

# International VIEWPOINT

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## **New Flareups in Middle East**

**Portents in  
French local elections**

**Blowup in Denmark**

**Jaruzelski's anti-Ukrainian  
campaign**





# International Viewpoint

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## Blood and oil

The mid-March Iranian offensive has apparently ended as disastrously as the first big assault on Iraqi territory in the summer of 1982. After the initial slaughter, the Khomeini regime's offensives were more measured in scope. The most ambitious was the attack through the marshes in February 1984, which led to the capture of Majnun island. It was in that battle that the Iraqis first used poison gas on a large scale. The Iranians suffered heavy losses, and after that the time stretched on without the new offensives the Khomeini regime promised.

The long delay of the "final offensive" became a subject of ridicule in the exile Iranian press, and the Tehran government spokespeople could offer no better explanation than claiming that the Islamic Republic had decided to wear out the nerves of the Iraqis by keeping them waiting. Finally, more than a year after the Majnun island battle, tens of thousands of Iranian fighters were sent through the Howeiza marshes and across the Tigris river in another attempt to cut Iraq in two. Small forces had managed to cross the river in February 1984, been cut off and annihilated. This time apparently much larger forces suffered a similar fate.

Gerry FOLEY

What is clear is that the battle was an extremely bloody one, and that the Iranian forces were shattered and pushed back. In its March 20 issue, the Paris daily *Liberation* cited an Agence-France Presse dispatch saying that AFP reporters had been able to visit the Iraqi side of the front and see "the ravages wrought in the Iranian ranks over dozens of kilometers."

The American authorities, who have the means for close surveillance of the region, announced finally that Iran had suffered a grave defeat, losing tens of thousands of fighters.

A new and more deadly type of poison gas seems to have been used by the Iraqis in the recent fighting. Pierre Taillefer, an AFP reporter in Iran, visited a survivor of a gas attack in a Tehran hospital. Hani Rastagar, sixteen years old, told him: "The bomb dropped by an Iraqi bomber fell near a bunker sending out a little cloud of smoke. Everyone in the bunker, about a dozen fighters, died instantly. They turned white and went stiff."

Another slaughter of the innocents in the Mesopotamian marshes cannot help but be a far greater disaster for the Khomeini government than the failure of the big push on Basra in 1982. For one thing, the political terms of the conflict have become clear. The Iraqi soldiers and people are not going to side with "Islamic" liberators coming from Iran. Moreover, the war has gone on now for more than two years on Iraqi soil, getting further and further removed from defense of Iran. It has also become obvious that big attacks on Iraqi positions mean slaughter with little chance of any significant victory.

It is true that as the war has gone on,

the Iraqi regime has become more and more dependent on the right-wing Arab states and moved closer to US-imperialism. Iraq's reconciliation with the pro-imperialist Arab states was made official at the height of the Iranian offensive, when Mubarak and King Hussein went to Bagdad to embrace Saddam in his moment of peril.

However, the Khomeini regime has also moved closer openly to such right-wing regimes as the one in Turkey and in Pakistan. This evolution, along with strong expressions of hostility to the USSR, has prompted Soviet organs to talk about a new CENTO (1) in a different form. The Soviet Union clearly sees it as in its interests to continue to arm Iraq.

As the Arabic magazine *Al-Havadi*, published in London saw it, "Washington and Moscow have a similar position toward the Iran-Iraq war, in the sense that they are waiting to see what direction the internal evolution in Iran takes in order to pursue a policy in accordance with their interests." (2)

This time the Soviets more openly condemned the Iranian offensive than in the past. *Pravda's* major article on the fighting (in the March 20 issue) was signed



by its correspondent in Kuwait, Yu. Glukhov. He used the chief editor of the Kuwaiti paper *Al Watan*, Jacem Al-Matua as a front quoting him as saying:

"Who benefits from this conflict? That is the question we have to ask first. Of course, it is not Iran or Iraq, which have suffered enormous material and human losses. Of course, it is not the Arab and the national liberation movement in the region ... The gainers from all this are American imperialism and its ally Israel."

Glukhov went on to write: "The conflict has become a stimulus to the arms race in the region ... The arms race has become a bridge for the Pentagon to establish itself here."

It was clearly not any strengthening of the Iranian revolution that prompted Tehran's offensive. The scenario was as follows: The Iraqis stepped up attacks and broke the truce on hitting civilian targets. Iran retaliated by systematically shelling Basra. Iraq then began bombing Iranian cities. Iranian officials promised to retaliate through ground attacks.

Both countries are becoming economically exhausted. In its February 22 issue, the *Iran Times* reported: "Hojatolislam Gholam-Hossain Naadi, deputy chairman of the Majlis Budget Committee, said that with only six weeks left to go in the Persian year, oil revenues totalled only 12.5 billion dollars.

The cabinet originally forecast oil revenues exceeding 20 billion dollars this year ... Oil was to comprise about 75% of the regime's planned revenues and taxes the remainder." That is a loss of one third of planned oil revenue.

At the same time, reports from revolutionists in Iran have emphasized a rapidly growing alienation of workers in Tehran at least from the war, even among regime supporters. They also confirm that strikes are increasing. In late February, Mehdi Bazargan, representing the "liberal" wing of the Islamic Republic, opened up a public attack on the regime.

Thus, indications are that the Iranian regime launched this offensive under the goad of economic disaster, rising mass discontent, and internal divisions in the government itself. The slaughter of tens of thousands of Iranian youth in the Howeiza swamps will not alleviate any of those problems.

The relative stability the Khomeini regime achieved through demagogy and repression seems to be cracking. And there can hardly be any doubt now that if the masses regain an opening to express themselves, the first thing they will demand is an end to a war from which they have nothing to gain, a war in which many tens of thousands of youth have been sacrificed to sustain false pretences of the ruling clerics to cover up their lack of solutions for the problems of the working people of Iran.

1. US sponsored pact between Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan, aimed against the Soviet Union.  
2. Quoted from a Persian translation of the article in the March 22 *Iran Times*.



## The political terrain after the Israeli withdrawal

The flareup of communal war between Christians and Muslims in the Sidon area in recent weeks and the Christian communalist rebellion against the country's Maronite president, Amin Gemayel, points up the continuing shifts and explosiveness in Lebanese politics. The following interview describes the underlying political developments in Lebanon since the Israeli invasion in June 1982. It was given to Gerry Foley in Paris at the end of March by Salah Jaber, a leader of the Lebanese section of the Fourth International.

*Question: What is the political character of the resistance to the Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon? That is, how did it develop and what are the major political forces and organising centers within it?*

*Answer:* There are some things about this that are very important to understand, because the international press has given a very distorted view of the resistance movement, and I think that it has done so for deliberate political motives. Thus, the tendency of the Western press has been to portray the resistance movement as Shiite and Islamic fundamentalist in character.

It is true that a lot of Shiites are involved in the resistance. That is for obvious reasons, since the population of the occupied area is mainly Shiite. But the Western press tends to use this fact to make it appear that the resistance is sort of a local branch of Khomeinism. That is a distortion, and I think a deliberate one because it has the apparent effect of making the resistance look like something exotic and unattractive, something few people in the West could sympathize with.

I do not mean to say that there is no Islamic component in the resistance to the Israeli occupation. There is. But it is only one element. There is also a major Lebanese left component, essentially the Lebanese Communist Party, and a large Palestinian involvement. The Palestinians, led by what is generally known in the West as the dissident wing of the PLO, have adopted a low profile. Among other things, that is because of the resentment that developed among the local people toward the old PLO with its displays of power. But everyone in Lebanon knows that they have been playing a big role.

Moreover, even in the Islamic component itself, you have to make a distinction between Amal, who place the resistance in a more nationalist context, and the purely Islamic, or Hezbollah component, which sees it as part of a historic struggle against Zionism, Judaism, the West and the East [that is, the Soviet Union and Communism].

Historically, the initiative for the

resistance came from the Lebanese left, specifically the communist forces, and more specifically still, the Communist Party and the militant wing of the Palestinian forces, that is the so-called dissident wing of Al Fatah, and other components of the left such as the Democratic Front and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

It was the Lebanese Communist Party that took the initiative of creating the National Resistance Front, which in the beginning took responsibility for the overwhelming majority of the operations that took place against the occupation and which still takes responsibility for a large part of these operations.

As for Amal, for a whole period of the occupation, it did not wage any armed struggle against the Israeli occupation. It even regarded the occupation as offering some immediate advantages, such as getting rid of the Palestinians. And Amal still opposes the return of the Palestinian armed forces to the places from which they were expelled. In fact, for a period Amal even tried to reach some sort of *modus vivendi* with the Israelis, some sort of peaceful coexistence. The idea was that the Israelis would not any more interfere in their affairs, and in exchange for that Amal would prevent the Palestinians from getting into the area and staging any more operations from southern Lebanon against Israel.

The initiative taken by the CP put strong pressure on Amal, because the resistance started to gain popularity rapidly, owing to a growing resentment of the Israeli occupation. The feelings of the local population rose sharply against the Israelis because of the behaviour of the Zionist troops, their alliance with some Christian communalist anti-Muslim forces, and the whole repressive climate created by the Israeli occupation.

Actually, the Israeli repression was directed mainly against the left, but because of the extended-family patterns among the local population, it provoked very broad hostility. Whole families and villages identified with the people arrested.

So, the pressure of resentment mounted, forcing Amal to join in the activity. And this also pushed the Islamic fundamentalist wing to begin activity against the Israeli forces.

*Q: When you speak about Islamic fundamentalists, are you talking about a definite organisation or a current?*

*A:* At the beginning, the frontier between the fundamentalists and Amal was not clear. In fact, the whole Shiite fundamentalist movement came out of the ranks of Amal. Up until 1982, there were no other Shiite groups apart from Amal, so all these currents existed within it.

The first split in Amal was in the Bekaa valley in 1982. The people who led it accused Berri, the leader of Amal, of compromising with the Phalangists at the time he agreed to hold negotiations with Bashir Gemayel. After that, you had the formation of the Unity Government headed by Amin Gemayel, in which Berri himself was given a ministry. So other parts of the fundamentalist current within Amal began to act independently. They had existed before, but they began acting openly after that time. This also affected southern Lebanon, where they began to operate their own resistance movement, which they called the Islamic Resistance.

The demonstration that the "Islamic Resistance" held in Sidon after the Israeli army withdrew from the city illustrates its political character. Its slogan was "Neither a Patriotic nor a Nationalist Resistance — an Islamic Resistance." For the first time, a current that claims to be anti-Zionist and what we would call anti-imperialist rejected the terms "nationalist" and "patriotic". For them, nationalist means left. They are against the idea of nationalism. They are for "Islam". That's why they burnt the Lebanese flag and raised the Iranian flag and pictures of Khomeini. It was their way of saying that this is the government they recognise for the whole Islamic world.

These fundamentalists even openly reject the concept of anti-imperialism as the left understands it. They explicitly oppose the concept of national-liberation struggle. To this, they counterpose "Islamic" struggle. So, they see the Islamic resistance as counterposed to the nationalist resistance. They mounted a strong propaganda campaign against the nationalist resistance.

Thus, there are two sides to these Islamic fundamentalists. They are anti-Zionist and anti-Western, but at the same time, they are also anti-Communist and anti-left. The Hezbollah [Party of God] is now the strongest fundamentalist Islamic current in Lebanon.

*Q: But from what you are saying, it seems that the Hezbollah are capturing the new radicalisation. So, how can you be sure that this process will not go further? After all, the Shiites are the largest community in Lebanon, and historically underprivileged.*

*A:* The Hezbollah's problem is that it



has nothing concrete to offer by way of an answer to the present economic situation. All they can say is that once we have an Islamic society and economy, everything will be solved.

*Q: But perhaps they don't need to say much about the concrete economic questions as long as people's attention is focused on fighting the Israeli forces?*

*A: Yes, but people's attention is not just focused on that nowadays. The Israelis are withdrawing don't forget. And the economic situation is now very bad. People's main concern now is how to live.*

*Q: On the other hand, although these communalist forces may have no program for solving the economic crisis, they have the advantage that they generally take care of their own people. They offer material help and solidarity for their members. Are the Hezbollah able to do that?*

*A: Yes, they are doing that with the help of the financial subsidies they get from Iran. With these resources, they have offered some social assistance. But about the crisis of the economy they have nothing to say. They stay firmly within the capitalist framework. They are leading the radicalizing section of the masses into a dead end.*

There are great dangers involved in the growth of the Hezbollah because it is whipping up a very violent hatred of communism. Sooner or later, this will lead to clashes with the CP. The CP will never take the offensive against them. They are too afraid.

*Q: How strong is the CP in the resistance in southern Lebanon today?*

*A: What is clear is that it is still one of the main organized forces in southern Lebanon. Its strength is comparable to that of Amal.*

*Q: That raises the question of how long you think the Amin Gemayel government is likely to survive.*

*A: What is going on now is a confirmation of the analysis we made a long time ago. For example, we made a distinction between the fascist wing of the Christian communalist movement represented by Bashir Gemayel and the Amin Gemayel wing as a representative of classical bourgeois interests. So when Amin Gemayel succeeded his brother, he enjoyed a certain level of popular support reflecting the breadth of bourgeois support for him. He also had support from the capitalist powers, except for the Israelis, for whom the assassination of Bashir was a big blow.*

However, everything Amin Gemayel did after taking office has undermined the support he initially enjoyed. He began by relying heavily of the Americans and on the West. He believed in the Multinational force, in the effectiveness of a US demonstration of strength.

Very soon, Gemayel began using his office as a tool of the Phalangist Party,

giving preference to Phalangist worthies in certain nominations. So, he began to lose support even among the bourgeoisie. Then you had the fighting in the mountains and the re-emergence in Beirut itself of an armed counterforce, mainly the Shiites. He tried to crush this militarily but only succeeded in deepening the opposition to him and strengthening it. This operation not only led to defeat for him but forced the withdrawal of the Western forces. So, he found himself virtually suspended in mid air.

Amin Gemayel's initial mistake had been to sign the May 17 peace treaty with the Israelis, which alienated the Syrians from him. Why the Syrians held back their forces from clashing with Gemayel for a while, after he signed this treaty they departed from their wait-and-see attitude and played a key role in defeating him. Finally, with a green light from the Americans, he had to go to Damascus. From then on he has played the Syrian card. But in a certain sense, this was too late. He could have played it when he was in a position of strength, then he could have used it as a basis of stability. But when he finally went to Damascus, it was clear to everyone that he was going there defeated.

*Q: And the fact that he had to throw himself into the arms of the Syrians has set the stage for a revolt against Gemayel in the Christian camp itself.*

*A: Gemayel took advantage of the defeat of the Lebanese Forces in the mountains to begin intervening in the Lebanese Forces themselves. Then, after the death of his father, Sheikh Pierre, he became the leading figure in the Phalangist party. Through his control of the party, he began to spread his control to the other forces, the militias, the police force. The military forces that had followed his brother, Bashir were loyal to the party only in a very ambiguous way. They would not openly oppose it, but many had their won political ideas that were much more radically rightist than those of the Phalangists.*

After Bashir's death, the person put in the leadership of the Lebanese Forces was torn between the pressure of the Phalangist Party and that of the radical wing of the Lebanese Forces dominant in the military apparatus. Then, after he took control of the party, Amin Gemayel managed to take control of the Lebanese Forces by imposing, through the party, his nephew as the new head of the Lebanese Forces against a figure who was considered a representative of the Bashir tradition.

So, Amin Gemayel managed to gain a grip on the Christian forces and hold it for a time. But in the most recent period, Gemayel has come under massive pressure from the Muslim opposition and the Syrians. Before the recent rebellion led by Geaga broke out, he was negotiating a general compromise on the political institutions of the state, a new balance between the representation of the various communities which would have to be

much more favourable to the Muslims.

Moreover, the problems this caused arose in the framework of the economic collapse. This opened up the way for Geagea's rebellion. The economic disaster created despair in the Christian population. That is why this rebellion could take place at this time and have the success it is having.

The rebellion was spurred also by Gemayel's authoritarian methods. He tried to deal with the Christian rebellion in the same heavy-handed way that he used before against the Muslims. He had Geagea expelled. This led to a rebellion that spread to the whole of the Lebanese Forces and gained quite a wide popularity in the Christian camp. And so Gemayel is placed in a perilous position.

The rebels want to install a sort of Christian parliament in the Christian area, but this will be perceived by the other communities as a partition state and a declaration of war.

*Q: Is that Geagea's only program, separatism?*

*A: Yes, Bashir's fascistic notions have proved totally illusory, and now the only thing the Christian right can fight for is partition, and that is what they are doing. Already the Lebanese forces constitute a kind of state apparatus. Now, they want to round out this state structure through a parliament and other representative bodies. They won't say at this stage openly that they are out for an independent state, because that would mean a declaration of war. But they will probably have to do it sooner or later. The objective dynamic has been going in this direction for a number of years now. And that means the collapse of Amin Gemayel.*

*Q: But since the Hezbollah are on the rise, as you say, do you think that they*

*Amin Gemayel (D.R.)*





can eventually unite all the fundamentalists behind them?

A: No. They cannot bridge the gap between the two main sects of Islam, the Shiites and the Sunnis. The Hezbollah have had little or no attraction for the Sunni Muslims. In Lebanon, there is also the large Druze community, and the Druzes are a special sect considered heretics at best by the Sunnis and Shiites. Moreover, the Druzes separate the elect, or the truly religious, from the ordinary believers, and so it is hardly likely that fundamentalism could develop among them.

Q: Well, could the Hezbollah dominate the Shiite community?

A: Even in the Shiite community, Amal is still much stronger than the Hezbollah. But this radical minority exerts a constant pressure on Amal. This is something that Berri has to take account of, and it inhibits him from going as far as he could otherwise go in conciliation with the Phalangists and the Syrians.

Q: What sort of fundamentalist forces are there among the Sunni community?

A: There is a current very similar to the Muslim Brotherhood. It is called the Islamic Unification Movement. It is very weak in Beirut and other parts of Lebanon except for the north, the Tripoli area. In that zone, it fought alongside Arafat against the Palestinian opposition. It has basically the same ideas as the Hezbollah, except that it is not so pro-Iranian. Because of its Sunni character, it can have a relationship with Arafat and behind him with the Saudis. On the other hand, the Iranians are not satisfied with Arafat's leadership.

