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Progress of the African Revolution

The Sino-Soviet Conflict

West European Capitalism

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**Documents of the 1965 World Congress
Of the Fourth International**

Letters

(The following letter is in response to "Soviet Management Reform," by Ernest Germain, in the Summer 1965 International Socialist Review.) =

To the Editor:

Mr. Germain might be well advised to make explicit the knowledge or interpretation of modern economic-planning theory that permits him to reject "supply and demand laws" as useful tools of analysis and rational economic determinants, even under socialism. Otherwise, his repudiation becomes cavalier, and his analysis of socialist economics becomes somewhat deficient in technical analysis. It is therefore one-sided.

It is of course true that Soviet

workers and peasants have been arbitrarily and often ruthlessly ruled by a State and party bureaucracy. That bureaucracy has aggrandized itself materialistically, though it has not re-created the legal basis for its own unlimited private accumulation of wealth. Nor has the drive to industrial and technical maturity been diverted to luxury goods. Moreover, fantastic wage differentials are being permitted to narrow, and the lowest brackets are especially benefitting from wage raises. The frenzied drive to expand steel, coal and other domestic heavy industry, at the expense of the vast "non-priority" consumer goods sectors, has been attenuated. The increasingly self-confident Soviet citizens have repudiated the forced marches imposed by an inner party clique, and the centralized command economy is beginning to yield to diffusive pressures.

It could not be otherwise. An increasingly complex and interdependent industrial economy would falter at the obstacles imposed by inept "material balancing," crude output targeting, and constrictively detailed resource allocation.

One waits for Mr. Germain to advance beyond vague "motherhood slogans" (workers self-management, true proletarian democracy, etc.), and as an economist, actually grapple with the tremendous technical problems facing socialist economics. Obviously full democracy, and popular control facilitate inquiry and experimentation, just as they attack vested interests and accumulated bureaucratic privilege. Obviously, too, these benefits will not come to the Soviet people without an intense struggle against a bloated ruling party with enormous economic and political power. But are these obvious truisms sufficient tools for a thorough analysis of the Soviet economy?

Specifically, does Mr. Germain

not see that he could use much of modern "abstract" economic theory as a tool to rationally calculate social and private costs and benefits, and to which he could attach goals of egalitarianism and rapid growth. His contention that some vague "principle of planning" stands above all of this simply opens the floodgates to all kinds of quackery and ill-considered material and human sacrifice.

Furthermore, Mr. Germain's general denigration of citizens' short and long run tastes as (at least) a powerful and fundamental determinant of resource and product allocation, leaves me wondering what party, what central committee, or what political executive he envisages substituting for the people's desires.

Perhaps Mr. Germain only meant to say that a socialist central authority would try to integrate and harmonize as many firm, industry and sector activities into a binding comprehensive plan as modern computers and programming techniques permit. Here "workers' control" would involve less local choice of productive techniques and output mix, and more group experimentation, personnel allocation, and search for non-wasteful techniques to feed to the data processors and decision makers.

Or perhaps Mr. Germain meant that co-existing with wider workers' control, plus large freedom for the firm in product and resource markets, there should be general programming of sectoral and aggregate investments to avoid sharp imbalances and depression.

But if he meant to say these things, Mr. Germain should have: (a) said them; (b) avoided implicit and careless equating of those useful "supply and demand" theorems of modern economists (predominately Western) with the vicissitudes of the capitalist economies in which they often happen to live.

May I once more apologize for the brevity (and obscurity) of this hurried comment. I have not bothered to praise the many competent points in Mr. Germain's analysis, or the general revolutionary political conclusions. Instead I have briefly attacked those Marxist eco-

(Continued on Page 86)

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Table of Contents

Editorial	35
International Situation	37
African Revolution	49
Western Europe	67
Sino-Soviet Conflict	76

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World Congress of the Fourth International

This issue of the *International Socialist Review* carries the complete text of the main resolutions adopted by the Fourth International at its regular Congress held in December 1965.

The documents presented for the information of our readers will serve to acquaint the radical public with the actual positions of the authentic Trotskyist movement on the main issues of world politics today. These views are so often misrepresented and so grossly falsified in so many different quarters that there should be a reliable source of reference where they can be consulted and known at first hand.

The Congress was attended by more than sixty delegates and fraternal observers, representing revolutionary Marxist organizations from almost all the countries of Western Europe, from numerous countries in Africa and Asia, as well as from North America and Latin America.

As the Second World Congress Since Reunification and the Eighth World Congress since the foundation of the movement in 1938, those present at the gathering were cognizant of the continuity of the revolutionary-socialist tradition they represented as well as the way in which the reunification of two years before had been consolidated.

After a split lasting ten years, the greater bulk of the forces throughout the world adhering to the conceptions of Trotskyism came together again in 1963 on the basis of agreement in principle on the fundamental questions and tasks confronting the international working-class movement. The validity of their approach and the soundness of their action was confirmed in the organizational report submitted by the United Secretariat which recorded the success and consolidation of the reunification achieved at the preceding Congress.

The reunification of 1963 brought together with some few exceptions all the forces adhering to the International Committee and to the International Secretariat. After some two and a half years, only two groups on the IC side, one in England and the other in France, remained outside. On the IS side, only the tendency led by Pablo withdrew to the sidelines. The overwhelming majority of Trotskyist organizations

are now within the Fourth International or, where the laws of the country prohibit formal adhesion, staunchly uphold its program.

Those who have refused to join the reconstituted movement, or broken with it, have done so because their political viewpoint and orientation are essentially opposed to the positions taken by the Fourth International and expressed in these documents. The Socialist Labour League in England, led by Gerry Healy, and the *La Verité* group in France led by Pierre Lambert, have shown a total incapacity to grasp the nature of the special problems involved in the colonial revolutions, notably in Cuba and Algeria, and have a sectarian and abstentionist attitude toward their development.

The tendency headed by Juan Posadas, located mainly in certain Latin-American countries, had quit the Fourth International a year or so before the reunification in 1963; its proposal that the USSR should launch a preventive atomic war, and others of its outlandish and ultraleft ideas have nothing in common with Trotskyism or with any rational outlook.

Finally, the recent Congress sealed the severance of the small tendency around Pablo. This group, which initially accepted the reunification, subsequently took a rightward course of conciliation with the Soviet bureaucracy, confusing its limited de-Stalinization measures with the full democratization demanded by the Trotskyist program. It has acted in a systematically undisciplined manner, conclusively demonstrating that it has no confidence in the future of the International.

