Labour Focus on EASTERN EUROPE

THE END OF YUGOSLAVIA



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The break-up of Yugoslavia

Its causes, a new role for the UN, a policy for the left

by Robin Blackburn

The collapse of Yugoslavia, and the resulting bloody civil war, has become the worst conflict to afflict any part of Europe for four decades. Neither the governments of the West nor the parties and movements of the Left have found it easy to orient themselves as the tragedy has unfolded, with partisans of the quick fix - namely throwing armaments at the problem - waxing particularly indignant and superior. In certain vital respects these particular Balkan wars have demanded something new, as counterpart to the novelty of the situation in former Yugoslavia.

The passions which animated this disaster should not be ascribed only, or even primarily, to ancient enmities. Though the latter have played their part they were lent a potent new virulence, recklessness and desperation by such modern furies as wrenchingly unequal development, hyper-inflation, mass unemployment, austerity programmes, media demagogy, militarism, political corruption, ethnic totalitarianism and that intolerant frenzy of unstable majorities that one could call democratic dementia. Indeed one of the most ominous aspects of the break-up of Yugoslavia is that its setting is only too modern and that its evolution in the eighties foreshadowed many of the domestic and international recipes which are being tried out in the nineties on other post-Communist states.

To survive in the modern world multi-national states need a collective imaginary sustained by a modicum of administrative competence, democratic development, economic progress and hope for the future. Somewhat against the odds Switzerland and Spain, Britain and Belgium, Canada and India, have until now kept above the threshold. Up to 1970 Yugoslavia did achieve the necessary modicum but by the seventies the increasingly authoritarian and sclerotic rule of the League of Communists first threatened and then destroyed this achievement.

The relatively greater legitimacy of Communist rule in Yugoslavia, deriving from the partisan war and the break with Stalin, at first gave a breathing space for the South Slav federation despite the poisonous legacy of the Ustashe and Chetniks, responsible for the slaughter of hundreds of thousands in the wartime years. The decision to make Kosovo, with its predominantly Albanian population, a province of Serbia rather than a separate Republic turned out to be a fatal flaw. But otherwise Yugoslavia offered reasonable representation to its various nationalities; and for a period even Kosovo enjoyed a degree of autonomy.

Unfortunately the relative viability and legitimacy of the constituent parts of the old Yugoslavia has itself helped to make the conflict between two of its republics - Serbia and Croatia - more sustained and vicious. Following the 1974 reforms, themselves enacted partly in response to Croatian national reformism, political life and public power were increasingly channelled and concentrated only through republican government - crisscrossing ties and Federal powers became increasingly weak. As the authority of the centre waned the political process threw up rival nationalist programmes. Democracy and nationalism grew together but within a restricted and stratified space. The decrepit power of the Federal bureaucracy was strong enough to inhibit or suppress the growth of inter-republican democratic forces but too weak to contain the national popular forces in the republics.

The 1974 reforms allowed republican-based media networks to replace Federal arrangements whereby, for example, each republican centre took it in turns to present the main evening TV news. In Spain the peaceful post-Franco transition was assisted by the fact that the political parties, trade unions and social movements of the Left developed on a cross-national basis, and in alliance with democratic national reformism in Cataluña and the Basque country, and with regionalism in Andalucia. The remarkable growth of the Spanish economy in the decade and a half after 1977, propelling Spain into the ranks of the advanced countries, must have helped the chemistry of Federalism, whatever social problems and injustices it bequeathed to the nineties. Yugoslavia Federalism in the eighties was blighted by the double curse of authoritarianism and economic failure.

The Lure of the West

Slavoj Zizek has written on the tendency of those who live in the region to draw a line to their South after which Europe ends and Balkan backwardness begins, so that Austrians look down on Slovenes, Slovenes look down on Croats, Croats look down on Serbs, Serbs look down on Bosnyacs, Albanians or Macedonians. Zizek observes that such conceits now unfold in a highly specific context: "what is at stake in contemporary post-socialist states is the struggle

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A slightly abridged version of this article appears in the current issue (No. 199) of New Left Review.

for one's own place: who will be admitted - integrated into the developed capitalist order - and who will remain excluded".[1]

Many Slovenes and Croats became seduced by the notion that they could simply join the advanced West, with its enviable prosperity and liberality, allowing their more backward ex-fellow countrymen to find their own level. We are often reminded that Yugoslavia was divided by such ancient lines of division as that between the Western and the Eastern Roman empire, or between the Habsburgs and Ottomans, or the Catholic and Orthodox Churches - with all of these separating Croats and Serbs, despite their common language. While such legacies must surely have great significance it is also true that Yugoslavia stood athwart the modern chasm separating the advanced world and the impoverished developing world. Croatia and Slovenia enjoyed greater prosperity than the rest of the Federation and much richer pickings from the tourist boom. For its part Serbia was in a precarious middle position, with Macedonia and Kosovo far behind.[2]

No other Communist state was as intimately acquainted with Western lifestyles as Yugoslavia. Tourists going one way, and migrant workers the other, helped to dramatize the failings of an economic order where average GNP was still less than a fifth of that in Western Europe. While those Yugoslavs who swallowed the Western dream cannot be excused responsibility for their deeds it is nevertheless true that the West, the European Community and the international financial organisations comported themselves in a disastrous way. In the eighties they imposed punishing repayment schedules and austerity policies which brought the country to the brink of economic collapse outside the coastal enclaves. In the nineties they offered covert encouragement to fissiparous forces and failed to adopt stern sanctions against Serbian truculence and militarism. The brave attempt made by the last government of the old Yugoslavia, that of Ante Markovic, to assert a democratic Federalism was sabotaged by financial measures that left it, by the end of 1990, unable to pay the salaries of its soldiers. The West's disastrous failure to give generous economic support to Markovic was prompted partly by stinginess, partly by anti-Communism - it was well-known that the League of Communists remained a force within the Yugoslav officer corps.

The international community did not wish to abandon Yugoslavia since it saw the Federal authorities both as a guarantee for debts totalling $20 billion and as the best lever for remodelling its society and economy. But by obliging the Federal government to adopt austerity and laissez faire it destroyed its credibility and weakened its authority over the armed forces. Under Western pressure the Federal regime was obliged to apply something like a fifth of the country's total earnings to servicing its international debt. Real wages fell by 40 per cent between 1978 and 1983 and continued to bump along at this level for the rest of the decade. And since unemployment was running at a third or more of the labour force those in receipt of these low wages were comparatively fortunate. While rural dwellers had some direct means for assuring subsistence the majority living in the towns had no protection. A section of the middle class, especially those with foreign connections or official contacts, continued to emulate the consumption patterns of their counterparts in the West.

The World Bank put the matter thus in its 1990 Report: "Demand-reducing measures, coupled with halting attempts to reduce subsidies, led to declines in real urban wages in both countries (i.e. Poland and Yugoslavia) and to increased unemployment in Yugoslavia... Urban poverty increased substantially. Although reform, was already underway in some Eastern European countries in the 1980s, much more radical measures are being implemented in the 1990s. These steps are likely to put added pressure on urban labor. A substantial shakeout of employment from the state sector will be necessary.... Subsidies are a major problem; they were 14 per cent of GDP in Poland in 1988, 12 per cent in Hungary and 9 per cent in Yugoslavia. The task is clearly immense. Even so, the principle of effective and early action on policy fundamentals, together with measures to smooth consumption, applies here too."[3]

Bland phrases about demand-reducing measures, a shakeout of employment, tackling subsidies, smoothing consumption and the rest, actually spelt widespread social misery. Yugoslavia was now a semi-advanced country with most of its population dependent on complex economic processes. In its 1991 Report the IMF, with less resort to euphemism, also praised the stabilisation policies of the Yugoslavian Federal authorities. Only one serious problem marred their "encouraging" achievement - namely that in implementing IMF plans so faithfully they had destroyed the Federation.

The irresponsibility of the IMF cannot excuse the demagogic and aggrandizing policies pursued by the dominant political elites in the republics, in the first instance that of Serbia. If the Federal government itself had repudiated its debts it would have invited punitive sanctions against its trade and the suspension of such projects as the autoroute to Belgrade. Nevertheless, perhaps it could have done more to resist the disastrous pressure of the international financial community. As it was the legitimacy of the central government was terribly weakened by the policies it had to impose. Regional inequality worsened and a public opinion was encouraged in Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia which saw their own republic as being unfairly burdened. Serbs saw themselves as a captive market for Slovenian goods

1. Slavoj Zizek, "Ethnic Danse Macabre", *The Guardian*, 22 August 1992. While Zizek is perceptive concerning Slovenian motivations his interpretation of Western policy is questionable, since he appears to believe that the West has been covertly backing Milosevic all along. The reluctance of Western governments to send their troops against Serbia represented a calculation of how extremely difficult and costly such an expedition would be. It is true that they could have sponsored earlier and tougher sanctions against Belgrade. But it is likewise true that rightwing Christian Democratc circles in Germany offered early encouragement to the Slovenian and Croatian nationalists and that the German government offered recognition to their declarations of independence, leading to a decision for general European recognition by the close of 1991.

2. Taking the Yugoslav average as 100 the per capita social product in Slovenia was 208, in Croatia 128, in Serbia 101, in Montenegro 74, in Macedonia 64, and in Kosovo 27: see Iraj Hashi, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia" *Capital and Class*, No 48, 1992, pp. 41-88, (p. 63). Unemployment was 3.4 per cent in Slovenia, 8.6 per cent in Croatia, 18.3 per cent in Serbia, 28.3 per cent in Macedonia and 58.3 per cent in Kosovo by 1989 (p.65). The Croatian figures themselves conceal regional disparities, with the coast and the northern regions near Slovenia being much richer than those bordering Serbia or most of Bosnia. Iraj Hashi shows the republican and regional inequalities to have widened in the eighties.

3. World Bank Development Report 1990, p. 108.

and they saw their taxes going to pay for the development of the poorer regions and republics. In fact Serbia found itself making a larger absolute contribution to the development fund for the poorer regions than did either Slovenia or Croatia.[4]

The social formation of Yugoslavia evidently nourished disintegrative passions which the Federal state could not contain.

The Logic of Disintegration

In the fifties and sixties Yugoslav "self-management socialism" earned widespread respect on the Left. At that time the "Yugoslav model" was associated with considerable economic achievements and some modest concessions to cultural pluralism. But critics on the Left always warned that the "self-management" model had two serious defects. Firstly, in the absence of political democracy, it could be denatured and manipulated by the single ruling party in each republic. Secondly, it could encourage a certain egoism of each working collective; it has even been shown that increasing levels of unemployment and inequality could result from such oblivious corporativism. Evidently these two failings could feed on one another. They were also to be aggravated by markets that were difficult to regulate because the Federal authorities lacked sufficient democratic legitimacy. And by the circumstance that the only form of political pluralism allowed, within certain limits, was that of each republican (often national) contingent of the ruling party.

The constitutional reforms of 1974 boosted the powers of the republics at just the time that the watchwords of war-time anti-fascism, fifties anti-Stalinism and self-management socialism were beginning to wane as effective constituents of a collective imaginary capable of transporting Yugoslavia into a better future. A fatal logic of disintegration set in. In successive waves a process of competitive decentralisation ensued. Economic elites carved out economic niches for themselves; republican national elites followed suit at the political level. Finally competitive military gangs entered the fray, with different political militias and republican armies. Each elite sought to attract its own following and in many cases several disputed who was the authentic representative of the nation. Successively the "self-managed" enterprise, republican government, and ethnic military band became vehicles of rapacious primitive accumulation.

If we are looking for the man whose reckless demagogy set the tragedy in motion then Slobodan Milosevic amply fills the bill. He encouraged Serbian grievances to assume a deeply chauvinist form. The Serbian government under his leadership embarked on a policy of brutal bullying and aggrandizement that was bound to lead, if unchecked, to the bloody Balkanisation of Yugoslavia.[5] The Albanians of Kosovo were at first the principal victims.

The Slovenian and Croatian leaders were inclined to allow the Serbian chauvinists a free hand in Kosovo so long as their own autonomy was respected or increased. At least this seems the only way to explain why Slovene and Croat representatives allowed the rights of the people of Kosovo to be trampled on. Federal and party institutions gave the Slovenian and Croat representatives several opportunities to curb the Serbian takeover of Kosovo - and intimidation of the Vojvodina - but none of these were taken. In March 1989 a Declaration was issued in Ljubljana denouncing the Serbian policy towards Kosovo. This drew overwhelming public support and informed the activity of Slovenian representatives in the meetings of the Yugoslav League of Communists up until they withdrew in January 1990. But it is, to say the least, unclear how Slovenian withdrawal in any way helped the Kosovans. As the reform Communists were shunted aside by liberals and nationalists the whole issue of defending democracy in Yugoslavia as a whole was replaced by advocacy of secession.

If Milosevic is the main culprit, the Slovenian and Croatian leaders were his accomplices. The Slovenian and Croatian Communists tended to appease Milosevic while their nationalist rivals favoured a withdrawal which would give him a free hand. The Slovenes, and in a more qualified sense the Croats, had a case for independence, deriving simply from the right of national self-determination and the evidence of popular will. But we now know that their particular way of tackling the chauvinist demagogy of Milosevic has led to murderous communal strife.

The Slovenian leaders opted for a sauve qui peut policy which visited dreadful mayhem on their neighbours. Prior to their secession the Slovenian and Croatian governments enjoyed a large measure of autonomy and were scarcely groaning under the Serbian yoke, as was certainly the case in Kosovo. They could continued seeking more autonomy within the Federation while still working to displace Milosevic - in alliance with those Serbs willing to oppose the national demagogue. On the other hand they must surely have known how fragile was the state of ethnic relations in the light of the country's whole history and development - most particularly in view of the mass slaughter of the war years and the Serbian sense of insecurity and grievance.

The problem of Serb minorities

The Serbs of Serbia were scarcely likely to be weaned away from chauvinist delusions by being abandoned to their own economic misery. And the Serbs of Croatia were bound to feel exceedingly vulnerable even if the Croatian government had been willing to offer them full guarantees as a national minority. As it was, without such rights, with the Ustashe-inspired HOS (the Croatian fascists) openly arming and agitating, and with the obtuse and intolerant Croatian nationalist Franjo Tudjman a disturbing figure as President of the new state, the minority Serbs of Croatia were unlikely to become loyal citizens. Tudjman was, after all, known for his attempt to deny the scale of mass killing by the Ustashe state in the war years. From one day to the next the Serbs of Croatia had become second class citizens - or worse - in what they had thought their own country. One of Tudjman's first acts was to purge Croatian citizens of Serbian extraction from the police and civil administration.[6] The fears and fate of these Serbs could only fuel Serbian chauvinism.

Just as the Slovenes should have pondered the implications of their action for other republics so

4. Iraj Hashi, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia", *Capital and Class* 1992. See also Jasminka Udovicki, ("Yugoslavia's War Without End", *Radical America*, Volume 24, No 3, 1993) who evokes both media demagogy and middle class panic when foriegn exchange holdings in Yugoslav banks effectively disappeared in the Summer of 1991.

5. Branka Magas,'The Balkanization of Yugoslavia', *New Left Review* 174, March-April 1989, pp. 3-32.

6. See Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, London 1992.

should the Croatian leaders. The doctrine of an ethnic state enunciated by the new authorities in Zagreb was as menacing for the Croatian minorities elsewhere - above all in the Vojvodina and in Bosnia-Herzegovina - as it was for the Serbs in Croatia, about 12 per cent of the population, and other minorities, which brought the total non-Croat population of a state designating itself "the land of the Croats" to some 24 per cent. Tudjman supposed that the threat of a Greater Serbia could be used to advance the project of a Greater Croatia. The Croatian President engaged in discussions with Milosevic in March 1991 aimed at the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbian and Croatian forces.

This time the main victims were to be the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina though, once again, many Croats and Serbs have also suffered whether or not they live in the "right" place.

Democracy and self-determination

If it were not for the disastrous implications for the delicate balance of the Yugoslav Federation as a whole the Slovenes would certainly have been justified in exercising their right of self-determination. The Croatian exercise of their right to self-determination should have been, to a greater extent, conditional on their own willingness to recognise and guarantee minority rights. Changes to borders should be supported only when they are mutually agreed or where they offer the best prospect of lifting national oppression. These considerations apply, with some qualification, to internal borders - the qualification being that a change in the status of a border can be almost as delicate as a change in its position. Attempts to make borders coincide with ethnic settlement is always bound to contain an arbitrary element, and nowhere more so than in ex-Yugoslavia. Where any border is arbitrary, one that actually exists, and is sanctioned by several decades of development, is better than none at all. In the formerly colonial world it has been widely recognized that existing borders, even if derived from the colonial powers, should be respected. A broadly similar principle applies to the ex-USSR.

It is instructive to note that the larger republics of the former Soviet Union have declined, so far, to follow the Serbian and Croatian path. The governments of Yeltsin and Kravchuk can be criticized on many grounds but at least they have avoided the worst provocations. The government of the new Ukraine began by offering some guarantees to the Russian minority. It was willing to remain in the Confederation of Independent States, to retain roubles for some purposes and, perhaps most important of all, it did not treat ex-Soviet armed forces on its territories as an army of occupation. The Croatian and Slovenian government abandoned the Federation to the mercy of Milosevic and surrounded the barracks of the Federal Army (JNA) instead of seeking to construct a democratic alliance against Milosevic and ensure that Federal forces were kept under some constraint. Ideas of a looser Federation along the lines of the CIS were abandoned.

Prior to the vote on independence Ante Markovic, the Federal Premier, himself a Croat, appeared before the Croatian Parliament and warned of the dire consequences of the course upon which Tudjman was embarked. But his warnings were contemptuously ignored and every effort made to drive every section of the JNA, and of Serbian opinion, into the arms of Milosevic. Of course the brutal truculence of Stalinist commanders of the JNA, and their connivance with Serbian irregulars, bear a grave responsibility. But in effect the intransigent nationalists were their unacknowledged allies.

The Yugoslavia Federation is now gone, though cherished in some corners of the country and likely to become an object of nostalgia. The republics of the old Federation had a right to self-determination, as does Kosovo. In so far as it brings the mass of people into political life nationalism has a potent democratic content, as well as absolutist and intolerant inclinations - the problem being that these two impulses are as often combined as separated. But in the contemporary world the democratic content of a people's right to sovereignty is made consistent and coherent to the extent that it respects minority rights and is willing to tolerate a degree of supranational cooperation and inviligation. In the case of several of the former republics of Yugoslavia they are unlikely to sustain independence unless they are prepared to make significant concessions to one another and enter international agreements to that end.

Bosnia's independence

Subsequent to the bloody clashes of 1991 the remaining Yugoslav republics and provinces faced an appalling predicament. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia declared for independence in February 1992 after it was clear that the old Federation had disintegrated. In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the declaration of independence only came after freelance Serbian forces, with the connivance of the Yugoslav Army, had begun seizing portions of the Republic's territory, displacing or terrorizing the non-Serbian majority of the population. In an appallingly difficult situation the new President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Izetbegovic, opted for independence, hoping for international support - and in the expectation of Croatian help. A referendum gave backing to the declaration, though the great majority of Bosnian Serbs declined to take part and their elected leaders set up their own separatist assembly

The holding of the referendum violated a widely acknowledged rule of political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina - namely that constitutional change in the Republic required the support of all three of the major ethnic communities. In a very informative and level-headed article Glenny explains that a constitutional formula known as "dual sovereignty" protected the position of national minorities in former Yugoslavia: "In order to guarantee Bosnia's security, Tito also gave a new twist to the idea of dual sovereignty in Bosnia-Herzegovina by establishing the principle that three constituent nations were to coexist under the Bosnian republic. This required that all three communities in Bosnia would agree before any constitutional changes, such as secession from Yugoslavia, could be made."7

Izetbegovic is not a "Muslim fundamentalist", whatever that might mean, but he does bear responsibility for being the first modern Bosnian leader to base political organization on ethno-religious identities. President Izetbegovic and the various members of his government were, of course, assiduously courted by Western diplomats and saw themselves appearing to advantage on the international stage. In the event the international help has been pitifully small while the Croatian alliance has

7. See Misha Glenny, "What Is To Be Done?", *New York Review of Books*, May 27 1993, p 14.

exacted a heavy price. Izetbegovic creditably insisted on the secular character of his government but made little attempt to find Serbian and Orthodox allies. Despite the declaration of independence much of Bosnia-Herzegovina remained at the mercy of Serbian forces - lacking discipline and humanity, but not weapons - and faithless Croat allies who were soon carving out their own mini-state. In fact Bosnia-Herzegovina, whatever the declarations of its leaders, could only be truly independent if its own Serbs and Croats were prepared to endorse the fact and if this was accepted by the authorities in Belgrade and Zagreb.

The old Federal Yugoslavia had been able to a offer and guarantee a workable republican status to Bosnia-Herzegovina; to survive as an independent entity it needed some new confederal accord between Serbia and Croatia. To be effective any structure offering such protection and guarantees must have sturdy local roots, and not simply be imposed by the Great Powers.

The Bosnian declaration of independence was predicated on the view that intervention by the "international community" - that is the governments of the Western powers - was both desirable and likely. The whole subsequent policy of the government and forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina appears to have been bent to the goal of securing outside military intervention. In their orientation to international sponsors the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina were following the example of Slovenia and Croatia, who had received German and Austrian backing, and of the Serbian military, with their connections to Russia.

This modern pattern has some features in common with one noted by Trotsky at the time of the Balkan Wars in 1912-14: "National revolutionaries, unlike social revolutionaries, always endeavour to link up their conspiratorial operations with the activities of dynasties and diplomats, either those of their own countries or of others."[8]

Trotsky believed that the diplomatic calculations of the national revolutionaries functioned as a substitute for the attempt to construct a popular majority across ethnic lines, that might embrace "Turks"(Muslims) as well as Serbs or Macedonians. In Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, as in Croatia in 1991, the hopes placed in Western sponsorship were thought to make redundant the need for seeking the consent of the Serbian minorities. When the hoped-for external intervention did not materialize then UN planes were shot out of the sky in ways that look calculated to boost the war party, or to ensure appropriate coverage on CNN.

The remaining Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina inherited a formidable arsenal from the Yugoslav Army, when its command structures were formally withdrawn. The Serbian commanders disposed of at least 40,000 well-armed regular troops and many thousands of militia. Most of these Serbian soldiers were themselves natives of Bosnia; in any head-on military confrontation they would see themselves as fighting for home and hearth. Yet it remained the case that the Bosnian Serb forces still depended on the political and logistical support of the authorities in Belgrade. Periodically their numbers have been swollen by Serbian military or para-military formations from other regions. Glenny reported that a meeting between Milosevic and Tudjmann in December 1991 had agreed the broad principles of a division of the new republic between them.[9]

In the Krajina a ceasefire was observed throughout most of 1992 while conflict between Serbs and Croats was localized rather than generalized in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Sarajevo government nevertheless appeared still to put its faith in the alliance with the Croats and in the eventual arrival of international aid. The option for independence allowed the leaders of the new Republic to receive recognition in New York but seems to have discouraged any search for allies amongst oppositional forces within Serbia and the rump of the old Federation.

The Milosevic regime

Throughout 1992 there was much evidence of resistance to Milosevic from his opponents inside and outside the republic of Serbia. The non-Serb peoples of Kosovo, the Vojvodina and the Sandzak were obviously alienated by the Belgrade regime but there was also much sign of dissatisfaction among Serbs and Montenegrins as well.

