

LABOR ACTION

Independent Socialist Weekly

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FIVE CENTS

ELECTION ISSUE

Inside:

Special Reports on the Election
from
New York, Detroit, California,
Chicago, Pittsburgh, Wisconsin

WHY EISENHOWER WON

**The Two Paradoxes of the Election Results... What the People Voted Against...
Who Were the Ten Million?... 'Labor Vote' Didn't Swing... A Look at Next Trends**

By HAL DRAPER

If Eisenhower's victory was a "landslide," it was the most peculiar "landslide" in American electoral history. As a matter of fact, the results in general were, in several very important respects, among the most seeming-contradictory in recent times. But by this time, as we write one short week after the event, it is not so very mysterious on the main counts.

Interpretation has to revolve around the two big paradoxes of the returns. These were:

(1) A Republican president was voted in by the greatest popular majority ever, and by the crushing electoral-college majority which gave the word landslide to the headlines, BUT—there was no corresponding spectacular gain for the GOP as a party in local elections and an unprecedentedly small gain for the party in the congressional elections.

(2) Stevenson was defeated, and defeated badly, BUT—he not only received more votes than did Truman when he won in 1948, he not only got more votes than any losing candidate had ever garnered before; he also got more votes than any WINNING candidate had ever piled up, with the exception of Roosevelt. And Stevenson in defeat scored a higher vote even than Roosevelt had done in 1944 or 1932, the latter's first and last campaign.

Talk of an Eisenhower landslide by itself is illusory. This need not be argued with respect to the electoral-college side of the landslide: in the American system, such a result merely means that the proportions over the country have been more or less uniform, without great sectional differences. The division in the popular vote was 55-45 per cent. All of the elections between 1920 and 1940 were won by wider percentages.

Blind-Alley Vote

But even if "landslide" is thrown out as a bit of headline jargon, the fact is that Eisenhower swept in by a decisive vote, that something new had happened to the voting lineup of the American people. What, and why?

Was it because Eisenhower was a popular war hero with a winning personality? Was it simply "time for a change"? Was it a vote against the Korean war? Was it the sinister result of the McCarthyite "Communism" issue? Was it disgust with the corruption that had festered in the Democratic administration?

These are the explanations which are being advocated with different degrees of emphasis by commentators. The official Democratic Party line, reportedly arrived at in conference, seems to be that Stevenson merely lost a popularity

contest. If we were to plump for any of them, it would be to put first emphasis on the fact that the people registered their frustration, irritation and discontent with the blind alley of the Korean war.

This by itself is too simple; yet, in another way, the broader reason is even simpler.

We submit that, to an overriding extent, the swing to Eisenhower was not motivated by any definite political issue or issues as such, but was primarily a vote of blind frustration, of discontent against WHAT IS, without even a clear idea of what this vote was against, let alone for.

This is not to claim that in previous elections the people always knew consciously and deliberately what they wanted and what they expected to get; there is no need to paint such a false picture of the political awareness and understanding of the U. S. electorate as a whole at any previous time. But what specially distinguishes the wellsprings of this vote in 1952 is its amorphousness. It was not so much against "the mess in Washington"; it was against The Mess, period.

From all sides it is pretty widely agreed that the main focal point of this mood was the Korean war. We should like to be able to report that the American people voted against this war. But that would not be the truth, by and large,

though no doubt a good deal of inchoate anti-war sentiment was involved. For the Korean war mess is merely the biggest and most important component of the shapeless fears and undefined discontents that beset American society at the same time that the Democrats could campaign on the slogan "You never had it so good."

Eisenhower's popularity and status as a war hero may have played a bigger part than we think at the moment. But there had been another war hero, who came home to find that he could get nowhere in politics at this time, not even in the ranks of the Republican Party, and who therefore had to retire on a salary paid by Remington Rand instead of by a grateful people.

Was it time for a change? Obviously, it is unnecessary to ask now whether a majority thought so, but the explanation explains re-

New York's Liberal Party Makes Big Gains; Vote for Counts High

By PETER WHITNEY

NEW YORK, Nov. 9.—The elections in New York State resulted in a big Republican victory, a big defeat for the Democrats, and an impressive strengthening of the position of the Liberal Party.

The Liberals, offering the voters an independent alternative in their candidate for U. S. Senate, Dr. George S. Counts, emerged in a substantially stronger and more powerful position, despite the Eisenhower landslide in the state as in the nation.

Eisenhower carried the state, outside the traditional Democratic stronghold of New York City, by the greatest plurality of any presidential candidate, while his total plurality over Stevenson was 851,032. Stevenson carried only three counties—New York, Brooklyn, and the Bronx—winning the overwhelming support of the Negro and other minority districts, but the upstate vote canceled out his New York City victory.

had an easy victory over the weak machine hack, Brooklyn Borough President John Cashmore. Cashmore squeezed out a bare 718-vote lead over Ives even in New York City and was completely swamped by the upstate vote.

The Liberals gained substantially in this election and demonstrated their political power. The Stevenson vote on the Liberal Party line was about 410,000, with the party's independent candidate, Dr. Counts, running ahead of Stevenson with some 485,000 votes. The Liberal Party leadership correctly interpreted this fact as a justification for their running a Liberal Party leader against the two old party candidates.

IMPRESSIVE GAIN

Dr. Counts' vote of 485,000 compares with the Liberal vote of 312,000 for Senator Herbert H. Lehman in 1950, a gain of 56 per cent. This gain is particularly im-

pressive considering Lehman's prominence and the hard campaign waged. Dr. Counts, on the other hand, is a relatively unknown figure and was waging his first big battle in the political field.

The Liberals devoted the major part of their campaign to the national candidates and failed to support Counts with an all-out and vigorous campaign. Had they done so, it is possible that Counts would have emerged with an all-time high vote on the Liberal Party line, beating the vote for Rudolph Halley of 660,000 in last year's City Council presidency election.

Another important comparison is the Liberal vote of 410,000 for Stevenson with the vote for President Truman of 220,000 in 1948—a gain of 85 per cent. The attractive powers of the Liberal Party are confirmed by these votes. The candidacy of Dr. Counts, a vice-

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MICHIGAN Union's Scare Campaign Intensifies Shock Effect

Vote Shows UAW Needs New Political Line

By WALTER JASON

DETROIT, Nov. 9—The reaction to the results of the national elections may be described in three distinct phases here. At first there was sheer disbelief at union and Democratic Party headquarters as the returns kept pouring in. Then there was a gradual shock effect—the kind that doesn't wear off overnight. And finally a deep gloom has permeated the labor movement.

Most labor leaders view it as a debacle almost too painful to discuss. For two days many secondary leaders walked around as if they were punch-drunk. "What hit us? What happened?" asked incredulous CIO activists who had worked long and hard in the election campaign.

On Wednesday it was very quiet in the auto shops, especially among the Negro workers who seemed to feel the defeat of Stevenson most keenly. There were many comments like, "I wish I hadn't bought a home. The depression will be here soon now." A very popular suggestion was, "The CIO is a kiss of death. We shouldn't be in politics." This kind of idea, coming more than once in informal sessions of shop leaders gives one indication of the immediate mood in the United Auto Workers (CIO).

PRE-ELECTION SCARE

Like a sailor clinging to any piece of driftwood after a tidal wave sunk his ship, the CIO leaders sought consolation at first in the hope that at least Governor Williams and Senator Blair Moody would be re-elected. As Moody was counted out, it became harder to find anything encouraging for the prospect of Williams as a lone-wolf official was hardly the answer to political problems.

top leadership of the UAW took the defeat very hard.

The basic reasons for this violent reaction here are two-fold. The campaign of the UAW was based on a fear psychology, as we pointed out two months ago. A typical example was the special edition of the United Auto Worker with a clever display of depression pictures contrasted with "Democratic Party" prosperity. It was an intense, personal campaign against Herbert Hoover and Senator Taft—but the main opponent happened to be General Eisenhower. Unquestionably, the UAW leaders believed, or fell victim to, their own campaign exaggerations and propaganda. Their dire predictions had permeated the active strata of the union, and hence the current state of shock.

Any suggestions that maybe Eisenhower would win and it wouldn't be the end of the world was met with impatient brush-offs. The faith of the leaders and the secondary ranks in victory was blinding. Anyone who ventured the prediction that Eisenhower would win was considered a defeatist and an agent of the Republican Party. Probably not since Black Fri-

day in October 1929 was there such a shock effect on a section of American society as the official labor movement got last Tuesday night. That's the way it looks here.

The second major reason for this dazed reaction is that life finally taught the union leaders something that no argument in the world seemed able to do. They had a theory about the keystone to all sound, practical, effective, victorious political action: it was that all you had to do was get the people to register and vote, and that the bigger the vote the bigger the Democratic Party victory. They reduced all political science to a mechanical schema, adopting the very oversimplified outlook which they falsely accuse their socialist critics of entertaining.

Their "key" to victory is precisely what hit them on the head in this election.

CATHOLIC ANGLE

A well-known New York philosopher of sorts once pointed out that "the power of the human mind to rationalize is infinite." The more politically conscious leaders in the UAW are already working on a fresh analysis which, if it doesn't save the face of the union movement nationally, certainly would put Walter P. Reuther in a better light.

It consists of pointing out that Wayne County didn't have the defections that marked the big-city vote elsewhere; if only the rest of the country had done as well as the UAW-CIO in Wayne County, the election might be different. Sounds plausible, doesn't it? And although there can be little doubt that the vigorous participation in the campaign by the labor movement had its effect, there are other factors which contributed strongly to the strength

shown by Democratic candidates in the county.

City, county and state officials, both legislators and senators, were re-elected handily from here. But the Republican Party didn't expect to crack this area, and one of the reasons was given us quite candidly by a prominent Catholic politician.

This politician, who said that in other big cities the Catholic vote would swing to Eisenhower in large numbers and help elect him, pointed out that the overwhelming bulk of the Democratic candidates in Wayne County were Catholic. Although many of them had been opposed in the past by the CIO, they were in a position to win the large and active Catholic bloc of voters. A check on state legislator candidates verified this; 16 out of 21 had Irish or Polish names.

Both Moody and Williams also maintained excellent contact with the powerful Catholic bloc here. They took a conservative tack in the election. Williams, of course, had the further advantage of being popular because his brain-truster, Paul Weber, is former editor of the Wage Earner, official paper of the Association of Catholic Trade-Unionists.

