

The New _____ **INTERNATIONAL**

December • 1943

A WORKERS PARTY RESOLUTION ON

**The United States in the War
The Post-War Crisis
Fight for the Labor Party**

"PARTISANS" vs. "CHETNIKS"

CLASS WAR IN YUGOSLAVIA

By Harry Young

BURNHAM AND THE MACHIAVELIANS

By R. Fahan

NEGROES IN THE CIVIL WAR

By J. R. Johnson

SINGLE COPY 20c

ONE YEAR \$1.50

Just Published!

PLENTY FOR ALL

The Meaning of Socialism

By **ERNEST LUND**

*A Popular Presentation of the
Socialist Viewpoint*

Why There Is an Age of Plenty

Why There Is Poverty in This Age of Plenty

Who Controls the Wealth Labor Produces

Why There Are Rich and Poor

What an Equitable Society Is

How It Can Be Achieved

Socialism as the Hope of Humanity

Ernest Lund has provided, in this pamphlet, an indispensable instrument for revolutionary socialist agitation. Avoiding the use of technical terminology, and confining himself to a simple and forceful exposition of the basic ideas of Marxism, he has written a pamphlet that any worker can read and understand.

Sixty Pages

10 Cents per Copy

Seven Cents per Copy in Bundles of Five or More

Published by the

WORKERS PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES

114 West 14th Street

New York 11, N. Y.

I enclose _____ for _____ copies of PLENTY FOR ALL.

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

A Monthly Organ of Revolutionary Marxism

Vol. IX

No. 11, Whole No. 81

Published monthly by the New International Publishing Co., 114 West 14th Street, New York 11, N. Y. Telephone: CHelsea 2-9681. Subscription rates: \$1.50 per year; bundles, 14c for five copies and up. Canada and foreign: \$1.75 per year; bundles, 16c for five and up. Entered as second-class matter July 10, 1940, at the post office at New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1879.

Editor: **MAX SHACHTMAN**

TABLE OF CONTENTS:

THESES OF THE WORKERS PARTY:

AMERICAN CAPITALISM IN THE WAR.....	323
THE COMING CRISIS IN THE U. S.....	327
THE FIGHT FOR A LABOR PARTY.....	329

THE STRUGGLE IN YUGOSLAVIA

By Harry Young	331
----------------------	-----

MACHIAVELLI AND MODERN THOUGHT

By R. Fahan	334
-------------------	-----

NEGROES IN THE CIVIL WAR

By J. R. Johnson	338
------------------------	-----

Discussion Articles:

THE EUROPEAN SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

By J. R. Johnson, Harry Allen, Tom Brown	341
---	-----

"BROTHERS UNDER THE SKIN"

By R. F.	345
---------------	-----

ORIGIN OF CAPITALISM IN RUSSIA—III

By V. I. Lenin	347
----------------------	-----

Books in Review:

A HISTORICAL TREASURE

By Sam Adams	350
--------------------	-----

MEN FROM NOWHERE	351
------------------------	-----

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

A Monthly Organ of Revolutionary Marxism

VOLUME IX

DECEMBER, 1943

NUMBER 11

From the Theses of the Workers Party:

American Capitalism in the War

The United States is today the dominant world political power. This new position is in marked contrast to its position in the First World War. At that time the political and military strategy of the war was determined by the Anglo-French imperialist allies. The United States played a subsidiary though important military rôle in the final months of the war. With the exception of shipping, American economy during that time, while organized on a war footing, did not contribute heavily to supplying military goods for the war itself. America's economic contribution to the Allies was in private bank loans and auxiliary materials (food, machinery, etc.). The real completion of the organization of the war economy did not take place until virtually the end of the war.

The sudden victory over Germany, following America's entry into the war, found the United States the dominant capitalist economic power, replacing England as the financial center of the world. It was transformed from a debtor nation to the world's largest creditor. Thus, this country became the first capitalist power which on the one hand exported more goods than it imported, and at the same time was a creditor nation.

U.S.A. After the First World War

Despite this dominant industrial and financial position, the ruling class lacked the political vision and program which would elevate it to the status in world politics corresponding to its economic power, as, for example, in the case of British imperialism during the pre-1914 decades. This anomalous lag was due in the first place to the fact that the market potential for capitalist expansion at home was sufficient not only to absorb the increasing native capital accumulation, but also to provide, at the same time, markets for foreign investments (particularly British). American direct investment beyond its borders prior to 1914 was primarily in Latin America, in the Far East and in the Pacific islands taken from Spain following the Spanish-American War. (In these instances, political, i.e., direct state intervention, was intimately interwoven with these foreign investments.) These factors, plus the geographic position, resulted in a mass ideology of political isolation permeating all classes.

The sudden transformation of the industrial and financial place of the U. S. in the world capitalism found the politically inexperienced ruling class ideologically unprepared to become the direct politically dominant power in the world. So that in the last post-war period the relation of the United States to Europe and Asia was predominantly economic, i.e., in the form of direct trade investment and loans. The political in-

The following three documents, "American Capitalism in the War," "The Coming Crisis in the U. S." and "The Fight for a Labor Party," constitute the main sections of the resolutions on the political situation and the tasks of the revolutionary Marxists recently adopted by the National Committee of the Workers Party.

terventions in these areas that did follow from its economic course were sporadic improvisations rather than acts resulting from a consciously developed and long-range policy.

This empirical, improvised course of American capitalism in world politics was not only a hangover from its pre-war 1914 position in capitalism but was reinforced by the tremendous internal industrial expansion and the fabulous rise in immediate direct profits accruing to the capitalist class, particularly the big monopolies. It led to the paradoxical situation where in the United States, which exported more goods than it imported and was the creditor of virtually all the European powers, placed high tariffs on goods from these countries—i.e., made it impossible for them to continue buying from this country except through new loans, thus creating a vicious spiral which contributed heavily to the greatest economic collapse in capitalist history. The economic crisis which began in the United States in 1929 with the stock market crash spread throughout the entire fabric of American and world economy.

This world crisis was not merely the usual cyclical crisis but a far more deep-going rupture of capitalist society which marked a new stage in the general decline of the social order; the United States, which heretofore had been an exception, now became an integral part of declining world capitalism.

The crisis was fundamentally an expression of the historically outlived character of capitalist society. The expanding social productive forces came into conflict with the limited and restricting consuming power arising from the class nature of capitalism and its division into competing national states. The tremendous over-capacity of productive plant, especially in the United States, and the existence of large surpluses in agricultural production and raw materials created a long period of mass unemployment throughout the world and resulted in a sharpened struggle between the main classes and within the ruling classes.

The universal breakdown of international economic relations—the collapse of world trade, the wholesale repudiation of debts, the destruction of the international gold standard and credit system—further intensified the economic decline in the separate countries and resulted in a social crisis of world capitalism.

"Haves" and "Have-Nots" in the Crisis

The impact of the world crisis intensified the struggle of the classes in all countries. The ruling classes sought to resolve these sharp conflicts as a necessary preliminary step to solving the crises on an international scale. Two main policies were employed, one by the "rich" powers, the "have" imperialists (Great Britain and the United States) and the other by the "have-not" impoverished imperialists (Germany, Italy, etc.). In the former case, the bourgeoisie succeeded in establishing an alliance with a large section of the organized labor movement and neutralizing its struggle through reformist methods; in the other countries, endangered by proletarian revolution and continuous upheaval, the bourgeoisie resorted to fascist totalitarianism, i.e., to nakedly violent rule.

Under these conditions, the imperialist states were compelled first to reorganize their national (or, in the case of Britain, its Empire) economies, in order to be in a better position to overcome the crisis by a new inter-imperialist struggle for foreign markets, for new fields of capital investment and trade. Thus the breakdown of world capitalist economy forced these states toward concentration on the nationally limited economy over which they had direct political control (the tendency toward autarchy).

This was demonstrated by the attempt of Britain to organize the Empire as an economic unit at the expense of the United States (Ottawa Conference, 1931), and strengthen its control over its European satellite states through the "sterling bloc," i.e., basing the monetary standard of these countries on the pound sterling instead of gold bullion. In Germany it was manifested by the coming to power of fascism and the reorganization of its national economy in preparation for a world expansion and for war. The United States showed the same trend in the first period of the crisis through the adoption of the "New Deal," whose foreign economic policy was symbolized by the repudiation of the gold standard, permitting the maximum control over the home market (prices, gold imports and exports, etc.) by Washington.

Thus the world economic crisis and the new economic course which it compelled the imperialist powers to take increased the tendency toward the direct intervention of the state in the economy. The bourgeoisie was no longer able to solve these problems in the old way. The magnitude of the new problems required the intervention of a collective agency which would represent the total interests of the capitalist system, i.e., the long-range interests of the capitalist class even at the expense of the immediate desires of this or that section of the ruling class. This was a partial recognition of the social character of the production which had already passed beyond the confines of capitalist private ownership and control.

Rise of the New Deal

In the United States, the bankers and industrialists appealed directly to President Roosevelt (1933) to save their bankrupt system; to prevent a rebellion of the masses in the face of the inability of the ruling class to supply the workers and farmers with the necessities of life despite the tremendous productive capacity of the industrial plant. The New Deal sought to reestablish an equilibrium between production and consumption. Its professed aims were to increase the purchasing power of the workers and farmers and revive production up to the old levels. It endeavored to do this through relief and public works, minimum wages and hours for labor, subsidies to and regulation of private industries and banks, subsidies to the farmers to cut production so as to decrease the surplus agricultural produce on the market.

The New Deal Administration was essentially a bourgeois-labor reformist coalition, which sought to reconcile conflicting class interests.

In the first period of the New Deal, big business was placed in direct control of government regulation of industry through its complete domination of the National Industrial Recovery Boards (writing and administering its codes). This new form of collective control by the monopolists of industry, though it succeeded in defending the profit interests of big business against "small" business, and sharpened the conflict between them, could not subordinate the individual interests of the big industrialists to that of the whole class. The failure of the NRA was manifested long before the Supreme Court declared it to be unconstitutional.

While the economy was revived from the low levels of the crisis and profits were once again being realized, the New Deal failed in its aim of raising production to the level of 1929, or solving the problem of mass unemployment.

There was no "national" solution to these problems. Their solution had to be sought in the international arena. But before this step could be taken, a necessary partial revival was required. Then the main task of American capitalism was to try to bring order in the world as a prerequisite for its imperialist expansion. That is to say, to organize the world in such a way as to enable it to express its industrial and financial power. The main disorganizer of capitalist world relations was fascist Germany, the "have-not" power at the close of the First World War, which, in turn, sought to organize the world under its own political and economic domination.

Conflicts of Imperialist Interests

Similarly, in the Far East, Japan, whose imperialist expansion took place as an associate of Great Britain, was and continues to be the "disorganizer" of "peaceful" American economic penetration. In order to achieve its ambitions in the Far East, American imperialism must first defeat Japan. As a matter of fact, so important is this area to the future of American capitalism that a large and significant section of the ruling class regards it as an even more important front than Europe.

The rivalry between the United States and the British Empire, which was expressed in the sharp competition between the two powers in Latin America and in Europe, was reproduced in Asia. Confirmation of this fact is to be found in the open and tacit support which England gave to Japan in the latter's conflicts with the United States until the outbreak of the war. This policy on the part of Britain flowed from her determination to maintain and extend her own imperialist domination and her colonial possessions. However, the British Empire, threatened by the colonial masses whom it subjugated, and by German and Japanese imperialism, could only be maintained through a military alliance with the United States. The Anglo-American conflicts, though continuing in various ways up to and in the war, were subordinated to the common need to defeat the "have-not" powers which sought to drive both out of Europe and Asia.

The rivalries and conflicts in Europe and Asia are similarly reproduced in Latin America, the "backyard" of American imperialism. Following the First World War, the United States replaced Great Britain as the dominant power in South America, a position which it has considerably strengthened since the outbreak of the present war.

Canada has been drawn closer to the sphere of American imperialism and further from the sphere of British imperialism in this war than in the First World War. Britain's island

bases in the West Atlantic are already shared on an equal basis and for the first time in history, by the United States. Even before the United States entered the war, and especially since its entry, the economy of the Latin American countries has become more and more dependent upon the United States—like-wise their political régimes and their military establishments. Japan, Italy and Germany have, of course, been ousted from almost every nook and cranny of Latin American life, thus removing three of the most important rivals of American imperialism. England continues to fight a losing battle in the last of its Latin-American strongholds, especially in the Argentine. The naked fact of the tightening grip of American imperialism upon the economic life of the Latin American countries is thinly veiled under the "Good Neighbor Policy," which cleverly exploits the democratic aspirations and anti-fascist sentiments of the Latin American peoples for the purpose of extending the sway of American imperialism all over the Western Hemisphere. Consequently, the main aim of American imperialism in the war is world domination through the establishment of international order by means of interstate institutions under its control. This in turn will require the use of military and political means in the post-war period, the extent and type of which will depend upon the concrete social conditions in the different countries following the war.

The American War Economy

Under the conditions of modern total war which requires the complete mobilization of all phases of the life of the warring country, the outstanding feature is the state direction and control over the entire economy. Thus in the United States, growth of state-directed capitalism under the Roosevelt régime, made imperative by the bankruptcy of the entire system, was tremendously increased as the country became organized on the basis of a war economy.

Planning for war leads to state direction of capital accumulation and control over the allocation of the productive resources of the country, material and human. In the interests of capitalist society at war, the profit motive of the private capitalists had to be integrated with the needs of the war itself. The state, therefore, decides how much and what type of war goods must be produced; how much and what type of civilian goods are to be manufactured. The production of consumer goods is subordinated to the output of war goods. Through price controls, forced savings, taxation, loans, priorities, labor freezing and control, the Roosevelt government seeks to achieve a balance between production and consumption in such a way as to get the maximum materials for war and the absolute minimum consumer goods necessary to maintain the population. The state direction of the economy has resulted in unparalleled growth of the productive plant and of the output of planes, ships and munitions.

The war economy of state-directed capitalism has resulted in changes in the relations within the capitalist class. Accompanying the wholesale bankruptcy of small manufacturers and wholesalers and shopkeepers (due to concentration of war contracts in large corporations, the curtailment of consumer goods production and the draft of men for the armed forces), the big industrialists have increased their domination of the national economy and their position in the state. Once again reaping fabulous profits, they have launched a planned campaign to oust the New Deal bureaucracy from control of the state production and substitute direct control by big business men. With the aid of the representatives of the big farmers and the Southern Democrats they have won their victories over the New Deal bureaucracy built up for over a decade by Roo-

sevelt. The President himself, conscious of the need of big business support in the war effort and also looking ahead toward the 1944 presidential election, has given increasing support to the right wing, pro-big business section of his coalition Administration (represented by Jesse Jones). The plan of the big industrialists for direct control of the war economy also has in view the problems of post-war United States. Who will own the government-built plants and facilities? How will the tremendous post-war stockpile of war goods be disposed of? What will happen to the government-controlled merchant marine and airplanes? In a word: who will control the post-war economy and determine the internal policies of the country and therefore its foreign economic and political course!

New Dealers and Monopolists

The New Deal bureaucrats and a small section of the capitalists, who believe that the old structure of private monopoly capitalism cannot solve the domestic or international economic problems of the United States, favor a strengthening of state-directed capitalism as a long-range program.

The dominant section of the big industrialists, while accepting the fact that the government will have to continue a number of the "emergency" measures of the war economy into the post-war period, are for the establishment of their own control of the state direction during this period and its telescoping of a brief interim stage. They look forward to the time when once again the state will only supplement their own direct economic operation of the economy and their international relations (and intervene only in periods of crises).

Their fear of state-directed capitalism in "peacetime" flows from the danger that under the democratic forms of government now prevailing in the United States, the other classes—the working class, the farmers, the small business men—all look to the state to help them against big business. The demand of these classes that the state take the responsibility for full employment, for the revival and expansion of small business, and for raising the living standards of the farmers, will inevitably increase manifold in the post-war period. For the big industrialists, increased growth of state-directed capitalism *within the framework* of bourgeois democracy means permanent uncertainty as to future developments and therefore interferes with their own long-range plans.

The conflict between the New Deal bureaucracy and the big industrialists and bankers is graphically symbolized by their differences on the proposed plans for international currency stabilization and inter-government international banks for capital investment and loans. The New Deal bureaucracy aims to establish an international managed currency (dominated by the dollar) and administered through an inter-governmental institution; and an inter-governmental international bank for capital and loans; which means a strengthening of the state-directed capitalism both at home and abroad. The big industrialists and bankers, however, want the minimum of state interference in money manipulations (within the country and internationally)—since this means state control of the economy—and direct dealings with other countries through their own corporations, banks and economic institutions. That is why they favor a return to the gold standard for the dollar and as the standard of international money; and a privately owned international bank for capital investment and loans. The interstate economic institutions, according to this plan, would exist merely to aid this main course.

The "Nationalists" and the Fascists

These industrialists and bankers, like the New Deal bu-

reaucrats, are anti-isolationist, "international-minded." But on the economic field they are for their own brand of internationalism: a type of monopoly-capitalist control which the New Deal bureaucrats hold cannot meet the new problems raised up by the present decay stage of capitalist development.

Another section of the ruling class, represented most vocally by McCormick of the *Chicago Tribune* and including in its retinue the America Firsters (Gerald K. Smith), Coughlin, the KKK, favors a program of "nationalism," i.e., political isolation from Europe and concentration of exploitation of Latin America and the Far East.

This reactionary bloc includes the most blatant anti-labor, anti-Negro, anti-Semitic elements and is the rallying center for the future development of a mass fascist movement in this country. At present, while this grouping is active and growing, particularly in the Middle West, and its influence has been expressed by the widespread growth of anti-Semitism and violent actions against the Negroes in various cities (Detroit, Beaumont, Newark, etc.), it is supported by only a small section of the big capitalists and has little influence in Washington or in national politics.

However, in the post-war period, a long stage of capitalist crises—mass unemployment, further impoverishment of the middle classes, discontent within the ruling class itself—will undoubtedly mean the growth of this movement and bring a more intimate connection between it and influential sections of big business. The fate of this movement is therefore intimately bound up with the further development of the impacts of the war economy and with the fate of post-war American capitalism.

Above all, the future of an American fascist movement which may attract large numbers of the demobilized soldiers and sailors, depends upon the political development of the working class.

• • •

From the moment that the war broke out, steps were taken to convert the United States into an arsenal for the Allies. This process was further speeded up with the fall of France in June, 1940. So that at the time of Pearl Harbor, and the American military entry into the war, plans were extended for a complete conversion of the economy to a war basis. This time America's allies were dependent upon the United States for planes, tanks, munitions, ships, as well as food and clothing. The United States undertook to supply these needs and simultaneously to equip an armed force of over ten million (in contrast to four million in 1917-18).

With great difficulty, and in the face of the initial reluctance of big business to reorganize industry in the common interest of capitalism, American war economy advanced rapidly.

U.S.A.'s Productive Record

The unprecedented demands of the global war for heavy materials of destruction had an immediate and direct effect upon the whole system. Production leaped upward at an unbelievable rate. The great pre-war problems of unemployment, capacity utilization of industrial plant, increasing production absolutely, raising foreign and domestic capital investments and trade, while lowering and finally eliminating the costs of the crisis, were guaranteed to be temporarily solved, for the duration of the war period, when German imperialism invaded Poland.

