

LABOR ACTION

Independent Socialist Weekly

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MAY 18, 1953

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SPOTLIGHT

Wechsler vs. McCarthy

In last week's "Spotlight" we referred to the hearings in which James Wechsler, editor of the New York Post was questioned by Senator Joe McCarthy. The transcript of the hearings has now been published and has received deserved attention at least in the editorial columns of the American press.

As the hearing proceeded, it presented a weird spectacle. Wechsler was supposedly called in by McCarthy to answer questions about some of his books which had been "discovered" on the shelves of American information libraries abroad. It soon became evident that McCarthy was not in the least interested in these books: his "junketing gumshoes" had not even been able to discover their titles.

From start to finish McCarthy pursued a single theory, with monomaniacal persistence. According to this theory, Wechsler, who has been a prominent and active anti-Stalinist for at least fifteen years, is actually a "secret" Stalinist agent. Proof? His paper has persistently attacked McCarthy and his methods. But how about all of the attacks against Stalinism, both foreign and domestic? That is just camouflage. The only acceptable demonstration of anti-Stalinism is support of McCarthy, Velde and Jenner, and "active exposure," i.e., stool pigeon work, against individual Stalinists.

Wechsler repeatedly pointed out that what was really at issue in these hearings was the political policy of the Post and nothing else. McCarthy just kept on working at his theory.

As we mentioned last week, Wechsler agreed to turn over the names of people

he had known as Stalinists in the '30s when he belonged to the Young Communist League. This was part of a deal in which McCarthy refused to make the transcript of the hearings public unless Wechsler turned in the names. Wechsler stated that he felt it vital to obtain the transcript so that it could be turned over to the American Society of Newspaper Editors for study as to whether McCarthy's line of questioning was not an infringement on the freedom of the press.

The publication of the transcript has been a real public service, there can be no question about that. Even Republican papers have raised their hands in horror at McCarthy's methods. Yet the question remains: did the accomplishment of this desirable goal justify turning in the names of dozens of people as Stalinists, many of whom have long since broken with Stalinism, but will now be exposed to McCarthy's methods?

There is only one theory on which this act can be justified. That is that the end of getting the transcript published justified the means of informing on these people. That theory is supposed to be the private property of . . . you know who. How about that, Mr. Wechsler?

Einstein Speaks Out

Professor Albert Einstein attacked Senatorial committees for inhibiting non-conformist thinking when he received one of five \$1,000 awards for "nonconformists" presented by Lord & Taylor, one of New York's fashionable department stores.

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Truce Negotiations Reach Crisis Stage

By GORDON HASKELL

The Point is rapidly being reached at which it will no longer be possible to conceal from the world whether either or both sides in the Korean war are willing to conclude a truce now.

Of course, both sides have claimed that this is their ardent desire for over a year. Yet each has insisted on conditions which the other has been unwilling to meet. At the moment of writing this, however, it is evident that the differences between the two sides have been narrowed to a point, as Sir Winston Churchill pointed out to the House of Commons, at which no difference in principle can be said to exist.

The Stalinists have agreed that those prisoners of war who do not want to be repatriated will remain in Korea. They have proposed that they be put in the charge of a commission composed of Switzerland, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Poland and India. Each of these nations is to provide troops for control of the prisoners. Representatives of both sides are then to have access to the prisoners to convince them of the merits of their different positions. After four months of this, the prisoners will be given another opportunity to decide whether they want to go home or to stay in the camps. The final disposition of those who decide not to go home will be left to the political conference which is to meet to settle the war in Korea for good.

The American representatives have asked a number of concrete questions about the meaning of several aspects of the Stalinist proposal. But the position is now relatively clear: the proposal meets

most of the American demands, although not in a form very pleasing to the U. S. To reject it would be to show that unless a truce in Korea can be had on clearly American terms, it is not desired. Without a doubt such a rejection would further strain relations between the United States and its allies at this time.

THE VIETMINH WITHDRAWAL

It is quite possible, of course, that the truce negotiations may yet break down. But over the weekend an amazing development took place thousands of miles from Korea which seems to point to a clear desire on the part of the Stalinists to end the fighting in Asia, for the present at least.

This was the spectacular and "mystifying" withdrawal of the Vietminh forces from the interior of the little kingdom of Laos in Indo-China. Here was an army which had penetrated for hundreds of miles through the jungle, almost without opposition. Even the most ardent well-wishers of French imperialism despaired of the ability of the French forces to hold the Vietminh armies with their hastily improvised defenses. Long articles were being written in the American press discussing the possibility of an imminent attack on the neighboring territory of independent Thailand. And then, the Vietminh armies vanished from before the defenses of Luang Prabang, and were observed to be beating their way back over the jungle trails on which they had come.

Before this change in the situation, the American government had demonstrated that it is firm in its determination to back the French empire to the hilt in Indo-China. Eisenhower announced an immediate emergency grant of \$60,000,000 for the French effort in that country, and his foreign-aid bill asked Congress for \$400,000,000 for the same purpose for next year. American aircraft, manned by American crews were pressed into the service of supplying the French garrison of Luang Prabang. Some of the more hot-headed congressmen were discussing the desirability of using American troops to "clean up" the situation.

Why did the Vietminh leaders decide on this withdrawal? Some "Far Eastern experts" claim that the chief reason is the approach of the monsoon, or rainy season, which makes fighting virtually impossible. This theory might appear to have greater validity if the very same "experts" had not pointed to the very same monsoon as a reason for the timing of the invasion of Laos just the week before. Then they claimed that the Vietminh leaders' diabolical cleverness was demonstrated by the fact that a victory so soon before the rains would prevent

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THE NEUROTIC THEORY OF STALINISM

By JAMES M. FENWICK

In a world of the profoundest ambiguities we must confess to a sneaking admiration for persons whose existence is governed by rigid and more than a little fatuous consistencies—a Bertrand Russell, say, who can write one article after another for the New York Times Sunday magazine section of an unflinching vacuity, or a Bernarr McFadden, also in his dotage, but carrying it off with considerably more nerve by periodically parachuting out of airplanes.

But our most wry admiration is reserved for the institutionalization of political brainlessness which the United States army is able to maintain in the face of all obstacles.

CP INDOCTRINATION

Three weeks ago the New York Times, a paper still biting its nails with frustration because there seems to be no visible, non-violent way of replacing Eisenhower and Nixon with James Reston and Arthur Krock, reported that the Defense Department had announced "that a 'small group' of exchanged American soldiers had shown indications of 'having succumbed to Communist indoctrination' while they were captive in North Korea, and would be given medical and mental treatment. . . .

"In announcing that the 'small group' would be taken to Valley Forge, the department said the Army felt 'it is obli-

gated to these men and their families' to see that the soldiers get 'medical and physical treatment for their rehabilitation.'"

Under the pressure of newspapermen who wanted to interview the returned PWs, Army officials began to waver on their statements that Stalinist indoctrination had taken place. Nevertheless, when the PWs were interviewed, despite their denials of currently holding Stalinist views, and the eagerness of all concerned to gloss over the shame of U. S. troops having been converted to a totalitarian doctrine, it became obvious that some of them at the very least had, for whatever reasons of expediency or conviction, been won over, if not to a pure Stalinist, then to a Stalinist "peace-front" organization type of ideology.

According to a Pentagon spokesman quoted by the New York Times, "those selected include former prisoners who have made broadcasts for the Chinese Communists, had Communist groups meetings while in prison camps, written Communist propaganda in camp newspapers full of Red propaganda and signed petitions urging the United Nations to end the war."

STEAK AND ICE CREAM

Employing psychological rehabilitation as an approach to the problem of Stalinist indoctrinated returned PWs represents, of course, an advance over that

of the Far Eastern official who was quoted as confidently stating, "There's nothing to this brainwashing that a good steak and an ice cream cone won't cure."

The gastro-intestinal approach to the problem of the world crisis, more popular in World War II, when GIs were informed that what they were really fighting for in contradiction to the soldiers of the axis powers was the right to blueberry pie and double rich chocolate milk shakes, was soon found in the post-war period to have limited utility in the real world of non-adolescent thinking and power politics.

This is not to say that the new approach is overwhelmingly better than the old. As a matter of fact, the transferring of the problems of the soldier's ideological well-being from the visceral to the psychological level once again underscores in another fashion the inability of the military in particular and the government in general to understand the phenomenon of Stalinism.

What has been in practice established, in placing Stalinist indoctrinated troops under psychological treatment, is that Stalinism is a neurosis.

It is of course incontestable that in any large group of PWs there will be found a number of neurotically torn persons. Under conditions of the crudely regimented army life, the terror of modern warfare, and a prison life with a seemingly hopeless perspective, some

Auto Workers

Anti-Reuther Right Wing Hails Stellato Victory in Local 600

By M. J. HARDWICK

DETROIT—Carl Stellato, president of Ford Local 600, scored his biggest triumph against Walter P. Reuther, and the entire leadership of the United Auto Workers Union (CIO) by winning his fourth election which gives him a two-year term.

The tabulation, with around 2,700 votes not yet counted, was Stellato 18,767 to 7,930 for Gene Prato, the Reuther backed candidate, and 2,383 votes for Pat Rice, backed by the Stalinist forces.