Already some of the state legislators, and Williams himself, have shown they are going to be more independent of labor than ever before. If this situation gives consolation to the CIO leaders, then small gifts indeed are big favors.

Outside of the comment, made Wednesday night on Guy Nunn's radio program, that "This signifies a basic swing to the right," there has been no attempt at a rounded-out analysis in the labor movement.

Until labor endorsed a proposal to reappoint the state legisla-

ture, the idea was very popular and supported by most Michigan newspapers. After "Proposition 2," a very sound and democratic proposal, became a campaign issue for the CIO, the papers turned against it and top Democrats like Williams skirted the issue whenever appearing upstate. Yes, in Michigan there is a swing to the right. Incidentally, Moody did somewhat better against Congressman Potter than generally expected.

LOOKING AHEAD

There is one other very disturbing factor in this situation to the UAW leadership. Their prestige has taken a sharp blow. Will the rank and file take up their dissatisfaction on the secondary leaders in the next local union elections? What happens to the demands made recently on Ford, General Motors and Chrysler? Will a new, conservative opposition arise to the Reuther leadership?

Above all, what happens to the influence of the leadership on the ranks if the dire predictions of the election campaign don't turn out to be true in the next period ahead? Will Walter Reuther be looked on as the boy who erred wolf too often?

Operating under the curse of the theory of the lesser evil, the CIO leaders, including the UAW, will furnish new kind of "victories" in the next period. They'll "save" the Taft-Hartley Law from worse amendments; they'll "defeat" proposals to take away nation-wide bargaining rights. How long will that kind of alibi work? What happens to their influence if President Eisenhower appears in the role of curbing the Republican extremists?

One observer in the UAW made the well-received point at a union meeting this week that "The problem is not one of rape in the next period, as CIO leaders have been yelling about a Republican victory, but rather of meeting seduction in the name of national unity!"

Walter Reuther's post-election statement about uniting as Americans and viewing Eisenhower's victory as a personal one, hardly prepares the ranks for the uneasy days ahead.

WILL THEY CATCH UP?

At the moment, the labor movement is bogged down by the feeling of defeat and stuck with the oversimplification that Eisenhower's victory is to be seen only as a "swing to the right." By its thought processes, 33 million Americans voted for depression, war, destruction of unions, McCarthyism, etc. Such is the power of self-hypnosis in political campaigns.

LOCAL CONTESTS

The defeat of incumbent Frank Havenner, whose pro-labor record incited the reactionaries and conservatives throughout the state, was most serious. He received only 45 per cent of his district's support, but he had been actually gerrymandered out of office when the Republican state house redistricted the state. Dean McHenry, ADA professor at UCLA, had been given only a slight chance for victory, so his defeat evoked deep disappointment.

Moss of Sacramento, King of Los Angeles, Condon of Richmond and Hagen of Bakersfield—all labor-supported—won out. Condon's victory served as a special consolation for liberals. As assemblyman he had been unmercifully smeared for casting one of the two lone votes against a state loyalty oath. Hagen beat out Wendell, Republican, who campaigned in the primaries against Governor Warren's "Republican Socialism."

Three additional labor-backed candidates were sent to Congress because they had cross-filed in spring and received both nominations. These include: Shelley, former president of the California Federation of Labor; George Miller, pro-labor liberal from the

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ILLINOIS Labor Carried the Ball but It Wasn't Their Party

Unionists Blame Democrat Machine

By PETE JARMS

CHICAGO, Nov. 9—Illinois went the way of the nation in the November 4 elections. This was the greatest victory for the Republican Party in Illinois and Cook County in recent history. The Democrats won only two of the elective posts in the county and lost all of the state posts.

The initial reaction in the shops in Chicago was one of great shock. The active union members were the most disturbed.

The fear of a coming depression was everywhere. Workers wondered about their unpaid homes, their installment debts, their jobs, their unions. The standard crack in the shops today is: "It's all over except the depression."

Some workers wondered to what extent anti-labor legislation would come with a complete Republican majority. The notorious Robert Denham gave color to this thought when he was quoted in a newspaper as saying that now "something can be done"—the NLRB must be abolished and the Taft-Hartley Act amended because it is too pro-labor. This comes from the first head of the Labor Board when the Taft-Hartley Act became law, appointed to that post by Truman.

Other workers worried about what would happen in the event the companies took this period as a signal to attack the trade unions. They wondered whether strikes could be successful, etc.

SEEK EXPLANATION

The active unionists could not figure out what hit them. They knew that the unions worked harder in this campaign than ever before. More people were involved in the work. The United Automobile Workers (CIO) Citizenship Council with its huge funds had hundreds of shop workers on full time Political Action Committee work.

Everyone criticized the activity of the Democratic Party in Cook County it was universally reported that precinct captains did not visit any homes. A number of reports have circulated that these party workers were bought off. Another explanation was that the precinct captains could only beg for a vote on the basis of saving their own political jobs, and were afraid of being involved in a political discussion. The unionists all agree that the Democratic Party as such did nothing.

In one congressional district, the CIO did all the work. It was considered a lost cause in advance by the Democratic Party. They nominated an unknown for the job. The CIO (UAW in the main) ran his whole campaign, furnished all the funds, did all the leg-work and carried every working-class district for him in spite of the Eisenhower landslide.

DEMS FELL DOWN

The Democratic Party as such was not responsible for the two congressional victories that they are bragging about today. Congressmen Yates and O'Hara were elected over vicious reactionary opponents by the liberal organizations and the CIO. The Independent Voters of Illinois (Americans for Democratic Action branch in Chicago) provided the election workers, assisted by the CIO in these contests.

The Democratic Party flouted the trade unions when they ran a candidate for Sanitary Trustee of Cook County who had disgraced the labor movement as Governor Stevenson's secretary of labor. He had been forced to resign his state job because of connections with the crime syndicate. Yet the Democrats went ahead and placed him on the ballot in spite of loud protests by the unions. He was trounced. Hundreds of CIO workers crossed party lines and voted for his Republican opponent.

One of the obvious results was that the South Chicago Republic

Steel and U. S. Steel workers did not follow PAC. This was not the case in the auto shops where the union does a much better job in the economic struggle with the employers.

The explanations given are numerous. Illinois Labor (publication of the state CIO) features a full-page cartoon. It pictures a large fish with a hook in its mouth, labeled "Continued Prosperity, Price Reductions . . . Home from Korea . . . 15% tax cuts. At the bottom is the legend, "We're hooked . . . but they'll have to prove these fish stories."

In the case of the men in the shops, some say the big issue was Korea, some say it was corruption, or Communism, or high prices, or that it was all these things rolled into a huge protest, a vote against the Ins rather than for the Republican Party. All agree that the Korean war is the most detested in U. S. history, and that the Democrats who defended the war did not have the answers.

The lesson is that the Democrats had no answer to the phony anti-war line of the Republicans, to prosperity based on war production, etc. Knowing how internal union politics works, men summed it up by saying that the Democratic Party was on the defensive all the time.

The victory of the Republican Stratton for governor was another blow to the unions. This pro-Fast-Bund man, mouthpiece of the Chicago Tribune, was believed to have been surely beat—but he ended up a 200,000-vote winner.

Everyone asks, "Where do we go?"

PENNSYLVANIA

Alliance with Fair Deal No Boon for Labor

Labor Held Its Lines, Dems Folded

By GERRY McDERMOTT

PITTSBURGH, Nov. 10—After the initial shock of the Eisenhower victory, the labor movement in Pittsburgh appears to be recovering its self-confidence. Although sobered by the prospects of an even less friendly Congress and a less friendly administration, labor spokesmen here feel that they were able to get out the vote, even if the regular Democratic machine couldn't. Furthermore, local spokesmen for labor, at least for the present, are advocating an intensified, not a decreased, political-action program.

They found the first returns numbing, however. Allegheny County, which includes Pittsburgh, its suburbs and many mill towns, gave the Democrats only a puny 14,000-vote majority. This despite the fact that the Democrats held a lead in registration of 123,000. In 1948 Truman carried the county by 84,000 and Roosevelt by as high as 190,000.

As election-night commentators gleefully announced that Eisenhower had run strongly in one industrial area after another throughout the nation, labor people and politicians alike concluded that Eisenhower had pulled many labor votes. Various labor spokesmen complained that they couldn't deliver any vote but their own, and that the workers only voted "correctly" when their beliefs were empty.

With these figures in mind, labor began to boast and to accuse

The real danger today is from two sides. The first is that the American Federation of Labor may return to its old Gompers theory of "reward your friends and punish your enemies." Another is the danger represented by the type of thinking of one CIO rank-and-file activist who said: "Let's get out, we only give the kiss of death to any candidate we work for."

Equally dangerous is the idea that we've got to stick with Stevenson and rebuild the Democratic Party. This thought is expressed by the line: "Now is our chance to capture the Democratic Party, because everyone is deserting the ship."

THE REAL LESSON

People who think that way have learned nothing from this campaign. First they couldn't capture the Democratic Party as a whole in a million years, and second, they would then have the problem of continually apologizing for mink coats, war, aid to Franco, McCarran, loss of civil liberties, etc. Sure, they could become the whole Democratic Party in Podunk, but what then?

The course for labor today is to strike out for the establishment of a new political force, a new party. One AFL business agent, who of course is not representative of the AFL (or the CIO), had this to say:

"The lessons of the 1948 election were lost on the non-Communist left in '52. The lesson of '52 may very well be lost on us again if we re-form our ranks merely to push the Democratic Party into the fold once again. New blood, new pressures are needed to turn the tide that is flowing toward extreme reaction. Only a third party cleansed of reaction and compromise can afford such pressure."

"The objections to a third party are, of course, that it cannot win. But that is the whole trouble with our concept of politics. We feel that winning an election is really decisive, whereas in reality it is the ability to turn on the pressure that actually carries the day. The Taft-Hartley Law momentarily is relatively ineffective

against labor only because labor has mobilized the pressure against it. When, as, and if that pressure relaxes, then the law will be devastating. Every unionist understands the significance of pressure; in fact every honest and idealistic union leader ceaselessly points out to his membership that 'the only guarantee of democracy and progress in our union is your interest and participation. If you stop being interested and stop participating, then no matter how good the leadership is in itself, it is bound to deteriorate.'

