

# **LABOUR REVIEW**

EDITORS: TOM KEMP, CLIFF SLAUGHTER  
186A Clapham High Street, London S.W. 4

VOLUME 7  
Number

# **3**

Autumn 1962


Price: Two Shillings

LEON TROTSKY:

# **Culture and Socialism**

and a  
Manifesto

# **Art and Revolution**



TOM KEMP and PETER JEFFRIES:

# **Two Studies of Imperialism**

# LABOUR REVIEW


EDITORS: TOM KEMP, CLIFF SLAUGHTER  
186A Clapham High Street, London S.W. 4

VOLUME 7  
Number

# 3

Autumn 1962

Price: Two Shillings



LEON TROTSKY:

# Culture and Socialism and a Manifesto

# Art and Revolution

TOM KEMP and PETER JEFFRIES:

# Two Studies of Imperialism

## *Editorial*

# For a new leadership of the Left

TWO years ago, the 59th annual conference of the Labour Party, meeting at Scarborough, adopted a resolution against the H-bomb. Labour's Left wing was jubilant, the massive trade union block vote had swung its way and it seemed that in the months ahead they could not fail to capture the commanding heights of the Labour Party.

Yet the results were quite different. Mr. Gaitskell and his immediate right-wing supporters took no notice whatsoever of the conference decisions. All the ballyhoo about Labour's democratic way of life was cast aside in favour of factional conspiracy which, immediately the conference was over, led to the formation of the ultra-right-wing group, Campaign for Democratic Socialism. Some day the truth about this faction will be known, but it becomes more and more clear that the Campaign enjoyed the support of some very wealthy and influential figures behind the scenes. This is particularly true of Lord Walston who, it appears, is one of Mr. Gaitskell's most ardent supporters. He was recommended for a Life Peerage in January 1961 by Gaitskell.

Perhaps the greatest support which the CDS enjoyed was in the Party machine itself. The three most powerful people in the Labour Party, who are not elected by any conference, are Mr. Len Williams, who was acting general secretary at the time of Scarborough, Miss Sara Barker, the national agent, and Mr. Reg Underhill, the assistant national agent. There is a direct connection between this trio and the full-time regional officers for the party, who in turn maintain a close relationship with the constituency party agents. Mr. Gaitskell received powerful backing from these sources. Private meetings of supporters were organized all over the country. The Gaitskell faction produced and still produces its own printed paper. Later, money was found to enable the extreme right-wing youth to produce their own organ, *Counterblast*. Official address lists appear to have been available for the organizers of the faction.

In short, the Scarborough decision on the H-bomb was not worth the paper it was written on so far as

the Right wing were concerned. The determination of Gaitskell to 'fight, fight and fight again' could not have been successful, however, if it were not for the absolute lack of opposition on the part of those regarded as the leadership of the Left wing. The keynote speech was made by Michael Foot at the end of the Scarborough discussion, when he said at a *Tribune* rally that 'the debate must continue'. But the debate had, in fact, concluded. Once conference had decided against the H-bomb, the task was to mobilize the Party to carry out the policy of conference. Mr. Foot and others were not concerned with this. They had no intention of seriously challenging Gaitskell for the leadership of the Labour Party, and confined themselves to sporadic demonstrations in Parliament.

In the early part of 1961, the whip was withdrawn and five of these Lefts, including Foot, have since been consigned to the political wilderness. Victory for Socialism which boasts of its relations with all five, was unable to organize a single meeting of protest in any part of the country against the withdrawal of the whip. During the early months of 1961, it engaged in a witch-hunt against Trotskyists, who, it claimed, had infiltrated its ranks. Instead of a real struggle against Gaitskell to implement the conference decisions, Victory for Socialism took time out to expel so-called 'Trotskyists' from its own ranks.

*Tribune* did even less. It abandoned its Brains Trust meetings. A new editor, notorious for his lack of understanding, especially of Left Labour politics, was appointed. For years he had worked as the editor of the official Transport House youth paper. After a brief spell at the *Daily Herald*, he joined *Tribune*. Such a man could not possibly inject political life into *Tribune*. At the first opportunity he ran for cover. This was provided for him through the courtesy of Messrs. Padley and Crossman who in Easter 1961 presented their famous H-bomb compromise with Gaitskell. It was this compromise which changed the votes of the Amalgamated Engineering Union and USDAW, and heralded the

swing back to Gaitskell which was responsible for his victory at the Blackpool 1961 conference.

The Left had betrayed the fight for the Scarborough anti-H-bomb policy. Irrespective of all the talk in *Tribune* about opposition to all H-bombs and H-bomb tests, the fact remains that together with its Parliamentary supporters, it could not face Gaitskell in the struggle for power inside the Labour Party.

From that day it became only a question of time before they joined in open support of him as leader of the Party.

### Brighton exposes the fake Lefts

The issue which finally brought Gaitskell, Michael Foot and all the others together was the controversy around the European Common Market. The remarkable thing about this argument is that it has nothing to do with socialism. Because of the growth of world capitalist monopoly, British imperialism is being forced to abandon its Commonwealth preferences and orientate itself towards the markets of Western Europe. Under pressure from Wall Street it has little or no choice but to join the Common Market. For the past year a fake discussion has been going on as to whether or not Britain should join, which completely ignores the behind the scenes role of monopoly capitalism. The Labour movement has been divided not on the socialist principle of nationalizing the monopolies, but upon the best steps to be taken to preserve the rule of the monopolies, and their interests. The only difference between Gaitskell and Macmillan is the question of terms for entry.

Gaitskell alleges that the British capitalists, headed by Macmillan, are planning to give away some of their business interests all too cheaply. He is deeply concerned that the British monopolists will not get a fair crack of the whip, so he loudly criticises the Tories and in doing so has had no difficulty in whipping behind him the support of the fake Lefts, who only two short years ago appeared to be at the point of splitting from him.

Mr. Sidney Silverman announced at the public meeting of CND that Mr. Gaitskell had joined himself and others in the campaign against the Common Market. Mr. Stuart Hall, another prominent supporter of CND, hailed the Gaitskell decision as a victory for the Left wing. So the circle was complete. The 'intransigent' Left now joined the intransigent leader on the Right in an issue which has nothing to do with socialism, but concerns solely the future of British capitalism.

Thus in the space of two years, *Tribune* and the fake Lefts have been thoroughly discredited and cannot under any circumstances be considered as

candidates for leadership in Labour's Left wing.

The capitalist press makes great play of the disgruntlement in the ranks of the Right-wing leaders of trade unions such as Carron of the AEU and Cooper of the NUGMW. This is camouflage. Mr. Gaitskell knew what he was doing when he made a bid for support from the Lefts. His full-time election agency service employs approximately 200 people all over the country. Many constituency parties are bankrupt. The unions have suffered heavy financial losses because of rising costs. He needs *Tribune* and Frank Cousins to rally the support of the loyal left-wing election campaigners in the constituencies. Gaitskell can stand a few criticisms from Carron and Cooper. If Labour under his leadership can win the next election, then he will promptly open negotiations for entry into the Common Market because he had no difference on the question of entry in principle. He will then enjoy, once more the support of the extreme Right.

### New difficulties for the Right wing

The Brighton conference should have been a complete victory for Gaitskell. Such an experience is not unusual in Labour Party history. At least two years before a general election, the Party unites its ranks behind the Right wing. At the 1957 Brighton conference, Aneurin Bevan joined hands with Gaitskell in preparation for the 1959 general election. Yet though unity was achieved at Brighton, it was by no means as complete as that which has been gained by the Right wing on previous occasions.

Ever since Scarborough, the full-time officials of the Labour Party have been in some difficulties. Supporters of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament have been most active in the organization of functions which have brought them into open conflict with the Right-wing organizers. This came to a head with the Moscow Peace Conference when it was decided to make a bid to expel several prominent pacifist members of the Labour Party who are also supporters of CND.

The greatest difficulty, however, was encountered in the youth movement. By an overwhelming majority the first conference of the newly reconstituted Young Socialists meeting in 1961 adopted resolutions calling upon Gaitskell to resign and reaffirming the Scarborough conference decisions. From the beginning the agents' department was absolutely opposed to the resurgence of the Young Socialists. Over the past 18 months practically no activity of any kind has been carried out except the organization of a constant witch-hunt against the youth. When one considers the weight of attention given by the full-time officials to the youth, it is remarkable that any youth movement exists at all

in the Labour Party. The 'guilt by association' amendment was badly needed to deal a blow that would finish off this militant movement and the influence of CND. Yet at Brighton something went wrong and the Right wing suffered their most serious defeat since Scarborough. Next business was moved and carried and the proposed amendment to the constitution fell.

Thus at a time when it appeared that all the cards were stacked on Gaitskell's side, his bureaucracy suffered a severe blow in a way that enables a new leadership of the Left to emerge in the coming period.

### The attack on 'Keep Left'

This is the real reason for the ferocious attack on the youth paper *Keep Left*. The paper was proscribed by the National Executive Committee in May of this year, after a prolonged witch-hunt against it in the constituency parties. The circumstances of its proscription reveal matters which may at some time in the future have to be examined in a court of law. Everyone from the fake Lefts of *Tribune* to the Right wing were unanimous in the demand to proscribe the paper. They fear more than anything else that the young people supporting the paper will become a fighting alternative leadership for the next stage in the resurgence of the Left in the Labour Party and the trade unions.

*Tribune's* denunciation of *Keep Left* on the Thursday morning when the matter was to be debated by conference, showed a spleen and venom that is by no means accidental. If *Keep Left* maintains its publication then it must win more and more readers from *Tribune*. Fresh forces who will join the Labour Party in the coming election will be quite different in outlook from those who have joined it in the past. This is a period of capitalist crisis where the growth of unemployment is already having considerable effects on the thinking of many constituency parties which formerly supported the extreme Right. In denouncing *Keep Left* on the day that its proscription was to be debated, *Tribune* was simply throwing in its lot with Gaitskell, revealing that it

is frightened about its future as a paper.

*Tribune* is no longer the paper which fights for democratic rights and freedom inside the Labour Party. It is a witch-hunting sheet devoted to covering up the filthiest betrayals of the Scarborough anti-H-bomb decisions and the attack of the Right wing on the Young Socialists. Small wonder the extreme CDS youth paper *Counterblast* applauded *Tribune's* attack on the 'Trotskyists'.

It was the Brighton conference which gave *Keep Left* and those who supported it their greatest victory. The conspiracy to proscribe the paper was fully revealed to the delegates. So much so that the organizers of the conference could not afford a public debate. When the appeal against the proscription was due to be heard, a deliberate policy of filibustering during the private session prevented the matter from being raised. A few minutes before 5.0 p.m. and the close of the session, anxious delegates demanded that the issue of *Keep Left* be now debated. This was refused on the grounds of shortage of time and a motion was presented that pages 9-21 of the NEC annual report (which included the item of *Keep Left*) should be accepted. Thus *Keep Left* was denied its constitutional right of appeal to the annual conference of the Labour Party. Having been defeated in their attempt to get their 'guilt by association' amendment adopted, the right-wing leadership had now to run away from a debate on *Keep Left*.

We are now at the beginning of a new stage in the development of Labour's Left wing. The attack on the Young Socialists spearheads this development. But Labour is still an ageing party. There are not sufficient young people coming forward to take over the jobs. The militant Young Socialists, therefore, have time on their side. The campaign to lift the proscription on *Keep Left*, the campaign for militant socialist policies in the youth sections and adult Labour Party, are the central tasks which have now to be undertaken.

Brighton was not a complete victory for the Right wing. It heralded the eclipse of the fake Lefts, but it may well have opened the door for the emergence of a real socialist Left wing in the months and years ahead

# Two Studies

## 1. What is Imperialism?

IN popular works and academic studies a continuous stream of criticism pours forth purporting to demolish all or part of Marxist theory; in fact, of course, the continuing necessity for this criticism testifies to the vitality of Marxism. It is not surprising that of late the theory of imperialism has come in for special attention. Under pressure from the national liberation movement the old colonial empires have been transformed in an attempt to conserve and extend the economic stranglehold of advanced capitalism. This process has resulted in a body of apologetic writing, sensitive to the stigma of exploitation attached to the term 'imperialism'. The idea has been sedulously propagated that the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism means *exclusively* the political control of backward areas by means of policies strictly subordinate to economic interests. With greater or less deliberation reference is made, usually mistakenly, to the alleged economic connection between the necessities of advanced capitalism and the acquisition and control of colonies. Necessarily, these authors prove to their own satisfaction, and that of readers who share their presuppositions, that if there was anything in what they have depicted as the Marxist-Leninist view it has no relevance to the world of the past half-century: 'imperialism' has long since ended, or is

now only characteristic of the USSR.

This comforting picture presented by the adherents of 'liberal' capitalism, the Western Alliance and the H-bomb finds innumerable variants and embellishments, historical confirmations in learned books, and even statistical verification.<sup>1</sup> To confuse matters still further, the term 'imperialism' itself is frequently rejected as being too full of ambiguities or too charged with emotive content to warrant scientific use. Attention is drawn to the varied definitions which have been made of it. In short, everything has been done to becloud the issue by showing that imperialism never existed, or, if it had a past, has no present and no future. Lefts, even self-styled Marxists, impressed by the weight of pretentious learning directed to show the beneficent workings of capitalism, have added a note of scepticism and retreat to the general chorus. The Stalinists, having uttered parrot-like for decades the pregnant formulae of Lenin garbled with the stale dogma of Stalin, have stumbled into a theoretical void of their own making: unable to enrich the Marxist heritage they have become convenient targets for those wanting to discredit it.

1. I have spared the reader a lengthy bibliography of these writings.

### THE MARXIST APPROACH

Yet the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism exists, coherent and comprehensive, if not complete: an instrument unparalleled for dissecting the complex processes of contemporary social develop-

ment when tempered and manipulated with the requisite skill.

It forms part of a complex, developing and interlocking whole—neither dogma nor merely method

# of Imperialism

by Tom Kemp

(for methodology cannot be separated from the analysis to which it leads). The theory of Imperialism grew out of Marx's teaching: it forms an indispensable part of its 20th century development: it cannot be rejected, in fact, without rejecting Marxism as a whole.

Marx did not develop a specific theory of imperialism, for the good reason that the phenomena with which it deals had not yet become over-riding characteristics of capitalism. Yet there is in his work a great part of the fundamental analysis which Lenin and other followers were to develop into such a theory. There was, of course, already colonialism and Marx wrote penetratingly about it.<sup>2</sup> It is wrong, however, to connect the Marxist-Leninist theory exclusively with colonial expansion and colonial rule: it does not set out to explain all those political and economic relationships to which the term 'imperialism' has been applied.

It is, in the first place, an application of historical materialism, which finds the roots of social activity and development in the production and reproduction of the means of existence. On this basis, itself repeatedly changing as men establish greater powers of control over their environment, was built the superstructure of laws, ideas, social and political institutions which, insofar as they assumed an autonomy of their own, reacted upon it. This is not a crude kind of 'economic' interpretation which finds the driving force in history in material motives, as is so often stated by ill-informed or dishonest critics.

Nor does it deal in separable 'factors'—economic, social, political and so on. It assumes the totality of human relationships, traces out their inter-relationships and seeks, not conscious or unconscious motives as the source of historical change, but the *motive forces* which ultimately derive from an objective source in the conditions of production and reproduction. For this reason, while taking note of the reasons which men give for their actions and the forms which they take in practice, Marxism looks beneath these appearances to discern the laws of social change.

On considering imperialism, then, we begin from the objective, material conditions of the economic base, those forces which set in motion 'great masses, whole peoples and again whole classes of the people in each people', as Engels put it.<sup>3</sup> In contradiction to Marxism, most other explanations of imperialism (however it may be defined) find the most compelling forces in history in what Marxists call the 'superstructure'—that is, ideas, institutions, motives, values: what men think and say and do are taken to be an adequate basis for framing historical explanation and social diagnoses. For them, therefore, imperialism is nothing more than a political or ideological phenomenon: it is a result of power drives, love of war and conquest, desire for glory. Its more or less conscious exponents are statesmen, military leaders, aristocratic castes, even whole peoples, who are somehow able to subordinate the massive productive forces of modern capitalism to their wills, perhaps

2. The more important of these writings have been collected in the volume *On Colonialism*, published by Foreign Languages Publishing House (Moscow).

3. Engels, F. *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*. Sel. Works (ed. Adoratsky), Vol. I, p. 459.

turning them from their 'true' path. In fact, such a theory, propounded most fully by Schumpeter, is the only fully-worked out alternative to the Marxist view.<sup>4</sup> Other theoreticians generally deny that there

is, or was, any such animal as imperialism.

4. Schumpeter, J. A. 'The Sociology of Imperialism:' in *Imperialism and Social Classes* (ed. Sweezy, P.).

## A WORLD SYSTEM

The capitalist mode of production did not develop in isolated, self-contained societies but had to operate as a world system. 'Capitalist production,' wrote Marx, 'does not exist at all without foreign commerce.'<sup>5</sup> Although he never reached that part of his examination of capitalism which he intended to devote to the world market, there is ample evidence that he appreciated that, as a mode of production, it was bound to reach out into the whole world, extending the process of circulation of industrial capital. A new and international division of labour was established between the centres of modern industry and the primary producing areas. In the latter the old forms of society were undermined by the invasion of commodity production and the establishment of capitalist forms of exploitation. India, acquired by England in the period of early capitalism, was a classic case, becoming a battlefield for the clash of interests between different sections of the property-owning classes in the advanced country. Instead of a source of tribute, India was transformed into a market for industrial products and a field for the investment of capital and its further accumulation. The capitalist relation was extended as underdeveloped countries like India were drawn into the world market.

The creation of a world market was more than either an application of the division of labour or the geographical extension of capitalist relations. It represented the working out of the necessary development of this mode of production, with which Marx was concerned through the three volumes of *Capital*. The laws of capitalist development express the growing necessity of 'socialization' of the productive forces under capitalism and the contradictions inseparable from a regime of private ownership of the means of production. This system of 'private enterprise' is governed not by human needs but by the need to extract and realize surplus value and to capitalize this surplus value in new means of production.

Those parts of *Capital* which are most directly relevant to the problems of imperialism concern: (i) the reproduction process—the problem of how surplus value is realized, taken up in the latter part of Vol. II; (ii) the problems related to the development of the productive forces resulting in the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, dealt with in

Vol. III; (iii) the structural changes brought about by the concentration of capital and the substitution of monopoly for competition as an immanent law of capital growth, outlined in Vol. I and returned to more specifically in Vol. III. It is important to see these component parts of the Marxist theory in relation to each other as parts of a whole, reflecting the laws of the overall structure of capitalism in its development.

