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*KRONSTADT 1921:
Lenin and Trotsky with
Red Army men*

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EDITORS: BRIAN PEARCE, CLIFF SLAUGHTER Winter 1961

THE WORLD PROSPECT OF SOCIALISM

TWO SHILLINGS

Resolution adopted by the Socialist Labour League

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
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The 22nd Congress of the CPSU—The Final Crisis of Stalinism: A

AT the 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev and the leaders of the bureaucracy were forced to return yet again to the theme of 'the cult of the individual' and its consequences. The resolutions and debates carried into the open the exposures begun in secret by Khrushchev in 1956. The Stalinist leaders all over the world have tried since 1956 to cheat history by ignoring the 'secret speech' and, more important, its political implications. Their concern was simply to suppress the political questions arising from 1956, and to continue with Stalinist policies. Khrushchev's insistence that the truth about the 'cult' must be unearthed will reopen with even greater intensity the crisis which beset the ranks of the official world communist movement in 1956-57. All those who argued that 'such things should not be gone into' or that the 'difficult period' has passed will be rejected by millions of rank-and-file communists.

It is clear from the Congress reports that there was enormous pressure from below to square accounts with the Stalinist past: the Leningrad party secretary, Spiridonov, reported resolutions for disciplinary action against the diehard Stalinists and for the removal of Stalin's corpse from the Lenin mausoleum; a delegate from the textile industry gave a horrifying account of the visit of Kaganovitch to her district in the period of the purge, describing the disappearance of innumerable leading cadres of the party and saying that she and her comrades still referred to this period as 'the black whirlwind'. Another delegate referred to Malenkov's work with Yezhov in the repressions of 1935-37.

There is not the slightest doubt that Communist Party members in the USSR and all over the world will ask, and demand an answer: 'What was Khrushchev's role in those years?' and 'Was not Khrushchev's suppression of the Hungarian revolution in the same tradition?' 'Can the settlement with the past possibly be left to Khrushchev and his collaborators?'

In point of fact, all the political questions raised by the Left Opposition and Trotsky, and later by the Fourth International, must now be discussed in every Communist Party. It is impossible to complete the process which Khrushchev has been forced to begin in any other way. What right has the present Kremlin clique to claim leadership of the international working class? Are they a leadership selected and steeled in struggle and sacrifice, their political line and their revolutionary determination tried and tested by the living movement over a generation? On the contrary, all they can say to justify themselves in the political struggles of the last 30 years is, 'We survived.'

The real opposition to Stalin's rule in the USSR was liquidated by a system of torture and physical extermination, barely covered by the perfected process of judicial murder. The present leaders arrived at their positions through silence and active collaboration in these repressions. A new leadership will be built only on correct political strategy, and first and foremost by answering the political questions raised by the 'revelations' of the 22nd Congress.

Khrushchev says of the Kirov assassination in 1934 that 'The deeper we study the materials connected with Kirov's death the more questions arise.' He goes on, along the lines of his 20th Congress speech, to promise a full investigation. It is not clear why this investigation has not yet been completed, since the 'anti-party group' which obstructed it was defeated four years ago.

Even on the material so far available, Khrushchev shows that this assassination, which was used to carry through the great purge trials, at which Trotsky was the main defendant, was carried out with the active collaboration of the Stalinist secret police. The question which immediately arises for every member of the Communist Parties is: 'Why was such a murderous act of provocation necessary?' It is now necessary to fully expose the political

reasons for Stalin's need of such an act, the necessary preliminary to the liquidation of his opponents, and above all of the followers of Trotsky.

The Congress delegates gave one example after another of the terrible depths of the purges, the destruction of a revolutionary generation. Khrushchev cannot go into the political reasons for this, nor can he complete the investigation into the Kirov affair, for this would immediately place him where he historically belongs, in the bureaucratic counter-revolutionary caste which could only retain its rule by the destruction of the opposition in the '30s.

The Trotskyist attitude to the history of the revolution and of the Communist International has been fully vindicated by the present crisis of the bureaucracy itself. Despite the Stalinist bureaucracy's insistence on the contemporary constructional tasks in the Soviet Union, the great concern of the Congress was to press for the truth about the **history of the Bolshevik movement.**

In opening the Kirov question, Khrushchev has opened the question of Trotskyism, no matter how much he wishes to arrest the process. All the arguments about the 'historical justification' for Stalin's crimes have collapsed. Khrushchev's plea for the establishment of the historical facts will not satisfy the workers and the youth of the Soviet Union and the rest of the world.

Khrushchev says this truth is necessary in order that the same things shall not happen again. But after the 20th Congress came Hungary. The only way to prepare the future is to understand the **political reasons** for the degeneration of the workers' state and the Party in Russia. In the course of this analysis, the Khrushchev strategy of 'peaceful competition' will be openly revealed as the continuation of the bureaucratic ideology of 'Socialism in One Country'.

Koslov's reply to discussion showed that amendments to the Party rules had demanded a return to the democratic party regime of

Statement by the International Committee(4th International)

the years before 1921. The ban on factions imposed in that year was a specific response to the conditions of breakdown caused by the Civil War, and was never intended as a permanent feature of Party life.

The 'anti-party group' of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovitch and Voroshilov has been condemned by a Congress without any circulation of its policy documents, and after the matter had already been settled by the bureaucratic apparatus. The new generation of Communists will not tolerate such methods once they have begun to understand the real traditions of Bolshevism.

There must be built in Russia a Bolshevik Party which takes its place in the world Trotskyist movement, leading the Soviet working class to the return of Soviet democracy and a proper place beside the international working class in the struggle against imperialism. Only the thorough defeat of Khrushchev and his gang can prepare the way.

There must be a **political** reckoning with the past. Khrushchev and the bureaucracy cannot do this, and it will only be done in struggle against the bureaucracy, by constant opposition to its opportunist role. Khrushchev's aim is to persuade the Russian people that the benefits of industrialization and the 'liberalization' of the police regime offer them a 'Communist' future, isolated from the international working class.

The Fourth International must campaign for the working class of the Soviet Union to take up the banner of proletarian internationalism against Khrushchev's faction. Like the 'anti-party group' this faction is unable to solve in practice the problems raised by the Stalinist past.

In establishing the truth about the history of Stalinism, the facts must also be brought to light about the fate of international Communists, the execution in 1937 by the GPU of Remmele, leading German Communist, who had escaped from Nazi Germany to Russia in 1933 and the handing

over to Hitler of Margaret Buber-Neumann in 1940, the execution of Bela Kun, the Hungarian leader, and of the entire leadership of the Polish Party in 1938

Two years ago, Tito demanded rehabilitation of 200 Yugoslav Communists who were executed in the 1930s. This demand has never been complied with. But this will raise the whole question of the betrayal of the revolution in Europe and China by the Stalin-controlled Comintern, the bloody role of Stalinism in Spain, and the post-war capitulation to 'Western democracy'. Once again it will be clear that only a thorough analysis of the past will prepare the regeneration of the Communist movement throughout the world.

The International Committee fully supports the demands of the widow of the late Leon Trotsky, Natalia Sedova Trotsky, that a public investigation of the trials and the murder of her husband should take place immediately. We demand that her Soviet citizenship rights be restored immediately.

Khrushchev wants to dispose of the Stalin heritage by Stalinist methods. He says the 'anti-party' group was dealt with by 'ideological' methods. In fact there was no discussion in the Party. When opposition came from the Left, as in Hungary, the methods used were not 'ideological'.

Khrushchev's plea to the delegates to desist from creating a new 'cult' of the individual' at the end of the Congress is in direct conflict with the actual state of affairs in the leadership, when in fact Khrushchev is immune to criticism, and where he is the only one to hand out criticism to others.

The crisis will only be solved by the conscious political action of forces under the leadership of the ideas of Trotsky and the Fourth International. Khrushchev's 'exposures' are the response to a great pressure from below for the restoration of Soviet democracy to correspond to the needs of the Soviet working class both economically and politically, in the return to true internationalism.

The Leningrad Party secretary

said at the Congress that the historical questions are now being raised 'with greater insistence'—this process must go the whole way, and will meet inevitably with resistance from Khrushchev and the other bureaucrats. For decades the Communist ranks have been educated only in opportunist methods, and the great need is for leadership.

The International Committee of the Fourth International opposes all theories that the process of reform of the international movement is inevitable or automatic. It requires the building in every country, and certainly in the USSR of sections of the Fourth International. This is the way to prepare for the political overthrow of the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union. The bureaucracy's desperate reaction to the great opposition movement from below gives us every confidence in the forces for this overthrow.

In every country we shall work with all members of the Communist Parties who strive for a real understanding of the history of the Communist movement and its revival. Everywhere we shall demand a full investigation into the trial and assassination of Trotsky and all other oppositionists. Trotsky's own verdict on the Kirov assassination, written in 1935, remains true today:

'No way out can be found except through the **regeneration of the Bolshevik party**. This problem can only be solved on an international scale. In order for the Russian workers to reject the opium of 'socialism in one country' and to turn **en masse** toward the world socialist revolution, the world proletarian vanguard must consolidate itself around the banner of the Leninist Party. The struggle against reformism, more intransigent than ever, must be supplemented by the struggle against the paralyzing and demoralising influence of the Stalinist bureaucracy upon the international working-class movement. The defence of the Soviet Union is inconceivable without the struggle for the **FOURTH INTERNATIONAL.**'

November 5, 1961

THE WORLD PROSPECT FOR SOCIALISM

Resolution on the International Situation, adopted by the British Socialist Labour League at its 1961 Annual Conference, and subsequently amended.

I The Necessity for the Socialist Revolution

1. Capitalism long ago reached the end of its progressive contribution to the history of mankind. Already at the beginning of the 20th century it had been driven into its final stage of Imperialism—an epoch of wars and revolutions. Having divided up the globe between themselves the rival capitalist states came into violent collision with each other in wars of terrible destructiveness. At the same time, the ruling classes of these states faced a persistent challenge to their domination both from the working class at home and from the movement for national independence in their colonies. As a result of these conditions bourgeois society was unable to assure the conditions for stable and peaceful development mapped out for it by its liberal ideologists in the preceding century. On the contrary, it manifested a permanent tendency towards decadence and violence, even in relatively peaceful periods. Despite cumulative scientific and technological advance representing great conquests for the human spirit, imperialism proved unable to use these in a sustained way for constructive purposes. Capitalist production relations continually imposed barriers to production, distorting and misapplying the achievements of human knowledge. Under conditions of crises and war, scepticism and uncertainty for the morrow replaced the confident belief in progress characteristic of the bourgeoisie in its prime.

2. When geared to the needs of capitalist profit-making, scientific advance became the means for ever-greater accumulation of capital and concentration of economic power, as well as for the

building up of massive destructive potential to defend or extend them. The manifestation of the new epoch in the history of capitalism, even in the most 'democratic' countries, was the growing power of finance-capital and monopoly, the synchronization of social and economic life through the medium of the state machine, as an instrument of the ruling class, and the increasing importance to industry of military contracts. While at particular times or in particular countries such developments may have served to overcome some of the inherent problems of capitalism temporarily, thus providing a basis for opportunist trends in the Labour movement, the ultimate effect is to deepen social and economic contradictions and heighten the danger to mankind from the continued existence of capitalism.

3. The October Revolution in Russia, and the later defeats of imperialism in Eastern Europe and China, have strictly limited the possibility of further capitalist expansion. Capital export continues and becomes no less urgent than in the past because capitalism experiences a chronic need for ever-new outlets for the realisation of surplus value. Threatened by the upsurge of the national liberation movement in the colonies, it becomes of the greatest importance for the ruling classes of the capitalist countries to arrive at an understanding with the petty-bourgeois leaderships of these movements so that capital export can continue, or alternatively to retain colonies by force where such a compromise does not seem to be possible. In appearance the methods of capitalism today, both through the

policy of 'welfare statism' in the advanced countries and in the policy of 'colonial independence', are more peaceable than in the past. In fact such policies of so-called 'neo-capitalism' have precisely the same end and arise from the same needs as the pre-war resort to fascism and strong-arm methods. The option of creating fascist movements, taking a desperate gamble on the plebeian elements in such movements, is a dangerous one which the bourgeoisie prefers to avoid. It chooses, wherever possible, to operate through parliament, the bureaucracy, the political parties, and the organized Labour movement. Likewise, in the colonies, the imperialists fight desperately enough to conserve positions which cannot be held by other means than force, but the world balance of forces makes retention of political control over colonies by repression a course which its intelligent representatives seek to avoid wherever possible. These changes in methods do not indicate any change in capitalism itself. Nor can it be assumed that the present course is a permanent one or that the bourgeoisie in the various countries will not, if need arises, resort once again to fascism or use force internationally to preserve, or regain, threatened positions.

4. Imperialism's unremitting threat to humanity in the mid-20th century is made all the more dramatic because it is now possible for a single war to destroy the human race.

It is no longer a question only of the violence and irrationalism of fascist mass movements brought into action by the monopolists, and the destruction of a single generation of class-conscious workers, nor even of a total war which exhausts but does not ruin the participants. The immediate prospect is that the contradictions of capitalism may issue into a world conflict of mutual total destruction which may destroy human life completely or throw it back thousands of years. There is only one difference from the past wars of imperialism: now the question is raised that the whole capitalist world system may be drawn into such a war of complete destruction rather than give up exploiting the working class and colonial peoples.

5. The very conditions which have enabled capitalism to survive into the second half of the 20th century produce a continual economic, political and moral crisis at every level and in all spheres of society which the threat of nuclear destruction serves only to enhance.

In the economic sphere, for example, there are many signs that capitalism is once again confronting the inescapable problem of finding outlets for 'surplus' capital. Even the massive absorption of resources in building up the material pre-requisites for nuclear war cannot provide a permanent solution

to this problem. Resumption and continued increase of capital export by the main capitalist countries represents the search for a way of escape, but one which is progressively narrowed and thus contributes to the explosiveness of the situation as a whole. The inability of capitalism to make a planned and rational use of investment resources stands out clearly. If the conditions of the market do not offer a favourable profit rate such resources will be lost to the productive capacity of the economy. Hence the ability of the industrial machine to produce such resources adjusts itself, through all kinds of ups and downs, to the rate of profit. But capitalism is now no longer the only world system; it has to face the competition of countries which, while still on the average poorer, have the inestimable advantage of being able to plan for balanced growth and thus full utilization of the available resources. The differences in production relations explain the broad differences in rates of growth and hence the increasingly less favourable position of capitalism in the world confrontation between the two incompatible systems. While it is true that the rate of growth and the general economic efficiency of the countries in the Soviet-China bloc are adversely affected by the predations and bunglings of the bureaucratic controllers and by their inability to make full use of the international division of labour, nonetheless, the more rapid rate of growth of these countries testifies to the advantages flowing from their nationalized and planned economic base.

6. Even the richest capitalist country, the USA, is unable to break out of an almost permanent economic stagnation, despite a high level of arms expenditure. Recessions now follow each other in rapid succession and after each recovery the permanent level of unemployment and unused capacity tends to rise. While some of the European countries, and Japan, have, owing to a combination of favourable factors, been able to achieve higher rates of growth and avoid serious recessions, it is clear that their prosperity hangs by a thread. It depends upon the continued buoyancy of the capitalist world market as a whole which is now expanding at a less rapid rate. Intensified competition in this market has been visible for some time. The market cannot expand indefinitely. Shocks or crises in any one part are liable to have far-reaching repercussions. The prospect for the '60s is not of steadily continued expansion, but rather increasing difficulty: a struggle for markets between the main capitalist countries punctuated by recessions and crises. In such conditions those sections of the capitalist world economy which are least well prepared are certain to experience heavy pressures. Events in Belgium in December 1960 and January 1961 were a foretaste of the kind of

problems likely to be experienced and the methods which the ruling class will employ to combat them. In different ways, varying with the internal situation, the capitalist class, and its governments, will be obliged to pass on their problems to the working class. Where possible this will be done without open conflict, by domesticating the working-class organizations. In other cases they may have to be broken, or their fighting capacity destroyed. The bourgeoisie adapts its methods skilfully to such situations. It may set out to wear down organizations, win over their leaders or destroy them by open war. The old-line leaderships lend themselves to such tactics. In France, for example, without destroying the workers' organizations, without an open fight, the de Gaulle regime was able to reduce real wages for large sections of the working class by 15 per cent. Such defeats for the workers will be sought everywhere as economic problems become more acute.

7. In the backward countries, dominated for decades and even centuries by the imperialists, there are again specific contradictions. Imperialism is a decadent social system, it oozes corruption, in the colonies more than elsewhere. The national bourgeoisies which have come to the fore as the result of 'de-colonization' are steeped in a corrupt milieu of self-seeking and petty intrigue. They do not intend to make a real fight against imperialism. They are content, for the most part, to enjoy the fruits of office in politically independent, and economically unviable, states which provide today the necessary framework for continued exploitation by the imperialist monopolies. At the most these national leaders seek for themselves a bigger share of the spoils wrung by increasingly methodical exploitation from the subject peasants and workers or seek to turn part of the gains of the imperialists into 'development' programmes which lay the foundations for more complete, national capitalist development. It is true that the division of the world between two blocs offers them room for manoeuvre, of which the more skilful are able to take some advantage, and for obtaining aid from both sides. Essentially, however, and notwithstanding their protestations to the contrary, the new ruling classes in the backward countries have not broken their ties with imperialism. On the other hand, they have to face, at home, growing pressure from the working class which capitalist development increases in size and self-consciousness. Signs of new struggles are visible in which the very roots of imperialism in these countries will, for the first time, be in danger. This situation is made all the more explosive precisely by the fact that the national bourgeoisie is unable to fulfil the tasks of the bourgeois democratic revolution. It cannot carry through land reform, break with imperialist economic

domination or ensure an autonomous capitalist development. Meanwhile living conditions tend to deteriorate. Vast masses are thrown into the ranks of the proletariat; old social structures are disintegrating; poverty and desperation grow. This situation, a manifestation of the unevenness of development inseparable from the activity of imperialism on a world scale, accelerates the class struggle which prepares its final overthrow.

8. It is upon this revolutionary crisis, with its dialectical relationship between the struggle of the workers in the advanced countries and of those oppressed by imperialism in the colonies and former colonies, that Marxists base their revolutionary strategy. Reformists and opportunists of all varieties echo the spokesmen of the bourgeoisie in supposing, and hoping, that the separate manifestations of the fundamental world crisis can be taken one by one and separately remedied. Marxists claim that this is impossible. All such problems are related because of the inextricable connections between them established by imperialism itself. They do not assume, however, that imperialism will somehow collapse because the contradictions which it secretes will eventually bring the system to a halt. Such an idea of automatic downfall is no part of Marxism. The history of the last 40 years has driven home the lesson so often repeated by Lenin and Trotsky, that there are no impossible situations for the bourgeoisie. It survived the challenge of revolution and economic depression between the wars by resort to fascism. It survived the Second World War with the complicity of the Stalinist and Social Democratic leaderships—which ensured that the working class would not make a bid for power—and used the breathing space to elaborate new methods of rule and strengthen the economy. Even the most desperate situations can be overcome if only the active intervention of the workers as a class for themselves, with a party and leadership with a perspective of overthrowing capitalism, is not prepared in time. The continued existence of capitalism is not a reflection of its inherent strength or a justification for it; it is primarily a consequence of a series of defeats for the working class, the historical responsibility for which rests upon the shoulders of international Stalinism and Social Democracy.

For Trotsky's contribution to the leadership of the early Third International, read his speeches and reports in

The First Five Years of the Communist International

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II The Crisis of Leadership

1. The only future for mankind is the victory of the working class in the socialist revolution. A proletarian leadership must be built which can bring to the working class of the world a consciousness of its great historical role. Such a consciousness cannot arise spontaneously; it comes in the course of struggles in which the leadership is theoretically formed as it emerges, is tested and establishes its authority. *The survival of capitalism into its present overripe stage is essentially a consequence of the crisis in leadership which besets the working-class movement.* The betrayals of the traditional leaderships have prepared the necessary groundwork for the bourgeoisie to achieve periods of temporary stability and relative expansion. The resolution of the crisis of leadership is the first responsibility of Marxists.

2. Political leaders of the traditional Social Democratic and Stalinist schools continue to dominate the working-class movement. They have built up powerful bureaucratic apparatuses to discipline and control the class. They have turned socialist phrases and the language of Marxism into a protective covering of deception, in order to conceal their renunciation of the goal of working-class power. They stand as the principal barriers on the road to working-class political independence, without which the bourgeoisie cannot be defeated. In order to build the revolutionary parties to achieve the proletarian dictatorship, Marxists must make a continuous and decisive attack on every opportunist trend, particularly on Social Democracy and Stalinism.

3. Social Democracy acts on the assumption that capitalism is being transformed into a more humane system, concerned with welfare as much as with profit. The actions of the Social Democrats are strictly contained by loyalty to the bourgeois state and institutions, within which they accept office, even accepting governmental responsibility for long periods, particularly during crises and wars. They

are hostile to any movement whose aim is the *overthrow* of the bourgeois state.

The social basis of Social Democracy is the privileged minority of the working class in the advanced countries. With this base, and infiltrated by elements from the petty bourgeoisie, the Social Democratic leaderships have demonstrated more clearly since 1945 than ever before in history, their role as capitalist agents in the Labour movement. In Western Europe they salvaged capitalism in the immediate post-war years. They have subsequently campaigned for the removal of all specific socialist demands from the party programme. In Germany the Social Democracy has come forward openly as a pro-capitalist party of a radical reform type.

Domestic policy has been a complement to the acceptance by Social Democracy of full support for the world strategy of American imperialism including military alliances and the H-bomb.

4. The material basis for the hold of Social Democracy in the advanced countries (it has never assumed much importance in the less developed countries) has been steadily undermined by the world developments of recent years. Social Democracy's capitulation before fascism and open commitment to the imperialist front against the Soviet Union and its allies have helped to discredit it in the working class. But more fundamental has been the inevitable weakening of the older imperialist powers in relation to the world market. The older methods of exploitation of colonial empires, of dependence on these as markets as well as for expanded investment, have given rise to greater and greater contradictions. While still retaining in certain countries the allegiance of the majority of the working class, especially in Britain and Germany, the Social Democratic parties have increasingly tended to be bureaucratic shells, with Right-wing leaderships challenged by centrist and Left trends and torn by inner crisis. In France the exponents of 'classic' Social Democracy have mostly left the Socialist Party. In Italy the centrists, under Nenni,

have the mass following. In Britain, the growth of the Left-wing Labour youth movement, and the beginning of big economic struggles, are making more and more difficult the domination of the opportunists.