For Lebanon, both the Shiite and Sunni fundamentalists have the same programme. They both call for an Islamic republic; they both, in effect, say that the only solution for the country's crisis is for the Christians to become Muslim.

Q: But you say the fundamentalists, mainly the Shiite fundamentalists, have been growing. What is the reason for this? Does it represent a kind of radicalization that could lead to other things?

A: The reason for the growth of fundamentalism is two sided, a sharpening of the crisis and a failure of the left. Since mid-January, the value of the Lebanese currency has plummeted. In six weeks, it has lost more than half its value against the dollar. This is an unprecedented economic disaster for Lebanon. And it has had an immediate impact on the masses, since a very high percentage of necessities and consumer goods are imported. Even before the war, local production was limited, and since the start of the hostilities it has been largely destroyed. So the fall in the value of the currency means an immediate and more or less comensurate increase in prices, which is bringing about a real social disaster.

This social disaster can only lead to a further radicalization of the masses, but

this radicalization is now being mainly captured by the fundamentalists in the Shiite community and by other types of communal fanaticism in other communities, as among the Christians.

Q: Does that mean that a major shift is taking place in the political relationship of forces in Lebanon?

A: The first major shift took place after 1982. It was from the CP to Amal in the Shiite community. In the first years of the period of wars in Lebanon, starting with the civil war in 1975, the main militant force in the Shiite community was the Communist Party.

Amal was built at first mainly as a counterforce to the CP, as a weapon against the spread of communism in the Shiite community, which is the largest one in Lebanon.

The policies of the Lebanese CP since the start of the war period, 1975 to 1982, were to bow to the Syrians and the PLO leadership and to follow a compromise line in Lebanese internal politics. This led to their becoming discredited. Amal was able to profit from this. Although Amal had stagnated in the first years of the war period, it began growing at the expense of the CP in the late 1970s. In 1982, before the Israeli invasion, it had managed to gain control of some key areas of Beirut that had been communist bastions.

The Israeli invasion itself was a big blow to the Communist forces and to all the left or nationalist forces. I should point out here that the Israelis chose to disarm what we might call the ideological parties, the CP, the Nasserites, and so forth. They left the communalist forces such as Amal or Jumblatt's Druze party almost untouched. This obviously gave Amal a big advantage.

By taking the lead in the resistance movement, on the other hand, the CP regained some of its lost popularity. In 1984, in fact, the CP seemed to reach a new peak in its strength and influence, compared to the low point that they reached in 1982. But after that came the compromise between Amin Gemayel and the Syrians after the defeat suffered by the Multinational Force in Lebanon.

Since the CP are very much linked to the Syrians, Moscow's main ally in the region, after this compromise, the CP could not continue to appear to be the radical force. The continuing radicalisation tended to bypass both the CP and Amal. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that there has been a fundamental shift in the relationship of forces, in the sense that the Hezbollah is stronger now than the CP. It is not, but it is growing, and it has an advantage that the CP does not, that is its closeness to Amal. Both stand on the same Shiite ground. ■

A young fighter of the Shiite militia (D.R.)





## Danish workers spit out Schlueter's bitter pill

On Monday, April 1, the big Danish cities and industrial areas were paralyzed by a de facto general strike. Pickets organised by the trade-union left wing, the Tillidmandsringen (Shop Stewards Coordinating Committee) blocked the buses, trains and ferries. Where workers arrived at work, they held meetings and decided to walk out.

A number of workplaces decided to call a three-day strike, leading up to the Easter holiday, which begins Thursday, April 4. After they go back to work on Tuesday, April 9, they will hold meetings to decide what to do next. Thus, they are leaving open the possibility of an unlimited general strike. Many workplaces have only decided to strike for 24 hours, but in these cases also the momentum of the action will be decisive.

Despite sentiment for an unlimited general strike, which according to the Danish Fourth Internationalists, is running very strong, the Communist Party and the Socialist People's Party, (the majority political forces in the shop stewards committees) have been dead set against it.

Gerry FOLEY

"Showdown in Denmark," the March 27 British business daily *The Financial Times* headlined its commentary on the Danish private sector strike that began two days before. It expressed concern that the very mechanisms that have proved so useful over the last decades in keeping the labor movement under tight control could create explosions now.

What prompted this concern was the onset of a strike by 300,000 private sector workers, the likelihood that it could spread to include 200,000 public workers, and an insurgent mood among rank and file union members.

In the main Scandinavian countries, there is one big union federation — called the Landsorganisation (LO — National Organisation) in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. And this federation negotiates a national contract with the government and the bosses for the great majority of workers.

This system has maximised the weight of the union bureaucracy and of governmental institutions in bargaining and served to hold in check more militant groups of workers or unions. But it also assures that if a conflict becomes too strong to suppress, it can immediately turn into a direct battle between the government and the working class.

The conditions for such a confrontation are greatest in Denmark, which has an economy particularly dependent on international trade and which has suffered severely from the world recessions. At

the onset of the world capitalist crisis in 1974, successive Danish governments started to impose what was in effect a national contract by law. That is, the cabinet simply submitted to parliament a bill setting the guidelines for wages and conditions, and once parliament accepted it, the unions were prevented by law from striking, on pain of heavy fines.

In a telephone interview with Soeren Soendergaard, a leader of the Socialistisk Arbejderparti (SAP — Socialist Workers Party, the Danish section of the Fourth International), I asked why the Danish workers had submitted to the government's dictates before now. He said:

"Since the beginning of the crisis it has been the rule that the government has decreed a settlement. But up until 1982, it was always a Social Democratic government that framed the law. What is different now is that a right wing Thatcher-type government is in power and they are launching a very hard attack on the working class. They have set a 2% limit on wage increases for the next two years, for example, and inflation is expected to be 10% so that is going to mean a further cut in real wages for working people. The bill does offer a reduction of the work week to 39 hours.

"But this cut in working hours is modelled on the worst features of the settlement of the strikes for the 35-hour week in Germany. That is, the employers are permitted to introduce 'flexible working hours,' which means in effect that a lot of people may find themselves working more than a forty-hour week instead of

The Social Democratic Party also strongly opposes strikes, which are now illegal according to Danish labor law since the parliament passed a law imposing a general labor settlement on Saturday, March 30. The Social Democrats argue that the government's policy should be opposed only by legal means, that is, preparing for the next general election which is three years away.

On Friday March 29, massive demonstrations against the government's law took place throughout Denmark, certainly among the largest in the country's history. The police themselves admitted that there were at least 125,000 people in front of the parliament building. And large demonstrations took place even in small cities and towns.

Hardy Hansen, the leader of the SiD (Speciellearbejderfoerbund Danmark — General Workers Union in Denmark), a left Social Democrat, shifted from a legalistic position in the Friday demonstrations to one of support for the strikes. In the coming days, the ability of the Tillidmandsringen to adjust to the militancy of the ranks and to lead it will be tested.

less."

The government's offer for "shorter hours" was explained in detail in the March 21 issue of *Klassekampen*, the paper of the SAP:

"The bill provides for a reduction of the workweek by a half hour from September 1 this year and by one hour from September 1 next year. Workers on a 39½ hour week and the 38½ hour week before these provisions go into effect will get no reduction.

"This is not the first step toward a 35-hour week. To the contrary, the bosses have gotten their demand for the right to use their workforces more intensively, that is, the so-called flexible working hours.

"The normal workday has been extended. In the metal industry it runs today from 6.00 am to 5.00 pm. This is to become from 6.00 am to 6.00 pm.

"And from today until September 1, for many workers the workweek can remain 45 hours. After that it will be 44½ and next year it may be 43½. And this is without overtime pay."

The article went on to point out that "flexible hours" could mean five hours less per week in the first three months of the year and five hours more in the second quarter."

Soendergaard said: "this settlement will do absolutely nothing to reduce unemployment." There are about 300,000 jobless in Denmark, which has a total population of about four and a half million. In the past, he pointed out, the Social Democratic governments had



always sweetened the contracts they imposed, and this made it possible to use the Social Democratic controlled unions to get the workers to accept it.

"For example, the last time a Social Democratic government put in such a law, they extended vacations from four weeks a year to five." But the Schlueter government has been feeding the workers nothing but vinegar.

In fact, the Social Democrats deliberately turned the government over to the right wing coalition in the fall of 1982 so that it could carry out the austerity program that it was unable to get the workers to accept by the traditional trickery. The Schlueter government took the ball and ran with it. It immediately reduced unemployed benefits for casual workers, provoking a dockers strike at the beginning of 1983. (1) It then proceeded to break the dockers strike, essentially by means of police violence and intimidation. But these attacks have been stimulating a growing radicalization in the unions. Soendergaard described how all the potential has been building up for a strong fight back against austerity and repression.

"It has been developing since 1982, when the bourgeois parties took power in parliament and started the hard austerity policy. Just after that there was a national negotiation between the employers and the trade unions, and they were concluded quite peacefully, without any conflict. But this agreement meant that there was a cut in wages and unemployment still kept growing.

"So, what has happened since is that a left wing has been developing in the unions, with a lot of people starting to raise demands for higher wages and a shorter workweek. This left wing gained the leadership of some unions. One is the Unskilled Workers Union. In the 1983 national negotiations, this union, which is the largest in Denmark, voted against the contract.

"The dockers fought a very hard struggle at the beginning of 1983, and the left wing in this union has been very strong."

I asked how well defined this left was and what it consisted of. Soendergaard said: "It's not one left wing but left tendencies on various levels and made up of varying elements. If you take the leadership level, you have the chairperson of the Unskilled Workers Union, Hardy Hansen. He is not a Scargill type but rather a left Social Democrat bureaucrat, but he represents a real step to the left in the union leadership.

"What Hansen reflects is a real class-struggle left wing that can be seen among the dockers; the bus drivers; and in some big factories, such as the Danfoss factory in the south of Jutland for example, the biggest industrial plant in Denmark [with 4,700 workers], where there has been a long strike.

"From the standpoint of the political forces involved, it is left Social Democrats, the Communist Party, and the Social People's Party [a more or less left Social Democratic party that grew out of

an anti-Stalinist split in the CP in the 1950s] at the top leadership level. At the lower level, there are forces further to the left, the Left Socialists [VS — a New Left party], ourselves, and also some members of the Socialist People's Party. But this current is not dominated by one or two parties."

This class-struggle left, Soendergaard said, was a broad current that expressed itself through the shop stewards bodies. "The dockers started a Shop Stewards Co-ordinating Committee [Tillidsmandsringen], which is totally dominated by this left wing. So, you can say that this current expresses itself through the official structures of the union on the local level."

#### Fourth Internationalists campaign for general strike

For months, the SAP has been campaigning for a national general strike to defeat the Schlueter government's anti-labor offensive. Soendergaard said that there was considerable sentiment for such a response and the Copenhagen Shop Stewards Committee might call for that after its meeting on Thursday March 28. He expected that the battle would be between that proposal and the Communist Party's demand for protest strikes. As it turned out, the meeting did not come to any decision between the two counterposed proposals.

In any case, Soendergaard explained, "The left wing does not yet have the power to impose a general strike on the national level. They can do it in a few areas, for example, in the Copenhagen area. But on the level of the country as a whole, it cannot yet override the opposition of the bureaucrats."

I asked if there were any signs of a polarization within the Social Democratic Party. "Yes, you can see very clear differences between the people in parliament and the left Social Democratic labor leaders. For example, there was a big rally Monday [March 25], where the former Social Democratic premier Anker Jorgensen spoke, together with Hardy Hansen.

"Jorgensen said that the workers should accept the government's law but that they should try to exert pressure to get adjustments that would be more in tune with social justice. What Hardy Hansen said was that we should not accept a settlement imposed by law. He said that the last time he had argued against a law, his union was fined 20 million kroner [about one and a half million US dollars], and so he wouldn't say anything precise about what the workers should do. So, in fact, he said that people should strike. When there was a conflict involving the bus drivers last spring, he said that people should go on strike. And for that, he was fined 20 million kroner.

As in West Germany, the soaring unemployment in Denmark in the past

period has put the demand for a 35-hour workweek at the center of the fight. And this is going hand in hand with a demand arising out of the sharp cuts in real wages.

"In 1982, the Schlueter government eliminated the sliding scale of wages. And so the unemployed and low-paid workers who benefitted from the sliding scale before have had a very rough time. Thus, the demand for raising the lowest wages became very strong. And then the government offered an hour cut in the workweek and nothing for the lowest paid. Even if Hardy Hansen accepted it, he would face a revolt in his union."

The March 21 *Klassekampen* pointed out "In the last ten years from 1975 to 1985, the real wages of LO members have dropped by 15%." So, with expected inflation of 10% over the next two years and wage increases limited to 2% a year, the buying power of LO members would fall by 6%, more than a third of the already drastic decline that has taken place over the last decade. So, it is not surprising that the workers' tempers are boiling over,

The Social Democrat leaders argue, Soendergaard pointed out, that it would be wrong to oppose a "democratically elected government" by direct action. But the fact of the matter is that the government itself does not have a working majority. (2) It has had to make a deal with a small right-wing petty bourgeois party, the Radicals, which has an anti-military tradition, to get a majority for its law.

During the confrontation, the SAP is publishing *Klassekampen* twice weekly in special editions, Soendergaard said "The paper is coming out Tuesdays and Fridays, and it is full of strike information. We give a high priority to selling it. We have been putting forward the line for weeks that the working class has to prepare for a general strike to throw this government out, because the conflict is totally politicized, you can't have any real negotiations without getting rid of this government.

"We have linked this with our activity in the unions, arguing that the unions on a national level should support the strike with money from the strike fund. After the law is passed, according to the rules, the strike will not be official any more, and the money will stop. We have argued that it should continue.

"We have put forward the call for a 'Robin Hood government,' that is, one that takes from the rich to give to the poor. This is an expression used by Hardy Hansen and is the equivalent here of Arthur Scargill's call for a 'government as loyal to our class as Thatcher is to hers.'"

1. On the dockers strike, see *International Viewpoint* No 25, March 7, 1983; No 32, June 13, 1983; No 33, June 27, 1983. No 35, August 1, 1983; No 37, October 3, 1983; and No 38, October 17, 1983.

2. The right-wing government headed by Paul Schlueter came to power as the result of a game in parliament in the fall of 1982. The rightist coalition gained seats in the January 10, 1984, parliamentary elections, but failed to get an absolute majority. Cf *International Viewpoint* No 45, January 30, 1984; and No 46, February 13, 1984.



## "Our fight will go on"

We reprint below the March 8 editorial of *Socialist Action*, a revolutionary socialist paper, which spells out the aspects of the British miners' strike upon which the labour movement can begin to create a new leadership to carry on the fight.

"The strike is over, but the dispute continues." Arthur Scargill's statement after Sunday's [March 3] special delegate conference expressed the spirit of struggle that continues to exist in the mining communities. The closeness of the return to work vote — 98 to 91, even after 12 months on strike — was adequate testimony to that ...

The NUM's [National Union of Mineworkers'] refusal to sign an agreement which would make it complicit in the Coal Board's closure programme was correct and necessary. Given the deteriorating situation faced by the strike, and the necessity to return in the short term, it was far better to refuse to make an agreement than to dress up a capitulation as "compromise".

As Arthur Scargill wrote in the *Observer* on March 3: "The NCB [National Coal Board] is demanding that the NUM accepts closures on 'economic' grounds prior to such cases going through the review procedure — which means that the fate of these pits and units would effectively be predetermined even before they enter the procedures. That is the Board's ultimatum to us. We cannot accept it."

The crucial question for those who voted not to go back was rightfully the issue of amnesty for the 700 miners sacked in the course of the strike. This struggle is going to deepen. There are still over 2,000 court cases outstanding against NUM members — many on serious charges such as conspiracy and riot.

The NCB will continue to use these cases to victimise militants. Defence of those sacked is now a key task of the entire movement and not just the NUM...

The outcome of the strike is a defeat not just for the miners but for the entire labour movement. But the attitude taken by Scargill, and the NUM rank and file, has created the best conditions possible for an ongoing struggle.

This is despite the fact that the right has been sitting on its hands and waiting for an opportunity to isolate the Scargill wing of the union. And despite the fact that the South Wales executive decision to recommend a return — with the implied threat that the coalfield would go back whatever the national conference decided — effectively tried to pre-empt the discus-

sion at Sunday's delegate conference.

The refusal of the NUM to sign an agreement, to become complicit in pit closures, means that the miners return to work in a much more favourable situation than, for example, the workers at British Leyland or British Steel — NCB chairman Ian MacGregor's previous two victims. There the leaderships accepted the agreements and effectively policed the rundown of the industries.

The NCB tried to force this same role on the NUM. It failed.

Of course, the NCB will try to move rapidly now to stamp its authority on the coalfields: to isolate militants, restructure the industry, and impose its spurious criteria of profitability. MacGregor had already announced he will be continuing with the closure programme.

But the miners, under Scargill, are in a much better position to rebuild a fight-back than the steel workers were under their former president Bill Sirs — or for that matter than the miners would be under another Joe Gormley [a former NUM president]. This is what makes the Scargill leadership different from anything that has existed in the British labour movement for 60 years. That is an intransigent determination to stand and fight on the basic issues...

The blame for the defeat does not lie with the NUM leadership. The mining communities have given the greatest example of struggle in the history of the British working class. Responsibility for the defeat lies with the leadership of the TUC [Trades Union Congress] and the Labour Party.

As Mick McGahey, vice-president of the NUM, put it at the December TUC General Council, there were "three kinds of leader round the table": the honourable ones who had tried to deliver the support and had succeeded, the honourable ones who had tried to deliver support and had failed, and the dishonourable ones who have never tried.

The last are in a clear majority in the TUC. There is no room in the offices of the TUC for a leadership that stands and fights for its members interests.

The NUM's refusal to allow the TUC to take over the dispute was correct. The decisions of the September [TUC] congress to give "total support" to the

miners was sabotaged by TUC general secretary Norman Willis and the majority of the General Council.

The TUC, no doubt, will use as an excuse the clause that support — particularly in the power stations — had to be "by agreement with the unions concerned." The truth is that from the beginning the General Council have been more afraid of a Scargill victory than a Thatcher one.

