and the rise to power of Stalinism, none of them knew fully and some not all, neither Lovestone, Foster, nor Cannon.

By implication, Cannon would now have us believe that in those years of 1925, 1926 and 1927, he was gradually moving toward an acceptance of Trotskyism. In describing some attack of the Comintern upon him for reasons which he could not understand, Cannon writes: "They must have suspected something." What? Perhaps Cannon was reading Trotsky's writings and talking about them in the Party? Perhaps he was developing views approximating those of Trotsky? No, he cannot say these things because too many people know otherwise, knew that he was ignorant about the fight in the Russian party and cared even less. And when he adds that the Comintern: ". . . went far out of their way to take cracks at me . . .", he is merely "suggesting" a legend.

Cannon and the Left Opposition

On another page he describes how he came across the 1926 Left Opposition document on the Anglo-Russian Trade Union Unity Committee and favored its position. How? Was it publicly manifested? Did he present his views to his faction? Or, is this an afterthought which occurred in the writing of this book? No one in the party knew of this "opinion"; more important, none of his intimates in the faction was aware that Cannon had any thoughts whatever on Trotsky, the Left Opposition, or the International. As far back as in the CP Cannon's "international" interest was the subject of humor.

By 1928, however, Cannon was completely fed up in the CP. He wanted to get away, he said, to get "a bath in the mass movement." So he went on a speaking tour for the Interna-

tional Labor Defense. He went, he added, because he wanted to "think out . . . the Russian question which troubled me more than anything else." So far as was known then, the only thing that troubled Cannon and which had anything to do with the Russian question was how to get the Russians to stop supporting Lovestone. If he had any ideas about Trotsky and the Left Opposition, they were kept completely secret from the party, from his faction and from his most intimate collaborators. But, if Cannon did go on the tour to think out the Russian question, nobody was ever informed what it was he had thought out.

As a matter of fact, the leaders of the American party and the party as a whole were completely divorced from the politics of the Kremlin. They were really political neophytes. The struggle against Trotsky was to them quite remote and never to be taken too seriously. Certainly no one then believed that Trotsky would be expelled from the Russian CP and subsequently deported from the country where he had helped to make the revolution. Nor did the American leaders understand the international ramifications of that struggle. They were completely absorbed in their own factional conflict and what troubled them was the solution to this fight rather than the struggle against Trotsky.

The struggle against Trotskyism in this country took the form of "enlightenment campaigns" initiated in Moscow and carried out by the factions in an effort to show the Comintern bosses which was the more loyal faction and worthy of Moscow's support. The individuals in the Cannon group did less than those of the other factions in these "educational campaigns," as they were also called, but they participated too.

The real truth about Cannon's role in those days was that he had lost all heart for the struggle. He had no wish to continue it further. He even refused to go to the Sixth Congress and it was only after the most persistent urging by the faction leaders that Cannon agreed to go to Moscow. His position was that the whole business was hopeless and a waste of time. But if he had any thoughts about Trotsky before his departure to the Sixth Congress in 1928, this too was unknown to anyone in the faction.

There has been a great deal of speculation on how or why Cannon became a Trotskyist. To us, this is of no fundamental importance. Whether he discovered Trotskyism in Moscow for the first time, or whether he had secret views on it before he left in no way invalidates the fact that he was the first in this country to accept the views of Trotsky and was the individual responsible for the establishment of a Trotskyist movement in America. This much is history already and for that alone, if not for his role in the CP, Cannon has earned his place in the history of the Marxist movement of America. What is objectionable, as objectionable as the speculations of those who wonder why and how he did it, is the attempt to create a legend about something which is really not mysterious, in order to strengthen a theory which is utterly false and contains dangerous implications.

The Formation of the CLA

We come now to the actual formation of a Trotskyist organization in America. It was necessary to deal at some length on the antecedent period in the Communist Party because those events led directly to the subsequent emergence of a Trotskyist group in this country and because they shed light on Cannon's background, his activities and his outlook. These had an important influence on the events of the future.

The most important period in the history of American Trotskyism is the worst part of Cannon's book. The period between the wave of expulsions in the CP and the formation of the Communist League of America at its May, 1929, conference in Chicago is dealt with adequately for a book of this type. But the actual formation of the Communist League, which was indeed a historic day, since it marked the organization of the Trotskyists in this country, is dealt with in less than two and half pages! The conference was of enormous significance. It gathered the scattered elements throughout the country, welded them into an organization, adopted a program which was based on a Marxist estimate of the world situation, elected a National Committee, made a decision to issue a weekly *Militant* and to initiate a campaign for it. Most important of all about this gathering is that it presented the platform of Trotskyism to the American labor movement.

And of this conference, Cannon has little or nothing to say. The great ideas which inspired our small movement are hardly even referred to, or where reference is made, there is no intelligent discussion of these ideas. Those questions which Cannon does discuss briefly relate to the trade union issue, or the question of whether or not the Left Opposition should have become a party or remained a faction of the Communist Party.

The period between the conference in May, 1929, and the issuance of the weekly *Militant* in November of 1929 is omitted in Cannon's book. These were "dog days" too. But it was a period when Cannon's interests and activities had flagged. It transpired that shortly after the founding conference, he had little faith in the future of the organization. At that time he wanted to retire and leave the job to the "younger elements." Only the strongest pressure of his collaborators prevented "America's No. 1 Socialist" from leaving the organization in the hands of these "younger elements," and retiring to the Middle West. Thereafter, he opposed the establishment of the weekly *Militant* and expressed his opposition by taking leave completely for a period of time. He was not even present at the affair which greeted the *Weekly* in those dog days.

Yet with the same suddenness that he departed, he reappeared. He returned to carry on a fight against the "youthful leadership" which had not heeded his counsel that the organization ought to "retrench." He organized his group of "older and maturer comrades" to fight against every bold step made by the Communist League. He won over to his side Dunne of Minneapolis and Webster, who were ready at one time to go ahead without Cannon, the latter even proposing that organizational measures be taken against Cannon.

Some Important Omissions

Cannon was against the issuance of a youth paper; he opposed the publication of Jewish and Greek papers. All three of them *were* issued. He fought against Shachtman's trip to Europe to establish our first contact with Trotsky and to seek aid of the European movement for the *Weekly Militant* which he insisted should become a bi-monthly or monthly. Every step of progress made in the CLA had to be fought out against Cannon. Is it any wonder that all of these important stages in the development of the CLA find no place in Cannon's book?

Every successive period in the development of the Trotskyist movement is similarly treated. The great ideas of the movement, the great struggles of international Trotskyism are replaced by anecdotes and platitudes and by patronizing ref-

erences to his "boys." For example, Cannon has no place in the book to mention the editor of the *Militant* or the real secretary of the League. But he wastes space to tell an old tale about the linotype operator! He makes no reference to the first contact made with Trotsky by Shachtman and his first tour in this country which had such a profound effect on our movement and an important influence on its followers. He says nothing about Glotzer's visit to Trotsky and his national tour in 1932 which covered Canada and the United States as far as Kansas City. But he does mention Webster's tour in 1934! Why? A slight omission? No, Webster is one of his "loyal" supporters. Webster is one of the comrades who, together with the men of Minneapolis, "always supported me, they never failed me, they held up my hands." There is the finished bureaucratic outlook!

Now you can understand more fully the absence of objectivity and history in the Cannon book. His observation of events is subjective, based solely on his participation in them, and whether his participation looks good in print. Everything else goes out. His treatment of individuals follows the same pattern. Those who are his supporters are fine comrades. Everyone else is a scoundrel.

Cannon's Views on New York Organization

Throughout the book there is a running attack on the successive New York organizations of the CLA, WP and SWP. The impression created is that the New York organizations were a haven for Greenwich Villagers, intellectual snobs, careerists, etc. It goes without saying that this was untrue. It is true that the Trotskyist movement attracted a number of alien elements who either had to leave the movement when they found it to be a serious revolutionary organization and not merely a stamping ground for "anti-Stalinists", or were expelled from it. But the New York movement was always the political, organizational and financial backbone of the Trotskyist movement in America.

It is true that in later years the Minneapolis organization rivaled it in numbers and financially, but by no stretch of the imagination could Minneapolis be said to be the political and organizational center of the movement. On the contrary, under Cannon's direction and his policy of sheltering it from "Eastern intellectuals and ideas," Minneapolis was always one of the most backward sections, theoretically and politically, in the party. The main reason for this was Cannon's leadership in that city.

The policy Cannon pursued there was consciously predicated on keeping Minneapolis uninformed about the great ideas and inner struggles in the movement; the aim was to prevent the "workers' branch" from becoming infested with ideas, to keep it politically backward. Instead of raising the Minneapolis movement on par with the most advanced sections of the party, Cannon actually sought to reduce the party to the political level of Minneapolis.

Cannon's repeated sneers at the New York movement are based on one fact and one fact only: The New York movement usually opposed Cannon. Cannon could not cope with the most politically advanced section of the Party and that is why he spends so much time and effort in the book in tearing it down.

It is true that the years between 1929 and 1932 were dog days, but no small reason for it was the sharp internal struggle waged by Cannon against the aggressive policy pursued by the CLA in opposition to his conservative program of "retrench-

ment." His only explanation of how our small band issued the weekly *Militant* is that "somehow the paper came out." But there was more than "somehow" to it. The paper came out because of the great sacrifices of all the members of the organization and those who directed the work of the League in those days.