In 1939, the first rises in the economic indices were to be noted: since then production has continued upward at a record-breaking rate. The basic industries now work at capacity or near-capacity. This rise in production has absorbed the

millions of unemployed. Unemployment has now reached the lowest point in American history, since 800,000 jobless is regarded as less than "normal." In contrast to the virtual elimination of unemployment, the numbers of employed workers had risen to 42,000,000 in 1940 and to an estimated 62,000,000 at the end of 1943 (including the armed forces).

This expansion of production which ended unemployment and brought about a corresponding absolute growth of the proletariat, was accompanied by a change in the character of production from that of producer and consumer goods for a peacetime economy to a continually increasing production of war goods. At the present time the entire national economy is based on this production of war goods.

In 1940, the record American peacetime year, production which reached the high yearly income level of one hundred billion dollars, was still largely in durable and consumer peacetime commodities, with only two billion dollars, or one-fiftieth, in war goods. At the end of almost three years since 1940, production, measured in terms of national income, will reach an estimated one hundred and fifty-five billion dollars, of which eighty-five billion dollars, or over forty times that of 1940, will go into the production of war goods. This change in the character of production will reduce available consumer goods by twenty-eight billion dollars, creating an immeasurably more difficult situation for the mass of workers which must bring with it political development of increasing importance.

Through the lend-lease system, the state supervises the distribution of war goods and becomes the instrument through which the vast foreign trade of the country now passes. Even before the war, the acute international situation compelled a greater and greater intervention of the state in the field of foreign political and economic relations. Lend-lease is a governmental affair; it has become the chief means by which loans travel from this country to the Allies. The debts of the latter are now directly owed to the state. This, too, is in sharp contrast to the last war, when the immense loans made to the Allies came principally from private bankers and industrialists (J. P. Morgan & Co. and others).

So vast are the requirements of war that the construction of new plants for old industries and the construction of new plants for new types of industries were essential to the prosecution of the conflict. The construction of these new plants, mounting to billions of dollars, was accomplished by the state, and where private industry engaged in plant expansion, there too it was primarily through loans from the state.

The New Rôle of the State

The war brought to an end the domestic reformist course of the New Deal. The social reforms of the earlier period were frozen in such a manner that the War Labor Board became the arbiter which has final powers to set aside collective bargaining agreements and to determine the conditions of labor of the working class (wages, hours, union shop, etc.).

The new rôle of the state in this war has been accompanied by the passage of subtle totalitarian measures, which, while they have not touched on the more prominent and spectacular forms of civil liberties, have been extremely effective on the economic field. Here the totalitarian direction has been unmistakable and is reflected in congressional anti-labor legislation, the no-strike pledge, the War Labor Board, the wage freeze and the hold-the-line order, and the direct interference in the affairs of the labor movement by the state and even more dangerously by the President as the personification of the state.

The degree of totalitarian development has depended and will continue to depend on the military stages in the war (victory, difficult struggle and defeat) and the degree to which the labor movement is prepared to carry on the struggle against the ruling class. Up to now the ruling régime has utilized only such measures which have been required by it to realize its needs in mobilizing the country for war. But the next stage in the war and the post-war problems are growing increasingly acute and these are in turn reflected in the increasing totalitarian direction of the Roosevelt régime.

The greater the intervention of the state in the economic process, the more difficult does it become for it to appear as "above the classes"; the more openly will its bourgeois character be made plain to the broad masses. The process which is developing in the midst of the war will become more clear with each passing month. For already, America's military, political, economic and social policies have become unmistakably more reactionary.

War production demanded more drastic controls over the working class and these were gradually attained with the aid of a reactionary labor officialdom, tied to the Administration. But the outstanding counteracting force to the reactionary turn at home is the militant spirit and will to struggle of the American working class. In this, it is carrying on the tradition which made possible the foundation of the new trade union movement based upon industrial organization: the CIO. The existence of this kind of movement has created a base for working class struggles of incalculable importance.

The extreme dissatisfaction of the masses who bear the main burdens of the war at the same time that they observe the enrichment of the capitalist class, is expressed in strikes,

sit-downs, in violation of pledges given the state by their craven leadership, slowdowns, opposition to speed-up "incentive" schemes. The absence of a strong mass revolutionary party, added to the existence of a reactionary labor leadership, has prevented the political organization of the American working class and the maximum expression of its opposition to the ruling class and its Washington Administration.

The aforementioned dissatisfaction of the masses was given living expression in the heroic miners' strike. This significant struggle in the face of the united and ferocious opposition of the reactionary ruling class, the New Dealers, their liberal hangers-on and the Stalinists, coupled with the extreme restlessness of the working class and its various sections, especially the Negroes, chafing under the conditions of the war, and resisting, now openly, now covertly, the economic measures of the ruling class, represents the first sign of a decisive break in the Roosevelt-labor bloc. The recent union conventions, where reactionary labor leaders succeeded in forcing their class-collaborationist policies down the throats of the workers, in reality concealed the deep ferment in the ranks of labor. Thus the first evidence of a schism between Roosevelt and labor which came with the defection of Lewis in the elections of 1940, has grown wider at its base than at the top (but it is definitely here and destined to become wider).

A definitive break with Roosevelt is an indispensable step for the future political development of the American workers. It will mark a tremendous step forward only provided it does not take the form of support to the Republican Party under the leadership of Willkie or some other liberal and provided it does take the positive form of independent political action of the working class through its own political party.

Prospects of the Post-War Period

The Coming Crisis in the U. S.

The United States is heading toward an economic crisis in the post-war period that will be more catastrophic and more far-reaching in its social consequences than it has experienced at any time in its history. The gigantic problems of post-war reconversion of the economy and social life of the country will find the antagonistic classes more conscious of their particular interests and better organized to defend them. Above all, this will be the case, on the one hand, with the big industrialists and bankers, and on the other, the working class organized through its powerful unions. In addition, the millions of demobilized men and women of the armed forces—yesterday's "lost generation"—will demand jobs and decent living standards and will be determined to enforce their demands. And the mass of the middle classes, crushed by the war and the big monopolists, will put forward their own program for their rehabilitation and security. Post-war United States will be a place of great social turbulence and sharp class strife.

Already the immense wartime construction of new industrial plants and the expansion of the key machine-tool industry have reached their peak. In view of the stupendous productive capacity of the economy, the expansion of war production for the duration will be by means of the exploitation of labor. In the post-war period, reconversion of the economy will mean that the pre-war chronic mass unemployment will

once again plague the United States; this time it threatens to be far more widespread in view of the greatly augmented productive plant capacity and labor force.

The Economic Collapse

The economic collapse will be accompanied by mass migrations of workers from the war-boom, over-populated areas of the country, thus further disorganizing the economy and the social life of the country.

The large potential consumer demand due to wartime postponement of purchases (the unavailability of these goods during the war) and the existence of vast savings by the people (in the form of war bonds and bank deposits) even if increased by soldiers' bonuses, social security payments and relief, can only mean a brief spurt in the production of civilian goods.

Even the "consumer boom" will require a preliminary period of reconversion and readjustment; a period whose length will depend, among other factors, upon the future developments of the war and the war economy and the time relation between the end of the war in Europe and in the Pacific and Far East. In any event, many of the wartime governmental controls of the economy and new forms of government intervention will be imperative in the post-war period if the inevitable crisis is not to lead to complete economic and social

chaos.

In the post-war period, therefore, each group in American society will look to the state to intervene in its own behalf. The big monopolists will continue their wartime course in the new period. They will seek to strengthen their domination of government policies and boards and completely replace the New Deal bureaucracy as the directors and managers of the state. They will seek an early return to the direct control of the economy by the private monopolist corporations and banking houses; the scrapping or retiring of some government-owned plants and the sale of the rest to them; the abolition or sharp decrease of all taxes on corporations and the reduction of tax rates on the higher bracket incomes; early lifting of wartime government control measures; the early return to a free gold standard of money with ownership of gold by the private banks; the emasculation of the social legislation adopted in the last decade.

All these policies are national aspects of the general program of the big monopolists for extending their domination throughout the world by the means of their own private institutions, aided by the U. S. government and any inter-governmental bodies that may be set up.

The wealthy capitalists who do not belong to the monopolist group of the ruling class and the middle layer of manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers will demand that the state protect them against the big monopolies; sell the government-owned plants and stockpile of goods to them; give them subsidies and loans; enforce the anti-trust laws; reduce their tax rates; protect them against the unions and the "high" labor standards established during the war by modifying or abolishing some of the existing social legislation.

The middle classes, the really small business man, the bankrupt shopkeepers and the self-employed professionals who have been thrown out of business by the war economy and the draft for the armed forces, will demand state aid to reestablish their old positions and create conditions favorable to them.

The farmers likewise will demand that the state guarantee their continued prosperous development through price parities between agricultural and industrial products and subsidies and loans.

The workers and the demobilized men and women of the armed forces will demand that the government which was able to provide full employment during the war must also assure a job and decent living standard for all after the war. They will demand that the young people today in the armed forces and in industry, who were taken out of the schools, be given government aid to permit them to continue their formal education; and that this aid also be extended to all youth.

The workers do not and will not expect that the individual capitalists and corporations will be able to cope with the problem of post-war mass unemployment. The pent-up discontent of the workers with their present working and living conditions, now controlled because of the war and the no-strike policy of the union leadership, will be further increased by the mass unemployment and the well-organized offensive of the capitalists against their unions; and against the wage standards and working conditions of the employed workers.

Post-War Prospects of Capitalism

The fate of the United States in the post-war period will depend upon its ability to organize the world. America's rôle in the present war has destroyed isolationism as the dominant policy of American capitalism. Henceforth the foreign policy of the ruling class will be interventionist. The insistence on all sides (Sumner Welles, Wendell Willkie, Eric Johnston) that "the era of imperialism is past" is an expression of the

ruling class for a different type of imperialism. On the one hand, it is an attack on British, French and Dutch colonial empires, with a view toward American participation in their exploitation and, on the other hand, an expression of the fact that American capitalism cannot at this late stage of history repeat the course of the old imperialism, i.e., convert large areas of the world into its own direct colonial empire, maintained through military and political domination. Further, due to the industrial and financial superiority of the United States over its rivals, the "open door" policy is the most advantageous course.

This policy is also dictated by the need to win the support of the colonial bourgeoisie and masses, who hate the imperialisms which now rule over them and who seek national independence.

To achieve and maintain an "open door" policy, the United States has become and will seek to retain its position as the leading naval and air power in the world, with far-flung bases on the seven seas and the five continents. The contraction of the world due to the phenomenal development of aviation has further strengthened potentialities of the industrially power United States to enforce such a course.

However, the United States is in the paradoxical position—similar to the position it has been in since the last war, but now far more acutely—of being at one and the same time the world's leading industrial country whose exports exceed its imports and the greatest creditor nation; in addition, it owns about three-fourths of the world's monetary gold. This has led and will continue to lead to a chronic disequilibrium in foreign trade in favor of the United States and disrupts harmonious international relations.

To solve these problems, the United States must take the lead in establishing international institutions, political and economic, under its direction, to control the world economy; revival of the national economies in the devastated areas; the organization of a stable international monetary system and credit facilities and provisions for loans and capital investments. The formation of these institutions, the precise character of which is as yet undetermined, is now the subject of sharp conflict within the Allied camp (between England and America; between these countries and Russia; and between the big powers and the exile governments); and within the ruling classes of Britain and the United States. Whatever the character of these institutions, they will be unable to solve the contradictions between the imperialist powers or establish a progressively developing world capitalist society. Through these means, the United States at best may be able to postpone for a brief time the inevitable consequences of its imperialist paradox.

The United States will endeavor to revive European production through loans and capital investments but American economy will soon find that the goods produced in Europe are competitive products and, therefore, the basis for the repayment of these loans, which must ultimately be in goods and services, will be non-existent.

But even for such a development, American imperialism will find tremendous obstacles. First of all, political and social order must be established on a basis favorable to the Allies. In the face of the expropriation of the national capitalist classes and the scrambling of property rights in occupied Europe by fascist Germany, the masses will demand collective ownership of what remains of these industries, i.e., drive toward socialism. The Allies, in turn, will come into conflict with this program as they seek to reestablish the power of the dispossessed national bourgeoisies.

The Main Political Problem

The Fight for a Labor Party

The working class of the United States faces the gravest responsibilities in its history. Already it is compelled to meet the offensive against its economic standards and its political rights which American capitalism has launched in the very midst of the war. Tomorrow it will be faced with the crisis of the post-war period and the life-and-death problems that the crisis will pose. Powerful though it is, the United States cannot escape the mounting effects of the general decay of world capitalism. All it can hope to accomplish is to delay the appearance of the more malevolent of these effects, but even then only by accelerating their advent in other countries; to mitigate the violence with which they strike the country, but only by increasing the ruinousness of the coming crisis in other lands. Sooner or later, less violently at first or more violently, the fury of the fundamental crisis of decay will nevertheless be felt in the United States. No country today can escape making the basic choice of society—barbarism or socialism. At best, it can postpone the decision.

The development of a new barbarism is most spectacularly visible in the triumph of fascism in Germany and its works, both before and during the war. But this development is inherent not in the mythical "Aryanism" of the Germans, nor in their equally mythical "racial soul," it is a product of capitalism at a certain stage of its evolution, or rather, or its decline. If the United States is not the very next in order after Germany, it is nevertheless—barring the victory of socialism—somewhere on the list.

The decay of capitalism into a new barbarism simply means an unprecedentedly intensive exploitation and disfranchisement of the working class, mass suffering unknown in modern times, and permanent war interrupted only by short periods of truce. The long-lasting crisis of 1929 and the devastating war that began in 1939 are only harbingers of what decaying capitalism has in store for society.

Labor—Discontented but Unprepared

The American working class, by and large, has lost its confidence in the ability of the ruling class to establish a peaceful, secure, orderly and prosperous régime after the war. It greets all the wordy but hollow "post-war plans" for social and economic stabilization and reconstruction put forward by the defenders of the old order with the skepticism and even cynicism which they merit. However, while its faith in the old has waned considerably, even if not with a fully conscious understanding of the reason for this lack of confidence, the working class in the United States has not yet acquired either understanding of or confidence in a new, or socialist, order.

In a word, the American working class is most inadequately situated at the present time to meet the deepening crisis.

Between its state of economic organization and its state of political organization and class consciousness, there is today a more striking contrast than ever before, and this at a time when the contrast jeopardizes its whole future.

In the trade union field, the American working class is today better and more fully organized than ever in its history, or even in the history of the international working class. There are now almost thirteen million workers organized in the trade union movement. This is not only more

than there have ever been, but the type and composition of its organization are most significant and promising than ever before. Not only are almost half the trade unionists in the country organized for the first time on an industrial basis, but they cover industries which were citadels of open-shopism in the past—the basic, key, heavy, mass-production industries. The tone of the labor movement in this country is set today not so much by the "aristocracy of labor," the highly skilled and highly paid craftsmen, but by the most important and basic sections of the American proletariat.

From the standpoint of organization, and even more important, from the standpoint of militancy and determination to safeguard their economic standards regardless of any other consideration, including demagogical appeals directed to them about the "war for democracy," the American workers are today undoubtedly the vanguard of the international working class.

On the political field, however, the American working class only brings up the rear. In no important country of the world is labor without a mass party of its own, and even in the countries ruled by reactionary dictatorships there are hundreds of thousands of workers who feel an allegiance to the old working class parties that are now outlawed. The outstanding exception is the United States.

In the United States, the masses continue to follow the political path of bourgeois reformism, exemplified by Rooseveltian New Dealism. If they look upon it today, in the light of bitter experiences, with reserve and with greater skepticism and even disillusionment, the modifications in their attitude have not yet expressed themselves in a mass movement for a party and a program of their own. The parties that stand openly on the program of revolutionary socialism are still a tiny minority of the working class; the proponents of a Labor Party with a reformist program are not organized and are themselves a small minority; and even such timid steps in the direction of independent political organization as the formation of the American Labor Party in New York represents are not only far, far from adequate but are still isolated phenomena standing on the platform of the New Deal.

This does not signify that the working class is politically content. In the very nature of the situation in the United States today, where economic and political institutions, economic and political life, are so closely, if not inseparably, intertwined, every important economic struggle of the workers is at the same time a political struggle. Like all other classes, the American proletariat, too, looks more and more to the *government* in negotiating or solving its economic problems and less and less to the individual employer. The increases of governmental intervention and direct participation in every sphere of economic life, and in social life in general, is calculated to heighten the political consciousness of the American worker to an ever greater extent. The more openly class character of the government's intervention in economic and social life is calculated to heighten the class consciousness of the American worker.

However, the growth of the class consciousness and independent political organization and activity of the working

class is not automatically and arithmetically guaranteed by economic and political activities of the capitalist class or its régime. The political thinking, organizing and action of the American workers must be stimulated and promoted inside the labor movement itself on the basis of both the needs and the experiences of the working class.

The Need for a Labor Party

These experiences and needs make the formation of an independent working class party in the United States the problem of the day that most urgently demands solution. The formation of a Labor Party is the most important forward step that the working class can take today in this country. That makes the struggle for a Labor Party the most important and most urgent political task of the revolutionary vanguard.

The workers today cannot give political leadership to the widespread discontentment of the people today. In the absence of a radically different and progressive working class party the masses have no alternative to Rooseveltism except political indifference or the time-worn American practice of punishing the Democratic incumbent by voting for the Republican aspirant (or *vice versa*.)

The working class will be unable to maintain itself politically, much less rally the masses of the people in general, in the big crisis of tomorrow if it does not have a party of its own with a bold program for the solution of the crisis at the expense of the monopoly-capitalist minority. In the absence of such a party, which offers a progressive alternative to the *status quo*, the masses of the people, the lower middle classes in town and country, that enormously important section of the people that will be represented by the homecoming war veterans, and even large sections of the working class itself—all these will tend to accept a reactionary alternative and fall victim to the social demagogy of this or that fascist or semi-fascist clique.

Even now, millions hope for, and tomorrow will be ready to fight for, what they vaguely call a "change." In the post-war crisis, they will number tens of millions. The bourgeois-reformist politicians to whom labor is now attached will seek to maintain, more or less, the *status quo*—that is, precisely the situation which generated the crisis as well as the demand for a "change." If labor then tries to maintain the unmaintainable *status quo* by remaining the tail of a bourgeois political kite, it will easily fall as the victim of those who exploit the popular demand for a "change" for reactionary and anti-working class purposes. If labor puts forward, on the contrary, a bold political program for social reorganization in behalf of all the "little people," it can crush the reaction and move to the leadership of the country with the support of the masses.

The organization of a Labor Party by the powerful trade union movement would be an immense step forward by the American working class—it declaration of political independence, its most important proclamation hitherto of its separation from capitalist politics and capitalist political parties. However, this step would be vitiated in the long run and the working class doomed to defeat if the program of such a party (and correspondingly, its leadership) were imbued with the reformist conceptions, platforms and practices which have paralyzed the traditional parties of the working class in other countries and brought about such disasters in many. To be effective in the highest degree an independent Labor Party must not take capitalism as its basis and seek to hold its together with repairs at this or that point. It must rather put forward such a program as disregards entirely the interests of capitalism and the class which is its beneficiary, disregards en-

tirely the "sacred right of private property" which is only the right of the monopoly capitalists and imperialists to exploit and oppress the masses, and directs itself exclusively to defending and promoting the class interests of the proletariat and those sections of society who are its allies in the struggle against the monopolists and their reaction.