To cap it all there can be few more dispicable incidents in the history of the British labour movement than the TUC using last week's talks to "bring them closer to the government."

The TUC's treachery is all the greater when one realises just how little effort was necessary to bring power cuts and win the dispute. As few as eight of the major power stations had to be stopped to bring nationwide cuts. This was well within the TUC's grasp. Instead, along with Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock, and deputy leader Roy Hattersley, Willis concentrated on attacking the NUM for so-called violent picketing...

From Willis through to electrical workers union leader, Eric Hammond, and Kinnock through to Labour Party MP Denis Healey, the Labour leaders have clearly shown that they are unfit to lead the labour movement.

In the present crisis the working class needs a leadership that will stand and fight. The miners' strike has driven this understanding deep into the trade unions, the Labour Party, and all sections of the oppressed in struggle...

The centre and right of the TUC and Labour Party will undoubtedly use Thatcher's victory as an occasion to try and crush the left in the movement. They want the defeat of the miners to be, as the *Observer* put it last Sunday: "the making of Neil Kinnock". And now Kinnock has announced his opposition to an amnesty for sacked miners.

For the labour movement, such a strengthening of Kinnock could be a disaster. It would consolidate the leadership that betrayed the miners — one that couldn't fight its way out of a wet paper bag.

But Kinnock will not have an easy task. The miners' strike has brought into being a class-struggle layer and leadership in Britain which is thousands strong and organised throughout the movement. It has opened a period of radicalisation and political struggle of a kind not seen in Britain since the 1920s. It is a radicalisation that will deepen.

The task now is to organise that left to throw out the traitors. It requires a programme for a government as loyal to our class as Thatcher is to hers — and a fight for the Labour Party to adopt such a programme.

We need a leadership that will follow the example of the miners in resisting the attacks on the working class. For the working class there is no other road — no matter how long it takes.

Arthur Scargill put it very well: "It is on struggles such as ours that democracy itself depends. Our fight will go on. ■"



# " This is not the end it's only the beginning "

*Stamping feet, clapping, singing and chanting ran through the football stadium at Chesterfield, Derbyshire on March 9, at one of the most memorable celebrations of International Women's Day ever. Thousands of women and men had descended on the town from every pit village in the country.*

*The success of the rally, held only a few days after the miners' strike had been called off, was testimony to the determination of the women of the mining communities to continue their struggle.*

*Miners' leader, Arthur Scargill, addressed the rally and below we reproduce the text of his speech.*

Comrades and friends, I want to bring warm fraternal greetings from the national executive committee of the National Union of Mineworkers, to this international women's rally. I have never felt as proud to be bringing greetings as I have today to women who have stamped their mark indelibly on history, and certainly on this dispute over the past twelve months.

My friends in the media have got a problem. They can't attack Tony Benn. They'll try. And they're having a problem with me. But they're having a bigger problem with you.

You see, these journalists don't go to normal schools. They go to these new computer schools which programme them. And they've been told by Mrs Thatcher, and Mr Walker, to put it out that they have won. They don't find that a big problem because they've been saying that for 12 months. But the problem that they find is the fantastic sight of miners, members of the women's support groups, families and workers from other industries marching to work in victory.

I participated in the march at Barrow colliery near my own home. When I arrived at the gates of Barrow, there was a handful of pickets. We turned away. The assembled motley crew of journalists said 'Mr Scargill why did you turn away?'. I said: 'Because I reacted as any decent trades unionist should, and so should you. *You don't cross picket lines!*'

You see, there have been historians already comparing the 1984/85 dispute with 1926. They've been pontificating from their Fleet Street desks or offices, about what is right and what is wrong, about the lessons to be drawn, and the conclusions to be drawn. They don't know what they are talking about.

In 1926, miners didn't go out on strike, they were locked out. In 1984 they took strike action. In 1926, they were fighting to stop a decrease in wages and an increase in hours. After seven months, they were starved back to work with longer hours and lower wages.

In 1985, at the end of the most historic strike in history, Britain's miners marched back to work on Tuesday having seen the 1984 closure programme not implemented, the five pits still open, a new procedure keeping an appeals body intact, and above all, this union refusing to acquiesce to the closure of pits on so-called economic grounds. That's a victory.

There have been casualties in this dispute. We have just paid tribute to those that paid the ultimate price. They died not only for the fight to save jobs and pits. They died, because they believed in their trade union.

And if there's any individual in the miners' union or elsewhere, who still asks the question of why they should have supported the fight of the National Union of Mineworkers, its because people like Joe Green and David Jones gave their lives for the British trade union movement and the right to work. That's why they all should have supported us.

There were those unions affiliated to the Trades Union Congress, particularly those in the power industry, that should hang their heads in eternal shame for what they have done during the course of this dispute. They can come forward with whatever arguments they wish. But they will never be able to erase the fact that when the chips were down, they supported Margaret Thatcher and turned their backs on the NUM. For that they'll be stained until the end of time.

Of course, something approaching a thousand of our members have been dismissed for the most trivial of reasons during the course of this dispute. This government, and its American appointee, now seek to impose the Americanism that we have seen deployed in the mining areas of the United States here in Britain.

This union has got a responsibility. Those men who have been arrested and jailed are, as far as I'm concerned, political prisoners. They've been jailed because they fought for this union. And we should all stand up and say straightforwardly what we mean.

Those of our young people, and those of the women's support groups who were arrested in the most brutal way, have been criminalised by a state that's deployed every possible tactic against the miners' union. They sought to defend their system against the demand of a union and of a movement that sought only the right to work. This is a stain that the next Labour government has got to wipe clean. It's a stain that they have got to take on board.

And I appeal to all of our parliamentarians, I appeal to all those in the trade union movement — when this union talks about amnesty, for god's sake stop the equivocation. We want amnesty for all our members who've been sacked in the course of this dispute. They've a right to their jobs back. Their only crime was fighting for the right to work.

A women's movement was established during the course of the 1984/5 strike in the mining areas. It not only transformed the lives of the women who, until that time, had had a narrow vision of what their role was and should be. It transformed our lives in the union.

And if there's one thing the union's got to do its to say to the women's support groups: this is not the end, its the beginning. Because you're part of this union and must remain in existence. I want the women's groups to go away from rallies like this and rededicate themselves to the struggle.

## Government's war of attrition

This dispute has not ended. The strike has come to an end, as the government wants to fight a war of attrition. The miners' union and the women's groups, together with those sections of the labour movement who have supported us consistently, have now got to adopt new tactics. That means an increase in determination on the part of the women's movement to defend the NUM. It's your movement. You've made yourselves part and parcel of the strike movement.

All of us in this stadium have got a responsibility to those that have been sacked during the course of this dispute. We've got to collect in every town and village throughout the British Isles in order that none of those sacked suffer as a consequence of what has occurred. We've got to take this fight forward and step up the campaign.

The women's support groups have got to take on a broader role. You must become involved in the wider issues. Learn and understand the fact that rate-capping effects each and every one of us. And that the peace movement is of absolute importance to every man, woman and child.

This dispute has cost this government, and as a consequence the tax payers, £7 billion. Now for the benefit of the *Daily Star* and the *Daily Express* [British daily newspapers] — that's a lot of



money. At a time when they can't even find the money to keep a kidney machine operating to save a man's life, they're prepared to spend 50% of the annual expenditure of the health service on trying to smash the NUM.

They're spending millions upon millions of pounds on weapons of death and destruction. If this government really meant that it doesn't want to deal in uneconomic ventures, let them close down the cruise missiles programme and end the missiles programme in Scotland.

I'm sure that remark will have got my phone tapped now. I'll tell you what, they'll have some cracking conversations to listen to. I can just imagine them listening to Arthur Scargill talking to Tony Benn: 'Hello Tony.' 'Hi, Arth.' 'Tony, I'm wanting to keep the pits open.' 'Great.' 'I also want to retain jobs.' ('My God!'), 'And I want to have peace in the world rather than war' ('Goodness me!'), 'And I want to see a better quality of life for human beings.' ('Great Scott! Heseltine get your flak jacket!').

They'll be absolutely beside themselves. They just haven't come to terms with the fact: they don't have to tap our 'phones. We'll tell them what we want. We want a better life, a better world. We want the right to work. That's what we want.

Of course, there have been those that have said: 'What have been the positive achievements of the miners' dispute?' Well, this rally is one of them. We've more here than Chesterfield football club can get.

We've developed friends throughout the world. Not only with trades unionists but with ordinary men and women who are not prepared to stand idly by whilst the miners were ground into the dust. Example after example can be cited to demonstrate what real internationalism is. The ship worker, the port workers, the miners and the seamen didn't make a ton of coal for the entire twelve months of the dispute. That's real internationalism.

And in a lesson to those trade union leaders who are apparently more interested in getting a seat in the House of Lords — as Tony Benn pointed out on *Question Time* [television programme] the other night — we had the best display of internationalism we've ever seen on Tuesday.

The Australian government contacted the seamans union of Australia and said: 'Now the strike is over, will you now release the coal and let it be transported overseas?' The Australian seamens union cabled the NUM in Sheffield and said that they would only release coal when the NUM told them that the strike was at an end. Only then would they transport it abroad. That's internationalism, that's trade unionism,....

I've come to this rally today to talk in the most optimistic way about the next step in our campaign. The fight goes on to save our pits, our jobs and our industry.

It goes on with the total involvement of the whole wider movement to preserve our communities. To preserve a culture and a way of life. To enable us to further tap the marvellous latent talent and ability, that we've all seen released during the course of this dispute. If we allow the marvellous actions of the women's action groups to dissipate, it would be an act of criminality.

Each of us today has got to dedicate ourselves to a public campaign to save the mining industry, to develop and expand the industry in line with the Plan for Coal. There must be no pit closures. There must be no reduction in manpower levels. There must be no victimisation. But above all, from this day forward, each and every one of us should say that we owe it to all who participated in the dispute to take it one step further.

We've got to do things in a tangible way. And I've already made, together with Peter Heathfield and Mick McGahey, one of the first steps to show that we think about the efforts that have been made. I'm sure you'll agree with us.

The miners' headquarters in Sheffield will be built, hopefully, within the next period — if we're not sequestered too long. In the entrance hall of the major

Arthur Scargill (D.R.)



trade unions in Britain — indeed the major institutions of Britain — there are normally plaques to those who have led the union or to the worthies of the trade union or labour movement.

Well, as far as I'm concerned — as far as I or Peter or Mick are concerned — we don't believe that we or any of our predecessors belong in there. We believe that there should be three plaques erected in the entrance hall of the new headquarters in Sheffield. And I hope that you'll agree that we've made the right choice.

The first will be a plaque to honour the memory of David Jones. The second is for Joe Green. [miners who died on the picket lines] And the other will be dedicated to the achievements of the magnificent women's support groups during the course of this dispute.

Comrades, I want to say from the bottom of my heart how grateful I am for the efforts that you put in during the course of the past twelve months. But I also want to plead for some more effort — to direct every penny that's raised to the miners' solidarity fund in order that every penny shall go to those who have been victimised until we can re-instate them in the industry.

**'I want each and every one of you to become part of the peace campaign ...'**

I want each and every one of you to raise your eyes and to take the struggle forward. To become part and parcel of the peace campaign. To become part and parcel of the campaign to stop attacks on local government and upon your communities and your way of life.

I believe that this movement has transformed Britain in a way that was unthinkable only 18 months ago. You've changed the face of British politics. You've demonstrated what you can do provided you're prepared to stand and fight. You've proved to be a glowing example not only to those who created and built our movement, but also to those in the trade union movement who stood to one side during the course of this campaign.

We should ensure that in the days, the weeks and months that lie ahead, that we lift this struggle onto a new plane. That we translate into action the kind of views that have been expressed at this rally today. If we do that, we shall not only march to victory, and save the pits and the jobs of those that we are privileged to represent.

In the process of doing that, we shall lay the conditions for transforming forever the kind of society in which we live.

- We shall transform it from one that preaches war to one that preaches peace.
- We shall transform it from one that preaches greed to one that preaches care
- We shall translate it from a capitalist system to a socialist system of society. ■



# International solidarity with British miners continues

No coal to Britain! Victory to the miners! have been the watchwords of the Fourth International during the course of the miners' dispute. Sections of the International have carried full reports of the strike in their papers not only in Western Europe but in the Americas, Australasia, Asia and, with important results, in Poland. Despite our modest resources, 25 tours of miners and miners' wives have been organised by supporters of the Fourth International in France, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Sweden, Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Luxembourg, Ireland, the USA and Canada. These tours themselves raised over £30,000 for the miners' cause and have helped to build and initiate broad trade union campaigns of solidarity. At the time when the strike was called off, sections of the Fourth International were organising tours of miners' wives for International Women's Day in France, West Germany and Sweden. Money is being raised in support of the campaign for all those imprisoned or sacked through tours in Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands.

Below we give an account of this continuing campaign by the Fourth International in support of the miners which is aimed to raise money and to continue to spread the courageous example of the miners' struggle within the world workers' movement against all those who refuse to fight austerity and unemployment and seek to use the defeat of the miners to prevent struggle.

In Italy ... During the strike the Italian unions, especially the GCT took several measures in support of the British miners. The PCI (the Communist Party of Italy) also expressed, in principle, its support for the struggle.

At the same time, trade union leaders were not too happy with a struggle which objectively implied a criticism of their own timid behaviour. That is why, when the NUM had to suspend the strike, they began to launch their own criticisms.

One 'expert' on labour issues, the well known socialist senator, Giugni, explained that the miners had fallen 'into a real trap'. (What a pity they could not consult this expert to avoid such a disaster!)

The UIL (the socialist dominated union federation) commented that the NUM had suffered an inevitable defeat comparable to what had happened in Fiat in 1980. The leader of the CGIL, Bruno Trentin, a PCI member did not beat about the bush either; he said that the strike was 'a serious mistake. In Fiat, as in Great Britain, a false objective had been set. At the beginning the miners had the right instinct (sic). The National Coal Board and Mrs Thatcher's government were not only putting jobs on the line, but were challenging the role of trade unions in modern society. Industrial restructuring and technological change are being put into practice without the unions. That is the goal. The struggle, therefore, began on a justified premise, which was later forgotten. Also the miners' union opted for an indeterminate-

ly long strike, something that we do not do any more...Such strikes of long duration preclude real participation by the workers: they dictate that the strike is widely delegated and outside of the control of the union itself.'

In other words, just like Thatcher and her cronies, Trentin is accusing the NUM of not having operated democratically. Those who are familiar with the methods imposed on the Italian unions by Trentin and his friends will appreciate the hypocrisy of this statement. This is more apparent in his closing words when he says: 'They (the miners) refused to confront the problem of restructuring of industries in financial difficulty as the mining industry is.' The moral is clear: the miners should have not have struggled, they should have accepted the destruction of their industry!

In an editorial on the ending of the strike, the newspaper of the LCR, Italian section of the Fourth International, *Bandiera Rossa*, took up just this point and accused the so-called trade union leaders of crowing. 'According to these crows,' it stated 'it would be better not to fight against anything and to submissively put your own head on the guillotine....'

Fortunately, the British miners and many other workers like them throughout Europe will not take the advice of these timid trade union leaders. The comrades of the LCR organised a solidarity tour with British miners to raise support for those sacked or imprisoned. Jim Doig of Littleton Colliery and Philip Harker from the Labour Party in the Stafford-

shire area took part in meetings in Brescia Milan and Genova and other northern cities between March 15 and 22. They also addressed workers assemblies in Genova and in the factory councils in Milan. Altogether two million lira (about £1,000) was raised.

In Spain ... miners' wife, Hazel Jones, hit the front page headlines of the Spanish daily, *El Pais*, during her tour.

In the tour organised by the Spanish section of the Fourth International, and lasting one week from March 4, Hazel spoke in about 15 gatherings including a women's group of the CCOO (Workers' Commission), to other trade unionists in El Vendrell, in Unidad Hermetica in Sabadell, to workers at the SEAT car factory and to postal workers on strike in Barcelona. She also addressed an International Women's Day rally in Barcelona. According to *Combate*, the paper of the Spanish section of the Fourth International, to all those who asked her about the outcome of the strike, Hazel answered proudly that 'I don't know who has lost or won this strike, Thatcher or the miners: but I am convinced of one thing and that is that we women have won something because nothing will ever be the same again after what we have lived through.'

In Switzerland ... three miners from Upton and two miners' wives from Kiverton Park collieries spoke to a total of 700 people in various meetings and to 1,500 women on a demonstration for International Women's Day in St Gollen. They received widespread press coverage on radio and in the daily newspapers and raised a total of 12,405 Swiss francs (about £3,865). The tour was organised by the Swiss section of the Fourth International.

In West Germany ... Lesley Boulton, a Greenham Common Woman and a representative of Women Against Pit Closures toured the country to raise money for miners' wives in South Yorkshire on the occasion of International Women's Day. Altogether 4,000 Deutschmarks (about £1,100) was raised and more links were made between women in West Germany and the miners' wives. For example, women from the Greens in Elensburg decided to start a twinship with a miners' wives group.

Women organised around the Hecker steel plant in Saarbrücken gave Lesley a particularly warm welcome since they had had a very similar experience in forming a women's action group when the plant was occupied by the workers against the threat of closure.

Everywhere Lesley went people understood the basic message which was that though the strike is over, the struggle continues. ■



# The organisation of the independence movement enters a new stage

The Socialist Kanak National Liberation Front (FLNKS) has called for an international day of solidarity with the Kanak people's fight for independence on April 20. On this occasion, solidarity actions are to take place in the Pacific region. The FLNKS has called on the trade-union organisations in the area to organise boycotts of French interests. In France itself, the Association for Information About and Support to, the Kanak People's Rights (Association Information Et Soutien au Droit du Peuple Kanak — AISDPK) is also organising a national demonstration in Paris for April 20. Solidarity actions will take place in other European countries.

The following is a report from our correspondent in New Caledonia on the present evolution of the FLNKS.