In principle Serbian nationalism is as capable of democratic development as any other and Milosevic himself an opportunist politician who has, on several occasions, withheld endorsement to Greater Serbian claims and compromised with, for example, Tudjman. The elections in December 1992 showed that Milosevic still commanded the support of a plurality of Serbs - though with 35 per cent of the vote, achieved in the teeth of widespread intimidation and a generally hostile media, Milan Panic showed that there was a significant opposition. Seemingly Milan Panic received backing from the Yugoslav President, Dobrovic Cosic, and from some Yugoslav Army chiefs who deemed Milosevic's path dangerous and adventurist. Milan Panic failed to win support from Serbia's large minority populations - if he had done so he could have defeated Milosevic. While Milosevic's faction controls the Serbian state apparatus it has many political foes and faces some resistance from remnants of the old Federal state. Milosevic's encouragement of armed Chetnik-style Serbian paramilitary gangs was in part a reflection of the fact that some senior officers were disinclined to do his dirty work for him. Some former Communists have refused to follow Milosevic in ditching Titoist

8. Leon Trotsky, *The Balkan Wars, 1912-13*, New York 1991, pp. 234-5.

9. Misha Glenny, "Yugoslavia: the Revenger's Tragedy", *New York Review of Books*, 13 August 1992.

traditions.

The Serbian President tries to balance between the neo-fascists, who received about a fifth of the vote, and liberal nationalist opponents who feel he has gone too far, that he has isolated Serbia, wrecked its economy, corrupted and suborned the media while enriching himself and his cronies. The irregular forces committed to Greater Serbia are able to impress and intimidate the Serbs of the rural areas. But while Milosevic's opponents did not fight on a level field it is clear that the Serbian President and his party still have a social base, despite economic chaos - and despite, or even because of, the hostility of the international establishment.

Fascism?

A particularly unhelpful and misleading way of assessing the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia is that of labelling one or other of the main contending states as fascist. It is a regrettable truth that as these republics shed their past political commitments neo-fascist agitation gained ground. In both Croatia and Serbia oppositional political groups, and those not of the dominant nationality, have been subject to intimidation and physical attack. But despite Serbia's notorious espousal of territorial aggrandizement and "ethnic cleansing" the political life of Serbia proper - that is not including Kosovo and the Vojvodina - has included elections and legal agitation by oppositional movements. There is some independent trade union and civic activity while some independent newspapers and journals are published.

We should surely by now be accustomed to the fact that governments elected in a more or less democratic fashion can behave in unspeakable ways - especially to subject peoples. After all the history of the United Kingdom or United States has its own unlovely episodes of democratic dementia. Serbian aggression has been blatant. On a more modest scale the Croatian state has also sought to aggrandize itself, at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its policies towards Croatian Serbs have helped to drive hundreds of thousands from their homes. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the presence of the openly fascist HOS was frightening to Bosnian Serbs from the outset. On several occasions since October 1992 the Croatian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina have turned on the Muslims; their "ethnic cleansing" of the region they control has helped to swell the tide of Muslim refugees.

But all this disgraceful behaviour does not make Croatia a fascist state. Tudjman is an elected leader and, however grudgingly, allows some opposition to exist. We must hope that the democratic dementia will abate. The intolerant and chauvinist projects in Serbia and Croatia are being discredited by the claustrophobia and disruption they cause - and the prestige of liberal and socialist oppositions could be correspondingly enhanced, in the longer term. So long as significant opportunities remain in these countries for developing movements of opposition it does not make sense to call them fascist, though their governments are certainly brutal and vicious. The "F word" is really an attempt to force our hand and oblige us to look for some external military deliverance. It fails to register that Tudjman's gamble has led to disaster and that Milosevic now bestrides an increasingly inchoate and makeshift structure casting its shadow over by far the greater part of the land area of the old Federation.



Ethnic cleansing and partition

Ethnic cleansing attempts to make the Serbian and Croatian statelets in Bosnia-Herzegovina into homogeneous enclaves but even there opposition survives in the shape of some Muslim guerrillas. There are also still beleaguered minority communities of Muslims in both Serb- and Croat-controlled areas. The Serbian and Croatian statelets are not self-sufficient and could not survive without their sponsors in Belgrade and Zagreb. There is also much evidence that the JNA and HVO (Croatian army) control the logistics of the irregular forces active in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Serbian atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been well publicized in the Western press so it is worth noting that the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina have followed suit, albeit on a smaller scale. In April and May 1993 Croatian forces expelled the significant Muslim community in Mostar in what was not the first blatant exercise of ethnic cleansing. Around the same time the Muslim forces in the vicinity of Vitez were also responsible for expelling Croats from the areas they controlled.

Bosnia-Herzegovina has existed as some sort of political entity for a thousand years but it has always been a patchwork. In 1940 the Serbs were the largest community but at the last census the Muslim Bosnyacs comprised about 44 per cent of Bosnia-Herzegovina's population, the Orthodox Serbs 33 per cent, the Catholic Croats 17 per cent and the remainder were of other nationalities (Albanians, Gypsies, Jews, mixed etc). Moreover these communities were not distributed in clearly marked zones but were intermingled, with the Moslems over-represented in towns and thin in much of the countryside.

The government formed in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 may have represented a majority of the population but it failed to win significant Serb support and has subsequently lost touch with the great majority of Bosnian Croats. The Bosnian government has made commendable attempts to guarantee minority rights and generally pursued a non-communalist and secular policy. Sarajevo and Tuzla, both areas still under its control, retain a degree of ethnic and religious tolerance and diversity. But the Izetbegovic government has made few attempts to find interlocutors within the Serbian or Orthodox communities.

Popular will in Bosnia

If the declaration of independence received no sanction from the Bosnian Serbs then the subsequent unfolding of the logic of ethnic conflict has driven a wedge between most Bosnian Muslims and most Bosnian Croats. It is to the credit of the Bosnian government that some Serbs and Croats are still to be found in official positions or serving in some of its military units. But could it be said that Izetbegovic was the true representative of the Bosnian Serbs or Croats in March 1992, or October 1992, or March 1993?

Unfortunately Izetbegovic and his government are credible only as the representatives of the Moslems, who constitute a minority of the population, albeit a large one. In the long run a state that is not supported by the majority of the population will not be viable. Of course, until there is extensive de-militarisation of the Bosnian countryside it will be impossible to know what a majority of the population want anyway. But it is clear that the existing Bosnian government could not itself be the instrument for bringing about that demilitarization since it has become one of the contending parties in a three-way ethno-religious military conflict.

Those who have urged a policy of "arming the Moslems", or lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian government, have failed to register this central political objection to the policy they advocate. The ending of the embargo on one former Yugoslav republic would also undermine the embargoes applying to Serbia and Croatia, accelerating the flow of arms to all three of the contending ethno-military forces. Given that the Bosnian government only controls a small, landlocked and vulnerable area, the Serbs and the Croats would very likely gain the most from such a policy. If it were not for the inherent complexity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the gross intrusions and intimidation practised by the Serbs and Croatians, there would be a case simply accepting the logic of competitive military nationalism. The Bosnia-Herzegovina of yesterday and of a thousand years of history was guaranteed by central states with little or no democratic character.

Neal Ascherson has argued that in post-Communist Europe the "old divisions of religion, language and race" inescapably define popular aspirations to self-government: "When they asked Radovan Karadzic why he was replacing multi-ethnic tolerance with nationalism, he put his odious finger on it: 'People no longer have to live that way; we have free choice'. It is not only the break-up of such communities that is a tragedy. More tragic still is the history which tied them together so long that they could only break up with murderous violence... The hard truth is that, if we want to reduce human misery, we have to help nationalities to separate peacefully rather than rivet them together."[10]

In the specific case of Bosnia-Herzegovina the impetus to ethno-religious fragmentation derived much of its virulence from the wider Serb-Croat war and from the destruction of a Federal context which was widely accepted by the population of the republic. On the one hand the party of Ante Markovic received significant support in the 1991 elections; on the other the various Serb, Croat and Muslim political parties came together on the basis of respecting the identity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There was, in other words, something like a Bosnian and Yugoslav nationalism and identity, embracing and containing the more specific ethno-religious identities.

Bosnian identity

The decisive events which destroyed this were not the elections of 1991 but the spread of Serbo-Croat hostilities, international recognition of Croatian independence and the referendum on independence for Bosnia-Herzegovina in defiance of the opposition of the elected representatives of the Bosnian Serbs. Competitive ethno-religious military bands have an awful potential for creating the communalist antagonism which is their lifeblood by simply pursuing a systematic double standard, favouring certain given identities while persecuting others.

Thus those with a Catholic and Croat "given" identity soon discover that they and their children are only really safe where there are HVO or HOS thugs to protect them, despite the fact that they abhor the Ustashe, have staunchly atheistical views, Orthodox Serb cousins, and cherish the characteristic Bosnian marks of a hybrid, partly Islamic civilization. Likewise young men with a "given" Moslem identity discover that they cannot become true members of the HOS, however zealously they give the heil Hitler/Pavlovic salute. The discovery of identity in such a situation is not some sort of pure spiritual election, nor the welling up of an inner essence, but rather the assumption of an imposed social marker, policed by pitiless repression and fear.

Of course all existing nation-states - very much including Britain, France and the United States - have been formed by using such methods in the frontier and marchlands regions. In so far as there has been a relaxation of ethno-religious criteria for citizenship this has been the product of the pressure exerted by liberal, socialist, anti- colonial and civil rights movements, which have succeeded in establishing some secular and multi-ethnic principles which, albeit precariously and formally, begin to link citizenship to residence. There is no good reason why every new nation should have to recapitulate the barbarities of the old established nation states, especially where, as in the case of former Yugoslavia, they also have secular and democratic traditions which can be mobilized against identitarianism.

It is remarkable that the most intense bloodshed in former Yugoslavia has taken place between ethno-linguistic groups that are closest to one another. Serbs, Croats and Muslims speak virtually the same language, and represent overlapping racial mixtures. However religion and history separate these communities and set for them an identitarian trap. The realm of religious identifications tends to be generalist because it is linked to such universal experiences as birth and death. This is why the realm of religious identifications can help to qualify and weaken the hold of national identity, reducing the temptation to conceive the latter in totalitarian terms where it does not coincide with it. But where religion and nationality operate along the same boundaries then the delusion of a total and exclusive self-identity is more easily sustained, as many of the most persistent communalist regimes show (Ulster, Israel, Cyprus, Pakistan) . In former Yugoslavia there are nevertheless two traditions which potentially contradict particularistic identities - Communism and liberal anti-Communism - but for obvious reasons negotiating an alliance between them is not easy.

10. "Better peaceful seperation than enforced tolerance", *The Independent on Sunday*, 16 May 1993.

Strategies of intervention

The popular wish to join the advanced world can either boost intolerance, or encourage secularism, depending on which responses promise to prove effective. From the beginning the European and US governments have made several attempts to sponsor a negotiated settlement between the different political forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They should not be denounced simply because they have found the task difficult, nor still less simply because of some automatic reflex. Once battle was joined reaching a settlement between the warring communities was anyway bound to take time and could never be achieved by simply ignoring their existing political leaderships. Since the summer of 1992 the civilian leaders of the Bosnian Muslims, Serbs and Croats have been brought to negotiate with one another, and from time to time the basis of an accord has seemed within reach.

The main fault of the international conciliators seems to be that they yielded to the exclusive claims of these leaders within "their own" areas, without insisting on effective guarantees for ethnic and political minorities. The Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and Mate Boban, the Croatian leader in Bosnia-Herzegovina, both practice a politics of ethnic expansion and intolerance. Yet their credentials as political leaders of their respective communities are just as good as those of Tudjman and Milosevic. The government of Izetbegovic was right to abandon its refusal to negotiate with these men as de facto leaders of Bosnian Serbs and Croats. And the US and EC mediators were right to ask that Milosevic and Tudjman should also demonstrate their support for the accord reached. The internal borders proposed by the mediators have not yet been accepted but at least the principle of a federal state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, guaranteed by its neighbours, was. The rights of minorities within each province were mentioned, but in a formalistic way with no provision for enforcement. Similarly, the civilian leaders of each side disowned ethnic cleansing, forcible deportation, mass rapes and the like.

However empty such declarations may have been when they were made they could furnish the basis for subsequent attempts to secure human rights and, at a later date, the return of refugees. Of course the Serbian or the Croatian military formations, both official or free-lance, made little secret of their intention to flout the principles proclaimed in Geneva, New York and Athens. Nevertheless the agreements entered into there, whatever their defects, do furnish the basis for an attempt to de-escalate, and even to pacify, the conflict between the different embattled communities. The key problem concerns implementation rather than the content of the accords devised by Owen and Vance. The UN has established humanitarian and peace-keeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the first instance it is these forces which would have to secure compliance with the agreement, seeking to isolate to the maximum the most recalcitrant forces.

In March this year the UN General Philippe Morillon showed that international intervention does not have to be militaristic in character. By establishing his headquarters in the beleaguered Muslim enclave of Srebrenica, and by speaking to both sides, he was, at least temporarily, able to break the Serbian siege. While such successes could be worthwhile as part of a long-term strategy for demilitarisation, without such a strategy it would simply protect concentrations of refugee misery.

The frustrations generated by the peace process, and the failure to find effective means for implementing accords, led to a clamourous demand for a Dessert-Storm-style expedition, not only from Margaret Thatcher but from US liberal opinion and from some on the left. Massive military intervention appeals to all those who believe that there is a short-cut, and that Western political wisdom will be able to arbitrate the quarrels of rival local nationalisms. Yet a predominantly, or even purely, military confrontation could easily strengthen rather than weaken the politico-military leaders it is aimed at.

Milosevic used the project of Greater Serbia to secure greater power, and more plentiful sources of accumulation, than would have been possible had he remained a Serbian Communist leader; he has been backed by a military-industrial-media complex, retaining some popular base and developing strong links to the Chetnik-style military commanders. Up to June 1991 he boasted and blustered but was, in effect, confined to the borders of Serbia. The decision of Slovenia and Croatia to go for independence in the summer of 1991 was an attempt to circumvent the Serbian problem, to get out from under, but in the event it led to the loss of a quarter of Croatian territory. In Bosnia-Herzegovina about 70 per cent of the territory was controlled by Serbian forces at the start of 1993. So if the aim was to frustrate the project of a Greater Serbia it has failed, and at appalling cost

An attempt by Croatia to roll back the Serb occupation of much of Croatia could only unleash further terrible bloodshed; even if a Croatian offensive forced the hand of foreign backers the resulting conflict would, as at Vukovar, destroy the very territory it was aimed to "liberate". While Milosevic has been fully prepared to exploit the concerns and delusions of Serbian communities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina he has also been ready to confront or disregard them. The touchstone of his policy is the interests of his own Serbian government and regime.

Sanctions

While outright military confrontation would be exploited by Milosevic and Tudjman, allowing them to appear as the champions of the countries they have so woefully misled, peaceful sanctions on the supply of war material and luxuries will, if effectively applied, weaken the war machines and induce the political elite to seek a settlement. The winding down of military conflict by strategic sanctions, and inducements to negotiate, opens space within which civilian opposition forces could become effective.

The structure of both the Serbian Republic, with its occupied provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and of the rump Yugoslavia, with the uneasy relationship to Montenegro, remain politically irrational and vulnerable. In the longer run sanctions targeted on the elite could also dissuade it from policies of national aggrandizement. Those who argue that sanctions are useless should consider the fate of South Africa and the Soviet Union. The sanctions that are most effective are undoubtedly those targeted at the material interests and amour propre of the political elite. In April 1993 Milosevic, impelled in large part by a desire to avoid sanctions, agreed to the Vance-Owen plan and demanded that the Bosnian Serbs do likewise. Plausible accounts of his change of position pointed to his desire to see the Cypriot bank accounts he controls unfrozen and, perhaps even more importantly, to be recognized by the "international community".

The de facto Greater Serbia which now exists faces large problems of internal coherence. The Albanian leaders in Kosovo have promoted many types of civic resistance, including setting up their own administration in many parts of the province. They have also sought to encourage and influence the oppositionists in Belgrade. In the Sandzak area close to the border of Serbia and Montenegro a Muslim, or Bosniac, majority has organised its own autonomous region. In Vojvodina the Serbian authorities rule a mixed and fearful population with large Hungarian and Croat minorities. In Montenegro there is growing resentment at Serbian tutelage and the depredations of Chetnik-style forces. Thus the newly proclaimed Yugoslav Federation is itself an uneasy and unstable amalgam, with many constituencies hostile to the ultra-nationalist project; the rump Yugoslavia does not, of course, include the self-proclaimed Serbian statelets in Bosnia and Croatia.

The government of Macedonia has declared independence, initially persuading representatives of the Albanian minority to join in a coalition. The situation in these areas is obviously highly delicate. The manifest danger of new clashes surely underlines an imperative for common understanding and coordination amongst all those forces that might be drawn into a democratic and peaceful settlement in that large arc of territory now subject to Chetnik intimidation and the increasingly reckless rule of Milosevic. Such an approach lessens the danger that the armies of Albania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Greece could all be sucked into a conflict, with incalculable consequences. Most analysts reckon that the Serbian/Yugoslav armed forces enjoy local superiority but they now face increasingly formidable Croatian armour and are distributed between three or four relatively distinct regions. Not all Serbian commanders are irrevocably wedded to the Greater Serbia project. Milosevic himself has been denounced by ultra-nationalists as someone prepared to barter away the rights of Serbs outside Serbia. The rise of the Serbian ultra-nationalists, and the thuggishness of the irregular forces has alienated many liberals, nationalists and socialists within Serbia itself. Renunciation of the Greater Serbia project would not only bring great benefit to Serb-occupied Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina but also to war-exhausted Serbia itself and the territories it holds in thrall.

The defeat of the Greater Serbia project by a combination of forces, some of them Serb, is a more desirable, and perhaps more realistic, prospect than Croatian victory on the battlefield. It is, of course, inevitable that the Zagreb regime will launch an offensive to drive Serbian forces from the occupied areas of Krajina and Slavonia as soon as it judges the time is ripe. While this could achieve some successes it is scarcely likely to dampen down nationalist militarism in Belgrade. A democratic settlement in the region cannot by-pass recognition of the existing civilian authorities in Belgrade and Zagreb, and of the civilian leaderships of the three major ethnic communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This remains the case however odious or intolerant we find their policies. In the medium and long run we must hope that the politics of Milosevic and Tudjman are discredited and defeated. But while they retain a democratic mandate attempts to overthrow them by external military force would be extraordinarily costly and unproductive.

Liberal militarism

The task of removing them falls to those who live in the areas they rule. This does not absolve those outside from pressing for the sort of internationally-backed policies that would encourage and guarantee a local settlement but it should caution against thinking that Western "liberal militarism", with its resort to "overwhelming" force has the answer. Overwhelming force can cause great death and destruction without actually overwhelming.

In some quarters there is a belief that a really determined Western military intervention could topple Milosevic, drive back the Serbian forces and save the Muslims from genocide. Because there was oil in the Gulf, the West assembled a huge expedition in Saudi Arabia in 1990-1 which, some hoped, would be able not only to drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait but also Saddam Hussein out of power. This did not happen, as we know. Western intervention against Milosevic and the partisans of a Greater Serbia would be another short cut intended to roll back the Serbian demagogue. But neither the terrain nor the relationship of forces are remotely as favourable to foreign intervention as was the case in Kuwait. On the other hand the tragedies of the Kurds, Marsh Arabs and Sh'ia uprisings could be repeated on an even larger scale.

The Canadian General Lewis MacKenzie, formerly commander of the UN forces in Sarajevo, has declared that on a scale of one to ten outside military



intervention in Bosnia would rate eight or nine compared with one or two for the US operation in Somalia; he also pointed out that it would immediately trigger reprisals both against UN peacekeeping forces throughout the region and against the significant number of vulnerable Moslem communities that remain.[11]

No doubt a NATO-sponsored intervention could quickly achieve certain delimited objectives. It could establish an enlarged "safe haven" for the Moslems or destroy Serbian airfields. But how safe would those havens really be and what would happen to Muslims outside them? Western forces could not restrain Serbian or Croat forces in all the areas they now control nor would it be likely to encourage positive political developments.

The Left should consequently oppose such ventures and the further fruitless bloodshed they will cause. Instead we should support implementation of such accords as can be reached and an enforcement of strategic sanctions against those who break them or who sponsor new aggressions.

The European powers could easily persuade Bulgaria and Rumania to seal their borders with Serbia under UN inspection if they were willing to offer them a large aid package and more favourable entry to Community markets. Since socialists should anyway support such measures of economic disarmament by the capitalist metropolis this seems to me to be a principled, as well as practical, proposal. And we should urge support for the gathering potential of civic resistance to Milosevic and Tudjman.

While the German government played a bad role in encouraging secession in 1991 it seems subsequently to have discouraged plans of wholesale military intervention. It may be anxious to avoid bringing about an embarrassing axis between the Luftwaffe and the Bundeswehr and the Ustashe and HOS. For their part the American, British and French authorities have so far held back from offensive military action because of its probable cost and because its objective is so difficult to define. If the West is to take military control of Bosnia- Herzegovina, why not Kosovo? And if former Yugoslavia why not the Caucasus? The logic of such military interventionism would lead to the construction of a vast new Western system of outright colonialism over vast swathes of the post-Communist world and third world.

New role for the UN

The alternative is to deploy international guarantees and economic inducements to foster, rather than smother, civic resistance and the political development of local democratic forces. In the most critical situations there could be a case for a new type of UN mandate, as Mary Kaldor suggested recently in these pages, so long as steps are taken to ensure that the UN is more capable of pursuing a locally-guaranteed settlement and freed from self-interested NATO tutelage.[12]

Within the councils of the Western states there will be forces which will be prepared to support such a perspective simply because military intervention in former Yugoslavia promises to be costly, unpopular, open-ended and counter-productive. It has been shown that the West retains great leverage with the Serbian President because his real ambition is to be accepted as a reputable statesman; the same can be said of Tudjman.

If the Balkans in 1993 are compared with the Gulf in 1990-1 then a further large change of conjuncture must be noted. In 1990-1 Gorbachev's Soviet Union aligned itself almost completely with the United States - but did so while abstaining from committing its own forces to the area. If Gorbachev had either vetoed the Security Council resolutions which permitted "all means necessary" - or insisted on participation of a 200,000 strong Soviet expeditionary force, based in Syria - then the outcome of that clash would have been significantly different. Either Desert Storm would never have been launched or it could have had a different outcome. Today Russian benevolent neutrality is far more difficult to guarantee. Even Yeltsin might find it difficult to stand by while Croatia and the West destroy Serbia. If there is to be a larger UN peacekeeping force in former Yugoslavia then Russian participation would help to ensure that it does not just become a tool of one or other of the national communities.

Diplomatic pressure, deploying a combination of sanctions and inducements, can help to wear down resistance to democratic features in the agreements. But in the end the best reinforcement for a peace settlement must be the strengthening of the elements of a democratic and multi-ethnic civil society and state throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. The UN peacekeeping forces are meant to ensure free passage throughout the republic and the maintenance of law and order - including restitution of homes to those who have been ejected from them. The best way of ensuring that the UN Protection Force will be able to discharge its duties would be a multi-ethnic local auxiliary force, paid by the UN and under UN command. Some of the effectives of the existing Muslim, Croatian and Serbian forces could be integrated into this auxiliary, so long as care was taken to mingle ethnicities in each unit. It should not be difficult to find volunteers for such a forces amongst all three communities.

It should not be forgotten that the rapid rise of Tito's Partisans in 1942-3 owed much to the fact that they were seen as transcending a vicious ethnic conflict - wisely the Allied military mission decided to channel all help to them. The establishment of such an auxiliary force, nucleus of a future state authority, would eventually allow the UN protection forces to be withdrawn and authority handed over to elected authorities, operating within a government structure with built-in safeguards for all communities. At the present time the UNPROFOR forces are concentrated in particular regions; the formation of auxiliaries would enable UNPROFOR to negotiate an extension of the area of its operation; its rules of engagement should permit it to take on freelance military forces violating the peace accords, with the aim of disarming and disbanding them; one such rule might well be not to undertake such action until overwhelming local superiority had been achieved, "pitting ten against one" as Mao used to put it and finding useful, paid employment for the disbanded military men.