Against Reformism

The Workers Party, which vigorously and assiduously champions the formation of an independent Labor Party as a great historical advance by the United States working class, is a party of revolutionary socialism and internationalism, and consequently an intransigent opponent of social-reformism in all its varieties. While urging the formation of an independent Labor Party based on the trade unions and democratically controlled by them, it nevertheless counterposes to the adoption or retention of a reformist program and a reformist leadership by such a party the adoption of a militant, bold, working class program of struggle against the capitalist offensive, the capitalist class and capitalism itself, with the aim of raising labor to the position of ruler of the country in a workers' government. The Workers Party thus distinguishes itself from all other parties and groups in the working class not only by its fundamental program of revolutionary socialism, but also by the program for immediate political action which it advocates for the working class and by the militancy of the struggle it carries on for it.

It is difficult to indicate concretely the prospects for the formation of a Labor Party in the United States or the stages through which it will pass.

The lesser likelihood is that the working class, in breaking with the bourgeois parties and developing their independent political class consciousness, will move directly to affiliation with or support of a revolutionary socialist organization such as the Workers Party. The main task of an organization like the Workers Party is to help develop the class and revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat. At the present time, in this country, the first step in fulfilling this task is to work and fight for independent political organization and action by labor. In advocating the formation of a Labor Party, the Workers Party, far from diminishing its own significance as a consistently revolutionary proletarian organization, can only enhance it, and draw into its own ranks those workers who reach agreement with its program not only in the written word but also in the deed.

It is more likely that the first steps in political and class consciousness will be taken by American labor in forming a Labor Party. At the present time the overwhelming majority of the labor officialdom, its Stalinist wing prominently and viciously among them, is opposed to the formation of a Labor Party and seeks to keep labor tied to the wagon wheels of capitalist politics. The fight for a Labor Party thus becomes at the same time a fight to expose the labor lieutenants of the capitalist class.

It is even possible that the labor leadership will remain stubbornly and stupidly opposed to the formation of a Labor Party even in the turbulent days of crisis ahead, opposed even to the formation of a thoroughly reformist party which is strictly under their control. Their efforts to liquidate or at least to deepen the paralysis of even such a caricature of an independent working class political party as the ALP shows how strong is this possibility.

In such a case, the movement for independent political action would not be stopped cold, but would merely take on different forms. Given the continued opposition to a Labor

Party by the trade union bureaucracy, it is possible that such a party would come into existence "from below," as a result of a powerful political upsurge in the ranks sweeping over the heads of the official leadership, and throwing up a new leadership, at least in part. That is, a development might take place in the political field comparable with the rank and file upsurge that produced the mass unions of the CIO.

However, there is greater reason to believe that the sharpening of class antagonisms in the country will generate enough pressure upon at least a section of the labor bureaucracy to impel it to take the leadership of an independent labor political party lest the movement of the masses "get out of hand." Such a prospect is not immediately in sight, that is to say, not before the 1944 elections. But the declining ability of the remnants of "New Dealism" to give any serious concessions to labor, or even to the labor officialdom, is a factor that will impel the labor movement, from bottom to top, to seek more radical means of wresting concessions from the government. More radical means can only signify the formation of an independent political party of labor, or at least the first hesitant, timid, half-way steps in that direction, upon the model of the New York ALP, whose leaders are already engaged in initial, if not very bold, attempts to spread their organization to other states.

Danger of "Third Partyism"

Finally, it is possible that the prospects of an independent Labor Party will be thwarted, at least for a time, by the subversion of the movement into a middle class "third party." This was the case in 1924, when La Follettism absorbed and destroyed the Labor Party movement. However, it should be borne in mind that by 1924 the first big post-war crisis had come to an end and the "prosperity period" was setting in. There is no realistic similar prospect ahead. The United States faces not another "prosperity period" but another crisis in the midst of another world crisis. While the danger of "third partyism" undoubtedly threatens the incipient Labor Party, it has neither the strength nor the prospects it had twenty years ago.

In any case, the revolutionary vanguard cannot and does not content itself with passive contemplation of prospects and possibilities from the sidelines. It is its duty to participate in the struggle and help direct the course of events. To direct

them in a forward direction, which means in the general direction of the socialist power of the proletariat, means, concretely, now, in the United States, to concentrate and centralize all political agitation, propaganda and activity around the slogan of a Labor Party and a workers' government. A Labor Party as a radical break with the parties of capitalism; a workers' government as a radical break with the rule of capitalism.

That the workers will conceive these two ideas in a reformist manner, that they will think of realizing them by reformist means (that is, without a fundamental and revolutionary assault upon capitalist class rule)—that is the greater probability, above all in the first period of the struggle. Nothing could be more "natural," for that matter. This concerns the Workers Party only insofar as it means that at each stage of the struggle it must put forward such demands, such a program, such a road, as will help bring the working class and its party into clearer and more conscious conflict with its class enemy, as will help them shed their reformist illusions, as will help them, through their own concrete experiences, understand the need for the final struggle for power and the socialist reorganization of society.

As part of its campaign for a Labor Party, the Workers Party therefore puts forward from the very beginning a minimum program as its proposal for the program that an effective and militant working class party should adopt. Even if, as is most probable, the coming Labor Party does not adopt such a militant program, the Workers Party, while giving full support to all the practical activities of the Labor Party and those who are working to form it and build it, will reserve the right to present its criticism of the program that the Labor Party has adopted and the leadership that represents it, and the right to continue urging upon the party the program which it, the Workers Party, considers suitable and necessary in dealing with the social problems facing the working class.

The Workers Party as a consistent revolutionary socialist organization thus not only maintains the organizational and political independence which are indispensable to its proper and effective functioning, but remains an advanced but inseparable part of the working class movement, distinguished from its other sections only by its uncompromising opposition to capitalism and all its supporters and by its unequivocal support of both the immediate interests of the working class and its socialist future.

The Struggle in Yugoslavia

Despite the efforts of King Peter to bring the fighting factions together, there is civil war in Yugoslavia. There is civil war in Greece, where three rival factions are organizing guerrilla warfare against one another. There is civil war in Albania. As soon as the lid is lifted, there will be civil war in Rumania, in Hungary, in Bulgaria. All over Europe, in fact, the liberators, besides delivering nations from Nazi rule, are bound to liberate also the inner conflicts that were latent before the war started.—Anne O'Hare McCormick in the *New York Times*.

Within the framework of the great imperialist war that embraces the world, the great international proletarian war for world socialism slowly but steadily proceeds to develop. It takes on many and complex forms, ranging from the elemental nationalist uprising in India last

What Is Happening in the Balkans?

year to the advanced demonstrations of the Milan workers in July and August of this year.

In this article we shall describe, within the limits of available information, another manifestation of this growing revolutionary spirit and its effect, in particular, upon the approaching European revolution. Just as the movement in Yugoslavia is but the forerunner of similar happenings throughout the whole Balkan peninsula, so we can already foretell that simi-

This article was written before the announcement that the Tito-Ribar government had been proclaimed in Yugoslavia by the leaders of the "Partisan" forces, thus consummating their break with the King Peter-Mikhailovich régime.

lar struggles will spread through all of Europe, particularly in the more backward lands of central and northern Europe (Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Baltic states, etc.)

The complex character of these revolutionary movements is obvious. The problem of national independence, of a solution to the agrarian question, the relationship between the city workers and the peasant masses, the struggle against re-establishment of reactionary, pre-war régimes (military dictatorship in Greece, monarchy in Yugoslavia, etc.), relations with powerful neighbors (Russia), or other imperialists scheming to establish spheres of influence (England, America), the question of suppressed national minorities within the old boundaries (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia)—these are but the most fundamental and acute questions placed before revolutionists in the more backward areas of Europe.

It is not our intention to take up all these problems as they affect Yugoslavia, the Balkan nation we have in mind as the best contemporary illustration of the developing European revolution. We shall instead describe some of the basic characteristics of this country, as well as the contending forces that have brought it to the forefront. But first we must consider some elementary facts about Yugoslavia.

An Artificial Creation

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia (known in official language as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) is an artificial creation of the Versailles Peace Conference. It was created by a tremendous expansion of the pre-war Kingdom of Serbia primarily as an imperialist counter-stroke against the defeated Austro-Hungarian Empire, in precisely the same spirit as the equally artificial Czechoslovakia was created.

Yugoslavia had a population of 16,000,000 before the present war began, but in no sense of the word was the country unified or homogeneous. The Serbian ruling house—descendants of mediæval bandit leaders—symbolized the corrupt class of ruling Serbian landlords, aristocrats and capitalists who lorded it over the numerous national minorities within the country. The dominant Serbs did not even constitute a majority of the 16,000,000 population. In northern Yugoslavia there are approximately 1,000,000 Slovenes; in northwestern Yugoslavia—the concentration area for most of the population—there are about 5,000,000 Croats (Croatia); and, in addition, there are 2,500,000 people of German, Hungarian, Albanian, Macedonian, Rumanian, Bulgarian, etc., nationality. It was this multi-national "state," already cracked and deeply split by these centrifugal nationalistic forces that fell so easily into Hitler's hands in 1941. In this respect, too, Yugoslavia resembled that other brain-child of the Versailles masterminds, Czechoslovakia.

The Kingdom was an incredibly poor and backward country. Split into many mountain plateaus and isolated valley areas by the criss-cross network of the Slovenian Alps, Dinaric and Balkan mountain ranges, and with communication further limited by the primitive transportation system, there was little possibility of breaking down barriers between the various national groups, particularly under the stern, *inner-imperialist* policy pursued by the assassinated King Alexander and his son and heir, the present King Peter. (We refer to the young gentleman now anxiously waiting at Cairo.) A rocky, stormy and high coastline (the Dalmatian coast), with few usable harbors, forced Yugoslovian trade and commercial life to depend on Danubian transportation (that is, dependency upon the other Balkan nations, Turkey and Russia). Belgrade, the principal city, is located on the Danube.

The entire Kingdom was the same size as the state of Oregon (100,000 square miles) and eighty-five per cent of its people lived on the land, either as small peasant proprietors (the largest group by far), or as semi-serfs or sharecroppers working for Serbian landlords. There was little manufacturing or industry. Croatia was the most advanced and industrialized area, with some steel and iron industry growing up around Belgrade. Economic life was generally stagnant and backward. The volume of trade with the outside world was small and confined to the Danubian river area. All in all, Yugoslavia was doomed to fall apart at the slightest pressure. That came in 1941.

The Nazi invasion not only destroyed the disjointed Kingdom, but was disastrous to the workers and peasants and their nationalist aspirations. As in all such cases, a complex "sharing of the loot" took place. The Axis powers and their jackal-satellites tore the land into shreds. Minute Slovenia (1,000,000 population) alone was divided among Germany, Hungary and Italy. The Nazi-dominated puppet state of Croatia was created. Italy took over the Dalmatian coast area; Bulgaria and Hungary moved into other sections, with the German occupation forces dominating the land as a whole. Rarely has a land been so thoroughly "thrown to the wolves"!

The Struggle for Power

Under such conditions, a confused and highly variable struggle for power was bound to develop. Petty bourgeois liberalism would like to describe the scene as a struggle between Nazi Germany, on the one hand, and the "people" of Yugoslavia (aided by the Allies), on the other hand. However, the interlaced factors of nationalism, class struggle and imperialist war are not so simple, in reality. It is worth our while to list some of the contending forces.

First, and most important at present, are the forces of imperialism. On one side, German imperialism and its bourgeois puppet allies in the Quisling states of Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria, etc. The intention of this power is clear: to keep its hold over the Balkans in the interests of the German bourgeoisie. In the other imperialist camp we find, naturally, the Allies—Britain and America are primarily concerned. They wish to capture and dominate the anti-Nazi movement of the workers and peasants, open up a rear entrance, by way of Austria, to attack Germany, drive a deep wedge into the midst of Russia aspirations with respect to the Balkans, and also, by control of Greece, to further assure British domination of the Mediterranean.

The other contending imperialist power—Russia—has its special aspirations in Yugoslavia and the Balkans. Curiously enough, these designs are not exactly unknown to previous Russian history. In former years it was called Russian Pan-Slavism (that is, Czarist imperialism); nowadays it is referred to, by some so-called "Trotskyites," as the bureaucratically executed but "progressive" extension of the "Workers' Fatherland" into foreign territories! Of course, the possibility that the Allies and Russia may agree among themselves on how to "handle" the Balkans must certainly not be overlooked. But the above represents, nevertheless, the objectives of the various imperialists.

But within the borders of the old Yugoslavian state, while the rival candidates for imperialist mastery attempt to interject their dominion in a variety of ways, a savage and significant civil war has been raging for over a year. From the viewpoint of the European revolution, it is far more important than all the imperialist schemes taken together. This civil

war involves the proletarian and peasant masses of Yugoslavia, regardless of their nationality or race. In this internal struggle there are two camps; although the delineations and character of one of them is far from clear.

The power of the army represented by General Mikhailovich and his Chetniks is similar to that represented by every national bourgeoisie and government in exile that seeks to re-establish its former rule. Mikhailovich, Minister of War for the exiled King Peter, wishes to resurrect the old Yugoslavian Kingdom, with its repression of the Croatian, Slovenian and other minorities. The accusations directed against him by his opponents (collaboration with the Nazis and Italians; terror against the opposition peasantry; program of full political reaction) are all undoubtedly true. The exiled government of King Peter is but the reactionary Quisling of America and Britain and certainly one of the darkest forces in the whole picture. Mikhailovich is the Balkan composite of Darlan and Badoglio. There is little reason to doubt the statement of Louis Adamic that he has virtually no support in Yugoslavia, except among the old officers' clique, landlords and feudal reaction at the top. Whatever strength he does have is apparently confined to the southern (Serbian) sections of the country.

The Partisans' Movement

On the other side—bitter opponents of the Chetniks—are the Partisans. And here we find ourselves dealing with a force that is extremely difficult to analyze and describe with any exactitude. The reason for this is clear. It is a broad social movement *in process of formation*; a movement within which many tendencies are struggling to such an extent that nothing definite and conclusive has yet been able to emerge. In this sense it is typical of what we may expect in all these "people's movements" that are now, and will in the future, springing up all over Europe. Above all, we must guard against hasty judgments or sectarian statements that, for example, "it is only a Stalinist movement" or a "backward peasants' movement," etc.

Unfortunately, there can be no doubt that the hands of the Balkan Stalinists have dug deep into this organization. They are probably the best organized faction. It is reported that Soviet planes fly regularly over Hungary on their way to the Partisans to drop supplies. We can rest assured that many a GPU organizer is included on the bill of lading. The Partisan leader, General Tito, is described by *Time* magazine as a fifty-three-year-old Croatian, ex-metal worker and Stalinist-trained politician who was active in the Spanish civil war. There can be no question that he is the prototype of those cynical Stalinist functionaries who have played such a treacherous rôle in so many revolutions.

Within the ranks of the Partisans (whose struggles against the Nazis and Chetniks are taking place in Dalmatia, Slovenia and Croatia) are found many diverse elements. All nationalities are represented, apparently, with the Croats and Slovenians predominating. According to the American reporter, Daniel De Luce, who visited the Partisan camp, he came across political commissars, Catholic priests, business men from the local towns, with peasants making up the general mass. "There are no barriers of religion or politics. We embrace all patriots who love and fight for Yugoslavia," an officer told him. Most significant fact of all appears to be the lack of relationship between the Partisans and proletarian forces in the large cities (with the exception of village and

town artisans who are undoubtedly participants in the movement).

Does the Partisan movement have a definite political and social program? Here again the formative and loose character of this entire movement is emphasized. So far as we know from the information available, it does *not*. Or, in other words, the Stalinist faction in the movement has as yet been unable to impose its program upon the Partisans as a whole. This largely accounts for the guerrilla type of activity that it exclusively conducts. Tito has not yet clearly stated his attitude on the question of resurrecting the old Yugoslavian Kingdom—not even his opposition to the return of King Peter! (Obviously he must await the outcome of the Allied negotiations with Moscow before he can do so.) He has not spoken out for national independence for the various minority groups and their right to form independent states; he has said nothing about the agrarian problem; or the workers in the large cities.

Yet the strong radical pressure within the Partisan ranks, a pressure constantly being exerted against the Stalinist leaders, is apparent. Mikhailovich constantly complains of "the bloodthirstiness of the Red students and peasants" against the Serbian bourgeoisie. All reporters point to the growing bitterness between the opposing forces (as contrasted with the temporary and short-lived truce that prevailed toward the end of 1941), and Sonia Tomara writes in the *New York Herald Tribune* of October 18 that "... the feeling between the two factions resembles that which existed in Spain and Russia in the days of the civil wars in those countries."

When Roosevelt handed over four bombers to Mikhailovich, Tito issued a statement declaring in an aggressive manner, "We consider this was a blunder which cannot be allowed to happen. The Yugoslav people have every right to expect that supplies of arms will in the future be handed over to the Yugoslav People's Army of Liberation, which, indeed, alone is fighting the enemy." Strong words from a man subject to pressure from radical workers, peasants and students. There will certainly be a further differentiation within the ranks of this popular-frontist movement, and that in the near future.

In the entire complex panorama of the Yugoslavian civil war, one historic thread maintains its former strength—that is, the struggle of the nationally-oppressed people for national independence, linked together with the class struggle of the workers and peasants *as a whole* against capitalist exploitation in the city industries and agrarian exploitation in the countryside. Even if Russia and the Allies agree on the disposition of the Balkan problem and even if Tito unites with Mikhailovich, the problems and demands of the worker-peasant masses will remain as before. Whether a Moscow agreement works out or not, the Allies may soon land in the Balkans and seek to dominate the whole situation by force of military arms. Through sheer weight they might succeed at first, but it would not last long. The irrepressible class and national conflicts would break through again at the first opportunity. Neither Stalinism nor Allied imperialism can solve the problem of these Balkan peoples.

The current and far from settled struggle on Yugoslavian soil is but one of many similar developments that Europe will experience. Anyone who expects full-fledged proletarian movements, guided by solidly organized revolutionary parties, is seeking miracles. To expect this is to ignore all that has happened in Europe for the past twenty-five years. Clearly, revolutionists in such a situation as exists in Yugoslavia must attach themselves organically to a movement like that of the

Partisans; try to tie it up with movements of the city workers and constantly press for the most democratic and radical solutions of the various problems. They must be there so as to combat equally the Allied and/or Stalinist efforts to take control of such movements and subject them to their will. The question of Yugoslavia is not a matter of a small, isolated

Balkan country. It is a matter of the European revolution: either the revolutionists will remain isolated from its slow, painful development, or they will participate in it and eventually make their ideas become its ideas.

HARRY YOUNG.