The outgoing leadership reported that, despite these minor defections, in the two years since the last Congress numerous sections have been strengthened, new ones created, and the centrifugal tendencies of the past decade have been halted and reversed. The most significant and gratifying feature of the reinforced united movement has been the influx of recruits from the rising generation of young revolutionists in numerous countries which was reflected in the considerably lowered age level of the delegates at the Congress itself. This indicates what an immense attraction the ideas of the Fourth International have for young

workers and students who keep moving in significant numbers toward the Trotskyist organizations and embracing their answers to the problems of changing contemporary society in a socialist direction.

At the present juncture the forward march of the world revolution has been temporarily checked by a series of setbacks suffered in the colonial countries, the area of most intense activity since the Second World War. These reverses began with the reactionary military takeover of April 1964 in Brazil which encouraged a string of similar overturns in Latin America and have culminated with the anti-Communist bloodbath in Indonesia and the deposing of Nkrumah by a military conspiracy in Ghana this March. Although the latest counter-revolutionary events in Africa and Asia took place after the writing of these Congress documents, they do not in the least invalidate its analyses or conclusions.

On the contrary, these tragic defeats have shown the heavy price the masses are forced to pay for the absence of dependable revolutionary leadership and have underscored the urgent necessity for building revolutionary Marxist parties that can guide their struggles to a successful outcome. The creation of such parties and the coordination of their ideas and activities on a global scale is the prime task of the Fourth International.

A large part of the discussion at the World Congress centered around the need for solidarity with the Vietnamese revolution. It issued a Manifesto calling upon the working masses of the entire world to aid the heroic efforts of the Vietnamese people who have been fighting for their freedom for more than 25 years against the French, Japanese, and now the American imperialists. The escalation of U. S. intervention in Southeast Asia, bearing with it the threat of war with China and a possible nuclear showdown, is part of the global strategy of imperialism to stop the spread of the liberation movements in the colonial countries and prevent them from taking the road to socialism. It represents the gravest danger to world peace and to the welfare of the American people. This is recognized by the unprecedented scope and intensity of the antiwar sentiments in our own country.

The Congress documents counterpose a world strategy of socialist revolution to the counter-revolutionary strategy of the imperialist powers headed by Washington. Only such a policy can serve to defend the security of the workers states, constitute an active force of solidarity with all anti-imperialist movements, and prepare the resurgence of working-class struggles in the capitalist centers.

The main document at the Congress was the general political resolution. This document seeks to summarize the great questions of our epoch—recent developments in the workers states, particularly in the economic field and current economic tendencies in the capitalist world and the effect upon them of the Vietnamese war. The causes of the temporary but considerable setbacks of the revolution in Indonesia and other countries are considered in this document.

In the discussion under this point, the delegates

reported on the development of armed struggles in Latin America in particular. They underlined the need to participate in a united front with the guerrilla movements, with the right and even the duty to criticize certain adventurist tendencies, a criticism which should, however, be made subordinate to solid unity with these movements against the reformism practiced by most of the Communist parties in this part of the world which prattle about a "peaceful road" to freedom.

"The Progress and Problems of the African Revolution," which was discussed at some length at the Congress, should prove of particular interest to American radicals. It offers essential background material for the recent spectacular events in such countries as Nigeria and Ghana. The analysis provided on the nature of the economies and regimes of the African countries is basic to a clear understanding of this continent and its developments. Particularly to be noted is the way in which Trotsky's theory of the permanent revolution is applied in considering the extraordinarily complex and unique problems encountered from one end of the continent to the other.

In the document on the situation in Western Europe, the Congress reiterates the long-standing position of the Fourth International that in the final analysis the real guarantee of enduring peace is to be found in a socialist victory in the advanced capitalist countries. Particular attention is devoted to exposing the line of "peaceful coexistence," promulgated by the Kremlin and its adherents, that signifies giving up the class struggle.

The document on the Sino-Soviet conflict deals with one of the most important developments in the world today. The aim of the document is not to find "reasons" for supporting one side or the other, but to ascertain the truth of the situation, the basic causes of the dispute and its major ramifications. In the process it emerges very clearly that the position of the Fourth International is independent. Nevertheless, as between Peking and Moscow, the Trotskyist movement leans to the side of the Chinese. Its criticisms of the Chinese views are summarized in the resolution. Both Khrushchev and his heirs as well as Mao and his circle have violently attacked the Trotskyist movement.

In criticizing the Kremlin, the document points to the lamentable role of the Soviet bureaucracy in failing to respond vigorously to U. S. aggression in Vietnam. And in criticizing Peking, the document calls special attention to its role in fostering and covering up the opportunist line of the Aidit leadership in Indonesia which paved the way for the bitter defeat there last October and the subsequent mass blood purge.

Although the Socialist Workers Party is prohibited from affiliating with the Fourth International by reactionary legislation dating back to the Voorhis Act of 1940, it supports the line of action projected in these resolutions. It recommends them for serious study and consideration by all opponents of imperialist aggression and the evils of capitalism who are interested in the revolutionary Marxist alternative to Social-Democratic reformism and Stalinism in all its variations.

The International Situation and the Tasks of Revolutionary Marxists

Since the October 1962 Cuba crisis, American imperialism has intensified its counterrevolutionary activities on a world-wide scale. In an ever more systematic way, it is assuming the role of world policeman for capitalism and the possessing classes, openly intervening in the domestic affairs of any country where a rise in the mass movement might set off a revolution. Through coups d'etat rigged up by the CIA or through open military intervention, Washington has played this role of center of the counter-revolution successively in Brazil, the Congo, Vietnam, Santo Domingo and Indonesia.

Each time "local" wars or crises were involved. But these broke out during a period of boom in the American economy and a spirit of growing confidence among the American imperialists in their own forces. Under these conditions, it is doubtful that they calculated on carrying any action so far as to risk a nuclear conflict that could seal their own doom. Nevertheless, the lack of an energetic response on the part of the Soviet Union and, although with less culpability, the Chinese leaders encouraged them to proceed with their "escalation" in Vietnam, thus considerably increasing the danger of a nuclear world war.

The deepening division in the "socialist camp," the scandalous passivity of its main leaders in face of the imperialist "escalation," the criminal support given by the big workers organizations in the capitalist countries to the counterrevolutionary foreign policies and actions of the ruling class, and the lack of coordination among the revolutionary movements in the direct line of fire, enabled imperialism to score unquestionable gains in its counterrevolutionary aggressions in the past few years.