Claude GABRIEL

When the FLNKS was formed in September 1984, it was only a coalition of various organizations. It included the Union Caledonienne (UC), the Parti Socialiste Caledonien (PSC), the Union des Populations Melanesiennes (UPM), the Front Uni de Liberation Kanak (FULK — Kanak National Liberation United Front), the Union des Syndicats de Travailleurs Kanaks et Exploites (USTKE — The Federation of Unions of Exploited Kanak Workers), the Comite de Revendication des Terres de la Cote Ouest (the Committee for Land Claims on the West Coast) as well as the small, Groupe des Femmes Kanakes et Exploitees en Lutte (GFDEL — Group of Kanak Exploited Women in Struggle).

The Parti de Liberation Kanake (PALIKA), which was present at the founding congress, decided definitively to join the FLNKS only at the end of November 1984.

The FLNKS was organized around the perspective of the pro-independence forces leaving the colonial institutions — the Government Council and the Territorial Assembly — in which most of them had participated, and organizing a boycott of the November 1984 territorial elections.

The events that followed the November 18 mobilisation against the elections were to modify somewhat circumstances that marked the founding of the FLNKS. In particular, they reinforced the unity of the coalition, even though many problems remained, especially with respect to the difficulties of organizing the independence struggle.

The November 1984 confrontation with the colonial state had been a great jolt to the consciousness of people. It stimulated a rapid advance of unity among the ranks and the development of a collective awareness of the Kanak national question.

Today, a lot of activists think of them-

selves more as members of the FLNKS than as supporters of one of the organizations that make it up. The formation of local FLNKS among the tribes undoubtedly represented an advance for the unity of the Kanak people.

Moreover, the recent months have put to the test the leaderships of the various organizations, as well as cohesiveness of their respective movements. Thus, the activist base of the UC, the largest formation in the independence movement, has undergone a considerable radicalization. The process was strongly marked by the example provided by the UC's general secretary, Eloi Machoro, who inspired the occupation of Thio and was assassinated on January 12, 1985, by the colonial forces. The UC leadership has had to take account of this evolution.

Parties such as the UPM and the PSC, on the other hand, have found it very difficult to maintain a distinct existence and to continue really to function as parties. Many of their members say quite definitely that they consider themselves first and foremost members of the FLNKS. The structures of these parties were too weak for them to be able to maintain the cohesiveness of their memberships after the establishment of the FLNKS.

The FULK is in an in-between position in this respect, while the PALIKA is defending its own special character. The latter believes that the unity in which it is involved now is promoting a general radicalization of the population. Like the UC, it maintains its own party structure and takes great care to preserve the cohesiveness of its supporters within the FLNKS.

As an advocate of "revolutionary socialist Kanak independence", the PALIKA rejects in its entirety the plan unveiled on January 7 by the French government's envoy, Edgard Pisani. But since it thinks that the first priority is to improve the overall relationship of forces,

it does not see any need for launching premature debates over strategy within the FLNKS.

The USTKE had been more or less in low gear for some time. Although it has a crucial and special role to play in the struggle for independence, it has not been easy for this union organization to interlock its activities with those of the FLNKS, whose center of gravity remains in the tribes living in the rural areas. The USTKE, on the other hand, is based mainly in Noumea and its environs.

The opposition to the policy of the territorial government headed by Dick Ukeiwe and that of the Noumea municipal government headed by Roger Laroque, a member of the Rassemblement pour la Caledonie dans la Republique (RCPR) (1), nonetheless, offers the union an opportunity to relaunch activity in support of its political and economic demands.

The authorities' reactionary policy, for example, was expressed recently in the material benefits accorded to ministers and the decision by the mayor of Noumea to fire city employees who took part in the FLNKS demonstration a few weeks ago in Noumea.

For Monday, March 25, a municipal workers strike was called jointly by the USTKE and the Union des Syndicats d'Ouvriers et Employes de Nouvelle Caledonie (USOENC — Federation of Industrial and Office Workers Unions of New Caledonia), a union that is not pro-independence. Strike pickets were organized in front of the municipal offices and workshops, and the strike could spread to the hospitals.

Another problem at the level of the leadership of the FLNKS is relations between the Political Bureau — which is made up of two representatives of each of the components of the Front — and the Provisional Government of Kanaky, presided over by Jean-Marie Tjibaou.

While the ranks of the independence forces have grown in the recent period, with the influx of hundreds of new activists and sympathizers who identify with the FLNKS as such, the Political Bureau of the Front retains its initial form of a coalition of representatives of the various components of the FLNKS. This does not make it any easier to work out an effective division of labor between the Provisional Government and the Political Bureau of the Front.

This problem was highlighted at the congress of the FLNKS held at Nakety in early February. Such bifurcation of the leadership between the FLNKS Political Bureau and the Provisional Government, in which PALIKA refuses to be represented, could be a source of confusion for a base of militant activists, who have sometimes found it difficult to tell which structure is responsible for what.

It is all the more important to clarify this situation because in the coming months the independence movement will face some important tests.

1. The local branch of the French rightist party, the Rassemblement Pour la Republique.



# What the French local elections showed

The cantonal elections in France which took place on March 10 and 17, constituted an important test of popularity for all the political parties in the run-up to the national legislative elections in March 1986.

Once again the Socialist Party (PS) were forced to take note of the consequences of their betrayals and suffered the effects of a massive abstention in working class areas. They got 24.25% of the votes compared to 29.80% in the cantonal elections of 1982.

For the time being anyway, the Communist Party (PCF) managed to halt its decline in these elections but has not been able to recoup its influence since leaving the government.

The right wing on the other hand is clearly making alarming gains with nearly 58% of the votes going to the right wing parties as a whole and the racist and fascist National Front gaining 8.6%. This is a decline in their vote from the 11% gain in the Euro-elections but does not detract from the fact that the National Front are becoming more and more legitimised in French political life.

These results pose important questions for the left in France and Alain Krivine a leader of the French section of the Fourth International, the LCR, explained to us his organisation's view of these events and of how to go forward.

*Question: Was the scale of the defeat suffered by the parties of the left in the cantonal elections expected?*

*Answer:* There are two ballots involved in the cantonal elections. The first ballot is perhaps more important in that half the French electorate cast a vote. In the first round all the parties of the left taken together got 42% of the vote. The parties of the right, including the far right, got 58%.

The rate of abstention was 2% less than in the elections to the European parliament last year. There is still a high rate of 'left abstention'. In some workers' areas there was an abstention rate of up to 40%, in the bourgeois areas it was much smaller. But even taking this into account we have to say that there has been a small shift to the right since the Euro-elections.

In both the ballots, but especially in the second ballot, you have a very small remobilisation of the left, in the sense that the left got 1% more than in the European elections and in the second ballot 2% more than in the first ballot. This is due to the fear of victory for the right and especially the development of the fascist right. You have what Lionel Jospin, a leader of the Parti Socialiste (PS) called a small 'shudder'. It was therefore not a movement for the government, but against the fascist right.

*Q: About the fascist right. Does Le Pen's score mark a stabilisation of the vote of the Front National (FN)?*

*A:* Before the victory of the left in 1981 Le Pen got less votes than that of the far left, Lutte Ouvriere and the Ligue

Communiste Revolutionnaire (LCR) a very small vote in other words. Today their vote is 10-11%, the same as during the Euro-elections. Officially, Le Pen received 8%, but he did not put forward candidates throughout the whole country. There were 600 areas where there were no FN candidates, but where they supported the official candidates of the right. So the fact is today you have 10% of the French electorate voting for racist candidates.

Perhaps even more significant is that this support comes from the towns, not the country. In fact, in the country there has been a small decline in FN support. But in the big towns and in those workers suburbs where there are a lot of immigrants and which are traditionally strong Communist areas, Le Pen got a lot of votes. For example, in both Montreuil and St Denis on the outskirts of Paris, Le Pen got 17% of the vote. This is a change from the right-wing populism of the 1950s, which was called Poujadism. Poujadism was the reaction of one section of the population — shopkeepers and small business people. But with Le Pen you have, in embryo, much of the traditional content of a fascist movement in a period of crisis. Of course, Le Pen has a traditional base of support amongst the *pieds noirs*, those who left Algeria after independence, especially in Marseille where he got 25% and sometimes 30% of the vote. And on the national level the main layers supporting him are amongst the middle classes, amongst small business people and the liberal professions. But the new and disquieting thing is that he got small but

significant support from among the popular classes, who are completely disillusioned by unemployment and the incapacity of the left to solve this burning problem.

*Q: The right failed to get a majority on the first ballot without Le Pen. Does this mean they will make some kind of rapprochement with him in the lead up to the legislative elections in 1986?*

*A:* The right on the first ballot got 49% without Le Pen. This heightened the debate amongst them about whether or not to make agreements with him. Of course, the Mitterrand government used this card to make further divisions among the right asking if they were really prepared to make alliances with fascists. After much hesitation and discussion the main leaders decided not to make any official agreement, even if there was an unofficial agreement. At the last minute Le Pen decided to withdraw his candidates where this would prevent a victory for the left. Officially this was a unilateral move by Le Pen, but there were many local leaders of the right who did come to some agreement with the FN. It is interesting to note that all those who voted for the FN on the first round voted for the official right wing candidates on the second round. But in the areas where Le Pen retained his candidates the supporters of the right wing party either abstained or cast their votes for the PS candidates, which is an indication that the majority of people who voted for the right wing are not willing to vote for fascist candidates.

*Q: So how are the right forming themselves up for the 1986 legislative elections?*

*A:* There are three main figures who are fighting for the leadership of the right wing as a whole, Jacques Chirac, Valerie Giscard Destaing and Raymond Barre. This shows that even if the right has a majority electorally in France today there are big divisions concerning tactics and strategy towards the left. Their really major problem is that they do not have an alternative economic strategy to offer to that of the government's. Chirac and Giscard are fighting on behalf of their respective parties, the Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) and the Union pour la Democratie Francaise (UDF) to lead the right in the legislative elections. The other, Barre, who has his eye on the presidential elections in 1988, is playing a sort of Bonapartist game, keeping out of the official right parties.

In any event, they will try and make a common agreement for 1986, but it's not guaranteed. The major problem they will face will be the decision of Mitterrand on a proposed new electoral law. This law will introduce a small measure of proportional representation. The present system always favours the majority. Given the left are in the minority today they have an interest in changing it. But the official right parties say if there is a



move towards proportional representation they will make a fantastic fight. Mitterrand will then hesitate, as he hesitated over the reform of the educational system in the face of a determined right wing offensive. Mitterrand is frightened of this type of show down with the right. So he will probably introduce a law at the last minute. But it will fall short of a system completely based on proportional representation. The LCR is in favour of a complete reform of the electoral system based on proportional representation, so we have participated in a campaign along with other forces such as the Parti Socialiste Unifié, the Greens and others to launch a national petition to demand this.

*Q: The project of a 'republican front' government, which would include a section of the right, has been floated by some Socialist Party leaders. What is the idea behind this?*

*A: For twenty years Mitterrand has had a very definite and intelligent strategy which I think we can now see clearly. After 1968 Mitterrand responded to the hope for unity and change of the population with the Common Programme with the Parti Communiste Française (PCF). That was the way he chose to reinforce and strengthen the PS which was possible only on the basis of the unity of the left organisations.*

The second step was the taking of governmental power. The third step was to limit the PCF in this alliance, because obviously it was not possible for two large reformist parties to coexist within such an alliance. The more credible of the two parties was the PS. The final step was to move towards an alliance with a section of the bourgeoisie, what we call in France a government of the 'left-centre'. That is Mitterrand's project today. Not only because he wants to stay in power, that's true, but that's a conjunctural problem, strategically a 'left-centre' government has been his aim for a long time. His main weapon in bringing this about is to propose unity of all those who are against the Front National and the extreme right. In this way Mitterrand can avoid speaking about austerity and the real responsibility of the Socialist government for the rise of the right. So the PS is making a very big campaign on the question of Le Pen, because he is rather useful to them. That's why Le Pen is allowed to appear so much on the television. They need him to provide a motive for a 'republican front' government which extends from the PS to the 'republican' right wing parties.

So far they have not succeeded with this campaign. But some significant bourgeois figures, ex-ministers like Olivier Stirn, have declared themselves ready to support such a project. But it won't happen before 1986 because the main leaders of the bourgeois parties want to pay back Mitterrand for his victory in 1981. They might respond after that on the condition that the PS gets a high score, say 30%. Under those conditions the PS would be useful for the bourgeoisie.



LCR Demonstration against the right (D.R.)

If not, if the PS gets a small vote, the bourgeois parties will take the power directly for themselves.

There is also a debate within the PS on the role of the PCF. For some figures like education minister, Jean Pierre Chevènement, the PCF should be included in a 'republican front' government. Of course, Mitterrand is completely opposed to such a suggestion. He is joined by the press who try to present the question as the French people rejecting two extremes — on the one hand the extreme right of Le Pen, on the other hand the extreme left, which for them is the PCF.

*Q: What is the line of the PCF following their departure from the government and the holding of their twenty-fifth congress?*

*A: To a certain extent we can say that the PCF lacks any line. After they left the government they began to attack the PS verbally, in practice they didn't do anything. But it's different from 1978 when there was a rupture with the Common Programme. There is still a big sentiment for unity in the working class. The cantonal elections provided some proof of this. In the second round 90% of those who voted for the PCF voted for the Socialist candidate when that was the only left candidate. Secondly, the PCF leaders withdrew their candidates on the second ballot at the last moment to prevent victories from the right. This is because they have no alternative. After breaking with the Union of the Left and leaving the government they developed what they call the 'Rassemblement Populaire'. This is very typical of the PCF when they are in a sectarian phase. They say that they are in favour of unity, not with the PS, but with the 'people'. This in fact means unity with themselves. Even this is a problem given the divisions within the party today. This party has changed its policy five times in five years, unity-rupture-unity-rupture and so on. It's really a question of credibility. This*

is really a historic crisis of the Communist Party, with a fantastic debate inside the party.

*Q: The far left in Europe finds itself in a complicated situation today. What is the position of the French far left? Has there been some discussion about the possibility of a Green type development in French politics?*

*A: It's true that the situation today for us is very difficult. Amongst the working class there has been a climate of demoralisation and passivity because they did not see any credible alternative, politically or organisationally, on the left of the left. But for some months now there has started to be a shift among trade unionists and among the youth, especially against Le Pen.*

There is also a shift amongst members of the PS and the PCF. Some middle ranking leaders of the PCF, even some elected councillors, come to discuss with us. Some have even applied to join us. It's a small thing, but it's an indication of the way things are going. In the trade unions there is a great debate. To give an example of the change which is going on, there was a Paris conference of the second largest trade union confederation, the CFDT, representing some 80,000 members in the Paris region. The left got the majority. They removed the leadership of the region and elected a three person secretariat, one of whom is a member of the LCR. This was widely reported in the press and seen as an indication of the move to the left that exists amongst a minority in the working class, a significant minority. Given that shift to the left we have to make every effort to organise an anti-capitalist united front for the elections.

Our hope is to be able to organise a coalition which includes forces ranging from the Greens over to the extreme left. We call this an 'anti-capitalist alternative' but we want this alternative to be very broad, to try and get an agreement on



some fundamental points, not on the whole programme. This would include being against austerity, against the right, against racism, against colonialism. These points would provide a common rubric for all the organisations, while each would retain its own separate identity. We would aim for this coalition to have committees at the local level and to try and present a united list in all areas in France in 1986.

This would correspond to the hope of many people today who prefer to abstain rather than vote for one of the two, three or four lists of the far left organisations. They are ready to be remobilised within that type of united framework.

We are pushing this idea forward, having discussions with many people on a national level. On a local level there are a number of public calls initiated by ecologists, the far left, peasant leaders and so on. The response of the ecologists nationally to this type of appeal is complicated. They represent perhaps 5-6% electorally speaking. But you have very different sorts of ecologists, some are anti-capitalists, some are nothing.

We have a Green party. They wanted to copy the German Greens, but they only have 300 members nationally. But they could get a lot of votes. They want to keep their identity and up to now they have refused any agreement on the national level with the organised far left. But all the other tendencies locally are making a campaign to convince them that they have to make this coalition with the revolutionary left. Locally some of them have agreed. For example in the cantonal elections we presented very few candidates, because we are conserving our forces for 1986. We stood in about 15 towns and we got a very small vote, about 1%. But there were some exceptions. In some areas we were able to organise the beginning of small coalitions, where very often, although the candidate was a member of the Ligue, the coalition was larger. In these cases we sometimes got up to 5 or 6% and in one exceptional case 16%, where the local PS voted for us. But this is some indication that when you have even the beginning of a regroupment it totally changes the type of support that you get. So that will be the main project of the LCR in the coming year to try to build the 'anti-capitalist left', the 'anti-capitalist alternative', 'a left which refuses to capitulate' — the name is not important, but we have launched the idea publicly and today it's getting discussed amongst a broad layer of people.

*Q: What is the place of youth in this alternative? There have been some very important mobilisations against Le Pen and racism.*

*A:* The biggest demonstrations have been organised by the immigrant youth themselves, it was a product of their self organisation supported by a lot of left and far left organisations. In many French cities today you have coalitions of all the anti-racist organisations who organise demonstrations when Le Pen

comes. But the big problem is that with all these demonstrations you have a mass of young people, but very few organised workers. So you have a separation between the organised working class, which is anti-Le Pen, but is not mobilised and this new generation of people coming out onto the street who are not demoralised and who want to fight against racism. It's from this point of view that we can understand the success of the campaign 'SOS-racisme'. This campaign was initiated by some people in the PS who produced this badge 'Touche pas a mon pote' (Hands off my mate). More and more people are wearing this badge. People wear it on the Metro in Paris, even some TV announcers have taken to wearing it.

*Hands off my mate (D.R.)*



*Q: Has the campaign in defence of the Kanaks in New Caledonia found an echo in this movement?*

*A:* Yes. The meetings organised in defence of the Kanaks have probably been the most important since 1981. Not only because people are in solidarity with the fight of a small people and so on. It's also a way for a lot of people to get back into activity against the policy of the government, against Le Pen and so on. In this question of New Caledonia you are confronted with all the problems of French politics: the capitulation of the PS, the left language of the PCF who do nothing for the Kanaks, the role of the fascists and the right who mobilise to defend what they call French New Caledonia. When Jean-Marie Tjibaou, the Kanak leader, came to Paris there was an enormous meeting of 5,000 people. Nobody expected such a turn out. It was an incredibly spirited and enthusiastic response. We have helped to build a national campaign with local committees in solidarity with the Kanaks which has been able to regroup part of the far left, the ecologists, some individual trade union

leaders around this issue. Everybody knows we play a big role in this campaign, but nevertheless the PCF and the trade unions are forced to recognise this campaign as the authoritative one. It's the only committee recognised by the FLNKS themselves. We are organising a big demonstration on April 20 on the international day of solidarity called by the FLNKS and we hope that in all the other European countries even if they are not as involved as us, that they could organise pickets and delegations to French embassies on that day.