Machiavelli and Modern Thought

A Critique of James Burnham's Book

PART I

M. Proudhon does not know that the whole of history is nothing but the progressive transformation of human nature.—Marx.

The past decade has brought not only the defeat of the socialist movement and the consequent desertion of the American intellectuals who had adhered to it, but also the rise of anti-socialist and anti-democratic voices propounding theories which were getting rather musty at the turn of the century. Such profundities as "human nature makes socialism impossible"; "collectivism inevitably results in tyranny"; "what we need is a mixed economy of balanced social forces"; "the masses cannot play a decisive rôle in history, only the élite can"—have filled the writings of the ex-radical intellectuals. Only a few have been conscious of the origin of these concepts, and we therefore have James Burnham to thank for a book* which synthesizes into a coherent system the theories of the "Machiavellians"—Mosca, Michels, Pareto. Possibly some of our intellectuals may be a bit disturbed to find their stray thoughts so rigorously systematized as Burnham has, for the net result is not very pretty. What concerns us, however, is that his book provides an opportunity for discussion of concepts recently directed against us as part of the anti-socialist arsenal; it is that, rather than any desire to polemicize against Burnham's doubtful volume, which prompts the detailed discussion these articles will contain.

•

Machiavellianism, as used by Burnham, does not refer to the mass-manipulation which Machiavelli urged on his Prince and which has since been the supposed counsel of malevolent rulers. Rather he refers to a school of political thought whose credo is summed up in the following major propositions:

1. "The primary subject-matter of political science is the struggle for social power in its diverse open and concealed forms."

2. "The laws of political life cannot be discovered by an analysis which takes men's words and beliefs... at their face value." Machiavellianism claims that most men are deceived about the motives of their social activity and that "logical or rational action plays a relatively minor part in political and social change... Non-logical action spurred by environmental changes, instinct, impulse, interest, is the usual social rule."

3. All history is the history of the élite, the ruling group, "its composition, structure and the mode of its relation to the non-élite." There is no realistic possibility of removing the élite, only of changing its members. This latter process is, after Pareto, the "circulation of the élites."

4. All revolutionary attempts at changing society must inevitably substitute one élite for another, and may often result in an increase in tyranny because of revolutionary zeal to extirpate opponents. Democracy is both meaningless and impossible: self-rule is socially and organizationally impossible for the masses. All that can be done in this increasingly totalitarian and collectivist world is to preserve certain "juridical defenses" (Mosca), i.e., civil liberties.

*The Machiavellians, by James Burnham. The John Day Co., 278 pages, \$2.50.

The reader will perceive that all theories which categorically reject the possibility of a democratic, classless society and posit the continuation of class oppression as an invariable constant, must ultimately reside on a premise about human nature. Burnham may fancy himself an exponent of modern science—which he often equates with a genuflective idolization of crude empiricism—but there is no way of saying that a classless society is necessarily impossible without resting on a theory of human nature as immanently "evil" . . . or proving that society is economically too primitive for socialism. Since the latter is an obvious absurdity, it is the theory of human nature which is at the foundation of Machiavellianism. True, Burnham attempts another argument: the argument from technique, which claims that the difficulties in instituting a classless society are insuperable because of the size and complexity of the modern societal unit. But this thesis, to be discussed later, can never be posed in terms of invariant constants but only in probabilities, thereby removing the "inevitability" prop from the argument. That is why we must turn to the argument from human nature in order to pierce to the root of Machiavellianism. We hope the reader will remember that if we discuss this matter at length it is only because recent years have seen a recrudescence of such thought among our most "scientific" political writers. The choice is not ours.

I—The Argument from Human Nature

Burnham is usually quite ready to rush in where angels fear to tread. There is, however, one question which he steadily avoids giving explicit treatment, and that is the very theory of human nature which is central to his approach. His reticence is understandable enough. To state explicitly as an organized thesis that human nature is static and "evil" is a bit too much even for him; he is simply too well educated. Yet elementary intellectual responsibility would seem to dictate a frank statement that the static concept of human nature is recognized as fundamental by Pareto when he writes that "The centuries roll by and human nature remains the same," and when Pareto posits his concept of residues which is merely an elaborate terminological dress-coat for this same theory; and by Michels when he writes of the "natural love of power" as precluding a classless society. Nonetheless, Burnham cannot evade this central problem completely. He is forced by the very logic of his position to blandly slip in an occasional statement which betrays his full accord with his mentors. We quote a few such statements, since an explicit summary is evaded in the book:

If we review the history of humanity . . . it is apparent that despotic régimes are far more frequent than free régimes, and it would therefore seem that despotism is more nearly than freedom in accord with human nature (page 250).

. . . Wars are a natural phase of the historical process (page 131).

... The aristocratic principle will always be asserting itself to some degree at least; it too accords with ineradicable human traits (page 106).

The Machiavellians have shown that the practical impossibility of democracy depends upon a variety of factors: upon psychological tendencies which are apparently constant in social life (page 236).

Willy-nilly, Burnham is forced to adopt the human nature premise which is central to Machiavellian theory. We can therefore proceed to a direct examination of this premise, secure in the knowledge that Burnham cannot possibly worm out of his adherence to it.

There has never been a progressive historical movement which has not had to contend with some variety of the human nature premise. Locke, with his theory of the mind as a "wax tablet," and Rousseau, with his theory of the social contract, constructed elaborate psychological rationalizations to aid their advocacy of the then revolutionary bourgeois cause. Each declining social order has always attempted to identify the temporal ethics and morals bred of its uniqueness with immanent human nature.

The Attitude of Modern Psychology

Modern psychology is little concerned with the controversy about "human nature" which continues to rage among political writers. Ever since it left the adolescent realms of speculative philosophizing and embraced the disciplines of experimental science, modern psychology—acutely aware of its immaturity—has seldom ventured to propose such a definitive, closed-door answer to the problems of human existence as is given by Machiavellian theory. The most fruitful of modern psychologists and psychoanalysts have concentrated on experiment and measurement; their theories are hardly more than tentative hypotheses; there is certainly no scientific evidence whatever for the belief that there exists some core of inherited and intrinsic behavior patterns with which each man is endowed. It has rather been the philosophers and sociologists, like John Dewey (in his *Human Nature and Conduct*) and Bertrand Russell (in his *Philosophy*) who, more aware of its sociological implications, have turned their attention to destroying the human nature theory.

Yet, the evidence of modern science to the contrary notwithstanding, the Machiavellians have had to resort to the theory of endowed instincts. Pareto's list of residues (the motive forces of human action which he identifies as the basic causal factors of history) are merely a socialized version of the thoroughly discredited list of instincts which William McDougall so laboriously compiled some years ago. It is a theory of human activity which is false because: (1) it is based on an unscientific failure to differentiate masses of activities lumped under generic but, in reality, unbinding classes and therefore prey to the Aristotelian procedure of explaining by classifying rather than by critical experimentation; (2) it ignores the recent evidence of contemporary psychological research; (3) it ignores the findings of modern anthropology; (4) it ignores the experiences of history.

As John Dewey points out in his monumental *Human Nature and Conduct*, the theory of inherited evil nature has its origin in the glorification of the divine and the accompanying disparagement of the mundane, as well as in the apparently necessary stage in human development which, expressing the compulsive quest for certainty, attempts to explain the unknown in terms of some mysterious motive causes within itself.

On the Concept of Instinct

Modern science, however, has largely refrained from accepting the concept of "instinct" (an inherited, highly com-

plex behavior pattern which provides directive to the basic needs of life) which is at the core of the human nature theory. Under the sweeping headings of "sex," "fear," the "instinct of domination," or the "instinctive drive for power," have been lumped so many conflicting types of human experience, derived from so many different social contexts, that the generalized classification blurs rather than clarifies. As Dewey has so conclusively shown, even what might appear as the most elemental of "instincts" are acquired, social in their origin and learned in their developmental pattern. He writes in *Human Nature and Conduct*:

Why do we not set out with an examination of those instinctive activities upon which the acquisition of habits is conditioned? ... The query is a natural one, yet it tempts to flinging forth a paradox. In conduct the acquired is the primitive. Impulses although first in time are never primary in fact; they are secondary and dependent. The seeming paradox in statements covers a familiar fact. In the life of the individual, instinctive activity comes first. But an individual begins life as a baby, and babies are dependent beings. Their activities could continue at most for only a few hours were it not for the presence and aid of adults with their formed habits. They owe to adults the opportunity to express their native activities in ways which have meaning. Even if by some miracle original activity could continue without assistance from the organized skill and art of adults, it would not amount to anything. It would be mere sound and fury.

In short, the meaning of native activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction with a material social medium.

If, then, habits or "instincts" are secondary and acquired, and not native and original, then they are clearly amenable to adaptation. Surely, also, if the primary activities of a baby are dependent upon a "matured social medium" for their expression, the complex activities of social classes and political movements cannot be explained by the generic catch-all instincts which fail to elucidate even the most simple of human actions. But are there not *some* basic "instincts" common to all men,* the very motive forces which make for the continuation of the race? Here again Dewey comes to our aid:

Even in the case of hunger and sex, where the channels of action are fairly demarcated by antecedent conditions (or "nature") the actual content and feel of hunger and sex are indefinitely varied according to their social contexts. Only when a man is starving is he under an unqualified natural impulse; as it approaches this limit, it tends to lose, moreover, its psychological distinctiveness and to become a raven of the entire organism."

It is clear then that there is no human nature in the abstract, apart from the social framework which encases it. By this statement we do not wish to suggest that it is necessary "to choose between innate ideas and an empty, passive, wax-like mind" (Dewey) but rather that "the innate apparatus of man consists of 'reflexes' rather than ideas; also that our sense organs and our glands and muscles lend to responses of certain kinds in which our organization plays a part ... as that played by the external stimulus" (Russell) and that both the human organization and the "external stimulus," being historical products, are historically amendable.

A Limit to Human Adaptability?

Whether there is any limitation to the *social* adaptability of the human race has not yet been determined; and whether that limit, if such there be, precludes a classless society has certainly not yet been proved. One thing is certain: there is no positive evidence for such an assertion, and its conclusive proof is impossible short of the actual attempt to establish

*No more definitive disposition of this notion can be found than in Robert Briffault's anthropological study, *The Mothers*, which contains a wealth of material demonstrating that the modern attitude of romantic love is of recent origin and that mating among primitive peoples was without any romantic qualities, as modern man understands them.

such a society. If anything, the teachings of history and anthropology demonstrate the wide range of adaptability which the human impulses or drives have been subject to under differing conditions. Even the very "instincts" themselves (following Dewey's useful distinction, we use "instinct" as signifying a complex, highly organized behavior pattern, while "impulse" is a human drive or reaction, "something primitive, yet loose, undirected, initial" and exerting its "main force in the struggle for survival," rather than in more complex societal situations) are so hazy and vague as to preclude any possibility of testing their validity.

In fact, also, every reaction takes place in a different environment, and its meaning is never twice alike, since the difference in environment makes a difference in consequences. It is only mythology which sets up a single, identical psychic force which "causes" all the reactions of fear, a force beginning and ending in itself.

Fear of the dark is different from fear of publicity, fear of the dentist from fear of ghosts, fear of conspicuous success from fear of humiliation, fear of a bat from fear of a bear. Cowardice, embarrassment, caution and reverence may all be regarded as forms of fear. They all have certain physical organic acts in common—those of organic shrinking, gestures of hesitation and retreat. But each is qualitatively unique. Each is what it is in virtue of its total interactions and correlations with other acts and with the enviroing medium.—(Dewey)

If then, again, habits are learned, are socially-conditioned and are unique in their forms and expression within each situation, the traditional psychology of "instincts" which set up a hard-and-fast preordained class under which specific acts are subsumed, was merely attempting to explain what it didn't know in terms of its ignorance. It speaks of the instinct or capacity for fear or sex, but in what demonstrable way does that increase our knowledge of the primary qualities of fear or sex themselves? The entire instinct theory* is akin to defining words in terms of themselves; its causal factors (the instincts) are only names condensing into duplicate form a variety of complex occurrences; it reduces social custom to individual habit and offers the latter as explanation of the former by means of a covering term which explains neither. In his book, *Pareto*, Franz Borkenau neatly sums up this idea:

A century ago, Hegel turned his bitter irony against Kant, who explained every mental activity by assuming a specific capacity for it. Plato, in his turn, explains every psychological and sociological fact by assuming a specific instinct or sense for it in human nature. Now an explanation is the correlation of unknown phenomena with other phenomena better known to us. Is the "instinct of combinations" known better to us than the combinations themselves, the natural aversions better than the taboos they are supposed to explain, the sense of uniformity better than the actions enforcing uniformity? Certainly not! Those instincts, as Pareto assumes them, are simple doubles of the facts they are supposed to explain, queer psycho-sociological *Dinge an sich* which resemble on all points the phenomena they are intended to make intelligible, except the one point that they are unobservable and thus metaphysical entities, whereas the social phenomena they are meant to explain are observable.

We believe we have demonstrated the "instinct" theory of human nature, which Machiavellianism accepts, to be false to scientific evidence which shows that so-called basic instincts are learned from at least the moment of birth and social in their subsequent development; and self-contradictory and meaningless, as well, in its use of what is to be explained as an explanation and in its obscurantist lumping of a variety of unique experiences under generic and vague classes.

Individual Psychology and Social Life

There is still another serious methodological objection to

*The very attempt to explain societal phenomena by means of a human nature theory is itself conditioned by the then prevalent social attitude. As Sidney Hook writes in his *A Portrait of John Dewey*: "It is in social and moral terms that human nature is always constructed, especially by those most convinced of its fixity."

the Machiavellian approach. Burnham speaks of "psychological tendencies which are apparently constant in social life" as one of the factors making democracy a "practical impossibility." We must strongly object to the attempt to graft psychological conclusions formulated about the individual onto the social organism. The infliction of individual behavior patterns upon social groups or societies is as invalid as the attempts once made to explain organic changes by mechanical laws. For societies are not mere agglomerations of individuals; they have their own character and complexion, determined mainly by factors beyond the individual's control. It may be fruitful to analyze the psychological effects of a given society's development on certain individuals, but that is a far cry from describing social classes in terms of individual behavior patterns as do the Machiavellians in their attempt to show history as a monotonous mosaic in which the few inescapable "residues" repeatedly exert their decision. The very language of psychoanalysis is in terms of the individual; its application to social groups is at best analogically illuminating and often merely confusing.

Two Glances at Modern Science

Whatever relevant materials modern science has offered on this subject indicates that the Machiavellian approach is antediluvian, to say the least. We cite two such instances because they represent the general tendency of modern science, at least with respect to this particular problem:

1. Everyone is by now familiar with Pavlov's experiments in conditioned reflexes. The connection between training a dog to find the beat of a metronome an adequate stimulus for his salivary glands and the problem of whether human nature precludes socialism, may not be readily apparent. But connection there is, nonetheless. For this initial experiment and its derivatives have demonstrated that even what one might think to be the most basic of human reflexes—connected with the most essential human function: eating—can be radically modified by conditioning. Why can we then not assume that there is at least a reasonable prospect that the "instincts" which men have acquired from the capitalist mode of existence and which are largely unique to it (as a contrast between the mores of capitalism and feudalism will so vividly demonstrate) can likewise be conditioned by a new society?

2. Without necessarily committing ourselves to his theories, it is worth noting that Freud's concept of neuroses being bred in infantile experiences within the forbidding arena of adult life, opens incredible vistas for the development of the human race, if it is provided with a milieu which is stimulating and liberating to the child (and the adult!) rather than inhibitory and conflict-breeding.

James Burnham is a well educated man. He is without question aware of the latest developments in the fields of psychology and psychoanalysis. Yet his book is shot through with both the language and concepts of a psychological approach which is simply mediæval in its essence. Is this not a fine example of how the attempt to rationalize reactionary politics results in abandonment of the heritage of modern science?

The Evidence from Anthropology

We have thus far discussed the human nature theory in terms of its own propositions and methodology. But it can be disproved not merely by internal analysis but also by reference to the experiential disciplines of anthropology and history. We shall not attempt to offer "primitive communism" as a rationale for a modern socialist society's ability to satisfy

man's nature; "primitive communism" is too controversial an anthropological subject to suffice as definitive proof, and modern society is so different in its structure and relationships that the analogy is not convincing. But anthropology can prove something more important: the flexibility and adaptability of human nature:

(a) Margaret Mead, in her *Sex and Temperament*, describes two New Guinea tribes, one of them, the Arapesh mountain dwellers, among whom mutual respect and affection are the norm, and among whom the concept of competition is unknown. On the other hand, "The Mundugumor man-child is born into a hostile world, a world in which most members of his sex will be his enemies, in which his major equipment for success must be a capacity for violence, for seeing and avenging insult, for holding his own safety very lightly and the lives of other even more lightly."

(b) Assuming perhaps that Burnham's psychological constants in social nature do not, for some mysterious reason, apply to New Guinea, we turn to the American Indian tribes. Ruth Benedict, in her *Patterns of Culture* (perhaps with the presentment of Burnham's discovery that "wars are a natural phase of the historical process") describes the Pueblo Indians, for whom warfare is the norm of social existence, and the Baffinland Eskimos, who not only never indulge in warfare but cannot—happy folk that they must be!—even understand its meaning when explained to them by an outsider.

(c) Otto Klineberg, in his *Race Differences*, describes the Yakuts, a Siberian tribe, which leads so cooperative a social life that they cannot understand why—explain it to them, good Machiavellian scientists!—starvation can exist in Western civilization.

These are three instances we have chosen completely at random. There are others, perhaps even more striking. But even these are enough to demonstrate that, at some time, on every part of the globe, every kind of social form, every kind of social practice seems to have been praised or tolerated. As Dewey asks: "How is the tremendous diversity of institutions (including moral codes) to be accounted for? The native stock of instincts is practically the same everywhere. Exaggerate as much as you like the native differences of Patagonians and Greeks, Sioux Indians and Hindoos, Bushmen and Chinese, their original differences will bear no comparison to the amount of difference found in custom and culture."

Why indeed? Why do certain men have this tendency and others its opposite? "And then," enters the mocking voice of Bukharin, who, in his *Historical Materialism*, faced some of these problems, "and then—oh horrors!—we must go back to the conditions of men's existence..."**

And "History Teaches Us..."

But history, doesn't history demonstrate that... well, it is better to discuss history in terms of historical theory, and that

*Without making too much of it, we wish to point out how the Machiavellian theory of human nature makes possible theories of racial supremacy. Admit once the concept of inherited characteristics and then admit that different races or nations have shown different traits (as nobody can possibly deny) and you must face the logical conclusion that it is possible that there are different psychological constants of social nature for each race or nation. That is the logic of the position, and Burnham's character has little to do with it.

**A lot of fuss has been raised by anti-Marxists about the fact that Engels used Morgan's BY NOW outmoded anthropology in his *Origins of the Family*. Most of this is either demagogical or beside the point and has validity only when directed against those contemporary Marxists who insist on unquestioning adherence to every scrap of material which Engels borrowed from the scientists of his time. For what Engels sought in Morgan was above all evidence to demonstrate the diversity of human experience and culture, the dialectical transitoriness of all societies, the flow of change in history. In that approach he had more of the scientific spirit than all the academicians who now reproach him for not having used twentieth century anthropology which, as a matter of fact, provides even more startling evidence for what Engels was seeking than Morgan ever did.

we propose to do in analyzing the Machiavellian approach to history. One thing needs to be said: even the most cursory glance at recent historical experience will demonstrate that the human being has been capable of the most diverse and uncharted of behaviors, from the most base to the most noble. From the heroism and spiritual exaltation of the Russian proletariat in 1919 to the debasement of the GPU agent murdering defenseless Jews—that is the range of present-day "human nature." Who can draw generalizations therefrom except to say once more that the human being is a completely adaptable organism, molded by the society in which he finds himself, and capable, under certain conditions, of changing that society? When Marx wrote, in his *Eighteenth Brumaire*, that history repeats itself, once on the tragic plane and the second time on the ridiculous plane, he was really expressing in epigrammatic form the concept that the flow of history is a continued process of unique configurations and that each historical situation and each social attitude it produces among people, must be considered in its own uniqueness as well as in relation to its past and future. Is there any approach more fruitless than that which sees history as a constant variation on a theme, a sort of continued derivation of Eve's bite into the evil apple of knowledge?

