

LABOR ACTION

Independent Socialist Weekly

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JUNE 1, 1953

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SPOT-LIGHT

The Time to Be Scared

As we go to press, Senator Taft has come out for the "go it alone" line in Korea, cutting loose from UN ties. He thereby joins Senators McCarthy, Knowland and Jenner, whose recent outcries in the upper house seemed to be only the voice of the extreme right wing of the GOP.

It may be thought that this line means war to the bitter end in Korea. That would be much too optimistic. Not even these people really think that their policy could bring any end to the Korean war, bitter or otherwise.

When Aflée recently referred, as a matter of common knowledge, to the American elements who want to intensify the war, Eisenhower added his voice to the leather-lunged bellows of most of the press that this was a slander. Eisenhower hadn't met anyone who didn't want peace, said he, not even on the Burning Tree course. Imagine his surprise to find that his late golfing partner from Ohio was backing up Aflée.

The Reverend Dr. Daniel Poling, editor of the *Christian Herald* and chairman of the All-American Conference to Combat Communism, told his organization on Friday that any peace in Asia now would be "appeasement." Perhaps Eisenhower hasn't met the reverend. Dr. Poling also said:

"If Moscow and Red China can keep us talking a little longer, they will take Indonesia, Thailand, Burma and Malaya and move directly into India."

Presumably, instead of talking, it is the U. S. which should move into Indonesia, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, India and other points east. Otherwise what is the connection between Moscow's ability to keep Washington "talking" and its ability to move into these Asian areas?

The *Bridgeport Herald*, which at least does not call itself Christian like Dr. Poling's organ, opined last week that the Kremlin has taken up Eisenhower's "deeds-not-words" challenge with a vengeance, in freeing Oatis; pulling back in Laos, etc. Soon it will be in a position to say, "Look at the things we have done." And it comments: "And that is the time we should be really scared."

According to this other *Herald*, then, the "deeds-not-words" line will be a boomerang if, for any reasons temporary or otherwise, the Stalinists really intend to ease up the cold war. It will be a boomerang because then, clearly, it will be the U. S. that will have to show some deeds, and not merely words, including words like "deeds-not-words."

No Witches?

In his May 15 speech at Notre Dame University, George Kennan, the ex-ambassador to Moscow who was certified pure by the Russians when they insisted on tossing him out, directed restrained but pointed shafts at the "anti-Communism of a quite special variety" which is the anti-red hysteria in the U. S., called McCarthyism. "I have lived more than ten years of my life in totalitarian countries," he said. "I know where this sort of thing leads."

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AFRICA Terror—by Whom? British Decree Forced Labor In Kenya, Ban Labor Union

By PHILIP COBEN

The African continent, burning fiercely in the south, where the resistance movement against Malan's racism in South Africa continues strong, and in the north, where French imperialism's colonial power is under fire, is getting good and hot in-between too—in the colonies of Black Africa, especially those under British rule.

The focal spots of the rising tide of opposition to white imperialism, in this area, are in Kenya, Nigeria, southern parts of the French African empire, French Togoland, and even places in the Belgian Congo. British Tanganyika and Rhodesia may catch up with these.

In Kenya particularly, the myth has been pretty well exploded that British imperialism is a thing of the past—a myth which became common coin for a while even among certain liberals and radicals, especially after the old lion found that it could no longer hold on to India.

On May 20 the British colonial government in Kenya announced that it had banned the Labor Trade Union of East Africa, the largest and oldest labor organization in Kenya,

formed in 1937 and including a wide variety of trades, including the railroad workers. "No reasons for the ban were given," says the Reuters dispatch.

Americans who think that the trouble in Kenya is just caused by Mau Mau terrorists may well start from this point to ask whether the roots of the Kenya crisis spring from terror by native Africans who are fighting against a fierce exploitation, or from terror by the white masters who fear every expression of independence by the black population.

On the very same day, May 20, and perhaps not unconnected with the above decree, the British colonialists officially instituted slave-labor in the colony: "The government today issued a forced-labor decree applicable only to Africans in

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Eisenhower Finds Out About War and Taxes— Campaign Promises Were a Lot Easier

By BEN HALL

War and taxes—we have the war: who is to pay the taxes? In the confident flush of his campaign, Eisenhower gave assurances that he could do more than create matter out of nothingness; he would continue to mobilize for war, yet everyone could get tax relief. How this miracle was to be accomplished always remained a little confused; but the man who was going to end the Korean war would find a way.

But the new president knots his brow as he pores over the balance sheets of governmental financing and discovers that even after pruning and cutting, economizing and pinching, the total taxation of the nation cannot be substantially reduced. Taxes can be shifted from one place to another. One tax can be reduced and another substituted for it.

It is all very complicated and cannot be settled as easily as a campaign promise. Meanwhile, Eisenhower announces the tax system which he inherited from the Truman administration will have to do, at least for another six months, while his experts go into the matter more fully.

In sum, Eisenhower proposes:

(1) To extend the excess-profits tax which was due to expire on June 30, to December 31.

(2) To allow the special 11 per cent increase in individual income taxes enacted in 1951 to die, as originally scheduled, on December 31. Here he comes into conflict with important Republican congressmen who want to kill the special tax by June.

(3) To extend the 1951 tax increases on liquor, cigarettes and other items, increases which would otherwise expire in March.

(4) To continue the tax rate on corporate earnings at 52 per cent. Present

Big Three to Go in Huddle On War Line

By GORDON HASKELL

President Eisenhower's proposal for a British-French-American meeting sometime in June appears to have one major virtue from the administration's point of view. It will give it time in which to try to straighten out its own policies in preparation for the attempt to get its chief allies to go along with it—if it ever finds out where it wants to go. In the meantime, it is likely that except at Panmunjom, all Allied proposals for any major action in the field of foreign policy will be suspended pending this meeting.

It is quite evident that British public opinion and Prime Minister Churchill himself regard this projected meeting as a preliminary to some kind of top-level meeting with the Stalinist leaders. It is equally obvious that Washington is opposed to having this meeting regarded as being preliminary to anything, as the administration wants to keep itself free for movement in any direction.

The effect of all this is to raise the question of the possible value such a meeting can have for the government, let alone for any real progress toward a solution of the war crisis.

The day before the prospective Big Three meeting was announced to the world, Churchill had indicated that he

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laws would allow such taxes to drop to 46 per cent in April 1954.

Eisenhower's explanation for demanding the virtual status quo on taxes for at least six months can be summarized as follows: the government must have the money. Or as House Speaker Martin said (of the excess-profits tax), it "was a kind of must" if the budget, including war preparation, was to be met without the largest peacetime deficit in history.

NO GRATITUDE

Howls of anguish arose from within the Republican Party, expressing the indignation of legitimate profiteers and big-businessmen whose battle is eternally waged under the banner: "No taxation, with or without representation." These gentlemen showed no gratitude toward the old Democratic administration under whose regime profits soared, stocks rose, and millionaires prospered. The share they were asked to pay of the nation's expenses was too high; that of the people, too low. Now that a new administration has come to

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Auto Workers 5-Year Plan in 3 Get New Contract at GM

By M. J. HARDWICK

DETROIT, May 24—Facing another year of fabulous profits and a new high in labor unrest, General Motors Corporation did the smart thing: It accepted the argument of the United Auto Workers (CIO) that the current five-year contract must be viewed as a "living document," and granted a series of concessions which it hopes will bring quiet and peace in the plants.

In response to an industry-wide movement among the skilled workers for a 28½-cent wage increase—as recommended more than a year ago by a sub-panel of the Wage Stabilization Board—GM boosted skilled wages by 10 cents an hour, a figure it hopes is high enough to satisfy the increasing pressure for more money among the skilled trades. Since the annual-improvement factor is due on June 1, and it was changed from 4 to 5 cents per hour, the addition of the amount is expected to achieve the desired results.

For the vast majority of auto workers,

the new agreement brings only a one-cent increase in the annual-improvement factor, going to five cents an hour, and by the acceptance of the new government cost-of-living index, removes a threat of a two-cent "escalator" cut, based on price levels of the current "old cost-of-living index."

GM also agreed to put a floor on the possible drop in the cost-of-living wage boosts to 19 of the 24 cents won under that clause in the contract. How successful this will be in quieting the unrest among the production workers remains to be seen.

It is generally conceded that Chrysler and Ford will go along the GM pattern, as usual.

This development in the auto industry took place at a time when an increasing number of key strikes threatened to shut down the auto industry. The strike at the Ford plant in Canton, Ohio, is already forcing major layoffs throughout the country. A similar situation loomed on the GM horizon as the UAW began putting pressure on for an agreement before June 1, and this tactic obviously brought some results.

LONDON LETTER

Only Yesterday It Was Called 'Bevanism'

By ALLAN VAUGHAN

LONDON, May 20—"Britain Gets Her Voice Back!" This is the headline on this week's *Tribune*, the Bevanite weekly.

The occasion for this gust of enthusiasm was the spectacle of Britain's two political leaders, Churchill and Attlee, apparently pleading the case for "Bevanism." The similarities between the 1953 Churchill and Attlee line on Anglo-American relations and the April 1951 Bevan line are so great that the *News-Chronicle's* famous cartoonist Vickey drew two convincing pictures of Winston Churchill pinching some of Bevan's policy, and speaking to some of Bevan's opponents (Butler, Attlee, Morrison and Sir William Lawther) saying: "And, er, Let Me Pay Tribute to the Foresight and Courage of This Great Statesman" (Aneurin Bevan).

What are the circumstances which have brought about this deep-seated change in the Anglo-American alliance? What are the driving forces which have compelled the official Labor Party leaders and even the Tories to embrace—in part—the heresy of "Bevanism"? And most important, how have the Labor Party and the country at large reacted to this widening rift in the Anglo-American bloc?

BENDING WITH THE WIND

As this London Letter predicted some months ago, the Labor Party has gone Bevanite-without-Bevan. Or, to be more scrupulously precise, the Labor Party in its entirety—the Parliamentary Labor Party group in the House specifically included—has gone Bevanite without Bevan officially assuming its leadership. Attlee has not resigned, as many imagined he would a year ago, but has held firmly on to his position; with one small proviso: His leadership is dependent upon the extent to which he voices the views held by the majority of the party.