The remarkable character of the Stellato victory is emphasized by the concentration which the Reuther forces made against him. Besides a staff, and the use of Reuther's "brain-trusters," the Prato slate had ample funds, and also had succeeded in winning over Bill Hood, recording secretary of Ford Local 600 from the Stellato group.

In terms of votes, it was Stellato's highest margin of success. In terms of political capital, it showed that his course of action at the recent UAW convention, while it may not have influenced more than 10% of the delegates, certainly did make a hit with the rank and file back home.

The results of this election cannot be explained by any "superiority of program," for if anything, Stellato is actually less militant than the Reuther leadership. His has no real program, no long-range outlook.

NO RESPONSIBILITY

His advantage, and this accounts partly for his success, is that he does not have to take any responsibility for events in the UAW or elsewhere, and is thus in a perfect position to "raise hell."

Stellato's success is basically a reflection of a diffuse and directionless mood of dissatisfaction and discontent among the rank and file of the UAW, which it can express by supporting the symbol today of "anti-international" sentiment.

The fact that Prato was a "porkchopper" until he was put in the race by Reuther, helped point up this situation,

and enabled Stellato to exploit easily this anti-administration mood.

There is a far greater significance, however, to the UAW in the Stellato victory than merely the fortunes of the personalities concerned, for what is happening at Ford 600 may well be emulated elsewhere.

One of the oldest techniques of conservative and reactionary forces is to utilize the discontent of the workers, moving leftward, into defeating middle-of-the-road or "centrist" leadership, and thus taking power for the right.

ATTACK FROM THE RIGHT

In the UAW these forces consist of the vulgar opportunists, conservatives and reactionaries, who are far stronger in the secondary leadership than the Reuther leadership acknowledges. They attack Reuther from the right, while at the same time playing up the rank and file discontent over the inability of the UAW leadership, bound by five-year contracts, to improve wages and working conditions.

When Reuther, for example, in March threatened a nation-wide auto strike if the auto companies didn't re-open the contracts and improve the lot of the auto workers, a vast array of secondary leaders pressured him into dropping that threat. Nor was the rank and file in the least interested in a strike.

Yet, precisely those leaders who are afraid or denounce any idea of a struggle, criticize Reuther most vigorously in private at least, for not "delivering the goods!" They rejoice in the victory of Stellato, although publicly they profess faith in the Reuther leadership. They repeat Stellato's "socialist-baiting," not having the nerve to tackle Reuther directly.

The results in Ford Local 600 point up another weakness of the Reuther leadership which we have often emphasized: Reuther's failure to build a cadre of "Reutherites" capable of struggling and winning the support of the rank and file along a programmatic basis, as Reuther did in his struggle for power.

There just aren't any capable, quali-

fied and leading Reutherites in Ford Local 600 who can attract the rank and file and defeat Stellato with a rounded out program. An administratorship is not only a poor substitute for a militant cadre, it also serves to strengthen the anti-international forces, as the experience at Ford Local 600 shows.

Of course, the results at Ford 600 are not the beginning of the end of Reuther, as many embittered old-timers of the anti-Reuther caucus hope, or as the many ex-"left-wingers" who quietly snuck into the Reuther camp pray.

Stellato himself made a rather quiet, and olive branch type of victory statement. The convention itself revealed that the Reuther top leaders have the union quite well in hand.

A HEAVY BLOW

Nevertheless, a heavy blow has been dealt to the prestige of the Reuther leadership, and above all to Walter Reuther personally.

If the steel workers manage to obtain a wage increase of a substantial character in current negotiations, and John L. Lewis does better for the coal miners this fall, both the national prestige of Walter Reuther, and the relationship of forces in the UAW are going to take a turn for the worse.

Any UAW delegate who heard the reactionary views of Stellato on many questions like "tar and feathering" the Stalinists, can get little consolation in the fact that that kind of "opposition" to Reuther is on the upgrade.

Incidentally, there will be a run-off on one post at Ford 600. Bill Hood who ran on the Reuther slate got 10,451, while Stellato's man, William H. Johnson drew 12,871, and a Stalinist backed candidate got enough votes to deprive Johnson of the required 50 per cent of all votes cast to win without a run-off.

John Orr won the vice presidency 13,709 to 6,552 for Nelson Samp, and W. G. Grant, incumbent financial secretary, defeated Jack Pellegrini 17,127, to 9,005.

SPOTLIGHT

(Continued from page 1)

"I gladly accept this Lord & Taylor award," he told the audience assembled at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel for the presentation, "as an expression of friendly sentiments. It gives me great pleasure, indeed, to see the stubbornness of an incorrigible non-conformist warmly acclaimed.

"To be sure," he continued in a tape-recorded message, "we are concerned here with nonconformism in a remote field of endeavor, and no Senatorial committee has as yet felt impelled to tackle the important task, the task, namely, of combating, also in this field, the dangers which threaten the inner security of the uncritical or else intimidated citizen."

Other awards for "nonconformism" were given to people working in the fields of aviation research, archeology, and mental health. None were given in any field remotely connected with the political or economic controversies of our time.

ANOTHER WARNING

On the same day when the assembled guests at the Waldorf-Astoria were listening to Dr. Einstein's message, across the continent in Los Angeles Dr. D. Ewen Cameron, president of the American Psychiatric Association warned the 109th annual meeting of that body to stand fast against authoritarian forces of both the right and left which would destroy free inquiry. He said that American scientific progress is in serious danger today because of fear-inspired rumors, unjust accusations and ill-advised investigations growing out of the tensions of the cold war.

"One thinks," he said, "of chance meetings of already huddling little groups of men and women—afraid to look, to speak, to act, save in accepted form; afraid to tread off the beaten track, afraid to be different, for difference is danger. One thinks of men at great universities who will not speak out on controversial subjects—and those who will not these days speak out against error and fear and hate may never speak again in freedom's name."

There is certainly room for a medal in nonconformism, where it counts. But we doubt that such a medal will ever be given by a department store.

Churchill and Attlee

Winston Churchill's proposal for a conference of the heads of the most powerful governments in the world has been received favorably by all sections of British political opinion, and has found its echo among liberal circles in this country as well.

The New York Times reports that on no other proposal in recent years has there been such unanimity in the British press. All papers, from the London Daily Worker to the most conservative journals, and including, of course, the Labor publications, are ardently for it. In Western Germany the Social Democrats are jubilant at the proposal, while the Adenauer government regards it as a further obstacle to the early passage of the law which would re-militarize the country as part of a European Defense Community.

Far different, however, has been the reception in this country of the critical remarks made by Clement Attlee, leader of the Labor Party in the House of Commons on the conduct of American foreign policy. Attlee stated that it is difficult for other countries to know just who is running the foreign policy of the United States: the president, the State Department, the Department of Defense, or Senator Joe McCarthy. He stated, also, that there are certain influential politicians and military men in America who do not want a truce in Korea, but rather would like to extend the war to the whole of China. He suggested that in view of this fact it would be highly desirable if the British government had a representative on the truce team in Korea, so that the British view could be used to put counter-pressure on the negotiators to that exerted by the belligerent faction in America.

Everything Attlee said was true, but he hardly went far enough. The trouble with American policy is not that no one knows who makes it, or that the American constitutional system prevents the executive department from having full control over it. The real difficulty is that in this country there is no powerful political movement which advocates a democratic foreign policy, and which can exert real pressure by such advocacy. In the absence of such a movement, it is small wonder that the reactionaries, who know what they want and are backed by powerful economic groups in the country, can have a heavy impact on American foreign policy and its execution.

ISL CONTESTS "SUBVERSIVE" LISTING

Last week LABOR ACTION reproduced a telegram sent Attorney General Herbert Brownell by the Independent Socialist League, in which its chairman, Max Shahtman, protested the retention of the ISL, the Socialist Youth League and the former Workers Party on the list of subversive organizations. The telegram also requested a hearing at the earliest possible date in which to contest this listing.

The Department of Justice has replied by furnishing the ISL with the rules of procedure issued by it on April 29 which will govern listings of organizations by the attorney general in the future, as well as the contest of such listing by the affected organizations.

It is evident from the procedure, which we will summarize for our readers below, that organizations affected by the "subversive list" will have a right extended to them under this administration which was denied them by the Democratic government: to know the grounds on which they have been put on the list. They will further have the right to contest these grounds as well as the specific evidence charged against them at a formal hearing, though within restricted limits. The government is still not obliged to disclose any relevant information which it chooses to designate as "classified security information," nor will the organization's representatives have the right to cross-examine "confidential informants."

In brief, the procedure laid down is as follows:

PROCEDURE FOR APPEAL

Within ten days of the effective date of Eisenhower's Executive Order No. 10450 any listed organization may file a notice of contest with the attorney general. Failure to file such a notice within this period will be deemed "an acquiescence in such designation."

Within sixty days of receipt of the notice of contest, "the attorney general shall cause to be forwarded to the organization by registered mail a statement of the grounds upon which the designation was or is proposed to be made and written interrogatories with respect thereto. . . .