*Q: So how would you summarise the prospects up to 1986 and beyond for the working class struggle against austerity? Will the retreat continue or will there be a rallying against these attacks?*

*A:* Today locally you either get no resistance at all or when you do get resistance it tends to be very strong and very prolonged. The trouble is however you have no such movement on the national scale. The struggles are totally fragmented. The more they are fragmented, the more people are demoralised, because they realise that without national organisation there can be no victory.

That was one of the lessons drawn here from the miners' strike in Britain. The strike has been widely discussed, partly because the CGT, the largest union confederation, organised a very big campaign of propaganda and solidarity. But the balance sheet is contradictory. On the one hand it showed that it is possible to fight, that the miners fought a tremendous battle and that we should have such unions in France. All that was progressive. What was negative was, of course, their defeat. The balance sheet that was drawn was that, even given such an exemplary struggle, without the support of the rest of the working class the struggle will fail.

The leader of the CGT, Henri Krasucki, has now been talking about a general strike against austerity for the last six months. Only speaking about it of course, but nevertheless it is a sign that people are beginning to understand the need for that sort of response. But having said that, the record of the left parties has had a disastrous effect on the level of consciousness and organisation of the working class, the weakening of trade unionism, the fact that more and more people are leaving the PCF and PS. The combination of that and the impact of austerity in terms of the structural division of the working class between the employed and the unemployed, with migrants, women and so on contributes towards certain elements of disintegration of working class consciousness. So this results in a contradictory process; a very bad impact on the majority of the working class, but at the same time a big politicisation of a significant fraction of the working class. The result is that we can organise and develop the activity of this minority on the basis of all the experiences they have had up to this point. That's our aim. ■



## "The crisis of socialism" Debate in the Soviet press

In the weeks since Gorbachev's ascension to the general secretaryship of the Soviet Communist Party, the international press has been filled with speculation about the politics he might follow. The British *Economist* for example thought that the biggest question was whether he could "do a Deng," that is, make concessions to market economics, involving juicy deals for imperialist companies, that the Deng regime has in China. The main story in *Der Spiegel* last week was about talks between West German chancellor Helmut Kohl and Gorbachev.

The speculation about Gorbachev's leadership has centered so far essentially around two questions, market-economy reforms in the USSR and what line he will take in the arms limitations negotiations. There

Marina BEK

Before becoming general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev at an ideological conference compared the exertion needed to shift from extensive to intensive economic development, and overcome the USSR's scientific and technical lag, with the effort made in the 1930s to industrialize the country. There is, in fact, a real danger, unless something is done in the field of the advanced technologies in particular and, more generally, to try to get the country out of the economic stagnation in which it has been mired in recent years (1), of seeing the technological gap between the USSR and the West widen, with all that that implies.

The implications of the USSR lagging behind the West are not simply economic problems but affect the base of the regime itself and its legitimacy in the eyes of the Soviet citizens. A Hungarian economist, who also makes a very lucid analysis of the economic crisis in Eastern Europe, notes quite correctly: "In the case of the socialist countries, it must not be forgotten that growth rates have always been a crucial question throughout the sixty years that have gone by since the creation of the first socialist society.

"Partly because of the need to eliminate the previous underdevelopment and partly because it was essential to demonstrate the superiority of the new social order, a high rate of growth has always been a major — if not the major — factor for legitimizing the new social system in central and eastern Europe." (2)

In the case of the Soviet Union, it is clear that the steady improvement in the living standards of the population over the three decades following the Second World War, as well as a great social mobility, have played an important role

has not been much attention to his overtures to China. These have, however, been a prominent feature of the statements of the new leadership.

The following article, on the other hand, points up the basic impasse of the bureaucratic dictatorship and shows that in the face of accumulating problems an implicitly political debate is developing within the institutions of the bureaucracy itself. The thoroughgoing suppression of the dissident movement, which was the achievement of Andropov, who is generally regarded as the model and pioneer for the Gorbachev leadership, has not, therefore, managed to keep the awkward questions from coming up, even in the bureaucracy itself.

in the relative social calm this country has enjoyed by comparison with its neighbors. This does not mean, far from it, that a halt of this steady process will automatically lead in the short term to an open social crisis. But the fact remains that signs of tension have been accumulating over the last years in the face of waste, corruption, privilege for some and scarcity for the majority, as well as tightening work discipline.

The extremely favourable reception accorded Andropov's anticorruption campaign is one indication of these tensions. More fundamentally, the regime's inability to forge values with which the young people and workers can identify has been more and more reinforcing the feeling of alienation from the system that exists among these layers of society.

For a long time now, Soviet leaders have been worried about the "negative" tendencies operating among the youth. In its July 7, 1984, issue, *Pravda* stressed that these negative tendencies were proof that the Komsomol [Communist Youth] had suffered some "major failures" in their task of political and moral education.

In its own way, the avalanche of criticism directed at young people indicates the extent of this problem. They are accused of "immorality and a tolerant attitude toward abuses", of "apoliticalness, passivity, and indifference". Alcoholism is said to be growing among them at an alarming rate, as well as a "spirit of consumerism, apolitical, immoral, and uncritical imitation of Western fashions, individualism and trivial amusements."!

How can such a situation be remedied? In a speech to the Komsomol on May 28, 1984, Chernenko offered his recipe. In order to make the youth into citizens "worthy of Soviet society," it was nec-

essary to "rally them round the old guard" and reinforce patriotic and military education." That, no doubt, is really an exciting prospect for young people who are chasing after Michael Jackson posters and trying to buy them at any price!

Bolstering patriotic and military education was also what Chernenko asked from writers and artists in general at the opening of the congress that marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Writers Union. He appealed to his audience to center their artistic works around a "positive socialist hero." It is hardly likely that in this way he provided any answer to the persistent malaise that exists in creative cultural circles as a result of the censorship and the drain from their ranks that it produces. The going into exile of such figures as the film maker Tarkovski or the theatrical producer Liubimov, who are responsible for some of the USSR's greatest cultural achievements, could only increase this malaise.

As for "positive socialist heroes," a lot of people wonder who they might be in the USSR of today. This question was suggested by the discussion opened up by the weekly *Lituerarnaia Gazeta* on the "values" that should be promoted in literary works. The debate was between contributors who thought that "the problem of values and in part the problem of the nature of moral ideas has not only not been solved but has not even been posed by our philosophers," and others who thought that in this field, as in all others, Marx, Engels and Lenin solved every-

1. To be sure, a slight improvement was registered in 1983, but it was not maintained in 1984, and cereals production is reaching disastrously inadequate levels.

2. Laszlo Szamuely, "The Eastern European Economic Situation and the Prospects of Foreign Trade", *New Hungarian Quarterly*, Budapest, No 975, Autumn 1984, p 61.



thing. (3)

More significant, perhaps, is the unease the Soviet leaders have been showing for some time about the attitude of the workers. It is more than obvious that the workers who are supposed to be in power in the USSR, no longer identify with the government.

Prompting this uneasiness on the part of the leaders, we find the admission that they have no idea what the workers are thinking. Indeed in the Soviet Union how could the workers express what is on their minds? But rather than set up organs of workers' democracy, the leaders have preferred to turn to Mr Gallup, the inventor of public opinion polls.

A specialist explained: "Public opinion is a barometer ... Often it gives a timely warning of contradictions and conflicts engendered by the evolution of social life, by the growing complexity of social relation...." (4) So the June 1983 Plenum of the Central Committee decided to set up a center for studying public opinion. The first results of such studies have not been very encouraging for the leaders, tending to show total alienation of the workers from the system.

The same thing is shown by the letters that arrive regularly at the offices of Soviet newspapers and magazines. Referring to the letters sent to the magazine *Sovetskaia Kul'tura*, N. Rimaskevskaja expressed concern at the fact that most of these letters indicated that their writers regarded Soviet society as deeply divided between "them" and "us", and that they pointed up the lack of equality in this society.

"Them," are the privileged, who do not do much, but get the lion's share of the consumer durables (cars, TVs, etc.) "Us," are the masses of working people, of whom many wonder why they should try to work more and earn more, when they cannot get what they want. (5)

The Soviet leaders' sudden concern about public opinion was obviously aroused by the Polish events. But it has grown more acute at a time when the tightening of labor discipline is threatening to increase tensions in the factories.

Faced with such mounting problems in the economic, political, social and ideological fields, the Soviet leaders have been totally incapable of offering the bold answers needed to solve them. So, their only recourse, whether they are "conservatives" or "reformers" is to wave the stick. And the boldest action they are capable of is patchwork reforms of economic management.

Nonetheless, there are people in the USSR who are trying to work out an overall analysis of the crisis of their society and the means for remedying it. Many of them belong to economics and sociology institutes. And the fact that the debate they have initiated has been able to make its way into the official magazines is undoubtedly a sign that they are posing questions that are also being raised at a higher level.

The publication in the West of a report by a Novosibirsk sociologist,

Tatiana Zaslavskaja, revealed the existence of a reformist current among Soviet intellectuals and researchers. (6) T Zaslavskaja developed a detailed analysis of the causes of the economic crisis and the reform that was needed, but in particular, she stressed the social dimensions of such reform, the need to mobilize the initiative of the masses and to put an end to bureaucratic centralization.

Zaslavskaja's report, which was presented to an official conference, was never published. But that is not true of the writings of other advocates of reforms, who, as we will see, develop their thinking on a more theoretical level.

## Debate opens up

The debate that opened up two years ago in the columns of the magazine *Voprosy Filosofii* ("Philosophical Questions") and *Voprosy Istorii* ("Historical Questions") is taking up the underlying causes of the difficulties and crises arising in the "socialist countries". This debate was initiated by members of the Economics Institute for the World Socialist System.

The objective at the start was to analyse the causes of the Polish crisis, and in this respect, already their conclusions go well beyond the official explanation of an American plot or even errors by leaders. Subsequently, they extended their analyses to the "socialist societies" as a whole.

The debate was opened in *Voprosy Filosofii* by a long article by A. P. Butenko on the contradictions at work in Soviet society. Basing himself on an article by P. Fedoseev, he rejected the idea that these contradictions were essentially of a non-antagonistic character. In fact, P. Fedoseev wrote: "It is impossible, as historic experience shows, to rule out the possibility that in special circumstances — as a consequence of an accumulation over a long period of serious deficiencies in the bodies responsible for economic and cultural construction and in the direction of cultural affairs, etc. — that non-antagonistic contradictions may take on the features of antagonistic contradictions." (7)

For Butenko, the fact that Poland has stumbled constantly from crisis to crisis is not just because of the errors of the leaders but is rather "the social consequence of a lack of understanding of the real contradictions of the new social order." Those who accept the existence of contradictions in socialism, he continued, generally stress their non-antagonistic character. But, "if you study the historical experience of all the socialist countries, it is hard to agree with this."

In Butenko's view, the fundamental contradiction in the socialist system is only a variant of the more general contradiction between the productive forces and the relationships of production, more precisely between "the growing productive forces of the socialist society and the actual system of relationships of produc-

tion." Of those who deny the existence of this contradiction, he asks what do you do when the socialist relationships of production have ceased to promote the development of the productive forces. (8)

In the magazine *Novoe Vremia*, A. Butenko pointed out, in reference to Poland, what this "actual system" of the relationships of production means: "for example, the ownership of the means of production by the entire people is replaced by ownership by a group; planning, by uncontrolled development; democratic centralism, by bureaucratic centralism of anarchic decentralization.

"A flagrant deformation is introduced when in practice the two-way contact between leaders and the led, that is, from the bottom up and from the top down, is reduced simply to commands coming from above. The attempts to replace workers' power by the functioning of a single state apparatus acting in the name of the workers, but not in their interests, are incompatible with scientific socialism." (9)

In the columns of *Voprosy Filosofii*, both advocates and adversaries of the ideas put forward by A. Butenko expressed their views. All agreed about the need to carry the analysis at work in the socialist societies further than has been done up till now. But Butenko's critics put their stress on the non-antagonistic character of these contradictions and on the responsibility of the imperialists for the "crises of socialism".

This debate has had echoes in other countries in Eastern Europe, in Hungary and Poland in particular, where the director of the United Polish Workers Party's Institute for the Fundamental Problems of Marxism-Leninism, Wiatr, maintains views similar to those of Butenko. He explains, on the one hand, that the errors committed by the Polish leadership flow from the very nature of the political system of a country distinguished by an excessive centralization of power. On the other, he says that the sources of the crisis lay in the abandonment of the "Polish model of socialism" and the imposition at the end of the 1940s of the "Soviet ideological model" as the basis for building socialism in Poland. Under the title "On the Theoretical Conceptions of a Certain Polish Philosopher," an article in the columns of *Voprosy Filosofii* took Wiatr severely to task.

3 For the first position, see, for example, A. Gulyga, "Chelovecheskoe v Chelovechestve", *Literaturnaia Gazeta* No 11, 1984. For the second, see, B. Slavina, "Gde Iskat Idealy?", *Idem*, December 9, 1984.

4. R. Safarov, "Obshchestvennoe Mnenie — Izuchenie i Deistvennost'", *Pravda*, January 25, 1981.

5. N. Rimaskevskaja, "Mir Liudei i Mir Veshchei," *Sovetskaia Kul'tura*, September 29, 1984.

6. Long extracts from this report were published in the Paris magazine *l'Alternative*, No 26, March-April 1984.

7. P. Fedoseev, "Dialektia Obshchestvennoi Zhizni", *Problemi Mira i Sotsializma*, No 9, 1981.

8. A. Butenko, "Razvitiia Sotsializma Kak Obshchestvennogo Stroia", *Voprosy Filosofii*, No 10, 1982.

9. A. Butenko, "Forms and Deformations of Socialism", *Temps Nouveaux* No 6, 1982.



A. Butenko counterattacked, using more explicit arguments, in *Voprosy Filosofii*, he focussed on the notion of "antagonistic" and "non-antagonistic" contradictions. (10) The quote given below is worth citing in full:

"When you analyze the contradictions inherent in a socialist society, it is extremely important to identify the relationships between contradictions and interests. For example, when we talk about negative phenomena such as bureaucracy, formalism, conservatism and localism and about the way they obstruct socialist development, and the contradictions that flow from this, it is obvious that we are not just talking about an impersonal excrescence on the social organism, but about real individuals who are the embodiment of these social evils. Who are they? Where do they come from? Are the evils in question (to say nothing of other evils, such as parasitism, speculation etc.) antagonistic or non-antagonistic to the progress of socialism?....

"Under some conditions, in particular in the case of deformations of socialism, the non-antagonistic contradictions inherent in the historic development of socialism may become transformed into contradictions that can assume the features of antagonistic contradictions. The claim that only non-antagonistic contradictions can exist under socialism is based essentially on the arguments that since there are no exploiters or exploited, no longer any classes with mutually opposing interests, there can be no social antagonisms under socialism.

"This argument is correct in general but it holds only when non-antagonistic contradictions cannot develop in a direction that leads to the interests of the social groups and forces that stand behind these contradictions diverging more and more widely. However, as the history of actually existing socialism shows, such a divergence can arise. Non-antagonistic contradictions can develop in such a way that a profound change may occur in the interests of the opposing social forces in what at the start was only a non-antagonistic contradiction. Let us consider, for example, the problem of the leaders and the led in a socialist society. These interests are contradictory, even if they are not antagonistic.

"However, if the leaders become more remote from the led and begin to take advantage of their position to further their egoistic group interests to the detriment of society and of the workers, these egoistic group interests and the workers' interests can become mutually exclusive, and then they may take on the character of an antagonistic contradiction. It must be stressed that the problem here is not one of a 'residual antagonism' or of 'vestiges of capitalism'.

"This sort of backsliding, of regression, can not only occur but has occurred under socialism .....So, if you consider the nature of the contradictions that may arise in a socialist society, it is necessary to analyze the process in the course of which the changes take place, not only

from the standpoint of the contradictions and the means of resolving them but also from the standpoint of the forces that lie behind these contradictions." (11)

When, in her detailed study of the causes of the Soviet economic crisis, Zaslavskaja started to put names and addresses on these concepts, it is not surprising that the Soviet authorities took fright.

In *Voprosy Istorii*, the debate was opened by an article from E. A. Ambartsumov, the director of a department of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System. He had already shown his heterodoxy in the debate that unfolded in the 1960s on reform. (12)

In his article entitled "Lenin's Analysis of the Causes of the 1921 Crisis and the Means for Getting Out of It", Ambartsumov drew a parallel between the present economic and social situation and the one that existed at the start of the 1920s. And he proposed the introduction of a new NEP.

Ambartsumov also started off from an analysis of the Polish crisis and went on to extend his thinking to all the "socialist countries". The Soviet literature, he explained, "has not up till now been able to offer a general theory of the causes of crises under socialism". And he listed these crises — East Germany in 1953, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland in 1970 and 1980.

According to Ambartsumov, these crises arose when the leaders lost contact with the led, when "contradictions, even conflicts, emerged between the revolutionary government and its policy and the vital interests of certain sectors of the working masses, leading to deeply rooted expressions of discontent".

At the same time, Ambartsumov pointed to the domestic causes of these crises, stressing that "the counter-revolutionary forces cannot whip up popular discontent unless causes of discontent exist in the country concerned itself and are neglected by the leadership".

Then Ambartsumov went on to recall that the reason for the NEP was the need to make concessions to the peasantry in order to win their support for the Bolshevik government, that this represented

the first "crisis of socialism." In his view, the lessons of the NEP period have to be considered valid for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe today. (13)


A new interest in the NEP period is neither an isolated nor a new phenomenon. (14) These ideas were already expressed in the debate in the 1960s on the economic reform. (15) They reflect the tendency of certain economists to seek in the history of their own country and in the intense debates that have taken place in the past, in particular in the ideas of Bukharin, answers to the questions they pose.