Of course, it would be simplifying the complex relationships between Attlee's position in the Parliamentary Labor Party and his position in the Labor Party proper (the constituency branch sections) if one took it for granted that Attlee immediately or automatically reflects the pressure from below. However, as has been explained before, in the final analysis Attlee and Morrison have to bend or be broken at the party conference. Of this painful fact Herbert Morrison is well aware.

However, this change in the outlook of the Labor Party leadership cannot be explained in terms of the pressure of the rank and file alone, by any means. For this pressure itself is generated as a result of certain clearly defined economic changes which, in turn, have their effect on the course of the class struggle both on the industrial plane and on the political plane.

The three main factors leading to the present situation in Britain are:

(1) Britain's economic situation. The American tariffs have severely affected her export drives.

(2) Britain's political situation. American conduct in the Korean peace talks appear to Britain as quite unjustified. Britain has a vested interest in stopping the Korean war, in establishing normal political and economic relations with China. Apparently Senator McCarthy is not so anxious.

(3) The Russians' peace overtures. Genuine or otherwise, they have received a warm reception in Britain and on the Continent. America is less prone to assume the good faith of the Kremlin.

It is indisputable that a wave of strong anti-American feeling has gripped this country as a result of these circumstances. Senator McCarthy's sleuth boys, Cohn and Schine, received the chilliest reception ever laid on for important American visitors (though perhaps the right adjective is self-important). More interesting still is the apparent unanimity of the Tory, Labor and even Stalinist press on this new foreign policy.

COLONIAL POLICY

It would be wrong to imagine that it was only in the field of international power politics that Attlee and Churchill made their voices heard. On a subject no less vital to Britain, Tory and Labor alike, Attlee came out sharply against the policy of the suppression of the colonial revolution. The press reported him as saying:

"While Soviet Russia no doubt had a policy whereby they gave support to nationalist movements, that did not mean that there were no genuine nationalist movements in the world. There was a body of opinion in the United States, and to some extent in this country, which tended to think that all the world's troubles must be due to Soviet intrigue. On the other hand there were people in this country and elsewhere who tended to put down all our troubles to American policy. That, too, was a mistake."

But this is pretty much what Bevan himself said, in different phraseology, in April 1951. Today it seems mild and almost innocuous. And yet, two years ago, to even hint that perhaps BOTH Americans and Russia were mistaken in their international policies would have been denounced as "Bevanism," or worse, Communism.

Of course, platonic friendship with the nationalist movements in the world is very fine. The important thing is to make this friendship a little more solid. To "recognize" the world of poverty in the underdeveloped and backward countries, to take note of and even salute the colonial revolutions is not good enough.

The arguments put forward in favor

Eisenhower's Man Crawford Did Whitewash Job for the Nazis

By GABRIEL GERSH

Fredrick C. Crawford has just returned from Rome, where he made a checkup of Mutual Security projects in Italy for the Eisenhower administration. Crawford is the same man who surveyed Europe near the end of World War II and reported that the people had been better off under the Nazis.

In that earlier European tour, which took place shortly after the liberation of France, Crawford and five other American businessmen were the guests of the U. S. army.

On the basis of some ten days touring France, Belgium and Luxembourg, Crawford reported his findings to a meeting of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce:

"I had been told that France had suffered economically under the German occupation. I saw fat horses drawing wagons, many with rubber tires. We went to the Ritz hotel . . . the big brass door-knobs and all the decorations were there."

Crawford went on to say that collaborationists were not necessarily quislings

or traitors but industrialists who "expanded their production for the Germans" or who got "in trouble with radical labor leaders." The underground, Crawford said, was made up largely of Communists, young people and characters from the underworld "who robbed the peaceful French families" for every train they blew up. A "conservative" French friend told Crawford that France was so prosperous under the Nazis that "if these conditions had continued a year and a half longer, too many people, perhaps half of them, would have been willing to settle for things as they are. They liked it."

In further glorifying the "virtues" of Nazism, Crawford added: "I am told that the safety boxes of the banks were opened by the Germans but nothing was taken. There is every indication that the Germans expected to stay in France and wanted the support of the people. . . ."

Needless to say, Crawford's tributes to Nazism brought some sharp replies.

Eugene Gentel, a representative of the French forces in the U. S., said that the Nazis looted France by exacting payments of 500,000,000 francs a day for four years and that the average wage of French workers under the occupation had been less than \$15 a month.

A bigger blast came from the conservative New York *Herald Tribune* in an editorial titled "Innocent Abroad." Frenchmen, the *Herald Tribune* observed, cannot eat brass doorknobs; General of the Army Eisenhower had publicly thanked the underground.

"The French were so happy under their German ruler," the editorial continued, "that virtually every correspondent and every soldier who took part in the liberation of the country asserted that the tumultuous gratitude of the French people was one of the greatest experiences of their lives."

The *New Republic* followed suit with even stronger language. "If Goebbels reads this speech, he will certainly want to give Mr. Crawford a medal. Mr. Crawford's speech shows the kind of mind that has in the past been in control of such a powerful body as the NAM—and might easily be again."

NAM-NAZI TYPE

Besides being president of Thompson Products, Inc. and a director of the Armstrong Cork Corporation, Crawford is a director and past president of the National Association of Manufacturers.

The NAM, whose members control \$60,000,000,000 in corporate wealth, is the main political and propaganda weapon of U. S. big business. Since its founding in 1903, the NAM has invested fabulous sums to influence the outcome of state and national elections, to bribe legislators and congressmen and to finance racist and quasi-fascist groups. So notorious has the role of the NAM been that the U. S. Congress has often conducted probes into its activities.

The Garrett committee disclosed the existence of the NAM lobby in Washington, its "secretive" and "reprehensible" activities, its "questionable and disreputable" means of defeating congressmen who refused to obey it, and its general criminal character in using money in a corrupt way to smash the labor unions.

The La Follette committee's probe into the criminal acts committed against labor established the fact that leading members of the NAM used poison gas, machine guns, spies and murderers in their plants. The La Follette committee also revealed that the NAM is directed, controlled and financed by only 207 firms; that the NAM has corrupted public opinion in America by using the largest network of propaganda; etc.

These are the forces which Crawford represents. Despite his reactionary record, President Eisenhower gave him an important assignment abroad. The political ascendancy of reactionaries like Crawford is a foretaste of things to come under the Eisenhower administration.

of the withdrawal of troops from Egypt, for instance, are based less on principle than on expediency. It is already quite a habit for left-wing Labor MPs to demand the "recognition" of the Chinese revolution, to "recognize" the *fait accompli*, to "recognize" the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek. This is not very difficult and this explains its popularity in certain circles.

This brings us to the Sunderland by-election. The Labor Party lost the seat to the Tories. This took place in spite of the favorable winds that blew during the council elections.

NO POLICY LINE

What is the explanation? Accident? This can be ruled out, for as has already been mentioned, Tory votes in three by-elections have taken an upward turn, while Labor votes have gone down.

In other words, there is a drift in national politics toward Conservatism. The local borough council elections were not as big a victory for Labor as some have imagined. The fact is that in the 1949 borough council elections—which took place under a Labor government—Labor lost twice the number of seats it has now regained in the borough council elections.

There can be no doubt that it is the landslide back toward Labor. The new Policy Statement of the National Executive Committee is not to be published until after the coronation, and this means the Labor Party will have been left without a policy line for one and a half years, since the 1951 election. It would be imperative to comment on the actual contents of the Policy Statement, since rumors are not a reliable guide to correct judgment; but one thing is certain: the Margate conference of the party will have the last say.

Already members of the party are drawing up carefully worded alternative resolutions on the new NEC Policy Statement, so that it will be possible to flood Transport House with the views of the rank and file. The anti-American feeling—which means, of course, anti-American-government feeling, and not antagonism to the American people—which is rising in the party will also add fuel for the countless foreign-policy resolutions that will be sent to party headquarters at Transport House. Kenya, Egypt, South Africa and Malaya will also be the subject of resolutions.

Yes, the Margate conference will certainly have to "go to town." The leadership, now in the saddle, is faced with two choices: either respond to the socialist pressure or cut themselves off from the party. Heads may fall—it happened last year—but the chances are smaller this year. This is so for two good reasons. There is only one head to fall, Jim Griffiths, among the NEC members elected by the constituencies; and the bloc vote will try to retain the present setup in the other NEC divisions, the trade-union section and the women's section.

Inside Story on the Frame-Up of the POUM and the Murder of Andres Nin

THE REVELATIONS OF JESUS HERNANDEZ

On the Role of the GPU in Spain

INTRODUCING THE AUTHOR

One of the most sensational books of the year, still little known in the United States since it has not been translated, was published in Mexico by Jesus Hernandez, *Yo Fui Un Ministro de Stalin* (I Was Stalin's Minister).

During the Spanish Civil War of the '30s, Hernandez, a top leader of the Communist Party of Spain, was one of the Stalinist ministers in the Popular Front cabinet of Largo Caballero. In this book, having since broken with Moscow, he tells the inside story of the Stalinist betrayal of the Spanish revolution and of Russia's counter-revolutionary intervention in the civil war.

In this issue we begin publication of one section of Hernandez' account, that dealing with the frame-up of the POUM, the Workers Party of Spain, which was the left-wing socialist group in the Spanish revolution and civil war, while the official Socialist Party collaborated with the Stalinists and yielded to their designs. Since the POUM stood out against the Stalinist influence, it had to be destroyed, as far as the Stalinists were concerned, and the official Stalinist tale naturally was that the heroic socialist fighters of the POUM were "agents of Franco." The POUM leader, Andres Nin, was arrested and murdered by the Spanish GPU, as will be related in part of Hernandez' story.

This series of articles is translated from *La Batalla*, the organ of the POUM, published in emigration in Paris, issues of March 20 and April 24, 1953.