"Viewed in such terms 'winning' is something more concrete; it means forcing the powers-that-be to concede. Voting and electoral victories are a small percent of political action; what is decisive is the vigilance and pressures of an aroused electorate."

"We of the non-Communist left can forge a new political force if we adhere to two fundamental principles, one political and one organizational. First, we must dissociate ourselves from a foreign policy based on military containment and struggle for one which makes political containment primary. Secondly, we must ceaselessly educate American

workers, farmers, and intellectuals to the thesis that a vote for a 'winner' among either the Democrats or Republicans is a WASTED VOTE because it is a vote for a 'man' rather than a program, because it is a vote that permits illusions to be sowed and de-emphasizes the importance of pressure groups.

"The only vote that counts is a vote that is coupled with day-to-day political struggles for a party capable of making such struggles. The old parties are too closely linked with status-quo pressures to permit any such thing; we can have no decisive place in their apparatus. Only a Third Party can offer us—and America—such an opportunity."

One UAW-CIO local has issued a statement re-raising the labor party question and calling upon the national CIO Convention to move toward the establishment of a new party.

Now is the time. There could never be a more appropriate moment.

No Sweep for Jumpin' Joe In Wisconsin

MILWAUKEE, Nov. 9—Joe McCarthy's victory in Wisconsin was shallower than most people will gather from their newspapers. Although he was faced with a colorless opponent who could not even make a decent political speech, the labor movement—whether it realizes it or not—was able to narrow the gap to the point where McCarthy might well have lost if it had not been for Eisenhower's sweep.

It was the trade-union movement that provided the 90,000-majority for Fairchild, the Democratic Party nominee, in Milwaukee—where it was not expected that he would be able to get more than a 50,000 plurality. On the other hand, in Dane County, where Fairchild falls from, he did not even carry.

Another example is what happened in the district where the ex-socialist Andrew Biemiller ran against Charles Kersten. The trade-union movement did all the work, the Democratic Party nothing. In one Negro precinct, the vote was 490 to 18 for the Demo-

crat. The CIO worked hard, but the national trend was too great. In Wisconsin the Democratic Party looks like a corpse, and the auxiliary corps is the only vital organization. The Democratic Organizing Committee is the only live organization, and it is composed exclusively of the trade-unionists. Without the unions in Wisconsin there would likely be no Democratic Party at all.

In a working-class district of Milwaukee, Clem Zablocki won handily, while Howard Pellant, a UAW international representative won a post as state senator.

Most of the trade-unionists believe it was no defeat for them. They got out the vote. But it was a defeat for the Democratic Party.

Whether out of this situation a grass-roots movement will arise for the development of a labor party remains to be seen. A labor party here, we have a right to think, could do no worse and probably much better, considering the anti-war feelings of the people of this state.

an even greater Ike sweep. The body decided to put its political-action work on a year-round basis and to give it increased financial support. If the AFL nationally regrets having plunged deeper into politics this year—and this has been reported—the feeling is not shared by local AFL leaders.

The same sentiments were echoed by David McDonald, secretary-treasurer of both the CIO Steelworkers and the national PAC. He declared to a conference of District 16 of the Steelworkers that labor did deliver the vote. He attributed the loss to women and new voters. What is more important, he advocated more intensive political action in the future as well as an aggressive organizing and union-building campaign.

The conclusion is hardly warranted, however, that the election results in industrial districts here show that labor's alliance with the Democrats has been fruitful. This is even aside from the question of the failure of the Fair Deal to deliver any of its promises in the past four years, and the probability that a Stevenson administration would have done even less.

First of all, the labor vote, where it was successful, elected machine

(Turn to last page.)

CALIFORNIA Reactionary Propositions Carried Along with Ike Sweep

Democrats Lost All Down the Line

By B. ARNOLD and S. BEILAS

BERKELEY, Calif., Nov. 10—The travail of the labor-liberal coalition within the Democratic Party failed to stem the Republican-Eisenhower tide which in California mounted to higher dimensions than the national sweep. The liberals have come away from the election returns as though kicked in the stomach, while the labor leaders have been stunned into silence.

Not only did the GOP candidate pile up the greatest margin in the state's history, 115,000 votes, but major metropolitan centers like San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego and Oakland, as well as all Southern California counties—without exception—repudiated the Democrats and the administration.

Not since the days of Upton Sinclair's EPIC did the state's labor leaders toil so for a political party. The California Federation of Labor, LLPE, the CIO-PAC and the railroad brotherhoods all endorsed and campaigned for the Stevenson-Sparkman ticket. The local memberships were mobilized, and electioneering down to the precinct level was conducted.

Nevertheless, throughout the whole state ballot—top candidates, congressional and state legislators, and state constitutional amendments—labor suffered an electoral rout through the means of the Democratic Party. Only nine of the state's 58 counties escaped the GOP sweep, and of these two—Contra Costa and Solano—were considered part of the semi-industrial stronghold of the Democrats.

The shock and the bitterness of the election outcome was enhanced by the fact that none of the pollsters, politicians and labor leaders foresaw the sweep. All forecasts

Los Angeles, with its wide diversity of social and class makeup, mirrors more accurately the heterogeneous composition of its state.

Comparative data with previous returns reveal the extent of the Democratic defeat. Unionized counties like San Francisco and Alameda (Oakland and Berkeley) swung to the GOP for the first time in decades.

FARM VOTE

In 1948 Truman took the Central Valley agricultural counties overwhelmingly. This time the farm population generally rejected the Democrats. Only three important agricultural counties—Sacramento, Fresno and Madera—supported Stevenson and then by small majorities. All suburban areas upheld the GOP.

The only group in the population standing firm behind the Democratic ticket was the urban Negroes in the North. Some Negro precincts showed over a 95 per cent support for Stevenson-Sparkman, the latter propped up with the flimsiest apologies. But without this pro-FEPC vote the landslide would have turned into an avalanche.

That Knowland would retain his senatorial toga was a foregone conclusion. He had successfully employed cross-filing in the primaries to eliminate Democratic opposition. But his total of over 3,100,000 votes, the largest senatorial sum in state history, was less of a tribute to the China lobby than a criticism of labor's failure to resort to petition rights in presenting an independent candidate.

Of the 30 seats in the U. S. House of Representatives (seven

of which were added through reapportionment) 18 were claimed by the Republicans, 11 by the Democrats, and one is still in doubt. It was over these seats that the both LLPE and the PAC efforts were most vain. Sixteen Democrats were endorsed and campaigned for, but only four were victorious and there is an additional one in doubt.

LOCAL CONTESTS

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The ISL Program in Brief

The Independent Socialist League stands for socialist democracy and against the two systems of exploitation which now divide the world: capitalism and Stalinism.

Capitalism cannot be reformed or liberalized, by any Fair Deal or other deal, so as to give the people freedom, abundance, security or peace. It must be abolished and replaced by a new social system, in which the people own and control the basic sectors of the economy, democratically controlling their own economic and political destinies.

Stalinism, in Russia and wherever it holds power, is a brutal totalitarianism—a new form of exploitation. Its agents in every country, the Communist Parties, are unrelenting enemies of socialism and have nothing in common with socialism—which cannot exist without effective democratic control by the people.

These two camps of capitalism and Stalinism are today at each other's throats in a worldwide imperialist rivalry for domination. This struggle can only lead to the most frightful war in history so long as the people leave the capitalist and Stalinist rulers in power. Independent Socialism stands for building and strengthening the Third Camp of the people against both war blocs.

The ISL, as a Marxist movement, looks to the working class and its ever-present struggle as the basic progressive force in society. The ISL is organized to spread the ideas of socialism in the labor movement and among all other sections of the people.

At the same time, Independent Socialists participate actively in every struggle to better the people's lot now—such as the fight for higher living standards, against Jim Crow and anti-Semitism, in defense of civil liberties and the trade-union movement. We seek to join together with all other militants in the labor movement as a left force working for the formation of an independent labor party and other progressive policies.

The fight for democracy and the fight for socialism are inseparable. There can be no lasting and genuine democracy without socialism, and there can be no socialism without democracy. To enroll under this banner, join the Independent Socialist League!

INTERESTED? Get Acquainted

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- I want to join the ISL.

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Youth and Student Corner

Exhibit B in Freeman's Upside-Down Campaign on Academic Freedom

By DON HARRIS

Last week in this column we sought to describe the Through the Looking-Glass picture of the American campus which is professedly entertained by the editor of the *Freeman* magazine. It is a weird picture of rampant radicalism dominating the intellectual life of our colleges and cultural life in general, and conducting a reign of terror against the holders of conservative views.

Now this intriguing viewpoint is startlingly different from that held by most informed people, both here and abroad. Indeed, so different that it is in conflict with expressed opinions of a number of well-known figures. Bertrand Russell, Justice William Douglas and James Thurber have recently deplored one or another aspect of the feeling of "intellectual terror" which is currently abroad in the land.

The most recent addition to the critics is Fredrick Lewis Allen in his book *The Big Change*, where he writes of recent times: "... a great many useful and productive people have been frightened into a nervous conformity. . . . At many a point in American life, adventurous and constructive thought is stifled by apprehension."

The editors of the *Freeman* take note of this (to them) absurd opinion in their own characteristic fashion. By definition, they declare, "adventurous thought can hardly be stifled by anything but death," so that if anyone is being stifled, it can obviously not be the exemplars of adventurous and constructive thought. Thus, the conclusion is that liberals today are not being scared into nervous conformity.

Rather, they affect to claim, the case is the other way around. It is the conservatives who are afraid to open their mouths and who are denied access to the mass media of communication. Don't the liberals have exclusive access to the columns of the *New York Times Magazine* Section, the editorial page of the *New York Post* and the professorships in the Department of Economics at Harvard University? Look at those eminent conservatives like Burton Roscoe, Ludwig von Mises and Ralph de Toledano who, if it were not for the *Freeman*, would have no possibility of having their views appear in print. . . .