"The organization, within sixty days following receipt of such statement and interrogatories, may file a verified reply. . . . The reply shall answer each interrogatory completely and with particularity and shall be limited to statements of fact. The organization may also submit supporting affidavits with its reply." If the organization fails to answer any part of the interrogatories, or replies to it evasively, this will be deemed as "an admission of the truth of the facts" to which the interrogatory refers.

NATURE OF THE HEARING

Any organization filing a reply as per the above may accompany it with a written request for a hearing. Upon receipt of such a request, the attorney general "will set a date and fix a place for hearing and notify the organization thereof by registered mail."

The hearing will be held before an officer or board, as the attorney general "shall deem necessary." If the officer or board decide that a determination may be made without the taking of evidence,

none will be taken. The attorney general may either rely on his original grounds for designating the organization, or may introduce "evidence in support thereof or supplemental thereto," at his own discretion. The organization may be represented by counsel at the hearing, and testimony will be given under oath.

After outlining the rules of evidence and other procedural matters relating to the hearing, the document continues:

"Within a reasonable time following completion of any proceeding hereunder, the attorney general shall make a determination on the record which shall include the statement of the grounds, interrogatories, replies to the interrogatories, affidavits, and testimony elicited at the hearing and other documents and papers filed in the proceeding, and shall notify the organization of the determination by registered mail. In making his determination the attorney general shall take into consideration any handicap imposed upon an organization by the non-disclosure to it of classified security information or the identity of confidential informants and by reason of the lack of opportunity to cross-examine confidential informants."

It is quite evident that the procedure provided by the attorney general, and particularly the last paragraph quoted is designed to meet the criticism directed by the Supreme Court at the procedure used by the Truman administration in listing organizations.

A formal contest of the listing of the Independent Socialist League, the Socialist Youth League, and the former Workers Party was filed with the attorney general on May 7. As the effective date of the president's Executive Order No. 10450 is May 27, it can be expected that the procedure outlined above will take its course shortly after that date. Officers of the Independent Socialist League have indicated that they intend to pursue this matter with the utmost determination.

WEEK by WEEK . . .

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LONDON LETTER

Labor Party Faces Test on May Day '53

By ALLAN VAUGHAN

Last year's May Day demonstrations were overwhelmed with rain. This year, however, the weather was perfect. A colorful procession, led by the London Federation of Trade Unions, the recently formed body which has been set up to replace the disaffiliated London Trades Council, started off from the Victoria Embankment (near Westminster Abbey). In the procession many trade union branches were represented (conspicuously from the Transport and General Workers Union) as well as Constituency Labor Parties, Cooperative Guilds and Labor Leagues of Youth. All manner of banners and inscribed slogans were carried aloft in the procession, and "The Red Flag" and "The Internationale" were sung lustily by the marchers. Huge crowds lined the route, and even larger crowds pressed in at Hyde Park itself. To the accompaniment of marches played by TGWU bands the procession moved into the park, where the marchers were addressed by various Labor Party and trade union speakers such as Tom Williams and Morgan Phillips, secretary of the Party. Everyone was in festive mood, and it seemed as if all London had come out to greet the May Day marchers. The kites and balloons only added to the gaiety of the occasion.

An hour or so later, the disaffiliated London Trades Council, controlled by the Stalinists, marched in and took their banners to the opposite side of the park. Here they were harangued by D. N. Pritt, Julius Jacobs, and a few Stalinist trade union officials. It must be admitted, however, that the London Trades Council was able to draw on loyalty of many non-Stalinist trade unionists who felt quite rightly that bureaucratic decrees of the sort that the Trades Union Council had handed down to the London Trades Council were no substitute for the democratic struggle of ideas within the trade union movement.

In fact, due to the TUC's high-handed tactics, the Communist Party which marched behind large numbers of trade union branches (particularly from the AEU and ETU) was able to protect its political prestige and cover its "nakedness." It cannot be doubted that the best and most militant of trade union branches were drawn behind the Stalinist-controlled Labor Day march. This, by the way, explains the phenomenon of pro-Stalinism in the labor and trade union movement which, as has been pointed out in previous London Letters, is quite a different thing from "CP-ism."

A broadly based political struggle inside the trade union branches and Trades Councils could have won the best workers over to democratic socialism and thus shifted the allegiance of the London Trades Council to the Labor Party and away from the CP. Moreover, such a political struggle would have isolated the Communist Party still further. Today the CP seems almost ashamed of its own existence, masquerading as it does behind various front organizations or utilizing the "respectable" cover of bonafide Trades Councils to conceal its identity. It is interesting to note that the (London) Daily Worker, perhaps in its anxiety to remove any suspicion that the Labor Day Committee had anything to do with the CP, carried no May Day message or greetings from the London Trades Council or even from its "own" trade unions (such as the Constructional Engineering Union).

BOROUGH COUNCIL ELECTIONS

This brings us to the Borough Council Elections, which began on Monday, and are to continue until Thursday, May 7, when London is to vote. These elections have a bearing not only on local politics, but also on national politics. A pronounced drift to the right would be the signal for a Tory snap election. A drift to the left would make the Tories think twice. A piling up of Labor votes would convince the Tories that a snap election on Mr. Butler's budget would boomerang.

The Borough Councils deal with housing, old age homes, youth councils, parks, playgrounds, libraries, hygiene, road repairs, public baths and washhouses, and local civil defense. Their importance cannot be overstressed. The Borough Councillors are elected by wards, which subdivide each constituency. The Labor victory of 1945 had an important effect on the party labels which many of the candidates adopted. Prior to that time, the Tories had preferred to use such names as "Ratepayers" on the ballot to conceal their Tory poli-

tics. Labor has forced local politics into a national mould. Today all electors know that it is Labor, Liberal and Tory, no matter what fancy label is used by the Conservative Party. The constituency I live in, for instance, has 126 Conservative, Liberal and Labor candidates (42 of each) all fighting under their true names, using their true colors. The Liberal candidates are becoming rarer from one election to another. They haven't a ghost of a chance.

It must never be forgotten that it was local politics which made the Labor Party, as we know it. It was the hard, grudging work of Labor Borough Councillors (who, by the way, are unpaid), which first established the Labor Party as a national force. The LCC (London County Council) Housing Estates, and the Labor-controlled Borough Council Housing Schemes, testify to the great work carried out by the Labor Party. The Labor Party has tried hard to keep rents low, rates low, and all of the funds at the disposal of the County Councils and the Borough Councils for welfare, educational facilities and housing in the interests of the working class.

In London, at the moment, Labor controls 17 of the Borough Councils and the Tories control only 11. We all are working for a big turnover in the Tory-controlled Borough Councils.

Scanty reports in the American press indicate that the municipal and borough elections showed a sharp swing to Labor. The Labor Party won control in Manchester, Leeds, Plymouth, Oldham, Grimsby, Swindon and Dewsbury, and in London managed to wrest control of at least one borough council and strengthen their majorities in eight others. We trust that further details will be forthcoming in next week's London Letter.—Ed.]

"Revolutionary Threats"

Another matter of concern for the Tories is Labor's "cantankerous" attitude to the Tory Transport Bill [the bill to denationalize the road transport industry.—Ed.] In the course of the struggle in Parliament, Aneurin Bevan has threatened to abolish the House of Lords, and remove the Ulster Unionist MPs from the House of Commons, if the Tories insist on relying on these weapons to prevent the mandate of the people of this country from being expressed. Bevan was speaking officially on behalf of the Labor Front Bench. Whether all his colleagues approve of his "revolutionary" threats is another matter. In any event, the Labor Back Benches cheered him.

It is becoming all too clear that the obstacle to Labor's return to power with a large majority is its lack of policy. Last year was mainly a year of struggle within the Labor movement for a militant leadership which could somehow or other give voice to the feeling of bewilderment at the official leadership's failure to lead, or even to give a lead. There has been a genuine undercurrent of skepticism of official Laborism; a deep-seated opposition to the impossible demands of the arms budget, and a strong desire to see a program which could fire the people with the enthusiasm of 1945. Scarborough and Morecambe forced the official leadership to come into line with the rank and file. When it failed to do so, it was ousted.

This year the struggle within the movement is centering around the program—the detailed and specific program—to be presented to the electors at the next election. The right-wing Labor and trade union leaders are doing their level best to thwart the policies decided on at Scarborough and Morecambe.

More particularly, they are trying to halt the further nationalization projects. The most revolutionary of these projects has already been defeated on the National Executive Council—the project for the nationalization of rented land. Such a move would present nothing less than a revolution in agriculture, and would assure the Labor Party of a new mass support in the countryside.

BOLSHEVISM

Tribune (Bevan's paper) this week spotlights this rejection by the NEC. Reading between the lines of the leading article, it is obvious that Bevan and his supporters are urging the Constituency Parties and trade unions to flood Transport House with resolutions on this subject for the conference at Margate. Undoubtedly this will be a real showdown, as nationalization of rented land is considered by the Tories and some right-wing elements in the movement as "Bolshevism."

Bolshevism or no Bolshevism, the Labor Party is going to nationalize rented land, and that is the end of the matter. The political correspondent for the Observer reports that Clement Attlee himself is in favor of this nationalization! He reports the astonishment of other NEC members at Attlee's conversion. With Attlee in favor of "forced collectivization" (this is considered to be equivalent to land nationalization) anything can happen, the pundits are forced to admit.