Commenting on Hernandez' book and specifically on the section which we will publish, *La Batalla* observes that the ex-CP leader's story meshes entirely with what the POUM comrades themselves know to have taken place. Editor Wilebaldo Solano adds:

"We repeat what we said on another occasion: Jesus Hernandez does not enjoy the sympathy of Spanish workers' circles. For thousands of workers of all tendencies, he is still the author of an infamous book—*Red and Black*—and one of the principal executive arms of the politics of Stalinism in our country.

"It has been said that Hernandez is a grudge-bearer and that it is only and exclusively resentment which has induced him to speak out now. That is possible, and if so it would be well to take that into account in judging his book and his present political conduct. But, as we see it, the fundamental question is whether Jesus Hernandez is telling the truth or, at least, whether the essential facts he relates, in main outline, conform with what we more or less darkly knew ourselves or guessed at through simple intuition. To this we can unhesitatingly answer yes."

The reader will also see, of course, that Hernandez makes out that he himself resisted the designs and methods of the GPU. It is scarcely necessary to caution that this requires to be taken with a grain of salt, however much one may be ready to believe that his experiences disquieted him even then. But the interest of his book does not depend on the reader's belief in his self-whitewash efforts.—Ed.

GPU CHIEF SLUTZKY MAKES A PROPOSITION

The following day [beginning of December 1936—Ed.], on arriving at the ministry, my secretary handed me a small closed envelope. Inside was a postcard. I read:

"Dear friend: If you have nothing more important to do, I expect you for tea at 6 in the evening. I want urgently to talk to you. Greetings,

"ROSEMBERG."

I had spoken with the Soviet ambassador only a few times. Almost always I had visited him about some celebration or official reception. Now his invitation was special and urgent.

Punctually at 6 I was at the embassy.

"Come in. They're expecting you," one of the secretaries told me.

There in a comfortable office was his excellency, the ambassador of the Soviet Union.

"Thanks for coming," he said, shaking hands. "Have a seat. The tea will be here right away. Or do you prefer coffee?"

Rosemberg rang a bell and ordered:

"Coffee for the gentleman."

He took out an expensive Russian-lacquer cigarette case engraved with miniatures, and offered me a Soviet cigarette with a wide cardboard cigarette holder.

"I'm expecting a friend; I'd like you to meet him. He is very much interested in getting personally acquainted with you," said the ambassador.

At that very moment one of the secretaries announced the "friend." Rosemberg rose quickly with a haste which showed his respect. The new arrival stretched out his hand to the ambassador and, turning to me, said in Spanish with a French accent:

"Comrade Hernandez?"

"Yes."

"I am . . . Marcos. I like the name," he said, smiling.

I was already accustomed to the fact that the "to-varichi" baptized themselves with Spanish names and gave no special importance to the fact. Afterwards I learned that his name was Slutzky and that he was the chief of the Foreign Division of the GPU in Western Europe.

The Plot Begins

"I came only a little while ago, not more than a few days ago. I hope that you will excuse me for bothering you, but—it would not be prudent for me to be seen going into your ministry or into the party headquarters. This place is more discreet. And there are so many Russians in Valencia! . . ."

"Yes, another Russian more or less, nobody notices. And besides, I don't believe that anyone has any interest in watching the Russians. Almost all the police are in our hands," I said laughing.

"But there are agencies that the party does not control. And above all, there is the spy service, Comrade Hernandez, the enemy's spies," he said with a certain vehemence.

Tea and coffee were served, and while the trim waiter filled the cups with delicate precision, I observed friend "Marcos."

He was getting close to 50. Tall and ungainly. Stooped shoulders and sunken chest gave him an ape-like look. His sharp-featured face was topped by a shaven head, looking from chin to crown like a vertical melon. Eyes a bit slitted and high cheek bones. "A true Russian," I thought.

"That's what I wanted to talk to you about, precisely about that, espionage," he went on.

"Well, I'm listening," I said, with some curiosity.

"Our foreign service has gotten wind that some elements of the POUM are taking steps to bring Trotsky to Spain. . . . Do you know anything about it?"

"That's the first I hear of it."

"That shows that the Republic's counter-intelligence services are very deficient."

"I don't believe they're deficient, except in having little interest in the vagaries of the POUM."

"That's what's serious."

"I don't see why."

'Marcos' Sees the Error

Our ape-like friend's features contracted, denoting disgust.

"If the responsible party men ascribe no importance to this band of counter-revolutionists and agents of the enemy, that helps us understand many things that have happened in the war," he said harshly.

"In Spain Trotskyism has never awakened from sleep. And I don't see what influence the POUM can have on the things that have been happening to us," I replied with a certain amount of annoyed anxiety.

"The POUM has units at the front," explained Rosemberg.

"Not all of them have to be Communist, do they?"

"But if they aren't Communist, we must make sure that they are not enemies," Marcos persisted.

"You can pose the question that way in Russia, but in Spain nobody would take us seriously if we called the Trotskyists agents of Franco."

"But they are rabidly anti-Soviet! Don't you read *La Batalla*?"

"Yes, I read it. And they say a lot more about us than about Stalin. They also say a lot about the anarchists; but that doesn't bring me to the conclusion that our principal aim is to wrangle with them when Franco is shooting impartially at everybody."

"That's an error! That's it, that's it!"—and the slanting eyes of the old Chekist pierced me with stormy looks.

Rosemberg smoked in silence, piling up mounds of cigarette ashes in the ashtray, as if he were not present at our conversation.

"I'm talking to you out of the authority of my experience," said "Marcos."

"Tell me, Marcos, why did you call me in to tell me all this, instead of explaining it personally to the secretary of our party? After all is said and done, it's he who ought to raise these questions in the Bureau."

"Because I was told at the 'House' [the Kremlin, in the colloquial language of the Stalinists—Ed.] that you're a man of action, and for our work we need men who are energetic and determined."

"Thanks for your confidence, but the 'man of action' in me is a thing of the past. Everyone has his period, and mine has already been and gone."

"Where something has been, something always remains," threw in Rosemberg, in suave tones.

"It isn't a matter now of your going to plant a bomb under Prieto's printing press. . . . You knew, Rosemberg?" he said, turning to him with a sly smile. "Hernandez wanted to blow up Prieto's printshop in Bilbao."

"At that time I wanted to do it—and even more stupid things," I replied in disgust.

"No, now it's an entirely different matter. We want you to understand that it is necessary to take practical measures against Trotskyism, and help us. Your ministerial post can facilitate the job for us."

"My ministerial post has been given me by the party, and I can go ahead only when the party orders me act along one line or another," I declared with asperity.

"Marcos" caressed his sharp-pointed chin, thinking it over.

"Our services are performed rather on the fringe of the party," he said.

Rosemberg smiled imperceptibly. "Marcos" looked at him fixedly.

"I think," continued Marcos, "that you realize how much trust in you such a proposition reflects. The 'House' gives you a mark of distinction. . . ."

"I don't think it's worth while to insist," I cut in, "we'll be wasting time."

'Stalin Himself . . .'

Marcos' look immediately became more intense.

"You don't even know what it's about," he said. "It's a question of getting our hands on documents which show the POUM's contacts with the Falange [Franco's fascist organization—Ed.] and we have to act fast."

"If such documents exist, what follows is to draw up the charges and hand over the responsible people to the courts. Once the evidence is verified, we'll have no reason to go about it crookedly."

"We still have to get some more facts to make sure they don't get away."

"And how can I be useful to you?"

"For the moment, no way. That's our agency's affair. But when the time comes to make certain arrests, maybe we'll run into some difficulties with the authorities, and at that time your collaboration can be decisive."

"See me then, when you have all the evidence, and I'm ready to bring the case all the way to the cabinet itself."

"I knew we'd get together in the end!" he said with visible satisfaction.

And, after a pause:

"Orlov and Bielov are working on this. They'll lay it all before you."

And then addressing Rosemberg:

"Have you talked to the president of the Council about this matter?"

"About this . . .?"

"I mean, the POUM in general."

"Yes. Many times. But Largo Caballero [Socialist Party leader, then collaborating with the Stalinists—Ed.] resists taking political measures against the Trotskyists."

"Did you tell him that this matter is of extraordinary interest to our government?"

"I told him that Stalin himself is interested in it."

"And what did he answer?"

"That as long as they act within the law, there is no reason to proceed against them, and less still to jail the local people and suspend their press; that his government is a government of the Popular Front."

"Popular front, Popular Front! We'll have to take care of it some other way," said "Marcos" angrily.

Of the Blood Pure

The Chekist rose. He stuck his hand out to me and, while we took leave, said with an air of confidence: "Everything will turn out just as we want."

When he had gone, it seemed to me I observed a change in Rosemberg, something like an inner satisfaction.

"Serious question. . . . All these things are disagreeable, even though they're necessary," he said sadly.

I understood that Rosemberg could not put more than that into words, but behind the words was the expression on his face. "This man's reaction is something like mine," I thought. "No doubt he feels aversion for the GPU, or fears it."

"Friend 'Marcos' is a pure-blooded Chekist," I said jokingly.

"Hum!" grunted Rosemberg.

I said goodby.

When he put out his hand, nobody could have supposed that this man was already sentenced to die with a bullet in the back of the head fired by one of the "pure-blooded" gunmen, in the cellars of the Lubyanka in Moscow.

(To be continued.)

MARXISM for TODAY

SPOTLIGHT

Continued from page 1

Bukharin's Anticipation of Capitalism's Trends

Before the rise of Stalinism, did Marxists envisage the possibility of a new social system arising out of the degeneration of the capitalist world if the working class did not bring socialism to birth?

In general, of course, the answer is usually no, as we well know; the conception of the socialist movement was that history posed only the alternatives of capitalism or socialism. But this was not because of any theoretical exclusion of a different course of development, as was made clear by Marx and Engels as far back as the *Communist Manifesto*, in which they spoke very plainly of the possibilities of either going forward to a socialist reconstitution of society or else "the common ruin of the contending classes" of present-day society.

But naturally it has been the actual rise of the Stalinist social system in Russia—anti-capitalist and anti-socialist—which has turned socialists' attention to this question as being more than an abstract possibility. This Stalinist type of exploitive social system, which we have labeled "bureaucratic collectivism" for more or less convenience, focused attention not only on the Russian phenomena but also on the trends in the modern capitalist world toward what Trotsky once called "bureaucratic collectivization."