We believe that we have shown that the psychological premise—without which the entire Machiavellian structure begins to wobble as if struck by an earthquake—is contradictory, meaningless, without empirical verification. We for our part entertain no rationalistic illusions about "human nature." We are convinced, however, that we can make of it almost what we will, provided we furnish a societal seed-bed in which it can flourish. Trotsky, in his *Literature and Revolution*, speaks of the coming society as producing a race of men on the level of Beethoven, Goethe and Marx. Perhaps that is only a very distant perspective, a mere goal to aim at. Perhaps, on the other hand, we, dragged down by the barbarisms of capitalist civilization, are incapable of envisaging what a socialist society could accomplish. In either case, the perspective is there; the possibility acute; the task remains. Human nature is not a doom; it is an experiment.

In the second section of this article, we shall turn to the historical method of the Machiavellian theory as presented by Burnham, with especial emphasis on the theory of the élites.

R. FAHAN.

THE TRUTH ABOUT INDIA:

'INDIA IN REVOLT'

By HENRY JUDD

Order from the **PRICE: 25 CENTS**
WORKERS PARTY In Bundles of
 114 W. 14th St., N. Y. C. Five or More—20 Cents

Negroes in the Civil War

Their Role in the Second American Revolution

An indispensable contribution to the understanding of the rôle of the Negro in American history is a study of the period between 1830 and 1865. In this article we treat the subject up to 1860.

The basic economic and social antagonisms of the period embraced the whole life of the country and were fairly clear then, far less today. The system of chattel slavery needed territorial expansion because of the soil exhaustion caused by the crude method of slave production. But as the North developed industrially and in population, the South found it ever more difficult to maintain its political domination. Finally the struggle centered, economically, around who would control the newly-opened territories, and, politically, around the regional domination of Congress.

The régime in the South was by 1830 a dreadful tyranny, in startling contrast to the vigorous political democracy of the North. The need to suppress the slaves, who rebelled continuously, necessitated a régime of naked violence. The need to suppress the hostility to slavery of the free laborers and independent farmers led to the gradual abrogation of all popular democracy in the Southern states.

Previous to 1830 there had been anti-slavery societies in the South itself, but by 1830 cotton was king and, instead of arguing for and against slavery, the Southern oligarchy gradually developed a theory of Negro slavery as a heaven-ordained dispensation. Of necessity they sought to impose it upon the whole country. Such a propaganda can be opposed only actively. Not to oppose it is to succumb to it.

The impending revolution is to be led by the Northern bourgeoisie. But that is the last thing that it wants to do. In 1776 the revolutionary struggle was between the rising American bourgeoisie and a foreign enemy. The bourgeoisie needs little prodding to undertake its task. By 1830 the conflict was between two sections of the ruling class based on different economies but tied together by powerful economic links. Therefore, one outstanding feature of the new conflict is the determination of the Northern bourgeois to make every concession and every sacrifice to prevent the precipitation of the break. They will not lead. *They will have to be forced to lead.* The first standard-bearers of the struggle are the petty bourgeois democracy, organized in the Abolition movement, stimulated and sustained by the independent mass action of the Negro people.

The Petty Bourgeoisie and the Negroes

The petty bourgeoisie, having the rights of universal suffrage, had entered upon a period of agitation which has been well summarized in the title of a modern volume, *The Rise of the Common Man*. Lacking the economic demands of an organized proletariat, this agitation found vent in ever-increasing waves of humanitarianism and enthusiasm for social progress. Women's rights, temperance reform, public education, abolition of privilege, universal peace, the brotherhood of man—middle class intellectual America was in ferment. And to this pulsating movement the rebellious Negroes brought the struggle for the abolition of slavery. The agreement among historians is general that all these diverse trends were finally dominated by the Abolition movement.

The Negro struggle for Abolition follows a pattern not dis-

similar to the movement for emancipation before 1776. There are, first of all, the same continuous revolts among the masses of the slaves themselves which marked the pre-1776 period. In the decade 1820-30 devoted white men begin the publication of periodicals which preach Abolition on principles grounds. The chief of these was Benjamin Lundy. No sooner does Lundy give the signal than the free Negroes take it up and become the driving force of the movement.

Garrison, directly inspired by Lundy, began early, in 1831. But before that, Negro Abolitionists, not only in speeches and meetings, but in books, periodicals and pamphlets, posed the question squarely before the crusading petty bourgeois democracy. *Freedom's Journal* was published in New York City by two Negroes as early as 1827. David Walker's *Appeal*, published in 1829, created a sensation. It was a direct call for revolution. Free Negroes organized conventions and mass meetings. And before the movement was taken over by such figures as Wendell Phillips and other distinguished men of the time, the free Negroes remained the great supporters of the *Liberator*. In 1831, out of four hundred and fifty subscribers, fully four hundred were Negroes. In 1834, of 2,300 subscribers, nearly two thousand were Negroes.

After the free Negroes came the masses. When Garrison published the *Liberator* in 1831, the new Abolition movement, as contrasted with the old anti-slavery societies, amount to little. Within less than a year its fame was nation-wide. What caused this was the rebellion of Nat Turner in 1831. It is useless to speculate whether Walker's *Appeal* or the *Liberator* directly inspired Turner. What is decisive is the effect on the Abolition movement of this, the greatest Negro revolt in the history of the United States.

The Turner revolt not only lifted Garrison's paper and stimulated the organization of his movement. The South responded with such terror that the Negroes, discouraged by the failures of the revolts between 1800 and 1831, began to take another road to freedom. Slowly but steadily grew that steady flight out of the South which lasted for thirty years and injected the struggle against slavery into the North itself. As early as 1827 the escaping Negroes had already achieved some rudimentary form of organization. It was during the eventful year of 1831 that the Underground Railroad took more definite shape. In time thousands of whites and Negroes risked life, liberty and often wealth to assist the rebel slaves.

The great body of escaping slaves, of course, had no political aims in mind. For years rebellious slaves had formed bands of maroons, living a free life in inaccessible spots. Thousands had joined the Indians. Now they sought freedom in civilization and they set forth on that heroic journey of many hundreds of miles, forced to travel mainly by night, through forest and across rivers, often with nothing to guide them but the North Star and the fact that moss grows only on the north side of trees.

The industrial bourgeoisie in America wanted none of this Abolition. It organized mobs who were not unwilling to break up meetings and to lynch agitators. Many ordinary citizens were hostile to Negroes because of competition in industry and the traditional racial prejudice. At one period in the early 'forties, the Abolition movement slumped and Negro

historians assert that it was the escaping slaves who kept the problem alive and revived the movement. But we do not need the deductions of modern historians. What the escaping slaves meant to the movement leaps to the eye of the Marxian investigator from every contemporary page.

By degrees the leadership of the movement passed into the hands of and was supported by some of the most gifted white poets, writers and publicists of their time. The free Negroes, in collaboration with the Abolitionist movement, sometimes by themselves, carried on a powerful agitation. But a very special rôle was played by the ablest and most energetic of the escaping slaves themselves. These men could write and speak from first-hand experience. They were a dramatic witness of the falseness and iniquity of the whole thesis upon which the Southern case was built. Greatest of them all and one of the greatest men of his time was Frederick Douglass, a figure today strangely neglected. In profundity and brilliance, Douglass, the orator, was not the equal of Wendell Phillips. As a political agitator, he did not attain the fire and scope of Garrison nor the latter's dynamic power in organization. But he was their equal in courage, devotion and tenacity of purpose, and in sheer political skill and sagacity he was definitely their superior. He broke with them early, evolving his own policy of maintenance of the Union as opposed to their policy of disunion. He advocated the use of all means, including the political, to attain Abolition. It was only after many years that the Garrisonians followed his example. Greatest of the activists was another escaped slave, Harriet Tubman. Very close to these ex-slaves was John Brown. These three were the nearest to what we would call today the revolutionary propagandists and agitators.

They drove the South to infuriation. Toward the middle of the century the Abolitionists and the escaping slaves had created a situation that made compromise impossible.

The Anti-Fugitive Slave Law

In 1848 there occurred an extraordinary incident, a harbinger of the great international movement which was to play so great a part in the Civil War itself. When the news of the 1848 revolution in France reached Washington, the capital, from the White House to the crowds in the streets, broke out into illuminations and uproarious celebration. Three nights afterward, seventy-eight slaves, taking this enthusiasm for liberty literally, boarded a ship that was waiting for them and tried to escape down the Potomac. They were recaptured and were led back to jail, with a crowd of several thousands waiting in the streets to see them, and members of Congress in the House almost coming to blows in the excitement. The patience of the South and of the Northern bourgeoisie was becoming exhausted. Two years later, the ruling classes, South and North, tried one more compromise. One of the elements of this compromise was a strong Anti-Fugitive Slave Law. The Southerners were determined to stop this continual drain upon their property and the continuous excitation of the North by fugitive slaves.

It was the impossibility of enforcing the Anti-Fugitive Slave Law which wrecked the scheme. Not only did the slaves continue to leave. Many insurrectionary tremors shook the Southern structure in 1850 and again in 1854. The South now feared a genuine slave insurrection. They had either to secede or force their political demands upon the federal government.

The Northern bourgeoisie was willing to discipline the petty bourgeois democracy. But before long, in addition to

their humanitarian drive, the petty bourgeois democrats began to understand that not only the liberty of the slaves but their own precious democratic liberties were at stake. To break the desire of the slaves to escape, and to stifle the nationwide agitation, the South tried to impose restrictions upon public meetings in the North and upon the use of the mails. They demanded the right to use the civil authorities of the North to capture escaping slaves. Under their pressure, Congress even reached so far as to side-track the right of petition. The Declaration of Independence, when presented as a petition in favor of Abolition, was laid upon the table. Negroes who had lived peaceably in the North for years were now threatened, and thousands fled to Canada. Douglass and Harriet Tubman, people of nation-wide fame (Douglass was an international figure) were in danger. There was no settling this question at all. The petty bourgeois democrats defied the South. The escaping slaves continued to come. There were arrests and there were spectacular rescues by pro-Abolition crowds. Pro-slavery and anti-slavery crowds fought in the streets and with the Northern police. Scarcely a month passed but some escaping slave or ex-slave, avoiding arrest, created a local and sometimes a national agitation.

Slaves on ships revolted against slave-traders and took their ships into port, creating international incidents. Congress was powerless. Ten Northern states legalized their rebelliousness by passing Personal Liberty Laws which protected state officers from arresting fugitive slaves, gave arrested Negroes the right of *habeas corpus* and of trial by jury, and prohibited the use of the jails for runaway Negroes. Long before the basic forces of the nation moved into action for the inevitable showdown the petty bourgeois democrats and revolting slaves had plowed up the ground and made the nation irrevocably conscious of the great issues at stake.

The Free Farmers and the Proletariat

Yet neither Negroes nor petty bourgeois democracy were the main force of the second American revolution, and a more extended treatment of American history would make that abundantly clear if that were needed by any serious intelligence. The great battle was over the control of the public domain. Who was to get the land—free farmers or slave-owners? The Republican Party, as Commons has said, was not an anti-slavery party. It was a Homestead party. The bloody struggle over Kansas accelerated the strictly political development. Yet it was out of the Abolition movement that flowered the broader political organizations of the Liberty Party and the Free Soil Party, which in the middle of the decade finally coalesced into the Republican Party.

It was Marx who pointed out very early (*The Civil War in the United States*, page 226. Letter to Engels, July 1, 1861) that what finally broke down the bourgeois timidity was the great development of the population of free farmers in the Northwest Territory in the decade 1850-60. These free farmers were not prepared to stand any nonsense from the South because they were not going to have the mouth of the Mississippi in the hands of any hostile power. By 1860 the great forces which were finally allied were the democratic petty bourgeoisie, the free farmers in the Northwest, and certain sections of the proletariat. These were the classes that, contrary to 1776, compelled the unwilling bourgeois to lead them. They were the basic forces in the period which led to the revolution. They had to come into action before the battle could be joined. They were the backbone of the struggle.

In all this agitation the proletariat did not play a very prominent rôle. In New England the working masses were

staunch supporters of the movement and the writer has little doubt that when the proletariat comes into its own, further research will reveal, *as it always does*, that the workers played a greater rôle than is accredited to them. Yet the old question of unemployment, rivalry between the Negroes in the North and the Irish, the latest of the immigrant groups, disrupted one wing of the proletariat. Furthermore, organized labor, while endorsing the Abolitionist movement, was often in conflict with Garrison, who, like Wilberforce in England, was no lover of the labor movement. Organized labor insisted that there was wage slavery as well as Negro slavery, and at times was apt to treat both of them as being on the same level—a monumental and crippling error.

Nevertheless, on the whole, the evidence seems to point to the fact that in many areas the organized proletarian movement, though not in the vanguard, supported the movement for Abolition. Finally, we must guard against one illusion. The Abolition movement dominated the political consciousness of the time. Most Northerners were in sympathy. But few wanted war or a revolution. When people *want* a revolution, they make one. They usually want anything else except a revolution. It was only when the war began that the abolitionists reaped their full reward. Despite all this Abolition sentiment in the North, and particularly in the Northwest areas, the masses of the people on the whole were not anxious to fraternize with the free Negroes, and over large areas there was distinct hostility. But the free Negroes in the North never allowed this to demoralize them, and the masses of the revolting slaves kept on coming. Between 1830 and 1860, sixty to a hundred thousand slaves came to the North. When they could find no welcome or resting place in the North, some of them went on to Canada. But they never ceased to come. With the Civil War they will come in tens and then in hundreds of thousands.

Abolition and the International Proletariat

From its very beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, the Negro struggle for freedom and equality has been an international question. More than that, it seems to be able to exercise an effect, out of all proportion to reasonable expectation, upon people not directly connected with it. In this respect, the Abolition movement in America has curious affinities with the Abolition movement a generation earlier in Britain.

In Britain, before the emancipation in 1832, the industrial bourgeoisie was actively in favor of abolition. It was industrially more mature than the American bourgeoisie in 1850; the West Indian planters were weak, and the slaves were thousands of miles away. But there, too, the earlier Abolition movement assumed a magnitude and importance out of all proportion to the direct interests of the masses who supported it. Earlier, during the French Revolution, the mass revolts of the Negroes brought home to the French people the reality of the conditions which had existed for over a hundred and fifty years. A kind of collective "madness" on the Negro question seemed to seize the population all over France, and no aristocrats were so much hated as the "aristocrats of the skin."

The Abolitionist movement in America found not only a ready audience at home but an overwhelming welcome abroad. Not only did Garrison, Wendell Phillips and others lecture in Britain. Frederick Douglass and other Negro Abolitionists traveled over Europe and enrolled many hundreds of thousands in Abolitionist societies. One inspired Negro won seventy thousand signed adherents to the cause in Germany alone. In the decade preceding the Civil War, *Uncle Tom's*

Cabin was read by millions in Britain and on the continent, and even as far afield as Italy. And masses of workers and radicals in France, Spain and Germany took an active interest in the question. Their sentiments will bear wonderful fruit during the Civil War itself.

It is not enough to say merely that these workers loved the great American Republic and looked forward to the possibility of emigrating there themselves one day. There are aspects to this question which would repay modern investigation and analysis by Marxists. Beard, who has some insight into social movements in America, is baffled by certain aspects of the Abolition movement.* Thoroughly superficial are the self-satisfied pratings of English historians about the "idealism" of the English as an explanation of the equally baffling Abolition movement in Britain. It would seem that the irrationality of the prejudice against Negroes breeds in revolutionary periods a corresponding intensity of loathing for its practitioners among the great masses of the people.**

"The Signal Has Now Been Given"

The slaves played their part to the end. After Lincoln's election and the violent reaction of the South, the North, not for the first time, drew back from Civil War. Congress and the political leaders frantically sought compromise. Frederick Douglass in his autobiography gives an account of the shameful attempts on the part of the North to appease the South. Most of the Northern Legislatures repealed their Personal Liberty Laws. And Douglass concludes his bitter chapter by saying: "Those who may wish to see to what depths of humility and self-abasement a noble people can be brought under the sentiment of fear, will find no chapter of history more instructive than that which treats of the events in official circles in Washington during the space between the months of November, 1859, and March, 1860." (*Life and Times of Frederick Douglass*, Pathway Press, 1941, pages 362-366.)

For a long time even Lincoln's stand was doubtful. On December 20, 1860, the very day on which South Carolina seceded, Lincoln made a statement which seemed to exclude compromise. However, in a series of speeches which he delivered on his eleven-day journey to Washington, he confused the nation and demoralized his supporters. Even after the inaugural, on March 4, the North as a whole did not know what to expect from him. Marx, as we have seen, had no doubt that the decisive influence was played by the Northwest farmers, who supplied sixty-six votes or 36.6 per cent of the votes in the college which elected Lincoln.

But there was refusal to compromise from the South also. Says Douglass: "Happily for the cause of human freedom, and for the final unity of the American nation, the South was mad and would listen to no concessions. It would neither accept the terms offered, nor offer others to be accepted."

Why wouldn't they? One reason we can now give with confidence. Wherever the masses moved, there Marx and Engels had their eyes glued like hawks and pens quick to record. On January 11, 1860, in the midst of the critical period described by Douglass, Marx wrote to Engels: "In my opinion, the biggest things that are happening in the world today are,

**Rise of American Civilization* (page 698). "The sources of this remarkable movement are difficult to discover." Much the same can be said of the movement in Britain, which embraced literally millions of people.

**It is something for revolutionists to observe in the past and to count on in the future. Already in England, a country where race prejudice is still very strong, the presence of American Negro soldiers, the prejudice against them of white American soldiers, and the reports of Negro upheaval in America have awakened a strong interest among the English masses.

on the one hand, the movement of the slaves in America started by the death of John Brown, and, on the other, the movement of the serfs in Russia. . . . I have just seen in the *Tribune* there has been a fresh rising of slaves in Missouri, naturally suppressed. But the signal has now been given."

Fifteen days later, Engels replied: "Your opinion of the significance of the slave movement in America and Russia is now confirmed. The Harper's Ferry affair with its aftermath in Missouri bears its fruits . . . the planters have hurried their cotton on to the ports in order to guard against any probable consequence arising out of the Harper's Ferry affair." A year later Engels writes to Marx: "Things in North America are also becoming exciting. Matters must be going very badly for them with the slaves if the Southerners dare to play so risky a game."

Eighty years after Marx, a modern student has given details which testify to that unfailing insight into the fundamental processes of historical development, so characteristic

of our great predecessors. In Arkansas, in Mississippi, in Virginia, in Kentucky, in Illinois, in Texas, in Alabama, in Northwest Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina—rebellion and conspiracy swept the South between 1859 and 1860. Writes a contemporary after the John Brown raid: "A most terrible panic, in the meantime, seizes not only the village, the vicinity and all parts of the state, but every slave state in the Union . . . rumors of insurrection, apprehensions of invasions, whether well founded or ill founded, alter not the proof of the inherent and incurable weakness and insecurity of society, organized upon a slave-holding basis" (*Ibid.*, page 352).