The purpose of a theory is not to provide a substitute for reality but a guide to its understanding in order that it may be mastered. But if confrontation with concrete facts provides the test, the theory must first be understood, the relationship between its parts correctly grasped. Not only did Marx's analysis of capitalism remain incomplete at the time of his death, the problem of application and interpretation against the background of changing reality would have arisen in any case. This creative task devolved on his followers in the labour movement; for historical reasons it has been often inadequately and distortedly taken up, and diverse schools or tendencies have arisen.

Some of these divisions have arisen genuinely from differences of interpretation having as their root a one-sided development of a single, or partial, aspect of Marx's teaching. For a long time, for instance, Marxists gave exaggerated attention to the schemas of Vol. II. Rosa Luxemburg built a whole theory of capital accumulation and imperialism on her interpretation of them.<sup>6</sup> While rightly seeing that continued accumulation was a matter of life or death for capitalism, she went on to find in the absorption of the non-capitalist environment the only important way in which continued expansion could, for a period, be sustained. Failing to distinguish the requirements of an economic model, such as Marx's schema, which abstract from the real world and cannot give a complete picture of its actual dialectical and contradictory character, she fell into a mechanical method of reasoning. In fact, once brought into the circuit of exchange of capitalism the non-capitalist environment becomes a field for the capitalization of surplus value and the bringing into the orbit of capital of new exploitable supplies of labour power. The new lease of life which capitalism receives from the subjection of new areas or new layers of people can thus be much more

5. Marx, K. *Capital*, Vol. I.

6. Luxemburg, R. *The Accumulation of Capital*.



important than Luxemburg's theory assumes. This is shown, too, by her underestimation of the possibility of continued expansion of Department I (industries producing means of production) at a faster rate than Department II (industries producing means of consumption) and her relative neglect of the concentration of capital and the falling rate of profit. In fact, she leaves little room for the 'export of

capital' and the methodical exploitation of underdeveloped areas as part of the process of imperialism. While making an inspired effort to deal with fundamental unsettled questions of Marxist political economy, the flaws in her method prevented her from seeing the capitalist process as a whole. Unfortunately, the kind of error to which Rosa Luxemburg was prone keeps cropping up.

## IMPERIALISM AND MARX'S MODEL

The problem of advanced capitalism is not simply one of realizing surplus value, a problem, that is, of markets. In any case, capitalist relations themselves are a barrier to its realization through the raising of the living standards of the masses of the population. The rising material levels which have taken place in the advanced capitalist countries are a consequence of the expansion of the system as a whole: firstly, its expansion on a world scale bringing into its orbit new possibilities for the extraction and realization of surplus value in the backward areas, secondly, the increase in productivity due, primarily, to technological progress. At the same time, the share of the working class in total output has not increased and the rise in real wages itself has been attributable as much to 'full employment' as to an increased real wage per hour. Moreover, such increases would not have been conceded without steady and continuous pressure from the trade unions. It is useless to argue, therefore, that capitalism has solved its problems through paying higher wages or through full employment—these are merely reflections of its ability to find other ways of realizing surplus value and to counteract for a period other crisis tendencies in the system. These tendencies—the falling rate of profit, disharmony between different sectors and consequent overproduction, monetary disorders—have been operating all the time, but only at certain times have they revealed themselves in symptoms of crisis. At other times they have been overcome by other processes set in motion because of their very presence.

Because the capitalist mode of production is a complex and changing entity composed of intricately interacting parts, which, of course, can only be separated from the whole for purposes of analysis, it is difficult to comprehend the whole process which governs its movement. The mistake of many followers of Marx, as with Rosa Luxemburg, is to isolate one particular feature and to build a picture of the operation of capitalism upon this feature pushed to its fullest expression. Thus some Marxists, under the pressure of Keynesian teaching, have linked some sections of Marx's work too specifically to crisis theory, in the course of which they have

made him out to be an underconsumptionist.<sup>7</sup> Emphasis is then thrown on the alleged tendency of capitalism to expand the production of consumption goods more rapidly than the demand for them. But, while there is a general tendency for production to outstrip the consuming power of the masses, this is only one of the contradictions of capitalism and may not be the predominant one at any particular time. In the building up of means of production, including that made possible by the 'export of capital', a market can be made available which staves off the ever-present tendency to overproduce despite the limited consumption levels of the workers. To see the problem through the optic of underconsumption is to see only part of the picture, and that part only distortedly. It leads on to the view that there can be various offsets to deficiency in demand—Hobson thought that 'imperialism' was one such vast offset—government expenditure, armaments, even space projects which somehow abrogate the laws of capitalism. Although they may make possible an expansion, they do so by enabling surplus value to be realized, counteracting the tendency for the rate of profit to fall and increasing the demand for labour power ('full employment')—all in conformity with the nature of capitalism, all subject to its contradictions.

A classic example is given by the effect upon the rate of profit when the means of production are expanded. The tendency for the rate of profit to fall arises from the fact that only variable capital—i.e., the labour power bought by wages—produces surplus value; continued capital accumulation, on the other hand, results in a tendency for more of the total capital to take the form of constant

7. Important flaws in the work by Sweezy, *The Theory of Capitalist Development*, which is often taken as an 'authoritative' exposition of Marxist political economy, arise from this source. M. Dobb, who in the '30s was more cautious, later succumbed to similar thinking. The contradictions and confusions in the work of such talented people was a result of pressure from Stalinist orthodoxy on the one side and Keynesianism on the other. They were happiest, of course, when both could be harmonized. Marxism lost heavily as a result of this situation.

capital, i.e., plant or fixed capital. This is what is meant by the rising organic composition of capital. In practice, however, as Marx pointed out in enunciating this law, it operates in conjunction with numerous counteracting influences, as a result of which it does not manifest itself necessarily in an actual decline in the rate of profit. What is important is that the very nature of this process acts as a compulsion upon capitalists to seek means of evading its operation. This is made more imperative with the growing concentration of capital in fewer hands and the continued mechanization of the production process: in fact these developments, which enhance the tendency, are, in turn, part of the struggle to evade it. In short, the tendency for the rate of profit to fall is at the heart of the dynamic of capitalism, which produces not to satisfy social wants, but to make profits and to accumulate as a means to further profits. This apparently never-ending circle is, however, from time to time rudely disturbed when these contradictions break through into crisis: then it is no longer possible to go on realizing surplus value at the rate necessary to make further production and accumulation profitable, and the factors making for a fall in the profit rate break surface and temporarily dominate the situation.

These natural laws of capitalism bring us directly to the epoch of monopoly capitalism. It shows itself in the growth of concentration or monopoly as well as in the search for new possibilities of extracting and realizing surplus value. It represents an endeavour to find means of evading the consequence of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall by opening up new fields for exploitation with a lower organic composition of capital, removing, at the same time, from the fields already choked with capital, a pressure on the profit rate which would otherwise tend to keep it down over the whole system. It must be borne in mind here that we are now considering not separate national capitalisms, but capitalism as a *world* system to which the separate parts, whatever their political status, or level of economic development, are integrally related.

Naturally we are dealing here with laws at a given level of abstraction. When we come to a confrontation with the facts important modifications are

necessary. Also, no attempt has been made to work out these laws here with any degree of refinement: we are sketching the theory with broad strokes, necessarily involving some inaccuracy in detail and making leaps over difficult problems.

When we consider historical development we no longer have a chemically pure capitalism as assumed for analytical purposes. We find that the bourgeoisie has developed within a framework of national states which constrict the productive forces and provide an inner source of political conflict within the capitalist world system. Past historical development still hangs heavily over the scene: old ruling classes retain influence, state policies are set in certain grooves, class struggles assume different forms according to national backgrounds, colonies may have been acquired in an earlier period of commercial capitalism. In any particular national case, the working out of the laws of capitalism will depend upon such factors as natural resources, the timing and nature of industrialization, the period of entry into the international division of labour, the completeness with which the bourgeoisie has attained political dominance, the strength of the labour movement and so on. In any given case such factors must be carefully examined: but it must always be remembered that the physiognomy of any particular national capitalism cannot be understood except in relation to the world economy of which it forms a part.<sup>8</sup>

It may be added that the operation of the laws of capitalism, of its peculiar motive forces, does not automatically remove those forces persisting from earlier historical stages. For instance the old-style colonial policy may continue to be active together with the new and specific relationships between advanced and backward countries which capitalism brings into being. The Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism does not attempt to provide an explanation for all colonial acquisitions, even after capitalism has become dominant.<sup>9</sup>

8. In this connection Trotsky's *The Permanent Revolution* is indispensable; see especially the Introduction to the German Edition in the latest English translation (New Park Publications, 1962).

9. See Ch. VI of Lenin's *Imperialism*.

## LENIN ON IMPERIALISM

The time has now come to consider the nature of Lenin's contribution to the theory of imperialism, especially in his work *Imperialism: the Highest Stage of Capitalism*. This work, written during the First World War while he was in exile in Switzerland at a

time when practically the whole Marxist movement had capitulated to the ruling war fever and taken a 'defencist' position, was not intended as a piece of original research. Nor had Lenin any intention of laying down inflexible dogma to stand for all time.

Drawing on the data available to him he sought to explain the reasons for the bloody conflict then raging and the pro-war stand of the leaders of the Second International, in order to arm the socialist movement. Although to escape censorship the political lessons were left largely unstated there is no doubt that the alerted reader would draw the necessary conclusions.

Lenin set out to show how the capitalism of the late 19th and early 20th century, while developing in accordance with the laws which Marx had discerned, had developed features which marked it off from the old-style competitive capitalism. In his earlier writings he had shown how, while capitalism had played a progressive role in breaking down old restrictions on human development and making possible a rapid development of the productive forces, it did so only by creating new antagonisms: class struggle, crises, concentration of capital, over-production. The 'contradiction' reappears with striking force throughout the book.

In line with the analytical method of Marxism, Lenin took the most general lines of development in order to show the main direction or tendency of capitalism. He combined features of different national capitalisms to build up a composite picture.<sup>10</sup> In the first three chapters Lenin devotes little attention to the outward thrust of capitalism which many writers have taken to be the main, or most typical, characteristic of imperialism. But Lenin was not seeking to define imperialism in general. He was attempting to describe and track the main lines of capitalist development which had given rise to a whole new epoch which he now named 'imperialism'. It was an appropriate description because central to it was the division of the world into empires and spheres of economic influence by the main competing capitalist nations and the resulting conflict between them. In drawing together the various aspects of the latest epoch of capitalism Lenin did not provide a summary, one-sentence definition but an extensive description which included the proviso concerning 'the conditional and relative value of all definitions, which can never include all the connections of a fully developed phenomenon' and adds that 'all the boundaries in nature and society are conditional and changing'.

10. At the same time, he made a special point of the special features of particular countries. Thus the special development of England is dealt with in a number of places: as the first capitalist country, as one in which leading bourgeois politicians were for a period (1840-60) opposed to colonial policy, as holder of a monopolistic position in the world market, etc., but as showing late, or only partially other features of imperialism—monopoly, protection.

Lenin's theory of imperialism cannot therefore be refuted by using a different definition. Lenin was not trying to do what some of his critics assume he was doing; he was, on the contrary, using the Marxist method for understanding the 20th century. All the same, many of his self-styled disciples, especially the Stalinists, have manifestly distorted Lenin and have misappropriated the entire Marxist heritage in such a way as to deform and distort it. The very conditions under which *Imperialism* was written show that Lenin did not intend it to be the answer to all eventualities. In another pamphlet he wrote 'an all-sided scientific investigation of imperialism is one thing; *such an investigation is just beginning to be made*, and is, in essence, as infinite as science itself is infinite. The principles of socialist tactics against capitalist imperialism, however, are quite another thing . . .' (my emphasis—T.K.).<sup>11</sup> No doubt he was thinking of the reading upon which he was engaged and the work which he and his fellow exiles Zinoviev and Bukharin were to embark upon in the first years of the war.<sup>12</sup>

There is not in Lenin's *Imperialism*, then, a completely worked-out and explicit theory of imperialism. To accept it as such is to discredit Lenin's contribution. It is evident, for example, that he largely took for granted the economic analysis of capitalism which was available in Marx. He did not deal at all with the kind of problem discussed at even obsessive length by Rosa Luxemburg. The inter-connections between the different facets of imperialism are not traced out in detail. While obviously rejecting Hobson's underconsumptionism, as any Marxist must, he did not reiterate the demolition of similar theories which he had undertaken in a number of previous works directed against the Russian Narodniks.<sup>13</sup> There is, nevertheless, an immense gap between the forcefulness and meticulous care of Lenin's work and the dull and sterile dogmatism of his Stalinist 'followers'.

11. Lenin, 'The Collapse of the Second International' in *The War and the Second International*, p. 9, and the whole pamphlet for a discussion of the political problems.

12. Both of whom published work on imperialism, no doubt inspired by Lenin; see Lenin's preface to Bukharin's *Imperialism and World Economy*. Such works were, naturally, consigned to oblivion during the Stalin period.

13. Indeed *Imperialism* should be studied in connection with these earlier works of Lenin on the 'problem of markets' which are now all available in English in the first four Vols. of the *Collected Works*. *A Characterisation of Economic Romanticism* is also available separately.

## IMPERIALISM SINCE LENIN

If dogmatic adherence to supposedly Leninist theory must be rejected, what can be said of Lenin's work in the light of the developments of the past century? In the first place only those who have made the effort to understand Marxist method and Marxist political economy earn the right to attention as serious critics. This certainly does not apply to a host of facile verbal criticisms speaking of Lenin's lack of originality, a priori reasoning, borrowings from Hobson and Hilferding, which try to assume away the problems which Lenin dealt with, twist definitions and employ methods of controversy which would be instantly condemned if directed against their peers.<sup>14</sup> Especially does such criticism deserve contempt when it stems from the application of an entirely different definition based upon the assumption, in any case, that imperialism must be equated with colonial empire or even with the rule of one people over another. Usually its own presupposition is, as we have seen, that what it calls 'imperialism' is a political phenomenon. The question at issue here is the validity of Marxism as a whole.

At the same time, as has been briefly hinted, Lenin's work was incomplete, even for his own day, if only because it took much of the theoretical groundwork for granted. Naturally capitalism has continued to change. Not only is Lenin's statistical material now of primarily historical interest, but structural changes inside the different national capitalisms and in capitalism as a world system have gone on at a rapid rate. There is no need to recapitulate world history since Lenin's day. The question is that capitalism has changed in line with its own nature and that, however much research and analysis requires to be done, Lenin's work nevertheless remains a significant starting point.

On particular points, such as the validity of the concept of finance capital which Lenin took over from Hilferding, there is room for difference of opinion. It concerns primarily the relations between the different sections of the ruling class, and those relations are subject to considerable national variation. In any case, the universal trend seems to be towards the intermingling of industrial and bank capital into a single dominant oligarchy within which

there may be, nevertheless, secondary rivalries. The facts are the arbiters here, and they show that Lenin's work grasped the significant trend.<sup>15</sup>

What at first sight seems to be a more weighty criticism is the question of the role of capital export. The method employed by critics here is to compare the altogether unusual amount of British capital export before 1914 with the capital export from Britain or some other country in recent years. What this overlooks is the uneven development characteristic of the imperialist epoch and the fact that neither the amount nor the relative weight of the export of capital is decisive, but its qualitative significance for sustaining the forces of capitalist expansion. Here it can be said that, taking into account the different world situation, export of capital is today of scarcely less importance than it was in Lenin's day. It still provides an indispensable field for the realization and capitalization of surplus value. The past investment provides a means for the exploitation of labour power on a world scale and contributes its own flow of surplus value. Without continued outlets for capital accumulation the rate of profit would be lower than it is through-out the world system of capitalism.

Reference is also made to the shrinking colonial possessions of countries like Britain or France. Of course, if imperialism is identified with formal sovereignty over less developed areas it is on its way out—but no Marxist argues in this way. After all, Germany and the United States never had formal colonies of much economic worth, yet would it be argued that these countries did not participate in the formation of the imperialist epoch, displaying the same drives and characteristics as, say, Britain and France? The answer is that formal empire does not tell the whole story. Nor does the extent of cosmopolitan investment within the advanced countries themselves disprove Lenin. Such investment was always important and follows from the tendency for capital to seek the most remunerative outlets—which may or may not be in underdeveloped countries. At the same time, these countries have become no less indispensable to advanced capitalism than before, though their relative weight may have changed, regardless of whether they now form sovereign states or not. They remain part of the capitalist world system: they remain tributaries of the advanced countries.

Even the existence of such countries as Sweden or Switzerland which have attained prosperity without possessing colonies proves nothing. Not only do the capitalists of such countries invest

14. Again it would be tedious to provide a full bibliography. Reference may be made, however, to one J. Strachey, as facile an apologist for neo-colonialism as he once was for Stalinism. In *The End of Empire* he switches from one definition to another with undoubted virtuosity: e.g., at some points it is 'the rule of one people by another'. In general he is content with surface phenomena; there is no real economic analysis in his books which are merely controversial tracts based on debater's tricks.

15. See, for example, the discussion in Sweezy, op. cit.

on a world scale, but a moment's thought shows that their fortunes are inseparably connected with those of world imperialism, regardless of their lack of colonies or even political strength.

All in all, it can be said that the attempts to 'refute' Lenin by a point-by-point discussion of this kind, however smart they try to be, are based upon a misunderstanding, whether it arises from ignorance or malevolence.<sup>16</sup> There would, indeed, be little point in taking up such arguments if they did not lead to spreading confusion and have the obvious aim of proving that 'imperialism', as understood by Lenin (or rather misunderstood by his critics) has changed into something else. Such criticisms bear, indeed, all the hall-marks of the pressures emanating from the dominant Keynesian economic orthodoxy and other fashionable theories current in 'intellectual' circles. What, then, has capitalism changed into? The replies of a Crosland will differ from those of a Kidron, but the common ground is nonetheless visible—as is the desire to make absolutely clear their distance from consistent Marxists. Let us leave aside Crosland, Strachey and their ilk who are open anti-Marxists and consider only the reply of the 'state capitalists'. According to them what they describe as 'the permanent arms economy' has now become the substitute for 'imperialism' and, in their vocabulary, is synonymous with contemporary capitalism. 'Naturally Lenin could not have envisaged,' they proclaim, 'the role of the permanent arms economy in stabilizing mature capitalism, fixing it on a course of almost automatic growth and transposing the locus of stagnation from mature capitalist countries to backward ones.' (my emphasis—T.K.) Let us leave aside

the logical inconsistency—the assumption that 'the locus of stagnation' was once in the developed countries while the underdeveloped countries presumably grew more rapidly. Let us overlook the fact that to speak of capitalist 'maturity' in the sense which it seems to have here—i.e., a state inconsistent with rapid growth—is to use an entirely relative term. The essential things are: (i) the assumption that such growth has been mainly or exclusively a result of 'arms economy'; and (ii) that this means a new phase of capitalist development.