For a discussion of the relation between the Marxist tradition and the "theory of bureaucratic collectivism" in Stalinist Russia, the reader is referred to an article in our sister publication *The New Internationalist* for April 1947 on "The Nature of the Russian State" by Max Shachtman. In this article and previously in the Independent Socialist press, we had already pointed to the extremely interesting note written by the Bolshevik theoretician Nikolai Bukharin, in his book *Imperialism and World Economy*, in which he raised the question of a non-capitalist and non-socialist society.

SOURCE FOR LENIN

Equally interesting is the accompanying material, on this page of LABOR ACTION, referring to another work by Bukharin in which he raises a similar question from another angle.

This material has recently appeared in the current issue of the *American Slavic and East European Review* (Feb., 1953) in the course of an article by Robert V. Daniels of the Bennington College social-science faculty on the sources of Lenin's *State and Revolution*. He points out that Lenin was first stimulated to re-examine the Marxian theory of the state by the

'MILITARISTIC STATE CAPITALISM' AS A NEW EXPLOITIVE SOCIAL SYSTEM

Excerpt from: Robert V. Daniels, "The State and Revolution," in *American Slavic and East European Review*, Feb. 1953.

[In one of his articles during the First World War] Bukharin developed the idea that a fundamental task of the proletarian revolution was the literal destruction of the existing bourgeois state. The rationale of this program Bukharin set forth most profoundly in another article, where he revealed what in retrospect can be seen as amazing prophetic insight. This was *Teorija Imperialisticheskogo Gosudarstva* (The Theory of the Imperialist State), an essay so apt as an analysis of a major social trend of the twentieth century that its virtual oblivion should be remedied.

Bukharin in this article advanced the thesis that in the era of imperialism a new form of political and social organization was evolving out of bourgeois society. "Militaristic state capitalism," he termed this incipient new order, under which—

"the state power . . . sucks in almost all areas of production; it not only embraces the general conditions of the exploitive process; the state becomes more and more a direct exploiter, which organizes and directs production, as a collective capitalist."

The ultimate result of this tendency would be ". . . a new Leviathan, in comparison with which the fantasy of Thomas Hobbes seems like child's play." Socialism, in Bukharin's mind, had nothing in common with the totalitarian, bureaucratic state whose possible evolution he foresaw.

"Socialism is the regulation of production directed by society, not by the state . . . it is the abolition of class contradictions, not their intensification."

The proletarian revolution is not simply the midwife of the

writings of Bukharin on that subject during the war, and that his *State and Revolution* was the outcome of this awakened interest. For this reason Daniels discusses a couple of articles by Bukharin in 1916, in particular one entitled "The Theory of the Imperialist State."

It was in this article by Bukharin, which he says justly should be rescued from "virtual oblivion," that Bukharin discussed the symptoms of the emergence of "a new form of political and social organization" out of moribund capitalism. Although Bukharin called this trend "militaristic state-capitalism," it is clear that he has in mind a different social order, that is, different from unhyphenated capitalism.

The excerpt on this page is from Daniels' article, which quotes Bukharin, and it is presented for the interest of our readers.

THE DISCUSSION IN 1916

We have made some attempt to obtain the whole text of Bukharin's article but unsuccessfully so far. It will be worthwhile, however, to quote part of Daniels' footnote on the circumstances in which the article was first published:

"Bukharin originally wrote this article in the middle of 1916 with the intention of publishing it in the semi-periodical *Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata* edited by Lenin, but the article was rejected. It ultimately appeared in 1925 in *Revolucija Prava* (Moscow, Communist Academy), *Sbornik I*. In a note attached to the article at the time of publication (p. 5, note 1), Bukharin advanced as the explanation for the original rejection the surmise that the editorial board 'did not consider it possible to publish the article because it felt that there were developed here incorrect views about the state.' In contrast to this, Lenin said in his letter to Kollontay of February 1917 (*Leninskij Sbornik*, II, 283) that it was simply the lack of funds which prevented the publication of the next number of the *Sbornik*, in which Bukharin's article was already scheduled to be included. . . ."

In any case, socialists interested in the theoretical analysis of the nature of the Stalinist state should be acquainted with this 1916 article. It should be noted, of course, that in this case Bukharin was viewing the emergence of "militaristic state capitalism" out of capitalism, and not out of the degeneration and overthrow of a workers' state and revolution. But this is also highly relevant to the problem of today.

Hal DRAPER

new socialist society which is bound to come forth at some moment from the shell of capitalist society; there are two alternative successors to capitalism—"militaristic state capitalism," under which the whole force of social organization bears down on the proletariat to exploit it, where "the worker is transformed into a slave"—or socialism.

"Theoretically, there can be two possibilities here: either the workers' organizations, like all the organizations of the bourgeoisie, will merge into the state-wide organization and be transformed into a simple appendage of the state apparatus, or they will outgrow the framework of the state and burst it from within, as they organize their own state power (the dictatorship [of the proletariat])."

The proletarian revolution was assigned the crucial task of forcing the development of society out of the course toward state capitalism, and into the course toward socialism. (Bukharin, to his personal misfortune, was of course unaware of the possibility that a successful proletarian revolution might fail to divert the course of history and, under certain conditions, actually accelerate the evolution of the Leviathan which he so feared.)

The tactical conclusion which Bukharin derived from his theory of contemporary social evolution was ultra-radical, ". . . a general attack on the ruling bandits. In the developing revolutionary struggle the proletariat destroys the state organization of the bourgeoisie. . . ." This dictum was echoed by Lenin in *State and Revolution*: "A revolution must not consist in a new class ruling, governing with the help of the old state machinery, but in this class smashing this machinery and ruling, governing by means of new machinery. . . ."

in Washington on May 20, Justice William O. Douglas dared to make a literal comparison between the present atmosphere in America and the days of the witchcraft trials in Massachusetts of 1692. We say "dared" because American apologists for the climate of fear—including the genus Anti-Witchhunter, Liberal and that well-known defender of heretics, Sidney Hook—are known to get especially outraged when the very word witchhunt is used. There was even a Broadway play recently which fared none too well simply because it chose that historical theme, with contemporary overtones.

This breed is wont to snort "witch-hunt" with scorn and then remind good people that after all there really were no witches around in those old days, whereas no one doubts that there are live Stalinists today. Witchhunt indeed!—it's supposed to be a stopper.

They merely forget that what was distinctive about the Salem episode was not the people's false belief that witches existed and did nasty things to god-fearing people. That belief was not uncommon anywhere. What made the witchcraft trials an historical portent was precisely the methods employed and the climate of fear, suspicion, denunciation, prejudice and blind hunting for non-conformists which prevailed. It is this which has given the witchhunt its modern connotation, and it is this which makes the apologist wince at the term.

And they certainly do wince.

A Kind of Tito

A small news item has announced that Li Li-san has been purged from the Stalinist Chinese regime. He had not been heard from for quite a while before this. The significance of this is that Li has all along been authoritatively regarded as Moscow's man in the Mao Tse-tung entourage.

It tends to underline the belief that with Stalin's death, Mao took the opportunity to assert broad lines of autonomy from the Kremlin, as a more or less independent partner within the Stalinist world—the status which Tito sought before 1948, but which Moscow refused to accord.

In this sense, the long search for "Chinese Titoism," by which the searchers tended to mean signs of a growing open break, has been somewhat beside the point. There is much reason to believe that Mao is already a "Tito," but the Tito of pre-1948 vintage, and so far a more successful one from the point of view of the original objective.

War and Taxes — —

(Continued from page 1)

power they feel the right to expect an immediate and abrupt shift in the tax burden.

After all, the poor, the workingman, the dirt farmer experience none of the pleasures and thrills of riches; the least we can do is provide them with the exhilaration, the dignity of paying for the nation's welfare.

Another six months of servitude under Truman's taxation program which only allowed them to become rich! But they need not fear; they will be allowed to become even richer. The administration understands their annoying problems and intends to help them out, only not so suddenly. It takes time to shift the tax burden onto the shoulders of the people, especially for a party which promised to reduce taxes.

Secretary of the Treasury George M. Humphrey assured everyone that he disliked the excess-profits tax which contained "vicious things." And among the many possible new taxes which, he explained, were now under consideration was a plan for a national sales tax.

As a means of shifting more of the financial burden of war onto the working class, this is intended to reconcile the corporations to the fact that so far, as McCormick's *Chicago Tribune* complained, there hasn't been a sharp break between Republican and Fair Deal methods of paying for war. The *Chicago Tribune* considers this a sad reflection on Eisenhower, but then there is also the opinion that it works vice-versa.



LABOR ACTION

June 1, 1953

Vol 17, No. 22

Published weekly by Labor Action Publishing Company, 114 West 14 Street, New York 11, N. Y.—Telephone: WATKINS 4-4222—Re-entered as second-class matter May 24, 1940, at the Post Office at New York, N. Y., under the act of March 3, 1874.—Subscriptions: \$2 a year; \$1 for 6 months (\$2.25 and \$1.15 for Canadian and Foreign).—Opinions and policies expressed in signed articles by contributors do not necessarily represent the views of Labor Action, which are given in editorial statements.

Editor: HAL DRAPER. Asst. Editors: MARY BELL, BEN HALL, GORDON HASKELL. Bus. Mgr.: L. G. SMITH

New 'Vpered' Discusses Russian Change

Vpered, the organ of the Marxist wing of the Ukrainian liberation movement (Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party), published in emigration in Germany, is out with a new issue, its first of this year.

Its lead articles are on Stalin's death, including the piece by Babenko which appeared recently in LABOR ACTION as a discussion article.

An article by Vsevolod Felix is devoted to an analysis of the current Five Year Plan. He notes, among other things, that this plan aims at rapid development of

heavy industry; that it looks to a big increase in food production; that the difference between capital investment in industry and in agriculture is not great for the first time in the history of the five-year plans; and the author compares the rise of Russia's production with that of the United States.

Third featured article in the issue is a contribution by Hal Draper, editor of LABOR ACTION, especially written for *Vpered*, on "Why Do We Support the Ukrainian Liberation Movement?"