It is, regrettably, only too likely that Clinton, Major and company will be deaf to such advice and will prefer the traditional techniques of Great Power bluff

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11. General MacKenzie's estimates given to the Royal United Servfices Institute in London were reported by Christopher Bellamy in *The Independent*, 10 December 1992

12. Mary Kaldor, "The Wars in Yugoslavia", *New Left Review*, 198, March-April 1993.

13. David Edgerton, "Anatomny of Liberal Militarism", *New Left Review*, 185, January-February 1991.

and bluster, laced with high-minded and simplistic cant. But there is at present great pressure on these politicians to find something to do that will not put the lives of their own soldiers at risk. And while air-strikes are the reflex resort of Anglo-American "liberal militarism", as David Edgerton reminds us,[13] in Bosnian conditions they could scarcely be carried through without either withdrawing the UN forces or massively reinforcing them. While evacuation would dramatize the truth that the Bosnians were being abandoned for a gesture, massive reinforcement would set the stage for confrontation and casualties. One of the happier features of the political culture of the modern bourgeois democracies is that their politicians are most unanxious to shed the lives of their own citizens. This concern does not extend to an equivalent anxiety over the life prospects of those without votes, or voting relatives, but we should still be thankful for small mercies.

Intervention and the left

In an extraordinary, though not unprecedented, development leaders of liberal and Left opinion, even former peaceniks, have been amongst the most vociferous in calling for military intervention in former Yugoslavia.[14]

By comparison General Colin Powell and the British Conservative government have seemed quite reluctant to resort to the pointless carnage of aerial bombardment or the bloody risks of battlefield engagement. Those who urge military intervention may want to do something for the Bosnians but they have failed to think through the consequences or to consider all the alternatives. Instead of abandoning the special, peace-keeping role of the UN forces would it not be best to find ways of strengthening it?

It could seem that the Left should never align itself with international agencies or projects which are likely to be more or less suborned by the rich states. The major UN-sponsored interventions to date have been tailored to suit US interests whether in Korea, Congo (Zaire), Israel/Palestine, or the Gulf. It is very much to be hoped that the UN operation in Bosnia does not become simply an extension of NATO structures. The participation of the Ukraine, Russia and Egypt could help to furnish a more balanced peace-keeping force and somewhat to qualify Western control.

But nevertheless our predicament bears comparison with that of socialists in the nineteenth century in their attitude towards the growing powers exercised by the capitalist state. While anarchists or syndicalists simply rejected the state and all its works, reformists and class collaborationists simply subordinated the labour movements to imperialism abroad and bureaucratic paternalism at home. Rosa Luxemburg showed that a different politics could be constructed, placing democratic and anti-militarist demands on the capitalist state and fighting for universalistic welfare goals.

Giovanni Arrighi has pointed out that we live today in an epoch marked by the emergence of an international state, with transnational agencies of coordination and intervention.[15]

The UN remains dependent on revenue from its member states, who often withhold payments as a way of exercising pressure. Matters would be greatly improved if the UN was made the beneficiary of exploitation of the sea-bed, or of a tax on the use of fossil fuels, or on capital movements.[16]

An internationalist Left needs to develop a sense of such cosmopolitan agency that would be democratic and anti-militarist, and constructed against the grain of the massive economic privilege presently structuring the world economy. Existing international bodies, like the United Nations, or agreements, like that of Helsinki, are deeply unsatisfactory from such a standpoint. But at least they do operate at the international and global level and claim to represent an interest which is less inherently particularistic than that of the nation state. Former Yugoslavia, where pursuit of nationalist principle has brought deadlock, is proof that "internationality" is, in its own awkward way, as much of a fact as is "nationality". Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are today more closely interlocked by military confrontation and political negotiation than they ever were by the old Federation. The conferences in London, Geneva, New York and Athens recognised this fact by trying to bring the contending parties together around the negotiating table. While the old Federal Socialist republic has disappeared some new framework of multi-national guarantees and cooperation will have to be constructed.

Human rights in former Yugoslavia could best be secured by some new, loose and democratic Federation of Balkan states, with just sufficient strength to guarantee equal rights for its patchwork of peoples. United Nations-sponsored ventures have sometimes had a bad record when it comes to guarantees for human rights or democratic government since the United Nations is itself an association of states, tending to favour state interests as against those of individuals quite apart its members own uneven record and ulterior motives. The European Court of Human Rights might offer a more promising model where the participating governments sacrifice an element of state sovereignty. The Helsinki accords might also furnish a basis for a supranational body. The governments of the former Yugoslav republics could be invited to form their own equivalent institution or subscribe to the binding arbitration of the European Court as part of the setting up of a loose Federation of Balkan states. Certain economic and social institutions might also be established at this level. The European Community could make a lifting of sanctions, and generous offers of aid, conditional on guarantees for borders, human rights and democratic procedures. In principle all former Yugoslav republics could be offered associate status in the European Community, as a preliminary to full membership. After all the blood that has flowed the notion of even a loose Balkan Federation might seem a chimera. But in fact there have been close and repeated negotiations between the existing authorities in Belgrade and Zagreb in recent months over a multitude of non-military matters. Post-Milosevic and post-Tudjman a much more healthy relationship could be built.

The removal of these leaders will eventually occur because the authoritarian and intolerant projects of

14. See Alexander Cockburn's discussion of this, "Call to War Weds Strange Bedfellows", *Los Angeles Times*, 5 May 1993.
15. Giovanni Arrighi, "Global Income Inequalities", *New Left Review*, 189 (1991).
16. For a proposal to make the UN the beneficiary, with due ecological safeguards, of exploitation of the sea-bed see John Matthews, "The Law of the Sea", *New Left Review*, 95, Jan-Feb 1976.

the ultra-nationalists are have been discredited by appalling social regression and bloodletting. But for the time being the needs of economic regeneration recommend the various parties to cooperate with one another. The Slovenes, whose heedless egoism did so much to wreck the old Federation, have subsequently discovered that they need extensive exchanges with Serbia and Croatia since their trade with the European Community has fallen far short of expectations. In fact Slovenia has busily traded with both belligerents - including the sale of arms - since the onset of the war. One might hope that this pragmatic spirit could be applied to a worthier end - the construction of democratic Balkan Federation. Revulsion at the slaughter of war can also play a part, as it did in the formation of the European Community.

The perspective being proposed here is not one in which Serbian or Croatian nationalism are somehow entirely conjured away. Rather it is one in which the nationalism of Serbs and Croats is encouraged to lose the absolutist and identitarian delusions by which they have recently been gripped. Social movements, humanitarian movements, class struggle, chastened versions of nationalism, liberalism and socialism, peace movements, even a revised memory of the old Federation, could all play a part in such a moral and political education of collective conscience. Outsiders might encourage, but could never force, such a development, since ultimately it depends on the former Yugoslavs themselves.

The nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia

by Karl Kaser

The ethnic landscape of Yugoslavia is, as is well known, like a leopard-skin. The Slavic and non-Slavic groups that today occupy the territory of the one-time Yugoslav state came there in four main migratory periods. The present article, in a somewhat summary fashion, looks at who these various peoples were, where they came from and when.

A brief look at the official population statistics of the census of 1981 gives us a very clear impression of the complex ethnic structure of this country. The statistics confirm that twenty-four different nations and nationalities live on this territory of 22.4 million people. None of the republics is ethnically pure, i.e. without national minorities. If we look in some detail at the different nations and nationalities that live in this area, then certain basic and incontrovertible facts become immediately clear.

Firstly, there is no one national group, in the whole territory of Yugoslavia, which gives its character to the country as a whole, as is the case, for instance, with the German-speaking population of Austria. The largest national group are the Serbs, who make up around 36 per cent of the population, roughly one third. The second largest group are the Croats, making up around one fifth. Yugoslavia is a conglomerate of national groups. The name Yugoslavia (meaning south Slavia) is an appropriate name (though not completely) because six of the national groups, making up over 70 per cent of the population, are indeed Slavs.

There are very few people who think of themselves as Yugoslavs. They were indeed Yugoslav citizens, but saw themselves primarily as Serbs, Croats, Turks, Albanians, etc. The nationality statistics don't contain the category "Yugoslav".

Superficial intermingling processes can be observed, for instance, in Bosnia. Here a thin veneer of the transnational "Bosnian" appeared to cover the three national groups of this republic, but it's fragility has been demonstrated in the recent conflict. The present population living on the territory of Tito's Yugoslavia settled here in four major phases of migration.

The first settlement

The peoples of the first phase of settlement were remnants of the original population of south east Europe. Around 1200 BC these people were mainly the Illyrians (western part of south east Europe), the Thracians (from the eastern part of the region) and the Greeks (from the southern part). The present-day Greek population are more or less the direct descendants of these original Greeks. The Romanians regard themselves as the descendents of the Thracians while the Albanians (in Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro) see themselves as the descendents of the original Illyrian settlers. The Illyrian population had its political centre in what is present-day Kosovo. This doesn't mean, of course, that all the present Albanian people of Kosovo are descended from the Illyrians. The majority of the Albanians migrated westwards from the Albanian highlands after the end of the 17th century.

In the second century BC, the Romans began their

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conquest of south east Europe. With the Roman administration came Italian colonists, functionaries and soldiers. These were the basic stock from which came the present Italian population. The number of Italians, however, had radically decreased since the second world war. The Walachians were probably Illyrians who were Romanised during the period of Roman rule. The descendants of these original people from the first phase of settlement today make up about 8 per cent of the Yugoslav population.

The second phase

The core of the present Yugoslav population came during the second phase of settlement, namely, the Southern Slavs. They make up today about 72 per cent of the population. The migration of the South Slavs took place during the course of the 6th. and 7th. centuries. The Slavic tribes put themselves down among the indigenous population, sometimes peacefully, sometimes after much struggle. The living space of the original inhabitants was restricted by the newcomers and, in many instances, they were forced into the mountainous regions.

What began, however, was a peaceful and intensive process of assimilation between the old and new settlers, a process that lasted some centuries. It is very difficult to have an accurate picture of this process but one thing is absolutely certain: not one Yugoslav citizen can assert truthfully today that they were always and forever, back to the original forefathers, Serbs, Croats, etc. It was largely a consequence of historic accident that a person belonged to one ethnic group or another. Church and religion were one factor, another was the desire to be part of whatever was the dominant culture or group. A similar process occurred in Austrian history.

The histories of the different South Slav peoples that came together in a common state in 1918 was by no means uniform or simple. We can assume that the cultural and social differences among the various South Slav groups at the time of settlement were not so significant as they are today made out to be. These differences as they are perceived today are largely the outcome of history.

The majority of the tribes that migrated into this territory in the 6th. and 7th. centuries were either Serb or Croat. The process of state formation took place rather rapidly in the case of the Croats. Already in the 8th. century there is reference to a Croat duke. At the beginning of the 10th. century there was a Croat kingdom. The political centre at that time was still in Dalmatia. In 1102 the Croat kingdom was subdued by its neighbour, the kingdom of Hungary, and it remained a separately administered part of Hungary until 1918. From the 15th. to the end of the 17th. century, parts of Croatia were administered by the Ottoman Empire. From the 16th. to the end of the 19th. century, about a third of its territory was a special military border area, administered at first from Graz but later from Vienna. It was in this border area that many Serb families settled during this period. They were the forerunners of the present-day Serbian minority in Croatia.

The Serbs didn't succeed in establishing their own state until the second half of the 12th. century. The Kingdom of Serbia developed into a powerful Balkan state in the medieval period. It extended its territories far into the south and south east, over Kosovo for instance, and, in the 14th. century, came close to overthrowing the Byzantine Empire. In the 15th. century, however, Serbian territory was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. It was only in 1830 that the process of rebuilding the Serbian state could begin. The small Serbian princedom, led at various times by the Obrenovia and Karadjordjevia dynasties, gradually won back territory from the Ottoman Empire and eventually achieved full state sovereignty in 1878.

Slovenia is a much more recent phenomenon. Originally these people were elements of the various Slav tribes that settled in the Alpine and lower Alpine region. In the 7th. and 8th. centuries they succeeded, for a brief time, in establishing their own state, the Dukedom of Karantania. In the 8th. century, however, they were subdued by the East Frankish Empire and were later integrated into the Habsburg Empire. Under the Habsburgs they were constantly being divided into various different administrative regions. Their area was brought together into a single administrative unit only in the Yugoslav state.

The ancestors of the modern Montenegrins migrated to this territory at the same time as the rest of the South Slavs. Their formation as a separate (ethnic) group took place much later. Present-day Montenegro was part of Serbia until the 14th. century and the people of this area were regarded as Serbs. But just as the Austrians separated themselves from the rest of the German ethnic area, the Montenegrins gradually established a separate identity for themselves. In the course of the 19th. century, under the leadership of the Montenegrin bishops, a small Montenegrin state was established which, initially as a princedom and later as a kingdom, enjoyed full sovereignty between 1878 and 1918.

The ethnic formation process began much later for the Macedonians. In the 19th. and in the early 20th. century there was no mention of a Macedonian nation. The Slavic population of this area were ruled partly by the Greek state. The majority of the population were, however, claimed by either Bulgaria or Serbia. To settle this question once and for al, the Yugoslav leadership, after the second world war, decided to create a Macedonian nation. A language was codified and the ethnic formation process was set in motion.

Third settlement period

The third settlement had to do with the rule of the Ottomans over a large part of what is present-day Yugoslavia. As is well known, the Ottoman-Turkish conquest began in the 14th. century. After a long period of conflict a border was finally established in the middle of the 16th. century between the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires, a border which ran through Croatia and which remained for centuries. Although the pressure to push back the Turks began at the end of the 17th. century, it wasn't until the two so-called Balkan wars that Yugoslavia was finally freed from Turkish rule. The more than 100 000 Turkish people living today in Yugoslavia are the remnants of Turkish settlement during the Ottoman period. A small number of them live in Kosovo (mainly in Prizren and Draga) but the greater part live in Macedonia. They are a third of the population of the Macedonian city of Debar.

The ethnic and religious group described as Moslems was also formed during the long period of Turkish rule. Islam was the religious foundation of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman administration tolerated other religions but social mobility was open only to Moslems. On Yugoslav territory Moslems were a numerically small elite, the mass of the population remaining Christian. The Ottoman state

Nation/Nationality	Number	% today
I. Phase		
Albanians	1 730 000	7.7
Greeks	2 000	0.0
Romanians	55 000	0.2
Italians	15 000	0.1
Walachians	32 000	0.1
II. Phase		
Montenegrins	579 000	2.6
Croats	4 428 000	19.8
Macedonians	1 340 000	6.0
Slovenes	1 754 000	7.8
Serbs	8 140 000	36.3
Bulgarians	36 000	0.2
III. Phase		
Moslems	2 000 000	8.9
Turks	101 000	0.4
Jews	1 000	0.0
Roma	168 000	0.8
IV. Phase		
Austrians	1 000	0.0
Germans	9 000	0.0
Czechs	20 000	0.1
Hungarians	427 000	1.9
Poles	3 000	0.0
Russians	4 000	0.0
Ruthenians	23 000	0.1
Slovaks	80 000	0.4
Ukrainians	13 000	0.1

did not generally carry out forced conversion. But in the border areas, for security reasons, a certain amount of Islamicisation was carried out. This is why about 40 per cent of present-day Bosnia-Herzegovina is Moslem. The majority of the Albanians of Kosovo are also Moslem.

The Moslem population of Bosnia-Herzegovina is recognised today as a separate nation. There was a special reason for this. Because of their religious affiliation, the Bosnian Moslems undergo quite a different socialisation from their Croat and Serb neighbours, have a different system of values and a different mentality. The problem was, and is, that before their conversion to Islam they were either Serbs or Croats. In the nationalist conflicts of the 19th. and 20th. centuries the Moslem population was constantly torn by the conflicting claims of Serbs and Croats. As a way out of this senseless conflict, they were recognised as a separate nation in the 1960s.

In 1930 about 70 000 Jews lived in Yugoslavia; in 1945 there were only 13 000. About 12 000 of these lived in Serbia and, already in the first year of occupation (1941), between 4000 and 5000 of these were murdered near Belgrade. Most of the Jews on Yugoslav territory were Sephardic Jews, i.e. Jews expelled from Catholic Spain at the end of the 15th. century. A majority of these expelled Jews were given permission to settle in the Ottoman Empire.

Most of the Roma also came to Europe during the Ottoman period. Their ancestors had belonged to the lower castes of northern India and they probably left India between the 9th. and 11th. centuries. Many of them then came, over Syria and Asia Minor, to south east Europe. The first Roma on Yugoslav territory were registered in Zagreb in 1378. The majority of them came, however, during the Ottoman period.

The fourth phase

The fourth settlement period took place as part of the resettlement programme that followed the retreat of the Ottoman Turks. In the case of the Austrians, they were probably German-speakers in the lower Steyrian part of Slovenia. In the 1920s there were about half a million Germans living in Yugoslavia. A small number of these had settled in this territory in a much earlier period; these were the so-called Gottscheer Germans who had settled in the kraina area of Slovenia in the 14th. century.

The descendents of this fourth settlement today make up about 10 per cent of the Yugoslav population. After the second unsuccessful siege of Vienna (1683) the Turks, around the beginning of the 18th. century, were forced out of the eastern part of present-day Yugoslavia and southwards towards Belgrade. A large number of the existing population then left Slavonia, Syrmia, the Banat and Baranja. Under the Habsburgs, during the course of the 18th. century and into the 19th. century, these areas were colonised. Germans, Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks and Ukrainians took advantage of the possibility and settled in the newly opened territories. The resulting multi-ethnic mixture can be seen today especially in Vojvodina. The largest group among the newcomers were the Hungarians. With a population of half a million they are, after the Albanians, the second largest non-Slavic minority in Yugoslavia. Around 88 per cent of them live in Vojvodina. Cities such as Backa Topola, Kanjia, Senta, Subotica and Temerin have Hungarian majorities.

Around 80 000 Slovaks also live in Vojvodina. Their cultural centre is Backi Petrovac. The Ukrainians also live mainly in this region. A good dozen or more nationalities live together here peacefully.

In the 1920s there were a more or less equal number of Germans and Hungarians. Of the original half million, only about 9000 germans are still living in Yugoslavia. The second world war was a catastrophe for Yugoslavia's German minority. Persecution, deportation and execution was their fate at the end of the war, justified by the Yugoslav government as a response to the horrors of Nazi occupation during the years 1941-45.

The situation in Yugoslavia today wouldn't be so complicated today if perhaps all these different ethnic groups lived in their own compact territories. But this is far from being the case. Only Slovenia is relatively compact, with just a few Hungarians and Italians near its border regions.

During the course of the centuries, big political crises have led repeatedly to major migrations in these southern lands, resulting in large-scale ethnic mixing. To untangle this today, in the pursuit of ethnic purity, is not possible.

Was a "Yugoslav solution" possible?

by Knut Mellenthin

The editor of the left magazine, *Konkret*, asks why, in Yugoslavia, "groups that had until quite recently lived peacefully together" are suddenly "fighting each other". His answer: "German weapons and German encouragement" have brought about this amazing change. (*Konkret* 7/92) The parliamentary fraction of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), after more than a year of conflict in Yugoslavia, still publishes statements in which Germany's "premature recognition" of Croatia and Slovenia are condemned as having contributed to "an escalation of the conflict" (PDS *Pressedienst* No. 33, 1992) But has everyone forgotten that, at the time of the EC's formal recognition, at the end of 1991, the war had already been going on for months in Croatia and there was no serious prospect of keeping Yugoslavia together?

Left-wing publications frequently claim that Germany's "one-sided support" for the two separated republics, Croatia and Slovenia, hindered a "Yugoslav solution", the preservation of the Yugoslav federation. But after the first shots were fired in Slovenia in June 1991, just after the republic's declaration of independence, a politically negotiated settlement to save Yugoslavia was never a possibility. It has not been demonstrated that the German government encouraged these two republics to separate before they actually did so. It would also be difficult to point to any concrete intervention on the part of the German government which blocked a "Yugoslav solution" before the beginning of the conflict. It is true, of course, that since the conflict began Germany has adopted an extremely anti-Serbian position.

The attempt to show that Germany blocked a "Yugoslav solution" presupposes that, without Germany's intervention, it would have been possible to rescue the Yugoslav federation. Of course, it is impossible to prove such an assertion. In historical interpretation, "what if" remains pure speculation. The real question is whether the possibility of a negotiated Yugoslav solution has any plausibility.

Secession of Slovenia and Croatia

The secession of Slovenia and Croatia was not a bolt from the blue. This process had begun long before any German politician considered the option of recognition.

Let us recall the sequence of events. On 2 July 1990 the parliament in Ljubljana adopted a "Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Slovenian State". With this Declaration, Slovenia claimed for itself the right to make its own foreign, defence, security and economic policy. On 23 December 1990 there was a referendum in which 88.5 per cent of the population answered yes to the question "should the Republic of Slovenia become an independent state?". On 20 February 1991 the parliament in Ljubljana decided to proceed to separate from Yugoslavia and to establish an independent state.

One day later, Croatia took a step along the same road by declaring that Croatian law took precedence over the laws of the federation. On 19 May 1991 there was also a referendum in Croatia in which 93.2 per cent voted for independence, with the Serbian minority boycotting the vote. Finally, on 15 June 1991 both republics decided on 26 June as the date for their proclamation of independence.

Up to this point, speaking purely hypothetically, there was still the possibility of a negotiated Yugoslav solution. In the concrete situation, this could only have been a confederation with a very weak centre. With this qualification, both Slovenia and Croatia were prepared to negotiate but Serbia rejected any talks on the decentralisation of Yugoslavia. The leaderships in Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were looking for a compromise solution.

An agreement was then actually reached at the beginning of June 1991 to transform Yugoslavia into a "union of sovereign republics". But this agreement on paper was highly self-contradictory. The federal government was to be responsible for foreign policy and defence but the republics were to have their own armed forces and independent foreign policy. On all important decisions there would have to be consensus among the six republics, which would have made any central organ powerless. The federation treaty was to be renewed every five or ten years.

But two days later this agreement was rejected by Serbia. The German government and the governments of the other EC states had welcomed this agreement as "an encouraging step back to a constitutional order and a peaceful dialogue".

Saying that it was Serbia that first withdrew from this agreement is by no means an accusation against Serbia. The agreement was such a poor compromise and so open-ended that it could not have served as a basis for common action. What this demonstrates is that the reasons for the failure of a negotiated Yugoslav solution were primarily internal: the different sides were so far apart that a middle road was no longer to be found. There were only two alternatives then: either allow the two republics to separate, leaving the door open for peaceful cooperation, or intervene militarily to stop the separation. At the end of June 1991, a "Yugoslav solution" was only

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a fig-leaf for war.

The latter alternative was a contradiction in itself: any attempt to rescue Yugoslavia by means of war could only mean the final destruction of the Titoist concept of a Yugoslav state and, quite independent of the outcome of this war, would have meant a long-term poisoning of relations among the peoples of Yugoslavia.

Failure of the big powers

In the interest of the future co-existence and cooperation of the different peoples of Yugoslavia, what was absolutely necessary in the summer of 1991 was to avoid war and to see the secession of the two republics and the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation as the lesser of two evils. Was anything gained by the attempt to maintain the federation by military force?

In any case it was clear from July or August 1991, after the defeat of the Yugoslav army (JNA) in Slovenia, that a military option no longer existed: the JNA was to weak to bring about a rapid capitulation of the two separated republics. From that point in time, any insistence on a "Yugoslav solution" could only have led, in practice, to a fiasco.

This makes it clear also why, from around November/December 1991, Germany was to play a leading role in determining the Yugoslav policy of the Western alliance. According to the interpretation of the PDS and like-minded groups, Germany "rushed through its anti-Serbian policy" and forced the other EC states and the USA into "a premature recognition" of Croatia and Slovenia. This view leaves unanswered the question as to how Germany was able to dictate its own policy to the other big powers and why, if Germany was intent on "rushing through" its policy, a full six months went by between the declarations of independence and foreign recognition.