5. The role of Stalinism in the post-war years has been similar in its effects to that of Social Democracy. In a number of countries the Communist Party had become, by the '30s or '40s, the mass party of the working class, and had attracted militants moving away from Social Democracy in other countries like Britain and Holland. The Stalinist conception, that the power of the Soviet bureaucracy could best be preserved by a deal with its wartime capitalist allies, shaped the policies of these parties after the war, despite some spasmodic leaps into reckless ultra-Leftism. From 1944 onwards in a number of countries, but especially in France and Italy, the Communist leadership was entirely engaged in preventing the working class from taking advantage of the weakness of the bourgeoisie and the virtual collapse of its state power. The upsurge of working-class confidence, backed by the existence of armed partisan formations, broke against the formal opposition of the Communist Party leadership to any action against the bourgeois state or capitalist institutions. The disarming of the partisans, the entrance of the Communist Parties into bourgeois coalitions, and the call for maximum effort for production, took the edge off the class attack and prepared the way for a long series of betrayals whose fruits were to be seen in spreading cynicism and a weakening of the Communist Parties themselves.

6. In China and Yugoslavia the bulwarks erected against the spread of revolution by international Stalinism were broken down by the elemental force of the popular revolutionary movement, the absence of any viable bourgeois alternative and the corruption and breakdown of the old regimes. Here, then, a real break in the international front of imperialism took place. In Eastern Europe generally the Soviet bureaucracy showed itself ready to collaborate with the old ruling classes and parties in 1944-45, even with elements heavily compromised with the Nazi occupiers. But these were too discredited, too obviously tools of Western imperialism, for such an alliance to endure. As a result, capitalist property relations were more or less quickly abolished by bureaucratic methods as part of the process of building a defensive front against imperialism, whose anti-Soviet aims became clearer in the course of 1946-47.

Certain political trends, in particular the revisionist Pabloite group, implicitly or explicitly argue that these events contradict Trotsky's definition of the

nature and role of world Stalinism. They further infer that the task of building an independent Marxist leadership in the advanced countries must be postponed indefinitely until the epicentre of the revolution has moved into the advanced countries.

The experiences of China, Indo-China and Yugoslavia do not conflict with Trotsky's analysis of world Stalinism as *the ideology and programme of the Soviet bureaucracy*. Because of their comparative freedom from strict organizational control of the Communist International, particularly during the second world war, the Communist Parties of these countries were able to pursue a relatively independent policy which combined the national-liberation struggle with the social revolution. At every stage in the struggle for state power, however, these leaderships have come into conflict with the Soviet bureaucracy who wish, in the interests of 'peaceful co-existence' with world capitalism, to restrain and suppress these movements, or subordinate them to the bureaucracy's own ends.

The Peking and Belgrade bureaucracies on the other hand, because of their empirical outlook, Stalinist training and reformist-utopian ideas about building 'socialism in a single country', are completely incapable of elaborating a programme or organization for assisting the European workers in their struggle for state power. They remain centrist currents guided by their own immediate national interests and unable to comprehend the scope and direction of world events. The recent Belgrade conference is an eloquent demonstration of the bankruptcy of these leaders.

The industrialization of these countries and the collectivization of agriculture cannot be carried through successfully without the assistance of the West European or American working class. Hence the conquest of power in the West remains an indispensable precondition for the rational and harmonious integration and advancement of these economies.

7. The death of Stalin in 1953, the reforms in the USSR, and the aftermath of the 1956 20th Congress, have not altered the attitude of the Soviet bureaucracy to the world revolution. In fact there is an essential thread of continuity between the policy of Yalta-Potsdam* and that of Khrushchev's 'peaceful co-existence'. The aim is still to contain and channel every upsurge of the masses to enable a deal to be made with the imperialists. Where revolts are 'supported' it is only in order to obtain a bargaining advantage in negotiations.

In the earlier period the policy of arrangement

* Wartime agreements between the USSR and the Western Powers concerning the post-1945 settlements in Europe, and involving abandonment of revolutionary struggle in Western Europe.

with capitalism arose out of the internal weaknesses of the USSR and the need to buy time. Today it is the very strength of the mighty power which they control which frightens the bureaucracy. The potentiality of Russia's nationalized and planned economy is a standing challenge to world capitalism and thus impels it to an attitude of suspicion and opposition backed by military alliances and the H-bomb. In both cases what is sought is a quiet life—a stabilization of the internal position by getting a guarantee that there will be no disturbance of world equilibrium which could open up a gulf under their own feet; hence no extension of the revolution can be contemplated.

8. Ideological justification of this position has to be offered both for internal consumption and to stem criticism in the world Communist Parties. Its latest form is the attack on 'dogmatism'; this campaign is essentially a revision of the Leninist view of imperialism as an epoch of wars and revolutions which can only be ended by the decisive intervention of the proletariat organized in revolutionary parties for the capture of state power and the building of socialism on a world scale. In place of this perspective is held out the idea that this is a period of the 'consolidation' of socialism in the USSR in which the superiority of planned economy will prove itself and a peaceful transition to socialism will occur as this becomes apparent. In the meantime, independent working-class action is rejected or subordinated to the task of building a broad alliance, including 'peace-loving' capitalists, not to build socialism, but to restore, in the capitalist countries, a peaceful variety of capitalism of a pre-imperialist variety! The real aim, therefore, is a series of new coalition governments in the style of 1944-1947, based on several classes, able to negotiate effective peace and disarmament measures with the USSR. Where necessary everything is geared to such aims. Strike movements are held in check, independent movements against imperialist military alliances, such as that in Japan, are condemned as adventurist, the struggle against colonialism is pushed aside and old chauvinistic slogans are pushed to the forefront. All this marks a sharp reversal of everything which the Communist Parties were established to fight for. No wonder that the early history and declarations of the Communist International are clothed in secrecy and effectively concealed from the membership.

9. Social Democracy and Stalinism at the same time batten on each other. Much continued working-class support for Social Democracy stems from the ability to play the anti-communist line, for which the record of Stalinism offers the necessary confirmation. On the other hand, the Communist Parties not only

gain from the attractive power of the October Revolution, they also profit from the obvious corruption of the Social Democratic leadership. The problem is not, of course, as some simple souls believe, that the working-class movement is divided and that everything can be put right by a 'Popular Front', to be effected by some kind of reconciliation of the leaderships and the clearing up of misunderstandings. Both have to be swept away and replaced. But both are equally adamant in their resistance to any movement which threatens to be an alternative pole of attraction; they are even capable, in such situations, of forming an unholy alliance.

10. In recent years dissatisfaction with both the Social Democratic and the Stalinist leaderships has been growing. This manifests itself in negative ways, such as cynicism, apathy and desertion from their organizations. In all countries, in the struggle against imperialist war and against the employers on the economic front, the working class and the youth have continuously found 'unofficial' ways of fighting and organizing which have shown time and again the objective basis for a new and revolutionary leadership. This must be forged in the experience of these struggles and in determined conflict with the traditional leaderships.

11. The need to build independent Marxist parties in order to provide alternative leadership is the most urgent task of today. The reorganization of the Fourth International which will reunify all those Marxist groups and parties adhering to basic principles of orthodox Trotskyist must be undertaken immediately. In this reorganization it will be necessary to struggle against all revisions of Marxism, particularly those in the direction of 'objectivism', which lay an undue stress on the objective inevitability of socialism which detracts from the decisive importance of conscious creation of a revolutionary leadership.

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III Imperialism and World Revolution — the Present Stage

i) Introduction

1. The false leaders of the working class have a role and an ideology which corresponds to the objective needs of imperialism in its present stage of development. The opportunists of all varieties now rest not only upon the labour aristocracy of a few advanced countries but upon new layers of the world's population under modern state monopoly capitalism with its particular relation to the non-capitalist world. The advanced countries have gone through a gigantic concentration of industrial and finance capital, militarization and bureaucratization of the economy and of the state, growing reliance on state intervention in the economy, and the consequent creation of a new middle caste of executives, administrators and bureaucrats of the big banks and monopolies, the state, the military and security apparatus, 'social services' and the means of manipulation of 'public opinion'. The international needs of capital are faithfully administered by this middle caste. In the backward countries they find their counterpart in the nationalist petty-bourgeois governing classes to which imperialism has handed over government office. The United Nations and its agencies have the function of providing an overall check on the political and economic security of this system.

2. It is on these middle groupings in the advanced countries, the backward countries, and the United Nations Organization, that the modern opportunists in the Labour movement depend. The role of the Soviet bureaucracy is objectively to assist in the temporary stabilization of imperialism which these new middle classes and their political representatives effect. The steady economic growth of the Soviet Union is a direct threat to imperialism, but the Stalinist bureaucracy tries to regulate the relation of the October Revolution and its conquests to the imperialist enemy by means of state, bureaucratic manipulations. For this reason, the economic effect

of Soviet economic growth, as controlled and directed by the bureaucracy, is expressed in collaboration with the new middle caste in the colonies, just as the political effect of the crisis inspired by Soviet industrial development will be *subordination* of the working class to the needs of the ruling bureaucracy in its state relations with the imperialist powers. Yet it is precisely upon these imperialist states that the traditional opportunists of Social Democracy depend.

3. There are thus objective class reasons for the persistence of opportunism in the present critical stage of imperialism's development. The struggle against opportunism is not just an ideological one between tendencies in the same movement. In the present situation, revolutionary consciousness is the essential element for change. Dependence upon the 'objective inevitability' of socialism, which somehow is thought to force the opportunists and the class forces behind them to play a 'progressive role', is dangerous and misleading. Only those who lead the working class to a conscious understanding of its own road to power are in fact progressive. Without a decisive struggle against all opportunism this leadership cannot be given.

4. The Fourth International approaches the problems of the movement in particular countries always from the point of view of the distinguishing features of our imperialist epoch. The overall needs of imperialism and of the proletariat determine the roles of the various social groups and political tendencies. The world market developed by capitalism and the domination of international finance-capital make it ever more necessary to look at all developments, in advanced or in backward countries, from this internationalist standpoint. In this total picture, only the working class can transform the situation, and so we consider every problem from the standpoint of the international working class. The

peculiarities of the movement and developments in particular countries are to be understood not as varieties of a common type but as partial phenomena whose true significance is determined only on the *world* arena of struggle between imperialism and the world proletariat.

5. The situation in the advanced countries, despite the betrayals of Social Democracy and Stalinism, shows a marked difference from the years after 1918. In no country has the working class been incapacitated for struggle by massive economic or political defeats. Despite some superficial appearances and the congenital pessimism of faint-hearts and defeatists, the working class in the advanced countries has never been in a better position to fight, unencumbered by bitter memories of defeat or the demoralization of mass unemployment. Moreover such a period has been an unfavourable one for Social Democracy and Stalinism in important respects. Social Democracy flowered in a period of growth and victory for imperialism. Stalinism battered on the defeats of the inter-war years. Neither has gained in the last period because of the change in objective conditions. Nevertheless, the fighting capacity of the working class, which is real and manifests itself at times with great vigour, has to be evoked, mobilized and organized.

6. The basic contradictions of capitalist economy, manifested in each advanced country according to its

particular place in imperialist development, are leading to a revival of the class struggle and great opportunities for the Marxists. In the older capitalist countries, the exigencies of competition in the world market impose the need for adjustments which are incompatible with the old methods of exploitation, and place a great strain upon the traditional industrial and political structure. In Belgium, France and Great Britain, such economic and political crisis is already manifest in one degree or another: in Belgium, a great general strike, in France, Bonapartist rule, in Britain a crisis of Social Democracy as the capitalist class prepares a necessary attack upon trade union organization. With varying degrees of success, the bourgeoisie has sought to solve its more pressing problems by making inroads into the gains made by the working class since 1945. It is in Europe, the USA and Japan that the next qualitative leap in the world revolution will be made. Without this there can be no rupture of the present domination and containment of the power of the masses by the Stalinists and the petty-bourgeois nationalists. Only a breakthrough in the advanced countries will provide the political and economic conditions for the workers in the backward countries to retain proletarian power and advance to socialism, once they have overthrown the imperialists and their agents. Similarly, only the revolutionary revival of the working-class movement in the West will give the necessary support for the Soviet working class to fight a revolutionary battle against the bureaucracy.

ii) The Struggle for Security and Stability in European Capitalism

1. Until the first world war, the great states of Western Europe dominated the capitalist world market, each of their economic structures being shaped by the particular historical conditions under which they had assumed their place in it. Britain was the old, overripe imperialism with a world empire knit together by golden threads radiating from the City of London, but with an industrial structure already showing signs of age and inflexibility. The most dynamic element was the new Germany which had taken political form with the defeat of France in 1870-71 and whose economy was geared to the needs of the magnates of coal and steel, the real power behind the state. The weakest, economically and militarily, was France, mature like Britain, but much less intensively industrialized; in the grip of demographic stagnation and with an economy which could properly be called rentier in

character, the French bourgeoisie sought security in alliance with Tsarist Russia and the erstwhile rival, Britain. Britain, France and Russia lined up on the basis of common interest against the expansion of Imperial Germany and her Central European ally and satellite, Austria-Hungary.

2. After the powers had been locked together for four years in bloody conflict, the shape of Europe changed, and so did its place in the world. Three empires disintegrated. The Bolsheviks triumphed in 1917 and led the workers and peasants of Russia out of the orbit of world capitalism with the defeat of the armies of intervention. In Germany great opportunities were presented for working-class revolution; they were lost through the treachery of Social Democracy and the failure of revolutionary leadership. Capitalism was restored to Germany,

but on weakened foundations; the bourgeoisie, which acquired full power for the first time, faced a combative working class. France suffered devastation and a loss of manpower which she of all countries could least afford; her ruling class suffered from a protracted crisis of confidence which issued into the capitulation of 1940. Of all the European countries Britain was in many ways the only gainer from the 1914-18 war; her imperialist possessions and position had been safeguarded from the predations of Germany and she had added substantially to her empire. But the triumph was costly; it was paid for in a sharp deterioration of her world position signalized by the industrial stagnation of the inter-war years and the constant struggle of sterling to look the dollar in the face.

3. Europe as a whole had declined both absolutely and in relation to the concurrent rise of the United States to a dominant position in the capitalist world. The emergence of Japan as the first Asiatic contender for great power status and a serious economic competitor underlined the fact that Europe was no longer the centre of the globe. The growth of the Soviet Union demonstrated, despite all the distortions of Stalinism, that capitalism was not the only conceivable world system, and gave notice that it would have to fight for its existence.

4. The fear of Bolshevism mingled with international rivalries in Europe and the ambivalent relationships maintained with the United States to produce the complex pattern of inter-war diplomatic history. When capitalism's acute crisis in Germany led to the ruling class's resort to fascism, their counterparts in France and Britain were presented with a dilemma: whether to regard resurgent German imperialism as the main danger, or to ally with it in the face of the threat of revolution. Out of this dilemma came Munich and Vichy but also September 3, 1939 and a renewed war of unparalleled dimensions.

5. The immediate result of the war of 1939-45 was that capitalism was brought to its knees throughout Western Europe, as well as in the less developed East. The prolonged economic depression of the '30s, revealing the weaknesses of capitalism and thus undermining confidence in the system, led, in a number of countries, to a resort to fascism. In turn fascism intensified rivalries between the capitalist states and made war inevitable. The association was widely made between capitalism and war, the responsibility for which was seen to devolve upon the bourgeoisie and its system. The widely practised collaboration economically between large sections of the ruling class and the Nazis in the occupied countries discredited them still further.

The collapse of the collaborationist regimes, confronted not only with the Anglo-American military machine, but also with the people in arms in the resistance movements, produced a situation in which the state power temporarily fell from the grasp of the bourgeoisie altogether and reverted to its most basic form as 'bodies of armed men'. Owing to the deliberate choice of the Communist Parties, and their allies, however, under the cry of 'one police, one army, one state',* it was conveyed, through the Anglo-American military governments and puppet governments, to the bourgeoisie by means of the politicians brought in their train or collected from the social ruins. The restoration of West European capitalism was thus a consequence of the counter-revolutionary policy of the Soviet bureaucracy.

6. Despite its crisis of confidence, its cowardice and incompetence, the old ruling class was thus able to retain or recover its power; never has a ruling class had such historical good fortune.

It is true that the ruling classes took over countries which had been devastated by war, whose links with the world market had been ruptured for years and which were in a state of economic penury. The decline of Europe seemed even more irrevocable than after the first world war.

Yet within a comparatively short period economic life was restored to its pre-war level and began to outstrip it, testifying to the recuperative power of modern industrial technology, not to any inherent vigour of capitalist relations. Indeed capitalism was on crutches everywhere. It had to be supported by state measures and by the tacit agreement of the Labour movement to assist in restoring the profitability of those sectors which it was not absolutely indispensable that the state should take over outright.

7. This task could not have been accomplished without the massive inflow of American assistance, first as loans and then in the form of aid under the Marshall Plan. American capitalism, raised to the level of a world power with the help of two wars in which its productive capacity had increased by mighty leaps, was strong enough to bear a large part of the capitalist world on its shoulders. And it needed to do so for a number of reasons. While it was true that the European capitalist countries were its rivals on the world market, US capitalism could not afford to see them knocked out of the capitalist world economy by social revolution or by absorption into the USSR. Not only would that

* Phrase used by Thorez, French Communist leader, in 1945 imposing dissolution on the partisan militias. Togliatti in Italy and the other Communist Party leaders used similar arguments.

threaten the US world position, it would mean the end of Western Europe as investment fields and markets—a situation which grimly but reluctantly had been accepted in hard bargaining with the USSR as far as Eastern Europe was concerned (a bargain in which Stalin 'gave away' the West, including Greece and a 50 per cent share of Yugoslavia). So Western Europe became necessary to capitalist America both as a military pivot point and as an economic ally. Moreover, the aid which was siphoned into war-disrupted European economies was no strain on American capacity; indeed it helped to avert the post-war slump which was generally expected to appear sooner or later. The menace of the USSR meant that America could not afford to see West European capitalism weakened and that it was important to succour it at any cost, even if that meant running certain economic and political risks.

8. Consequently American policy was directed to the economic recovery of Europe. Inter-state co-operation was encouraged and assisted. As the Cold War worsened, so the occupation zones in Germany were merged into a new Federal State which provided the political context for the spectacular revival of German economy which was to take place in the '50s. Everything was done, too, to restore Europe's links with the world market, since this was necessary if new life was to be breathed into capitalism's ravaged body. While some American policy-makers tried to impose policies on the European governments which they would not have chosen for themselves, once the latter got on their feet they had sufficient bargaining counters to be able to assume a certain autonomy. At the same time, the European bourgeoisie was clearly bound to the American ruling class by a myriad ties. As the Cold War proceeded, through the Berlin airlift and the Korean war, so dependence on American military aid and the need for a common strategy brought into being a number of European supranational organizations. The key role was played by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: a new Holy Alliance designed to deal with 'communist aggression' and 'internal subversion', but, unlike its 19th century predecessor, having at its disposal a considerable military striking force, and with a political and economic base stretched across Europe to the borders of the Soviet bloc. NATO was progressively adapted to the needs of nuclear warfare and provided a stronghold for the military caste which, in all capitalist countries, had emerged considerably strengthened by a decade or so of war and war preparations. NATO represented the determination to buttress Western capitalism with the cement of armed power, in which the contributions of the separate states were inextricably related in common strategic plans.

9. Side by side with the military strengthening of Europe went a renewed economic upsurge. The stimulation given to the economy by the needs of post-war reconstruction, the drive to rebuild foreign trade links, the release of new techniques and the influx of dollars, was carried forward by unprecedented peacetime arms expenditure. From this point, in the '50s a genuine capitalist boom, centred on civilian investment and a great extension of the market for consumer goods, carried production and trade forward to new heights. This new upsurge of capitalism was accompanied by, and in part dependent upon, a more intimate relationship between the state and the economy than before the war. While the essential social relations of capitalism remained, the state, as the organ of the dominant class, discharged some of the functions which had formerly been within the province of individual enterprises or had been left to the hazards of the market. The nationalization of certain key industries, especially those which were technically deficient and unprofitable, and the state direction of part of new investment were the most notable of the constituents of the new policy (not, of course, a wholly new one but now indispensable for capitalism's survival). They were accompanied by social measures, representing in part the pressure of the masses, but now become likewise a necessity if capitalism were to survive. This 'ensemble' led to much talk about capitalism having changed or disappeared, and thus provided the breeding ground for new revisionist currents which assumed, on the basis of a few years' experience, that the contradictions of capitalism had disappeared. New 'theories' were built to justify and explain policies which were already in existence, policies which in fact had themselves contributed markedly to the continued existence of capitalism in Europe at all, let alone under conditions of prosperity.

10. Nor was there any doubt about the reality of the prosperity. European capitalism had once again become able to extract and realise surplus value on an expanding scale from the numerous and highly skilled proletariat which it had at its disposal. There was really no miracle about it, even in Germany. Nor did it signify at all that capitalism was inherently more secure, or more stable. In fact at the heart of the new-found prosperity was a series of contradictions.

11. In the first place, the whole series of policy measures which had served to bring it into being were conditioned by the fact that on a world scale capitalism faced a life-and-death challenge which belied the essential conditions for security. The willingness of the American ruling class to pump aid into Europe, both civilian and military, and to maintain an army on the continent, was a direct

result of the Soviet threat. The military spending, which had played a crucial role early in the expansion, and still has a sustaining effect on European economies, arose from the same source. The willingness of the French and British governments to accept the rehabilitation of Germany—their major economic competitor on the continent—first economically, and then as a political and military equal, arose from the same fears. The establishment of a series of supra-national institutions, though accompanied by a great outpouring of verbal and printed expositions of a supposedly 'European' ideology, was an unpleasant necessity. Somewhere in Strasbourg existed and still exists a Council of Europe where members of European Parliaments convene to weave idealistic verbal patterns which are quickly lost to view behind smoking factory chimneys . . . and rocket sites. Probably few people are aware even of its existence.