An addiction to novelty for its own sake is the sign of immature thought. Before assuming such a new phase, attention ought to have been given to the roots of the phenomenon supposedly characteristic of it. Of course the level of arms budgets in the major capitalist countries has been considerably higher than in previous periods of peace. Admittedly the demand from the state for arms has provided capitalism with a means of realizing surplus value without, at the same time, making necessary its capitalization (i.e., without creating additional means of production bearing down on the profit rate and creating commodities for which markets would have to be found). In that respect the arms budgets have provided a major sustaining force in the expansion of the past decade and a half. But the devotion of such a high proportion of national output to arms production has been imposed by necessity—the pressure of an antagonistic world system threatening the position of . . . imperialism. To see the high arms production as the sign of a new stage, superseding imperialism, is to misunderstand the nature of the epoch in which we live: the epoch of decaying capitalism which, capable of prolonged bursts of economic expansion, is nonetheless fighting for its life. What does that mean? It means that the capitalist class fights for the right to continue to exist by extracting and realizing surplus value as a world system dominated by the monopolies of the advanced countries, to which, whatever their political status, the underdeveloped countries remain linked as tributaries. The so-called 'arms economy' represents no *qualitative* change; the connection between imperialism and militarism was always close, it has become closer in the period of its decline, but there can be no antithesis between the two nor can one substitute for another. Necessarily, the level of arms production has important economic results, as well as influence on the superstructure of capitalist society, but the dominating laws of capitalism have not been overcome.

It is to be hoped that this article will have cleared up some of the confusions which tend today to surround the term 'imperialism', that it will contribute to the understanding of Lenin's work and prepare the way for further studies which can enrich the Marxist analysis of 'imperialism'.

16. Such, for example as the article 'Imperialism. Highest Stage But One', in *International Socialism*, Summer 1962, which considers Lenin's work in isolation and proceeds, with patronizing and smart-alec tone, to 'refute' *Imperialism* piece by piece. In this article, for example, the concept of capitalism as a *world* system finds no place and the *contradictions* have disappeared thanks to 'the permanent war economy'. There are no longer organic links between advanced and backward economies, a 'relatively high degree of planning' has taken the place of *laissez faire* and the article abounds in such 'discoveries' as that while Germany is more dependent on imported industrial materials than Britain she has no colonies. The author is impressed by a random assessment of ill-digested information collected from a miscellany of sources and by the latest *partial* analyses of bourgeois economics. There is no reference to the great monopolies which continue to dominate the economic life of *all* the newly independent underdeveloped countries. There is inability even to analyse his own material, such as the shift in investment from extractive to manufacturing industry in countries such as India. But the fact that there is hardly a detail which cannot be contested is less important than the method which is employed and the conclusion to which it leads.

## 2. New Trends in Imperialism

MARXISTS have yet to make any all-round analysis of the new developments in world economics and politics since Lenin wrote *Imperialism* in 1916. Blame for this tragic gap must rest fairly upon the shoulders of the world Communist Parties; their desertion of the basic principles of Marxism makes the job an impossible task for them. But the recent growth of the revolutionary movement after years of isolation now makes possible the deepening and enriching of our understanding of the world developments which have taken place since the death of Lenin.

We need to examine some of the contemporary problems of Imperialism which are in some respects different from those which it faced 40 years ago. This article tries to begin this by developing some of the ideas which have recently appeared in *LABOUR REVIEW*.<sup>1</sup> The conclusions reached here can only be tentative; there is a wealth of material to be analyzed and a team of Marxists must be trained who can reduce this to coherence so that the working class can be armed with a greater understanding of the world in which it lives and the necessary tasks which this imposes upon it.

Imperialism depends upon the division of the world into rich and poor countries. Traditionally, Marxists have seen the underdeveloped countries fulfilling three inter-connected roles in relation to the advanced Imperialist countries.

(a) As areas for the investment of capital. In the last quarter of the 19th century capital began to flow at an increasing pace to the backward areas of the world because of the restrictions to its expansion being encountered in the metropolitan countries. To survive, capitalism needs to realize surplus value on an ever-increasing scale and it was in order to facilitate this realization that capital invaded the underdeveloped parts of the globe. In this way, the pressure of accumulation was relatively reduced at home and the tendency for the rate of profit to fall arrested.<sup>2</sup>

1. See F. K. Girling 'Opportunism in 1961' and Tom Kemp 'The Course of Capitalist Development' in *LABOUR REVIEW*, Vol. 6, No. 2 and 'The World Prospect for Socialism' in *LABOUR REVIEW*, Vol. 6, No. 3.

2. There is perhaps some misconception that the rate of profit earned in the backward countries is considerably in excess of that earned in the metropolitan countries. This is not so. The export of capital abroad also tends to raise the rate of profit on home investments. Because there is less domestic capital seeking investment

(b) As markets. Capitalism is at once an exploitative and a market economy; exploitative in that the aim of the capitalist is always to increase the 'gap' between the output of each worker and the purchasing power which he gets in the form of wages. It is by increasing this gap (i.e., by raising the rate of exploitation) that the capitalist can prevent his rate of profit from falling. Marx noted this tendency for the rate of profit to fall alongside 'the progress of industry', as the organic composition of capital (the ratio of capital to labour) increased. To maintain the rate of profit there must be ultimately a disproportion between production and consumption. But capitalism is also a market economy. The commodities produced must be sold, and at a profit. In a market economy therefore there must be a rough proportionality between production and consumption. In order to produce surplus value on an ever-increasing scale there has to be a disproportion between production and consumption, but in order to realize this surplus value (that is to say, sell the commodities on the market) production and consumption have to be in rough proportionality. This is the essence of capitalist crisis; in the final analysis (though not necessarily in the short run) the productive power of capitalism meets the barrier of an inadequate market. In an attempt to resolve this contradiction, capitalism looks to the backward areas of the world to provide it with the enlarged market which it needs.

(c) As suppliers of cheap food and raw materials. This has two results. Because the price of food is very important in determining the price of subsistence (wages), cheap sources of food mean that lower wages can be paid to the workers in the metropolitan countries. This raises the rate of exploitation of labour and thus acts as a very important counteracting tendency to the falling rate of profit. In the second place, cheap imports of raw

outlets at home, the forces of supply and demand tend to raise the rate of profit which it earns. In the second place, because there is less capital employed in the domestic economy this will tend to increase the reserve army of labour; as a result wages will be reduced and the rate of profit will be increased. In this way the rates of return on home and foreign capital may be brought into a position of near equality. It has been calculated that, in 1948, the return on U.S. foreign investment was about 17% compared with about 13% for home investment. *Measures for the Development of Underdeveloped Countries*, United Nations 1951, p. 81.

# by Peter Jeffries

materials help to cheapen the elements of constant capital and slow up the tendency for the organic composition of capital to rise, thereby helping to stabilize the rate of profit.<sup>3</sup>

We can usefully look at the problems now being faced by Imperialism if we examine these three aspects of the relationship—as usually seen in the

3. For a detailed exposition of Marx's concept of the falling rate of profit see Joseph Gillman *The Falling Rate of Profit*, Denis Dobson 1957. For a simple analysis see *The Newsletter*, Vol. 6, No. 255, June 30, 1962.

## DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ADVANCED ECONOMIES

It will be useful to start with a brief analysis of some of the developments now taking place in the metropolitan countries. Generally speaking it is possible to discern a breaking down of the traditional relationships between the advanced and underdeveloped parts of the world economy as the metropolitan countries of Western Europe and North America become more self-sufficient in the production of certain foodstuffs and raw materials. Not only does Imperialism bring unevenness of development on a world scale; this is also true if one considers the metropolitan countries alone. In Britain, for example, the contrast is between motor cars, chemicals, synthetic fibres, rubber and oil-refining on the one hand, and railways, shipbuilding, coalmining and textiles on the other. Of special concern to us is the rapid development of synthetic fibres and rubber in North America and Western Europe. The growth of these industries is now beginning to undermine the position of the underdeveloped countries as suppliers of the equivalent raw materials to the imperialist countries.

But firstly we should examine the position of agriculture, where it is perhaps easier to see the processes which are at work. In Western Europe, and to a lesser extent in North America, agriculture has remained a relatively backward sector of these highly industrialized economies—'backward' in the sense that the ratio of capital to labour has been comparatively low. But the increasing intrusion of capital into this sector has steadily raised production and productivity. (The two world wars, during which the European economies were cut off from their traditional suppliers, helped to speed up these

past—between the developed and backward parts of the world economy. Naturally, they are interconnected but the division of the material along these lines makes for easier handling. Throughout the discussion it is very important to keep in mind the general decline of Imperialism as a world system. The growth of the Soviet economy to a position where it can now challenge American imperialism in many fields, the spread of the revolution to China and Eastern Europe, and finally the continuing struggles of the workers and peasants in the backward countries, have all weakened capitalism considerably since 1916.

developments.) At the same time, consumption has failed to keep pace with these increases. Consequently, not only are the imports of food into the advanced countries being reduced but these countries are also releasing their growing surpluses on to the world market; this is forcing down the price of many commodities and intensifying the problems of the countries of Africa and Asia. In the United States, for example, crop production has risen by about 20 per cent in the last decade, and could rise by a further 25 per cent in the next five years. During the 1950s, however, American food consumption per head has been virtually static.<sup>4</sup>

This trend is true not only of America, but also of Western Europe. Since 1938-39, production of grain in this area has risen by over 15 million tons from about 64 million tons, while the figures for a similar period in the United States show a rise from just over 100 million tons to nearly 160 million tons.<sup>5</sup> Commenting upon this our 'top newspaper' has pointed to the political risks involved in the situation. The advanced countries are beginning to produce surpluses in an increasingly wide range of commodities; this by 'depressing prices (will) reduce the capacity of the underdeveloped countries to buy food which they need . . . This picture recalls the "hunger amid plenty" which had disastrous effects

4. *The Times*, June 3, 1962, reporting a speech by President Kennedy.

5. *Grain Crops*. A review published by HMSO, 1959. In the same period American exports of wheat increased more than fivefold to a figure of nearly 13 million tons in 1957.

on men's minds and then on political events in the thirties.<sup>6</sup> Not only has the danger to Imperialism implicit in this situation been grasped, but *The Times* has correctly analyzed the position: 'Countries with large capital resources are applying technology to agriculture with startlingly successful results . . . the North American farmer pours out more foodstuffs (grain and dairy produce) than can be consumed at home, sold abroad or even given away.'<sup>7</sup>

President Kennedy has realized that, despite the glaring world food shortage, American exports will be unable to remedy the situation, not because the farmers cannot raise the production to the required levels, but for other reasons. Income in the backward countries is too low, and, in any case, even if the backward countries had the money to buy food, transport facilities there are not sufficiently developed to handle and distribute it. Kennedy's 'solution'—tailoring demand to supply, compensating farmers for land not used, etc., exposes in a cruel way the contradictions which Imperialism suffers on a world scale, contradictions which condemn millions in Africa, Asia and Latin America to undernourishment and starvation.<sup>8</sup>

The metropolitan countries are relying less and less upon the backward areas to supply them with certain foodstuffs; while this trend must not be exaggerated, the continuing application of science and technology to agriculture will increasingly force us to take these developments into account. The limited amounts of capital which are being applied to agriculture in the underdeveloped world will raise production even more and further worsen the economic plight of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

But if capital is finding it less advantageous to exploit the agricultural resources of the backward areas this is increasingly the case with regard to certain raw materials. Take the case of rubber,

6. *The Times*, May 3, 1962.

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.* Here the annual world deficit is shown as follows:

- 3,000m. lbs. of non-fat dry milk
- 350m. lbs. of dry beans
- 7,000m. lbs. of vegetable oil
- 1,000m. lbs. of wheat.

which is perhaps the best illustration of the forces at work; apart from the present US stockpiles of rubber which Senator Symington is demanding be released onto the world market, the threat which overhangs the natural rubber market is the perennial competition from synthetics. 'Already this year there have been reports, that the rate of substitution of synthetic for natural rubber has accelerated over that in 1961. In Europe especially, it is expected that synthetic still has many gains to make at the expense of its natural rival. Whereas synthetic now has over a two-thirds share of the North American tyre market, its share in the United Kingdom, France and Western Germany is about a half and in Italy two-fifths.'<sup>9</sup>

This trend away from natural rubber will have severe repercussions on such countries as Malaya and Indonesia, both of whom derive about half their earnings from the export of rubber. Increased production of rubber will depress world prices even more and still further undermine the external position of these countries.<sup>10</sup> Similar developments appear to be taking place in the case of man-made fibres. Since 1954 the consumption of these fibres has risen at four times the pace of the consumption of the natural fibres, wool and cotton.<sup>11</sup> In the first quarter of this year (1962) production of synthetic fibres in Western Europe, the United States and Japan (which together account for nearly 80 per cent of total production) had risen by about 14 per cent compared with a similar period two years ago.<sup>12</sup> Cotton is now more expensive than rayon staple and investment is proceeding at such a pace, especially in synthetic fibres, that prices are almost certain to be reduced still further.<sup>13</sup>

9. *The Financial Times*, May 7, 1962.

10. 'Earnings from natural rubber will almost certainly be reduced below the 1960 level. . . . Given the considerable increase in the capacity to produce synthetic rubber, it seems unlikely that the price of rubber will move far out of line with that of synthetic in 1961.' *World Economic Survey 1960*, p. 212.

11. *The Financial Times*, April 30, 1962.

12. *The Guardian*, May 29, 1962.

13. *The Financial Times*, May 3, 1962.

## MARKETS AND CAPITAL EXPORTS TO THE UNDERDEVELOPED WORLD

The usefulness of the backward areas of the world as markets for the excess commodities of the advanced countries is being gradually eroded because of the widespread and growing poverty which exists in these areas. The general pattern since 1945 has

been one of boom and advance in the metropolitan countries and stagnation and decline over large parts of Africa, Asia and South America. The outstanding feature of these areas is their poverty and hence comparative uselessness as markets. As one example,



in the case of Ghana, enjoying the highest average level of income of any African state south of the Sahara (with the exception of South Africa), per capita income is only about £45 per annum. In many African states the figure is as low as £15-20 per annum.<sup>14</sup> In any case a per capita figure may be misleading: in India, parts of Africa and South America, because of the high degree of inequality which prevails, the majority of the population constitute only a very limited market for the goods of the metropolitan countries. The fact that richer people tend to save a greater proportion of their income than do poorer people further restricts the potential market in many parts of the backward world and heightens the unevenness of capitalist development. Any tendency towards greater inequality in the distribution of income will only intensify the problem of exports for the imperialists.

But the poverty of Africa and Asia is also reducing their value as fields for the investment of surplus capital. Since *Imperialism* was written one feature of the development of capitalism has been the growth in the complexity of what economists usually call the 'infrastructure' upon which any advanced economy has to be based. Such an infrastructure in the 1960s consists of an adequate transport system, a literate, skilled, disciplined, labour force as well as a number of scientists and technologists. These increasingly necessary requirements are almost wholly lacking in most of the poor areas of the world. To give a few examples from Africa: the transport system is completely inadequate to meet the needs of the 20th century—on the whole the railways are single track and do not extend far into the interior; in addition most Africans are illiterate and few of the states have 2 per cent of their children at school; water shortage is a problem over perhaps two-thirds of Africa; many of the soils are poor and there is a serious lack of fuel, especially coal. Because of widespread poverty, disease and under-nourishment are commonplace. This results in an inefficient labour force: 'such illnesses limit Africa's opportunities for economic growth by vastly reducing the efficiency of African manpower.'<sup>15</sup>

To remedy this situation is a costly business from the point of view of the imperialists: to lay the basis for large-scale investments in these areas is vital, but promises no immediate return. There is little profit to be made in building roads, schools, hospitals and so on, but, until this is done, in this period of modern technology no big profitable investments are possible.

14. For list of per capita incomes throughout the world see United Nations Statistical Papers, Series E, No. 14, quoted in *Labour Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2.

15. Shirley Williams, 'How Rich is Africa?' in *The Twentieth Century*, Vol. 165, No. 986, April 1959.

As technology and industry become more complex in the metropolitan countries this problem will only grow more acute; the unevenness of development upon a world scale will become more and more pronounced. 'In short, most of Africa still lacks the basic economic "infrastructure", as it is called, on which profitable investments depend. Businessmen who want to establish industries or mines in Africa have to provide their own power, build their own access roads, train their own labour and import their own managers and technical staff from overseas.'<sup>16</sup>

This is not meant to imply that the imperialists are deserting the underdeveloped areas of the globe. What is happening is that investments are being more and more concentrated into petroleum and mining; this means that the majority of capital exports are going to those parts of the world rich in oil, tin, copper, gold, etc. More and more the capitalists in the metropolitan countries are openly raping and plundering Africa, Asia and Latin America. Despite President Kennedy's attempt to create a new image of Imperialism, this is the reality, and all pretence at balanced development for these areas has vanished. Fields of investment hitherto profitable are being abandoned and new outlets for capital sought:

'In recent years, most of it (private foreign investment)—about 70%—has been going into petroleum. Very little investment is occurring outside the oil-bearing countries.'<sup>17</sup>

'In certain mineral exporting countries, Rhodesia and Nyasaland and Venezuela, for example, large amounts have been invested by foreigners in the production of copper and petroleum. In contrast, countries which export chiefly textile fibres and certain foods have been particularly unattractive to private investors.'<sup>18</sup>

In the case of Africa, over half the total investments in the period 1945-1949 has been concentrated

16. *Ibid.*, p. 404. (The United Nations has summed up the position: 'Generally foreign private investors seek outlets for their funds in areas where certain basic facilities—such as transport, communications and banking—are already fairly well developed. Adequate facilities of this kind are usually available only in countries which have reached a higher stage of economic development and where the level of per capita income is generally higher. Moreover, with a given population, a higher per capita income provides a larger domestic market which offers an additional impetus for the inflow of foreign capital . . . the low level of per capita income seems to have been one of the deterrents to such inflows in countries such as India and Pakistan.' *World Economic Survey*, United Nations 1960, p. 66.)

17. *Measures for the Development of Underdeveloped Countries*, United Nations, pp. 80-81.

18. *World Economic Survey 1960*, p. 63.

in South Africa, the Central African Federation and the Belgian Congo, each of them rich in gold or copper.<sup>19</sup> Figures for the United States are even more revealing. The outflow of capital invested in petroleum rose by over 300 per cent in the years 1955-57; in mining and smelting the increase was

19. *The Twentieth Century*, op. cit.

over 200 per cent, whereas the figure for the outflow of capital as a whole rose by about 120 per cent. In 1957, capital investments in mining and petroleum accounted for something like five-sevenths of total capital outflow.<sup>20</sup>

20. *The Flow of International Private Capital 1956-58*, United Nations.