NOT IN THE HEADLINES . . .

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The New Crisis in the SWP—III

Faction Fight in a Blind Alley of Politics

By ALBERT GATES

To continue with the Alice-in-Wonderland discussion in the Socialist Workers Party on Russia and Stalinism: We have already seen how both factions, the Cannonite majority and the Cochranite minority, declare their solidarity with the views of the Fourth International's third congress, on Stalinism and its expansion. This congress became a sort of Bureau of Standards for both SWP factions, but with a difference.

The minority swallows the political line of the Fourth International hook, line and sinker, and wishes to apply its implications for the United States by adopting a pro-Stalinist orientation all the way. It does not propose liquidation into the CP, however, for the CP is not a mass party in this country, and the Fourth International proposed CP entry only in such cases, holding to an independent-party orientation for the U. S. This latter point is seized on by the Cannonites to show they are indeed "following" the F. I. line, though in fact the Cannonites give only lip-service to the political analysis made by the F. I. on the progressiveness of the Stalinist revolution.

Both factions, therefore, are formally for an independent party, but the minority's emphasis is directed toward a formally independent propaganda group which is oriented politically and organizationally toward Stalinist circles. Both factions are formally for endorsing the political line of the F. I., but the Cannonite majority walks around the heart of this line. Such a discussion, naturally, necessarily takes on an eerie quality.

Russia is a degenerated workers' state, say both factions. Though they are unalterably opposed to the Stalinist bureaucracy, which is totalitarian and anti-socialist, they are for the unconditional "defense of the Soviet Union" because the nationalization of property makes it a progressive state and prepares the way for socialism. Both hold that the bureaucracy is a caste, not a class.

What, then, is the nature of this bureaucracy which governs a country in which there are has not been a bourgeois class for more than thirty years, and where nationalization and collectivization dominate the economy?

Discovery in Russia

Joseph Hansen, who has become the theoretical spokesman for the majority, has suddenly discovered, without reference to time or place, the rise of petty-bourgeois formations in the land. Therefore:

"The base of Stalinism consists of a peasant and labor aristocracy on which rests an enormous state bureaucratic apparatus. This is topped by the Bonapartist oligarchy. The social base of Stalinism is the petty-bourgeois formation which has arisen in the Soviet Union." (Emphasis in the original.)

What petty-bourgeois formations? Where? And if they exist, in what way do they exercise their influence and control to provide the social base for Stalinism in Russia?

Moreover, if this is true, if the petty-bourgeois formations in Russia are of such tremendous force as to compose the social base of Stalinism, what happens to the theory of the degenerated workers' state which in Trotsky's mind implied not only the loss of political power by the working class, its total disfranchisement but also the destruction of the old classes?

"The theory is utterly ridiculous and the minority is able to make hash of it. It does this by introducing Trotsky's unfortunate characterization of Russia as a 'big trade union.' The theoretician of the minority, one H. Frankel, replies to Hansen, with his own theoretical weapon based on Trotsky's trade-union analogy.

"This, as a class starting point," says Frankel in reply to Hansen's analyses of the regime, "is one-sided and inadequate. It is true that the specific class pressures, class ideologies, and even class base upon which Stalinism arose are those of the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie inside and outside the Soviet Union [Mind you, the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie inside Russia!—A. G.]. In that sense the Soviet bureaucracy reflects and bases itself upon these alien classes. But none of this alters the fact that the Soviet oligarchy represents, in the last analysis, a labor bureaucracy both in its fundamental social base in the property forms created by the October Revolution and in its place in historic evolution."

Divine Doctrine

Isn't it crystal-clear? Stalinism, whose class base is the petty-bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie inside and outside the Soviet Union, is a labor bureaucracy both "in its fundamental social base in the property forms created by the October Revolution and in its place in historic evolution." How its social base can be both the petty-bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie, inside as well as outside Russia, and still have its social base in the "socialistic" property forms, how it can be both a petty bourgeois and labor bureaucracy, is something only the Fourth International and the SWP can debate seriously. They are discussing divine doctrine and not reality.

For the majority, the view that the social base of Stalinism is the petty-bourgeois and bourgeois formations enables it to separate, the regime from the economy, oppose the one and support the other. It is led by this theory into a political blind alley. But what about the minority? If the social base of the bureaucracy lies precisely in the property forms created by the revolution, which are claimed to be socialistic, and the regime is a labor bureaucracy, then its opposition to Stalinism can only be a provisional one at best, and is determined finally not by any theory it may have about Stalinism, but by what the regime may do from time to time.

Because neither faction understands the bureaucracy as the indigenous product of non-socialist property relations, i.e., as a new ruling class that emerged from a nationalized economy without workers' control, without independent workers organization, without democracy, without a free society, they remain utterly lost in a theoretical swamp. Responsibility for that, of course, lies with Trotsky and his inability, despite the most perspicacious analyses of the reactionary characteristics of Russian society, to cast aside in time his theory of the degenerated workers' state.

This theory has become the greatest barrier to any kind of political clarity in the movement which calls itself orthodox-Trotskyist. The fact that the development of Russian society under Stalin took a turn which no socialist had ever forecast, not Marx, not Engels, not Lenin nor Trotsky, and not even the opponents of the revolution like Kautsky, has brought the movement which Trotsky founded to a point of stagnation.

It is impaled on a Stalinist pike. But it has been there so long, that the Fourth International has come to find the unwholesome position pleasant.

The Stalinist Revolution

The only explanation for Stalinism which makes any sense and corresponds to what is real in this world, and not the fanciful ones created by the bourgeois and so much of the radical world, is that the Stalinist state represents a new class society. The bureaucracy takes on the form and characteristics of a new ruling class, based on nationalized property and the disfranchisement of the working class and peasantry. Russian society is a totalitarian, police and modern slave state, in which the bureaucracy, by its "ownership" and domination of state, "owns" and dominates the economy, not in the image of private capitalism, but as a collective ruling class with collective property forms. The basic laws of capitalist society are absent in Russia.

Once that is understood, a great deal of the foolish and doctrinaire discussion in the gap about the role of Stalinism in the rest of the world, would be eliminated.

In the present dispute in the SWP, both the majority and minority contend that the expansion of Stalinism produced "deformed workers' states" in Eastern Europe and revolutions in Yugoslavia and China. The question which they argue, however, is whether this means that Stalinism is progressive, since both assert that the expansion has advanced "nationalized property" and dealt severe blows to capitalism. The majority is somewhat hesitant in proclaiming this prog-

ress enthusiastically, while the minority is quite ecstatic in hailing the post-war developments as the triumph of socialism.

Hansen chides the minority by paraphrasing their position:

"1. Three revolutions have taken place in the post-war period—Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and China. But the Trotskyists did not lead them.

"2. World Trotskyism made a historical contribution by keeping alive the body of Marxist thought. But if every Trotskyist were to drop dead tomorrow the revolution would continue.

"3. The victory of socialism is not only inevitable; it is now automatically assured. Capitalism has become so decrepit it faces a hopeless situation today. Even under Stalinist leadership, the masses will down it."

For these reasons any discussion about the "independence of party" loses all meaning.

How does Frankel reply to Hansen's paraphrase of the minority's position? He says: "behind the shield of the valid assertion that our fundamental theoretical concepts have not changed [he], tries to shape the thought of the party in the notion that nothing has changed." He then takes up Hansen's reference to the three revolutions:

"What is so heretical about that? So far as I can see, it is nothing more than a statement of fact, long accepted by our entire movement and not just 'certain comrades.' Three revolutions have indeed taken place . . . moreover, there are other revolutions in progress; Korea, Indo-China, etc. None of these revolutions have had a Trotskyist leadership. . . .

"Does Hansen recognize the facts? Does he deny them? Does he ignore them altogether? Does he draw any conclusions at all? What conclusions? That Stalinism is counter-revolutionary? We knew that quite well before Yugoslavia, China, Eastern Europe, Korea, etc. Our whole effort has been to supplement our thought, to make it more precise and adequate in relation to these matters and what they have revealed. Is Comrade Hansen going to help the party in this reorientation [toward the Stalinist movements—A. G.] or is he going to throw rocks at our feet?" (Emphasis in the original.)

Dialectics to the Rescue

The reader can now see where this discussion is going to lead, so let us wend our way more quickly through this Luna Park of politics with its avenues of distorted mirrors.

Hansen describes how the organization hesitated to take a position on the Eastern European satellite states, when it began to discuss some years back the significance of Stalinist expansion. It was Cannon who cautioned the party in drawing conclusions to that discussion. Hansen writes:

"Comrade Cannon was concerned about the danger of this type of thinking [that the new states were prototypes of the Russian state—A. G.] appearing in our movement. In his opinion this danger far outweighed any progressive element in the overtures in Eastern Europe in and of themselves. And in this he was dead right, in my opinion.

"He raised the question several times in the Political Committee to my knowledge and at least once in a plenum of the National Committee in sharpest form. He acknowledged that these territories could be assimilated into the Soviet Union, but that Stalinism could convert them into independent workers' states—isn't that a concession to Stalinism? The reaction was varied among the comrades who held that the buffer-zone countries were deformed workers states . . . Cannon was asking a political question. He knew where we stood subjectively; he wanted to know if we had thought this through politically and had fully appreciated the danger and if so what was our answer. At the plenum my response was along these lines: 'Yes, if you follow formal logic and identify Stalinism with the Soviet Union, then you can make the error of conceding it can play a progressive political role. But if you approach it dialectically and differentiate Stalinism from the property forms it rests on, then you can account for the overtures without granting Stalinism one ounce of credit. In fact, you can put a fresh edge to our attack because the conclusion is that the counter-revolutionary political consequences of the overtures far outweigh the progressive social aspect.'"

Cannonite Logic

Thus the party was stopped momentarily from adopting a political position consistent with its theory because Cannon questioned how this position might affect the party's relation to Stalinism.