The solution is nearer at hand. The option favoured by Britain, the USA and France, namely, to maintain the Yugoslav federation in some form, had collapsed by the autumn of 1991 with the failed attempt to maintain the federation by military means. The unrealistic insistence on this option meant a significant loss of time for France and the other powers and it strengthened the position of Germany which had accepted the dissolution of Yugoslavia earlier and made the necessary adaptations in policy.

With the one-sided pressure and sanctions against Serbia today, it is sometimes easy to forget that, up until the summer of 1991, the Western powers had given Serbia every reason to assume that a military action (rapid, of course, and successful) against the two secessionist northern republics would not only be tolerated but was in fact secretly desired. In mid-February 1991 an EC delegation visited Belgrade to stress the interest of the EC and the European Council in the maintenance of a unified Yugoslavia. Unity was a precondition for financial assistance. (This was by no means a minor consideration since Yugoslavia was heavily in debt from the 1980s and very dependant on the good will of the IMF etc.)

At the end of May 1991 the chairman of the European Council, Santer, and the president of the European Commission, Delors, both visited Belgrade. Their message was that the EC did not wish "to interfere in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia" and did not want for itself any mediating role. Yugoslavia would have to maintain itself as political institution and there could be no question of association agreement with the EC as long as its internal problems were unresolved.

Then, finally, on 21 June 1991, a few days before the planned declarations of independence, the US Secretary of State, James Baker, visited Belgrade. He declared his support for the appeal issued on the previous day by the CSCE at its meeting in Berlin (19/20 June 1991) that Yugoslavia be preserved as a united federation and that its territorial integrity should remain intact. Baker warned Slovenia and Croatia against "unilateral steps". Both republics could not hope for recognition from the US.

The right thing to have done at the time would have been to emphasise the fundamental importance of maintaining the unity of Yugoslavia but, at the same time, to make a clear and sharp warning against any attempt to impose this unity by military means. The most sensible thing to have done would have been to recognise Slovenian independence right away and to hold out this prospect to Croatia but only on condition that it negotiated some form of autonomy for the Serbian areas of the republic. But what was necessary, and this is the important point, was that the CSCE and the UN should have involved themselves much earlier, 1990 at the latest, and institutionalised some kind of "crisis management", called a Yugoslav conference, mediated between the republics, etc. Instead of this, they involved themselves in negotiating and mediating at a point when the outbreak of fighting had already destroyed any chances of success. Against this background, the sanctions policy against Serbia can be seen as nothing but the cynical self-justification of the great powers who had failed to do what was politically necessary a a time when it might have had some effect.

The elephant in the china shop

It is the viewpoint of quite a few on the German left that the reasons for the destruction of Yugoslavia are as follows: the two rich republics, Slovenia and Croatia, attracted by the pleasures of the capitalist market, tempted by the fleshpots of the EC and encouraged by German imperialism, broke their links with the other republics in order to move faster towards integration. The Serbian leadership, according to this scenario, is defending the status quo, which is the right and the progressive thing to do because it is directed against German hegemonial ambitions.

It can't be denied that economic differences among the republics and the desire of the two northern republics "to leave the sinking ship" played an important role in the break-up of Yugoslavia. But this is only one aspect of the situation.

The Yugoslav crisis was set in motion when the group around Milosevic took over the Serbian CP in 1987/88 and began to mobilise around nationalist policies. The first object of hate were the Albanians of Kosovo whom Milosevic accused of raping Serbian women and carrying out genocide against the Serbian people. Milosevic supporters responded with slogans such as "Death to the Albanians" and called for arms.

Serbia then rescinded the autonomy of the two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, an autonomy anchored in the Yugoslav constitution. This was followed by the fall of the government of Montenegro after mass actions organised by the Serbian leadership. These events destroyed the foundation of the Yugoslav federal state. Serbia had now acquired three more votes in the federal presidency, those of Montenegro and the two provinces (which

maintained their voting rights in spite of having lost their autonomy).

Of course, Slovenia and Croatia were not oppressed or colonised nations. Economically, they were privileged to a certain extent. Nevertheless, it is clear that if, in a multinational state, the largest state significantly shifts the balance of forces in its favour, then the complex equilibrium on which that state is based will be rendered unstable. The other republics don't immediately become "oppressed nations" but what they are confronted with is an enforced change in their general situation and an unacceptable reduction of their role in the state and in society. To defend themselves against this is not, in itself, a sign of national fanaticism, although a sharpening of the conflict can, of course, lead to this.

Serbian nationalism is no better or no worse than any other. The problem is that, in the context of the actual relation of forces in the Yugoslav federation, its effects are much more devastating than the chauvinist escapades of any of the other groups. Serbia is not only the biggest nation on the Yugoslav territory, but it has solid minorities in two other republics, occupying clearly defined territory. At that moment when forces took power in Serbia that claimed for their nation the leading role in the Yugoslav federation, then the foundations of that federation (equilibrium and equal rights) were undermined.

No Yugoslavia without Tito

Contrary to the clichés that one one hears quite a lot now, Yugoslavia wasn't exactly an "internationalist state" with a centuries-old tradition of inter-ethnic peace. The kingdom established at the end of the first world war was so dominated by Serbian interests that the Yugoslav CP called for its dissolution. One also should recall that at that time neither the Macedonians nor the Bosnian Muslims were recognised as national groups. Neither were the Albanians, something that changed very little even under Tito.

In socialist Yugoslavia, because of the historical experience, the right to separation was anchored in the constitution. One has to recognise, however, that this right existed only in theory. In practice, the union was held together not by the free will of the population but with repressive interventions by the centre whenever and wherever there were signs of "nationalist deviation". At the beginning of the 1970s the Croatian leadership was removed when it allied itself with a nationalist opposition. Nationalists in the Serbian leadership suffered a similar fate.

This kind of demonstrative symmetry was typical of the Titoist system. The federal state was strongly defended, and defended equally against all sides. The interventions of the centre had at least a neutral character. This role of the central state was more or less acceptable to the the different national groups in Yugoslavia. (I'm leaving to one side here the special problem of Kosovo.)

However, in Yugoslavia today apparently every national group believes that Tito discriminated against them and in favour of the other national groups. Tito, at some time or other, offended every particular group. It is indicative that the Serbs and Montenegrins, the two national groups that are claiming to incorporate the continuity of the Titoist state, have both rejected the founder of that state.

The Serbs argue, quite correctly, that the borders of the six republics, as they were established after the second world war, did not correspond to the ethnic distribution and that therefore this inevitably led to problems when the federation disintegrated, problems which the founders of the Yugoslav state had not reckoned with. The Serbs in particular felt themselves disadvantaged by the republican boundaries that were drawn at that time. The territorial boundaries followed historical rather than ethnic lines. For instance, the north-western boundary between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina corresponded to the border established around 1700 between the Habsburg and the Ottoman empires. The boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina are a product of the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The border between Croatia and Slovenia is roughly tthat established by the Holy Roman Empire from the 10th century.

After Tito's death the mediating and equalising function of the federal state organs continued to decline and this was to have very negative consequences. In retrospect, one can perhaps say that the federal state's almost uncritical acceptance of Serbian leadership excesses after 1988 signified the final end of the Yugoslav federation. With its silence and passivity it lost almost all of its political credibility and moral integrity. Basically, the federal government played little or no role from the latter part of the 1980s. This was clear in 1990 when Markovic established a new party, the sole programmatic specificity of which was its "Yugoslavism". Electorally it received only 10 per cent of the popular vote and not much was heard of it after.

The federal government was finally abolished by Serbia in the autumn of 1991. The first step was taken on 3 October of that year: the state presidency, consisting now only of the representatives of Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro, declared that from then on it would be functioning "under conditions of war". This meant that it had taken over all the constitutional functions of the federal government and federal parliament. The final step took place on 15 November: the remnant of the Belgrade parliament voted a motion of no confidence in the president, Markovic, and the foreign minister, Loncar.

From the party to the army

The second and indeed the most important institution which incorporated the federal state was the Yugoslav communist party, the League of Communists (LCY). The LCY dissolved into its republican constituents during 1990. The driving force in this dissolution were, without doubt, the Slovenian communists, joined later by the Croatian communists. Even at that stage the parties of Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina, although they fought to maintain the federal party, were not inclined to go it alone with Serbia in the LCY. This led, one year later, to the exit of these two republican parties. Their fear, founded on history and reinforced by the chauvinist policies of the Serbian leadership from the mid-1980s, was that, without the counterweight of Slovenia and Croatia, the Serbian leadership would dominate absolutely. Under those circumstances, exit from the LCY was seen as the lesser evil.

With the disintegration of the federal party, the central political-ideological and organisational motor of the federation came to an end. The assumption is probably correct that the second Yugoslav state would be unthinkable without the tradition of the CP-led partisan struggle against the fascists, without the socialist framework and without the CP's leading role. Yugoslavia without the LCY was probably as

unrealistic as the Soviet Union without the CPSU.

After the federal government had ceased to function as such and the communist party had disintegrated, there was only one central institution left - the army. In 1990/91, a "Yugoslav solution" would have been a possibility only with the help of the army. In other words, after the majority of the people in Slovenia and Croatia had voted for independence, a "Yugoslav solution" would have been synonymous with a repressive law-and-order state in which the army played a major role.

To play this "Yugoslav role" the Yugoslav army, like the Titoist CP earlier, would have had to be in a position to act as an autonomous and neutral arbiter above the particular interests of the individual republics. At the ideological level, this was indeed how the top army leaders saw their role. This led in 1990 to the attempt on the part of some prominent military leaders to establish a rather dogmatic successor organisation to the LCY. Of course, nothing came of this attempt.

At one point it looked as if the leaders of the army were going to seize power: on 27 June 1991, two days after the declaration of independence, army units used force to attempt to establish control over Slovenian border crossing points. The outcome wasn't a good one for the army. At the beginning of July Markovic accused the military leadership of having acted without authorisation and of exceeding their authority. The next day, General Adzic made a speech on television which sounded like the declaration of a putsch: the army was forced to take up this struggle and would carry it through "to the end". The crisis finally came to an end on the afternoon of 3 July when the commander of the 5th. army region ordered a ceasefire and declared that the army accepted the authority of the new president, Mesic.

But what happened then was this: the presidency, on 18 July, decided to withdraw federal troops from Slovenia, which de facto signified that Slovenia was no longer seen as part of the federation. Mesic voted against this proposal because he foresaw, quite correctly, that the army would now direct its attention to Croatia. At the end of July the army then launched a massive attack against Croatia. In so doing it relinquished its claim to be a "federal" institution. From now on it was the military arm of Greater Serbian policies.

This move on the part of the army inevitably led to a change in the attitude of the Bosnian government in Sarajevo. In July 1991 the government was still appealing to the army to defend the neutrality of Bosnia-Herzegovina against incursions from Serbia and Croatia. In September 1991, however, the government of Izetbegovic prohibited JNA recruitment in Bosnia. The government also demanded, without success, that the army should undertake no movements or operations in Bosnia without its explicit approval.

The government of Izetbegovic had come to the conclusion that the JNA was no longer a neutral body, that it could no longer act as the guarantor of a "Yugoslav solution".

The myth of the stab in the back

Some writers on the left in Germany speak not of the "dissolution" of the Yugoslav federation but of its "destruction", with the German government, of course, playing the main role. They appear to believe that the conflict in Yugoslavia had its origins abroad and would have been settled long ago were it not for the interventions of foreign powers.

This theory is given some credibility by the fact that the German government did indeed intervene very heavily in Yugoslavia and its hostility to Serbia has shown not the slightest constraint. However, as I have attempted to demonstrate in this article, the causes of the failure of the second Yugoslavia were to be found primarily within Yugoslavia itself.

It seems to me that what we are dealing with here is a general problem in the societies of "real existing socialism", namely, that it was not possible, alongside the monopoly state party that allowed no opposition, to create parallel nation-wide structures that could carry out a rescue operation in the event of the collapse of the state party. In multinational states the unity of the state was incorporated exclusively in the unity of the party. The only alternative that might have fulfilled this role of the party was the army, but the army was no longer in a position to do so. The events of 19 August 1991 in the Soviet Union were a further confirmation of this.

In the past year we have witnessed the disintegration not only of Yugoslavia but also of the Soviet Union. Theories of "destruction of the state" or of incitement from abroad have little explanatory value in the Soviet Union. There military conflicts have escalated and without the help of inflammatory speeches from German politicians or diplomatic interventions by the EC. Even Czechoslovakia, against every dictate of reason, has disintegrated, and without encouragement from Bonn.

The end of "real existing socialism", wherever it has existed, is not a scenario directed from Germany. This process has to be understood in terms of its own inner causes, its own preconditions and its own history. For those of us on the left, this will also mean an unavoidable element of self-criticism.



The West and the division of Bosnia

by Ben Cohen

The declaration on Bosnia at the EC Foreign Ministers Copenhagen summit in mid-June refined double-speak into an art. Recalling the principles of the August 1992 London Conference on the former Yugoslavia, the Ministers affirmed their commitment to Bosnia-Hercegovina's integrity and the inadmissibility of taking territory by force. At the same time, they gave their consent to the partition of Bosnia into three states - one Serb, one Croat, one Muslim.

In the killing fields of Bosnia, the strategy of partition remains the same; the razing of villages, the shelling of towns and the forced expulsion and mass torture of civilian populations. The current situation leaves most of the north, east and south-east of the country under Serbian control, with the west in the hands of Croatian forces. Small patches of central Bosnia and the Bihac pocket in the north-west remain under Bosnian control, albeit under constant siege and bombardment from Serbs and Croats. Indeed, one notable feature of the war since the onset of Spring is the increased collaboration between Serb and Croat militias. This is a reflection of the cooperation at state level between the two erstwhile rivals.

The denial of sovereignty

The common theme in discussions of Bosnia now is that it is either too late or too unrealistic to expect that active measures will be taken in defence of Bosnia's sovereignty. It can therefore be reasonably concluded that the net result of international policy has been to undermine Bosnian sovereignty, by not lifting the arms embargo to grant Bosnian forces theirlegal right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, and by not engaging in any of the range of possible military options which the Bosnians themselves have been asking for. These include: air strikes on artillery positions; destruction of supply lines, for example the bridges over the Drina river between Serbia and Bosnia; jamming of radio frequencies used by the aggressor forces; forcible delivery of humanitarian aid to besieged populations in Sarajevo, Gorazde, Tuzla, Maglaj, Brcko and other areas; deployment of ground troops to secure the six nominal UN safe areas and prevent further seizures of territory.

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The basic impression is that the world is faced with a fait accompli in Bosnia. Faith in negotiations combined with a fierce distaste for military involvement has led to victory for the nationalist forces. The west, and particularly the twelve EC member states, would have liked a different outcome. As was said in Copenhagen, Bosnia should - in principle - stay together.

But the impression is wrong. True, there were EC member states like Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands who voiced strong displeasure at the carve-up at various stages of the war. Germany even attempted to raise the arms embargo on the Bosnians in a foiled exercise in joint diplomacy with the Clinton Administration (for its part, the US has been consistently critical of European policy in Bosnia). But the thrust of European policy - in tandem with the nationalist warlords on the ground - has been to partition Bosnia. From the beginning of the war in the former Yugoslavia, the Europeans ducked head-on confrontation. First, their diplomatic interventions came too late. Second, they legitimised the regime of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia and his operatives in Croatia and Bosnia. Third, they painted themselves into a corner by legitimising Franjo Tudjman's regime in Croatia. Fourth, they avoided the provision of genuine security guarantees to Kosovo and Macedonia, a policy which continues. Fifth, they helped in the destruction of Bosnia.

It is this last point which is the focus here. Partitioning the country along ethnic lines was for a long time unthinkable for the majority of Bosnian citizens, regardless of national origin. The ethnic structure of the republic, as recorded in the censuses of 1991 and before, was in itself evidence enough that ethnic division would bring catastrophe. According to one Bosnian journalist, writing in February 1992, partition would "seed 100 years of terrorism".

The myth of ethnic hatreds

Prior to the outbreak of full-scale war in April 1992, Bosnia-Herecgovina's 4.35 million citizens were identified as follows: 43.7 per cent Muslim, 31.3 per cent Serbs, 17.3 per cent Croats, with the remainder Yugoslavs and others. Around 30 per cent of Bosnian citizens are intermarried and a variety of nationalities, including Roma, Jews and Vlachs, were present. In Bosnia's towns and cities, particularly Sarajevo, Travnik, Mostar and Tuzla, a cosmopolitan, non-national culture dominated, which became a symbol of Bosnian national pride once war broke out. Hence, the pre-April 1992 reality of Bosnia defied the crude western portrayal of the republic as miserable Balkan backwater, where ethnic hatreds had been sat on for five decades by a cigar-puffing communist tyrant.

The image of ancient animosities made it considerably easier for European Community negotiators, who were joined in August 1992 by representatives of the United Nations, to make the case for partition. To the uninitiated, partition might have even seemed the logical step once war began in April. Intranational strains were already visible in Bosnia through the following key events: firstly, the November-December 1990 elections in Bosnia, which polarised the parliament along national lines, with the mainly Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA) winning 86 seats against 72 for the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and 44 for the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ); secondly, the October 1991 memorandum of Muslim and Croat MPs on Bosnian sovereignty and neutrality with regard to the war in Croatia, which Serb MPs responded to the following month by organising a referendum on remaining in the Yugoslav state; thirdly, the increasingly aggressive behaviour and actions of Serbian irregulars and Yugoslav army personnel, who were using Bosnian territory as a base for attacks on Croatia; fourthly, the Serbian economic blockade imposed on Bosnia at the end of 1991; fifthly, the December 1991 request to the EC from Muslim and Croat MPs to recognise Bosnia along with Slovenia and Croatia on January 15, 1992; sixthly, the declaration of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina on January 9, 1992 with Sarajevo as its capital; finally, the independence referendum of February 29 and March 1, 1992, in which 99 per cent of those who took part, predominantly Muslims and Croats with some urban Serbs, voted for independence, while the ballot was boycotted by many Serbs with SDS backing.

All this needs to be understood against the background of Yugoslavia's disintegration and the wars in Slovenia and Croatia. The struggle for Greater Serbia was at the root of Yugoslavia's collapse. "Not even one hundred thousand dead", argued Serb historian Milorad Ekmecic, "will be too many for its creation". In fact, one hundred thousand was not enough. More than twice that figure have been killed in fifteen months of war, with a further two million civilians forcibly displaced. In one way or another, over two-thirds of Bosnia-Hercegovina's population have had their lives ravaged by the war.

The contribution of the western powers to this process has been decisive. In particular, the positions advanced by the UN and EC have actually encouraged the "ethnic cleansing" which has led to genocide. Over the last year, the principle of ethnic division has been progressively strengthened among western policy makers; the stage has now been reached where it is Serbia and Croatia, rather than the international mediators, who are deciding such vital issues as the dividing lines on maps and the constitutional future of the country. Time is another crucial factor on the side of the aggressors, as the impending winter and the deep crisis in the provision of humanitarian aid may eventually force the legal Bosnian government to yield towards partition.

National Cantons

In March 1992, the EC negotiator for former Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington, and the Portuguese diplomat, Jose Cutilheiro, issued a "Statement of Principles for new constitutional arrangements for Bosnia-Hercegovina". Already, the tensions in Bosnia clearly pointed towards war. Sporadic fighting was reported in Sarajevo and in the north and west of the country. By the end of the month, self-styled Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, had unveiled the constitution of the Serbian republic, which declared itself to be part of Yugoslavia.

The Carrington/Cutilheiro principles were a living contradiction. A cursory reading of the constitutional principles reveals nothing remarkable. Indeed, the principles are described as those "understood and generally practised among the states of Western Europe". They include respect for human rights, equal and free voting, freedom to organise politically, the right to form trade unions, separation of religion and state, the separation of powers between the various branches of government under the rule of law and the protection of the constitution. At the root of the plan are the "three constituent units", or cantons. As the statement says: "Bosnia-Hercegovina would be a state composed of three constituent units, based on national principles, and taking into account economic, geographic and other criteria".

There can be little doubt that both Carrington and Cutilheiro knew there was no possibility that a Balkan state built upon ethnic foundations could remain intact, with an overall central authority and a satisfactory balance of power between the centre and the regions. Although Carrington, in a flight of fancy, once opined that the constituent units might become a "Balkan Switzerland", the areas assigned to the Serb and Croat nationalists were fast becoming mini-states. The July 16, 1993 edition of the Sarajevo daily *Oslobodjenje*, which has appeared on all but one day of the war so far, alleges that in December 1991 Croat nationalists met in Grude to discuss purging their ranks of Bosnian unitarists. It was here that the fate of Stjepan Klujic, the pro-unity leader of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) in Bosnia, was decided, under pressure from Zagreb. As Klujicwas eclipsed, Mate Boban rose. Boban remains the head of the Croatian mini-state of "Herceg-Bosna".

International recognition

International recognition of Bosnia in April 1992 did not bring security to the republic. Both the Serb paramilitaries and the Yugoslav Army (JNA) intensified their struggle to swallow up 70 per cent of Bosnia under the RAM plan for Greater Serbia. There were a few Bosnian commentators who hoped that a JNA withdrawal would weaken the paramilitaries, some of which, like the "White Eagles", are named after ultra-right Serb Cetnik units who fought during World War Two. Yet when the JNA finally withdrew in May, it bequeathed its considerable resources to these same irregular forces, who now have the capacity to carry on fighting for at least another decade. As Muhammed Sacirbey, Bosnian Ambassador to the UN, remarked to a group of British MPs gathered in London: "You would have to reduce Serbia's military capability by a factor of ten to stop is being a threat to its neighbours". Currently, there are 80,000 troops in the Bosnian Serb Army, under the overall command of General Ratko Mladic.

With the military threat comes the political programme. The perception of Balkan political culture in the west - which, as others have pointed out, is racist to the core - is that the region will always be plagued by conflicts and wars which are essentially tribal in nature. As such, they are also irrational, in that killing and the destruction of property are seen as ends in themselves. To be sure, the Bosnian war has been breathtakingly wasteful - according to Zlatko Lagumdzija, the Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister who was seriously injured in a mortar

attack on Sarajevo earlier this year, around $80 million worth of damage has been done to road and communications links in the republic. But the immediate aim is not to make the mini-states economically viable, as the long- term plan is in any case to incorporate them into Serbia and Croatia respectively. The aim is to acquire contiguous territory from which the "wrong" national and ethnic groups will be eliminated, regardless of the financial cost.

This political programme, centred on ethnic purity, has been adopted by the west. Proposals for nationally-based cantons have been interpreted as a green light for organising, as JNA General Zivota Panic succinctly put it, "all Serbs in one state". That Serbs were only a majority in 31 out of pre-war Bosnia's 109 municipalities is of no consequence - total wars do not need to consider history, constitutions or civilisations. Hence, the true character of the national cantons was quickly revealed, as the following example shows. On July 23, 1992, approximately four months after the Carrington/Cutilheiro principles were released and one month before the London Conference on the former Yugoslavia, the Celinac War Presidency of the Serbian Republic issued a "Decree on the Status of the Non-Serb Population of the Commune of Celinac". The document, uncovered by UN Human Rights Rapporteur Tadeusz Mazowiecki, whose reports have consistently exposed the systemic character of "ethnic cleansing", outlines a number of restrictions. It forbids non-Serbs to congregate in the streets between 6PM and 4AM. It puts public places like restaurants and parks out of bounds. Non-Serbs cannot leave Celinac without their families and without the permission of the local authority. The purpose of these measuresis to encourage non-Serbs - predominantly or exclusively Bosnian Muslims - to leave those areas earmarked for the Greater Serbian state.

Similar policies have been followed elsewhere, most notably inthe north-western town of Banja Luka, which has become a key logistical centre for the Bosnian Serbs. There are also different levels of ethnic cleansing, ranging from the bureaucratic methods described above, to massacres, detention in concentration camps (like Omarska, Manjaca, Trnopolje and the Keraterm factory) and the mass rape of Muslim women in order to impregnate them with Serbian children. The Warburton Commission on Rape in Bosnian concluded that around 20,000 women and girls had been raped. Some estimates are as high as 70,000.

