

# LABOR ACTION

Independent Socialist Weekly

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JULY 20, 1953

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**SPOT-LIGHT**

## Ethics

"I don't think, after two years of thinking, that any one individual can even indulge himself in the luxury of individual morality. . . ."

That, recently quoted with approval by Hearst columnist George Sokolsky, was the rationalization of Robert Rossen of Hollywood, when he reversed himself on testifying as to Stalinist affiliations before the congressional inquisition.

**We like to read these edifying ethical discoveries by the reformed characters who lick the dust before the witchhunters, unlike the terrible persons who offend Sidney Hook by refusing to spill their guts before McCarthy and his ilk.**

We doubt whether Rossen was trying to be more profound than the simple thought that in these hard times it is wrong for a man to "follow the gleam" of his own convictions and keep a stiff backbone. The state says: "Thou shalt be a stoolpigeon!" and two solid years of cranium-cracking meditation brought Rossen to . . . the state-morality of the Stalinist totalitarians; whereupon he knew once and for all that he had to go along with the House Un-Americaners. It stands to reason.

That is not said to sneer at efforts to fight McCarthy; on the contrary. But as we have pointed out in a number of connections: when liberals seek to "fight" McCarthy while partially capitulating to his pressure, or by conceding to the witchhunt basic principles of civil liberties, they are holding the walls against barbarism only by barbarizing the defenders. Thus the Roman legions were so successful in holding back the tide of barbarism that eventually barbarism sat on the imperial throne.

Ike may yet turn on Joe. There will then be hallelujahs. All it may mean is that Joe went too far, too fast, with too little, too soon. If that is all, then the fight for democracy will still have to be waged against the men who will be draped with laurel by the liberals for their "victory" over McCarthyism.

## Reformed Character

"For several years the steel magnate, Ernest T. Weir, whom we all attacked so bitterly during New Deal days when he successfully opposed unionization of Weirton Steel, has been carrying on a campaign for peace."

So says I. F. Stone, editor and publisher of *I. F. Stone's Weekly*, in a nostalgic—if not forgiving—vein, under the head of "A Steel Magnate's Plea for Peace and Co-Existence." Wounds heal with the passage of time and why should we remember Weir's bloody terror against the steel union if he is now a reformed character? One writes instead: "successfully opposed unionization. . . ."

The reform of his character is vouched for by the fact that he is for negotiations with Russia. Skim his article (reprinted by Stone) for "The present high cost of government . . . cost of defense . . . extremely high taxes . . . balance our budget," and you get the idea in few words.

# Beria: One Down in the March Back to One-Man Russian Rule

By HAL DRAPER

The sensational fall of Lavrenti Beria, who for 15 years has headed the Russian secret-police apparatus, shows first of all that the pace of events in the Kremlin is faster and fiercer than anyone thought. Most of all, it shows that the direction of development of the new clique of masters in the Kremlin is determined by the totalitarian social system, and not the other way around.

Beria, who headed up the largest-scale mass-murder machine in the history of the world, will be lamented by nobody in or out of Russia; a hangman has no friends, even among his assistants. Since someone had to go in the bureaucratic conflict at the top, Beria's head on the pike is guaranteed to draw the most cheers. The victorious assassins who remain can even think of making some capital out of that.

**The ruling gang themselves, with or without Beria, cannot get away from the purge system, no matter how many sour-grapes editorials appear in Pravda about "collective leadership." Even as the moves were being made (like the purging of the Jewish doctors' purgers) which were greeted as evidences of a turn away from the system of terror, not by Stalinist dupes but by anti-Russian "experts" if you please, we pointed out that these very steps were accomplished by the same methods in the same system. The edge of the knife was being turned against new men, but the knife was the same one.**

There has not, from the beginning of the post-Stalin crisis, been the slightest evidence for the "democratization," "liberalization" or "reputation of Stalin's system" which has been so widely if not wisely discerned by the squinting researchers of the speculative school of commentators. A loosening up of the pressure, a great relaxation in policy, concessions—these crisis-enforced tactics

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## Now: First Law Imposing Gov't Purge on Industry

By BEN HALL

What once might have aroused a boiling indignation among civil-libertarians, liberals and democrats now causes not a ripple. For the first time, to the knowledge of this writer, a law has been placed on the statute books establishing a political criterion for workers in private industry and denying them the right to work if they do not meet it.

The scene, of all places, is not Arkansas but the state of New York. The law in question is the bill enacted on June 25 by the state legislature regulating the longshore industry of the Port of New York.

**Amid the big fanfare of anti-racketeering a provision was adopted in the course of ordinary routine affecting any longshoremen, pier superintendents, hiring agents, and port watchmen who "knowingly or willfully advocates the desirability of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States by force or violence or shall be a member of a group which advocates such desirability, knowing the purposes of such group include such advocacy."**

Under the new law it will become illegal for such men to work at their trade or for employers to hire them. Note that this section refers clearly to their views, to what they might say, and not to anything illegal that they might do.

Measures of a parallel type are, of course, already familiar in the witch-

(Turn to last page)

## Anything in the Treasury for Welfare?

By SARA KLEIN

Many columns of newspaper print have been devoted since the new administration took over to the debate over the cut in the air-force budget and in armaments. Despite a recommendation for a lower allocation at present from President Eisenhower, a man to whom arms preparedness is the breath of life, many members of Congress were prepared to waste billions of dollars rather than risk something less than total preparedness.

But no such concern was shown over the slash in the welfare budget, which was the first major cut made under the new administration. Perhaps in elevating the Federal Security Administration and other federal welfare services to departmental status, giving it a smarter title (Department of Health, Education and Welfare) and a glamorous director, Mrs. Oveta Culp Hobby, the new administration decided it had made enough of a gesture in the direction of public welfare.

A very short, apologetic complaint from the new department reveals that Congress has not yet appropriated funds to make possible the appointment of sev-

eral important directors. Lacking to this date, three months after the reorganization, are a special assistant for medical affairs, a commissioner for Social Security Administration, and a director of the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance.

Questioned on whether the shortage of money has been holding up the appointment of key officials, Mrs. Hobby very politely sidestepped any hint of congressional criticism:

"Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953, elevating the Federal Security Agency to departmental status, provided for additional positions at the standard departmental salary rates. Obviously the estimates and appropriations made to the FSA for the fiscal year 1953 did not contain the additional funds required to staff the department in accordance with that plan."

**McCarthy did not have trouble finding funds for two snoopers to go to Europe to read titles in the American propaganda libraries and to scare the thin skin off diplomatic aides. There must be something left in the treasury for health, education and welfare!**



NEW YORK

The Liberal Party's Slate—

# Running Mates for Halley: Who Are They?

By PETER WHITNEY

The Liberal Party of New York finished naming its city-wide ticket in the coming elections by ratifying the party ranks' choice of Rudolph Halley for mayor and naming his two running mates. Justice Juvenal Marchisio of the Domestic Relations Court will run for the post of president of the City Council (now held by Halley), and Chase Mellen Jr., former N. Y. County Republican chairman and present committee-man, will run for city controller, by decision of the meeting of the Five-County Executive Committees of the Liberal Party held on July 13 at the Hotel Astor.

State Chairman Adolf A. Berle Jr., reporting for the policy committee, presented the names of Marchisio and Mellen. While Mellen had received some previous press discussion, the name of Marchisio was new to most of the 200 county and club leaders attending the meeting. Neither nominee is outstanding in any way on the New York political scene, and has played no special role with regard to the Liberal Party. Both are political lightweights.

Berle urged their acceptance as part of a balanced, "practical" ticket, which could bring "non-partisan" "good government" to New York. He read very detailed biographies of both men, enumerating their birth, education, degrees, positions, appointments, club memberships, marriage ties, number of children, religion, etc.—and it was truly remarkable that, with all this plethora of detail, not one word was said about any policy, program, or principles endorsed by these men.

erating their birth, education, degrees, positions, appointments, club memberships, marriage ties, number of children, religion, etc.—and it was truly remarkable that, with all this plethora of detail, not one word was said about any policy, program, or principles endorsed by these men.

## INDEPENDENT?

Perhaps Berle thought it sufficient to mention that both men had been appointed to city posts by LaGuardia, as though this sprinkling of holy water purified them for all time. What these nominees had been doing, thinking, or saying, politically, was glossed over very lightly. Berle had time to enumerate all the banking connections of Mellen and to pay high tribute to his financial acumen, but little explanation of his role as a so-called independent Republican leader. To be exact, there was

one mention of his "independence"—Mellen supported Adlai Stevenson in the last election.

How independent has he been of Governor Thomas E. Dewey, who jammed down the throats of New Yorkers increases in fares and rents? What about his Republican leadership of New York County, and his current committee membership? Surely if the Liberal Party leadership demanded of mayoralty prospect Javits that he practically divorce himself from the Republican machine, not less of a commitment should have been required of Mellen who has been more deeply bedded down in local Republican affairs. But not a word was mentioned of any demands or commitments.

Marchisio, a Democrat (not even an "independent" Democrat), was described as having substantial support among the Italian Catholics because of his service in organizing post-war relief for Italy and other Italian-American activities. He has an impressive collection of decorations and Berle listed them—from the Vatican, from the Italian government, even from an Italian trade union—but he drew the line and spurned a medal from Mussolini. Bravo!

But just what have been Marchisio's political activities and connections?

Where did he stand in the last mayoralty election? Did he support the insurgent Democrat, the incumbent Mayor Impelleri, or the regular Democratic candidate, also endorsed at that time by the Liberal Party? Did he support Halley two years ago when he ran as the Liberal candidate for City Council president, or did he support the Democratic nominee? Will he defend and support Halley's record in the City Council, which has followed Liberal Party lines? And what about his recent radio interview when he stated his willingness to accept the Democratic nomination for mayor?

These are all natural questions to be asked even within the circumference of the Liberal leader's politics.

