

# International VIEWPOINT

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**INTERNATIONAL VIEWPOINT**

Fortnightly review of news and analysis published under the auspices of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, in conjunction with the French language *Inprecor*, which appears on alternate fortnights.

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# A hard blow for a staggering regime

OLIVER TAMBO, president of the ANC, and Joe Slovo, a leader of the ANC and chair of the South African Communist Party; Maureen Reagan; Yassar Arafat; and Guy Penne, representative of the French president Mitterrand were a few of the personalities who attended Samora Machel's funeral in Maputo on October 28. The absence was noted of any Eastern Bloc leader and of Fidel Castro, who had in the past offered Cuban aid against the South African-manipulated guerrillas.

While the circumstances in which the airplane carrying the Mozambican leaders crashed in South Africa remain obscure, after 11 years of independence Mozambique's future continues to be overshadowed with doubt. Samora Machel was part of the group that unleashed the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism in 1963, and he had presided over the country's destinies since their surrender on June 25, 1975. His death is going to complicate a domestic situation that is being described as catastrophic. There are a number of reasons for this alarm. One is the geo-political conditions of southern Africa, in which the South African regime is intervening directly and through the movements that it supports. Another is the choices made by the ruling party, Frelimo, since independence. And all of these problems have been aggravated by natural disasters.

## JEAN-JACQUES LAREDO

Agriculture, the country's principal resource, is moribund. Production of maize, citrus fruits, manioc, tea, cacao and sugar cane has been hard hit by falling world prices. Only about 20% of these crops is marketed. Moreover, the marketing of these crops is totally disorganized. They have suffered from drought, as well as from errors in economic orientation made by the Frelimo leaders.

The transport network, another cornerstone of the economy, the ports and railways used both by Mozambique and its neighbor Zimbabwe, have been severely affected by the operations of the Renamo (RNM, National Resistance Movement of Mozambique).

Since independence, Mozambique has never known any peace. Some 42% of its budget (more than 11% of the Gross Domestic Product) is absorbed by the war effort. In nine of the country's ten provinces, Frelimo is threatened by the RNM.

Renamo was created by the Portuguese colonialists with the support

of Ian Smith's Rhodesia, which saw this as a means of weakening Robert Mugabe's guerrillas, who were backed by independent Mozambique. When power changed hands in Salisbury, which became Harare, in Zimbabwe in 1980, the RNM had to look for a new godfather. It found one in the

South African regime, which is its main paymaster today, although it also gets aid from some Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and the Sultanate of Oman.

This is one of the differences from the Angola situation. While the anti-Communist guerrillas of UNITA have an umbilical cord linking them to the country of apartheid, they have their origins in a component of the movement of resistance to the Portuguese colonialists, which gives them the possibility for influence beyond their specific ethnic base.

Ending South African support for the RNM guerrillas was the quid pro quo officially accepted by Pretoria in return for a clampdown on the ANC operations based in Mozambique. These provisions were part of the non-aggression pact signed between Samora Machel and P.W. Botha on March 16, 1984, on the bank of the Nkomati river, not far, as it happens, from where the Mozambican president's plane went down.

Mozambique kept its pledges, expelling most of the ANC representatives within two weeks of signing the agreement. It reduced the ANC's local listening post to a few individuals. South Africa was far from so scrupulous. Documents seized at general headquarters of the RNM, which was briefly occupied by Mozambican and Zimbabwean forces, showed that the flow of aid from Pretoria never dried up.

Was this accord a swindle, a betrayal? The least that can be said is that Mozambique gained nothing from the pact signed at Nkomati. Angola, which was in a bit better military position, also signed an accord with South Africa that also bore the seeds of a Pax Americana.

The question of whether Mozambique had an alternative in the middle of March 1984 is not the real one. Nkomati was only the inevitable conclusion of the nine preceding years. Of course, Samora Machel was not wrong when, in the wake of the accord,

Samora Machel (DR)



he said, "You choose your friends, not your neighbors." But in 1984 Mozambique was exhausted by paying for the mistakes of the regime, and was in a trajectory leading it back to an orientation toward the Western countries.

Portuguese colonialism had done everything but develop the country. There was a "growth without development," based primarily on port and railway facilities and on an import-substituting industry in the hands of the colonists. The features of this colonization did not permit the development of a Black petty bourgeoisie or a layer of skilled native workers.

### Portuguese revolution took Frelimo by surprise

Caught by surprise by the Portuguese "Revolution of the Carnations" on April 25, 1975, Frelimo had no idea that it was so close to taking power. It had about 12,000 members. It was to find itself obliged to assign about one third of those to the state apparatus after independence. The departure of the Portuguese colonists became a serious drain on the country. Between September 1974, when the transitional government was set up, and the end of 1985, the white population fell from 230,000 to 25,000.

At a stroke, Frelimo gained control of the country, without having to go through the civil war that the MPLA did before it could consolidate its government in Luanda. Thus, the Mozambiquan front did not take power in the course of an upsurge of social struggles — with the exception of an economic strike of dockers. And no lasting forms of self-organization arose.

The relations between Frelimo and the Mozambiquan masses were therefore determined by substitution of the party for mass action. The constitution of Mozambique expressed the reality quite well: "Power belongs to the workers and peasants united and led by the Frelimo."

Over the years, the consensus and sympathy achieved by the continuity of the struggle ("A luta continua" "The Struggle Continues," is one of Frelimo's central slogans) was to crumble, owing to the authoritarianism and bureaucratization of the government.

The existing mass structures were emptied of their substance, and those set up were primarily transmission belts for the party's line. The Grupos da dinamizaco [Sparkplug Groups] that appeared with the installation of the transitional government lost precisely their spark, and adopted the slogan:

"Unity-Vigilance-Work."

It was not until the Fourth Congress of the Frelimo in April 1983, which decided on an economic reorientation that the Workers' Organization of Mozambique (OTM) was launched. But this "socialist union" has not made itself known as a means for defending the interests of the working class.

At the founding conference of the OTM in October 1983, Samora Machel said, "its task is not to make demands." It is hardly surprising that such a structure set up by a regime that had denounced strikes as actions manipulated from abroad, has not gained the enthusiastic adherence of the workers.

Toward the rural population (80% of the total), Frelimo, if not its leaders, at least its apparatus, used methods that fueled the serious discontent it is facing. In the aftermath of independence, the land was nationalized. But the practice of forcibly regrouping the population in communal villages after 1979 and the exactions perpetuated by Mozambiquan soldiers, who held the people to ransom in order to feed themselves, had a repellent effect.

The RNM has behaved in a brutal way, pursuing a policy of terror in the regions where it operates. Thus, 300,000 persons have fled the combat zones, crossing the borders to endure the degradation of apartheid. When you consider what apartheid represents, such an exodus speaks volumes about the despair of the population buffeted by war.

Is Frelimo a party cast in the East European model? There is no lack of correspondences, and Frelimo maintains an orientation of special links with the Soviet Union. Socially, there are indeed features of the nomenclature system, with its train of privi-

*Civil war continues in Mozambique (DR)*



leges for the party leaders, such as special stores, and scarcity for the population at large, along with wide-scale corruption.

What has been decisive, however, has been the situation and history of Mozambique, the degree of consciousness of the masses, the cultural level and the low level of skills at which the population was kept by Portugal. Frelimo has indeed mounted campaigns directed at the population. A notable example is when it decided to open up its doors, to double its membership, by means of an original method — "electing the party." New candidates were presented to the people in mass meetings in order to prevent former collaborators with the Portuguese and other "dubious elements" from taking advantage of the chance to get into the party.

However, while this method of determining membership had a positive side, it was not accompanied by provisions giving the population the right to observe the discussions in a party whose members it designated, or the debates over the country's orientations.

Moreover, the leadership consciously chose to fuse Frelimo with the state. The party was set up to be a single party. In 1977, the Third Congress of Frelimo opted for Marxism-Leninism and declared the advent of the stage of "people's democracy." If the regime chosen for the party was "democratic centralism," this was also to be the rule imposed on the People's Assemblies, "the supreme organs of state power at every level."

Samora Machel was able to preserve some of his popularity by permitting public criticisms and denunciations of bureaucratic and parasitic behaviour, even among ministers. Thus, for example, in 1978, the minister of agriculture was fired, and on several occasions there were actual purges in the apparatus.

Such denunciations, examples of which can also be found in Eastern Europe, also reflected internal divisions in the ruling apparatus. Economic policy and the attitude toward the Western countries and the world capitalist market underwent rectifications in accordance with the relationship of forces in the party.

The 1977 congress marked out a path inspired by the Soviet Union, at the time one of Maputo's few allies. "Taking agriculture as a base, industry as a locomotive and the construction of heavy industry as the decisive factor, we will break free once and for all from poverty and dependence, and we will build an advanced economy in the service of the people."

The nationalizations that followed independence extended beyond land to small and medium industry, as well

as trade, health services and education. But they did not affect big industry, the mines, energy or the plantations that belonged directly to Western companies or were technically or commercially dependent on them.

Even though the state sector came to embrace about 50% of enterprises in 1978, it could not serve as a basis for economic independence or as a springboard toward breaking from the capitalist market.

After 1980, Samora Machel defended the idea of reestablishing a hierarchy in the state sector, as well as financial guarantees for the return of small foreign industrialists, traders, and planters.

In 1980 also, the Southern African Development and Coordination Conference was set up to try to achieve better economic integration and rationalization of economic relations with the countries of the region against a dangerous South African neighbor and dependence on the West. The actual result was that the developed capitalist countries committed about 400 million dollars to about 20 projects that reinforced the country's dependence.

In April 1983, the Fourth Congress of the Frelimo was to rectify the line of the preceding congress. The central slogan was a three-point one — "Defend the country, overcome underdevelopment, build socialism." But already the big projects that require heavy investments were put in question.

Despite the restatement of a socialist goal, the period after 1983 was marked by a growing opening to the West. In June 1985, Mozambique did sign an accord with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the East Bloc aid agency, indicating that it was not breaking with the Eastern countries. But it was also to join the IMF and the World Bank. Likewise it was to sign the Lome III convention. In 1985, the United States made available 18 million dollars in aid, on condition that the number of Eastern advisors be reduced.

At present, more than 50% of Mozambique's commercial exchanges are with the developed capitalist countries. The East Bloc countries account for only a fourth of imports and purchase only 15% of the country's exports.

Today, this gloomy picture for Frelimo has been darkened still further by the disappearance of the kingpin of its government. The problem of replacing the "Comrade President" could well bring to light persisting divisions.

The Mozambiquan people has not reached the end of its travail, in particular since South Africa is on the lookout for opportunities to counter the blows dealt it by the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire and the fall of the Rhodesian white government.

## Playing with fire

**THE EXPLOSION** on a Soviet atomic submarine on October 5 was a striking reminder of the dangerous times in which we are living and in which the October 11-12 "pre-summit" took place in Reykjavik.

From its position the submarine could have destroyed New York or Washington in 10 to 15 minutes, and, depending on the nuclear arms it carried, effectively another 14 to 30 cities. It was only for the sake of making a political demonstration that the submarine turned around there, the editor of *Bruckebauer* wrote in its October 15 issue.

An outdated model, this submarine would have to surface before firing and, in the event of war, would be immediately destroyed. But that is the point. An atomic war will not begin with any declaration.

When the Pershing 2 missiles were deployed in West Germany (as an answer to the Soviet SS-20s), the Soviet government announced that it was taking countermeasures by stationing submarines in the Atlantic that would hit Washington within 10 minutes, as the Pershings can do to Moscow.

In one way or another (either as part of the strike force or as a decoy), the submarine that went down was part of this operation. This incident, thus, demonstrated the destabilizing effect of the dangerous game of mutual "counter-measures."

Still more destabilizing is Reagan's Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), called Star Wars, which is a spur to a new, insane arms race. According to the official version, both sides came to the pre-summit with big disarmament objectives, as well as with certain (by no means all) problem details.

They were supposed to have presented these questions so precipitously that they really undertook a summit. And then, as it were, because of Reagan's refusal to limit SDI, they fell back below the level of a pre-summit.

How things will proceed from here, or whether they will remain

unclear. What the Soviet government made clear is that the US cannot simply "bag" Soviet concessions without a quid pro quo, which was the US intention as their security chief Pointdexter inimitably blurted out.

It is also clear that the Soviet Union proposed some important steps (e.g., "solution zero," that is the elimination of the European intermediate-range missiles), from which it can hardly retreat, if the obstacle of SDI is limited.

At the same time, it has become evident that there is a dangerous, limited SDI project (a defence of US missile installations) that can be built relatively quickly and with today's technology.

### Remove US missiles and end nuclear tests

The pre-summit has shown that the key to more security for the people of the world lies in the capitalist West. The peace movement can fight with a renewed energy for specific arms control measures that will help to maintain the balance rather than undermine it.

Not only are thousands of US scientists turning against SDI and refusing to collaborate with it, but also recently some politicians have argued that they only want to "bargain it away" for Soviet concessions.

These days, the congress of the International Society of Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War, which has 150,000 members in 49 countries and in 1985 got the Nobel peace prize, is calling for a halt to atomic tests by the USA (and a continuation of the moratorium on tests by the Soviet Union).

On October 11 in Hunsruck, West Germany, 150,000 to 200,000 people demonstrated for eliminating US Pershing 2 missiles from Europe. In our opinion these are the slogans for 1987.

[Editorial from the October 27 issue of *Die Bresche*, the German-language paper of the Swiss section of the Fourth International.] □

# A new challenge for Solidarnosc

ON SEPTEMBER 11, General Czeslaw Kiszczak, minister of the interior and number two man in Jaruzelski's regime, announced a spectacular measure. It was the release of the so-called "non-criminal prisoners". They included Zbigniew Bujak and other jailed leaders of Solidarnosc, the Freedom and Peace Movement (independent peace activists), and the Independent Poland Confederation (right-wing nationalists).