The basic theory on Russia held by the SWP was of no great moment to Cannon. He was afraid that the SWP might draw the political logic from its estimate of the nature of the Eastern European states which could spell only disaster for the SWP. It made no difference to him what the new states were called so long as no change in the attitude toward Stalinism was implied. Hansen was ready to oblige by calling upon the much belabored "dialectics" to prove that the position he evolved on the nature of the new states had nothing to do with the political logic demanded by the analysis.

(Concluded next week.)

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The Contradiction of Stalinist

Contribution to a Fundamental Question

By HAL DRAPER

The article by Robert Loukota on this page is one of the most valuable studies we have seen anywhere on a fundamental question bearing on the nature of Stalinism: the basic contradiction between totalitarianism and planned economy, as the basic contradiction of the Stalinist social system.

This introduction may be necessary in case a quick reader takes it to be "merely" concerned with current Czechoslovak economics.

The point is that THROUGH this study of the latest developments in Czech Stalinist planning, and the motives behind them, our friend Robert Loukota is—in effect—presenting a case study of what typically happens to a Stalinist planned economy under the conditions of totalitarianism.

It is such studies which are needed, in the first place, for Russia itself. But the great majority of the "Russian experts," who by now are fairly swarming in America, do not concern themselves with such questions; just as most academic scholars do not concern themselves with basic social analyses even of the capitalist world with which they are more familiar. It will be Marxist students of Stalinist society who will have to do that job, and the truth is that it has scarcely been begun. This article is an important contribution.

It concerns itself with Czechoslovakia because Loukota is one of the socialist analysts grouped around the periodical *Masses-Information* (published in Paris), and, as we have noted before in *LABOR ACTION*, this periodical is devoted to a close study of Czechoslovakia only. The men who write for it (Paul Barton, Daniel Simon, etc., as well as Loukota) are specialists in that country. This gives them a narrower scope but, in return, the reader of *Masses-Information* gets the most thorough and deep-going analysis of a Stalinist state to be found regularly published in any periodical in the world.

The present article is translated from Loukota's manuscript, as submitted to *Masses-Information* for publication in its current issue, which is, we believe, now appearing in Paris.

We have sought to emphasize the wider import of this article as it bears on Stalinism generally, but of course we must add that obviously in its concrete de-

tail it does indeed apply only to Czech Stalinism. It describes one set of developments taking place under the conditions of the Stalinist regime in one country at one phase, and the forms taken are specific to the country. It is the basic pattern that emerges which is of more general interest, but the illustration of the pattern through a concrete case has its own value.

That pattern, as we said, points to the contradiction between planning and totalitarianism as the inherent contradiction of the Stalinist economy. We discussed this very briefly, from a theoretical point of view, in the May 4 special issue of *LABOR ACTION* on Socialism and Democracy under the head "What to Learn from Stalinism."

On a different level, we presented some material in a column in our April 6 issue, "Some Examples of the Myth of 'Planned Economy' in Stalinland." Actually, the raw material for such an analysis with regard to Russia is very abundant.

An excellent summary of one aspect of it (centering around the role and tasks of the factory managers) was to be found recently in the February 1953 issue of *Fortune* magazine, in one of the articles entitled something like "How Business Is Carried On in Russia." A book which many of our readers have probably read, Kravchenko's *I Chose Freedom*, is interesting for its description of the author's experiences as an industrial executive. (These sections were cut in the pocket-book reprint, which should be avoided.) Both of these are purely descriptive, in the main, and I mention them as easily available sources of some "raw material" only. Serious students of the question have far more and better documented sources than these to go on, not only in a number of books and academic journals but also in the Russian press.

We believe that it is this question, above all, which points to the error of those theorists—whether pro-Stalinist, or anti-Stalinist (like Fritz Sternberg)—who uncritically assume the indefinite expansibility of the Stalinist economy, on the ground that it is free of the capitalist-type crises well-known to us from the '30s. That is why we urge close attention to this article by Loukota, which bears on the general question from a special angle; and that is why we intend to keep coming back to this in *LABOR ACTION*.

because, up to a certain point, the enterprises could adjust their supplier-user relationships in spite of the Plan. When, in December 1951, President Gottwald inaugurated the fashion of denouncing lack of "discipline in the Plan," he was talking about discipline in something which was nothing but a farce.

However, up to last year the Plan's fantasies were still corrected, at least to a certain extent, by the participation of the enterprises in the fixing of the production quotas. The National Planning Office first sent the provisional "guiding figures" to the enterprises, the enterprises gave their opinions, and returned the corrected figures to the top office for final adjustment. This was the so-called method of "counter-plans."

LATEST 'REFORM'

It goes without saying that the enterprises took into account their prospects of production, supply and sale, and made sure of a margin of security for themselves by declaring a production capacity a little lower, and need for raw material and manpower a little higher, than what was strictly necessary.

To the extent that the final Plan respected the industry's claims, it reflected the market conditions, it was realistic—and superfluous. As soon as it began to put on pressure, it became a source of chaos.

Now the latest reforms in planning deliberately take away from the Plan the sole element which still kept it attached to reality.

It is striking to see the official criticisms of the methods now abandoned lay the blame solely on the enterprises' custom of protecting themselves against excessive quotas. The counter-plan method "did not mobilize anyone." In order that the Plan may regain its character as "mobilizer," they have decided to do without the collaboration of the enterprises.

The plan for 1953 was prepared within the circles of the National Planning Office, government and ministries, at the risk of ending up as an arithmetical chimera. The enterprises were only to draw up a plan of execution in conformity with the prescribed quotas and, in-

stead of questioning them, to "seek the resources" to fulfill them.

To give an idea of the convulsions which accompanied the application of this system into real life, let us quote the testimony of the secretary of the Communist Party, Josef Tesla:

"It is known that at the present time an unsatisfactory situation has developed in the distribution, among the plants, of the tasks established by the government for the current year. . . . The National Planning Office drew up in good time the Plan's control figures, transmitted them to the ministries for elaboration, and the government already [sic] approved them in December 1952. But a whole series of production ministries have not prepared themselves for a detailed distribution of the tasks set by the Plan. They claim that they do not have the correct technical and economic norms necessary, for example, to realistically calculate the need for raw material. True, the individual ministries sent the enterprises the data on the total volume of production, but the specific tasks—especially in the mechanical construction field—cannot be assigned in detail: the ministries either have not sent concrete demands or else sent contradictory data. . . . Instead of the Plan being the basis for the guiding activity of the responsible organs, instead of everybody ensuring production and necessary material, etc., in conformity with the Plan, what happens is that the enterprises often themselves determine the priority of tasks, thus acting as a transmission belt for disorder in the other branches of production. In the United Steel Mills at Kladno, 25, 125 representatives of 60 enterprises, in the most various branches and from all corners of the republic, without counting the representatives of ministries, took turns all demanding priority for the delivery of different articles." (*Rude Pravo*, Jan. 29, 1953.)

The secretary's lament is confirmed and amplified by a number of particular complaints. Thus, it is stated by the correspondent for the Krizik electrical apparatus plant in Prague:

"Unfortunately, in the case of certain articles we have twice as many orders as we can fill according to the Plan; outside of these we have only a tenth. One tries to save the situation by improvising; the enterprises change their plans from one week to the next. . . ." (*Rude Pravo*, Jan. 28, 1953.)

In a Usti-nad-Labem foundry—

" . . . the Plan is not entirely covered by orders. In a way the foundrymen know how many tons they have to cast but they do not know what they have to cast. . . . We try to make shift ourselves. But the plants to which our sales director writes give us answers that aren't very funny: 'Right now we have no work for you. If we need something we will let you know, and so forth.' The days go by, and still no content is given the work. How is it possible for the Planning Office to give us a plan for which the ministry lacks concrete content?" (*Rude Pravo*, Jan. 22, 1953.)

The answer is contained in these relations themselves. In a voluntaristic furor, the government bureaucracy set out to impose on industry a "plan" born out of calculating machines, without being able to specify who is to produce what articles, without being able to mold the plan on the innumerable relations of selling and buying enterprises. The Plan, which is largely purely quantitative, thus becomes an alien element in the economy, ripping the complicated tissues of the market relations.

If this tendency was being intensified under the planning system which has been abandoned, the change to the new system will push to an extreme point.

2. Financial Control Measures

These are the conditions which doom the ambitious system of controls centered around the financing of the enterprises, a system of controls which is supposed to be rigorously applied together with the Plan for 1953.

In setting up these measures, the regime starts from the accurate idea that the finances of an enterprise reflect more or less faithfully its state of economic health in general.

When unsold stocks of goods pile up in the distribution centers of the enterprises, a larger part of the circulating capital is tied up. The same is true if the production of an article is suspended in the middle, for lack of supplementary products; the average production time is thus unconsciously stretched out. Or again, if the enterprise must halt production while waiting for raw materials, the unrepaid expenses will scarcely be compensated for by sales receipts. The costs of production, on the other hand, will be inflated by a rash of breakdowns and unforeseen repairs necessitated by the general wearing out of old machines; to the costs

By ROBERT LOUKOTA

The much-talked-of resolution of the Czech ruling party and government on the reorganization of coal production in Silesia, dated October 15-16, 1951 (see *Masses-Information*, No. 10, 1951, page 15) set off an avalanche of similar resolutions. From that time on, not a month passed without an extremely detailed document which tried to prescribe curative measures in the steel mills, electric plants, chemical industry, and other branches of the economy.

The value of this kind of document became clear as soon as (to take an example) the electrification of 14 mines, a key point in the first resolution, was in large part rendered null and void, a few months later (*Prace*, Dec. 19, 1952). During the past year the magnates of the regime and its press could only repeat that the resolutions remained a dead letter (cf. Zapotocky in *Prace*, Dec. 24, 1952).

However, far from being discouraged by the futility of the decrees concerning the separate branches of production, in the middle of 1952 the regime undertook a general overhauling of the system of drawing up and checking on the Plan. The Plan for the year 1953 has already been put together along the new lines, and a series of steps were put into operation on January 1 of the present year.

The transition to the new system has been marked by a crisis in production which surpasses that of last year.

1. Chaos in Planning

The experience of the last few years had simply demonstrated the blind alley of Stalinist-type planning to the Czech leaders.

