

International VIEWPOINT

ISSUE No 38

17 October 1983

The masses vs the missiles

What future
for Lebanon
ceasefire?

Setbacks
for Reagan
in El Salvador

The Philippine
powderkeg



International Viewpoint

ISSN: 0294-2925

Fortnightly Review of News and Analysis Published Under the
Auspices of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

West German Unions Mobilise Against Missiles by <i>Angela Klein</i>	3
What Future for the Lebanon Ceasefire? by <i>Salah Jaber</i>	5
Growth of the Philippine Revolutionary Movement by <i>Paul Petitjean</i>	9
New Setbacks for Imperialism in Salvador Interview with <i>Francisco Herrera</i>	14
No Justification for French Troops in Chad by <i>Francois Cazals</i>	17
The Political Implications of the Abortion Referendum in Ireland by <i>Aine Furlong</i>	20
Ireland: What Next After the Elections Debate between <i>John McAnulty</i> and <i>Danny Morrison</i>	21
Around the World: Corsica, Latin America, Sweden, Denmark, France, West Germany, USA, Switzerland	24
The Polish Bureaucracy Against the KOR by <i>Cyril Smuga</i>	28

News closing date 10 October 1983

Subscribe now!

We prefer payment in French Francs where possible. Personal checks to PEC, and mail to: IV, 2, rue Richard-Lenoir, 93108 Montreuil, France. Postal orders to PEC, CCP Account no. 2 322 42T Paris. Bank Transfers to PEC, BNP Robespierre.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES :	6 months	1 year
Surface mail, all countries	95FF	175FF
Air mail		
Europe, Middle East, N. Africa	105FF	195FF
The Americas, Africa	130FF	240FF
Asia	145FF	270FF

Exchange rates :

FF	95	105	130	145	175	195	240	270
£	9	10	12	14	16	18	22	25
US dol.	16	19	22	25	31	37	42	47
Can dol.	19	21	26	29	37	40	49	55

British subscribers

For subscribers in Britain and others who find it easier to pay in £ sterling rather than French francs we now have a bank account in Britain.

If you wish to pay by cheque, these should be made payable to *International Viewpoint* and sent to IV, 2 rue Richard Lenoir, 93108 Montreuil, France.

Payment by bank transfer should be made to: International Viewpoint, Account no 14612874, Williams and Glyns Bank code 16 - 00 - 58, Islington Branch.

The receipt and subscription details should be sent to the IV address as above. All correspondence should, of course, also be sent to the IV address.

BLOCK LETTERS PLEASE

LAST NAME FIRST NAME

ADDRESS

CITY COUNTRY CODE

RENEWAL

SUBSCRIPTION

West German unions mobilise against missiles

On September 8 the national leadership of the main trade-union federation in West Germany, the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) decided to organise a 5-minute warning strike for October 5 to protest against the installation of medium-range nuclear missiles (Euromissiles) in West Germany and several other European countries in December this year.

This symbolic work stoppage was put in the context of an appeal to the US and Soviet Union leaders to come to an effective agreement on disarmament at Geneva. This was the condition set by the NATO 'two track' decision in 1979, that if such an agreement was reached, the 572 new missiles would not be deployed in Europe.

The purpose of the strike, in the words of one metalworkers union official was, in fact, to give 'a warning to leading politicians, so that they know that the question of safeguarding peace in the world is the central concern of the trade unions.'

This action, which represented the entry of the organised workers movement into the fight against the deployment of the NATO missiles with its own methods of struggle, has obviously an importance as an example for the whole of the anti-war movement.

The not inconsiderable response to the call for this strike also demonstrates its importance. Thus, having described the low participation in the strike from 11.55 a.m. to 12 noon in the federal capital of Bonn, the correspondent of the Paris daily *le Monde* wrote on October 7, 'However, one should not draw general conclusions from the situation in the capital. The DGB's call was taken up unevenly, but it was heard. In some cities public transport was immobilised. In the big factories on the Ruhr, Hoechst in Dortmund, Krupp in Bochus, Thyssen in Duisburg, the 'five minute warning' was observed to the letter. It was the same in the big car plants, at Opel, Ford, Volkswagen. The workers often left the work places to discuss among themselves.'

The article we publish below was written before this action took place. It looks at the political considerations and significance of this action by the West German union federation.

FRANKFURT — The National Executive of the West German Trade-Union Confederation (DGB) decided on September 8 to call a five-minute warning strike for October 5 against the deployment of intermediate-range missiles planned for this fall.

The DGB presented this as an admonition to the politicians to reach an agreement in Geneva.

This is the first time the organized workers movement has taken an action against the deployment of these missiles.

However, this action was taken separately from the peace movement. The DGB deliberately chose a time other than during the October 15-22 week of action. Nonetheless, it has recognized the legitimacy of using trade-union methods of struggle against the stationing of the rockets. A dam has been broken.

The basis for mobilizing against the missiles has been extended to the broad mass of working people, whose opinion was previously reflected only in the public opinion polls.

Several factors led to this shift on the part of the union leadership. In the first place, the mobilizations by the peace movement have continued without let-up. There was no summer break. Innumerable local actions were organized to commemorate Hiroshima Day, August 6. In Berlin, 30,000 people demonstrated on that day.

There has been considerable discussion in the press of the government's plans to

limit the right to demonstrate. Likewise, the press has carried a lot of reports about negotiations between unauthorized representatives of the peace movement with figures in the government, police, and army about "defusing violence" in the fall actions.

LINKUP BETWEEN THE UNIONS AND THE PEACE MOVEMENT

The kickoff date for the fall mobilizations was the "Anti-War Day of Action" on September 1, the anniversary of Hitler's invasion of Poland, which marked the beginning of World War II.

Since the end of the war, the unions have commemorated this date every year with demonstrations and rallies. This time a hundred thousand people took part in the trade-union actions. Unlike previous years, in many places the peace movement and trade-union activists demonstrated together.

A poll carried out in August showed growing opposition to the deployment of the missiles. About 75% are now against it. There is a stronger and stronger feeling among the population that the U.S. is "not serious about the negotiations in Geneva," and does not really want disarmament. This is the interpretation given also to the U.S.'s continual rejection of the Soviet proposals.

It is obvious that the Geneva negotiations are not leading to disarmament but rather serving as a cover for continuing

the arms race. So, the feeling is growing that the people themselves have to mobilize against the deployment of the missiles, which is expected to take place this December. In the meantime, an initiative group against the missiles has even developed in the Christian Democratic Party.

The government's right to take a decision that threatens the survival of the population is being challenged. On this basis, the Initiative Group for a Referendum developed, and this proposal will be taken up on a large scale by the Coordinating Committee of Peace Initiative Groups after the week of action.

GROWTH OF PEACE MOVEMENT COINCIDES WITH RISING CLASS STRUGGLE

Since the bourgeois parties assumed responsibility for the government on March 6, the critical elements in the SPD and the unions have gotten more room to mobilize for their positions.

In this respect, the unions are playing a vanguard role. Several individual unions have taken a clear position against the stationing of the missiles. Even the DGB, which is opposed to unilateral disarmament, is pushing the demand "No Deployment of the Intermediate-Range Missiles" more to the fore in its statements.

The SPD is limping along behind the unions. It has postponed its special party congress on the missiles to after the last round of negotiations in Geneva. Only if there is no agreement will it open up the way for opposing deployment of the missiles. In the meantime, to the great dismay of the national SPD leadership, the state party congress in Baden-Wuerttemberg made opposition to the stationing of the missiles independent from the outcome of the negotiations. It is expected that other state SPD congresses will follow this example.

The bourgeoisie has as yet been unable to achieve its objective of transforming its March 6 electoral victory into an overall "turn" in the social relationship of forces. The bourgeois operation has run up against a rise in class struggle, and has tended, in fact, to reinforce and radicalize this fightback.

Immediately after taking office, the bourgeois government was forced to drop its project of a census, since the massive boycott that was shaping up would have made the results useless.

The government's austerity policy has more and more provoked the unions. Demonstrations by the unions against social cutbacks and the capitalist restructuring of the crisis-shaken steel, coal, and shipbuilding industries have been growing.

Last week, a DGB women's demonstration drew 30,000 persons, although the union did little to mobilize for it. Mobilization for the 35-hour week has also gotten off to a strong start.

Resistance in the workplaces is also taking more radical forms. Two weeks

ago, the Howaldts-Deutsche Werft in Hamburg were occupied. In a parallel action to this, the Bremer AG Weser is supposed to be partially shut down. There have been solidarity strikes all along the coast. Almost every decision by the government meets with protest and resistance.

THE QUESTION OF THE POLITICAL STRIKE

Political strikes, factory occupations, and proposals for a referendum are actions that begin to put in question the legitimacy of the government. This government still bears the stigma of having come to power "improperly" last fall [through a deal with the liberals of the FDP, who had been part of the SPD coalition]. Its tactic of splitting the growing social resistance by coopting the "moderates" and repressing and isolating the "radicals" has so far not gotten any results.

In combination, these factors favor politicalization and radicalization among the workers. If the DGB does not want to be pushed aside, it has to take the lead to some extent in this movement.

The mayor of Saarbruecken, Oskar Lafontaine, was the first to call for a general strike against the missiles. He did so in May. The demand was immediately taken up in the unions, above all by middle- and base-level union functionaries.

In this respect it is a lucky coincidence that the printers union, the engineering union (IG Metall), the teachers union, and the postal workers union are all having congresses this October and November.


In the case of all these unions, numerous resolutions have been submitted to the congresses that, based on the right of resistance written into the constitution, call for strike actions up to, and including, a general strike, if there is no agreement in Geneva.

The strike discussions reached a new height in the unions this summer. Franz Steinkuehler, IG Metall district leader in Stuttgart (who was elected vice-president of the national union in October, preparatory to being elected president in four years) called for a "Factory Day of Action" on October 19, in the course of the peace movement's week of action. He proposed a 10 to 15 minute work stoppage. Choosing this date assures a close linkup between the union mobilizations and the struggle of the peace movement.

CAPITALIST PRESS RAISES AN ALARM

The business press and the regular bourgeois press have been raising a storm about this development. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* has accused the unions of abandoning the attempt to maintain a distance between themselves and the peace movement and of "hitching their wagon" to it.

The DGB has to consider now whether



German peace camp (DR)

it wants to become a socialist-oriented union. The spark of radicalization has jumped from the peace movement to the vanguard in the factories and in the unions. The bourgeoisie fears that this dynamic can no longer be held back.

In fact, the political importance of this discussion lies in the fact that the taboo on political strikes has been broken. The last major "political" strike was in 1950-52. Its objective was to win co-determination in the factories.

After the strike was broken, the federal supreme court ruled that strikes not directly tied to wages and conditions were illegal. All political questions were supposed to be the monopoly of the government and the parliament. The right of resistance was also limited by the bourgeois courts to the defense of bourgeois democracy against an attempt to "overthrow the democratic order."

This restriction will not mean much to the activists in the factories. After all, what can destroy bourgeois democracy more thoroughly than the nuclear annihilation of the entire population?

In 1958, in the campaign against the stationing of short-range missiles in West Germany, there were some strikes despite the ban on political work stoppages.

Later, the unions also called for short work stoppages for specific political reasons. One case was in 1972, when Willy Brandt was toppled by a vote of no confidence by the Christian Democrats. Another was in 1977, when the chairperson of the employers association, Hanns Martin Schleyer, was murdered. This experience is being carried further today.

Steinkuehler's proposal led immediately to a call by the union officials in southern Germany for a "Pause for Peace" on October 19. This appeal has already been signed by hundreds of persons. Now a mass signature campaign is underway in the factories.

Parallel to the discussion in the unions, numerous peace initiative groups have been formed in the factories. By systematic educational and informational work, the members of these groups are trying to mobilize their fellow workers.

There are over 150 such groups,

mainly in the big factories, where the political left is active. Most of them were started by the West German Communist Party and some also by the MLPD, the last Maoist party in West Germany. They continue to be dominated by these forces.

On September 11 in Dortmund, the factory peace initiative groups held a conference to building the October 19 action. About 1,500 workers participated. The conference was organized by an action sub-committee of the Federal Coordinating Committee of the Peace Initiative Groups.

Although this conference was very successful from the standpoint of participation, it had some major weaknesses. The political spectrum was almost totally restricted to the CP and the MLPD. Social Democrats and Greens were virtually absent. Above all, the numerous activists in the individual unions that have played the vanguard role in the strike discussions were not there.

The conference approved an appeal in support of the DGB decision to hold a five minute stoppage on October 5 and called for making October 19 a day of action in the factories. In this connection, various proposals were made. They went from circulating petitions, to factory assemblies, to warning strikes.

The meeting failed, however, to clarify how to build the October 5 and October 19 actions. Thus, it failed to offer leadership for the factory mobilizations against the missiles.

The key date for the factory mobilizations thus became the one set by the DGB, October 5. By this proposal the DGB tried to undercut the Steinkuehler initiative. The activists who had already set their sights on October 19 had to completely reorient themselves.

THE TEST OF A NATIONAL WARNING STRIKE

Obviously, this choice of date must be seen by these activists as a maneuver designed to shield the workers movement as much as possible from the radicalizing pressure of the peace movement. Nonetheless, the DGB decision also has a mobilizing effect.

The union officials are being called on to do something to assure that October 5 will not be a flop. Even the right-wing unions, such as IG Chemie and IG Bergbau (the miners union), are coming under pressure to do something.

In the factories now people are being approached who up until now have had no connection with the peace movement. A broad discussion is getting underway about whether strikes are a proper form of action and about what the deployment of the missiles really means.

October 5 has become the focus of the mobilization in the factories against the deployment of the missiles. If October 5 is a success, then there will also be actions in the factories on October 19 that can serve as the basis for assuring broad participation in the "people's assemblies" called for October 22. ■

What future for the Lebanon ceasefire?

Salah JABER

The "Peace in Galilee" operation launched in June 1982 by Israeli premier Menahem Begin and his defense minister, Ariel Sharon, had two objectives.

The initial, minimum objective was attained in the first days of the invasion, that is, the occupation of a zone 45 kilometers deep in southern Lebanon, that is, the area south of the Awali river.

The second objective, the maximum one cherished by Sharon, was to destroy the independent infrastructure of the PLO and set up a strong central government in Beirut allied to Israel.

The Zionist leaders made no bones about their desire to see Beshir Gemayel, the leader of the Lebanese Forces — the fascist Christian militia allied with Israel — take the presidency of the Lebanese Republic.

FROM THE ISRAELI INTERVENTION TO THE AMIN GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT

The second objective was almost achieved. Begin and Sharon gained the withdrawal of the Palestinian fighters from Beirut, their last independent stronghold, and "sponsored" the election of their ally, Beshir Gemayel, to the post he sought.

Carried away by his reactionary simple-mindedness, Ariel Sharon forgot that unlike its Egyptian counterpart, the Lebanese bourgeoisie could not survive a boycott by the Arab countries.

Since it gets the bulk of its profits from its relations with its Arab hinterland, the Lebanese bourgeoisie cannot afford the luxury of breaking with the other Arab countries of the area.

Thus, even Beshir Gemayel himself, after he was "elected," had to adjust his political ambitions to this fact. He had to go back on the peace treaty he promised to the Israeli leaders and in exchange offer them a feeble security treaty.

Gemayel tried to get out from under the shadow of Israel by stepping up his declarations of allegiance to the U.S. But, in fact, the fascist leader remained dependent on the Zionist state, since his "election" was disputed by Syria and the great majority of Lebanese Muslim currents. The assassination of Beshir Gemayel on September 14, 1982, put an end to all these calculations.

Designated by the Phalangist Party — the reactionary Christian bourgeois party — to succeed his assassinated brother, Amin Gemayel was elected to the presidency of the Lebanese Republic. But he was able to take the helm of the state in much more favorable circumstances than Beshir.

The Israeli army took the assassination of Beshir as a pretext for occupying Beirut and seizing the enormous stocks of weapons held by the Lebanese left, including those left behind by the Palestinian resistance.

In this situation, at the outset of his term, Amin Gemayel enjoyed the broadest national consensus ever achieved around a Lebanese president.

Unity of the Lebanese bourgeoisie, including all communities, is a rare enough thing in itself and had been impossible to achieve for a long time. Nonetheless, it was achieved around Amin Gemayel.

The Lebanese left itself, in particular the Stalinists and Nasserites, declared their friendliness toward him.

As for the Lebanese people, in such conditions, it could not but place its hopes for peace and stability in the new president. It hoped these aspirations could be achieved in the context of a renewed accord among the communities.

War weary after seven years of fighting, the Lebanese people fervently hoped they had found their "savior."

What is more, the consensus around Amin Gemayel extended to the Arab states of the region and the great powers of the world. Syria, which had vehemently denounced Beshir Gemayel's election, sent its congratulations to his successor.


In the reactionary camp, only the Israeli leaders and the fascists of the Lebanese forces had reason not to join in the general rejoicing.

The unity around the new president was, in fact, largely due to his reputation as a "moderate" — unlike that of his assassinated brother. Amin Gemayel was supposed to be anxious to maintain good relations between the government and the Lebanese Muslims, and between Lebanon and the Arab states in the region.

He was much more representative of the real interests of the Lebanese bourgeoisie than his brother. Amin Gemayel, himself a businessman, could in no way take the Israeli option. His road was clearly marked out. He had to balance between the economic interests of the Lebanese bourgeoisie and world imperialism, that is, primarily between the U.S. and the oil-producing Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia.

Since he got unreserved support from both quarters, Amin Gemayel had only to maneuver adeptly to maintain the advantages he started out with and to achieve the Bonapartist project he expressed when he said on the day he was sworn in,

French troops in Lebanon (DR)



that he would keep the presidency "above party and community conflicts."