One could write at great length on every chapter of the book to show how Cannon has not represented the history of the Trotskyist movement. Page after page can be read without finding out, for example, where the Trotskyist movement stood on a series of world-shaking problems. There is not even a single statement of what Trotskyism stands for, what its main ideas are. All we get from Cannon is that "Trotskyism means business." This is, of course, hardly an enlightening description of the theory and politics of Trotsky; it is "revolutionary" rotarianism.

Just as the early history of the CLA is represented as a great struggle between Cannon and men who wear corduroy trousers, who talk a great deal, and argue even more, the later history of Trotskyism in this country, represented by the turn in policy with the coming of Hitler to power, the fusion with the AWP, the entry into the SP is also personalized. Always it is Cannon versus villains.

The struggle over entry in the Socialist Party was an extremely important struggle. For my own part, it is difficult to determine who was right or wrong. It is obvious too, that one cannot argue at this day: would we have gained more by entry or by the independent road. Entry for this writer was not then, nor is it today, a principled question, but rather a tactical one. But we find in Cannon's book a new reason to justify the entry, a reason obviously developed as an afterthought. Following a gratuitous admission that perhaps a number of errors (opportunist) were committed in the Socialist Party, Cannon makes the utterly monstrous statement that:

It was required of us historically, at that crucial moment, to be members of the Socialist Party and by that to have slocer access to elements—liberals, intellectuals and half-practical people—who were necessary for the great political task of the Trotsky Defense Committee.

This is, of course, a political libel against Trotsky who opposed many of the policies pursued inside the SP which he thought might be developed on the grounds of expediency relating to his case. So far as was known in the Party, the Trotsky case had nothing whatever to do with the entry!

The Tid-Bits

We have said that the book lacks theory, politics and ideas in general. This criticism is validated by Cannon himself. Let us take a few examples, from the many which fill his history.

On page 81, the great man writes: "It is just as impossible to bluff in the political movement as in war." Why? Cannon's own book is a refutation of this platitude. And politics and war are filled with bluffs, a countless number of them. But it sounds good to Cannon to write this. Makes a great impression on young people who are in the process of being miseducated by the kind of training given them by Cannon.

In reference to the hotel strike in New York and the rôle of the CLA Cannon writes: "That is one of the characteristics of Trotskyism. Trotskyism has never done anything half-way. Trotskyism acts according to the old motto: Whatever is worth doing at all is worth doing well." Never does anything half-way! Whatever is worth doing at all is worth doing well!

On page 146 we learn again: "These Trotskyists mean business. When they undertake anything, they go through with it."

Again on page 179: "Trotskyists mean business."

And on page 198: "They always do things right in Minneapolis." Always!

This is Trotskyism, according to the history written by Cannon, whom George Collins in the *Fourth International*

described "as the historian of a movement that has swept the field of revolutionary politics of all rivals[!], it is a tribute to the viability of his teachings and their adoption and application in life by the group itself."

One member of the Cannon party said of the history: "There was never a history like this!" We heartily concur. We cannot recall another like it.

ALBERT GATES.

The Italian Revolution and the Slogan "For a Republic!"

The Strategy of Lenin vs. Ultra-Leftism

[The following article first appeared in the *Internal Bulletin* of the Socialist Workers Party under the title, "The Slogan of the Republic in Italy and Its Discussion in the SWP." Space limitations have necessitated the omission of the first part of the article, giving the author's account of the background of the question in the SWP discussion and his own difficulty in securing timely publication of his articles in the party's *Internal Bulletin*. Comrade Logan has long been a leading member of the international Trotskyist movement.—EDITORS.]

"We are for Socialism!"

This is the common denominator of a great variety of arguments against the slogan of the republic in Italy: "We want socialism, not the republic!", "We are for a workers' republic, not a bourgeois republic!", etc.

These arguments are not new. They are classical expressions of ultra-leftism. Arguments built on the same pattern have often been examined and refuted in our movement, and in the Bolshevik party and the Third International. In my article *On the Situation in Europe and Our Tasks*, I tried to show how alien that kind of argument was to our methods. Comrade Goldman dealt with them again in his article *On the Question of the Slogan "For A Democratic Republic"* (*Internal Bulletin*, Vol. VII, No. 1, March, 1945). I simply summarize again our conclusions.

The method of ultra-left arguments consists in opposing our goal to anything else. The method of those who want to follow Lenin is the direct opposite: it is to find a path of action from the present situation to socialism. The problem cannot be solved by simply stating whether or not we are "for socialism" (a strange thing in our movement!), but by analyzing *how* to get onto the road to socialism. And here the whole question of democratic demands is involved.

The fundamental defect of such arguments, when used in our ranks against the slogan of the republic, is the following: these arguments about "being for socialism" are so general that they can equally be used against *any* democratic demand. That is why we have the right to say that the acceptance of a program of democratic demands by those who use such arguments against the republic is merely *ritualistic*. The struggle for democratic demands is so unquestionably a tradition of our movement that they cannot oppose it openly. But the kind of arguments they used against one specific slogan, being equally applicable to all, shows that they pay only lip-service to our traditions.

Of course, one can sincerely be for democratic slogans and at the same time be against the slogan of the republic in Italy now. But, in such a case, the reasons against the slogan of the republic must be specific, related to that one particular slogan, and not apply as well to all democratic slogans.

The Monarchy in Italy

The inability of some members of the majority to grasp the handling of democratic demands at all is at times suddenly revealed by the surprising arguments they use. Thus a minor spokesman of the majority declared: "If you are for the republic in Italy, why not in England?" And a burst of laughter completes his argument.

This objection is remarkable for its method: if the slogan of the republic is correct in Italy, it should also be in England. Since nobody puts it forward for England, then it is clearly incorrect for Italy. Admirable logic!

However, more than the method is deficient here; the political acumen is not especially sharp either. Today, the existence of the monarchy in England a tenth-rank question (which, however, should not be completely forgotten in our agitation.) But, when England enters a revolutionary crisis, the Court may become a focus of counter-revolutionary Bonapartist intrigues. Its existence may become a burning political issue. In that case the slogan of the republic will become for a time an important political demand of the revolutionary party. Our critic does not seem to suspect that, and thus reveals how much his thoughts are imbedded in the frame of present reality, how little he sees a political situation in its revolutionary dynamism.

Sometimes spokesmen for the majority tell us, not without a malicious tone: "But calling for a republic means your acceptance of the bourgeois republic!" Such an argument could be directed against *any* partial demand. Does it mean that we stop there? We support the struggle of a union for a ten-cent increase per hour. Does that mean we are against a twenty-five cent raise? More generally, does our support of a fight for a wage increase mean our acceptance of the capitalist wage system? Etc., etc. But enough about all these ultra-left ratiocinations. Here a clear answer must be demanded about our past.

The Example of Spain

Our movement had the slogan of the republic in Spain in

1930-31. In the pre-revolutionary period of 1934-36 Trotsky suggested its inclusion in the program of action of the Belgian section of the Fourth International, where it had incomparably less importance than now in Italy. That does not imply that the slogan is necessarily correct now in Italy. But it does imply that the slogan cannot be opposed for general reasons such as: "We are for socialism, not for the bourgeois republic," etc. It also implies that the first task of the majority of the leadership should have been to explain what concrete, specific and new conditions, not existing in the past, prevented the use of the slogan in Italy now. As it did not fulfill this elementary duty, as it left the traditions of our movement in the dark, and instead of precise clarification, threw all kinds of general accusations at the opposition, it thus opened the door to the strangest misconceptions in the minds of its own followers. The result of such a policy did not take long to appear. A minor spokesman for the majority declared: "Yes, Trotsky was for the republic in 1931, but because Spain was a feudal country." Not a voice from the ranks of the majority came to correct such political illiteracy.

It must be repeated once more: As long as the majority does not settle its political accounts with our past, as long as it does not clearly state what specific reasons prevent us today from using a slogan we used in the past, but simply opposes us with general arguments and accusations, the majority must be considered to be in a state of political insolvency.

"The masses want soviets!"

The argument about our being "for socialism" was so shaky, so alien to our methods for solving such a question, that most of the spokesmen of the majority felt obliged to present something a bit more concrete. They discovered, although "more than three thousand miles away," that the Italian masses "want soviets," and therefore . . . we cannot call for the immediate proclamation of the republic.

Does that mean we are on the eve of the passing of state power into the hands of the Italian soviets? In such a situation, of course, the problem of the monarchy would have been solved long ago, or would have been by-passed and would have lost any significance. Unfortunately, we are not yet at such a stage.

There are no soviets in Italy now. The Italian masses still have very little practical experience about the functioning and the potentialities of such bodies. The present problem is, then, to get soviets. How can we get them? By the revolutionary action of the masses. How can we help the masses to unleash their revolutionary energy and *enter the road of action*? On that point the majority keeps silence.

How Soviets Are Formed

Soviets are not formed because the masses are intellectually convinced beforehand of their advantages, because the masses set the goal of forming them. Soviets appear at a certain stage as a necessary *instrument* of the struggle. The *objective* aim of the struggle is, of course, to establish a duality of power and, later on, the power of the soviets. *Subjectively*, however, in the consciousness of the masses, soviets appear rather as a means than as an end. This is especially true at the beginning of the struggle. And we are still at the beginning in Italy.