It is an open secret that everything possible is being done by the right wing to prevent a landslide of the magnitude we saw at Morecambe. The London Labor Party, for instance, heavily weighted with TGWU officials, has been trying to undercut Tribune with the London Forward (which is subsidized by the executive of the London LP). Unfortunately for the right wing, London Forward is getting nowhere, and stacks of unsold copies clutter up Labor Party offices all over London. Tribune, is fighting a gallant battle, and all attempts by the NEC to "launch" new weekly magazines, or by the London LP to push London Forward will fail—because the rank and file knows what the line-up is.

The London Labor Party Executive has also now, for the first time in its history, a Labor League of Youth representative, elected from the London Youth Advisory Committee of the Federation of Leagues of Youth. The new "change" forced by the 1952 London Labor Party Conference has enabled a well-known left-wing Leaguer, Cyril Smith, to make the voice of the LLY and of the London LP itself heard. The imbalance inside the London LP, where the dead hand of the TGWU bureaucrats has always stifled the proceedings of the London Labor Party Conference, is now slowly being redressed.

Stalinist Victory

And finally, a word about the colonies. The elections in British Guiana, giving the Peoples Progressive Party 18 out of 24 seats in the new Parliament, has shaken the Colonial Office. The fact that the PPP is a Stalinist party—an assurance I have been given by the brother of one of the candidates in the election—has caused great concern here in many circles. However, it appears that the PPP is organizing a sell-out along Popular Front Lines, and has renounced its declared object of withdrawing from the Commonwealth, as well as putting its plans for the nationalization of sugar and other industries in cold storage. Whether this heralds a new line from Moscow it is difficult to say. The only positive thing this sell-out has accomplished, as far as I can ascertain at the moment, is that it has convinced my friend that the Stalinists are enemies of the colonial revolution, and are prepared to betray their most sacred promises in order to gain some diplomatic advantage. Whether his feelings are symptomatic of more widespread reactions remains to be seen.

ISL FUND DRIVE

FUND DRIVE GOES OVER THE TOP!

By ALBERT GATES,
Fund Drive Director

The 1953 fund drive of the ISL closed with a rush in its final week. Although not all returns are in, this final report for LABOR ACTION shows that we have gone over the top with total contributions of \$11,762.50, or 102.2 per cent of the goal. This is, indeed, a remarkable showing, and we take this opportunity to thank our branches, members, friends and sympathizers for making this result possible.

This campaign was a difficult one, but it has gone off splendidly. On the whole it has taken somewhat less pleading and cajoling than is normally the case in financial campaigns. And I think it is a remarkable sign of how much the ISL, SYL and their friends appreciate the value of our press which is sustained by the annual fund drives. In these times the maintenance of our socialist press is a political achievement of genuine magnitude.

As you can see from the box score, the Socialist Youth League ended the campaign in first place. Whether the youth appreciate our press more than the adults is something that cannot actually be measured, but they certainly have shown what it does mean to them by the efficient manner in which they proceeded to surpass their quota and top the drive. The SYL

raised the sum of \$1576 or 126 per cent of their assigned quota. And as has now become the habit in fund drives, we give our youth the top laurels. They can, if they wish, share them with other branches that pressed them just a little during most of the drive.

EVERYONE HAS DONE HIS SHARE

Streator remains in second place with 120 per cent. And in third place is General, which turned in \$1211 or 112.5 per cent, which is pretty good for the National Office. Thanks to the many friends of the League who made that possible. Detroit, too, did remarkably well, surpassing its quota of \$500 and ending in fourth place with 110.6 per cent. And so did Seattle with 110 per cent.

Lack of space prevents us from paying proper respect to all the other branches which have finished their local campaigns with 100 per cent, but they know how much we appreciate it. The two larger branches with the largest quotas, New York and Chicago, have yet to complete their quotas, but they have told us that they will do it. At present they have sent in \$3908.25 and \$1711.75 respectfully for 97.7 per cent and 95 per cent in the standings.

Word from those branches which have not completed their quotas at this writing is that they are continuing their efforts to do so in the quickest possible time. We are holding them to their word. The fact that the drive is over should not deter anyone from making

a contribution to our campaign, if so far they have missed out in doing so.

We are very happy to say in this final report: thank you, one and all! You have made a solid contribution to the cause of socialism in these trying times.

Box Score

	Quota	Paid	%
TOTAL	\$11,500	\$11,762.50	102.2
SYL	1,250	1576	126
Streator	25	30	120
General	1,075	1211	112.5
Detroit	500	553	110.6
Seattle	200	220	110
Oakland	500	510	102
Cleveland	200	203	101.6
Pittsburgh	150	150	100
Indiana	75	75	100
Reading	50	50	100
Oregon	50	50	100
St. Louis	25	25	100
New York	4,000	3908.25	97.7
Chicago	1,800	1711.75	95
Los Angeles	600	576	92.6
Buffalo	650	556	85.5
Philadelphia	250	193	77.2
Newark	250	128	51.2
Akron	50	0	0

PRO AND CON: DISCUSSION

"Has SYL Learned to Act in Good Faith?"

To the Editor:

I suppose it is not impossible that the SYL observers reported the YPSL convention just as they saw it. After all, it is not unheard of for people to see what they want to see. But good faith or no, the slant which your article gives to the convention does a remarkably good job of (a) increasing the strain on YPSL-SP relations, should any SPers happen to read your report and believe it ("maybe we'll pick up the pieces"); and (b) relegating YPSL to a tail on the SYL kite ("so why not join the vanguard in the first place?") I should like, therefore, to make a few partisan remarks interpreting the YPSL convention from a standpoint more favorable to the organizational interests of the YPSL.

To begin with, there is one error of fact in the article, namely your statement that "When the pacifists introduced their particular proposals, they were for the most part rejected by the majority." To the contrary, everything remotely resembling a pacifist proposal was passed.

YPSL-SP RELATIONS

More important, for the moment, is the issue of YPSL relations with the SP. You state that we have taken "steps which lead (us) into even sharper conflict with the pro-war leadership of the Socialist Party." In the first place, the present leadership of the Socialist Party is not pro-war. As LABOR ACTION well enough knows, neither the pro-war right nor the anti-war left was able to win a decisive victory at the last convention of the Socialist Party. If the present SP-NEC is not resolutely anti-war and third camp, therefore, neither is it pro-war and Thomasite; it does not look upon the anti-war sentiments of the YPSL with any such horror as LABOR ACTION pretends, nor does YPSL regard the present SP-NEC with any such hostility as you imply. To the contrary, we are happy to be dealing with one of the most friendly, democratic, and leftward NEC's in more than a decade. You leave an utterly false impression when you say, "Despite the hostility of the parent organization, which in a number of instances has sought to prevent the Young Socialists from pursuing a policy of cooperation with other anti-war socialist organizations. . . SYL is the only organization with which the SP has urged us not to cooperate, and it urged us thus only because three left-wing members of the SP-NEC were convinced, on the basis of old prejudices, that the SYL is a totalitarian organization. Granting this perspective on the part of SP-NEC members, it is no sign of hostility to YPSL's anti-war line that they try to prevent our cooperation with the SYL; I am sure the ISL would be equally concerned were the SYL to start cooperating with Stalinists."

The SP has made absolutely no attempt

to interfere with our pursuance of an anti-war policy in any other way. In many sections of the party we get active cooperation. And even the SP's one attempt to "interfere," its attempt to prevent cooperation with the SYL, has been limited to admonitions, and has been referred, while the cooperation yet goes on, to a committee for further study—apparently a gentlemen's agreement to drop the matter. If this be hostility, let us make the most of it! I wonder how long the SYL would thus try ISL's patience, and get away with it.

The convention did indeed lash out in no uncertain terms against the current unity negotiations with the SDF. But it does not follow that "the ties between the YS and its parent organization have been . . . endangered," or that we think a basically left-wing NEC is busy digging a grave for us. We are merely setting up a howl and opening up a fight lest anything be put over on the predominantly left-wing rank and file of the SP under the cloak of darkness. Rest assured that we expect to win this fight, if a fight even becomes necessary; that we intend a long and mutually beneficial association with the Socialist Party; and that we would much rather inherit the SP than be forced into the *Anschluss* which SYL is preparing for us. More than this I decline to discuss in the press of an as yet rival organization. On the day that I see an SYLER criticizing Max Shachtman or discussing some such affair as the Willoughby Abner fracas in the *Socialist Call*, that day shall I un-

burden myself of my many feelings on the subject of Norman Thomas, or discuss intricate factional maneuvers on SDF unity, in LABOR ACTION.