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This measure was justified by the need to "strengthen the bases of national understanding," meaning the normalization of the bureaucratic dictatorship. Concretely, it was supposed to "influence broad sectors of society that are vacillating politically and unstable in their judgements of reality, those who suffer from a lack of confidence and keep to the sidelines." In other words, those who do not support the regime.

As regards the hierarchy of the Catholic Church, which is itself trying to establish a comfortable *modus vivendi* with the regime, Kiszczak said: "I hope that its reaction will be constructive and that, above all, the Church institutions will contribute genuinely and actively to stabilizing the situation that will arise after September 15, when there are no non-criminal prisoners in Poland." At the same time, he stressed, "Most of those coming out of detention and prison, in particular notorious activists in illegal structures, have not been participants in the national understanding, and I doubt they will be in the future." (1)

On the same day, the political police "mounted a nationwide operation aimed at achieving the dissolution of the illegal groups and structures that are still pursuing activities against the state and public order without resorting to penal sanctions." (2) To that end, three thousand people allegedly involved in such activity were summoned to police stations.

The editors of the influential official weekly *Polityka* maintained that this was a turn in the political situation in Poland: "Passing from

the stage of trauma (and repression) to the stage of understanding."

According to *Polityka*, this step was already foreseen in July 1984 in the general amnesty for "non-criminal prisoners." But the plan supposedly failed owing to the serious repercussions created at the time by a "criminal action." That referred to the murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko by political police agents. Today, *Polityka* says the problem is to make up for the "two lost years" in the process of normalization. (3)

At the same time, the Jaruzelski team has taken an initiative aimed at "integrating", that is winning over, sections of the Catholic intelligentsia who are critical of the regime but not ready to oppose it openly and actively.

Jaruzelski has recognized publicly that the totally collaborationist and completely discredited formula of the so-called Patriotic Movement of National Renaissance (PRON) cannot serve this purpose.

Consequently, he is proposing the formation of a Social Consultative Council, under the Council of State (the collective executive of the republic), and "civil assemblies" under the provincial councils and outside the PRON. It is clear that these institutions would serve as a facade of a certain "pluralism of views," which would offer a cover for collaborating with the regime.

According to reports from sources close to the Democratic Opposition, some weeks before the release of the Solidarnosc leaders the secretary of the Central Committee of the United Workers' Party of Poland (PZPR), Stanislaw Ciosek, opened

negotiations with four personalities close to the Catholic Intellectuals' Club (KIK). The latter included Andrzej Wielowieyski, who is supposed to have the backing of Lech Walesa. In early September in the Paris newspaper *Le Matin*, correspondent Krzysztof Wolicki, wrote:

"The government is holding out the possibility of a timid political detente, in particular in the trade-union field. The possibility of allowing the formation of several unions in certain enterprises is presently under discussion in the ruling team. But this detente has a price. The negotiators have already let it be known that a statement by Lech Walesa breaking with the underground opposition would be welcome and could move things along. While he does not have a lot of confidence in this, Ciosek hopes at least to sow division among his adversaries."

Ciosek, Jaruzelski's representative, is out for something much more important, according to Wolicki:

"If the government is prepared to tolerate some sort of illegal press for the intellectuals, it will not tolerate the agitation of the underground activists. The latter have once again demonstrated the power of their organization and their capacity to hold out against the police operations directed against them, after the arrest of their leader, Zbigniew Bujak, in June." (4)

## Solidarnosc forms Provisional Council

The trade-union leaders' answer to the regime's maneuvers was to form the Provisional Council of Solidarnosc on September 30 as an "open" trade-union leadership body. This council includes almost all the former members of the underground leadership, the Provisional Coordinating Committee (TKK). Similar councils have begun to form in many regions.

The dissolution of the TKK is considered probable, if not imminent. But it is not expected that Solidarnosc's underground factory

1. *Polityka*, September 20, 1986.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Le Matin*, September 2, 1986.

Two days after Wolicki's revelations, this same paper reported: "The Polish government has asked us to point out that no meeting is presently envisaged between the secretary of the Central Committee of the PZPR, S. Ciosek, and four personalities close to the opposition." They failed to deny that such meetings had already taken place.

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committees or the underground press networks will follow suit. They continue to flourish. Nor is it expected that their circulation will be limited to intellectual circles alone.

Is this a concession to the bureaucratic dictatorship? Or, on the contrary, is it a bold tactic by which the Solidarnosc leaders are trying to wrest the political initiative from the dictatorship? That is the key question. In Lech Walesa's case, he has adopted a language of concessions. Announcing the formation of the Provisional Council, he said:

"There are obstacles on both sides to dialogue. Without abandoning what is necessary to achieve the ideals of Solidarnosc, we are ready to eliminate what the authorities see as a barrier erected by Solidarnosc. We want to demonstrate our good will." (5)

This sort of statement is nothing new from the chair of Solidarnosc. But two circumstances have to be taken into account. First, Walesa today does not exercise real leadership in Solidarnosc on any level, nor does he enjoy the same prestige among its activists that he did before December 13, 1981. Second, what counts today is not statements by Walesa but acts by leaders such as Zbigniew Bujak, Wladyslaw Frasnikiuk, Bogdan Lis, Jozef Pinior and Bogdan Borusewicz — all of whom were in the underground and today are members of the Provisional Council.

It is to be hoped that these leaders will have sufficient political understanding not to fall into the trap the bureaucracy seeks to lay for them, and that they will have the political sense at this crucial time to intransigently defend the cause of Solidarnosc, basing themselves on the still extensive layers of activists.

The Polish government reacted to the formation of the Provisional Council in a way that showed a rapid loss of composure. It warned that its desire to see Poland become a country without political prisoners, where "a new step forward toward national understanding would be possible" could be thwarted by the "destructive activities" of "enemies of the state," of a "handful of extremists." Such elements, by taking advantage of the government's good will to "mobilize their organizational energies," could "impel the government to apply the rigors of the law against them." Such activities "endangering the established order", Kiszczak declared, "will be nipped in the bud."

It is quite significant that the government's spokesperson responded to Walesa's assurances that the formation of the Provisional Council "is not

intended to put obstacles in the way of dialogue and participation in getting the country back in shape" by saying "there is not a single word that comes out of the mouths of Walesa, Bujak and others that is not crooked." (6)

On October 10, the authorities declared Solidarnosc's Provisional Council and its regional councils illegal. At the same time, to show their desire for "liberalization," they gave legal authorization for the publication of the independent journal *Res Publica*. This magazine is published by a right-wing ideological group dedicated to defending neo-conservative "spiritual values," without any claim that it is engaged in politics. It is clear enough who the bureaucracy fears.

In other words, "all quiet on the Eastern front." There is no way of getting around the nature of the bureaucratic regimes. The jails will empty and national understanding will flourish, on the condition that the defenders of trade-union freedom, pluralism and democracy retire into their homes. In today's Poland, there is not much chance of that.

At present there are two organizations independent of Solidarnosc in the strict sense. There is the Workers' Opposition Alliance (POR-S) and the Fighting Solidarnosc Organization (OSW). The first is presided over by Daniel Dziubelski and its supreme objective is the liberation of the working class. The second, led by Kornel Morawiecki, considers as its central aim winning national independence.

These two organizations have not only refused to dissolve their underground structures and "surface" their leaders, but have also rejected any compromise with the bureaucratic regime and the very idea of a "national understanding." On the contrary, although they differ on important philosophical and political questions, these two organizations maintain a perspective of building up social forces to overthrow the regime.

The present tug of war between the chiefs of the bureaucracy and the leaders of the mass movement to gain the initiative is taking place on ground that is shaking with social tensions.

"The gap between present real incomes and those attained in 1980-1981 does not indicate a decrease in the pressure of demands. With the price increases foreseen, especially if they are extensive and affect many necessities, the intensity of social demands could mount considerably." (7)

It is precisely on this ground that the independent trade-union leaders should concentrate their activity today. To the extent that they can, with their modest but growing forces, the working-class left organized in the POR-S is showing the way forward. □

5. 'Le Monde,' October 2, 1986.

6. 'Le Monde,' October 5-6; and 'Liberation,' October 6, 1986.

7. 'Zycie Gospodarcze,' April 20, 1986.

## The continuing example of 1956

IN POLAND, the night of October 21-22, 1956, was the third night of extreme political tension throughout the country. The workers' militias of 16 big Warsaw factories, which were linked to workers' and students' vigilance committees, were on tenterhooks as Soviet troops slowly advanced toward the capital and other cities and the Soviet fleet sailed toward Gdansk. In many units of the Polish army and police the decision was taken to resist, if the Soviet Union intervened militarily.

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That night, Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had just been named as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR -- the Polish CP), got a telephone call from Nikita Khrushchev in the Kremlin. The Soviet chief had returned there after attending the CC plenum in Warsaw the day before, at which Gomulka had been elected.

Khrushchev announced that the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party had decided to place its confidence in the new leadership of its Polish sister party.

At the same time, the Soviet troops

started to withdraw to their bases. The alert in the factories, universities and neighborhoods was lifted. The Soviet bureaucracy had dropped the idea of a military intervention in Poland. It thought, and it was not wrong, that Gomulka, who had enormous mass support, would be able to handle the masses astutely, to dampen the flames of anti-bureaucratic revolution and re-establish the power of the bureaucracy, without any need for the Soviet armed forces to go in.

On October 23, on the initiative of students demanding socialist democracy, and in solidarity with the dem-

ocratic mass movement in Poland, a demonstration was held in Budapest, Hungary's capital. The rallying point was the monument to General Jozef Bem, hero of the Hungarian and Polish revolutionary democratic movements in the period of the 1848 uprisings, known as the "Springtime of the Peoples". (1) Quickly, the crowd grew to several thousands. The demands became more radical. Militancy increased.

At 8.00 in the evening, Erno Gero, chief of the Hungarian bureaucracy, made an aggressive speech over the radio, condemning the demonstration as a counter-revolutionary operation mounted by "the enemies of the Hungarian people and of the Soviet Union." The speech aroused the anger of the masses, who stormed the radio station in order to be able to broadcast their demands to the country and to the entire world.

The political police wanted to hold back the demonstrators, and opened fire. The demonstrators fought back with the few arms they had. The army moved in, but instead of suppressing the demonstrators it fraternized with them and helped them to arm themselves. Truckloads of reinforcements came from the working class suburbs. The working class went into action. The great monument to Stalin was demolished moments later by the people of Budapest.

The East European people most oppressed by the bureaucracy rose up violently and with extreme radicalism, demanding, arms in hand, all that it had been denied -- respect for human rights, national dignity, political democracy and collective control by the workers over the means of production.

In the capital and provinces, workers' councils, revolutionary committees and people's militias established their authority, destroying the hated political police and the apparatuses of bureaucratic domination. Finally, they confronted the Soviet troops.

The special correspondent of *Po Prostu*, the journal of the revolutionary left that was at the head of the mass movement in Poland, telegraphed from Budapest: "The entire people is on the side of the insurgents. The

1. The French revolution of February 1848 installed the Second Republic. The news of the fall of the monarchy in France sparked a new wave of revolutionary crises in Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary and Poland against the reactionary order and absolutism that had been established in Europe after the Napoleonic wars. This was a national liberation movement against the empires, a movement for national unity of divided peoples and for social emancipation. This period of March to June 1848 was also known as the "Springtime of the Peoples", and was followed by a summer of reaction throughout Europe.

Monument to Hungarian uprising at Poznan, Poland (DR)





## Tribute to the Hungarian revolution

ON THE anniversary of the Hungarian uprising, October 23, the following statement was issued simultaneously in Berlin, Budapest, Prague and Warsaw.

Thirty years ago, on October 23, 1956, workers, students and soldiers stormed the radio station in Budapest because they had had enough of official lies and wanted to hear the truth and to voice their demands. They destroyed Stalin's statue and the credibility of a regime that claimed to be a dictatorship of the proletariat and a people's republic. Their struggle showed clearly that what the Hungarian people really wanted was independence, democracy and neutrality. They wanted to live in peace in a free and honest society.

The Hungarian revolution, like the uprising in East Berlin, the Prague Spring, and the social movement of the free union Solidarnosc in Poland, have been suppressed, either by Soviet intervention or by the intervention of local armed forces. Over the last 30 years, life has become easier for many people. Some people can express themselves without being thrown into prison. But the essential demands of the revolutionists have not been met.

On this anniversary, we appeal to all our friends throughout the world to join with us in commemorating the Hungarian revolution of 1956. We proclaim our common determination to fight for political democracy in our countries, for their independence, for pluralism based on the principles of self-management, for the peaceful reunification of a divided Europe and for the rights of all national minorities. We stress our reciprocal support for all efforts underway to achieve a better, free and honest life in our countries and throughout the world. The tradition and experience of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 remain our common heritage and our inspiration.