Before that, extremely favorable objective conditions made possible spectacu-

lar victories for the revolution in the colonial and semicolonial countries, even in the absence of a consistent revolutionary leadership, in view of the extreme weakness and isolation of the indigenous possessing classes. The systematic intervention of American imperialism brings an extremely powerful enemy to bear against the revolution, thus requiring leaderships of superior quality, having far better grasp of the international import of anti-imperialist and revolutionary struggles, to win decisive successes.

But the successes of imperialism have not been able to halt or to hurl back the advance of the colonial revolution, fed by objective conditions which imperialism has proved incapable of modifying in the least degree. It has not succeeded at all anywhere in stabilizing the situation or breaking the militancy of the masses.

The example of Greece has demonstrated once again that among the European capitalist countries the fighting potentialities of the masses remain high, periodically breaking out in big struggles.

Finally – a result unforeseen by the imperialists – the Pentagon's "escalation" triggered a wave of opposition among American youth and intellectuals at the very beginning of the new war in Vietnam, thus strengthening the anti-imperialist and anticapitalist forces on a world scale. In conjunction with the increasingly explosive movement of the Negro masses, this testifies to the basic instability of American capitalism and offers a foretaste of the speed with which a political and social crisis can develop in the United States once conditions become ripe for it.

Understanding therefore that the dynamics of the world relationship of forces remains unfavorable as a whole to capitalism, the revolutionary Marxists must seek to increase the effectiveness of the immense forces engaged in the struggle

for the socialist transformation of the world, fighting jointly for an anti-imperialist United Front, for the defense of the Vietnamese Revolution, and for the construction of a new revolutionary leadership capable of taking advantage of the new openings for the world revolution.

-I-

ECONOMIC SITUATION

A) The Capitalist World

The economic situation during the past three years has continued to be characterized by the contrast between the relative economic stagnation in the colonial and semicolonial countries and the expansion occurring in the imperialist countries. It is true that the acceleration of this expansion in the principal imperialist country – the United States – brought about an increase in sales of raw materials by the colonial and semicolonial countries to the imperialist countries, leading to an increase in prices recently for certain raw materials and even, for 1964 and the first quarter of 1965, to liquidation of the deficit in the balance of trade between the colonial and semicolonial countries and the imperialist countries.

However, this slight improvement in trade (which had some consequences in the political field in various semicolonial countries) did not alter the enormous gap between the imperialist countries and the backward countries; on the contrary, this gap has not stopped widening particularly in per capita income. The fact that this gap is no longer accepted by

the peoples living in the "third world," and that imperialism cannot bridge it through reformist methods, constitutes the principal driving force behind the colonial revolution.

During the past few years, the economic situation has not evolved along parallel lines in the advanced capitalist countries. In some of them (United States, Canada, West Germany) expansion is continuing; in others (Great Britain, Belgium), there has been some faltering due to a downward turn in foreign demand or to deflationary domestic measures, evoking the specter of a recession. In still others (Japan, Italy, France) a real recession has been experienced since the spring of 1964, occasioning an actual drop in production in manufacturing, a curtailing of work and massive layoffs.

These displacements in phasing of the cycle of capitalist economy—which have been noticeable for some years (Western Germany and Italy experienced no recession in 1957-58; Western Germany ran into a considerable slowing down in growth between October 1962 and October 1963 while the American boom was at its height)—have helped attenuate the effect of the recessions in the countries where they occurred, and delayed the outbreak of a general economic recession in the imperialist countries.

Nevertheless, such a general recession remains inevitable. The expansion as a whole has lost its impetus and is slowing down or about to slow down everywhere. Excess capacity in a series of key sectors in industry weighs heavily on investments in these sectors in Western Europe, North America and Japan. As predicted, the "anticrisis" policies being followed currently by the imperialist governments have increasingly undermined the buying power of their currencies. The permanent deficit in the balance of payments of the United States and Great Britain induces deterioration of the position of the dollar and the pound sterling, the two currencies which, together with gold, function today as international means of payment. The situation is more and more disturbing to the world bourgeoisie. Whatever the stop-gap solutions, the imperialist economy will continue to face the dilemma: either a grave crisis of overproduction, or mounting inflation in the coming years.

The growth in armament expenditures will likewise undermine the capacity of such measures to refuel an imperialist economy already marked by a very high level of outlays of this kind. A new threat in 1965 of decline in the American boom seems to have been conjured away by the considerable increase in military expenditures associated with the imperialist aggression in Vietnam. But this same increase limits the possibility of preventing the outbreak of a genuine recession through a new jump in such expenditures in the coming years.

On the other hand, the terrible stagnation in the standard of living of the

broad masses in countries like India or Indonesia and the total failure of the "Alliance for Progress"—which did not stimulate any considerable economic growth in Latin America where raging inflation is another source of disorganization in economic life, lowering the standard of living of the masses in countries like Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, etc.—do not permit the colonial and semicolonial markets to play the role of a genuine substitute for the classical anticrisis measures in refueling the boom that is beginning to run down. The same observation applies to the increased volume in imperialist trade with the workers states, a growth which is a fact and which has greatly sharpened inter-imperialist competition, but which affects and can affect only a very small fraction of world trade as a whole, thus not representing a genuine "substitute market" for the imperialist economy.

The factors mentioned above—partial loss of impetus in the boom in certain countries, recession in others, the progressive disappearance of factors that would permit a considerable resumption of the expansion on a world scale—explain in the final analysis the exacerbation in imperialist competition which we see at the moment, an exacerbation that constitutes a kind of background to the numerous political conflicts which have been pitting the different imperialist powers against each other (USA-European rivalry of the European market; France's rivalry with its five partners in the Common Market and Great Britain within the European market; rivalry between Great Britain, West Germany, the United States in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Canada, Australia, etc.).

But these conflicts remain within the context of a fundamental common outlook concerning relations with the colonial revolution and the workers states, none of the imperialist powers being ready to actually break their alliance, even if they propose different tactics in dealing with what is their common enemy.

B) The Workers States

The economy of the workers states has continued to progress at annual rates of growth considerably above those of the imperialist countries on the average, experiencing difficulties but no recessions and thus showing the intrinsic superiority of a planned economy founded on the nationalization of the means of production over the capitalist mode of production. This is so despite the propaganda of bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologists who maintain that the latest bureaucratic reforms introduced in the management of the Soviet economy in the name of the principle of "individual profitability of firms" pay tribute to the "capitalist" methods and foreshadow further steps in the same direction. Such

extrapolations are completely superficial.

The continued high average rate of economic growth in the workers states is not in contradiction with the slowing down in growth of national revenue experienced in the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Poland. This is due to the continuing agricultural crisis and to difficulties in industry ascribable to the innumerable brakes characteristic of bureaucratic management.