ON UNITY WITH SYL

Now, as to unity with the SYL. Throughout your article you maintain the impression that it is YPSL's "advance" toward an ISL-SYL position that is making cooperation between the two groups, such as it is, possible. What exalted egotists you "cadres" are! The anti-war program we are developing is every stitch our own; it is the logical extension of our democratic socialist tradition, and if there be points with which you agree, you needn't pretend that we had to borrow them from you. Moreover, YPSL-SYL cooperation is becoming more possible, and will become still more possible, not solely because of YPSL's turn to an anti-war stand, but equally because, and insofar as, we find SYL abandoning the last vestige of the totalitarian elements in Bolshevik tradition and practice, and showing itself increasingly able to act in good faith toward other groups. And indeed, the slow progress that cooperation has made to date is due primarily, in my opinion, to the suspicion that is continually engendered in the minds of many Yipsels, including myself, as to whether SYL really has learned to act in good faith. When all the members of one organization, to a man, are constantly and in a unified manner poking and prying into the internal affairs of another organization, and constantly making comparisons, but without ever exchanging

similarly candid remarks on the internal affairs of their own organization, or so much as breathing that their own organization might be anything less than idyllic (surely members must have some gripes about the way SYL is run; if they don't, they're certainly a passive bunch of dead-heads)—it would appear as if one organization were plotting against the other. SYL will have to evidence its turn to ethical behavior a little better than this, if unity is to become really effective and friendly.

I'm sorry that I must dwell so upon the negative side of YPSL-SYL relations. I could as easily say many fine and laudatory things about ISL-SYL and LABOR ACTION. Perhaps I should have been so courteous as to start out by thanking you for a publicity break such as we shall receive in no other quarter. But I have chosen to emphasize the negative side instead because I think it important in the interests of further cooperation and unity itself to warn you that we Yipsels are not to be taken for fools, merely because we happen to be open-minded and good-natured. I was one of the first Yipsels to advocate limited cooperation with SYL, and I shall be only too happy when I can advocate unlimited cooperation; but I believe in doing things with eyes open, and giving cooperation to whatever extent it can be given without receiving hurt in return, and no more.

Sincerely yours,

Dick FREDERICKSEN
National Chairman, YPSL

For Unity of Anti-War Socialists

Comrade Frederickson's letter is a welcome contribution to the discussion which is now taking place between the Socialist Youth League and the Young Socialists (YPSL), even though we cannot accept his major criticisms of the LABOR ACTION story on the YS convention.

Aside from the factual correction which he starts with, he claims that we misrepresented the current state of relations between the YS and the Socialist Party. Now that may very well be, and Comrade Frederickson is probably in a better position to judge, but all that we can do is draw conclusions on the basis of known facts. Thus, it is known that not only with respect to SYL, but also toward *Anvil*, the anti-war student magazine, has an important body of the SP taken a hostile attitude. If our facts are correct, the New York City Committee of the SP designated someone to "investigate" YPSL's endorsement of the magazine, and his published report hardly indicated approval. This same "investigator" has recently been appointed as party representative to the YPSL.

We prefer to believe that it has been the steadfast position of the YS rather than the friendship of its parent body that has secured the continued support of the YS for *Anvil*. Similarly, we can hardly be expected to know that Comrade Frederickson's proposal to make the YS independent of control by the SP National Executive Committee (which he introduced at the convention, where it was defeated) really had no reference to the current state of SP-YS relations.

PUTTING THINGS OVER

The basis for the good relations between YS and the SP is attributed to the political agreement, or at least lack of hostility which LABOR ACTION's report presumably misrepresented. The YS is against the war and for the third camp. The SP national committee "is not resolutely anti-war and third camp," but neither is it pro-war and Thomasite. Indeed, it is the most friendly, democratic and leftist of any NEC in a decade. This is certainly the most encouraging piece of information since the announcement that this same NEC had voted in favor of unity with the Social Democratic Federation, an organization so intimately associated with support of American foreign policy and its war program that in certain circles its members are referred to as "State Department Socialists." Among these same circles it is also assumed that the SP's apparent willingness to unite with the SDF means that the SP considers itself in more or less sufficient agreement with the SDF to belong in

the same organization with died-in-the-wool supporters of the war.

Now we learn that it means no such thing. It is merely an attempt (by whom; the NEC?) to put something over on the predominantly left-wing rank and file of the SP.

We are certain that there are many genuine anti-war and left-wing members in the SP, and that they are represented on the NEC. Yet we cannot forget that the last time the SP had a referendum on unity with the SDF the vote was 5-1 in favor. No, we may "see what we want to see" but without a magnifying glass it is difficult for us to locate a Socialist Party with a predominantly left-wing rank and file, and an NEC which reflects this sentiment. The NEC's willingness, whatever may have been the motives of this or that member of it, to consider unity with the SDF without even raising the question of war policy as a question in dispute, is sufficient for us as a measure of the SP majority's position on the war as a practical political matter.

We do not suggest that Comrade Frederickson unburden himself on Norman Thomas in LABOR ACTION. We would much rather see an article by him, or by some other anti-war member of the NEC in the *Socialist Call* presenting the anti-war and third camp position; not as a letter to the editor, or as part of a discussion column, but as an accepted and "legitimate" point of view within the SP. The real problem, as we see it, is how to strengthen the organized fight for an anti-war program—wherever such a fight is in progress. But Comrade Frederickson seems to prefer to reduce the question of the organizational implications of our common position on the war to the level of organizational maneuvers and factional plotting, and just in passing, as it were, to make some kind of an analogy between the SYL and the Stalinists. Really, Comrade Frederickson!

But if a plot there be, let us bring it out into the light for all to view! Our belief, as we tried to express it in LA's report of the YS convention, is that between the SP which is going rightward, and the YS which is going leftward there is an ever-widening gulf, which becomes the greater the stronger grows the anti-war position of YS. The last convention, as we wrote "represents a consolidation and strengthening of the anti-war left wing. . . ." Now Comrade Frederickson may dispute this; he may think that the YS is not "becoming" more anti-war, or that if it is the significance is negligible. But for us, this fact is self-evident, and of considerable significance. At least he will allow the SYL to believe

that our two organizations now have more in common than heretofore, and that this finds its expression in our increased collaboration in areas of common concern.

FOR ANTI-WAR UNITY

If, as we believe will be the case, such collaboration should prove that we are in actuality moving closer together, and in the process removes by mutual interaction, some of the remaining differences which exist, then organizational unity would certainly be posed as a desirable thing. For our part, we have never made any secret of our desire for the unity of all anti-war socialist forces adhering to a third-camp view. Such a desire follows naturally from the hope of strengthening the socialist anti-war tendency by consolidating its forces and weakening the pro-war forces which speak in the name of socialism. Now such a desire, and the actions to which it gives rise, may revive old, outlived prejudices resulting from past controversies and earlier disputes. Thus, when the SYL takes an interest in the developments taking place in the SP and YS, when it seeks to encourage every sign of militant anti-war sentiment, and where such sentiment exists in strength to collaborate with it in the most open and frank fashion, we don't consider this to be "prying and poking," or even worse, "plotting."

As for the pique which Comrade Frederickson feels at our "tone," which to him appears condescending and "egotistical," again we are afraid that the wish is father to the accusation. Our article spoke of the YS and SYL having "been drawn closer together in the course of pursuing their common aim of opposing the war," of "common adherence to a third-camp position." Nowhere did we speak in any way of any direct influence of the SYL upon the YS, of the YPSL's advance "toward an SYL-ISL position" in the manner of "relegating YPSL to a tail on the SYL kite." We hope that a re-reading of the original article will, at least in this case, induce Comrade Frederickson to change his opinion. It is sufficient for us that we hold common ideas, without regard for priority!

Fraternally yours,

Don HARRIS,
Nat'l Chairman, SYL

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The New Crisis in the SWP

THE ISSUE IS: WHAT IS STALINISM?

By ALBERT GATES

A new and important factional struggle has broken out in the Socialist Workers Party. In contrast to previous disputes in that party, this one occurs within the authentic Cannon group itself; the contenders have been members of that political faction for years and years. Of even greater importance, however, is that, other issues aside, the split among the Cannonites occurs on the one question which has united them against all opponents: Russia and Stalinism.

A strong minority faction led by Cochran, Clarke, Bartell and Frankel, a faction which has been in process of formation for several years, has finally taken the initiative in a political fight against the Cannonite majority. The large number of discussion bulletins dealing entirely with the present fight reveal that the political differences are not new, but actually began when some of the leaders initiated a discussion to determine what attitude the party should take toward the satellite states created by the expansion of Stalinism beyond the Russian borders.

A KIND OF POLITICAL CRISIS

To those acquainted with the main political position of the Socialist Workers Party, that which distinguished it from all other political groups and determined its politics (the theory that Russia is a degenerated workers state), the inability of the party to arrive swiftly at a forthright attitude toward these new states already indicated a kind of political crisis. Armed with this theory and with what Cochran had once described as a "finished program," the party approached this whole problem with great hesitation, timidity and fear.

This was understandable, since the theory of the degenerated workers' state was forcing the SWP to accept the satellite states as prototypes of Russia, as smaller and less important degenerated workers states, but of the same type nevertheless. [It is interesting to note that the word "deformed" was substituted for "degenerated" in describing these states to get away from the difficulty of explaining from what they had degenerated.—Ed.] The implications of this was fairly clear to all of the Cannonite leadership. For if these states destroyed the capitalist classes and, nationalized their property, under the ingenious syllogism which determined SWP thinking (nationalized property equals a workers state; a workers state equals nationalized property) they had to accept these states as in the likeness of Russia and apply to them too the slogan of "unconditional defense against imperialism." But if that were true, then it meant that Stalinism was expanding the socialist revolution on a world scale, with "counter-revolutionary methods" it is true, but expanding it none-the-less.