The struggle of the Negro masses derives its peculiar intensity from the simple fact that what they are struggling for is not abstract but is always perfectly visible around them. In their instinctive revolutionary efforts for freedom, the escaping slaves had helped powerfully to begin and now those who remained behind had helped powerfully to conclude, the self-destructive course of the slave power.

J. R. JOHNSON.

The National Question and

The European Socialist Revolution

Contribution to the Discussion

The following document consists of extracts from a resolution submitted to the Workers Party by three of its members. It is printed here as a continuation of the discussion on the subject begun months ago in *The New International*.

The Character of Fascism

The second imperialist war has concentrated in Europe all the suicidal tendencies of totalitarian barbarism characteristic of capitalist society in this epoch.

To maintain the German workers in subjection, fascism was compelled to destroy the democratic liberties of the whole nation. It destroyed as socially organized forces all intermediate strata of society which act as a buffer between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, converting them either into bureaucratic appendages or propagandist adjuncts to the régime. All organs of administration, economic and social, it infused with its own corrosive content and stamped with its own loathsome insignia. The bourgeois state, seen abstractly, appeared to have reached the peak of power. In reality, the fascist state, seen in its concretely developing relations, represented a brutal but hollow façade of bourgeois defense against the invading socialist society.

Fascism began by atomizing but ends by polarizing the nation into the fascist régime with its supporters on the one hand, and on the other, enemies of fascism, the large masses of the people. It has so concentrated power in the state that the alleviation of grievances becomes inseparably associated with the smashing of the state power. By making violence the overt and not the latent force of government, it familiarizes the masses with the idea of violence as the only solution to their difficulties. It is the implacable enemy of Marxism. Yet it is compelled to make demagogic references to "socialism," "classless society," "workers of the world, unite!" and other Marxian concepts. Thereby it betrays to the world that ten years of the most brutal repression have failed to dim the as-

pirations and extinguish the hopes of the German proletariat, with its predominant rôle in modern society and its deep-rooted traditions of Marxian socialism.

Unable to solve the basic economic contradictions of capitalism, fascism embarked on an adventurous war, when it pushes the régime toward a catastrophic explosion. But much as it has destroyed, fascism cannot destroy that organization of the working class which is imposed upon it by the very process of capitalist production itself. When all the superstructural relations of society are destroyed or loosened, the working class possesses in the social organization of the factory the means of instantaneously creating revolutionary proletarian organizations embracing the class and therefore of a type most dangerous to capitalist society. Owing their very inception to fascist barbarism and capitalist ruin, these alone can form an organized social force to raise and, to the degree of their political consciousness, carry out the immediate and imperative needs of the nation and thus the historic destiny of the class.

These are the characteristics of German fascism. And these, in peace as well as in war, it has transferred to the European continent as a whole. To the deprivation of all democratic liberties in Germany, fascism is compelled to add, abroad, the deprivation of the only democratic right still left at home, the right of national independence. Thereby it raises the national question on a continental scale. But the process cannot stop there. German monopoly capitalism as a result of fascism will be compelled to yield or to barter even this last democratic right of the German people to a still greater imperialism in order to retain some shred of profit and privileges. This is the national question in Europe. It is the culmination of the capitalist degradation of European civilization by German monopoly capital. The consolidation of the independent national state was the first creation of the European bourgeoisie and the basis of democratic liberties for the nation. Today the completed centralization of capital is

fast leading to its logical conclusion, the destruction of national independence for the whole of Europe.

Imperialist Intervention

Such is the disintegration of bourgeois Europe, so violent and contradictory have been the remedies attempted by the bourgeoisie in peace and in war, against the working class and against each other, that even now, before the end of the war, the absolute character of the European crisis is already revealed. With the coming of peace, bourgeois Europe, victorious and conquered, will present the unprecedented spectacle of a continent where conquerors and conquered alike are involved in a common ruin and social disintegration.

America will propose to the European proletariat in exchange for its socialist birthright a mess of American pottage. But it will have no stable base in Europe. It will have to police the continent, openly in certain areas, and vicariously, if that is possible, in others. But the policing of a continent is primarily a political and only secondarily a military question. *The main political weapon of American imperialism against the European proletariat is the national divisions of Europe.*

To save Europe for capitalism, American imperialism must wring every drop out of its glory as the "liberator" of the continent from German fascism. For the time being it incites occupied Europe against Germany while it promises protection against an embittered Europe to frightened capitalist groups in the Axis. It is bitterly hostile to the underground movements of both France and Germany, the basis of a future proletarian unity. Stalin, more than any other leader of the counter-revolution, knows that a social revolution in Germany could radiate to every corner of Europe. He knows that the bourgeois national passions which divide the proletariat today are subordinate to the fundamental objective unity of the European proletariat, established by the development of the European economy and the cumulative experiences of thirty years. As the revolutionary crisis approaches, Stalin, operating for the Anglo-American imperialist combine among the proletariat, dissolves the Communist International. Thus this experienced enemy of the proletariat seeks, for the time being, to isolate and keep isolated the dreaded proletariat of Germany and strikes a moral and political blow at the haunting specter of proletarian unity.

The European Proletariat and National Liberation

The European proletariat is unified by its common experiences of 1914 to 1939. It is unified by the intensive barbarism, devastation and cruelty of the present imperialist war. It is unified by the centralization of European capital which makes the main enemy in every European country, the fascist régime in Germany. At the end of the war it will be further unified by the changed correlation of forces between the proletariat in every country and the bankrupt and disgraced European bourgeoisie.

Upon the basis of this objective unity, the cruelties of the military occupation, forced upon German officers and men by fascism, have engendered fierce national hatreds, surpassing anything known in Europe for generations. This has created the belief that nationalism is the dominating social force in Europe today and that in this respect the continent has been thrown back a hundred years. Such a conclusion would be entirely false. Nothing but the destruction of the European economy can throw the mental processes of the present European proletariat back a hundred years, least of all at this time when all tensions are at their highest. In the minds of the masses of the workers of the oppressed countries, their libera-

tion from the crimes and catastrophes of thirty years of capitalist society undoubtedly takes the form of the struggle against the foreign oppressor. But whereas the slogan of national independence one hundred years ago was raised by the bourgeoisie on the basis of the struggle for the bourgeois-democratic régime, today the banner of national independence is raised by the proletariat on the basis of the advancing revolution.

The fact that stares us in the face is that in France and in Poland the native bourgeoisie, as an independent force, does not exist. By capitulation or abdication, collaboration or absorption, plain flight or plain destruction, it is gone. But no class in any period of modern history can escape the consequences of so complete a removal from all its functions. The barbarous slogans of bourgeois nationalism become merely an outward shell for a new proletarian content. *Every intensification of chauvinistic sentiment against Germany has resulted, as it must result, in the increased development of the proletariat as an independent force in society. In irreconcilable conflict with the German bourgeoisie and the collaborators, and distrusting or ignoring the serio-comic governments in exile, the proletariat is compelled to struggle for the national, i.e., its own, emancipation by its own means in its own way.*

There are only two fundamental classes in modern society, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie is the servant either of the one or of the other, and it can dominate the proletariat only when it has the power of capital and the bourgeois state to reinforce it. Today, in the occupied countries, capital and the bourgeois state are the enemy, not the support, of the petty bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie in places appears to lead but in reality must obey the proletariat or forfeit all influence.

Thus it is clear that owing to the very bankruptcy of the bourgeoisie the proletariat is compelled to develop its own political independence and self-confidence and, even while it fights under the banner of bourgeois nationalism, is in practice shaking itself free from the old crippling bourgeois ideology with its dependence upon the bourgeoisie. The exiled bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie in the occupied countries, notably the French Committee of Resistance, is always chanting hymns to the new unity of the nation. They are striving to deceive the workers. The sacred unity of the nation before the bourgeoisie was driven out was a profane lie based on the domination of the native bourgeoisie. The new unity is equally a bourgeois lie based on the domination of the proletariat. This is the distance traveled by Europe in three short years.

In the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat to drive out the existing capitalist class, it is being rigorously trained and subjectively educated in the hard school of civil war for its place at the head of the nation. This process, going on before our eyes, is appreciated nowhere so much as by the most class-conscious of all classes, the bankrupt bourgeoisie of Europe. These, far from rejoicing over the destruction of the old organizations of the proletariat, view this new development, the direct product of their own inadequacy, with mortal terror.

Essentially false is the idea that the proletariat is satisfied to think, for the time being, only of the restoration of bourgeois democracy. The underground press in France contains full and detailed discussions of socialism and the prospects of a new order. The proletariat does not express its aims clearly. That is the task of the vanguard. But even when the great masses of the French workers say the Republic, they mean a republic in their own image, that is to say, an abstract, ideal

proletarian republic, and, above all, not the Third Republic which so persecuted the workers and ruined France.

The bourgeois struggle for national independence, though carried out in the name of the whole nation, organized and consolidated the bourgeoisie as a political class. Despite all superficial and misleading appearances to the contrary, the proletarian struggle for national emancipation, though carried out in the name of the whole nation, does not and cannot throw the proletariat back but accelerates its political consolidation and consciousness as an independent class, representing the immediate and historical interests of the nation.

Whatever the consciousness of the Polish proletariat, in the very preparation for the class struggle against the Polish bourgeoisie, it is objectively far closer to the proletariat of Germany than is the proletariat of an unoccupied country. Conversely, the British proletariat, functioning in a stable bourgeois milieu and therefore still dominated by the successful and triumphant Anglo-American bourgeoisie, allowed its Labor Party to pass a resolution specifically condemning the German proletariat. Thus events in Europe have already shown, and the coming insurrections may reveal with incredible speed to the participants themselves, that it is the proletariat in the occupied countries far more than those in countries unoccupied, which will be ready for collaboration with each other and with the revolutionary proletariat of Germany.

The Building of the Party

After a century of European history, the international vanguard knows that the proletariat, with its traditional mass organizations (as in Catalonia in 1936), or without them (as in Russia in March, 1917), is fully able to achieve a successful insurrection against a bankrupt bourgeois society without any substantial cohesive vanguard party. That is the organic strength of the proletariat.

The same century of European history and forty years of Leninism have taught the vanguard that an insurrection needs for its continued success a powerful, well organized vanguard party. The difficulty of creating this is the organic weakness of the proletariat.

The vanguard knows that the proletariat of Europe, in the approaching historical circumstances, without assistance from Marxists, is fully able to break the back of the fascist régime. Its difficulties will begin *afterward* because of the absence of a revolutionary international. The vanguard, small and disorganized as it is, approaches the task of building this, not with lamentations about the destruction of the proletarian organizations, nor with the technique of routine times. Instead, in the organic strength of the proletariat in motion, it seeks the basis of repairing its organic weakness.

The vanguard realizes that the Stalinists, the Social-Democrats, the Radical-Socialists and the downright fascists are raising the slogan of national emancipation and, according to their policies, seeking to use the working class and then chain or limit it. The vanguard, therefore, as its special task in the national struggle, seeks to *unveil to the masses the fundamentally socialist character of the approaching insurrection.*

Because it so clearly understands the proletarian character of the national revolution, the vanguard in the oppressed countries plunges into the national struggle.

Every member of the vanguard therefore joins the organized national resistance movement.

The vanguard raises the slogan of national independence and makes this the main political slogan of the day.

The proletariat, however, is in revolt, and every revolution, whatever its character, poses the question of power.

The vanguard raises the slogan of the power to the workers (or workers and peasants as the national circumstances may warrant).

The vanguard seeks to base the resistance groups consciously upon factory committees or peasant committees. It encourages the peasants to form joint committees among themselves for the planning of joint production, distribution, and secreting of food. It struggles for a constant relation and representation between the peasant committees of resistance and the city committees, seeking always to build up conscious mutual action, conscious mutual experience and conscious mutual confidence. In this way it concretely prepares the workers in town and country not only for the immediate struggle but for the joint task which history has placed upon them. By constantly emphasizing to the workers and peasants their own responsibility for every action in the struggle for national emancipation, the way is prepared for the final conclusion. With flexibility but with firmness, on every possible occasion, in every speech and in every leaflet, the vanguard distinguishes itself from the Social-Democrats, the Stalinists and the de Gaullists by pointing out that the workers and peasants are not sacrificing and dying so that the Girauds, the Peyroutons, the Daladiers and Blums and all those who led the country into ruin should come back and rule. The rule must be by the workers and peasants themselves, those who are bearing the burdens and will have to face the post-war misery. Thus, the vanguard, in the midst of the struggle, by example and by precept, educates the masses of the people, and without in the slightest degree subordinating the national struggle, attracts to its ideas and organizations those elements which are most conscious of the lessons of thirty years.

The Tasks of the German Vanguard

In Germany today it is estimated that there are over twelve million foreign workers of various nationalities. These workers are animated by the sole desire of overthrowing Hitler so as to regain their personal liberty and national independence. *Today, the most significant feature in the whole European tangle is that the French workers in Germany and the German workers have already established good relations against the common oppressor and this fact has been broadcast to the French people by the underground press.* There, in the very heart of the bourgeois barbarism, the Socialist United States of Europe is taking shape.

The German vanguard must demand the right of all those workers who wish to do so to be returned home immediately at the expense of the German government. It must raise the slogan of the national independence of every country oppressed by Germany and call upon the German soldiers in those countries at the first possible moment to join the populations in their struggle against Hitlerite tyranny.

For every concrete demand—food, clothing, conditions of labor, right of free press, right to organize, etc., which it makes on behalf of the German working class, it specifically includes the workers of the nationally oppressed countries, demanding for them special national privileges, such as the right to their own press, assembly, etc., and encouraging them to make the same demands. On this basis and in every possible manner it strives to create a complete and yet flexible unity between all sections of the wage slaves in Germany for the coming revolution and draws together the most advanced and resolute elements as a nucleus for the revolutionary international.

The vanguard in Germany, as it sees the impending imperialist domination of Germany by Anglo-American imperialism, prepares the German people for the only road out. It

therefore watches the developing struggle and at the correct moment raises the slogan, "The workers and peasants of Europe must safeguard the German revolution." According to the success which it has had in forging a unity between the millions of workers from the oppressed countries and the German proletariat, the vanguard thereby creates a powerful sentiment among the masses of the European liberated people in support of Germany's national independence and builds up the consciousness of unity among the European proletariat.

The analysis of the national question in Europe thus begins and ends with Germany. What was apparently merely the national question in oppressed Europe is in reality the most powerful adjunct to the achievement of the all-important proletarian revolution in Germany and the strongest preparation for the defense of the European proletariat against American imperialism.

The fundamental weakness of the European proletariat is the absence of any trained and organized revolutionary party. For this reason the conscious seizure and consolidation of power by any section of the proletariat, immediately succeeding the national liberation, is by all historical precedents and present prospects extremely unlikely. The most reasonable expectation is that at the end of the war the proletariat, through its factory committees, peasant committees, soviets, and other organs of resistance, should seize the property of the collaborator, establish workers' control in all factories and, in a manner similar to the Catalonian revolt in 1936, actually form what will be *de facto* governments over large sections of the continent. The returning bourgeoisie will then try to regain possession of the countries. This will inaugurate the period of dual power.

The Marxian terminology must be here defined with some rigidity in order to avoid confusion. The bourgeois-democratic régime is the régime in which the workers have not created organizations to challenge the power of the bourgeoisie. There is only a single power, bourgeois power, and the working class organizations, trade unions, labor parties, etc., are recognized by the bourgeoisie and in turn submit to it. The dual power begins when the workers have created factory committees or soviets which openly contend with the bourgeoisie for the whole or part of the power. If these organizations are beaten down, the bourgeois régime, with or without democracy, is once more reestablished.

If the first eruption of the European proletariat takes place in Germany with the full participation of the imported European workers, the dual power in the occupied countries will assume a particularly sharp and unbearable intensity. American imperialism and European socialism will stand face to face. If the German revolution lags behind the others or does not take place at all, the dual power in the occupied countries is likely to be of an entirely different character. The task here is not speculation about unpredictable things but to teach the proletariat by word and deed the importance of the German revolution.

The second stage of the proletarian revolution depends upon many factors besides the relation of forces established by the action of the proletariat and the consolidation of the vanguard. Owing to the very weakness of the vanguard, the future revolutionary course depends heavily upon the military decisions of the imperialist war, upon the points chosen for attack by Allied imperialists, upon the disposition of the forces at the moment of victory, on the character of the decisive defeats inflicted and sustained by Germany (and not any temporary arrangements preceding these "military decisions of a violent nature") on the particular moment when the

break in the morale of armies and civilian populations takes place. These factors are so unpredictable in themselves and so closely intertwined that an examination of possibilities can only return to the starting premise of any national liberation in the coming world. At a particular stage German fascism will collapse and the European proletariat will face the problem of power against the American bourgeoisie, pushing in front of it its European satellites.

The American bourgeoisie is undoubtedly preparing to seize all strategic positions on the continent. It will bring much-needed food and clothing and medicine. It will be welcomed at first. The chief enemy of its early success here is the revolution in Germany. It is this revolution leading Europe which can unite the European proletariat, sharpen appreciation of America's rôle, and do more than anything else to awaken the proletariat of America, Britain and Stalinist Russia. But the more clearly one visualizes the enormous counter-revolutionary potentialities of the American bourgeoisie and of Stalinism, the more urgent it becomes to place before the proletariat, *today*, the necessity to struggle for workers' power and proletarian unity in the present stage. It is on this theoretical basis that the European vanguard party can be founded. It can be founded on no other.

So great a change as faces Europe is not accomplished in a day or in a year without advances and setbacks. The Russian Revolution has given us a false conception of the rapidity of revolutionary development. The French Revolution lasted for years. The workers, as so often in a revolutionary crisis, may need a period of rest and a physical, mental and political reorganization immediately after their first torrential outburst.

European society will see many strange changes, unpredictable at the present moment. American imperialism may find itself in the first stage compelled to enter into direct co-operation with the proletariat. Whatever the forms, they will revolve around the proletariat until its eyes are gouged out, its hands tied and its legs broken.

The revolutionary vanguard in America is not at all a passive or even merely a sympathetic spectator of these events.

1. It must show to the advanced workers that in the same way that the defeat of the German proletariat has resulted in such a catastrophe for Europe and the world, so the defeat of the European socialist revolution by American imperialism must have ultimately disastrous consequences for the American workers.

2. By its own deeply-felt interest, not so much in the national and international maneuvers of the bourgeoisie, but in the strenuous study and analysis of the actual struggles of the workers for independent action, the vanguard can stimulate and impregnate the advanced workers of America with the ideas and give them an invaluable concrete education in the true meaning and historical significance of the concepts: class struggle, independent action, international solidarity, socialism or barbarism.

3. The vanguard has a special responsibility to take the offensive on behalf of the German proletariat and the tortures which American imperialism is preparing for it.

4. In its presentation of the national aspirations of the European peoples oppressed by Hitler, the vanguard takes care to place this always in its proper European perspective and to make clear that the national revolutions in Europe today are merely the form assumed by the advancing socialist revolution.