If the reader thinks that we are not really stating the views of the *Freeman* accurately, the following quotation will show what this magazine pretends to believe: "What bothers the people who go around prating of the 'intellectual terror' is a simple thing: their monopoly of white space, their power to dominate forums, college faculties, radio programs, review media and magazines, has been challenged for the first time in a generation." They are really frightened of the non-Keynesian economists, the William Buckley and intrepid editors of the *Freeman*.

Of course, the liberals are only playing the part of dupes of the Communists. The line appears in the *Daily Worker*, whence it is carried by the liberal gulls and innocents. Thus the *Freeman* in its own fashion carries on the tradition of guilt-by-amalgam which some of its leading figures probably learned while serving apprenticeships on the staff of the *New Masses*.

Nancy Jane at Vassar

What makes these opinions of interest to us, however, is that they pertain in large measure to the campus, in which the *Freeman* takes a special interest. It is there, we are told, that the liberals really ride high.

In substantiation of this, they quote the postscript to a letter they received from some college freshman, asking that his name not be published: "I am at the beginning of my four years at this academically magnificent but politically naive college and I prefer to conclude them in comparative anonymity. In case you doubt the need for such precautions may I suggest that you consult Mr. William F. Buckley, Jr. He had the intelligence and ability which warrant opposition to the *Nation-New Republic-Reporter* fans, I do not. . . ." From this, the *Freeman* concludes that "a conservative freshman in a large college doesn't dare speak out by name," leaving the impression that if he did so; some form of persecution would be visited upon him.

In this case, of course, the *Freeman* is deliberately confusing matters by talking about "fuzzification." We suspect that the worst that might ever happen to the anonymous freshman, who admittedly doubts his brightness, is that, if his opinions became known and he had to hold his own in arguing for them, his modest opinion of his own intellectual abilities might be confirmed. To our knowledge liberals and radicals today do not complain about merely polemical attacks on them even when made by a Winchell or Fulton Lewis Jr. Rather they complain of being fired from their jobs, discriminated against in employment and

subjected to unwarranted attentions by the FBI. And in school they resent the procedures designed to keep them from teaching and out of the better graduate schools.

Naturally, the *Freeman* is not aware of any such procedures, except as they are employed against Stalinists, whose civil liberties are of no concern to them. But in its zeal to prove that there is no terror from the Right, it has scrounged up evidence of an intellectual dictatorship of the Left.

As Exhibit B it produces the experiences of one Nancy Jane Fellers, until recently an unhappy senior-year student at Vassar. In an article entitled "God and Woman at Vassar" the unfortunate Miss Fellers recounts the harrowing story of her persecution by the Red Faculty of this notorious Communist College of Subversive Fifth-Columists.

Now Vassar, as is generally known, is not strictly speaking a school for the underprivileged. At a cost to the parent of several thousand dollars a year it manages to turn out "well-rounded" young ladies who are due to become perfect wives for aspiring corporation executives, government officials and higher army officers. It stresses the humanities, literature and the creative arts. And despite the fact that of its type, it has probably the highest entrance standards, its alumnae are not known for their outstanding success in graduate schools. As far as the intellectual and political climate is concerned, in line with the future expectations of its students Vassar attempts to "broaden" their views so that they will be able to participate intelligently in the conversations of their husbands' associates. Naturally, they cannot be left with the primitive political and social views of high school textbooks, so it has become a necessary part of the Vassar education to assume the values of "the campus community." It is part of what the parent pays for.

Terror Over the English Class

As can be seen, we hold no particular brief for the Vassar system, which annually turns out more female snobs than perhaps any other girls' college in America. Indeed, in a certain way we can even sympathize with the experiences of a Miss Fellers who sought to challenge the pattern of Vassar conformity, albeit from her own reactionary standpoint.

It seems that Miss Fellers decided to enter Vassar in her junior year, after two years at Earlham College, Indiana. Having missed two years of "broadening" education, she undoubtedly entered under something of a handicap. Her main difficulty, judging entirely from her own article, however, stemmed from the fact that she insisted on proclaiming her belief in the ideals prevalent in the late 18th century.

Her difficulties began when her English class was assigned at the beginning of the year to write an essay on their beliefs on God, the universe, the state, family, money, culture, attitudes toward the stranger and education, and it was announced that the assignment would be repeated at the end of the year in order to assess the degree of change in values which had taken place. Miss Fellers, in her own forthright fashion wrote: "I believe in God, Human Dignity, and the United States of America. Next June I shall believe in God, Human Dignity, and the United States of America."

Throughout the ensuing semester she wrote papers defending Buckley's book *God and Man at Yale*, attacking the Luce publications for their internationalism and anti-capitalistic prejudices, etc. She wrote home to her parents about how the teachers would slander Senator McCarthy, attack the Catholic Church, and show "an extraordinary preoccupation with the UN Declaration of Human Rights."

Now according to Miss Fellers' account, her views and activities soon brought her the unfavorable attention of the faculty. She was accused of holding "dangerous ideas" and even worse, refusing to change them in favor of those approved by the Vassar faculty. Finally, she was even threatened with punishment: "If something is not done, your getting through Vassar will be imperiled," she was informed by her persecutor, a Professor Lockwood, head of the English Department.

A Deal for 'The Freeman'

Reacting to her parents' suggestion, she took some of her papers to the dean, who agreed with Miss Lockwood "that I was a problem, academically." When she recounted Miss Lockwood's threat, the dean brushed it off as not a "threat." Nancy Jane, however, knew better: "But I was there. . . I saw the look in Miss Lockwood's eyes. . ."

Sure enough, Miss Fellers' suspicions were confirmed. It became apparent that she was about to become the victim of intrigue. "Frankly, I suspect a plot," she wrote home. ". . . I think their main tactical line is to show me up as 'unintelligent' [the cardinal sin at Vassar—D. H.], not up to Vassar standards. If they flunk me out I can't fuss as much as if I'm dismissed for no obvious reason." The plot thickened when her parents were called in for a conference and told that her graduation would be held up pending completion of a make-up summer course. Rather than submit to such an indignity, Nancy Jane decided to return to Earlham College to get her degree.

This account, then, is the main piece of evidence on which the *Freeman* rests its charge that there is today a terror "visited not upon Leftists, but upon those who would pursue the adventure of 'constructive thought' on the Right." Behold the young, defenseless maiden who was driven out of college for holding rightist views.

Naturally, it is impossible for anyone to decide on the basis of Miss Fellers' article whether her teachers were justified in their low opinion of her academic work. Even in its edited and doubtlessly refurbished form, as it appears in the magazine, its form is not impressive; but then even "senior level" standards at Vassar are not for professional writers. There is fortunately a simpler way for the *Freeman* to prove that it is interested in the girl's case as one of academic freedom.

As socialists we, for example, would be quite willing to join in a protest if investigation should prove that Miss Fellers' views were actually the reason for real academic discrimination. We are entirely in favor of upholding a student's right to remain an unreconstructed reactionary, even so naive a one as Miss Fellers.

In return we would suggest only that the *Freeman* see its way clear to denounce the next case of discrimination against a liberal or radical, not to speak of Stalinists.

This would not go to show that the main danger to intellectual integrity in the country today is the phantasmal reign of terror of the Left; but at least it might indicate that the *Freeman* is concerned about free men and not merely reactionaries.

New York Liberal Party Vote

(Continued from page 1)

chairman and leader of the Liberal Party, appealed to the independent sentiment among normally Democratic Party voters disgusted with corrupt machine politics and their hacks.

LABOR ACTION and the Independent Socialist League supported Counts in this election as an independent candidate of the Liberal Party.

Significant for the future growth and development of the Liberal Party was the great increase in its upstate New York vote, where most of the increased registration took place. Against a previous highest vote of 24,000, the Liberal Party piled up 73,000 votes for Stevenson and 83,000 for Counts. This tripling of the upstate New York vote is due, in large measure, to the increased party-building upstate during the past few years and the increased support which the party has won in the organized labor movement.

REVEALING AD

Outside New York City, the Liberals have been able to win broader trade-union support with AFL and CIO City Councils than they have within New York City.

Here their main base remains the Ladies Garment Workers Union and the Hatters Union, although the endorsement of Counts by the largest local of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers Union may presage similar breaks in the future. Nevertheless the rest of the labor movement campaigned for the Democratic candidate, Cashmore.

The day before the election, some of New York's leading labor leaders ran a full-page advertisement in the *New York Post*, only New York paper supporting Stevenson and Counts, directly appealing to the members of the Liberal Party not to "waste" their vote on Dr. Counts and urging them to vote for Cashmore. In this "Open Letter to the Members of the Liberal Party," the leaders of the state and city CIO and AFL revealed once again their shameful capitulation to any incompetent dished up by the Democratic Party.

ALP FLOPS

Not missing a trick, these leaders cited all the great heroes of the Liberal Party—Governor Stevenson, President Truman, Senator Lehman, and Averell Harriman—and even President Roosevelt—as supporters of John Cashmore. If he was good enough for all of them, why not for the Liberal Party leaders? A difficult question for them to answer since they have accepted, in this election and others, candidates on a par with and even some below Cashmore.

California: All Down the Line

(Continued from page 2)

East Bay; and Chet Hollifield, Los Angeles ADAer.

As usual the Republicans resumed their 50-year domination of the state Senate and Assembly. This time, however, they are returning to Sacramento with a two-to-one control over both Houses.

The landslide ground down even to the fine print of the state propositions, by which the state constitution is amended. For years labor had been advocating the abolition of cross-filing. At last the issue was pushed onto the ballot for referendum, only to be rejected by a slight majority. Another labor-backed proposition requiring candidates to note their party registration on the ballot was carried. But whether this watered-down device will transform California's plebiscitic primaries into bona-fide elections is quite doubtful.

The most contested proposition dealt with tax exemption for parochial schools below the college level. Peculiar interests and group combinations developed over the amendment: the Catholic church and the labor movement urged the approval of the exemption; while Masons, anti-Catholics, radicals, socialists, real-estate boards and most liberals opposed the proposition. Yet this proposition won.

IPP FADES

Through Propositions 5 and 6 McCarthyism reared its ugly head. Both were loyalty amendments—the latter requiring an oath from all state employees and imposing a statement of past, present and future "non-subversiveness"; the former, excluding from public employment and tax

exemption all persons and groups defined as subversive.