The London Conference

An abiding theme in the debate on intervention in Bosnia concerns western strategic interest in the former Yugoslavia and the wider Balkan region. Moral considerations have played a negligible role. Rather than creating a set of normative standards to govern the behaviour of states towards their citizens and relations between states, the post-Gulf War world order has highlighted the growing divisions between Europe and the US on security policy and confirmed that military action will only be taken if material resources are at stake, or if, as in the case of recent operations in Iraq and Somalia, the western public needs to be reassured that its leaders are resolute and tough. Were human rights, national

sovereignty and international law really the issues, the desert storm would have been matched in the Balkans.

By August 1992, the increasing ferocity of the Bosnian war and Carrington's dismal diplomatic failure had turned the former Yugoslavia into an international issue. The US began to take a more active interest and anger was growing in the Islamic world, where EC policy was regarded as an expression of profound contempt for all Muslims, be they Europeans or not. Calls for military intervention remained guarded, but there was a recognition that the scope of the negotiations had to be widened and former Yugoslavia dealt with comprehensively. Put another way, a strategic interest had emerged based on two points. First, that the war in Bosnia was creating an ugly precedent, in that nationalists elsewhere might be encouraged to behave in the same way, bringing more instability and conflict to the former communist states. Secondly, there was the spectre of a third Balkan war, which would bury the province of Kosovo and the Republic of Macedonia, drag in Albania and possibly Bulgaria and Hungary, and place two NATO member states, Greece and Turkey, on opposite sides. As a result, the London Conference was convened to reinvigorate the the diplomatic process and introduce the perspectives of non-European parties.

The London Conference largely focussed on Bosnia and reaffirmed a diplomatic commitment to the sovereignty of the republic. One of its more outlandish demands was for all heavy weaponry to be placed under international control within 96 hours - a year on, this still has not occurred. In his address to the Conference, UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali condemned the aggression against a UN member state and defined the war as an "international conflict". The view which still prevails in Britain and France is that the conflict is a civil war. The UN joined the EC as a formal party to the negotiations through Envoy Cyrus Vance. The EC announced that its new negotiator was Lord Owen, who before continuing the partition of Bosnia had been distinguished by his partitioning of the British Labour Party.

All of the declarations of the London Conference on sovereignty, territorial integrity and regional security rang hollow. For the Bosnians, perhaps the most important principle of the conference was its rejection of explicit partition. Indeed, recent statements from the Bosnian Presidency in Sarajevo have

referred to the London Conference as the foundation for the federalist proposals of the Izetbegovic government. But the cantonisation model remained in place; given the lack of political will to defend Bosnia through military means, it was inevitable that the cantons would emerge as nationally exclusive states. As fighting went on through the summer to the end of 1992, Bosnian Serb and Croat forces began to consolidate the territories under their control, although the Bosnian Army did score a few successes in eastern Bosnia, creating a semi-secure corridor from Tuzla to the centre of the country.



Ghettoisation

In January 1993, Vance and Owen came up with their now defunct plan to divide Bosnia into ten ethnic provinces, or "devil's yards", as the Bosnian writer Alija Kebo labelled them. The sharpest feature of the plan was its rewarding of aggression, assigning the Serbs 42 per cent of Bosnian territory and the Croats 30 per cent. The plan was also a fundamental assault on the concept of Bosnia and Bosnian national identity, through its delineation of "Serb", "Croat" and "Muslim" territories. The plan was in many ways a development of the original Carrington blueprint: it denied the provinces an "international legal personality" and it called for a democratic constitution guaranteeing human rights, freedom of movement and democratically elected legislatures in the centre and in the provinces. However, for the Serb nationalists, the real concern was the map. In the event, Karadzic signed the plan, although his main demand for a corridor through northern Bosnia was not satisfied. He did so under the pressure of Milosevic, keen to preserve his domestic power base and anxious to present himself to the west as a moderating influence on Serbian extremism.

The plan was eventually rejected by the so-called "Bosnian Serb Assembly", which itself had no legal basis under either the terms of the Vance-Owen plan or in international law. Milosevic's gamble had paid its dividend. The collapse of the plan was not met by international military intervention, but by a joint Serb/Croat rush for territory. By the time western leaders had convened in Washington in May, the key eastern town of Srebrenica had caved in to besieging Serb forces, with further heavy attacks on Gorazde, Brcko, Maglaj, Zepa, Bihac and other areas. Croatian forces, meanwhile, stepped up their attacks in Hercegovina and central Bosnia. The shifty allies became vicious enemies in Mostar, Travnik, Kiseljak and Vitez.

In Washington, the west finally dispensed with the habit of paying lip service to liberal principles in Bosnia. The Washington Agreement set up six "safe areas" - Sarajevo, Gorazde, Srebrenica, Zepa, Bihac and Tuzla - in what had become a strategy of containment. So far, the agreement has meant nothing, in that conditions in these areas have steadily worsened, instead of improving. Moreover, no guarantees were offered for those areas under Croatian attack or for those areas, like Maglaj, Tesanj, Trnovo, Doboj and Brcko, suffering from an unrelenting Serbian siege.

The "safe areas" are little more than ghettoes for the Bosnian population, mainly Muslim but also with some Serbs and Croats. Cut off from the sea and from major roads, with no real industry, intermittent provision of humanitarian aid and isolated from each other, the 900,000-odd inhabitants of the areas face a bleak future. No doubt, they will be swallowed up in the great carve-up authored by Milosevic and Tudjman.

West a guilty party

The west has been a witness, participant and guilty party in all of this. It was the EC, later joined by the UN, which designed a diplomatic support framework for the terrible atrocities which have led to partition. One year ago, the Bosnian unitarist position was still a possibility. Without the lifting of the arms embargo, and without any form of serious external military intervention, there is little evidence for believing that a Bosnian state has any chance of survival.

There are other questions. Why did the west promote the recognition of Bosnia, while at the same time arranging for its partition? Why did the west fail to go beyond its feeble diplomatic endeavours, when it was clear early on in the conflict that the aggressors had no intention of honouring any agreements? Some argue that the west is neither politically nor institutionally equipped to deal with national conflicts in the post-communist countries. The hotch-potch of acronyms which make up western security architecture - NATO, WEU, CSCE etc. - do not have a sense of how to divide the work of intervention in Bosnia. Another viewpoint is that Europe will not defend a European state where Muslims make up the main part of the population. European leaders will prevent, at any cost, the acquisition of political power by Muslim communities, be they immigrants, like the Turks facing Nazi pogroms in Germany, or native Europeans, like the Bosnian Muslims experiencing genocide at the hands of Serbia.

Finally, the partitionist tradition is of key importance. Bosnia is not the first country where partition has been sanctioned by the west, and it is not likely to be the last. The Middle East, the Asian subcontinent and south-east Europe are just three areas where the alteration of borders has been accompanied by the forced transfer of local populations. After Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia may well become the next victims of Balkan partition. As always, it will be the most vulnerable who will suffer most.

Intervention in Bosnia: the arguments against

by Thomas Harrison

Talk of "safe havens" in Bosnia amounts to little more than a pious hope that the Serbs will be satisfied with what they have achieved and allow a few Muslim enclaves to survive - a sort of "Balkan Monaco or Lichtenstein", to use Ronald Steel's snide characterisation (New York Times, 23 May 1993). It remains to be seen whether the Serbs will generously permit a token Muslim population to abide here and there in what was Bosnia - like Native-Americans on reservations.

In any case, now that the Serbs think they have won, even Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, calls for more UN troops; since the West has essentially accepted Serb and Croat gains as irreversible, a greater UN presence would serve to freeze the current divisions and discourage any attempts by Bosnian defence forces to recapture lost territories. What must be noted about the safe havens proposal is that it would first of all disarm the Bosnians - in return for some vague and extremely dubious promises to defend them from Serb attacks. Safe havens are therefore quite compatible with Serb objectives.

"International community" of the rich and powerful

Though direct, large-scale foreign troop intervention in Bosnia by the UN, or by the US alone, now seems extremely unlikely, were it to happen, it would have dangerous consequences which are important to keep in mind as the situation in Bosnia continues to change. Even a "limited" intervention carries the built-in danger of escalation because of Western governments' fear of a drawn-out war. Given this fear of becoming bogged down in an unpopular "quagmire", there is a strong possibility that if the US or Western Europe send in troops, they will be tempted to shorten the war with some brutal acts of overkill - like the slaughter of more than 100 000 Iraqi conscripts in 1991. A "Balkan Storm" would probably include bombing attacks on Serbian towns and infrastructure, which would criminally victimise Serbian civilians. A US-led intervention, in particular, would be an extremely bad precedent for peace making, mainly because it could not be separated from Washington's ongoing desire to assert its "right" to police other countries. "Waiting for Clinton" (or the UN) is understandable, if illusory, for the desperate Bosnians; but for those in the West who care about human rights and democratic values, it is a moral dead-end.

As for the UN, even at its best, it was never really able to stand apart from the political self-interest of the states which constituted it, particularly the members of the Security Council. And this has been even more true since the end of the Cold War. Today, the policies of the Security Council cannot be distinguished from those of the Western powers, and chiefly the US. As the Gulf War demonstrated, there is now more unanimity among the leading states than ever before. In the Yugoslav crisis, tensions over recognising Croatia and Slovenia in the early stages and over lifting the arms embargo more recently do not reflect major conflicts of interest. In other words, a kind of "international community" seems finally to have come into existence - but it is a community of interest among all the rich and powerful nations to cooperatively run the world.

International progressive opinion

The potential power of international progressive opinion, on the level of civil society, has probably never been greater than it is today. There is more interest in and awareness of human rights, more of a sense of solidarity with the oppressed everywhere. But this broad sympathy seems, paradoxically, to be combined with a deepening pessimism about the ability of ordinary people to resist oppression themselves. As a result, the "moral capital" of international human rights consciousness is increasingly wasted by being invested in the big power-dominated UN and in anti-democratic fantasies of collective security.

We need to remember that decisive pressure for progressive change has come from popular resistance and citizens' movements, not from the "international community" of states. To take a notable example, international sanctions against South Africa helped to undermine apartheid, but serious sanctions were imposed only as a result of grass roots pressure; moreover, sanctions themselves were only one aspect of a massive global citizens' campaign which powerfully succeeded in delegitimising apartheid. In regard to ex-Yugoslavia, on the other hand, sanctions express the feebleness of international solidarity and

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its inchoate demands to "do something"; this allows Western governments to cynically pursue a policy which appears to help Bosnia and punish Serbian aggression while actually appeasing Serbia and forcing Bosnia to accept defeat.

Those who seek peace in Bosnia are all too willing to see the elected Sarajevo government simply dissolved. Vance-Owen would do this not only by constitutionally decentralising the Bosnian republic, but by effectively disarming the Bosnian government forces, while allowing Serb and Croat forces to simply change uniforms and become the armed police of their respective "provinces". Lurking behind Vance-Owen, as well as other proposals for safe havens and UN trusteeships, is a thoroughly anti-democratic vision, recently articulated by a "senior State Department official" who told the New York Times (2 Feb 1993) that Bosnia, like Cambodia and Somalia, is a state that is "not capable of governing" itself; in all three cases, the US and the UN have begun to "take government out of the hands of indigenous peoples".

The prospect of the UN acting as a new global colonial power should give us pause. We need to question the assumptions expressed by this official, assumptions which pervade international discussion of Bosnia and the Balkans generally; that only certain people are fit for self-government, while others, the collectively incompetent, need to be tutored in the mysteries of democracy. But it is no more legitimate to deny self-government and self-determination to the Bosnians than it would be to deny these rights to Americans, British, French, or any other supposedly advanced nations. ...

The arms embargo

The arms embargo has been a form of military intervention, one which has crippled Bosnia's ability to defend itself and left it virtually helpless. But for the embargo, Bosnia might have been able to acquire heavy weaponry to match Serbian armour; with this they would have had a fighting chance to reconquer the occupied territories, disarm the Serb militias, resettle those who have lost their homes, and put war criminals on trial. Were the embargo to be lifted, they might still have this chance. Surely this would be the quickest and most effective way to bring peace to this martyred nation.

During the Spanish Civil War, world democratic opinion denounced the Western powers' hypocritical policy of "non-intervention" and called for arms for the Republic; similarly, the international human rights and peace community should have been demanding from the beginning that all restrictions on arms transfers to Bosnia be suspended. The Bosnians desperately needed to know that democratic opinion in the West was with them, was on their side, and wanted them to acquire the means to win back their country. They did not and do not need the condescension of those who can only pity them as hapless victims, as pitiful creatures who cannot be trusted to organise their own legitimate armed self-defence, but, sadly, must accept their fate and be crushed.

Bosnian military victories would not only weaken or even stop the Serbian war machine, they might also decisively undermine the Milosevic regime and the far right in Serbia. Serbia needs a revolution, and military defeat may be the shock required to open the way for radical change. There has been massive opposition to Milosevic ever since the war began Already an estimated 150,000 young Serbs in Belgrade alone have refused to serve in the army.

It is often argued that arming the Bosnians and raising the stakes for Serbia will only strengthen the extremists - the fascists and the gangsters. But these elements thrive precisely because Serbia has encountered only the most modest resistance from its victims. Serbian citizens suffer from the embargo and are offended by the rhetoric of the West, of course; but, at the same time, the fact that Serbia has been winning encourages many of them to believe that a Greater Serbia is both necessary and achievable.

Solidarity

The place to begin, then, is in active solidarity with the despoiled and persecuted victims. The miracle is that after two years of war, these people continue to resist. In Bosnia there are still multi-communal defence efforts, while guerrilla groups are proliferating in the countryside. Croatians are determined to win back Serb-occupied territories. In Kosovo the people have stood up to massive ferocious repression, maintaining an entire alternative society and government with non-violence (for how long?) and immense dignity.

The shameful betrayal of Bosnia is just "business as usual" for the US, whether under Bush or Clinton, and for the other big powers. And the UN has been their obedient servant. Unfortunately, there is no institution today to which we can realistically appeal to support democracy and human rights. We must look instead to popular struggle and resistance. What we can do is show solidarity and work to prevent our governments from actively crippling this resistance with such things as the arms embargo on Bosnia.

Behind the breakup of Yugoslavia

by Catherine Samary

In a previous issue of *Labour Focus on Eastern Europe* (No. 43, 1992), I offered an analysis of the causes of the break-up of Yugoslavia. I would like to continue the discussion here by referring to recent developments in the war - and to the more general fragmentation taking place in Eastern Europe - and in this way to answer Branka Magas's polemic against my interpretation ("The War in Yugoslavia", in *LFEE*, No. 44, 1993).

Divisions on the European left over the Yugoslav crisis reflect its real complexity as well as the profound weakness of the left in the former Yugoslavia itself. Those who thought they could defend "socialism" or Yugoslavia by backing the Serbian leader Milosevic underestimated the extent to which he had broken with Titoism, and the nature of the alliances with a nationalist far-right geared to a Greater Serbia policy.

The national question

Those who simply espoused the cause of self-determination did not realize how difficult this was to apply in a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia with a highly loaded past; they were prepared to ignore the fact that the collapse of the external borders called into question the whole equilibrium of internal boundaries and the inter-ethnic relations lying behind them.

These relations were themselves bound up with the socio-economic changes of the 1980s, the crisis of socialist projects and the liberal offensive. Those who chose to support liberalism against the retreat into ethnicity did not gauge the profoundly disintegrating effect of market liberalism, especially on federal states in both Eastern and Western Europe.

National questions do not have only one meaning in a context of weakness of the labour movement and crisis of the socialist alternatives: in every case they combine with many different causes and contradictory dynamics. Among these causes, to be sure, are those of emancipation and defence of collective rights, and real difficulties of economic and political democracy lie behind the failure in Yugoslavia (what kind of state, what citizenship, what individual and collective rights, what form of pooling of resources and of local, regional, national and supra-national control?). But national causes have also been used to defend reactionary regimes, whether or not they call themselves "socialist", "democratic" or anti-communist. Independence may serve the cause of capitalist restoration - or, in less developed regions, slow it down. The process of consolidating "populist" or even fascistic authoritarian regimes may follow a number of variants.

A dominant anti-communism tends to light up one of them while leaving the others in shadow. Thus, there is the "red/black" alliance - in Serbia or Russia, for example - between part of the former CP apparatus and extreme-nationalist currents from the anti-communist tradition; in Croatia, a Croat totalitarianism is being forged in the shadow of its Serbian counterpart, and fascist figures and policies from the past are whitewashed under cover of anti-communism. The victims can be on any side. And is it possible to understand Great Serb nationalism in abstraction from the fascist genocide of 1941?

Such are the questions underlying the differences in interpretation between myself and Branka Magas. I have no fundamental disagreements in general with what she says. The problem is with what she does not say. My approach, I hope, takes account of everything essential in hers, while covering all the wars currently taking place. But the converse is not true, because Branka Magas points up only the (certainly existing) Great Serb aggression.

Similarly, the break-up of Yugoslavia itself is not chronologically attributable only to the rise of Serb nationalism - a scenario in which all the other policies are those of victims forced in one way or another to give up the federation. In my view, that is true only of the Macedonians and the Bosnians, "impure" nationalities which have endured the most threats and sacrifices, including from international diplomacy. For their part, the Kosovo Albanians are victims of a special kind. But Slovenian or Croatian policy is not only or even mainly one of victims. Are Croat nationalists compelled, for example, to dismember Bosnia-Herzegovina? It is an analysis which sins by omission or by the downplaying of essential facts; it makes it impossible to account for the agreements between Slovenian, Serbian and Croatian regimes during the break-up of Yugoslavia or for the joint aspects of Serbian and Croatian involvement in Bosnia. Nor, more generally, does it explain the way in which the policies of a Greater Serbia and a Greater Croatia have mirrored each other, beyond their tactical, diplomatic and military differences.

Serb nationalism

Is Serb nationalism the only cause of the break-up of Yugoslavia? To argue this is to fail to see the more general causes which have shattered the Yugoslav cement. The lack of democracy perverted the gains in social and national rights and benefited the nationalist republican regimes in the 1970s. Branka Magas's

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"chronological" approach is useful but quite inadequate. Anyway, what would be the "right" date to start from, when we know how heavily the past weighs on people's minds in the present?

The rise of Serb nationalism took concrete shape in the challenging of the autonomy of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1987. Those events certainly marked a first explicit break with the "Titoist" system and the constitution of 1974; and they also made it easier to assert separatist projects in Slovenia and Croatia. But that was still only one of the causes of the break-up. Recentralisation of the federation, as advocated by the liberal federal government of the Croat Ante Markovic in 1989, had for years no longer been accepted in Ljubljana and Zagreb. (One of the demands of the "Croat Spring" in 1971 had been that foreign currency earned in Croatia's external trade and tourism should be kept within the republic.)

Such is the broader reality which Branka Magas completely fails to mention in her account of the conflicts between Milosevic and the other nationalities. At a stroke she identifies all military interventions with the alliance policy between the Serbian regime and the federal army. That does not make any sense in the case of Slovenia. On the one hand, it is known and widely accepted today that the Greater Serbia policy had no interest at all in Slovenia, and that an agreement between Milosevic and Kucan had been reached before the declaration of independence. While making Kosovo an internal affair of Serbia, this agreement recognized the right to self-determination for the (ethnic) peoples making up the Yugoslav nations - which coincided with the republic in the case of Slovenia - but not for the other peoples.

On the other hand, the federal army, and the Titoist tradition of which it was the bearer, remained defiant vis a vis Serb nationalism and regarded it more as a threat than a cement for Yugoslavia itself. It is true that the army had acquired a certain political autonomy, but it had evident interests in common with the federal government: the maintenance of a Yugoslav state was supported by both sides, and by the "international community", until June 1991. Here we had a number of responsibilities for the armed intervention in Slovenia, and not simply or mainly a Greater Serbia policy. In the "phoney war" in Slovenia, the army lost several dozen soldiers against six dead among the Slovenians. It was after this intervention radicalised Slovenian separatism that the Yugoslav army, purged and rejected by the non-Serbian regimes, converted itself into a pro-Serb army.

Branka Magas plays on a secondary constitutional argument to deny Markovic's responsibility in the intervention in Slovenia: that is, on the fact that the government was not the head of the army and that the collegial presidency was in crisis. Alright. But in that crisis situation the government was still the only federal body endowed with legitimacy, and it evidently played a political role which could either encourage of discourage intervention by the army. The Slovenian Ministry of Defence itself assigned a major responsibility to Markovic, even if the army went beyond what the Prime Minister had intended.

The economic crisis and separatism

In essence, and independently of the existence of Milosevic, the decade of crises, the 1980s, not only called higher living standards into question but also involved mounting conflicts between, on the one hand, the central state and, on the other, self-management and the republican regimes whose rights had grown under the 1974 constitution. Paralysis of the institutions was a reality of all economic decision-making throughout the 1980s, with obvious analogies to the present situation in the ex-USSR or the Russian Federation. The break-up of the Czechoslovak federation also reflects one of the essential realities of this crisis context: namely, the opening of a gulf between richer and poorer republics, accentuated by liberalism and the breakdown of elements of solidarity. One major cause of the separation of both Slovenia and the Czech Republic was, in my view, this urge to "get rid of" attachments that were slowing down insertion into capitalist Europe and to forge closer links with Germany and Austria.

Thus, by the end of the 1980s the Yugoslav project was regarded in Ljubljana as an intolerable economic burden and in Belgrade as an irreversible failure, while in Zagreb it was denounced by President Tudjman as "against nature" and "anti-Croat" in its very essence -in both its Milosevic and its liberal Markovic variants. The republics and communities with a more stable, recognized "identity" - Slovenia, Serbia and Croatia - played a central role in a break-up for which each regime, having regard to the real popular attachment to Yugoslavia, sought to blame the others.

Whatever the finer points of the constitutional battles, chronology is not here the essential factor. For federal recentralisation was not accepted in Slovenia and Croatia, and the consolidation of internal boundaries into ethnically-defined external frontiers entailed the explosion of the national question, except in the case of homogeneous Slovenia. Slovenes represent 90% of their republic and are concentrated there. Croats form 80% in their republic and 18% in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1% in Serbia, mainly in Vojvodina where they make up 5%). Serbs form only 40% of the population in their republic, the diaspora is spread in Croatia (12%) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (33%), with a large minority in Macedonia.

In the end, Branka Magas considers that the challenging of the "external frontiers" was legitimate, but not any questioning of the internal boundaries. One can certainly agree with her that a quest for ethnic frontiers has dramatic and explosive consequences. But frontiers cannot be given merits that they do not possess, nor can they be considered as immutable in principle in one case (Croatia) but not in another. The revolt of the minorities cannot be codified by interdicts or by "definitions". It is the rule in ex-Yugoslavia that no national community wants to be a "minority" - so much so that the very term was seen as degrading or threatening and banished from the official vocabulary. The challenge to the Titoist constitutional balance was expressed in a reassertion of majority rules breaching the consensus. But each community lays claim to such majority rules, or even "universal" citizenship, when it is itself the majority. It rejects them as soon as it is the minority: Serb nationalists refuse to be a minority in a state with a Muslim or Croat majority; but in the name of Yugoslav citizenship they suppress minority rights and the autonomy of Kosovo, in line with a Jacobin model. There should, on the contrary, be universal rights for all fragmented peoples. And if one thinks that frontier challenges and the construction of a Greater Serbia (or a Greater Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and so on) would be a drastic course sowing the seeds of wars without end, it is

necessary not to refuse application of the right to self-determination, but to do everything to show that a life in common is possible in multi-ethnic states, and to make the frontiers porous by guaranteeing reciprocal links and rights. But that was obviously in contradiction with a logic of challenging "any kind of Yugoslavism".