J. R. JOHNSON,
HARRY ALLEN,
TOM BROWN.

"Brothers Under the Skin"

Racial Problems in the U. S. A.

Despite the fact that it has pock-marked American life for decades and that it immediately affects a sizable group of our population, the status of the non-Negro colored minorities in this country has escaped the attention of even our liberal historians. This is understandable enough, since they are more concerned with composing lullabies than writing history. Only in comparatively obscure studies has the problem been discussed, and that in isolated form. Carey McWilliams' *Brothers Under the Skin** has, therefore the virtue of bringing together popular studies of the colored groups—Indian, Puerto Rican, Mexican, Negro, Orientals. In eight sketches he has traced the history of these groups, their segregation and exploitation, their pathetic efforts to integrate themselves into the American community and the rebuffs they have met. Regardless of the other merits of the book, it serves the valuable purpose of presenting the fact that there exist in this country some 14,000,000 people who by virtue of the dark pigmentation of their skins are doomed to live as an inferior social caste from which, by definition, escape is impossible.

The Dualism in McWilliams' Approach

McWilliams is not a footnoting sociologist; nor is he a particularly subtle social psychologist. He is a popularizer, which is quite acceptable, since he carefully documents his sources and does not sacrifice accuracy for popularity. His approach, unfortunately, suffers from that dualism which is indicative of the difficulties to which even such competent liberals as McWilliams are driven by the untenability of their present politics. He attacks color discrimination because (1) his sense of decency is outraged at the fact that men can be made to suffer indignities merely because of the color of their skin, because he realizes that the culture of the prevailing group is impoverished by discrimination, and because he realizes that no decent society can be built so long as racial and color fissures eat into the social organism; and (2) because he believes that the victory of the United Nations is partially dependent upon a progressive solution of the color and race questions. Since McWilliams is a liberal, he cannot be expected to have a fundamental understanding of the war and it would therefore be pointless to argue with him *when his main preoccupation is with another question*; what is reprehensible, however, is to suggest in any way that the color problem needs to be solved primarily as a *means* toward winning the war. McWilliams, however, has not allowed his political preoccupations to divert him from his main task and, with the exceptions of the poor first and last chapters, his book is reasonably free from any attempts to pose the color problem as a function of the war.

McWilliams' main approach is in terms of the cultural effects which the oppression of colored minority groups produces. He has a fine respect for the integrity and value of different cultures and his best pages describe how colored groups have had their social and cultural patterns debilitated as a result of the impenetrable economic barriers which American society has placed in their path. He appreciates the fact that

the alien colored groups find themselves in an impossible position when they are thrust into a strange, hostile land in which their folkways are neither accepted nor tolerated, and they are, then, not allowed to become part of the American life-stream. Especially is this true in two contingencies: (1) where the immigrant group has succeeded in establishing a ghetto existence, such as the Chinatowns or the Hispanidad agricultural communes in New Mexico, and then these precarious structures are swept away by the appetites of American capitalism; or (2) where the second generation groups become alienated from the values of their parents and the new "democratic" values which they acquire during their scanty educations are never fulfilled in actual life, with personal and group demoralization as the result. And though official society blithely pretends to be unaware of these situations, America is husbanding within its borders a minority which is degenerating into social and cultural atrophy. This situation is not true for the Negroes, or at least not as true; they are in a different position from, say, the Mexicans or Chinese because they have become, in a perverted way, an integral part of the American social structure, and therefore capable of resistance. But of that, more later.

It is pathetic to see with what eager credulity the Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, the Chinese and Filipinos have accepted at its face value the prattle of democracy and economic opportunity which American big business utilized when it needed additional sources of cheap labor. If ever there were peoples anxious to make themselves acceptable in their new land, it was they. Yet they have had to face the withering effects of that terrible provincial insularity and snobbishness with which American society has been afflicted.

There has resultantly developed a marginal caste, hemmed into poverty by the visibility of their skins, and living as a doomed group, unable to integrate itself into either the economy or society of the nation. Is it any wonder that the tightly knit family life of the Chinatown community has begun to disintegrate; that the Japanese group, once virtually free of crime, has begun to produce an increasing criminal element; that the Puerto Rican community in New York has witnessed an alarming growth of juvenile delinquency; that the Mexican community in California has produced the zoot-suiters; that, in short, degeneration, disintegration, demoralization have all been forced on these initially industrious and ambitious peoples by the "land of the free"? Is it any wonder that the second generations find themselves in the heartrending dilemma of having neither a heritage nor a future, a memory nor a promise, a cultural buttress nor a social guide? One of the most poignant passages of McWilliams' book is his description of how even the primitive natives of Guam have been disturbed by the contrast between the "democratic" phrases of the American schools and the reality of colonial existence.

Source of Color Oppression

McWilliams' cultural approach is in the main a worthy one since the final toll of national oppression is cultural: the oppressed minority has its native culture destroyed and is unable to develop an adequate substitute, while the oppressing

**Brothers Under the Skin*, by Carey McWilliams. Little, Brown & Co., 325 pp., \$2.75.

majority fails to absorb the best elements of the minority culture. The great Marxists have also adopted this stress, but they have properly placed it in the context of a controlling social situation. McWilliams, while aware of the causal rôle of capitalism in producing color discrimination, consistently neglects to emphasize it. He adequately describes the economic effects of color discrimination and relates it to the less tangible aspects of that discrimination, but he is remarkably chary in dealing with its social causes. He even suggests, because of his liberal politics, that color discrimination was not in the interest of American capitalism; that, for instance, the Japanese truck farmers in California were not an economic threat to the native agricultural combines.

Yet it cannot be denied that color oppression arose as a social corollary to the growth of American industrial capitalism. This took several forms: (1) the colored minorities were used as a source of cheap labor and potential strike-breakers with which to threaten the standards of American workers; (2) they were used to fill menial tasks or labor in substandard industries which proved unattractive to American workers accustomed to a higher wage level; (3) they have formed an important element of the reserve pool of unemployed which capitalism finds useful to maintain even during "prosperity" periods; (4) they served as the convenient scapegoat on which the masses could vent their spleen as a result of their own economic difficulties while simultaneously adopting an attitude of social superiority. These are a few indications of the way in which color oppression in general, and Jim Crowism in particular have been a vital part of the development of the American capitalist economy. Why does McWilliams skate around these questions? Perhaps we shall find an answer when we discuss his program of action.

While it might be expected that he would fail to stress the economic causes of color discrimination sufficiently, it is surprising to note that he has also neglected many of the psychological aspects of the situation. He has avoided the rich field of social psychology which is opened when the question is asked: Why do so many whites participate in the shameful acts of discrimination which so often erupt into open violence? As a result, his study is deprived of a good deal of necessary subtlety. Once these reservations are made, however, it is necessary to note the rich harvest of materials he has gathered. Within the limitations of his cultural approach, he has presented materials that are indispensable knowledge for any socialist.

The best chapters are on the Indians and Mexicans. He reviews the story of how America massacred the Indian tribes, as well as the recent policies of the government. These have fluctuated between two extremes, each of them disastrous: first, the policy of "cultural attack," which attempted to destroy the Indian tribal community, suppress its native languages and customs, abolish the ownership of land in common and attempt to set up individual Indians as small landowners; and second, the attempt to recreate in miniature a bloodless replica of the old Indian life on the artificial basis of the reservation, which attempt no longer challenges the independence of the Indian cultural tradition but doesn't foster any development toward modernity and views the continued existence of the Indian people as a sort of museum-piece anachronism. In a sense, the treatment of the Indian is the "original sin" which stimulated and served as the starting point for the American racist tradition.

It is somewhat different with the Mexicans. McWilliams

ventures the estimate that there are about 3,000,000 of them in this country. They suffer nearly all of the difficulties that the Negroes do, but lack the social cohesion of the Negroes with which to resist. There are three main groups of Mexicans in this country: (1) the majority of them are the most miserable of the migrant workers of the Southwest and the South; (2) a group of nearly 500,000 has become stranded in such large cities as Chicago, where they lead the life of a marginal slum proletariat; (3) and most interesting of all, there remain the original Hispaños of New Mexico who have long been citizens of this country and who, in the obscure regions of that state, have continued until recently to live as a primitive semi-communist agricultural community. McWilliams describes these latter as "communities which have remained almost wholly unaffected by world developments during the last two hundred years. Inhabited by the descendants of the original Spanish colonists, these villages still speak the Spanish of the time of Cervantes. To visit the villages is not only to form an intense admiration for the people themselves, but to become deeply impressed with the integrity of their social life and of their culture." Yet even these havens have been destroyed over the course of years, the pressure of "Anglo" capital being too strong to resist. Today these three groups of Mexicans find themselves in a common state of economic despair, political inarticulateness and social disintegration.

The Question in the U.S. Colonies

Less worth while are McWilliams' chapters on America's colonies, the Philippines, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. They provide fine materials on the cultural suppression of the peoples of these islands (especially harrowing is his story of the Puerto Rican "educational system") but are very weak with regard to the methods and policies of American imperialism. It is here that the scholar exits and the liberal enters, for McWilliams believes that independence for these peoples is a worthless chimera. He rationalizes this position by saying that the difficulties of a free Puerto Rico, for instance, would be insurmountable and that the solution lies in so liberalizing American life that the Puerto Ricans will desire to become a forty-ninth state. There is, of course, a grain of truth behind this reactionary nonsense. There is no doubt that the Caribbean island peoples would want to tie their fate in some way with a socialist America, but since that socialist America is at present lacking, it is incumbent upon all genuine democrats to support the right of Puerto Rico for national independence, without which any subsequent federation is merely a farce.

McWilliams is at his weakest in dealing with the Negroes. He gives a fair summary of the Negro in the post-Civil War period, based on Du Bois and Allen. But his contemporary interpretation is largely in legal terms—the increasing "rights" which Negroes have won in the courts—and fails completely to take into account such essential factors as the rôle of the Negro in the trade unions, the factors of resistance in Negro life, etc. Least adequate of all is a program of action, which is nothing more than a set of legislative perspectives without any realistic considerations of the means with which to achieve them. McWilliams is in a trap: his political opinions, lashing him to the war machine, prevent him from offering the socialist conclusions which his materials clearly suggest.

One final thought is stimulated by the reading of this book. We of the American Marxist movement have paid much attention to the polemics over the national question in Europe, but we have almost totally ignored the materials

which this book contains. As part of that other-worldliness which has been a crucial cause of the theoretical barrenness of American Marxism, we have studied primitive communism in Engels and have not even been aware of the settlements in New Mexico. We have contented ourselves with agitational generalizations but have never attempted to apply the tools of Marxian method to the Negro question in this country. All of these problems—some of them, such as the Negro question,

of burning importance, and the others of marginal significance but great theoretical interest—we have ignored in so far as any serious study is concerned. McWilliams has provided us with the materials; that is why his book is indispensable for every socialist. But these materials must be developed with the sociological precision and psychological subtlety that the skilled Marxist can furnish.

R. F.

Origin of Capitalism in Russia—III

An Old Essay by Lenin

[Continued from last issue]

VII. Theories of National Income

Having stated the fundamental postulates of the Marxist theory of realization, we must yet point briefly to its tremendous significance in the theory of "consumption," "distribution," and "income" of a nation. All these questions, especially the last, were until now the real stumbling block for economists. The more they wrote and spoke of it, the greater was the confusion emanating from the fundamental mistake of A. Smith. We will indicate several examples of this confusion here.

It is interesting to note, for example, that Proudhon essentially repeated this mistake, simply giving the old theory a somewhat different formulation. He stated:

A (under this are presumed all owners, employers and capitalists) begins an enterprise with 10,000 francs, paying the workers in advance, for which they must produce products. After A has thus transformed his money into commodities, he must, when he has completed production, for example, at the end of a year, again convert the commodities into money. To whom will he sell his commodities? Naturally, to the workers, since there are only two classes in society—on the one hand, the employers, on the other, the workers. These workers, having received 10,000 francs for their labor in the form of wages, which are sufficient to cover the necessities of their life, must now, however, pay more than 20,000 francs, that is, they must pay the percentage of return on capital investment and other profits which he anticipated making at the beginning of the year. This excess above 10,000 francs the worker can cover only by a loan and, as a consequence of this, he falls into greater debt and poverty. One of two things must happen: either the worker can subsist on nine units out of ten he has produced, or he must pay the employer only his wages and no more. In that case, however, the employer himself becomes bankrupt since he borrowed his capital at a rate of interest which he must pay back. (Diehl "Proudhon," II, 200, quoted in the Sbornik "Industry." Articles from *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, M. 1896, page 101.)

As the reader sees, this is the same difficulty—how to realize surplus value—which bothers Messrs V. V. and N—on. Proudhon merely expressed this in a somewhat peculiar form. And the peculiarity of his formulation brings him even closer to our Narodniki. They, exactly like Proudhon, discern the "difficulty" in the realization of surplus value (interest or profit in the terminology of Proudhon), but fail to recognize that the confusing theory, borrowed by them from the old economists, hinders the explanation of realization not only of surplus value but also of constant capital. That is, their "difficulty" results in a failure to understand the whole process of realization of products in capitalist society. Concerning this "theory" of Proudhon, Marx remarked sarcastically:

Proudhon, incapable of grasping this, exposes his incapableness in the ridiculous formula: The laborer cannot buy back his own product, be-

cause the interest is contained in it, which is added to the purchase price. (*Das Kapital*, III, 2, 379. Russ. tr., page 698, with errors.)²⁰

Marx quotes a remark against Proudhon by a vulgar economist, a certain Forcade, who "quite correctly generalizes the difficulty, which Proudhon expressed only under a more narrow point of view,"²¹ that is, Forcade stated that the price of commodities includes not only a surplus over wages and profit, but also a part which replaces constant capital. That means, concludes Forcade—in opposition to Proudhon—that the capitalist too cannot, with his profit, buy back his commodities. (Forcade himself not only failed to solve this problem but did not even understand it.)

In exactly the same manner, Rodbertus failed to contribute anything to the solution of this question. Asserting with particular emphasis that "ground rent, profit on capital, and wages comprise income,"²² Rodbertus, however, did not in any way clarify for himself the concept of "income." Describing what would be the problem of political economy if it followed the "correct method" (l.c., page 26), he thus deals with the distribution of the national product: "It (i.e., the genuine "science of national income"—emphasis by Rodbertus) "should have shown how, out of the whole national production, one part is always designated in advance as *replacement* for what was used in production or by capital, and the other part as *national income*—for the satisfaction of the direct needs of society and its members" (*Ibid.*, page 27). But although a genuine science should have demonstrated this—nevertheless the "science" of Rodbertus did not make this demonstration at all.

The reader will see that Rodbertus merely repeats Adam Smith word for word, not even noticing, evidently, that the problem first arises here. Which workers "replace" the national capital? Which realize their product? Of this he had not a word to say. Summing up his theory (diese neue Theorie, die ich der bisherigen gegenüberstelle, S. 32) in the form of separate postulates, Rodbertus speaks from the very outset about the distribution of national income, thus: "Rent" (it is clear that under this term Rodbertus meant that which is called surplus value) and wages are therefore in essence shares which pertain to the product to the extent that it is income" (page 33). This very important slip of the tongue should have led him to the most essential question. Since he had previously stated that under income are understood ob-

²⁰*Capital*, III, page 982, footnote; the word "ridiculous" is left out of the translation, though it appears in the original German.—Tr.

²¹*Ibid.*, page 982, footnote.

²²*Zur Beleuchtung der sozialen Frage*, Dr. Rodbertus-Jagetzow, Berlin, 1875, page 72 u.f.

jects serving "the satisfaction of direct needs," it follows that there are products that are not used for personal consumption. How are they realized? But Rodbertus does not notice this lack of clarity; he quickly ignores this slip and passes on to a discussion of the "division of the product into three shares" (wages, profit and rent, pages 49-50ff). Thus Rodbertus essentially repeated the dogma of A. Smith and together with it his basic error and hence explained nothing at all regarding income.

The promise of a new and better theory as to the *division of the national product* turned out to be an empty promise. In actuality, Rodbertus did not advance the theory on this question by a single degree. To what degree his concepts of "income" were confused are revealed in his further discussion in the fourth Social Letter to F. Kirchman (*Das Kapital*, Berlin, 1884) on the following: It is necessary to consider money as national revenue; are wages derived from capital or from income?—speculations which Engels said belong "to the domain of scholasticism" (Vorwort to Vol. II of *Capital*, S. XXI).²²

The reign of complete confusion regarding concepts of national income is absolute with economists even today. For example, Herkner, in his article on "Crises" in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften* (the Sbornik mentioned previously, page 81), discussing realization of the product in capitalist society (in paragraph 5—"Distribution") finds the statement of K. G. Rau, who merely repeats the mistake of A. Smith by dividing the whole product of society into shares of income, a "felicitous" one. R. Meyer, in his article on "Income" (same pl., pages 283ff), quotes the confused definitions of A. Wagner (who likewise repeats the mistake of A. Smith) and frankly admits that "it is difficult to distinguish income from capital" and "the most difficult thing is the distinction between profit (Ertrag) and income (Einkommen)."

We thus see that the economists, having criticized and being still in the process of criticizing the insufficient attention that the classicists (and Marx) paid to "distribution" and "consumption," could not elucidate even an iota of the fundamental questions of "distribution" and "consumption" as if they were independent branches of science corresponding to some independent process and phenomena of economic life. Political economy does not concern itself with "production" at all, but with social relations of people in production, with the social organization of production. Once these social relations are explained and analyzed in full, *by that token* there are defined the place of each class in production and, consequently, their share in national consumption. And the solution to this problem—before which classical political economy stopped and which has not by a hair been advanced by all sorts of specialists in the field of "distribution" and "consumption"—is given by a theory directly related to that of the classicists, which consummates the analysis of production of capital, individual and social.

The questions about "national income" and about "national consumption" are absolutely insoluble if posed as independent questions. But, although they are thus fruitful only of scholastic discussions, definitions and classification, they prove to be completely soluble when the process of production of the whole social capital is analyzed. More than that: it ceases to exist as a separate question when the relation of national consumption to the social product and the realization of each individual part of the product are explained.

²²Preface to Vol. II of *Capital*, page 26.—Tr.

There remains only the need to *name* these individual parts:

In order to avoid useless difficulties, it is necessary to distinguish the gross output and the net output from the gross income and the net income.

The gross output, or the gross product, is the total reproduced product....

The gross income is that portion of value and that portion of the gross product measured by it which remains after deducting that portion of value and that portion of the total product measured by it, which replaces the constant capital advanced and consumed in production. The gross income, then, is equal to the wages (or to that portion of the product which is to become once more the income of the laborer) plus the profit, plus the rent. On the other hand, the net income is the surplus value, and thus the surplus product, which remains after the deduction of the wages, and which, in fact, represents the surplus value realized by capital and to be divided with the landlords, and the surplus product measured by it.