What kind of a campaign can such a candidate run on the Liberal Party line as the Liberal Party spokesman? What will he say about the Democratic machine bosses and organization? How loudly will his voice ring out against Democratic corruption, graft, and gangsterism—covered up by the Democratic majority of the New York City Council? How does he stack up even with Halley, whose record and program are out in the open and have won him the enthusiastic support of the Liberal members?

Surely in proposing political candidates of a political organization, such questions are neither irrelevant nor immaterial, yet Berle scarcely referred to their political past or present, and certainly gave no indication that they were committed to anything beyond a broad "non-partisan good government" program in the future. It remained for Alex Rose of the Hatters Union and David Dubinsky of the Ladies Garment Workers Union to assure the Liberal members that these candidates support "our program" and are independent—but only after some opposition from the floor put the spotlight on this question.

## DISSENT FROM FLOOR

In an unusual break in the cut-and-dried proceedings of nominating sessions, a committeeman from Queens County sharply objected to the naming of Mellen and Marchisio as the party's choices. He vigorously applauded Halley's selection, and argued that the Liberal Party should run outstanding men from the ranks of the party as his team mates. New Yorkers, he said, had revealed their independence from and their disgust with the two party machines by electing Halley two years ago. This was a tremendous victory for the Liberal Party, and the party followed it up by running Counts last year as its candidate for U. S. Senate.

The Queens committeeman urged a continuation of the policy of running the party's own candidates for office, as reflecting the sentiment both within the party ranks and among the voters. He pointed out that little was known of the programs of Mellen and Marchisio, and quoted a party leader, Dr. John Childs, that a candidate had to be "wedded to a program of social progress." Non-partisan, good government interests would be best served, he asserted, by Liberal Party candidates who have the only program devoted for the welfare of the people.

Stating that the party has plenty of talent within its own ranks, he proposed that men with liberal principles like Joseph O'Leary, state secretary, run for comptroller, and Dr. George Counts for City Council president. Also, he objected to the manner in which the candidates' religious and national origins were stressed and felt that such considerations were alien to the Liberal Party which ought to concern itself with the political policies and social concepts of its candidates.

The applause which greeted this speaker doubtlessly reflected the feelings of many of the committeemen, who for reasons of their own feel it better to remain silent and go along with the leadership. But that such sentiment exists in the clubs was evidenced by the fact that the big guns, Rose and Dubinsky, swung into action and spoke at some length to justify and defend the leadership's position.

There was some indication that perhaps Berle had a heavy influence in the selection of Marchisio and Mellen. He underscored that he had personally known and worked with them in various capacities. Where Berle was unable to swing the Liberal Party leadership be-

## LONDON LETTER

# BLP Trailing After Churchill in Cold War

By ALLAN VAUGHAN

LONDON, July 8—A well-thought-out editorial in last Sunday's *Observer* engages in some "Stock-Taking," and deals specifically with what it calls the "change of atmosphere" in international relations. The main substance of the editorial was as follows:

"On both sides of the slightly punctured Iron Curtain, this will be a week of stock-taking. The three Western foreign ministers are to meet in Washington; Russian diplomatic representatives from all over the world are called back to Moscow for consultations. The moment for such stock-taking is appropriate. The first phase of the new diplomatic activity which began after the death of Stalin seems to have ended. There is at the moment a pause; but it is a pause which of its nature can hardly be prolonged.

"Sir Winston Churchill's enforced rest has inevitably removed for the time being the possibility of a Four Power meeting 'at the highest level.' President Rhee has, for the moment, succeeded in sabotaging the Korean truce, and this postpones to an indefinite date the political conference on Asia which was to follow the end of the fighting in Korea. Both the original movements toward a meeting of the two sides in the cold war have thus been stalled, and a new initiative will be needed if such a meeting is to be brought about.

"But this does not mean that it is now possible simply to overturn the policies of three or four months ago. During these months the cold-war fronts have rapidly begun to disintegrate—in Europe even more dramatically than in Asia—and both Russia and the West face a radically changed situation. In Eastern Germany and in Czechoslovakia there has been open revolt, and the Russian satellite system in Europe is showing unmistakable signs of cracking up.

"But it would be sheer self-delusion to ignore the fact that similar signs are accumulating also on the Western side of the Curtain. The chances of the ratification of the European Defense Community in France are now almost nil, as far as one can see ahead; relations between France and West Germany have worsened ominously even during the past week; anti-Americanism in France and Italy has become virulent; and opinion in West Germany is rapidly veering from Western integration toward German reunion.

"It may be possible for both sides to patch up their disintegrating positions in Europe for a time, in the hope that the other side will collapse first; but we shall succeed only insofar as we recognize the change of atmosphere. It has become clear in the last few months that there is a wish in Europe—both East and West—to break the 'mould of the cold war' and to return, for better or

worse, to something like the former national pattern.

"The place where the issue is likely to come to a head is Germany. The reunion of the two Germanies through nationwide free elections would make the decisive break in the Iron Curtain; and a peace treaty with Germany would be the precondition for a new and uncharted phase in world politics. The power which makes the first clear business-like and convincingly sincere move to set this process rolling will gain a great political advantage. Why leave the initiative to the Russians?"

## FOR 4-POWER TALK

Why indeed? This central question which the *Observer* editorial places before its readers contains the dilemma facing the Western capitalist powers. "Why leave the initiative to the Russians?" asks the editorial.

The answer is all too plain. Because the Western powers cannot take the initiative. It is this realization which is slowly dawning on the British Labor movement. Unless a dramatic, independent and bold course is taken by the Labor Party itself, the initiative in easing world tension will continue to be held by the Russian government.

The Tory government, and still less the Eisenhower administration, is in no position to make a real contribution to easing world tension, as this would come into direct conflict with the essential requirements of the classes that support them and the system to which they are wedded.

No doubt, it is possible for a "little Bermuda," or even a full-fledged "Big Bermuda," to settle the broad terms which the Western powers consider a minimum for acceptance by the Russian government, as a basis for a new four-power peace settlement. But any new Yalta or Teheran could only pave the way for a later open conflict even deeper than the present one.

Moreover, such top-level conferences never take into account the many factors that so often upset plans for dividing the world into spheres of influence. Such a factor was the East Berlin revolt, which has not only shaken the Russian regime but also the intricate network of the Western alliance. Konrad Adenauer is only too well aware of this fact, and is trimming his sails accordingly. The workers of

East Germany want a united Germany on their terms, not the terms of America or of Konrad Adenauer.

The *Bevanite Tribune* has come out firmly on the side of the heroic German workers, who, at the time of writing, are engaged in another demonstration—a sitdown strike—against the Kremlin's puppet government.

Michael Foot, in a special front-page article in this week's *Tribune*, also writes the following: "The workers in Germany have risked their lives to end rule by foreign armies and to secure the unity of their country. That end can only be gained by genuine negotiation with the Soviet government. That is the demand of the German Social-Democrats. It is a demand which should be supported by every socialist all over the world.

*Tribune* also deals with the projected Big Four talks. "U. S. Plans to Hot Up the Cold War—Big Four Talks in Danger"—these are the headlines. *Tribune* rightly suspects that the Eisenhower administration is not too anxious to have any talks with the Russian government at the present time. The Tory government—representing the junior and more vulnerable partner in the Western alliance—is quite naturally more willing for negotiations with the Russian government.

## TAIL-END

It is a fact that except for *Tribune* and a few scattered Labor MPs, no serious attention has been paid to this vital question of foreign policy by the Parliamentary Labor Party leadership. Despite repeated efforts by backbench labor MPs to get Attlee to take the bull by the horns and open up a new phase in Labor's foreign policy, he was only able to make his voice heard after Churchill had stolen his thunder.

This deplorable state of affairs with the Labor Party leadership trailing behind Churchill's flamboyant moves has seriously affected the stock of the Labor Party in the view of the electorate. The Abingdon by-election proved this beyond any shadow of doubt. There is a general feeling that foreign policy is Winston Churchill's special prerogative.

The Korean deadlock was a heaven-sent opportunity for the leadership of our party to make the position quite clear to the American government. Only John Strachey had the nerve to say what must be in the minds of even the most right-wing and die-hard of the Front Bench leaders: "I am convinced that resistance in Korea was an indispensable part of our defense effort, but now we may have to reconsider our position." He said this only a fortnight ago.

What John Strachey means by "reconsider our position" is difficult to say.

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**One Theory on the Reasons for the Upset in the Kremlin—**

# What Did Beria Want and Why Did He Fall?

By ELIZABETH FRANK

The fall of Beria has been greeted with almost unanimous expressions of delight. This reaction is understandable: everyone likes the idea of the head of a terrible secret police ending up in one of his own cells; and everyone assumes quite rightly that a fight to the death at the very top of its ruling caste can only weaken the Moscow regime. Nevertheless, a closer look at the probable reasons for Beria's disgrace will show that, at least for the immediate future, there is not so much cause for rejoicing.

Since the death of Stalin, Beria was the active protagonist of a "liberal" policy, of important concessions to the social and economic forces that have been creating dangerous strains in the Stalinist edifice. The chief of the terror apparatus seems a bit miscast in the role of "liberal," to say the least. Beria showed the kind of social vision not usually associated with a policeman. But in Russia there is precedent for such a case: in the tsarist police, too, top officials often doubled as sociologists, and rather intelligent ones at that.

It is likely, in any case, that Beria was not alone in his views, that an important section of the top bureaucracy agreed with him for a time, hoping to build a more stable regime by loosening the reins to some extent. If it was possible for Malenkov to eliminate his rival so rapidly and thoroughly, some of those who first supported Beria's policies must have changed their minds. Why did they? It is the content of Beria's reforms that must give us the clue to their motives.

The main aspects of what we may call the "Beria plan" were the following: (1) easing of the police terror; (2) a freer hand for the managers, as against the central planning agencies of the economy; (3) concessions to the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union; (4) economic concessions in the satellites; (5) concessions to the demands of the ordinary citizen for a more civilized existence.