## CHANGING DIRECTION OF CAPITAL INVESTMENTS

The developments related above suggest a changed emphasis in the flow of international capital which to some extent modifies the traditional Marxist view of Imperialism. Increasingly the metropolitan countries are investing in each others' economies in the face of barriers to investment in the backward countries. What I want to do is to give some indication of this change, first in general terms and, by way of convenient illustration, from the recent experience of British Imperialism.

Of particular interest to us at this point is the position of those areas of the world which, while they cannot be considered 'underdeveloped' in the sense of comparability to Africa and Asia, nevertheless have not reached the high levels of development achieved by American, German, French or British capitalism. If, as a rough guide, we can take the per capita income as a measure of the development of an economy, this 'middle' range, as it were, would include Ireland, Austria, Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Israel, etc.

As fields for the investment of capital these countries have certain advantages which are not found in the very backward areas. In the first place, they often have a reasonably developed 'infrastructure' which, as we tried to show above, is completely lacking in most parts of Africa and Asia. Road and rail networks are in many cases more suited to the needs of 20th century transportation, educational facilities are usually more extensive, and the population more ready to accept the discipline required of a modern labour force. In the second place, because the level of per capita income in these countries is higher than in most places in Africa and Asia, there is a richer domestic market to be exploited. On the other hand, countries such as Italy and Portugal do not suffer the 'disadvantages' of the very highly developed economies; in particular, wage rates tend to be lower and this offers capital the possibility of a higher rate of return. Again it may be too early to make any definite predictions, but there are some indications that countries such as Italy and Spain are proving a greater attraction to foreign private investment.<sup>21</sup>

21. *Ibid.* To give an example 'United States invest-

United States capital has been flowing into Italy at a fast pace and trade with and between Spain, the United States and Great Britain has increased considerably in recent years. In the case of Spain, the government has been trying to modernize the economy in preparation for full entry into the Common Market. Much government investment in Spain has been channelled into the provision of an adequate 'infrastructure' as a basis for the importation of private capital; it is expected that assistance will come from the World Bank to speed up this process.<sup>22</sup> We must not, of course, fall into the trap of

22. It is interesting to see the role which the World Bank is playing in opening up these backward areas of Europe for imperialist investments. For Spain see *Board of Trade Journal*, Vol. 182, No. 3402, June 1, 1962. Aid to Greece and Turkey is flowing through the World Bank and also the Organisation for European Combined Development. See *The Financial Times*, July 9, 1962.

ments in Italy have increased from \$80m. in 1952 to \$233m. in 1957. Total foreign investments in Italy . . . amounted to 400 billion lire in the period 1948-56 and more than half of this amount corresponds to investments made in the last 3 years . . . for the most part, recent foreign direct investment in Italy has been in the southern, less developed, part of the country'. (My emphasis—P.J.)

It is perhaps of some significance that *The Financial Times* (March 30, 1962), in reporting the launching of a German Economic Development Corporation, designed to assist small and medium-sized German firms to go into business in the developing countries, notes that 'the Corporation will be in a position to operate in the developing countries as defined by the Organisation for European Combined Development. That means that European countries such as Greece and Spain will be included besides the needy countries overseas'.

*The Times*, commenting upon 'the growing internationalism of investment' (March 2, 1962), states (May 7, 1962), 'of the countries of Western Europe the stock market regards Spain, Belgium and Italy as offering the best opportunities at the moment. . . . Spanish industry has been making good headway and the introduction of foreign capital is being welcomed. . . . Italian production rose last year by 15% and there is considerable scope for further development'.

separating political from economic considerations; one of the prime reasons for the influx of United States capital into France and Italy after 1945 was an attempt to achieve some degree of political stability in these countries and ward off the threat of the advance of communism. But apart from these very important considerations I think it is possible to detect some more directly 'economic' factors which are beginning to operate in the world economy and which are making these countries more attractive to foreign investments.

The flow of capital between the very highly developed European economies of France, Western Germany and Great Britain has also been growing in importance. And expert opinion believes that this trend will develop in the 1960s.<sup>23</sup> Investments are beginning to flow around Europe to such an extent that giant Continental Investment Trusts are appearing which spread their investments throughout the European Economy.<sup>24</sup> This increase in European investment is also reflected in increased European trade; in the two years prior to 1960 trade between the European Economic Community countries increased by about 50 per cent while total exports from this area rose by only 30 per cent.<sup>25</sup>

United States investment in Europe has also been growing rapidly and this is of key importance. Numerous firms organized upon an international basis now own plants and firms throughout Europe. They operate in the field of motors, electrical and mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals and food processing. Many of these plants are owned partly or wholly by American concerns. Between 1952 and 1957 United States direct investment in Western Germany, France and the United Kingdom rose by almost 100 per cent and by 1957 represented almost 20 per cent of American foreign investment.<sup>26</sup> Since that date the United States has taken the lead

throughout Europe in take-over bids and mergers.<sup>27</sup> Also significant is the fact that the net outflow of long-term capital from the United States to the high income countries in the years 1953-58 was about three times as high as that going to the low income countries in the same period—if Latin America is excluded, where investment in the development of petroleum has been heavy. Even if this area is included the low income countries still received less than did the richer areas of the world.<sup>28</sup>

We can now illustrate some of these developments from the experience of British Imperialism. Looking only at the Sterling Area first: the flow of capital has definitely been to the more highly developed countries of the area and 'principally (to) Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, leaving a minor portion for India, Pakistan and Ceylon, the newly independent countries of Africa and the remaining colonial territories.'<sup>29</sup> Capital investment in Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa has been especially heavy, reflecting the heavy concentration upon gold and copper which parallels American developments. In the second place, Asia has been virtually neglected; this because of the lack of easily exploitable minerals and the low levels of income which provide little or no market for British exporters. 'It is apparent therefore that the post-war flow of capital has not in the main been to those countries which urgently need development resources. On the contrary, the trend has been perverse to the extent that available supplies of capital have gone mainly to the countries which have already attained a high degree of development.'<sup>30</sup>

While the Sterling Area still retains great significance as an outlet for British capital<sup>31</sup> the importance of Europe has also been growing. In 1958 British firms invested £14 million in Western Europe, in

23. 'No estimate can be made of the total intra-European direct investment. All the major capital exporting countries—Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—are known to have substantial investments in each other and elsewhere in Europe. . . . such investment is likely to absorb a considerable proportion of the region's available resources in the near future . . . the creation of the European Common Market . . . is also stimulating the inflow of entrepreneurial capital from the United States, as United States manufacturers see an advantage in establishing production facilities within the Common Market.' *The Flow of International Private Capital 1956-58*, United Nations.

24. *The Times*, May 7, 1962, gives details of a recent example.

25. *Journal of Industrial Economics*, Vol. 10, No. 1, November 1961.

26. *The Flow of International Private Capital 1956-58*, United Nations.

27. *Journal of Industrial Economics*, op. cit.

28. *The Flow of International Private Capital 1956-58*, United Nations.

29. *The Times*, May 21, 1962. In the same article it is noted, 'It has long been observed that countries already fairly well established on the path of economic development are generally of greater attraction to private foreign capital than those whose economic advance is only just commencing.'

30. A. R. Conan *Capital Imports into Sterling Countries, 1960*, p. 37.

31. In 1960, 63% of total direct investments of United Kingdom Companies was directed to the Sterling Area. Within this group Australia has been gaining rapidly in importance. Whereas in 1958 only £19m. was invested by the Companies in this country by 1960 this figure had risen to £57m. *Board of Trade Journal*, Vol. 182, No. 3393. (N.B., Investments in oil and insurance are not included, the data being unobtainable.)

1959 £20 million and in 1961 £25 million. Of this £25 million about 80 per cent was invested in the countries of the European Economic Community whereas this area took only 60 per cent of European investment in 1958; the countries growing most rapidly as fields for British investment were Italy and France.<sup>32</sup> Investments in Canada and the United States totalled £43 million in 1960, not far short of twice the amount invested in Europe during that year. About £15 million of British capital was invested in Latin America, the largest slice going to Argentina with one of the highest per capita incomes of the region. British experience also conformed to the trends noted above in that less emphasis was placed upon investment in agriculture; in 1958 this absorbed about 10 per cent of British Imperialism's direct foreign investment; in 1959 this fell to 6 per cent and in 1960 to 5 per cent.

What is the pattern of foreign investment in Britain?

32. *Ibid.*, p. 675; again oil and insurance are excluded. Earnings from investments in France, for example, rose from £0.8m. in 1958 to over £2m. in 1960.

In 1961 capital exports from Britain amounted to about £211 million, whereas capital imports stood at £225 million. Britain has, of course, traditionally been a net exporter of capital and this 'new phenomenon' of 1961 was due mainly to 'an astonishing net inflow of private capital of £75 million'. As the *Financial Times* put it: 'The tendency for investment to become international is likely to continue (especially if we join the European Economic Community and liberalize exchange controls) and there is much to be said for financing part of our investment abroad out of foreign investments in this country.'<sup>33</sup> To some extent the inflow of capital was unduly swollen by the Ford deal which involved about £130 million, but, as leading experts noted, recent years have invariably seen some 'special' inflow of capital. Where did the capital invested in Britain come from? Breaking down the 1960 figures, of the total of £132 million the lion's share came from the United States (£85 million), with sizable contributions from Canada (£18 million) and Western Europe (£16 million).

33. *The Financial Times*, March 29, 1962.

## CONCLUSIONS

What is the significance of the processes which I have tried to describe? Basically they signify the continuing decline of Imperialism since 1916. The difficulties increasingly experienced in the export of capital to the backward areas of the world are not to be thought of as an isolated phenomenon; they are linked essentially to the rapid advance of industry and technology in the metropolitan countries and particularly to their growing self-sufficiency in certain foodstuffs and raw materials. As industry advances in Western Europe and America, so will the unevenness of development upon a world scale become more pronounced. In these conditions, investment in the increasingly impoverished two-thirds of the world will become more difficult. It will become less and less possible to install advanced and highly complex plant in an Africa and Asia growing more and more unsuited, both economically and culturally, to receive it on the expanding scale required. While it is true that investment goes on apace in these areas in the fields of mineral extraction and petroleum, it would be wrong to look upon this as a permanent 'escape route' for Imperialism. Firstly, this ignores the fact that such a rapid expansion in the production of these commodities must sooner or later end in a crisis of over-production and falling prices—indeed this is currently happening in the case of oil. The development of Soviet production—oil is again a good example—is bound to worsen the situation. In the second place, the development of mining and

oil production in these backward areas must speed up the growth of a concentrated industrial working class. Given a correct leadership this can provide a real force in the struggle against Imperialism throughout Africa and Asia.

But we must not look upon these questions in isolation. Capitalism is now entering a period when it is generally finding it more difficult to extract and realize surplus value on the necessary scale, a difficulty which, in this particular context, shows itself in a tendency for the rate of profit upon invested capital to decline. The phenomenon of growing barriers to investment in the backward areas of the world is only one of the totality of interconnected factors which is now producing this difficulty.

It is necessary to understand fully the place which the concept of the falling rate of profit has in the structure of political economy. Above all this resolves itself into a question of *method*.<sup>34</sup> Marx was trying to lay bare the economic law of motion of modern society; in doing this he was obviously unable to deal with the whole complex of forces operating in capitalist economy. On the basis of his experience and judgment he had to abstract certain of the features which he thought were of key importance and construct a 'model' of the essential

34. For a discussion of this see Tom Kemp in *Labour Review*, op. cit.

workings of the capitalist system on the basis of these features. It would therefore be a mistake to try to show that the rate of profit had, or had not, fallen with the development of capitalism and on this basis either prove or refute Marx's basic analysis. Certain factors, which in a simplified model may be taken as 'given', may be powerful enough to counteract or even reverse the operations of any law. Abstraction is, of course, the key tool of the social scientist but we must be careful to understand exactly what abstract models represent and what valid conclusions we may derive from them.

Marx was fully aware of this and was quick to show that there were powerful counteracting forces at work in the system which operated alongside and as part of those pressures producing a general and long-term tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Summing up the discussion on this point, Marx notes:

'We have thus seen in a general way that the same influences which produce a tendency in the general rate of profit to fall, also call forth counter-effects, which hamper, retard, and partly paralyse this fall. The latter do not do away with the law, but impair its effect. . . . Thus the law acts only as a tendency. *And it is only under certain circumstances and after long periods that its effects become strikingly pronounced.*'<sup>35</sup> (My emphasis—P.J.)

What we therefore have to discuss are the specific factors which are now operating in the capitalist countries which currently make the law 'operative', as it were. This can perhaps be most conveniently discussed by an examination of some of the counteracting tendencies which have been at work since 1945, the combined power of which would now appear to be ebbing.

At the basis of the law of the falling rate of profit was the trend which Marx noted for the value of constant capital (machinery, tools, raw materials and so on) to rise in relation to variable capital (the wage bill of productive labourers). Since 1945, there is no doubt that in many sectors of the economy the organic composition of capital has risen sharply—investment has proceeded at a rapid pace in motors, steel, engineering, chemicals, oil, synthetic fibres and so on. This Marx termed a rise in the organic composition of capital (o.c.c.). Other things being equal, with a rising o.c.c. the rate of profit must fall.<sup>36</sup> But,

35. K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. 3, p. 233. F.L.P.H. edition.

36. The rate of profit is the relation of the amount of profit realized to a given amount of capital invested. Thus if C represents the total capital and S represents the surplus value (or unpaid labour time) then the rate of profit is shown by the formula  $S/C = p^1$  (rate of profit). Then Marx divides capital up into constant capital (c) and variable capital (v). The rate of profit is now given by  $p^1 = S/(c + v)$ . If a part of the denominator (c) is increased while S remains unchanged, then  $p^1$  must fall. This, in essence, is the 'law' of the falling rate of profit.

of course, 'other things are *not* equal'; the law does not operate in a vacuum, in other words. What are the main counteracting tendencies which have until recently been in operation in the world economy? Only a few elementary things can be said in the space available.<sup>37</sup>

In the first place, Marx assumed, for analytical purposes, that the rate of exploitation (that is, the ratio of the 'unpaid' portion of the day to the 'paid' portion) would remain constant over time. The rapid advance of productive techniques (especially in that sphere loosely defined as 'automation') has raised the productivity of labour enormously and with it the rate of exploitation. Without empirical investigation it is difficult to be more definite but the strong possibility is, to say the least, that the increase in the rate of exploitation has counter-balanced the tendency for the rate of profit to fall.

In the second place, in several European countries wages have been held down because of the existence of a considerable reserve army of labour. To use Marx's phrase, there has been 'relative overpopulation' in the countries such as Western Germany, Italy and France. The rapid accumulation of capital which was made possible in these countries (and especially in Western Germany) had repercussions throughout the capitalist world economy and acted as a strong force for expansion.

Finally, the period since 1940 has seen a big increase of State intervention in the economies of certain capitalist countries—notably in Britain. The State has taken both a greater interest in the control of direct investment—in Britain, for example, in the case of the nationalized industries, which account for roughly 20 per cent of the economy—and also in more general control via manipulation of credit and monetary institutions. There is little doubt that this has brought a greater degree of economic and social stability to the system and has been one factor contributing to the avoidance of any major recession. The fact that nationalization in this country also took place in the backward sector of the economy, with high rates of compensation being paid, meant that capital was released for more lucrative openings.

Some of these stabilizing factors are now, however, beginning to turn into their opposites. The disappearance of unemployment in countries such as Germany means that wages in several European countries are now beginning to rise. Secondly, while nationalization did stabilize the system in some countries after 1945 this also allowed accumulation to proceed at a faster pace. This meant a rapidly rising organic composition of capital which, in the period we are now entering, means a downward pressure upon the rate of profit.

It is into this general pattern that we must fit the

37. For a more detailed treatment of all these questions see Tom Kemp, *op. cit.*

growing barriers to investment in the backward countries. One of the main counteracting forces operating against the tendency for the rate of profit to fall is, of course, the ability of the metropolitan countries to exploit and export capital to the underdeveloped areas of the world, with the results which we outlined at the beginning of this article. When one grasps the relationships of the processes described in some detail above to those briefly mentioned in this concluding section, it is possible to obtain a clearer picture of the nature of the crisis which is now facing the system on a world scale and the steps which its rulers are taking to avert it.

By moving into the less well developed areas of the advanced world (Spain, Ireland, Greece, Turkey, Southern Italy and so on) the capitalists hope to stave off their problems. These areas have the advantages compared to Asia and Africa which we noted above—a better transport system, a more highly skilled working class, better educational facilities, a bigger domestic market to be exploited and so on. On the other hand they have the advantage—from the point of view of the imperialists—of lower wages, higher rates of unemployment and weaker traditions of trade unionism and working class organization.<sup>38</sup>

This, of course, is where the Common Market fits into the picture. Capital is now demanding greater mobility in the face of barriers to its expansion—this the Common Market will give to it. Firms will now be able to roam Europe looking for pockets of unemployment and cheap labour; we can expect to see whole sections of the economies of Britain, America, Western Germany, France and so on take legs and walk to these backward areas of Europe.

The lead in all these developments is taken by the American ruling class—the section of world finance

38. A series of recent articles in *The Guardian* (especially June 15, 1962), significantly called *Profitless Prosperity—the outlook for the sixties*, notes the basically similar problems being faced by the rulers of Germany, America, Great Britain, Switzerland and Holland. The author goes on to point out that France and Italy are to an extent different. Companies operating in these countries are 'the odds on favourites for profit growth'. There are 'near ideal conditions for industrialisation. . . . a reserve pool of labour in agriculture (and) a low initial level of productivity'.

capital with most at stake. It is clear that they have been the driving force behind the Common Market, and American capital has flowed into Europe in recent years at a rapid pace. From the point of view of United States Imperialism wages in Europe are generally lower than at home and there is a large and rich market to be exploited. A recent article in *The Financial Times*<sup>39</sup> entitled 'America's Grand Design for Europe' (!) clearly shows this: the aim has been 'a strong political partnership between Europe and the United States more closely knit than ever before and more effective than before in combating the threat of communism'. It is also clear where the pressure for Britain's entry into the European Economic Community came from: 'it remains true that America is determined that Commonwealth objections should not interfere with the development of the Atlantic Community.'