What are the *subjective* aim or aims of the struggle at the starting point? There is a great variety of them. Experience in many countries, as far back as 1848, shows that many diverse issues may be incentives to action for the masses in the first stages of a revolutionary crisis. The touchstone of a revolu-

tionary party is precisely its ability to seize upon such questions and use them as a lever to push the masses onto the road of action.

This does not at all mean that the immediate proclamation of the republic is the only or even the main slogan in Italy now. But even if the problem of the monarchy were secondary, that would be no argument for condemning the slogan of the republic. As a matter of fact, the problem of the monarchy, in my opinion, has been for the past nine months and is now one of the four or five major political questions in Italy. But, whatever may be the exact rank of the slogan of the republic in our program, it does belong to it. It is true that the problem may be solved very rapidly, in a few days of revolutionary struggle of the masses, especially if a military front ceases to separate the North from the South. However, the problem of the monarchy still exists today; it has existed since June, it existed at the time of the convention, and only those who voluntarily and obstinately closed their eyes could not see it.

If soviets appear tomorrow in Italy with the monarchy still in power, will the fight against it lose all significance for revolutionary action? It depends on the tempo of events. If the tempo is not too quick, the duality of power will manifest itself as the opposition of the central authority of the soviets to the monarchy. The court will become the center of reaction, the focus of Kornilovist intrigues. The question of its existence will be a burning issue, even with soviets existing. There is the possibility, of course, if the tempo is very quick, that the soviets will be confronted with the problem of power so rapidly that the issue of monarchy may be by-passed and as good as forgotten before being solved. This, however, seems to me the most unlikely perspective.

The Present Reality

But, whatever the future variants may be, the present reality is still the absence of soviets. The present problem is to enter the path of action, in order to form soviets. There is not the slightest contradiction between the orientation toward soviets and the demand of the republic. Quite the contrary, in fighting for that demand, along with many others, the masses will build soviets.

I have heard the following argument repeated here and there in the party: "Did not Zinoviev, in October, 1917, threaten to lead the Bolshevik Party astray, with his orientation toward the constituent assembly?" The implication is that the use of democratic demands in general and of the slogan of the republic in particular may trammel the party in its offensive for power. Surprising as such an argument may be, its examination helps us to get at the heart of the question, which is: at what stage of the Italian Revolution are we now? Answering this question is an important part of the problem of determining whether the slogan of the republic is correct or not. The majority did not give any clear answer to the question, it did not even notice the existence of a question; but, by circulating or letting circulate such arguments as the one reported above, it confused the present situation in Italy with the eve of October.

I tried to answer that question about the present stage in my article "On the European Situation and Our Tasks." Using the Spanish revolutionary calendar, I made a comparison with the Berenguer interlude, trying to show the similarities as well as the differences. If we want to use the Russian calendar, the question which arises is not "Are we on the eve of October in Italy?" but "Are we before or after February?" My answer to

this question is as follows: Certain factors of the Italian situation put us after February. The most important of these factors has been the participation of the Stalinists and the Socialists in the government. But other factors place us before February: the Italian masses still have less experience of a generalized political struggle in the streets than the Russian masses had after February, the monarchy is still in existence and, because of that, the Italian ruling classes still have more centralization and cohesion than the Russian ruling classes had after February. The result of the analysis tends to prove the correctness of a vigorous offensive by the revolutionary party on the question of the monarchy.

Stages in the Struggle

Certain comrades have objected to this method of establishing points of comparison between Italy now and past revolutionary periods. This method, they say, may lead to the conception of necessary stages: Italy will ascend, one by one, the successive steps of the revolutionary ladder. The objection does not seem to me to be correct. In the period we have now entered, the masses will make, from time to time, tremendous leaps. Problems which have been stagnating for months, for years, will be solved in a few weeks, a few days, even a few hours of tremendous revolutionary passion. This is precisely the true character of every revolutionary period. Moreover, the tempo will not be the same everywhere and will not be the same as in past revolutions. Here slowly, there quickly, it will bear the mark of specific circumstances.

When all this is said, however, it does not mean that anything can happen at any time. Revolutions have their natural history. If not, what is the use of studying the past? We try to establish a correspondence between the different stages in Russia, in Spain, in Italy, never forgetting, of course, that the tempo may be slower or quicker, that whole stages can be skipped over, etc. Analyzing the May days in Barcelona in 1937, Leon Trotsky tried to determine whether they were the Spanish counterpart of the Russian July days or October days. We cannot dispense with such a method. It entails a certain relativity, for events are never exactly repeated, and we must always be on the lookout for possible differences; but to abandon the method of comparison altogether means to abandon all method in political thinking.

To the question: "At what stage are we in Italy now?" I have given my answer, using either the Spanish or the Russian calendar. I only wish that arguments be presented against me, permitting me to change, to correct or to maintain my analysis, but, anyway, helping clarify the problem. The majority has not made the slightest effort in that direction, has not even considered the problem—which has not prevented it from throwing out the most brazen accusations at its opponents and from letting some of its members here and there argue about Zinoviev and the eve of October.

Positive and Negative Slogans

Certain comrades put the problem this way: We can very well propagate the negative slogan: "Down with the King!" but to call: "For the republic!" that is impossible! And they think they have thus avoided the sin of opportunism and saved their souls.

The main argument for the substitution is that on the morning after the proclamation of the republic the masses will be disappointed with the bourgeois republic; therefore we cannot call for anything positive. Unfortunately for the proponents of the negative slogan, exactly the same arguments can

be directed against it: You called to fight against the King, the King is overthrown, and things are not much better! The solution is, of course, not in the petty trick of substituting a negative slogan for a positive one, but in a proper understanding and use of the slogan.

We call for the republic, but we never take the slightest responsibility for the republic arising out of the dirty compromises between the reactionaries, the liberals and the collaborationists. On the morning after the proclamation of the republic we tell the workers: "Is that the republic we fought for? Is it for this that we have fought in the streets and forced the King to flee? No!" And we will develop the next stage of our problem. The masses will lend an ear to us, because we have been with them in their first fight. Bolshevism, real Bolshevism, is precisely that way of going with the masses through all their struggles, and not the lifeless mannikin which is presently being built in the central offices of the SWP.

Italians' Point of View

I must say that, if the same place and weight are accorded to them in the agitation and action of the party, the difference between the two slogans—the positive one "For the republic" and the negative one "Against the King"—is very small. If the Italian comrades would for some practical considerations prefer the negative one, I would not spend a minute discussing the change and would accept it readily. However, the Italian comrades *did* adopt the positive slogan of the republic and put it as the first point of their program. And when some American comrades, on this continent, prefer the negative slogan, it is not for practical considerations on the Italian scene, but the distinction is for them a kind of shelter where they expect to be protected from the scarecrows of opportunism erected by the leadership of the majority. This is why we must discuss with them and force them to bring their reasons into the open.

Since last June, newspapers have reported dozens of incidents which indicate, even more than "three thousand miles" away, that the problem of the monarchy is a burning political question in Italy. These incidents show the wrath of the masses against the accomplices of Mussolini, the King and the Crown Prince. They show also the servility of the official parties, Stalinist and Socialist, on that question.

Here we may stop an instant to answer an argument of a minor spokesman for the majority. According to him, we cannot use the slogan of the republic because the Socialists and Communists are also calling for a republic and we must "differentiate ourselves."

First, a question of fact. It is not true that the Stalinist party is now calling for the republic or even saying anything against the monarchy. For many months the Socialist Party kept silent on the issue. Last November, Nenni, a bit less cynical than Togliatti, felt obliged to utter a few phrases against the monarchy.

What Events Proved

But even if the collaborationists were using the slogan of the republic, that would not in itself prevent us from using it. Very often we do not "differentiate ourselves" by the slogans, but we "differentiate ourselves" by the *methods* we advocate for their realization. We say clearly that, unlike the collaborationists, we prepare to solve the monarchic problem, as any other problem, by our *own* methods, through the revolutionary action of the masses. When in 1940 the Stalinists were denouncing the imperialist war, did we feel the necessity of

"differentiating ourselves" by ceasing to oppose the war? But enough of that.

A great light has been thrown on the question by the November 12 meeting in Rome. It has, until now, been the greatest political demonstration in Italy since the fall of Mussolini. Let us reread a few sentences of the account in the *New York Times*:

The meeting was clearly anti-monarchy, as far as the sentiment of the public was concerned, although Signor Togliatti was again careful to avoid compromising himself on what has become Italy's most delicate problem. Every possible reference to the monarchy, however indirect, was greeted with tremendous hoots, whistles and boos.

What a vivid picture of the situation!

The November meeting was such a blow at the shaky political structure of the majority that its spokesmen had to find some kind of explanation. Until now they have found nothing better than this: "The meeting was for the celebration of the anniversary of the Russian Revolution; the masses showed they were for socialism." How revealing of their mentality is that explanation! Instead of trying to discover in the shouts, in the interruptions, in what the speakers said and in what they did not say, what questions preoccupy the masses, the spokesmen for the majority simply accepted the official Stalinist version of the meeting.

According to the *New York Times*' account of the meeting, "Signor Togliatti's address was restrained. It was full of praise for the Russian Revolution. . . . Whenever possible the crowd shouted: 'Down with the monarchy!' But the Communist leader was careful never to mention the subject."

The Militant was also careful not to mention the subject of the monarchy. Its account of the meeting, in the November 25 issue, simply repeated the official interpretation that "Italian Masses Celebrate 1917 Russian Revolution." Not a word about the anti-monarchical character of the meeting! Can you imagine? The Italian masses confirming just in time by their action the prognosis of the opposition. What impudence! A letter from Comrade Abe Stein, reminding the editors of *The Militant* of the obvious anti-monarchical character of the meeting, was buried.