**RESENTMENT**

(1) Beria's promise of legal reforms not only implied far-reaching changes in the general atmosphere of the country, but also tended specifically toward a more normal labor force. Removing the threat of police sanctions for minor infringements of work discipline would please not only the workers but to some extent also the managers.

But, taken together with a measure such as the amnesty, it would certainly not please one section of the ruling class which has a vested interest in arbitrary police power: the administrators of the NKVD's vast economic empire, who need a steady supply of forced labor. In this connection it is certainly significant that the man who has replaced Beria as the chief of the police and the ministry of the interior, Kruglov, is head of GULAG, the administration of the police's economic enterprises.

(2) Parallel to promising a little more freedom to the harassed workers, the managers were offered the prospect of more latitude in their activities. The various economic ministries were given greater power, and this has always been to the detriment of the central planning agencies. Again, the group of "planners" must have resented such a threat to their position. Malenkov, who bases himself chiefly on the party and administrative bureaucracy, was certainly able to make use of their dissatisfaction.

**ENEMIES**

(3) The Russian empire can be thought of in the form of concentric circles. At the periphery are the satellite states, more or less completely "sovietized," and closer to the center are the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union. The center is made up of the Great-Russians, who lord it over the nationalities which are "less equal than others."

Beria apparently considered it advisable to make important concessions to the "bourgeois nationalism" of these colonies-within-the-country. He took measures to reduce the cultural imperialism of the Great-Russians and to assure the local bureaucracy of a larger share of lucrative positions. As Harry Schwartz has pointed out, this policy undoubtedly created a great many enemies for him among those interested in maintaining Great-Russian privileges.

(4) Years of economic exploitation by the Kremlin, without even the most ele-

mentary regard for the structure of the national economies involved, finally brought the threat of complete economic collapse in several satellite countries, and with it, the danger of revolt. A minimum of concessions thus seemed almost inevitable and will most likely continue to be carried out. But in East Germany Beria indicated that he was ready to go far beyond this minimum level of concessions. In addition, according to a statement by Nagy, the East German "new course" was to be applied to the other satellites as well.

When, therefore, Beria's new course backfired so disastrously on June 17, nearly all of the Kremlin bureaucracy

must have trembled for its empire and blamed Beria for engaging in such patently dangerous experimentation.

**AGAINST STATUS QUO**

(5) Beria's East German experiment, however, had even more far-reaching implications, concerning the Russian regime itself. A remarkable dispatch to the N. Y. Times from Moscow, on June 28, indicates that even after the revolt of the East German working class Beria tried to use his satellite policy as a jumping-off position for a similar policy inside Russia.

"Not the least interesting aspect of the German situation to observers here is the fact that the emphasis the East German Government is placing on meeting the needs of workers and peasants reflects a number of measures that the Soviet Government has taken in the last three months to a similar end. . . ."

This is not all. At this same time, there were mass meetings in factories and offices "for the purpose of expressing 'ardent solidarity' with the working people of Germany." At those meetings,

discussions of the German situation were astonishingly frank, painting the concessions in glowing colors and in effect making propaganda for a demanding attitude on the part of the workers and the little people. This encouragement of a voice from below must be coupled with earlier articles in the press, asking the trade union organizations to begin to defend workers' rights.

It is thus not impossible that Beria would have liked to provoke at least a little militancy among the workers, as well as among the peasants and the plain citizen in general, in order to win support for his reforms more easily.

What is certain is that he encouraged the production of consumers' goods, in greater quantity and better quality, promising to make daily life a little more bearable for the ordinary citizen. Together with the other elements of his reform policy, these measures meant a profound change in the system. As such, they must have provoked the anger and fear of all parts of the ruling class interested in a strict maintenance of the status quo.

## Beria: Odd Man Out—

(Continued from page 1)

of the system have been identified with a change in the system. But the top masters, despite all pressure from below, even from within the ranks of their own bureaucracy, cannot lift themselves out of the system by their bootstraps. Some will live and some will die by it.

The pretense of a principled return to a "collective leadership" was in part a temporary necessity and in part a fraud. As long as the power has not been gathered into one hand, some kind of arrangement of this sort is inevitable (and since it is, one might as well write editorials in Pravda about it). But this is an unstable arrangement of the structure—fissionable—and the explosion had to come.

**THE SHARKS**

What is enlightening is that it came so soon. It is downright amazing that the new masters could not maintain their internal balance of power even long enough to live through a more extended transitional period and the turmoil in their empire. Amazing—but not bewildering; for what it means is that the overweening need for the re-establishment of a "Stalin" is even more unpostponable than one had a right to think—even if the new "Stalin" is weaker, more vulnerable, less able to control, less able to guarantee the bureaucratic stability which is sought.

It is another inherent contradiction of the system: the ruling class as a whole badly needed a period of adjustment and quiet, but it cannot achieve it even by decision; like a man whose bones need time to knit but who cannot afford to lie in bed.

So the top struggle breaks out into the open. Perhaps it was from *Kon-Tiki* that we remember the scene of a swarm of sharks, swirling hidden under the waters in an internecine struggle to the death; the sea boils with their murderous attacks on each other as they draw blood; every now and then a jawful of sharp teeth flashes above the waters; every now and then a loser floats to the top, in view, belly torn open. . . .

**THE KEY ARENA**

It is possible to check another aspect of our attempt to understand the dynamics of the Russian totalitarian system of bureaucratic collectivism. Since the day after the death of Stalin, we have often been told that the conflict in the Russian regime is between rival departments of the government—army, secret police, party machine, industrial bureaucracy, etc., all used as clubs by their respective chiefs in the struggle for power. According to this schema, the party machine is one machine among many. Beria was in control of one of the most powerful of these departments, with its own armed forces, tanks, etc.

Yet Beria is disposed of—this "omnipotent" wielder of the most powerful force in Russia—with no more open physical struggle than if the victim were Molotov (or Kaganovich). The only echo of this schema is the rumor reported by

Sulzberger of the *Times* that tanks were seen in Moscow on July 27, or, as the saying goes, "tanks rumbled through" Moscow.

There is no discouraging an artificial construction once it has been put together, any more than the Ptolemaic system can be "disproved," and we know how such a schema can be maintained by piling up one speculation upon the other. But the GPU apparatus did not belong to Beria any more than the army belongs to Bulganin or Zhukov. All of these top bureaucrats are the men through whom the party seeks to maintain its control of all departments, as it must in order to hold the whole society together.

The indications are that the struggle took place within the party apparatus, not between Malenkov's phalanxes of party secretaries versus Beria's GPU detachments. If Beria lost out, it was because he failed to capture the party control. Insofar as the all-controlling role of the party is weakened, the underpinning of the whole system is weakened, and not merely the personal power of one group of bureaucrats. There are indeed strong forces which press in this direction, but they are disintegrative forces, constituting a mortal danger to the ruling group as a whole. Yet the contending bureaucrats are forced to rock the boat in the course of their struggle.

**SOME CAUTIONS**

We have not discussed here the moot question of the possible connection between Beria's fall and the "relaxation" policy of the regime either internally or in foreign policy. The discussion article on this page presents an interesting version of one interpretation. But it is an ironic commentary on the vulgar "democratization" theory, not often faced by

those who hold it, that the representative in the Kremlin of the "democratic" tendency should be considered to be—the GPU—hangman of the country. Beria's possible role is perfectly credible (however moot) if we regard the Kremlin ease-up as a wise tactic of bureaucrats-in-a-quandary. It is scarcely credible if Beria is regarded as the leader of a serious political tendency which is supposed to be fighting . . . the system of terror which he implemented.

In any case, whatever schema one draws up connecting men with policies, two cautions are in order:

(1) Although internal policy and foreign policy are intimately related, that does not automatically mean a one-to-one correspondence between them. There is no reason to exclude a trend toward harder measures within the Russian empire together with continuation of the relaxation in the cold war.

(2) We will all be interested in seeing whether the fall of Beria means that the regime will return to a "harder" or maintain a "soft" policy. But another factor should not be ignored while searching for the signs: a zigzag, uncertain, hesitant and ambivalent mixing-up of expedients in perplexity and wavering of will. It may seem elementary to mention it, but the fact is that, almost without exception, even the best speculative discussions of this question tend to assume that at every moment the brain trust in the Kremlin has a policy, one policy, of which it is confident and on which it drives ahead. This is no doubt far from true at given junctures. The present may be one, unless we assume that Malenkov (or any name of your own choice) has already gone all the way in ascending Stalin's throne. It will be even more true on the future road of the regime toward its overthrow.

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## FOR COMMON ACTION OF SCIENTISTS & UNIONS

By CARL DARTON

The common cause of the scientists and the trade-union movement should be a challenge to both the "new labor leaders" and the scientists.

A review of recent events indicates that closer collaboration would be desirable for both groups. On a purely commercial basis trade unions are now "big business" with multi-million dollar budgets and can well command the services of scientists as well as government and industry can. Every year, in 1953 more than ever, industry grabs up scientific and technical graduates with one purpose in mind, the development of greater profits by rationalizing mechanical and labor power. The trade unions, on the other hand, with extremely few exceptions, have left technological knowledge to the bosses, who have the scientists and technologists lined up against them.

It is true that of the 215 national and international unions listed in the 1953 Directory of Trade Unions, 89 have "Research Directors." But too few of the unions have endeavored to keep abreast of the technological developments in their industry. The unions lag far behind management in using engineering knowledge in determining productivity factors, job placement and long-range industry planning. Most research carried out by unions has been done by economists, or to a lesser degree by sociologists, as an aid in improving public relations or nation-wide bargaining.

Indicative of this trend is the recent announcement by Walter Reuther that the UAW will utilize the services of ten distinguished economists to advise them in their campaign for an annual wage. The next meeting of this group, known as the UAW-CIO Advisory Committee on the Guaranteed Annual Wage, will be in Detroit on September 11 and 12.