More significant, perhaps, than these references to the NEP's economic measures (in fact, the question of how much validity they would have would require a study in itself) is the parallel that Ambartsumov draws between the social situation then and the one today, that is, the leaders losing contact with whole sectors of the toiling masses. (Given the sociological transformations that the USSR has undergone, this cannot refer today to the peasantry alone.)

The old hard-liners, who habitually express themselves in the magazine *Kommunist*, went on a rampage against Ambartsumov, rejecting his analyses and his proposals. (16) And they also attacked the magazine *Voprosy Istorii* for not having exercised the necessary editorial control. More concerted measures were taken.

In a November 1984 issue, *Kommunist* informed its readers that *Voprosy Istorii* had recognised the correctness of its criticisms, after a meeting of historical review's editorial committee, in which "eminent" historians and representatives of the History Department of the Academy of Sciences had participated. *Voprosy Istorii* had promised to publish an article "in accordance with the line."

It might be asked, what is the line? The fact that this debate could be carried on for more than two years on this level indicates the existence of disagreements within the Soviet leadership itself on the questions at issue. The fact that such a debate has gone on at the top levels seems to be confirmed by the publication of two articles in the April 1984 *Kommunist* that stress the harm done to the party by factional struggles. One was signed by the conservative Bugaev, the other by Shikin, who is known for his reformist inclinations. Stopping this debate was one of the last actions of the Chernenko leadership. But the burning questions that it raised are no less urgent today. ■



10. *Voprosy Filosofii* No 12, December 1983.
11. A. Butenko, "Eshche Raz o Protivorechiakh Sotsializma, *Voprosy Filosofii*, No 2, 1984.
12. Cf. Moshe Lewin, *Political Undercurrents in Soviet Economic Debate*, Pluto Press, London 1975.
13. E. A. Ambartsumov, "Analiz V. I. Leninym Prichin Krizisa 1921 i Putei Vykhoda iz Nego", *Voprosy Istorii* No 4, 1984.
14. Cf. Zenovia A. Sochor, "NEP Revisited: Current Soviet Interest in Alternative Development", in *Soviet Union*, No 9, Part 2, 1982, pp 189-211
15. Cf. Moshe Lewin, *Op. Cit.*
16. See E. Bugaev, "Strannaia pozitsia," *Kommunist* No 14, September 1984.



## Jaruzelski launches anti-Ukrainian campaign

In George Orwell's novel 1984, "two minutes of hate" sessions were one of the techniques of indoctrination utilized by the totalitarian regime. Although the system of "oligarchic collectivism" imagined by Orwell does not exist in Poland, the Polish bureaucracy's arsenal includes a device reminiscent of the "two minutes of hate". Last year, which was Orwell's year, this method was used against the priest Jerzy Popieluszko. It was what incited a group of secret police agents to assassinate him. In 1984 the system of "two minutes of hate" was also utilized against the Ukrainian people. For months in a clearly co-ordinated way, the official press trumpeted what it called the "truth about the criminal character of Ukrainian nationalism" and about the actions of the "barbaric hordes of Ukrainian nationalists" forty years ago.

The fighters of the Ukrainian liberation movement, who for eight years (1943-1951) waged an armed struggle against German imperialism first of all and then against Stalinist tyranny were presented as "savage executioners", and as "fascist cutthroats out of the forests". Their activity was described as "synonymous with crime against humanity". According to the information that has reached us, this campaign was directly whipped up by the Ministry of the Interior, that is, by the police, which in Poland is the main

institution of the state that concerns itself with the question of nationalities. This ministry was the source of all the documents published in the press.

In one way or another, all the press organs of the various factions of the bureaucracy took part in this campaign from the pseudoliberal weekly *Polityka* controlled by the deputy premier, Mieczyslaw Rakowski, to *Rzeczywistosc*, organ of the Stalinist hardliners, including *Slowo Powszechne*, the magazine of the "socially progressive Catholics," that is, those who collaborate shamelessly with the bureaucratic regime in all its forms.

*Rzeczywistosc* found no difficulty in basing itself on a statement made in 1943 by the National Party (SN), a formation that represented the most chauvinistic currents in the bourgeoisie and among the big landowners, which was always in the forefront of support for repressive Polish policies in the Ukraine and Byelorussia. "Ukrainian society, showing its immaturity or its degeneracy by mass criminality, condemns itself. The weakness and primitivism of Ukrainian society are obstructing its own development." (1)

In order to understand the present anti-Ukrainian campaign, it is necessary to review the historic events that the bureaucracy are exploiting in this campaign. I will try to do that in the following article.

Arthur WILKINS

Following the failure of the Red Army in the war with Poland in 1920, the western part of the Ukraine and also of Byelorussia remained incorporated into the Polish bourgeoisie state until 1939. The new Polish state continued the traditional policy of the Polish ruling classes in these areas toward the Ukrainian population, which was 90% peasant in composition. It was a policy of national oppression, cultural discrimination, economic exploitation and forced assimilation.

In 1930, in reprisal for terrorist actions carried out by the Ukrainian nationalists, Marshall Jozef Pilsudski, the Polish chief of state, ordered the army and police to "pacify" the Ukrainian villages. "It was this that gave the fundamental shape to the experience of an entire people of Poland and Poles," it says in a book recently published underground in Warsaw, which deals with the relations between Poland and its neighbours. "It was a crime, and one that we had to pay for." (2) It was this repression that set the stage for the revenge of the Ukrainian peasants in 1943, which I will take up later.

Moreover, the western Ukraine was the traditional center of the Ukrainian national movement, especially Galicia, which was called the "Piedmont of the Ukraine." For some time, this movement exhibited

a pro-Soviet attitude, turning toward the Soviet Ukraine, which after the October Revolution exercised a considerable attraction over the peasants, the workers, the petty bourgeoisie and even the Uniat priest of the Polish part of the Ukraine.

However, this situation changed drastically as a result of Stalinism's monstrous crimes against the Ukrainian people at the time of forced collectivization. The ensuing famine led to the death of nearly six million peasants in the Soviet Ukraine, and this was accompanied by slaughter of Ukrainian intellectuals and national communist cadres.

Leon Trotsky wrote: "Nowhere did restrictions, purges, repressions and in general, all forms of bureaucratic hooliganism assume such murderous sweep as they did in the Ukraine in the struggle against the powerful, deeply rooted longings of the Ukrainian masses for greater freedom and independence. To the totalitarian bureaucracy, Soviet Ukraine became an administrative division of an economic unit and a military base of the USSR." (3)

After the Stalinist crimes, Trotsky explained, the Ukrainian masses did not want to live in the USSR any more or remain attached to it. On the contrary, they aspired to the creation of an independent workers' and peasants' state.

The workers of Russia and the entire world, Trotsky said, "must even now

understand the causes for Ukrainian separatism, as well as the latent power and historical lawfulness behind it, and they must, without any reservation, declare to the Ukrainian people that they are ready to support, with all their might, the slogan of an independent Soviet Ukraine in a joint struggle against the autocratic bureaucracy and against imperialism." (4)

After the German imperialist attack on the USSR, a national liberation struggle developed in the western Ukraine. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) took the leadership of this fight, and in 1943, in the countryside it founded the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, (UPA), which rapidly grew into a force of nearly 40,000 combatants. Previously, the OUN had been a rightist organization. It had conducted terrorist actions directed against the Polish state and shown a penchant for fascism. Its hope was that Germany would consent to the formation of an independent Ukrainian state.

1. Jędrzej Seret, "Tragedia Kresow" ["The Tragedy of the Eastern Borderlands"]. *Rzeczywistosc*, No 32, 1984.

2. Kazimierz Podlaski, *Bialorusini, Litwini, Ukraincy: nasi wrogowie czy bracia?* ["Are the Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Byelorussians Our Enemies or Our Brothers and Sisters?"], *Slowo*, Warsaw, 1984, p 75. Excerpts of this interesting book were published in the Paris magazine *L'Alternative*, No 31, 1985.

3. *Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1938-39*, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1984, pp 302-303.

4. *Writings of Leon Trotsky, 1939-40*, Pathfinder Press, New York, 1977, p 53.



The bloody repression of every expression of Ukrainian nationalism, and the policy of brutal exploitation of the Ukrainian masses followed by the Nazis quickly dispelled the OUN's reactionary illusions. At the same time, the OUN was led by other factors to make a deep-going ideological shift. Beginning in 1941, its "expeditionary groups" started to penetrate into the Nazi-occupied Soviet Ukraine and establish contacts with the local population.

As a result of discussions with the population in the Soviet Ukraine, whose consciousness was shaped by the gains of the October Revolution and the structure of post-capitalist society, and in particular under the pressure of the working class in the Donbass, the leading coal and steel center of both the Ukraine and the USSR as a whole, the OUN and the UPA adopted a program not just for a national revolution but for a social one as well.

### Left turn

The independent Ukraine that was to come out of the struggle "against both Hitler and Stalin" was to be a democratic state without capitalists or landlords, without "the parasitic class of Bolshevik grandees," without oppression of one nation by another, without the exploitation of human beings by human beings, a state based on social ownership of the means of production and which would build a classless society.

The adoption by the Ukrainian nationalists of a program for social revolution confirmed Trotsky's thesis that the social revolution in the USSR, which had been betrayed by the bureaucracy and its party, lived on in the property relations and in the consciousness of the workers. This was pointed out by Pierre Frank at the time of the Third World Congress of the Fourth International in 1951. He said then: "What we have learned from the Ukrainian independence movement on this question is also quite significant. As a result of the division of the Ukraine before the Second World War, the Ukrainian nationalist movement in Poland contributed to the development of pro-independence tendencies in the Soviet Ukraine. But on the other hand, the difference in the social system between the two parts of the Ukraine led to the Ukrainian nationalists in Poland evolving toward support for the forms of social ownership in the Soviet Ukraine. This is a phenomenon that must not be forgotten." (5)

The new revolutionary nationalism that was evolving toward democratic socialism won the support of the masses in the western Ukraine, which had been part of Poland before 1939. When the Soviet army entered this army in 1944, the Kremlin found itself facing the first mass movement for political revolution in its state.

In 1943, when the UPA was set up, in the western Ukrainian provinces of Volhynia and Polesia, a bloody national con-

flict raged between the Ukrainian peasants and Polish settlers. Massacres of civilians were perpetrated by both sides. The Polish and Ukrainian resistance organizations became involved in the conflict in the two opposing camps. The German authorities, who had every interest in seeing the sharpest possible antagonism between the Poles and Ukrainians, poured oil on the flames. The same was done by the Soviet partisan groups, which had an interest in provoking pogroms among the Ukrainian masses that supported the movement for national and social liberation.

In taking up a war of liberation against German imperialism, the Ukrainian masses at the same time took their revenge for the national oppression they suffered at the hands of the Polish population. Indeed, the Polish resistance movement and the authorities of the Polish "underground state" were hostile to the Ukrainian national movement. (6) They thought that in the future the western Ukraine should belong to Poland, wanting to maintain the territorial gains the Polish bourgeois state had made in the east.

The Polish Home Army (Armia Krajowa — AK) had rejected the UPA's proposals for putting an end to the conflict and collaborating against the common enemies of both movements, Hitler and Stalin, based on a recognition of the right of the Ukrainian nation to form an independent state.

It is the episode of this conflict primarily that the Polish bureaucratic government is exploiting today. The regime not only obscures the historic background to the 1943 massacres and the historic responsibility of the Polish forces involved in them as oppressor, but it also passes over in silence the reactionary policy followed by the political and military institutions of the Polish "underground state" in the Nazi-occupied western Ukraine as regards the national question.

The historian Jerzy Tomaszewski has even been pilloried by the regime's press for having dared say that massacres of civilians were carried out by both sides, and that the actions of the Polish resistance against the Ukrainian peasants cannot in any case be considered self-defense.

The official press talks about "propaganda materials fabricated by the Ukrainian nationalists saying the same thing as this Polish historian". (7) It has also referred to other material that, it claims, "are pure Zionist inventions, like what Professor Jerzy Tomaszewski offers Polish readers."

*Rzeczywistosc* suggests that "Western tourists of a swarthy type" are trying to buy off some Polish scholars to get them to put forward ideas similar to Tomaszewski's. It accuses him of "spitting in the face of Poles", and goes on to say that public presentation of Tomaszewski's studies of the relations between Poland and the Ukraine in the past "will do more harm than good to Polish scholarship, and also to our fatherland, which cannot be a matter of indifference to us who are its

citizens!" (8)

The official press portrays Ukrainian revolutionary nationalism and the liberation struggle of the Ukrainian masses as a fascist movement allied to Hitler. Using the method of the amalgam, it talks about the UPA and the two formations set up by the Nazis — the Ukrainian auxiliary police and the SS-Galicia division — as if they were various wings of the same movement. Finally, to top it all off, the official press bases itself on the "political thought" of the most chauvinist and imperialist currents in the Polish right, as indicated by *Rzeczywistosc* quoting the National Party's shameful statement from 1943.

Such an ideological orientation is not new in the history of the bureaucratic dictatorship in Poland. From the outset of its rule, Polish Stalinism has followed a chauvinist policy with regard to the national question. In 1945, the "people's" government proclaimed that the Polish state should be nationally homogeneous.

More or less openly, the successive ruling teams have remained faithful to this "tradition," from which Solidarnosc tried to break in 1981 by proclaiming the democratic principle of a "republic of the nations."

The Ukrainian population living within the new Polish frontiers established after the Second World War were the victims of the totalitarian "ideal" of a "nationally homogeneous state." In the wake of the war, in accordance with a deal made with the Kremlin, the great majority of this population (several hundred thousand persons) were forcibly deported to the Soviet Ukraine. This included even villages that had traditionally been Stalinist, and was done over the energetic protests of old Ukrainian Communists.

The UPA detachments mounted armed resistance to these deportations and defended the Ukrainian population against pillage, pogroms and murder carried out by the security apparatus, the militia [i.e., the regular police], and the army of "people's" Poland, as well as by armed detachments of chauvinist Polish settlers.

It was in this period that armed groups that came out of the old AK that opposed the Stalinist regime began to collaborate on the ground with the UPA. They helped to protect the Ukrainian population from the persecutions, agitated within the militia and army against the anti-Ukrainian repression, and organized aid for the Ukrainian peasants in the Polish villages. Breaking in this way from the old policy of the AK, they took a democratic position on the Ukrainian question, and some leaders of these guerilla detach-

5. Pierre Frank, "Evolution of Eastern Europe, in *Class, Party and State and the Eastern European Revolution*, Education for Socialists series, SWP, New York, 1969, p. 51.

6. On the "underground state" in Poland during the war and the Home Army (AK), see the article by Arthur Wilkins and Cyril Smuga, "Les Veritables origines de la Republique Populaire," in the February 4 issue (No 189) of *Inprecor*, *International Viewpoint's* French-language sister publication.

7. Jacek E. Wilczur, "Nawroty do zlej przeszlosci" ("Returning to an unhappy Past"), *Przegląd Tygodniowy*, No 26, 1984.

8. J. Seret, *Op cit*.



ments accepted the aspirations of the Ukrainian people for national independence.

The Ukrainian question in "people's" Poland was finally "solved" in 1947. At that time only a single Ukrainian ethnic group remained on Polish territory, in the Carpathian mountains, the Lemkos. The Polish army mounted an operation, called "Action Vistula," for which tens of thousands of soldiers were mobilized. Its objective was to deport the entire Lemko community and destroy the UPA.

The Lemkos defended tooth and nail their right to live on lands they had inhabited for centuries. It was the guerilla company made up of Lemko peasants and led by Stepan Khrin, one of the UPA's best military commanders, that waged the fiercest battles, successfully utilizing the tactic of offensive raids against the enemy troops. The Polish army deported 150,000 Lemkos to the north and west of Poland, where they were dispersed and consigned to "achieving a higher degree of Polishness," that is, to assimilation.

It is worth remembering that it was in this criminal pogrom against the Lemko people that the present chief of the Polish regime, General Jaruzelski, won his officer's stars. To this day, it is forbidden to talk about the fate to which Polish Stalinism condemned the Lemkos.

It has only been during the processes of political revolution that the legal press has been able to discuss this question. The democratic press recalled the tragedy of the Lemkos on two occasions. In 1957, it was the weekly *Po Prostu* the organ of the "October Left," that did this. In 1981, it was *Tygodnik Solidarnosc*, the national weekly of the free trade union movement.

The lands of the Lemkos were entirely cleared of any population. So, the UPA detachments had to retreat to the Soviet Ukraine, where they joined the local units of the UPA. For some years more, they continued to wage a heroic struggle, but they were finally mercilessly exterminated by NKVD detachments.

In March 1950, Taras Chuprynka (Roman Shukhevych), the commander in chief of the UPA, was killed near Lvov. Shortly after that, the last groups of Ukrainian guerillas who fought to the end in the Carpathian forests to eliminate this "prisonhouse of nations" — as they called the Stalinist USSR — were defeated.

"If you add up the numbers of people who died in the 1917-1920 revolution, the forced collectivization and in the great purges in the 1930s, and in the Second World War, the total comes out to half the male population and a quarter of the female population of the Ukraine. With these human beings, the traditions, the ideas, the gains and the hopes of entire generations were destroyed. After such a holocaust, it is remarkable that Ukrainian society still had the strength to manifest its national aspirations after the war. Still more remarkable is the rise in the 1960s of the Ukraine dissident movement, a new testimony to the tenacity of

the human spirit." (9)

Why did the Polish political police, which does not normally concern itself with history, suddenly take an interest in the Ukraine nationalist movement of forty years ago? Why has the regime's press, instigated by the Ministry of the Interior, all of a sudden started pounding away on the theme of "Ukrainian fascists and bandits," a stereotype unfortunately that strikes a chord with a section of the Polish people?

It should be noted here that in the past, it was the Jewish minority, which was accused of taking part in "Zionist plots" against the Polish nation and socialism, that was the target of the Polish bureaucracy's chauvinist campaigns. Today, for the first time, similar accusations are being directed at "certain elements" of the Ukrainian minority.