Despite the recommendations and the work of the trade-union movement, the efforts of scores of liberal organizations like the ACLU, the opposition of the governor, a state-wide door-to-door campaign, thousands of handbills, radio time and newspaper ads—despite all this, the two propositions were approved by a two-to-one majority.

Even more decisive than the repudiation of the Democratic Party was that of the Independent Progressives, California's Stalinist-controlled party. Whereas Wallace polled 190,000 votes, Hallinan in his home state received a meager 20,000—11 per cent of 1948! Borough's tally of over 450,000 votes, contrary to the *People's World* boasts, was less of an index of voter response to the IPP than a measure of the anti-Knowland sentiment.

The Christian National Party, created by G. L. K. Smith and running MacArthur and Tenney as write-ins, had no figures presented on its anti-Semitic campaign. Nor were the results of

These attacks by the bulk of the labor leaders had an unquestionable influence on some Liberal Party leaders, who talked privately of the "mistake of the party" in running Counts. After all, they argued, if we support a candidate like Sparkman, why should we gag at Cashmore? Let us hope that the rank and file will reverse this question: *If we can't accept a Cashmore, why should we take a Sparkman?*

Counts' resounding victory will probably silence the doubters on his campaign, and will stimulate the growing tendency within the party to run its own candidates. Attention will now focus on the 1953 mayoralty campaign and the role of the Liberal Party. It is doubtful that any candidate can win unless he has Liberal Party support, and all kinds of coalitions and candidates are being bruited about.

While the Liberal Party reached its high-water level of influence, the Stalinist-controlled American Labor Party just about fouled bottom. Taking the worst beating in its history, the ALP managed to get only 98,400 votes for its Senatorial candidate, Corliss Lamont, and a meager 63,000 for its presidential nominee, Vincent Hallinan.

DEMOCRATS' PLIGHT

While the Republicans were rejoicing over their increased representation in Congress and their even tighter grip over the state legislature, the Democrats were facing a series of internal battles after their worst defeat since 1920. Resignations from posts, beginning with State Chairman Fitzpatrick, are flooding the party; fights over the leadership of various counties and sections of the party are developing into a free-for-all; and next year's mayoralty campaign is a big question mark.

Having lost the White House and weak in Albany, the Democrats are in a desperate fix and are determined to win City Hall. But with no patronage to dispense and with their party machines in shambles, they are in a bad way. Complicating the situation for them is the Tammany Hall-Mayor Impellitteri feud, and the problem of selecting a mayoralty candidate for 1953. Like Cashmore, Mayor Impellitteri has been booted at Democratic Party rallies, and the Liberal Party would never support him.

The plight of the Democrats and their increasing rejection by New York City's voters opens up great possibilities for the Liberal Party. If it plays the role of nursemaid or savior to the Democratic Party, it will be throwing away perhaps the greatest opportunity that has come its way. If it continues on a more independent path, and boldly and forthrightly gives the voters a real alternative to the candidates of the old parties, it can increase its political influence and power.

Labor in California, which identified itself more intimately with the Democratic Party in 1952 than 1948, feels the defeat striking close to home. A gnawing apprehension of coming anti-labor legislation poses more sharply than in the past the question of what labor will do toward taking the road to its own party.

AL LEGA

It was with a deep sense of loss that we learned of the tragic death of Comrade Al Lega, member-at-large of the Socialist Youth League. He was killed in an accident on November 4 while driving alone on his way to Ann Arbor from Detroit.

Comrade Lega, though in the SYL only a relatively short time, entered our movement with far more than an elementary understanding of its socialist ideas and ideals. Socialism was a frequently and warmly discussed topic in the working-class home from which he came; his experiences as a soldier in World War I—out of which he emerged seriously wounded and partially disabled—confirmed his belief that socialism was a goal both socially desirable and morally necessary.

At Oberlin College, Ohio, he participated as a leading figure in the Young Progressives of America, subsequently breaking from it as he came to reject the Stalinist influences which dominated that movement. He joined the SYL two years ago and from that time until his tragic death entered into and played an active part in building it.

In many ways Al represented the kind of member who is the source of strength and hope for the socialist movement today. In his quiet and unassuming way he worked for his ideas as a socialist must—without illusions but without cynicism. He has been lost to us before he could become a leader of others—as he wished to do and as he could have done. And we have lost that which is so precious to us in these times, a responsible, devoted and loyal comrade. We shall miss him.

Get acquainted with THE SOCIALIST YOUTH LEAGUE

For information on SYL program and activities, write to:

SYL, 114 West 14 Street, New York 11, N. Y.

READING from LEFT to RIGHT

KOREAN STALEMATE—THE WAR OF 'WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE,' by S. L. A. Marshall.—*The Reporter*, November 11.

This being the week in which LABOR ACTION analyzes the results of the election, it is appropriate for this column to use the above article by the military analyst for the *Detroit News*, all the more because it was written without primary reference to the election at all. Nonetheless, it involuntarily gives an important slice of the background of Eisenhower's sweep. Following a subhead "Whence This Defeatism?" Marshall writes:

"... No responsible spokesman [in the election campaign] has issued a clear call for a greater rallying by the nation and a further expanding of military power to reinforce the Korean undertaking. . . .

"For the third time since the start of the war, we are spiritually scraping bottom, as we did when we first saw that our arms were weak and that of the North Koreans were not push-overs, and as happened again when the Chinese Communists pulled their smashing surprise on the Chongchon River.

"But this time the pessimism does not stem from military reverses. Nor can it be charged to greater war weariness, since less than one per cent of the American people has had a personal stake in the battle, and the past 17 months of operations have had the look of a practice scrimmage.

"Frustration is hard enough. But when we see that our team is not only failing to gain ground but is also fumbling the ball, it is almost more than the spirit can bear. . . .

"... Both sides have settled down to a war of position. Both have burrowed into artillery-proof works, and both have artillery to burn against defenses which cannot be much hurt. The seesaw action back and forth across the grid of White Horse Hill is the likely pattern for the winter fighting. . . .

"... Proposals are heard that 19-year-olds be called up and that the terms of service be lengthened. But these are not tokens of a re-doubled effort. They will do no more than enable a stand in midfield by a team still lacking in reserves. . . .

"The Eighth Army stands in front of Seoul. It stood there one year ago. It paused there two years ago. There has been much shuttling up and down country in the intervals. Like the farmer who, while motoring to the big city, kept seeing signs reading 'Pittsburgh 20 miles,' we can at least praise the Lord that we are holding our own.

"There is no better outlook than more of the same, no brighter promise than to keep on keeping on."

That is the note on which the article ends, and that is the note on which the Democratic administration of two decades has ended.

WHY EISENHOWER WON

(Continued from page 1)

markedly little. For instance, Wilson Wyatt, Stevenson's campaign manager, told *U. S. News & World Report*:

"The thing that to me was decisive in the election was in the slogan 'Time for a change,' which started actually 12 years ago and was repeated 8 years ago and 4 years ago, and this year, I think, was irresistible."

Wyatt is apparently sincerely unaware that he has said precisely nothing, since the "Time for a change" formula, which failed three times, was perhaps even stronger when Roosevelt was violating the unwritten taboo against third—and fourth—terms. Why was it "irresistible" this time? That's the same question he started to answer.

Was it the "Communism" issue? This is now the least tenable of all, taken by itself.

The leading proponent of this issue, Joe McCarthy, not only ran well behind Eisenhower but even behind the state ticket headed by Governor Kohler in Wisconsin. As an issue, it should have redounded to the benefit of the Republican Party as a whole somewhere near as much as of Eisenhower. Three of the troglodyte group of Republican extreme-reactionaries were defeated outright—Kem of Missouri, Cain of Washington and Ecton of Montana.

The Korean Brew

Even more important: it would really have been disconcerting if a purely fabricated issue, actually baseless in view of the fact that the Communist Party in the United States is so strengthless, should have proved so strong that a decisive change in national politics could be ascribed to it. But it is not the strength of the CP, nor the ability of a demagogue to invent a scarecrow, that made the Communism issue one of the ingredients in the blind reaction of frustration of the voters: it was the fact of its relevance to the mess of the Korean war. The strong element in the GOP's demagogic line on this was: Maybe there is some truth to the charge that this Korean mess is due to the influence of "Communists" in the government. . . . The "Communism" issue was one drop in the brew.

The people see no way out of the Korean war and, even more widely, out of the world-wide cold war of which it is a part. The Truman administration, echoed by Stevenson in the campaign, did not and could not claim that the way out was through victory, through fighting it out to a successful conclusion, as is standard for war governments. This is how wars are supposed to be ended, isn't it? and has there been another government or regime in history which has failed at least to claim that it will and can end a war by winning it?

But what has been borne home is that this war is one of the strangest in history. Stevenson made a great hit with the liberal intellectuals precisely because he quite clearly told the people what he believed to be the truth: there was no solution to the impasse (while American soldiers died as hills in Korea changed hands three times) but that we must all grit our teeth and slog it out indefinitely. . . .

Honest Bankruptcy

This was no doubt a tribute to that honesty of the man which helped to make the liberal intellectuals so enamored of him, especially in contrast with the hypocritical attempts by Eisenhower and the GOP to pose as possessors of a way out when in truth they had no more to say than Stevenson. That is a moral point up for Stevenson and a demagogue's mark for the Eisenhower campaign. But it is the people, and not Stevenson, who are right in feeling that there must be an exit road somewhere, that something could be done, that this could not be the first war in human history to which one had to reconcile oneself to fighting for the sake of fighting, endlessly, without visible goals—not even the war aim of simple victory!

The people were right—without any more idea of what had to be done than either of the candidates possessed—and Stevenson was "honestly" expressing the bankruptcy of U. S. policy in the world crisis.

But what candidate has won because he honestly confessed his bankruptcy?

It is not to the point, at this juncture, to prove all over again—as LABOR ACTION has done, to be sure—that

Eisenhower and the Republicans offered no real alternative. The votes cast for Eisenhower were against WHAT IS. The general's promise of a visit to Korea was a meaningless grandstand play? Certainly, and we will bet a year's subscription to LA that the Ike voters were less deceived about its possible efficacy than most commentators now claim to think. But maybe he'll do something, what will it hurt to give him a try when the others "honestly" assure us that they know no way out whatsoever, maybe the South Koreans can do all the fighting, Ike is a general and he ought to know, anyway we're not for starting any wars but maybe it would be better even to get tough with the Chinese over there than to settle down to an endless future of marching uphill and down while the casualty lists mount, and taxes go up, and prices go up, and Washington tells us to pull in our belt because this is going to take a long time. . . .