WHY GEMAYEL FAILED

There is no need today to spend a lot of time proving that the balance sheet of the past year of the Gemayel presidency amounts to a pathetic failure. All that is necessary is to explain why the new president managed to wear out the great political capital he had when he started — the Arab consensus that had formed around him.

Within Lebanon, Amin Gemayel quickly emerged — contrary to his promises — as the representative of a party and a community.

Dependent on his party, the reactionary Maronist Phalangists led by his own father, Amin Gemayel was obliged to name Phalangists or people close to them to all the key posts in the state apparatus, in particular to the leadership of the most important bodies for any dictatorship — the army, the military intelligence services, and the police.

So, far from taking on a Bonapartist appearance, the military dictatorship with a civilian government that established itself in the Beirut area was very quickly seen for what it was — a Phalangist dictatorship.

Moreover, as premier, the second most important post in the state and the most important one that could be held by a Muslim according to the balance that has been in effect since 1943 (1), Gemayel appointed the nonentity Shafik El-Wazzan. The cabinet was made up of illustrious nobodies, who represented nothing.

These practices, which to say the least were ill-advised from the standpoint of the original project, were carried further by repeated appointment of Phalangists to functionaries' positions over a period of weeks.

The inevitable result was to progressively alienate the Muslim masses, who had shown their sympathy for Gemayel at the start of his term by displaying his portrait all over West Beirut.

Still more surely, these methods alienated the Muslim political forces, not so much the traditional bourgeoisie represented in parliament as the "fighting" bourgeoisie currents that consolidated a position after 1975, and which are not represented in any state institution.

This category includes three political currents based in the three Muslim communities and they had expected Gemayel to give them representation commensurate with their real influence.

One is the Sunni Nasserite current, whose best known organization is the Murabitun. It is the weakest of the three for sociological reasons but also — unlike the two others — because it was disarmed by the Israeli invaders who entered Beirut in September 1982.

Another of these currents is the Shi'ite one represented by Amal, which over the last years has recruited around the themes

of anti-Communism, hostility to the Palestinians, and support for the specific demands of the Shi'ite community. In recent months, in confrontation with the Gemayel regime, it is these demands of the Shi'ite community that have come to the forefront.

The third current is the Druze one represented by Walid Joumblatt, the feudal-bourgeois leader of the so-called Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), a member of the Socialist International. The Lebanese Stalinists tail after this current. (2)

In order for the opposition of these three currents to the Gemayel government to spill over into clashes with the "legal" army, the regime had to lose another of its bases of support — Syria. To one degree or another, all three of these currents have attached themselves to the Syrians.

LIMITS OF THE UNDERSTANDING WITH ISRAEL

However, before going into Gemayel's break with Syria, we have to go back to the Gemayel regime's relations with Israel, of which this break was in fact an effect.

Indeed, in the course of one year Gemayel managed to alienate everyone, except his imperialist protectors. He was already on poor terms with Israel when he took over the presidency, since he immediately made it clear that he was putting his relations with the Arab countries first.

Moreover, the Israeli leaders bitterly resented the fact that the Phalangist leaders had denied that their militia was involved in the massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Chatila camps and had put the sole responsibility on the Israeli army. (3)

In fact, this was a hypocritical and cowardly action on the part of the Lebanese leaders, who were trying to escape the heat of public opinion, both in the Arab world and in the world in general. The Begin-Sharon team have never gotten over it.

This resentment against the Phalangists on the part of the Israelis was compounded by just as deep unhappiness with their American protectors. This was not just because Washington helped put the blame for the Sabra and Chatila massacres on the Israeli government. It was also and more fundamentally because of the famous Reagan plan. This involved a statement by the U.S. administration at the beginning of September 1982 calling for a freeze on the building of Zionist settlements on the West Bank and for the restoration of the occupied territories to King Hussein's Jordan. (4)

In such circumstances, the presence of the Israeli army in Lebanon became the Zionist leaders' main card in their confrontation with their American big brother. They proposed a deal, Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in return for the U.S. dropping the Reagan plan.

However, this condition was unacceptable to Washington, whose relations with

the Begin-Sharon government reached their most critical point.

The Israeli leaders then decided to stall the negotiations on the withdrawal of their forces from Lebanon by advancing a series of conditions unacceptable to the Gemayel regime. These were in fact much more onerous than those imposed on Egypt in return for the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

However, the Israeli presence in Lebanon soon proved to be a two-edged sword, and the other edge began to turn more and more sharply against the Israelis. With the growth of all sorts of resistance to the Zionist occupiers, their burden grew continually, increasingly neutralizing the diplomatic advantages they drew from their presence in Lebanon.

The balance sheet of the Begin-Sharon government's operation in Lebanon also added up to a dismaying failure. The Israeli regime had not succeeded in establishing an allied regime in Lebanon.

The Zionists had, moreover, alienated Washington and made Yasser Arafat's PLO more credible as an interlocutor for world imperialism. This corresponded, paradoxically, to the fact that the PLO was weaker and less independent than ever, and thus could more easily be integrated into the American plan, without this requiring any major concessions.

The Zionist leaders reacted by a fit of spite. In the summer of 1982, they had allowed Beshir Gemayel's militia to move in forces into the Chouf and Aley regions, the preserve of Joumblatt's PSP since 1976. Now they let Joumblatt take up arms against the Lebanese forces and even to bring in massive quantities of arms from areas controlled by the Syrian army.

Clearly, having been unable to get a Lebanese central government totally subservient to them, the Zionist leaders were putting their bets again on a break-up of Lebanon along communal lines. This old Zionist scheme had the merit in their eyes that it would create two ministates, one Maronist and the other Druze, both of which would be "clients" of Israel. And the rest of the country would be divided up between themselves and Syria.

This result, however, would be a meager consolation prize in view of the

1. On the basis of the latest census figures available in 1943, when the French protectorate over Lebanon was coming to an end, a "national pact" was adopted that was supposed to establish a fair division of the central government among the various communities. On the basis of these decisions, the president is supposed to be a Maronite, the premier a Sunni Muslim, the president of the Chamber of Deputies a Shi'ite, the minister of foreign affairs a Greek Orthodox, etc. This "national pact" in fact gave political dominance to the Maronite Christian bourgeoisie.

2. Walid Joumblatt was in fact chairman of the Lebanese National Movement, in which the Lebanese Communist Party participated, among others.

3. On the Sabra and Chatila massacres, see IV, No 14, October 4, 1982.

4. There is an analysis of the Reagan Plan in the resolution of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International entitled "The War in Lebanon: A Turn in the Middle East Situation," published in IV, No 16, November 1, 1982.

scope of the Israeli fiasco in Lebanon. Ariel Sharon, Begin's scapegoat, had to pay the price. The report of the inquiry into the Sabra and Chatila massacres offered the chance to sacrifice him.

Begin's former right-hand man was replaced as defense minister by the former Israeli ambassador to Washington, Moshe Arens. The objective of the new chief of the Zionist armed forces was to get Israel out of the Lebanese quicksand and to reestablish good relations with the American administration.



An ordinary day of streetfighting in Beirut (DR)

The Israeli government's new star, Moshe Arens, advanced a very simple point of view. It can be summed up as follows: Israel had nothing to lose by making an accord with the "legal" Lebanese government, even if this meant "sacrificing" Israel's faithful puppet, Saad Haddad, and his militia in southern Lebanon.

This was for the good reason that such an accord, even if it included only the minimum conditions accepted by Amin Gemayel on Washington's advice, had no chance of being approved by Syria. It would therefore be a dead letter even before it was signed, because its application would depend on Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon.

So, such a movement would be a cheap way of placating the Americans by putting the ball in the court of the Syrians. The latter, in turn, were demanding guarantees on the matter of the Golan Heights, a Syrian territory seized by Israel in the 1967 war, as a condition for cooperating with Washington.

Thus, the idea was, Israel would continue to hold the aces and at the same time get out of the Lebanese quicksand. It would then only have to pull the Israeli army back to the line of the Awali river, which the Zionist government treats more and more like the Jordan, that is, as the natural boundary of the Israeli state. (5)

The Israelis expected that this move would, of course, be followed by a sharp-

ening of the conflict between the Druzes and the Maronites. But the Begin team did not see anything in that to be unhappy about.

BREAK BETWEEN GEMAYEL AND SYRIA

"Advised" by Washington, Amin Gemayel fell into the trap that Moshe Arens laid. In May 1983, he signed an "accord" with Israel. It had no validity, but it did alienate the Syrians, who were opposed

to it. (6)

In fact, the Syrians took the Lebanese-Israeli accord as a pretext for launching an offensive against the Gemayel regime, which was the big loser in this whole operation.

Indeed, no one should be fooled. It is not the Phalangist government that excites the ire of the Damascus government. It got along with Gemayel quite well before the conclusion of this still-born accord. In fact, Hafez El-Assad allied himself with the Phalangists, intervening on their behalf in 1976 against the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese left.

Over and above their present opposition to the Phalangists, what the Syrian leaders are seeking is recognition of a central role for Syria in any settlement of the Israeli-Arab conflict by the Zionists' American protectors.

Already in 1975-76, before intervening on the side of the Phalangists, the Syrian Baathists leaders backed the Palestinian and Progressive forces in Lebanon. This was their countermove to the Egyptian-Israeli accord on the Sinai, which was concluded in September 1975, under the sponsorship of Henry Kissinger.

However, this attitude on the part of the Syrians lasted only until Washington, faced with the threat of an anti-Phalangist victory, was ready to make a deal with Damascus. The Americans promised to include Syria in any further diplomatic

moves to achieve a settlement in the region in return for Syrian intervention in Lebanon to stop the Palestinians and the Lebanese left. (7)

Subsequently, the Syrian-American honeymoon was soured by the victory of the Likud party in the 1977 Israeli elections.

In the present crisis, the Syrian leaders want to make the American administration understand that if Israel holds one key to implementing the Reagan plan, they hold the other.

Today the dictatorship of Hafez-El-Assad's Baathist party finds itself in a much stronger position with respect to Washington than it did in 1975-76. And as paradoxical as it might seem, that is because of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in the summer of 1982.

Because of the Zionist aggression, the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese forces opposed to the Phalangists are more dependent on Syria than ever. At the same time, since it ended in a checkmate, the Israeli intervention is no longer a Sword of Damocles hanging over the Syrian regime.

Quite the contrary. The "Lebanese syndrome" is at least as strong a factor in Israeli public opinion as the "Vietnam syndrome" has been in the U.S. since 1973. The Zionist state is less capable than ever of waging any war other than a defensive one. The best proof of this is the low profile it adopted during the clashes in Lebanon.

THE LEBANESE OPPOSITION

Thus, after the conclusion of the Israeli-Lebanese accord in May 1983, Damascus gave the green light to the revived Lebanese opposition to take on the Phalangists. A Front of National Salvation was constituted, under Syrian auspices, bringing together the three main figures attached to Syria — Soleiman Frangieh, who was president before the 1975-76 civil war, and who later became hostile to the Phalangists after long being their ally (up to 1978!); Rachid Karemeh, premier during the same period, who, like his north Lebanon home city Tripoli, is under Syrian control; and, of course, Walid Joumblatt.

In due course, the Stalinists lined up behind this front, which has nothing popular about it, with its three bourgeois components.

The Shi'ite organization Amal did not join this front, which reflects its relative autonomy from the Syrians. But it saw the offensive of the anti-Phalangist oppo-

5. Many reports of Israeli preparations for long-term occupation of southern Lebanon make it possible to compare its position there with the occupation of the Left Bank of Jordan.

6. Extracts from the Lebanese-Israeli accord were published and commented on in *Inprecor*, our sister publication in French, No 155, July 28, 1983.

7. For a more detailed analysis of the 1975-76 civil war, of the attitude of Syria, and the orientation of the Lebanese left forces, see my articles published in *Inprecor*, No 47-48 (old series), April 1976.

sition as a chance to make a show of strength and renegotiate the question of its involvement in the "legal" government, as well as the "Shi'ite" demands, for which it had assumed the role of spokesperson.

Since the Israeli army had announced its intention to withdraw immediately to the Awali river — despite the heavy pressure Washington was putting on the Begin cabinet to delay the pullback until the "legal" Lebanese army was ready to move in to fill the vacuum — the starting signal was given for a battle for control of the region between the Awali and the Beirut-Damascus Highway.

Prior to this, Amal had taken up arms in Beirut, and in particular, in the predominantly Shi'ite suburbs in order to demonstrate its strength.

As soon as the Israeli withdrawal was carried out at the beginning of the summer, the Chouf went up in flames. The Lebanese Forces were rapidly defeated, in particular since they were not fighting on "their own" territory.

The "legal" Lebanese army then took over from the Phalangists, and the fighting concentrated around the Souk-El-Gharb area. This was a strategically important point since it commands access to the capital from the south and east.

Joumlatt's Druze forces were reinforced by Palestinian fighters, with the blessing of the Syrians, and were backed up by Syrian artillery. They probably could have scored a military victory and rung the death knell for the Amin Gemayel regime, if the imperialist multinational force stationed in Lebanon, and in particular the American forces, had not intervened directly against them.

IMPERIALIST INTERVENTION

The multinational force, which originally included troops from three imperialist powers — the U.S., France, and Italy — and was later joined by forces from Britain, intervened in Beirut on August 1982 with a two-faced line. Its purpose was presented by some as protecting civilians while the Palestinian fighters withdrew and by others as assuring that this withdrawal was actually carried out.

In fact, the multinational force opened up the way for the subsequent Israeli invasion of the capital by dismantling the fortifications and clearing away the mine fields from the defensive perimeter built up by the forces besieged in Beirut. Once this task was accomplished, the multinational force withdrew, leaving the field open for the Tsahal (the Israeli army) and its Lebanese allies, who were to perpetrate the revolting massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Chatila camps.

The remodeled multinational force that returned to Lebanon shortly afterward maintained its two-faced pretenses. According to Claude Cheysson, the French minister of foreign affairs, its role was to be to protect the civilians. According to Ronald Reagan, it was to help

Amin Gemayel build up his state.

In fact, once again, there was nothing humanitarian about the way the multinational force intervened. Its troops, in particular the French paras, distinguished themselves by going over Beirut with a fine tooth comb, working alongside Gemayel's army. At the same time, the American contingent specialized in training the recruits to the Lebanese army.

There could be no doubt that the purpose of the multinational force was not to keep the "peace" but to maintain "order," and specifically the Phalangist new order.

With the new flareup of the Lebanon war in the summer of 1983, the imperialist governments involved in this multinational force found themselves facing a dilemma. They were caught between the prospect of getting immersed in the quicksand where many had sunk before them or becoming decisively discredited in the eyes of their neocolonial clients if they failed again to bail out an allied Lebanese regime.

This is why Washington above all had to intervene in support of the Lebanese army and the Phalangist forces, for fear of seeing President Gemayel's name added to a long list of proteges abandoned by the U.S. To take up just the most recent period, this list includes the shah of Iran and Somoza in Nicaragua. Washington had, therefore, to intervene directly in the Lebanon war to show the dictatorships in Latin America and elsewhere that they will not be left to their fate when the chips are down.

However, the Reagan administration is still hampered by the "syndrome" created by the U.S. military defeat in Vietnam. And so it could not throw its troops into the fight just like that. It chose to advance slowly but surely, threatening direct intervention by its troops (2,000 Marines are being kept in readiness off Beirut to be landed in support of the forces already on the ground). Along with this, for the first time since the Vietnam war, the U.S. openly used its means of mass destruction to rescue an allied regime. Washington even went so far as to divert the *New Jersey*, the "world's most powerful" battleship from the Caribbean to the waters off Lebanon.

However, besides the stakes in world politics, the imperialists had chips in the local game to protect. The Reagan administration wanted to make the Syrian leaders understand that there was a limit that the offensive of the military forces they were backing could not overstep.

PERSPECTIVES AND TASKS

The American intervention created an impasse in the Lebanon war, making a diplomatic agreement the only way out. Damascus, for its part, considered that the Americans have been given a clear enough lesson. And so, it proved possible to declare a ceasefire on September 25.

The question that is posed is what the outcome will be. Will the "reconcilia-

tion" under Syrian and Saudi auspices proceed as expected? In other words, will this battle end in a new partition of the central government, or a partition of the country?

These questions remain open, but one thing is certain today, as it was in 1976: The outcome of the war will be determined by the course of U.S.-Syrian relations, and this continues to be tied to the evolution of Israeli domestic politics.

If the post-Begin period, prefigured by the resignation of the Israeli premier, leads to a government of Zionist national unity and if the Israeli regime demonstrates a greater willingness to accept a negotiated settlement in the region, the way will be smoothed for a Syrian-American understanding.

In any case, the Syrian regime is trying to show Washington that it can control not only the Lebanese opposition but also the Palestinian resistance. This is the meaning of the ultimatum recently put to Yasser Arafat's troops stationed in the Bekaa valley (where Syrian and Israeli troops directly face each other), demanding that they withdraw to northern Lebanon, which they did.

When it considers it necessary, the Syrian regime will not hesitate to dictate to all the Palestinian fighters in Lebanon, ordering them to regroup wherever it suits them. A Syrian-American accord could not fail to lead to a refloating of the "constitutional document" that the Syrians negotiated at the beginning of 1976 with Frangieh, who was president at the time, and which has remained a dead letter since.

This revival of this document would mean a redivision of the "legal" government among the various communalist and political factions in the ruling class, a redistribution of power in which the working people would get nothing.

If, on the other hand, the Syrians and Americans do not manage to come to an understanding, the fighting will resume sooner or later. The task of the revolutionary communists will be to try to keep these struggles from being diverted away from the only objective that today is in the interests of the working masses — that is forcing the withdrawal of the imperialist forces and then bringing down the Phalangist regime of Gemayel and dismantling his state.