The Greater Serbia project

The Greater Serbia project rests upon an ideological mixture: it does not question the right to self-determination of other nations, but refuses to accept that Serbs can be a minority within a state that is (rightly or wrongly) perceived and presented as threatening to them. It is a project which rests upon mythical symbols such as that of Kosovo as cradle and "property" of the Serb nation (like Palestine for the Zionist far right). It is saturated with historical revanchism against those who adopted the religion of the Ottoman oppressor or who are collectively accused of having perpetrated the Ustashe genocide in 1941. And lastly, it rests upon a paranoia which presents Serbs as the victims of genocide, past, present and future, and of an international plot hatched by Germany. In this framework, a gathering of the nation within the same state is supposed to defend its collective identity against expected risks. Conceived and operated in accordance with a general strategy, it bases itself upon an army looking for the largest possible state, and far-right militias who do not shrink from welcoming bandits and mercenaries plying their dirty trade.

There is no disagreement with Branka Magas over the crimes and disasters to which such a project leads, nor over the fact that it puts the Serbs against all the other communities - precisely because they are dispersed and mingled with all the other communities, except the Slovenes. But such a project could take root among a major part of the Serb population only on the basis of its real fears about the break-up of Yugoslavia and the transformation of the new regimes. Here again there is a debate to be had with Branka Magas.

I should also mention one other point without dwelling too long on it: the purpose, after all, is to bring out the real issues of debate. In Branka Magas's polemic there are some false debates which are often no debates at all: for example, when she simply takes my analysis of "joint responsibility with certain asymmetries" as indicating "equal responsibility" of the different nationalisms - which is not my position. Then she piles up the figures to illustrate Serbian responsibility and says that I 'mention them not at all'. To this I plead guilty. I do not use the figures. I do not trust them. But I do not need those figures to call the atrocities by their name. Where is the real debate here? The main issue is whether or not I deny the policy of ethnic cleansing conducted by the Serb militias. And in fact I do not. Finally, Branka Magas offers a guiding thread to explain my thinking: it is a camouflage for French imperialism. No comment...

Wars within the war

The "liberation of Serb territories" in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina is said to have followed a largely pre-established scenario and strategy, and thus to be an act of external aggression committed against those republics with the logistic support of the army, the aim of which was to separate populations from one another and to cleanse the future territories of Greater Serbia. However, the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were more attached to a Yugoslav project than to a Greater Serbia. They voted for the Serb nationalist parties only as a reaction to the aggressively nationalist campaign conducted by Tudjman and supported by the emigré far Right.

The media war preceded the war proper. But the political and constitutional changes in Croatia were perceived as threatening by the Serb population, their only experience of an independent Croatian state having been that of genocide in the Greater Croatia which encompassed Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Second World War. Zagreb's promises of autonomy, and the constitutional amendments introduced under pressure from the international community, were seen as so much dust in the eyes. Denunciation of Croat nationalist policies by the Croats themselves would have been a necessary condition for effective struggle against the Greater Serbia projects. It would have meant fighting for the possibility of coexistence within a single state, on egalitarian and democratic, multi-ethnic foundations. But could one have such an ideology if one rejected all "Yugoslavism" and repressed as a "bad Croat" anyone who dared to criticize the regime and its policies?

Once international pressure eased and independence was recognized, the Croat regime rapidly evolved towards the extreme right, with its discriminatory citizenship based on blood rights, its fostering of a climate which prompted name-changes and religious conversions, its completely muzzled press which reported offences on a selective ethnic basis.

A civil war

This is why the war is not simply a war of aggression by Greater Serbia. It is first of all a war of territory (and thus property) by regimes which legitimize themselves in ethnic terms. But it is also a civil war in which not just militias and armies but whole populations are implicated; for a country which was not artificial is breaking apart. That country, Yugoslavia, had made it possible to calm real traumas and wounds from the past, although these never entirely disappeared. In fact they re-emerged later, exploited by the new regimes in an attempt to consolidate themselves. In this civil war the Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are not mere pawns in the hands of the Belgrade media, authorities and army; this can be very clearly seen today in the radicalism with which they refuse to become minorities in the newly independent states. Moreover, it is awareness of this reality of civil war - not just external aggression - which is one major reason why the Western military commands are so reticent about intervention. This is what the Serbs hoped to achieve with their "referendum". The new spotlight on the Croat policy of carving up Bosnia-Herzegovina in alliance with the Serb regimes adds to the confusion. What is left now of the "single aggressor"?

The Bosnian symbol

Bosnia-Herzegovina is a miniature Yugoslavia. As elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, two realities face each other: one looks to ethnic separation as a response to the crisis; the other defends what remains of a common life. But Serb nationalism and Croat nationalism both dismiss this second reality because it prevents the completion of a territorial carve-up. If it is no longer possible for Serbs and Croats to live together in Yugoslavia, why should it be possible in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Although the Serb and Croat regimes hoped for a while to annex the whole of

Bosnia-Herzegovina to their own state, what was actually negotiated between Milosevic and Tudjman well before the outbreak of war was a carve-up similar to 1939. At the end of the first unitarist Yugoslavia, which had only internal administrative boundaries, the Croats obtained a Croat Banovina whose borders overlap with those of the Vance-Owen Plan: a division of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the expense of the Muslims and the mixed city populations. But in 1939 the Bosnian Muslims, who were regarded as Turks, had no recognized national reality.

The Bosnian Muslims, Slavs islamicised during the Ottoman occupation, have no other homeland than Bosnia-Herzegovina, even though Serbs and Croats have also long existed on this territory. Some of the latter feel themselves to be "Bosnian" before being Serb or Croat. But that is not always the case, especially now in a context of nationalist polarization in Serbia and Croatia. The whole population (Muslim, Croat or Serb) speaks Serbo-Croat. The ethnic-cultural differences are linked to a long past in which religion consolidated resistance: Bosnian religious heresy was persecuted by Catholics and Orthodox alike in the Middle Ages; Islamicisation in the Ottoman Empire allowed these Bosnian Muslim Slavs to find a place in the dominant, urbanized social classes (Orthodox Serbs very largely remaining serfs and peasants). Finally, after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the 19th century, there was a tendency for these particular Muslims to become secularised. The reality of this Muslim community was recognized in 1961, and in the Constitution of 1974 Bosnia-Herzegovina is described as a state of three communities: Serbs, Croats and Muslims. They were also "absorbed" into Greater Croatia in 1941, which considered them as Croats - and such is still today the dynamic of relations between the Croat and Muslim "allies": to become Croat or disappear. But the Tito regime consolidated, under the ambiguous name Muslims, a national community whose fate and identity are bound up with Bosnia-Herzegovina. This ambiguity today serves the Serb and Croat nationalist causes: in Belgrade, as in Zagreb, the Muslim community is identified with religion and religion with fundamentalism.

The reality of a mixed "Bosnian" community (Serb, Croat and Muslim), which makes itself felt in the towns, therefore, has to be completely obscured. It found no representation at the Geneva talks, for example. Would this be the case if Muslims and Bosnians were faced only with a Serb aggressor? If it were the case, the Bosnian government would indeed be supported by a Croat ally which refused the logic of ethnic partition. But that is not the Croat policy.

Serb and Croat complicity in Bosnia

Here is what the *Helsinki Watch Report* said in August 1992: "On 6 May 1992, Mate Boban and Radovan Karadzic... were...were in Graz in Austria. Boban and Karadzic are considered the lackeys of Tudjman and Milosevic respectively, and it is widely thought that the meeting was organized by the presidents of Serbia and Croatia to continue discussions on the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.... On 3 July 1992, Mate Boban proclaimed the creation in Bosnia-Herzegovina of a quasi-independent Croat state out of a third of the Bosnian territory free of Serb forces.... This Croat-dominated region thus includes towns and villages where Muslims and Serbs are in a majority.... The proclamation of a Croat state in Bosnia was preceded by pressure brought to bear by Tudjman on the Bosnian president Izetbegovic, for him to commit himself to the creation of a confederation with Croatia. Faced with Izetbegovic's resistance, Boban issued a virtual ultimatum: either he declared the confederation, or Croat forces stationed near Sarajevo would not come to the city's assistance. Boban increased the pressure on the Bosnian government in June and July, by blocking the delivery of arms that the Sarajevo government had secretly purchased."

The siege of Sarajevo could have been lifted, but the Croat allies had every interest in maintaining it. For it served a dual policy: both anti-Serb, because a besieged Sarajevo was capable of attracting Western military intervention against Serb forces; and anti-Muslim, in that an alliance with the Serbs was visible to the naked eye in the relations between Serb and Croat militiamen in the areas around Sarajevo where there was a heavy traffic in Deutschmarks.

The Vance-Owen plan

The Vance-Owen Plan could not be a plan for peace, because in one breath it condemns the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina along ethnic lines, and in the other breath encourages it. It condemns the aim of a Greater Serbia but accepts the ethnic division of provinces; it refuses to the Serbian side what the Croat side has achieved for months (a separate republic, with its own flag, its own militias, and contiguity with the neighbouring Croat republic). By forcing its logic on the Muslims, it places them in the position of hostages between the Serb and Croat aggressors. And by not providing the means for an alternative constitutional logic to develop on the basis of those who wish to continue living together, it blocks the only possible peaceful outcome.

The incapacity of the Bosnian forces to prevail politically, and to resist with Vance-Owen Plan with a different project, is due to a number of causes: (1) the difficulty of withstanding concerted pressure from Croat and international "allies" to accept the plan; (2) the political weakness of the anti-nationalist opposition in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as in the rest of the former Yugoslavia, and especially its inability to respond in a coherent and united manner at the level of the whole Yugoslav (and Balkan) area to ethnically based projects for the building of nation-states. Only the idea of a new Balkan union of multi-ethnic states can provide such an answer. But it will also have to counter the disintegrating logic of market liberalism.

The new nationalism in Europe

by Mary Kaldor

Far from ending, history seems to have speeded up since the revolutions of 1989. Germany has unified; the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia have fallen apart. A major war is taking place in the middle of the continent, with tens of thousands of deaths, millions of refugees, and the destruction of whole villages, towns, and historic buildings. Anti-semitism, anti-gypsyism, and other forms of xenophobia are on the rise again almost everywhere in Europe.

Did those of us who devoted so much of our lives to the goal of ending the Cold War make a mistake? Was it worth being a dissident or a peace activist if this was to be the final outcome? Why did we assume that everything could be solved if the division of Europe were removed? Cold War apologists, like John Lewis Gaddis or John Mearsheimer told us that future generations would look back nostalgically on the period of the Cold War as a golden era of stability- the "Long Peace", they called it. East European officials used to warn us that democracy was impossible because nationalist and racist feelings would be revived. Were they right after all? Was nationalism kept in check, "deep frozen" as many commentators would have it, only to reemerge when the Cold War ended?

I do not think we were wrong. People's behaviour is conditioned by their immediate experience not by memories of what happened to previous generations. Of course, those memories are rekindled and used in every nationalist conflict but it is the current context that determines the power of memory to shape politics. In this essay, I want to put forward two propositions. First, far from having been suppressed by the Cold War, the new nationalism is a direct consequence of the Cold War experience. Without the Cold War, it can be argued, the current wave of nationalism would not have happened, at least, not in the same way and with the same virulence. Secondly, the new nationalism that is sweeping through Central and Eastern Europe is a different phenomenon from the nationalism of previous epochs, although it may share some common features. It is a contemporary phenomenon not a throwback to the past. Before developing this argument a few preliminary remarks need to be made about the nature of nationalism.

What is nationalism?

"Nationalism" according to Ernest Gellner "is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent. Nationalism as a sentiment, or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this principle. Nationalist *sentiment* is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment. A nationalist *movement* is one actuated by a sentiment of this kind." (*Nations and Nationalism*, 1990.)

Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon that came into being in the late eighteenth century. It is extremely difficult to disentangle the concept of a nation from the concept of a nation-state. Definitions of a nation vary: a common linguistic group, inhabitants of a particular territory, an ethnic group, a group with shared cultural traditions, religion or values. In practise, a group of human beings that define themselves as a nation usually do so because they are citizens of a particular state, because they are discriminated against by a state, or because of their interest in establishing their own state.

All nationalisms share two common features. One is the notion of citizenship- the idea that sovereignty, i.e. control of the state, is vested in the nation rather than, say, the monarch as in eighteenth century Western Europe or nineteenth century Central Europe, or foreign oppressors, as in the third world or in the Soviet empire. This idea is linked to the expansion of the territorial and administrative reach of the state. Before the eighteenth century, the state was a rather remote affair that hardly impinged on everyday life. As state functions expanded, it became harder to gain legitimacy for monarchic rule.

Secondly, nationalism always involves a sense of distinct group identity which is defined in contrast to other groups. The rise of nationalism was linked to the rise of written vernacular languages which, in turn, was linked to the expansion of the intellectual class. The discovery of print technology made the written word far more widely accessible. new publications, for example, novels and newspapers gave rise to new identities and new communicative networks. Benedict Anderson uses the term "imagined community" to describe the way in which people who had never met or who were not related could develop a sense of community because they read the same newspapers or novels.

But it is in war that the idea of a nation is substantiated. The existence of an enemy, real or imagined, is an important element in forging a sense of national identity.

During the Cold War years, it seemed as though national sentiment was being superseded by bloc sentiment, at least in Europe. In the East, the language of Marxist-Leninism displaced the language of nationalism as a legitimising principle. And in the West, vague commitments to democracy and the Western way of life seemed more important than national interest. The idea of an ideological enemy seemed more convincing than a national enemy. Many commentators talked about the post-1945 European era as "post-nationalist." This turned out to be wishful thinking.

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Roots of the new nationalism

The current wave of nationalism has to be understood in terms of the collapse of the Communist state. Weber defined the state as an organization "that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force." Pierre Bourdieu, the French sociologist, has extended that definition to cover what he calls symbolic violence as well as physical violence. By symbolic violence, he means the use of language as a form of domination. It is, in both senses, that the state has collapsed or is collapsing in much of the post-Communist world.

First of all, the language of domination, the Marxist- Leninist discourse has been totally discredited. More importantly, no alternative language exists which is capable of reconstructing legitimacy, i.e. mobilizing a consensus about the political rules of the game. During the Communist period, there were no public political debates and no autonomous political movements or parties. There was no mechanism through which political ideas, principles or values, political groups or even individuals could gain respect or trust in society. Any individual who succeeded in a career or who established himself or herself as a public figure did so through some form of collaboration or compromise with the regime.

There were, of course, private intellectual debates in universities and institutes and across the kitchen table. (Russian dissidents used to talk about kitchen table diplomacy.) And these debates were often farreaching, especially in the former Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland. Nevertheless, they were private and confined to a marginal stratum in society. There were also dissidents and some of these, like Vaclav Havel, George Konrad, or Milovan Djilas, were very famous. But dissidents are troublesome, ambiguous figures. In societies, where everyone has to collaborate in order to survive, the dissident is a guilty reminder of complicity. They are seen as idiosyncratic individualists not reassuring leaders.

To some extent, Europe, understood as a haven of peace, prosperity and democracy and identified with the European Community, constituted a political alternative. But it soon became clear that only rich countries could join the EC. And the experience of market reform, which was associated with Western countries, especially in the former Yugoslavia, Poland, and Slovakia, quickly dispelled the mobilising potential of the European idea. Moreover, since all politicians made use of the language of democracy, markets, and Europe, and nobody really understood what it signified, it lacked the substantive content on which to base new forms of authority....

In these circumstances, the appeal to an untainted uncompromised ethnic, religious or linguistic identity is one of the most effective ways to win power. In large parts of the post-Communist world, it is nationalist parties which have won elections. You vote for a politician because he (and it almost always is he and not she) is a Serb or a Slovak or whatever like you. And the mobilisation of fear, the notion that you and your people are threatened, the creation of a war psychosis in the time-honoured Communist tradition, are all mechanisms to stay in power, to reestablish authority, to reclaim control over the means of symbolic violence. Both Communist and nationalist discourse require an other-imperialism or an enemy nation. But the Communist rhetoric could claim a monopoly over discourse because it was based on universalist values. The problem with the nationalist rhetoric is that it is inherently exclusionary. Of its nature, it is fragmentary - stimulating counter claims to the control of symbolic violence.

Secondly, the Cold War machines are disintegrating. The arms build-up over the last forty years was an extensive process profoundly influencing economies and societies. It was naive to suppose that this process could be reversed merely by cutting defence budgets. Large parts of the post-Communist world are flooded with surplus weapons, unemployed soldiers and arms producers. It is easy enough to form a para-military group by putting on a home-made uniform, buying weapons on the black market, and perhaps even employing an ex-soldier or two in a mercenary capacity. The wars in the former Yugoslavia or the Transcaucasian region are being fought by para-military groups of this kind.

In the Croatian occupied part of Bosnia-Herzogovina, known as the "Croatian Community of Herzog-Bosne", there are, for example, several military groupings. There is the official Croatian-Bosnian army, the HVO; there is the Muslim territorial defence force known as "Armija"; there is the extreme right-wing Hos, who wear black in memory of the Ustashe (Croatian Nazis) who ruled Croatia in 1941-5; and there are a number of smaller free- lance armies like the Croatian "Falcons" or the"Yellow Ants". Each group has its own chain of command, its own sources of supply, its own registered licence plates and its own roadblocks. The same plethora of groups can be found in the Serbian parts of Bosnia-Herzogovina and, with the breakdown of lines of command as a consequence of the collapse of the Communist Party, the Yugoslav Army, the JNA, has come to look more and more like a collection of para-military groups.

The point is not simply that private armies exist as in feudal times. It is also that no single grouping has the legitimacy to reestablish a monopoly. No single group, be it an elected government or a disaffected minority can command widespread trust in society. In these circumstances, government troops become just another para-military group.

In societies, where the state controlled every aspect of social and economic life, the collapse of the state means anarchy. The introduction of markets actually means the absence of any kind of regulation. The kind of self-organized market institutions that are the precondition for a market economy simply do not exist and have not been allowed to exist. The market does not, by and large, mean new autonomous productive enterprises. It means corruption, speculation and crime. Many of these para-military groups are engaged in a struggle for survival. They use the language of nationalism to legitimise a kind of primitive accumulation- a grab for land or for capital. The nationalist conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union cannot be understood in terms of traditional power politics terms, that is to say, in terms of conflicting political objectives defined by parties to the conflict, which are in principle amenable to some kind of compromise solution. Rather, they have to be understood as a social condition-a condition of laisser-faire violence.

Many of the characteristics of this social condition exist throughout the post-Communist world. But the situation is more extreme in both the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union. Part of the reason for this is historical and geographical. Both regions are a patchwork of ethnicities; the countries of Central Europe are much more homogeneous. Both regions have histories of ethnic conflicts which can

easily be used by politicians. This is especially true in Yugoslavia where memories of atrocities inflicted on all communities, especially the Serbs, during the Second World War are still vivid. And in both regions, the Communist regimes - Stalin in the Soviet Union and Tito in Yugoslavia - exploited and exacerbated national questions to sustain their rule.

Differences

The new nationalism is different from the old nationalism in a number of respects. First of all, it can be said that the new nationalism is anti-modern whereas earlier nationalisms were part of the modern project. This statement needs both elaboration and qualification. Nationalism has, of course, always harked back to some idea of a romantic past but nevertheless nationalism was an essential component of what we call modernity; it was linked to the rise of the modern state and to industrialisation. Indeed, the early nationalists were rather functionalist. Nationalism, for them, was part of the march towards progress. They viewed the nation-state as a viable political unit for democracy and industry, not as a natural institution for an historically established national community, but as a stage in human evolution, from local to national and eventually to global society. Mazzini, for example, did not support the independence of Ireland because he thought that Ireland was not viable as a nation-state. In much the same way, nationalists in the third world envisaged national liberation as a precondition for modernisation and development.

The new nationalism is anti-modern not only in the sense that it is a reaction to modernity but also in the sense that it is not a viable political project- it is out of tune with the times. This is why I use the term anti-modern rather than post- modern. The rediscovery of cultural identity is often considered an element of post-modernism. The term post-modern implies some possibility of moving beyond modernity, whatever that may involve. The new nationalism offers no such prospect. In a world of growing economic, ecological, and even social interdependence, the new nationalism proposes to create ever smaller political units. Earlier nationalisms were unifying rather than fragmentative,often in very oppressive ways. In the eighteenth century, there were some 300 German states; they were unified by German nationalism. The rediscovery of Scottish traditions in the nineteenth century was part of the process of creating a British not Scottish national identity; some Scots liked to call themselves North Britons. In many third world countries, nationalism was a way of overcoming ancient tribal or religious feuds.

Earlier nationalisms incorporated different cultural traditions. The new nationalism is culturally separatist. It is often said that Yugoslavia was an artificial crèation because it contained so many different linguistic, religious and cultural traditions. But all modern nations were artificial. The national language was usually based on a dominant dialect which was spread through the written word and through education. At the time of Italian unification, only between 2 and 3% of Italians spoke Italian. At the first sitting of the newly created Italian National Assembly, Massimo d'Azeglio said: "We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians." The Yugoslav project was simply less successful than earlier national projects perhaps because it was attempted too late or too quickly. The new nationalism is a reaction to the cultural hegemony of earlier nationalisms. It is an attempt to preserve and to reconstruct pre-existing cultural traditions, said to be national, at the expense of other traditions.

The new nationalism puts a lot of emphasis on ethnos. Cultural traditions are a birthright; they cannot be acquired. This is reflected in the citizenship laws in the Baltic countries or in Slovenia and Croatia, which exclude certain minorities and which distinguish between autochthonous, i.e. indigenous, and other minorities. There were, of course, elements of ethnicity in earlier nationalisms, especially in Germany. But the current emphasis on ethnos combined with cultural separatism contains an inherent tendency to fragmentation. Every excluded minority discovers it is a nation. The former Yugoslavia is not only divided into Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzogovina, etc, Croatia is divided into a Croatian and Serbian part,in Bosnia and Herzogovina, there is now a Bosnian Croatian state and a Bosnian Serbian state, and there are now distinctions between Bosnian Muslims who were once Croat and Bosnian Muslim who were once Serbs.

The anti-modern nature of the new nationalist movements is also reflected in their social composition. The earlier nationalist movements tended to be urban and middle class although they did become mass movements in the twentieth century. While it is difficult to generalise, the new movements often include an important rural element. Susan Woodward has characterized the war in Bosnia Herzegovina as a socio-economic war, in which rural nationalists confront multi-ethnic townspeople. In Serbia, the main support for Milosovic comes from industrial workers who live in the countryside and maintain their own smallholdings. In the nineteenth century and in third world national liberation movements, intellectuals were extremely important. There are, of course, nationalist intellectuals, and they play a significant role, but in to-days world where the opportunities to travel and to collaborate with intellectuals in other countries have greatly increased, it is equally common to find intellectuals in green, peace and human rights movements which have a globalist consciousness. The expansion of education and of scientific and office jobs has greatly increased the number of people who can be called intellectuals and who have international horizons. In Serbia, it is the students and the Academy of Sciences that constitute the main opposition to Milosovic. In the Transcaucasian region, it is Armenian and Azerbaijani intellectuals, supported by Russian intellectuals, that are making the main efforts to overcome the national conflicts.

A post-modern project would be integrating rather than unifying or fragmentative. It would emphasize cultural diversity rather than cultural homogeneity or cultural divisiveness. It would encompass the growing educated strata in society. Some people argue that the new nationalism has the potential to be integrating. Scottish nationalists talk about Scotland in Europe. Likewise, the new nation-states in Eastern Europe all say that they want to "join Europe". Indeed, it is often said that a major motivation for nationalism in Slovenia and Croatia and also the Baltic states was that people in these countries believed that their chances of joining the European Community were greater if they were unencumbered by their large backward neighbours, i.e. Russia and Serbia. Fashionable European concepts like "subsidiarity" or "Europe of the Regions" offer the possibility of combining local and regional autonomy with

Europe-wide cooperation. But this kind of concept is completely at odds with the ethnic principle of citizenship and, even, I would argue with the notion of territorial sovereignty which is an essential element of all nationalisms. And, in practise, the new nationalism has shown itself to be closed and not open to the outside world. New nationalist governments are reimposing control over the media, especially television; they are renationalising rather than privatising industry; they are introducing new barriers to travel, trade and communication with the multiplication of frontiers. As such, the new nationalist project is unviable; it is incapable of solving economic and environmental problems and it is a recipe for violent unrest and frequent wars.