Two tasks still remain unfinished. It is necessary to think out very carefully the *political* implications of what has been discussed here. Firstly, the strategy to be adopted by the revolutionary movement in backward countries would seem to be involved. If the imperialists are deserting many of the backward areas, leaving them in poverty and misery, all talk of the 'two stage' revolution must become more patently sheer nonsense. There can be no hope of natural and organic transition to capitalism and then on to socialism. Again, with the search for capital outlets which is now developing throughout Europe, all theories which claim that the centre of the world revolution has passed to the colonial areas will be left way behind by events. Europe and the US will be the stage of the big mass struggles which will settle the fate of humanity—the upsurges in Germany, Britain and Spain are a sure if early sign of this.

Secondly, the role of the Soviet and Chinese economies has been ignored; given their growing potential to provide exportable surpluses—the case of oil has been briefly touched upon above—one would expect this to intensify the crisis of imperialism—a crisis which must in turn react back upon the countries of the Soviet bloc. There is an urgent need to examine these developments and relate them to the analysis and tentative conclusions produced in this exploratory article.

39. *The Financial Times*, June 21, 1962.



*By Leon Trotsky*

# *Culture and Socialism*

This article was compiled by the author from a talk he gave to a Moscow club on February 3, 1926, and a number of other addresses. It appeared in the journal 'Novy Mir' for January 1927. This translation has been made by Brian Pearce from the version printed in Vol. XXI of Leon Trotsky's 'Works', published in 1927.

## 1. TECHNIQUE AND CULTURE

LET us recall first of all that culture meant originally a ploughed, cultivated field, as distinct from virgin forest and virgin soil. Culture was contrasted with nature, that is, what was acquired by man's efforts was contrasted with what was given by nature. This antithesis fundamentally retains its value today.

Culture is everything that has been created, built, learnt, conquered by man in the course of his entire history, in distinction from what nature has given, including the natural history of man himself as a species of animal. The science which studies man as a product of animal evolution is called anthropology. But from the moment that man separated himself from the animal kingdom—and this happened approximately when he first grasped primitive tools of stone and wood and armed the organs of his body with them—from that time there began the creation and accumulation of culture, that is, all kinds of knowledge and skill in the struggle with nature and subjugation of nature.

When we speak of the culture accumulated by past generations we think first and foremost of its material achievements in the form of tools, machinery, buildings, monuments, and so on. Is this culture? Undoubtedly it is culture; the material forms in which culture is deposited—material culture. It creates, on the basis provided by nature, the fundamental setting of our lives, our everyday way of living, our creative work. But the most precious part of culture is its deposit in the consciousness of man himself—those methods, habits, skills, acquired abilities of ours which have developed out of the whole of pre-existing material culture and which, while drawing on this pre-existing material culture, also improve upon it. We



will, then, consider it as firmly established that culture has grown out of man's struggle with nature for existence, for the improvement of his conditions of life, for the enlargement of his power. But out of this same basis classes also have grown. In the process of adapting itself to nature, in conflict with the hostile forces of nature, human society has taken shape as a complex organization of classes. The class structure of society has determined to a decisive degree the content and form of human history, that is, its material relations and their ideological reflections. This means that historical culture has possessed a class character.

Slave-owning society, feudal-serf-owning society, bourgeois society, each engendered a corresponding culture, different at different stages and with a multitude of transitional forms. Historical society has been an organization for the exploitation of man by man. Culture has served the class organization of society. Exploiters' society has given rise to an exploiters' culture. But does this mean that we are against all the culture of the past?

There exists, in fact, a profound contradiction here. Everything that has been conquered, created, built by man's efforts and which serves to enhance man's power is culture. But since it is not a matter of individual man but of social man, since culture is a social-historical phenomenon in its very essence, and since historical society has been and continues to be class society, culture is found to be the basic instrument of class oppression. Marx said: 'The ruling ideas of an epoch are essentially the ideas of the ruling class of that epoch.' This also applies to culture as a whole. And yet we say to the working class: master all the culture of the past, otherwise you will not build socialism. How is this to be understood?

Over this contradiction many people have stumbled, and they stumble so frequently because they approach the understanding of class society superficially, semi-idealistically, forgetting that fundamentally this is the organization of production. Every class society has been formed on the basis of definite modes of struggle with nature, and these modes have changed in accordance with the development of technique. What is the basis of bases—the class organization of society or its productive forces? Without doubt the productive forces. It is precisely upon them, at a certain level of their development, that classes are formed and re-formed. In the productive forces is expressed the materialized economic skill of mankind, his historical ability to ensure his existence. On this dynamic foundation there arise classes, which by their interrelations determine the character of culture.

And here, first and foremost, we have to ask ourselves regarding technique: is it *only* an instrument of class oppression? It is enough to put such

a question for it to be answered at once: no, technique is the fundamental conquest of mankind; although it has also served, up to the present, as an instrument of exploitation, yet it is at the same time the fundamental condition for the emancipation of the exploited. The machine strangles the wage-slave in its grip. But he can free himself only through the machine. Therein is the root of the entire question.

If we do not let ourselves forget that the driving force of the historical process is the growth of the productive forces, liberating man from the domination of nature, then we shall find that the proletariat needs to master the sum total of the knowledge and skill worked out by humanity in the course of its history, in order to raise itself up and rebuild life on principles of solidarity.

'Does culture advance technique or does technique advance culture?' asks one of the written questions lying before me. It is wrong to put the question that way. Technique cannot be counterposed to culture, for it is its mainspring. Without technique, no culture. The growth of technique advances culture. But the science and general culture which have arisen on the basis of technique constitute a powerful aid to the further growth of technique. Here we have a dialectical interaction.

Comrades, if you want a simple but expressive example of the contradiction contained in technique itself, you will not find a better one than railways. If you take a look at West-European passenger trains you will see that they have carriages of different 'classes'. These classes remind us of the classes of capitalist society. The first-class carriages are for the privileged upper circles, the second-class for the middle bourgeoisie, the third for the petty-bourgeoisie and the fourth for the proletariat, which was formerly called, with good reason, the Fourth Estate. In themselves railways constitute a colossal cultural-technical conquest by mankind which has very greatly transformed the face of the earth in the course of a single century. But the class structure of society also influences the structure of the means of communication. And our Soviet railways are still a long way from equality—not only because they make use of carriages inherited from the past but also because NEP<sup>1</sup> merely prepares the way for equality, it does not accomplish it.

Before the railway age civilization was hemmed in by the shores of the seas and the banks of the great rivers. The railways opened up whole continents to capitalist culture. One of the fundamental causes, if not the most fundamental cause, of the backwardness and desolation of our Russian

1. NEP—The 'New Economic Policy' introduced in Soviet Russia in 1921, following the liquidation of 'War Communism'.—Translator's note.



countryside is the lack of railways, metalled roads and access roads. In this respect the majority of our villages exist in pre-capitalist conditions. We must overcome our great ally which is at the same time our greatest adversary—our great spaces.<sup>2</sup> Socialist economy is planned economy. Planning presupposes first and foremost communication. The most important means of communication are roads and railways. Every new railway line is a path to culture, and in our conditions also a path to socialism. Besides, with improvement in the technique of communications and in the country's prosperity the social profile of our railway trains will change: the separation into 'classes' will disappear, everybody will travel in 'soft' carriages . . . that is, if when that time comes people are still travelling by rail and don't prefer to use aeroplanes, which will be available to one and all.

Let us take another example, the instruments of militarism, the means of extermination. In this sphere the class nature of society is expressed in an especially vivid and repulsive way. But there is no destructive (explosive or poisonous) substance the discovery of which would not be in itself a valuable scientific and technical achievement. Explosive and poisonous substances are used also for creative and not only for destructive purposes and open up new possibilities in the field of discovery and invention.

The proletariat can take power only by breaking

2. Trotsky here refers to the value of Russia's enormous distances and expanses for the purpose of defence, as shown in the wars of intervention.—Translator's note.

up the old machinery of the class state. We have carried out this task as decisively as anybody has ever done. However, in building the new machinery of state we have found that we have to utilize, to a certain, fairly considerable extent, elements of the old. The further socialist reconstruction of the state machine is inseparably linked with out political, economic and cultural work in general.

We must not smash up technique. The proletariat has taken over the factories equipped by the bourgeoisie in that state in which the revolution found them. The old equipment is still serving us to this day. This fact most graphically and directly shows us that we do not renounce the 'heritage'. How could it be otherwise? After all, the revolution was undertaken, first and foremost, in order to get possession of the 'heritage'. However, the old technique, in the form in which we took it over, is quite unsuitable for socialism. It constitutes a crystallization of the anarchy of capitalist economy. Competition between different enterprises, chasing after profits, unevenness of development between different branches of the economy, backwardness of certain areas, parcellization of agriculture, plundering of human forces, all this finds in technique its expression in iron and brass. But whereas the machinery of class oppression can be smashed by a revolutionary blow, the productive machinery of capitalist anarchy can be reconstructed only gradually. The completion of the restoration period, on the basis of the old equipment, has only brought us to the threshold of this tremendous task. We must carry it through at all costs.

## 2. THE HERITAGE OF SPIRITUAL CULTURE

Spiritual culture is as contradictory as material culture. And just as from the arsenals and storehouses of material culture we take and put into circulation not bows and arrows, not stone tools or the tools of the Bronze Age, but the most improved tools available, of the most up-to-date technique, in this way also must we approach spiritual culture as well.

The fundamental element in the culture of the old society was religion. It possessed paramount importance as a form of human knowledge and human unity; but there was reflected in this form above all man's weakness in the face of nature and his helplessness within society. We utterly reject religion, along with all substitutes for it.

It is different with philosophy. We have to take from the philosophy created by class society two invaluable elements—materialism and dialectics. It was in fact from the organic combination of materialism and dialectics that Marx's method was

born and that his system arose. This method lies at the basis of Leninism.

If we pass on to science in the strict sense of the word, here we find it quite obvious that we are confronted with a huge reservoir of knowledge and skill accumulated by mankind during its long life. True, one can show that in science, the aim of which is the cognition of reality, there are many tendentious class adulterations. That is quite true. If even the railways give expression to the privileged position of some and the poverty of others, this applies even more to science, the material of which is a great deal more flexible than the metal and wood out of which they make railway carriages. But we have to reckon with the fact that scientific work is basically nourished by the need to obtain knowledge of nature. Although class interests have introduced and are still introducing false tendencies even into natural science, nevertheless this falsification process is restricted by the limits beyond which it begins directly to prevent the progress of technology. If

you examine natural science from the bottom upward, from the field of accumulation of elementary facts up to the highest and most complex generalizations, you will see that the more empirical a piece of scientific research is, the closer it is to its material, to facts, the more indubitable are the results which it produces. The wider the field of generalization, the nearer natural science approaches to questions of philosophy, the more is it subjected to the influence of class inspiration.


Matters are more complicated and worse in the case of the social sciences and what are called the 'humanities'. In this sphere too, of course, what is fundamental is the striving to get to know that which exists. Thanks to this fact we have, incidentally, the brilliant school of classical bourgeois economists. But class interest, which tells very much more directly and imperatively in the social sciences than in natural science, soon called a halt to the development of the economic thought of bourgeois society. In this field, however, we Communists are equipped better than in any other. Socialist theoreticians, awakened by the class struggle of the proletariat, basing themselves on bourgeois science and also criticizing it, created in the teachings of Marx and Engels the powerful method of historical materialism and the peerless application of this method in *Capital*. This does not mean, of course, that we are insured against the influence of bourgeois ideas in the field of economics and sociology generally. No, the most vulgar professorial-socialist and petty-bourgeois-Narodnik<sup>3</sup> tendencies burst out at every step into currency among us, from the old 'treasure houses' of knowledge, finding a nutrient medium for themselves in the unformed and contradictory relations of the transitional epoch. But in this sphere we have the indispensable criteria of Marxism, verified and enriched in the works of Lenin. And we will give an all the more triumphant rebuff to the vulgar economists and sociologists the less we shut ourselves up in the experience of the passing day, the more widely we embrace world development as a whole, distinguishing its fundamental trends beneath mere conjunctural changes.

In questions of law, morality and ideology in general the situation of bourgeois science is even more lamentable than in the field of economics. A pearl of genuine knowledge can be found in these spheres only after digging through dozens of professional dunghills.

Dialectics and materialism are the basic elements in the Marxist cognition of the world. But this does

not mean at all that they can be applied to any sphere of knowledge, like an ever-ready master-key. Dialectics cannot be imposed upon facts, it has to be deduced from facts, from their nature and development. Only painstaking work on a vast mass of material enabled Marx to advance the dialectical system of economics to the conception of value as social labour. Marx's historical works were constructed in the same way, and even his newspaper articles likewise. Dialectical materialism can be applied to new spheres of knowledge only by mastering them from within. The purging of bourgeois science presupposes a mastery of bourgeois science. You will get nowhere with sweeping criticism or bald commands. Learning and application here go hand in hand with critical re-working. We have the method, but there is work enough for generations to do.

Marxist criticism in science must be not only vigilant but also prudent, otherwise it can degenerate into mere sycophancy, into Famusovism.<sup>4</sup> Take psychology, even. Pavlov's reflexology proceeds entirely along the paths of dialectical materialism. It conclusively breaks down the wall between physiology and psychology. The simplest reflex is physiological, but a system of reflexes gives us 'conscious-



PAVLOV

*'Generalizations are won step by step: from the saliva of dogs to poetry . . .'*

ness'. The accumulation of physiological quantity gives a new 'psychological' quality. The method of Pavlov's school is experimental and painstaking. Generalizations are won step by step: from the saliva of dogs to poetry—that is, to the mental mechanics

4. From Famusov, a character in Griboyedov's play *The Folly of being Wise* (1824), a high official whose sole interest is in living up to his rank; he has a horror of anything that may give offence to authority and so disturb his comfortable situation. Trotsky here hits at people who rejected the work of Freud and his followers in a sweeping, indiscriminate way, not on scientific grounds but because they knew it was looked upon with disfavour by the party leadership.—Translator's note.

3. A reference to the 'populist' school, anti-scientific and disposed to idealize the peasantry, whom the Marxists had to dislodge from the leadership of the Russian revolutionary movement at the end of the 19th century.—Translator's note.

of poetry, not to its social content—though the paths that bring us to poetry have as yet not been revealed.

The school of the Viennese psycho-analyst Freud proceeds in a different way. It assumes in advance that the driving force of the most complex and delicate of psychic processes is a physiological need. In this general sense it is materialistic, if you leave aside the question whether it does not assign too big a place to the sexual factor at the expense of others, for this is already a dispute within the frontiers of materialism. But the psycho-analyst approaches the problems of consciousness not experimentally, going from the lowest phenomena to the highest, from the simple reflex to the complex reflex, but attempts to take all these intermediate stages in one jump, from above downwards, from the religious myth, the lyrical poem or the dream straight to the physiological basis of the psyche.

The idealists tell us that the psyche is an independent entity, that the 'soul' is a bottomless well. Both Pavlov and Freud think that the bottom of the 'soul' is physiology. But Pavlov, like a diver, descends to the bottom and laboriously investigates the well from there upwards; while Freud stands over the well and with penetrating gaze tries to pierce its ever-shifting and troubled waters and to make out

#### FREUD

*... from the religious myth, the lyrical poem or the dream straight to the physiological basis of the psyche.'*



or guess the shape of things down below. Pavlov's method is experiment, Freud's is conjecture, sometimes fantastic conjecture. The attempt to declare psycho-analysis 'incompatible' with Marxism and simply turns one's back on Freudism is too simple, or, more accurately, too simplistic. But we are in any case not obliged to adopt Freudism. It is a working hypothesis which can produce and undoubtedly does produce deductions and conjectures which proceed along the lines of materialist psychology. The experimental procedure will in due course provide the tests for these conjectures. But we have no grounds and no right to put a ban on the other

procedure which, even though it may be less reliable, yet tries to anticipate the conclusions to which the experimental procedure is advancing only very slowly.<sup>5</sup>

By means of these examples I wished to show, if only partially, both the heterogeneity of our scientific heritage and also the complexity of the paths by way of which the proletariat can advance to mastery of it. If it is true that in economic construction problems are not solved by decree and we have to 'learn to trade', so also in science the mere issuing of bald commands can achieve nothing but harm and disgrace. In this sphere we have to 'learn to learn'.

Art is one of the ways in which man finds his bearings in the world; in this sense the heritage of art is not distinguished from the heritage of science and technique—and it is no less contradictory than they. Unlike science, however, art is a form of cognition of the world not as a system of laws but as a group of images, and at the same time it is a way of inspiring certain feelings and moods. The art of past centuries has made man more complex and flexible, has raised his mentality to a higher level, has enriched him in an all-round way. This enrichment is a precious achievement of culture. Mastery of the art of the past is, therefore, a necessary pre-condition not only for the creation of new art but also for the building of the new society, for communism needs people with highly developed minds. Can, however, the art of the past enrich us with an artistic knowledge of the world? It can, precisely because it is able to give nourishment to our feelings and to educate them. If we were groundlessly to repudiate the art of the past, we should at once become poorer spiritually.

One notices nowadays a tendency here and there to put forward the idea that art has as its purpose only the inspiration of certain moods, and not at all the cognition of reality. The conclusion drawn from this is: with what sort of sentiments can the art of the nobility or of the bourgeoisie infect us? This is radically false. The significance of art as a means of cognition—including for the mass of the people, and in particular for them—is not at all less than its 'sentimental' significance. The ancient epic, the fable, the song, the traditional saying, the folk-rhyme provide knowledge in graphic form, they throw light on the past, they generalize experience, they widen the horizon, and only in connection with them and thanks to this connection is it possible to

5. This question has, of course, nothing in common with the cultivation of a sham Freudism as an erotic indulgence or piece of 'naughtiness'. Such claptrap has nothing to do with science and merely expresses decadent moods; the centre of gravity is shifted from the cortex to the spinal cord . . .—Note by Trotsky.

'tune in'. This applies to all literature generally, not only to epic poetry but to lyric poetry as well. It applies to painting and to sculpture. The only exception, to a certain degree, is music, the effect of which is powerful but one-sided! Music too, of course, relies upon a particular knowledge of nature, its sounds and rhythms. But here the knowledge is so deeply hidden, the results of the inspiration of nature are to such an extent refracted through a person's nerves, that music acts as a self-sufficing 'revelation'. Attempts to approximate all forms of art to music, as to the art of 'infection',<sup>6</sup> have often been made and have always signified a depreciation in art of the role of the intelligence in favour of formless feeling, and in this sense they were and are reactionary. . . . Worst of all, of course, are those works of 'art' which offer neither graphic knowledge nor artistic 'infection' but instead advance exorbitant pretensions. In our country no few such works are

6. Here Trotsky tilts at Tolstoy's ideas on art and their revival by Bukharin, in *Historical Materialism*.—Translator's note.