To get out of the impasse, the leaders of the Soviet bureaucracy have sought once again to reform the planning system and plant management without changing anything essentially. There is no broad and democratic participation of the masses in working out, applying, and controlling the plan, no genuine workers management in the plants, no genuine Soviet democracy on the state level. Under these conditions, the latest reform will yield what the previous ones did: a temporary spurt forward and the replacement of a set of former bureaucratic contradictions (hypercentralization, particularism among the ministries, particularism among regions) by a new set of contradictions, which will lead to a new lowering of the rate of growth when their momentary effect has worn off.

The Bonapartist leaders of the bureaucracy have made a few concessions to the plant directors, who for years have been demanding increased rights both in relation to the workers and the central bodies. But at the same time they strengthen the central apparatus by reconstituting the economic ministries and suppressing the Sovnarkhozes, in this way revealing their fear of the dynamics which bureaucratic decentralization unfailingly introduces in a planned economy.

The effects of excess decentralization clearly appeared in Yugoslavia where it increased the general economic disorder, inflation and social inequality, compelling the leaders to carry out a reform which meant a severe lowering of the standard of living for the masses and which even threatens to lead to massive layoffs.

To find the correct necessary combination between workers self-management at the plant level and overall planning in the economy is not primarily a question of discovering techniques or inventing "economic models"; it is above all a question of social forces to be mobilized and inspired.

In this way, due to its social position, the bureaucracy is able to apply only partially effective or outrightly dubious reforms, and these reforms are necessarily destined to give way to new ones of the same kind, without providing a fundamental solution to the problems posed by the economy of the workers states. It is necessary to take this fundamental fact into account in order to avoid being periodically surprised by abrupt drops in the rate of growth, which will likewise occur in the case of countries like the Rumanian People's Republic, where the



FATHER AND CHILD. A Vietnamese child clings to his bound father. Minutes later the father was dragged off as a "Viet Cong" suspect.

rate of growth is at present the highest in Europe. This is not due to the organization of the system of planning and the establishment of socialist self-management and proletarian democracy, but to a judicious combination of techniques, credits and orders from the imperialist countries and the workers states, a turn in the situation that will not prove long lasting.

The People's Republic of China succeeded several years ago in overcoming the worst effects of the agricultural crisis unleashed by the excesses of the "great leap forward." Agricultural production has been re-established, the standard of living of the masses has recuperated from the losses of 1959-62, the recovery of industry is also a fact. This re-establishment of the economic situation in

in China was accomplished without even a partial return to private agriculture. The framework of the commune remained safeguarded, but the organization of labor was resumed at the village level, which corresponds with the present nature of the means of production and agricultural techniques. In allocating peasant labor, priority has again been given, correctly, to agricultural activities and not to complementary activities, the abnormal expansion of which was the essential cause of the defeat of the "great leap forward."

The absence of Soviet aid, and the rise of autarchic policies, caused in the main by the disappearance of this aid, as well as the need to defend the country against American imperialism, have been cruelly felt in China: The rate of

industrialization had to be slowed down in comparison with the forecasts of 1957-59, and progress in assimilating the most advanced contemporary techniques remains very modest except in certain special fields, particularly the military. If the isolated USSR required several decades to catch up with the technological base of the industrialized capitalist countries, this will require more time in China, a country beginning at a much lower level. In the light of this difficulty it can be seen why the Chinese leaders favor the international expansion of the revolution and why the partial boycott of China by the Soviet bureaucracy constitutes such a criminal blow against the Chinese Revolution and the international revolution.

It is not less true that the level of economic development and the overcoming of the most extreme forms of misery and human degradation now achieved by China, contrast in the most striking way with the status of the rest of Asia and Africa. This is what makes China a pole of attraction for the oppressed masses of these two continents and fundamentally explains the hate which the bourgeoisie and reactionaries of India, Indonesia, Malaya, Thailand, Africa, etc., feel toward the Chinese Revolution.

-II-

THE VIETNAMESE WAR

The American aggression against Vietnam constitutes the first open imperialist attack against the territory of a workers state since the end of the Korean war more than a decade ago. It constitutes a stage in the "escalation" of the counter-revolutionary struggle which American imperialism is deliberately conducting on a world scale against each new advance of the revolution. It constitutes an important change in the international situation, imperialism having launched a war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam such as it did not dare undertake in Cuba in 1960-62.

It demonstrates the completely illusory nature of the Khrushchevist concepts of "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful collaboration" with American imperialism, slogans which reached their high point with the signing of the Moscow treaty on halting nuclear tests in the atmosphere and under water. It shows, contrary to the affirmations of the Kremlin apologists, that imperialism will never hold back in face of the advancing world revolution, that the assumption underlying the alleged "refusal to export counterrevolution," as advanced by these apologists of "peaceful coexistence," is false.

It shows that despite the existence of nuclear arms and the threat this represents to mankind, the fate of the world in which we live will be decided by force in the international class struggle between



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the reactionary rulers of the dying capitalist system and the drive of the masses of humanity toward scientific economic planning and the classless social order of the future. All those who try to hide this fact, to gloss over it, or who refuse to recognize it, are guilty of misleading the masses and disarming the proletariat to the great advantage of imperialism and the bourgeoisie.

How is it to be explained that imperialism decided to open a new stage in 1965 in the "escalation" of its global counterrevolutionary action? A number of factors no doubt contributed, such as the progressive loss of impetus in the economic expansion of the imperialist countries, the economic and strategic importance of Southeast Asia, which threatened to be lost as a whole to imperialist exploitation through an imminent victory of the revolution in south Vietnam. But the most important factor in the decision to act was without doubt the lack of cohesion among the governments of the workers states, and the weakness, hesitancy and paralysis of the leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy.

Events since then have proved that from the point of view of the interests of imperialism and the counterrevolution, the heads of American imperialism were not mistaken.

Lack of Support

The excuses advanced inside the Communist parties by the Soviet and Chinese leaders and their advocates, to justify refusing sufficient aid to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and to the National Front for Liberation in south Vietnam, scarcely merit refutation. It is true that they are somewhat more plausible in the case of China, which on the one hand does not have the most modern materiel which the Democratic Republic of Vietnam needs, and which on the other hand is directly threatened by nuclear bombing in one of the succeeding stages of the American "escalation," if Washington does not encounter an effective deterrent. The same argument does not hold for the USSR since it is capable of replying with terrifying means on the nuclear level and thus it is improbable that it would be subjected to a nuclear attack in the present international context. But even the Chinese leaders could have furnished much more ample material aid in the beginning than they did.