The second feature of the new nationalism that is different from earlier nationalisms is the use of new technology. If the new nationalism is anti-modern in philosophy, it is modern or even post-modern in technique. In place of the novels and newspapers that provided the medium for the construction of an earlier nationalism, the new nationalism is based on new communicative networks involving television, videos, telephone, faxes, and computers. These new techniques greatly extend the possibilities for mobilising, manipulating and controlling public opinion. The neo-Nazis in Germany circulate anti-semitic videos and they use CB radios to orchestrate their demonstrations.

A particularly important aspect of the use of new technology is the emergence of transnational "imagined communities." Groups of exiles in Paris, London or Zurich have often played an important role in national movements. But ease of communication, as well as the expansion of ex-patriate communities in new countries like the United States, Canada, or Australia, have transformed the new national movements into transnational networks. In almost every significant national movement, money, arms and ideas are provided by ex-patriates abroad. Irish- American support for the IRA has been well documented. Other examples include Canadian mercenaries in Croatia; American Macedonians calling for the unification of Macedonia and Bulgaria; the Armenian diaspora supporting the claim to Ngorno Karabakh. The new nationalism is, in part, a consequence of the loss of cultural identity in the anonymous melting pot nations of the new world. The dreams of the ex-patriates, the longing for a "homeland" that does not exist, are dangerously superimposed on the anti-modern chaotic reality which they have left behind. Radha Kumar has described the support given by Indians living in the United States given to the Hindu nationalist movement. "Separated from their countries of origin, often living as aliens in a foreign land, simultaneously feeling stripped of their culture and guilty for having escaped the troubles 'back home', ex-patriates turn to diaspora nationalism without understanding the violence that their actions might inadvertently trigger." ("Nationalism, Nationalities and Civil Society", in *Nationalism and European Integration: Civil Society Perspectives*, Helsinki Citizens Assembly Publication Series 2, 1992.)

Another aspect of the new technology is, of course, modern weapons. Modern military technology is immensely destructive. Even without the most up-to-date systems, villages and towns in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have been razed to the ground. It is the combination of an anti-modern philosophy with modern technology, in both military and communicative terms, that makes the new nationalism so dangerous.

Alternatives

The new nationalism is a dead-end phenomenon. It is a reaction to the oppressive nature of modernity, especially its statist East European variant, and a rationale for the new gangsterism. It will lead, at best, to small, autarchic, authoritarian, poor states, and, at worst, to endemic, continuous violence. The conflict in Northern Ireland can be viewed as a foretaste of the new nationalism; it is a mistake to interpret what is happening in Ulster as a reversion to the past, although the various parties to the conflict, especially the various para- military groups make use of tradition, rather it is a contemporary anti-modern phenomenon with many similarities to the new nationalisms in Eastern Europe.

The reason why the new nationalism is unviable lies in the fact that the nation-state as a form of organisation, with extensive administrative control over clearly defined territory, is no longer an effective instrument for the management of modern societies. In my view, this was already the case before World War I. The bloc system, which came into being after the Second World War as a result of the Cold War, succeeded in establishing some sort of stability, albeit oppressive, because it was able to overcome some of the short-comings of the nation-state.

The nation-state is both too large and too small. It is too small to cope with economic interdependence, global environmental problems, destructive military technologies. It is too large to allow for democratic accountability, cultural diversity, and the complex decision-making needed in economic and environmental fields. The blocs offered a method of dealing with the problems that arose from the fact that nations were too small. But they greatly exacerbated the problems that arose from the fact that nation-states were too large. The new nationalism is a reaction to these problems, through attempting to make ever smaller nation-states.

What is needed now is a break with the idea of territorial sovereignty- the notion of more or less absolute control by a centralized administrative unit over a specific geographic area. There is a need for greater autonomy at local and regional levels in order to enhance democracy, to increase peoples ability to foster cultural traditions and diversity

and to overcome the sense of anonymity engendered by modernity, and to make sensible decisions about local economic and environmental problems. But there is also a need for international institutions with the right and the real power to intervene and interfere at local levels in order to protect human rights and democratic practises, to uphold environmental and social standards, and to prevent war. In other words, there need to be layers of political organisation, criss-crossing both territory and fields of activity.

Is this a utopian concept? In fact, elements of this approach already exist. The most important example is the European Community. In my view, the European Community is not the forerunner of a European nation-state, although that is what many people would like it to be. It is a much more interesting animal. It is a new type of political institution with certain elements of supranationality, i.e. sovereignty in certain fields of activity, which enable it to interfere in the affairs of member states, to overrule member states on some issues. The EC could become an institution capable of dealing with Europe-wide problems and, at the same time, enhancing local and regional autonomies. And the same kind of evolution could be envisaged for other international institutions like the United Nations or the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe). At present, these organisations derive their power from the nation- states and this constitutes a severe limitation on what they can achieve. If their roles are to be extended, this will have to come about as a result of new forms of transnational political pressure.

New forms of communication have given rise to new transnational networks. In certain fields of activity, especially intellectual and managerial activity, people communicate more, through telephone, fax and frequent travel, and relate more to others in the same field all over the world than to their neighbours or to their fellow nationals. If these networks have created transnational "imagined communities" based on ethnicity, they have also created other kinds of more globally conscious "imagined communities." There are, in particular, two types of networks which have a common interest, together with international institutions in curbing the administrative sway of nation-states.

One type of network relates to local layers of government- municipalities and regional governments. Since the early 1980's, local governments have become much more involved with foreign policy issues through twinning arrangements, nuclear-free or violence-free zones, and other initiatives. Organisations like the Association of Nuclear-free Authorities, the Standing Council of Local Authorities of the Council of Europe or the Association of European Regions potentially constitute new types of transnational pressure groups.

'A second type of network arises out of the single issue social movements that became so important in the 1970's and 1980's. These groups were much more successful at local and transnational levels than at national levels. While they were unable to break the grip of traditional political parties on national politics, they were much more effective than political parties at creating transnational constituencies. Organisations like Greenpeace, Helsinki Watch, Amnesty International, Oxfam, or the Helsinki Citizens Assembly are able to cross national boundaries and to operate in an international context. To these groups should be added trades unions, churches and academic institutions which have greatly increased international networking in recent years. Together, they are forming what could be called a transnational civil society.

Throughout Eastern Europe and especially in areas of conflict, it is possible to find brave groups of individuals, often intellectuals, who are struggling to provide an alterative to violence and to ethnic nationalism. They use the language of citizenship, civil society, non-violence, internationalism. And they are supported by transnational networks of the kind described above. The main hope for an alternative to nationalism lies in the construction of a new political culture, a new legitimate language, that might be based on an alliance between this emerging transnational civil society and international institutions.

The Balkan War provides an example of what could be done. At the moment, the activities of international institutions are greatly hampered by their intergovernmental nature, which essentially means they are seeking solutions "from above". This is both because, they can only take decisions based on compromise between member states, and very often the compromises satisfy noone, and because they consider that their negotiating partners are the representatives of states or embryo states and these are people, aggressive nationalists, who are breaking all the norms of international behaviour. As a consequence, international institutions are becoming parties to ethnic partition which, among other tragic consequences, could mean a loss of legitimacy for the institutions themselves.

As I have argued, the new nationalism is a social condition arising from the collapse of Communist state structures. The new politicians may have been elected but they do not have the legitimacy to be said to "represent" the people because of their exclusionary policies. There are also, in the Balkan region, municipalities, civic groups and individuals who are doing whatever they can to keep multi-ethnic communities together, to prevent the war from spreading, to support refugees and deserters, to provide humanitarian aid. These groups are helped by municipal and civic transnational networks, although their resources are extremely meagre. If international institutions could identify those groups and institutions who uphold international standards as their primary partners and could take actions to condemn all those who violate international norms, this could be the beginning of a reconstruction of legitimate political culture "from below".

The forerunners of the new groups in Eastern Europe are the dissidents of the 1970's and 1980's and their political discourse can be traced back to the dialogue between peace groups and democracy groups across the East-West divide. In the long run, it is to be hoped that the dialogue will be remembered not for its role in ending the Cold War and ushering in a new period of turbulent nationalism, but rather as the beginning of a new way of thinking about politics and political institutions.

Appendix

This appendix is divided into five parts:
I. A history of Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav revolution, the Titoist regime and the current crisis, in the form of a chronological table.
II. A more detailed review of the major economic periods in Tito's Yugoslavia.
III. Some figures on the republics and provinces of the YSFR.
IV. Military forces in Bosnian war.
V. Addresses and reading list.

I. Chronological Reference Points

A. The Middle Ages

6th century: Arrival of the Slavs in the Balkans
9th century: First Bulgarian Empire
10th-11th centuries: Kingdom of Croatia
12th century: "Personal union" of Hungarian and Croatian monarchies
12th century: Second Bulgarian Empire
12th-14th centuries: Kingdom of Serbia
14th century: Kingdom of Bosnia

B. From the 14th Century to the First World War

1389: Turkish victory over the Serbs at the battle of Kosovo 1462: Turkish conquest of Bosnia
16th-17th centuries: Turkish siege of Vienna (Austria). Austro-Turkish war. Serb migrations.
16th century: Creation of the "Croatian military frontier" (Krajina Serbs).
1804: Serbian revolt against Turkish rule.
1809-15: Napoleon abolishes the republic of Dubrovnik and annexes the Illyrian provinces to the French Empire.
1830: Serbia becomes autonomous within the Turkish empire. 1878: Treaty of San Stephano. Congress of Berlin. Austria occupies Bosnia-Herzegogina.
1912: First Balkan War (against Turkey).
1913: Second Balkan War (against Bulgaria).
1914: Assassination in Sarajevo. First World War begins. 1918: Allied victory ends First World War. Creation (on 1 December) of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (renamed Yugoslavia in 1929).

C. The Interwar Period: The CPY, the Kremlin and the First Yugoslavia

End of 1918: In the new kingdom, foreign ownership predominates in 90% of the main industrial sectors.

April 1919: The social democratic parties and communist nuclei fuse into a Socialist Workers Party, which in 1920 takes the name Communist Party.
End of December 1920: The CP and trade unions are banned and persecuted. The CP had just won an important political victory in the elections: it was one of Europe's most powerful communist parties at the time (59 seats in Parliament, with popular majorities in the biggest cities and industrial centers). Tens of thousands join CP in 1918-20.

6 *January 1929:* Coup d'état by King Alexander Karadjordjevic establishes a dictatorship. The National Assembly is dissolved, along with the unions and national or religious organizations. The Consitution is abolished. The economic crisis of 1929 exacerbates the situation; ministries are replaced one after the other.

1928-29: So-called "ultraleft" turn by the Comintern, which preaches an insurrectionary line without taking account of the real circumstances in each country. At this point the Yugoslav CP loses much of its influence (because of intense faction fights, errors on the national question, and repression). Even the unions include only 2% of the working class! Despite its weakness, the CPY accepts the Comintern's orders and carries out a line of insurrection against the dictatorship.

The CPY disintegrates completely after this experience. Josip Broz/Tito is arrested in August 1928 and sentenced to five years at hard labor. In jail he meets many of the revolution's future leaders (Kardelj, Pijade, etc.) The CP Central Committee moves to Vienna and stays there until 1937. From 1937 on, under Tito's leadership, it comes back clandestinely to Yugoslavia and becomes more independent (including financially) from the Kremlin.

1934: The king is assassinated. In the elections that follow, the majority of the CPY Central Committee advocates running independent candidates on a "Workers Party" slate. Gorkic, carrying out Comintern directives, proposes supporting bourgeois candidates. The CC is dismissed by the Comintern, which appoints Gorkic (who will live in Moscow) general secretary and Tito (who will stay in Yugoslavia along with half the CC) organizational secretary.

1936: Tito is put in charge of organizing the departure of volunteers to fight in Spain, where civil war is raging between fascist and republican forces. About fifteen hundred Yugoslavs go to reinforce the anti-Francoist International Brigades. Half of them are killed in battle. Many Yugoslav Communists who survive the Spanish Civil War and take refuge in the USSR will be liquidated by Stalin, victims like many others of the great Stalinist purges. Tito is certainly aware of this danger, which probably contributes to his decision to return to Yugoslavia, at a safer distance from Stalin's "justice." But Tito never publicly criticizes Stalin's trials: in many ways, "opponents" are treated similarly in the CPY itself.

1937: The former leadership is completely dismissed, except for Tito. The new leaders (Kardelj, Djilas, Koncar, Pijade, etc.) have emerged from recent struggles. All oppositions within the party are expelled. Faced with the rise of fascism, the CPY calls for the formation of a "democratic government of national union and national defense, which will above all support the USSR." But the fear of

communism undermines any Popular Front strategy.

August 1939: Signature of the German-Soviet Pact, on the eve of the Second World War, between Hitler's Germany and Stalin's USSR. Tito will say later: "We accepted the pact like disciplined communists, considering it necessary for the security of the Soviet Union, at that time the only socialist state in the world. We were ignorant at the time of its secret clauses countenancing Soviet interference in the rights of other nations, especially small ones. " (cited by Dedijer in his book *Tito Speaks*, p. 124)

This is a period of great confusion in the CPY. The Germans complain to the Kremlin about CPY pamphlets against the pact signed in 1941 between the Yugoslav government and Hitler. Yugoslav Communists take part in the mass demonstrations against the Three-Power Pact, despite the official line. After the fascist invasion of Yugoslavia, the state is dismembered. Stalin plans to support the new separate Croatian state (a fascist regime that represses, in particular, Yugoslav Communists). The Yugslav Communists reject the Kremlin's line, which, they say, must be due to tactical disagreements with Stalin and Stalin's lack of information.

May 1941: Consultative meeting of the CPY CC in Zagreb, after the crumbling of the Yugoslav state under the German army's attack. "At this consultation Tito established a new thesis: the possibility of a direct Communist takeover of power; the denial of the need for the revolution to go through two stages, the bourgeois-democratic and the proletarian, which had been the party' position until then, following the Comintern decisions. " (As recounted by Djilas in his book *Memoir of a Revolutionary*, p. 388)

22 June 1941: Hitler attacks the USSR.

End of August 1941: The CPY CC decides to organize a mass armed struggle leading toward an insurrection.

December 1941: Creation of the first Proletarian Brigade.

February 1942: A telegram from Moscow: "It seems that Great Britain and the Yugoslav government (in London) have good reasons to suspect the partisan movement of having a *communist* character and aiming at the sovietization of Yugoslavia. Why have you created, for instance, a special *proletarian* brigade? At the present moment, the main duty is to merge all anti-nazi trends.... " (cited in Michael Löwy, *The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development*, p. 109 (Löwy's emphasis))

The orientation adopted by the Yugoslav Titoist leadership does not fit with the Kremlin's plans. In consequence, the Titoist partisans have to fight for more than 20 months with only the arms they captured from the enemy, without receiving any aid from anyone. The CPY initiates from above Committees of National Liberation, which take on the functions of a new state apparatus. They become the framework of a real socio-political dual power (creation of a revolutionary administration, cancelling of debts, organization of privisioning, curbs on speculators, etc.). They organize the regroupment of partisan detachments into batallions of a genuine (people's liberation) army, soon 300,000 members strong.

Stalin and the Allies (Great Britain, etc.) demand the unification of the Titoist resistance with that of Mihailovic's royalist Chetniks. Tito agrees ... but demands that the unification take place on the basis of the Committees of National Liberation. Mihailovic refuses, and his Chetnik organization often collaborates with the fascists in hunting down Communists.

January 1942: The Allies appoint Mihailovic minister of war. The CPY responds by creating the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). At the end of 1942 it calls together a conference of delegates from all the regions of Yugoslavia to elect AVNOJ, a true underground parliament formed on a federative basis that prefigures the future republics. AVNOJ's Executive Committee is given the functions of a government. The Liberation Army's Supreme Command is the CPY CC.

October 1943: Conference in Moscow of Molotov and the Allied foreign ministers. They decide that Yugoslavia will not be part of the USSR's postwar sphere of influence and that it will have a "popular front" coalition government.

The CPY leadership sends a telegram to this conference, saying that it recognizes neither the king nor the government in exile and that it will allow neither to return to Yugoslavia, "since that would mean civil war ". The CPY declares that Yugoslavia's only legal government is that of the People's Liberation Committees, headed by AVNOJ.

The Kremlin sends a furious telegram back: "The boss (Stalin) is extremely angry. He says it is a stab in the back for the Soviet Union and the Teheran decisions. " (cited in Löwy, op. cit., p. 110)

8 March 1945: A final compromise is accepted in the form of a coalition government. But the CPY keeps its army of 800,000 partisans, and all the organs of dual power that it controls, on an active footing.

October 1945: The two last bourgeois ministers leave this "coalition government" dominated by the CPY. The new state apparatus consolidates and legalizes its accomplishments: nationalization of the banks and means of production, agrarian reform, practical monopoly of foreign trade.

29 November 1945: Proclamation, after a referendum, of the Yugoslav People's Federal Republic, which officially abolishes the monarchy.

D. The Second Yugoslavia

End of 1945-1947: The new regime bases its economic policies on the Soviet Stalinist model (very centralized planning) – except in agriculture, for which they will be "taken to task" by Stalin. At the same time the CPY carries on discussions with other Communist parties in the region about the project of a socialist federation of the Balkans. The political tensions between the too-independent Titoist leadership and the Kremlin are kept hidden, but the crisis is brewing.

28 June 1948: The Kremilin's first public resolution on the situation in Yugoslavia condemns the CPY's "nationalism", supposedly revealed in the project for Yugoslavia's rapid industrialization, since the Kremlin wants to control the country's economy and proposes accordingly that the Yugoslav government "lean" on its Soviet "big brother"'s industry.

But the great majority of CPY members still follow their leadership, and a sweeping purge reduces to impotence those who support the Cominform (the body that replaced the Comintern, which was formally dissolved in 1943).

The CPY's Fifth Congress (1948) represents, from the Yugoslav side, one last attempt at compromise. It reaffirms the party's socialist objectives, but represses any criticism of the Soviet regime.

The Kremlin sets in motion a wave of purges in all the national CPs it controls. In Hungary Lazlo Rajk is arrested (May 1949), and his "confession" supposedly proves that "the Tito clique has never had anything in common with either socialism or democracy." Moscow sees the maintenance of private agriculture as "proof" of the CPY's "pro-capitalist" orientation. The Yugoslav regime tries to "answer" this accusation by adopting a policy of forcible collectivization (1949-53).

November 1949: Cominform meeting: from now on the CPY is characterized as a "clique" that has gone "from bourgeois nationalism to fascism" and to "direct treason against the national interests of Yugoslavia". In Yugoslavia, Milovan Djilas works out an interpretation of the crisis based on an analysis of the CPSU's bureaucratic degeneration.

27 June 1950: Adoption of the law on workers' self-management.

November 1952: The PCY's Sixth Congress decides to transform the CPY into the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) and reaffirms the policy of self-management.

1953: Stalin's death in the USSR. In Yugoslavia, re-establishment of private property on 80% of the land (limited to ten hectares, with a limit of five waged workers). January 1954: Trial of Milovan Djilas.

26 May 1955: Khrushchev's trip to Yugoslavia to bring about reconciliation between the two countries. He makes a public self-criticism that Tito considers inadequate. Tito will never accept the idea of a socialist "camp" consisting only of Communist parties and subordinated to the CPSU. Besides, Yugoslav "opportunism" will be denounced once more at the world congress of 81 Communist parties in 1960.

April 1958: The LCY's Seventh Congress: after the Hungarian and Polish events, the Congress declares that workers' self-management is a goal of the revolution everywhere and is not only the "Yugoslav road."

1965: Introduction of an economic reform moving toward decentralization gives considerably greater leeway to the laws of the market.

1966: Dismissal of the Communist leader Rankovic, one of the strongest advocates of a centralist Yugoslav regime (particularly in Kosovo).

1968: Student revolt, workers' strikes, and a trade union congress that harshly criticizes the regime's economic policies. Denunciation of the "development of capitalist relations of production" and of "wild" privatization. Condemnation of Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Disturbances in Kosovo.

May 1971: Second LCY Congress focused on self-management (but very top-down). Denunciation of "centrifugal forces."

Winter 1971-72: Development of the Croat nationalist movement (so-called "Croatian Spring"). Repression and purges in Croatia, then purges in the other republics. In October 1972: Mini-"cultural revolution." Letter from Tito launches a campaign "Against the millionaires" and for a reordering of the Party.

1973-74: Kardelj criticizes "overly broad" conceptions of the working class and a "falling away from the dictatorship of the proletariat." Attacks on Milovan Djilas, who is supposedly "to blame for the errors" of the Sixth Congress, and against the professors around Praxis in Belgrade, who are defended by their students. Offensive against the magazine Praxis, which is banned.

Repression of the student left (October 1974) that supported Praxis and developed demands for a generalization and democratic centralization of self-management.

Thanks to a new law promulgated in Serbia, the authorities will manage (in 1975) to expel the Praxis professors from the university in Belgrade -- by using the organs of self-management. These professors will nonetheless keep their salaries and continue with their other activities besides teaching. Campaign against the "Cominformists" (accused of having factional ties to the Kremlin).

February 1974: A new constitution is adopted, providing for a collective presidency, equal representation of the republics, a bigger role for the army in the party and state, and a new system of delegations in place of the old system of depties to different houses of the Federal Assembly.

May-June 1974: The LCY's Tenth Congress criticizes "illusions concerning the market". It affirms the need for strict party discipline and the need to strengthen the party's centralizing role at all economic levels, which are now very decentralized (thus justifying the reform). The role of self-management in "expanded reproduction" (meaning investment) is to be detailed in a new law. The next law on "associated labour" is debated publicly.

End of 1976: Adoption of the "Law of Associated Labour," which extends the organs of self-management in the context of a breaking down of enterprises into small units (BOALs: Basic Organizations of Associated Labour).

E. The 1980s: Crisis and Explosion

1980: Tito dies. $20 billion foreign debt is publicly revealed.

1981: Disturbances in Kosovo.

1987: Slobadan Milosevic becomes first secretary of the Communist League of Serbia.

1988: Demonstrations against the army in Slovenia. Alternative movements. The Vojvodina leadership resigns. A million people demonstrate in Belgrade against the "anti-Serb genocide" allegedly being perpetrated in Kosovo. Miners' strikes and purges in Kosovo. Mikulic's government resigns.

1989: Montenegro leaders resign.
-Ante Markovic forms a new federal government.
-Pluralism develops in Slovenia. A new constitution abolishes the leading role of the party.
-A constitutional reform in Serbia takes away the provinces' (Kosovo's and Vojvodina's) autonomy.

1990: Austerity policy to curb hyperinflation.
-LCY congress abandons the leading role of the party, but the Slovenes break away and the congress is adjourned.
-State of emergency in Kosovo. The Serbian Assembly suspends the Kosovo government and parliament.
-Serbian referendum on the constitutional changes.
-A clandestine meeting of Kosovo's Albanian deputies proclaims a Republic of Kosovo separate from Serbia.
-Elections in Croatia. Constitutional amendments.
-Elections in the other republics.
-Slobadan Milosevic is elected president of Serbia.
-Slovenia holds a referendum on independence.

1991: Armed conflicts and the war begin.
-Krajina declares its separation from Croatia and its desire to remain in Yugoslavia.
-On 25 June, Slovenia and Croatia declare their independence.
-On July 7, agreements reached through European mediation provide for a three month moratorium on independence, the evacuation of the federal army from Slovenia, and the election of the Croat Stipe Mesic to head the Yugoslav collective presidency.
-Macedonia holds referendum on independence.
-Tudjman and Milosevic meet secretly to arrange the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
-The UN institutes an arms embargo. The Bosnian parliament, boycotted by the Serb deputies, votes for sovereignty.
-In December, the European Community decides to recognize Slovenian and Croatian independence unconditionally.