12. Lip-service to the notion of United Europe has become a political necessity for European governments, bound together in history's most formidable military alliance ever seen in peacetime and blessed by the Vatican itself. This necessity arises not from the strength, but from the weakness of capitalism's foundations. Ten years of artificial co-operation has not stamped out three centuries of European history. The age-old process of jockeying for positions of political and economic advantage has simply taken on new forms. Whenever the economic situation reveals the possibility that the market may cease to expand or start to contract capitalist interests push for national advantages in the struggle. Military men, and those who pay them, quite ready to see their own position and interests safeguarded by arms and soldiers of other countries, are hesitant to let their own forces pass under the control of others. Only the temporary coincidence of aims provided by the supposed Soviet invasion threat has brought about military co-operation.

13. Each of the big three European states conserves its own national designs and pushes them on every convenient occasion, sometimes brashly, as in the case of de Gaulle, sometimes discreetly, as with Adenauer and Macmillan.

14. **FRANCE.** The case of France is especially instructive. The colonial wars in Indo-China and Algeria, which have fed back a festering stream into the murky waters of French social relations, have made the country the 'sick man of Europe' of the mid-20th century. It is true that there has been rapid economic development, a big increase in production, and extension of modern industrial methods, and, since de Gaulle took over, a strengthening of the balance of payments position. This progress, however

impressive on the surface, has only contributed further social strains which threaten to rip apart the whole fabric and prepare the conditions, once more, for the intervention of the working class on the scene as a revolutionary force. The divisions within the ruling class, and the fury of the petty-bourgeoisie at the adjustments which modernization of the state and economy was thrusting upon them, prepared the way for de Gaulle. The insoluble problem raised for French imperialism by the challenge of the Algerian social revolution brought the whole state machine to the point of breakdown in May 1958, and thus prepared the way for the entrance of de Gaulle.

15. The Fifth Republic is a regime of crisis. The President, playing the bonapartist role to which he is adapted by his personality, and which the state of French society offers him, has been able to bring no fundamental solution to the problems of French capitalism. The economic successes—rising production, a balance of payments surplus, higher profits—have been attained by holding back or forcing down the living standards of the working class. This involved: first, devaluation; second, the imposition of a police-type regime the bases for which had already, in some measure, been established by the Fourth Republic. The strengthening of the state apparatus and the assumption by the President of a role which makes it necessary to balance between discordant social forces and even, at times, to oppose some sections of the bourgeoisie, could only have been carried through with the acquiescence of the working class. The 'achievements' of bonapartism have therefore been the product of a lengthy process going back to 1945. It was, in fact, prepared by the betrayals of the Socialist and Communist leaderships over a period of years in which the working class demonstrated time and time again a great capacity and will to struggle. The failure of spontaneous action to create a new leadership and the failure of the Marxist current to provide in time an alternative led on, therefore, to the defeat of May 1958 and the subsequent listlessness of the working class. Still held in the grip of the old-line organizations, where it has not, for the moment, lapsed into apathy, the French working class has been unable to undertake a real struggle against the regime. On the other hand, it has not been won over to its support; confused and bewildered, it remains a latent force which the regime fears. For the present, the holding in check of the workers is something which the General is pleased to allow the old-line leaders to do for him. He does not seek to smash the trade unions or political parties of the working class because under their present leaders they are less dangerous as they are and because, at times, he can, to a certain extent, lean on the workers

against the other forces which threaten his regime. It was characteristic both in February 1960 and in April 1961 that the threat to the regime from the Algerian ultras and the rebel generals saw the working-class leaders rallying to support of the regime under the cry of defence of the republic, just as they had done in May 1958, for its predecessor.

16. That de Gaulle steers a dangerous course in manipulating the working class in this way is clear. He recognizes its strength by not smashing its organizations, but he seeks to gear it into his system more effectively in order to get some kind of guarantee about its future good behaviour. So far this has not gone very far. The alternative is to play the present game of manoeuvre, which requires a tactical skill and a willingness to take a calculated risk which his successors will be unlikely to possess. But to raise the question of the succession is to realise that no legitimate successor with half de Gaulle's capacity for holding together irreconcilable social forces is in sight. Every threat to the regime, or to de Gaulle personally, reveals the unfathomable abyss which stands before it. The stability achieved by bonapartism is purely temporary, nor can it be more: and the price at which it is achieved involves a more open and violent clash of forces on the morrow. That is realised by every acute observer; it is the all-pervading fear which lurks behind a facade of normalcy and produces gnawing doubts and anxieties at every level of society.

17. The seven-year long Algerian struggle continues amid ever-growing apathy, cynicism and sporadic opposition. The complexities of the Algerian question, and especially the irrepressible, elemental struggle of the masses for land, bread and the right to manage their own country, make it difficult for French imperialism to find a compromise solution or for the nationalist leaders to accept it. The presence of the settlers, as a privileged and racialist group, and the mood of the officer corps—ready, as events in April 1961 showed, to make a bid for power—diminishes the field for negotiation. But French capitalism needs to end the war while preserving its essential stake in North Africa and the continent generally. Its clear-sighted representatives, including de Gaulle, know that some formal concessions have to be made to the nationalist leaders if the field for imperialist exploitation is to be kept open. That means that some inroads will have to be made into the privileges of the European population, handing over to an Algerian government which will have political independence. At the same time, such a concession cannot be made without guarantees from the nationalists regarding European landed estates, investment capital, the Sahara oilfields and military bases. The exact content to be given to 'independ-

ence' and to these guarantees is a matter for hard bargaining, rather than of inflexible principles. But neither side is free to determine the limits of its concessions. De Gaulle has to contend with the 'ultras' and the army; the nationalist leaders with the fighters in the fields and the revolutionary potential of the peasants and workers of Algeria. Both sides want a compromise; neither can have it on terms which they would be willing to accept because of pressures from their own side.

18. On the French side the cleavages are open and dangerous. The 'strong state' of the bonapartist regime consists of elements which are not even unequivocal in their support for the ruler. As the April 1961 events showed, high-placed functionaries and army leaders, in time of crisis, want to know who is going to win before they commit themselves. Everybody knows that conspiracy and plotting are rampant in the state machine and the army. For a long period the fascist terrorist groups were able to organize with impunity and obtain the explosives which they needed for their outrages on a scale which could only be explained by the complicity of army and police officers. Meanwhile large-scale agitation among the peasantry, the section of the petty bourgeoisie most hit by the growing concentration in the economy, adds to the social crisis.

19. The prospect of a smooth development of the regime can therefore be excluded. Further profound shocks are in prospect; the problem of the succession remains an open and insoluble one. The return to a parliamentary system is now discounted even by writers who pass for liberals. The build-up of police power and the arrogance of the military caste offer the bourgeoisie the possibility of rule through some form of fascism as a last resort. Such a solution, of course, passes through a road which involves the domestication or complete breaking of the workers' organizations. Sharp clashes, a re-awakening of working-class resistance—certainly opportunities for a new, militant leadership if it can be built in time—seem to be inherent in the French situation. That does not imply a facile optimism. The disproportion between the size of the vanguard and the immensity of its historic tasks has seldom been greater. If there is a basis for optimism it is in the combativity and capacity for sacrifice of the French working class, embodiment of so many revolutionary traditions, despite its having been worn down by a series of defeats, betrayed and confused by its misleaders.

20. While, despite appearances, the French regime hangs by a thread, poignancy is added to the situation by the intransigence of de Gaulle with regard to NATO. While needing the support of the Americans

as much as anyone else, the present French government jealously seeks to preserve its independence. Behind this lies the fact, firstly, that France has half a million men tied down in the Algerian war, and the government fears that the weight of France in Europe will suffer thereby. Secondly, the Algerian ulcer, which French capitalism itself dare not cut out, invites attention from outside, i.e., from America or the United Nations, to ensure that Algeria does not fall under Soviet influence or go the way of Cuba; this has to be countered at all costs. It is not, therefore, simply that de Gaulle is proud and nationalist. But it is true that the possible consequences of such an independent course, if pursued to its logical conclusion, have caused nightmares to some French capitalists and their political representatives. Hence a new source of division in the ranks of the French ruling class, summed up as in Britain, between having one's own nuclear striking force or sheltering (if that is the right word) behind the Americans'.

21. The capitalist system in Western Europe can be no stronger than its main constituent parts. The French link is, to say the least, doubtful. Knowing this, French diplomacy aims to balance between the British and the Germans, and sell its acquiescence to American plans as dearly as possible. In recent years, and especially since de Gaulle took over, relations with Germany have improved, while those with Britain have deteriorated. Britain, by virtue of her closer position to America politically—deriving from greater material strength—has sought to use this to prevent the European states from pursuing policies which threatened to harm her interests. British policy thus seeks to prevent any power or group of powers from gaining ascendancy in the continent in a way which could harm her trade and political influence, or weaken relations with the Commonwealth and the Sterling Area. The attempt of the European governments, with American backing, to bring about closer economic relations through a customs union brought resistance from Britain, despite its obviously attractive features. Even the French, or at least sections of the French capitalist class, were hostile for some time, since it seemed that the major benefits would accrue to Germany. This reluctance was eventually broken down and, as the European Common Market seemingly showed that important economic advantages could be obtained by French industry, the French government became a stalwart of the new organization. It did so, however, for national ends, just as the British had stood aside, and then formed the Free Trade Area of states peripheral to the Six of the Common Market, for national economic reasons.

22. WESTERN GERMANY. But economic

interests need the backing of state power. A complex series of diplomatic moves has been going on in Europe precisely with this intention. The main lines of force can be said to run from London and Paris to Bonn, a testimony to the great specific weight of Federal Germany in post-war Europe. The British government sees West Germany both as a rival and as a counter-weight to French hegemony in Europe which, given de Gaulle's position on the nuclear striking force and NATO, is regarded as undesirable. In any case, though de Gaulle may have delusions of grandeur, the very upsurge of Germany, and the great astuteness of Adenauer and his colleagues, makes anything like French hegemony out of the question.

23. The re-arming of West Germany under its reactionary government, with many ex-Nazis in key positions both civil and military, constitutes a special threat to the Soviet Union and to the other countries of Eastern Europe. The staggering possibilities of the remilitarization of the strongest industrial capitalist state in Europe are not correctly assessed by the Communist Parties, and are glossed over by West European capitalists for whom Germany is an ally against the Soviet Union. The Communist Parties' campaign against West German militarism has been calculated to evoke a purely nationalist response from the audience to which it is addressed, in direct contradiction to the principles of working-class internationalism. Such propaganda, while formally absolving 'the German people' from blame, makes no analysis of the reasons why the working class has not prevented remilitarization. The present weakness of the German working-class movement must be seen against a background of tragic historical experience resulting from the betrayals of Social Democracy and Stalinism, which opened the way for Nazism. The destruction of the working-class movement from 1933, the military successes of Nazism in the early years of the war, and the plundering of Europe under Hitler's 'New Order', all contributed to the difficulty of overcoming the ideology of racism and nationalism after 1944.

24. The small Communist vote in post-war elections shrank progressively, until, without any mass feeling being aroused, the Communist Party—which had once had strongholds in West Germany—was driven underground. The strong anti-war movement which developed in the '50s lost momentum, and the emergence of the Bundeswehr seems to be accepted, if not approved, by the masses. What has gone wrong? In both cases Soviet policy has a good deal of responsibility. Communist support never regained its pre-war level partly because of the lessons of Stalinism; the behaviour of the Russian occupying forces, the expulsion of Germans from

the Sudetenland and the East, the nature of the regime in East Germany, the continuous flow of refugees—these spoke louder than Stalin's words and cancelled out the memories of decades of working-class struggle more thoroughly than the propaganda of the Nazis had done. Then, in 1956, the Hungarian uprising, coming only a few years after the similar movement in Berlin, helped to convince many reluctant Germans that their rulers were right when they spoke of the menace from the East and the need to rearm. The fruits of Stalinism are bitter indeed.

25. However, the German situation is by no means hopeless despite the fruits of Stalinism and the record of betrayal by the Social Democracy, finally sealed by the adoption of a new programme from which all traces of socialism and class struggle are expunged. There were many reasons why, in the post-war years many Germans should turn away from politics and seek to rebuild their shattered existence. In doing so they unwittingly contributed to the restoration of German capitalism. But this system can do no more than win the temporary allegiance of the mighty German working class. The class struggle reasserts itself every day in factory, mine, building site and office. The German working class will rediscover its strength and throw off the leaderships which have betrayed it. But the task will be difficult and it seems unlikely that the first steps in the struggle against European capitalism as a whole will come from Germany. That is why the working-class movements of France and Britain have a particular responsibility, firstly not to be diverted by anti-German feeling in response to the propaganda of the Kremlin or of their own ruling class, and above all to give aid and encouragement to German workers in struggle wherever they can. For example, though blame has been attached to the Soviet Union for the dampening down of anti-war feeling in West Germany in the '50s, this great movement was also partly dissipated as a result of the lack of support which it received in Britain and France. A Labour movement which supports German rearmament or NATO or the H-bomb can teach the German people nothing.

26. It cannot be assumed that German capitalism has somehow discovered the secret of eternal boom. It is true that the impact of the 1957 recession was very slight. But the very fact that German prosperity has been bound up with a great expansion of investment and exports means that it could be extremely vulnerable to slump. The failure of markets at home and abroad to expand—and the home market does not grow as rapidly as industrial production, hence the importance of exports—could give the signal for a check to investment and to

prosperity. Even without deep depression, a period of insecurity, of sudden shifts and changes, would, under the specific conditions prevailing in Germany, contribute to the militancy of the Labour movement and aid the emergence of a new leadership.

27. It would, however, despite this long-term prospect, be unrealistic not to measure at its full weight now, and in the near future, the economic might of West Germany and to pay detailed attention to the aims and policies of its ruling class. While in the economy the great trusts have reassumed their old position, their political agents, learning from the turbulent history of recent decades, have set out to provide new means for the under-pinning of capitalism. The combination of 'orthodox' economic policy with a monopoly capitalist base and a calculated social policy of concessions to the working class, or its privileged sections, and the buying off of the bulk of the trade union and Social-Democratic leadership, while not new, has been carried through very determinedly by Erhardt and Adenauer. The domestication of the unions—by providing them with the illusion of partnership—and the disciplining of the members by the union bosses are models of their kind. The acceptance by the Social Democratic Party of open collaboration in making capitalism work provides an apparent solidarity in society which must be realistically assessed as a force, making a break-through by a new leadership extremely difficult as long as the economic expansion, upon which it is based, itself endures.

28. Accompanying the upsurge of the economy, directed by the great magnates and by their politicians who are among the most ruthless in modern Europe, are obvious dangers. It is widely recognized today in West Germany that without a continued growth of markets—outlets for the realization of surplus value, in reality—the profit rate will decline and the whole prosperity era may be put in jeopardy. The old premises of capitalist expansion, analysed by Marxists in the theory of imperialism, thus reassert themselves. A drive for external outlets has been going ahead in recent years, both in the Common Market and farther afield. West Germany is a creditor country on current account, the mark is a strong currency. At the same time the potential outlets are narrowed both by the the competition or policies of the other capitalist states and by the 'iron curtain'. It is true that West Germany trades with Eastern Europe and the USSR, but this is not enough. West German capitalists feel the need, for economic and not sentimental, patriotic reasons, to recover their mainly agrarian hinterland in the German Democratic Republic and in Eastern Europe generally. The very development now going on in this area means

outlets for the kind of equipment and heavy machinery which the West German trusts turn out in swelling volume as well as for consumer goods. The pent-up pressure for a drive to the East is reflected in foreign and military policy. Thus the nationalistic and bellicose gesturing of the West German politicians are not mere theatricals or a sop to public opinion; though the latter is sedulously cultivated by the interests which control the venal press and propaganda machine, backed by American would-be liberators who finance and organize the various broadcasting stations and organizations which spearhead the attack at this stage.

29. These tendencies meet with no great organized resistance in Germany today. The Social Democratic Party vies with the Christian Democrats to promote such policies. The new Wehrmacht creates new interests as well as instruments for an activist policy. The Berlin situation provides the focal point for the German internal drive for expansion. It offers means of enlisting support from the NATO powers, for stirring up hatred of the Russians and for creating the necessary atmosphere for new expansionism. The revulsion against war among the masses visible after 1945 is subjected to a continuous propaganda assault in order to synchronize them into the aggressive machine of imperialism as they were pre-1914 and pre-1939.

30. No doubt the Berlin crisis has been used, played up, exaggerated for pre-election purposes, to prepare the soil in Germany, and to show the allies that West German policy is the only one which they can pursue in dealings with the USSR. Neither side has been averse to staging such a crisis, with cynical disregard for the masses whom they manipulate, not to speak of the danger of initiating a chain reaction carrying mankind into nuclear destruction. The crisis atmosphere has been particularly welcome to Strauss and Adenauer for the very good reason that it weakens resistance to the policies which, as agents of German big capital, they wish to pursue and gain support for from the Western governments.

31. The relationship of Britain to continental Europe has, since the war, obviously become much more intimate. For the British ruling class a closer union with their counterparts may be necessary in the face of common danger, but they do not cease to regard each other as rivals. Diplomatic handshakes, hypocritical smiles and carefully worded speeches should deceive no one about the real relations between the European great powers. Relations between the workers of these countries should be quite different. They should not allow their rulers to play them off against each other in wage bargaining or in the course of political

manoeuvring. Indeed they have a true common interest in destroying capitalism in the region which was its birthplace and in creating a unified economy on a socialist basis which really will permit a full development of the productive forces and bring the advantages of a large single market to which so much lip-service is nowadays paid. The United Socialist States of Europe is the watchword which the working class of Britain and all Europe must inscribe on its banner.

32. **BRITAIN.** The situation in Britain, indeed, long the centre of the most conservative Social Democracy, offers immense opportunities. In a way not approached in France or Germany, the traditional relationships in the Labour movement are being undermined and the old leaderships are being seriously challenged. Powerful tendencies have appeared which, with correct leadership, can break from class collaboration once and for all. The gathering of mass forces behind the campaign for unilateral nuclear disarmament is of a different character to the centrist and Stalinist peace movements of the past. The struggle against the H-bomb and American bases means a break with bipartisan foreign policy and thus with class collaboration. It is highly significant that new forces have been entering into these struggles, free from the shackles of cynicism and routine or the goal of political career-making. The impetus which they helped to produce led to the Scarborough decision in 1960 and prepared a favourable situation for a fight to a finish against the Gaitskellite leadership in the Labour Party. Important sections of the rank-and-file, the bulk of the youth and even some trade union leaders swung behind policies involving a sharp break with the bourgeoisie and consequently with their agents in the Labour movement. Yet, after Scarborough, the momentum of the Leftward swing was steadily lost, while the Gaitskell clique, by superior manoeuvring, unscrupulous flouting of conference decisions, and control of the party machine, was able to re-establish firm control and prepare the way for a formal reversal of the decisions in 1961.

33. The reason for this reversal of fortunes is no mystery. It should not be sought exclusively in apathy, in the wiles of the Right wing or changes in the objective situation. The main and overriding factor was the bankruptcy of the alternative to Gaitskell and Co. offered by the Labour Left. Unwilling to embark on a real struggle, putting parliamentary careers before principle, making a fetish of party unity (really an alibi)—they were clearly alarmed by the *logic* of the decisions and by the unremitting struggle, and the challenge, not merely to their Right-wing colleagues, but to the

unstated fundamentals of British political life, which was ahead of them if they sought to translate their conference victory into action. Instead of leadership, then, the 'Left' Social Democrats, true to their nature, could offer nothing but pious hopes, sterile formulas, sham fights and ultimately the face-saving compromises which they could effect in accordance with all the time-honoured practices of their kind. Tamely accepting disciplinary action against themselves, never appealing to the rank-and-file for a vigorous fight, only too glad to find scapegoats on the Left, and seeking for issues around which party unity could be restored, it is no wonder that these sensitive souls are now resigned, with tranquil consciences, to being defeated by the Right. After all, they only want to be an opposition *within* the Opposition; to lead, to accept the *consequences* of their pronouncements, all that is very far from their minds. On the surface then, a return to order is inevitable. But if the Right has reassumed its position as policy-maker—it never lost control of the expression of policy in Parliament—it does so on altered conditions. 1960 and 1961 have shown that it can be defeated. Increasingly its power depends on the carcass of a party, not on a living movement. The youth remains opposed to it in the main. Militant unionists likewise oppose it. Party membership declines steeply. The followers of the 'Left' demoralized but not understanding the reason for the reversal, seek elsewhere for an escape from the dilemma. The Labour Party *crisis* is thus not at an end: only the prologue has been played and all the great chances for the new and developing Marxist leadership lie ahead.

34. The struggle in the British Labour Party has shown that a working-class defence policy is incompatible with a situation in which the big monopolies control the arms industry. Even the House of Commons Committee on Public Accounts has had to admit that no real accounting principle is observed in the arms orders for new weapons. Massive, concealed profits are being made from missiles and their components. A programme of expropriation of the arms industry can have a decisive appeal. But such a takeover would cut deeply into the most profitable sections of British industry in engineering, electronics and chemicals, and thus leads on logically to an all-out onslaught on capitalism with revolutionary implications.

35. The bringing of large trade unions behind such demands means that there is now a movement afoot which is very different from the routine demands of the Left of the traditional type. Twenty years of full employment have built up working-class organization and self-confidence, which makes an employers' offensive on wages and conditions more

difficult than ever before. This built-in strength is of far more fundamental importance than the fact that in some sections there has been a complacent tendency to accept prosperity as permanent.