It is false to affirm, as do the Maoists, that the situation in Vietnam is "excellent," and that American imperialism is "sinking in a swamp." The Vietnamese people have made enormous sacrifices, and the victory of the revolution which appeared imminent in January 1965 has been postponed. It is false to say that imperialism is becoming more and more "isolated" due to the "moral" condemnation which its aggression has aroused everywhere. If it succeeds in exhausting north Vietnam and arresting, if only

temporarily, the progress of the revolution in the south, its power and its resolution will mount and its imperialist allies will more than ever accept its factual leadership.

It is false to think or to claim, as do the Khrushchevists and pacifists, that negotiations in the corridors, diplomatic maneuvers or pressure of any kind can cause imperialism to draw back. The imperialist gangsters respect only power. The scheme of utilizing diplomatic channels to compel imperialism to retreat is illusory. It plays into the hands of those who would like to hand Washington a success which it cannot gain by military means, thus cheating the Vietnamese masses of a victory for which they have fought for twenty years at a fearful cost in lives and suffering.

It is false to affirm that a more vigorous Soviet reaction would increase the risks today of a nuclear conflagration. How far will the White House and the Pentagon carry the aggression? The answer is—up to the point where solid resistance has been reached or is clearly impending. Thus, in face of the weak response of both Peking and Moscow, Johnson has continually extended the probing operation of American military forces. Consequently the stakes have constantly risen.

The threat to China and, in the final analysis, the Soviet Union has grown increasingly acute, posing ever more insistently the problem of the military defense of these two workers states. The Pentagon in turn, because of the depth of the commitment of American arms, has become increasingly tempted to resort to nuclear weapons and even to attack China. Thus does the logic of the war launched by Johnson in Vietnam point toward a nuclear conflict precisely because of the weakness of both Moscow and Peking in presenting an effective deterrent.

Contrariwise, a vigorous reaction from the very beginning of the American aggression would in all probability have compelled imperialism to review the situation, to abstain from the more extreme forms of aggression, to hesitate about becoming so deeply committed on the mainland of Asia, and perhaps even to draw back. In view of such considerations and Havana's practical experience in defending the Cuban Revolution against American aggression, Fidel Castro in several speeches urged rapid and energetic reaction by all those concerned about the defense of Vietnam as the most effective way of stopping the "escalation" in time.

In opposing the imperialist aggression in Vietnam, in seeking to counter the passivity and disorganization of the anticapitalist forces, the Fourth International again stresses one of its basic theses: Only the international extension of the revolution can weaken imperialism; only the weakening of imperialism can reduce its capacity to simultaneously move against all the revolutionary fires

flaring up in the world; only the overthrow of American imperialist rule by the workers of the United States—encouraged and inspired by the progress of the revolution throughout the world, as well as by the contradictions of American society itself—can definitively end the danger of a nuclear world war.

Nothing in the recent evolution of the international situation diminishes the correctness of this strategy; everything relating to the imperialist aggression against the Vietnamese Revolution confirms it in the strongest way. It is within the framework of this strategy that the Fourth International has worked out its precise proposals to defend the threatened revolutions, to alert the international proletariat to the dangers threatening it and the colonial peoples from the imperialist "escalation," and to meet these dangers with the maximum effectiveness.

-III-

COLONIAL REVOLUTION

Since 1963, the colonial revolution, while progressing and extending into a series of countries (particularly Southern Arabia, Syria, the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Guatemala, a number of countries in black Africa), has unquestionably suffered a series of grave defeats (Brazil, the Congo, Indonesia) or, if they were less grave from the historical point of view as a whole, were of sufficient importance to modify the political climate and the fundamental relationship of forces (Ceylon, Algeria, Chile). The common feature in all these defeats was the absence of leaderships capable of guiding the colonial revolution into its socialist phase.

In *Brazil*, after forfeiting the opportunities and dissipating its own forces by orienting for a bloc with the "national bourgeoisie," the Communist party staked everything on Goulart and the circles around him, abstaining from any systematic preparation for a revolutionary reply to the masses while the generals and their domestic and American backers were openly preparing a coup d'etat. It thus lost an excellent possibility not only to raise the revolutionary movement of the masses to a higher level, but even to profoundly divide the army, the "revolt of the sergeants" having demonstrated that the army ranks were favorably disposed toward a genuine revolutionary movement.

In *Indonesia*, the Communist party likewise staked everything on the Bonapartist role of Sukarno, failing to educate and systematically prepare the masses for taking power in a situation that was nevertheless highly favorable. Thus the CP objectively encouraged the reactionary officer caste by not organizing a general mobilization of the masses when the generals unleashed their attack in a

bid for decisive control of the government.

In *Ceylon*, the unions, embracing one million members, had expressed enthusiastic agreement on an anticapitalist program of "21 demands." A campaign should have been launched behind the slogan "Power to the United Front of the Workers Organizations" (including the unions so as to bring in the Tamil plantation workers) in order to carry out this program. The campaign should have sought to mobilize the masses outside of parliament. Instead, the reformist leadership of the Lanka Sama Samaja party joined a coalition government with the party of the national bourgeoisie. This capitulation could only divide, demobilize and disorient the masses, ending in returning the United National party to power, the party of the comprador bourgeoisie. The pro-Moscow Communist party, which had promulgated this very line for years, obviously also shares responsibility for this betrayal.

In *Chile*, the leaderships of the Communist and Socialist parties participated in the presidential election campaign by spreading the illusion that socialism could be reached along the electoral and parliamentary road—while at the same time failing to support their electoral campaign by systematically mobilizing the masses. They thus helped prepare the victory of the "reformist" Christian Democrat Frei and undermined the position won by the workers years ago, opening up the possibility for the Christian Democrats to deal heavy blows against the labor movement.

In *Algeria*, the group around Ben Bella, with the approval of the former leaders of the dissolved Algerian Communist party, believed they could settle the fundamental questions of the revolution through maneuvers at the top. They failed to organize the left wing of the Front de Liberation Nationale on a broad mass base (not to mention organizing the state power on the basis of democratically elected committees), thus becoming more and more prisoner to the state bureaucracy where the bourgeois and neocolonialist influence was still strong, postponing the second phase of the agrarian reform, in this way demobilizing the majority of the poor peasantry who have yet to profit from the revolution. The group consequently rendered its own overturn inevitable at the hands of Boumedienne, supported by an army, the tops of which have been transformed into privileged elements largely cut off from the masses.