An anti-war sentiment? Some of it is mixed in, but after one has run across enough people who are simultaneously both for pulling out of Korea and pushing the war to Stalinist China, one gets an idea of the muddy, contradictory, blindly baffled, aimlessly exasperated bitterness to which the Eisenhower line appealed with its equally muddy and demagogically contradictory plays on the Korean theme.

Labor Didn't Swing

But there is a tremendously important correction we have to make at this point. It is not "the people" that we have really been talking about up to now, not the people as a whole. For the voting lineup, with its paradoxes, showed that we have been talking about a specific part of the people.

Who swung to Eisenhower? Judging by the evidence now in—and no one has any different or better data—the talk by commentators about the failure of the labor forces to deliver for their chosen candidate is baseless.

LABOR ACTION was not for Stevenson any more than for Eisenhower, and we advocated "Vote Socialist," but if it were true that the GOP candidate, representing the more conservative and even reactionary sections of the ruling class, had been able to make significant inroads into the labor vote, which has hitherto gone to the Fair Deal as the lesser evil in politics, then conclusions would be necessary about the temper of the country. But all available evidence indicates that the labor-Fair Deal vote was not invaded by the Eisenhower appeal, with all its blind attractiveness.

Who gave Stevenson a larger vote than Truman in 1948 if not essentially the same coalition of social forces that has been backing the Fair Deal up to now, as against the Republicans? If the labor vote went to the right, where did Stevenson get the near two and a half million votes more than Truman ever got? To ask the question is to answer it. The stupid talk about the "breakdown" of the labor political machine ignores the leading paradox of the election.

All specific analyses of local returns that have so far appeared have confirmed this, by and large. Taking counties in two heavily industrialized states where labor is strong, in Ohio and Michigan, a *New York Times* correspondent records that—

"The Michigan and Ohio figures show, instead, that Governor Stevenson ran a stronger race than President Truman had done four years ago; that he drew a larger vote in those urban areas where organized labor was active politically. . . .

"In Detroit, headquarters city of the politically active United Auto Workers, CIO, Governor Stevenson polled 126,000 votes more than President Truman had four years ago. In Cleveland he ran 65,000 votes ahead of the president's total four years ago. In Youngstown, a steel center, he topped the Truman total by 5,000 votes."

He takes 7 industrial counties in Ohio and 6 in Michigan, and in every one of them, Stevenson beat out the Truman vote. Labor "delivered" more this time.

The fact that this article appeared on page 66 does not make it less significant.

The same pattern appeared in Pittsburgh wards loaded with Jones & Laughlin workers. Stevenson held the Democratic vote in coal districts of Pennsylvania; he won West Virginia, where John L. Lewis' mine workers gave him the state and beat the Republican candidates for governor and senator.

The Democratic vote generally held its own, at least, among the Negroes; it slipped somewhat among the farmers, but not enough to account for Eisenhower's total. Where did that total come from?

The Ten Million

The answer, of course, lies in the fact that the total number of ballots cast set a record high. It was between 60 and 61 million votes—as compared with the previous high of 49.9 million in 1940!

A whole stratum of voters came out who had never gone to the polls before. They came crawling out of their political cellars to vote for Eisenhower. Ten to eleven million of them. And it was this stratum which swung the election. It is also to this stratum, above all, that our discussion of the motivating issues applied.

The labor vote that had gained the respect of the analysts in 1948, the same labor vote that showed its strength and political weight then, stayed with the Fair Deal capitalist party. The main sections of the bourgeoisie, and its periphery and dupes, went as before with the Republicans, down the line. The ten millions who came out of their political darkness to like Ike were derived largely from the

most backward sections of the middle-class flotsam, which had not before even reached the level of political consciousness enough to fluctuate between the parties, as well as from the least politically conscious elements of a working class which still has millions of unorganized. This is what Eisenhower pulled out of the nether reaches of the social structure; these are the elements who were drawn to the polls to vote, their disgust and their inchoate frustrations, their fear, their disgust and their inchoate discontents with what they knew to be the going concern, with WHAT IS. They made the difference.

This is what the picture shows in its main lines, and the social character of these elements is in harmony with the nature of the vote that was cast. They were striking out blindly, to be sure, but it is characteristic that such strata are drawn into unaccustomed political expression in such moods.

The Pattern to Remember

It would be a mistake to think of this in simple derogation of such sections of the unpoliticized mass. Societies in blind alleys have seen this phenomena—in larger scales—both in times of revolution and in times of reaction. It depends on what major social force can give them a lead, can offer them a channel to express their legitimate resentment against the going concern, can offer a way out.

In tenser and more developed situations than the one that now exists in the United States, the forces of progress and revolution have been able to bring them along; where no progressive lead was given, or where the left abandoned its historic role, the fascists have fallen heir to this reservoir of latent social energy.

In the milder situation of America in 1952, it is not, of course, a question of fascism or social revolution that is posed. But, on its own plane, the type-situation is there: only labor could have developed a program which could have been a progressive alternative to The Mess, and labor was devoting its energies to all-out support of the party in official charge of The Mess; it was the right wing of the lesser-and-greater-evil duo, the GOP wing of capitalism, which could appeal to it if only demagogically.

Even this was not enough to carry the GOP as a party to the same decisive victory that Eisenhower won. For even in the eyes of these elements, the central personnel of the Republican cast of characters was also tainted with The Mess. Its men had been in Congress; they had made no very different record on the main questions. If Eisenhower ran so far ahead of the Republicans hanging to his coattails, it was an index to the degree to which he had not been associated at all with politics as the people understood the word. His status as "war hero" also had the negative connotation of "no politician."

Both Taft and Lodge have admitted that the Republicans made little or no local gains. Asked "Do you think the Republican Party throughout the country showed material gains on the local levels?" Taft replied meekly, "They showed gains—I wouldn't say material."

Lodge was even more direct. He was asked: "Would you say the party showed a material gain over four years ago in the local candidacies, and so on?"

"I wouldn't know about that," replied Lodge. "But I'd be surprised if that were true."

"Do you think the party strength is about the same as before, other than his [Eisenhower's] popularity?"

"Yes, I think so. I think the party's strength isn't going to start to grow until Eisenhower has been in office and does what the president can do to improve the party organization."

"In other words, you think the growth of the Democratic Party may have been stopped, but the Republican Party hasn't started growing yet?"

"Yes."

What Did They Offer?

Nor were these moods, it is clear from the election results, outweighed by continued "gratitude" for the social gains of the New and Fair Deals. We write "gratitude" advisedly because the Fair Deal campaign, especially as it was conducted by labor's political arms, pointed more to past benefits than to present hopes. CIO election propaganda had more to say about Hoover breadlines than about the Korean war.

It has been pointed out from various sides that there is a whole generation of young workers (young voters) to whom the depression of the 1930s is an historical episode of which they have heard, not a living part of their experience.

But in addition, the new conditions and social assumptions brought in by the Roosevelt and Truman Deals have to a large part become part of the regular furniture of the country. In a sense, items like social security have become so firmly established in the political and social picture that they have become dissociated from the Democratic Party as such, except for those whose memories go back. (There is the old joke whose punchline goes "But what have you done for me lately?") . . .

Eisenhower was able to convince the strata which were decisive for him that, in casting their ballots for a new administration, they were not voting to go back to the pre-New Deal era. This was testified to by Wilson Wyatt:

"General Eisenhower," Wyatt told the *U. S. News* as Monday-morning quarterback, "adopted all of the Fair Deal and New Deal measures that had been put into effect, without exception. So that it was not a case of

And a Look at the Next Trends

General Eisenhower being in opposition to the Fair Deal and New Deal—he adopted those and called them 'middle of the road' and said that 'there are social gains that, of course, no one questions' . . . I think he adopted the accomplished New Deal and Fair Deal. . . .

But if this was so—the labor political leaders will have to ask themselves—what did Stevenson have to offer? Merely firmer assurance that there would really be no going back? But Stevenson's line of campaign was not designed to make this assurance a living one down in the dark political layers of the electorate who came out of the social Woodwork to vote for Ike. This was so not merely because Stevenson and his election line already represented a shift to the right by the Democratic Party, as we explained in the course of the presidential debate.

It is the opinion of this writer—though it need not necessarily be shared by all in view of the tenuous nature of such an estimate—that Stevenson's main emphasis in the campaign may have been excellently designed to convince Max Lerner that he is a "great man" but that it was the last thing in the world to counteract the decisive Eisenhower appeal. The aspect of Stevenson's approach which this bears on was, in fact, that which the governor chose to highlight in his very last windup speech of the campaign on election eve, as the last thought he wanted to leave in the minds of the voters. It impressed me that he did so, but not in the same way as it impressed his supporters.

In this last word, Stevenson chose to stress very hard what he was not going to do for anyone. That is what it added up to as I listened to it. He proudly pointed to the fact that he had fearlessly and honestly told the American Legion that he was not for special favors for veterans. He proudly mentioned that in Detroit he had told labor he was not their captive. He proudly reminded his listeners that he had told off the Texans who wanted the tideland oil for the state . . . etc.

Each individual item may or may not be laudable, and of course Stevenson was trying to emphasize his freedom from narrow-interest control, but the tone and weight of this approach (which colored his whole campaign in various ways) need only be compared with Truman's radical demagoguery of 1948 to see the point that should be made here.

Who Can Give the Lead?

This is not to recommend that Stevenson should have vied with Eisenhower in demagoguery. That is a matter of tactics which the capitalist politicians will have to decide for themselves without our advice. But being less demagogic than Eisenhower (or Truman), Stevenson was also more futile, in the face of the moods which we have attempted to analyze. For in the last analysis he had no more to offer than the Republicans about the No Exit situation in which the country was bogging down under a Democratic administration, and only the labor-liberals could get enthusiastic (with a strong note of desperation in their enthusiasm) about a lesser-evil whose most touted virtues depended on what he was not doing—not as demagogic as his rival, not fostering illusions about solutions to the Korean war, etc.