36. After the false optimism generated before and in the period immediately following the last election, the Tory government has been obliged to admit that a further relative deterioration in the underlying position of the British economy has taken place. These weaknesses, to which Marxists have long pointed, have not been resolved, despite a decade of unprecedented 'prosperity', as is now generally admitted. Lagging investment, and hence industrial production and productivity, means a continuous tendency to fall behind the more rapidly advancing capitalist countries and a diminishing share of world trade. The duality of British capitalism—it is both an advanced industrial country highly dependent on world markets and an international financier and major creditor—creates insoluble dilemmas for policy-makers. To safeguard the international financial position of sterling measures have periodically to be taken which slow down industrial investment and thus hold back competitive power. It is practically impossible to devise policies making possible steady and balanced industrial growth and at the same time maintain and strengthen the exchange reserves and the world position of sterling. The long-standing problems of the oldest capitalist country have not been overcome and the most favourable moment for the capitalist class seems to have passed.

37. Even without recession or depression the strains experienced by British capitalism are appreciable. Inevitably, to diminish their effect on business, the government and employers strike at the working class. The recent emergency measures, especially the demand for a wage freeze, demonstrate once again their desire to overcome their problem at the expense of the workers. So far only a foretaste has been offered. As the position worsens, and especially if it should be complicated by recession and a slowing down of the growth of international trade, stiffer measures will be imposed and a new wave of class battle will begin.

38. The trade union bureaucracy, like the Labour Party Parliamentary leaders, tries to confine struggles to the negotiating table, and openly collaborates with the employers against shop stewards and rank-and-file organizations. But the militants in mining, engineering, the ports and elsewhere will gain strength from the Left-wing trend in the field of foreign affairs and defence even if, at the beginning of the process, these two trends are separate and appear, superficially, to be opposed to each other. For example, the announcement that Polaris bases

were to be built on the Clyde must have appeared to workers in a high unemployment area as a new source of jobs and higher wages. But the existence of a growing movement against nuclear war preparations had effects locally as well as nationally. It is likely that industrial action against this political-strategic move will mark a new stage in the struggle for jobs and wages as well as against the H-bomb.

39. The attempt of British manufacturers to escape from the confident and highly-organized workshops of the Midlands to areas where wages are lower and competition for jobs keener has also met with resistance. Such moves represent the search for means to keep down costs in view of the increasing difficulty of maintaining car exports; they therefore arise directly out of the deep-seated problems of British capitalism.

40. It is the task of revolutionary leadership in Britain to link these issues and to bring the movements against the H-bomb, colonial atrocities, capitalist economic attacks and the decay of culture into relation with the general crisis of capitalism. By its active participation in rank-and-file movements of the workers and linking them up with the international and colonial struggles it can build a mass revolutionary movement and Marxist party in

Britain. The preparatory tasks undertaken especially by the Trotskyists in the Labour Party and through their theoretical and propaganda work are the basis of the construction of a revolutionary party.

41. Such a revolutionary party, having won the confidence of the mass movement, will assert the political independence of the working class. With this perspective, it criticises the various petty-bourgeois and centrist trends which, from theoretical confusion, pessimism and lack of confidence in the class, seek another way. The British Socialist Labour League recognizes the prime importance of a struggle to defeat the class which treasures the H-bomb and the American alliance as the only protection of its social existence. That struggle leads up to the taking of state power. Charting such a course, the British working-class movement will call on the workers of Germany, France, the USA and Japan to fight a united campaign against war preparations. At the same time it will sever all ties of domination over colonial and dependent territories and lend active support to the defeat of the reactionary European settlers. It will withdraw support from the national bourgeoisie and bonapartist leaders in the underdeveloped countries since they block the victory of the colonial revolution.

iii) United States Capitalism

1. The performance of the American economy in the period since the last recession has been far from spectacular. In the course of 1960 it ran into a phase of stagnation, especially in the steel industry and the durable goods industries. Spreading unemployment has been a feature of the last quarter of the year until it reached a peak higher than at any time since the war. The failure of the US economy to grow at more than 3-4 per cent per annum is felt all the more acutely in view of the rapid rates of growth achieved in the USSR. The apologists for American capitalism draw some consolation from the high wage level and generally higher standards of living, and claim that the growth rate is not so important. Nonetheless, without continued growth profitable investment opportunities decline, the system loses its mainspring and has to be sustained by continued injections of Federal help which largely takes the form of opening up a means for the realization of surplus value through the arms programme. Even normal replacement of plant increases productivity 2-3 per cent per annum in the US, and so reduces the demand for labour while the size of the labour force is growing. Any disturbance

of economic conditions therefore opens up serious prospects, and an unemployed army of 5-6 million is now accepted as inevitable even by bourgeois economists.

2. In the period since the war the involvement of the American economy with the world market has become more intimate than ever before. Europe had to be preserved for capitalism. American economic policy and strategic policy were geared closely together with the aim of providing the world conditions for the continued existence of American capitalism. Isolation was no longer practicable, nor was the involvement merely an economic question—it was backed by a closely co-ordinated network of American bases, by planes and missiles poised for instant action and fleets ploughing the oceans of the globe. This was to be the American century but only if the world revolution could be held in check and pushed back.

3. American alliance with the weakened ruling classes of Europe saved capitalism in its old home, but it was not without its problems. For one thing

Book Reviews

At great expense

The Price of T.U.C. Leadership. By Bryn Roberts. Allen & Unwin, 16s.

This is a badly written book. Indeed it barely deserves to be called a book. It has no coherent and logical argument; it is repetitive in a rather tedious and amateurish fashion. A lot of words strung together between two hard covers. Nonetheless it is important because it raises problems which should not only be aired but which, in the interests of the Labour movement, should be solved.

Bryn Roberts is critical of the structure of the trade union movement and of the men who dominate it. He complains of the untidy, illogical structure which results in senseless competition between unions for jobs or for members and in conflicting industrial policies and he complains of the leadership to which this situation gives rise—arid, conservative, unimaginative. In particular he lays into the General Council of the TUC. This body, smug and self-indulgent, is mediocrity incarnate. It excludes non-conformists from its ranks if at all possible. Persons such as Frank Cousins are members by accident rather than intention. A consequence of all this, Bryn Roberts maintains, is a low status amongst workers, no mass recruiting campaigns, bad publicity, and reactionary industrial policies. The criticisms are valid ones.

The solution according to Bryn Roberts is industrial unionism. He would like to see 30 or 40 unions roughly comparable in size serving all of the workers' interests and he thinks the re-organization could be achieved through the initiative of a group of radical leaders. Throughout the

book personalities are emphasized. It is understandable that one who is a leader himself should think that leaders are so important. But it is a mistaken emphasis.

The form of the trade union movement, its traditions, its conservatism have resulted from the country's industrial conditions; as those conditions change so the movement responds. In other words the forces for change come from the bottom, not the top. It is in the workshop that the forces mould new forms of organization. So we must look at the shop stewards' organizations for signs of the new format and we must encourage those organizations to develop. Bryn Roberts recognizes that shop stewards are important but as an afterthought. They are mentioned in a brief last chapter. In any positive criticism of the structure of the trade union movement they must form the core. Anyway, read the book. It is rare enough indeed just to have the thoughts of a practising trade union leader. **V.A.**

Useful statistics

Trade Union Officers: A Study of Full-Time Officers, Branch Secretaries and Shop Stewards. By H. A. Clegg, A. J. Killick and Rex Adams. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 32s. 6d.

Mr. Clegg and his assistants have done a useful job of research, within very considerable limits. The limits are imposed by the approach, which is empirical to the nth degree. Capitalism exists and the workers have developed organizations to serve their interests within its framework. The organizations have, of necessity, become staffed with full-time officers.

Their number is estimated at around 2,500, servicing some 9½ million trade unionists. How well do they function as officers? Is their quality rising or falling? Are the problems of recruitment, staffing and training being satisfactorily dealt with?

Some of the results of this survey are interesting and one or two are important. As a by-product, a new and useful method of classifying trade unions emerges. The traditional classification into craft unions (like the ASW), industrial unions (NUM) and general unions (TGWU) has long been recognized as unsatisfactory. The authors have developed their own system of classification into five types: General, Single-Industry, Skilled, Ex-Craft (AEU, AUBTW, ETU, etc.) and White Collar. This is certainly an improvement and can be useful for future analyses and discussions on the complex structure of British trade unionism.

Of more doubtful value is the authors' attempt to compare the quality of officers in four different unions—the TGWU, AEU, NUGMW and ETU. It occurred to them that 'personnel officers were the largest group who come into frequent contact with union officers', so they sent them a questionnaire. The results, which might have been anticipated, showed no perceptible difference between the first three unions, while the fourth came comfortably bottom. Since the table of trade union growth rates, given by the authors in Appendix 6, shows the ETU as having increased in membership much more rapidly than the other three, this result shows nothing except political prejudice among personnel officers, as one of them came near to admitting.

Contrary to some current impressions, trade union officers are not

under-paid, their salaries having increased by about the average for all salaries over the last 20 years—though salaries as a whole have increased less than wage rates and much less than earnings. The same is true of trade union staffs (numbering about 4,000), though there are some very bad individual cases of under-payment and the organization of trade union staffs for collective bargaining is far from satisfactory.

Another misleading impression which the authors' findings refute is that, with increasing opportunities for workers to rise into the salaried group, the educational level of trade union officers must decline. In fact it is rising, the proportion of grammar school products being higher in the lower age groups, particularly among the under 40s. The number of shop stewards in Britain is probably about 90,000, and though this is a rough estimate, the number given by the TUC in its 1960 Report as 200,000 is clearly an over-estimate.

There is a lot of information of this kind, much of it quite new. The authors do not draw, and do not want to draw, any far-reaching conclusions. They are satisfied to have done a thoroughly competent job of systematic fact-gathering. **H.C.**

Wesleyans and others

Methodism and the Trade Unions. By Robert F. Wearmouth. Epworth Press, 6s.

'What the working classes of this land owe to religion and to Methodism in particular has never been fully portrayed,' contends Mr. Wearmouth in his preface. This book sets out to tell it. An orthodox, although as always appalling picture of working-class conditions in the 19th century is followed by a rather dreary list of trade union pioneers, who shared in common their Methodist convictions, but who range from the heroes who faced deportation and starvation to those who sold out for knighthoods (Mr. Wearmouth has equal praise for both).

Methodism was founded by a Tory who served his party well in providing a powerful distraction for the working class from the world's real problems. Much of its success in the

19th century, however, lay in its emphasis on education and democratic organization, and it was inevitable that it should attract many of those whose hatred of servitude also made them zealous trade unionists. But the real contribution of Methodism, though not apparent to the five Tolpuddle Martyrs who were Methodists, is revealed by Mr. Wearmouth when he says 'these trade union leaders, outstanding in many respects, were distinguished by the nature of their activities. They were never revolutionary'. Or, of Thomas Burt, 'he showed by his demeanour and influence that the government of the day had nothing to fear from the representatives of the working-class population'.

It is no surprise to find that Mr. Wearmouth, so safely appalled by posing today's problems not as the continued oppression of the working class, but as individual and minority rights, the risks of political power in the hands of the unions, the influence of communism, and (he oddly thinks 'for no apparent reason') the declining Methodist appeal. **A.B.**

A cleft stick

Parliament & Public Ownership. By A. H. Hanson. Cassell and Company, 30s.

This book deals with the conflict between democracy and bureaucracy in the nationalized industries. Mr. Hanson, however, can think of democracy only in the bourgeois sense of periodic elections to Parliament. And since he also regards bureaucracy as 'one of the inevitable and irreversible consequences of the technological revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries', he finds himself in a cleft stick. 'Business-like efficiency in administration', he says, 'would appear to be incompatible, at least to some degree, with democratic control.'

Outspoken bourgeois economists, such as Joseph Schumpeter, denounce any suggestion of popular participation in government and insist that the main economic agencies must be as free from 'interference by politicians' as from 'fussy citizens' committees' or the demands of their own workmen.

Mr. Hanson is uneasy about such

extremism, but his view of society would seem to impel him to the same conclusions. Thus his book reads like a tortuous attempt to avoid the logical results of his own social outlook.

He examines *ad hoc* committees, autonomous public corporations, semi-autonomous bodies; he compares the merits of 'unitary' or 'federal' constitutions, of centralized or decentralized administration; he discusses how much or how little supervisory authority Ministers or MPs should have; he assesses the value of Questions in the House, and of Select Committees. All this is both exhaustive and exhausting.

But he has very little to offer at the end. He advocates departmental forms of administration, together with a wide delegation of authority to some kind of internal board (composed—needless to say—of 'top managers'). In addition, he suggests a 'measuring agency' which could undertake an annual examination of the nationalized industries.

This is pretty thin. But Mr. Hanson's problem is that he sees industrial development as something quite separate from democracy. The latter is—in general—'desirable', so some way has to be found of grafting it on artificially, in such a way as to cause as little disruption as possible.

Thus, Mr. Hanson writes from the standpoint of one entirely caught up by the Establishment. The existing State forms are an accepted framework of society. They may be modified here and there by extremely clever and suitably 'distinguished' people, but no significant changes are expected. In 237 pages about the nationalized industries, the workers in them barely rate a mention.

As for the possibility of a different sort of State, with workers' control of industry, this is utterly beyond Mr. Hanson's comprehension. He dismisses it in a single paragraph as an idle dream ('a combination of the best features of Athenian democracy with the spirit of William Morris's "News from Nowhere"'). Stalinism, to him, has proved it impossible. Like other former members of the Communist Party who have moved to the Right, Mr. Hanson makes no distinction between Stalinism and Leninism.

This is a conservative book, by a conservative writer. It is all the more depressing since, at one time Mr.

Hanson was at least on speaking terms with Marxism. **G.G.**

Attlee sahib

A Prime Minister Remembers. Earl Attlee and Francis Williams, Heinemann, 21s.

Francis Williams interviews Earl Attlee on his war and post-war memories. The interviews are supplemented by extracts from Attlee's private papers.

From all this a picture of Attlee emerges—this in turn, being a picture of Social Democracy in action. The picture is far from pleasant.

Gone is the myth surrounding Attlee. He does not appear as the quiet, mild-mannered, doodling leader. Instead, we see Attlee and the rest of the Labour Party leaders as nothing more than 'social-imperialists', as Lenin described their type.

If this sounds a harsh judgment perhaps these few quotations will set doubts aside. There are many more like these in the book.

Attlee on India in the war: Williams: 'Do you think you helped things by ordering the arrest of Gandhi and Nehru—a decision that you yourself actually took, as I remember, when Churchill was away and you were in charge?'

Attlee: 'Yes—it was necessary.'

Williams: 'Why was it necessary?'

Attlee: '... If they chose to set themselves against the government in war they had to answer for it. ...' (pp. 205-206)

Attlee vigorously defends the dropping of the atom bomb insisting that '... on the knowledge we had we were right. ...' (p. 74)

When Attlee took office in 1945, so used was he to collaboration with the Tories both in the war and pre-war (on the India Commission) that Williams records: 'He (Attlee) had invited Churchill to return to Potsdam with him in the same capacity as he himself had gone there in the pause between the election campaign. ...' (p. 69.) Attlee certainly tried, but Churchill declined.

Nevertheless, recorded in the book are the warm letters that passed between Attlee, Bevin and Churchill

from 1945 to 1951. Complete identity of views between them on foreign policy is revealed. They were an absolute trinity in their hatred of the Soviet Union.

Williams: '... And, you don't think you sacrificed too much independence 'to get America in? ...'

Attlee: 'Of course not. Without the stopping power of the Americans the Russians might easily have tried sweeping right forward. I don't know whether they would but it wasn't a possibility you could just ignore. ...' (p. 171)

Thus did Attlee and the whole Right wing help to create the imperialist war machine of NATO with its rocket bases and its constant threat of nuclear annihilation. The Cold War and Hot War (Korea, etc.) policies of the Labour Government unfold before the reader page by page until it is kicked out of office.

Unwittingly, Williams' book helps to justify the sharp criticism that Marxists and other rank-and-file Left-wingers levelled at the Attlee government for its betrayal of socialism at home and abroad.

It would certainly take an expert—nay, a diviner—to find in Attlee's recorded conversations any semblance of a socialist content bar the usual clichés about 'humanity' which politicians of all hues frequently utter.

H.F.

From the inside

Science and Government. By C. P. Snow. Oxford University Press, 9s. 6d.

The real purpose of this book is to demonstrate that in the advanced capitalist societies of the West, scientists must be employed at all levels of government; so that the USA, Britain and so on can compete effectively with 'societies that look to the future', notably the USSR.

The shortcomings of the existing use of scientists in the West are illustrated by the Lindemann (Lord Cherwell)/Tizard controversy, which takes up the bulk of the book. As soon as Churchill came to power during the last war he saw to it that his friend and adviser Lord Cherwell displaced Tizard to become the effective scientific director of the country.

Churchill and Cherwell were for the strategic bombing of Germany; Tizard and other scientists were against it from the start, advising that it would cost Britain more to carry out than the damage to be inflicted on German war production. In the event, Tizard was proved correct. Clearly, in a matter of vital concern to the prosecution of the war, personal influence, caprice and self-conceit had triumphed over a rational appreciation of the situation. Thus the author urges the rational employment of scientists at all levels of government and administration, as against promotion by knowing people in the right places.

The author has been both scientist and administrator. While recognizing that administrators tend 'to become masters of the short-term solution' whereas scientists can know 'what a future-directed society feels like', the book bears the stamp of the administrator. For no amount of adjustment in the art of government can make a society devoted to production for profit into a society geared to production for use. Only government based on working-class power will be able to remove the anarchy in production relations and allow scientists to work in harmony with the needs of society.

The necessity for secrecy and 'closed politics' inevitably prevents scientists from full and free discussion and influencing government decisions as they should. Thus the more rational use of scientists in government is discussed within the context of 'above politics'—but not before the author briefly recognizes that the abolition of nation-states will mean the abolition of 'some, though probably not all, secret choices'. Even in a limited way, C. P. Snow is obliged to reach some conclusions fundamental to the concept of international socialism.

R.S.

Managerialism

Power Without Property. By Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Sidgwick & Jackson, 15s.

This is yet another in the long list of books attempting to show that capitalism has been transformed. This basis of this particular variation on the theme is three-fold; the

growing power of the consumer to dictate the goals of the economy; the increased planning of the government and, most important, the separation of ownership and control, with the attendant growth of a professional managerial class in control of the big American corporations.

More exactly, Berle shows that in the post-war USA the vast majority of capital formation has come from sources internal to the firm; ploughed back profits, depreciation allowances and so on. Increasingly the rest is supplied by pension trusts and insurance companies.

To a growing extent both the control of the big firms and their investment programmes are falling into the hands of a non-owning salaried managerial class. Berle concludes from this that managers, as non-owners, will be less interested in profits—they can take wider social issues into account and be more willing to respond to pressures from the consumer and the government. In his final chapter Berle suggests that, because of this growth of a managerial class in the USA, the basic economic power structure is in essentials fairly like that of the Soviet Union.

Even accepting Berle's version of the 'managerial revolution' (and British research would suggest that Burnham's followers have over-stated their case considerably) one cannot accept the conclusions which he draws from it. In the first place, Berle's picture of the consumer's relationship to the economy has recently been rejected by a fellow-adviser to Kennedy, J. K. Galbraith. In *The Affluent Society* he admits that big business, via high pressure advertising, sets the goals of society. More importantly, Berle fails to examine the basis on which the managers hold their power. The fact is that, because they function within a capitalist economy, they must expand their capital or die. To continue to play the game they must abide by the rules. They have no choice.

Finally, in comparing the USA to the USSR, Berle offers no explanation of the latter's tremendous economic progress, now in sharp contrast to the present under-employed American economy. In 1917 capitalism was abolished and it was on the basis of the planned

economy then established that the Russians recently launched a man into space and will soon overtake America in terms of production and income levels.

One cannot help noting the similarity of the arguments in this book to those of Burnham and of C. A. R. Crosland in his *Future of Socialism*, the latter of course being the theoretical foundation on which the Right wing in the Labour Party are trying to abolish Clause 4 and remove the socialist and class content from the Labour Party's programme.

G.P.

White hope

The Road from Sharpeville. By Bernard Sachs. Published by Dennis Dobson, 18s.

Too much of the recent large output of writing on South Africa, has been of dubious value; and here is a book saved from the opprobrium of Socialists only by the weakness and confusion of the author's presentation. For it is hard to take seriously a writer whose pages are splattered with name-droppings—'. . . as Burke . . . Schopenhauer . . . etc. . . said . . .'—and who suggests that the greatest peril to the Nationalist regime 'comes from beyond the borders of South Africa, as the agitation about boycotts and sanctions gathers momentum'.

He finds the 'only hopeful sign' in the 'vigorous opposition' of Sir de Villiers Graaff, leader of the United Party; and, in his hopeful quest, he discovers anew 'the one ray of hope' in the growth of moderation within Afrikanerdom.

Bernard Sachs' purpose, which protrudes uneasily from the muddle, is to advertise the case for the Progressive Party, the all-white offshoot of Smuts' (all-white) United Party. This group is anxious to build bridges to moderate African opinion, and it proposes to assimilate 'by a steady process every black man who reaches a certain level of civilisation'. In the Africa of the 1960s, this must be irresistible.

It is no accident that he discusses the emergence of African political consciousness, virtually without refer-

ence to the independent efforts at political programmes and organizations; or to the debates, splits and re-formations, which constitute the stuff of the political struggles in South Africa. On this, Bernard Sachs' gaze barely falls; tremulously he looks backward, at the 1922 Rand strike in which he himself participated, at the organization of the Garment Workers' Union by his brother, Solly Sachs.

How sad it is to see a one-time fighter floundering; and how distressing that his muddy thinking has been exposed to print. T.B.

Double-dealer

Lawrence of Arabia. The Man—and the Motive. By Anthony Nutting. Hollis and Carter, 21s.

This is an interesting and readable summary of the best previous studies of T. E. Lawrence. It includes a useful review of the contradictory pledges given by British authorities to the Arabs, Zionists and French in the First World War for the 'settlement' of the Middle East, and it brings out some of the underlying strategic and economic antagonisms in the area.

However, it fails to convey Lawrence's originality as a strategist or his literary power; it misses both the lessons and the excitement of the Arab 'Resistance'.