It is with this perspective that the Revolutionary Communist Group, the section of the Fourth International in Lebanon, took part in the recent fighting. Two comrades were killed in the Souk-El-Gharb region, defending their village against Gemayel's army. They did not die for Joumlatt or for Assad but in defense of their own people and their own banner, in defense of their own program.

It is an urgent task for the entire Fourth International to join in the fight of the Lebanese comrades to force an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the imperialist and Zionist troops from Lebanon. ■

Growth of Philippine revolutionary movement

The continuing mass upsurge against the Marcos regime forced Reagan to call off a planned visit to the country.

Reagan's retreat represents a major political defeat for the Marcos regime and its backers.

Marcos himself had said that such a move "would be a blow to the country, because we have a ticklish monetary situation."

That is, even his banker friends might get the idea that he was a goner.

In the last issue of *International Viewpoint*, we analyzed the significance of the assassination of Benigno Aquino at Manila airport and the framework in which it was perpetrated. The following article takes up in more detail the development of the mass struggles and movements in the Philippines.

This chain of islands, which represents the U.S.'s major remaining base in South-east Asia and an arena of fierce economic competition between the U.S. and Japan, has been one of the places in the world where struggles have taken on the greatest intensity in recent years. They are now reaching a crucial stage.

These mass struggles, which are being fought on all levels — military, political, and social — and have not been stopped by severe repression, now need active international support.

Paul PETITJEAN

A month after Benigno Aquino's murder, on the anniversary of President Ferdinand Marcos' proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972, a vast crowd, estimated at half a million people, assembled in the heart of Manila in response to a call issued by the leaders of the opposition.

Following this rally, thousands of young workers, high-school and university students, and shantytown dwellers headed for the presidential palace.

The "forces of order" opened fire, and after violent clashes, eleven people were found dead, and hundreds of others wounded.

In the days that preceded and followed this bloody day of struggle, the Makati business district was the scene of several antigovernment demonstrations.

The shock created in the country by Aquino's murder cannot in itself explain the extraordinary breadth of the demonstrations that followed this murder. This is not sufficient to account for the radicalism of the slogans, which demanded President Marcos' resignation, or for the variety of the political forces involved in the movement, extending from the bourgeois opposition to the Communist Party of the Philippines.

The crisis that has opened up today has revealed the profound decay of the regime and the acuteness of the social tensions in the country. It represents a decisive test for the opposition movements and holds very high stakes for the future of the revolutionary struggles. It also illustrates certain specific features of the mass struggles in the Philippines.

The specificity of the situation in this island country, by comparison with the one that prevails in the others in the region, is a result in particular of the contradictory heritage of the colonial period, the special history of the Philippine Communist movement, and the consequences of the policy the Marcos regime has been following for over a decade.

Since the Philippines became a colony of Spain in the sixteenth century and were a direct colony of the U.S. for half a century after being taken over from the Spanish empire, they have quite a different history from the surrounding countries. (1)

A CONTRADICTIONARY HISTORICAL HERITAGE

From the standpoint of revolutionary struggles, the heritage of this long colonial period is contradictory.

In 1896-1898, when in Vietnam the French had not yet been able to break the resistance to their domination led by the mandarins, in the Philippines a rebellion, for all practical purposes, put an end to the 350-year-long rule of Spain.

The mass uprising was led by *illustrados*, members of an intelligentsia trained in Spain, representatives of a bourgeoisie of mixed Philippine and Chinese blood that was made up of plantation owners, merchants, and entrepreneurs.

The armed groups of peasants and urban workers generally followed the lead of members of the petty bourgeoisie and professionals, provincial administrative personnel, and teachers.

So, the Philippines were the first country in Asia to throw off the colonial yoke, even if this was only for a very brief period, because in 1898 the Americans took over formally from Spain.

The political and social forces that led this liberation struggle already exhibited a "modern" character. They did not represent any old order but were the product of the cultural and economic shake-ups created by the colonization and early integration of the country into the world market. (2)

This uprising against Madrid and the stubborn resistance by sections of the masses to American occupation left an invaluable revolutionary tradition. Still today, the nationalist movement can identify this "uninterrupted revolution" so as to link up the present struggle with

the memory and historical experience of the Philippine people.

However, by the very fact that this struggle developed so early, the political movements of the time left a tradition of class collaborationism and prepared the ground for neocolonialist ideology.

The Propagandist Movement, represented most prominently by Jose Rizal, reflected the anticolonialist, anticlerical, and democratic aspirations of the big Philippine planters (the sugar plantations grew rapidly in the nineteenth century on the Isla de Negros and in Luzon), the Chinese merchants, and intellectuals from well-to-do local families.

The Katipunan movement, founded by Andres Bonifacio, had deeper roots in the masses and followed a radical course. In addition, local leaders emerged who were to continue the struggle to the end, such as "Papa" Isio on Negros, who was captured in 1908 by the Americans.

But overall, the Katipunero leaders (after Bonifacio was assassinated) were to remain under the ideological influence of the *illustrados* of the new bourgeois and plantation owning social elite.

It was the government that came out of the 1896-1898 uprising that made an agreement with the Americans about bringing in the expeditionary forces, supposedly to hasten the defeat of the Spanish.

The theme of national unity of all classes predominated. It was so all-pervasive that the first workers organization, which was founded at the start of the century, was led by an *illustrado*, Isabela de los Reyes, who advocated collaboration between capital and labor and a neocolonial pact with Washington.

This brings up one of the contradictory aspects of the colonial history of the Philippines. Although for a long period Madrid did nothing to develop the country, the early imposition of colonial rule favored the development in certain regions of an export economy (such as sugar production). Often in fact it was British capital that played the leading role. This gave rise to new social classes that were capable of opposing the Spanish administration and the Catholic clergy.

However, the fact that a retrograde, feudal Catholic clergy was able at an early stage to get control of the education of the masses and block the development of public education effectively cut off the population from the influence of the

1. See my preceding article in IV, No 37, October 3. On the history of the Philippines, see the works of Renato Constantino, especially *The Philippines: A Past Revisited*, Quezon City, Tala Publishing Services, 1975 (also published by Monthly Review Press, New York, 1976, under the title *A History of the Philippines from Spanish Colonialism to the Second World War*); and *The Philippines, the Continuing Past*, Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Quezon City, 1978.

2. On this subject, see Jonathan Fast and Jim Richardson, *Roots of Dependency, Political and Economic Revolution in 19th Century Philippines*, Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Quezon City, 1979; and Jose Rizal, *Philippine — 1881-1896. Un aspect du nationalisme moderne*, Maspero, Paris, 1970.

European socialist and workers movement and from the Asian revolutionary movements.

Moreover, many regions of the country have not been directly affected by the spread of the market economy.

The revolutionary traditions are rooted only in certain areas, in particular in the central and southern parts of the island of Luzon and the island Negros.

At the origins of the national movement, the leadership remained in the hands of essentially bourgeois forces. And these were not victorious and self-confident forces but a leadership that negotiated capitulation to the U.S. on behalf of a movement that had triumphed over the Spanish.

In order to justify themselves, the new Philippine administrators had to present the U.S. expeditionary force as a liberating army and do everything possible to wipe out the memory of the heroic mass resistance that lasted up to 1908.

The formation of the Philippine national consciousness was thus shaped both by the revolution of 1896-1898 and by the early imposition and deep imprint of Spanish rule.

THE FAILURE AND REVIVAL OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

In the beginning, the union movement and the peasant movement were led by elements that were both nationalist and politically conservative.

In the mid-1920s, a bipolarization developed in the mass movement under the impact of several factors. One such factor was the indefinite postponement of the date when the country would become independent. The economic crisis that was driving down the standard of living of the masses was another. The reverberations of the Russian revolution and the founding of the Third International also had an effect.

In 1925, the Workers Party was founded. It developed in a Marxist direction. In 1927, the union movement split into conservative and radical wings. The main unions joined the Pan-Pacific Trade-Union Secretariat of the Profintern (the red trade-union International).

In 1930, the PKP (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, Communist Party of the Philippines) was formally constituted. It exercised a mass influence among the urban workers and the peasantry respectively through the KAP (Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis ng Pilipinas, Workers Congress of the Philippines) and the KPMP (Katipunan Pambansa ng mga Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, National Confederation of Tenant Farmers and Agricultural Workers). (3)

For reasons that were largely objective, the new Communist movement took form essentially in the Manila region and certain areas on the island of Luzon. It came under repression and enjoyed only rare periods of legality.

However, more and more the line the PKP adopted under Moscow's influence kept the Communist movement from

Solidarity with the Philippine people's struggle

The following statement was issued on September 25, 1983, by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

Following the assassination of former senator Benigno Aquino, Philippine government forces have attacked several opposition demonstrations violently in an attempt to suppress them. About a dozen people have been killed.

Today President Ferdinand Marcos is talking about reinstating the martial law that he clamped down on the country in 1972 and formally lifted two years ago.

In response to gigantic mass demonstrations demanding that the government resign and that those really responsible for the murder of Aquino be punished, the regime is stepping up repression and trying to intimidate people.

The Marcos regime is being rocked by a deepgoing social and economic crisis. It faces the spread of social mobilizations and mass struggles. The guerrillas led by the Communist Party are growing stronger. In the southern part of the archipelago, the government faces stubborn resistance from the Moro National Liberation Front and the people of the area.

At the same time, disaffection is growing among the middle classes, divisions are opening up in the bourgeoisie itself, and the government is more and more discredited in the eyes of international public opinion.

For more than ten years, the Marcos regime has directed an increasing militarization of the country, which has brought a train of pillage and massacre. There has been a rise of arbitrary arrests and growing numbers of "missing persons." The use of torture has increased. Paramilitary terrorist groups have gone on the rampage.

However, this repression has not succeeded in stopping the growth of the mass struggles. The Communist Party of the Philippines, the New People's Army, and the National Democratic Front have played an important role in leading and widening these battles.

The democratic and revolutionary struggles in the Philippines have entered a crucial period. The regime has the power of the army behind it and the direct support of the U.S., which has established some of its main military bases in the archipelago.

In particular since the defeat of U.S. imperialism in Indochina, the Philippines have held a key place in the deployment of American air and sea forces in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

Of all the regimes that belong to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the one in the Philippines is the closest to, and the most dependent on, Washington.

The riches of the country have, moreover, been pillaged by the imperialist capitalists, in particular the Americans and Japanese, and by the Marcos clan and its cronies. The democratic struggle against the Marcos dictatorship is at the same time a social struggle and a fight that the working people and the oppressed are waging against imperialism.

The stakes involved in the ongoing struggles in the Philippines are considerable, and not just for the peoples of the archipelago but also for the future of the revolutionary struggles in the region and for the fight against imperialism worldwide.

Active solidarity is urgently needed from all democratic, progressive, and revolutionary forces. The United Secretariat of the Fourth International calls for broadening and strengthening the movement of solidarity with the struggle against the U.S.-backed Marcos dictatorship. In their fight against the Marcos regime and the power of the United States, the peoples of the Philippines must not remain isolated.

taking advantage of the real possibilities for growth that existed despite the repression.

In these early years, it advocated a very sectarian and ultraleft line (oriented toward an armed insurrection), which corresponded to the so-called Third Period line then being put forward by the Third International.

After 1933, however, and especially after 1938, in the name of the need to fight fascism, the PKP advanced a "democratic" anti-Japanese line that was once again to lower the movement's defenses against the American forces.

On the eve of the second world war, the PKP managed to root itself in sections of the population where it had been very weak, such as the students and intellec-

tuals. And during the Japanese occupation, it greatly extended its influence and its organization thanks to its guerrilla forces (the Huks or Hukbalahap, the People's Anti-Japanese Army), which were set up in March 1942.

The PKP's line called for putting off the social struggle against the landlords to a later period. But in reality the growth of the Huk guerrilla movement itself led to a class polarization in the areas concerned. Frightened by the mass movement, the landlords either fled or collaborated with the occupiers.

3. On the first decades of the Philippine Communist movement, see also Norman Lorimer, "Philippine Communism, An Historical Overview" *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Vol. 7, No 4, 1977.



Today, even Reagan is rather cool to his ally Marcos (DR)

In the wake of the war, the PKP emerged stronger than ever, politically, socially, and now militarily. But, still following the line of Moscow, it greeted the American forces as a liberating rather than an occupying army. (All the PKP's propaganda had stressed the need for an alliance with the U.S. as a democratic power against Japan).

However, the U.S. administration immediately dealt severe blows to the PKP. Then, following formal independence and the first elections in 1946 (in which six candidates of the Democratic Front led by the PKP were elected), the new president, Manuel Roxas, unleashed a witch hunt against the Communists.

In 1947, the Huk guerrillas, who had not given up their arms, began to reorganize. In the following year, the supporters of armed resistance gained the majority in the leadership of the PKP.

Despite repeated delays, the PKP and the Huks had a number of factors in their favor. The regime was badly discredited, since the 1946 elections had been too

grossly fraudulent. Social tensions were strong in a number of rural areas. The PKP and the Huks also benefited from the impact of the Chinese revolution and from the resistance aroused by the massive repression. (4)

The PKP leadership believed that it could win a quick victory. It deployed its guerrilla forces as widely as possible and thus exposed itself militarily. In the cities, the pacifist education of the past period disarmed the militants. The regime got major support from the U.S. And the new president, Ramon Magsaysay, pursued a demagogic policy that bore fruit.

In 1952, the PKP and the Huk guerrillas were smashed, to all intents and purposes. The peasant movement suffered a major setback, along with the union movement in the cities, which had reorganized after the war in the CLO (Congress of Labor Organizations).

Communist leaders gave themselves up. Some of the guerrilla units turned to banditry, for example the one led by

Commander Sumulong in the province of Pampanga.

The mass movement did not regain the initiative until the end of the 1960s, and then it was essentially the students who were the moving force. The student population, which had been very elitist, had begun to change.

Reflection on the failure of the PKP, the impact of the Sino-Soviet split and the cultural revolution in China, and the revival of political struggles led to a split in the PKP.

A handful of activists, most of whom had joined the party in the early 1960s, formed a new party (or "reestablished" the old one, which was the formula they used, trying to claim the mantle of continuity). It was called the PCP (Communist Party of the Philippines, Marxist-Leninist-Maoist Thought, to give the full name). Three months later, the PCP formed the NPA (New People's Army). Symbolically it chose the anniversary of the founding of the Huks to launch the new force. (5)

The influence of the new party, which identified completely with Maoism, was mainly in the student movement, but it gained peasant and military cadres coming from the Huks, and it started to get a foothold in the trade-union movement, where the PKP remained very active.

The relationship of forces between the two parties was far from settled when President Marcos decreed martial law throughout the country on September 21, 1972. This was to be the first serious test for the young PCP, and, politically, the last one for the PKP.

At the beginning, the PCP and its armed wing, the NPA, suffered severe blows as a result of the repression and a militarist, guerrillaist orientation, which was reflected in an attempt to set up an overly ambitious guerrilla foco in the Valley of Cagayan in northeast Luzon. But it gradually recovered from these setbacks.

The PKP also had to go underground. But the leadership decided to try to make an arrangement with the Marcos regime, in which it discerned the virtues of the national bourgeoisie. It physically liquidated a number of leaders of a faction that opposed this orientation (that is, the Marxist-Leninist Faction).

So, in October 1974, the PKP accepted a "national unity agreement" with the Marcos administration. After this,

4. On the Huks, see (although the author seems clearly to underestimate the role of the PKP in the struggle of the Luzon rural masses) Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion, a Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*, New Day Publishers, Quezon City, 1979. See also the memoirs of William Pomeroy, an American Communist faithful to the Moscow line who participated in the Huk guerrilla movement. It has been published in French under the title *Les Huks dans la foret des Philippines*, Maspero, Paris, 1968.

5. On the analyses and orientations of the PCP in the 1970s, see Amado Guerrero, chairman of the Central Committee, *Philippine Society and Revolution*, IAFP, Oakland, 1979. See also Jose M. Sison, *Struggle for National Democracy*, Amado V. Hernandez Memorial Foundation, Manila, 1972.

the PKP enjoyed a certain semilegality, and some of its leaders turned up in the Ministry of Labor in particular.

The PKP continued to some extent to function as an organization and maintained its allegiance to Moscow. It probably still had a significant influence in the trade-union movement and perhaps bases of support in some rural areas. But as a revolutionary force it was finished, both as a result of the physical liquidations ordered by its leadership and of its long-lasting alliance with the martial law regime.

The fact that the PKP always maintained formal criticisms of the government and the fact also that for some time it has been taking more and more distance from the regime have not by any means counterbalanced the disastrous effects of the capitulationist policy that it pursued throughout the 1970s and subsequently.

THE IMPACT OF THE MARTIAL LAW PERIOD ON SOCIAL STRUGGLES

For a whole series of reasons, the revolutionary movement and the mass movement were not able to respond effectively to the proclamation of martial law in 1972.

There was the failure, followed by the total capitulation of the PKP. The PCP suffered from political and organizational inexperience. The effects of the political and social crisis were very uneven from region to region. The level of organization of the mass movement was inadequate. Finally, the U.S. and the World Bank pumped in substantial aid to Marcos.

Nonetheless, despite its initial successes, the government followed an orientation that recreated the conditions for a new upsurge of mass struggles in the country.

Marcos quickly adopted an aggressive policy on the southern island of Mindanao, the heart of Bangsa Moro Land, the territory claimed by the Muslim forces in the southern part of the archipelago.

A series of very important islands are in fact historically Muslim. Sultanates were established on them before the arrival of the Spanish, who, moreover, never succeeded in bringing these regions effectively under their colonial rule.