**Signed: Hungary:** *Ivan Baba, Peter Bokros, Geza Buda, Sandor Csoori, Istvan Csurka, Gabor Demsky, Olga Dioszegi, Istan Eorsi, Gyorgy Gado, Arpad Goncz, Csaba Gonczol, Bela Gonda, Judit Gyenes, Aliz Halda, Miklos Haraszi, Janos Kenedi, Zsolt Keszthelyi, Janos Kis, Karoly Kiszely, Gyorgy Konrad, Ferenc Koszeg, Gyorgy Krasso, Zsolt Krokovay, Gabriella Lengyel, Sandor Lezsak, Fruszina Magyar, Imre Mecs, Miklos Meszoly, Tamas Mikes, Tamas Molnar, Andras Nagy, Jano Nagy, Tibor Pakh, Robert Palinkas, Gyuala Perlaki, Gyorgy Petri, Sandor Racz, Sandor Radnoti, Laszlo Rajh, Laszlo Rusai, Ottilia Solt, Miklos Sulyok, Jenő Szell, Sandor Szilagyi, Pal-Szalai, Jozsef Talata, Gaspar Miklos Tamas, Mihaly Vajda, Judit Vasarhelyi, Miklos Vasarhelyi.*

**Czechoslovakia:** *Rudolf Battek, Vaclav Benda, Jan Carnogursky, Jiri Dienstbier, Miklos Duray, Jiri Gruntorad, Jiri Hajek, Vaclav Havel, Ladislav Hejdanek, Eva Kanturkova, Jan Kozlik, Miroslav Kusy, Ivan Lamper, Ladislav Lis, Vaclav Maly, Anna Marvanova, Martin Palus, Jiri Rumi, Jaroslav Sabata, Anna Sabatova, Libuse Silhanova, Milan Simecka, Frantisek, Starek, Petr Uhl.*

**Poland:** *Konrad Bielinski, Marian Brandys, Jacek Czaputowicz, Marek Edelman, Jacek Fedorowicz, Jan Andrzej Gorny, Janusz Grzelak, Zbigniew Janas, Jan Kielanowski, Wiktor Kulerski, W. Kunicki-Goldfinger, Zofia Kuratowska, Jacek Kuron, Jan Jozef Lipski, Jan Litynski, Barbara Malak, Wojciech Maziariski, Adam Michnik, Leszek Moczulski, Piotr Niemczyk, Zofia Romaszewski, Zbigniew Romaszewski, Klemens Szaniawski, Jacek Szymanderski, Henryk Wujec.*

**East Germany:** *Martin Bottger, Barbel Bohley, Reiner Deitrich, Werner Fischer, Peter Grimm, Monika Haeger, Ralf Hirsch, Herbert Misslitz, Lutz Nagorski, Gerd Poppe, Ulrike Poppe, Wolfgang Ruddenklau, Sinico Schonfeld, Templin, Wolfgang Templin, Mario Wetzky.*

dividing line is clear. The people are on one side, the Stalinist section of the leadership of the regime on the other, basing itself on the forces of the political police.

"Among the insurgents are thousands of communists. A part of the Hungarian army is remaining neutral, but another part has joined the revolution. The workers have taken power in the factories. The student and worker youth is on the barricades. It is fighting against the Soviet troops called in by Gero." (2)

In the fall of 1956, Hungary gave the signal for a new Springtime of the Peoples, this time aimed against the bureaucracy. Bill Lomax, a British Marxist historian of this revolution, wrote:

"The Hungarian workers, in establishing direct control over their factories through the workers' councils, had thus in one blow both smashed the former state power ruled over by the Communist Party, and reopened the road to that society which had

been the original aim of Marxism and socialism — in which hierarchy would give way to equality, in which political institutions would be replaced by popular organs, in which political rule would be replaced by social power, and where 'the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things.'" (3)

The night of November 3 and 4, the Kremlin began their final military intervention.

On the occasion of the thirtieth anniversary of the beginning of the Hungarian revolution, the anti-bureaucratic oppositions of four countries — Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany — published a joint statement paying homage to the heroic Hungarian fighters and declaring their adherence to the values in defence of which they rose up. This is the first time that dissidents and oppositions in four East European countries have made a common statement on a question that goes beyond national frontiers. This is a sign of

their growing ties and an act of defiance to the bureaucratic regimes.

The most numerous signatories to this statement were Hungarian dissidents. The dissident movement in Czechoslovakia also made a major effort, within the limitations of its modest forces. In East Germany, it seems that the statement was not so widely circulated, but the opposition in that country is the least structured in East Europe today. The Polish signatories reflect only partially the breadth and diversity of the social movement as it appears today.

The first to react were the Polish political police. They immediately called in some of the signatories to inform them that once again they had committed a new act "contrary to the national understanding and to the interests of People's Poland." □

2. B.N. Lopienska, E. Szymanska, 'Stare numery', *Aneks, London, 1986, p.83.*

3. B. Lomax, 'Hungary 1956', *Allison & Busby, London, 1976, p.203.*

# "We must get rid of the dictatorship"

A NEW STATE of siege was declared in Santiago, following an attack on President Augusto Pinochet, for which the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR) claimed responsibility. Hundreds of people have been arrested, among them leaders of the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP), whose main components are the Chilean Communist Party (PCC), the Socialist Party-Almeyda and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). (1)

The interview below is with Jose Carasco, who was seized and subsequently assassinated by a para-military gang the day after it was originally published by *Amauta*, the newspaper of the United Mariateguist Party (PUM) of Peru. Jose Carasco was a journalist for the oppositionist magazine, *Analisis*, a leader of the journalists' union and a militant of the MIR. [The text has been slightly shortened for space reasons.]

*Question. Why is there disagreement today within the opposition?*

*Answer.* We think that a real feeling exists in society that the overwhelming majority of Chileans want to have an end to the dictatorship. Now that is being expressed at the level of the political parties.

This country, Chile, is going through the deepest economic, political and social crisis in its history. Since at least the end of the 1950s and during the 1960s, this crisis has meant that Chilean capitalism is incapable of reproducing itself widely enough to maintain its hegemonic domination over the country. This crisis calls for a radical solution.

There are two plans for dealing with this situation. The dictatorial government, which came to power through the coup d'etat, expresses the attempts of the bourgeoisie to resolve the crisis through a deepgoing reconversion of the economic and political apparatus. In this sense, the failure of the dictatorship is not only that of the military regime. It is also a failure of the big bourgeoisie to resolve a crisis of class rule in its favour. The parties in the Democratic Alliance have a project of resolving the crisis on the basis of upholding a capitalist schema, a system of bourgeois domination with some modifications, but fundamentally maintaining capitalist domination.

Conversely, the Popular Democratic Movement (MDP) expresses the determination to get out of the current im-

passee and also out of this profound crisis in a way that corresponds to the interests of the masses. Therefore what is at play here are different class interests.

*Q. Does this mean that there is no possibility of agreement between the MDP and the Democratic Alliance?*

A. We think that in spite of this basic divergence, the fundamental problem concerns the interests of the Chilean people themselves to decide their future. Today, the unity of popular forces is strategically vital in order to give the Chilean people an alternative that is popular, democratic and revolutionary, so that the crisis in Chile can be resolved definitively.

But we think that in the short term, the whole people, the sovereign masses, must decide that it is imperative to get rid of the dictatorship. To this end, it is necessary to achieve a unity in action of all the opposition forces on the points of agreement that exist. We need that in order to get an active, profound and continuous mobilization that will make the country ungovernable and thereby make it possible to put an end to the dictatorship and return sovereignty to the people. It must be the people who decide.

We think it is possible and necessary to reach a certain amount of agreement. But this involves an understanding that we must get rid of the dictatorship, that we must finish with it.

*Q. Do you think it is possible to reach agreement on the means of ending the dictatorship? That is, do you consider it possible to bring down the dictatorship through policies of civil disobedience, or do you think that it is indispensable to resort to armed force?*

A. I think a crucial point must be underlined here: the problem of what methods to use is not posed by the Chilean people. It is the regime, sectors of the right-wing and the imperialists who have tried to raise this problem in order to block the unification of the opposition forces. In Chile, from independence to the present day, violence and armed struggle have been part of the country's development into a nation. To deny this is to deny the history of our country. No-one is less violent than us. We love peace and love life, but more than anything we love justice and freedom, and we are prepared to give our lives if necessary.

Violence is not dependent on our wishes. It depends on the scale of the dictatorship's opposition to our achieving freedom, social justice and democracy in Chile.

*Q. But faced with Pinochet and, given the options for struggle that exist today, what means of struggle do you consider possible?*

A. Inasmuch as Pinochet has demonstrated that he has declared war on the people, the only alternative is to use all the forms of struggle that the people are capable of, including armed struggle, to get rid of the dictatorship.

Now, we think that along with the armed struggle there exist many other possibilities, such as non-violent action and civil disobedience. Taken together, they constitute a force for ending the dictatorship. Therefore, to claim that armed struggle prevents unity is a pretext for not taking forward our people's struggle. And, I repeat, the degree of violence to which the people will have to resort, the extent to which they will have to use arms, will be in direct relation to the ferocity with which the government, and the armed forces who support it, oppose our people's desire for liberty, justice and democracy.

*Q. Is the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) carrying out any armed actions at the moment?*

A. The MIR has carried out some armed actions since the coup d'etat. It has engaged both in propaganda and some armed actions because we are conscious that building a military force is part and parcel of a strategy

1. On the political situation before the state of siege was enacted, see "Thirteen may be Pinochet's unlucky number", by M. Javier in 'International Viewpoint' No. 105, September 29, 1986.

to defeat the military dictatorship. Without a military force that can defend our people and keep the armed forces from maintaining themselves in power — they are the true mainstay of the dictatorship — it will be impossible to achieve liberty and democracy.

We are very clear on this. We will not accept this solution. We will fight with all our forces and with any means to end this dictatorship and any that may follow it, whatever its facade.

**Q.** What is the perspective from a military point of view? For example, is there any agreement between the MIR and the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR)?


**A.** These organizations are different. The MIR is a politico-military organization. The Patriotic Front — as they say themselves — is purely a military organization for fighting the dictatorship.

The MIR is a political party, with a socialist programme, a revolutionary strategy for accumulating forces and a popular proletarian programme. It is, therefore, different from the FPMR. That means that the MIR does not just carry out armed actions but works also in the unions, among peasants and students, in the universities and in the poor districts. It is accumulating a social, political and also military strength. To say this is not to dismiss the FPMR — it is very important in the struggle of the Chilean people. I think we should applaud its development, but at the same time understand its character.

It is therefore entirely possible to reach some agreement on the military level, but that does not mean that the MIR has to limit its work in other social sectors that are also important. Today, the forces of both the MIR and its youth organization, Rebel Youth (Juventud rebelde), must be taken into account. Members of Rebel Youth are presidents of four universities, and one is vice-president of the Santiago Secondary School Students' Federation. The MIR is active in many secondary schools and has some union leaders in a number of places. The MIR and the FPMR have different conceptions of the struggle.

**Q.** The current politics of the MIR are based on a self-criticism of past positions, in particular the fact that it did not participate in the Popular Unity (UP), although today it is part of the MDP. In your opinion, what has changed in the MIR?

**A.** What has changed is the situation in Chile. It is this that must be studied. I think it is a question of different political times. The MIR characterized the Popular Unity period as a pre-revolutionary one. It thought that the enormous strength, vitality and revolutionary hopes of our people



could make it possible for the reformist project — which at that time meant Popular Unity — to open up the way to socialist revolution in Chile. This was the framework for its activity.

**Q.** Supposing we could return to 1972, would the MIR do the same things? Was it the only possibility?

**A.** Undoubtedly there were some errors, which we would correct, but fundamentally I think that the politics of the MIR were correct on the character of the period. They related to the time and the conditions in a country where profound and drastic changes were needed. Popular Unity brought enormous progress for the mass movement in its living conditions, morale and material well-being. Nonetheless, it also meant a frustration that created the conditions for the gestation of a military coup and for the dictatorship that we are experiencing today.

**Q.** But don't you think that if the MIR had been part of the UP the possibilities for influencing its project would have been bigger?

**A.** Other contradictions existed in the mass movement. There were different views of the period that we were going through and of the possibilities offered in 1972-73. I am one of those who not only refuse to accept but totally reject the black-and-white view that tries to put the blame on the MIR and other revolutionary forces for the defeat of the UP.

I think that the defeat of the UP was the result of a number of errors. Without doubt, the MIR itself made some mistakes. But above all the errors were in the conception of a strategy for achieving socialism by a route that proved to be impossible. The bourgeoisie weren't going to accept it, imp-

erialism still less. In the case of Chile, imperialist and bourgeois aggression, supported and maintained by the armed forces, condemned this plan to defeat.

Now, was this inevitable? I think not. I think that the Popular Unity government and the 1970 victory could have led to advances with a much clearer socialist perspective, one more deeply-rooted and determined, if there had been a policy of basing the struggle on the enormous strength of the mass movement. That is, if they had relied on the people to play the main role and organized a more deep-going mobilization. Our people then would have been able not only to prevent the coup d'etat, but also to move Chile in a socialist and revolutionary direction.

But these discussions are pointless. Today we are living in a different period, where a political situation exists that is absolutely and radically different from the time of the UP. Therefore the alliances formed are different.

Some forces who did not take part in the UP, like the MIR, and some who were part of it have progressed on these questions and have achieved a certain level of basic agreement on characterizing the present situation. Therefore, they are presenting common political proposals, expressed by the MDP.

This recognition, common work and this identity within the people creates today, I think, the conditions for a strategic alliance. This could include the MIR, the CP, the SP-Almeyda, MAPU (workers and peasants), the SP-24th Congress and other left forces. Such an alliance would not only make it possible to overthrow the dictatorship today, but to work together tomorrow to achieve social justice, revolution and socialism. □

# People's Referendum challenges government

IN THE LAST issue of *International Viewpoint* Charles Andre Udry described the revival of the mass movement in Bolivia and the attack of the government's repressive forces on a march of thousands of miners, their wives and children, and thousands of other working people on La Paz.

The following article from *Bandera Socialista*, the paper of the Bolivian section of the Fourth International, comments on an action that represented a turning point in the Bolivian political situation.

The People's Referendum held on July 25 by the Bolivian Confederation of Labor (COB), revealed a change in the attitude of the masses. In the elections of July 14, 1985, the people's frustration with the [popular front] government of the UDP had led intermediate sectors to vote for the Banzerite right or the so-called lesser evil of the National Revolutionary Movement [MNR -- old populist formation which has evolved far to the right].

For a year, this electoral victory of the right was touted as a turn-about by the Bolivian masses, who were supposed to have abandoned their leftist traditions. Paz Estenssoro and Banzer claimed to represent the majority and used this to justify their economic and political plans.

The People's Referendum put an end to this illusion of the 1985 elections, reducing the right to its real proportions, a tiny minority without a social base. According to the results published in the Cochabamba *Los Tiempos*, 71 per cent of the population over 18 years of age voted. Of these, 98.3 per cent voted against the MNR-ADN government, against the New Economic Policy, and rejected the foreign debt and the new tax law.

The percentage of those who voted on July 14, 1986 was much smaller. According to the INE, the number qualified to vote was 2,931,100. Only 1,729,365 actually voted. Blank and invalid votes numbered 224,309. Thus, the right and the "legal left" shared 1,504,056 votes, representing about half of the 1985 electorate.