Economic advisors have been the predominant "experts" used by the unions. Such experts to be worthy of the name must be scientists, social scientists. As the unions continue to grow and their demands increase they will do well to use all available scientific and technical facilities to augment their bargaining power.

### COMMON THREAT

As the activities of the unions turn toward broader social problems and politics they will have increasing need of the advice of scientists. It is in these fields that collaboration of the scientists and unionists on a free and equal basis appears imminent and desirable.

The Astin affair in the U. S. Bureau of Standards, with its almost bizarre chain of dismissal and partial reinstatement, was recognized by the labor unions as a threat to consumer interests and an invitation to business to market their wares regardless of merit and the public interests. It is interesting to note that the scientists did fairly well in defending themselves only after adopting near-union tactics of mass appeals and threatened group resignations from the Bureau of Standards.

The utilization of atomic energy by private industry and the necessary changes in the law to make this possible have not escaped the attention of the trade-unionists. In a recent AP dispatch, the CIO committee on regional development and conservation voiced its objec-

tions to the "atomic give-away."

If the present law was changed the union felt that the control of atomic power by private industry would result in abuse by the big monopolies, who would inevitably take over; large government subsidies would continue but only further fatten the profits of the large companies. Moreover, private control would remove the last hope for international control of atomic weapons with an increasing arms race: likewise, industry's notoriously bad record of water and air pollution and wasting of natural resources might result in public danger through contamination by the materials of atomic fission.

### JOINT WORK DUE

Other common problems of the scientists and the unions are those of national policies growing out of the defense-versus-offense approach to atomic warfare, dispersal as a defense measure and job security, labor and technical collaboration in the improvement of undeveloped areas of the world, as well as common problems of loyalty, security and civil liberties. These merely illustrate the fields in which the trade-unionist and scientist are more and more intermingling.

We wish that we could call for the rank and file of both the scientists and the labor movement to collaborate on a common front against ignorance and privilege. Lacking the basis for this, however, we hope that the pressure of events will force the national offices of the large trade unions and such public-minded scientists' organization as the Federation of American Scientists and the American Association of Scientific Workers to seek joint action to the advantage of both movements.

## POUM Greetings to American Socialists

Replying for the recent conference of the Spanish socialist POUM (Workers Party) to greetings from the ISL, Wilbardo Solano, POUM secretary, sends its "most fraternal greetings" in return, and asks that they be conveyed to all the comrades of the ISL.

The POUM is the left-wing socialist party of anti-fascist Spain, which has been playing an important role in the fight against Franco.

Solano writes: "The militants of the POUM are aware that to maintain the banner of revolutionary socialism in the United States is a task which requires energy, courage and unshakable faith in the cause of the emancipation of the working class." And—

"The militants of the POUM have followed with enormous interest everything you have done to popularize in the United States the struggle of the Spanish people against the Franco tyranny and the special fight of our movement for the development and strengthening of revolutionary Marxism in Spain.

"The POUM conference ratified our Third Front orientation and estimated that we have entered into a period of the accelerated disintegration of the two imperialist blocs and of the renaissance of the workers' movement. Our movement is firmly convinced that we are on the eve of great perspectives for the working-class movement and revolutionary socialism.

"The POUM conference showed its desire for closer and closer fraternal relations with the ISL of the United States, with a view to more effective political and practical collaboration."

## BOOKS and Ideas

Rosmer: Moscow Under Lenin

## 'I Was There—This Is the Way It Was'

MOSCOU SOUS LENINE—Les Origines du Communisme, by Alfred Rosmer.—Editions Pierre Horay, Paris, 1953, 316 pages.

By HAL DRAPER

Alfred Rosmer's new book is his political memoirs of the Comintern and revolutionary Russia from the foundation of the International to the death of Lenin at the outset of 1924. It is perhaps hard to greet it as enthusiastically as it deserves without giving the reader an exaggerated idea of what it tries to do.

It is not a history of the period, nor of the Communist International under Lenin, still less of Russia under Lenin. What he sets out to do he succeeds in doing admirably: to present, as though seeing them again through fresh, young eyes, though with maturer understanding, what it meant in 1918-1923 to try to reassemble the revolutionary Marxist forces; to let the reader live, through the author's own eyes, in the problems which faced the revolutionary socialists then; to convey not only dead historical events but the living feel of the political atmosphere.

In its own way—though it is far from even trying to present any definitive historical treatment of the events and topics he covers—Rosmer permits one to understand the period under Lenin in its live context better, perhaps, than will be done when the definitive history of the early Comintern is finally written. For, as the American magazine editors like to say, "you are there."

That is also Rosmer's modest statement of purpose:

"The fate of the Russian Revolution, the daily acrobatics of recent years which is called 'Marxism-Leninism,' poses important questions: Is Stalin the continuator of Lenin? Is the totalitarian regime another form of what had been called the dictatorship of the proletariat? Was the worm in the fruit? Is Stalinism 'a logical and almost inevitable development of Leninism,' as Norman Thomas affirms?—To answer that, it is necessary first of all to get to know the facts, the ideas, the men, just as they were, in the heroic years of the revolution: a preliminary task of clearing-away is necessary for they have been systematically buried under successive layers of various lies. My work is to restore them to truth. I shall simply say: I was there—this is the way it was."

### NEITHER DISHONOR

The rewriting of history by the Stalinist professors has been cruder, but not more effective or more lying, than the rewriting of the history of the Russian Revolution by the bourgeois professors who follow the "American party line" or by the more reprehensible types who have made a career as "experts" out of vindictive falsification. Rosmer's book is not written as a polemic against them. He says: "I was there—this is the way it was."

Rosmer, before 1918 a syndicalist, became one of the founders of the French Communist Party and early a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. He is not and never was a sycophant of Bolshevism—which had its sycophants too; Rosmer impales a couple—but he came to the Third International as a revolutionary socialist, and he has not turned his coat.

This, indeed, is the note struck by Albert Camus in his introduction to the book; Rosmer is one of those who has resisted "both dishonor and desertion," both the dishonor of bowing to the Stalinist counter-revolution in the name of the revolution, and the dishonor of deserting the revolution out of panicky fear before the monster that crushed it and took its place.

Unified as it is by the running account

of what he saw and did and participated in, year by year, *Moscou Sous Lenin* is a rich variety of political and personal sketches, insights, summaries of great events, profiles, *aperçus*, and even anecdotes. It is not really summarizable. The biggest single impression that stands out at the moment in our mind is the vividness with which we see, through his pen, what was indeed the main problem of the young Communist movement in its heroic days. This was the problem of trying to build, in the midst of a revolutionary upsurge and not in calm years of slow preparation, a truly Marxist cadre out of such politically immature elements as flocked to the new banner.

### TOUR DE FORCE

The elements out of which the new International had to be created were not Communists except in aspiration and will; they had to learn how to be. There were the careerists and opportunists who still had their faces turned to the reformists; and there were also—this is Rosmer's specialty—the "wild men," the ultra-leftists, who did not know how to be Communists. The Bolsheviks were faced with the impossible task of trying quickly to make a revolutionary International against—and out of—both. Elementary questions of parliamentarism had to be fought out, while the new cadres made mistake after mistake; elementary questions of revolutionary trade-union work. . . . By the time the lessons began to sink in, the revolutionary opportunities were temporarily over, and then Stalinization overlaid the mistakes with betrayal.

Rosmer summarizes the highlights of the second, third and fourth congresses of the Comintern as they fall into his record; sometimes his accounts are more like a series of political snapshots than a history, but his contribution is to make it possible to appreciate the issues and decisions of the congresses in terms of the contemporary conflicts and problems, and not as reference works.

His most impressive *tour de force* in this regard is in sections devoted to summarizing and discussing some of the works that were published at the time, *Lenin's State and Revolution* and *Left-Wing Communism*, for example. What could he possibly say that was new? Yet he does, solely by making you re-read them as if you had just gotten them fresh from the press in the midst of the swirling debates and disputes among the delegates to the congresses.

### CLOSE-UPS

The Kronstadt uprising, the NEP, the Paul Levi affair in the German CP, and many other events take on the same quality of being seen *afresh*, not as a polemicist but as a witness. You are on Trotsky's military train with him for a couple of days; you meet and get an impression of a series of personalities: Clara Zetkin, Angel Pestanna, John Reed, Zinoviev, Radek, Serrati, even Earl Browder (in an aside of Gallic irony), and of course Trotsky and Lenin.

A number of sections, scattered through the story, deal with the internal development of the French party and the role especially of Cachin and Frossard. Karl Radek, typically or untypically, is seen somewhat at his worst in a couple of episodes—at the conference of the Second, Third and "Two-and-a-Half" Internationals in Berlin; making his "Schlageter" speech in 1923.

We get close-ups of the difficulties in countering the syndicalist and anarchist tendencies that permeated so many of the elements who were drawn to the Bolsheviks out of revolutionary sympathy but who understood little about Bolshevism except its revolutionary intransigence.

He reviews the 1922 trial of the Socialist-Revolutionaries in Moscow, which the Western and social-democratic counterparts of Stalin's historical hacks have dared to compare with the Moscow trials of the '30s. On the more anecdotal plane (and yet with political point) he relates, for example, how he came to speak for the Comintern at the funeral of Kropotkin, and the very "deep" conclusions which the anarchists drew from his laudatory address. . . .

Naturally, it is perhaps too much to expect that American publishers, who are so busy printing and translating the "authoritative" works on Bolshevism of the state-approved "experts," will include Rosmer's work on their lists. It is to be hoped that our press will be able to obtain permission to publish at least some sections of it.



LABOR ACTION

July 20, 1953

Vol. 17, No. 29

Published weekly by Labor Action Publishing Company, 114 West 14 Street, New York 11, N. Y.—Telephone: WAtkins 4-4222—Re-entered as second-class matter May 24, 1946, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1874.—Subscriptions: \$2 a year; \$1 for 6 months (\$2.25 and \$1.15 for Canadian and Foreign).—Opinions and policies expressed in signed articles by contributors do not necessarily represent the views of Labor Action, which are given in editorial statements.