The First Step

Yes the Italian masses want socialism. But how to get socialism? How to make the first step? On that, of course, the majority is as dumb as a fish. The whole problem is erroneously transferred from the plane of *action* to the plane of *conviction*. The question is not simply to convince the masses that socialism is very beautiful, but to help them to take the first step of political struggle, to find the issues on which they are ready to fight. I have said since last July that an important one of these issues was the monarchy. The November meeting con-

firmed my prognosis as completely as a political prognosis can ever be confirmed. The answer of the majority is: "The masses want socialism, and you are a literary man." Everybody can appreciate the pertinence of the answer.

Since the November meeting, new incidents have further confirmed the importance of the problem. After the escape of the Fascist hangman Roatta, a big political demonstration took place in Rome on March 6. Where did the crowd go to express its wrath? To the Quirinal Palace, that is, to the residence of the royal family. The revolutionary instinct of the Roman masses was more correct than all the ultra-left ratiocinations. The whole demonstration clearly had an anti-monarchic character.*

The problem of the monarchy has taken on even more political weight than one could suspect last July, when I wrote my first article on the problem. Very likely, when the military front which separates the North from the South disappears, evens will take a quicker tempo. The fate of the Italian monarchy may be sealed in a few days and the Italian revolution will tackle new and higher tasks. But, until then, the question is on the order of the day.

It is not for us, of course, to decide here, in New York, all the details of the use of the slogan of the republic. We can leave that to the Italian comrades. But have not events thrown enough light upon that question in the last nine months to permit us to adopt the slogan in itself?

The majority of the leadership of the S.W.P. has been prevented from accepting the slogan not by lack of information, but by political prejudices. Nothing reveals that more clearly than the fact that they have concealed information about Italy. The press of the S.W.P. has kept silence on the anti-monarchic character of the November 12th meeting and other political demonstrations. The press of the S.W.P. took four months—and then only after a minority motion for it—to publish the program of action of our Italian comrades, which was received in the latter part of November. The delay was for no other reason, as far as we can understand, than that the first point of that program is the demand for the republic.

When political misconceptions come into such conflict with reality, it is high time to abandon them. It is high time to reject all ultra-left ratiocinations. It is high time to come back to the traditions of our movement. It is high time to enter the road outlined by the opposition.

March 14, 1945.

DANIEL LOGAN.

*Most of the big newspapers were careful not to mention this aspect of the demonstration. But a UP dispatch, reproduced for instance, in *Il Progresso Italo-Americano* of New York, states: "The demonstrators shouted 'Death to the King!', 'Death to Umberto!', 'Down with the House of Savoy!'"

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In the Land of the Political Vacuum

An Observer's Notes on Germany

GI soldiers, greatly attracted by the beauty of the German landscape, and its constant variations, often say, half out loud: "My God, with such a nice country why did they do what they did?" Aside from the political naïveté thus expressed (it is impossible to find anyone who understands less about politics or the war than GI Joe, the man who fought it), there is no doubt about Germany being Europe's most attractive country. A succession of geographic areas, each with its own interests and peculiarities, and each with its own special type of "Germans."

The Frankische Schweiz mountain region, lying between Nürnberg and Beyreuth (Ober-Franken) is typical. Rounded, green hills (remnants of worn-down mountains), deep valleys and numerous stony cliffs and crags (Felsen) are everywhere. Pine, linden and small oak forests are scattered about. The peasants, tilling small fields of wheat, corn and grain, live in small villages. A new element in the villages is the evacuéé from one of Germany's destroyed cities (Ruhr cities, Berlin, etc.). Some villages have as much as a 50 per cent increase in population, made up of bombed-out families. They are squeezed into the farmers' houses, where they form a restless and unhappy element, a part of Germany's huge housing and living problem. In such areas Goethe, the folk songs about valleys and forests, et cetera, the whole German "Naturkultur" becomes easily understood. With the compulsory, forced, back-to-the-land and village migration, a revival of such cultural tendencies, accompanying glorification of "the simple life," is inevitable.

The New German Hierarchy

The new German governmental bureaucracy, now developing under AMG supervision in the occupied areas, is as follows (proceeding from bottom to top):

- (A) Germans employed in menial capacities (KP and cleaning work in military compounds, maids in officers' quarters). They benefit by having regular work, American food, and scrounging off leftovers, cigarettes, cast-off clothing, etc.
- (B) Germans employed by American army in factories producing for army, or on American road, bridge, and repair projects. Only benefit is that of being employed.
- (C) Germans employed directly in Military Government capacity, as clerks, stenographers, typists, interpreters—all varieties of petty officials. They benefit by employment, prestige in eyes of their fellow-Germans, bureaucratic power and authority that comes with such positions and the feeling of protection at being close to those in power.
- (D) Germans appointed to political functions (mayors, judges, administrators, etc.) by AMG authority. Overwhelming bulk from the Center Party, or traditional civil service. They benefit by the power, authority and prestige that comes with such positions.
- (E) Germans employed directly by AMG as "informers and listeners."

The German Petty-Bourgeois

He (or she) might well be called the "know-nothing" of Germany, or "the believer." "We knew nothing; we just believed." Having discovered originally, in Hitler, the embodiment of their frustrations, hopes, and illusions of grandeur, they obeyed the age-old, petty-bourgeois characteristic of self-deception to the end. Now, they claim, everything has come to them as a blinding revelation. Their "sad story," which they repeat endlessly and without variation, never changes—its tones of remorse, self-pity and self-flagellation only mellow with age and repetition. "What scoundrels they were; if we had only known." Now they thrash about for something new in which to believe (Nature and the simple life; God or the convent; or AMG and its earthly bureaucracy). In general, their behavior and reactions are along well-known to-be-expected lines. Whoever is in power has their grovelling support, even if it means self-abasement and spitting upon whatever national pride they may have had. They are the classic middle-class of modern times—bewildered and lost. Their immediate hope is to ingratiate themselves with the new military government (or any German régime that may come into existence later on): with the more distant perspective of finding a better function (perhaps a re-integration into productive economic life) in a new war against Russia, under American auspices.

The German Youth

The German Youth (we mean the young girls of all ages up to marriage; plus the young boys who did not serve in the army) was brought up under the systematic Hitler indoctrination which consisted of hammering in a few slogans and fixed "ideas." The tenacity and durability of these shallow prejudices (with the probable exception of anti-Semitism) is highly doubtful, *unless* the vacuum in which this youth now lives continues. In that case, the Nazi indoctrination will undoubtedly continue to fester within their minds. Concretely, if schools fail to re-open, if the young boys fail to receive an opportunity to learn professions and build careers, to express themselves in the ways common to youth (clubs, sports, associations, etc.), they will turn to some form of neo-Nazi or neo-chauvinistic organization, and will begin to actively resist the occupation. At present, wandering through the countryside or the ruined cities, they are restlessly "maturing" within a vacuum. Obviously, their present quiescence will not endure forever.

The situation with respect to the young German girls (those unmarried, or whose husbands have vanished in the war) is still worse. Already pushed far along the path of bourgeois immorality by Nazi doctrine and methods (promiscuity, huge illegitimacy rate, etc.), and generally deprived of any professional learning or skill by the Nazi educational doctrine with respect to women (Kinder, Kirche, und Küche), they are now fast striding along the road of semi- and professional prostitution, as a means of earning a living. Without work, without means of education, etc., their economic function in Germany economy is, apparently, to be limited to that of Spring sowing and Fall harvesting. Of all the layers of highly

disreputed German society, these hundreds of thousands of young girls have probably sunk the lowest morally, and with the greatest rapidity. Their sole energy, now, is directed toward associating themselves (in the only manner they know) with the conquering soldiers in all areas. This effort goes to the extreme, even, of exhibiting an open contempt and disdain for their own returning soldiers and men! As for the occupational soldiery, its attitude was well expressed by an American GI who said, "This is a wonderful country! Where did we get so much of it, and practically for nothing, too!"

The German Soldier

The German soldier, released from the prisoner of war camps, does not talk. It is not fear alone that dictates his silence; he is thinking and until the process is completed, he has little or nothing to say. With groups of others, he finds his way home, or to a farm area where he will find rough work. As he trudges through the deserted and broken cities (he does not look about him at the ruins) he appears, outwardly, to be bone-weary, dirty and exhausted, ragged and empty. The weight of his Musette pack keeps his eyes on the ground. But this outward appearance is probably an illusion. There is nobody who can say what is going on underneath, with which ideas and paths he will experiment at a later stage, what road he will ultimately follow when the inevitable re-grouping and re-organization of German political life takes place. It is not accidental that I have never seen an American or British soldier sneer or laugh at the returning men of the Wehrmacht. They did not invite such an attitude: in this respect differing from the German petty-bourgeois, or the young "Fraülein." For the time being, most of those who work are on farms. The others have little or no work, and their future differs little from that of the German people as a whole.