The division of this half of the potential vote was 27 per cent for Paz Estenssoro and 28 per cent for Banzer. These percentages scored by

the right were completely discredited by the results of the People's Referendum.

In summing up the results of the 1985 elections, our party maintained that even in a context in which half of the electorate abstained, the victory of Banzer and Paz Estenssoro had only an episodic character. We said that this vote in no way represented the consolidation of a social current

*Bolivian miners (DR)*



with a fascist ideology.

The People's Referendum confirms our judgement. The episodic majority of the MNR-ADN went up in smoke. The intermediate layers, hard-hit by the crisis and cheated by the UDP, voted for the ADN, together with the oligarchy of big ranchers, industrialists and exporters. The bourgeois sectors, afraid of immediate social warfare, as well as the welloff petty bourgeoisie and popular sectors without a political instrument of their own and without alternatives, voted for the MNR. Today, the masses have abandoned those candidates. Those who called for a tactical way to stop Banzer are ashamed of themselves today.

Now, there is no longer any room for confusion. The "lesser evil" and the "greater evil" have united together in government to apply a policy harmful to the interests of the social sectors that supported them in 1985. The supporters of Paz Estenssoro and Banzer are seething today with frustration and bitterness and trying to move closer to the workers' and peasants' movement.

## Anti-government demonstrations

This mood has been swelling the big civic mobilizations in Oruro, Potosi, Cochabamba, Beni and even Santa Cruz [a traditionally right-wing stronghold]. For example, the mining policy, decentralizing COMIBOL [the state mining corporation], shutting down mines and firing thousands of miners is virtually wiping out a major market. The impact is being felt from the Beni ranchers, who cannot sell their meat, to the Cochabamba peasants who have nowhere to take their lettuce, carrots, potatoes, and so on. It includes also the small garment-makers and shoe-makers, as well as the noodle producers who had a steady flow of customers in the mining towns.

By showing the change in the position of the middle and popular strata which have now turned away from supporting Banzer and Paz Estenssoro, the People's Referendum has deprived this government and parliament of legitimacy. The MNR-ADN government, as well as the parliamentary majority on which it is based, have ceased to be representative. With its negative vote in the People's Referendum, the people have shown that they represent only a tiny minority of oligarchs, exploiters and agents of imperialism.

This is the truth, and, holding it up, we have to lay out revolutionary tactics and strategy for mobilizing the masses. □

# Democracy "nonexistent" in the North

IN LATE October, the Dutch Supreme Court ruled that Brendan McFarlane and Gerard Kelly, two escapees from the H-Blocks of Northern Ireland, could be extradited to the United Kingdom. Nonetheless the court qualified its decision. The two can be extradited only for the acts of violence they allegedly committed in breaking out of Long Kesh prison camp, and not for the charges for which they had been imprisoned, which include accusations of major terrorist actions against MacFarlane in particular.

Furthermore, the court stipulated that the two could not be extradited unless the British authorities could offer guarantees that they would not be mistreated after being returned to the British prison system.

## GERRY FOLEY

There is obviously a fundamental contradiction in this decision. McFarlane and Kelly had maintained that they were engaged in a guerrilla struggle against a foreign power illegitimately occupying part of their country and denying them their national rights. By not granting extradition on charges made against them for such activities, the Dutch court at least partially recognized their claims.

If the court did not consider that their actions in engaging in a military struggle against the occupying power were crimes, how could their actions in escaping from the captivity of their military enemies themselves be extraditable offences? The court obviously tried to avoid the real issue. But in shifting the final decision on extradition to the political authorities, it handed them an even hotter potato.

The republican prisoners had argued that Britain subjected the nationalists it jailed to systematic mistreatment in order to break them as representatives of an oppressed people and therefore to maintain a yoke of oppression over an entire population. By demanding guarantees before McFarlane and Kelly can be extradited, the court also implicitly admitted that this problem existed.

Moreover, how can the British authorities give guarantees against mistreatment of these two republicans without implicitly acknowledging that its prisons exercise counter-revolu-

tionary terror in violation of human rights and democratic principles?

It appears that it will take a long time, perhaps many months, before a deal can be made for the actual handing over of the prisoners. So there remains time to build pressure on the Dutch authorities to stop the extraditions.

There is a more immediate reason than the question of general political principle for opposing these extraditions. The political prisons in the North of Ireland are not only counter-

revolutionary slammers, they are institutions of systematic quasi-racist brutality. They are staffed by members of the Protestant loyalist caste developed by British rule to hold down the majority.

The British themselves have a very tenuous control over a layer trained to function as savage watchdogs. The loyalist riots against the British attempts to make even minor, formal concessions to the nationalist population in the North have again recently demonstrated the paranoid rage of social layers formed as a caste of jailers.

While the case of McFarlane and Kelly was being heard in the Netherlands, republican prisoners in the H-Blocks smuggled out messages that guards were boasting about what they would do to the two if they were returned.

McFarlane in particular played a major role in the H-Block hunger strikes in 1980-81 that led to the emergence of a mass political base for republicanism in the North of Ireland. The republican political organization, Sinn Fein, now gets nearly half of the Catholic vote in the North, and it is beginning to try to offer a political alternative for the masses of exploited and oppressed in the South.

In the following article, written for the Dutch prestige daily *Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant*, Brendan McFarlane described the conditions that he fought against. The article was not published in its entirety, but was later quoted by the paper in reports, and may have helped to put pressure on the court by influencing Dutch political opinion.

Letters and telegrams opposing the extradition of McFarlane and Kelly should be sent to the Minister van Justitie, Schedeldoekshaven 100, 2511 Ex. Den Haag, The Netherlands. □

*The British army "keeping the peace" in the North of Ireland (DR)*



## No extraditions

THE BRITISH requested that we be extradited to face the due process of the law as applied by their "democratic" institutions. The recognition by your court in April of the political character of the Irish struggle for liberation has been regarded by the British as an affront to democracy. What many people outside of Ireland fail to recognize is that democracy does not exist in the British-occupied North-east of Ireland.

### BRENDAN McFARLANE

At the outset of the current campaign for national liberation, in the early 1970s, normal rules of practice for due process of law were dispensed with and replaced by emergency legislation and an unashamedly political system, geared to deal with an insurrectionary situation:

Mass arbitrary arrests of nationalists and republicans; torture in military interrogation centres; internment without trial for indefinite periods (which was employed for more than four years); special non-jury courts, presided over by a single unionist, British-appointed judge; inordinately lengthy terms of imprisonment for offences of a political nature; "confessions" of suspects, extracted under torture, accepted as concrete evidence by the courts; "evidence" from paid perjurers, uncorroborated, accepted, leading to the incarceration of hundreds of nationalists and republicans; special prisons (H-Blocks) where we were continuously subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment, kept naked and deprived of books, papers, radio, fresh air, exercise, recreation, human contact, visits with family and friends, for a period of five years.

I personally spent three and a half years naked, on 24-hour per day lock-up, without furniture or bed (just a mattress on the floor and three blankets), and was on a number of occasions subjected to violent attacks by the Loyalist guards, requiring medical attention. After one particularly violent attack, I spent one week in hospital as a result of head injuries received.

I've been hosed down with fire hoses and had my cell flooded on numerous occasions, had snow shovelled through our broken windows as we slept, and had air freshener and urine put in our food on occasions. I

also spent regular periods in solitary isolation and was on a number of occasions forcibly held down and scrubbed from head to toe with rough deck-scrubbers. All this was inflicted upon me (and hundreds of other republicans) in an attempt to break my resistance to British attempts to force me to accept the label of common criminal as opposed to that of political prisoner. I refused to renounce my republican ideals.

The Northern Irish statelet is not a democratic elected entity and never was. It is an artificial state, created by the British in 1921, based on a sectarian headcount which gave a minority section of the Irish population, who were pro-British unionist/loyalist, a guaranteed majority and privileged position within the partitioned six counties, thus securing British control, influence, and strategic interests on the island. This partitioning was completely against and in total disregard for the democratic wishes of the overwhelming majority of the Irish people who had voted for independence.

The repeated calls today by British and Irish establishment figures for us to desist from armed struggle and to use the "democratic" process instead, rings very hollow indeed in the light of the nonsense, illegality and blatant non-democratic nature of British institutions in North-eastern Ireland.

Even on those occasions when we did use the electoral process, once it ran to our favour the British changed the legislation governing the procedures. For example, after Bobby Sands had been elected to the British parliament, the British changed the law to prevent prisoners from standing for election. On top of that they chose to completely ignore the democratic wish of 30,000 Irish voters who asked only for Bobby Sands to be given his life — proving further that their system of "democracy" is dependent on certain considerations — if it's not acceptable to the British they change the rules to suit.

Our electoral successes of recent years have also initiated further changes in rules — ex-prisoners must be out of prison for at least 5 years before they are eligible to engage in the electoral process. And our elected representatives are shunned by British administrators who simply refuse to discuss any matters with them or with delegations which consist of republican representatives.

Added to all this is the very limited access to the media afforded to our elected personnel, and even when this is achieved, it is a hostile media totally sympathetic to the British administration. Deliberate misinformation is constantly disseminated by the British

and is willingly carried, unchallenged, by the vast majority of the media. The BBC, which is government controlled, have axed many documentaries dealing with the Irish conflict whenever an objective viewpoint has been projected. The truth remains subdued by the British and is indeed the first casualty of the Anglo-Irish conflict. While such a situation prevails our struggle will remain a prolonged one indeed.

In seeking our extradition the chief objective is a political one as opposed to a legal wrangle. The same applies to their current high-level lobbying in the United States to have legislation passed which would enable Irish republicans to be handed over to the British. The granting of extradition by the American and Dutch authorities will in fact give unequivocal recognition to the "right" of the British government to occupy the territory of a foreign nation (namely North-eastern Ireland), and to subject our people to further injustice, torture and oppression.

There exists now an opportunity for your government to demonstrate their support for a people to be free to determine their own future without outside interference. Your own colonial past must surely be an influential factor in arriving at a decision now to advocate and fully support de-colonization of the North-east of Ireland by the British. Furthermore, the just right of the Dutch resistance fighters in struggling against Nazi occupation in all its forms must also leave no doubt as to the legitimacy of the Irish struggle for liberation against an unwanted foreign invader.

Both Gerry Kelly and myself are casualties of that liberation struggle which has continued, with little respite, for more than fifteen years. We have both been involved since we were teenagers, and are now approaching our mid-thirties. The British government recognized the conflict as political in essence and accorded us political status after our capture. This status was later withdrawn because we continuously attempted to return to the struggle on the streets — we attempted escapes at various intervals.

The final outcome of the extradition proceeding against us will, I believe, rest on international political considerations. While I am not optimistic, I still retain a little hope that your government may yet refrain from kicking an oppressed people in the teeth. It will be a sad irony indeed if the Dutch, who suffered so much under occupation themselves, are now to hand over those whose only crime is to resist occupation in Ireland. □

# Andean peasants fight for land

THE THIRD CONGRESS of the Peasants' Federation of the Department of Puno was held on August 28-31. It was attended by 1,250 delegates from every area of Puno. In this department, the peasants' struggle for the land goes back a very long time. (1) In 1920, the *Asociacion Pro-Indigena* (Native Rights Association) estimated that out of the 7,000 Indian rebellions in this region since the onset of Spanish colonization, 5,000 had been over the land taken from the peasant communities.

ARIANE MERRI

With the introduction of the agrarian reform administered by Velasco Alvarado's military regime, the appropriation of the peasants' land took another form. (2) The cooperative corporations that emerged from this agricultural restructuring became the new masters. They got the better land and virtually all the credits. The vast majority of the peasant communities remain confined to marginal low-productivity land. (3)

For years the peasants have been fighting for the dismantling of these cooperative corporations and distribution of their land to the peasant communities. In his election campaign Alan Garcia, the candidate of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) — who became president on July 28, 1985 — made a lot of promises to the peasants. (4) But the Puno peasants got tired of waiting for results and, with their organizations, they went into action in early 1986, occupying land and demanding that it be divided up.

The process of capitalist development in Peru led at the end of the 1950s to a diversification of the economy, which gave rise to the emergence of new strata in the bourgeoisie and to a revival of mass struggles, especially in the countryside. The old landholding oligarchy was challenged from all sides. Although they were brutally suppressed, the peasant movements that shook the country at the time revealed the backwardness of the agrarian structures.

Velasco Alvarado's military government, after taking power in 1968, had a dual objective. First, it sought to shore up the country's political

stability, which had been threatened by the peasant mobilizations. Second, it aimed to modernize the existing economic structures, so that Peru could meet competition from its neighbors.

In this strategy, agrarian reform had a key importance. It was necessary to institute a form of agricultural development that could support a rapid process of industrialization. On June 25, 1969, an agrarian reform was enacted into law by Decree 17/116. It was given a very radical appearance. Nearly a million hectares were expropriated from holdings of over 50 hectares in the coastal area or 30 hectares of irrigated land in the highlands. Their owners were paid compensation in the form of bonds, which they were called upon to invest in industry.

Subsequently, another decree obliged the banks to accept these bonds as security for investments. So, in the last analysis, the bill for these expropriations had to be paid by all Peruvians.

In all, 43.6 per cent of the arable

land (2,874,000 hectares), 59.1 per cent of which was irrigated, were affected by the agrarian reform. (5) Only 13 per cent of the land was allocated to individuals or to the peasant communities. The remaining 87 per cent was given to the cooperative corporations [*Asociaciones Asociativas*] set up on the foundations of the former estates. (6)

There are 1,984 such cooperative corporations according to official figures. They are divided into three types: Social Interest Agricultural Companies (SAIS), Agrarian Producers' Cooperatives (CAP), and Socially Owned Rural Enterprises (ERPS). They monopolize the better land and absorb almost all agricultural credit, at the expense of the communities. At the same time, they employ a tiny minority of the economically active population in this sector, about 120,000 people at the beginning of the 1970s. (7)

The workers in these cooperatives, the *feudatarios*, are supposed to be partners. In fact, they have become agricultural workers who are paid less than the subsistence minimum set by the government. The managers and technicians have become the new bosses.