Editor: HAL DRAPER. Asst. Editors: MARY BELL, BEN HALL, GORDON HASKELL. Bus. Mgr.: L. G. SMITH

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# Brain-Washing the 'Non-Firers'

## The Army Worries About a 'Psychological' Solution to a Problem It Doesn't Understand

By BERNARD CRAMER

We missed a sensational story a few months ago; but it was not spotnews then and it is just as up-to-date now. *Colliers'* magazine may have printed it in a desperate effort to buck up a waning circulation but it was a sure thing that the general press would treat it like poison.

It is the story of the "non-firers" in the army. It is absolutely necessary for socialists to know it, for there are few things that shed as much light on militarism and allied subjects.

The article in *Colliers'* for November 8 last, by Bill Davidson, was based on studies made by Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall on the astoundingly high proportion of soldiers who never shoot at the enemy.

Here, for example, is some of the picture:

**"... In any given action of World War II, only 12 to 25 per cent of all the combat soldiers who were armed and in a position to fire their weapons at the enemy were able to pull the trigger! In Korea, the average has been raised by dint of intensive effort, but only to a maximum of about 50 per cent! In other words, today, one out of every two American soldiers who come face to face with the enemy cannot be counted on to fight.**

"... Official studies of why combat men freeze up reveal clearly that courage, as such, often is not involved. There was a much-decorated World War I company commander, for example, who always advanced under fire well ahead of his men, urging them on. Yet he confessed it to a fellow officer that throughout the entire war he never was able to bring himself to pull the trigger of his weapon. He's now, incidentally, a general in the Marine Corps.

"... Marshall also learned—and ignored the fact at the time—that of the more than 1000 men in the reinforced battalion, only 37 had fired their weapons. He just thought the outfit was green. But a few weeks later, on Chance Island in the Marshalls, he did a similar group investigation of a gallant action by the crack Reconnaissance Troop of the 7th Infantry Division. Of the 100 men in the fight, only 14 had done all the firing that routed the enemy. He began then to suspect he was on the trail of something big. Marshall became absolutely certain later during a European tour of duty. In Normandy he found that no more than 25 per cent of our best airborne troops were firing their weapons."

There is the core of the facts.

### IDEAL ROBOT

But why? Naturally the army wants to know. They want to remove these "inhibitions."

Here is the explanation given in the article, plus the conclusions for remedy as seen by the brass:

"... Psychiatrists point out that a man's failure to fire his weapon in battle may be traceable to inhibitions placed upon him in infancy. Every child is born with aggressive tendencies. But his impulses to commit violence are soon suppressed in the family. His parents disapprove, often with threats of punishment, if—for example—he should crown brother Billy with a baseball bat. As the child grows older, the inhibitions are further strengthened by cultural taboos (a gentleman keeps his temper), religious sanctions (Thou Shall Not Kill), plus fears of legal reprisal.

"All his life, the boy's mind works unconsciously to suppress any desire to kill. Then, abruptly, he is put into a soldier suit and told to shoot fellow human beings. One man in two loses the resulting struggle to break down the lifelong inhibition.

"I went to the University of Michigan to talk to two outstanding military psychiatrists: Dr. Raymond W. Waggoner is head of the university's department of psychiatry and an adviser on psychiatric problems of the draft to Director of Selective Service Major General Lewis B. Hershey; Dr. M. M. Frohlich is a psychiatrist who, as a lieutenant colonel during World War II, handled thousands of combat-fatigue casualties at the 298th General Hospital. They cited case after case of soldiers developing actual paralysis on the battlefield the first time they were required to fire.

"Dr. Frohlich suggests there are at least three ways (preferably to be used in combination) of removing these inhibitions temporarily so that soldiers will

shoot. The most efficient method is to prompt them to lose their individual identities by promoting a mob psychology. People in a mob override their inhibitions and act as they would never dare act as individuals. A second approach is to make the man feel that because he's in a uniform and because he's an integral part of a group of men he likes and respects, somehow it is all right to join them in setting aside one's life-long inhibitions against killing. The third task is to provide the man with a fatherlike leader who, he can believe, is supremely strong, wise and just; so that he will accept his leader's orders to set aside temporarily the taboos against killing."

Recondition them, suggests the psychiatrist, for the Brave New World: depersonalize them into elements of a mob; train them till they lose their identity as human beings; make them into mindless robots; give them a Fatherlike Leader. . . .

### MUST WE DECIVILIZE?

As if this were a new solution to the new problem of the "non-firers"! What the benevolent psychiatrist is recommending is—more of the same thing, more of the kind of training which militarism has always specialized in. What he is describing is the kind of effort which militarism makes now.

If, in addition, we hear from such a psychiatrist that all this is to be done "temporarily," we need not be surprised at the stupidity—or hypocrisy—of the qualification.

If, in addition, we recognize, in this "psychological" remedy, the tones and overtones of Goebbels, we need also not be amazed.

But is it true that the good doctor's psychological analysis tells the whole story?

We can grant for the sake of argument that it tells part of the story. And everyone who knows what civilization is will say "Thank god" in his own fashion. If culture, custom, parental training, the threat of legal reprisals curb the aggressive tendencies of human beings—

well, that is what the needs of social living demand, in one way or another, in one form or another. Society could not exist without such "taboos."

The army's problem is to decivilize. That is how the army sees it. It is a direct enough approach! If civilized human beings do not make "good soldiers," and yet we need good soldiers to . . . defend civilization, the solution is plainly to build the Army of Civilization against Red Barbarism on dehumanized savages, who are clearly best fitted to protect All the Values We Hold Dear.

Or is there another way?

That is, not to suppress and root out the civilized values among soldiers, but to give them incentive to shoot which will counterbalance these "inhibitions" for definite, understood, powerful reasons in a given war?

Yes, incentive to shoot, for we are not absolute pacifists. We are perfectly willing to admit that war has an evil effect on the personality of the soldier (and of society) in the very best of cases; but so does enslavement and oppression and exploitation—including exploitation on assembly line. We are not "against war" absolutely but only against unjust, reactionary, imperialist wars.

### REACTIONARY SOLUTION

Let us take two kinds of cases where the inhibition against shooting seems to be less than unconquerable.

In the first case, it is only partially overcome and to a small extent: the case of the Korean war cited in the article. In Korea, Marshall found, almost twice as many men were willing to shoot. This was so, says the article, because of "intensive effort." We venture to suggest another part of the explanation.

We venture to suggest that at least part of the reasons for the decrease in non-firers in Korea was the poisoning of many soldiers' minds with a notion which the good Dr. Frohlich did not recommend but which is also far from alien to militarism: the notion that the enemy soldiers are "really" kind of subhuman anyway, so civilized values don't apply. In no war that the U. S. has fought, with the possible exception of the Pacific war against the Japanese in World War II, was this reactionary idea so widespread in the army. It was the "psychology" which the military sought to build up against the Japanese "monkeys" in the last war.

We cite this as a provocative example of a line of endeavor which does not seek, or act, to eliminate the civilized inhibitions but to counterbalance them in a given case, which will not necessarily carry over to all other life situations.

It is as much a reactionary and retrogressive solution as Dr. Frohlich's, to be

sure. Also, it can be truly pointed out that if even in one case the poison of race prejudice is injected and systematically inculcated, the poison spreads.

The second kind of case is quite different, and indeed it has been seen in history more often. No army on earth in all history has ever fought as bravely, as devotedly, often even suicidally, as have armed men in revolutionary situations who were permeated by the knowledge of what they were personally fighting for—permeated not by books or "morale lectures" or stiff talks from the commanding colonel, but by the conditions of their life and struggle. No army ever fought like the Resistance guerrillas during the war, or for that matter like the Yugoslav Partisans against the Nazi invaders, or like the Red Army and militia men in the Russian Revolution's war of defense against imperialist aggression in 1918-1921.

### IT WON'T HELP THE BRASS

Such armies of liberation do not escape the evil effects of military conditions, since they exist on this planet and not on some other one, but their leaders did not have to think in terms of barbarizing them—they relied for their strength on elevating and educating their thinking and individuality. We have a right to doubt whether the problem of non-firers was a big one with them.

It would be a soapbox exaggeration to say that most of the American soldiers in the Second World War were non-firers because they did not believe in what were supposed to be the aims of the war, or because they did not want to contribute to victory. But there are many degrees between being consciously anti-war and knowledgeably pro-war. And in the last analysis the amazing percentage of non-firers was due to the fact that they never did feel the "war aims" for which they were supposed to be fighting—and killing.

That's how it is in an imperialist war. For all the rhetoric, they were not fighting for democracy, or for peace, or for civilization, as they were told and as they may have even believed; and the fact that this was so was just as important as the fact that they believed differently. One was the objective condition, and the other was merely . . . "ideology."

This kind of analysis will, of course, not help the U. S. army any, as things stand, and we do not propose it as a solution for the worried brass. They can't use it. They can use only "practical" cures, such as Fatherlike Leaders, mob psychology, de-facto exercises in sadism, etc. The militarism which the *Colliers'* article presented was capitalist militarism.

## BLP Trailing After Churchill—

(Continued from page 2)

Whether he means that Britain's troops should be withdrawn if Syngman Rhee continues to sabotage the truce provisions, or that Syngman Rhee should be forcibly brought into line, there can be little doubt that the Labor Party leadership is thoroughly fed up with the Korean fiasco, and the rank and file is even more so.

Only the illness of Churchill, Eden and now McMillan has prevented the Tory party from reaping the fruits of the incompetence and blockhead obstinacy of the right-wing Labor and trade-union leadership. With a skill that is typically Churchillian, the Tory government rode the wave of the first few months of discontent with its rule.