The cadres of the labor vote stuck with him from 1948 to 1952 for positive reasons, to be sure, and above all were not won over to the right-wing alternative to the Democratic mess; but what happened socially in this election is perhaps even more striking as a portent than for what it may mean immediately.

For, as we pointed out, the outpouring onto the political stage (if only on an election day) of backward strata which have not previously made their weight felt is not a one-shot peculiarity merely of this election vote. It is a characteristic phenomenon of critical times. From the longer-range point of view, it underlines the question: Who can give a new, fresh and bold lead to the American people? In anticipation of the times—which we are not predicting for tomorrow—when blind convulsions of amorphous discontent can become more powerful and frenzied than this relatively mild case which we saw on November 4.

That is the historic question of our period, and beside it all others pale. This election has already given indications, discussed in other articles, that the future belongs to new political forces. But it can belong to reaction or to progress.

The biggest potential force for the latter is that of the labor movement, but labor cannot give a lead of its own as long as it is tied to the Democratic mess rather than to the Republican variety.

The labor politicians are fond of explaining profoundly that labor cannot win by itself and therefore must maintain its alliance with the Democrats even at the cost of subordination. But though it cannot win by itself, it can give a lead only by striking out for itself, and winning allies to itself (not the Democratic machine) by offering a political alternative to the outworn defenders of an outworn system.

Without a Crystal Ball

In putting Eisenhower in the White House, while holding the Republican Party off from the decisive gains which they had a "right" to expect from an Eisenhower victory, the people were not voting for reaction. In giving Stevenson the biggest labor vote of the post-war period, while Eisenhower's majority came from the tangled moods of an elemental revulsion against the going concern, the people were not registering any substantial turn to the right in political feeling.

But while this is true, the result of Eisenhower's victory will undoubtedly be a shift-over to the right in the governmental and social climate. It is the right-wing elements who will be encouraged to raise their heads more boldly, while the liberal and labor forces "take it easy." There may even be a passing phase of panicky fear and demoralization among the latter.

Here let us insert a note to all well-intentioned readers: Nothing that follows below should be mistaken for a prediction. In discussing the short-range period which lies immediately ahead, for the next one-two years, no one's forecasts can be worth much. The two big imponderables—even besides the question of what, after all, Eisenhower turns out to be as a politician—are the Korean war and the extent and immediate consequences of the expected economic letdown. To mention only one of a variety of considerations which no one can answer, there is also the vital matter of the Kremlin's strategy. It is not excluded that Moscow can even decide to woo (and lull) the new administration in the hope that the foreign-policy dinosaurs of the Taft-Hoover wing can be induced to follow appeasement policies.

But it is useful to discuss the tendencies which will contribute even to this short-range period.

The Shift to the Right

It is likely that the labor leaders will learn that the heavens have not quite fallen on them, now that the Republicans are back in Washington.

Granted that the Eisenhower administration, accompanied in Congress by essentially the same GOP-Southern Democrat coalition which has been steering the Congress up to now, will mean a move to the right—one more evident than what would have probably taken place under Stevenson—the campaign-bogies which labor propaganda tried to dress up are not likely to materialize, any more than the 1952-type breadlines and apple-sellers. If we grant the Republicans something of an instinct of self-preservation, one should rather look for quite cautious rightward steps rather than a big swing to reaction or anything like a raw crackdown on labor. No one's going to take on the labor movement in a frontal attack.

It is true that the Eisenhower regime will be making moves, particularly if there are big strikes during its life, which will be denounced by the labor leaders in terms more vigorous and denunciatory than we have been accustomed to hear from the CIO and AFL with respect to the government. To anticipate this, we need only imagine what Murray, Reuther or Green would have had to say about some of the past president's strikebreaking measures if that president's name had been Robert Taft. This will have to be kept in mind.

For if like wants to be liked for another term, he still needs more of a mass base, or at least toleration, than the character of his vote promises for him. Stevenson's record vote in defeat rested on relatively solid cores of politically active sections of the people. Eisenhower's decisive votes came from elements which have now retired back to the political limbo from which they came. After four years of condemnation by office and the responsibility of office in times like these, it will be the Eisenhower regime which will represent WHAT IS.

The GOP administration may go somewhat to the right on measures like tax-cutting, budget-cutting and foreign-aid cutting, but the responsibility of power is quite the restraining influence which it is cracked up to be. It will have good reason to try to placate a foe which is the most powerful single force in political life—the labor movement—even if it is not a question of winning it over. It can afford to fix up the Taft-Hartley Law by a shade or two in the direction of labor's complaints, without any more basic change than anyone had a real right to expect from a Democratic victory. "Fascism" is not around the corner.

New Experience for Labor

Labor, on the other hand, will find that it was not control in Washington by its "friends" which gave it everything it has today. It will find that it can live without such friends in the seats of power, as labor has had to live and grow and fight during most of its life.

It will rediscover—for some, discover for the first time—what it feels like to be in opposition to Washington, instead of always pulling its punches on the vital issues of the times in order not to embarrass "our" administration. It will have to learn more of the meaning of labor independence from the state.

For an indeterminate part of the labor movement this will be a brand-new experience, old as it is for labor in the main. Many of its cadres active today, as well as its rank and file, grew to consciousness in the labor movement only under the Deals—just as there is a whole generation today which has never been aware of living under any other administration than these of the Roosevelt-Truman era.

Not because of a change in outlook, but by force of circumstance, one of the leading changes for which the labor movement is now due is a turn to greater independence, willy-nilly. That is simply because there is less to be dependent upon. It is such political shifts which change outlook more than the other way around.

Can the Democrats hold on to their coalition with the labor forces? Here most of all is a prediction possible for the next immediate period. But the first thing to be said is that the question itself doesn't quite mean the same thing that it did before. What exactly will coalition with the Fair Deal mean now? What it meant with a Fair Deal

in power was definite enough: there was a *quid pro quo* possible in terms of concrete promises and performances by an administration which held the levers. But the labor leaders, like the politicians, are not noted for idealistic gratitude or loyalty to abstract principle, assuming that they saw a principle in the Fair Deal. What does the Democratic Party have to offer?

What this means at a minimum is not necessarily that the coalition is doomed or without material base, but that the labor leaders will be forced at every step to re-examine the question of their relationship.

And obviously one of the biggest things that will decide is which way the tops of the Democratic machine steer, themselves.

The Democrats' Road

It would be easy to make out a case to show that the Democrats will lean "left" to become a more radical opposition, now that they are relieved of the responsibility of office; that the Northern liberal wing will become more self-assertive as against the Southern Democratic conservatives and reactionaries; etc. It would be easy to argue that, since the election showed that the party can no longer depend on the South but that its rock of voting strength came from its labor coalition and Negro supporters, it will be labor and the Northern liberals who will increase their weight in the party. In this event it might be natural to look toward even greater involvement of labor into the Democratic machine.

But it is not quite that simple. Such a development would mean going at a gallop toward a definitive split in the party. Whoever may be rash enough to predict this may be voicing his hopes, perhaps; but the calculations of the party machine mechanics are not those of their labor allies. A development which would leave them face to face in a split party with a lusty labor political machine is enough to scare them to death. In this sense, they need the Southern wing all the more, as a counterpoise.

Furthermore, the decrease in Democratic representation in Congress from the North and West means an even greater specific weight for the Southern Democrat, Dixiecrat and semi-Dixiecrat congressmen in Washington than even heretofore. This is the group which acts out Democratic policy. As long as the Fair Deal occupied the White House, it had an alternative and even superior symbol of Democratic policy, the presidency. Even if a large section or, worse, a majority of the Democratic legislators voted "wrong," the labor movement continued to look on Truman as the face of the Democratic Party. In the new dispensation, the voice of the Democratic Party will be more than ever the voice of its congressmen and senators.

Nor have the Democratic Party leaders given any indication that they have reconciled themselves to losing the South as a solid bloc. A Republican victory does not mean that a new era has been born, and Eisenhower's tremendous vote in the South does not necessarily mean that the Republican Party has been established there as an alternative force.

Toward a New Dynamic

The course of the Democratic Party will not be decided all at once or in a straight line, but at a minimum, again, the new situation forces labor into attitudes of greater independence from the machine. It could mean a good deal more. No one predicted in 1948 the reaction of many top labor chiefs in the early part of the year when they felt that Truman didn't have a chance—and started talking about new political realignments and even a labor party. Looking forward then to a change which would turn their allies out of the White House, there was a strong impulse registered toward a break with the Democratic Party.

There are tendencies at work which can push labor to find its way to political independence even more quickly under Eisenhower than under Stevenson.

But the overshadowing factor which will condition the course of next events is still the Korean war and its larger matrix in the cold war. This is what clouds the crystal ball for the next couple of years—even while it mirrors the longer-term trend of capitalist policy—not only for labor but also for would-be Republican optimists.

The right-wing *U. S. News & World Report*, for example, in its post-election issue, makes a brave show of recounting "What Eisenhower Will Do." It paints a virtual promised land for business, as intoxicated a picture of the Big Change as the labor-liberals painted a black one. "The role of government will tend to shrink . . . attempt to restore a larger measure of competitive capitalism. . . . The role of government will be regarded more as that of umpire and balance wheel rather than of active player and motive power. . . ."

And in the course of hallelujahs, it also mentions casually: "Unless war can be brought to an end, it will be difficult for the new president to carry out many of the ideas he holds." To say the least! And some distance further we find out, in fact, that "The chances are that a basis for real peace will not be found." And that "Armament under the Republicans as under the Democrats, will remain a great new, permanent industry. . . ."

Labor bids fair to be pushed during Eisenhower's term from cautious sparring to more independent assertion of its economic needs and political aims, and in the inevitable clashes it will find that the tenant of the White House may have been changed but that the Permanent War Economy is still installed in Washington. From these clashes a new dynamic can emerge.

The Image of the General as Genial Fixer

By WALTER BARRON

That the national election was a victory for candidate Eisenhower more than for his party has been accepted by most commentators. He ran ahead of his ticket just about everywhere, sometimes by very sizable margins, won in places where other Republicans lost, and probably carried in many Republicans on his coattails. Despite the landslide result in the presidential race, the Republicans have barely won control of the House—a combination never before seen in recent American political history.