The German Workers

The American left-wing and democratic press has published "information" regarding the German working class of a highly fanciful nature. This goes for that portion of the press that should know better too. It indicates a failure to fully grasp the results and processes of fascism as it effects the working class. The naive belief (or wish) seems to exist that the German workers simply continue on from where they halted 12 years ago. This conception, apparently, is based upon the emergence of some ancient Social-Democratic trade-union leaders. Their rebirth, however, bears the same resemblance to reality as does the rebirth of various Center Party and Social-Democratic Party leaders. That is, little or no resemblance. Such a conception ignores what has happened and assumes that the effects of Nazism can be lightly brushed off. Actually, what *has* happened is that the atomizing machine of the Nazi state has ground to a halt, and that the German working class, *along with every layer and segment of German society*, lies inert, disorganized and bewildered, in the center of the vacuum.

To begin with, what happened to the old, highly organized German working class? It was mobilized and fought in the war, and that goes for its most concentrated and skilled groups (miners, machinists, steel workers, etc.). It suffered enormous casualties among the millions of German dead; many others remain as prisoners and will work long years in Russia, France, etc. No one has any statistics on their numbers but they are not small. Then, in the physical destruc-

tion of German industry, large numbers of workers were scattered into the towns, away from their factories. They became farm hands with their families; or used their skills in primitive or craft professions. This scattering into the countryside, this de-proletarianizing of the German worker will, of course, increase with the application of the recent Potsdam Conference decisions. Only coal and iron ore miners and railroad workers will remain in any substantial numbers; plus scattered groups of workers engaged in "light, domestic" industries. Generally speaking, the German worker has been torn from his machine and thrust back into agricultural or handicraft production. Since no reconstruction is contemplated, even building trades workers and related industries, have no place.

The German worker today is a worker only in memory, with the vaguest of pre-war traditions. He is beaten, fearful, frightened, submissive, confused and groping. He has little hope of finding his old job, his former factory, his previous profession. He is an atom, moving from one day to the next, and rapidly losing his illusion that the war's end would mean a revival of "normal" industrial life, along with his place in it. He is, in a word, just another German.

The "New Unions"

As for the "new unions" that have been started in various areas, and are now to be permitted everywhere, let us recognize them for what they are: namely, the first halting step in that lengthy process by which the German worker may be able to find his best form of organization for the future. It is the hesitant step of a baby—*not*, as some people think, the "revival of German trade unionism." That idea is preposterous. These groupings, under strict AMG supervision, not only display no initiative or independence, but do not, as yet, understand the meaning of such terms. In many of them, because of this, the former Nazi elements (foremen, etc.) are still able to maintain their old terror against the workers. The German workers are not the Italian workers of north Italy. They are beginning all over again, from scratch, to crawl up the road of democracy and independent action. These "unions" are, therefore, in reality, elementary associations of workingmen, to discuss various matters. They are beginning and must be recognized as such. Naturally, they will develop, but at an extraordinarily slow speed.

As for "political" thought—there is no more indication that the German worker, or what remains of him, has any "political" ideas or conceptions that there is among the average German petty-bourgeois. To live—that is, to get my day's feed; to earn a small sum of money; to put a roof on my half-bombed-out cellar apartment and to store up some wood-fuel for the long winter that approaches—that occupies exclusively the mind of the German worker and his family. The slow re-organization of political parties (Social-Democratic, Christian Democratic and Communist) will eventually come to his awareness, but not yet. Scrawled on a smashed wall of a Frankfurt-am-Main factory were those famous lines of Goethe:

"Ach, ich bin des Treiben müde.

Was soll' all der Schmerz und Lust?

Süsse Friede, komm', ach komm' in meine Brust."

ROGER JUDSON.

The Positions of SWP and WP on Unity

An Exchange of Documents

[We herewith continue the publication of the documents relating to the question of the unification of the Workers Party and the Socialist Workers Party, first proposed in a resolution of the "Minority" of the latter party. This resolution and a resolution of the Workers Party in reply to it appeared in our September issue. The first of the documents that follow is a letter from James P. Cannon, national secretary of the Socialist Workers Party, asking for more precise information on how the unification is to be brought about and stating the readiness of the Socialist Workers Party to participate in a meeting of representatives of both organizations for purposes of "exploratory verbal discussion." The second document is a detailed and specific presentation of the Workers Party position on the basis of unification. The exchange of these documents was followed by two meetings of representatives from each organization. The third document recapitulates the point of view of the Workers Party in the light of these meetings. It was presented to the National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party, meeting in plenary session. The resolution adopted by the SWP National Committee and comment upon it by the Workers Party will appear in our next issue.—EDITORS.]

August 28, 1945

Max Shachtman, National Secretary
Workers Party,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Comrades:

Your letter of August 22 with the enclosed statement of your National Committee "On the Unification of the Workers Party and the Socialist Workers Party" has been received and discussed by our Political Committee. We especially note your declaration, in Point 5 of your statement, that the Workers Party is "prepared to discuss the question of unity with the Socialist Workers Party." We are in favor of such a discussion and will so recommend to the next Plenum of our National Committee.

In view of the sharp conflicts which resulted in the split between us and the formation of your own organization five years ago, and in view of the deep differences which have separated us since, we believe that the National Committee's consideration of the question will be facilitated if you will indicate more precisely and more concretely your view of how the unification is to be brought about and what form it should take.

We have always proceeded from the point of view that programmatic agreement on the most important and decisive questions is the only sound basis for unification; and that, when divergences of opinion occur, unity can be maintained only by the scrupulous observance of the democratic principle of the subordination of the minority to the majority and strict discipline in public activity and action.

If, in the course of the discussion, it appears that we are approaching agreement on the most important political questions, as well as upon the organizational principle referred to above, and that unification is a realistic perspective, then systematic joint consultation and plans for the coöperation of the two organizations for the carrying out of practical work pending the formal unification, would follow as a matter of course. But to attempt to begin with such practical coöperation, prior to a definite approach to unification, would seem to us to put things upside down and lead to a sharpening of

conflicts over secondary questions rather than to their moderation. In our view, "the practical possibilities of living and working together harmoniously" flow naturally and inevitably from a basic agreement on the fundamental questions, not vice versa. Friction and conflict arise from political disagreement rather than from personal incompatibility. In the long run, the latter is always subordinated to the former.

In our opinion, the question of unification must be discussed with complete frankness and seriousness. The aim must be to effect a genuine unification on a firm and long-lasting basis. We, for our part, believe that unity would be a good thing if it is firmly based and leads to the strengthening of the party and the building up of the party. On the other hand, a unification followed by a sharp faction fight and another split would be highly injurious to the party.

The views set forth above are designed to give a concrete basis to the preliminary discussions between us. Naturally, we are perfectly willing to hear and consider any different form of preliminary approach which you may wish to make. If you think that any exploratory verbal discussion would facilitate the preparation and organization of the agenda for a thorough-going consideration of the whole problem of unification in all its aspects, a subcommittee of our PC is prepared to meet with you for such a preliminary discussion. Such a meeting can be arranged on short notice by a telephone call to Comrade Stein, Organizational Secretary, at the National Office of the SWP.

Yours fraternally,

J. P. CANNON, National Secretary,
Socialist Workers Party.

September 15, 1945.

James P. Cannon, National Secretary,
Socialist Workers Party,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Comrade:

Our Political Committee has discussed your letter of August 28 on the question of the unification of the Socialist Workers Party and the Workers Party, and wishes to place before you its views on the matter dealt with in your communication.

We have taken note, first of all, of your statement that you are in favor of a discussion on the question of unification of the two parties and will so recommend to the next Plenum of your National Committee. We have no doubt that such a discussion, carried on with the candor and seriousness to which you refer, and animated by a mutual desire to reach speedily the solid basis for unity which we believe exists, can result in the consolidation of a strong and healthy party of the Fourth International in the United States, with stimulating effects upon the movement in every other country. The reasons for this conviction have already been stated in a general way in the Resolution on Unity adopted by our National Committee and sent to you on August 22.

Agreement on Formula

To us, the central question to settle is the basis for unification, which, in the concrete case, is the question of the basis

for the revolutionary Marxian party. You state in your letter that the Socialist Workers Party has "always proceeded from the point of view that programmatic agreement on the most important and decisive questions is the only sound basis for unification." As we have understood this conception, which applies not only to the basis for unification between two revolutionary organizations but in general to the basis for existence and functioning of a revolutionary party, we are able to subscribe to your formula. In the present case, however, the concrete meaning of the formula is not sufficiently clear to us. The ambiguity to which it lends itself is heightened in our minds precisely because of what you call "the split between us and the formation of your own organization five years ago, and . . . the deep differences which have separated us since."

If, by "programmatic agreement on the most important and decisive questions," you refer to agreement with the fundamental principles of Marxism and the basic program of the Fourth International as worked out in the whole period, that is one matter. In that case, any preliminary discussion between us could only establish the fact that on this plane, the plane of basic program and principle, the two parties are close enough in their positions to require and justify immediate unification, on grounds similar to those which made their membership in one party possible and desirable in the period prior to the split. We are quite prepared to engage in such a discussion, but our knowledge of the similarity of position of the two parties on this plane, as revealed in their public documents, causes us to regard such a discussion as a formality.

Sufficient Agreement Exists

In other words, we feel, for our part, that an extensive discussion for the purpose of establishing "that we are approaching agreement" on such basic questions is not essential. On these basic questions, sufficient agreement already exists to warrant unification, and a discussion could only record that fact.