### 3. THE CONTRADICTIONS IN OUR CULTURE

#### Town and country

What is special about our position is that we—at the point where the capitalist West and the colonial-peasant East meet—have been the first to make a socialist revolution. The regime of proletarian dictatorship has been established first in a country with a monstrous inheritance of backwardness and barbarism, so that among our people whole centuries of history separate a Siberian nomad from a Moscow or Leningrad worker. Our social forms are transitional to socialism and consequently are beyond comparison higher than capitalist forms. In this sense we rightly consider ourselves the most advanced country in the world. But technique, which lies at the basis of material and every other kind of culture, is extremely backward in our country in comparison with the advanced capitalist countries. This constitutes the fundamental contradiction of our present reality. The historical task which follows from this is to raise our technique to the height of our social formation. If we do not succeed in doing this, our social order will inevitably decline to the level of our technical backwardness. Yes, in order to appreciate the entire significance of technical progress for us it is necessary to tell ourselves frankly: if we do not succeed in filling the Soviet forms of our social order with the appropriate productive technique we shall shut off the possibility of our transition to socialism and we shall be turned back to capitalism—and to what sort of capitalism: semi-serf, semi-colonial capitalism. The struggle for

printed, and, unfortunately, not in the students' books of art schools but in many thousands of copies. . . .


Culture is a social phenomenon. Just because of this, language, as the organ of intercourse between men, is its most important instrument. The culture of language itself is the most important condition for the growth of all branches of culture, especially science and art. Just as technique is not satisfied with the old measuring apparatus but is creating new ones, micrometers, voltmeters, and so on, striving for and attaining ever greater accuracy, so in the matter of language, of skill in choosing the appropriate words and combining them in the appropriate ways, constant, systematic, painstaking work is necessary in order to achieve the highest degree of accuracy, clarity and vividness. The foundation for this work must be the fight against illiteracy, semi-literacy and near-illiteracy. The next stage of this work is the mastering of Russian classical literature.

Yes, culture was the main instrument of class oppression. But it also, and only it, can become the instrument of socialist emancipation.

technique is for us the struggle for socialism, with which the whole future of our culture is bound up.

Here is a fresh and very expressive example of our cultural contradictions. There recently appeared in the papers a report that our Leningrad Public Library holds first place for the number of books: it now possesses 4,250,000 books! Our first feeling is a legitimate feeling of Soviet pride: our library is the first in the world! To what are we indebted for this achievement? To the fact that we have expropriated private libraries. Through nationalizing private property we have created a richer cultural institution, accessible to everyone. The great advantages of the Soviet order are indisputably shown in this simple fact. But at the same time our cultural backwardness is expressed in the fact that in

*'Fresh and very expressive example of our cultural contradictions.'*



## CULTURE AND SOCIALISM

our country the percentage of illiterates is greater than in any other European country. The library is the biggest in the world, but as yet only a minority of the population reads books. And that is how things are in almost every respect. Nationalized industry, with gigantic and far from fantastic schemes for Dnieprostroï, the Volga-Don canal and so on—and the peasants do their threshing with chains and rollers. Our marriage laws are permeated with the spirit of socialism—and physical violence still plays no small part in our family life. These and similar contradictions result from the entire structure of our culture, at the meeting-point of West and East.

The basis of our backwardness is the monstrous predominance of the country over the town, of agriculture over industry, while in the country itself, moreover, the most backward implements and modes of production predominate. When we speak of historical serfdom we above all have in mind estate-relations,<sup>7</sup> the bondage of the peasant to the landlord and the Tsarist official. But, comrades, serfdom has a deeper foundation under it: the bondage of man to the soil, the dependence of the peasant on the elements. Have you read Gleb Uspensky?<sup>8</sup> I fear that the younger generation do not read him. His works should be republished, or at least his best ones, and there are some splendid things among them. Uspensky was a Narodnik. His political programme was utopian through and through. But Uspensky, a writer about the morals and manners of country life, was not only a splendid artist but also a remarkable realist. He was able to appreciate the peasant's way of life and his mentality as derived phenomena, which had developed on an economic basis and were wholly determined by it. He was able to appreciate that the economic basis of the countryside was the bondage of the peasant in his labour-process to the soil and in general to the forces of nature. You should certainly read at least his *Power of the Land*. With Uspensky an artist's intuition takes the place of Marxist method, and in its results it in many respects rivals the latter. For this reason Uspensky the artist was constantly engaged in mortal conflict with Uspensky the Narodnik. From the artist we must still learn, even now, if we want to understand the many survivals of serfdom in peasant life, especially in family life, which often slop over into urban life as well; it is enough to listen to certain notes which are being sounded in the current discussion about problems of the marriage laws!

Capitalism has throughout the world brought to extreme tension the contradiction between industry

7. i.e., relations between different 'estates', social groups with different legal status and rights.—Translator's note.

8. Russian writer of the 1870s and 1880s.—Translator's note.

*'... the use of machines on a large scale and in the right combination.'*



and agriculture, town and country. In Russia, owing to the lag in our historical development, this contradiction is quite monstrous in character. After all, our industry had already begun to strive to imitate West-European and American models, while our countryside remained in the depths of the 17th century and even more remote times. Even in America capitalism has proved obviously unable to raise agriculture to the level of industry. This is a task which has entirely passed to socialism's responsibility. In our conditions, with the colossal predominance of country over town, the industrialization of agriculture is the most important sector of socialist construction.

By the industrialization of agriculture we mean two processes which only in combination can, in the last analysis, finally wipe out the frontier between town and country. Let us dwell a little longer on this question which is so important for us.

The industrialization of agriculture consists, on the one hand, in the separation from the rural household economy of a whole series of branches of the preliminary processing of industrial raw material and foodstuffs. All industry in general has emerged from the countryside, through the handicrafts and the work of the village craftsman, through the detachment of particular branches from the closed-in system of domestic economy, through specialization, the creation of the appropriate apprenticeship and technique, and later also machine production. Our Soviet industrialization must, to a considerable extent, proceed along this path, the path of the socialization of a whole series of production processes which lie between agriculture in the strict sense of the word and industry. The example of the United States shows that here immeasurable possibilities are open to us.

But the question is not exhausted by that. The overcoming of the contradiction between agriculture and industry presupposes the industrialization of arable and pastoral farming, horticulture and so on. It means that these branches of production too must be placed on a basis of scientific technology: the use of machines on a large scale and in the right combination, tractorization and electrification, proper rotation of crops, laboratory testing of methods and results, correct organization of the whole production process with the most expedient use of labour power, and so on. Of course, even highly-organized cultivation will differ from engineering. But for that matter there are profound differences within industry itself, between different branches. If today we have the right to counterpose agriculture to industry as a whole, this is because agriculture is carried on in scattered units by primitive methods, with servile dependence of the producer on natural conditions and in circumstances of an extremely uncivilized way of living for the peasants.

It is not enough to socialize, that is, to transfer to factories, particular branches of present-day agriculture, such as butter-making, cheese-making, the production of starch and molasses, and so on. It is necessary to socialize agriculture itself, that is, to wrest it from its present parcellization and in place of the present wretched pecking at the soil to set up scientifically-organized wheat and rye 'factories', cattle and sheep 'factories' and so on. That this is possible is shown in part by the capitalist experience already available, in particular the agricultural experience of Denmark, where even the chickens are subjected to planning and standardization, laying eggs to order in huge quantities, of uniform size and colour.

The industrialization of agriculture means the elimination of the present fundamental contradiction between town and country and so between peasant and worker: as regards their role in the country's economy, their living conditions, their cultural level, they must come closer together in proportion as the frontier between them disappears. A society in which mechanized cultivation forms an equal part of the planned economy, in which the town has absorbed into itself the advantages of the country (spaciousness, greenery) while the country has been enriched with the advantage of the town (paved roads, electric light, piped water-supply, drains), that is to say, where the antithesis of town and country has itself disappeared, where the peasant and the worker have been transformed into participants of equal worth and equal rights in a single production process—such a society will also be a genuine socialist society.

The road to this society is long and hard. The most important landmarks along this road are mighty electric power stations. They will bring to the country light and transforming power: against the power of the land, the power of electricity!

Not long ago we opened the Shatura power station, one of our best constructions, erected on a peat-bog. From Moscow to Shatura is only about a hundred kilometres. You might say the two places could shake hands. And yet what a difference in conditions! Moscow is the capital of the Communist International. But you go a few dozen kilometres and you are in the backwoods, with snow-laden fir trees, frozen marshes and wild beasts. Dark hamlets of log-huts dozing under the snow. From the carriage window you can sometimes see the tracks of wolves. Where the Shatura station stands today, a few years ago, when they began construction work there, elks had their homes. Today the distance between Moscow and Shatura is covered by an elegant series of metal masts which carry the cable for a current of 115,000 volts. And under these masts vixens and she-wolves will this spring bring forth their cubs. That is what our

entire culture is like—made up of extreme contradictions, of the highest achievements of technique and generalizing thought, on the one hand, and on the other of the primeval conditions of the taiga.<sup>9</sup>

Shatura lives on peat, as though on pasture. Truly, all the wonders created by the childish imaginings of religion and even the creative fantasy of poets pale before this simple fact: machines which occupy very little space are eating up an age-old bog, transforming it into invisible power and returning it along light-weight cables to that very industry which created and set up these machines.

Shatura is a thing of beauty. Gifted and devoted builders made it. Its beauty is not put on, is not an affair of tinsel decoration, but grows from the inherent properties and needs of technique itself. The highest and the only criterion of technique is fitness for purpose. The test of functional fitness is provided by saving. And this presupposes the most complete correspondence between part and whole, means and end. Economic and technical criteria fully coincide with aesthetic ones. One may say, and it will not be a paradox, that Shatura is a thing of beauty because a kilowatt-hour of its


power is cheaper than a kilowatt-hour of power from other stations situated in similar conditions.

Shatura stands on a bog. We have many bogs in the Soviet Union, very many more than we have power stations. We have also many other kinds of fuel which await transformation into motive power. In the south the Dnieper flows through a very rich industrial area, spending the mighty force of its head of water to no purpose, bounding over age-old rapids, and waiting for us to bridle its flow with a dam and compel it to give light, motion, wealth to towns, factories and fields. Let us compel it!

In the United States of America they generate 500 kilowatt-hours of power per head of population every year, while here we generate only 20 kilowatt-hours, that is, one-twenty-fifth as much. Mechanical motive power in general is only one-fiftieth as much per person here as in the United States. The Soviet system shod with American technique will be socialism. Our social order offers a different, incomparably more expedient application for American technique. But American technique for its part will transform our order, liberating it from the heritage of backwardness, primitiveness and barbarism. From the combination of the Soviet order with American technique there will be born a new technique and a new culture—technique and culture for all, without favourite sons or stepsons.

9. The dense forests of North Russia, between the tundra and the steppe.—Translator's note.

*'The most important landmarks along this road are mighty electric power stations.'*



## The 'conveyor' principle of socialist economy

The principle of socialist economy is harmony, that is, continuity based on inner concord. What is the conveyor? An endless moving belt which brings to the worker or takes from him everything required by the course of his work. It is now well known how Ford uses a combination of conveyors as a means of internal transport: transmission and supply. But the conveyor is something bigger than that: it constitutes a method of regulating the production process itself, in that the worker is obliged to harmonize his movements with the movement of the endless belt. Capitalism uses this circumstance for higher and perfected exploitation of the worker. But this use of the conveyor is connected with capitalism, not with the conveyor itself. In which direction is the development of methods of regulating labour in fact proceeding: in the direction of piece-work or in the direction of the conveyor method? Everything points to the conveyor. Piece-work, like every other form of individual control over work, is characteristic of capitalism in the first epochs of its development. This procedure ensures the maximum physiological loading of each individual worker but not the co-ordination of the efforts of different workers. Both of these tasks are accomplished automatically by the conveyor. A socialist organization of the economy must endeavour to bring about a reduction in the physiological load on each individual worker, in accordance with the growth in technical power, while safeguarding at the same time the co-ordination of the efforts of different workers. This will be the significance of the socialist conveyor as distinct from the capitalist one. Speaking more concretely, the whole problem here consists in regulating the movement of the belt in accordance with a given number of working hours, or, contrariwise, in regulating working time in accordance with a given speed of the belt.

Under the capitalist system the conveyor is used within the confines of an individual enterprise as a method of internal transport. But the principle of the conveyor is in itself very much broader. Each separate enterprise receives from outside raw material, fuel, auxiliary materials, supplementary labour-power. The relations between the separate enterprises, however gigantic they may be, are regulated by the laws of the market—limited, to be sure, in many instances, by all sorts of long-term agreements. But every factory taken separately, and still more society as a whole, is interested in raw material being supplied in good time, not accumulating wastefully in the stores, but also not causing stoppages in production, that is, in other words, it is interested in this material being supplied on the conveyor principle, in complete accord with the rhythm of production. For this there is no need



Early Soviet poster

['Let us take the storm of the Revolution in Soviet Russia, unite it to the pulse of American life, and do our work like a chronometer!']

to imagine a conveyor necessarily in the form of an endless moving belt. The forms of the conveyor can be endlessly varied. A railway, if it is working to plan, that is, without cross-hauls, without seasonal piling up of loads, in short, without elements of capitalist anarchy—and under socialism that is just how it will work—is like a mighty conveyor, ensuring the service of factories in good time with raw material, fuel, materials and personnel. The same applies to steamships, lorries, etc. All kinds of means of communication form elements of transport within the production-system from the point of view of the planned economy as a whole. An oil pipe-line is a form of conveyor for liquids. The wider the network of oil pipe-lines the less need there is for reservoirs, the less oil is transformed into dead capital.

The conveyor system does not at all presuppose that enterprises are located very close together. On the contrary, modern technique makes it possible to scatter them, not, of course, in chaotic and casual fashion, but strictly taking into account the most



advantageous location for each separate factory. The possibility of a wide scattering of industrial enterprises, without which the town cannot be dissolved in the country or the country in the town, is ensured to a very great degree by the use of electricity as motive power. A metal cable is the most perfect conveyor of power, making it possible to divide motive power into the smallest of units, setting it to work and switching it off by merely turning a knob. It is precisely by these characteristics which it possesses that the power 'conveyor' clashes most sharply with the partitions erected by private property. Electricity at its present level of development is the most 'socialist' sector of technique; and no wonder, for it is the most advanced sector.

Gigantic land-improvement systems, for the in-draught or drainage of water, constitute, from this standpoint, the water conveyors of agriculture. The more completely chemistry, engineering and electrification liberate cultivation from the effects of the elements, giving it the highest degree of planned regularity, the more completely will present-day agriculture be included within the system of the socialist conveyor which regulates and co-ordinates the whole of production, beginning with the subsoil (extraction of ore and coal) and the soil (ploughing and sowing).

Old man Ford tries to build a sort of social philosophy upon his experience with the conveyor. In this attempt of his we see an extremely curious combination of experience on an exceptionally large scale in the field of production management with the insufferable narrowness of a smug philosopher who has become a multi-millionaire while remaining merely a petty-bourgeois with a lot of money. Ford says: 'if you want wealth for yourself and well-being for your fellow-citizens, act like me.' Kant demanded that everyone should act in such a way that his conduct could serve as the norm for others. In the philosophical sense Ford is a Kantian. But in practice the 'norm' for Ford's 200,000 workers is not Ford's conduct but the gliding past them of his automatic conveyor: it determines the rhythm of their lives, the movement of their hands, feet and thoughts. For 'the well-being of your fellow-citizens' it is necessary to separate Fordism from Ford and to socialize and purge it. This is what socialism does.

'But what about the monotony of labour, de-personalized, and despiritualized by the conveyor?' I am asked in one of the written questions sent up.

### The cultural revolution

It is now, I think, clear to everybody that the creation of a new culture is not an independent task to be carried out separately from our economic work

This is not a serious fear. If you think and discuss it through to the end, it is directed against the division of labour and against machinery in general. This is a reactionary path. Socialism and hostility to machinery have never had and never will have anything in common. The fundamental, main and most important task is to abolish poverty. It is necessary that human labour shall produce the maximum possible quantity of goods. Grain, shoes, clothing, newspapers, everything that is necessary must be made available in such quantities that no one may fear that there will not be enough. Poverty must be abolished, and with it, greed. Prosperity and leisure must be won, and with them the joy of living, for everyone. A high productivity of labour cannot be achieved without mechanization and automation, the finished expression of which is the conveyor. The monotony of labour is compensated for by its reduced duration and its increased easiness. There will always be in society branches of industry which demand personal creativity, and those who find their calling in production will make their way to them. What we are concerned with here is the basic type of production in its most important branches, until at least a fresh chemical and power revolution in technique sweeps aside mechanization as we know it today. But it is for the future to worry about that. A voyage in a boat propelled by oars demands great personal creativity. A voyage in a steamboat is more 'monotonous' but more comfortable and more certain. Moreover, you can't cross the ocean in a rowing-boat anyway. And we have to cross the ocean of human need.

Everyone knows that physical requirements are very much more limited than spiritual ones. An excessive gratification of physical requirements quickly leads to satiety. Spiritual requirements, however, know no frontiers. But in order that spiritual requirements may flourish it is necessary that physical requirements be fully satisfied. We cannot, of course, put off and we do not put off the struggle to raise the spiritual level of the masses until we have got rid of unemployment, the problems of waifs and strays, and poverty. Everything that can be done must be done. But it would be a miserable and contemptible daydream to imagine that we can create a truly new culture before we have ensured *prosperity, plenty and leisure for the masses*. We must and will test our progress by its reflection in the everyday life of the workers and peasants.

and our social and cultural construction as a whole. Does trade belong to the sphere of 'proletarian culture'? From the abstract standpoint one would

have to answer this question in the negative. But the abstract standpoint is valueless. In the transitional epoch, and especially in its initial stage in which we now are, products assume, and will continue for a long time yet to assume, the social form of *commodities*. And we have to know how to deal properly with commodities, that is, to know how to buy them and sell them. Unless we do, we shall not advance from the initial stage to the next stage. Lenin told us to learn to trade, and recommended us to learn from the examples provided by West-European culture. Trading culture forms, as we now realize very firmly, a most important part of the culture of the transitional period. Whether we should call the trading culture of the workers' state and the co-operatives 'proletarian culture' I don't know; but that it is a step towards Socialist Culture is beyond dispute.

When Lenin spoke of the cultural revolution he saw its fundamental content as raising the cultural level of the masses. The metric system is a product of bourgeois science. But teaching this simple system of measurement to a hundred millions of peasants means carrying out a big revolutionary-cultural task. It is almost certain that we shall not achieve it without the aid of tractors and electric power. At the foundation of culture lies technique. The decisive instrument in the cultural revolution must be a revolution in technique.