## Food deficit growing

These enterprises are oriented toward the export trade. The result is that Peru's food deficit has been steadily growing from year to year. While in 1971, 34 per cent of cereals' consumption was covered by imports, this proportion increased to 46 per cent in 1978. The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates that Peru imported 119 million dollars' worth of food products in 1969, the date of the agrarian reform, and 231 million dollars' worth in 1976. This sum reached 500 million dollars in 1984. (8)

The cooperative corporations very quickly came to be seen as new *latifundia* [big landed estates] by the peasant communities. The res-

1. The major territorial subdivisions in Peru are called departments, the "provinces" are subdivisions of the departments.

2. On October 3, 1968, a military coup ousted President Belaunde Terry and put General Velasco Alvarado in power.

3. The peasant communities represent a vestige of Indian tribal collectivism. The Quecha word for them, "ayllu," also means "clan."

4. Alan Garcia was elected on April 14, 1985. See "Political recomposition after the general elections," in *International Viewpoint*, No. 76, May 20, 1985.

5. 'Le Monde diplomatique,' November 1981. Only 2.2% of the total land in Peru (2,285,215 square kilometers) is cultivated (28,275 square kilometers). Pasture land and woods take up 25% of the

surface, or 311,304 square kilometers (31,130,400 hectares).

6. The General Directorate of Agrarian Reform (DGRA), 'Le Monde diplomatique,' March 1980. The 1970 statute officially recognized 2,939 peasant communities, representing 3.5 million inhabitants scattered over 18 million hectares. Only 432 communities benefited from the agrarian reform. Moreover, not all the existing communities are recognized, far from it.

7. Mariano Valderama, "La reforme agraire peruvienne, vers de nouvelles formes de domination du capital," in 'Reforme agraire et revolution populaire en Amerique latine.' CIERA, Managua, 1982.

8. Sylvie Ballay, "L'agriculture a l'epreuve du Liberalisme," 'Problems d'Amerique latine,' No. 73.

ponse was a wave of mobilizations and land occupations at the beginning of the 1970s. Out of these mobilizations was forged the Peasant Confederation of Peru (CCP), which very quickly established itself as the country's major peasant organization. All the government's attempts to cut the ground out from under the CCP through setting up a rival organization, the National Agrarian Confederation (CNA), failed.

In August 1975, a coup d'état put General Morales Bermudez in power, and then in 1980 power was handed back to civilians. Belaunde Terry, who had been kicked out by the military in 1968, returned to power, along with the rightist Action Popular (AP). Under the auspices of the IMF, he plunged into a policy of decontrolling prices and reprivatizing the agricultural and industrial enterprises that had come under state supervision. That was the direction of the Law for Promoting and Developing Agriculture passed on November 17, 1980.

The government intended to promote exports of tropical products, with the effect of further impoverishing a large section of the peasantry, that is, the producers of consumer goods. The enterprises that up until then had marketed agricultural products passed into the private sector.

This return to free enterprise guaranteed domination of the market for a few big companies. They could set prices to suit themselves and ruin the small and medium producers, who could not keep up. The result was the same for consumer products.

The restructuring of the cooperatives that Belaunde Terry proposed had nothing in common with the peasants' demands. It did not at all involve distributing land to the peasants but rather broke up these cooperatives and returned them to the private sector in order to open the way for the development of capitalist agriculture. That, in fact, was what the cooperatives were supposed to accomplish, but until then they had failed to do so.

In May 1983, an unprecedented event occurred. The first National Congress of Farmers' Unity (CUNA) was held. It brought together both the peasant organizations such as the CCP and the organizations that represented the cooperatives opposed to Belaunde Terry's privatization projects. He had united everyone against his policy. Despite the lack of consensus on the question of the cooperatives, the CUNA established a program of demands that, in catastrophic circumstances of successive drought and flooding, were common to all.

The April 14, 1985, elections brought Alan Garcia to the presi-



dency. He got 47 per cent of the vote, against the coalition headed by a totally discredited Belaunde Terry, which got a pathetic 5 per cent. On the other hand, the United Left (IU), got 23 per cent of the vote cast. (9)

The new president enjoyed an immense popularity. He had made a lot of promises to the peasants, and still more to those of the traditionally neglected Andean communities. He promised to restructure the cooperatives, interest-free credit and agricultural development programs for the "Andean Trapeze" — the highland departments.

#### Peasants begin land occupations

In the department of Puno, the agrarian structure left behind by Velasco is particularly grotesque. The cooperatives got 49.76 per cent of the land in the department, or 1,766,180 hectares. The peasant communities hold no more than 155,882 hectares, or 4.39 per cent. Only 44,059 hectares, 1.24 per cent, were distributed to individuals. Moreover, the land held by the cooperative corporations is good quality, unlike that given to the communities.

In the department of Puno, there are about 1,300 communities and *parcialidades*, of which only 582 were officially recognized by the 1970 statute. (10) Thirty-nine communities, 3.9 per cent of those recognized, are associated with SAIS's, while the SAIS's in Puno alone represent 39 per cent of the cooperative corporations in Peru.

The result of this policy has been a decline in production for internal consumption (3.6 per cent in 1985-1986), for the advantage of export groups, which increased by 6.9 per cent in the same period. Along with that, 400,000 persons joined the exodus to the cities.

Tired of waiting for delivery on promises that have been made so often and never kept, peasants in the department started to occupy

SAIS land in December 1985. The Kunurama, Rio Grande and Azangaro enterprises were occupied one after the other. The APRA government sent in the army to evict the peasants.

Although the department has not been officially put under the state of emergency, it has been in fact put under military rule on the pretext of combating Sendero Luminoso.

Nonetheless, in February 1986, the government was obliged to issue two decrees (005 and 006) providing for agrarian restructuring, especially in the department of Puno. These decrees recognized that the SAIS's were disproportionately large, a source of corruption, and that they had marginalized almost all of the peasantry.

Decree 005 is applicable throughout the country. While the need for restructuring the cooperative corporations was recognized, only the General Directorate of Agrarian Reform (DGRA) was authorized to carry out this process. The peasant communities and their trade-union organizations were effectively denied any role.

Decree 006 applies only to the department of Puno. It is an implicit recognition of a particularly acute situation, but also of the combativity of the peasants in the region. While the government is obliged to undertake to restructure the 44 cooperative corporations in the department of Puno, its plans rest entirely on the state bureaucracy, with possible involvement of the armed forces.

There is an explicit refusal to involve the peasant organizations on the provincial and district level, as well as the Peasant Federation of the Department of Puno (FDCP), which is linked to the CCP. The whole process remains in the hands of APRA functionaries. That means they will implement the reform at their discretion, in accordance with a tradition of political patronage.

This scheme is also designed to destroy the independent class-struggle organizations that the peasants have built. This applies equally to the United Peasants' Federation of Melgar (FUCAM), which initiated the land occupations in December 1985, and the FDCP. The government is trying to revive APRA's own peasant organizations, which are totally unrepresentative today.

9. A left coalition made up mainly of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP), the United Mariateguist Party (PUM) and the National Union of the Revolutionary Left (UNIR).

10. "Comunidades" and "parcialidades" refer to two types of peasant communities. The first is characterized by communal ownership of the land, which does not exclude private plots. The second is characterized by private land tenure.



Finally, despite a recognition of the need for restructuring the cooperative corporations, in the government's plan they remain the center and power-house of agricultural development. The peasant communities get the left-overs.

As an alternative to this scheme, the peasant organizations — the CCP, FUCAM, and the FDCP — have proposed their own plan. It was put before the National Assembly by Izquierda Unida (IU) deputies and rejected by APRA. [See the interview with the general secretary of the FDCP.]

Although the government promised to implement its law within 120 days, the peasants were left waiting for the land to be handed over. At the beginning of September, the peasants who occupied the Kunurama cooperative got 5,000 of the 10,000 hectares initially assigned to them. The cooperative corporation still held 39,000 hectares. Significantly, the land was handed over under the eye of the army, which is ever-present in the region.

The FDCP congress decided to occupy the land the peasants needed without relying on the good will of Alan Garcia, and to defend these actions against the growing military pressure on the region by building peasants' self-defence organizations.

Not only has the government sought to discredit the peasant leaders and the IU representatives supporting them by accusing them of belonging to Sendero Luminoso, it has not hesitated to resort to violence in an attempt to break the Puno peasant movement.

The official violence of the armed forces has been compounded by that of APRA's paramilitary commandos, which have directed their attacks at the same time against the peasants and their self-defence groups; IU activists; and the Church, which through Monsignor Francisco de Alaroché, bishop of Puno, has taken the side of the peasants. [See the PUM press statement.]

The unification of all the peasant organizations in the FDCP is well underway. The government has announced a second distribution of land. Undoubtedly, this sudden concern is not unrelated to the fact that municipal elections are to be held in November throughout Peru.

The popularity that Alan Garcia enjoyed at the time of his election has sagged considerably. The demagoguery of this politician who called himself the "president of the peasant communities" has fizzled out, and these elections are a major test both for the left as a whole, and, more broadly, for the Peruvian mass movement. □

## Guerrillas and militarization

ON MAY 18, 1980, the day of the elections that were to put in office a civilian government after 12 years of military rule, Sendero Luminoso (SL) burned the ballot boxes in the village of Chuschi in the department of Ayacucho. In this way it showed that it was declaring open war against the state, regardless of whether the government was civilian or military.

Six years passed between that action, which went almost unnoticed at the time, and the prison mutiny staged by Sendero activists on June 18 and 19, when the Socialist International was meeting in Lima. The army, sent in to suppress the uprising, killed several hundred prisoners.

In the beginning, SL only attacked material objectives, dynamiting bridges and rail lines. In 1981, it started carrying out more daring operations and executing those it called collaborators with the government. In 1982, the movement no longer confined its activity to the departments of Huancavelica and Apurimac but extended them to Lima. In February 1986, the capital was put under a state of siege, with the institution of a curfew from 1.00 a.m. to 5.00 a.m. At present, 25 provinces of six departments are under a state of siege.

While it is difficult to draw a balance sheet of Sendero Luminoso's activities, if only because it only exceptionally signs its actions, the officially published figures, give an idea of the growth of the movement.

In 1980, when Sendero Luminoso first appeared, there were 261 operations (terrorist attacks, sabotage and guerrilla actions). This figure rose to

701 operations in 1981; 891 in 1982; 1,226 in 1983; 2,408 in 1984; and 3,079, or nearly ten a day, in 1985.

The emergence of Sendero Luminoso in Ayacucho was the result of a situation common to the Andean highlands as a whole: poverty, injustice, subjection, an ancient tradition of humiliation for the Indian population. The reopening of the University of San Cristobal in Huamanga in 1959 provided a catalyst for this discontent. It was to play the role of detonator of the movement and of a breeding ground for the cadres of the guerrilla organization.

It was through university students who became teachers, nurses and agronomists that Sendero Luminoso was to begin to build a base among the peasants in the region. Moreover, a lot of Sendero Luminoso fighters are high-school or university students from peasant backgrounds who have lived in Lima. Education has only increased their frustration, owing

*Poverty in Peru: one reason for the support for Sendero Luminoso (DR)*



to the lack of perspectives in a crisis-racked society incapable of offering them any social advancement.

The first phase of Sendero's strategy, between May 1980 and the end of 1982, was carried off with a minimum of violence. When there was violence, it was against the elements that had dominated the communities for centuries and made themselves odious by their abuses: merchants engaging in usury, judges, mayors, landowners who took community lands and cattle thieves. This policy won them the support of the population. For example, at the end of 1982, 15,000 people from Ayacucho attended the burial of Edith Lagos, one of the movement's leaders.

This attitude was to change when the Senderistas began to forbid the peasants to develop saleable crops and, in order to starve the towns, ordered them to confine themselves to purely subsistence agriculture. The brutal methods Sendero Luminoso used against those who refused to carry out these orders helped to deprive it of part of its initial capital of sympathy.

It is in the villages and small towns in the high Andean valleys that Sendero Luminoso put down its deepest roots. The poor inhabitants of these settlements derive only a part of their income from agriculture. A lot of them are obliged to supplement seasonal agricultural work with other occupations that take them out of their villages.

These semi-peasants are at the same time itinerant peddlers, building workers or miners, depending on what jobs they can find. This situation, far from being specific to Ayacucho, is common to most of the Andean departments. It has been aggravated by the effects of the economic crisis that is hitting Peru and breaking down the traditional social structures.

The rural exodus, which is yearly swelling the shantytowns of Lima, is helping to magnify the numbers of the unemployed or at best semi-employed who are living from hand to mouth, going from one precarious job to another.

According to Alan Garcia himself, 70 per cent of the Peruvian population live on the margins of the economy. This is one of the factors that explains the spread of the movement outside Ayacucho, its birthplace.

The state of emergency brought a suspension of constitutional guarantees and authorized the repressive forces to make searches and arrests without any warrant. The militarization of entire areas of Peru, under the pretext of fighting Sendero Luminoso, has had tragic consequences for the people.

Since the proclamation on October 12, 1981, of a state of siege in five provinces of the department of Ayacucho, and especially since the official involvement of the army in December 1982 and the extension of the state of siege to the entire department, the number of victims has been increasing at a staggering rate.

While 11 deaths were registered in 1981, there were more than a hundred in 1982 and 2,000 in 1983. In most cases, these deaths were the

result of outrages by the military committed by way of reprisals. The official total of victims has risen to 8,256 since 1980. But to this figure should be added thousands of "disappeared," kidnapped by the military or by the special units, the Sinchis. The human rights organizations have made the count, but their figures are probably below the real ones. And, on top of this, thousands of people are in prison on charges of belonging to Sendero Luminoso. □

## "We want a real agrarian reform"

THE MAIN ISSUES debated in the third congress of the Puno Department Peasants' Federation, held August 28-31, are described in this interview with Julian Paucar, outgoing general secretary of the organization. At the center of discussion were restructuring the cooperative enterprises, distributing land to the Indian communities, peasants' self-defence and the struggle for a regional government. (1)

It had been expected that a thousand delegates would turn up, but the final number was 1,250. The fight waged by the peasants in Puno today is one of the focal points of the mass mobilization against the APRA government. The following interview was given to Frank Slegers on August 31 in Puno.