Production goals imposed on industry without any relation to its capacities; the impossibility of foreseeing the whims of Soviet demands; hence the impossibility of estimating the demand of the internal market with any precision; hence the necessity for changes and endless improvisations—these are the principal factors which deprived the figures of any meaning.

If the economy functioned at all, that was

'Planned' Economy: A Case Study

there is added also the exorbitant prices that the enterprises must pay in order to get machines and other hard-to-find things on the black market, plus forced purchase of unusable Soviet machinery. The penalty fees paid to the railroads for delays in unloading freight cars further swell the general expenses, and the sales income is cut into by payment of fines for delays in delivery or defects in quality.

During the last year, all of these factors, the list of which could be lengthened indefinitely, made more and more jerky and uncertain the turnover of goods into money.

On the financial level, these disorders in the circulation of capital, accompanied by growing costs of production, are translated into a need for supplementary liquid funds. In principle, an individual enterprise has three possible ways of getting such funds: (1) by getting subsidies from the national budget; (2) by soliciting short-term credits from the State Bank, in the hope of being permitted to indefinitely put off paying them back, if the situation doesn't get better; or (3) increasing the selling prices—a recourse which is theoretically prohibited.

Up to 1952, budget subsidies went through an in-between financial institution, called the Nationalized Economy Fund. The enterprises put their profits into this pool and withdrew from it subsidies to cover their losses. If the total of the losses was greater than the profits, which was the rule, the deficit was made up by allocations from the budget.

The government decided to get rid of this deficit by abolishing the institution which paid out the subsidies. Once the Nationalized Economy Fund was abolished, it was henceforth the treasury itself which rationed out the subsidies, by way of the ministerial budgets; and this was done not to fix up accomplished facts but to allocate the funds strictly within the limits set by the Plan.

The same line of behavior was marked in connection with short-term credits. Since enterprises which are in financial distress are forced to go for credits to the State Bank, the regime concluded that it was enough to close up the source to get rid of the need. In a speech on September 26, 1952 the president of the State Bank, Otakar Pohl, described in detail this change in the role of the Bank as dispenser of credits.

PRESSURES

Criticizing the then current practice, Pohl said:

"The credit departments are often very generous in handing out credits. . . . In credit policy elements of automatism are often seen. . . . Often very little examination is given to the question whether the credits are repayable and if they are materially guaranteed. . . . The Bank organs frequently incur great responsibility by letting themselves be misled by the opinion that it is . . . their job under any circumstances to give aid to any enterprise which finds itself in an embarrassing financial position. . . . The Bank organs take care to have enough of a cash balance to cover the planned expenses, but they pay very little attention to the fact that the planned income must likewise be secured." (*Ekonomie a Finance*, No. 8, 1952.)

In the future all that must change. "We must ensure that the Bank workers are not uselessly exposed to incorrect pressure, to which those with least strength succumb." (*Ibid.*) The Bank must carefully examine to see if the credits are intended for a legitimate purpose, to see that they are not covering up disorder. The credits must be granted solely within the planned limits. Acceptable as collateral are nothing but stocks of goods which are within the norm, unless the government expressly consents to okaying excess stocks for the purpose. If the requests for credits go beyond the limits foreseen by the plan, the Bank agents must immediately investigate the nature of the disorder and propose remedial measures right away.

All of these requirements rest on the tacit assumption that the Plan is harmony itself, and if an enterprise lacks funds it is because it is not fulfilling its plan. In conformity with this assumption, Pohl treats as something accidental what is in truth fundamental:

"The defects in credit policy were also influenced by causes which have their root in defects in the supply of material, in the frequent changes in the organization of the enterprises, and in the changes in the sched-

ule of production, in an insufficient tying-up of the financial plans with the material plans." (*Ibid.*)

But alas! what prevented the Bank from effectively controlling the finances of the enterprises in September 1952 can produce no different result in 1953.

To illustrate what kind of tie-up connects the financial plans with the material plans in 1953, let us give the floor once again to the correspondent of the Krizik plant in Prague:

"In the detailed specification of the cost plan, a mechanical cut of 20 million kr, was made in the cost of raw materials, in order thus to save the prescribed accumulation. The expense for raw materials have been lowered by a sum which has uselessly gone to inflate wages, salaries and expenses for social purposes. In other words: we received a pile of money for the payroll, but we haven't any for raw materials." (*Rude Pravo*, Jan. 28, 1953.)

3. Fiscal Measures

Aside from subsidies and credits, the most natural way to recoup rising costs of production seems to be increase in prices. Though inconceivable in official theory, this method has become the normal result in practice.

Inadequate and faulty nomenclature for different goods facilitates more or less free price-fixing, so that the planned prices, fixed in 1948, have been superseded since then by the so-called "current" prices. Notice has been taken of articles whose price doubled from one delivery to another (*Prace*, Nov. 14, 1952); machines and fixtures have been overpaid sometimes by ten or even twenty times. (*Rude Pravo*, Dec. 12, 1952.)

The general increase in costs was transmitted via the prices from one enterprise to another, and this ended by compelling the monetary authorities to start up the paper-money presses, to hand out subsidies liberally, and extend the volume of credit, without pressing for repayment.

The effect on state finances could not be different from the effect on the finances of the particular enterprises. While the budgetary expenses mounted, the income was devaluated by inflation, and the sum-total mass of profit did not increase in the desired proportion.

The way to stop the inflation which was eating into the profits was sought in a series of fiscal measures. Since the ceiling set by the 1948 prices had been pierced like a spider web, the Finance Ministry firstly drew up a new schedule of wholesale prices, which went into effect on January 1, 1953.

These wholesale prices included (1) the turnover tax—the big source of the budgetary income—fixed a-priori by the Finance Ministry; and (2) the accumulation, frankly rebaptized "profit," also prescribed in advance by the Plan. Thus (3) the costs of production became the sole variable element in the price.

This is very far from the outlived capitalism which got its profits after sale on the market by deducting its incurred costs from the market price. The self-styled "socialist planning" first fixes the prices, then the profits (under the double form of accumulation and the turnover tax) and then, by a wave of the bureaucratic wand, makes the costs adapt themselves to its own voracious appetite.

4. Accounting Controls

The regime betrays its own doubts about the automatic effectiveness of all these administrative measures by adding still another one, accounting control.

According to the practice of the last few years, the managers could use the funds of their enterprises for various purposes in accordance with their own judgments. It could not be otherwise since, as we have seen, the "financial plans" which they received from on top were absolutely unusable. In using their judgments, it was natural that they accorded more respect to the economic and social realities of their enterprises than to the wishes of the government. Thus "the efforts made by the enterprises to get investment funds are so strong that they prefer to use methods . . . of getting production

or purchase of investment funds beyond the limits fixed by the Plan. The enterprises [make] internal transfers of funds of all kinds." (*Ekonomie a Finance*, No. 7, 1952.)

It was to guard against this situation that the attempt was made, for the year 1953, to specify limits for the various uses to which funds could be put, in accordance with the principle which already regulated the "wages fund," introduced since 1952, limiting the sums payable to the workers (cf. *Masses-Information*, April 1951, page 19). This, it had been asserted, had served to check the "wages fund," and could only encourage the regime to generalize the system.

In spite of this regulation, the independent disposition of funds in the interior of an enterprise could still go on as long as the directors continued to enjoy unlimited authority. To prevent that, their authority has been split in two. Since January 1, 1953, the supreme power over financial methods has been entrusted to the chief accountants.

Henceforth, the directors can make decisions only to the extent that the chief accountants give them the money. The chief accountants of the enterprises are responsible to the chief accountants of the next higher economic unit, and to them only, as far as concerns making the use of funds conform to the plan. In case of deviations from the plan, the accountants are liable to fines or even to penal sanctions (*Sbirka Zakonu RCS, castka 32*, Nov. 15, 1952). This is certainly to guarantee that the accountant "in his collaboration with the director of the enterprise and other workers, does not fall into a position of passive dependence on his surroundings." (*Ekonomie a Finance*, No. 8, 1952.)

Like the banking controls, the accounting controls makes no sense except under a workable plan. With respect to the type of plan presently adopted, we can learn what it is again by consulting the statements of Secretary Tesla which were quoted above.

'Results Do Not Come . . .'

In summary: to bend the economic laws to the confused wishes of the planners, the regime has placed the managers right in the middle of the crossfire of administrative controls. The managers would seem to be lost, if in some way they did not personify the logic of the real economic conditions.

On the other hand, the abilities of the little bureaucrats who are in charge of the imposing superstructure of controls leave much to be desired. The Bank, for example, runs into "a problem which has not been solved so far, that is, the far-from-satisfactory political and economic level of some of our workers." (*Ekonomie a Finance*, No. 8, 1952.) As for the ministers, they suffer "from a lack of cadres or from their own far-from-satisfactory level. It is said that the blame rests with the comrades in the enterprises because they do not want to release capable workers." (*Rude Pravo*, Jan. 28, 1953.) And so forth.

It remains no less true that the difficulties do not flow so much from the incompetence of the bureaucracy as from the intrinsic contradictions of the Plan and the economy.

The traditional attitude of the regime toward economic reality was expressed forcefully by the secretary of the trade-unions, Marie Trojanova:

"We are going to purposely ignore all the so-called objective obstacles. . . . It is men who have to answer for errors and inadequacies in the period of the construction of socialism. It is not possible to impute them to objective circumstances independently of the human will." (*Prace*, Dec. 2, 1952.)

But this titanism is beginning to be supplanted by the despair which rings out from the resumé of the situation given by the secretary of the CP, Tesla:

"One changes the organization, one elaborates perfect schemes, one introduces live men into them—but the results do not come. . . ." (*Rude Pravo*, Jan. 29, 1953.)

Big Three Huddle — —

(Continued from page 1)

had no desire to see Eisenhower in the very near future.

Answering a question in the House of Commons directed to him by Laborite Woodrow Wyatt, Churchill said that he saw no reason to meet with Eisenhower right now, although he said that nothing would give him more pleasure than to have the president as a visitor in England, and that he hoped that "this great event" might occur during Eisenhower's tenure in the presidency. Whether this was just a slip of the tongue, or whether Churchill meant to imply that he saw no reason for a conference much before the time when Eisenhower's term is likely to expire, it is difficult to say.