As usual, Lawrence is 'explained' by inexpert 'psychological' speculations based on evidence that is fragmentary, contradictory and probably faked by Lawrence himself. This time, it is his alleged discovery that he was a masochist, getting satisfaction from suffering, that 'explains' his crisis (not, as in Mr. Rattigan's play, his alleged homosexuality).

There is no reason to stress Lawrence's eccentricities. Parsonages and public schools turn out many gifted individuals who administer, soldier or preach and by clinical standards are distinctly peculiar. The history of 19th century India is full of them.

Lawrence was by no means the first to find through what filth lies the road to greatness in the service of imperialism. Most individualists make some personal adjustment between their consciences and their

careers. The Establishment is experienced in domesticating original talents. It did not deny Lawrence his chance to settle down.

Some of the gifted eccentrics sweat out their souls in prayer. Some commit suicide. Some, like Lawrence, try to retire, tortoise-like, within themselves, to lead lives detached from social conflicts. When they succeed it is always at the cost of mutilating themselves.

Lawrence showed in the RAF that he had no insuperable difficulty in accepting authority. His real tragedy is that he saw the whole business of imperialism as a personal affront to his honour and not as a conflict of social forces.

For instance, Mr. Nutting has usefully disinterred the unpublished document in which in 1922 Lawrence could quite categorically 'put on record my conviction that England is out of the Arab affair with clean hands'. Nutting also quotes Churchill's explicit statements that, as Chief British Representative in Transjordan in 1921 Lawrence 'restored complete tranquillity' by stopping his old friends and allies from raiding the French mandate in Syria.

So much for the legend of the 'tortured conscience'. Lawrence remained a patriot. He could not understand his own role in history. Only Bolshevism could have saved him. But his whole Oxford training and associations blocked that road; his equipment for social analysis stopped with what he had learned from the Homeric epics, at the level of individual heroism.

His tragedy is not at all unique in our times. How many other gifted individuals, much closer than he ever was to Marxism, have been wasted because, in resentment at having been deceived by Stalinism, they turned their backs on politics? J.A.

Outspoken Tory

Wilfrid Scawen Blunt. By The Earl of Lytton. Macdonald, 30s.

In the year 1922 there died a man who, for the greater part of his 82 years of life, had been a fearless,

outspoken and courageous opponent of Queen Victoria's Empire, and the friend and supporter of many leaders of nationalist causes. His name was Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and, his ferocious anti-imperialism apart, he was in every respect an unmitigated Tory. To this day his commentaries and prophecies on foreign affairs, particularly on Far and Middle-Eastern affairs, have the embarrassing quality of relevance. His ideas on the rightful yearnings for self-determination of subject nations—many of which he regarded as having cultures and traditions not only older than our own but also, in some cases, rather superior to them—are still such as might cause a riot at a Tory Conference, and perhaps even at a Labour one.

Blunt was born in 1840 and married Byron's grand-daughter in 1869. He was a 'fox-hunting, land-owning, wealthy aristocrat . . . man of letters . . . poet and publicist'; a diplomat of 10 years' standing; a breeder of fine horses; also that rare spirit; a gentleman whose views were quite as independent as his income. In short, something of a megalomaniac but one of high principles (except, perhaps, in a matter of sex) and great abilities.

His story is inevitably a denunciation of British mendacity—as well as that of other European powers—perpetrated during his lifetime in the Middle and Far East, not to mention in places nearer home (in 1887 his part in the Irish Home Rule troubles of the day earned him a two months' sentence in Galway Gaol, one of his prosecutors being no less than the redoubtable Edward Carson). Often he appears as a reactionary bombardier with the weapon of revolution, firing heavy broadsides at Liberal governments for the illiberality of their policies. And when he was not fighting governments he was fighting members of his family.

As Bernard Shaw observed, the English are always ready to recognize a man of genius, provided that he is pointed out to them. The Earl of Lytton points his finger unequivocally in the direction of Blunt and, though one may suspect the natural bias of a grandson, his book reveals Blunt as an outstanding personality. His story is not merely well told; it was worth telling. R.M.

Theological niceties

Nuclear Weapons and Christian Conscience. By Ed. Walter Stein, Foreword by Archbishop Roberts. Merlin Press, 12s. 6d.

That this book is tremendously progressive by the standards of the Roman Catholic Church does nothing to prevent it being reactionary by any other standards. The very discerning reader will be able to extract from the morass of metaphysico-theological reasonings the fact that the writers are arguing the case for unilateral nuclear disarmament. In the words of the editor, 'There is now no moral alternative to an unconditional renunciation of "the deterrent".'

It has to be admitted that, as metaphysico-theological reasoning, some of that contained in this book is of the highest order. This is especially true of those sections contributed by the two most skilful and devious members of British academic philosophy, G. E. M. Anscombe and Peter Geach, both of whom are Catholics. However admirable as pieces of scholasticism, these reasonings are no substitute for the political analysis that must precede tactics against the H-bomb, and war in general. Such a political analysis is, of course, completely alien to Catholicism, and would lead to some rather painful conclusions about the role of the Church.

Miss Anscombe's section is the nearest the book gets to political theory, and she doesn't seem to be acquainted with any of the developments in political thought since Hobbes. It is her view that 'to think that society's coercive authority is evil is akin to thinking the flesh evil and family life evil. These things belong to the present constitution of mankind', and that 'the world is less of a jungle because of rulers and laws, and . . . the exercise of coercive power is essential to these institutions as they are now'. But we search in vain for any attempt to understand the origins and functions of institutions which defend their existence by coercion. It is a platitude to say that institutions defend their own existence: the important question is—in the interests of which class do particular institutions function?

Anyone less concerned with what Marx has called (in another context)

'metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties' would have preferred some explanation of the campaign of Catholic Action against Frank Cousins, the attempt by Catholic Action to take control of the ETU and the activities of Catholic Action in the AEU and its support for the H-bomb policy of Gaitskell and Brown. Workers have more to learn from Catholic Action bomb-lovers in the TU movement than a thousand abstractions. C.W.

Mr. K

The Life and Times of Nikita Khrushchev. By Roy MacGregor Hastie. Panther Books, 2s. 6d.

This book provides interesting background reading on the history of the Soviet State. Although it deals more adequately with the 'life' than with the 'times' of Khrushchev there is no serious attempt to analyse his political development. It concentrates rather on the macabre intrigue amongst the 'top people' of the Soviet bureaucracy. Hastie's criticisms are seldom objective and are made in a loose, almost frivolous (though occasionally poignant) vein which the subject does not warrant. 'Hitler was frightened of Stalin. He was even more scared of Stalin than Stalin was of him.'

Most of his comments flow directly from his political position which is clearly 'Western orthodox'. Nonetheless he cannot conceal a sneaking admiration for 'Nikita'—the sort of admiration most broad-minded individuals concede to opportunist statesmen who have risen from 'nowhere' at the expense of better men.

It is apparent from this book that Khrushchev had a very scanty general education and a brief acquaintance with Marxist theory. The author demonstrates well Khrushchev's complete lack of principles, his ruthlessness and political cowardice—particularly in his very competent investigation of the Tukhachevsky affair (it will chill your spine!) but he regards Trotsky and Stalin's other opponents as having no political significance other than as obstacles to the careers of Stalin and our hero, Khrushchev. In a biography this is perhaps understandable but it is evident that Hastie regards them: all

as rogues, the fittest of which survive.

It is interesting to note that Khrushchev was on common ground with Trotsky in believing that Stalin employed the New Economic Policy too long. But after losing his position, Khrushchev decides to dance to Stalin's tune. 'He who goes quietly goes furthest.'

Khrushchev put himself and his career before his principles. While Marxists were being persecuted, Khrushchev said: 'Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin, the "Rightists" have been beaten in our Party, beaten in the Moscow organization which is ideologically united around the genius of our leader Comrade Stalin.'

The important part played by Khrushchev during the wars of intervention and the second world war are well written against a background of enormous sacrifice and suffering of the Russian people who manage not to intrude often into Hastie's book.

There are also the odd snatches of humour: 'Five thousand miles away in a Welsh mining town another revolutionary, Aneurin Bevan, was learning his trade. It was as if Fate had decided to forge a link between these two.' (Khrushchev worked in a coalmine.) In the light of the present-day political scene, this quote has interesting connotations. M.J.

Voice from the lottery

People and Life: Memoirs of 1891-1917. By Ilya Ehrenburg. MacGibbon & Kee, 21s.

'Many of my contemporaries have found themselves under the wheels of time. I have survived—not because I was stronger or more far-seeing but because there are times when the fate of a man is not like a game of chess played according to rule but like a lottery.'

Ehrenburg was certainly lucky. Stalin's monsters murdered people on a points system. Points were awarded for being a party member, an intellectual, a Jew, prominent in the state apparatus and for long residence abroad. Anyone with five points out of five was practically certain of a death sentence; with four points there was a very high probability, with three a strong possibility. Ehrenburg's

score was four and luck must have played a large part in his survival. Political acumen must have accounted for the rest.

Ehrenburg will never be awarded the highest marks for courage. But his memoirs reveal, a little surprisingly, a very commendable honesty. There is a vivid picture of the hyper-sensitive, middle-class student drifting, with his generation, into the Bolshevik Party after the 1905 revolution. Forced to leave Russia, Ehrenburg moved to Paris. He immediately fell in love with the city and, in particular, with its bohemian fringe. The artists and revolutionaries who frequented the Rotonde argued and drank, painted, wrote poems, fell in love and contracted T.B. The intense, hungry, wasteful, creative and quintessentially romantic life fascinated Ehrenburg. The atmosphere of Paris in the Quartier Latin and around the Rotonde is beautifully conveyed in these memoirs. Rivera, Modigliani, Leger, Picasso, Lunarcharsky and countless others throng the pages. Ehrenburg has written novels and poetry but only in his journalism does his talent find full expression. This is essentially pre-1914 Paris of the bohemians seen by a journalist of genius. It also explains the man.

Ehrenburg was committed primarily to art and incidentally to politics. That he excelled only in the art of journalism is beside the point. As an art critic he is responsive if not very profound. When the time came to sell himself to Stalin, Ehrenburg did so, with what compunction we may learn in a later volume. While writers were being murdered by the score Ehrenburg stayed silent. It was all he could do if he were not to join them in front of the firing squad. When Stalin and Zhdanov stifled the soul out of Soviet writing, Ehrenburg stayed silent, for the same reason. The moment it became possible to speak out he did so. Now, with his accustomed acumen, he gauges how far it is expedient to go, and goes a little farther.

The book is peppered with hints of colleagues done to death. It is a cautious defence of formalism, rootless cosmopolitanism and everything that is alive in contemporary Soviet culture. The translation, by Anna Bostock and Yvonne Kapp, is superb.

H.C.

Out of his depth

The Writer and Commitment. By John Mander. Published by Secker & Warburg, 25s.

This is an ambitious book, and it fails because the author has merely flirted with a subject which requires scholarly attention and reflection. John Mander discusses 'commitment' as if the debate on engagement in literature began with Sartre in the 1940s. Georg Lukacs he dismisses in a footnote and one or two cursory allusions. Marxist aesthetics, he informs us, is simply the substitution of sociological analysis for literary criticism; and Marxists demand that art promotes action.

Now this is a little presumptuous of Mr. Mander; had he followed the mid-19th century debates of the philosophical circles in both Germany and Russia on tentatiousness in literature; had he grasped Lukacs's aesthetic system, and had he read Trotsky on Literature and Revolution, he could have avoided these dilettantish generalities. And had Mr. Mander been but a little humbler, he might have clarified his concepts and saved his readers much needless wading through turgidity and confusion.

The notion that good art must be party art, that it must conform to political standards, and that only Marxists are good artists, is not seriously held even by Stalinists today, and was never held by Marxists; and it is dishonest of Mander to imply this. Criteria of judgment are being explored by writers, literary critics and academicians. Marxists do not claim to have a formula, though they have made a larger contribution to the field than Mander realises.

In the critical essays on Auden, Orwell, Angus Wilson and Arthur Miller, the author assesses their works in terms of an ethereal concept of commitment—a concept characterised mainly by what it is not. In the last two chapters on Thom Gunn, John Osborne and Arnold Wesker, he mercifully abandons his game of catching shadows and produces some provocative criticism; and we are temporarily willing to forget his theme.

Having geared his book to defining commitment, he will not admit that

if this is to mean anything at all, it implies being committed to an outlook or ideology. All that he ultimately says is that commitment is the sum of what he finds artistically satisfying, and this involves the integrity of the writer. Thus, what we come down to is that all serious writers are serious in their outlook—a statement not as trite as it would appear, but certainly little contribution to the discussion on commitment.

In addition to his central theme, there is a preoccupation with the irreconcilability between Marx and Freud. This he does not treat from an ideological point of view; in fact he feels there is no need to enter into technical details and philosophical tradition. He attempts to illustrate this incompatibility by pointing to the irrelevancy of certain sociological data in some of Angus Wilson's short stories (in 'Such Darling Dodos') which are written primarily on a psychological level. It is true that in the instances he cites, Wilson does fail to integrate his psychological and sociological insights; but on such evidence, Mander's thesis must remain unproven.

A great deal of shallow logic dominates the earlier essays: thus after quoting Orwell on the probable dependence of certain virtues such as bravery and loyalty on the social context which gave rise to them, Mander chastises Orwell for supposedly wishing to retain a modest degree of evil in the world. To this Mander dazzlingly suggests that we would be better off without these evils and the 'questionable virtues that go with them'—the very point which Orwell seems to be making.

It may seem surprising that a number of reviewers have referred to Mander as a Marxist (after all, isn't he apt to describe a story as 'being round a dialectical skelton?'). Another appellation will however have to be found; and perhaps his comments on the Spanish Civil War will assist in this. He criticises Orwell's account, and when it comes to choosing between the 'Trotskyists' (here he means the POUM) and the Communist Party, he leaves no doubt as to where he stands, but adds:

'There is not much doubt that the communists were, in a practical sense, correct, though whether a communist dictatorship in Spain would have been preferable to a Fascist one

is a question few people would care to answer.'

Young men with facile talents are generally a bit of a bore; but here we have someone only moderately well-informed, posing as a universalist. It's exasperating. **B.T.**

The Diggers

Comrade Jacob: A Novel of the English Revolution. By David Caute. Andre Deutsch, 16s.

A novel written in terms of political tendencies and with insight into these, is rare. In this book the author examines the conflict in the period after 1649 within the ranks of those who made the English Revolution. So sure is his grasp of the historical material, that from the motives and actions of the characters emerge the aspirations of the various sections within the insurgent camp: the gentry, the Presbyterian churchmen and the army officers who sought to conserve their gains, and the craftsmen and small farmers who aimed at extending the revolution.

The novel is primarily concerned with the Diggers, a group dismissed in most erudite works as visionaries and fanatics. Their attempt to establish a form of primitive communism on a stretch of land in Surrey is depicted as the strivings of the propertyless to live with dignity by their own labour. This impassioned effort was doomed, not because communism is foolhardy, but because the forces ranged against it were too virile.

Although David Caute's own sympathies permeate the book, he avoids oversimplifying the motives and personalities of the Diggers' adversaries. So too, the participants in the experiment are shown as rounded persons, subjected to pressures, and not as bodiless embodiments of ideals.

The 'historical novel' is in many respects an unhappy medium. The novelist is bound to explore actual men in actual situations and in this sense both structure and characterization are partially pre-determined. Further, even the reader not fully steeped in the particular period may be uneasy at the author's imaginative reconstruction of historical figures' inner thoughts and personal desires.

Caute's novel does not always escape contrivance in composition and artificiality in style; but its virtues outmatch the deficiencies.

A largely ignored aspect of the English Revolution springs to life, and the author's understanding of political conflicts makes this a significant study of men and women participating in, or flung into, revolution.

B.T.

Sorel

Radicalism and the Revolt Against Reason. The Social Theories of Georges Sorel. With a translation of his essay on The Decomposition of Marxism. Irving L. Horowitz. Routledge and Kegan Paul, 30s.

The turn of the century was marked by a crisis of socialist theory as well as of bourgeois philosophy and social thought. The work of Georges Sorel reflects the two crises, but contributes nothing to their solution or their understanding. His stress on the spontaneous consciousness of the masses was not the predominantly healthy reaction against bureaucracy and opportunism which expressed itself in a similar stress among the German Spartacists (as Horowitz suggests, p. 65).

It was the basis for imposing on the masses the 'myth' developed by some outside political leadership. Since the masses are irrational, the programme which unites them need not be a true reflection of their class interests; it need only express some emotional whole which attunes social action to these interests. Horowitz does manage to point out, if a little laboriously, the contradiction between this outlook and the possibility of a rational social science.

Despite his attacks on the bureaucratic degeneration of Marxism in the old Social Democratic parties, Sorel ended up with an exactly parallel attitude to the masses. Their consciousness was to remain an amalgam of immediate impressions from their environment and the unconscious, irrational springs of human action. The only men who would really grasp what was going on would presumably be the 'myth-makers'. Just how their consciousness sepa-

rates itself out from the irrationalities of the mass is unexplained, as it is in all bourgeois sociology, even in its best representatives like Mannheim.

This is the real weakness of Horowitz's analysis: the crisis in bourgeois social theory and the anticipations of the split in the international Marxist movement at the turn of the century were part of a single process, the entry of capitalism into its final, imperialist phase. In Social Democracy, this phase expressed itself through the opportunism of the labour aristocracy; in bourgeois sociology, in the triumph of pessimism and the collapse of any unified historical outlook.

Sorel reacts to both of these without understanding their basis. Consequently he ends by combining many of the worst features of both. He was unable to develop a theory related to the actual course of struggle of the proletariat. His ideas were essentially those of the helpless petty bourgeois in the imperialist world. This, combined with the extreme stress on irrationality, made his theories so welcome to Mussolini.

Unfortunately Horowitz is firmly in the stylistic tradition of modern sociology. The many quotations are welcome oases, though they do not seem to have provided sufficient refreshment to the proof-readers.

C.S.

New model army

Civil War in Russia by David Footman. Faber & Faber, 35s.

This is an attempt at an objective history of the Civil War which raged in Soviet Russia from 1918-1920; a Civil War which Germany, Britain, France, the United States, Japan—joined forces with the Russian Whites to destroy the first workers' state. The author, however, finds it most difficult to conceal his sympathies with the counter-revolution and especially with Nestor Mahkno, the Ukrainian anarchist whom he describes as the 'revolutionary' leader in closest touch with the peasant masses.

Two factors emerge clearly from this admittedly incomplete study of the period. Without the speedy building of an efficiently organized,

equipped and disciplined Red Army the October Revolution would have been crushed by its internal and external enemies. And it was Leon Trotsky who was the chief architect and creator of the first proletarian army in the world.

When the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, they had given little thought to the military requirements of the new state. The Red Guards had played a decisive role in the seizure of power, but the Red Guards were never more than militia. To meet the threat of the Kornilovs, the Wrangels and the Denikins—the still powerful remnants of the old regime, and especially to combat the growing menace of the Czechoslovak Legion in May 1918, something more was required—a new type of army, a Red Army devoted to the Revolution. The Bolshevik leadership entrusted this all-important task to Trotsky, as Commissar for War. After the fall of Simbirsk, he was sent to the Volga where the greatest danger to the Soviet power threatened. He found there an atmosphere of defeatism and panic.

'The fresh Red detachments,' he wrote, 'arriving in vigorous mood, were immediately engulfed by the inertia of defeat . . . Despite all this the Revolution was saved. What was needed for that? Very little . . . The first requirement for success was to hide nothing, our weakness least of all, not to trifle with the masses but to call everything by its right name.'

How refreshing it is to recall that the real Bolshevik leadership believed in telling the masses the truth, to call defeats defeats and retreats retreats. How different from the behaviour of the Stalinist epigones who even in the agony of the Nazi victory of 1933 could only mutter 'after Hitler—us', and talked blithely of victories in Spain when Franco's forces were already battering at the gates of Madrid.

Those who still believe that Stalin's 'positive contributions' to the Revolution outweigh his 'later' crimes, will find no consolation in this book. His name is mentioned only twice in passing and the legendary epic defence of Tsaritsyn, which in the Stalinist interpretation of history became the very lynch-pin of the whole Civil War, is scarcely referred to.

C.V.G.

the revival of European economy, however much desired by the American ruling class, has led to a relative growth in the political bargaining power of the European ruling classes. The greater economic self-dependence of European capitalism has also had a number of new consequences. For one thing American private capital has been attracted into Europe on a greater scale than ever before, taking advantage of a market growing more rapidly than in the US and of the lower labour costs which prevail there. Thus in 1960, while investment at home has been falling off, investment in manufacturing industry overseas, especially in Europe, has grown. Moreover, though some American manufacturing plants abroad compete effectively in the US market, there has also been, in 1960, a growth of US exports to Europe and Japan. Indeed, the continued economic boom in these areas has helped to counteract the sagging market at home both for raw materials and capital equipment. The involvement of the US economy with the world capitalist market takes many new forms which have potential consequences unlike those to which we have become accustomed in the past. It is important that America's growing tendency to export capital will have consequences and contradictions different from that of the older powers. This export is in large measure to the imperialist countries and old capitalist powers themselves.

4. A sharp reflection of this has been the weakening of the dollar as a result of the large and continuing balance of payments deficits of the past two years. The vulnerability of the dollar reflects, in part, the greater strength of other currencies, especially the mark, as well as the world commitments of American strategy involving high military expenditures and aid to under-developed countries. Higher interest rates in European centres have also led to transfer of funds, and these speculative movements have become frenzied when dollar devaluation has seemed likely—as happened between July and September 1960—further contributing to the difficulties of the dollar. To meet this situation some cuts have been made in overseas spending and attempts have been made to shift some of the foreign aid responsibilities to other NATO countries. In the meantime, US exports have to be stimulated—which means increased competition for the European and Japanese exporters already faced by declining sales. At the same time, American business becomes increasingly dependent on the state of the economies in which these sales are made. Thus if continued expansion in Western Europe in the future helped to soften the recession in the USA the onset of a recession in Europe could play back on the American economy in a way not previously experienced. It is wrong to think of world capitalist economy as being set in a particular mould once and for all.