*Question. What is the structure of land holding like in the Puno region after Velasco's reforms?*

*Answer.* Under the Velasco government an agrarian reform was carried out in Puno. The bulk of the land that was previously in the hands of big landowners is now held by business cooperatives.

In Puno, among the cooperatives formed 16 are Social Interest Agricultural Societies (SAIS), 16 are Agrarian Producers' Cooperatives (CAPS), and five are Socially Owned Rural Enterprises (ERPS). These cooperatives hold 1,800,000 hectares of land.

While there were more than 500 Indian communities on the register, only 74 have benefited from this agrarian reform, being allotted small plots of land, which have often been arid or rocky. The peasant communities have remained marginalized in this process of agrarian reform.

It should be added that a thousand communities were *parcialidades* and as such were not officially recognized as communities. They were not entitled to a single plot of land in this agrarian reform process.

For this reason, in the department of Puno, the bulk of the land is concentrated in cooperatives. The peasant communities do not have the land. They have been pushed way up in the mountains, into the most arid and rocky areas, where irrigation is non-existent and impossible. The cooperatives have gotten the flatlands where irrigation is easy, which greatly facilitates production.

In these cooperatives, there are few peasants. Most of the peasants are in the communities or the *parcialidades*. The peasants, who were supposed to be partners in the cooperatives, have in fact become agricultural workers.

The situation in the department of Puno can be summed up as follows. On the one hand, we have cooperatives that include few peasants and hold a great deal of land. On the other, we have peasant communities containing the majority of the peasants, which have little land and that is of poor quality.

1. See also the interview with Hugo Blanco in 'International Viewpoint' No. 107, October 27, 1986.

*Q. The third congress of the Peasant Federation is in progress now. What are the issues at this congress and what are its objectives?*

*A. In this third congress, we are going to examine the problem of the land as it arises in our region. One of our major objectives is to change the agrarian structure. We do not agree with the way the land was distributed under Velasco.*

*We want a real agrarian reform. And that can only be accomplished through a genuine restructuring of the cooperatives. As I have already said, these enterprises hold the bulk of the better land, and therefore we want a restructuring of land tenure. We want all these cooperatives in Puno liquidated, because this sort of cooperative is not suited to this department. It is good for nothing.*

*We want the land distributed to the peasant communities, to the *parcialidades* and to the people who work in these enterprises, who are agricultural workers. When these enterprises were created, the managers and technicians become new bosses. We want to see the domination that these managers exercise in these enterprises disappear. The laborers who are working the land should be able to manage themselves and combine to form democratic agricultural cooperatives or small communal enterprises.*

*That is the only way to assure the growth of production and of productivity in the department of Puno.*

*Q. What is the government's policy toward this proposal?*

*A. Alan Garcia's government has for years failed to heed the demand raised by the Puno peasants. Recently in a struggle in the Melgar province, we occupied the lands of a cooperative, taking back 10,000 hectares. In another part of the department, Acura, in the same way, we took back 15,000 hectares. This has enabled us to advance our struggle and to put pressure on the government, which has found itself forced to issue Decree 006 on restructuring the cooperatives.*

*The government promised to apply this law within 120 days. The deadline has passed, and the decree has not been applied. The 15-day period for appeals has also passed, without any results. Alan Garcia's promise about the 305,000 hectares involved in this region has remained only words. In practice, he has done nothing. He had also promised to give 700,000 hectares to the peasant communities. That also remained a dead letter.*

*Altogether, he had promised to*

*give more than a million hectares to the people in various communities, but nothing was delivered. As a result, in this congress, we are going to decide to carry out the restructuring ourselves. The agricultural workers [*feudalorios*] are taking part in this congress. Together we are going to agree to restructure the cooperatives ourselves. We are going to fight to get the changes carried out legalized.*

*Q. So, land occupations and land seizures are one of the main objectives of this congress?*

*A. That is in fact one of the central objectives of our congress, to take action ourselves to take the land we need. We can't spend our time waiting on the convenience and good will of the government. We went through that experience with the previous government of Belaunde Terry. We mobilized hundreds of times to put pressure on him. He promised us restructuring, and five years went by and it was not done. Exactly the same thing could happen with this government. So, we have decided to carry out this restructuring ourselves by means of land occupations.*

*Q. In your opinion, how will the government respond to these occupations? By violence? If that*

*happens, how are you going to face up to that problem?*

*A. The government is trying to impose its will on us by violence. For example, in Melgar province, which is part of Puno, the government responded to the peasants' demands by establishing military rule. This militarization is not only aimed against that province but against all the peasant communities in the region.*

*So, we have to take up the problem of militarization in this congress, and not just in words, not just saying that "we don't want militarization," because the government has already imposed it, has already put it into practice. We are already under military rule.*

*In this third congress, we are going to pose the question of peasants' self-defence. What we are discussing is largely how to guarantee in practice the non-militarization of the department of Puno.*

*Q. In this context, what is the role of Sendero Luminoso?*

*A. Sendero Luminoso showed up in this department at the start of the 1980s. I think that the root of the problem is that all the successive governments never paid any attention to the peasants or even, to a very large extent, the working people as a whole. That is why*

*Peru's black economy is mushrooming (DR)*



the group appeared as an armed group, because there was no possibility of mere paper-work solutions. The group started out by saying that it was necessary first to take power in order to guarantee that attention would be paid to Puno on the national level.

*Q. But this congress is not supporting Sendero Luminoso?*

A. In the congress, we have not felt any presence of Sendero Luminoso. We don't feel it in the countryside either.

*Q. The other objective of the congress is the fight for regional autonomy and for a regional government. What is the significance of this demand?*

A. We want Puno to have a regional government. Some of us in this congress are perfectly aware that we cannot achieve it within the framework of this system. It is necessary to change this system, to replace it with another more just system in which there will be neither rich nor poor. That is the real guarantee of a regional government. But we are fighting here and now for a regional, autonomous government for Puno.

## PERU IN STATISTICS

### Population

19 million — 46% Indian, 38% Creole, 15% white; 63% urban.

Lima: 5.5 million inhabitants, 500 shantytowns, covering an area of 2.5 million hectares.

Arequipa: 800,000 inhabitants.

Cuzco: (in the Andes) 924,000 inhabitants.

### Infant mortality

100 per 100,000 births; in the Indian areas in the Andes, 250 per 100,000.

### Life expectancy

58 years (it was 62 ten years ago), 45 years in the Andes.

Gross National Product per capita 1982:1,260 dollars; 1983:1,040 dollars.

### Economically active population

Agriculture 39% (12% of GNP)

Industry 18% (40% of GNP)

Services 43% (48% of GNP)

### Inflation (official figures)

1980:59.2%; 1981:75.4%; 1982:64.4%; 1983:111.2%; 1984:110%

Foreign debt (in thousands of millions of dollars)

1980:9.6; (56% of Gross Domestic product); 1985:13.9 (80% of GDP).

In this country, everything depends on Lima. We don't agree with that. We want to solve the problems we face ourselves. Take for example the case of the restructuring of the cooperative enterprises in Puno. That is a specific problem of the department. So, it should be solved here. That is why we are fighting for a regional government.

*Q. How does the question of the Quechuas and Aymaras fit into this regional government framework?*

A. The Quechuas and Aymaras are two nationalities in the department of Puno. In the northern part, Quechua is spoken; in the south, Aymara. We are all working together in an organized way in the Federation. There is no discrimination. Every one of us is using his or her own language, and I don't think there will be a lot of problems in the context of a regional government.

We are aware that the bulk of the population of Puno are peasants, and so we will fight to assure that the peasants have a majority in the regional government.

*Q. What balance sheet have the peasants drawn of the various political organizations and formations, of APRA and the Izquierda Unida?*

A. APRA has been in government for a year now. We have seen it at work, and it has not solved any of the problems of the peasants, of the countryside. And we are not the only ones. All sections of the ordinary people have seen this.

For example, Puno suffered from floods caused by rising waters in Lake Titicaca. The government turned a blind eye to the problem, just offering us reassuring words as usual. It did nothing in practice.

On the other hand, some aid was sent to the department by international bodies. Under various pretexts, the governmental authorities in the region did not distribute this aid. They kept it, and now that an election campaign is approaching, they are distributing it to get people to vote for the government party, APRA.

We say that this government is an anti-peasant government incapable of solving the peasants' problems. In his election campaign, Alan Garcia made us a lot of promises. So far we haven't seen him even start to deliver on them.

The IU is playing a very important role in the Puna region. In the peasant federation, we have prepared a bill on restructuring, the sort of law we want for Puno. But we are not members of parliament and cannot present it. Deputies have to in-

roduce it, and the IU comrades have helped us a lot in this respect. We have three IU deputies for this department who have brought the restructuring question into the Chamber of Deputies. They didn't get a hearing. The bill has not been discussed. The government has not bothered to apply the bill that it passed as an alternative.

*Q. What place does the Federation hold in the Peruvian people's movement as a whole?*

A. The peasants have to struggle, but experience has taught us that we cannot fight isolated in our own corner. We have to unite all the people's forces on the departmental and national level. In the peasant federation, we are going to take part in the second preparatory meeting for a People's Assembly, which is to be held in January. We will be at that meeting and at the People's Assembly, of which we are a component.

We will make known there the point of view of the peasants and the alternatives we'll propose. In Puno, we have a lot of experience with people's assemblies, because we think they are the best way to bring together all the people's forces in the department at all levels. For example, at the time of the last land occupation in Airibiri we held a people's assembly. The people decided to strike in support of the peasants, and we then proceeded to occupy the land.

*Q. What sort of government does the Federation propose for Peru as a whole?*

A. We want Peru to have a government that corresponds to the aspirations and needs of the people. In the last elections, it was the parties of the right that won out, the APRA. The peasants were taken in by Alan Garcia's promises. But his demagogic policy seems to have fizzled. We think that our role as a federation is also to clarify political questions, and our objective is a workers' and peasants' government.

*Q. What role do women play in the Federation?*

A. Last year in Puno, we organized a departmental federation of peasant women. That is part of the Federation's organizing plan. Sometimes the men have played active roles in the Federation, while our companions have been left at the sidelines. So now, women are organizing in order to strengthen the departmental federation. To achieve our objectives, we need everybody, men and women. □

## White terror in Puno

ALTHOUGH THE department of Puno has not been officially put under a state of siege, it has not been any the less affected by the militarization of the country. The official violence of the army is now being compounded by the activity of APRA's paramilitary commando groups. In an effort to stop the growth of the peasant mobilization, intimidation, threats of all sorts and outrages against individuals and headquarters of organizations have been stepped up in recent months.

The following is a press statement from the parliamentary group of the United Mariateguist Party (PUM), issued on September 3, 1986, from Lima. This Peruvian revolutionary organization, because of the important place it holds in the peasant movement, has been a special target of the terror campaign.

Puno suffers from systematic violence resulting from the poverty, exploitation and marginalization to which the peasantry is subjected. The cause of this is the unequal and unjust distribution of the land, which disregards the rights of the peasant communities.

This violent condition is aggravated by the frustrations created by the government's broken promises. At the time of the election campaign, it made the following promises:

- \* To implement economic development plans calling for increasing the cultivation of winter wheat, introducing new varieties of potatoes and increasing the production of trout. Nothing came of this.

- \* To provide interest-free credit to agriculture. The peasants in the [native] communities benefited little from this because of their marginalization in the system of land tenure.

- \* To change the pattern of land ownership in 120 days, starting in February (State Decree 006-MA). Today, the land has still not been turned over to the peasant communities.

- \* To grant regional autonomy to the province [department]. But nothing has been done in this regard.

- \* It announced that it would provide aid for flood victims. Such help was minimal, and in many cases it was handed out in a partisan way.

This climate of violence has been exacerbated in two ways. On the

one hand, Sendero Luminoso has carried out terrorist acts without regard for the mass movement, barbarously executing people without any respect for humanity. On the other, the province of Melgar has been to all intents and purposes put under military rule. The army illegally jailed peasants on June 22 and 29 in the Nunoa district. It carried out these actions without any legal authority in a zone that is not under the state of siege and where guarantees have not been suspended.

### APRA campaign

In this situation of violence, sections of APRA have mounted a concentrated campaign against the PUM, the Church and the people's associations in Puno. This is a way of creating the psychological and social conditions for repression against them. Among these attacks, the following can be noted:

- \* Slanderous allegations by APRA leader A Romulo Leon against Javier Diez Canseco, Alberto Quintanilla, Romeo Paca (the mayor of Puno) and the TECIRA institution. (1)

- \* Slanders by Alberto Valencia, an APRA deputy, against Alberto Quintanilla and two other Izquierda Unida (IU) deputies, claiming that they were Sendero Luminoso infil-

trators in parliament.

- \* The campaign of intimidation waged by Luis Denas Peralta, former sub-prefect of Puno and today APRA's candidate for mayor of the city. This campaign has been aimed against the PUM, TECIRA. Moreover, in this context Hilda Escobedo and Maria Laos, poor-neighborhood leaders, have been accused of being "subversives."

- \* The statements published by all the major papers and magazines accusing the mass movement in Puno of being pro-Sendero Luminoso, because it is pressing for compliance with its demands (statements published in the second half of July).

Since July, we have been keeping account of acts of white terror against the mass movement in Puno. The following are some examples of such attacks, which have been directed at the Puno Department Peasants Federation; the Church; mass institutions such as TECIRA; people's leaders; IU candidates [municipal elections are to be held in November]; and left political leaders.

The following are examples of the white terror directed against the mass movement in Puno since July:

*Against the Puno Department Peasants' Federation:*

July 16. Dynamite bomb explodes in its headquarters.