In relation to capitalism we say that the development of the productive forces is pressing against the social forms of the bourgeois state and bourgeois property. Having accomplished the proletarian revolution we say: the development of the social forms is pressing against the development of the productive forces, that is, technique. The big link by seizing which we can carry through the cultural revolution is the link of industrialization, and not literature or philosophy at all. I hope that these words will not be understood in the sense of an unfriendly or disrespectful attitude to philosophy and poetry. Without generalizing thought and without art man's life would be bare and beggarly. But that is just what the life of millions of people is to an enormous extent at the present time. The cultural revolution must consist in opening up to them the possibility of real access to culture and not only to its wretched fag-ends. But this is impossible without creating very big material pre-conditions. That is why a machine which automatically manufactures bottles is at the present time a first-rate

factor in the cultural revolution, while an heroic poem is only a tenth-rate factor.

Marx said once about philosophers that they had interpreted the world sufficiently, the task was to turn it upside down. There was no disesteem for philosophy in those words of his. Marx was himself one of the greatest philosophers of all time. These words meant only that the further development of philosophy, as of all culture in general, both material and spiritual, requires a revolution in social relations. And so Marx appealed from philosophy to the proletarian revolution, not against philosophy but on its behalf. In this same sense we can now say: it is good when poets sing of the revolution and the proletariat, but a powerful turbine sings even better. We have plenty of songs of middling quality, which have remained the property of small circles, but we have terribly few turbines. I don't wish to imply by this that mediocre verses hinder the appearance of turbines. No, that cannot be said at all. But a correct orientation of public opinion, that is, an understanding of the real relationship between phenomena, the how and why of things, is absolutely necessary. The cultural revolution must not be understood in a superficially idealistic way or as something which is an affair for small study-groups. It is a question of changing the conditions of life, the methods of work and the everyday habits of a great nation, of a whole family of nations. Only a mighty tractor system which for the first time in history will enable the peasant to straighten his back; only a glass-blowing machine which produces hundreds of bottles and liberates the lungs of the old-time glass-blower; only a turbine of dozens and hundreds of thousands horse-power; only an aeroplane available to everyone—only all these things together will ensure the cultural revolution, not for a minority but for all. And only such a cultural revolution will deserve the name. Only on that basis will a new philosophy and a new art come to flower.

Marx said: 'The ruling ideas of an epoch are essentially the ideas of the ruling class of that epoch.' This is true also in relation to the proletariat, but quite differently from what it means in relation to other classes. The bourgeoisie, when it had seized power, tried to perpetuate this power. All its culture was adapted to this purpose. The proletariat, having taken power, must unquestionably try to shorten as much as possible the duration of its rule, to bring nearer the classless socialist society.

### The culture of morals

To trade in a cultured way means, in particular, not to deceive, that is, to break with our national tradition in trading matters: 'if you don't deceive you won't sell'.

Lying, deceit, this is not merely an individual sin

but a function of the social order. Lying is a method of struggle and, consequently, is derived from the contradiction between interests. The fundamental contradictions result from relations between classes. True, one can say that deceit is

older than class society. Animals already show cunning and deceive others in the struggle for existence. A considerable part was played by deceit—military cunning—in the life of primitive tribes. This sort of deceit resulted more or less directly from the zoological struggle for existence. But from the time when 'civilized', that is, class society appeared, lying became frightfully complicated, it became a social function, was refracted along class lines and also entered into the corpus of human 'culture'. That, however, is a part of culture which socialism will not take over. Relations in socialist society, that is, the higher development of socialist society, will be thoroughly transparent and will not require such auxiliary methods as deceit, lies, falsification, forgery, treachery and perfidy.

However, we are still a long way from that. In our relationships and morals there are still very many lies of both serf-owning and bourgeois origin. The highest expression of serf-owning ideology is religion. The internal relations of feudal-monarchical society were based on blind tradition and were elevated into the form of religious myths. A myth is an imagined, false interpretation of natural phenomena and social institutions and the connections between them. However, not only the deceived, that is, the oppressed masses, but also those in whose name the deception was carried out, the rulers, mostly believed in the myth, and were honestly guided by it. An objectively false ideology, woven out of superstitions, does not in itself necessarily mean subjective mendacity. Only in proportion as social relations become more complicated, that is, as the bourgeois order develops and religious mythology comes into ever-greater contradiction with it, does religion become a source of greater and greater trickery and deliberate deception.

Developed bourgeois ideology is rationalistic and directed against mythology. The radical bourgeoisie tried to get on without religion and to build a state upon reason, not tradition. This was expressed in democracy with its principles of liberty, equality and fraternity. Capitalist economy created, however, a monstrous contradiction between everyday reality and democratic principles. In order to make up for these contradictions higher-grade lying was needed. Nowhere is there such political lying as in bourgeois democracies. This is now not the objective 'lying' of mythology, but consciously organized deception of the people by means of a combination of methods of exceptional complexity. The technique of lying is cultivated no less than the technique of electricity. The most lying press is found in the most 'developed' democracies, in France and the United States.

But at the same time, and this must be frankly admitted, in France they trade more honestly than here, and at all events with incomparably more attention to the customer's requirements. Having attained a certain level of prosperity, the bourgeoisie renounces swindling methods of primary accumula-

tion, not from any abstract moral notions but for material reasons: petty deceit, counterfeiting, grabbing, do harm to the reputation of an enterprise and undermine its future prospects. The principles of 'honest' trade, derived from the interests of trade itself at a certain level of its development, enter into morals, become 'moral' rules, and are watched over by public opinion. True, the imperialist war brought colossal changes in this sphere too, throwing Western Europe a long way back. But the post-war 'stabilization' efforts of capitalism have overcome the more malignant manifestations of the reversion to savagery in trade. In any case, if you take our Soviet trade in its total scope, that is, from the factory to the consumer in the remote village, then you will have to recognize that we still trade in an incomparably less cultured way than the advanced capitalist countries. This results from our poverty, from the insufficient supply of goods, from our economic and cultural backwardness.

The regime of proletarian dictatorship is irreconcilably hostile both to the objectively false mythology of the Middle Ages and to the conscious falsity of capitalist democracy. The revolutionary regime is vitally interested in laying bare social relations, not in covering them up. This means that it is interested in political truthfulness, in saying what is. But one must not forget that the regime of revolutionary dictatorship is a transitional regime and therefore a contradictory one. The existence of powerful enemies obliges us to resort to military cunning, and cunning is inseparable from falsehood. It is only necessary that the cunning used in the struggle against foes be not employed for the deluding of one's own people, that is, of the working masses and their party. This is a fundamental requirement of revolutionary policy, which runs like a red thread through all of Lenin's work.

But while our new state and social forms create the possibility and necessity of a higher degree of truthfulness than has hitherto been attained in relations between rulers and ruled, this cannot at all be said as yet about our relationships in everyday life, on which our economic and cultural backwardness and in general the entire heritage of the past continue to weigh very heavily. We live much better than we did in 1920. But the lack of the necessary good things of life still sets its mark heavily on our life and on our morals, and will continue to do so for a number of years. From this result contradictions big and small, big and small disproportions, struggle connected with these contradictions and, connected with this struggle, cunning, lies, deceit. There is only one way out: raising the level of technique, in both production and trade. A correct orientation in this direction must already in itself help to improve 'morals'. The interaction of improved technique and morals will advance us along the road to a social order of civilized co-operators, that is, to socialist culture.

# Art and Revolution

THE following manifesto appeared in the New York *Partisan Review*<sup>1</sup> for autumn 1938 over the signatures of the French writer, André Breton, and the Mexican painter, Diego Rivera. André Breton has since revealed (in *La Clé des Champs*, Paris, 1953) that the document was in fact drawn up in collaboration with L. D. Trotsky during a visit which Breton made to him in 1938. It develops ideas which are briefly touched upon in Trotsky's 'Art and Politics in Our Epoch' (*Fourth International*, March-April 1950), where he wrote: 'A revolutionary party is neither able nor willing to take upon itself the task of "leading" and even less of commanding art, either

before or after the conquest of power. Such a pretension could only enter the head of a bureaucracy—ignorant and impudent, intoxicated with its totalitarian power—which has become the antithesis of the proletarian revolution. Art, like science, not only does not seek orders but by its very essence cannot tolerate them.'

Early adumbrations of the ideas in the manifesto will be found in Trotsky's *Literature and Revolution* (English edition 1924, reprinted 1957) and his address to the Mendeleyev Congress of 1925 (available as a pamphlet, *Marxism and Science*, from the Lanka Sama Samaja Party, Ceylon).

## Manifesto: towards a free Revolutionary Art

We can say without exaggeration that never has civilization been menaced so seriously as today. The Vandals, with instruments which were barbarous, and so comparatively ineffective, blotted out the culture of antiquity in one corner of Europe. But today we see world civilization, united in its historic destiny, reeling under the blows of reactionary forces armed with the entire arsenal of modern technology. We are by no means thinking only of the world war that draws near. Even in times of 'peace' the position of art and science has become absolutely intolerable.

Insofar as it originates with an individual, insofar as it brings into play subjective talents to create something which brings about an objective enriching of culture, any philosophical, sociological, scientific or artistic discovery seems to be the fruit of a precious *chance*, that is to say, the manifestation, more or less spontaneous, of *necessity*. Such

creations cannot be slighted, whether from the standpoint of general knowledge (which interprets the existing world), or of revolutionary knowledge (which, the better to change the world, requires an exact analysis of the laws which govern its movement). Specifically, we cannot remain indifferent to the intellectual conditions under which creative activity takes place, nor should we fail to pay all respect to those particular laws which govern intellectual creation.

In the contemporary world we must recognize the ever more widespread destruction of those conditions under which intellectual creation is possible. From this follows of necessity an increasingly manifest degradation not only of the work of art but also of the specifically 'artistic' personality. The régime of Hitler, now that it has rid Germany of all those artists whose work expressed the slightest sympathy for liberty, however superficial, has reduced those who still consent to take up pen or brush to the status of domestic servants of the régime, whose task it is to glorify it on order, according to the worst

1. It was reprinted in the London *Workers' International News* of April 1939.

possible aesthetic conventions. If reports may be believed it is the same in the Soviet Union, where Thermidorean reaction is now reaching its climax.

It goes without saying that we do not identify ourselves with the currently fashionable catchword: 'Neither fascism nor communism!' a shibboleth which suits the temperament of the Philistine, conservative and frightened, clinging to the tattered remnants of the 'democratic' past. True art, which is not content to play variations on ready-made models but rather insists on expressing the inner needs of man and of mankind in its time—true art is unable *not* to be revolutionary, *not* to aspire to a complete and radical reconstruction of society. This it must do, were it only to deliver intellectual creation from the chains which bind it, and to allow all mankind to raise itself to those heights which only isolated geniuses have achieved in the past. We recognize that only the social revolution can sweep clean the path for a new culture. If, however, we reject all solidarity with the bureaucracy now in control of the Soviet Union, it is precisely because, in our eyes, it represents, not communism, but its most treacherous and dangerous enemy.

The totalitarian régime of the USSR, working through the so-called 'cultural' organization it controls in other countries, has spread over the entire world a deep twilight hostile to every sort of spiritual value. A twilight of filth and blood in which, disguised as intellectuals and artists, those men steep themselves who have made of servility a career, of lying for pay a custom, and of the palliation of crime a source of pleasure. The official art of Stalinism mirrors with a blatancy unexampled in history their efforts to put a good face on their mercenary profession.

The repugnance which this shameful negation of principles of art inspires in the artistic world—a negation which even slave states have never dared to carry so far—should give rise to an active, uncompromising condemnation. The *opposition* of writers and artists is one of the forces which can usefully contribute to the discrediting and overthrow of régimes which are destroying, along with the right of the proletariat to aspire to a better world, every sentiment of nobility and even of human dignity.

The communist revolution is not afraid of art. It realizes that the role of the artist in a decadent capitalist society is determined by the conflict between the individual and various social forms which are hostile to him. This fact alone, insofar as he is conscious of it, makes the artist the natural ally of revolution. The process of *sublimation*, which here comes into play and which psychoanalysis has analysed, tries to restore the broken equilibrium between the integral 'ego' and the outside elements it rejects. This restoration works to the advantage of the 'ideal of self', which marshals against the

unbearable present reality all those powers of the interior world, of the 'self', which are *common to all men* and which are constantly flowering and developing. The need for emancipation felt by the individual spirit has only to follow its natural course to be led to mingle its stream with this primeval necessity—the need for the emancipation of man.

The conception of the writer's function which the young Marx worked out is worth recalling. 'The writer,' he declared, 'naturally must make money in order to live and write, but he should not under any circumstances live and write in order to make money. . . . The writer by no means looks on his work as a *means*. It is *an end in itself* and so little a means in the eyes of himself and of others that if necessary he sacrifices his existence to the existence of his work. . . . *The first condition of the freedom of the press is that it is not a business activity.*'<sup>2</sup> It is more than ever fitting to use this statement against those who would regiment intellectual activity in the direction of ends foreign to itself, and prescribe, in the guise of so-called 'reasons of State', the themes of art. The free choice of these themes and the absence of all restrictions on the range of his exploitations—these are possessions which the artist has a right to claim as inalienable. In the realm of artistic creation, the imagination must escape from all constraint and must under no pretext allow itself to be placed under bonds. To those who urge us, whether for today or for tomorrow, to consent that art should submit to a discipline which we hold to be radically incompatible with its nature, we give a flat refusal and we repeat our deliberate intention of standing by the formula *complete freedom for art*.

We recognize, of course, that the revolutionary State has the right to defend itself against the counter-attack of the bourgeoisie, even when this drapes itself in the flag of science or art. But there is an abyss between these enforced and temporary measures of revolutionary self-defence and the pretension to lay commands on intellectual creation. If, for the better development of the forces of material production, the revolution must build a *socialist* régime with centralized control, to develop intellectual creation an *anarchist* régime of individual liberty should from the first be established. No authority, no dictation, not the least trace of orders from above! Only on a base of friendly co-operation, without constraint from outside, will it be possible for scholars and artists to carry out their tasks, which will be more far-reaching than ever before in history.

It should be clear by now that in defending free-

2. Marx, 'The Debates on Freedom of the Press in the Rhineland Diet', *Rheinische Zeitung*, May 19, 1842.—LABOUR REVIEW editors.

dom of thought we have no intention of justifying political indifference, and that it is far from our wish to revive a so-called 'pure' art which generally serves the extremely impure ends of reaction. No, our conception of the role of art is too high to refuse it an influence on the fate of society. We believe that the supreme task of art in our epoch is to take part actively and consciously in the preparation of the revolution. But the artist cannot serve the struggle for freedom unless he subjectively assimilates its social content, unless he feels in his very nerves its meaning and drama and freely seeks to give his own inner world incarnation in his art.

In the present period of the death agony of capitalism, democratic as well as fascist, the artist sees himself threatened with the loss of his right to live and continue working. He sees all avenues of communication choked with the débris of capitalist collapse. Only naturally, he turns to the Stalinist organizations which hold out the possibility of escaping from his isolation. But if he is to avoid complete demoralization, he cannot remain there, because of the impossibility of delivering his own message and the degrading servility which these organizations exact from him in exchange for certain material advantages. He must understand that his place is elsewhere, not among those who betray the cause of the revolution and mankind, but among those who with unshaken fidelity bear witness to the revolution, among those who, for this reason, are alone able to bring it to fruition, and along with it the ultimate free expression of all forms of human genius.

The aim of this appeal is to find a common ground on which may be reunited all revolutionary writers and artists, the better to serve the revolution by their art and to defend the liberty of that art itself against the usurpers of the revolution. We believe that aesthetic, philosophical and political tendencies of the most varied sort can find here a common ground. Marxists can march here hand in hand with anarchists, provided both parties uncompromisingly reject the reactionary police patrol spirit represented

by Joseph Stalin and by his henchman Garcia Oliver.<sup>3</sup>

We know very well that thousands on thousands of isolated thinkers and artists are today scattered throughout the world, their voices drowned out by the loud choruses of well-disciplined liars. Hundreds of small local magazines are trying to gather youthful forces about them, seeking new paths and not subsidies. Every progressive tendency in art is destroyed by fascism as 'degenerate'. Every free creation is called 'fascist' by the Stalinists. Independent revolutionary art must now gather its forces for the struggle against reactionary persecution. It must proclaim aloud the right to exist. Such a union of forces is the aim of the *International Federation of Independent Revolutionary Art* which we believe it is now necessary to form.

We by no means insist on every idea put forth in this manifesto, which we ourselves consider only a first step in the new direction. We urge every friend and defender of art, who cannot but realize the necessity for this appeal, to make himself heard at once. We address the same appeal to all those publications of the left wing which are ready to participate in the creation of the International Federation and to consider its task and its methods of action.

When a preliminary international contact has been established through the press and by correspondence, we will proceed to the organization of local and national congresses on a modest scale. The final step will be the assembly of a world congress which will officially mark the foundation of the International Federation.

Our aims:

The independence of art—for the revolution.

The revolution—for the complete liberation of art!

ANDRE BRETON  
DIEGO RIVERA

Translated for *Partisan Review*  
by Dwight Macdonald

3. Leader of the Anarchists in Spain, collaborating with the Spanish Stalinists in strangling the revolution and rendering inevitable the victory of Franco.—LABOUR REVIEW editors.

## Book Reviews

### Revisionism and history

**A History of the Southern Confederacy.** By Clement Eaton. Collier Books, New York, 11s. 6d.

Mr. Clement Eaton follows the aptly named 'revisionist' school of interpretation of the American Civil War.

To Marxists, who contended that the Civil War was the inevitable outcome of a conflict between two different systems of economic production, writers of this school who first emerged during the 1940s ventured to point out that economics really only constituted a minor factor of historical causation. The real cause of the wars and revolutions of the past was simply that on particular occasions people were extremely rude to each other, politicians blundered and were tactless, agitators spread their ill-feeling and 'stirred up the people', and then, being driven on and excited by 'a wave of emotionalism', everybody unfortunately lost control of themselves. It followed on from this that readers should respect and revere 'the democratic process', never lose control of themselves, and cultivate the 'sensible perspective' of 'reasonable men'.

The above summary is no exaggeration. J. G. Randall, the classic spokesman of the doctrine and clearly a theoretical ancestor of Mr. Eaton, writes that if he were to select one word or phrase to account for the war, it would not be 'economics' and 'class struggle' but 'misunderstanding'

or even better 'fanaticism'. For him history is driven by suspended 'states of emotion' that swoop on influential individuals from time to time. Pointing to the title of his work he explains that the whole catastrophe was the fault of 'The Blundering Generation' and the abnormal 'incompetence' and 'irresponsibility' of the politicians and agitators of the 1860s. Then with some pride he presents his solution. Now that 'individual processes and behaviour have been elaborately studied' (?) a 'psychiatry of a nation' must be immediately developed and applied to prevent such further misunderstanding and social upheaval.