In the *Congo*, the circumstances were different, the crisis in the leadership of the revolution flowing in the final analysis from the backwardness of the country, the success of imperialism in blocking formation of an intellectual layer and a nationalist party on a nationwide scale during the years of colonial rule, the low ideological level of the first revolutionary leaders outside of the martyred Lumumba, the absence of a serious Marxist nucleus and the personal

rivalries which became pre-eminent under these conditions. But in the Congo, too, the crisis was marked by grave opportunist errors such as the dissolution of the Gizenga government in Stanleyville, which controlled a considerable part of the country, and its "fusion" with the Leopoldville government. This quickly led to the liquidation of the Gizengaist armed forces and organizations.

Despite the peculiarities in each of these cases in widely separated parts of the world, the opportunist errors were due fundamentally to lack of understanding among the revolutionists of the dialectics of the anti-imperialist united front and failure to grasp the real import of the social contradictions between the "national" or "bureaucratic" bourgeoisie on the one hand and the proletariat and poor peasantry on the other.

Experience has shown that the colonial revolution cannot solve the vital problems of the masses unless it leads to the creation of a workers state that nationalizes imperialist and capitalist property, including the holdings of the "national bourgeoisie," freeing the country's economy from the grip of the capitalist world market and carrying through the agrarian problem in a radical way. These tasks can be carried out only by revolutionary Marxist leaderships capable of mobilizing the mass of the laboring population at each phase of the revolution in order to carry it forward.

This does not mean that the revolutionary Marxists must deliberately scorn or refuse all support to progressive measures which the revolution is capable of carrying out, even when it still remains under the leadership of bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist forces.

But the anti-imperialist united front that in practice inevitably arises in favor of such measures—particularly in reply to the efforts of imperialism and its agents to force back the revolution even at this stage—benefits the revolution in the long run only if the revolutionary Marxists and the forces speaking in the name of the proletariat continually maintain their organizational and political autonomy; if the masses set up bodies enabling them to control the movement, to drive back the counterrevolution and to then take power (through soviet-type committees); if the vigilance and militancy of the masses are constantly maintained; if the masses are educated to mistrust the bourgeoisie, to understand the insufficiencies of the nationalist petty-bourgeoisie, and to comprehend the final tasks which the revolution must accomplish in order to triumph.

These conditions have been absent, in whole or in part, in all the revolutions since 1954 (when north Vietnam won freedom from French imperialism) with the exception of the Cuban Revolution, where the Fidelista leadership has to a considerable degree applied the lessons listed above as well as the general line of the permanent revolution. This explains why these revolutions have either suffered

grave defeats or stagnated at the neocolonialist level, or, in the best of cases, progressed under petty-bourgeois nationalist leaderships up to the point of socialist revolution without being able to cross over into it.

The Fourth International advocates the above line in the colonial revolution. It holds that in the decisive phases of the revolution one or more variants of armed struggle are inevitable: guerrilla war; the armed struggle of workers and peasant militias based on mass organizations; armed mass struggle in the cities. Combined with a general strike, the latter form of struggle has just demonstrated its potential power in Santo Domingo, where it compelled even American imperialism to fall back tactically and postpone its project of imposing another military dictatorship upon the people.

The colonial revolution is at present developing in five big sectors of the world in which the progress and temporary setbacks in one country profoundly influence the situation in neighboring countries. In each of these sectors, the defeats referred to above have not led to a prostrating loss of morale among the masses nor to a prolonged halt in the revolution, imperialism's not having succeeded anywhere in stabilizing the situation.

In *Latin America* the defeat suffered in Brazil unquestionably had grave repercussions on a continental scale. It was followed five months later by Frei's victory in Chile. In Venezuela, although four guerrilla fronts have been consolidated with peasant support in the area of operations, the Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (FALN) have not succeeded in opening a higher stage of the struggle. In Argentina the military continues to dominate the situation despite the Peronist electoral victories, the trade-union bureaucracy avoiding a decisive test of strength with the government. In Peru the Belaunde regime unleashed severe repression against the entire workers and peasants movement; and the new nuclei of guerrilla forces have not succeeded in widening their influence or their areas of action to a great extent.

Santo Domingo

On the other hand, the revolutionary upsurge in Santo Domingo shook the position of the imperialists and the ruling class. The Yon Sosa movement in Guatemala, the guerrilla movements in Colombia and Ecuador have grown stronger. Through a general strike in October, the workers movement in Uruguay replied on a very broad scale to the government offensive. In Bolivia the repeated assaults of the Barrientos military dictatorship have not succeeded in breaking the heroic resistance of the miners, who have maintained their cohesion and kept their arms despite the

loss of certain conquests of the revolution.

The victory of the Cuban Revolution touched off a movement among the revolutionary vanguard in Latin America essentially based on constructing small nuclei of guerrilla fighters, isolated from the masses, as a substitute for building a new revolutionary leadership. The vanguard paid a heavy price for these adventuristic experiences, which appeared in the Fidelista current itself, through the useless sacrifice of the most devoted and dynamic elements. But little by little a more mature conception of armed struggle displaced this putschist tendency, a conception fusing guerrilla struggle, armed mass struggle and the organization of the masses in pursuit of economic demands.

In the *Arab world*, the setback to the revolution dealt by the victorious coup d'etat of Colonel Boumedienne coincided with a halt in revolutionary progress throughout this sector. The stop to the Yemenite revolution imposed by the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian compromise, the victory of the forces of the right in Sudan after the overturn of the military dictatorship, the unleashing of a new wave of anti-Communist repression in Iraq, the resumption of the war against the Kurds in the same country, the fact that the reactionary forces of the Muslim Brotherhood are again lifting their head in Egypt, are signs of this stagnation and retreat.

By way of contrast, at the two extremities of this sector, in Southern Arabia and Aden on the one hand, and in Morocco on the other, the radicalization of the masses is continuing vigorously. In Morocco the "bloody week" in February 1965 served to spur all the popular forces, bringing the Union Marocaine du Travail into the camp of the opposition alongside the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires. Both organizations now favor workers self-management. They have blocked the king from consolidating his position after suspending parliament, and furthered the leftward movement of the Union Nationale des Etudiants du Maroc. In Aden and Southern Arabia, the masses are valiantly resisting the attempt of British imperialism, under Wilson's cabinet, to crush their revolutionary upsurge, and have succeeded in closely integrating the struggle of the National Liberation Front guerrillas and the working masses of Aden.

In *Black Africa*, the temporary victory won by the imperialist intervention and the neocolonialist forces in the Congo has been felt heavily throughout the sector. The neocolonialist forces have regained confidence and audacity, splitting the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and leading a series of governments to increasingly counterrevolutionary actions, not only in the Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache, a bastion of neocolonialism, but in East Africa (Malawi), thus placing the African masses on the defensive just as a test of



U.S. GUNS. Santo Domingo, May 1965. U.S. tanks backed "mopping up" operation to drive Dominican revolutionaries into city center. Civilian casualties of the 10-day struggle have never been released.

strength developed over Rhodesia, facilitating Wilson's maneuvers for a compromise favorable to the racist whites.