August 7. Its headquarters is destroyed by a powerful bomb.

August 30. Two bombs planted at its congress, one of which explodes.

*Against the Church:*

August 3. The antenna of Radio Onda Azul is destroyed by two charges, one placed at the bottom and the other at a height of 30 meters.

August 4. Carlos Pacheco Giron threatens and beats up a Radio Onda Azul journalist, Raymundo Paquista.

September 8. A bomb explodes in the headquarters of the Aid Committee of the Diocese of Ayaviri, which obtained the release of the 135 peasants jailed by the army in Nunoa.

September 22. A bomb destroys the main door of the Azangaro parish hall.

*Against institutions:*

August 7. Three bombs destroy the headquarters of TECIRA.

*Against mass leaders:*

July 16. A bomb explodes in the home of Hawar Orihuela, falsely charged by the judicial authorities of subversive connections.

August 8. Three hooded men come into the home of Hilda Escobedo, a neighborhood leader, threatening her and accusing her of being a subversive.

1. These three are all members of the PUM. TECIRA is a peasants' aid and support organization.



September 8. A bomb explodes in the home of professor Norma Caceres, a member of the Ayaviri Aid Committee.

*Against IU candidates:*

August 19. A bomb explodes in the home of Jose Llosa Lanza, bank workers' leader and candidate for mayor of the province of San Roman.

August 22. Terrorist attack on the home of Marcelini Pachari, candidate for mayor in Azangaro.

August 24. Terrorist attack against the headquarters in which a campaign party was in progress, attended by Marcelino Pachari.

August 28. Terrorist attack against the home of a candidate for the city council in Azangaro.

*Against political leaders:*

July 16. Threatening letters received by Romeo Paca, mayor of Puno, accusing him of being a subversive.

July 23. Letter received by Augusto Castro, Deputy mayor of Puno, demanding that he turn over 100,000 Intis to insure the lives of his daughters.

July 8. Terrorist attack against the home of Deputy Alberto Quintanilla in Puno.

*Others:*

July 22. Terrorist attack against a bakery in Azangaro, whose owner has been accused of aiding Sendero Luminoso.

The gravest act of terrorism occurred during the Peasant Federation's Third Congress, at 10.50 p.m.

on August 30. Two powerful bombs were planted at the entrance to the Universidad del Altiplano, where the congress was in session.

This incident could have had disastrous consequences and even cost lives. It was thanks to the action of the chief of the peasant self-defence guards that no one was injured. After finding one of the two bombs, he carried it far from the building, while the other members of the peasant self-defence guard herded the 850 delegates present into the middle of the hall, thus getting them far away from the place where the second bomb exploded.

**Terrorist acts**

At the moment of the explosion senators Javier Diez Canseco and Andres Lunas Vargas, Deputy Alberto Quintanilla, Hugo Blanco, Ricardo Letts, president of CUNA, and Saturnino Corimayhua, general secretary of the CCP, were in the hall. (Some 1,250 delegates had been attending the congress, but about 400 of them had left the building and were in the city of Puno before the incident.)

In view of the gravity of these facts, we demand that the top authorities in the central government and APRA clear up the following points:

\* For what reason and with what purpose were Carlos Pacheco Giron and Felipe Padilla Diaz [APRA activists] in Puno in August? The first represents himself as a technical advisor in the Ministry of Transport. He is well known for his paramilitary activities, as is his brother Arturo. The second is supposed to be a government advisor in housing. These so-called advisors created a certain apprehension in the hotel where they arrived, accompanied by strange-looking people, all armed with machine guns.

\* What sort of work is done by "APRA's Internal and External Security"? In Puno, it is headed by Antonio Olave, who was seen on August 7 at noon near Deputy Quintanilla's home and the TECIRA headquarters, where on that night the terrorist attacks we have described occurred.

\* What is the meaning of the various reports about training given to this brigade on the islands of Amantani and Anapia in Lake Titicaca, in Ventilla and on Mount Cancharani in Puno?

\* What are the precise missions of the innumerable advisors and commission members now in Puno at government expense and supposedly on government business?

\* Do the police forces intend to carry out an investigation of the terrorist incidents we have mentioned, in order to find out who was responsible for them?

# Labour Party conference: Kinnock tightens his grip

THE LAST ISSUE of *International Viewpoint* published a report of the Labour Party's recent conference from the newspaper *Socialist Action*. (1)

The following article by Richard James, a supporter of the International Group, gives a different assessment of the conference and the tasks for the left. We decided to publish both views because of the importance of this particular Labour Party conference, which may well be the last held before Margaret Thatcher's Tory government decides to hold a general election.

## RICHARD JAMES

Commenting on the outcome of the Labour Party conference, the *New Statesman* (a weekly magazine which reflects the views of Labour's right wing) said: "Kinnock can reasonably expect to have a party in as good a shape as at any time in the past two decades to fight the next election without falling into internal dispute." (2) This assessment has been echoed by all of the serious bourgeois press. It reflects two key processes which have been at work in the Labour Party since the failure of the upsurge of the left in the 1979-81 period (marked by left leader Tony Benn's defeat in the contest for deputy leader of the party in 1981) and the defeat of the miners' strike in 1985.

The first of these has been Kinnock's strategy of turning Labour into a party "fit to govern" in the eyes of the bourgeoisie. The second has been the break up of the old "Bennite left": the peeling off of successive layers of this left towards the Kinnock leadership and its project.

In relation to the first process the conference marked a considerable success for Kinnock's project. First, on almost all of the central policy questions, and particularly on those which will define a future Labour government's relationship to the working class, the Kinnock leadership scored big victories. Second, the attempts to isolate and marginalize the left were consolidated, in particular with the continued expulsions of leaders of the *Militant* tendency from the party and the defeat of Eric Heffer (a pro-

minent left leader) in the elections to the National Executive Committee (NEC). (3)

On the economy, a policy statement from the party's NEC was overwhelmingly carried. It specifically rejected the nationalization of any of the core sectors of capital in favour of encouraging small scale "worker cooperatives" and "employee share ownership schemes". There was not even any commitment to take back into state ownership all of those industries privatized by the Thatcher government.

The target set for reducing unemployment was one million over two years — which would leave at least three million jobless. It is difficult to see how a Labour government could reach even this modest target given the commitment, in advance, that the power of the capitalist class will remain unchallenged.

Proposals for a National Investment Bank and for a National Economic Assessment (a summit meeting of representatives of government, trade-union leaders and big business leaders) amount, at best, to a classic social-democratic formula for tinkering with the economy in the hope of marginal benefits for the working class. At worst they will lead to a re-run of the wage restraint and "social contract" of the 1974-79 Labour government, in the context of a deepening economic crisis.

Policy passed on industrial relations would indicate that the second of these possibilities is the most likely. With the agreement of the

Trades Union Congress (TUC), the Kinnock leadership succeeded in winning the conference to the position that a future Labour government would, in effect, keep central aspects of the Thatcher anti-trade union laws on the statute book. (4) In particular, the commitment to maintain the *legal obligation* for trade unions to hold secret ballots before taking strike action is a key indicator of the fact that Kinnock expects to have to confront and attack the working class if elected.

The debate on nuclear power generated considerable media interest. A left-wing resolution calling for phasing out all nuclear power plants in the life-time of the next Labour government, moved by miners' leader Arthur Scargill, was passed with a huge majority. But it was passed in conjunction with a statement from the party leadership which said that the phasing out of nuclear power was a "decades-long process" and that a future Labour government would continue with the building of a nuclear reprocessing plant at Sellafield.

So, even as a radical policy was being passed, the Labour leadership was making it clear that it had no intention of implementing it. This contradictory policy was easily exploited at the Tory Party conference the following week, when it was pointed out that if nuclear energy was as dangerous as the Labour leadership argue that it is, then the reactors should be closed down immediately — not in 18 years time.

## Ambiguity on defence and disarmament

There was also considerable ambiguity on the issue of defence and nuclear disarmament. On the one hand, policy in favour of unilateral nuclear disarmament was re-affirmed. On the other, Kinnock, in his keynote speech, stated that under a Labour government all non-nuclear United States defence and intelligence installations would be permitted to remain in Britain. In addition, he reiterated the Labour leadership's commitment to NATO. Denis Healey, a leading right winger within the party and the spokesperson on foreign affairs, said before the conference that it was conceivable

1. See "A victory for the right at Labour's conference" by John Lane, *International Viewpoint* No. 107, October 27, 1986.

2. *New Statesman* 3 October 1986. [Emphasis added].

3. *Militant* is a centrist current within the Labour Party which claims adherence to Trotskyism.

4. For a report on the Trade Union



Neil Kinnock: ratting on the working class (DR)

that a Labour government would change its position on nuclear weapons. A Gonzales-type *volte face* on the question of nuclear weapons is clearly posed.

It was on certain social questions that advances were made. A resolution committing the party to campaign on the question of lesbian and gay rights was carried with a big majority. A proposal for a Ministry of Women was passed, including a commitment that the new minister for women would have Cabinet status — something which the leadership had opposed.

In addition, Kinnock made great play of his solidarity with the Nicaraguan people in the face of US interference, and of his support for the black South African masses in their struggle against apartheid.

This left-sounding rhetoric, combined with support for progressive policies on certain social questions and the continued public commitment to nuclear disarmament is evidence of the specific character of Kinnock's project. It does not represent the resurgence of the old right wing, as represented by people like Healey. Rather, it is a centre-right project whose success has depended upon the co-option of a whole layer of what was previously the Bennite left behind the Kinnock leadership. In order for this to be achieved a certain amount of "left" posturing has been required. In the last analysis, this project is the product of a balance of class forces in which, despite the defeat of the miners and the ravages of unemployment, the working class remains largely undefeated and capable of tenacious defensive struggles.

As well as the adoption of policies generally acceptable to the bourgeoisie, the other aspect of Kinnock's attempts to make Labour a party "fit to govern" has been the organizational attacks on the left. On a number of key fronts, the Kinnock leadership consolidated its organizational grip on the party at this conference. It is not so much the fact that leaders of the *Militant* from Liverpool were expelled, as that the tiny vote in their defence reveals the relationship of forces in the party. Less than half the delegates from the constituency Labour Parties (traditionally the most left-wing section of the conference) voted against expulsions.

The elections to the National Executive Committee resulted in a marked shift to the right. The effect of this will be to reinforce Kinnock's dominance within the party. The establishment of a National Constitutional Committee, which will operate as a witch-hunting "inquisition"-type body, is a further blow for the left and clearly opens the way for further persecution of militants within the party.

One important feature of the continuing witch-hunt was its broadening to include activists not associated with the *Militant* tendency. The expulsions of Amir Khan, an activist in the Black Sections movement and Kevin Scally, a member of the Labour Committee on Ireland, were both upheld by conference, although with a much larger vote against than the expulsions of *Militant*. (5)

The conference, therefore, marked an important step along the road towards a Labour government committed to austerity at home and imperialism abroad. As a by-product of this, the possibility of a coalition government with the bourgeois SDP-Liberal Alliance was implicitly opened up. In short, in the eyes of the bourgeoisie — which is beginning to look seriously at its governmental options as the crisis of the Thatcher administration deepens — Labour is increasingly becoming a party "fit to govern".

The second central process reflected in the conference, the continued peeling off of layers of the old Bennite left into the Kinnock camp, is bound up with the first, although it has begun to develop a dynamic of its own. Three main elements of the disintegration of the left can be distinguished. First, after the election defeat in 1983, a section of the left led by the Labour Coordinating Committee (LCC) drew rightist conclusions. (6) They analysed the defeat as the result partly of the unpopularity of certain radical policies, and partly

of the image of the party promoted in the capitalist media as being dominated by the extreme left, particularly in the form of the *Militant* tendency.

The election of Kinnock as party leader provided these forces with the opportunity to promote a realignment within the party predicated upon support for the new leadership and hostility to the hard left which stood out against this process. The LCC has subsequently been in the forefront of the witch-hunt against the *Militant* tendency. It gave its project a "left" cover by arguing that it was attempting to put a left pressure on the Kinnock leadership rather than abandon it to the right wing. It has organized significant forces, particularly in the constituency Labour Parties and the Labour students' organization.

The second element of disintegration came at the time of the defeat of Labour-controlled local authorities' fight against the Thatcher government's austerity policies. The capitulation of most of the Labour local authorities in the face of this offensive resulted in the peeling off of a further important layer of the left, represented by such figures as Ken Livingstone (former leader of the Greater London Council), and their going over into the Kinnock camp.

However, it was clearly the defeat of the miners' strike, the ramifications of which are still working their way through the labour movement, which provided the main impetus for the further break up and realignment of the left which was evident at this year's conference. To give an example, the balance of forces in the leadership of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) itself has shifted markedly to the right. This was demonstrated by the fact that the NUM delegation at conference voted with the leadership on the expulsions and on the secret ballots.

The consolidation of the dominance of the right bureaucracy in the trade union movement, as reflected in the TUC held a few weeks before the Labour Party con-

Congress, see 'IV' No. 105, September 29, 1986.

5. For the past few years Black people within the Labour Party have been fighting for constitutional recognition of their right to organize autonomous Black Sections to combat racism and increase representation of Black people.

The Labour Committee on Ireland is a campaign which fights for an anti-imperialist position on the Irish struggle within the labour movement.

6. The Labour Coordinating Committee originated as part of the Bennite left in the 1979-81 period. Since the failure of Benn's deputy leadership campaign its evolution has been to the right.



ference, helped to create the conditions for Kinnock's successes. In particular, the TUC's agreement on a whole series of policy questions (including the question of the legal obligation to hold secret ballots on strikes) prepared the ground for a "united front" of the dominant sections of the trade-union bureaucracy and the Kinnock leadership. It is important to note that influential figures such as Tom Sawyer of the public employees' union NUPE, formerly on the left of the trade-union bureaucracy, have become part of the realigned left which supports Kinnock.

### Left under pressure from Kinnock

There can be no question that as the next general election approaches, further layers of the former Benite left will come under increasing pressure to bow down to the Kinnock leadership and keep their mouths shut in the interests of party unity and winning the election. There can also be no question that this year's conference saw this process already well advanced.