The famed war hero went over with the voters, even those who consider themselves Democrats. Gallup asked people to select their choice of presidential candidate by name and, separately, by party. Eisenhower was, personally, 2 or 3 per cent ahead of "the candidate of the Republican Party" in every poll seen. Another Gallup survey found that 48 per cent believed the Democratic Party was "best for them," while only 31 per cent thought the same of the Republicans, a big margin for the Democrats.

Eisenhower was nominated because of personal appeal, and no doubt that had much to do with his election. But no mere smug and snobbish analysis explains it—it took more than a charming smile, favorable news coverage, and the efforts of the best advertising men on Madison Avenue. By now all should be able to appreciate the particular historical environment that made this appeal work so readily. And it fitted in well with traditional American political ideology, which most supercilious intellectuals have helped foster and maintain. The success of the hero image, the ever-present Bonapartist potential, was no historical accident.

The Korean war and other issues directly associated in popular consciousness gave Ike his mass support. Not many voters had the slightest idea what he would, or could, do about this very unpopular "police action." Yet the overwhelming sense of frustration, the feeling of an impasse which could not go on, facilitated the vague message of the master "fixer."

A mild form of Bonapartism took over; the man who led the military coalition against Hitler and had begun the coalition against Stalin could surely figure some way out of the present impossible situation and carry it through. This is no full-fledged Bonapartism that cries for a man on horseback. It is rather a hopeful submission to the genial man-above-parties, superior in most qualities but still a replica of all of us. That, of course, is dangerous enough.

The long-time acceptable American political ideology helped put

easily slides into the acceptance of the gracious, non-violent, "democratic" Caesar.

Program, even of the most ambiguous and weasel-worded sort, is thoroughly toned down. The most complete explanation came in the *Newsweek* column of former Roosevelt brain-truster Raymond Moley. About two years ago the same writer told Americans that, though they might have the most developed industrial system in the world, they could learn about politics from Britain, where people vote on the basis of program. This was his more recent lesson for his readers:

"I would advise Mr. America to brush aside all the arguments, to try for a moment to forget all he has heard. Then I would advise him to ask a simple question, which of these two men, Adlai Stevenson or Dwight Eisenhower, is best fitted

by character to stand guard for you and yours in the four perilous years ahead?"

"The real issue before the American people is personal character. And furthermore, I cannot believe that the people who come to see Eisenhower are concerned about what he says. Somehow he makes them feel safer in this dangerous hour."

"And now with fresh blood on the first snows on the hills of Korea and a pall of despair fallen over the truce tent and Panmunjom, a sense of danger grows. In such a moment, people seek integrity and character. They find it in Eisenhower."

THE OTHER HERO

That is the Eisenhower side. It is strange to hear the type of voice now mockingly accusing Americans of searching for a

"father image." A large section of the Stevenson camp helped create the most pervasive father image of our time in Franklin Delano Roosevelt. None other than Max Lerner lamented, not so long ago, that it was, indeed, not easy to live a "life without father."

But some of the same group went even further—they helped build Eisenhower. When the Republicans shoved down their throats the reminder that in 1948 they had begged Ike to run on the Democratic ticket, they plaintively wailed that they hadn't yet known what he stood for. What an amazing confession—they were all out for a man whose ideas they did not know! Who sought the father image then?

A much worse recent offender is one of their prominent minds, Senator Paul Douglas. Early this year, the man who once wrote a book to prove that a new party was essential proclaimed that both parties should nominate Eisenhower, the "greatest living American" and the only man who could "unify the country."

Finally, despite the frequent emphasis on voting for Stevenson because of New and Fair Deal programs, foreign policy, FEPC, etc., much of the argument for him was, likewise, that of hero adulation. Only one sample will be quoted, a letter sent by novelist John Steinbeck and Herman Wouk to the *Times*:

"In our opinion, his [Stevenson's] uncanny instinct for the people's broad personal feelings in all affairs and issues, his personal humility, his immersion in the words and thoughts of the Bible, his ability to strike in the same speech notes of shrewd humor and notes of the highest spiritual value, all mark an extraordinary public man; possibly a genius of our century; certainly the most attractive and inspiring personage in our national life since the death of Franklin Roosevelt. We are for him heart and mind."

The American governmental system, with its overweighted role for the presidency, sometimes as power but often as symbol, permits the ready assumption of a "great man" appeal. In times of crises such a submissive trend can more easily take hold, helped by the accepted ideology of voting for "good men." The depression helped put over the legend of the Democratic hero, Roosevelt. The Korean debacle helps put over the Eisenhower legend. Both sides are responsible for perpetrating and extending the idea that we need a hero-father. The men behind Stevenson cannot too righteously indict their opponents.

Will Democrat Leaders Move Toward Me-Tooism?

By DICK OLIVER

CHICAGO, Nov. 11—While expressing satisfaction over the Republican victory in the November 4 elections, Colonel McCormick's *Chicago Tribune* takes at least equal pains to "keep the record straight" on matters inside the Republican Party, thereby indicating the shape of things to come, factionwise. The situation may have an effect not only on future relations within the new government party, between Eisenhower and the Taftites, but also on relations between them and Stevenson's Democrats, and between the Democratic Party and labor.

McCormick, whose election views and proposal for a new reactionary party by 1956 has been discussed in LABOR ACTION, editorially cautioned on November 8: "Whether they [the voters] have installed a party that will be an effective and honorable servant of America and the best interests of the people remains to be seen."

Indirectly belittling Eisenhower's personal popularity and the strenuous efforts by his supporters to elevate him above the Republican Party because of his bigger vote, McCormick writes, "We think it likely that any Republican presidential candidate would have been swept in on the tide that a frustrated, resentful and angry people rolled up." After recalling the *Tribune's* 20-year uncompromising struggle against the New and Fair Deals, the editorial states, "As our readers well know, we had reservations about the general who rode the tide of popular revulsion to Trumanism. But a Congress possessed of judgment and discrimination is there to make the decisions. Good Americans of both parties represent the conservative and nationalistic will which brought the up-

heaval at the polls. These men stood with us on the issues. In them resides the promise of a restoration to a representative republic. . . ."

Having sounded these warnings of impending Republican factional struggles which will spill over into the new Congress, the *Tribune* daily embroiders this line with its specific demands and gathers its forces together. With pride it displays letters from Senators-elect McCarthy of Wisconsin, Jenner of Indiana, and Potter of Michigan crediting the *Tribune* with tremendous help in achieving their victories. With equal pride it hails the defeat of the "Truman Republican," Senator Lodge of Massachusetts.

Right here, according to some indications, is where the defeated Democratic leader, Adlai Stevenson, and his "loyal opposition" may come in. Will the Democratic Party leaders adopt as part of their strategy the "protection" of Eisenhower and his more "internationalist" and "liberal" group as against the Taftites, in order to prevent Ike from having to accommodate himself much to the GOP right wing?

Once the Democratic exponents of "national-unity-above-all" have gotten over the first sharp pang of their defeat, there will be such a pull on them. It is likely to be one of the influences pushing the out party, or elements within it, toward a "me-too" line with reference to the general.

British Labor Squints at Ike

By DAVID ALEXANDER

LONDON, Nov. 5—At 8 a.m., by our time here, we learned that Eisenhower had been elected president of the United States. At 10:30 a.m. the "evening" papers were already out with the details and lists of results.

While all official sources have been strictly impartial in the election, a certain disappointment was felt even among Conservatives in this country. It is not that Eisenhower as a person is not respected in this country, but since he came to terms with Taft, McCarthy and the others of that wing of the Republican Party he has largely lost sympathy in England. If these electoral agreements did not alienate the American people, they certainly discouraged Europeans.

Eisenhower's promise of a trip to Korea to end the war there received much publicity here but it did not cut any ice at all. Most people here agreed with Stevenson that the root of the problem was in Moscow, or at any rate that its focus was in the worldwide cold war as a whole, and it could only be solved there. The

English people, realizing the expense of Korea and having to make much greater sacrifices in the execution of imperialist wars anyhow, do not see in such a trip, or in any other act of melodrama, a panacea for the world's political and economic ills.

Of great concern to Labor is the future of Anglo-American relations as a result of the election. If we assume that Labor is returned here in the next election in Britain, what will be the attitude of Eisenhower's backers to a Labor and socialist government — "quasi-Communist" according to so many of the Republican dinosaurs? The new administration may be more reluctant than Truman's government to come to an agreement for world-wide distribution of raw materials.

Furthermore it seems likely to hearken to the invocations of American industrialists to increase the tariffs against British imports where these have captured a piece of the market. Labor is concerned not only because the industrialists supported the Republicans but also because the Republican government is less likely to let a Labor regime function successfully by its grace.

Labor Held Lines—

(Continued from page 3)
backs and not labor people.

Secondly, the Republican vote in the labor districts was still much higher than it should be. The Democratic ticket remains hard for the labor leaders to sell.

Finally, the Democrats have lost their hold on the middle classes, the housewives and the young people to an aggressive Republican Party, and it is hard to see how the politically bankrupt Democrats can win it back. An aggressive labor party, however, untarnished with scandal, corruption, Sparkman and the Dixiecrats, the McCarran Bill, the Kerr natural-gas bill, Tammany-type machines, rising prices, a bankrupt foreign policy and a hundred and one similar millstones, could win these groups away from GOP.

There has been no discussion of a labor party in this area by official labor leaders in the past week. However, the few long-time advocates of a labor party in the rank and file here are getting a better response to the idea than they have gotten since the war years.

One state situation here in

Pennsylvania deserves more than passing attention, that is, a comparison of the situation in the state's two big cities, Pittsburgh and Philadelphia. As discussed above, the Pittsburgh machine is of the traditional Tammany-type. Its leader, Mayor David Lawrence, was instrumental in capitulating to the Dixiecrats at the Democratic convention this summer. Lawrence also ran roughshod over the overwhelming pro-Kefauver sentiment in the state. And his machine failed miserably. The Philadelphia organization, on the other hand, has a strong ADA coloration and was in the Kefauver camp at Chicago. The Philadelphia organization came through with a thumping majority. We are, of course, not suggesting that the ADA, Kefauver, and Richardson Dilworth of Philadelphia combined would make the Democratic Party a real party of labor. But it is politically significant that the "leftish" Democrats of Philadelphia and Detroit did tremendously better at the polls than the conservative machines like Pittsburgh and Chicago.

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