However, since the interwar period, Christian peasants from the northern island of Luzon and from the Visayas (the island group in the middle of the country) have been systematically settled on Muslim territory by the governments in Manila. As a result, there is now quite a large Christian population on Mindanao. (6)

Because of its climate, the island of Mindanao is agriculturally very rich. It also offers other advantages. The Marcos regime decided to open it up for the growth of agribusiness (which is dominated by U.S. and Japanese capital), and this meant in fact pushing the Muslim and animist population back into the remote

areas.

In this way, the regime provoked a long war with the forces of the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front) and the Bangsa Moro Army. For a long time, two thirds of the government's military forces were stationed in the southern part of the archipelago for use against the Muslim population. Despite attempts at mediation and short-lived accords, a state of war continues in the Bangsa Moro territory.

The militarization of the country took on a particular momentum in Mindanao, and the Christian population in turn was affected by the presence of an army engaged in a military campaign.

The Communist forces were weak on the island of Mindanao. But they have been growing substantially for some years, along with the mass movement. Mindanao has also been a favorite stomping ground for the paramilitary groups, and their exactions and massacres have created many scandals and aroused widespread resistance.

What has happened in Mindanao is also taking place in many other regions. In order to open up the country to foreign capital (generally American and Japanese but also Australian and European), the government is attacking the local populations.

To crush the resistance of the local people, the government has embarked on a policy of militarization. And, in a situation where the PCP and the NPA offer an alternative, this has led to a radicalization of activists and social strata without past revolutionary experience.

The social conditions remain quite diverse from region to region and island to island. (7) But by creating a real army and a real national policy for the first time, by imposing the first national "development" plan, and by using the military as the principal instrument of government, the regime has created a common, clearly identifiable enemy for the masses.

Before now, the masses were dispersed and atomized, divided by geography (the sea and mountains), language (Tagalog, the national language is spoken by only 20% of the population), and by history. Now their common enemy is the national state and its personification, the Marcos-Romualdes family.

Of course, the process of the spread and unification of the struggles is developing slowly. This is one of the reasons for the present caution of the opposition groups with respect to the Marcos regime.

For the first time in the history of the archipelago, a struggle for power has begun on a really national scale, and there are still a lot of obstacles to overcome. But the process got underway several years ago and then began picking up speed.

One of the first things the martial law system was supposed to accomplish was to make it possible to housebreak and atomize the mass movement and assure cheap labor for the multinationals and the capitalists close to the president.

According to the government's own figures, under martial law the standard of living of the peasant masses and of the urban and rural workers dropped by about 30% on the average.

In the industrial free zones, the meager trade-union rights that were formally recognized elsewhere were generally wiped out.

However, the workers movement began to raise its head again, with an important strike in the La Tondena distillery. More generally, strikes began again, with ups and downs.

In 1980, a radical trade-union current took form in what was in fact a new labor confederation, the KMU (Kilusang Mayo Uno, or May 1 Movement), which included national unions as well as locals that might also belong to other federations.

A broader alliance was formed — the PMP, which included the KMU, the unions affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), and some industrial unions.

At its May 1 rallies in Manila the KMU gathered from 20,000 to 40,000 workers, depending on the year.

All of this reflected a major step toward a broad, militant class-struggle union movement. In 1982, moreover, a very important strike was waged, which briefly paralyzed the major free zone in the country, the Marivles zone across the bay from Manila.

One of the first sections of the population to mobilize after the imposition of martial law was the people of the shantytowns on the outskirts of the cities. In Greater Manila, a metropolis of about 8 million inhabitants, there are vast shantytowns. The main one, Tondo, which lies behind the port, experienced a very long and well-organized struggle.

Today, even though it has been weakened by the partial demolition of this shantytown, the ZOTO (Zone One Tondo) organization has nonetheless played an exemplary role, which has been very important in encouraging the spread of organizations of the urban poor who live in the shantytowns and working people in the so-called "marginal" sectors or "minor trades."

As a result of the big projects undertaken to provide the infrastructure and facilities for capitalist development, people in one local area after another organized to fight.

6. On the struggle of the Moros and the MNLF, see Permanent Peoples' Tribunal Session on the Philippines, *Philippines: Repression and Resistance*, KSP Publication, London 1980. The magazine *Southeast Asia Chronicle* published an interesting issue on this question (No 82, February 1982). It has also published other important issues on the Philippines, such as its No 62, May-June 1978.

7. On economic developments, mainly concerning agriculture, see Third World Studies Program, *Political Economy of Philippine Commodities*, TWSC (University of the Philippines), Quezon City, 1983. Lussa Research Staff, *Countryside Report*, Manila, 1982. Rene E. Ofreneo, *Capitalism in Philippine Agriculture*, Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Quezon City, 1980. See also the book published after the session of the Permanent Tribunal of the Peoples, cited in footnote No. 6.

There were the boatmen and the people of Navotas north of Manila. In this area, the Japanese started building a modern container port that would eliminate their jobs. The building of a series of hydroelectric dams on the Chico creek (a World Bank project) threatened to drive the Kalinga and Bontoc mountain tribes off their land in northern Luzon. The small fishermen on the island of Samar found their fishing grounds wrecked by the activity of the big sloops that overfished the area to meet the demands of the Japanese market.

In a more general way, the agrarian reform undertaken in the rice-growing areas soon showed its limits. Most of the peasants who "benefitted" from it had their land seized for debt before they even finished paying for it. That is, the land "distributed" by this reform had to be purchased. The objective, moreover, was to develop modern agriculture (the Green Revolution), which may be very productive but is also very costly in fertilizer, seed, pesticides, labor, and so forth.

The situation of the sugar plantation workers on Negros, already horrific, was further aggravated by intense mechanization, which threatened thousands and thousands of jobs.

The coconut producers were hard hit by declining sales on the world market. And in general Philippine agriculture, largely export oriented, was rocked by the falling prices on the world market for agricultural raw materials.


To a considerable extent, all these factors — the social crisis and repression, the effects of systematic militarization of the country, the hardening of the regime as it faced growing struggles (despite the formal lifting of martial law in January 1981) — explain why the NPA guerrillas spread out to cover a wider and wider area.

At the same time, they lie behind the radicalization of growing sections of social activists in religious organizations as well as of a small but significant minority of priests and members of religious orders who have identified with the mass resistance.

The Catholic church, which remains influential in the central parts of the country, is shot through with the same contradictions as the society. This is the reason for the uneasiness expressed by the upper echelons of the hierarchy about a regime whose policy is fomenting civil war.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT

By no means all the democratic and social mobilizations in recent years have been initiated by the PCP, the NPA, and the NDF (National Democratic Front, led by the PCP), far from it. They have in fact at times been taken by surprise by developments such as the unleashing of a movement against martial law in the cities led by Christian activists. This struggle developed at a time when the PCP's urban networks were preoccupied with



organizing support for the rural guerrillas.

However, the PCP-NPA-NDF have managed to link up with, organize, or take the leadership — either partially or entirely — of a very great number of such movements which at the start were more or less spontaneous. Today they form the backbone of the mass resistance to the regime.

In order to achieve this position, the PCP had to modify by successive adjustments its original orientation, which was close to Latin American guerrilla focism.

Since the PCP, unlike the Thai CP, did not have the benefit of a friendly border and of substantial aid from outside, it had to build a base among the people in the rural areas where its guerrilla forces operated.

Moreover, the PCP had to give a more and more important place to work in the cities and to legal or semilegal organizational work outside the guerrilla areas proper.

In view of the evolution of the Chinese leadership, the PCP in fact took its distance from Peking and undertook an ideological reassessment.

However, as a result of its successes, as the movement's influence has been spreading rapidly to new regions and new sections of the population, the PCP-NPA-NDF have continually run up against new problems or old weaknesses that have not yet been overcome, such as the shortage of cadres.

The movement has already been confronted with problems of orientation, which are becoming more complex with the present evolution of the situation and the extension of its political activity among the masses.

What sort of alliances should it make, with what political forces and in what forms, under what conditions? A debate has started up on the lessons of the Central American revolutions that bear particularly on these questions.

How should the party operate in autonomous mass organizations outside

the guerrilla areas? What orientations should it propose for the unions? How can it broaden the NDP and build up a formal structure? How can it extend and consolidate international solidarity work?

There are organizational problems, problems of political orientation, and ideological questions also. The "Chinese model" has had its day. But how should the party systematically re-evaluate the ideological heritage of the movement and its analysis of the world situation?

The PCP has long remained prisoner of schemas regarding the "definition" of Philippine society (characterized as semifeudal and semicolonial). Despite the considerable growth of its mass work in the rural areas (and in the cities as well), it has suffered from an accumulated lag in this field. (9)

These problems aside, the PCP — along with the NDF and the NPA — today holds a central and essential place in the organization of the mass struggles. But it is not the only organization in the progressive and revolutionary camp. (10)

There are also some currents that have come out of the "Social Democratic" Front (which was led by Jesuits and not by a Socialist Party), small groups of independent Marxists, loosely organized radical Christian currents (which are coordinated to some extent by the Christians for National Liberation, who include founding members of the NDF). There are also groups active in intellectual circles and among professionals such as the KAAKBAY (Movement for the Sovereignty of the Philippines and for Democracy), which is led by the lawyer Jose Diokno.

However, the PCP, along with the NPA and the NDF, is the only movement able to coordinate struggles nationally, to combine political, social, and military struggles. It alone can offer a concrete perspective for the relatively near future and offer a viable framework for bringing together the various progressive forces. It has earned this position by the work and sacrifices of its members and leaders, many of whom have been killed or imprisoned.

A still greater responsibility now falls on the shoulders of the PCP, since Aquino's murder has opened up a political crisis that had been building up for some time.

The situation is evolving rapidly, and even if a decisive struggle for power cannot yet be undertaken on a national scale, all the political forces are going to have to adjust their orientations and tactical options to a situation in flux. ■

8. On the question of the highland minority groups in the Philippines and the role of their struggle in the context of the country as a whole, see Anti-Slavery Society, *The Philippines, Authoritarian Government, Multinationals, and Ancestral Lands*, London, 1983.

9. To get an idea of this debate, which is running through the various currents in the Philippine left, see *Symposium. Feudalism and Capitalism in the Philippines. Trends and Implications*. Foundation for Nationalist Studies, Quezon City, 1982.

10. As regards the bourgeois opposition to the Marcos regime, see my article in the preceding issue of *International Viewpoint*.

New setbacks for imperialism in Salvador

Francisco Herrera, representative of the Salvadoran revolution front — the FMLN-FDR — for Austria and Switzerland, passed through Paris in early October.

At that time, he gave the following interview to Gerry Foley and Vincent Kermel — the editors respectively of *International Viewpoint* and *Inprecor*, the English- and French-language journals published under the auspices of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

The interview was conducted in French and has been translated and edited. Companero Herrera has not had the opportunity to review the English edited text. Because of the length of the interview, we have divided it into two parts. The second part, to be published in the next issue, will take up the political perspectives of the revolutionists in some detail, along with the questions of negotiations with the regime and its imperialist backers.

Question. In recent weeks, massive peasant demonstrations took place in the capital of El Salvador, San Salvador. In your opinion, what is the significance of these actions in the context of the conflict that is going on in the country?

Answer. These demonstrations were held when the question of the agrarian reform came up in the constituent assembly. This is, in fact, a decisive question for the constitution that the regime is preparing.

It is notable that on every one of the three articles dealing with the agrarian reform, very sharp clashes have occurred among the bourgeois forces. On the one side is the oligarchy, which is not prepared to make any concessions on the question of agrarian reform. On the other is the Christian Democracy, which is committed to some reform.

This conflict among bourgeois forces was the immediate background to the demonstrations. But they have to be seen in the context of larger and more fundamental factors.

The peasants involved in these demonstrations are very poor. They are suffering especially from the very severe economic crisis that is hitting all sections of the population. They live every day in the grip of desperation.

These people are disillusioned. They are frustrated. They have come to realize that this regime is not going to do anything for them. That is, it is not going to give the land to those who work it.

To the contrary, thousands of families have already lost the little plots that they got just a short while ago during the first phase of the agrarian reform. [That is, they lost it for debt, because of the economic crisis in particular, since according to the land reform the land had to be purchased.]

A year and a half ago, most of these peasants were prepared to support a project pushed by the U.S., that is the March 1982 elections.

Q. So, the demonstrations represent

a further narrowing of the regimes's social base?

A. Yes. It should be noted also that while the international press talks about these demonstrations being called by the Christian Democratic Party, the reality is much more complex.

The economic crisis bearing down on the Salvadoran people today does not make any distinctions according to party affiliation, it does not distinguish between a peasant who supports the Christian Democratic Party and one who supports one of the component organizations of the FMLN-FDR.

The peasants see today that the regime is obliged to import maize. But this is traditionally the basic crop of the country, along with beans. It is the basis of the national diet, the one thing above all that we should not have to import. And now we are importing a very poor quality maize from the U.S.

It is impossible to find milk, which poses a serious problem for families with infants. Even water is very expensive. Some consumer goods, such as tooth paste, have gone up by 500 percent.

A large part of the peasant population, sectors that are not with the regime but have not yet taken a position either in support of the opposition we represent, were waiting to see what the agrarian reform would bring.

Up until now the Christian Democratic Party has been able to take advantage of these sectors but it is beginning to lose control. That is the basic meaning of these recent demonstration.

Q. How are these peasants organized?

A. Most of them are organized by the Salvadoran Peasant Union, the UCS. The UCS has very close relations with the UPD, the Democratic People's Union, which includes both political parties and unions. Its component parts are generally oriented toward the Christian Democracy.

It was these peasants who forced the holding of this demonstration. President Magana was obliged to let it be held.

But I would stress that these actions

went over the head of the UPD. Peasants meeting in an assembly are one thing. Peasants in the street are another.

In a country where there is a very sharp confrontation between the classes, where there is a terrible civil war, the streets are by nature "subversive."

In fact, in this demonstration, we saw the people raise such excellent slogans as "No People Without Land, No Land Without People," and "Only the People Will Save the People."

These are in effect revolutionary slogans. To demand the land in a country where this is the central point of conflict has enormous significance, especially when this is done at the point when the constituent assembly is discussing land reform. This is why we say that these demonstrations went over the heads of the Christian Democrats, that it would be simplistic to see them in the context of the Christian Democracy.

Q. In fact, what was most impressive about this peasant demonstration was that it was the first time in quite a while that people had been able to take to the streets. Previously this was impossible because of the repression and rightist terror.

Do you see possibilities for similar action by the urban working people? How has the union movement reorganized since the onset of the repression? What possibilities does the crisis of the Christian Democratic organizations that you referred to open up for the left, for resuming mass work in the urban areas?

A. I said that it was mass discontent that produced this demonstration; that it went beyond the Christian Democracy.

In this situation, we have one primary responsibility. It is to bring the people involved to more advanced positions. We are, so to speak, condemned to do this. If we did not, these masses would be de-



ceived again by formulas put forward by the imperialists and the Christian Democrats.

We have to show them that there is no solution but to join organizations that are clearly in opposition to this regime, that is, the FMLN-FDR.

It is true that an opening has appeared. But it has to be kept in mind that this represents a victory of the mass organizations, whether they belong to the UPD or the FDR.

That is, it is not the regime that is offering this opening. The regime did not decide out of the goodness of its heart to let the peasants demonstrate. Quite the contrary, this was a victory, a victory in the fight that has been waged for the last three years. And in this respect, we should highlight the struggles of the workers in San Salvador.

It is well known that the regime undertook a calculated campaign of repression, with the aid of the U.S., and that this succeeded in demobilizing more than a few of the trade-union organizations.

This relative demobilization posed a grave problem for us. According to the conception we defend for taking power, the mass movement is a strategic necessity. The seizure of power cannot be accomplished by arms alone. A whole spectrum of political work is necessary to combine the people's insurrection and armed struggle.

This is because we are a small country, and the imperialists are determined to smash the process of liberation that has been developing. So, it is only with the broad support of the working people and the other poor masses that we can hope to hold out, that we will be able to achieve the seizure of power and meet the challenge that will come after. So, we had to try to regain the ground lost in the area of the mass movement. This was ex-

tremely difficult. It was necessary to find new methods of work. But we are rather satisfied now with the progress that has been made.

For example, last May 1, it was possible to hold a day long workers rally in the capital. The area was surrounded by the repressive forces. But it was possible to get the meeting held.

On July 26, the Revolutionary Trade-Union Federation, the FSR, which is a member of the CUSS, that is the United Trade-Union Committee of El Salvador, held a congress. That was a great achievement.

AMES, the Salvadoran Women's Organization, also managed to hold a congress.

The peasants are making preparations to hold a congress. Every year the teachers have their day of discussion, on June 21, and they hold it in public, which is extremely difficult but nonetheless they do it.

The university was militarized three years ago. But the university educational system continues to function even though the campus is occupied by the military. Courses are being held in private apartments and in facilities made available by various organizations.

Recently, there have been a lot of strikes. They have taken place in the building industry, in the textile industry, among municipal workers. And the level of solidarity has been quite high. So, these actions interlock.

We, the revolutionary opposition forces, have to be able to exploit the enormous economic difficulties in which the regime is floundering. We have to increase the contradictions within the ruling class and between the oligarchy and Washington in order to widen the space for mass activity that you talked about. This will make it possible, in time, to rebuild the mass movement, and that is fundamental for us.

Q. What are the organizational forms of the struggles you mentioned? Do they go through the unions?

A. Yes, in many cases. But there are also a lot of sectors that are unorganized. These are generally politically unaligned. They have not come out for the people's struggle. But they are not with the government either. They are sectors that have good reasons to be afraid.

They live in the zone controlled by the enemy, who is carrying out a ferocious repression and a massive propaganda campaign to promote a distorted view of the revolutionary movement.