The Labor leadership has not only missed the boat on foreign policy, it has also missed the bus on industrial policy. It has allowed Churchill to appear as the friend of the trade unions. Without raising a word in protest, Aflée and Morrison have allowed Lincoln Evans and Andrew Naesmith to take seats on the Steel Board, which has as its avowed aim the sabotage of the work of the Labor government.

Fortunately, not all the members of the General Council of the Trade Union Congress have acceded to the bulldozing methods of Lawther, Deakin, Williamson

and Evans. The National Union of Railwaymen, the USDAW (distributive workers) the AEU (engineers) and the London Society of Compositors, for example, have protested against these moves.

More important still, the rank and file of the local Labor Parties where these gentlemen reside have passed resolutions condemning their actions. Naesmith has been censured both by his local party and trades council, in Accrington. And Evans has been severely criticized by the General Management Committee of Wembley North Labor Party, the constituency party of which he is a member.

It is interesting to note that at the time of his censure he had been a member of the Labor Party for only seven weeks! (Although trade-unionists are automatically members of the Labor Party, the politically alive unionists, and particularly the higher officials of the trade unions usually join their local parties as ordinary members.)

The latest move on the part of the right-wing trade-union leaders is an attempt to bring back Herbert Morrison onto the NEC of the party by contesting Arthur Greenwood's position as treasurer (which automatically makes him an NEC member) of the Labor Party. Since the party treasurer is elected both by constituency party votes and the trade-

union bloc vote, it is possible (so the right wing calculates) to foist Morrison onto the NEC. It appears that Arthur Greenwood, the present chairman of the NEC, has offended the trade-union leaders by telling them a few home-truths. Fortunately Greenwood is not going to stand down if Morrison is put up.

The big battle at the coming Margate conference of the party will be over "Challenge to Britain," the document which one reader of *Tribune* described in his letter as "being all things to all men," and another described as "vaguely radical waffle," behind which were lurking the "consolidators" of 1950. Another battle will be waged over the non-existent foreign-policy document, which was to have been presented for discussion in the constituency parties this month.

The action of the Steel Board trade-union leaders will also provoke lively scenes. And if Herbert Morrison does try to get onto the NEC, like the proverbial thief through the back door, this is sure to provide the setting for another storm.

The Labor Party will have to do a lot of rethinking before it can present itself to the electorate again with sure confidence. But the sort of rethinking required must find its inspiration in the work of the Labor pioneers and not in the work of the present-day new Fabians.



## HOW TO 'TAKE THE INITIATIVE' AGAINST STALINISM—

# American Troops Out of Germany!

Following is a continuation, from last week's LABOR ACTION, of the lecture delivered by Max Shachtman on "The Workers' Revolt in East Germany," on July 2. In the section published last week, Comrade Shachtman analyzed the movement in East Berlin and East Germany itself.—Ed.

By MAX SHACHTMAN

Everybody who was in or around the East German workers' uprising, everybody who was near or far from it, has a somewhat different angle on what happened. But all of them agree on one thing: There was no passionate declaration or manifestation in among these demonstrators of an attachment to the principal citadel of "world democracy," which, as any idiot knows—which, as every idiot knows—is Washington.

No support to the U. S. in the demonstration, no American flags raised, I regret to say, no shouts of "Hoch, Eisenhower!" and what is most discouraging, no shouts of "Hoch, Dulles!"—and not even protestations of brotherhood for the Bonn government.

How was that possible, in so popular, widespread, variegated a movement? Among thousands, tens of thousands, nobody heard it! So far was it from being heard that even professional inventors, correspondents, didn't even attribute such a thing to them. If not even they could invent such a thing, then you may be scientifically dead certain it was not there in any form, shape or manner.

## No "Pro-West" Feeling

All the Western observers are puzzled by this, most of them deeply chagrined. After all, the American government in the U. S., through its representation in Europe and particularly its high commissioner, its various high commissioners, its military representatives, its educators, and the whole kit and kaboodle it has sent and continues to send to Germany, has said that it is friendly to the German people, and that it is decidedly partisan to many of the ideas and principles of democracy.

Nevertheless, no response from the German demonstrators. No what-they-call "pro-Western slogans" are uttered. Not in Berlin, and not in any of the other cities where the demonstrations took place.

As a matter of fact, under any and all circumstances it is downright startling that nowhere was there even a trace of that!

That can be put down to one of two things: the innate ingratitude and stupidity of the "German soul"—which differs from the "Russian soul" as much as it differs from the "Anglo-Saxon soul" (that is, our type soul!)—or you can give it a political significance, thereby running the risk of being set down as a dogmatist. Let us run that risk, and simply say that it indicates clearly, to anybody who has half an eye, the mood of the masses of the people and the mood of the leaders of the people in Germany.

And in the face of this mood, made so clear by their eloquent silence, by their studied omission, it is no wonder that Washington and so-called public opinion in the U. S. in general do not know whether to be delighted by what is happening in Eastern Germany or dubious as to its significance and consequence. All the papers are saying now, now that they are beginning to catch their breath somewhat in the light of this truly historical event—all the papers are saying that, truth to tell, nobody on the Western side, and alas, not even the American representations on the Western side, knew what to do.

## He's a Liberal

Some papers and their editors have developed politically to the point where they realize that what happened in Berlin was not ordinary. And this in itself shows that human progress is possible, even in the U. S., and is a rebuke to all

cynics and skeptics. But (a) what to have done, and (b) what to do now about Germany—that poses, believe it or not, to the great statesmen of world democracy, to Conant in West Germany, to Dulles and the president in Washington, an insuperable problem.

Dr. Conant, who managed by the skin of his teeth to get approval from the Senate to be representative of the U. S. as ambassador, does not rightly know what to do. And mind you, he's a liberal! He is not a Dulles—which is easily understandable since nature cannot produce two at one time; it needs a rest. He is not a worse-than-Dulles—that, strictly speaking, is possible, by the way, it has been ascertained. He is a liberal—you know what I mean; if you don't the good doctor made that perfectly clear in his hearing for clearance with McCarthy, who is a Senator. He is strongly opposed, and had the courage to say so in McCarthy's teeth, to the public burning of books when it is so easy and far more discreet (he pointed out) to burn them privately, so that nobody can tell what is that smoke coming out of the State Department chimneys or the libraries of the State Department abroad. . . . You may laugh. But if you want a real distinction between a zoological specimen of reaction like McCarthy, on the one side, and a dignified, literate liberal on the other side, there you have it, in the real and in the symbol.

## Big Concession

He is now our ambassador in Germany. He does not know what to do. He knows something must be done. I think credit should be given him for that. But what to do—is a problem.

Democracy is not totally helpless, however, in spite of my insinuations. He has vacated one of the buildings previously occupied by the U. S. military and returned it to the Bonn regime, to do with it as they see fit without let or hindrance or reservations by the U. S., because he believes, deep in his soul, that eventually Germans should have national sovereignty, that they should run their own country. Of course, it is absurd to believe that that can be done with the present, or the next two or three, generations of Germans, because the Bible does not for nothing say that the sins of the fathers shall be expiated unto the seventh generation, and that takes a long time, even with fast breeding. But he starts them off by actually giving them back a whole piece of land, 300 by 300 metres, and the building that stands on it.

If this does not excite the support of the East Berlin workers, I ask myself the question: What will? How much do they want? We give them German buildings, next they'll be asking for American money, like the other Europeans.

That's Dr. Conant's contribution to the big crisis of Stalinism—300 square meters of German land, back to the Bonn government, plus the building on it, free and clear and without a title to it.

## The Man With Initiative

That's only Dr. Conant. He is only a humble worker in the vineyard of the State Department. There is the State Department itself, the whole vineyard, with Mr. Dulles, and above him, his acknowledged superior, the president of the U. S.—the man who represents, if nothing else, initiative.

He was ready to tolerate with repressed and controlled fury everything of the Truman regime, but one thing he could not stand: its lack of initiative in the struggle against Stalinism. And although a man who had all his life eschewed politics on the ground that it was a dirty game about which he knew nothing—a state which he has refused to this hour to remedy—he was so infuriated by the absence of initiative in American foreign policy that he overthrew his whole tradition and he started to run for office, in order to get initiative.

The events took place. He had not the excuse that he was at Burning Tree. He was in Washington. The other day he was approached by the reporters, who are evidently determined to

make his life a nightmare, not by accompanying him on walks as they used to do with Truman, but by asking questions. "What do you intend to do to help?" . . . Nothing!

That's the president. That's not Conant, that's not Dulles, that's the president. Where else can you find something like this in the face of events of such staggering importance, events that are unquestionably convulsing the minds of the Kremlin masters, causing them to think and to re-think, and to plan and to re-plan? In the face of that, the president of the U. S., the spokesman for world democracy, has absolutely nothing to say, nothing to propose. Where can you find such majestic incompetence, such awe-inspiring helplessness?

## Blow to Stalinism

It was to be a government with initiative, to arouse people, not to wait for the Kremlin to act but always to act ahead of them, to jump in and force them to follow, to arouse the oppressed of the world. Their policy in the concrete and actual life—after he's been elected president, mind you; after he's been sworn into office; after he's been told by intimate friends just who he is now—has all of the intoxicating dash of an imbecile corpse standing stark, staring naked in a snowstorm.

Nothing—that's the reaction to the German and the Czech and the Polish events.

A simple devastating thing does not even occur to the Washington mind—like an announcement that we are pulling out of Germany with every occupying force; we are taking out of Germany—out of what we claimed up to yesterday was "our" zone, eight years after the destruction of Hitler, eight years after we reduced Germany to a smoking ruin, eight years after we captured and imprisoned or hanged every important big-shot Nazi—we are pulling American troops out of Germany, in order to let the Germans, whom we claim, seek, and implore to be our allies, run their own country.

What a stupefying blow that would be to Stalinism! What a shattering blow it would be! "All American troops out!"—and of course all British and French, because we seem to have a certain influence with the British and above all with the French. . . .