This new test once again showed up the divisions within the OAU, the threats leveled against British imperialism not being followed by action except on the part of a minority of governments. The African revolutionists and their friends in the imperialist countries should, however, be wary of British military intervention which could only aim at blocking African military action. They should demand arms for the Africans instead of demanding imperialist military action against Smith.

In South Africa, on the other hand, a revolutionary crisis of huge dimensions is maturing. The procrastinating tactics of the pro-imperialist white opposition and the ineffective sabotage organized by the African National Congress and the Communist party have failed. The field is thus open for a revolutionary mass struggle in which guerrilla war will play a key role. The South African revolution will set off revolutions again throughout Black Africa. The workers movement is awakening and gaining force in Nigeria; differentiation and radi-

calization are taking place in countries like Tanzania and Kenya; imperialism and its agents are unable to stabilize the situation in the Congo, and a new wave of mass struggles is to be expected there, not only in the classical guerrilla zones of the most poverty-stricken plantation areas but also in the urban and most industrialized areas.

In the subcontinent of *India* and the bordering Middle East, the paralysis of the Indian mass movement and its still very low level in Pakistan enabled the bourgeoisies of these two countries to unleash the Indo-Pakistan war, considerably strengthening the positions and weight of imperialism in this sector. The acceptance of the position of national defense by all tendencies of the Indian workers movement except the Trotskyists, the whipping up of a wave of chauvinism by the bourgeoisie, which thus succeeded in smothering the first outbreaks among the peasants and demonstrations for food; the political drift to the right and the threat of a military dictatorship have placed the Indian revolutionary movement in the most difficult position since political independence was won.

However, the present upsurge of the



U.S. GUNS. Santo Domingo, May 1965. U.S. tanks backed "mopping up" operation to drive Dominican revolutionaries into city center. Civilian casualties of the 10-day struggle have never been released.

reaction signifies intolerable conditions for the masses in India which will provoke new conflicts if not explosions as the armaments race, the accentuated inflation and the lack of basic necessities aggravates the already insupportable privations and misery. In Pakistan, the class consciousness of the proletariat is slowly awakening, already giving rise to significant strikes.

In Ceylon, the mass movement is on the political defensive for the first time in years due to the victory of the United National party.

On the other hand, in Iran, there has been a revival and regroupment of an opposition of an anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and socialist tendency, the development of which had been temporarily halted by the decline of Mossadegh's National Front, the discrediting of the Tudeh party because of the Soviet bureaucracy's overtures to the Shah, and a certain reformist demagoguery voiced by the palace.

In *Southeast Asia* the two main revolutionary poles have been south Vietnam and Indonesia. In south Vietnam, the heroic struggle of the masses is continuing and broadening, but the intervention of American imperialism bolstered the fascist General Ky, whereas on the eve of this intervention, the reactionary regime was manifestly disintegrating. Due to the same cause, the mass struggle in the cities, which was surging forward throughout 1964, came to a halt and the perspective of a quick victory for the guerrilla forces was set back. In Indonesia, the opportunist and vacillating policies of the Communist party leadership led to a grave defeat for the mass movement.

Contrariwise, the reactions against the imperialist aggression in Vietnam stimulated the mass struggle in a number of countries in this part of the world, notably in Thailand where a guerrilla movement is developing, and in the Philippines where the mass movement is reviving. The reaction to the setting up of Greater Malaysia by British imperialism stimulated the mass struggle in Singapore and touched off a guerrilla struggle in North Kalimantan. In Indonesia itself, it is more than probable that the most militant and tempered forces of the Indonesian Communist party will reply vigorously, along with at least a sector of the mass movement, to the momentarily triumphant counterrevolution. Nasution's victory may well prove to be a Pyrrhic victory in the end.

-IV-

THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY

As the Fourth International predicted at the time, the downfall of Khrushchev did not signal any profound modification in the domestic or foreign policies

of the Soviet bureaucracy. Whatever the internal differences in the bureaucracy, the major lines of Khrushchev policy have been continued. This policy includes concessions to the popular desire for more and better consumer goods, maintenance of the relative individual security against arbitrary arrest, etc., which followed abolition of the worst forms of Stalinist police terror.

The policy also includes blocking the most rudimentary forms of political opposition, with no hesitation at using repressive means to accomplish this reactionary objective. And it includes an avid desire for "peaceful coexistence" with American imperialism through division of the world into zones of influence; as well as a persistent effort to maintain a certain degree of dominance in the camp of the workers states and over the Communist parties in other countries even if with reluctant concessions to "polycentrism." The Khrushchev policy expresses the fundamental interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, given the present relationship of forces between it and the Soviet masses, imperialism and the international revolution. The main differences within the bureaucracy are not over strategic aims but over the tactical means of achieving them.

Khrushchev's downfall was the result of a series of defeats for his policies which endangered the fundamental objectives of the Soviet bureaucracy indicated above: the defeat of his agricultural policy; stagnation, if not a setback, in the standard of living of the masses for several years (the freezing of real wages and a rise in prices for a number of food products, threatening to provoke a violent reaction among the workers); delays in carrying out the housing plan; appearance of new centrifugal tendencies within the camp of the workers states (Rumania); complete lack of reaction in face of the first aggression of American imperialism in the Gulf of Tonkin in August 1964.

Khrushchev's successors sought to apply measures of greater efficacy in the various centers of crisis. In the agricultural field, they stressed a new "course toward the peasantry," particularly by encouraging small plots and the private raising of livestock, by granting considerable investment means to the kolkhozes, and by annulling the heavy debts accumulated by the poor kolkhozes. As for the standard of living of the masses, they ended the wage freeze, speeded up the construction of housing, and sought to stimulate the quantity and quality of consumer goods. To free the resources necessary to attain these goals, they reorganized the plant management system and planning in order in particular to achieve a higher rate of growth by reducing unused productive capacity and by shortening the cycle of outlays in major investment projects.

Within the camp of the workers states, they took the pressure off in relation to the progressive integration of several branches of industry in order to preserve

a minimum of cohesion with Rumania, which was ready to break with the COMECON if this meant modifying development plans that stressed industrializing the country. They likewise sought to muffle the public polemics with the Chinese Communist party—with very little by way of results—and to find a common ideological base, however limited and vague, that might regain the adherence of most of the Communist parties. But this effort has failed up to now, as the fate of the proposed March 1965 conference of Communist parties bears witness.