If, however, "programmatic agreement" refers to agreement on those theoretical, political and even organizational questions that have divided us in the past, that seems to us to be a different matter. The differences between the two parties on these questions are not less well-known than the points of agreement. They relate to such questions as the class character of the Russian state; the slogan of "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union," the application of the Leninist theory on the national question to the world today, in particular to Europe; aspects of the military policy of the revolutionary Party; application of the principle of democratic centralism and the question of party regime; and a number of questions of lesser prominence and significance. In some instances, these are differences between our party and yours; in others, it has not always been clear whether our differences are with questions officially taken by the Socialist Workers Party or only by individual party representatives. But even if in every instance, the specific differences were between the two parties officially, that would not in our view, rule out unification. Our position on this point has already been set forth with sufficient clarity in the Resolution of our National Committee. We reiterate it here:

The differences that do exist between the two parties are not, singly or severally, of a nature that is impermissible within the framework of one revolutionary Marxist party. It is possible for the two parties to unite now into one, despite these differences, because, as our resolution states, first, there is a

sufficient fundamental agreement in principle between them, and second, the main political difference which engendered the original separation into two parties, namely, the question of "unconditional defense of the Soviet Union," does not now have the same acuteness or prominence that it had at the beginning of the war, according to the declarations of the Socialist Workers Party.

Common Point of View Unlikely

These facts, too, we believe, could only be recorded by a more detailed discussion between representatives of the two parties. From that standpoint, such a discussion would be profitable. By means of a discussion, to be sure, the character, scope and means of regulating (eventually, disposing of) these differences could be established more precisely. But in view of the lengthy period over which these differences have developed, and the vast documentary material presented on them by both sides, it is, of course, most unlikely that they could be eliminated in one, or even two or three such preliminary meetings, and a completely common point of view worked out.

The fact cannot be ignored that we have the same firmness and depth of conviction about the views we hold on a number of theoretical and political questions as the comrades of the S.W.P. have of their views. It is not to be denied, either, that these views relate to significant and important questions. Furthermore, we are the last to minimize the importance of political and theoretical questions, and of taking a correct position on them.

We do not regard this as a hindrance to early unification, however. As all of us in the movement have held, a "monolithic" party is neither possible nor desirable. In the history of the Fourth International, there have been, and still are, sections in which the differences on certain theoretical and political questions were greater than those which today divide the Socialist Workers Party and the Workers Party. It might be added that within the Workers Party itself, we regard as entirely permissible the existence of a difference in some controversial questions, which are not less important than those which, on other questions separate us from the S.W.P. We not only believe that our differences with the S.W.P. today are of such a nature as are quite permissible within the limits of a united revolutionary party, but that they can be fruitfully debated and best settled by means of comradely discussion, organized and conducted in the best traditions of democratic centralism, within the ranks of one party.

Agreement on Every Question Unnecessary

These views, if we may repeat, make up our conception of the basis for unification and the basis for the revolutionary party in general. If your views are the same as ours on this score, or similar to ours, we would consider that very little remains for the achievement of unity beyond the discussion and settlement of practical organizational steps. Moreover, agreement on this would dispel any impression that the indispensable pre-condition for unification of two revolutionary Marxist groups is an agreement on every theoretical, political, and organizational question. However, if your conception differs in any important aspect from ours, we are prepared to discuss it with the necessary objectivity. A precise formulation by you would make it possible for us to express a precise opinion.

There remain three points which are dealt with in your letter.

To the statement quoted above, you add "...when divergences of opinion occur, unity can be maintained only by the scrupulous observance of the democratic principle of the subordination of the minority to the majority and strict discipline in public activity and action." To this point of view, too, we subscribe. We have maintained this view throughout the existence of the Workers Party. We would, of course, continue to maintain it within the united party. To this view, we join the view, likewise well-established in the entire revolutionary Marxian movement, that a minority has the right and even the duty to disseminate and defend its special point of view in the party, and that the majority—precisely because it is the majority and therefore mainly responsible for the leadership and integrity of the organization—has the special obligation to protect the rights of a minority as a function of its obligation to preserve the rights and interests of the party as a whole. Having these conceptions, we believe that a "genuine unification on a firm and long lasting basis" is possible. It goes without saying that we share the view that a "unification followed by a sharp faction fight and another split would be highly injurious to the party." No serious comrade could contemplate a unification of this kind. A faction fight of any sort, much less a split, following the unification, would compromise both the party and those responsible for such lamentable consequences of the unity. In any case, it seems to us, the unification would have to be followed by a period of intensive common activity in the class struggle, during which—while the opinions and rights of any minority would be respected and protected—factionalism, mutual recrimination, and judgments of the old division would be abjured.

On the basis of the foregoing, we have no difficulty in meeting your request that we indicate more precisely and more concretely our view of how the unification is to be brought about and what form it should take.

Once it is agreed that there is sufficient accord in our positions on the fundamental principles of Marxism and to make possible and justify unity; once it is agreed that the differences we do have (which we do not wish to conceal) are of a nature that may exist within the ranks of a single revolutionary party—the only important point left is the discussion of the practical organizational steps for fusing the two parties into one.

On Preliminary Exchange of Opinions

If the comrades of the Socialist Workers Party feel that a preliminary exchange of opinions, especially on controversial questions, would make for a better and more fruitful understanding on the respective views among the membership of the two parties, and would contribute to a smoother passage to a healthy unity, we are ready to consider the publication under the joint auspices of the two Committees of a discussion bulletin open to both organizations. If this measure is considered superfluous, and the Socialist Workers Party is of the opinion that a discussion of controversial questions is, under the circumstances, better held after the unity, the decision is in its hands. In that case representative Committees of the two parties could, as is customary, arrange the details of the fusion. A National Committee could be set up subject to review by the first convention of the united party; similarly in the case of officers of the party. The question of merging the two theoretical and popular organs could also be settled by the two negotiating Committees.

In our case, as, we suppose, in the case of the Socialist Workers Party, all these proposals, if agreed upon the Committees of the two parties, would be subject to the preliminary approval of a National Convention. One further point, in conclusion. We find that we do not agree with your statement on the possibility or expediency of practical collaboration in a number of fields, to be carried on between now and the eventual union of the two parties.

You say that "to attempt to begin with such practical cooperation, prior to a definite approach to unification, would seem to us to put things upside down and lead to a sharpening of conflicts over secondary questions rather than to their moderation."

On Practical Collaboration

We call your attention, first, to the fact that it is not practical collaboration that we are beginning with. Both organizations have already begun with the question of unification, the Workers Party by its resolution in favor of unification and the Socialist Workers Party by its decision in favor of unification. The fact that both parties envisage unification as a practical possibility—and unless they did, further discussion would be superfluous or deceptive—creates, in our view, the basis for considering, now, agreement for practical collaboration in specific, concrete fields of work. Second, it is difficult for us to see why such collaboration would necessarily, or at all, lead to a sharpening of conflicts.

On some questions there are, it is true, differences in theory. But we have always held that it is precisely in those cases where there is a difference in theory or program between two proletarian organizations, and not contrariwise, that practical collaboration is necessary and possible—provided, of course, that the two organizations have a similar standpoint or aim in the practical step: Such collaboration is not less indicated between organizations with a similar program. It is certainly ten times more warranted in the case of two organizations which have already commenced to discuss the question of unity between themselves.

Naturally, when there are specific political disagreements on actual tasks, tasks of the day, practical collaboration is not possible between the organizations involved. For example, we cannot today have practical collaboration between the parties on the question of the election in Detroit. But the two parties can, even now, we are convinced, reach a high measure of fruitful collaboration in such matters as a joint fight, or joint consultation in the fight, for these slogans and aims which we put forward in much the same way in the trade unions. Similar practical collaboration is possible and desirable in the case of the New York municipal elections; in the case of the united action against Fascists like Smith and Winrod; in the case of joint efforts on behalf of our comrades of the Fourth International abroad, etc., etc.

For these reasons, we request that you reconsider your position.

* * * *

We have set forth our views on a number of questions as plainly as we can with the aim of clearing all obstacles off the road to unity and without concealing our differences in general or our differences, to the extent that they exist, on the question of unity itself. It is quite possible that we have failed to express ourselves in all questions with the necessary clarity, or have failed to deal with all the questions of importance.

If that proves to be so, in your view, we are prepared upon request to elaborate our views on any point germane to the question of unification. We are ready to deal with any such points in further correspondence, or orally in a meeting with the sub-committee appointed by your Political Committee.

Meanwhile, we await your reply to the present communication.

Yours fraternally,
MAX SHACHTMAN,
National Secretary, Workers Party.

Letter to SWP National Committee Meeting

October 4, 1945

National Committee,
Socialist Workers Party,
116 University Place,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Comrades:

To facilitate the consideration of the question of the unification of the Socialist Workers Party and the Workers Party at your Plenum, we want to summarize here the views we have already set forth in our written communications to you and orally at the two discussion meetings already held by your sub-committee and ours.

The National Committee of the Workers Party proceeds from the following premises:

The Socialist Workers Party and the Workers Party represent two tendencies in the revolutionary Marxist, or Fourth International, movement. Between the two parties there is, however, sufficient agreement on basic principles and program to warrant and make possible their fusion into a united party. The differences between the two on a number of theoretical, political and organizational questions, the nature and scope of which are well known, are permissible within the framework and in the ranks of a single revolutionary party. Furthermore, the main political differences which led to the split in the SWP and the formation of the WP more than five years ago, namely, the question of the defense of Stalinist Russia in the war, does not have the same acuteness and prominence today that it had then, the SWP having declared recently that its main slogan in this question has receded into the background.