It is surprising that now nearly 30 years later this particular reactionary line should still be considered up-to-date by even the most obtuse idealist. But Mr. Eaton is undeterred by time and is an idealist, and what is worse a very crude one, when he treats of the second revolution in American history. Economics was of some relevance, he concedes, but we are only to mention this in passing. He himself is more interested in playing variations on the old theme weaving 'emotionalism' . . . 'popular hysteria' . . . 'emotional unbalance' . . . 'a high state of emotionalism' . . . and 'an inflamed state of feeling' into paragraph after paragraph, sometimes at full volume, sometimes by a sneaking implication. The point about all this 'emotional chasm' is that it completely evades any real analysis.

With regard to the inevitability of force Mr. Eaton could well have

taken note of William H. Seward's speech of 1860 which dealt a blow to the illusions of the conciliationists and reformists of his time. Here the Northern industrial and commercial bourgeoisie speaks vividly through one of its individuals. Seward speaks a concrete language. For him ex-president James Buchanan (Democrat) was and is a confessed apologist of the slave-owning property class. And with people who hope that slave-owners might reform themselves Seward is straight to the point. 'How long and with what success have you waited already for that reformation? Did any property-class ever so reform itself? Did the patricians of old Rome, the noblesse or clergy in France? The landholders in Ireland? The landed aristocracy in England? Does the slaveholding class even seek to beguile you with such a hope? Has it not become rapacious, arrogant, defiant?'

The bulk of Mr. Eaton's book is devoted to the struggle of the disintegrated slaveocracy during the war. Many statesmen are found to have been unusually irresponsible as well as speculators of 'the wealthier class' who made large profits by holding wheat and corn to raise its price. There are detailed chapters on the lack of a centralized agency, on transportation, on the intelligence service, and on the conditions of the Confederate soldiers—their lack of shoes, clothing, food and medical supplies. Military movements and techniques of fighting are quite graphically described. And the organization of the Southern workers,

their strike action for higher pay, and the general complaint that it was a 'rich man's war and a poor man's fight' receives some (though very superficial) attention. The short portraits of the Southern generals Robert E. Lee, 'Stonewall' Jackson, Bragg and Beauregard and the descriptions of their general strategy make interesting reading. Even a bad book can be informative.

Sometimes, Mr. Eaton's view of the 'glamour of a soldier's life', his sentimentalization, his reactionism and hero-worship burst into verbal bloom. Writing of Forrest, he rounds off: 'Twenty-nine horses were shot from under him, but he lived to become the Grand Wizard of the Ku-Klux-Klan.'

The material on conference diplomacy is of interest, if analyzed in terms of the relations between different ruling classes in crisis. On the level of fact the chapter on naval power is informative. The analysis of the South's 'economic disintegration' is, as one might expect, almost totally in terms of taxes. The finale of the book entitled 'The Sunset of the Confederacy' brings out the author's worst. He must conclude with a requiem for the 'lost cause' and the 'ghost of the confederate dead'.

That the Civil War laid the foundations and greatly extended the scope of the capitalist system, such a perspective of the historical process is not within Mr. Clement Eaton's ken. While considering himself not a sentimental man, he secretly finds in the overthrow of the slave-holding feudal planter class something of a sad but beautiful story, impregnated with the rich colours of romance. **G.L.**

## Science in history

**Francis Bacon—Philosopher of Industrial Science.** By Benjamin Farrington.

**James Watt and the History of Steam Power.** By Ivor B. Hart. Collier Books, New York (paperback), 1961, 7s. 6d.

One of the most important features of human society in the second half of the 20th century is that natural science has become one of the basic means of production. This opens up the possibility of creating the material base for a classless society, but it also

produces new problems for us, not least in the assessment of the changes in the mode of production which will come from this change in the technology.

If we had enough history of technology, we could possibly get real guidance from it, for history is only an explicit rendering of the accumulated experience of mankind. Unfortunately we don't have enough history, but only scattered special studies and general surveys. So we take what we can get, and build on that.

Benjamin Farrington starts from a Marxist attitude, and discusses things about Bacon that academic philosophers have ignored for some centuries. The least interesting thing about Bacon is his 'logic' or 'inductive method'. His real significance was that of a prophet: one who saw a vision of a socially organized endeavour to gain a new sort of knowledge 'for the glory of God and the relief of man's estate'. Farrington discusses his philosophical development, and indicates possible relations between his thought and the developing social forces in England at the end of the 16th century. The book was written for a general audience, and makes easy and worthwhile reading.

In *James Watt and the History of Steam Power*, Ivor B. Hart goes through the earliest great achievement of applied science: steam power. His account shows how much the steam engine (Newcomen's as well as Watt's) owed to the science of the previous century, and he gives a generally reliable picture of the various engines in the line of development. Any important technological innovation is a result of a complex of factors, including: available theoretical knowledge, state of the necessary crafts, economic demand for the new product, availability of capital, and, of course, individual foresight, determination and courage. Hart is less concerned with the social than with the technical side of the story, and so he has less to offer to us. **J.R.**

## Imperialism, continued

**The Underprivileged Nations.** By P. Moussa. Sidgwick and Jackson, 1962, 30s.

The 'new' imperialism of the mid-20th century masquerades in the guise

of 'decolonization' and concern for the welfare of the underdeveloped countries. As a manual for the decolonizers, or better, 'neo-colonialists', Moussa's book has its virtues. It brings together in non-technical form points which have been made in the literature of the subject in recent years. It sketches out reassuring prescriptions for those, including the present rulers of these countries, who wish to keep the former colonial territories within the world market of capitalism.

In accord with this standpoint, real problems of political power and social structure are glossed over. Agrarian reform receives a chapter which says no more than that it is desirable but not easy to carry out. No light is cast on the relation between the existing distribution of landownership and the political set-up in the underdeveloped countries or their role as primary producers.

By a process of fallacious reasoning—which omits any mention of the exploitation of labour power in the advanced as well as the backward areas—Moussa tries to blame part of the poverty of the latter onto the workers in the former. This is in line with his conception of 'proletarian nations' (the French title of the book) which follows from accepting a high degree of solidarity between rulers and ruled in these countries.

At the same time, Moussa sheds some light, unintentionally, of course, on the processes of modern imperialism. He insists on the fact that 'industrial countries are being obliged by their need for raw materials to form ever closer links with underdeveloped ones'—contrary to some of those who tell us that because this is no longer true imperialism is finished. He wants to see private capital playing a larger part in the economies of underdeveloped countries. He points out how this can be profitable not only for the foreign undertakings directly concerned, but for the whole economy of the investing countries. Naturally international guarantees are required to prevent expropriation of foreign capital. And the 'neo-colonialists' know perfectly well what they are doing, as this statement shows: 'no opportunity should be lost of integrating the foreign enterprise with the host country [does this mean that the former are parasites?—T.K.]



whose nationals should be given an interest in the undertaking in every possible way: through financial participation by indigenous persons, whether physical or legal [he means individual capitalists or business companies], or by the state itself, and by a public relations attitude [!] and activity adapted to the underdeveloped country'. In short, win over and develop loyal executives to carry on the exploitation of the underlying population of peasants and workers, tie them to the interests of the big monopolies and create the illusion that everything is being done for the good of the people. This lesson has obviously been learned by government and business alike: Moussa is only generalizing from the experience of the past decade. Far from having ended, the old empire of world capitalism is being carried on under new forms of 'partnership' and joint management.

Of course, Moussa knows that the state must play a role in economic development in the backward countries. It may be a little awkward if the forms of government turn out to be authoritarian. But what does it matter if opposition leaders are locked up or shot and the masses regimented, so long as the field is kept clear for foreign capital, growth is speeded up and the country concerned—however loudly it proclaims 'neutralism'—is kept within the capitalist world market? T.K.

## Socialism rejected

**The Economics of Socialism Reconsidered.** By Henry Smith. O.U.P., 225 pp., 30s.

Although the blurb to this book, by the Vice-Principal of Ruskin College, Oxford, hails it as a 'major contribution to the theory of socialism', Mr. Smith has little new to say. His thesis is that the Marxian system of political economy is riddled with contradictions and weakness; this despite the fact that the analysis may have reflected quite closely the workings of 19th century capitalism, and despite Marx's undoubted talents. Instead, the analysis presented by Alfred Marshall and others and supplemented by Keynes represents much more accurately the real functioning and development of capitalism: rising standards of living, more

equitable distribution of income and lessening of class conflict are a testimony to the correctness of such models, it is suggested.

Having rejected Marx, Smith is quite helpless in working out a perspective for socialists. Look at Russia, where a new class has arisen! Or Western Europe, where capitalism has enjoyed such prosperity and stability for a longish period! What are socialists to do? 'Socialist political action will be restrained to the expression of a point of view, a civilizing one, at once conservative and radical, within the Labour movement' (p. 216). And if this is not stimulating enough we can always go back to the early ideas of the 19th century and start rebuilding socialist communities, along the lines of Robert Owen!

There is nothing of great importance about this writer. But he does show in a clear way the position of the whole social stratum to which he belongs. An intellectual either sinks his future with that of the working class or else he becomes an abject tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie, spreading ideas of helplessness which disarm the proletariat and strengthen the hands of the imperialists and their agents within the Labour movement. Abstract theorizing, the comparison of this model of analysis with that, is utterly useless if divorced from action. If Marxism has been shown to be inadequate and 'wrong' why does it still evoke so much fear for the ruling class? Why are the social science departments in the Universities increasingly becoming places for the distortion and rejection of Marxism? Why does Smith himself spend so much time over its refutation? These questions remain unanswered.

This is not, of course, to accept the 'Marxism' of Stalin and his followers. One tragedy of Stalinism, as this study illustrates once more, is that the historic achievements of 1917 can be turned into weapons of anti-working class propaganda. But once more, despite the fact that Smith claims that nationalization does not bring a flood of new wealth to man's disposal, he offers no explanation for the rapid advances achieved in the Soviet Union over the last 40 years.

One of the clearest indications of the author's separation from the real

movement of the working class comes mid-way through the book. After discussing the advances made since 1945—the rising living standards of the workers, the stability of employment and so on—he asks: 'Why, in these circumstances, has such a large body of anti-capitalist feeling remained: sufficient in Britain at least to render a Labour government a possibility to be taken seriously at each general election?' (p. 121). Again a question which he cannot answer. The working class, as the dominated and exploited class in this society, is forced to grope instinctively towards the question of political power in answer to its fundamental problems.

No sophisticated text-book rejection of Marxism, no 'new thinking' by Crosland and his friends, can prevent the revival of the European Labour movement and its striving for power. That such a new upsurge was taking place at a time when this book must have been at the printers is perhaps the best commentary one can make upon the ideas it contains. G.P.

## Income revolution?

**Wealth and Power in America.** By Gabriel Kolko. Thames and Hudson, 178 pp., 35s.

Backed by a wealth of carefully collected statistical data, this very useful study of income distribution and social class in the United States does much to explode the myth of the Affluent Society.

The book divides itself into three sections: a study of the main trends in the distribution of income and wealth in the last 50 years or so; an analysis of the concentration of power in the giant corporations of the economy; finally an examination of the causes and extent of poverty.

Looking first at the distribution of income, Kolko concludes that the basic pattern of inequality has persisted over many years: while the share of the national income going to the top 10 per cent of the population has remained virtually static for 50 years, the poorest 20 per cent of the population has experienced a sharp decline in the same period. Whereas in 1900 the poorer half of the people received 27 per cent of national personal income, this had fallen to

23 per cent by 1959 (p. 15). So much for the 'income revolution' so beloved of orthodox economists in America. When allowance is made for tax avoidance and expense accounts, Kolko's case that there has been no trend whatsoever towards economic democracy is only further strengthened.

Turning to the concentration of business power in the United States, it is obvious that all talk of a 'Managerial Revolution' is so much nonsense. Examining the giant corporations, Kolko shows that in 1955 200 companies, owning nearly one-fifth of the total assets of the economy, were controlled by about 2,500 men, and probably even fewer (p. 57). The influence of these 200 giants is even greater when it is shown that they exercise control over innumerable smaller, apparently 'independent' companies.

Most of the top directors of these companies were in no sense 'passive' in relation to their running and profitability: the reason is simple—most of them were active members of management. In addition, 'the managerial class is the largest single group in the stockholding population and a greater proportion of this class owns stock than any other' (p. 67). When are Crosland, Jay and company going to drop their fantastic conception of the divorce between ownership and control? The pairs are still happily married.

British readers will perhaps be most surprised by the sections of this study dealing with the nature and causes of poverty in America. Using the concept of a 'maintenance standard of living' (devised by the Bureau of Labour Statistics)—this is a minimum health and decency standard well below what we usually think of as a 'normal' American standard of living—official figures show that 'since 1947 one-half of the nation's families and unattached individuals have had an income too small to provide them with a maintenance standard of living' (p. 101). In a similar period, one-third of families have had an income too small to provide even an 'emergency' standard of living—this is one calculated at 70 per cent of the maintenance standard.

The causes of the existence of such a vast area of poverty are not hard

to discover: periodic unemployment which in the main hits unskilled and semi-skilled workers, the existence of a large amount of poverty among the under-privileged Negro workers concentrated in unskilled and service occupations and finally the increasing number of families headed by women, a result of the high divorce rate and break-up of marriages.

These facts are very useful as an exposé of the dominant theories of equality and economic justice so popular in America. But real analysis must lead to a concrete plan of action. This the author ignores: the only hope for a truly democratic society freed from want and poverty lies in finding ways and means of overthrowing American capitalism. Kolko refuses to face up to this and to the logic of his own analysis. His role is simply to analyze and reveal 'facts', not to draw up a programme of action based on the analysis.

This is the decisive weakness of an otherwise admirable study and one well worth reading for anybody with illusions about American capitalism.

P.J.

## Family fortunes

**The Wealth of the Gentry, 1540-1660.**  
By Alan Simpson. Cambridge University Press, 35s.

The social origins of the English Revolution in the 17th century are a subject of heated controversy among historians. The late R. H. Tawney, together with most Marxists, explained it in terms of the rise of capitalism, primarily in agriculture. The growth of the market in farm products enabled farmers and gentry to grow rich at the expense of the older, more feudal type of landlord. The rising class came into collision with Crown and Court, eventually overthrowing both.

This interpretation has been challenged, notably by Professor Trevor-Roper. The driving force in the revolution, he maintains, came not from the rising but from the declining gentry, 'in protest against royal extravagance and the fat living of courtiers. Professor Alan Simpson, of Chicago, does not offer a general explanation, but subjects the histories and accounts of three thriving East Anglian families to detailed scrutiny.

Nicholas Bacon, the rising lawyer and father of the more famous Francis, Sir Thomas Cullum, the canny draper who played a modest and equivocal role in the Revolution of the 1640s, and Sir Thomas Cornwallis, comptroller of Queen Mary's household, whose grandson was elevated to the peerage at the Restoration, are the main subjects of this study.

Professor Simpson believes that his evidence casts grave doubts on the Tawneyan and Marxist interpretations of the century. Bacon was not an improving but a conservative landlord, and still made his fortune. Cornwallis, after retiring from Court with the accession of Elizabeth, also increased his substantial wealth without engaging directly in capitalist farming. The 'mere landlord' was not, Simpson's evidence suggests, ruined by inflation and supplanted by more aggressive and bourgeois characters. Short leases and frequent rent-raising enabled the 'mere landlord' to take his cut out of rising agricultural prices.

As a basis for a general understanding of the problems, however, Simpson's evidence is unsatisfactory. East Anglia was an area close to the main markets, exceptionally prosperous and offering opportunities of enrichment to 'mere landlords' not available to their opposite numbers in the North and West. This highly untypical area cannot provide evidence for what was happening to class relations in the country as a whole. Early 17th century writers, such as Jonson and Middleton, believed that the scions of old landed families were being supplanted by thrustful bourgeois types. Of the supplanted, Middleton wrote in *The Family of Love*, 'their gentility they swore away so fast, that they had almost sworn away all the ancient gentry out of the land; which, indeed, are scarce missed, for that yeomen and farmers' sons, with the help of a few Welshmen, have undertook to supply their places'. The quotation could be capped by very many others. And even in East Anglia one would like to know more than Professor Simpson tells us about the people who sold the land that his successful 'mere landlords' were so persistently buying.

H.C.

an exceptional place in the democratic revolution. Without an alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry the tasks of the democratic revolution cannot be solved, nor even seriously posed. But the alliance of these two classes can be realized only in our way, that is, through an irreconcilable struggle against the influence of the national-liberal bourgeoisie.

# Permanent Revolution

4. No matter what the first episodic stages of the revolution may be in the individual countries the realization of the revolutionary *and* alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry is conceivable only under the political leadership of the proletarian vanguard, organized in the Communist Party. This in turn means

## Results and Prospects

that the victory of the democratic revolution is conceivable only through the dictatorship of the proletariat which bases itself upon the alliance with the peasantry and solves first of all the tasks of the democratic revolution.

*by Leon Trotsky*

5. Assessed historically, the old slogan of Bolshevism—‘the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry’—expressed precisely the above-characterised relationship of the proletariat, the

In one volume, 254 pps. Hard cover 25/-, soft cover, 15/-. Order from:

**New Park Publications Ltd. 186A Clapham High St. London S.W.4**

Printed by Plough Press Ltd. (T.U.), r.o. 180 Clapham High Street, London, S.W.4.

an exceptional place in the democratic revolution. Without an alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry the tasks of the democratic revolution cannot be solved, nor even seriously posed. But the alliance of these two classes can be realized only in our way, that is, through an irreconcilable struggle against the influence of the national-liberal bourgeoisie.

# Permanent Revolution

4. No matter what the first episodic stages of the revolution may be in the individual countries the realization of the revolutionary alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry is conceivable only under the political leadership of the proletariat vanguard organized in the Communist Party. This in turn means that the victory of the democratic revolution is conceivable only through the dictatorship of the proletariat which bases itself upon the alliance with the peasantry and solves first of all the tasks of the democratic revolution.

## Results and Prospects

*by Leon Trotsky*

5. Assessed historically, the old slogan of Bolshevism—'the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry'—expressed precisely the above-characterised relationship of the proletariat, the

In one volume, 254 pps. Hard cover 25/-, soft cover, 15/-. Order from:

**New Park Publications Ltd. 186A Clapham High St. London S.W.4**

Printed by Plough Press Ltd. (T.U.), r.o. 180 Clapham High Street, London, S.W.4.