These are unorganized sectors. But they have a certain consciousness. They have sufficient consciousness that when the FMLN launches a decisive offensive, they can join with the people's organizations. Because they are people who suffer, our duty is to help them, but in a practical way.

Q. But if they are not organized, how can they fight?

A. Work is being done in the neigh-

borhoods by new methods. There is a network of activists and there is broad sympathy. When these activists go into action, when they issue the call for specific actions, these masses are able to come out into the streets.

Q. Has the FMLN carried out political-military actions recently in the cities, such as were carried out during the election period — military actions with popular participation, such as barricades? Has it organized any self-defense actions?

A. Yes. This sort of action has never stopped. According to our conception of struggle, there is no question of ever abandoning a single front. It is necessary to harass the enemy everywhere, above all where he is strong. There was an ebb. There have been ups and downs in this. But for some months now these actions have been continual.

These are mainly guerrilla actions rather than self-defense actions. They are incursions. The guerrillas move in, stay a short time underground, prepare attacks on important centers for the regime, and then get out. There have been confrontations right in the center of the capital with the repressive forces. There have been sabotage actions.

You know that a U.S. military advisor was executed. This was a considerable achievement. This type of person does not move around easily and is well guarded. There was also an attack on the U.S. embassy in San Salvador, and you know what that represents.

These actions demonstrate the striking capacity of the guerrillas and their mobility. Likewise, they give an idea of how extensive a web of support runs through the society. The guerrillas made their strikes and then were able to get away safe and sound.

These actions point to a new rise of activity directed at the nerve centers of the enemy.

Q. In view of the growth of the liberation struggle, what strategy have the imperialists adopted to try to deal with it?

A. At the start, the Reagan administration thought the Salvadoran problem could be quickly liquidated. After the major offensive launched by the FMLN in January 1981, they realized that something serious was happening in the country. Then they set a time limit for destroying us. They thought it would take a few months. Then, after the FMLN was defeated, they would push what they called "democratization" of the country, which was part of their overall political-military plan. The means for this would be elections, the famous March 1982 elections.

But they had a lot of problems. The FMLN continued to gain strength throughout 1981, and so we were able to make a real demonstration of force during the 1982 elections. That was not the same, of course, as being able to carry out a boycott of them; that was quite a different matter.



Salvadoran army officer, US-trained (DR)

All this led the U.S. experts to estimate that they would need two years to wipe out the FMLN. It seems now that they think they would need seven years.

That means that there has been a considerable evolution over the last three years. The Salvadoran army has proved incapable of stopping the revolutionary movement. To the contrary, the people's forces have consolidated themselves and grown.

The Americans began to raise serious questions about the way their counterinsurgency strategy was being applied in El Salvador. They had a plan. They have learned a lot in Vietnam and elsewhere.

But they were dealing with an army on the spot that has a lot to learn. A few months ago an American advisor talked about the army in a contemptuous way, saying that it had a nine-to-five-Monday-to-Friday notion of how to fight a war. This worries the Americans. One of the results is that the advisors now direct the war themselves. They even take part directly in the genocide.

They have transformed Honduras into a staging ground for aggression against Nicaragua and El Salvador. There they are training Salvadoran soldiers and soldiers of other countries for confrontation with the Salvadoran people's forces.

They have made a major effort to apply more refined techniques of counterinsurgency warfare. They have tried to create very mobile small units. They have pushed in a massive way the creation of elite units, the famous special brigades. And this has gone hand in hand with the application of a whole package of advanced technology, particularly in the field of electronics.

Q. How do they apply this electronics technology?

A. They have ships on the Pacific to monitor our communications. They have an electronic surveillance center in the country. But technology in itself doesn't always produce results.

For example, there was a report by the CIA a few months ago saying that they had given information to the Salvadoran military that there was going to be an offensive and the military paid no attention to it. The offensive did take place all right, but the U.S. warning had no effect.

They have also started a campaign of infiltrating agents into the revolutionary military organizations and started applying a system of more systematic torture.

Q. There have been reports that the new methods — night operations, constant patrols, population re-settlement, and the setting up of permanent bases in guerrilla-controlled territory — have had an effect in disorganizing the controlled zones. What effect have these techniques had?

A. Most recently, the imperialist advisors and the Salvadoran military have started applying the so-called Conara Plan, which they say is a plan for "pac-

ification" and development of the country, for "reactivating" the economy. Their chosen target is the central region around the San Vicente volcano. They have put all their strength into hitting this region.

The campaign in the San Vicente region has been going on now for nearly four months. Their idea was to hit hard and fast, but now they are getting bogged down.

In fact, this region is very favorable for the guerrillas and very unfavorable for the counterinsurgency forces. They cannot get their heavy equipment to the top of the volcano, which is precisely where the guerrillas are based. The terrain does not favor them. They are obliged to expose themselves, and when they do, the guerrillas put their plans into action.

The "economic" part of the plan consists of trying to seduce the population. They give candy to the children. They dump bags of food out of planes. They drop a lot of propaganda from small planes.

They are trying to set up strategic hamlets like in Vietnam or Guatemala. That is, they are trying to separate the population from the guerrillas, because they start from the supposition that it is the population that supports them. And they aren't far off.

But they face natural obstacles. On the one hand, there is the terrain. But also the population has a very high level of consciousness, in particular because of the existence in this region of the PPL (Poderes Populares Locales, Local People's Power Bodies). This is a power in the hands of the people, of the people, and thus for the people.

These structures make it possible for the population to protect itself, to follow the guerrillas or to flee according to a plan and then to return when the bombing is over.

Q. What effect has the attempt to station troops permanently in the guerrilla zones had?

A. They did try to station the Rangers permanently in the San Vicente area. But the problem for them is that it means keeping troops in a hostile environment.

Since the people are hostile to the soldiers, they watch them and report on their movements to the guerrillas. Since the guerrillas have military control of the region, they can move about at will and carry out ambushes and so forth.

This means, if you will permit me to speak plainly, that if any soldiers wander off into the bushes to relieve themselves, they can easily fall into an ambush. This causes very painful nervous problems. Over time, the troops become demoralized.

So, the presence of the military is not very effective in determining people's power. The only effect of the military

offensive in San Vicente in that respect is more destruction, more slaughter.

Because of the bombing the people have to leave their fields. Everything is burned. And they have to start all over again. But this is only a physical setback. Because the people come back full of anger against the invader, as they say. That upsets the Americans because they want to destroy the basis of support for the guerrillas.

Q. There was a period of some months, however, when the guerrillas appeared less active. What was the reason for this?

A. War has its own laws. You can't launch offensives just to maintain credibility or impress people. There are real logistic difficulties. You have to take stock. You need more adequate plans to respond to the new plans of the enemy, who is neither weak nor stupid. It would be foolish to think that they are stupid. It's true that they have problems. They have lost a lot of capacity for initiative. There is a deterioration in the morale of the troops. But overall, thanks to American aid, the army is still a serious force.

Nonetheless, it's a bit too simple to say that there was an ebb in the period you mention, because the guerrillas had the capacity to fight back in San Vicente. And recently, they have shown their capacity for resuming the offensive.

Q. You're referring to the seizure of San Miguel six weeks ago?

A. Yes, this operation had excellent results. The enemy lost 300 men, and we captured a lot of weapons. In this battle the FMLN demonstrated its capacity to mobilize large units.

Q. You said that this was the first time the FMLN used heavy arms.

A. That's right. The guerrillas bombarded the military base in San Miguel for hours. And you have to consider that the comrades have no vehicles for transporting cannons; they have to be carried on the backs of the soldiers.

Moreover, corridors of approach have to be maintained, and this requires a lot of support all along the way. And this operation was carried off virtually without losses. This success makes it possible to envisage a whole campaign of major actions such as the one that took place about a week ago in the center of the country in a place called Tenancingo.

The results there also were quite encouraging. About 100 weapons were captured, and sixty prisoners. Most importantly three officers were killed. That is very important.

One of the Salvadoran army's biggest problems for the last two years at least has been the loss of officers. An army without officers is in serious trouble. That also explains the growing involvement of the American advisors. They are being forced more and more to actually lead the fighting. ■

No justification for French troops in Chad

A process of internal decomposition was already developing in Chad over the last few years, as well as an incredible social and economic chaos. (1) The civil war, a result of imperialist balkanisation of black Africa, involves a multitude of regionalist military cliques. This turmoil has been aggravated by the intervention of French imperialism, as well as by other states in the region.

In some ways the conflict in Chad represents a concentration of all the most explosive problems facing the neo-colonial states in Africa — political and economic dependence, strong regionalism, weakness of the state, the rapacity of the dominant cliques, clientelism, etc.

Throughout the twenty years Chad has been independent France has intervened almost continuously, although in varying forms, to try and maintain the fiction of a centralised state. This has included direct administration of the north until 1964; substitution of the Mission for Administrative Reform (MRA) for the local administration in 1969; sending expeditionary forces in 1969, 1978 and 1983; aiding the intervention by the Inter-African Force in 1981, the permanent presence of hundreds, or sometimes even thousands, of military 'advisors'; a monopoly on the exploitation of local wealth; regular aid to prop up the central government's budget; and so on.

The two principal elements in this intervention are obvious from the share out of the money allocated to Chad. One is military aid to try to form a Chadian army, in a situation where France had failed to ensure the real existence of a state. The other is paying for the functioning of the local administration.

In 1976, 40 per cent of the military co-operation budget for the African countries was allocated to Chad. In 1979, of the 399 million francs of French aid (about £40 million sterling at the time) 204 million went to 'military assistance'. France reduced the Chad state to being completely dependent on Paris. But all this did nothing to improve the standard of living for the Chadian masses, whose annual per capita income is estimated at 700 francs. It can be said that since independence French imperialism has substituted itself for the neo-colonial state in Chad. The presence of the French commander, Gouvernec, serving in a Chadian uniform, at the head of the intelligence services of the Chadian army from independence until 1976, is a striking proof of this.



French troops in CHad (DR)

Francois CAZALS

In recent years, having been unable to overcome the centrifugal forces at work, and weld together an indigenous bourgeois layer around the state apparatus, Paris has simply supplied the various cliques with arms as they rose to power. Relations with the different local factions

have nevertheless remained tactical and limited, since French imperialism has, despite everything, continued to pursue its own policy.

Thus, while there have been numerous collisions between Paris and its local proteges, none of these local tendencies represent a genuine anti-imperialist orientation. For example, in 1982 Hissene

Habre's Armed Forces of the North (FAN), at the time in opposition, criticised French support to the Goukouni government by accusing Paris of 'having kept up a large-scale war — militarily and politically — through delivering, daily and in enormous quantity, sophisticated arms to N'Djamena airport'. (2)

The southern leader Kamougue, presently allied to Goukouni and the Libyans, since he was France's tactical choice for a whole period himself, always turns out to be very understanding about the policy of French imperialism. Last November he made the following statement about French policy, 'This is the attitude of France, we don't hold it against them. We know that if we were at N'Djamena, France would come along, as it did before. Leave France aside. At least, the aid it supplies benefits Chadians.' (3)

To break with this sort of neo-colonial policy would have meant to refuse to support any of the military cliques, and to put into question all the neo-colonial agreements that keep the country within the French fold. To have done this would have been to orient towards an overall questioning of the system of domination that allows Paris to control the economies of a whole series of countries in black Africa. But, it was for precisely the opposite reason — to prove its capacity to defend the stability of the neo-colonial edifice of French imperialism — that the Mitterrand-Mauroy government sent 3,000 soldiers to Chad in August.

From the time he came into office, Francois Mitterrand has demonstrated, with no beating about the bush, his respect for France's commitments towards its African neo-colonies, including in the military field. From the point of view of managing French capitalism, keeping these states as a special preserve for French economic expansion is vital. Taken together, the co-operation agreements France has with these states assure the survival of this sphere of influence.

Nevertheless, there were many reasons that prompted caution in the Chad affair. There were the experiences of the previous bourgeois governments in getting bogged down in the situation. There was the complexity of the local political situation, the instability of the state, and also the need to retain good commercial relations with Libya. The last was all the more important since Tripoli had welcomed Mitterrand's election, and even invited French companies to participate in the different undertakings projected in the third Libyan development plan of 1981-85.

MITTERRAND'S POLICY IN CHAD

The first intervention by the new French government in Chad in fact dates from 1981. At that time, Mitterrand proposed the formation of an inter-African

1. Cf *International Viewpoint*, No 36, 19 September 1983.
2. *Le Monde*, Paris, 10 February 1982.
3. *Liberation*, Paris, 3 November 1982.

military force. It was to replace the Libyan contingent that Goukouni, then president of the Transitional Government of National Union (GUNT) in N'Djamena, had invited to help him repel the attacks by Hissene Habre.

Paris succeeded, in November 1981, after much pressure, in getting the Libyan troops withdrawn from Chad. In exchange, it offered a small amount of aid to Goukouni, payment of the Chadian government employees, and the sending of military contingents from Zaire, Senegal and Nigeria, which were to be jointly supplied and financed by France and the United States. Paris characterised this as an 'African' solution to the conflict in Chad. The Libyan action, paradoxically, was characterised as 'external'. However, it goes without saying that it was French policy that was applied by the African soliders.

The promises of international aid made to Goukouni did not save him from being overthrown by Hissene Habre in June 1982. Paris, saying not a word about this 'aggression' against a government characterised as 'legitimate' a few months before, gave its support to Habre. But Goukouni's troops, reorganised by Libya just as Habre's had been by Sudan and Egypt, took Faya Largeau on June 24, 1983.

The first reactions to Goukouni's offensive were marked by a certain prudence. The French minister for external relations, Claude Cheysson, called the confrontations a 'fight between chiefs' and recognised that 'there is no foreign intervention in Chad'. (4) The former Gaullist colonial administrator, Pierre Messmer, also stated that, 'the civil war arises from the fact there is not a Chadian state nor a Chadian nation'. (5) In the same vein, the delegate for external affairs of the Rally for the Republic (RPR), the party of Jacques Chirac, former French ambassador to Kinshasa, stated that, 'the conflicts taking place in this country are the result of a war between the chiefs of opposing clans'. He even added categorically 'France has no interest in getting involved in these internal struggles.' (6)

Libya seemed to be on the same wavelength, and Colonel Qadhafi declared at the same period, 'The conflict in Chad is a struggle for power which has lasted twenty years. N'Djamena is like a football of which both sides want to have possession. Goukouni was in N'Djamena, Habre chased him out. Now it is Goukouni who is attacking, and he will undoubtedly arrive in N'Djamena. But nothing guarantees that he will stay there, and whoever arrives after him, Habre or someone else, will not have any guarantee of power either.' (7)

No one made a distinction between the two camps that were confronting each other, or attributed to either some anti-imperialist or destabilising dynamic. For several days the situation was treated as one of the numerous, sudden flareups of the civil war in Chad. However, the French government was soon to engage

itself in a neo-colonial military adventure.

Hissene Habre, who received financial aid from Washington, called on France for support. The neo-colonial states in black Africa also put on pressure for this, while the bourgeois press widely circulated the notion that what was happening was aggression by Libya against the 'legitimate' government of Hissene Habre.

First of all, several tons of weaponry and several dozen military advisors were dispatched to N'Djamena. But on July 14, Francois Mitterrand was still saying, 'We have helped the legitimate government in Chad by all the means at our disposal, according to the terms of the 1976 agreement. But we have no need to go further than that, because beyond that nothing has been agreed by our countries.'

To reassure its African preserve, and to cover the ground militarily and diplomatically before Reagan, pursuing his anti-Libyan crusade, could take his own initiative, the French government got still more deeply involved. In July, 1,500 Zaire military, trained by French instructors were sent, and operation 'Manta' was launched. The latter was claimed to be a 'training mission' for the instruction of Habre's troops. It led to the dispatch of 3,000 French soldiers in August.



NATIONAL UNANIMITY AND THE ANTI-LIBYAN CRUSADE

An anti-Libyan hysteria worthy of Reagan swept the ranks of the Socialist Party and the government. On August 18, the Socialist deputy Alain Vivien did not hesitate to accuse Tripoli of, 'preparing to launch an offensive to seize the capital'. The French government had intervened supposedly to 'stop the invader and force him to negotiate', because, 'we cannot accept an African "Munich" '.

The French military intervention took place in the context of a huge brainwashing of French public opinion. The extent of Libyan aid to Goukouni was knowingly exaggerated. A journalist, who was at Faya Largeau at the beginning of July, wrote, 'From all the evidence received at Faya Largeau it appears that there are neither troops nor fighter planes from Libya, nor even the phantom 'foreign legion' of Colonel Qadhafi. On the other hand there are some dozen Libyan military personnel charged with maintaining radio contact with Libya, as

well as handling certain logistical matters, particularly supply'. (10)

What was presented by the Habre government as fifty Libyan aircraft bombing a town in northern Chad was, in reality, a foray by only two aircraft. And, after that, this propaganda campaign went so far as to present what everyone agreed was a war of the clans, as an attempt to destabilise the legitimate government. Thus, it is factually false to state that French troops intervened against Libyan aggression. The truth is that the Mitterrand government, following the policy of its predecessors, wanted to act as guardian of the phantom Chadian state, and, in order to do so, found itself caught up in a neo-colonial type operation. Chad has seen many such operations in the past. Hypocrisy reached its height when the French leaders claimed that their military action should guarantee the territorial integrity of Chad, the right to self-determination, and independence of the peoples. These affirmations had no other function than to obtain the support, or at least the tacit agreement, of the French masses for the neo-colonial policies of Mitterrand.

Thus, around this intervention, and on the basis of the anti-Libyan propaganda, a broad national consensus of the political parties was forged — of the majority and of the opposition. Jacques Chirac of the RPR, the former prime minister Raymond Barre, and Giscard d'Estaing all declared their agreement with the Mitterrand government.