5. However, it is a big step from underlining these recent difficulties of American capitalism to suggesting its imminent decline as a world force. The difficulties of the dollar must be seen against the background of America's vast productive power and strategic position reinforced by growing capital investment throughout the capitalist world and especially in the advanced countries. They do not threaten the existence of capitalist property relations to the same extent as do the problems of the old imperialisms, whose economic expansion in recent years is much more superficial. But the inability of the US economy to grow rapidly or to dispense with massive arms spending shows that even the strongest capitalism is in crisis. Each recession leaves a higher irreducible margin of unemployment, each boom narrows the field for new investment. Surplus value is still being extracted and realized at an expanding rate, but the rate of expansion is slowing down, and stagnation, if not deep slump, is the order of the day. The prestige of capitalism tends to shrink even in the USA, then, as it fails to face up to the Soviet challenge and to use rationally the technological possibilities of the century.

6. Meanwhile American capital faces the largest proletariat in the world which it has inevitably called into existence. The American working class has built up a high wage level and powerful organizations to bargain to maintain and increase these levels within the limits imposed by capitalism itself. It cannot, however, transcend the bounds fixed by its proletarian status. It has more means of consumption available, but it is still wage labour. It has skills, but these are liable to rapid depreciation as a result of technological advance, as a result of the decline of whole industries or in times of recession. Meanwhile the concentration of industrial power in the hands of giant corporations is immense and the objective conditions are being prepared for socialism.

7. The outstanding factor in the American situation is the weakness of the independent political movement of the working class and the smallness of the Marxist party. Yet for the world defeat of capitalism a frontal onslaught on its main stronghold in the Western hemisphere is indispensable. Therefore great responsibility devolve upon the American movement, responsibilities which cannot be fulfilled without absolute clarity and a firm political line. The SWP works in an environment which has many features which can debilitate and discourage individuals and movements. The strength of the American ruling class, the high standard of living for those who succeed in the rat race, the corruption of the union bureaucracy, the lack of political traditions of independent struggle among the workers, divisions between different layers and groups along lines of racialist ideology and discrimi-

nation, the pervading influence of the capitalist propaganda machine, the betrayals of the old-line leaderships, the easy slide into pragmatic methods and theoretical accommodation—all these dangers beset those who seriously desire to build a socialist movement in the United States.

The revolutionaries in the SWP need periodically to check over their own political work against these dangers. In a position of relative political isolation, of constant battle against the current, a diversion from true course can creep up unsuspectingly. A search for a shorter way, for alliances which may impose accommodation to alien trends, for regroupments without solid theoretical bases, for programmatic adaptations to suit what are assumed to be American peculiarities—these have constantly derailed American socialists in the period since 1917. The attention of the leaders of the SWP must be constantly directed to such dangers, as they may affect their own policy and thinking.

8. Nonetheless, in recent years some advances have been made and there are signs of a break in the American ice-block deep down in several key layers of society. Among the youth there has been growing criticism of the American way of life and an audience for various trends which reflect its cultural barrenness. A school of critical writers has emerged from petty-bourgeois bohemia and has canalized much of the protest into individualist and negative channels. Considerable success has attended critical studies of various aspects of American society which show how it alienates men and dehumanises them, but without pointing, or even desiring to point, any way out. Social pessimism and escapism are rampant, enmeshing the radical youth but at the same time leading the best of them to seek a way forward and a positive political alternative. Socialist ideas have been received more readily in the universities. The threat of nuclear war has stirred an anti-H-bomb movement into being similar to its British counterpart if, as yet, less important.

9. But the most important developments have been among the oppressed groups of American society, especially the Negroes. Breaking through the routinism and accommodation associated with the 'talented tenth' who in most areas dominate their big organizations such as the NAACP, new forces and new leaders have come from the ranks of the students, youth and industrial proletariat. By direct action and mass campaigns against segregation and for human dignity a magnificent example has been shown to the American working class in general. Without being carried forward with mass support from the organized workers, white and coloured, the movement could only achieve small and partial successes, but it has started something rolling which

can have great consequences. It has been shown that it is absolutely vital to strike deep roots into the negro masses from whom come the most exploited sections of industrial and farm proletariat, who suffer all kinds of political and economic discrimination and who can provide fresh forces and an invaluable source of revolutionary energies. The same can be said of a number of other minority groups who form part of the sub-proletariat on North American soil, especially the Puerto Ricans and the Mexicans. Sustained work among these sections is absolutely vital.

10. In various industrial battles, some small and limited, others nation-wide such as the 1960 steel strike, the American working class has itself shown a great fighting spirit and an unexcelled capacity for sacrifice and solidarity. The potential of the American working class remains unlimited. It is therefore a priority task to bring to it the political understanding which can use this potential for a struggle against the wage system which supports the American ruling class, itself the strategic underpinning of capitalism as a world system. There is no room for politics based on exceptionalism or exclusiveness. The very international ramifications of American capital—which clearly are designed in part to undercut the wages and conditions of American labour—impose an international outlook.

11. The electoral campaign in 1960 brought a change of administration with a fairly evenly divided popular vote. Undoubtedly many American workers voted Democrat in the hope of change in American policy both abroad and in respect to anti-Labour legislation at home. The SWP made an important contribution by posing a third choice and attacking those currents in the radical movements which openly or shamefacedly backed the Democratic Party, including the Communist Party.

The policy and conduct of the Kennedy administration since it took over confirms the view that the political custodians of American capitalism have little power of choice. Their course of action is determined essentially by the needs of the monopolies, and the international setting of the conflict between the two incompatible world systems leaves little scope for presidential initiative. The new President took over in a period of growing embarrassment for American capitalism both at home, where economic stagnation prevailed, and internationally. It was soon shown, not only that he had no intention of reducing arms expenditure, but that he was determined to uphold the interests of the US against the threat of revolution. The interventionist policy pursued in Laos and the abortive invasion of Cuba by puppets manipulated by the Central Intelligence Agency left little room for

illusions about Kennedy's foreign policy.

In dealing with the recession, Kennedy showed little desire or ability to take the initiative: more handouts to the jobless, but no major departures in policy. The slow revival that set in, still leaving a high level of unemployment, and the relaxation of pressure on the dollar pushed the economic problem temporarily into the background. Moreover, the worsening international situation, by mid-year as bad as it had been for nearly a decade, by bringing higher arms appropriations, helped the upward swing of economic activity. However, a real and growing problem of stagnation dogs the US economy. While, in an emergency, Kennedy will no doubt more readily increase the Federal budget and use government supports for the economy more liberally than his predecessor, there are strict limits here, too. Moreover, the Republicans were unable to reverse a trend which issued from the dire straits of the economy back to the '30s. In fact, outside the arms programme, the Federal budget is relatively small; the bulk of civilian public expenditure is controlled by State and local government not necessarily affected by the change in presidency or by the Keynesian ideas which are current among Kennedy's advisers. In any case, the international problem of the dollar sets limits to reflationary policy based on lower interest rates and budget deficits. A further flight from the dollar could make devaluation, or possibly the demonetization of gold, inevitable and strike a blow at American financial standing and international prestige. These dilemmas of American policy reveal great opportunities for exposing the crisis of capitalism, the linking up of separate struggles and the bringing of the growing unemployed army into action together with their employed brothers.

12. In terms of American conditions there is no justification for presenting the struggle for peace as something separate from the struggle of the classes. There is not the faintest prospect of a 'peace-loving' section of the American capitalist class appearing. The influence of Stalinism, while now extremely weak as far as the numerical strength of the Communist Party USA is concerned, still manifests itself in the radical movement. It shows itself in the acceptance of the 'peaceful co-existence' conceptions of Khrushchev, in illusions about disarmament agreements and the United Nations along the lines of the petty-bourgeois and 'new Left' currents in Europe. Such trends seek to bypass the class struggle, put their faith in Summit talks and arrangements between leaders and hope that the claws of American imperialism will somehow be drawn without a real fight. Phraseology and programmatic statements which compromise with these illusions must be condemned, as much as should be any

failure to point out the actual reactionary role of the Soviet bureaucracy at the present stage. Of course, with anti-Communism fostered by the vestiges of the Social Democracy and injected into the trade union movement and intelligentsia via the State Department, the banner of defence of the Soviet Union against imperialism must at all times be held aloft by the Marxists. But this cannot mean compromise with the Soviet bureaucracy, with its slogans and arguments or with its American stooges. Nor for that matter should the opportunist taking up of Leninist theories by the Chinese lead to sight being lost of the fact that the Chinese leadership is also an historical impediment to the spread of revolution in the Far East at the present time.

13. Further opportunities for building the international revolutionary forces in the United States are offered by the fact that the world involvement of American imperialism has evoked a widespread popular resistance in many countries. The State Department has tried to find and support docile political leaders overseas with whom it could deal on questions such as the establishment of military bases, missile sites and airfields ringing the Soviet Union. In general, especially in the less developed areas, this has necessitated dependence upon the most reactionary forces in the old feudal classes or the national bourgeoisie. However, such regimes are basically precarious, frequently corrupt and incompetent, maintaining themselves by graft, police rule and oppression of political opponents. No wonder, therefore, that one explosion after another has taken place in these adjuncts of the 'Free World' from Korea to Cuba. In the past year or two, American-propped regimes have been dislodged in Turkey, Korea and Cuba. Mass demonstrations have occurred in Japan and even in Formosa against American policy. Latin America is seething with resistance to 'Yankee' imperialism. All such signs reveal the revolutionary possibilities in the present world situation.

14. The toppling of unpopular regimes has been largely the result of the leadership of students, youth and some radical sections of the working class. They have not, however, been followed by the installation of revolutionary governments but merely of new teams selected from the petty-bourgeoisie and the military and civil bureaucracy. Consequently the revolutionary drive displayed in the mass upsurge has subsided without concrete results. The whole weakness has been the lack of a revolutionary Marxist leadership in these countries, thus underlining the prime task of creating such a leadership on a firm basis in preparation for the coming struggles. Such struggles, however, must scrupulously avoid a chauvinistic anti-Americanism. The main enemy

must be clearly indicated as the national bourgeoisie and American imperialism. At the same time the best contribution which the American working class can make to these movements, as well as to prevent

them taking an anti-internationalist course, is to sharpen the struggle against their own ruling class and to raise slogans in defence of the revolutions abroad.

iv) The Belgian Strike and its Lessons

1. In December 1960 and January 1961 the Belgian proletariat fought a bitter general strike against the government. In this struggle the objective necessity, in that period of a Marxist leadership implacably opposed to all opportunism, and with a clear perspective of working-class power, was strikingly demonstrated.

2. Belgium is one of the old industrial countries. Since the second world war the Belgian economy has enjoyed expansion and relative prosperity. Here, on a small scale, took place a dress rehearsal of the situation likely to confront the working class in the other countries in the coming period. The lessons to be learned from it are of the utmost importance and the most general kind. If those lessons are learned in time, other working classes may avoid having to experience the bitterness of defeat and the sacrifices of the Belgian workers will not have been in vain.

3. The strikes were detonated by the economy law brought before Parliament by the Eyskens Catholic-Liberal coalition government. This law was intended to place on to the shoulders of the Belgian working class—including government employees and white collar workers—the burdens of Belgian capitalism. Belgian capitalism is old, and in some ways inflexible. It has the worst record on the continent for new industrial investment and for the increase in industrial production. It has to cut costs and improve productivity if it is to compete with its rivals both within the Common Market and on the world market. The events in the Congo, while not bringing big immediate losses, aggravated the creeping crisis and determined the capitalist class and its government to take sharp measures to safeguard profits and to demonstrate its mastery of the internal situation. The law was a move in the sharpening class struggle, which it brought to a head.

4. In the working class, especially in the centres of heavy industry in Wallonia, a powerful mass pressure developed for a showdown which the leaders of the Socialist Party and the Confederation of Labour could not resist. Ignoring moderate appeals for token strikes or a postponement until the re-assembling of Parliament on January 3, the pressure

for strike action had by the middle of December become irresistible in many centres and trades. It was not a general strike which was planned and called for from the top; it was spontaneous, in the sense of being forced on leaders from below and developing according to the level of consciousness in the different layers of the working class.

5. The reformist leaders, masters of an organization powerful and close-knit as far as material means are concerned, were suddenly placed in a position which they had not sought. The Socialist Party leaders, who had never led much more than a routine demonstration or a move through the corridors of Parliament, were largely effaced. The trade union leaders, powerfully entrenched in their regional strongholds, came to the fore, Renard* of Liege claiming the most attention.

6. Neither the Social-Democratic parliamentarians, the trade union bureaucrats, nor the Stalinists could provide the necessary leadership, confining themselves within the limitations of bourgeois institutions. Instead of slogans of struggle there was only a call for the passing of the law to be prevented. There was no policy or programme expressing the will of the working class to do battle. The main object of the leaders, to judge by their actions, was to ride the wave, adapt themselves to the conditions of the moment, respond to the mood of the rank and file and hang on until some formula was found which could bring a way out.

7. In the trade union strongholds of Wallonia,† where the strike was solid and the possibility of establishing workers' councils existed, the trade union leaders went furthest in the direction of concessions to the pressure from below, but they kept the movement under close control. Here, then, a fighting posture was adopted, but without the essential preliminary of finding a tactic and staking a claim for power. With the masses keyed up and geared to the leadership, nothing happened beyond

* Leader of Metal-Workers' Union: a Left-centrist with syndicalist leanings.

† Heavy-industrial, French speaking area of Southern Belgium, with some parts suffering from pit closures and unemployment.

demonstrations and speeches obviously devised as a reflection of day-to-day currents and moods. In fact, the movement, however powerful in appearance, turned round in a closed circle beyond which stood the gendarmerie, the army and a government apparatus prepared to fight on.

8. Consistent with their reformist nature, then the leaders hesitated, drew back or just waited. Seeking a way out which would save face with their followers and convince themselves of their own self-righteousness, the Walloon leaders turned to federalism. The linguistic and religious division presented a ready-made excuse which in the circumstances could be made to appear plausible. In fact, the hold of the Church in the Flemish-speaking North and the inability of the Socialist unions to break away from the relatively low-paid, less class-conscious Flemish workers from the Catholic trade unions follows, in part, from lack of leadership in the past. The same political attitude which relies on spontaneity in the South justified waiting for the same spontaneity in the Catholic North, so that this theory played its classic role of surrendering the workers to bourgeois consciousness. The Flemish workers are written off as backward, as a kind of reactionary mass doomed to remain tame instruments of clerical reaction. In the meantime, surveying their predominance in the South, the leaders fall back on a change in the political structure of the country which would give them a majority on the basis of which they assume they would be able to carry out 'socialist' experiments.

9. In the meantime, the position of the Walloon leaders does nothing to break the hold of clericalism, does nothing to build a bridge to the Catholic workers, many of whom, in the early stages, had shown a willingness to strike even at the price of breaking with their own trade unions. Indeed it tends to reinforce the hold of the church and contributes to the miseducation of the Flemish workers.

10. This attitude betrayed an empiricist method of adaptation to the circumstances which the centrist trade union leaders like Renard consistently followed. Despite his demonstrations of impatience with Parliamentary limitations, Renard proved incapable of advancing a programme more advanced than that of the Socialist parliamentarians.

11. The solidarity and enthusiasm of the working class was not matched by audacity on the part of the leaders, as could well have been predicted. The energies of the class were dissipated in the listening to speeches, of the kind usually made only on Sundays, marching in processions and chiefly in waiting for something to happen, nobody knew

quite what. Instead of waiting to see what the government would do, workplaces should have been occupied, works and strike committees set up, defence guards formed and a basis laid for extending the struggle. Lacking such a lead and seeking their own path forward, the militant sections turned to aimless violence, window-smashing, sabotage and so on. The will to struggle was dissipated, those sections with the least stamina, as in Brussels, soon turning away and going back to work.

12. The leaders, then, hung back. They did not, in fact, accept the responsibility of leadership, and their unwillingness to seek a way out of the impasse played into the hands of the government. Eyskens and his colleagues played a shrewd game and conserved tremendous assets. They had the radio and a large part of the press, which still appeared despite the 'general' strike. They had the gendarmerie, as well as the police, and brought back from Germany part of the NATO contingent. Plenty of repressive power was in evidence, or it was common knowledge that it was kept in the background. It was used in such a way as not to exacerbate class feeling and no doubt with a knowledge of the likely reaction of the strike leaders. Hence there was no attack at the heart of the work-class organizations, the leaders were not arrested and their movements do not seem to have been restricted. The government policy was to let the movement burn itself out.

13. That is what happened. The length of time which it took largely depended upon the degree of class consciousness in different regions or layers of the class. Thus it weakened quickly from its peak in the North apart from two or three places. In Brussels it rose to a peak and assumed a mass character but was not sustained owing to the lack of perspective. The South was almost totally strike-bound and the workers remained determined to the very end of four weeks, even though for the last two weeks the strike was collapsing in other parts of the country.

14. Tremendous opportunities clearly existed in Belgium if a leadership had been in existence to counter that of the Socialist Party and trade union apparatus. No such alternative existed or emerged, nor could it have done unless careful and sustained work had been applied to this task over a number of years.

15. The position of the Communist Party offered, and could offer, no such alternative. Its policy was completely subordinated to the requirements of the 'parliamentary road to socialism'. Its slogans did not go outside the limits set by the Social Democracy and were well within those of the Left wing. It

coupled respect for parliamentary forms with a pathological desire to win acceptance on the Common Action committees set up by the Socialist Party and trade unions. Its call to the coalition parties to dissolve parliament and have new elections, in order, amongst other things, to conserve the prestige of 'our' parliamentary institutions, was a measure of its degeneration. It operated the policy of putting on pressure and generally acting as a shadow of the reformists. The adoption of such a policy in the situation of a general political strike is a clear indication both of the decline of the Communist Party as a political force and of the opportunist character of Stalinism.

16. On the Left wing of the Socialist Party, especially its youth movement, and to some extent in the trade unions, a Leftward current has been evident for some time but has failed to dislodge the old-line leaders. This section was likewise unable to break out of the impasse, despite the raising of what seemed to be more radical slogans. Its essential weakness lay in the fact that it has not built, and apparently has not sought to build, an alternative leadership, which, however small, could have built up a recognized and authoritative position with the militant workers. Such a revolutionary cadre force could have become of central importance in the strike. Such a cadre was absent because the Left wing's criticism of centrism was a purely formal criticism. Both before and after the strike the so-called Left wing conducted itself in a way which was itself entirely centrist in character. In practice it was also for putting on pressure, it sought to feed ideas and policy through the rank and file, or directly, to the trade union leaders such as Renard, with whom it had, apparently, established a relationship based upon convenience and not upon any real agreement about tactics or policy. In fact, Renard showed up his 'friends' by himself being prepared to push only, and that not very effectively, one part of the Left programme—that for 'structural reforms' in line with the minimum programme of the Socialist Party.

17. Though the Left wing may have gained some support, and may grow as a result of the experience of the strike, it is clear on analysis that it shared responsibility for the failure of the strike.

18. The experiences of the Left wing, centred on 'La Gauche'* is especially instructive in view of the other points made in this resolution. The policy and activity of the group around 'La Gauche' is an embodiment of the strategy and tactics of a

group of so-called Marxists. In fact this tendency has since 1953 consistently advocated and practised the subordination and even liquidation of the revolutionary cadre in centrist currents of the traditional apparatus (Pabloism). This has obviously resulted in a series of compromises in which, in order to win what can be represented as an 'influential' position, clarity on principles and programme has been lost. Becoming prisoners of the centrists, looking more and more like them until the difference was only formal—a matter of vocabulary and a more analytical treatment of problems—was the unhappy but politically inevitable fate of these 'Marxists'. More, it meant that they were unable to give a lead in the situation arising from the strikes, both because of their past misorientation and of their adoption of a minimum programme while the strike was on. In particular, they lost the opportunity of bringing the working class, by going through experiences with it, to a higher level of consciousness. This could have been through a series of concrete transitional demands which posed the problem of power while corresponding to the immediate needs of the strikers. To support instead a 'minimum programme' of reformist character, no matter with what reservations, was a betrayal of revolutionary responsibility. This experience confirmed at the same time the basic correctness of transitional demands as against reformism on the one hand, and the need for rejection by the Fourth International of those revisions of Trotskyism which led to the split of 1953; they now stand finally revealed as fundamentally centrist revisions, utterly unsuited politically to this revolutionary period.

19. On the most general level the Belgian events teach that the prime necessity is to build a revolutionary cadre. This task cannot be evaded by any consideration of immediate tactical success or to win approval from centrists of other tendencies. It cannot begin if major theoretical questions are not brought forward for discussion or if efforts are made to form combinations in which principled questions are put to one side. It cannot begin by support for centrist 'personalities' or the establishment of relationships which involve concessions on principle. It is not too late for the Belgian movement to learn, especially because of the existence of a vigorous socialist youth movement, at present considerably influenced by Pabloism.

20. Internationally the lessons are of even more importance than for the Belgian proletariat alone, and the full discussion of them is part of the theoretical preparation which the Trotskyist movement must undertake.

* 'La Gauche': Left-wing newspaper.

IV The Colonial Revolution

i) General Principles

1. The liberation struggle in each backward country must be viewed as part of the general crisis of imperialism. The roles of classes and parties must be assessed against the background of the needs of imperialism in this crisis. The strategy and tactics of working-class revolutionaries must flow from such an all-round appraisal.

In every process there are partial exceptions for temporary periods and in special conditions; there are even periods of limited advance in sectors of the imperialist world even though the general tendency is one of decay. It would be a betrayal of Marxism to base the policies of any national section of the Fourth International upon 'exceptional' phenomena. The basic general characteristic of the colonial revolution, as part of the world socialist revolution, remains the incapacity of any but the working class to lead the masses out of the morass of imperialism. This fact necessitates a strategy of building revolutionary Marxist parties with a programme of workers' power.

2. The revolt of the colonial masses has forced the imperialist governments to hand over political power to representatives of the colonial petty-bourgeoisie who stand in the leadership of the nationalist movements. Large sections of bourgeois opinion, particularly the European settlers in African colonies, oppose this strategy of international finance-capital in its immediate aims. In South and Central Africa, the conservatism of these elements inhibits the prospects of installing native bourgeois governments acceptable to the African population. A continental civil war is the result, in which moderate leaderships are very quickly exhausted. Whether native governments have been granted constitutional rights, or whether armed conflict is still in progress against imperialist troops, or the United Nations Organization and its agencies are 'ensuring stability', the Marxists must strive above all to establish the leading role of the proletariat and its party.