ONCE AGAIN: WHAT IS STALINISM?

The moment the SWP began to grapple with these questions, the intense struggle was actually begun; it has now reached the point where two irreconcilable factions have developed with differences that can only become sharper as time passes. The fight has returned the party to the basic question: What is the nature of the Russian state and Stalinism? To those who are familiar with the SWP this will seem incredible. Yet that is what is being debated once more. It is impossible for the contending factions to come to genuine grips with the concrete questions of attitude toward the new Chinese state, the Korean war, the Tito regime, international perspectives, and even tasks of SWP in America, without once more rehashing the Russian question.

The factional struggle therefore takes on a somewhat bizarre form. The majority faction charges the minority with "conciliation with Stalinism" and having lost its faith in the "independence of the party." The latter charge refers to the proposal made by the minority that the SWP transform itself into a propa-

ganda group since it is not a party in any important sense of the word. By calling itself a party and trying to act as one, says the minority, it is deceiving itself and its following.

So far as the minority is concerned, this proposal like all its other positions, arises from its evaluation of Stalinism. The minority charges the majority with "vulgar anti-Stalinism" and "Stalinophobia." The majority says that the Cochranites are "liquidationists." The Cannonites, in turn, are charged with being "sectarians" and frustrated ones at that.

The language used in the struggle indicates its sharpness. As we disclose the concrete nature of the differences in this and other articles, the readers will easily note how irreconcilable this fight really is.

As against the Cannonite majority, the minority acts like a firm and confident faction. Why? Because its political positions are the logical extension of the main theory of the SWP and the 4th International, whose views coincide with it, that Russia is a degenerated workers state, in opposition to capitalist imperialism, and is progressive as against capitalism. This basic theoretical position of the SWP is faithfully extended by the minority in an effort to understand post-war developments. With this theory it has been able to take a forthright position in support of the satellite states.

A MAJORITY IN FLIGHT FROM THEORY

The position of the majority is improvised and instinctive; it is a flight from the basic theory on which both groups stand. But it is not a clear, forthright and conscious recoil from the terrible consequences of the theory of the degenerated workers state. The majority chokes up at the thought of accepting Stalinism as a revolutionary socialist force which is extending the socialist revolution by unacceptable means. Yet it cannot successfully cope with the arguments of the minority so long as it adheres, at least formally, to the basic theory of Russia and Stalinism which both groups embrace. If there is any credit to the position taken by the Cannonite majority, it is of uncertain value, precisely because without a strong theoretical basis, the fight against the minority can only be improvised and instinctive.

Without a strong theoretical basis, the fight of the majority therefore takes on a primitive character. In the debates which have already taken place the minority has shown itself to be decidedly superior in the theoretical dispute and in logical construction of what the program of the SWP, given its basic theory, should and must be. The only way in which the Cannonite majority could meet this formidable minority is by an abandonment of the basic position which it holds in common with the minority.

As things stand now, then, the differences between the two factions divide themselves into the following categories (their order is not important, expressing only how they are placed in the series of debates between the two factions):

- The SWP: party or propaganda group.
- the nature of the satellite states; Titoism and Yugoslavia, and Mao and China.
- Russia and Stalinism.
- the decisions of the 3rd congress of the 4th International.

All the differences are contained within these divisions. We shall try to state what these differences are before taking them up in detail in future articles. If we take them up at all, it is because the discussion in the SWP has an important bearing on the large political questions of our time. They give us another opportunity to deal with the effects of Trotsky's erroneous theory of Russia as a degenerated workers state, as it has been developed and extended by his epigones and of presenting once more, what we consider an internationalist socialist position to be.

ONCE AGAIN: THE PARTY REGIME

In the Cannonite organization, all previous political factional disputes were colored over

with question of internal regime. This fight is no exception. The minority documents describe Cannon's attitude from the very beginning as one of great impatience. He wanted to resolve the differences that were only first emerging by proposing a split, a cold split without a long drawn-out political dispute.

The differences in the party began to reveal themselves formally in factional formations in the fall of 1951 over the question of the Stalinist movement and the party's approach to it. Earlier than that serious differences developed over the war in Korea, at which time their weekly paper expressed a position similar to LABOR ACTION, or what the minority called a concession to "third campism." (Both factions, by the way, are vigorous opponents of the theory of the "third camp.") And when the paper took the position for an independent Korea against both sides in the war, the minority instantly denounced its line and demanded its immediate change to support of the North Koreans. Subsequently the fight developed in earnest. In its statement of views, the minority described it in the following terms:

"The first differences broke out in the PC and the weekly paper in the fall of 1951. . . . They concerned our attitude to the Stalinist movement and our approach to it in the press. It had become clear to many of us that our position needed a sharp correction. The Stalinist movement, regardless of its desires, had been thrust into opposition to imperialism; it was persecuted and hounded as the chief target of the witchhunt. At the same time it was being shaken internally by the contradiction of a class-collaborationist policy that could not be realized in practice, for lack of any important bourgeois allies. Our press, however, was operating as though the war-time collaboration between the Stalinists and the State Department had never ended. Every time we raised problems of this kind—our attitude to the CP trials (the emphasis to be placed on them), the ALP, the *Monthly Review* and a series of others, our motives, were called into question: Were we proposing a 'soft' line, a line of 'conciliation to Stalinism'? Was Stalinist work 'Point One, Two or Three'? It was impossible for us to speak or make a proposal in the PC on some point relating to Stalinism without prefacing it with an earnest of our good intentions. There was clearly a hunt for 'Stalinist dangers.' This was in effect admitted by Comrade Cannon himself when he said in the now famous 'split' meeting of the PC in March 1952 that 'I do not now believe there is a tendency of conciliation to Stalinism in the leadership.'"

A FACTION FIGHT—FOR LEADERS ONLY

Although there were many attempts made to reconcile the differences—by suppressing them, rather than resolving them—they persisted and the fight in the leading committee continually broke out every time the party faced a concrete political question. The party as a whole was quite unaware of these struggles in the political and national committee and it reached the organization in a unique and abnormal way. The preparation of documents for the SWP, 1952 convention revealed sharp differences when the minority attempted to insert its views. These differences were in turn overshadowed by Cannon's continuous threats of split. Cannon's position was that a split was inevitable and would occur despite anyone's desires or intentions, the minority says. At one point the minority charges Cannon with having declared that here would be a split precisely because there were no fundamental differences!

At the May 1952 plenum which adopted the main resolution for the convention of that year, the faction struggle became sharper. Cannon "came forward with a declaration of war . . . he knew what the 'fundamental differences' were . . . insisted that the 'situation in the committee' be placed as a special point on the Plenum agenda."

Although Cannon made the issue in the committee "the loss of faith in the independence of the party," it is clear from all the documents that he really knew, if not in its broad theoretical and political implications (a subject somewhat beyond his area of intense interest), quite instinctively that the position of the minority was, despite all theory and logic, a capitulation to,

(Continued on page 7)

BOOKS and Ideas

U.S. Socialism—Its History and Heritage

THE AMERICAN SOCIALIST MOVEMENT 1897-1912, by Ira Kipnis.—Columbia University Press, N. Y., 496 pages, \$6.00

By DON HARRIS

A study of our American socialist forerunners can be of great and varied value. From their struggles it is possible to derive inspiration; and from their ideological disputes we can trace the source of those later political problems and developments which in their sum total make up a major part of our intellectual heritage.

Socialists have always been aware of the importance of such a tradition. Historians of socialist parties have been numerous, and they have frequently employed the talents of the most famous theoretical writers. But American socialism has, up to now, lacked any kind of history which in a general and over-all fashion attempted to deal with the growth and development of the Socialist Party before the first World War. The work sometimes considered as the standard authority, Hillquit's *History*, appears today to be truncated by its date of publication, and in addition suffers from factional tendentiousness. Works on special topics have sometimes recorded separate aspects of the SP's history, but never from a rounded, above all, historical point of view. This is all the more unfortunate, as the SP during this period eclipsed all other radical forces and became the face of American socialism.

This is why any serious attempt to present the history of pre-war socialism in America would be welcome. But when such a history is written with an obvious understanding and sympathy for the movement, neither idolizing its virtues nor minimizing its defects, it may be considered a truly valuable contribution to the literature of and on American socialism.

Graphic, Informative

Ira Kipnis' *The American Socialist Movement 1897-1912* comes extremely close to completely satisfying the need for such a history. The work of a professional historian, it contains nothing of the academician's contemptuousness for phenomena outside his range of social understanding. The style makes his account extremely graphic, readable as well as informative. The demands of professional scholarship would appear inhibiting only to the extent that they have forced the author to resort to ironic and incomplete commentaries rather than a clear statement of his own viewpoint toward the political differences which he discusses. This prevents any positive viewpoint from being presented directly and limits the value of the judgments expressed. It also leaves in doubt Kipnis' own specific political views, although his general radical sympathies are obvious.