The unification of the two parties is thereby rendered politically and practically possible at the present time. Such a unification, accomplished on a sound and healthy basis, would serve the best interests of the working class and of our common cause. It would give the movement for revolutionary socialism a great forward impulsion in this country and stimulate the movement of our co-thinkers and co-fighters throughout the world.

In our discussions, the delegation of the Socialist Workers Party pointed out that its committee had not yet taken an official position on the question of the unity of the two parties and had not yet decided whether or not it wanted unification or considered it desirable. The delegation did not, therefore, make any proposals in the name of the SWP on the question of unity, or on the basis upon which it could or should be accomplished. It limited itself largely to obtaining information from us with regard to the viewpoint of the Workers Party.

Ambiguity Largely Dispelled

Nevertheless, we are able to record a point which is important not only from our standpoint, but from the standpoint of the consideration of the question of unity itself. As we pointed out in our last letter to you, the reply sent by your party to our National Committee resolution on unity lent itself to ambiguity in the matter of the basis for unification. It could be interpreted to mean that the SWP took the position that before unity could be accomplished between the two parties, there would first have to be discussion and then agreement on the decisive and important political and programmatic questions. We replied by saying that the political differences between us were sufficiently well known on both sides; that they could most probably not be composed in one, two or three discussions between sub-committees; and that in any case, we took the position that these different views could very well be permitted, contained and freely discussed within the ranks of one revolutionary party. At the first conference between the two delegations, this ambiguity seems to us to have been largely dispelled. Two circumstances give us this impression. The first is that the political differences between the two parties were not raised by your delegation for discussion, and no indication was given that such a discussion, and above all, an agreement on the political questions, was considered an indispensable precondition of unification. The second is that the national secretary of the SWP, in response to our direct question, declared that he could grant, abstractly, in a general way, that the differences between the two parties were of a character and scope as made possible their co-existence within a single party; and declared further that the present differences between the two groups could be considered "frozen." A more precise and formal confirmation of this view, would, in our opinion, considerably narrow the field of difference between us on the question of the basis for unity and on the character of the united party.

While granting *abstractly* the possibility of fruitful co-existence of the two tendencies within one party, the delegation of the Socialist Workers Party repeatedly stressed the question of the *concrete* practicability, feasibility, of a fusion. It referred several times to the fact that the SWP comrades had uppermost in their minds the question, "Will it work?," that is, will the unification work out profitably for the movement in practice, in the concrete? Reiterating the view expressed in the letter of the SWP to our party, the delegation pointed out that

a unification followed immediately by an intense factional fight and perhaps another split, would not be a solid unity or a worthwhile unity from any standpoint.

These considerations were set forth by the SWP delegation with particular reference, it seems, to one of our proposals. We find it necessary to repeat and motivate it here, inasmuch as on the one side it has been endorsed by our committee both before and after its presentation to the joint conference of the two parties, and on the other side, because it became the principal topic of discussion at the first joint conference.

WP as a Disciplined Minority

In opening the discussion at the first conference, our delegation put forward orally the views presented in our letter to you. In reply to the question as to how, more concretely, we envisaged the actual unification, we added: For us it is not a question of maneuvering, bargaining or deception of any kind. We recognize the numerical superiority of the SWP, which means that unless and until altered by the majority of the membership of the unity party, the predominance in leadership and policy in the united party would fall to the comrades now composing the SWP, with the comrades now composing the WP making up a disciplined minority with all the necessary rights and facilities at its disposal to provide the means of changing the policy of the united party by democratic process.

However, our delegation added, the Workers Party, representing a distinct and different political tendency, or ideological grouping, from that represented by the SWP, required and was justified in having, inside the united party, an internal educational bulletin of its own in which it could freely defend, disseminate and develop its particular point of view on a number of theoretical and political problems of the movement. We proposed that the right of any minority to publish and disseminate such an organ inside the party—a right fully consonant with the best traditions and principles of democratic centralism—be recognized on both sides, thus obviating in advance any recriminations and friction that might otherwise be provided if and when such an organ was published. We pointed out further that the present party discussion bulletin, if published in the same way in the united party, could not be considered an adequate substitute for a bulletin of our own, inasmuch as the comrades of the WP believed that they could not place sufficient confidence in the present auspices of the SWP bulletin to warrant a withdrawal of our proposal for a bulletin of our

own and a joint recognition of the right of ourselves, or any other minority, to publish one at its own discretion and on its own responsibility.

This proposal, as your delegation will report to you, constituted perhaps the main burden of our joint conference, at least of its first session. Upon further consideration by us of the arguments advanced by your delegation, we find it necessary to reiterate our stand. It was our impression that most of the arguments advanced applied not merely to the harm that would allegedly come to the party from the discussion of party problems in a bulletin of our own, but equally to a free discussion conducted in any other form. We are unable to subscribe to any viewpoint that says or suggests that every ideological grouping or tendency is automatically a faction or must necessarily become one; or that every political or ideological discussion is automatically a factional fight or must necessarily become one. In our view, agreement with such a conception means one of two things: If every political or theoretical discussion is a factional discussion and means of a factional fight, the revolutionary party must be engaged in permanent factional warfare; and if this is so, and factional warfare must be averted at all costs, then discussion must be disallowed, and then in place of a living revolutionary party freely developing its theory, program and political line we will have a monolithic sect. Our conception of the basis for unification and therefore the basis of the revolutionary party is radically different from this.

No Principle Involved

Your national secretary pointed out, in the discussion, that there was no question of principle involved in our proposal. The publication of a minority organ inside the party had been allowed before and even the issuance of a public organ by a minority cannot be dealt with as a matter of immutable principle, he declared. To take no more than one example, he added, the Oehlerites in the old Communist League of America and in the old Workers Party were freely permitted to publish an organ of their own inside the party. What was involved, in his opinion, however, was the significance of our proposal concretely, in the given case. The question of unity could not be solved, he said, by the SWP rejecting our proposal or by the WP insisting on it. It should rather be considered as a "symbol," and from this standpoint it appeared to him that the proposal would or might adversely affect or nullify the aspects of the unity.

For the reasons already set forth in our conference sessions, we cannot accept this point of view or share these apprehensions. We have not taken a position for unification lightly. We do not contemplate the abandonment of our independent organization, leadership and press lightly, but only because of the progress for the movement that a healthy unity would represent. We look upon a factional war the morning after unity as an absurdity. But we are compelled to add that we regard as equally absurd any suggestion that a free exchange of opinions on party problems, a free and fruitful and

necessary discussion of such problems—which we look upon as the life-blood of a revolutionary party, and not as a "special" feature of party life or as a "luxury" accorded from time to time—is the same thing as a factional war or is in contradiction with any of the practical and daily needs of party work in the class struggle.

Finally, even if the publication of a separate organ inside the party by a minority is considered "abnormal"—a viewpoint we do not share—it must also be said that there are very few examples in our history of the union of two organizations which, for all they have in common, nevertheless have such a divergence of views, that is, of the union of two such distinctive tendencies as our two parties now represent. In that case, it seems to us utterly unrealistic to attempt, in the problem of our unification, to apply "normal" criteria (as some comrades consider them to be) to an "abnormal" (i.e., a more or less unprecedented) situation. If some comrades find it necessary, we can establish our own "precedent" in this matter.

On Practical Collaboration

We do not wish to dwell at length on our proposals for practical collaboration between the two parties now. Naturally, the area of collaboration and its character and limitations will differ in accordance with the position taken by your Plenum on the basic and primary question, the question of unity. We are prepared for collaboration in either case. If you find that unity is either undesirable or unfeasible at the present time, we are nevertheless prepared to enter into practical agreements with the SWP for united activity in all indicated fields. The nature of the agreements would then be of one kind. If, however, your Plenum decides that unity is not only desirable but feasible and soon realizable, the practical collaboration we should then engage in would be of another—a closer and more harmonious—kind. It would then also represent both a practical preparation for the unity of the two parties and a realistic test of its workability.

Finally, we point out, the question of our views on the stage of development and the perspectives of the revolutionary party in the United States, and of our views on the Stalinist Party, also arose toward the end of our second joint session. We find no need to reiterate what was said on these questions from our side or to elaborate on it. Some of what was said represents our party's views; some, however, represents only individual views, as was made clear in the discussion.

Those members who find it necessary to examine our views on these or other questions will find them stated with sufficient clarity and amplitude in the volumes of our theoretical organ and in the files of our party bulletin, both of which were supplied to your delegation in the most complete possible form. Our views on the stage of development of the movement in this country today, of its tasks (in the general sense) and perspectives, on the question of a party cadre, of tendencies in the revolutionary party, of party democracy and related

questions, are best and most recently set forth in the documents presented to and adopted by our Active Workers Conference a little while ago.

In view of the foregoing, we reiterate the position that our party has taken on the question of unification, and make the following requests of your Plenum:

That the National Committee of the SWP, upon examining the relevant documents and discussing the reports before it, adopt an official position on the question of unity to be communicated to us for our immediate consideration. It is difficult for us to see how any further progress can be made in the discussion and realization of unity between the two parties if your subcommittee designated to meet with us continues to be in a position where it cannot and does not make any proposals of its own on the question of unity, where it cannot express itself definitely on proposals made by us, and where it is even unable to declare that the SWP has decided in favor or in opposition to unity itself.

That the National Committee of the SWP, in adopting an official position, expresses itself at the same time on the series of proposals made by us for the basis on which the unification should be achieved and for the method to follow in achieving it.