3. Despite much talk of economic development, the international monopolies have neither the desire nor the possibility to bring about a balanced industrial advance in the under-developed countries. The advance of the colonial revolution has not prevented them from making temporary deals with the national bourgeoisie which permit continually increasing investment. The governments of the advanced countries, directly or through international organizations, have also provided economic aid as part of the political bargain with the new governments. Uneven development has continued and been intensified as investment has gone on rapidly in areas with valuable raw materials, notably oil and minerals generally, while neglect and stagnation—aggravated by world price movements—severely afflict large populous areas of the 'third world'. While in a large part of the world there has been no solution to the secular problems of poverty and exploitation, the interests of capitalism promote further accelerated development in the already advanced areas of the world: the disparities of income and levels of development become more sharply accentuated.

The very position of the national bourgeoisie, ruling countries crippled by decades or even centuries of imperialist plunder and distortion, unable to break from corrupt and decadent feudal or pre-capitalist elements in the old society—landlords, money-lenders, tribal chiefs, etc.—and tacitly accepting or even encouraging the continued presence of the monopolies as decisive factors in the economy, makes it inconceivable that it can carry through economic development in the interests of the masses.

4. In this situation the imperialists see the need for what is called a 'pre-investment phase' in the colonial and newly independent states. It is hoped that the basic work can be done, in conditions of relative social peace, for later industrialization to take place. Kennedy advocates the freeing of all

African trade, the dropping of the old colonial preferences, so that eventually there can be the free movement of capital and the creation of large consumer markets upon which modern industrial capitalism depends. (Another motive here is to make access to European markets easier for Latin American primary products, in order to ease the position of specifically American political and economic interests in the Western hemisphere. Thus the antagonisms *between* the imperialist powers still militate against any ideal solution for the system.) The instruments for administering this pre-investment phase are the nationalist petty-bourgeoisie who staff the 'independent' governments and the international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund, International Labour Office, etc.

5. The political role of the new governments cannot be judged on any formal criteria, or on the basis of their professions of political faith. Nationalization of basic industries and services is in fact recognized by the imperialists as a necessary prerequisite for the creation of capitalist conditions. There is conscious encouragement by the imperialists of 'democratic socialist' parties and ideologies as the most efficient instrument for this purpose. Here again the role of Social Democracy in the advanced countries as a support of imperialism is confirmed. Just as Social Democracy finds new bases of support in the bureaucracy of the centralized Western states, so does it adapt itself to the need for just such a bureaucracy in the backward countries. This bureaucracy is largely a state bureaucracy, for it is completely accepted by modern finance-capital that state control of the economy is a necessity in the present stage of development.

6. Just as the Social Democrats of both Right and Left welcome the petty-bourgeois nationalist leaders of this governing caste in the colonies as a progressive force, so do the Stalinists. Faithful to the theory of 'socialism in one country', they welcome the 'progressive role of state capitalism' in the present situation. Thus they evaluate classes and parties in terms of the supposed natural stages of some independent, national economic evolution, rather than on the basis of understanding imperialism and the socialist revolution as an international whole. As always, these theories are not accidental distortions of Marxism, but the ideologies of definite class tendencies in the Labour movement. On the one hand, the labour aristocracy and bureaucracy in the advanced countries empirically adapts itself to changes in the structure of imperialism, and this expresses itself in social democracy. At the same time, the Soviet bureaucracy, whose petty bourgeois interests stand between the Soviet workers and the achievement of the world revolution which can

complete October, develops through the CPSU its programme of the 1920s, suited to the conditions of the bureaucracy of an isolated workers' state, to the present phase of 'peaceful competition'.

7. The objective effect of these opportunist trends is to lead the colonial workers and peasants into defeats at the hands of imperialism. While the middle-class leaders make their peace with the monopolies and banks, the Communist Parties disarm the working class politically by accepting the theory that the time for independent working-class politics is not yet ripe. This has in fact led to the strengthening of the new ruling classes in Indonesia, Egypt, India, Iraq and elsewhere, and in many cases to the physical extermination of many advanced workers. The Stalinist and Social Democratic betrayals in the advanced countries also have their effect in preventing the development of just the kind of support there which the colonial workers need. The conduct of the French Communist Party in relation to Algeria is a classic example.

8. The turn of the imperialists to concentrate on investment in the advanced countries, the accelerating development of science and technique, the production of new synthetic materials which destroy the market for the backward countries' products, all of these increase the unevenness of capitalist development and ensure an accelerated pace of struggle in the backward as well as the advanced countries. The days of the petty-bourgeois leaders are numbered, and they cannot maintain for long the *crisis bonapartist regimes* which are the general tendency after a few years of 'independence'. In these struggles the task of the Marxists is to grasp their opportunities by building independent proletarian parties as sections of the Fourth International, with a programme of workers' and peasants' councils. All theories which 'discover' that the petty-bourgeois leaders will themselves carry through this socialist phase of the revolution are not only false and superficial, based on temporary and partial phenomena, but in effect constitute a dangerous revisionist tendency.

9. A correct class estimation of these national governments is also essential to an understanding of their role in world politics. The existence of the powerful Soviet Union enables some of these rulers to achieve a stronger position standing between their own masses and imperialism; they try to balance in a similar way in international diplomacy. The ideology and practice of 'neutrality' is only an extension of their class role at home. Thus Soekarno of Indonesia and Nehru of India help to foster the illusion that world peace can be ensured through the goodwill of influential statesmen who

will bring the warmongers to their senses. At the 1961 conference of neutral powers, all questions of the economic and social development of those parts of the world dominated by imperialism were put aside for the 'main task' of 'an initiative for peace'. Naturally the Social Democrats, even of a 'Left' variety, as well as the Stalinists, welcome any line of action which prevents the masses themselves from solving the problem of war through the overthrow of imperialism. These 'neutralists' will balance between the power blocs so long as their fate is not decisively threatened. But they are essentially part of the world bourgeoisie, and will take sides with it.

10. It is clear that the policies of support for the nationalist petty-bourgeoisie in the backward countries, 'peaceful co-existence' on the international arena, 'peaceful roads to socialism' in the advanced countries, and 'socialism in one country', in the Soviet bloc, are part of a single whole, a counter-revolutionary political trend which is fully hardened and which must be opposed in the most determined fashion. Here too, any tendency which waits upon the automatic change of this Stalinist course under pressure of some 'objective forces' is revisionist and reactionary. The petty-bourgeois nationalists and the Stalinists are obstacles in the road of working-class independence and power, and only the construction of Marxist parties with a revolutionary programme will overcome them.

11. Finally we re-emphasize the importance of seeing the colonial revolution as part of the international revolution of the proletariat, a revolution which cannot be completed without victories in the advanced countries. To see the colonial revolution as automatically extending under its own momentum is to encourage the serious revisions of Marxism already discussed. It is nonsense to speak of the theory of permanent revolution being 'confirmed' without the leadership of a Marxist party and without the perspective of a spread to the advanced countries. Without proletarian leadership the economic problems will intensify and the political regimes will become more and more repressive. The economic future of the workers' dictatorships which revolutionary struggles will bring in the backward countries will only be assured by assistance from the victorious workers' revolutions in the advanced countries. It is not a question of more and more 'progressive' regimes being set up as a result of the colonial revolution, finally bringing about a change in the diplomatic balance of power. This is a petty-bourgeois utopia, acceptable to the nationalist rulers themselves, to the Stalinist bureaucracy and to all centrist opinion. The Fourth International is firmly committed to the programme of the permanent revolution. There will be no independence from imperialism, there will be no peace, until the workers of the backward countries take power and are joined by the revolutionary struggle, then the victory, of their brothers in Europe and America.

ii) The Cuban Revolution: an example

1. The revolutionary overthrow of the Batista dictatorship in Cuba has since been followed by the nationalization of American property in the island by the Castro government. The Cuban movement has many specific features which deserve careful study and appraisal.

2. There are three features of the revolution which distinguish it from all previous revolutions in the Latin American continent: (i) The extent of the agrarian reform; (ii) The scope of the nationalization measures; and (iii) The creation of an armed militia.

(i) The Agrarian Reform

The agrarian reform is more extensive than anything seen so far in that part of the hemisphere. Neither Bolivia nor Guatemala were able to do what Castro has done. The reform, which has distributed land to more than 100,000 landless labourers (the

guajiros) struck a massive blow against the big American monopolies such as the United Fruit Company who owned vast tracts of land (some over 200,000 acres) and the native absentee landlords who were the principal prop of the Batista regime.

Nevertheless, the reform in its content and motivation remains a capitalist reform and does not transcend capitalist property relations in the countryside. Even Castro has admitted that 'it was not a very radical reform' because it did not touch those estates and ranches which were under 1,000 acres.

Although the Agrarian Reform Law prescribes that the lands belonging to the co-operatives cannot be divided, nevertheless in the event of a serious agricultural recession hitting Cuba there is no guarantee to prevent entire co-operatives either going into liquidation or even being sold to other co-operatives or individual farmers.

An agrarian reform of this type which affects

absolute rent while leaving differential rent intact can not only be contained within the capitalist framework but can also become a stimulant for the growth of the capitalist economy.

The absence of land nationalization, the failure to abolish the rural debt and the reluctance to provide cheap credit facilities for the farmers—all these things are creating the conditions for a new differentiation of rural society. The growth of a rural bourgeoisie and a rural proletariat will be inevitable. Fragmentation—the scourge of underdeveloped agriculture—and alienation of land will continue and in the absence of *planned* industrialization will pave the way for more intense class conflicts in the countryside.

Under such conditions the future of the co-operatives would be, to say the least, precarious.

(ii) Nationalization

The nationalization of US firms, like the agrarian reform, was aimed principally at the imperialist monopolies. However, they were carried out not in accordance with a preconceived and rational plan of economic development, nor as an integral part of a programme of nationalization of all bourgeois property, but only in response to the slashing of the sugar quota by the US government.

Like Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal they constitute an extreme example of 'State-ism' in the semi-colonial world. As Trotsky remarked in relation to the nationalization of railways and oil-fields in Mexico: 'It is a measure of state capitalism in a backward country which in this way seeks to defend itself on the one hand against foreign imperialism and on the other against its own proletariat.'

The absence of any legislation relating to workers' control, the denial of managerial rights to workers in the expropriated enterprises with a few exceptions, and the bureaucratic administration of the nationalized firms by the state, not to mention the overt and covert manoeuvres of the regime to discipline the trade unions and integrate them through the new labour bureaucracy that replaced the old Mujalist* bureaucracy, point definitely to the capitalist nature of the regime and its social policy.

For this reason they should not be confused with the expropriations in the workers' states. The reforms of the revolutionary government are directed towards a more rational utilization of natural resources, a more balanced programme of capital investment, and a modest expansion of the home market, within the framework of the extant capitalist property relations both in industry and in agriculture

* The pro-Batista TU leadership.

(iii) The Militia

The creation of a militia 300,000 strong is one of the most important achievements of the revolution and the firmest guarantee of the regime. Thanks to the vigilance of this militia every attempt at counter-revolution has been suppressed.

The future of the militia, however, is by no means assured. As class conflicts grow and contradictions accumulate, differentiations will take place in the militia between the pro-capitalist and anti-capitalist forces. Attempts will be made to disband or disarm the militia—as in Bolivia—or more probably to integrate it in the army and police apparatus as was done in Egypt with the 'Fedayeen commando'.*

The control of the arms depot by the Rebel Army ensures thereby the control of the militia by the bourgeois state. One of the major tasks of Marxists is to fight for the organizational independence of the militia and its subordination to the trade unions and co-operatives.

Failure of a viable revolutionary leadership to influence, organize and lead the militia along class lines will render its disappearance more than probable.

3. The Castro regime is Bonapartist in structure and petty-bourgeois in composition. All major policy decisions are taken by a small group around Fidel Castro while the masses are only consulted when and where the regime requires, e.g., the Havana Declaration. The extreme weakness of the national bourgeoisie, and conversely the relative strength and cohesion of the working class, renders any attempt at stabilizing a popular and genuinely representative capitalist regime based on popular organs of power completely illusory.

The absence of a genuine Marxist alternative enables the regime to balance itself between the opposing class forces, utilizing both the Right and the Left in order to secure its own objectives.

On all decisive and fundamental questions which impinge upon the power and wealth of the national bourgeoisie as a whole, however, the regime comes down on the side of capital. By attempting to form a 'single party of the revolution', by attacking the Left wing of the July 26 Movement, and by its refusal to convene a Constituent Assembly, on the basis of secret and universal suffrage, the Castro regime reveals more and more its class limitations in carrying the democratic revolution to the end. The attacks against the POR† are further evidence of this trend.

Thus only two roads are open for the Cuban

* Formed to fight the British in the closing stages of their occupation of bases in the Canal Zone.

† Partido Obrero Revolucionario: 'Trotskyist' party affiliated to the International Secretariat which maintains that Cuba is a 'workers' state'.

Revolution: Either forward to the Socialist revolution and the creation of an anti-capitalist workers' state, or back to military-police dictatorship and a regime of hunger and misery.

In any event, the Castro leadership can only be a transitory phenomenon pursuing a thoroughly utopian—and pragmatic—objective of trying to build a national capitalist state in a period when the whole of world capitalist economy and culture is cracking at its foundations.

4. It is of paramount importance to defend the Cuban Revolution—but at the same time to call for its extension, both in depth through the setting up of a regime based upon workers' and peasants' councils, and geographically by taking up the same issues in other parts of Latin America, and particularly in the Central American states which have similar problems and are openly dominated by the big American monopolies. There is no doubt that the Cuban revolution has already had a considerable influence throughout the hemisphere. It has many lessons to teach in the way of tactics and is proving that America can be opposed. But it is a far cry from this to defining Castro's Cuba as being already a workers' state or even in its present form as a regime which is capable of survival.

5. American radicals have been particularly susceptible to the appeals of the Cuban revolution. For the first time they have at hand and available for investigation an anti-imperialist movement with undoubted achievements to its credit. The faith and enthusiasm of the Cuban workers and peasants, the frankness and simplicity of the leaders themselves, the contrast not only between Cuba and every other regime in Latin America, but also with the decadent, cynical and money-ridden climate of the United States itself, accounts for the sometimes over-enthusiastic acceptance of the Cuban revolution in its present form. However, it is necessary to check carefully over the facts and possibilities.

6. The isolation of the Cuban Revolution, and therefore the inevitable dependence of Castro on the USSR, has led to the strengthening of the Stalinist People's Socialist Party. This party, which played no part in the earliest successes of the July 26 Movement, and was in fact for a time compromised with the Batista regime, has thus been able to secure positions and influence in the administration. It has not hesitated to use its power to strike at the independent press of other groups, which it fears may set out on a course embarrassing not only Castro but also the Soviet government. The kind of Stalinist methods used in Spain between 1936 and 1939 which ruined the chances of the Spanish revolution, are once again at work. The Soviet

bureaucracy much prefers to deal with Castro, 'pressurized' by the CP—just as was Negrin in Spain—than with a leadership genuinely representative of and closely dependent upon the working class in its own organizations.

7. The absence of a firm theoretical foundation on the part of the Castro leadership is by no means a virtue. It has led, and will lead, to improvisation and eclecticism in the face of intractable problems. It means that the popular masses are not being educated to a full understanding of the situation internally and in its international implications. Faith in a leader is no substitute for such understanding, on the contrary, it puts what has so far been achieved at the mercy of an assassin's bullet. It can lead to deceptions and retreats. But it is no accident that while popular in its basis, the revolution is not popularly controlled or led. The leadership is derived from the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia. It has proceeded against American imperialism only as a result of immediate necessity, and not with a clear programme of expropriation of capital. The future of the economy remains in question. Marxists campaign for the creation of a revolutionary working-class leadership which will fight on a programme of workers' and peasants' councils to take over the economy, together with a campaign throughout the American continent to defend and spread the Cuban revolution. The defence of that revolution is a prime task of socialists throughout the Americas, but its future lies in the realization of the slogan of a United Socialist States of America.

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V The USSR Since the 20th Congress

1. Since the October Revolution of 1917, world capitalism has been confronted with a rival system of production which has abolished the private ownership of the means of production and the anarchy of market relations. Since the second world war the economic achievements of the Soviet Union, together with the success of revolutions in new countries, particularly in China, have sharpened the contradictions of capitalism. A large proportion of the world's population and productive resources are now outside the sphere of capitalist exploitation or expansion. This necessary conflict between capitalism and the first conquests of the proletarian revolution will not simply fade away in an atmosphere of 'peaceful co-existence'. As interpreted by the Soviet bureaucracy, peaceful co-existence is only an ideological cloak for their policy of compromise with imperialism, their opposition to decisive clashes between capitalism and the revolutionary working class. The conflict between the capitalist and socialist systems cannot be solved except on the arena of international class struggle. It is false and contrary to Marxism to pose as the alternatives 'either peaceful co-existence or a third world war'. Above all, it is a question of the international consciousness, organization and action of the proletariat. Khrushchev envisages instead a growing number of existing states or governments committed to friendly relations with the USSR. Consequently the working-class movements in the capitalist and ex-colonial countries are channelled into 'pressure' politics rather than the overthrow of the capitalist state. This is the fundamental meaning of the theories of 'peaceful roads to socialism', 'anti-monopoly coalitions' and 'broad peace alliances'.

2. The economic advances of the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe result from nationalized and planned economy. Their more rapid and even growth, compared with the capitalist countries,

testifies to the advantages of planned economy over private enterprise. But this does not mean that the claims of Stalin and his successors about the construction of socialism or even communism in the USSR can be accepted. Such a claim is dangerous and in contrast to the facts; to accept it would mean accepting all the excesses of Stalinism, its political repressions and social and economic distortions, as inevitable features of a socialist society. Although the repression has become less ruthless and obvious, there remain all the contradictions flowing from the betrayal of the revolution which was cloaked by the theory of 'socialism in one country'. The inequality of incomes and the social privileges of the bureaucracy, the absence of effective control from below in the formulation and carrying through of the state plans, all result in disharmonies which drag upon the economy and prevent its full development of the productive forces in a planned way. In this way individualist tendencies are encouraged, not only in the bureaucracy but also among the workers and peasants. So long as the working class is rigorously excluded from political power by the bureaucratically controlled state and party machine, this contradiction cannot be resolved. The basis for socialism exists in the form of the nationalized means of production in the USSR and other workers' states. But this nationalized property does not constitute socialism any more than do the collective farms. A socialist society necessitates full participation in the functions of the state and democratic control of the economy by the working class at all levels through Soviets. Socialism implies also definite tendencies towards equality of income and the decline of the repressive function of the state. Today, on the other hand, the tendency is towards strengthening of the bureaucratic state and continued gross inequalities of income. Even without the usurpation of workers' power in the USSR by the bureaucracy, there could be no question of the

victory of socialism until imperialism was defeated and a much higher level of material production reached. The USSR, China and the Eastern European countries are *workers' states*: i.e., they are based on property forms established by the October Revolution, directly or indirectly, property forms which are the basis for socialist society. However, the working class in these countries does not wield political power, does not control production, and does not decide the policy of these countries to the world outside.

The confinement of the first stage of the world revolution to the USSR alone, a backward country, resulted in the victory of a bureaucratic caste in politically expropriating the proletariat. This bureaucracy stands above and outside the working class and is parasitic upon the economic forms created by the October Revolution. This is not an inevitable feature of the transition to socialism, but arises from the special conditions of isolation of the Russian revolution and will be replaced historically by a political revolution by the Soviet working class. The preparation of this revolution depends upon the strategy of the revolutionary working-class forces on a world scale.

3. Thus we see the USSR, China and Eastern Europe as workers' states which have become deformed or degenerated. Their present form can only be temporary, and it is wrong to interpret these temporary distorted forms as a new or inevitable stage in the development of society. We stand for the defence of these states as of every conquest of the working class; their return to the sphere of exploitation of imperialism would be a shattering blow to the prospects of socialism, whereas their continued existence constitutes a permanent challenge and threat of instability to imperialism. But our defence of the USSR, Eastern Europe and China does not mean giving up the right of criticism. Revolutionaries have a duty to criticise ruthlessly the counter-revolutionary role of the bureaucracy, which in fact works against the defence of the revolution. Both in the Soviet bloc and in the class struggle all over the world, through the influence of the Communist Parties, the bureaucracy hampers the struggle for socialism. In calling for a political revolution to overthrow the bureaucracy we are not supporting the 'liberation' propaganda of the imperialists and their agents in the Labour movement. We advocate such a revolution to preserve and not to overturn the nationalized property relations, to ensure their protection from the restoration of capitalism. The Fourth International's call for a political revolution to overthrow the bureaucracy in the workers' states is part of the strategy of world revolution against imperialism.

Especially dangerous is the petty-bourgeois

tendency which characterizes the Soviet Union as a system of 'state capitalism'. By using the method of superficial comparisons, the theories of 'state capitalism' claim that the Soviet bureaucracy, through its control of the state apparatus, has become a new capitalist class and has destroyed all the gains of the October Revolution. On this basis all responsibility for the defence of the USSR from imperialist attack is avoided, and the necessity for constructing a Leninist party is denied. Formally embracing Marxism, such tendencies in fact provide a Left cover for the bourgeois theories of 'totalitarianism' and the impossibility of working-class power; in times of political crisis, such as the Korean war, they provide support for the imperialists. They are a direct agency through which certain elements in the movement capitulate to petty-bourgeois democratic opinion at a time when sharp class struggle arises and the need for proletarian discipline and principled programme becomes vital. The discussion of the character of the USSR from the point of view of abstract political criteria like 'democracy' and 'freedom' rather than from the basis of production relations is clear evidence of the class character of this tendency. In theory as in practice they are a direct line of transmission to Right-wing social democracy.