The regime's representatives claim that veterans of the UPA and the OUN, "who in forty years of peace in Europe have learned nothing raised their heads again in Poland in a time of chaos and relaxed vigilance." (10) They are talking about a time when a process of political revolution was underway, 1980-1981.

### The reason for the campaign

Why is the Ukrainian minority in Poland being attacked? It is systematically discriminated against, denied the right to develop its national culture freely and to preserve its language. It is left with no organization of its own but a feeble social and cultural organization under the direct administrative control of the Ministry of the Interior.

The answer to these questions has to be looked for on the other side of the Polish frontier. In the Soviet Ukraine, particularly in the western part, the struggle of *Solidarnosc* made a significant impact among the workers and the intelligentsia.

A number of Ukrainian dissidents saw the social movement of the Polish workers as an example to follow and as a positive alternative for overcoming the problems of the human-rights defense movement in the USSR, which has been isolated from the working class.

In February and March 1983, leaflets appeared calling for a strike and supporting *Solidarnosc* in factories in the western Ukraine. In March 1984, leaflets from the Polish organization Fighting Solidarity (*Solidarnosc Walczaca*) were distributed in Russian and Ukrainian. They called for the formation of groups modelled on those existing in Poland, under the banner of self-management, solidarity and independence.

Indicating the reasons for the Polish bureaucracy's anti-Ukrainian campaign, a CPSU bigwig in the western Ukraine, Petro Sardachuk, wrote in Issue No 12, 1984 of *Kommunist* (the theoretical organ of the CPSU): "In carrying on its ideological diversion, the class enemy is

trying to take advantage of the history and the special geopolitical situation of the Sub-Carpathian region". He wrote that the border areas of the Ukraine "are the front lines of the ideological confrontation," proclaiming that "here you constantly smell the smoke of the anti-Soviet fires."

It is thus clear that Sardachuk was referring to the dangers represented by the Polish social movement. A short time before this article was published, in the fall of 1983, the Soviet press raised the alarm about subversive activity aimed against the Soviet Ukraine being conducted in Poland, and about the Western imperialist spy centers inciting Ukrainian dissidents to learn from *Solidarnosc* and to "adapt to Soviet conditions the methods of creeping counterrevolution" worked out in Poland.

For decades, the Kremlin has feared the liberation movement of the Ukrainian people, the largest oppressed nation in Europe, which inhabits the continent's second largest country. In terms of territory, population and economic strength, the Ukraine represents one fifth of the Soviet Union.

The Kremlin is quite well aware of the fact that it was the Ukrainian masses who unleashed the first political revolution against its regime. The hatred that the Stalinist regime displayed for Ukrainian nationalism in the 1940s is no less fierce today.

Soviet citizens are still being sentenced and executed on accusations of having belonged to the UPA. General Roman Shukhevych's son is still in prison, after 35 years, because he refuses to renounce his father. Moreover, the UPA veteran Danylo Shumuk, who was a Communist activist before the war, has recently been recognised by Amnesty International as the longest held political prisoner in the world.

The national aspirations in the Ukraine are a powderkeg. They have grown apace with the Ukrainian working class, which now represents 75% of the total Ukrainian population. The Ukrainian workers are one of the best educated sections of the working class of the USSR and they have acquired considerable experience in fighting to defend their rights.

In 1962, the Donbass workers waged strikes on a large scale that had a semi-insurrectional character. The national question is becoming more and more closely linked with the problems workers have as workers. "Finding myself as a worker at the bottom of the Soviet social scale, I have felt very directly the weight of economic, social and political and national oppression," Mykola Pohyba wrote in a prison camp in 1980. (11)

9. Bohdan Krawchenko, "The Great Ukrainian Famine", *L'Alternative*, No 24, 1983, p 50.

10. J. Seret, *Pogrobowcy Stepana Bandery*, [The Heirs of Stepan Bandera], *Rzeczywistosc*, No 50, 1984.

11. "The Open Letter from worker Mykola Pohyba", *Cahiers du Samizdat*, No 78, 1981, p 14.



## Revolutionary nationalism and the anti-bureaucratic revolution



Vasyl Mizerny, commander of the 'Lemko' section of the UPA, killed in combat in the Soviet Ukraine (D.R.)

In the Kremlin as in Warsaw, the thought of what might happen if an alliance were to come about between the Polish and Ukrainian social movements stirs panic. So, trying to fan the flames of national hatred between Poles and Ukrainians, of which the chauvinistic anti-Ukrainian campaign in Poland is an aspect, is a typical preventive operation.

### Solidarnosc's attitude to national oppression

In Poland, such an operation is all the more necessary from the bureaucracy's point of view because over the last two years, the underground press of *Solidarnosc* and the independent publishers have devoted considerable attention to the history and perspectives of Polish-Ukrainian relations. With a democratic educational approach and with an understanding of the need for mutual solidarity against the common enemy, they have explained the bases of the traditional antagonism.

Such activity by the underground *Solidarnosc* is an important element in forming a democratic consciousness with respect to the national question and in developing the strategy of the social movement in Poland.

Recently, the Polish *Inprekor* contributed to this effort by publishing a special on the Ukrainian national question. In this framework, it presented the real history of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The editors of the Polish *Inprekor* think that revolutionary socialists in Poland should include in their program support for the slogan Trotsky raised in 1939: "For a free and independent Ukraine of workers' and peasants' councils!" They also believe that revolutionary socialists in Poland should recognise that there will be no self-managed Poland without an independent Ukraine. ■

In November 1950, near the city of Ivano-Frankivsk, Captain Osep Diakiv-Hornovy fell in battle against the troops of the NKVD. In the winter of 1951/52, in the Carpathian forests, Major Petro Poltava (his real name is not known) was killed in similar circumstances. They were outstanding leaders of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and commanders of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). They belonged to the same generation of young cadres of the Ukrainian revolutionary movement and were its principal theoreticians. With their names and work is linked the radical ideological and programmatic evolution of the national liberation movement in the Ukraine toward democratic socialism. The political thought of the OUN and the UPA, developed by Hornovy and Poltava, is perhaps the most dangerous legacy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement of the 1940s for the Kremlin and what the Stalinists are most anxious to eradicate from the memory of this revolutionary movement.

Arthur WILKINS

In August 1943, the OUN's Extraordinary Congress adopted a new program. It was in this period that the OUN took the leadership of the insurrectionary and underground struggle of the masses of the western Ukraine against German imperialism. At the same time, it was preparing to wage armed resistance against the reconquest of the Ukraine by "Bolshevik Moscovite imperialism," as the nationalists called the system of national oppression imposed by Stalinism.

On the one hand, the program adopted at the 1943 congress called for the formation of an independent united Ukrainian state, as well as for collaboration with the liberation movements of other oppressed nations of the USSR, to eliminate the "prisonhouse of nations" and replace it with a system of free national states. The OUN saw such a system as the only possibility for ending Russia's domination over its neighboring nations.

On the other hand, the new program was based on the assumption that any national revolution had at the same time to be a social revolution, that there could be no real national liberation either in the USSR or in the world in general without social liberation. "By abolishing the exploitation of class by class, we will create a just social order in the Ukraine," the resolutions of the 1943 congress proclaim.

The statement entitled "What Is the UPA Fighting For?" based on the resolutions of the congress said that in an independent Ukraine, big industry (as well

as the major trading enterprises and the banks) would be the property of the nation state, and that small industrial and trading businesses would be owned by cooperatives and city governments. At the same time, the workers would be guaranteed a role in running the enter-

prises. The land would be nationalized, to be tilled either individually or collectively in accordance with the will of the peasants (1).

Poltava later explained: "Ukrainian nationalists are fighting to assure that in the future Ukraine a classless society will be built, that is a society in which there will be no exploitation of human beings by human beings and in which no social layer will economically dominate other layers. The foundation of this system will be social ownership of the instruments and means of production. In this way the economic basis for the formation of exploiting classes will be removed." (2)

The OUN and the UPA believed that in the USSR a monopoly of power was held by a "parasitical class of Bolshevik (or Stalinist) masters." This class exercised a two-fold domination: 1) totalitarian domination (dictatorship) over the working masses of all nationalities in the empire, including the working people of the Russian nation. 2) colonial domination over the non-Russian nations and nationalities ("Moscovite Bolshevik imperialism"). On this basis, they maintained, it also carried twofold exploitation, exploitation of class by class and nation by nation.

Hornovy and Poltava went into great detail in analyzing these two types of domination and exploitation. At the same time, they pointed out that the origin and nature of the power of the "class of Stalinist masters" were different from those of class rule in the capitalist system.

"We see that the exploitation of human beings by human beings," Hornovy said, "is not based solely in private

1. "Za shcho boret'sia Ukrains'ka Povstancha Armiia (UPA)?" in *Diialoh*, No 9, 1983. pp 85-89. (Published in Canada.)  
2. P. Poltava, *Zbirnyk pidpil'nykh pysan'* ("Collection of Underground Writings"), Ukrains'kyi Samostiinyk, Munich 1959, p 145.



ownership making it possible to accumulate enormous riches in the hands of a small minority (the landowners and capitalists). We see that in the USSR there is no private property as regards the tools and means of production (land, forests, mines, factories and plants, transport and so forth) and that these have not only been expropriated from the landowners, capitalists and wealthy peasants, but that the former owners of these themselves have been physically exterminated.

"Yet the exploitation of many exists; there exist the exploited masses and the exploiting party masters. There exists in the USSR, an exploiting class that has been created not on the basis of private property but on that of the unlimited political power of one party....

"In the Bolshevik system, we see a process opposite to the one that occurs under the capitalist system. Concretely, in capitalism it is private wealth that confers power in the state, while in the Bolshevik system, it is political power that opens up access to material wealth and makes it possible to use this wealth freely." (3)

To topple the totalitarian rule of the "parasitic class" in the USSR over the working masses, what was needed, therefore, was not a revolution that would change the system of ownership but one that would establish political democracy:

"The democratic system in the future Ukrainian state, in which the government will be elected by the people and under its control, will make it impossible for exploiting classes to form on the basis of political privileges." (4)

With the establishment of genuine political democracy, the means of production would come under genuine social ownership. In order to abolish the colonial domination of "Bolshevik Moskovite imperialism" and keep it from coming back, it was necessary to transform the USSR into a system of free and equal national states defined by the ethnographic boundaries of each nation. These two tasks were closely linked and would have to be achieved simultaneously.

At the same time as saying that in the USSR there was "the class of Stalinist masters that must be removed by force from the path of societal development" and calling "social revolution" what revolutionary Marxists call political revolution, Hornovy said clearly that this "social revolution is bolstered by the trend to national revolutions on the part of the oppressed nations of the USSR." (5)

In his works, which were written in the underground bunkers of the UPA, Hornovy devoted considerable space to the ideological struggle against Stalinism. Above all, he implacably and brilliantly exposed the consolidation of the ideology of Great Russian chauvinism, which was undertaken by Stalin in 1945. But he went further.

"A very important place in current Bolshevik ideology is occupied by the thesis about 'the progressive transition to communism.' Taking for granted that the first phase of communism, socialism,

already has been attained, the Stalinist masters contend that the second phase, a higher phase — that of developed communism — is now being built. In such a society the principle, 'from each according to ability, to each according to his needs' will be realised, and there will disappear differences between city and village and between physical and intellectual labour."

Hornovy's response to this theory was the following: "There can be no transition to communism in the USSR, inasmuch as there is no socialism. So long as there is no social ownership of the means of production, so long as there exists the brutal exploitation of man and so long as the principle of distribution according to labour done is not realised (from each according to ability, to each according to his work), so long can there hardly be any talk of transition to communism." (6)

### Against capitalist restoration

The OUN and UPA firmly opposed restoration of capitalism in an independent Ukraine. Hornovy and Poltava constantly stressed this. Poltava criticised the Voice of America's broadcasts for the Soviet Union, saying: "The Soviet masses hate the Bolshevik 'socialism.' But that does not mean that the Soviet people are longing for capitalism, which was destroyed on the territory of the present USSR back in 1917-20. The Soviet people in their absolute majority are clearly against the restoration of capitalism. That is the result of the revolution."

Poltava added: "We, the participants in the liberation struggle in the Ukraine, who are inside the Soviet Union and have connections with the broad Soviet masses, know only too well that they have no admiration for capitalism — neither the old European kind nor the modern American kind." (7)

Pointing out that "under capitalism the masses of working people find themselves in the position of being citizens who are economically and politically powerless," Poltava stated: "A situation in which some social classes grow rich and live in abundance while others go hungry and sink into poverty simply because all that they possess is their own hands, their labour power, is in flagrant contradiction to the concepts of social justice and national solidarity....

"The Ukrainian nationalists do not want there to be exploiters and exploited in the Ukrainian people; they do not want to see this people torn by class struggle. Since there is only one way to put an end to this dangerous situation, that is, by socializing all branches of economy, they consider this solution to be the basis for the new economic and social system."

Moreover, Poltava said, capitalism generates economic crises and wars, which are the greatest evil humanity faces. "One of the mechanisms for preventing crises is the introduction of planning into econ-

omic life, the planned organization of production and distribution. Planning in these areas is possible only in a socialized economy. For this reason, the socialization of the instruments and means of production is also one of the means for averting economic crises." (8)

In the light of this presentation of the political thought of Hornovy and Poltava, the question arises of what attitude the Ukrainian revolutionary nationalists took towards Marxism. This query was taken up in their time by a group of Ukrainian revolutionary socialists (Iwan Majstrenko, Vsevolod Holubnychy, Borys Levyts'kyi), who published the periodical *Vpered* ("Forward") in the West, and defended the UPA's struggle in the left wing of the workers' movement in the capitalist countries.

In this group it was believed that there were contradictions between the positions of Poltava and those of Hornovy, with the latter representing a Marxist current inside the OUN. In 1949-50, *Vpered* established contact with the OUN leadership in the Ukraine and got a letter from Poltava, written in agreement with Hornovy. Among other things, the letter says:

"It is only on the basic things that we agree with Marx's critique of capitalism. Thus, we make a positive assessment (although not in its entirety) of the socialist concept (as formulated by the various socialist currents) of building the society that is to replace capitalist society... On these two points — in our view of capitalism and our conception of a classless society — at most we come close to some extent to the socialist theories, including Marxism.

"We have formulated our views not as 'disciples of Marx,' not as advocates of socialism, without being in the least attracted by Marxism and in a struggle against Marxism as an overall ideology, in the struggle against the pernicious consequences of Marxism on Ukrainian soil. We have worked out our viewpoints in an empirical way, starting off from our nationalist ideological positions... We cannot be linked to Marxism because in the most complete sense of the term, we are a national movement, not a class-struggle movement or a class-struggle internationalist movement, as Marxism would require." (9)

In his letter, Poltava stressed that the OUN was formed and continued to operate "as a movement struggling against Marxism, against the corrosive and destructive effects of Marxism on the

3. O. Diakiv-Hornovy, *Ideia i chyn. Pouna zbirka tvoriv* ("The Idea and the Deed; Collected Works"), Association of Former UPA Fighters, New York 1968. There is an English-Language edition of the writings of O. Diakiv-Hornovy, entitled *The USSR Unmasked; A Collection of Articles and Essays on Soviet Russian Repression in Ukraine*, Vantage Press, New York, 1976. But it is incomplete and the translation is not reliable.

4. P. Poltava, *Op. Cit.*, p 171.

5. O. Diakiv-Hornovy, *Op. Cit.*, p 258.

6. *Ibid.*, pp 257-258.

7. P. Poltava, *Op. Cit.*, pp 213-214.

8. P. Poltava, *Ibid.*, pp 169-70.

9. "Lyst P. Poltava ("Letter of P. Poltava"), *Vpered*, No 4, (13), 1950, pp 3-4.





Political thought of Ukrainian intellectuals for the last half century and on our people's consciousness of the needs of independence and statehood." But what did Poltava mean by the Marxism against which the revolutionary nationalist movement had declared an ideological war?

In one of his most important writings, Hornovy pointed clearly to two things. First, for OUN members, there was no official philosophy that they had to subscribe to. The only thing that they had to accept was the ideology and the program of the organization, in whose ranks there were both philosophical idealists and materialists. Hornovy considered this variety of ideas natural and proper. Secondly, he said: "It is necessary to distinguish the dialectical and historic materialism of Marx and Engels from Stalin's dialectical materialism. We regard the first as a specific philosophical school of materialism, and criticizing it is a matter for scholarship.

"Stalin's version of dialectical and historical materialism we combat with the greatest determination as something unscientific, something contrary to the spirit of science, as an instrument used by the Bolshevik Party to legitimize its exploitative and colonial policy. The Stalinist dialectical and historical materialism has very little in common with Marx and Engels." (10)

What is more, in an extensive work entitled *On the Bolshevik Ideological Front*, in which he demonstrated that the Stalinists' "creative development" of Marxism, represented, in fact a break with Marxism, Hornovy said: "It is becoming more and more difficult for the Stalinist masters to manipulate Marxism because it is precisely Marxism which is the theory that constitutes their most dangerous foe, for it is completely at odds with Bolshevik theory and unmasks their policies. Today, Marxism looms up equally as a danger for Bolshevism as once it was for Czarism." (11)

In his commentary on Poltava's letter,

Iwan Majstrenko wrote: "Not knowing O. Hornovy's personal history, judging only from his writings, we characterised him once in the past as a revolutionary Marxist who had come out of a communist Marxist school. Recently we were more cautious in characterising him. In issue No 3 of *Vpered*, in introducing an article by Hornovy, we wrote: "In Poltava, one gets the impression of a nationalist school of thought, in Hornovy, of a Marxist one." We still think that Hornovy's work *On the Bolshevik Ideological Front* is Marxist.

"If Hornovy himself thinks otherwise, that does not constitute proof. A character in a play by Moliere also thought that he spoke in poetry, when he spoke in prose ... The information that P. Poltava has given us that O. Hornovy is a veteran OUN activist and does not come out of any Marxist school only confirms our longstanding conviction that in the Ukraine reality the Marxist scientific arguments are so powerful in the fight against Bolshevism that even a veteran nationalist like Hornovy has to resort to them and educate the young generation of nationalists in the country in these arguments." (12)

There might be some question whether Hornovy and Poltava represented only a "revisionist current in the OUN and not the ideology and program of the movement as a whole. This opinion has been put forward from time to time. A careful analysis confirms what the historian Lev Shankov's'kyi said about this, that the two commanders "revised nothing in their works, were not 'opponents' of General Taras Chuprynka but rather developed and clarified the official program and resolutions of the OUN, the UPA and the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council (UHVR)." (13) The latter was a political leadership body in which both Hornovy and Poltava held the positions of deputy president of the General Secretariat.