This, then, is the overall context in which what remains of the Labour left found itself at conference. The forces that are prepared to resist the move to the right behind the Kinnock leadership, fight for socialist policies to resolve the crisis in the interests of the working class and to oppose the expulsion of socialists from the party were isolated and under immense pressure. The impact that they made in the conference was, with some notable exceptions referred to above, marginal. However, the continued existence and future evolution of this current, which has minority but mass support in the labour movement as a whole, is of crucial importance.

The first thing to note about this current is that it remains a vertical one. That is, there are still figures within the left bureaucracy in the party and in the trade unions who are standing out against the drift to the right, and there is still a minority within the working class which identifies with them. Tony Benn remains a key leader of this left within the Labour Party and Arthur Scargill and the left on the NUM leadership remain central leaders of this left within the unions.

A week before the conference the left-wing Campaign Group of Labour Members of Parliament (in which Benn is involved) called a national meeting of left campaigns and groups to discuss organizing the left and combating the drift to the right. A decision was made to launch the "Campaign Forum"



Black activists are fighting for the right of self-organization in the Labour Party (DR)

— an attempt at coordinating the work of the left within parliament, campaigns within the Labour Party (such as the Black Sections and the Women's Action Committee), and activists in the constituency Labour Parties. (7)

The Campaign Group had a large fringe meeting at the conference itself, at which hundreds of Labour activists heard left leaders oppose the witch-hunt, argue the need for radical policies, and support the struggles of the working class and oppressed in Britain and internationally. However, the impact of the Campaign Group within the conference was small — no serious attempt was made to organize left delegates, for example.

Benn himself made his strategy for the left clear at a number of fringe meetings. He is not in favour of making an issue out of "personalities" — he is against specific attacks on Kinnock or other party leaders. He is in favour of the left organizing and fighting the election campaign around socialist policies. In other words, he is prepared to take the fight only so far and backs off when it comes to confronting the rest of the bureaucracy. Clearly, it is significant that a wing of the bureaucracy is prepared to continue to advocate class struggle and oppose class collaboration. However, it is also clear that in the run up to the election the left will continually come up against the objective limitations of Benn's strategy.

Some of these limitations were made clear at the conference. For example the Campaign Group (which is a politically heterogenous current and includes forces considerably to the right of Benn) supported candidates in the elections for the

National Executive Committee such as Tam Dalyell (a well known advocate of nuclear power) and Michael Meacher (a Kinnock supporter who attacked the miners' strike).

Attempts were made by the realigned left which supports Kinnock to make inroads into what remains of the "hard" left. Ken Livingstone, in particular, made a number of proposals to try to draw in a further section of the left behind the Kinnock leadership and marginalize what Livingstone called the "ultra left" such as *Labour Briefing*. (8) As the pressure of the coming elections intensifies, the likelihood is that these attempts will meet with some degree of success.

For revolutionaries the tasks of the coming period are clearly posed: to politically clarify and organize a class-struggle current based on the broader layer that looks to Benn and Scargill for leadership. A current which makes no compromises on the question of fighting for anti-capitalist policies to confront the crisis, which does not baulk at confronting and placing demands upon the bureaucracy and which at the same time also strives for the broadest possible unity in action on the left. It is only through the building of such a current in the Labour Party and trade unions that a countervailing pressure to that exerted by the Kinnock leadership can be built up, capable of resisting further peeling off from the left into the Kinnock camp. □

7. The Women's Action Committee is a campaign formed by women to promote constitutional changes in favour of women in the party.

8. 'Labour Briefing' is a hard-left paper in the Labour Party which originated with the struggles around local government.

# AROUND THE WORLD



## South Africa

### New campaign launched

IN EARLY October, at a press conference that was hastily organized for security reasons, representatives of the United Democratic Front (UDF), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and of the National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) announced the launching of a united national campaign against apartheid and the state of emergency.

The official communique from this campaign, extracts of which were published in the *South African Weekly Mail* of October 3, states "there has never been a more urgent need for united action against the state of emergency that is aimed at destroying our democratic organization, and against the apartheid government and its supporters, who are out to destroy the economic and social structure of our society."

Ten central demands were advanced. They called for lifting the state of siege; freeing Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners; lifting the ban on the affected organizations; setting up people's education and reopening the schools; an end to eviction of tenants; freedom of expression and association; a decent wage for all working people; an adequate social security system; and the right to strike.

The accord seems to concern only the demands to be put forward, while the concrete forms of action are left to the judgement of the base units of the various components of this united front of organizations that speak in the name of the different social sectors of the oppressed population.

These various forms of organization of the anti-apartheid mass movement — trade unions, the civic associations grouped in the UDF, mobilization committees on the educational question grouped in the NECC — are complementary. Their combining around a concrete action program is another factor in the convergence of the mobilizations of the sectors concerned.

This development reflects a conscious effort to coordinate actions of resistance to the state of emergency and to the government of Pieter Botha, as well as to lay the groundwork for a resumption of the offensive by the mass movement.

The ten central themes in the founding platform of this national action campaign illustrate well the consensus that has operated. It reflects the specific contribution of the three components supporting this united appeal. For example, it contains important working-class demands corresponding to the role played by the working class, and more specifically by COSATU, in this process of unification.

For several months and on several occasions, this sort of unity in action

as well as this role of the trade-union movement in the unity process, appeared in individual struggles. This occurred, for instance, in the Transvaal regional general strike in November 1984 and in the June 16 action commemorating the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising.

It is clear that the trade-union movement has made an important contribution to uniting the movement of the Black masses in South Africa. It has done so first of all through the unification process that gave rise to the formation of COSATU in December 1985 and also on the occasion of broad unity initiatives around democratic and political questions.

With this national campaign, the convergence among the forces fighting apartheid is taking a broader scope. The participation of the trade-union movement should make it possible for the democratic rank-and-file traditions of a large part of this movement to be reflected in the development of the local base of this national campaign. There is, therefore, a new possibility for the mass movement getting a second wind and developing a greater capacity to resist the state of emergency. □

## USA

### Anti-Reagan picket

ALL PUBLIC opinion polls indicate that while the US population rejects Reagan's political program a majority continues to support him. In an attempt to have his popularity rub off on other Republican Party candidates, President Reagan has been actively campaigning this fall to help fellow Republicans in the critical pre-election period. For instance, Reagan's public appearance at a reception and luncheon to endorse Bill Lucas, a Black Republican running for governor of Michigan, enabled the candidate to raise 500,000 dollars in funds that day alone.

However, peace organizations, progressive church groups, solidarity, anti-apartheid, political and anti-nuclear organizations called for a noontime picket line around five demands:

- \* Stop US intervention in Central America.
- \* Cut US ties with South Africa's apartheid regime.
- \* End racism in America.
- \* End the nuclear arms race.





\* Fund jobs, not war. Redirect resources from the military to meet human needs, create jobs, defend civil rights.

The ad hoc coalition of over sixty organizations was strong enough to attract official union sponsorship, including the Metropolitan Detroit AFL-CIO Council, Wayne County United Auto Workers (UAW) and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees. Endorsing the coalition's demands, the unions helped to build the demonstration.

Despite the fact that it was a mid-week, noontime event, the picket line attracted over 2,000. People were encouraged to bring their "friends, co-workers and signs," and they did. Students from the University of Michigan came with a group sign, which, when assembled, opposed the contra aid bill.

Just a few days before Reagan's stop in Detroit he announced his "war on drugs." The militant picket line was delighted with a street skit that parodied Reagan's anti-drug campaign. As one of the "Citizens for Clean Urine" [a sign of no drug use] pointed out, "With his war on drugs, Reagan's hoping everyone will overlook the real problems, like South Africa and Central America." Or even civil rights, given the nature of the drug tests.

Since Detroit is a majority Black city with a 24 per cent unemployment rate, the Reagan-Lucas rally organizers filled the auditorium by inviting high school students from the outlying, white suburbs. Most came "to see the president," while a small grouping of conscious right-

wingers attempted to provoke the demonstrators.

The media, of course, overlooked the breadth of the demonstration's endorsers and the specific demands and chants, focusing instead on the fact that Lucas had once been a conservative Democrat. Some Blacks have indicated that they are throwing their support to Lucas and voting Republican this time. Black Democrats, on the other hand, are in a frenzy at the challenge Lucas poses to their Black base. If he takes away votes from them, then they will have less clout within the Democratic Party.

But in the center of the controversy over Reagan's visit, a broad coalition was formed to oppose in action Reagan's foreign and domestic policies. The reason people felt strongly enough to come out was based on their opposition to what Reagan stands for. As one secretary said to me the day before the picket, when I was leafletting at one of the office buildings during the lunch hour, "I'm coming — and I've already got my sign ready." □

### Portugal

### PSR meets with CP

The following report is from the Revolutionary Socialist Party, Portuguese section of the Fourth International.

ON OCTOBER 2, 1986, on the proposal of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), a delegation from the

PCP met with representatives of the PSR. It was the second meeting of this type that has taken place between the two parties. The first was on March 19. On both occasions, the PCP was represented by its top leaders, Alvaro Cunhal, Octavio Pato and Carlos Costa.

The PCP said that it intended to promote meetings with the parliamentary opposition parties, more precisely with the Socialist Party and the Party for Democratic Renewal (PRP) of ex-president Eanes. Obviously, the discussions with the PSR do not fit into that category. Three aspects drew the attention of the media, which accorded a considerable importance to these meetings.

First of all, they are an unprecedented event. The PCP has, in fact, never established relations of this sort with far-left organizations, and it seems today quite interested in pursuing these contacts. For example, a member of the Central Committee of the PCP was present at the closing session of the PSR congress.

Secondly, the PCP is the Communist Party in Western Europe most loyal to Moscow, while at the same time playing a major role in Portuguese political life.

Finally, it is interesting to note the importance the PCP itself has given to these meetings. On every occasion, they have been announced on the front page of *Avante*, the party's official newspaper.

At the end of each of these meetings, both delegations have held a press conference. Asked whether the PCP intended to propose an electoral accord to a small party such as the PSR, Alvaro Cunhal replied "there are no small or big parties but there are parties that have the strength of their convictions." In fact, the electoral question has not yet been discussed. At the moment, no elections are scheduled, although there will probably be one next year.

Given the political weight of the PCP and the importance of united actions in trade-union struggles and against government measures, these meetings open up interesting prospects for the activity of revolutionaries. □



## The Zionist bomb

MORDECHAI VANUNU, the Israeli engineer who provided the information for a feature in the September 5 issue of the British *Sunday Times* on the Zionist state's nuclear arsenal, has been missing since September 30. A friend of his, the Australian pastor John Macknight, has alleged from Jerusalem that Vanunu was kidnapped by Mossad, the notorious Israeli secret service, and is being held in that city. He has reported that a Jerusalem judge handed down a two-week detention order against the dissident engineer.

The US magazine *News Week* has also reported that Vanunu was kidnapped in Britain by the Mossad and taken back to Israel. The following article on Vanunu's revelations is taken from the October 8 issue of *News from Within*, a weekly bulletin in English published by human rights activists in Israel.

So it was that the *Sunday Times* report on the Dimona station created such a sensation. Based on information from a nuclear technician, the report puts Israel as the world's sixth most powerful nuclear power.

Mordechai Vanunu, who began working at the Dimona station nine years ago, appears to have lost his security clearance after becoming involved with left-wing groups at the Beersheba University. Dismissed from his job at the station, unable to find another place of employment, Vanunu left the country.

According to the *Sunday Times* report, while working at the plant Vanunu secretly drew plans, took photographs and familiarized himself

with the bomb production process. Vanunu told the *Times* that Israel has been building weapons at Dimona for the past twenty years, "hiding its plutonium extraction process from sky satellites and independent inspectors during the 1960s by burying it beneath an innocuous, little-used building at the site."

The Dimona station was built by France between 1957 and 1964. France has always insisted that it didn't supply Israel with the plutonium separation technology necessary for the production of atomic weapons. Most intelligence reports (including those of the CIA and the UN) put Israel's nuclear stockpile at between 10-20 primitive atomic bombs, similar

to those the United States dropped on Japan in 1945.

This estimate is based on the maximum amount of plutonium that can be extracted using primitive methods. However, according to Vanunu's testimony, the station has the technology for annually producing 40 kilograms of plutonium, enough to build 10 bombs a year.

Nuclear experts who checked Vanunu's testimony said that they had been convinced by this evidence and calculated that Israel has stockpiled at least 100 nuclear bombs.

Vanunu alleges that when the French began constructing the Dimona Nuclear Research Station in 1957, they dug out a 25-metre-deep crater in which they buried a six-level bunker, known as "Machon 2." It was then covered by a two-storey, innocent-looking, above ground structure.

### Israel now a major nuclear power

The *Sunday Times* report carries a detailed description of the plutonium extraction process carried out at the station, concluding that "the sophistication and scale of Israel's nuclear weapons-making capabilities revealed by Insight [the team which debriefed Vanunu and examined his testimony] makes it clear that Israel is now a major nuclear power. Its survival in the face of a conventional defeat would seem assured, for no Arab nation could match its nuclear muscle. China has approximately 300 warheads, France 500 and Britain as many as 700. Both America and the USSR are in a class of their own with about 27,000 each. Israel's projected nuclear arsenal of 100-200 weapons may be dwarfed by comparison but it is enough to make it the sixth most powerful nation on earth.

"Ten days ago the outgoing prime minister Shimon Peres, attended a regular briefing of Israeli newspaper editors. On the agenda was the upcoming *Sunday Times* Insight investigation. Though no editor will publicly reveal details of the conversation, it is believed that Peres, having told the editors of the forthcoming report, warned them of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act. He admitted that Insight had gained access to an inside source"

Six days before the *Sunday Times* published Vanunu's testimony, both *HaAretz* and *Al Hamishmar* ran editorials on a *Daily Mirror* report which carried some of the information later released in the *Sunday Times*. Both editorials were completely censored. □