Lastly, that the National Committee of the SWP, in its deliberations on unity, consider again the question of practical collaboration between the two organizations and adopt concrete proposals, either in agreement with our own or else as a substitute of our own for us to consider.

Any relevant questions that remain unelucidated, or that require amplification, we are prepared to deal with during your deliberations, either by letter or orally before your committee. For that purpose, our committee's delegation is being held at your disposal upon your request at any time during your sessions.

Fraternally yours,
MAX SHACHTMAN,
National Secretary,
Workers Party.

WORKERS PARTY BULLETIN

Containing documents on unity negotiations and letter to the membership by Max Shachtman, National Secretary.

(Mimeographed)

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The Politics of

THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING CLASS

(Continued from inside front cover)

actual and direct power in its hands, the Assembly will sit removed from the actual political life of France until it has finished its labors and presents a constitution. This may take longer than the seven months provided for. Meanwhile de Gaulle remains in authority.

If, however, the Assembly has jurisdiction over the government, every problem facing the French people today will force its way into the debates of the Assembly. Under certain conditions the Assembly can become the focal point of mass actions of the workers with mass delegations, demonstrations and demonstration strikes carrying the voice of the people into its deliberations as in the early 1790's. It is this which the conservatives fear. It is this which makes question two the crucial one in the referendum.

The Socialist Party, under popular pressure, has found it necessary to support the demand for a new constitution. But as befits a party led by lawyers and parliamentarians, it, like the de Gaullists, prefers a constitution written in seclusion from the white heat of political struggle. It, too, prefers that the "Socialist" lawyers work undisturbed by the tread of marching masses from the Parisian industrial belt. It therefore supports de Gaulle on question two.

The Radicals have long waxed fat on the politics of the Third Republic. They have been the traditional mass base for French imperialist rule, drawing their support mainly from the lower middle class of the cities and the peasantry. They have suffered great losses during the war. Actually, the trend away from the Radicals began as long ago as the depression of the early thirties. However, the Popular Front threw the Radical politicians a life rope and recouped their failing fortunes. Now the desertion of the Radicals by their voting support is unmistakable. The bulk of it is going to the Socialist Party. Its more conservative elements have drifted to the de Gaullist parties and the "radical" Popular Republican movement which emerged out of the Resistance. Seeking once more the fleshpots of the Third Republic, the Radical politicians ask their supporters to vote "No" on question one, i.e., against a new constitution. However, their stand on question two is more difficult to understand. Should the Assembly have constitutional powers, the Radicals ask that their supporters vote that it also have immediate governmental power. It may be based upon the calculation that the emergence of a cabinet based upon the political balance in the Assembly would necessarily have to be a Left-Center government in which they would take a leading rôle, as in the post-Blum Front Populaire cabinets. It may also be prompted by demagogic considerations of competition with the Socialists for the support of the radicalized lower middle class, since their stand places them to the left of the Socialist Party on this question.

The position of the French Stalinists in the referendum is dictated by the fact that de Gaulle is once more drawing away from Moscow and toward an understanding with the Anglo-American bloc. At present it appears that the Americans are willing to consider at least a partial restoration of the French Empire for reasons of their own, of course. The

need for gestures toward Moscow on de Gaulle's part has consequently lessened. The opposition of the French Stalinists has consequently stiffened. This is bolstered by an immediate political consideration within France. The first great wave of support for the French CP, based upon its rôle in the resistance movement, is receding.

The trend toward the Left continues in France but it is the Socialist Party, not the CP, that is gaining strength, as shown by the cantonal elections. Much of the SP gain, as has been indicated, comes from the former Radical support in the middle class. But, nevertheless, the pro-de Gaulle policy of the CP during the height of the French-Soviet flirtation, had the effect of diminishing its attractive power among the masses, above all among the workers who still support the SP.

ILP Members Sit on Opposition Benches

The three Independent Labor Party members returned to the House of Commons in the last election—Maxton, McGovern and Stephen—continue to occupy their old places on the opposition benches.

They explain their position as one of general support to the Labor majority but desire to remain in a position from which they can oppose and criticize. That they will have plenty of occasion for the latter becomes obvious with each passing day of the Labor government, above all as Bevin unrolls Labor's foreign policy. But it will take more than the humanitarian zeal and oratorical prowess of James Maxton to pillory effectively the imperialist policy of the Labor Party leadership. To do this the ILP would require a consistent and thoroughgoing program of international Marxism. But every issue of the *New Leader*, ILP weekly, continues to reveal the theoretical confusion and programmatic formlessness which has, over the years, made this state of affairs and ILPism synonyms in the dictionary of politics.

The London *Daily Worker* has sought to capitalize upon the oppositionist position of the ILP by proclaiming with malicious glee that "the ILP members sit among the Tories." William Gallacher—Stalin's personal MP—and his newly elected co-worker have, of course, crossed the floor to the government benches. The British CP can make good use of the cloak of respectability afforded by membership in the government majority. We predict, however, that it will not be long before the CP will have less in common with the Attlee-Bevin cabinet than either the Tories or the ILP. The growing antagonisms between Russia and the British Empire will find the British servants of the Kremlin in opposition to the Labor government straight down the line on foreign policy and, in order to gain political support, in "radical" opposition on most matters of domestic policy.

Whatever the political meanderings of the ILP may be, they reflect the pressure of proletarian Glasgow and the Clyde-side. The politics of Gallacher reflect the latest cable from Moscow—and nothing else.

The Political Press in the Russian Zone of Germany

German Social Democratic émigrés in this country have been complaining that the Anglo-French-American occupation authorities have not permitted the organization of political journals in their zones while the Russians have shown the way toward democracy by giving such permission. As justified as they are in their protests against the lack of a free press in

Western Germany under the Allies, the Social-Democrats choose a poor example in pointing to the "liberalism" of the Russians.

The first samples of the Berlin political press put out under the Russians have reached our hands but recently. They all bear the same political stamp, "Made in Russia."

There are four dailies published by the four parties which Marshall Zhukov has "permitted" to be organized: the Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Christian-Democratic Union, and the Liberal-Democratic Party. From a careful reading of them one can detect differences only in the degree to which they outstrip each other in servility to their "liberators." The German Stalinists, being old hands at the game, find no difficulty in carrying off the honors in this competition. The so-called Social Democrats, whose traditionally flexible spines have grown none the firmer under the Nazi whip, outdo themselves to press close upon the heels of the CP. The "Christian" party politicians, composed of the old "Center" party, find their long practice of bowing to the hierarchical authority emanating from the Vatican now stands them in good stead as they bow to the hierachical authority emanating from the Kremlin. The bourgeois liberals, of course, find flunkeyism to the GPU a little more exacting than their past practice but with an effort will acquire the necessary skill.

In addition to their political line, the newspapers achieve a surprising degree of uniformity in make-up, format and—unrelieved dullness. The CP's *Deutsche Volkszeitung* (the very choice of this name in place of the historic *Rote Fahne* speaks volumes) is the only one to rise somewhat above the common level. Because it can apply the Russian political line as its own party line without subterfuge or camouflage, it achieves a more vigorous political tone.

The Social Democratic *Das Volk* managed to scrape the ground with its chin in a bow to the Russian "liberators" in its V-J Day edition. Its banner headline read, "Red Army Still Advances." A small type head over another story announced "World Peace"

French Buchenwald Victims Call for Freedom For German People

The *Socialist Appeal*, organ of the Revolutionary Communists of Great Britain (Fourth Internationalists) reprints along with a photostatic reproduction, excerpts from a paper published by a group of French Communist prisoners released from the Buchenwald concentration camp. The paper was published on April 22, shortly after their release. They write:

They have lost no time, the journalists who came to visit the camp and who yesterday were interned with us; they fled at great speed and marketed their stuff. They lost no time in flooding the ether with their impressions and recollections. And what impressions! What recollections! . . .

Yes, we denounce before the world the nameless horrors of murderous fascism—we who for years before the war were alone in denouncing the crimes of Hitler. Yes, we will explain how necessary it is to do everything to ensure that such a regime of shame and filth shall never again see the light; we who alone since 1933 have fought against Hitler the war-maker; but we will not permit another VERSAILLES to be prepared, we will not permit the conditions for a new world war to be prepared which in 30 or 50 years will come to spatter the world with blood.

In accord with the solemn declarations of President Roosevelt and Churchill, we demand for the German people—we the Communists who have had most to suffer from fascism—the right freely to decide its own fate.

The reference to the effects of the Versailles Treaty are here combined with reference to the "solemn declarations of President Roosevelt and Churchill." These communist militants show the political confusion of the constantly shifting line of the Stalinists but also reveal their basic internationalism. What has happened to this particular group upon their return to France is not known. We can only speculate upon what effect the rantings of an Ehrenburg or the cold and murderous language of the Potsdam agreement may have had upon them.

The Effects of National Oppression Upon Class-Consciousness

Ralph Parker, reporting in the *Nation*, Sept. 29, tells of the effect which occupation by the Germans has had upon the Czechs:

In others it has created a cruelty that was rare among Czechs. When I visited the Sudetan areas German anti-fascists told me how shocked they were to find Czechs using brutal methods against the German population. "We did not know these Czechs before the war," they said, "they have a hardness that is new to their character." "We have been deeply disappointed," a German Communist said to me in Usti-na-Labem, "to find the Czech Socialists have forgotten that we are their comrades." . . . "Do you trust German Communists?" I asked Josef Weiner, tight-lipped Communist chairman of a Czech commission at Decin. "Not one of them," he replied.

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