Aside from this possibly unavoidable deficiency, however, the book contains the basic material for an examination of this part of the history of the Socialist Party. The only other regrettable feature of its academic origin is the book's price, which probably will limit its sale considerably.

Kipnis begins his account with a brief description of the two tendencies out of the fusion of which the Socialist Party originated in 1901: the "Rochester" section of the immigrant, sectarian Marxian Socialist Labor Party, and the (largely) native, electorally oriented Social Democratic Party. He describes the fusion of these two groups into the Socialist Party, and the development of this party up through 1912, which he designates as the "peak of Socialist power." In broad outline he recounts the various campaigns for office which the party waged on a national and local scale. Though obviously critical of the policy of "pure and simple" reformism which lay behind a great deal of such activity, Kipnis elucidates the important but largely ignored role played by the SP in bringing into existence early labor and social legislation.

In a period when the rapid formation of trusts and monopolies was accompanied by industrial and agricultural depressions, starvation wages, child labor and vicious opposition to all attempts at trade union organization, sentiment was widespread for all kinds of social legislation. By becoming the exponents of all kinds of reforms, the Socialist Party not only gained broad support among farmers, middle class elements, and intellectuals, but also exerted a strong and steady pressure on the Democratic Party which had at all times to guard against losing its working class base. When latter-day social democrats make the plaintive accusation that "Roosevelt stole our program" they express a political fact which existed long before the New Deal.

And the tremendously progressive significance of this fact should never be overlooked whatever the further criticism of the way in which the policy of "pure and simple" reform was carried out by the Socialist Party. Not the advocacy of reforms, but the subordination of all other considerations to the method of reform through electoral action, and the interests sacrificed for the sake of prospective electoral victories—these were what made the Socialist Party an inadequate instrument for genuine socialist aims.

Ideological Disputes

A number of chapters in Kipnis' book are devoted to discussion of the many ideological disputes which went on within the party almost from the day of its founding. An exceedingly clear picture of the different tendencies emerges, together with a picture of how they managed to coexist in a single party for so many years. At its beginning, the SP based itself on a Marxist program which formally it never repudiated. Kipnis makes a somewhat formal, but convenient differentiation of the tendencies into a "left, right and center." The right wing consisted of various types of municipal reformers, Christian socialists and simple liberals who were not only anti-Marxist but loaded with all of the backward prejudices of the American middle class. Victor Berger and Seymour Stedman were the spokesmen, if not the prototypes for this section of the party. It was not until the right was united in a bloc with the center under Hillquit's leadership, however, that the party turned definitely in the direction of seeking electoral victories at all costs.

While describing the center's ideas and actions quite adequately, Kipnis tends to ignore its main source of political strength. It was the center's achievement that it saw the necessity for creating an indissoluble link between socialism and the American labor movement. Even in the form of the AFL, the labor movement was both a challenge and a source of danger to American socialism. The SP met the challenge by working in the AFL with considerable success, all the more significant since the left-wing militants were devoting themselves to building the rival IWW. Not only did socialists hold numerous posts, but they played an important part in founding and building unions in the garment, building and other industries.

Unfortunately, in their conception of the role of socialists, the center limited their aims to that of the union's leadership; subject only to the effort to get labor endorsement for the political platform of the party. The fear of "alienating" union members and leaders led the SP members to forego advocating any policy (such as industrial unionism) which threatened the position of the union bureaucracy. Under the slogan that the party "had no right to tell labor what to do," it attempted to play no real directing role in the labor movement.

The Fighting Left Wing

Through fear of alienating large sections of the middle class and the AFL bureaucracy, the right and center found themselves in common opposition to the SP

left wing which in its own fashion sought to imbue the movement with more than just an educational and electoral content, and to make it a fighting organization for militant political and economic struggles of the working class. In formulating theories about what they were doing, the left wingers fell into all kinds of sectarian and syndicalist errors, errors which only hindered them and helped defeat their attempt to win the Socialist Party to a left wing program.

The weakness of the left wing was perpetuated by its failure to establish more than local influence, and to throw up national leaders of comparable stature and calibre to the editors, ministers and lawyers who led the party nationally. There was never such a thing as a left wing conference, or an officially recognized left wing organ responsible to any elected caucus leadership. Indeed, it is difficult to speak of any significant tendency within the left as genuinely Marxist; certainly there was a lack of original Marxist theory, and even competent individual Marxists.

Contrary to general opinion, Debs emerges from Kipnis' book as far more than just the militant orator of great heart. For all his limitations, Debs appears as one of the most clear-sighted and perspicacious of all the left wing figures. For despite his misvaluation of the potentialities of revolutionary unionism, it was Debs who came closest to an understanding of what it was possible and necessary for socialists to accomplish on the American scene of his day.

The Socialist Party was not the left wing, which was ultimately defeated and demoralized with the expulsion of Haywood. It was above all the leadership of the electorally-oriented right and center. Kipnis paints a devastating picture of this amalgamation; its leadership by men like Hillquit (whom Trotsky once characterized as the ideal leader for socialist dentists); its narrow viewpoint, and the theoretical ignorance. The formal opposition of the American SP toward the first World War has gained for it a reputation for leftism which was not at all deserved during the pre-war period.

SP As It Really Was

Within the ranks flourished not only all kinds of consciously anti-Marxist ideas, but also patriotic and even chauvinistic sentiments. Thus the party went on record as favoring the exclusion of "Oriental" immigrants, in flat opposition to the position of the Second International, but entirely in conformity with the position of the AFL. Further, while formally standing for the equality of all citizens including Negroes, the pre-war SP never considered the struggle for civil rights to be an immediate concern of socialists. Even Debs, who fought chauvinism wherever he found it in the party or the labor movement, believed that the achievement of Negro equality must necessarily await the solution of the social question. Other SP leaders upheld the necessity of segregation while advocating "economic equality." But even here the party never consistently undertook to fight Jim Crow in the section of the labor movement under its influence. Rather than proving by this that the SP was a defender of segregation, it demonstrates the typical approach of the party's leadership: all questions which did not appear to be available to direct attack via the election platform were put off to the millenium after socialism had been achieved. This was the theoretical source of all of the party's opportunism.

We have tried to indicate some of the main questions on which Kipnis throws light, and with which later generations of American socialists are largely unfamiliar. Kipnis criticizes all of the tendencies severely, if with differing emphasis. If the book has any major failing it is in the author's tendency to accept the SP as the natural and possibly inevitable product of American conditions and peculiarities. Keeping this in mind, we can gain a greater understanding of the movement which, whatever its shortcomings, represents an important part of our socialist tradition.

New Crisis in the SWP — —

(Continued from page 6)

a drawing closer to Stalinism. If he did not and does not yet care too much about what this would mean on a world scale, the effects of such a policy on the SWP he knows can only be disastrous.

NO RECONCILIATION WITH STALINISM

If he is saddled with a theory which makes the course of the minority mandatory upon the party as a whole, he is quite ready, without understanding it too well, to compromise the theory upon which the party rests, or adopt a line of policy which is irreconcilable with the theory. Cannon will have no reconciliation with Stalinism, a policy which would wreck the SWP.

Yet, with these unmistakably fundamental differences present in the leadership, the 1952 convention was held without alluding at all to the grave disputes in the committee. No sooner was the convention over, however, than every effort of the leadership to cover over the dispute was shattered and the fight broke out more vigorously than ever before. It reached the membership in a strange way, not through the formal presentation of documents by contending factions in the leadership, but by the presentation of a "program of action" by Bartell in preparation for the local convention of the New York organization.

Bartell proposed a course of action in New York

which challenged the majority position on the nature of the party by its concentration of work in the Stalinist arena of organizations, and along propagandistic lines. The representatives of the majority in the New York City Committee took up the challenge contained in Bartell's proposals and from that point on the faction struggle became legitimized as an open conflict in the party as a whole.

After repeated demands made on the minority to state its positions and issue its platform, the minority has done so, while the majority has as yet failed to reply to them with its own platform. The majority cannot rest on the convention decisions because these were an evasion of the differences in the party and a deliberate suppression of the theoretical-political disputes. It has to reply to the documents of the minority and we shall await with interest the nature of its reply. We are certain that the majority will have considerable difficulty in doing so. For in the minority, it will meet highly doctrinaire, talmudist and formalist disputants who demand of the majority an adherence to the basic theory, the point of departure for the SWP.

A STRANGE, UNREAL WORLD

We can already see in part the dreary development of the struggle. The majority, through Joseph Hansen, says that the Stalinist bureaucracy in Russia is a "re-

formist bureaucracy"; the minority calls it a "labor bureaucracy," following Trotsky's unhappy analogy in which Russia is likened to a big trade union. Hansen asserts that the Stalinist bureaucracy is "counter-revolutionary through and through," or "to the core"; the minority asks: "how can a counter-revolutionary bureaucracy lead revolutions?", which the majority admits it did. Both groups clash as they try to pass through the needle's eye, and the fight takes place in a strange, unreal world, because the theory on which they both operate in common is unreal.

The fight can have a positive value only, if in its development, the majority abandons the false theory which it now has in common with the minority, namely, that Russia is a degenerated workers state, meriting the unconditional defense of the working class. If it fails to see Russia and Stalinism as a counter-revolutionary, anti-socialist, anti-working class phenomenon, it will smash itself completely on the shoals of its own false theory.