Churchill, of course, dropped his indifferent attitude the moment it was made clear to him that the American government wants such a meeting. In the meantime, however, the French government fell from office, and there is no telling how long it will take to form another one, and hence how long it will be before a Big Three meeting can take place.

The important question is, however: Just what will be the purpose of such a meeting, and what are its consequences for world politics likely to be?

NEEDS TIME

From the point of view of the administration in this country, the important problem is to give the American people the impression that Eisenhower is leading something or someone in the world. That is difficult if every time Dulles opens his mouth he is contradicted either by the British prime minister or by the Gentlemen from Formosa in the Senate, or by both from different directions.

It is difficult if not impossible to get a purely Republican majority in the Senate for any kind of policy which makes half-sense to the Western Allies, and especially difficult to get a majority if at the same time one is determined not to rely on Democratic votes for one's policies.

In short, it is plain that the Eisenhower administration needs time in which to try to reconcile the factions within its own party in this country, so that it can deal unitedly with its allies abroad, so that all together can speak to the Russians with a single voice, assuming they can find something to say. Even a postponement of the issue by calling this Bermuda conference is not likely to achieve all that for Eisenhower.

From their side of the fence, the Stalinists have raised objections to this meet-

ing. An editorial in *Pravda* says that they are awaiting deeds rather than words from the Americans, and that such a conference can only be an attempt to solidify the capitalist world against them. They state, further, that this is no time at which to confront them with ultimatums about the things they will have to do before a conference can be had with them, as they are not at all in the position of a conquered or helpless country to which an ultimatum can be sent.

All this is fairly true and to the point. The purpose of the Bermuda conference will be to get a solid front against Russia. But the important question really is: a solid front for what? What policies can be proposed which will deliver a blow to Stalinism, and bring about a truce in the cold war on terms which would be acceptable, if not to McCarthy, then at least to the vast majority of people throughout the world?

SEEDS OF WAR

That is the point at which a big blank is the only answer. A truce of appeasement, which simply gives in to the Stalinists at all disputed points, would be a disaster. A truce of victory in which the Stalinists give in at all points is an impossibility. Thus the only realistic possibility of a truce, if there is one, lies in the expectation of some kind of horse-trade, in the course of which the interests of some people (say, the Koreans) will be traded off against the interests of others (say the Austrians).

Such a truce might be concluded, and it might be observed for a while. But it would plant the seeds of its own disruption and of eventual war just as surely as the division of Poland and Germany planted the seeds of World War III at Yalta and Teheran.

The point is that for these governments, a truly democratic truce, or even the proposal for a truly democratic truce, is impossible. A truly democratic settlement could no more leave the Russians in control of Czechoslovakia than the French in control of Indo-China; it could no more accept the absorption of the Baltic countries into Stalinist Russia than the continuation of British rule in Malaya and Kenya.

In these negotiations, even if they finally take place, both parties will come with unclean hands. Both can point the accusing finger at the other and ignore the finger pointed accusingly at itself. But in the long run, the Eisenhower administration will again be on the political defensive, because it has no social

solution to offer the peoples of the world, while Stalinism has such a social solution, even though it be a socially retrogressive one.

Thus the only real purpose of the Eisenhower administration at the Bermuda conference can be to insist that its allies "stand firm." That is, they must stick to the guns of their armament programs and refuse to deal with the Stalinists economically, and not give them any political concessions. That is considered "firmness." But as long as this is the full content of the foreign policy of this government, the prospect both for itself and its allies is bleak indeed.

DEMOCRATIC POLICY

While they are "standing firm," the backward portions of the world, the source of the wealth and past stability of the British and French empires, are rapidly crumbling under their feet. It is easy to understand why their statesmen are not nearly as enthusiastic for a "firm" stance as are our own Republicans.

If we had a government in this country with a really democratic foreign policy, there would be nothing to fear and everything to gain from one or ten meetings with Malenkov and his gang. Before they even had a chance to "demand" that this government abjure colonialism all over the world, we would have done it by every word and "deed" at our command.

We would refuse to support anti-democratic governments in all parts of the world, and would give such support as is possible and proper to the democratic movements which oppose them. In short, without delivering "ultimatums" to an armed and powerful foe, we would be able to divest him of the support of millions of people all over the world whom he is able to fool today only because his adversaries are known to be everything he says they are.

Such a foreign policy, of course, could only be adopted by a government which believes in and practices democracy at home. That, in turn, would only be possible for a government which is based on and controlled by a democratic movement of the people themselves. Neither the Republicans nor the Democrats can possibly qualify.

The job could be done, not by any of the capitalist parties, but only by a new movement of the working class which was ready to break with the interests and ties of capitalism and its imperialist aims. That is indeed why we Independent Socialists are for the formation of a labor party as a step in this development.

The ISL Program in Brief

The Independent Socialist League stands for socialist democracy and against the two systems of exploitation which now divide the world: capitalism and Stalinism.

Capitalism cannot be reformed or liberalized, by any Fair Deal or other deal, so as to give the people freedom, abundance, security or peace. It must be abolished and replaced by a new social system, in which the people own and control the basic sectors of the economy, democratically controlling their own economic and political destinies.

Stalinism, in Russia and wherever it holds power, is a brutal totalitarianism—a new form of exploitation. Its agents in every country, the Communist Parties, are unrelenting enemies of socialism and have nothing in common with socialism—which cannot exist without effective democratic control by the people.

These two camps of capitalism and Stalinism are today at each other's throats in a worldwide imperialist rivalry for domination. This struggle can only lead to the most frightful war in history so long as the people leave the capitalist and Stalinist rulers in power. Independent Socialism stands for building and strengthening the Third Camp of the people against both war blocs.

The ISL, as a Marxist movement, looks to the working class and its ever-present struggle as the basic progressive force in society. The ISL is organized to spread the ideas of socialism in the labor movement and among all other sections of the people.

At the same time, Independent Socialists participate actively in every struggle to better the people's lot now—such as the fight for higher living standards, against Jim Crow and anti-Semitism, in defense of civil liberties and the trade-union movement. We seek to join together with all other militants in the labor movement as a left force working for the formation of an independent labor party and other progressive policies.

The fight for democracy and the fight for socialism are inseparable. There can be no lasting and genuine democracy without socialism, and there can be no socialism without democracy. To enroll under this banner, join the Independent Socialist League!

Forced Labor in Kenya — —

(Continued from page 1)

Kenya colony. It empowers British district commissioners to force native Africans to work for a maximum of 90 days a year with or without pay at the commissioners' discretion." (N. Y. Times, May 21.)

We do not expect Eisenhower to "take the initiative" in calling the attention of the civilized world to these atrocities, especially when they are perpetrated by a notable member of the "free world's" military alliance, but we have a right to expect that the trade unions of this country (not to speak of Britain) should have something to say about it—naturally, after they get through passing the perfectly sound resolutions denouncing slave labor, trade-union suppression, etc., in Russia.

RESEARCH PROJECT

The Kenya forced-labor decree is "an emergency measure," says the dispatch, and the emergency naturally is the fact that the Africans are getting less enthusiastic about working for a pittance.

Four days after the forced-labor decree, the government passed from this measure to one fraught with grim humor. It began an official investigation to determine whether the African workers were underpaid!

This is as noteworthy a research project as if, say, Moscow were to announce a survey to find out if there were any concentration camps within its borders.

The N. Y. Times correspondent Albion Ross (May 25) helped the British investigators along with some easily available statistics. Ninety-eight per cent of the native workers get less than \$10 a month, according to the March 1952 wage statistics. But that applies only to those employed in industry. On the land the wage

is below \$3 a month. In contrast the average wage for the bulk of European employees in the colony is about \$220 a month.

He adds that "the Mau Mau rebellion obviously is somehow connected with the fact that the wage-earners of overpopulated Kenya are having a desperately hard time to earn a living"—obviously a British-type understatement like "Many people are often inconvenienced when they have to starve."

Behind the barbarous forced-labor decree is also the fact that there has been an exodus of Kikuyu tribesmen from the farms to the Kikuyu Reserve, which has semi-paralyzed the white owners' farms and commercial establishments. "Businessmen report steady losses and Nairobi is full of rumors of larger establishments that may close down. A number of small establishments already have disappeared." (Times, May 26.) It is understandable, then, that the white settlers, who live on the Africans' toil, are very upset about the White Man's Burden.

RIVALS

These idealistic exploiters did not, however, allow their indignation against the terrorist Mau Mau campaign to color their judgment when the Moslem and Hindu minority in Kenya demanded the right to bear arms against the Mau Mau. Instead of welcoming this aid, as one might have expected, the Europeans objected.

Reason: the Asians, who are three times as numerous as the 40,000 Europeans, are their competitors in business and increasingly successful ones too. The British colonialists want troops from home to suppress the black majority, but they don't

want favors from their rivals at the same game. Not being internationalist-minded, moreover, they even want to recall the Kenya Regiment from Malaya, where it is busy in another of Britain's little "dirty wars."

The colonial government has compromised, calling up the Asian males between 18-23 but assigning them mostly to such jobs as clerks, storemen, drivers, etc. The Asian minority have been on much better relations with the Africans and in general might be expected to make more concessions to African aspirations.

CLOSING IN

Kenya is not the only point of ferment.

In Nigeria, which has a strong native anti-imperialist movement, Britain is striking its old India-style attitude as mediator between the Moslem Negroes in the North and the Christian and pagan Negroes in the South. The latter are the larger section and want self-rule. The "mediator" naturally has to stay around and rule both.

At some points of France's southern African possessions, "extreme poverty . . . has created strange rebellious sects occasionally somewhat akin to Kenya's Mau Mau," according to the Times (May 24).

There is still plenty of room in Africa for white settlers, but space is getting more and more restricted for white settlers and businessmen who want to rule the land against the independence desires of the overwhelming black majority. The continent does not belong to the Europeans but to its own people, and, hard as it may be before the former get it knocked into their heads, the African people are getting under way to take back their homes.

Get Acquainted!

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