Even the French Communist Party (PCF), although a little ill at ease, swallowed the pill. Moreover, it combined in its own way all the duplicity of the government's course supporting the dispatch of troops while insisting on the need for negotiations. Thus Pierre Juquin, member of the political bureau of the PCF, recognised the validity of the neo-colonial agreement with Chad, signed by Jacques Chirac, Giscard's prime minister, in 1976. However, the traditional position of the PCF is to demand the renegotiation of these agreements. While accepting the need to come to the aid of Hissene Habre, the same person whom *l'Humanite*, the PCF's daily newspaper, called a French counter-espionage agent a few years ago, Juquin covered his tracks, saying that, 'the number one question in Chad today is how to prepare the way for, and start negotiations'. (11) On the French military intervention, the PCF leader remarked on nothing more than, 'the risks involved in sending armed forces into such a complex environment'.

THE LIBYAN ROLE

There is no doubt about the Libyan intervention on the side of Goukouni. Moreover, Libyan action in Chad is of

4. *Le Monde*, 29 June 1983.
5. *Le Matin de Paris*, 7 July 1983.
6. *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 8 July 1983.
7. *Le Matin*, Paris, 1 July 1983.
8. *Le Monde*, 16 July 1983.
9. *Le Matin*, 18 August 1983.
10. *Liberation*, 4 July 1983.
11. *Le Monde*, 31 August 1983.

long standing. Culturally, the populations in the north of Chad are very close to Libya. In fact, we might even trace the connection back to the former Libyan king Idriss, who was spiritual head of the Muslim warrior sect of the Senussi, a major force among the Toubous of Chad. But in any case, Libya has always supported the Muslim peoples in Chad. When Moammar Qadhafi came to power in 1969, after the overthrow of the monarchy and the corrupt former ruling layers, he increased Libyan aid to the Chad National Liberation Front (FROLINAT).

In the name of a pan-Islamic policy Libya supported the 'Northern' elements the most favourable to a rapprochement with the Arab world. The most faithful pro-Libyan faction is, moreover, a split from FROLINAT composed mainly of Arabs, who are an ethnic minority in Chad.

Libya has clearly taken an expansionist attitude toward Chad. This is evidenced particularly by the occupation, since 1973, of the Aouzou strip, which is believed to be rich in uranium and oil. Libya has several times put on pressure to have Chad divided into zones of influence with France. Thus, paradoxically, it has sometimes found itself in alliance with the secessionist 'Southern' elements like Kamougue.

The Libyan regime has supported the different fractions in the struggle at every turn, and has participated in many negotiations with France and the neo-colonial states in the region. In 1979, Tripoli gave its support to the installation of the GUNT led by Goukouni. When this government, threatened by the action of Hissene Habre, called for their aid, the Libyans intervened massively in Chad at the end of 1980. However, Libya hardly invested at all in the restart of the economic machine in Chad. When Goukouni demanded the withdrawal of the Libyan troops at the end of 1981 they left in less than a week. But their precipitous departure left the way open for an anti-government offensive by Habre. He, thus, came to power in June 1982.

Libya's interest in Chad is undoubtedly motivated by its strategic concern to have a state on its southern flank that is not too hostile. It is certainly also looking forward to being able to put its hands on certain mineral wealth in the country. Libya has the financial means to devote to this undertaking, given its large oil revenues. But, while it is being exposed to manifold pressures from the Reagan administration, Libya remains no less a dependent country. This dependence is expressed in the form of the dominance of oil production in the economy of the country.

In fact, oil brings in the largest part of the state's income, with 40 per cent being sold to American companies. This keeps Libya under the pressure of the international capitalist market. The very development plans that are making Libya a

semi-industrialised country also reinforce the dependence of the state on Western technology and the purchase of goods and equipment from these countries.

Thus, 75 per cent of Libya's imports of goods and equipment come from the nine biggest imperialist countries. As for France, it is the sixth most important trading partner of Libya, but the second most important supplier of arms after the USSR. Some 50 French companies are active in the country. The total contracts with French companies for projects or services presently in force amount to 2.1 thousand millions of francs per year on average. Specifically, Paris sold Tripoli 150 Mirage jets in 1970 and 1978, along with several dozen Alouette-III, a dozen light patrol boats, 200 AMX tanks, Crotale and Milan missiles. And in every case training contracts were included in the purchase. The value of Libyan purchases of French civilian material rose from 206 million francs in 1969 to 666 million in 1972, and to 1,731 million in 1974. In this period the Libyan head of state declared that, 'Arabs can only count on two real friends in Europe, Yugoslavia in the East and France in the West'. (12)

To be sure, relations then worsened under Giscard d'Estaing. But, after each crisis between the two states, Qadhafi did not fail to make overtures towards French industry and government. In particular, a convention of co-operation was signed by Jacques Chirac in 1976, at the same time as the agreements between France and Chad.

THE PROCESS OF THE COLONIAL WAR

All this gives good objective reasons, for both sides, to try to come to a political settlement in Chad. Any such arrangement would, as everyone knows, only be provisional, even if it overrode the wishes of the forces on the ground. Such an accord was in fact made before, when Libya and France sought to impose a ceasefire agreement on the Felix Maloum regime and FROLINAT in 1978. This idea was also included in the recent proposals by Qadhafi, who stated in June, 'France must understand the key position of Libya in Africa. I hope she understands that her interests lie on the side of Libya, and that, we are the best available partner'. (13)

Moreover, the objective of the present tour by French diplomats in Africa is to try, on the basis of the relationship of forces created by the French intervention in Chad, to get Libya to come to an agreement and force its protege Goukouni to negotiate. However, the unknown factor in this operation is what sort of governmental and state formula will be put forward, since everything, or almost everything, has been already tried in Chad.

For the sake of his demagogic propaganda campaign to fool the French workers, Francois Mitterrand has tried to present his action in Chad as a different

policy from that of his predecessor. However, the sending of a French expeditionary corps, like the financing of the Chadian government employees, demonstrates the continuity of imperialist policy.

Obviously, there is a certain momentum created by sending in a military force. This makes it possible to defend every further step as necessary to defend the French expeditionary force. What is more, the French intervention is being justified by insisting that its function is as a deterrent. This argument clearly does not rule out the possibility of French forces going into action, since they can only be a deterrent if they are prepared to act. Mitterrand made this clear and precise on August 28 by stating that 'the forces that France has installed give it the means to respond rapidly and militarily to a new offensive if necessary'. The role of the French troops was then defined by the head of state, 'Beyond that we play a deterrent role, for those who might wish to advance towards the zone where we are. It is also known that, if threatened, our troops will respond and that, the better to defend themselves, they will not limit their response to simply defensive action.' (14) From that point on, the process of a colonial war would go into motion. French aircraft have already overflowed a column of Goukoun's troops, although it seems on this occasion it was without firing. It is easy to imagine the next stage of French involvement.

The action of the Mitterrand government in Chad therefore remains contrary to the interests of the popular masses in Chad and the French workers. In this period of austerity for French workers, and of the 'immigrant-hunt' against foreign workers in France, the Mitterrand government is engaged in spending hundreds of millions of francs to defend, arms in hand, a phantom of a neo-colonial state that is in utter decomposition. However, so far the national consensus that this policy enjoys within the organised workers movement and the bourgeois opposition parties has been challenged only by the campaign led by the far left organisations, principally the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire (French section of the Fourth International), which alone have come out for the withdrawal of French troops from Chad.

The French military intervention cannot bring a solution to the chronic crisis of the Chadian state. From now on the Mitterrand government has to look towards negotiations, which will undoubtedly mean an agreement with Tripoli. But even in this eventuality the French government will have helped to aggravate the civil war that is inflicting suffering on the Chadian masses. Therefore, nothing can justify keeping French troops in Chad. ■

12. *Afrique-Asie*, Paris, 24 March 1980.
13. *Le Matin*, 1 July 1983.
14. *Le Monde*, 28 August 1983.

The political implications of the abortion referendum in Ireland

Aine FURLONG

On September 7 voters in the formally independent Irish Republic (the 26 counties of the South) added this clause to the constitution:

'The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect and, as far as practicable, by its laws to vindicate and defend that right.'

The overall result was 66.45 per cent voting 'yes' and 32.87 voting 'no'. The turnout was 53.67 per cent, about 20 per cent lower than the turnout for a general election or for the referendum on entry into the EEC in 1972.

The voting figures reflect a sharp division between rural and urban areas on the question. In Dublin, the main urban centre, there were 51.36 per cent 'yes' votes and 48.09 per cent 'no' votes, compared to results in the rural West of over 70 per cent 'yes' votes.

A decisive cause of this sharp division was the open intervention by the Catholic hierarchy in the last few weeks of what had been a long and stormy public debate. Their statements had a much greater impact in the rural areas than in the cities. They thus boosted their allies — but at a price. For the results also showed that a large number of Catholics had broken with the Church's teaching over a 'moral' issue.

Such direct intervention has been unusual in recent times — of late the hierarchy has preferred to exercise its power behind the scenes. However, such interventions are not new. The last open break by large numbers of Catholics with the hierarchy on a 'moral' question was in the 1890s when the bishops aided in driving Charles Stewart Parnell, leader of the Home Rule for Ireland movement, to an early death in disgrace after he was cited as co-respondent in a divorce case. In so doing they got rid of an awkward obstacle to British government plans by leaving the nationalist movement leaderless, and thus easier to control, for a short period. But with the loss of Parnell, the most radical leader of the bourgeois section of the movement, the radicals looked for more militant answers.

In recent times the best-remembered political intervention by the Church was over the proposal in the 1947 Health Act to provide free health care for mothers and children. The hierarchy opposed this on the grounds that they would lose con-

trol over the hospitals if they received more state funding. Although they won on this battle the influence and power of the Church in the political arena has declined markedly in the period since.

The referendum victory for the bishops looks like being very short-lived. This is the shared assessment of the forces active in the Anti-Amendment Campaign (AAC). Is this just an attempt to look for a 'silver lining'?

The best yardstick to use is to ask not 'what does the Amendment say?', but 'what will it do in practice?'. It is supposed to stop abortions, but abortion is already illegal in Ireland under the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act, passed in the Westminster parliament when all of Ireland was still a British colony.

HAVE THE RIGHT WON A THOROUGHGOING VICTORY?

Two years ago, when the pro-amendment campaign started, ten Irish women a day were going to Britain for an abortion. Ten Irish women will have done the same on September 7, will be doing so today, and will go on doing so for the foreseeable future.

An 'anti-abortion' clause in the constitution only makes sense if Ireland's 'invisible abortions' are stopped or curtailed. When the pro-amendment campaign started they put forward a particularly vicious motivation for their aim: a constitutional change would allow any citizen to act on behalf of the 'defenceless' foetus, and thus serve a High Court injunction on any woman suspected of planning an abortion in Britain.

The implications would be horrific — pregnancy testing at air and sea ports, imprisonment of pregnant women, and so on. Most people in Ireland are opposed to abortion, but they would not endorse this sort of reactionary rubbish.

The pro-amendment forces then gradually retreated on this argument. In the end they argued that the amendment would merely stop any change in the existing law and medical practice...if this was true, the whole exercise was pointless.

Of course this is not its sole purpose. The amendment will encourage rightists who wish to close down clinics that refer women to Britain for abortions. Preparing to meet such attacks is now a priority task for those who mobilised against the amendment.

But, on the other side of the debate, politicians have been scared by their alliance with the far right. As the referendum results came in, one hypocritical 'anti-abortion' TD (member of parliament) after another declared that he (it was usually he) thought the restrictions on contraception should be eased, the question of divorce looked at, laws on illegitimacy reformed and so on. The strength of the anti-amendment campaign forced them to make these moves — according to the opinion polls there is now a 2:1 majority in favour of abolishing the constitutional ban on divorce. Two years ago it was 1:1. There may even be a referendum on divorce at the time of the EEC elections in June 1984.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE REFERENDUM

The main governmental party, Fine Gael, was opposed to the wording of the amendment, although it was in favour of introducing an amendment on this question into the constitution. The party leader and Taoiseach (prime minister) Garret Fitzgerald, called for a 'no' vote. But his party was crippled with internal divisions — serious enough to badly damage its ability to stay in office for a full term.

If this government falls, the ruling class will face major problems. There were three general elections within the eighteen months from June 1981 to November 1982 in order to try and achieve a stable government. An early collapse of the present Fine Gael/Labour coalition would reopen a crisis of governmental instability at a time when the bourgeoisie needs strong and brutal policies.

The major opposition party, Fianna Fail, hopes to benefit from this crisis. In accordance with their history as the traditional nationalist bourgeois party they remained monolithically united in support of a 'yes' vote. But, true to their opportunist form, they were the first to make noises about changing the laws on divorce and contraception.

The Labour Party, like Fine Gael, split badly over the referendum. They will lose support on both right and left after this result, and are already losing support because of their participation in this viciously anti-working class government.

The main gainers in this situation are likely to be the extreme anti-Republican Workers Party, who took a clear, and very opportunist stand against the amendment on the grounds of opposition to making the constitution 'sectarian' towards Protestants. On the other hand, they refused to affiliate to the AAC and joined the anti-abortion bandwagon for electoral reasons.

REPUBLICANS LET WOMEN DOWN

Sinn Fein, the main anti-imperialist party, were not involved officially in the campaign at all. Their position was of opposition to the amendment, but not

to support the vote 'no' campaign, as they do not recognise the Southern constitution and therefore would not vote at all.

Neither individual Sinn Fein participation in the campaign, nor the presence of all the smaller anti-imperialist parties in the AAC, could offset the damage this did to the anti-imperialist and nationalist movement in the eyes of those who look to it to bring answers to social, political and economic questions. Fianna Fail's support for the 'yes' campaign was accompanied with the usual hypocritical 'republican' rhetoric. So, in the end, the effect was that the idea that Republicanism equals Catholicism was strengthened, and an unwise emphasis given to the 'anti-Protestant' nature of the amendment by the liberal anti-Republican AAC leadership.

A clear lesson has to be learnt for the future — Republican socialism will mean nothing unless there is active support to all the struggles of the oppressed in Ireland. No other method will advance the cause of Irish unity. Women want answers now about their rights — they will not be convinced by promises of what will happen after British control of Ireland is ended. The divorce referendum is coming soon. This will test whether or not this lesson has been learned.

WHAT NEXT?

Overall, the result was a considerable achievement for the anti-amendment forces, representing tens of thousands of Irish voters who rejected a sectarian approach to the Southern constitution.

The size of the 'no' vote certainly means that the issue has not been decided for all time, and to that extent also represents something of a set back for the far-right supporters of the pro-amendment campaign, who wanted a derisory 'no' vote. The question of abortion and a woman's right to choose will be more and more discussed in post-referendum Ireland.

From this point of view, along with the proposal to hold a conference for anti-amendment activists to discuss how to prepare for future defence campaigns — against attacks on family planning clinics, individual women, etc. — the proposal for an international tribunal is important.

Such a tribunal, to investigate the crimes against Irish women as regards their right to control their own fertility, would allow Irish women to build links with the broad international women's movement which has had to face these sorts of attacks in many countries. It would also be an ideal forum to open up the debate on the right to choose by drawing out the links between the right of contraception and the right to abortion.

Ireland: After the elections what next?

On Wednesday August 17, a public debate took place in Belfast between John McAnulty, member of Belfast City Council and of People's Democracy, Irish section of the Fourth International, and Danny Morrison, elected member of the Northern Ireland Assembly, and of Sinn Fein.

The theme of the debate, 'After the Elections — What Next?' posed an important question for the anti-imperialist movement in Ireland, coming after the gains made by Sinn Fein in the recent election. The interest it aroused was demonstrated by the very large attendance at the meeting, organised by the James Connolly Society which exists to promote open discussion between republicans and socialists.

We reprint here the texts of the speeches made by the main contributors. These were first published in *Socialist Republic*, paper of People's Democracy, in its September issue.

John MCANULTY

The victories of Sinn Fein in the Assembly elections and more recently in the Westminster elections have an importance beyond the undoubted immediate gain for Sinn Fein as an organisation.

It shows that after 15 years of punishing oppression and brutality the nationalist population in the North are still undefeated, still willing to struggle on, still willing to register resistance to British rule. The importance of this should not be underestimated. Sinn Fein won similar victories in the 1950s but in a time of calm and when traditional nationalism had stood aside in despair. These victories now, after a long and bitter struggle, and in the teeth of opposition from the SDLP, the Southern politicians and the Catholic church. The support gained is a real barrier to British plans.

Already, the gains from the election have reversed a British strategy of many years standing to present the IRA as isolated criminals and their own repression as simply a 'police action'. The votes for Sinn Fein have made nonsense of this explanation.

John McAnulty (DR)



This vote, plus the bloody trauma of the H Block struggle, has convinced sections of the [British] Labour Party left and progressive forces in America and elsewhere that Britain has no solution to offer here and a whole new layer of solidarity has been created.

The key point here is that any solidarity internationally ultimately depends on mass struggle here. But despite the election successes, the mass struggle on the streets and in the factories is at a low ebb. The fact is that while we face new opportunities, we also face many new problems.

After the high point of struggle here the nationalist masses were filled with enthusiasm and confidence and successive British and Unionist opponents struggled from expedient to expedient without any clear strategy. Now we face an extreme right-wing British government which understands that no real conciliation or cosmetic reform is possible. One aspect of this is their decision to continue the Assembly in the face of a total nationalist boycott. The hysteria in republican circles at the time of the Assembly's formation has been followed by a dangerous apathy. We should not forget that as long as the Assembly exists it acts to stake a British claim that any future solution will be a partition solution. Neither should we forget that it was through the Assembly that the Unionists lobbied for the 'Shoot to kill' policy that nationalists are suffering from today.