1992: First Germany, then many countries recognize Croatian and Slovenian independence.
-The UN Security Council decides to send peace keeping troops to Croatia
-Major escalation of Serbian attacks on Sarajevo and other Bosnian towns
-Serbia and Montenegro form a "Yugoslav Federation."
-Bosnian Serb and Croat nationalist leaders (Karadzic and Boban) meet secretly.
-Bosnia holds a referendum on independence.
-Kosovo Albanians hold a clandestine referendum.
-The Croatian and Bosnian governments sign an agreement.
-The United Nations accepts Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia and Croatia as members
-The UN Security Council votes for sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (trade and oil embargo, end of civil flights, etc.)
-Tudjman wins the first elections in independent Croatia.
-In October Vance and Owen present their "peace plan" for the division of Bosnia.

II. Major Periods of the Economic System

A. 1945-50

Completely centralized planning modeled on the Soviet Union, and collectivization of agriculture.

B. 1950/52-65

Introduction, then extension of self-management in all sectors (including services and culture).

However, the federal state preserves a strict centralization of investments and leaves the enterprises little room to manage in. Among other things, a tax on fixed capital funds a Central Investment Fund that controls 70% of overall investment. A central plan sets the key ratios (consumption/investment and structure of investment). Banks are essentially mediators, which distribute the credits that central planners have decided on. Prices are essentially controlled, as is foreign trade.

The private sector is limited to agriculture (80% of the land is privately owned after the 1953 decollectivization (with an upper limit of ten hectares)) and to small craft production (with an upper limit of five employees). The Workers' Councils and their Management Committees (executives) manage what is left after taxes are deducted, in particular deciding how to divide the income according to the results on the market, and have the right to sack enterprise managers.

C. 1965-71

Application of the Economic Reform: a higher productivity of labor is sought through increased competition among enterprises and on the world market. "Profitability" on the market is supposed to guide investments, which leads to:
-- A considerable freeing of prices (in principle, but in practice the federation has to intervene very often to try to minimize the social costs of this policy); and
-- The elimination of the Central Investment Fund, whose resources are divided among the banks and enterprises. An Aid Fund for Underdeveloped Regions is kept in place, but it controls a very small percentage of the social product, which is allocated in the form of loans (whereas before resources were redistributed without any expectation of repayment).
As the table opposite shows, the banks rapidly become the main depository of investment funds. They grant credits at high rates of interest, which now enables them to accumulate uncontrolled funds quickly. Opening to foreign capital, in the form of import licenses or of capital invested in enterprises, where at least 51% of the capital is supposed to be Yugoslav and where self-management is supposed in principle to be enforced. Few foreign investors take advantage of this opening, particularly because of unhappiness, repeatedly expressed, with the rights of self-management.

D. 1971-80

The banking system remains decentralized, but secret accounts are eliminated and only the enterprises are allowed to found commercial banks, on the basis of

their own resources. These banks are a kind of financial institution subordinated to the enterprises.

The central plan sets the major orientations after a long process of adjustment starting from enterprise plans, local plans and republican plans. The outcome of this process is supposed to be a system of self-management agreements ratifying the major priorities given in the plan. While trying to respect these overall priorities - and thus the agreements reached among them - work units are free to manage their own income, which now includes investments, collective consumption and personal income.

The collective services (health, recreation, child-care, housing, etc.) are managed by Self-Management Communities of Interest that join together service workers and service users.

Services are broken down into base units (BOALs: Basic Organizations of Associated Labour) capable of managing their own budgets. The various BOALs are grouped into OALs (Organizations of Associated Labour, which correspond more or less to the old enterprises) and in combines that provide several products. But the BOALs are sovereign in the context of the agreements that they reach with one another . Despite the two oil crises, which increase the debt in this period, growth and imports are sustained by easy domestic and foreign credit, as well as by very strong domestic demand.

On the political level, a system of delegation is put in place for the election of communal and republican assemblies. The BOALs elect delegations that in turn elect delegates (subject to recall and accountable to those who elect them) in the communal assemblies. Alongside this representation by workplace, there is representation (by the same indirect system of delegation) by local community, and representation by political and trade union organization; so each communal assembly has three houses. The three houses together, along with the workplace and political and union delegates, elect their political and union delegates to the republican assemblies. All the communal delegates together elect their delegates to the federal lower house, and all the delegates from each republic together elect their delegates to the federal House of Republics and Provinces (in which each republic and province has equal representation). These two houses together constitute the Federal Assembly.

E. 1980-89

Debt. Crisis. Austerity policy. Very large number of strikes. In practice bankrupt and overindebted enterprises are not shut down. In 1989 hyperinflation reaches a peak of 2000%.

III. The Republics and Provinces

There were six republics in (Tito's) second Yugoslavia: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina; and two Autonomous Provinces within the republic of Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo. Except for Serbia and Montenegro, the various republics did not exist as independent states at the time Yugoslavia was formed. But these divisions corresponded nonetheless to real "historic" regions, which had had varying degrees of administrative autonomy within the empires that had ruled them.

A. Major Religions (1981 census)

Eastern Orthodox: 45.4% (Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians and minorities)
Catholics: 30.8% (Croats, Slovenes and minorities)
Muslims: 17% (including Muslims considered as a specific ethnic group of Islamicized Slavs, as well as non-Slavs such as Albanians and Turks)
But: These are the main groups, but not all Albanians are Muslim, not all Macedonians are Orthodox, etc. Note that up to the nineteenth century religious affiliation was the main mark of ethnic differentiation, with the terms designating different nationalities being used as equivalents or adjuncts. The (Orthodox) Serbs have however affirmed their identity to a greater degree.

B. Official Languages of Ex-Yugoslavia

Slovene is spoken in Slovenia and some areas of Austria and Italy.
"Serbo-Croatian" or a "Croato/Serbian" (with two alphabets, Latin and Cyrillic) is used in Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.
Macedonian (close to Bulgarian) is spoken in Macedonia.
Albanian and Hungarian had the status of semi-official languages at the federal level (right to have official texts or to be defended in court with these languages; local cultural rights).
Other minority languages also had an official status in certain republics, in addition to each republic's main language.

C. Some Figures on the Republics and Autonomous Provinces

("1991 Census," *Statistical Bulletin* no. 1934. Belgrade: Federal Institute, 1992). The population figures are for 1991. The 1991 census gave residents the option of defining themselves as "Yugoslavs."

Ex-Yugoslavia as a whole:
Area: 255,804 sq km.
Population: 23,529,000: 36.2% Serbs, 19.6% Croats, 9.8% Muslims, 9.1% Albanians (estimate), 7.3% Slovenes, 5.6% Macedonians, 2.9% Yugoslavs, 2.2% Montenegrins, 1.4% Hungarians, 5.9% others.

Bosnia-Herzegovina:
Capital: Sarajevo.
Area: 51,121 sq km
Population: 4,760,000: 43.7% Muslims, 31.4% Serbs, 17.3% Croats, 5.5% Yugoslavs, 2.1% others.

Croatia:
Capital: Zagreb.
Area: 56,538 sq km
Population: 1,950,000:
77.9% Croats, 12.2% Serbs,
2.2% Yugoslavs, 7.7% others.

Kosovo (Kosovo-Metohija):
(autonomous province
within Serbia)
Capital: Pristina.
Area: 10,900 sq km
Population: 1,950,000:
82.2% Albanians, 10% Serbs,
2.9% Muslims, 2.2% Roma,
2.7% others.

Macedonia:
Capital: Skopje.
Area: 25,713 sq km.
Population: 2,034,000:
64.6% Macedonians, 21% Albanians,
4.8% Turks, 2.7% Roma, 2.2% Serbs,
4.7% others.

Montenegro:
Capital: Titograd.
Area: 13, 812 sq km.
Population: 615,000:
68.1% Montenegrins,
14.6% Muslims, 9.3% Serbs,
6.6% Albanians (estimate),
4.2% Yugoslavs, 3.5% others.

Serbia: (without Kosovo and
Vojvodina provinces)
Capital: Belgrade.
Area: 56,000 sq km
Population: 5,824,000: 87.3% Serbs,
3% Muslims, 2.5% Yugoslavs,
1.3% Albanians (estimate),
1.2% Roma, 4.7% others.

Slovenia:
Capital: Llubjana.
Area: 20,251 sq km.
Population: 1,963,000:
87.6% Slovenes, 2.7% Croats,
2.4% Serbs, 1.4% Muslims,
5.9% others.

Vojvodina: (autonomous
province within Serbia)
Capital: Novi Sad.
Area: 21,800 sq km.
Population: 2,013,000:
57.3% Serbs, 16.9% Hungarians,
8.4% Yugoslavs, 3.7% Croats,
3.2% Slovaks, 2.2% Montenegrins,
1.9% Romanians, 1.2% Roma,
5.2% others.

Source (for Appendix I-III):
Catherine Samary, ***The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia****, No. 19/20, 1993 of* ***Notebooks for Study and Research.***

IV Military Forces in Bosnia

JNA Strength before breakdown of Yugoslavia

Total force strength: recruits: 180 000; officers: 79 000
High calibre artillery: 2 000; tanks: 1 850
Armoured vehicles: 2 000
Aircraft: 417 (16 Mig-29, 122 Mig-21, 85 Galeb, 80 Orao, 80 Jastreb)
Helicopters: 200

Left to the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) after JNA withdrawal

Tanks: 300 (not more than 50 M-84)
Armoured vehicles: 331
Aircraft: 48
Ballistic missile squadrons Frog-7: 4
Multi-tube rocket launchers: 87
Artillery high calibres: 300
120mm mortars: 5 000
(Basic infantry armament for approx. 200 000 soldiers and full logistical support of Serbia and Montenegro.)

Number of Soldiers in Bosnian war

"Army of Republika Srpska": 80 000
Croatian Council of Defence: 33-35 000
Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina: 200 000 (approx)
(25-30 000 have basic infantry arms, but with minimum heavy artillery, no air forces, very unstable supply lines and weak logistical support)

Sarajevo

Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Soldiers: 45 000
(only 12-15 000 with basic infantry weapons)
Tanks (T-54 T-55): 5
Howitzers: 6

Army of Republika Srpska

Soldiers: 10-12 000
Tanks (20 M-84): 90
Artillery weapons, all calibres: 600

Victims

Killed or missing: 130 000
Wounded: 750 000
Cases of rape: at least 20 000
Held in concentration camps in
Bosnia, Serbia or Montenegro: 90 000
Displaced persons within Bosnia: 740 000
Refugees outside Bosnia: 1 100 000

Source (for military figures): ***Bosnia Briefing****, July 1993*

ADDRESSES

Without claiming to be exhaustive, we give below the addresses of several organizations and magazines, in ex-Yugoslavia and elsewhere, with a diversity of perspectives, that are working for peace or are good sources of information.

Britain
Action for Bosnia
4 Panton Street
London SW1Y 4DL
Tel. 071-939-1228

Balkan War Report
(Institute for War and Peace Reporting)
1 Auckland Street
London SE11 5HU
Tel. 071-793-7930; fax. 071-793-7980

Balkans Working Group
c/o National Peace Council
88 Islington High St.
London N1 8EG
Tel: 44-71-354 5200; fax: 354 0033

Bosnia-Herzegovina
Centar za mir
(Sarajevo Peace Center)
Dobrovoljacka 11
71000 Sarajevo
Tel.: 38-71-214 884;
fax: 646 455/663 730

Anti-War Action
Ul Hasana Kikica BR 8
71000 Sarajevo
Fax: 38-71-219 866

Bosnian Government Refugee Service
Amila Omersoftic
Fax: 998-711-44 62 55

Canada
ACT for Disarmament
736 Bathurst St.
Toronto M5S 2R4
Tel: 1-416-531 6154; fax: 531 5850

Croatia
Anti-ratne kampanja (Ark)
(Zagreb Anti-War Committee)
Tkalciceva 38
41000 Zagreb
Tel: 38-41-422 495; fax: 271 143

Zagreb Women's Lobby
Autonomous Women's Centre
Tkalciceva 38
Zagreb
Tel: 38-41-688 278

Demokratski forum
(Rijeka Democratic Forum)
c/o Sura Dumanic
Tel. and fax: 38-51-713 291

Montenegro
Citizens' Peace Committee
Hercegoyarcka 15
YU 81000 Titograd Fax: 38-81-419 14

Serbia
Center za antiratnu akciju
(Belgrade Anti-War Committee)
Prote Mateje 6
YU 11000 Beograd
Tel: 38-11-431 298 ; fax: 681 989

Helsinki Citizens' Assembly
c/o Sonja Licht
Omladinskih brigada 216
YU 11070 Beograd
Fax: 38-11-332 940

Humanitarian Law Fund
(War crimes information center)
Terazije 6/III
11000 Beograd
Tel: 11-658 430 ; fax: 646 341

Civil Resistance Movement
Mladena Stojanovica 4
YU 11040 Boegrad
Tel: 38-11-668 324; fax: 402 915

Slovenia
Center za kulturo miru nenasilja
(Centre for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence)
Mestni trg 13
61000 Ljubljana
Tel: 38-61-210 374; fax: 224 666

Women's Movement,
Citizens' Assembly (HCA)
Sonja Lokar Tomsiceva 5
61000 Ljubljana
Tel: 38-61-161 140; fax: 215 855

Association of Preventive and Voluntary Work
Gorana Flaker Linhartova 13
61000 Ljubljana
Tel: 38-61-129 141 ext. 356

USA
Balkan War Resource Group
War Resisters League
339 Lafayette St.
New York, NY 10012
Tel: 1-212-228 0450 ; fax: 228 6193

Campaign for Peace and Democracy
P.O. Box 1640
Cathedral Hill Station
New York, NY 10025
Tel: 212-666 5924 ; fax: 662 5892

Peace and Solidarity for Sarajevo
c/o Kathy Kell
1460 West Carmen Av.
Chicago, IL 60640
Tel & fax: 312-784 8065

Vojvodina
European Civic Centre
for Conflict Resolution
Trg. Cara Jovana Nenada 15
YU 24000 Subotica Vojvodina-Serbia
Tel: 38-24-24600; fax: 37116

MAGAZINES

The following magazines regularly cover ex-Yugoslav events. The first three magazines are entirely devoted to ex-Yugoslavia. They give very useful information, particularly on peace movement positions and activities.

Balkan War Report (formerly *Yugofax*)
1 Auckland St.
London SE11 5HU ;
Tel: 44-71-404 25 45 ; fax: 404 10 75
(The special issue "Breakdown: War and Reconstruction in Yugoslavia" (1992) is particularly useful.)

The Intruder
Mestni trg. 13 ;
61000 Ljublana
Slovenia

Mirna Bosna
7 bd Carl Vogt 1205
Geneva

International Viewpoint
2 rue Richard Lenoir
93108 Montreuil
France

Diagonales Est-Ouest
10 Rue Romarin
69001 Lyon
France

Spectrum
European University Centre for Peace Studies
A-7461 Stadtschlaining
Austria

Ost-West Gegeninformationen
Dezentrale
Prokopigasse 2/1
8010 Graz
Austria
(This excellent Austrian magazine has published two special issues on Yugoslavia: No 6a/1991 and No.7-8/1991.)

The International Organisation of Journalists, with its Secretariat in Prague, has published a special report on the media in Yugoslavia, titled "*Media Freedom in former Yugoslavia*". This is available from
IOJ
Celetna 2
110 01
Prague 1

This Report is also published (in both English and French) in *Les Cahiers de L'OIJ*, No. 2, and is available (cost 35FF or $7) from:
IOJ Regional Centre
rue Edouard Pailleron
75019 Paris
France

The Austrian series, "Dokumentationen Alpe-Adria-Alternativ" has also published a special issue on Yugoslavia, titled "*Friede nach dem Krieg?*". It consists of documents from a special series of conferences on Yugoslavia, held between April and July 1992, and is available from:
Alpen-Adria-Alternativ
Jakominiplatz 18
8010 Graz
Austria

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The twentieth century may close much the same way it opened: with a Balkan tragedy of unthinkable proportions.

Echoing the explosion of 1914, the Yugoslav crisis reveals what is wrong with the contemporary world order. Like world war one, the current war in the former Yugoslavia will produce mass waves of refugees, casualties and devastation. It throws in our face such horrors that we would prefer not to see. But we must look.

The Bosnian disaster emanates from the decay of post-Stalinist society and the malaise of the modern world economy. It now threatens to infect much of Europe. Thus Catherine Samary begins her essay with:

"The Yugoslav syndrome haunts the ex-USSR. The two federations seem to have exploded in the same way; the crises are similar, up to and including the difficulty of re-establishing the so-called 'market economy', that is to say, capitalism. From this point of view, the Yugoslav crisis illustrates the most general features of the dead-ends of 'actually existing socialism'." (p. 5)

Misha Glenny, Branka Magas and Catherine Samary try to make this complex story comprehensible. Each examines the development of the Yugoslav war and provides important clues about its causes. Refreshingly, all three dispel some common myths: that Yugoslavia is a land of age-old ethnic rivalries, that these conflicts lay dormant for decades under the iron hand of Titoism, that co-operative existence of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Moslems, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Albanians, Hungarians and Jews is an impossibility. Quite the contrary, Yugoslavia has a history of violent nationalism matched only by its legacy of internationalism. Yugoslavia may be the home of the Serbs and Croatians, but it also yielded up the most effective anti-Nazi partisans. Casual references to age-old nationalism are mere excuses for ignorance and inactivity. By brushing these aside, the authors have started the discussion on healthy terms.

Misha Glenny is a BBC correspondent who tells his story with journalistic vividness. Glenny describes the look and feel of an event while he is trying to analyse it. His method is to switch back and forth from journalism to historiography. He may first recount the history of a certain region and then describe his personal ordeal with the area's border guards. Glenny is a journalist first, an analyst second. However, when he focuses on historical study he is insightful and original.

Glenny's work surpasses the others in its analysis of the various layers of the ex-Yugoslav bureaucracy in decomposition. He briefly paints pictures of the Serbian Chetniks, the Serb, Croat and Moslem intelligentsia and the social forces to which the different republican regimes relate. Glenny is concerned with why the ruling blocs of Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia behave as they do. He also tries to get inside the mind-set of a fired Serbian functionary who becomes a Chetnik. He is able to make one understand the the extraordinary pressures of social decay, and the unexpected recourse individuals seek.

Glenny insists that both the regimes in Serbia and Croatia represent wings of the ex-Communist bureaucracy clinging desperately to their waning power. However, he will not dismiss nationalism as mere bureaucratic manipulation. He demonstrates how historical processes have reactivated nationalist rivalries, without relying on the cliche that such conflicts were always inevitable. A telling example is his description of Serbo-Croat tensions in Croatia in 1990-91:

"The majority of the 600,000 Serbs in Croatia are urbanised. Before the war, they were generally well integrated into Croatian society and relations between these Serbs and Croats could hardly have provoked the ferocious conflict which ripped through Croatia in 1990 ... Yet it is the rural Serbs who control the broad swathes of countryside ... The economic horizons of the rural Serbs are limited, but the early post-feudal concepts of land and home are central to their thinking and sense of security. Passive for decades, when they believed their homes were under threat, their harmless ignorance transformed itself into something extremely dangerous." (p. 3)

Glenny detects a similar trend among the Croat peasants of Serbia. He insists, however, that it was not peasant anxiety but urban panic which finally ripped Yugoslavia asunder. Peasants hurt under the economic catastrophes of the 1980s. But in the early 1990s, Croatian president Franjo Tudjman purged the Serb intelligentsia from its long-held posts in the Croatian republican bureaucracy. This set off a great fear among Croatia's Serbs that worse was soon to come. The combination of the destruction of the urban functionaries and the rural landholders provided a social base for conservative nationalism. Thus Serbian nationalism outside Serbia is not a plaything of Slobodan Milosevic. It has real roots.

Glenny subjects all of the republican bureaucracies to rigorous analysis as he attempts to dissect the varied components of nationalism. He demonstrates that, in each of the republics and provinces, nationalist warfare is a relatively recent and sudden phenomenon. There have been important conflicts in the past - the "Croatian Spring" of 1971 and the democratic struggles in Kosovo throughout the 1980s were important warning signs. Yet it is incorrect to describe the current crisis as the final stage of a process of national strife building up for decades. The economic collapse of the 1980s and the devolution of power from the federal to the republican bureaucracies awoke dormant nationalist hostilities.

For a discussion of these latter factors one should turn to Branka Magas's detailed study. As with any collection of essays and documents, The Destruction of Yugoslavia suffers from discontinuity and repetitiveness. She closely examines the economic decline of the 1980s, the transformation of Yugoslav politics between 1987 and 1991, and the development of the workers movement over the past thirteen years.

Magas illustrates how the economic crisis of the 1980s brought an end to the Titoist era. Financial difficulties aggravated social tensions, internecine bureaucratic conflict and nationalist rivalries. Specifically, the decline of many "self-manages" industries led to the fall of important sectors of the bureaucracy

(particularly in Serbia). Yugoslavia's ability to pay off its foreign debts decreased and IMF pressure increased. The government responded by allowing inflation to skyrocket while even nominal wages dropped. This led to disaffection within the bureaucracies and active discontent within the working class.

Magas is at her best when she tells the stories of the courageous strikers of Kosovo in both the early and late 1980s. There Albanian miners staged massive sit-down strikes in protest against economic austerity, national discrimination and bureaucratic repression. Magas makes clear that for Yugoslavia the alternative to right-wing nationalism is a class solidarity which raises democratic demands. She argues that this dynamic was key to the early success of Yugoslav Communism.

If there is a weakness in Magas's work it is her almost uncritical attitude toward the Croatian regime. She justifiably points out that Milosevic is the region's principal aggressor. However, unlike Glenny, she overlooks the ways in which Tudjman's government has provoked real fears among the Croatian Serbs. She does not discuss Tudjman's purge of Serbian functionaries. Finally, her book was written too early for her to detail Croatia's role in ethnic cleansing in Bosnia.

On this question Catherine Samary is strongest:

"Tudjman's party, which is currently in power, is a heterogenous nationalist coalition which cannot be identified with the Ustashe, but which is not at all democratic. It received a lot of funding for its campaign from far-right emigrants, which had an effect on the symbols and first measures taken by the government in the direction of asserting the state to be a state of the Croat people in the ethnic sense ... This was not a 'response' to Milosevic's policy but a symmetrical political line, the one corresponding to the other." (p. 22)

Samary's brief essay provides a useful summary of the contemporary crisis. She takes head-on the clichés mentioned above and disputes them rigorously. Samary also synthesis the lessons of Yugoslav history. She highlights both the strengths and the weaknesses of Yugoslav Marxism. She outlines Tito's break with Stalin in 1948, the project of self-management and Yugoslavia's turn to Western creditors.

Samary's historical discussion is most useful. We see both the triumphs and the tragedies of Balkan development sense world war two. After 1945, the Balkans appeared to carry the brightest hopes for revolutionary Marxism. Revolutionary movements had taken power in Yugoslavia and Albania. Civil war raged in Greece. Communists were discussing seriously the possibility of a "socialist federation" which would unite Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece.

But Stalinism destroyed all such talk. The Kremlin had agreed at Yalta that Greece would remain part of the Western sphere and that, therefore, Communist revolution in Greece was excluded. Stalin had made a similar deal for Yugoslavia which would have partitioned the country. Fortunately, Tito disobeyed Moscow's directive. The Greek revolution, however, perished. Tito's support for the Greek partisans was one of the final straws in the Moscow-Belgrade split. Soon Stalin reigned in the Communist leaderships in Bulgaria and Albania. The project of a Balkan socialist federation came to an abrupt end. Yugoslavia was left isolated.

Glenny, Magas and Samary have each helped to uncover the real story that lies behind the modern tragedy of Yugoslavia. In combination the three works outline the history of post-war Yugoslavia and scrutinise the logic of today's warfare. Read together, they provide a good start to an understanding of Yugoslavia.

Kit Adam Wainer