Pulling out all the Western troops from Germany—can you imagine what that would do, right now above all? It could make up for five thousand mistakes of the past 10 years—not the fifty thousand that were committed but just five thousand. The Russians would be absolutely helpless, absolutely and guaranteed helpless. They would have to withdraw their troops from Germany—have to!

## Listen to Their Cries!

It would be absolutely impossible, and guaranteed impossible, if the West pulled its troops out of Germany tomorrow morning, for the Russians to attack—utterly out of the question. The Moscow regime could not even dream of such a thing under present conditions inside of its own empire and outside of its own empire.

That does not even occur to Washington, not even a promise, not even something spectacular along those broad lines.

And yet that would be the only thing that would mean anything in Germany now. Anyone who is listening to the passionate outcry of the East Berliners, of all the Germans of the so-called "Democratic Republic," for free elections and a united Germany, who heard them repeat in the East what they said in the Western sector—where they said "Ami, go home!" and here they say "Ivan, go home!"—would understand how the German nation would become like a monolith that nobody now could break, not all the Russian tanks put together, with their rifles and the submachine guns. It would be a political impossibility. Or if they were to attempt it, that would be the last attempt they would make to do anything in the world today.

That's what Germany needs today. That's

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# RUSSIA IN CRISIS:

## The System Needs a Supreme Dictator

The text of the 1950 debate between Max Shachtman and Earl Browder was published in pamphlet form in India and a second edition is now being prepared. The following was written by Comrade Shachtman as a new introduction to this pamphlet. It discusses the present situation in the Stalinist bureaucracy following the death of Stalin and the turmoil in the Russian empire.—Ed.

By MAX SHACHTMAN

The publishers, in their notification that a second edition of this booklet is being prepared, have invited me to write a foreword.

The theme of our debate can be even more clearly considered in the light of the many important events that have occurred since it took place. Outstanding among them is unquestionably the death of Stalin. It marks the point of separation between two eras in the evolution of Stalinism.

**Both eras have, and will have, so much in common that a quick glance can easily overlook the difference between them. Yet the difference between the two is most important. One was broadly the era of the rise to power and consolidation of the Stalinist regime; the other will be the era of crises, decomposition and death.**

The difference lies least of all in the fact that the unique personal qualities of Stalin are no longer in operation; it lies in the nature of the regime and above all of the conditions in which it rises and falls.

The distinctive birthmark of the Stalinist bureaucracy in Russia is this: it made its first appearance when the revolutionary working class of that country was making its last appearance. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that Stalinism could begin its rise to power only because there no longer existed a proletariat in the classical sense of the term. In the absence, further, of the relieving revolution in the advanced countries, the resistance offered by the Trotskyist and other oppositions, however heroic, justified and necessary it was, was doomed to succumb to the relentless drive of the new bureaucracy.

This bureaucracy was not, however, a neutral reflector of the stagnation and disorientation of the class or the remnants of the class that had led the great Russian revolution. It became an active and effective agency for maintaining the working classes, including the new one it was compelled to bring into existence, in a state of confusion, demoralization and paralysis. Under no other condition could it have consolidated its position as the new ruling class in

Russia and completed the work of expropriating the workers of all political power. In a society where the state owns all the means of production and distribution, those who are in absolute control of the political power are thereby and therewith likewise in absolute control of all economic and social, that is, all class power. This should be perfectly clear to all minds save those insulated by a dense coating of fuzz.

**We are inclined to forget that the new Stalinist bureaucracy had a long and arduous time in reaching power even though the socialist resistance to it came only from a small but silent and passive working class and a much tinier minority of intransigent revolutionists. It took years of unremitting struggle, of crude advances and frightened retreats, before it could look down upon a population subjected at last to totalitarian disfranchisement, and during those years its own fate quivered more than once on the edge of the knife.**

### Role of the Arbiter

We are inclined to ignore that in order to subject this population and keep it subjected, the bureaucracy had to transform itself and its own form of rule. The mass, even when under despotic political leash, is a permanent nightmare to the bureaucracy. The same mass, politically unleashed, would end the bureaucracy's nightmare only by ending the bureaucracy itself. To deprive the working mass of all the means by which it can assert itself politically by word and deed, is therefore an absolute precondition for the total rule of the bureaucracy.

But it is only one of the essential preconditions for this rule. The other requires that the bureaucracy deprive itself of all the means by which any one part of it can, in the course of an internal disagreement, appeal to the mass to intervene for it against any other part of it, the bureaucracy. To submit such a disagreement to the arbitrament of the enchained mass would be even more dangerous than to submit a theological disputation in the College of Cardinals to the decision of scientists.

A democratic vote in the ranks of the ruling bureaucracy cannot be expected to settle a given dispute, either. The rule of the bureaucracy became possible only because it usurped the democratic rights of the vast majority; indeed, its existence is the organized and successful rebellion of the oppressing minority against the oppressed majority. Why then should any minority within the bureaucracy automatically resign itself to the voting victory of a majority?

**Under such conditions, a powerful tendency makes its way and is eventually realized, namely, to elevate out of the ranks of the bureaucracy itself a supreme arbiter who is granted unlimited political power.**

### Ruler of the Rulers

If it is borne in mind that complete political power in the Russian state is equal to complete power in all fields of life, it is plain that the unlimited power of the supreme arbiter becomes greater than that enjoyed by any ruler of any land at any time in history. Corresponding to such unprecedented power, and in order to give it justification, the supreme arbiter is surrounded with the massively cultivated myth of his unparalleled intellectual and spiritual capacities, in most of which he soon rivals the better known of the world's deities and in all of which he easily surpasses all mortals. It is in the course of the unfoldment of this inexorable process that Stalin, renegade from socialism but by far the ablest incarnator of the bureaucratic counterrevolution, was transformed first into the Greatest Genius of Our Time and then into the Greatest Genius of All Time.

But above all things, he was the omnipotent ruler of the rulers as well as of the ruled.

That too took more than a day and more than a year. It took more than a generation—a good

three decades of bitter struggle, including struggle in the bureaucracy itself. Large sections of the bureaucracy resisted the working out of the process and in the course of this resistance it more than once imperiled the very existence of its own regime. But it found that it could not reverse the process; it could not escape it; paradoxically enough, it owed its very position of power to the unhampered unfolding of the process. For it turned out that the only way it could assure its rule over the masses was to abandon rule over itself. It had to accord supreme power to the supreme arbiter.

The apparent unshakability of the political structure thus created for a long time paralyzed the will not only of a legion of the opponents of Stalinism but of no smaller a legion of its supporters. The result was such a large-scale flight from the struggle for socialism as has not been known in the worst depressions of the modern proletarian movement. The first group looked upon Stalinism as the insurmountable obstacle on the road to socialism; the other regarded it as the only practical, even if unattractive, vehicle that could ever traverse the road.

### New Social Force

**In actuality, the structure was exceedingly fragile. Stalin's death is laying bare this truth about the Stalinist regime. The bureaucracy has, as if at one stroke, been hurled back into a position of the gravest peril: it faces the danger of self-rule.**

Again, as in the first beginnings of its rise, it has the problem of depriving itself of the normal means of self-rule as the only way of assuring itself that it can rule over the masses to any degree at all, in any way at all. Only, this time the process of creating and elevating out of its ranks a supreme arbiter begins under conditions that makes its unfoldment a hundred times more difficult than it was thirty years ago.

First of all and most of all, the bureaucracy stands before a different working class in Russia. It created this class as a by-product in order to expand, consolidate and protect its own power.

The new Russian working class is the most formidable the country has ever known. It is not only far more numerous than ever before but it represents a far more important social force than any of its forebears.

The hatred of the bureaucracy which this working class feels is unlimited; it cannot be overrated. Nobody knows this better than the bureaucracy itself. It remembers only too vividly the hatred of the Stalinist despotism which was displayed by the people in general and by those of the super-subjected nations (like the Ukraine) during the Second World War. The hatred was of such extraordinary violence that no other country could match it. It went to such lengths that the enemy, the German Nazis, could benefit from it in the outright military support on a scale that no other people gave it and which only the incredible outrages and brute stupidity of the Nazis themselves could transform again into reluctant cooperation with the bureaucracy.

### Triple Threat

In the second place, the bureaucracy faces a new situation in the vast empire which it conquered in the course of the war and afterward.

**In the countries dominated by the Kremlin, the Russian regime faces a three-fold threat. One is from the workers who hate the regime as only the working class can hate a class that exploits it with such inhuman cruelty. The other is from these same workers and all other toilers in their capacity as sons and daughters of the nation that feels the yoke of a foreign oppressor who has stolen their national independence.**

(Turn to last page)

## U.S. Troops Out — —

(Continued from page 6)

what this riven nation needs, that has become the crux of the world in politics right now.

That doesn't occur to them. It occurs "only" to the Berliners and to all other Germans. And if that's what the bourgeois statesmen do, together with their hangers-on and their apologists whose name is legion, it's understandable. What else can we expect from them? What else, unless you're a liberal *biologically*, can you expect from the regime in Washington? But from labor leaders, one might think, you can expect a little bit better. . . .

[Comrade Shachtman proceeded to analyze the do-nothing reaction of the American labor leaders in the face of the German workers' movement, particularly the kind of support they gave to the New York picketing demonstration at the Russian delegation's offices. But we were unable to transcribe the rest of the speech from the recording tape, beyond the point given, because of technical difficulties. —Ed.]



# Gov't Purge Law for Longshoremens — —

(Continued from page 1)

hunt atmosphere of the cold war but usually their proponents have felt obliged to produce some hypocritical demagoguery in justification. Union leaders must sign oaths so that labor organizations may not be misused. . . . Government workers must not "advocate" and must be "loyal" because they are, after all, hirelings of the very government which they might want to "overthrow." . . . Tenants in public projects must not be "members" and must not "advocate" because, you see, they are enjoying the bounty of a government upon which they look with scorn. . . . Teachers must "sign" or must "pledge" lest they implant ideas in the minds of a helplessly innocent youth. . . . Workers on secret projects must be above suspicion . . . etc., etc.