4. Stalin's excesses, justified by the theory of 'socialism in one country', expressed in the sharpest form the reactionary role of the bureaucracy. In the period following Stalin's death, the bureaucracy itself was able to curb the power of the security forces in its own interests. In this way the power of the bureaucracy was not ended but placed on a different basis. Khrushchev's speech to the closed session of the 20th Congress of the CPSU was an attempt to respond to the growing strength of the Soviet working class and to the questionings following Stalin's death, by rationalizing the bureaucracy's internal relations and attempting to give the impression of a clean break with the brutal repressions of the Stalin era. Khrushchev has succeeded in surviving the various crises within the Communist Party leadership and in the Eastern European countries, finally emerging as the undisputed successor to Stalin. Although Khrushchev's regime appears less rigid and brutal than that of Stalin, still the area of debate and democracy remains severely limited. The promises of collective leadership in state and party, a necessary response to the rise of a mass educated working class with growing consciousness, have not been fulfilled. The cult of personality remains, even if muted in comparison with Stalin's day. The rule of the bureaucracy is concentrated in the rule of one man, a supreme arbiter who staffs the top posts with his own nominees and takes all the major decisions both on domestic and foreign affairs. This

one-man rule befits a bureaucratic type of planning based on commands from the centre rather than democratic decisions and checks. A series of policy changes and ideological modifications, combined in an empiricist way that often amounts to demagoguery, have enabled Khrushchev to maintain a certain stability in the relations between the bureaucracy and the people. Concessions have been made to the peasants, and the discontent of the working class has been stemmed by some improvement of living standards and the promise of more to come. By applying his own personal energy to these practical problems and by skilfully routing his own opponents within the bureaucracy, Khrushchev has confirmed his own position as boss. The stability thus brought about is necessarily only temporary, for the personal power involved, centralized in a single personality, is in contradiction with the continued expansion of the economy and the growth of the working class. Thus Khrushchev's personal rule prepares for even deeper contradictions in the future. The whole course since the 20th Congress, where Khrushchev made his 'secret speech' in emergency conditions, has amounted to a bottling up rather than a solution of the fundamental conflicts.

In Hungary and Poland, the risings of 1956 were unable to overthrow the rule of the bureaucracy. Here too, a modification of the old police rule has taken place. But in Hungary, leading workers and intellectuals remain imprisoned, and the workers' councils set up in 1956 were ruthlessly suppressed. In Poland, Gomulka's leadership tided the bureaucracy over the storms arising from Poznan and Warsaw in 1956. Since the Eighth Plenum of that year, however, the legislation on workers' councils and the suppression of dissident opinions have been used to stifle the initiative of the youth and the working class. Following concessions to the Stalinist or Natolin group in 1958, with the return to office of many of the members of the repressive machine, there came a restriction of the worker's councils to advisory committees in the factories. This re-imposition of bureaucratic power and the checks on working-class activity have encouraged the open political campaigning of elements like the Roman Catholic Church.

5. Khrushchev now claims that the capitalist encirclement is ended and that communism is now being constructed in the USSR. Neither assertion describes the objective situation. The continued drain on the economy of a necessarily high armaments production and scientific research geared to military requirements, and the continued emphasis on heavy industry rather than consumer goods, due to the fact that the advanced industrial countries remain in the capitalist sphere, all reflect the capitalist encirclement. In many ways, the USSR is far from

having the lineaments of an advanced economy, despite the claims that communism is being introduced. The relative backwardness of consumer goods production, of housing, roads, and motor transport, are all inevitable disproportions in an economy surrounded by hostile capitalist states and unable to profit from the international division of labour. But they make a mockery of the claims to have reached the threshold of communism.

The bureaucracy can neither perceive clearly nor solve the economic problems of the USSR, because its own parasitic existence and opportunist policy are at the root of the difficulty. Khrushchev is inevitably confronted with the same problems which have bedevilled Soviet economy for 30 years; basic to all of these is the emphasis in the planning system on the caste of privileged administrators separated off from the producers and relying on a regime of commands from an uncontrolled centre. This centre and the caste around it are immune to democratic discussion of the economic plans and are independent of any control from below, which is an essential part of socialism. Khrushchev's own repeated complaints make it clear that the system of incentives and individual responsibility for norms encourages systematic dishonesty and cheating of the state and its enterprises. Corruption, inefficiency, plundering of public resources, bribery, 'fixing', unfulfilled promises—all these are not the inevitable consequence of economic planning as such or of 'human nature'; they derive from the bureaucratic methods of the ruling caste. There must be no one-sided evaluation of the USSR on the basis of these examples, but at the same time such developments must impede the economy, and it is ridiculous to continue to attribute them to 'survivals of capitalism'. The backward individualistic attitudes to which this latter characterization refers are in fact bred every day by the system of material incentives which continues to dominate the life of the working class itself, despite the official lip-service to 'workers' participation' and non-material incentives. Such attitudes are encouraged by the visible signs of privileged consumption by the members and families of the bureaucracy.

6. Khrushchev has been particularly concerned with the recurrent crises in Soviet agriculture and associated problems. The main production lags have in fact been in agriculture. Despite the 'virgin lands' projects and various agrarian reforms, the peasantry clearly remains little affected by the exhortations of the official spokesmen; the agrarian sector appears to offer particularly wide scope for the corruption and evils of bureaucracy. In industry the problem is less one of continued growth than of harmonious proportions between the different branches of production. But in agriculture it is not possible in the

same degree to ensure continued growth in output by continuous increase in the amount of capital investment in new means of production. This can only be brought about on the same scale by bringing new lands into cultivation. The other necessary conditions are improved livestock husbandry, improved crop yield, the spread of technical knowledge among the peasantry, and their active co-operation in carrying through the economic plan. Clearly results in these fields have been very uneven and have required many concessions to the peasants as well as the constant attention of Khrushchev himself. At the same time the system of procuring and distributing agricultural produce has been criticized severely by the bureaucracy itself as a weak link in the economy, allowing as it does enormous opportunities for fraud and speculation. The relation between the workers' state and the peasantry remains one which is endangered by the character of the bureaucracy; the agrarian problem remains unsolved. The future of property forms is no more certain than it was in the 1930s. Measures like the sale of the machine tractor stations to the large collectives leave in serious doubt the relation between collective farms and state farms.

7. The bureaucracy seeks peace and disarmament agreements with the imperialists, not only because it wants to ensure its own continued privileged existence but also because the arms programme is a great drag on the economy. But the existence of great imperialist powers who see the need to oppose any spread of the revolution makes such disarmament a dangerous illusion. The theory of peaceful co-existence seeks to get round this basic dilemma.

The theory of peaceful co-existence serves to sum up the current ideology of the bureaucracy in the USSR. It rests upon a number of major assumptions concerning the character of the class forces in the modern world. The statements of Soviet statesmen and the writings of Soviet economists reveal an oversimplified conception of the general crisis of capitalism as a steady growth of inevitable contradictions, involving growing unemployment and declining living standards. In fact this picture grossly underestimates the recuperative powers of capitalism after the second world war, powers which required direct collaboration from the Social Democratic and Stalinist leadership of the working class in Europe. Thus the Soviet economy suffers from distortions resulting from the political betrayals of the ruling caste internationally; the same bureaucracy now advocates an intensification of the same policy of illusions and betrayal. Similarly in the colonial revolution: it is all very well to talk about the colonial system having come to the end of its history, but this ignores the extent to which the imperialists have been able to come to terms with the national

bourgeoisie of these ex-colonial countries, preserving the imperialist stake in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Once again, this has only been possible because of the failure to build alternative revolutionary leaderships of the working class in the colonial countries, a failure which can be laid right at the door of the Stalinist bureaucracy, with its uncritical support of national bourgeois leaders in the anti-imperialist movements.

The automatic and non-Marxist conception of the nature of capitalism's decline, in which socialism will gradually 'prove' itself superior to capitalism in peaceful competition, as expressed in the Declaration of the 81 Parties in 1960, leads at the same time to an overestimation of the strength and potentialities of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries. The actual possibilities of independent revolutionary action by the working class are negated by this automatic identification of the working class with the Communist Parties and with the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy itself. Such a conception is geared to alliances with the 'peace-loving' sections of the bourgeoisie in the colonial and even in the advanced countries, in order to instal coalition governments friendly to the USSR or regimes dominated by the CP, as in Eastern Europe.

The Chinese Communist Party leaders have recently called into question all the basic theoretical presuppositions of Khrushchev's policy of peaceful co-existence. The Chinese saw in peaceful co-existence an implicit willingness to accept the status quo, thus abandoning the struggle against Chiang for the recovery of Formosa, and also to trade support for the colonial revolutions in return for disarmament agreements. The Chinese leadership also arises from a bureaucratic caste, no less wedded to its power and privileges than its Russian counterpart. But, being nearer to the source of revolutionary energies, facing difficult problems at home and resenting the imposition on the world communist movement of policies which were against its own interests, it readily found theoretical ammunition in Leninism with which to oppose the 'revisionists'. The concentration of this fire on the Titoists deceived no one as to the real target. The fact that, in the course of this controversy, the Chinese made many correct points, that their estimation of the division of world forces was more realistic and their ideology 'purer', should not lead to the acceptance of their case as a whole. It was equally arrived at on an empiricist and not a principled basis and it included some points which were adventurist and dangerous, such as the claim that in an H-bomb war socialism would be victorious.

The Chinese position emanating from a powerful powerful member of the bloc with high prestige, especially in the less developed countries, opened up a theoretical discussion inside the Communist Parties,

which has not yet shown its full results. The declaration of the 81 Communist Parties as well as subsequent Soviet statements show a verbal adaptation to some of the objections raised by the Chinese without any major change in tactics or policy. This suggests that, taking advantage of the Chinese domestic embarrassments, the Soviet leaders were mainly interested in preserving their dominance within a unified Communist movement, and they have in fact succeeded in this aim. As a result the declaration, and other statements are even more eclectic than such statements have customarily been: they contain something for all the different trends and made it possible to cover in advance almost any course upon which Khrushchev decides—thus leaving the Communist Parties no choice but to follow.

9. The fundamental causes of the crisis within Stalinism were no more dealt with in 1960-61 than in 1956: once again their solution was put off by methods of equivocation, suppression and the production of eclectic 'declarations' which papered over differences. The crisis is bound to intensify, in the great class struggles which are now beginning. The 'monolithic unity' of the Communist Parties, both internally and internationally, is only appearance. The new phase of the world revolution will produce further breaks from the Communist Parties as the dangers of Khrushchev's opportunist line are revealed and the rank and file comes to seek a policy nearer to the interests of the working class. At first these trends will necessarily be sporadic and uncoordinated. There is no automatic process by which the bureaucracy will be unseated or the policy of the old leaders in the capitalist countries transformed. A great responsibility rests upon the Marxist movement to construct new mass revolutionary parties and to further this process by winning militants from the Communist Parties and those sections of the working classes under their influence. In the Soviet Union and other workers' states the Party is first and foremost an instrument of the bureaucracy. It is possible that the movement of 1956 for a return to Lenin may be repeated, either within the framework of the Party or outside it. Whichever is the case, the question is not one of reforming the Communist Parties of these countries, but of building new revolutionary parties as part of the Fourth International with the strategy of political revolution. For this there is necessary a return to the traditions and methods of the Left Opposition and the Bolshevik Party, and it is particularly important to educate the youth in this spirit. No opportunity must be lost, however small and insignificant the beginnings, in the furthering of this task. The 1956 events in Poland and Hungary showed the tragic results of the absence of a revolu-

tionary leadership of the working class in the workers' states; they point to the urgent need to construct such parties if needless sacrifices are to be avoided in the future. Only when confronted by genuine revolutionary forces, organized as a Marxist party with deep roots in the masses, will the bureaucracy face its historic fate of destruction. Such a perspective in the USSR, Eastern Europe and China, together with our unconditional defence of these states against the capitalist countries, along with the building of a new revolutionary International, constitutes the essence of our policy towards the USSR, China and the countries of Eastern Europe.

10. The present world situation, 36 years after Stalin's introduction of the theory of 'socialism in one country' emphasizes the fact that the future of socialism is a question of world revolution. The second world war and the arming of the great powers with nuclear weapons give the sharpest answer to the theories of an isolated socialist society. Only a new relationship between the working class of the Soviet Union, China and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the working class of the advanced countries on the other, can guarantee the victory of socialism. Even within the sphere of the workers' states there has not developed a planned division of labour and resources on the basis of equality. With revolutions in the advanced countries, socialism will be able to develop on its true objective basis, the material foundation of high productivity and the international division of labour developed by capitalism itself.

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VI The Fourth International

1. The major task of building a revolutionary leadership on a world scale involves the reorganization of the Fourth International and therefore a consideration of the Pablo group. In its documents and activity the distinguishing features of Pabloism can be summed up as an impressionistic method which tries to assess quantitatively the so-called 'objective factors' and in this way minimises the role of the masses under revolutionary leadership. This scraping before 'objective' forces leads to talk of 'irreversible' and 'irresistible' processes. In the case of the Soviet Union it is responsible for extreme conclusions about the 'pressure' of the masses which will allegedly force the bureaucracy to 'liberalize' itself and restore Soviet democracy. The term 'political revolution' when used at all by the Pabloites, is not connected with the construction of the revolutionary leadership. In the capitalist countries it leads to over-estimation of the Stalinist forces and the belief that under certain circumstances mass pressure will similarly operate to bring the Communist Parties to power. Events have already considerably discredited such a prognosis, but it still means a withholding of confidence in the proletariat and a minimising of the task of creating a new revolutionary leadership. At an earlier stage the same impressionism produced the theory of an inevitable, indeed, imminent, world war. The same method is expressed today in formulations such as the following:

'Through the fact of the historical lateness of the revolution in the capitalist countries, which is the result of the dialectical interaction between the treason of the leadership and the *new economic evolution of capitalism*, the colonial revolution is objectively the motive force of the world revolution combined with the growing strength of the workers' states.'

2. Our analysis has nothing in common with such abstract and confused verbiage, typical of the commentator who stands aside from events and allots the leading and subordinate roles in them to whomsoever he wills. In the present epoch of imperialism

the Marxist begins the study of social contradictions with the role of the working class itself; the intention being to establish leadership in the given conditions. For example, stabilization in the metropolitan countries is, as has been shown, strictly relative, dependent upon a series of world forces which are running strongly against capitalism and complicating the underlying contradictions of imperialism. The economic upswing of the '50s was not something in itself which bore witness to the inherent health of capitalism or the restoration of its vigour on a permanent basis. Moreover this upswing has been the basis for the consolidation of working-class organization, not a weakening of the class.

3. The greatest danger confronting the revolutionary movement is liquidationism, flowing from a capitulation either to the strength of imperialism or of the bureaucratic apparatuses in the Labour movement, or both. Pabloism represents, even more clearly now than in 1953, this liquidationist tendency in the international Marxist movement. In Pabloism the advanced working class is no longer the vanguard of history, the centre of all Marxist theory and strategy in the epoch of imperialism, but the plaything of 'world-historical factors', surveyed and assessed in abstract fashion. The draft resolutions of the Pabloites for their international conference are very explicit on this point. The present stage of the world revolution, according to them, is particularly characterized by the growing strength of the workers' states and the great power generated by the colonial revolution; the struggle in the advanced countries, because of changes in the character of modern capitalism, is relegated to a definitely subordinate position. Here all historical responsibility of the revolutionary movement is denied, all is subordinated to panoramic forces; the questions of the role of the Soviet bureaucracy and of the class forces in the colonial revolution are left unresolved. That is natural, because the key to these problems is the role of the working class in the advanced countries and the crisis of leadership in their Labour movements.

A correct revolutionary orientation towards these questions is now a vital and urgent necessity, because in Japan and Britain there have begun great struggles which raise directly before the organized working class the issue of class leadership. In each case these issues are forced by the special manifestations of imperialism's latest crisis in these particular countries; the struggles around them will inevitably intensify and will spread to the other imperialist countries, including the USA. Any retreat from the strategy of political independence of the working class and the construction of revolutionary parties will take on the significance of a world-historical blunder on the part of the Trotskyist movement.

4. The sections of the Fourth International must be supremely conscious of their own historical responsibilities, in that a revolutionary proletarian leadership can only be built through a constant fight for correct policies and in competition with other tendencies, not in an attempt to find a common denominator. Each national group begins with the international programme, with the method and basic ideas as summed up in the Transitional Programme of the Fourth International. They recognize that there are no separate national roads to socialism, and that the struggles in the old imperialist countries, in the USA, in the colonies and former colonies and in the Soviet sphere are interdependent. The political and industrial situation in each country is overshadowed by the world tendencies.

5. The building of a revolutionary party in any country starts from an adherence to an international programme and strategy. But the tactics and manner in which we intervene in struggle must result from a concrete discussion beginning with class relations in that country itself and bringing in all the relevant considerations. Thus it would be futile to set off with a universally valid tactic derived from a generalization of world tendencies. For example, it is not possible in this way to prescribe an entry tactic in all countries where mass Social Democratic or Communist Parties exist. Each case must be considered in the light of the historical factors in the given country, the stage of the class struggle, the needs of the masses and the state of the movement itself; the entry tactic may well be correct but it has to be based on such a thorough examination of the situation.

6. The revolutionaries must link their activity with the class in its day-to-day struggles, as itself a decisive factor in the situation. Trotskyists do not therefore sit back and examine as impartial observers; they are participants who help to shape the events themselves. We must recognize, moreover, that all other tendencies in the working class are the result of

victories for non-proletarian policies based on victories for imperialism and defeats for the working class.

7. Our movement in each country must elaborate from its own experience and study of the struggle of the classes a programme of transitional demands which will provide a focus for all those sections which are thrown into conflict with the bureaucracies of the political parties and trade unions. A programme of unity on class struggle lines must be used to demonstrate to the working class in its own experience that their fight against the class enemy cannot be victorious without throwing off the bureaucratic leaderships. While participating in all movements and struggles which raise the consciousness of the workers, the strictest organizational discipline and ideological unity of the Trotskyist movement must be maintained. The whole purpose of such participation is to construct a Marxist leadership, of and for the class, which will win acceptance and lead to the development of a mass party.

8. However small their numbers, Trotskyists strive to intervene in class struggles and participate in the major experiences of the class. This intervention is not undertaken from the point of view of being with the 'main stream'. It is prompted by the aim of assisting the working class to an awareness of the need for a revolutionary alternative. Whether or not this involves entry into a mass political party it always involves independent intervention in the struggle. In fact this is a prime duty in order to strengthen the work in the traditional parties.

9. The idea that Marxists enter Social Democratic or Communist Parties in order to *transform* them into revolutionary parties must be rooted out. Marxist tactics towards these parties have nothing in common with the politics of the pressure group or ginger group. This places them in opposition to the rabid teaching that a 'Government of workers' parties, Communist Parties, Social Democratic Parties' can represent the 'first steps' of the dictatorship of the proletariat or its 'ante-chamber'. Where such parties control the mass of the working class as in France, Italy or Britain, Marxists have correctly posed 'Take the Government' as a central slogan from time to time. But we believe that it is necessary to put it forward as a *stage* in the experience of the working people. The call is intended not to prop up the reformist or Stalinist leaders but as a step towards breaking their grip on the mass movement. Such governments, with their inevitable half-measures and betrayals, can be a necessary step in the education of the working class and in leading them towards the revolutionary alternative.

10. The Labour bureaucracies—where they have state power as well as where they batten on the working class in the imperialist countries—will not be washed out of the movement by a spontaneous development or by broad propaganda groupings of a centrist type. The experience of the British Labour Party between its 1960 and 1961 conferences has demonstrated this once again. Anxious to preserve their power and privileges, their own narrow interests conflict with those of the masses. Even when forced to lead struggles, or when, in order to defend these privileges, they are forced to uphold working-class conquests, they do so with their own methods. And these methods seek to avoid, at all costs, the mobilization of the class power of the working masses.

11. The 1953 split in the international Trotskyist movement revealed the existence of two irreconcilable tendencies in relation to the all-important question of world strategy and the construction of revolutionary parties. Pabloism represents a Left-centrist tendency moving away from Trotskyism. Whilst on some questions its line appears similar to that of the orthodox Trotskyist movement, its orientation is in practice entirely different. As a result the basic political differences have tended to increase since the period of the split. There can be no compromise with Pabloism as a political tendency. On the contrary, the education of the international Trotskyist movement, especially the young cadres now joining that movement in various countries, can only be assured as the result of the most thorough-going discussion on what Pabloism represents.

12. The sharpness and suddenness of the 1953 split resulted in considerable confusion in a number of countries. Even now there is evidence that some of this confusion still persists. It must be resolved as soon as possible. Any attempts, however, to reunify the movement by purely organizational means will only result in further splits. The Socialist Labour League is not against unity, but it is against a spurious unity which is not based on fundamental political agreement following a full international discussion. The reorganization of the Trotskyist movement into one single world party can only be accomplished through such discussion. We do not believe, therefore, that the proposal for a Parity Committee as envisaged in 1958 can any longer serve as the main line of our approach to this problem.

13. The Fourth International as a world organization founded by Trotsky in 1938 no longer exists. It has been destroyed by Pabloite revisionism. The only sections which continue its theoretical tradition are those affiliated to the International Committee.

The reorganization of the Fourth International must therefore proceed immediately by the preparation of a thorough-going discussion in which all sections affiliated to the International Committee and to the International Secretariat should submit resolutions and contributions which would be circulated throughout the international movement as widely as possible. This discussion should begin not later than January 1962 and should be organized by the setting-up of a small sub-committee comprising an equal number of people from both tendencies, whose task would be to see that the various material was widely circulated and that the rank and file in all sections were given the opportunity of considering it. At the end of one year, a pre-conference of the international movement should be held in order to ascertain the measure of agreement or otherwise that had arisen as a result of the discussion. New statutes for the international movement could then be put forward.

14. A feature of this discussion would be a thoroughgoing examination of the tactical question of entry and the experiences of various sections involved in work inside the Social Democratic parties and Stalinist organizations. Such a discussion would have immense educational value for the entire movement.

15. The Socialist Labour League submits this resolution for international discussion. We stand for the reorganization of the international Trotskyist movement at a time when there are immense opportunities which can be realized through the re-establishment of an authoritative world leadership. We ask all sections to give this their immediate attention.

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