In response to this the Southern parties and the SDLP have offered their 'Council for a New Ireland'. This is a real threat to the anti-imperialist movement. Irish capitalism sees the vote for Sinn Fein as a threat to itself. Before, it could, from time to time, indulge in nationalist rhetoric in order to obtain some leverage over British strategy. In this crisis they need to crush the anti-imperialist sentiment of Irish workers to survive. The only direction that the forum can move in is towards further repression internally and more collaboration with Britain. The

role of the Southern parties in the attack on women's rights enshrined in the proposed amendment to the constitution shows this clearly.

Finally, one of the most basic new elements we face is the economic crisis of imperialism. The early period of this struggle was fuelled by an economic boom which brought a new confidence to Irish workers, especially in the North. Now we face recession, cuts, and mass unemployment. Not unreasonably the anti-imperialist movement is expected to answer these questions.

Posing these questions helps us to begin the process of finding answers. In the North today there are many localised fightbacks: against informers, against plastic bullets, against the 'Shoot to kill' policy, and also fightbacks on unemployment, cuts and housing. It is our job to unify these and bring them together in one mass struggle which should have as its focus opposition to the Assembly.

Such a movement could extend itself through all 32 counties by opposing the fake solutions posed by the 'Council for a New Ireland' and challenging not only British imperialism but the collaboration of Irish capitalism.

Above all we need the strength of the working class, especially in the 26 counties. For years, the Workers Party has burrowed away in the labour bureaucracy and it has paid off in increased support for them. We need to challenge them but not by copying them. The H Block-Armagh movement showed that it is possible to approach workers from outside the labour movement and win support. And we can learn from our mistakes then by also working seriously and consistently in the labour movement. Here a great challenge faces the Republican Movement. It has shown a new openness, a new enthusiasm and a new level of organisation in relation to the working class. But it has yet to put forward new policies to deal with the economic crisis and this is an essential element in building a real movement of the working class.

Apart from these strategic difficulties, there is a more general political problem facing the anti-imperialist movement. The decision to stand in elections was pre-dated by a long discussion around the old argument: 'If elections could achieve anything, they would make them illegal.'

Sinn Fein's victories have settled this to some extent without clarifying the role of elections in the revolutionary process. We in Peoples Democracy believe that revolutions are made by the mass of the people rather than by individual groups no matter how large or well organised. People must free themselves. They cannot be freed by an external agency.


The sort of debate that the Connolly Society is holding tonight is of great value to the activists who attend but it doesn't reach the mass of working people. They learn from their own experience and their own actions. It is here that elections are important. Through elections, revolutionaries win a platform in political de-

bate. They win sections of the working class to their program and in voting for this program workers take a first step. It is up to revolutionaries to present them with the next step of uniting in mass struggle against capitalism and imperialism.

It is the job of revolutionaries to prepare and organise and unify the struggle to pose the question of power. That is why we need a revolutionary party and that is what Peoples Democracy is fighting to build.

There are many problems to be resolved. But there are also many opportunities. The main point is that we do not have to resolve all these problems now.

Many will resolve themselves in action. What we do need to do is to unite together to build united action. Gerry Adams' recent speech advocating passive resistance to the British occupation is a welcome move in this direction. We should not delay but come together now to build a movement of the working class that can throw out the imperialists and their capitalist collaborators and put forward the real solution to the crisis of imperialism — an Irish Workers' Republic!



Danny MORRISON

The first thing before we can discuss the way forward is to take into account not only recent events and developments, not only revolutionary strategy, but the tradition of nationalist resistance in the North. Since partition left the people of the North isolated and condemned, through the civil rights struggle and the process of armed struggle, the nationalist people of the North have come back time and time again and have borne every cross forced upon them.

It is extremely important to understand that out of that nationalist tradition there was always a Republican Movement which had potential — revolutionary potential — to be radical and which

was of the people. From the struggle — from civil rights through armed struggle, through the heroic sacrifice of ten young men, and if need had been women in Armagh gaol, on hunger strike throughout 1981, what they represented was genuine determination and grit of a people determined to be free. And we have to appreciate that, we have to look at why that exists, we have to examine why that doesn't largely exist in the twenty-six counties and what has contributed to that development, what is behind partition, what is behind the driving force of the Irish revolution, which I believe is the Republican Movement.

Sinn Fein's election involvement didn't come about by accident. The ability of the movement in 1981 to ensure that Bobby Sands was elected didn't come about by accident either. There were a number of people in the Republican Movement who for a number of years believed that areas like Fermanagh, South Tyrone, Mid Ulster, areas like West Belfast had potential for inflicting poll defeats against nationalist collaborators and in creating a republican veto over British attempts and SDLP attempts to sell down the stream the war and struggle.

You have to be very wary of what potential the elections have unleashed. For example, as John McNulty said, if voting could have got one anywhere, the British, and in fact all the colonial powers, would have banned it years ago. All we're managing to do is exploit certain weaknesses in the nature of British colonial rule in the North of Ireland — that is all we're managing to do.

But this electoral intervention has its weaknesses, it has its strengths. Its weaknesses are pitfalls which no revolutionary organisation or revolutionary should allow himself or herself to fall into. There is a danger and it has been warned against, of falling into clientelism with regards to the constituency advice centres which have absolutely no use unless we are to realise the consciousness of the people.

The positive developments of the recent mandate given to Sinn Fein have obviously been seen, in overturning British propaganda on Ireland which has stated that the popular Republican struggle had no support. That's how they were able to introduce criminalisation, build the H-Blocks and stick young men and women away and weaken the struggle. We were able to overturn that by our political successes. We were able to show in America, in Europe, Australia and elsewhere that the nationalist people of the North remain undefeated, that the nationalist people of the North despite what they had gone through, were in fact certain where they were going. Remember the conditions against which Sinn Fein gained its first 65,000 votes and then the 100,000 plus votes.

What we were fighting, and indeed when the IRA announced the strategy of the long war, what we were saying was this; the British are not going to be got out of Ireland constitutionally. The Brit-

ish are going to have to be fought on a number of separate fronts. It was going to take a considerable amount of time to remove the British presence from Ireland and during the course of that revolution (because that's what it's going to be) will be the flourishing of certain ideas with regard to the liberation of every single man, woman and child with regards to attitudes in the home, our attitudes towards gay people, our attitudes towards how economics is generated, how people live, how property should be redistributed. And that is, in fact, what we hope to gain at the end of the day — complete and absolute control of our lives and to be able to determine what we do with our lives.

Our struggle is very certainly unique with regards to the liberation struggles in other countries throughout the world and, in particular, in other third world countries. For example, the struggle here is being fought against a background of mass media disinformation and information. No other struggle took place against such a background, no other successful struggle, and in fact it is true to say that whenever we fight with an Armalite in one hand and a ballot paper in the other it's an experiment, an historic experiment. Whenever the Yanks were fighting in Vietnam and whenever the Vietcong were fighting against them and indeed in Namibia, in Angola, in Mozambique, none of those soldiers were faced with the exact repercussions of their actions against the enemy. But every time a shot is fired in the North of Ireland, or a landmine is exploded, and there are fatalities or casualties, the media draws through the mill the exact effect of that operation on the total community here.

I think the nationalist people of the North have to be congratulated, and certainly the Republican Movement has to be clapped on the back, considering what it has withstood over the last 14 years. The struggle is going to be a long struggle, the political successes are only going to reap certain benefits to the struggle. They have shown there is popular support, they have overturned British propaganda. Now what we hope to do, and indeed this is where the problem arises, because problems always arise from success, the problems which we face North, South and in Britain and internationally, have to be analysed, have to be examined and we have to come up with strategies which dovetail on certain fronts.

The Republican Movement has developed as a result of certain divisions in Ireland and certain attitudes. The electoral successes in the North, and indeed if we are to develop these in the South where people largely consider the institutions of the state as legitimate, presents us with major difficulties and I honestly don't know how we are going to overcome them.

People who are not particularly tied to our tradition can put forward certain strategies which are difficult for the Republican Movement to overcome, be-

cause unfortunately whenever Britain divided Ireland, in 1920 with the Government of Ireland Act, and whenever she enforced that, in 1921, actual recognition of Free State institutions, and not just the Oath of Allegiance with De Valera was later to ditch, but the actual institutions of the state led to a major problem, led to a split and led to the Civil War. Indeed, down the decades one has often been considered as a traitor if one ever entered into institutions which other men and women had died opposing. The Republican split in 1969 enforced that division and it presents major problems to us. For example, if Sinn Fein, in order to develop the popular struggle in the North, in order to link in with and properly represent working-class interests, advocate entry into Leinster House, it would still present major problems and possibly insuperable problems and potentially split problems.

So we have many, many problems to face. Also I would personally be afraid that we would attract to our movement people who are really interested in political careers. At the present point in time, given the abstentionist policy of the Republican Movement and the fact that, at least internally, anyone who stands for election has to declare an oath of allegiance to the Republican Movement, republican philosophy, and ideology. I would be afraid that we would attract to our movement people who would be interested in getting into debating chambers, into parliament for their own ends and for their sectional ends and not for the ends of the people. We are going to have to remember this point whenever we discuss the way forward. Secondly, inside the North, I believe that the nationalist community is basically sound.

We've had many crosses to bear, from the time of internment and from the H-Blocks which replaced internment.

The H-Blocks and Armagh gaol were filled with young men and women on the basis of signed, forced incriminating statements made by these people under spells of 7 days in Castlereagh, Gough barracks and Strand road. Whenever the Brits found that that had been blown wide open, they then moved from there to the present strategy of using hired perjurers. Now we're going to have to mount a street campaign against that which will also have its limitations because the British appreciate absolutely the value of this strategy.

It has the potential of rending the nationalist community apart, it certainly creates distrust and of course a major by-product of it is that Republican activists, along with ordinary people, are going to go to gaol for long periods of time. We are going to have to determine strategies and tactics to fight all these problems. The electoral victories give us the opportunity to link in with people in Britain who sympathise with national unity. But to this day, no organisation, along with ourselves let me modestly add, has produced or finalised a strategy for British withdrawal. We come up with statements like 'Disarm the RUC or UDR!' or with statements like 'Immediate, total British withdrawal!' and yet the various scenarios are going to present us with major problems. The Republican Movement is fighting a long struggle and it is prepared to develop its strategy as it goes along.

I believe that we totally and absolutely need unity but I also think that comrades in other organisations have to bear respect for the traditions of the Republican Movement. ■





AROUND THE WORLD



CORSICAN NATIONALIST ORGANISATION BANNED

On September 27 the French Council of Ministers announced the dissolution of the *Consulte des Comites Nationalistes (CCN - Consultation Bureau for the Nationalist Committees)* in Corsica. This measure was taken as a result of the assassination of Pierre-Jean Massimi, general secretary of the General Council of Upper Corsica on September 13. This act was claimed by the *Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse (FLNC - National Liberation Front of Corsica)* on September 22. The FLNC itself was banned in January 1983, and the CCN established as a legal nationalist organisation.

In *International Viewpoint No 37*, 3 October 1983, we carried an interview with two leaders of the CCN. Here we print the editorial statement of Rouge, newspaper of the *Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire (LCR - French section of the Fourth International)* on the banning of the CCN in its issue dated September 30 - October 6.

The government has just established a serious precedent: to ban an organisation because of its opinion. The *Consulte des Comites Nationalistes (CCN)* has been dissolved because it shared the ideas of the *Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse (FLNC)*, its aims, and because it was a legal cover for its militants. In a word, because it is nationalist and rejects the policies carried out by the left in Corsica since May 10, 1981.

The militant nationalist, Guy Orsoni, was assassinated in June. Since that time the CCN has accused the French state of having been involved in this murder, in particular Joseph Franceschi and Massimi, former co-ordinator of the *Francia* group (the Corsican expression of the *Service d'Action Civique (SAC)*, [a grouping of ultraright gangs established by de Gaulle to 'defend Gaullism' through internal spying, murders, etc., dissolved by Mitterrand]).

Rather than shed some light on a death, about which the police services, obviously, have something to say, Defferre, minister for internal affairs, has chosen repression and the reign of the arbitrary.

The LCR holds to its show of solidarity with the militants of the CCN.

For two years the French government has refused to respond to the hopes raised in Corsica by the arrival of the left in power. It has preferred to set up a rump assembly which maintains the power of the clans and their men, whether of the left or right, on the island. This policy has kept Corsica in a state of economic under-development.

The dissolution of the CCN will not solve any of the problems that created popular discontent in Corsica. On the contrary, the government is taking responsibility for the spiral of violence.

Every worker has the right to criticise the methods and the orientation of the CCN. We ourselves have done so on several occasions. But what the govern-

ment wants to get today is criminalisation of the nationalist struggle, for it to be consigned to clandestinity. Faced with this iniquitous decision, solidarity is not to be haggled over.

Light must be shed on the conditions in which Orsoni was assassinated, and on the activities of the various police services in Corsica. The manoeuvres of the right can only be thwarted under these conditions.

The CCN is a political current which has a right to exist. Its dissolution ridicules democratic freedoms. We call on the workers of this country to reject this precedent and to reaffirm the right of the Corsican people to self-determination. ■

SECOND CONFERENCE OF LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN WOMEN

We publish here extracts of an account of the second conference of feminists from Latin America and the Caribbean which took place this summer in Peru. This report was published in *Combate Socialista*, paper of the *Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR) - Colombian section of the Fourth International*.

'All the hands, all the voices, all the blood can be songs in the wind, sing with me, sing, my American sister...' With this song, which will make Mercedes Sosa live for ever, the vigorous applause of 600 women of different nationalities closed the four days of discussion of the second feminist conference of Latin American and Caribbean women which took place in Peru. These four days were punctuated by agreement and disagreement, problems and pleasures, laughter and tears, confusion and hope.

The biggest delegations, each of about 60 women, came from Colombia, Chile and the Dominican Republic. This diversity allowed a real assessment to be made of the true state of the feminist movement in the Latin American continent. It is a social movement which is still at the stage of propaganda, which is looking for its identity through diversity. The most interesting aspect of this conference was precisely the expression of the different conceptions and nuances which run through the feminist movement.

However, perhaps with the aim of trying to please everyone, the sisters who hosted the conference organised 18 workshops around the central theme: patriarchy. It should be noted that many women took up this problem in their

contributions and tried to overcome it by proposing a discussion entitled 'What has happened in feminism from Bogota (where the first conference took place) to Lima?' During this discussion some progress could be made in looking for unity, beyond the initial differences.

While the plenary session did not discuss all the conclusions from the different commissions, this initiative, and others, succeeded in at least getting a general consensus on the adoption of motions of solidarity with the people and the women of Nicaragua and Salvador, with the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, with the democratic movement and feminists of Chile. Greetings were addressed to the Latin American conference of solidarity with Central America and the Caribbean which took place in Bogota in the same period. And support was expressed for the struggles of the peoples of the world for their liberation. The proposal was also adopted of a continent-wide housewives strike on September 1, 1984.

The maturity displayed in the response to sectarian attempts to divide or manipulate the conference was also remarkable. These attempts came from women who do not call themselves feminists. There were on one side comrades who considered that the revolution and socialism would completely resolve the oppression of women, and that feminism should therefore adopt precise class positions. On the other hand there were all sorts of teachers and researchers who considered this conference as a sort of laboratory of experience, and did not hesitate to explain they were not feminists.

As can be seen, a lot of things happened during this gathering, and we can still ask how worthwhile some of them were. But, at the end of the day, we can say it was a rich experience, with many different aspects, whose influence will make itself felt on each participant, at a personal level as well as the different women's groups and in the women's movement as a whole, in the period between now and the next conference, which will take place in Brazil in 1985. ■

ABOUT TURN OF SWEDISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATS ON SOUTH AFRICA

'It's a scandal that the government allows Sandvik Ltd. to invest fresh money in South Africa in a situation of increased repression.'

These were the very words of Carl Lidbom, social-democratic member of Parliament (now Swedish ambassador in France), when the bourgeois coalition government a couple of years ago planned to allow the Sandvik steel trust to invest 900,000 Swedish kronor in South Africa. Then these plans were stopped.

Now, one year after the new social-democratic government led by Olof Palme returned to power, it has just decided to allow three Swedish firms, Sandvik, SKF and Fagersta, to invest 12 million Swedish kronor in South Africa. This is despite widespread opinion in Sweden demanding a total boycott of investment in, and trade with, South Africa. A number of political organisations, trade unions and religious organisations support this demand.

In words the social-democratic government still clings to the law — instituted in 1979 — that forbids investments other than those which replace worn-out machines and aims at repairing material already on the spot. It also claims that the investment allowance is far from the sum demanded by the three firms. (In fact it's half that sum.)

But obviously, Swedish firms have a thousand and one ways to disguise new investments as just replacement of old material, and the government knows that. It explained this itself in those very words to earlier bourgeois governments. At that time central and local social-democratic leaders also made very sharp comments about 'light-hearted' investment permissions.

For example, Elisabeth Lindelof, responsible for the international activities of the social-democratic organisation in Sandviken (where Sandvik is situated) then explained:

'It cannot be right that we improve our conditions here through an increase of suffering among our South African comrades. Our jobs here must be secured

through our own trade-union and political battle, not as a by-product of the investments in South Africa.

'I earnestly believe that our trade-union members understand it is untenable to at the same time fight for international trade union solidarity in general and defend increased profits from Sandvik activities in South Africa.'

These words then reflected the feelings among many social-democratic members and leaders.



THE INTERNATIONALE IS NOT JUST A SONG

On September 7, following an intense defense campaign, Danish dockers leader Karl Joergensen was acquitted of charges of conspiracy to commit violence.

In its September 22 issue, Klassekampen, the weekly paper of the Danish section of the Fourth International, published a roundup of the international solidarity campaign on behalf of Joergensen. The article follows.