But longshoremens? The decline of democracy is revealed in the fact that not one politician feels the necessity or duty of concocting a decently dishonest pretext to justify the provision. The law does not pretend to deal with "subversion" on the waterfront but with racketeering;

public hearings discovered no "communist problem." Still, while a law is being passed anyway, why not decorate it with a clause which is so modish?

Such is the spirit of the times. One is reminded of a mock interview with comic psychiatrist "Heinrich Von Morgan":

"Do you mean, professor, that everyone has a subconscious?"

"Yes. Except communists, of course."

"Why not communists?"

"I don't know."

"Then why do you say that?"

"Ah, it's best to be on the safe side."

## WATERFRONT CZARS

Entirely apart from this provision on "advocating the desirability," longshoremens are about to be swirled around on that merry-go-round of government red-tape already highly perfected in the processes of the national loyalty program and the attorney general's subversive list. We remind our readers that in this Luna Park individuals and organizations suddenly slip into the black pit of anonymous accusation. They are accused of an offense not quite defined;

by accusers never produced; upon evidence that may not be disclosed.

The new law sets up a Waterfront Commission of two men, one appointed by the governor of New York and the other by the governor of New Jersey. These two men have vast powers over the workers on the waterfront.

They run the hiring halls and no one may be hired except through their halls.

They draw up a list of "registered" longshoremens and no one may work unless registered by them.

They may at their discretion refuse to register longshoremens under certain conditions (conviction for crimes, for example) and they may under certain conditions, of which the "advocacy" clause is one example, remove longshoremens from the list.

Although there are rules and regulations galore determining who may and who may not be registered, the commission retains the right "to register longshoremens on a temporary basis to meet special or emergency needs." To be blunt: it may deputize as many scabs as it desires to break a strike.

And how does this commission, which is answerable only to the two governors, determine whether a longshoremens is guilty of an offense against the rules? "The commission or such person conducting the hearing shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure in the conduct of such hearings." The star-chamber processes, the reliance upon secret informers, upon undisclosed evidence, are all foreshadowed already.

In one respect, the law is not as arbitrary as the "loyalty" program; it formally provides for a judicial review of the commission's decisions in the courts. But in a far more important aspect it goes beyond the national program for government workers by extending its boundaries into ordinary industry.

## Liberal Party — —

(Continued from page 2)

hind Javits as a non-partisan candidate, perhaps he was able to salvage something of his particular approach to the election in the nomination of these two men.

Certainly Rose and Dubinsky defended not so much the particular choices as the policy of a "non-partisan" approach. Rose pointed out that since we couldn't get a united front from above—via a Republican-Liberal coalition behind Javits—we now have a "united front from below"—and not with just one party but with the best elements of both parties. He was obviously referring to the independent sentiment within the Republican and Democratic Parties which will presumably swing behind Mellen and Marchisio.

Rose, far from considering it a criticism of the party, proudly acknowledged that the Liberals were not running one of their own, but insisted that they were acting solely as public-spirited New Yorkers, with no special ax to grind and with "nothing to profit politically." Why then set up your own party? In remarks that drew laughter, he pointed out that the Liberals only run their own men when they don't stand a chance of being elected. As a matter of fact, he insisted that we have to guarantee our men that they won't be elected; after all, we are not office-seekers. This is the "public service" concept of the Liberal Party, which Berle in particular insists upon, and which Rose found it opportune to stress at this time.

## TONGUE IN CHEEK

Dubinsky, more outspoken, indicated that this approach looked toward breaking away independent Republican and Democratic sentiment and corraling it into the Liberal Party. He insisted that Mellen and Marchisio support the Liberal program, else they would not have been endorsed. Just as Halley achieved what no Liberal Party candidate could have done, so we expect these candidates to do the same—to bring us voters and supporters that we never had before—and in that way make the Liberal Party the strongest and most powerful factor in New York.

Just how this tactic (which for other parties would be described as Trojan-horse-united-front-from-below stuff), as described by Dubinsky, squares with Rose's insistence on the purity of the party's non-partisan intentions, we leave for the skilled politicians to debate. Obviously, Rose was talking tongue in cheek for he too conceives this move as a clever strategy to build the Liberal Party.

The only way Dubinsky could sell this move to the Liberal committeemen was to stress that this, in reality, was the best way to strengthen the Liberal Party. Otherwise, he said, we would be a "sect"—we would remain "pure"—and we could keep on running our own men for ourselves. He referred to his secretary, an "old-fashioned socialist" with whom he keeps arguing that the socialists will never run the world until they convince the Democrats and Republicans to become socialists. But too often the Dubinskys—not to mention some socialists—become Republicans and Democrats in the process. More important, this whole reference to socialism by Dubinsky was a demagogic evasion: the question was not one of running "pure" socialists but of running his own "Dubinskyites."

The Democrats and the Republicans have not yet selected their own candidates, being in a state of "disarray and panic" as Malenkov used to say.

# Russian System in Crisis — —

(Continued from page 7)

The third is from the native Stalinist bureaucracies of the satellites who dream of nothing so much as their freedom to tyrannize over their own nation without having the main fruits of their rule taken from them by their patrons of the Kremlin.

The Hitlerites discovered during the Second World War that the combination of class exploitation and national oppression generates a popular resistance of irrepressible explosive power. The Stalinists are discovering the same thing in the foreign lands they rule today. The very expansion of Stalinism has brought it face to face with the greatest menace not only to its growth but to its very existence.

It is astonishing, after all, how little each new exploiting class learns from the disasters of its fore-runners. The Stalinist overlords cannot get it into their heads that this is the epoch of the destruction of all the old empires; that the old imperialist rule faces the most active and conscious resistance of hundreds of millions who have risen from a historic slumber; and that the idea of replacing the old empires with the new, even if in the guise of a "liberation of the peoples" by Stalinism, is an anachronistic absurdity.

## Dust in the Eyes

Both the masses and the bureaucracy understand, each in its own way, the new situation created by the death of Stalin. The mass senses the role that Stalin played in maintaining an ironclad front of the bureaucracy which the people could not think of breaching. It senses that the now automatically divided, mutually suspicious and antagonistic sectors of the bureaucracy need time, a good deal of time, before they can again face the population like a (more or less) self-confident and a (more or less) single-headed and single-armed force.

The problem of the bureaucracy is to determine which sector will impose its specific interests on the ruling machine as a whole, and which of the many equally ambitious and equally intolerant candidates for the supreme arbitership will succeed in suppressing and eliminating all the other candidates. Both sides in the revived class struggle in Russia—the rulers as well as the ruled—know that right now the most precious factor of all is at stake: time.

All the concessions made so precipitously and desperately by the new regime have one objective: to gain time, to throw dust in the opening eyes of the people, to sow illusion and confound confusion in order to gain more and more time. The silent but unrelenting and ubiquitous pressure of the Russian masses has already extracted from the bureaucracy all sorts of concessions, all of them of far less substance than appears on the surface, yet all of them revealing far more about the reactionary, oppressive and precarious nature of the regime than ever before in its history. (The release of the condemned Moscow doctors, and the acknowledgment that their "voluntary confessions" were fantastic falsehoods concocted and imposed by the police, tells us everything we ever needed to know about the "purges" and "confessions" of the past, that is, about the frame-ups and mass murders perpetrated by the regime against its opponents. What a self-revelation by this "socialist" regime!)

Outside of Russia, however, the pressure is no longer silent. The veritable unarmed uprising of the East Berlin proletariat against the rule of Stalinism is a landmark of history, heralding the beginning of the end of the great iniquity. Its spread to cities outside of Berlin, and countries outside of Germany, only underlines the fact that the uprising was neither an isolated nor accidental phenomenon. It is a product and a producer of the crisis of the regime. The regime needs time and more time and still more time; the masses, with increasing consciousness, are determined that it should get less time and still less time in which to reorganize and reconstitute itself over their backs.

## No Reform from Above

Who will prevail? For our part, we who never had any doubt of the final outcome, have, if anything, less reason than ever to feel doubt today. The days—or, for the more literal-minded, the years—of Stalinism are numbered. Even though capitalist imperialism and capitalist reaction, organized and led by Washington, would seem to be doing everything in their power to prolong the rule of Stalinism, its doom is nevertheless sealed—and with it is doomed world capitalism as well.

We do not for a moment entertain the preposterous notion, now so sedulously disseminated by ignoramuses and all sorts of volunteer as well as professional apologists for Stalinism, that somehow, sometime, the bureaucracy will organically and peaceably transmogrify itself into the democratic servant of an all-powerful people. Not for a moment! It will have to be overturned, crushed and extirpated by the revolutionary democratic upheaval which genuinely establishes the political and economic supremacy of the masses.

Before that happens, the bureaucracy, in Russia as well as in the satellite states, will give and will have to give more than one concession to appease the growing fury of the people, concessions that are real and valuable as well as the trivial kind of concessions it has granted up to now. But one concession it will never grant: the power to determine by itself whether or not to grant concessions, whether to grant one and not another, the power—in a word—to rule, exploit and oppress the people.

We shall yet see with our own eyes the frenzied savagery and bloodthirstiness with which the bureaucracy will fight to keep this power from being wrested by the people. And yet, the very concessions it is obliged to grant will only increase the appetite of the people, will only fortify their determination to wrest all power from the totalitarian despots and enhance their confidence that it can be done.

And when it is done, the masses will truly come into their own. Progress can triumph over the Stalinist reaction not in the name of capitalism, but only in the name of socialist freedom, and with its real substance. The idea that Stalinist states are "socialist communities" or are socialist in any sense at all, is grotesque. But the idea that the Stalinist tyrannies will be transformed into socialist regimes by the revolutionary assaults of the newly rising proletariat—that will materialize, it is already materializing, into the outstanding political phenomenon of the whole era we are now entering.