What Shankov's'kyi fails to clarify is

the source of the rumor about the unrepresentativeness of Hornovy and Poltava. The fact is that Stepan Bandera, the reactionary leader of the "Foreign Sections of the OUN" in the West had a hostile attitude to the democratic and left-wing positions held by the OUN on Ukrainian territory, and he raised the accusation that they represented adaptation to the prevailing ideology in the USSR or capitulation to it. (14)

It is clear that the OUN held a position of revolutionary nationalism, not revolutionary socialism. Vsevolod Holubnychy wrote about the OUN leaders: "They were not Marxists. They did not approach the situation from the standpoint of any complete doctrine. That is probably their greatest weakness, because a revolutionary party or organization cannot be successful without a scientific doctrine. But in any case, they proceeded in the formulation of their program from the reality of the Soviet Society, from the real 'mood' of the people." (15)

In an independent Ukraine, the OUN leaders wanted to build a democratic socialist system, in accordance with the aspirations of the working people in the USSR, whom they understood well and to whom they were loyal. On the basis of their program for national revolution they were allies of the revolutionary Marxists, and all the more so because in

10 O. Diaktiv-Hornovy, *Op. Cit.*, p 149. The important article quoted here does not appear in the English edition published by Vantage Press.

11. *Ibid.*, p 254.

12. A. Babenko (I Majstrenko), "Zavvaby do lysta P. Poltava" ["Remarks on the Letter from P. Poltava"], *Vpered*, No 4 (13) 1950, p 5.

13. L. Shankov's'kyi, "Spohady D. Shumuk u svitli faktiv" ["The Recollections of D. Shumuk in the Light of Facts"], *Vyzvol'nyi Shlykh* No 1, 1975, p 64.

14. B. Levyts'kyi gives a good explanation of this problem in "Istorychne Znachennia rozlamu v OUN", in *Vpered* No 2 (11), 1950. This article has also been published in English in the Canadian publication *Meta*, Vol 2, No 1, 1978, under the title "The Historical Significance of the Split in the OUN."

15. W. Wilny (V. Holubnychy), "The Future of the Soviet Union", *Fourth International*, New York, May-June, 1951, p 80.





Osyp Diakiv-Hornovy (1921-1950). No photo of Petro Poltava exists (D.R.)

their critique of Stalinism and capitalism, as well as in their goal of building a "Classless society", they drew inspiration to a large extent from Marxist theory.

Four things, fundamentally distinguished the OUN leaders from the revolutionary Marxists. First, despite what Poltava said in a letter to Majstrenko, declaring "We nationalists do not deny the class struggle, because it is a fact and because without struggle it is not possible to make any progress in life or any social progress either," nonetheless, the OUN did not give primacy to the class struggle but rather to the "idea of a nation." It made an error common among fighters for the liberation of oppressed nations.

Secondly, although the OUN leaders recognized the October Revolution as a gain for the workers and defended what remained of it in the property relations, they accused the Bolsheviks of having played a reactionary role in the revolution, of usurping political power and of rebuilding the Russian empire, the prison-house of nations. While they made a distinction between Marxism and Stalinism, they did not see the difference between Bolshevism and Stalinism.

Fourthly, they made an error committed by many fighters for political revolution in the Eastern Bloc countries. On the basis of its political character, they considered the regime in the USSR to be the most reactionary in the world, and the Soviet state to be the most dangerous imperialist power, one whose "parasitic class", as they saw it, aimed to conquer the world.

Regardless of everything that divides us from the revolutionary nationalists, we revolutionary socialists must honor the memory and heritage of Hornovy, Poltava and the other fighters for a Ukrainian national revolution in the 1940s. This is not only because of the respect they earned as genuine revolutionists. We must remember them because their political activity and their theoretical work teach us valuable lessons about the enormous importance of national oppression in the emergence and in the reproduction of the totalitarian Soviet bureaucracy's system of power. They help us to understand that the political revolution of the oppressed working people is bolstered by the national revolutions of the oppressed nations of the Soviet Union.



## AROUND THE WORLD



### SOUTH AFRICA Freedom fighters on trial

On Tuesday, February 18, a wave of arrests hit the central leadership of the United Democratic Front of South Africa. Six of the arrested, including Albertina Sisulu, whose husband is one of the imprisoned leaders of the banned African National Congress, and Black trade union leader Sam Kikine, have been charged with high treason, for which the maximum penalty is death. The six, whose trial is due to begin on March 29, will be joined in the dock by eight other militants of the UDF arrested on August 21 last year during the campaign to boycott the elections to the new Indian and Coloured chambers of the South African parliament. These elections were part of a public relations job by the Pretoria regime destined to convince international public opinion that the apartheid system was being reformed, whereas in fact, their essential aspect was to perpetuate the exclusion of the black majority.

The UDF was formed in August 1983, precisely to organise opposition to the constitutional reform, adopted on November 2 of that year, which provided for the creation of the Coloured and Indian chambers. It groups together more than 700 organisations of many different types (unions, community organisations, etc.), united in their common opposition to apartheid. Within the front, there are many disagreements over how best to conduct the struggle, despite the efforts of the Pretoria regime to present the organisation as simply a legal cover for the banned ANC. One of its patrons is 1984 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Bishop Desmond Tutu.

In the wake of arrests, Patrick Lekota, spokesperson of the UDF declares that 'the fragile image of reasonableness has already cracked'. He was referring to the much-publicised offer by the regime to release long-term prisoners on condition that they denounce the use of violence. The best-known of these prisoners, particularly the most celebrated among them, ANC leader Nelson Mandela, have refused this offer. The Transvaal Indian Congress, one of the UDF's affiliated organisations, has declared: 'At the moment when Mr Botha is speaking to Mandela and asking him to renounce violence, he arrests and charges with high treason the leaders of the UDF and other organisations which have always favoured peaceful change.'

What concerns the South African government is not the forms of struggle

favoured by this or that leader or component organisation of the UDF. It is rather that the organisation has developed a representativeness and a mass base (it claims the support of 1.5 million people) on the basis of opposition to the apartheid system. This has to be seen in the context of an increasingly volatile situation in the country, as shown on the one hand by the success of last year's boycott campaigns and on the other by the now endemic riots on the Black townships, which have resulted in more than twenty deaths over the last six months.

Protests against the latest wave of arrests should be sent to:

P. W. Botha, Union Building, Pretoria, South Africa.

with copies to:

United Democratic Front, P O Box 274, Salt River, Cape, South Africa.

### GREAT BRITAIN Fighting for a woman's right to choose Ten years on

This year the National Abortion Campaign in Britain celebrates its tenth anniversary. Ten years of campaigning for a woman's right to choose whether or not she continues a pregnancy — ten years of fighting off the many attacks on the 1967 Abortion Act.

We still have a long way to go to achieve the full rights of women to control their own fertility and destiny. The 1967 Act allows for abortion on the National Health Service when the health of the woman is under threat if the pregnancy continues. This legislation of abortion in Britain saw an end to much of the suffering resulting from back street abortions. Although the Act does not go far enough, it was a huge gain for women, and must be defended. Still today, less than 50% of abortions performed in Britain are carried out through the National Health Service. We have to stand for the extension of the 1967 Act, and for the protection of existing already limited facilities.

Events have been organised around Britain to celebrate the ten years of NAC. Women are saying to the Thatcher government that they will not let our facilities go undefended — and that we will continue to campaign around the message 'Our bodies, our lives, our right to decide.'



The existence of the 1967 Act means that there are also facilities for women outside Britain to turn to. For example, thousands of Irish women are forced to travel to Britain every year, because abortion is illegal in their country. Irish women are campaigning in the North and South for that situation to change. The situation in the South of Ireland is particularly difficult for women, following the passing of an Amendment to the Irish Constitution in September 1983. This amendment inserted into the constitution the right to life from the moment of conception. This has allowed anti-abortion groups to become much more public and vociferous in their campaigning — and the atmosphere in Ireland amongst many women is of fear, fear of unwanted pregnancies and of backstreet abortions.

Meanwhile in February the Powell Bill overwhelmingly passed at its second reading in the British House of Commons. Enoch Powell was a particularly right wing member of the Conservative government, well known for his racist views, and is now an Ulster Unionist Member of Parliament (MP). This Bill gave him an excellent opportunity to link up with the Catholic Church, and make his pronouncements on the the family and morality. The emotive title of the Bill — the 'Unborn Children (Protection) Bill' — gave a clear indication that any consideration of women's rights was far from his thoughts. It is possible that there may not be time to deal with this Bill during this Parliamentary Session, but this should not deter those who oppose the Bill from speaking out now, and organising against it. The aim of the Bill is to stop all research on human embryos, which would have very far-reaching effects on women with fertility problems, and effectively stop much research into handicap. In the so-called "interest of the child", control of a woman's fertility is taken still further from the woman. Under this Bill, any woman wishing to undergo in vitro fertilisation, would have to apply by name to the Secretary of State for permission.

The National Abortion Campaign has made clear its opposition to this Bill, and speakers at the different events this month have explained that. Jo Richardson a Labour MP, who has consistently fought for women against the Thatcher government, has been amongst the most prominent in doing that.

Unfortunately, the attitude of other Labour MPs is not so positive. Over half the Labour MPs present in the House of Commons that day, voted for the Powell Bill. This issue of embryo research and a woman's fertility is still regarded as a matter of personal conscience, and there is a free vote on it amongst Labour MPs. This attack on women's rights from Powell has served as a reminder to those supporters of NAC in the Labour Party that there is still a long way to go. Women in the Labour Party have been to the forefront of arguing that a woman's right to control her own fertility and as a matter of policy, fundamental to our

fight for women's rights.

Women fought long and hard for the Labour Party to adopt its current pro-choice policy and often need to remind some people of it.

This latest attack on fertility control has followed a recent High Court ruling in favour of Victoria Gillick who sought to prevent doctors from providing contraception to women under the age of 16 without parental knowledge. These attacks are often more subtle and more difficult to argue against than the more reactionary attempts to restrict abortion in the last few years. In the past the National Abortion Campaign has succeeded in mobilising the labour movement in support of its demands. That gives us the confidence to mobilise against the likes of Gillick and Powell and to fight for more extensive legislation and facilities in Britain. A. H.

## CANADA

### Political frame-up of Armenians

Barry WEISLEDER

TORONTO — Charges of attempted murder against three Armenian political activists, in connection with the shooting of Turkish diplomat Kani Gungor in 1982, were dropped by a provincial court judge in Ottawa on January 8 at a preliminary hearing.

Harout Kevork, Raffic Balian and Haig Gharakhanian will go to trial on lesser charges of conspiracy to commit murder, despite the scarcity of evidence against them. Melkon Gharakhanian, who was arrested with the others on March 12, 1984, was discharged on attempted murder and conspiracy charges last summer.

The remaining three activists have spent the past ten months in confinement, shunted between the Ottawa-Carlton Detention Centre and Toronto's archaic Don Jail to facilitate appearances at bail hearings and other legal proceedings.

New bail hearings have been requested in light of the latest ruling.

The nightmare of systematic legal harassment began in earnest for the four Armenian residents of Toronto in May 1982 when they were arrested and charged with various counts of conspiracy and extortion. After being held without bail for 112 days, all were released following an eight week preliminary hearing resulting in a number of charges being dropped.

None of the activists, contributors to the magazine *Azad Hay* (Free Armenian), has been convicted of any offense — despite the many months they have languished behind bars.

The four are partisans of a unified, socialist Armenia, and disavow the methods of terrorism with which they have been linked by the commercial media.

Many see the harassment of the four

activists, and the Armenian community at large, as an act of appeasement by the Canadian government towards its NATO ally Turkey, whose repressive right-wing regime still refuses to acknowledge the 1915 genocide of 1.5 million Armenians.

The political nature of the frame-up of the four Armenians was revealed when the new federal government's Security Intelligence Service blocked release of surveillance information requested by lawyers for the defendants.

Citing "national security interests", the spy agency's counter-terrorism branch objected to the questioning of an Ottawa police detective and several RCMP officers involved in the surveillance of hundreds of Armenians in Canada, going back to early 1982.

The defendants claim that the surveillance evidence would show conclusively that the four closely-monitored activists were nowhere near and had nothing to do with the wounding of the Turkish trade counsellor. But a Federal Court judge, in a separate proceeding, ruled against the release of this information.

Further cause for concern was fuelled by federal Defense Minister Robert Coates' January 10 call for a peace-time version of the draconian War Measures Act to empower police to deal with "public disorders", as well as earthquakes and industrial accidents.

Taken together, these actions and statements make clear that the new Conservative federal government has picked up where the former Liberal regime left off: the conscious strengthening of police powers to spy upon, intimidate and disrupt the legal activities of advocates of social change, be they trade unionists, feminists, ecologists or international solidarity activists.

The need to defend the three remaining imprisoned Armenian activists is urgent, even as the legal case against them continues to unravel.

Their families have been bankrupted by defense costs. The three, if again denied bail, face many more months behind bars during what is expected to be a lengthy trial.

And without public outcry, the authorities will be encouraged to continue to victimize the innocent.

It's time we fought back.

*Drop the charges! Free the Armenian activists with full financial compensation for wrongful prosecution and detention!*

(Any contributions to the defense fund should be sent to: CIDAPP, PO Box 456, Station Z, Toronto)

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# The peace movement challenges the Martens' government

On Friday March 15, the Belgian prime minister, Martens, announced the government's decision for the immediate deployment of the first set of 16 cruise missiles on Belgian soil, with the other 32 arriving in 1987. Only three hours later a US Air Force Galaxy delivered them to the base in Florennes.

On Sunday March 17, 150,000 people turned out in an impressive demonstration in Brussels, angry but not despairing, confident in their political strength and determined to continue their struggle for reversing the decision and withdrawing the missiles.

Guy HENDRIX

BRUSSELS — At the time of NATO's double track decision in December 1979, the Belgian and Dutch governments expressed some timid reserve and gave themselves a six-month delay before deciding definitively. Under the rising pressure of the peace movement, the delay in Belgium was finally extended for more than five years. With general elections scheduled for December 8, 1985, tensions are rising inside the government, with an important section of its majority advocating further delay until 1986.

However, after Martens' visit to Reagan in January, it became clear the neither the USA nor the NATO alliance would accept any change in their deployment plans which had timed the first Belgian deployment of cruise missiles for March 15. It still took 16 weeks of extreme tension and major crises developing in the government and in its biggest party, the Flemish Christian Democracy, the CVP, for a decision to be reached just a few hours before the deadline.

In the meantime, the anti-cruise coordinating bodies, the Flemish VAKA and the Walloon CNAPD were already preparing a mass demonstration on October 20 to coincide with the run-up to the elections. After the Washington visit by Martens when the risk of rapid deployment became clear, they immediately decided to organise an emergency demonstration on March 17, at the same time maintaining the long planned October 20 demonstration.

With a turnout of 150,000 people the success of the action is undeniable. Nobody expected more than 100,000. The most striking feature was the clear anti-government character of the demonstration. It was not only a general outcry for peace and against nuclear destruction but a directly political action. We must get rid of this right wing government, that was the main message of the day.

An important aspect of the achievements of the peace organisations to date,

has been the support of the Christian workers' movement. This movement includes the largest trade union in the country and is historically linked up to the main bourgeois party, the CVP.

Notwithstanding this, the leadership of the trade-union movement has mobilised its troops for previous anti-missiles demonstrations. For evident political reasons they refused to join this demonstration in order to avoid a confrontation with their friends in the CVP. But tens of thousands of their membership did, thereby revealing on a large scale the increasing crisis inside the Christian bloc and strengthening in an unprecedented way, the left wing of the Christian labour movement. This left wing wants to split up the CVP along class lines by founding an independent Labour Party of the Christian workers movement. This perspective is a threat to the entire bourgeoisie as became evident following the demonstration, in the reaction in the editorials of the bourgeois press.

A further feature worth noting was the massive participation of youth in the demonstration and in the movement as a whole. Whilst all the opinion polls over the last few years have revealed 65 to 70% rejection of the missiles amongst the population as a whole, they have also shown a 90% rejection among the youth. The determination of the youth is fast becoming the key driving force in the fight for withdrawal. In the course of this struggle, youth are beginning to lose all illusions in the so-called peace-keeping nature of NATO and in bourgeois democracy. The dispelling of such illusions signifies the removal of two real obstacles to developing a truly anti-capitalist strategy.

Finally it should be mentioned that the movement is much stronger in Flanders than in the Walloon area. This is mainly due to the differing approaches of both the peace organisations. While the CNAPD still sticks more to a traditional and gradual disarmament policy, the

Flemish VAKA, newly founded in the wake of NATO's double track decision, defends a principled programme of unconditional refusal of any cruise missiles in Belgium and a correct strategy of mass action directed against the government as well as very clever united front tactics.

The peace movement is preparing for a new demonstration on October 20 destined to influence all political parties before the election. The aim is clear and that is to get the missiles out. The means to do this are also clear and that is to deprive this government of its majority. All opinion polls thus far indicate a government defeat and a demand for every party to commit themselves to the removal of all cruise missiles as a precondition to participation in the government. The Flemish social democrats, the SP, expect to become the biggest single party in the country and, together with the Ecology Party, which is expected to attain 10% of the vote, are already campaigning on this issue. The other opposition parties, especially the Walloon Social Democrats, PS, have so far refused any kind of commitment. They do not want to handicap their perspective of forming a government with the CVP. In fact, despite its courageous stand on the withdrawal issue, the same political perspective of a new coalition government with the CVP, is not at all ruled out by the SP (Flemish) leadership. Since nobody can imagine a government with the CVP withdrawing the missiles, the SP policy does not offer sufficient guarantees to the peace movement.

In this political situation, the mass movement still feels that a real possibility exists to reverse NATO's militarist plans. It will depend on the movement's capacity to mobilise for October 20 and on the progress of this issue inside the trade unions whether this possibility can become a reality.