Kurt SOERENSEN

Overnight, the name Karl Joergensen became a household word, and not just in Denmark.

Workers hundreds of miles to the north of the Arctic Circle, in the Swedish mining center of Kiruna, heard about Karl's case. The same was true of workers at the other end of Western Europe, in Milan, Italy.

These are only a couple of the places from which socialist workers sent protests against the jailing of Karl Joergensen. How was it that protests could come from such distant places?

Was this by chance, because some socialist worker happened to read about it in *Norbottenskuriren* or in Milan in *l'Unita* and decided to take it up?

No, there was an organized campaign. The Internationale is not just a song but also a party, a living working world party.

The Socialistisk Arbejderparti (Socialist Workers Party — SAP) is the Danish section of this party, the Fourth International. It sent information about the persecution of Karl Joergensen to all other sections of the Fourth International, asking them to make protests and to try to get other sections of the workers movement to do the same.

The social-democratic government's about turn in this issue — coming after a number of other shifts of position on issues like trade policies, investment allowances and weapon export compared to its six years in opposition — is sure to create new irritation and tensions with many of its members who have to defend it. Solidarity with the anti-apartheid and popular struggle in South Africa is an important political issue in Sweden, now as before. ■

This is the background to the fact that when socialists met in very many foreign cities at the end of August and the beginning of September, the same name was on the agenda — Karl Joergensen.

SWEDEN

So, people in northern Sweden could read on September 2 that something had happened at the Danish consulate in Lulea, which is at the far north end of the Sea of Bothnia. The mass-circulation bourgeois journal *Norbottenskuriren* wrote:

'Lulea. A protest petition was delivered by a delegation to the Danish vice consul on Tuesday afternoon. The petition, received by Vice Consul Arne Nyman, protested against the imprisonment of the Danish dock worker Karl Joergensen and demanded his immediate release.

'The delegation and the small demonstration held outside the consulate while the petition was being delivered were organized by the Socialist Party (Swedish section of the Fourth International).'

The appeal from the SAP was taken with the same seriousness in a lot of other cities in Sweden. Socialist workers were clear that it was their duty to do what they could to get their Danish comrade released.

In Linköping, more than 1,000 kilometers to the south of Lulea, there is a big SAAB-Scania factory. The Danish vice consul in the city got a protest petition from a group of workers at the factory.

The statement ended as follows:

'During the winter we collected money at SAAB in Linköping to support

the striking dock workers. We have not forgotten what happened then, and we will not forget Karl Joergensen either. He is one of our people. Release Karl Joergensen."

The same thing happened in many other Swedish cities where Denmark has a consulate and where the Socialist Party has a branch — Goeteborg, Malmo, Oerebro, Visby.

ITALY

The Lega Comunista Rivoluzionaria (Revolutionary Communist League, Italian section of the Fourth International) held a rally on the Via Varchi in Milano. The campaign was taken into the big FIAT and Alfa-Romeo car factories and union leaders in these factories sent protests.

ICELAND

The Icelandic section of the Fourth International, the Fylkingar Byltingarsinnadhra Kommunistar, prepared a protest resolution for the Reykjavik membership meeting of the general workers union, Dagsbryn, the biggest union in the country. It was adopted.

FRANCE

"*Il exige la liberation de Karl Jorgensen et la levee de toutes accusations qui pressent sur lui,*" the language is different but it was the same demand that came from all the other places — release Karl Joergensen and drop all the charges against him. This was the statement of the Bureau of the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire, French section of the Fourth International.

NETHERLANDS

De Ruiterkade 139 is the address of the Danish consulate in Amsterdam. It is not known as a place for demonstrations. So, it attracted some attention on September 1 when the Socialistische Arbeiderspartij, the Dutch section of the Fourth International, held a demonstration outside:

"*We eisen de onmiddellijke vrijlating van Karl Jorgensen en de intrekking van alle aanklachten die tegen hem zijn ingebracht. Internationale solidariteit es absoluut noodzakelijk.*"

The Dutch comrades also took up the question in the union at the ADV shipyards and in the trade-union youth organization at the Fokker airplane factory. Both groups sent protest statements.

AUSTRIA

The Gruppe Revolutionaere Marxisten, Austrian section of the Fourth International, campaigned to get the other workers organizations to send protests. Statements in support of Karl were sent by the chairperson of the youth organization of the Austrian National Confederation of

Labor, the Catholic youth, and many others.

SWITZERLAND

At Thunderstrasse 95 in Bern, the Danish ambassador got a statement of protest from the Socialistische Arbeiterpartei/Parti Socialiste Ouvrier/Lega Socialista Operaia, Swiss section of the Fourth International.

USA

Intercontinental Press, which is produced by the Socialist Workers Party of the United States but circulated widely internationally, called for sending protests right away to the Danish minister of Justice.

The Internationale is not just a song or a few words after the SAP's name on the masthead of this paper. It is a functioning, fighting organization. ■

FRENCH TROOPS OUT OF CHAD!

On Wednesday September 7, several thousand people marched through Paris opposing French intervention in Chad and calling for the immediate withdrawal of French troops from Chad.

The demonstration was called by the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire, French section of the Fourth International, together with the French revolutionary organisations the PCI (Internationalist Communist Party) and Lutte Ouvriere (Workers struggle).

This is the only protest action against French imperialism's intervention that has taken place. The Socialist Party and Communist Party support the policy of the Mitterrand government, although the CP calls for the troops to be forces of dissuasion only, to put pressure on the Chadians to negotiate. ■

DEATH OF TURKISH REFUGEE SHAKES WEST GERMAN GOVERNMENT

The death of the 23-year old Turkish political refugee, Kemal Altun, in West Berlin on August 30 has provoked a sharp crisis in the West German government.

Altun's extradition had been demanded by the Turkish government. Originally he had been charged by them with the murder of a former ultraright member of parliament, a charge carrying the death sentence. Later this was changed to aiding and abetting the assassination.

Political asylum in West Germany had already been granted for Altun by the local court in Berlin. However, the case

was being reopened by the government at the request of the Turkish government, and it was while waiting for the further hearing of this case that Altun jumped to his death from the sixth floor of the Berlin court building.

This tragic event came also at a time when the West German government was criticised by the UN High Commission for Refugees for the treatment of refugees in the country.

There are some 1.7 million Turks in West Germany, whom the government would like to see leave the country and return to Turkey. The minister of the interior, Zimmermann, has drafted a law to this effect, and has been in discussion with the Turkish government to come to an agreement on this. For this reason he seems prepared to sacrifice Altun, and the other sixty Turks facing extradition, to ensure good relations with the Turkish government.

The opposition Social Democratic Party has thus attributed the 'political and moral responsibility' for Kemal Altun's death to the government. The Greens have demanded that Zimmermann, the subject for much criticism because of his projected laws on the 'repatriation' of refugees, and on strengthening police powers in demonstrations, should resign.

The criticism of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, who also cancelled a scheduled visit to the country, and who, moreover, had intervened on behalf of Kemal Altun, has caused intense embarrassment to the government, particularly the Liberal Party partners in the coalition. ■

IMPORTANCE OF US COPPER MINERS STRIKE

A bitter struggle is being fought by copper miners in Arizona. On July 1, some 2,300 copper workers employed by the Phelps-Dodge Corporation went on strike in protest against the employers attempt to drastically cut workers living standards.

The company wants to in effect take away cost of living allowances (COLA) from union contracts, and establish a dual pay scale whereby workers hired after the signing of the new contract would permanently be paid 10 per cent less than those already employed.

This proposed contract went even further than the concessions already won by the largest copper producer, Kennecott, in their new contracts, which are usually used to establish the basis of new contracts throughout the industry. Although the copper producers failed to get agreements like those in the steel industry, giving a reduced rate of COLA and a 1.25 dollar per hour wage cut, they did get a wage freeze, more flexibility in work rules, and reduction in retirement benefits.

The following article from the September 30 issue of *The Militant*, a weekly newspaper reflecting the views of the Socialist Workers Party in the US, explains the importance of the struggle in broader terms than the defence of workers living standards alone. It has been slightly shortened.

Malik MIAH

The Arizona copper unions need the all-out support of the organized labor movement; Chicano, Native American, and Black movements; women's rights and farmers organizations; and others opposed to union-busting and boss violence against working people.

Since July 1, 13 copper miners' unions have been in a life-and-death battle against the state's largest copper employer, the Phelps Dodge Corp. Phelps Dodge is herding hundreds of scabs into the mines to break the strike.

Its attempt to destroy the unions, as Reagan did the air traffic controllers union in 1981 when he fired all the striking workers and then blacklisted them from the industry, is being backed by Democratic Gov. Bruce Babbitt, the National Guard, state police, cops, courts, and daily press.

Striking workers are facing immediate eviction from company-owned homes. The courts are limiting pickets and issuing injunctions against the unions.

Arizona's "right-to-work" antilabor laws are the cover for these union-busting moves.

The stakes in this confrontation go beyond the small mining towns of Arizona. They will affect future battles of labor against the bosses, particularly if the copper unions are destroyed.

Moreover, the fight is not just a worker-employer confrontation. It involves oppressed nationalities — Chicanos, Mexicanos, and Native Americans — who are the big majority of the work force and the main component of the striking unions. A defeat of their union would be a blow to their fight for self-determination and for equality, freedom, and justice.

Women, as well, would suffer greatly by a Phelps Dodge victory. They only began to enter the mines in 1969 after a successful law suit that documented sexist discrimination.

These features of the battle are why more and more the strike is taking on a broader social character. The workers and their families in the mining towns have no place else to go. Some have lived there three or four generations and have raised their standard of living through the efforts of their unions. They don't want to go backward, and won't without a serious fight.

It was not that long ago in fact that Jim Crow segregation was prevalent in the mining towns. As recently as the 1960s, and in some towns the early 1970s, Chicanos, Mexicanos, and Native Americans were using different lunch, locker, and change rooms and lived in segregated

neighborhoods and attended segregated schools.

It wasn't until a strike in 1946 that equal pay for equal work was formally won. Even then the bosses continued to pay most Chicanos lower wages. Chicanos and Native Americans were also segregated into the unskilled, dirty, and most dangerous jobs.

This racism imposed on the work force by the bosses brought down the wages of white miners too. It wasn't until the mid-1950s that the unions led a struggle to give the Southwest miners parity with their counterparts in other parts of the country.

Significantly, the central leaders of the major strikes and battles after World War II for equal pay and parity were Chicano, Mexicano, and Native American workers. This explains why the history of the Chicano and Native American fight for equality in the region is tied to the fight for unionization. They went hand in hand. That rich history remains a part of the mine workers memory.

This is why other organizations led by Chicanos such as the United Farm Workers and Arizona Farm Workers (AFW) unions are backing the copper miners' strike too.

The role of women in the strike has also been significant. Four days after the strike began a women's auxiliary was formed.

The auxiliary provides food, medical, and social services for needy strikers and

their families. It is open to all women who support the strike.

Its effectiveness can be partially measured by the response of Phelps Dodge. They recently set up their own scab women's auxiliary.

The active leadership role of women in the strike and in solidarity efforts shows the potential to win support from women's rights organizations such as the National Organization for Women and the Coalition of Labor Union Women.

The key to victory, however, lies in what the organized labor movement does.

So far the AFL-CIO Executive Council and the 28 union-member Non-Ferrous Industry Coordinated Bargaining Committee — led by the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), the largest union on strike — have expressed solidarity. The Non-Ferrous Committee is urging its 100,000 members to donate a day's pay per month to the Copper Relief Fund.

While these steps are positive, much more is needed. Labor showed in Washington on August 27 and in the September 5 Labor Day parades that it can mobilize tens of thousands of workers. It has the capacity to organize a massive solidarity campaign that could make a difference in the strike. Such a mobilization would send a message to Phelps Dodge and the other employers that the union movement is serious about winning the strike. ■

'JOBS NOT TANKS' THEME OF SWISS ELECTION CAMPAIGN

The Workers Socialist Party (SAP/PSO/LSO), Swiss section of the Fourth International, is standing over one hundred candidates in the national federal elections this month. PSO candidates will be standing in the cantons of Geneva, Vaud, Fribourg, Neuchatel, Bern, Solothurn, Aargau, Baselstadt, Zurich, Zug, Schaffhausen and Ticino.

Where possible our comrades have formed an electoral bloc with other left organisations to present a clear choice to the electorate between left and right, between those who support the present course of increasing militarisation and arms spending pursued by the Swiss government, and those who do not.

Electoral agreements have been reached in some cantons but not others. For example, in Geneva the Geneva Socialist party has decided to call for a vote for the three lists of the PSO, the Socialist Party, and the Parti du Travail (PdT). In Zurich, an electoral bloc has been formed between the PSO, the PdT and the POCH (Workers Party of Switzerland), while in Basel the PdT refused to join such a bloc.

The main theme of the PSO election campaign is against the increase in mili-

tary spending, and the decrease in social services. This is summed up in their main slogan, 'L'AVS et des emplois, pas des chars!'. That is, retirement pensions and jobs, not tanks.

This refers to recent moves to restrict retirement benefits, and a decision to spend £1320 million on several hundred new tanks for the Swiss Army!

Despite the official neutrality of Switzerland the present imperialist militarisation drive is very much reflected in the country. Great play is presently being made of the need to be able to win any war that Switzerland could become involved in. In the newspaper of the PSO, *La Breche*, on September 10 Andre Meylan explained, 'In official Swiss circles it is very badly seen to attack the army. One can cast doubt on a certain number of things — the tactical finesse of Rudolf Friedrich for example — but absolutely not military policy and its greed for money.'

The PSO has already been attacked in the bourgeois press for its challenge to this policy, but the results of the elections will show how much the population as a whole regards military policy as a 'sacred cow' that cannot be touched. ■

The Polish bureaucracy against the KOR activists

Cyril SMUGA

Nothing demonstrates more clearly the continuity between the present Polish government of General Jaruzelski and that of Gierek in the preceding ten years, than the proceedings started against the militants of the former Workers Defence Committees/Social Self-Defence Committees best known as the KOR. The trials of four of them — Jacek Kuron, Adam Michnik, Zbigniew Romaszewski and Henryk Wujec — are to start in a few days time, if the government spokesperson is to be believed.

The four accused are among those who challenged arbitrary bureaucratic rule when, after the strikes of June 1976, heavy repression fell on the workers of Radom, Ursus, Plock and other cities in Poland. At that time they participated in the creation of an aid network for the families of the repressed workers, which gave birth to the KOR. It was thanks to their action that the strikers, some of whom had sentences of up to ten years in prison, were eventually released under an amnesty in summer 1977. For the first time, the Polish bureaucracy had to retreat under the social pressure that the KOR had stimulated.

Following this first victory the KOR diversified its activity. The bulletin *Robotnik* (The Worker) appeared in September 1977, and the KOR Intervention Bureau was founded. *Robotnik*, which was produced by Henryk Wujec among others, allowed a broad exchange of experiences between workers, breaking down their isolation, and leading to the appearance of groups of organised workers in the factories, some of which appeared openly as organising committees for free trade unions. The Intervention Bureau, organised by Zbigniew and Zofia Romaszewska, devoted itself to obtaining material and legal aid for all those who suffered from the arbitrariness of the bureaucracy. Thus, it played a role in Poland similar to that of the Committee for the Defence of Persons Unjustly Persecuted (VONS) in Czechoslovakia.

At the same time as these two initiatives were taken, different reviews and independent publishers were created. Among these Adam Michnik played a key role. He was also the organiser of the Flying University, which gave courses to

activists, completely independent from the state education system.

After the first outbreak of strikes in July 1980, the KOR activists set up an information bank, whose activity allowed the isolation of the workplaces on strike to be overcome, while at the same time making workers throughout the whole world aware of the movement day by day. The telephone switchboard installed in Jacek Kuron's apartment functioned until the arrest of eighteen KOR activists on August 20. They were all released after the Gdansk agreement was signed on August 31, 1980, at the express demand of the strikers from the Lenin shipyards.

Whatever its weaknesses, the KOR played a role in the emergence of an independent workers movement in Poland. It is for that role that the bureaucracy intends to make the KOR activists pay now.

After the foundation of Solidarnosc the KOR members actively involved themselves in building the independent union, either as experts — like Kuron or Michnik — or as members of the union leaderships in their regions. Wujec and

Romaszewski were members of the Solidarnosc leadership in the Warsaw region. Romaszewski was also elected to the national commission of the union during first congress.

Within Solidarnosc, they always declared themselves in favour of trying to reach a compromise with the regime in power. They considered this a guarantee against the danger of a Soviet intervention. Supporters of the 'self-limitation' policy, they contributed to propagating the illusion of a longterm stabilisation of the relationship of forces coming out of the Gdansk agreements. An illusion for which they paid immediately at the time of the military crackdown on December 13, 1981.

Romaszewski was the only one of them to escape arrest at that time. He took part in setting up of Radio Solidarnosc in Warsaw. In spring 1982 he declared himself in favour of preparing a general strike. Jacek Kuron, interned in the camp at Bialoleka, also succeeded in circulating writings that went in the same direction. Romaszewski, arrested at the end of August 1982, has been sentenced to four and a half years in prison for his activity within the resistance.

The four accused, charged with having tried to overthrow the regime by force — which in light of the positions they took during the fourteen months of Solidarnosc's legal existence is patently absurd — risk being sentenced to anything from five years in prison to the death sentence.

It is Solidarnosc as a whole that is being tried through them. They personify the 'prehistory' as well as the 'history' of the union per se, since they were among its top leaders. Given what these trials represent, solidarity action of the whole of the international workers movement is called for, with the broadest possible unity. We will play our part. ■



Police repression against a demonstration in Wroclaw (DR)