On the premises of the current struggle in the SWP, the two factions are irreconcilably separated. The minority follows the logic of the basic theory aforementioned; the majority hesitates to adopt that logic. The minority is ready to embrace all the sad consequences of the theory which must lead to a reconciliation with Stalinism; the majority recoils from it instinctively, without clarity, purpose or direction.

The Neurotic Theory — —

(Continued from page 1)

PWs can be readily induced to subscribe to the credo of their captors for any number of neurotic reasons—irrespective of the particular objective contents of this credo. After all, there are recorded cases of Jewish women who fell madly in love with their executioners in the Nazi extermination camps.

NEUROTIC OVERTONES

But though the Stalinist appeal may have neurotic overtones for types such as those whom Karen Horney has classified in her exceptionally interesting *Neurosis and Human Growth*, it has also an objective, anti-capitalist content which exerts a powerful attraction upon persons sensitive to the anti-human aspects of Western, that is, capitalist culture.

It can, therefore, make a profound appeal to the idealism and to the desire for logical consistency of exceptionally bright people. Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, and Allen Nunn May, to take examples from a section of the intelligentsia which has gone through a mythological investiture of recent years, are any number of things, but they are not fools.

It is this objective factor in Stalinist propaganda which makes the incredible upper-class ravings of Rebecca West (the English specialist on treason whose analyses have appeared in the *New Yorker* and elsewhere), not only so infuriating but from the point of view of a reasoning person, so uninformative outside the realm of demonology. If a person has no sympathy for the underdog, or if he is so totally immersed in the dominant ideology of his particular capitalist society as to be unable even to understand the forces motivating the actions of other persons not so situated, the step to considering Stalinism as a neurotic manifestation is an inconsequential one.

That the GI in Korea has not proved more vulnerable than he has shown himself to be is a tribute not to the military and political conduct of the war itself, but to the brute fact of the material strength and wealth of U. S. capitalism in contrast to the whole rest of the world, to the accompanying political primitiveness of the American people as a whole, and to an acceptable troop rotation policy.

WAR WITHOUT PERSPECTIVE

Nevertheless, it is a war which is vulnerable to Stalinist propaganda. First of all, it is a war without a perspective. In the European Theater of Operations during World War II, for example, the GI could watch the phase lines moving forward on the situation maps and know that at some future but finite date the junction with the Russians would be achieved and the war would be over.

Nothing like that holds in Korea. How peace is to be attained remains nebulous—not only to GIs manning rifle company outposts in Korea, but to the rearmost of all rear echelon brass in Washington.

In the meantime the troops are being put through the meatgrinder of static warfare whose horrors, they know, would only be exceeded by those that a full-scale offensive would bring. It is, apparently, a war which can neither be liquidated nor expanded. For them it is to one degree or another an unnecessary war.

On top of this basic conviction, the Stalinists hammer away at the imperialist, interventionist character of the war. They insist upon the right of the Korean and Chinese peoples to settle their respective economic and political problems themselves. And when the GIs see the frightful poverty of the Asian peoples first hand, it should not be surprising that not the least sensitive and intelligent among them, unfortified by an equivalent analysis of Stalinism which a capitalist United States has proved unable to give them, and undermined by lectures from captured air corps officers in which they state that they have engaged in germ warfare, should be attracted toward Stalinism. When such an appeal is made to Negro, Puerto Rican, Mexican, and soldiers from other minority groups who are discriminated against at home, the effect can be all the more devastating.

NO IDEOLOGICAL CONVICTION

The attempt to explain away the Stalinist successes on neurotic grounds is another proof that the United States neither understands nor can conduct serious political warfare. The plain fact is that the American soldier is sustained by almost no ideological conviction.

The reverse of this is manifested with startling clarity among Korean and Chinese PWs who since the publicized dem-

onstrations on Koje Island last year have continued an unbroken series of protests despite violent U. S. repression. Making every allowance for the employment of terror by Stalinist-GPU robots within the compounds, such a record of combativity could hardly be sustained without the basic agreement of a majority of the captives. It is an agreement based upon the Stalinist opposition to domestic and foreign capitalism.

A fundamental fact of world political life today is that almost the entire globe, to one degree of negation or another, is opposed to the pretensions of U. S. capital. It is a fact which the framers of U. S. policy, official, academic, and dilettante are absorbing with the greatest of difficulty.

The thesis that Stalinism is a neurotic phenomenon has some corollaries worth pursuing. We hope that Prof. Sidney Hook, the unguided missile of an oily, academic anti-Stalinism, whose antipathy to psychoanalysis is well known, will commit a few withered sociological platitudes to paper on this subject. In the

meantime, while waiting for "John Dewey's bulldog," as the Prof. is fond of thinking of himself, to lumber to the end of his social-democratic chain and yawn a few toothless yawns, we would like to make an observation on the subject ourselves.

CHINESE STALINIST NEUROTIC?

If the acceptance of Stalinism is a manifestation of emotional illness, accomplished by Chinese Stalinist brainwashing or otherwise, we are immediately faced with the fact that at least an important fraction of the 450 million Chinese who in one fashion or another have come to accept the fact of Stalinism are neurotic.

That means that these people are not basically susceptible to political propaganda and that the Far Eastern Voice of America might as well close down. It would, of course, be a little rough on the currently employed Ph.D.s from the New School for Social Research (now contributing its bit to the cold war by discreetly covering the portraits of Lenin and Stalin

in the Orozco murals), but it would give the boys a chance to earn an honest living.

As an alternative to political warfare a full scale military offensive against the Chinese could be opened up—a task, however, now apparently far beyond the material forces available to the United States.

Another alternative would be to arrange a peace based upon freezing the status quo. This, of course, would not solve the problem, only postpone its solution.

The course we would like to see pursued follows with iron logic from the premises established by the Pentagon in the present situation. This course, we propose to discuss in our concluding article next week.

(Next week Comrade Fenwick will present a strategy logically derived from the Pentagon's "psychiatric" theory of Stalinism, and will discuss the relationship of some of the most influential American schools of psychoanalytic theory to the politics of our time.—Ed.)

Korea Truce — —

(Continued from page 1)

the French, with their heavier equipment, from mounting an effective counter-attack, and thus would give the Vietminh time to organize its political victory.

STALINIST STRATEGY

We have no "inside" information on the reason for the withdrawal. But everything points to the theory that it is a result of orders from Moscow or Peiping. Whether the original invasion was also undertaken on such orders, to demonstrate what the Stalinists are capable of in that area, or was started on the initiative of the Stalinist Vietminh leaders themselves will only be known in time. But the withdrawal fits in with the idea that present Stalinist world strategy calls for an end to the fighting in Asia, or at least for the prevention of an extension of the military struggle there.

The American government has made it clear that any general truce in Asia must include Indo-China. It is doubtful whether even the Kremlin would dare to abandon the Vietminh completely as the price for a truce, though there is nothing in the history of Stalinism which would preclude such a betrayal of its own supporters if the stakes are high enough. But an extension of the war in that area would be clearly incompatible with any serious move for a truce in Asia as a whole, and could give the Americans an excuse for refusing to conclude a truce even in Korea, if such were their desire.

If the events in Laos indicate that the Stalinists may be calling in their warhounds, it appears that the Americans are going to have greater difficulty with their own ally in Korea, namely the government of Syngman Rhee. Ever since the truce talks in Korea have been resumed, the Rhee government has instigated a series of demonstrations all of which have as their demand that no truce be concluded which will maintain the division of Korea. The government itself, and its leader, have stated repeatedly that South Korea will not willingly accept any truce on the present battle-lines, and certainly will do all in its power to prevent any permanent settlement which would leave the country divided.

NORTH OF THE YALU

In addition to threats to continue or resume the war on its own if its United Nations allies should make a truce or peace unacceptable to it, the Rhee government has gone so far as to propose a buffer zone in Manchuria, north of the Yalu River, as a protection for a unified Korea. This idea was put forth in a statement by Foreign Minister Pyung Yung Tai on May 8, which was given wide circulation. This underlines the irreconcilable, even fanatical attitude of the Rhee government toward anything but total victory.

Of course the wishes of the South Korean government have only the faintest bearing on what will actually be done. Although the war was officially entered by the United States to protect this regime from a Stalinist invasion, since the early days of the war it has had no more power than does the North Korean Stalinist puppet. The only difference of significance in this respect is that the Stalinists at least have enough political understand-

ing to give North Koreans the leading role in the truce negotiations, while the Americans do not permit the South Korean attendant on their truce team to as much as open his mouth during the sessions.

Thus, a truce may finally be at hand in Korea. But the attitude of the Rhee government indicates how far from really solving the problem of that country a truce would still leave us. In fact, the problem is utterly subordinated to the

world struggle between the two power-coli, and can find no solution within its context which would be worth the paper it is written on. That is the tragedy of the Korean people. In a less poignant sense, it is also the political tragedy of those well-meaning souls who support either side in this world struggle on the grounds that by doing so they are trying to protect the interests of small and helpless nations such as Korea.

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