... Viewing the income of the whole society, the national income consists of wages plus profit plus rent, that is, of the gross income. But even this is an abstraction to the extent that the entire society, on the basis of capitalist production, places itself upon the capitalist standpoint and considers only the income divided into profit and rent as the net income. (III, 2, 375-6. Russ. tr., pages 695-6.)²³

Thus the explanation of the process of realization brought clarity also to the question of income, solving the basic difficulty which hindered an understanding of this question: How "income for one is capital for another"? How does production which consists of objects of personal consumption and falls entirely into wages, profit and rent include also the constant part of capital which can never be income? The analysis of realization in Part III of Volume II of *Capital* fully solves these problems, making it necessary only that these parts of the social product be designated, which Marx does in the concluding part of Vol. III of *Capital* devoted to the question of "income," and to refer to the analysis in Vol. II.*

VIII. Why a Foreign Market Is Necessary to a Capitalist Nation

In regard to the analyzed theory of realization of the product in capitalist society, the question may arise: Does not this contradict the fact that a capitalist nation cannot dispense with foreign markets?

It is necessary to remember that the analysis of realization of the product in capitalist society proceeded upon the assumption of an absence of foreign trade: this postulate has been stated and its *necessity* in such an analysis was demonstrated. Obviously, the importation and exportation of products would only confuse the question, and in no way aid in solving the problem. The mistake of Messrs. V. V. and N—on consists in this: that they bring in the foreign market *in order to explain* the realization of surplus value. Since it explains exactly nothing, this introduction of the foreign market only hides their theoretic mistakes, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, it permits them to avoid, by means of these erroneous "theories," the necessity of *explaining* the fact of the development of the home market for Russian capitalism.** The "foreign market" for them is merely a subterfuge which glosses over the development of capitalism (and consequently

²³*Capital*, III, pages 978-9.—Tr.

*Cf. *Das Kapital*, III, 2, VII, Abschnitt, "Die Revenue," ch. 49: "Zur Analyse des Produktionsprozesses" (Russ. tr., pages 588-706). Here Marx also lists the circumstances which hindered the former economists from understanding this process (pages 379-382, Russ. tr., pages 698-700). (*Capital*, III, Part VII, *The Revenues and Their Sources*, Ch. 49, *A Contribution to the Analysis of the Process of Production*, pages 968-992.—Tr.)

**G. S. Bulgakov very correctly mentions, in the above quoted book: "Until now the cotton industry destined for the peasant market has grown continuously.. Consequently, this absolute narrowing of national consumption" (about which Mr. N—on speaks) "...is conceivable only theoretically." (pages 214-215.)

of the market) within the country by a subterfuge all the more convenient because it frees them also from the necessity of analyzing the facts which testify to the conquest of foreign markets by Russian capitalism.***

The necessity of a foreign market for a capitalist country is not at all determined by the laws of realization of the social product (and of surplus value in particular), but primarily by the fact that capitalism is only the result of a widespread system of commodity *exchange* which transcends the limits of state boundaries. Therefore it is not possible to conceive of a capitalist nation without foreign trade, and indeed there is no such nation.

As the reader knows, this result is a historic phenomenon from which the Narodniki cannot take cover in the vapor of hackneyed phrases about the "impossibility for capitalists to consume surplus value." Here it would be necessary to examine—if they actually wished to pose the question of the foreign market—the history of the development of foreign trade and the history of the development of commodity exchange. Had they analyzed this history, they would, of course, find it impossible to explain capitalism as an accidental deviation from the path.

Secondly, the proportions between the component parts of social production (both in value and in natural form), which it is necessary to presume in demonstrating the theory of reproduction of social capital but which is merely an average derived from a series of constant vacillations—these proportions are constantly upset in capitalist society because of the fact that the individual producers work for an unknown market. The separate parts of industry which serve as a "market" for each other develop unevenly; some outdistance others, and the more developed industry seeks a foreign market. This does not at all signify "the impossibility for a capitalist nation to realize surplus value," as the Narodnik is ready wistfully to conclude. It shows merely the disproportionality in the development of separate industries. Under a *different* distribution of the national capital the same quantity of products could be realized within the country. However, in order that capital may leave one sphere of industry and emigrate to another, a crisis is necessary in the former sphere. What reasons then can restrain capitalists who are threatened with this crisis from a search for foreign markets and, in order to facilitate exports, from a demand for subsidies and relief from export restrictions?

Thirdly, the law of pre-capitalist methods of production is the repetition of the process of production in the pre-existing quantity, on the former basis. Such is the corvée economy of the landlords, the natural economy of the peasants, the handicraft production of the industrialists. Contrariwise, the law of capitalist production is that of constant revolution in the methods of production. Under old methods of production, the economic units could exist for centuries, changing neither in character, nor in magnitude, never departing from the limits of the landlord's domain, the peasant village or the small surrounding market for village artisans and petty industrialists (so-called home workers). Contrariwise, the capitalist enterprise inevitably outgrows the limits of the community, local market, the district and, subsequently, the state. Since the isolation and insulation of the state are already destroyed by commodity exchange, then the natural striving of each

capitalist branch of industry leads necessarily to the search for a foreign market.

Thus the necessity to search for a foreign market does not at all prove the insolvency of capitalism, as the Narodnik economists like to present the matter. Completely the opposite—this necessity graphically shows the progressive historical work of capitalism which destroys the ancient isolation and confinement of the earlier systems of economy (and consequently the narrowness of their intellectual and political life) and which links all countries of the world in a single economic unit.

We see from this that the last two reasons for the necessity of a foreign market are, again, reasons of a historical nature. In order to analyze them, it is necessary to examine each separate branch of industry, its development within the country, its transformation into capitalist industry, in a word, it is necessary to study the *facts* about the development of capitalism in a country. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the Narodniki utilize an incident to evade these facts under cover of hollow and worthless phrases about the "impossibility" of both home and foreign markets.

IX. Conclusions from Chapter I

Let us summarize now the theoretic postulates, analyzed above, which are directly related to the question of the home market.

1. The basic process of the creation of a home market (i.e., the development of commodity production and capitalism) is the social division of labor. It consists in this, that the various aspects of processing raw materials (and various operations in this process) are separated, one after another, from agriculture and became independent branches of industry, exchanging their products (now already *commodities*) for products of agriculture. Thus agriculture itself becomes an industry (i.e., producing commodities and the same process of specialization takes place in it.

2. The direct deduction from the preceding postulate is the law of every developing commodity economy and, particularly, of capitalist economy, that the industrial (i.e., non-agricultural) population grows faster than the agricultural population; an increasing part of the population is withdrawn from agriculture into manufacturing industry.

3. The separation of the direct producer from the means of production, i.e., his expropriation, which marks the transition from simple commodity production to capitalist production and which is the necessary condition of this transition) *creates* the home market. This process of the creation of the home market proceeds in two directions. On the one hand, the *means of production*, from which the small producer is "freed," are converted into capital in the hands of the new owner, serve in the production of commodities and, consequently, are themselves transformed into commodities. Thus even the simple reproduction of these means of production requires that they be purchased (formerly these means of production were reproduced, in the majority of cases, in the natural form and sometimes they were made at home), i.e., create a market for means of production and later also for the products now produced with the help of these means of production which are likewise converted into commodities. On the other hand, the *means of existence* of this small producer become a material element of variable capital, i.e., of the sum of money spent by the employer in hiring workers (it does not matter whether he is a landlord, a contractor, a lumber merchant, a factory owner, etc.). In this manner these means of existence

****Volgin*. "The Basis of Narodism," in the works of Mr. Vorontsev, St. Pt., 1896, pages 71-76.

A Historical Treasure

THE NEW COURSE, by Leon Trotsky; **THE STRUGGLE FOR THE NEW COURSE**, by Max Shachtman. Published by the New International Publishing Co., New York. 265 pages; price: \$1.50 paper; \$2.00 cloth.

The American and British student of the revolutionary movement, particularly of that phase that has now become known as Stalinism, will often have had occasion to confront references to *The New Course*, written by Trotsky in 1923. If such a student reads the Stalinized version of the history of the Russian Revolution and the development of the Bolshevik Party, an endless tirade against this book will be found. But in this reading there will be little or no textual reference to the work.

On the other hand, a study of the growing Trotskyist literature will likewise reveal only references or textual quotations, for the Trotskyist movement made the error of not long ago publishing that book which opened the struggle against Stalinism and forecast the *kind* of degeneration which must follow in the world revolutionary movement unless the cancer of bureaucratism was rooted out of the state and party apparatus in the newly-conquering proletarian revolution.

It must be constantly borne in mind that the great theoretical disputes which divided the early political labor movement and which, in a brief period of time, came to the forefront as the predominant features of the so-called Russian struggle did not actually *originate* the struggle against Stalinism. That such theoretical disputes were "in the cards" was not revealed in the early conflict over organization questions. The fact that the theoretical disputes, subsequently, not only overshadowed the struggle over "party" questions and the nature of the régime, cannot, however, historically speaking, or in any other way, diminish the enormous importance of the way in which the struggle broke out.

With the publication of *The New Course*, a big void in the anti-Stalinist literature has been filled. For now it is possible to trace the origins of the great struggle to preserve the gains of the October Revolution. While the conflict over such questions as régime in the state and the party, democracy and centralism, the rôle of the vanguard party in relation to the mass of workers, the relation of the workers to the peasantry in a backward country overwhelmingly peasant in population *appeared* to be prosaic questions, they can now be seen in their historical importance as completely related to the theoretical and political struggles which logically and inevitably followed.

The distant past now comes to life in the way it reveals the path of organizational degeneration—but a degeneration based upon a political degeneration away from revolutionary theory, program and activity. The terrible bureaucratic régime which arose in Russia on the basis of the rejection of the ideas expressed in *The New Course*, has had its reflection not only in the Communist International, completely dominated by the Russian Communist Party under Stalinist direction, but was thereafter transferred and integrated into the radical labor movement of the entire world. Wherever Stalinism had its representatives, we have had the automatic carry-overs from the régime in Russia.

have now also been converted into commodities, i.e., create a home market for articles of consumption.

4. The realization of the product in capitalist society (and consequently the realization of surplus value) cannot be explained unless we understand that: (1) the value of the social product, like that of the individual product, is divided into three parts, and not into two (into constant capital plus variable capital plus surplus value, and not only into variable capital plus surplus value, as Adam Smith and all subsequent political economists up to Marx had taught); and (2) that in its natural form it must be divided into two main departments: means of production (consumed productively) and means of consumption (consumed personally). Having established these basic theoretic postulates, Marx fully explained the process of realization of production in general, and of surplus value in particular, in capitalist production and revealed that it was entirely incorrect to drag the foreign market into the question of realization.

5. Marx's theory of realization also shed light on the question of national consumption and income.

From the above, it becomes obvious that the question of the home market as a separate, independent question, independent of the question of the degree of development of capitalism, does not exist at all. Therefore, Marxist theory nowhere and at no time raises this question independently. The home market appears when commodity production appears; it is created by this commodity production, and the degree to which the social division of labor has taken place determines the degree of its development. It spreads with the transference of commodity production from the product to labor power, and only to the extent of the transformation of the latter into a commodity does capitalism cover the entire production of the country, developing chiefly in regard to the means of production which, in capitalist society, occupy an increasingly important place. The "home market" for capitalism is created by developing capitalism itself, which increases the social division of labor and which divides those concerned directly with production into capitalists and workers. The degree of development of the home market is the degree of development of capitalism in the country. To pose the question about the limits of the home market separately from the degree of the development of capitalism (as the Narodnik economists do) is incorrect.

That is why the question as to how the home market for Russian capitalism is being formed is reduced to the following question: in what manner and in what direction do the separate aspects of Russian national economy develop? What are the connection and interdependence between these various aspects?

The succeeding chapters will be devoted to an examination of the data which contain the answers to these questions.

V. I. LENIN.

(Translated by F. FOREST.)

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

Requires the AUGUST and OCTOBER, 1942, issues of the magazine for binding purposes. We will appreciate it if our friends and readers send these copies to

THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

114 West 14th Street

New York, N. Y.

350

The NEW INTERNATIONAL • DECEMBER, 1943

The bureaucratic régime of Stalinism found its counterpart in the bureaucratic régimes of the official labor movements and these in turn coalesced in different forms to produce a vast network and technique of bureaucratic rule visible in the whole decaying social order of capitalism.

The prevailing idea of *The New Course* is that the progress of the Russian Revolution and the world labor movement and, conversely, the obstacle to "organizational" degeneration, lay not merely in a "correct political program," but in the active democratic intervention of the masses in the state power conquered by the proletariat and also in all the spheres of economic and political life of any state in which the working class had power. But it was not only true for a state where the working class had taken power; it was just as true in the capitalist world in the working class organizations, under conditions where the bourgeoisie still maintained power.

Thus the struggle for democracy is a constant struggle at all times and under all conditions. In *The New Course*, Trotsky revealed not only what the proper attitude on this question should be, but ably demonstrated that this was the traditional position of the Marxian movement, and it was threatened now, not by the old bureaucracy of the moldy Second International, but by forces in the very party which had made the Russian Revolution, and that the democratic existence of the revolutionary party was not alone threatened, but the very workers' state which that party had erected.

There is a prevailing legend, nurtured by the Stalinist falsifiers of history, by the bourgeois and petty bourgeois journalistic admirers of Stalinism, that it was Lenin the "Blanquist" who supplied the theory and practice behind the totalitarian degeneration of Stalinism. But *The New Course*, which is based on the real beliefs of Lenin, dissipates this view.

A study of Lenin's writings on democracy and bureaucracy reveals not only that Lenin had nothing in common with his traducers, but that from the very beginning of the Russian Revolution—even if we add to this history the adoption of the Tenth Party Congress resolution barring the existence and activity of party factions, he carried on a vigilant struggle to prevent the bureaucratic degeneration which followed the period immediately after the War Communism and the Civil War. This is completely borne out in the break between Lenin and Stalin immediately before the leader of the Russian party died.

The fact that *The New Course* is somewhat obscured by the passage of time is overcome by *The Struggle for the New Course*, by Max Shachtman, the excellent essay appearing in the same volume. *The Struggle for the New Course* is an invaluable companion piece to the Trotsky book, because it not only traces the origin of the book, but places it in the context of the struggle which was then beginning in the Russian party and which subsequently went through many convulsions to the final triumph of the Stalinist counter-revolution in Russia.

Even more important than this, however, is the fact that Shachtman traces the development of the conflict within the Stalinist movement into the conflict over similar questions within the Trotskyist movement. The main differences which developed between the present Workers Party and the Cannonite Socialist Workers Party, supported by Trotsky, over the nature of the Russian state, was similarly not confined to the borders of one country. This struggle too revealed its international ramifications, for it was a discussion which existed at one time or another in almost every anti-Stalinist organization.

The impact of events of the last ten years, especially the impact of the war and the formation of alliances between the

two imperialist camps, merely revealed the Stalinist degeneration in a new light. In this great dispute, Trotsky revealed, in our opinion, an inability to draw the necessary conclusions based upon his own analysis, namely, that the workers' state no longer existed in Russia. Trotsky clung to an outworn belief, based on a specious formula: Russia is a workers' state because property is nationalized; because property is nationalized, it is a workers' state. And thus the present misinterpreters of Trotsky's ideas are left with the theory of the "degenerated workers' state" which leads them into the ludicrous but dangerous position of proclaiming the victories and advances of Stalin's armies as the victories and advances of nothing less than the socialist revolution!

The present book, *The New Course* and *The Struggle for the New Course*, takes the most important questions which confront the world socialist movement and provides an answer to the past and shows the path to the future.

No one can really be without the book. It is truly a historical treasure.

SAM ADAMS.

Men from Nowhere

MEN FROM NOWHERE, Jean Malaquais. L. B. Fischer, pub., \$2.50.

The Javanese—the title of Malaquais novel in its original French—are a unique product of contemporary European civilization. They are the social lava, who wander from border to border with one eye on their false passports and the other keeping watch for the "occupation" of the country in which they momentarily reside. They are an unwanted conglomeration, a heterogeneous jumble of nationalities, classes and types flattened into the homogeneity of the lumpen-wanderer. They are neither optimists nor pessimists, revolutionists nor reactionaries, sophisticates nor primitives. They are the *Massenmensch* brought to his last resource. They succeed in reaching that terrible goal for which every soldier yearns and almost never grasps: they live only for the moment; tomorrow one's passport may again be examined. They are the final ironic italicization to a continent gone mad with nationalist frenzy.

For a few months, they are thrown together into a tiny peninsula of Southern France, "the island of Java." And these several hundred wanderers are known as the Javanese. What happens in that little span of time—their loves and hates, their luxuries of memory, their pathetic strike, their final dispersal—is the subject of Malaquais' novel. *Les Javanais* are more, however, than a mere backwash of a continent in its death-throes; they are the very distillation of capitalist civilization itself. They come from all over the world and each bears on his shoulders the welts of the sufferings of his brothers. Much more adequately than the time capsules buried by the recent World's Fair, they gather into their narrow boundary the final residue of how humanity has fared in the era between world wars.

Is it any wonder that Leon Trotsky, than whom none saw more clearly and passionately the corrosion of our society, hailed Malaquais as a "great new writer"? Malaquais has opened the cancer for all to see—its corruption, its rot, its pus and filth. And he has done so without any commentary other than his compassion and humanity.

On Sale Now!

THE NEW COURSE

By LEON TROTSKY

THE STRUGGLE FOR THE NEW COURSE

By MAX SHACHTMAN

Both in One Large Volume

Leon Trotsky wrote "The New Course" in 1923. With it he opened up the struggle against the decaying bureaucracy of the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Party, and for the establishment of genuine workers' democracy.

These problems of the revolution are treated by Trotsky with a clarity, profundity and breadth that have never been exceeded in the works of the great revolutionary leader and thinker.

Among the questions dealt with are the relations between the "Old Guard" and the youth in the party, the sources of bureaucratism, functionalism in the Red Army, the revolution and the peasantry, industrialization and planning, revolutionary tradition and its place in politics, what Leninism means, why workers' democracy is needed and how it can be established, etc., etc.

Whole sections of the work read as if they were written yesterday. It is not only impossible to have a complete understanding of the evolution of Russia since the Revolution, but also to have a clear and thorough idea of what Trotskyism really is unless this classic work has been read and studied.

This is the first time it has been printed in full in English, in a new translation by Max Shachtman, with notes which help make historical references in the book clearer to the reader.

In the same volume, Max Shachtman has written "The Struggle for the New Course." The reader will find it valuable in giving the historical setting of Trotsky's work and the great struggle which it opened up in the history of the Russian Revolution.

Shachtman presents, with details heretofore unavailable to readers, the story of the background of the fight for workers' democracy that Trotsky launched openly in 1923. He traces the growth of the present bureaucracy from its origins during and even before the Civil War down to the present day.

The development of the Stalinist bureaucracy to its position of totalitarian power is analyzed in close relationship with the development of Trotsky's point of view and his criticism in order to arrive at an appraisal of Trotsky's opinions and the extent to which they were or were not borne out by events.

The question of the class nature of Stalinist Russia is dealt with by Shachtman on the basis of Trotsky's theory of the Soviet Union as a degenerated workers' state. This theory is submitted to a fundamental criticism and the writer's theory counterposed to it.

The reader will find the historical material assembled and analyzed by Shachtman an indispensable companion piece to Trotsky's work and an important contribution to the history of the Russian Revolution from its early days to its present decay.

A "MUST" FOR YOUR LIBRARY!

Paper Edition: \$1.50

Two Hundred Fifty Pages

Cloth Edition: \$2.00

Send Prepaid Orders to:

NEW INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING CO.

114 West 14th Street

New York 11, New York