Interest Groups

This means that the tactical differences among the various interest groups and tendencies of the Soviet bureaucracy, which remained in the background when they reached general agreement on eliminating Khrushchev, have surged up again today and will lead inevitably to new crises in the leadership of the bureaucracy.

Particularly to be noted is the appearance of a group of former heads of the Komsomol within the leadership bodies of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. They appear to incarnate in particular the interests of the party apparatus as such, especially its agitprop apparatus which is now enormous.

Against this group the technocrats are becoming more cohesive as representatives of the so-called economic bureaucracy, which is preoccupied with economic efficiency and which has been demanding increased rights for the managers for almost a decade. This wing of the bureaucracy, which gained entry to the highest functions for the first time with the naming of Kosygin as head of government, could appear to be more "liberal" in the field of ideology insofar as it is actually in favor of loosening the control of the party apparatus over the economy and society. But this "liberalism" primarily expresses vulgar pragmatism and indifference toward Marxism. Confronted by a mass movement seeking economic gains, this wing of the bureaucracy could turn out to be much more brutal and less ready to grant concessions than the party wing of the bureaucracy, its immediate material interests running counter to those of the workers in a much more direct way.

The documents adopted at the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International (1963) stressed the existence of a "reformist" mood among the Soviet proletariat, their expectation being that things can be improved through successive reforms won from the bureaucracy rather than through a vast revolutionary movement aimed at restoring Soviet democracy and returning power to the proletariat itself. This mood is explained less by the illusions which the proletariat may have in the Khrushchev crew—such illusions are much more common

in the West and in the apparatus of the Communist parties abroad than in the Soviet working class—than by the disastrous effects of the Stalinist period.

It is clear today that the atomization, the political apathy and the demoralization inflicted on the Soviet masses by twenty-five years of Stalinist dictatorship had a more lasting effect than the revolutionary opponents of Stalinism foresaw. The physical destruction of all the old Communist cadres and the young cadres of the Left Opposition; the almost complete halt to independent Marxist research and thought; the degradation of Marxism to the level of a state religion, identified with the privileged ruling layer and universally hated by the masses: All this created a void, a discontinuity in consciousness, not to mention revolutionary action, which will take time for the masses to overcome.

This explains why the "de-Stalinization" has not yet resulted in a wave of revolutionary action in the Soviet Union. The masses are still affected by political apathy, skepticism and cynicism concerning socialist theory, a mood from which they are freeing themselves but gradually. Their direct acts, which are beginning little by little to increase in number and extent (the appearance of pickets during the conflicts preceding the downfall of Khrushchev were an eloquent indication), are still centered around immediate demands and preoccupations, and have not yet been raised to the level of a criticism of bureaucratic management as a whole of the state and the economy, to the level of formulating a program of political revolution in the USSR.

Only the rather small nuclei of youth, particularly the intellectual youth, are going beyond these limits at the moment and achieving the level of an overall criticism, from a revolutionary-socialist outlook, of bureaucratic rule in the USSR. They are the only circles that at present visualize the perspective of overcoming this rule by returning to Soviet democracy, which involves the defense and consolidation of the economic base of the USSR against the foreign capitalist enemies and the domestic counterrevolutionaries. But the bureaucracy is trying to keep these circles isolated from the working class, an aim that is helped by the general hostility of the working class toward the intellectuals whom it identifies with the bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, the entire evolution in recent years, the successive divisions, more and more apparent within the bureaucracy, the rapid disappearance of illusions and the continued improvements in the position of the masses, the increase in direct struggles, all foster the revival of the mass movement and a rise in political interest. The proletariat, whose number now equals that of the United States, will slowly regain self-confidence and acquire full understanding of the objectives of the political revolution which it is historically destined to carry out. The creation of a new Soviet section

of the Fourth International, the rebirth of a Bolshevik-Leninist organization in the USSR, will play an important role in this rebirth of revolutionary consciousness among the Soviet proletariat.

An analogous evolution is occurring in the other workers states of Eastern Europe. In Poland, the vanguard of the workers and the youth has not overcome the demoralization caused by the progressive liquidation of the gains made by the October 1956 movement; but radicalized nuclei among the student youth have made political progress, whereas many participants in the Polish October have fallen back into passivity or have become prey to skepticism.

In Czechoslovakia and to a certain degree in the German Democratic Republic, the tardy "liberalization" has not altered the political passivity and indifference of the broad layers of the proletariat and the intellectuals. But it has aroused a more critical attitude among the vanguard youth circles, a general questioning of all the dogmas inherited from the Stalinist period, a desire to find alternative solutions at all levels to the schemas and "solutions" applied by the bureaucracy. This will eventually facilitate the reappearance of independent Marxist thought and a revolutionary Marxist movement.

In Yugoslavia, the bureaucratic management has revealed in a very clear way the limits and contradictions of workers self-management confined solely within the plants in the absence of a genuine socialist democracy on the political level. The workers have felt the effects of these limits in their standard of living. This partly disappointing experience has likewise stimulated skepticism and cynicism with regard to socialism, particularly among the youth, the heads of the bureaucracy themselves complaining about this. But at the same time it has helped to clarify among the most conscious elements the real content of the socialist democracy for which it is necessary to battle, and it has helped create the necessary preliminary conditions to unleash this struggle.

Throughout this whole period, both before and after the downfall of Khrushchev, the centralized leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy over the camp of the workers states became weaker and weaker. As a result of the Sino-Soviet conflict, it lost control over Albania, North Korea and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; and even in the Mongolian People's Republic its authority is questioned. Rumania has slipped toward a position more and more analogous to that of Yugoslavia in its relations with the Kremlin.

At the time of Khrushchev's downfall, the Hungarian and Polish leaders permitted themselves to publicly express doubts both as to the necessity for this change in government as well as the way in which it was carried out. The Ulbricht group in the German Democratic Republic, which continues to fear a turn

in the Kremlin's attitude toward Bonn, has likewise taken its distance. In Czechoslovakia the tardy wave of "de-Stalinization" gave headway to the recent critical questioning of the advisability of systematically lining up with the positions and models of the Kremlin. Bulgaria appears to be the last "loyal ally" of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The multiplication of centrifugal tendencies has been registered in each of these countries by the bureaucracy taking an increasingly nationalist course. If the determination to withdraw from systematic alignment with the Kremlin, which has often been accompanied by the exploitation and oppression of the masses of the countries involved for the benefit of the Soviet bureaucracy, has without doubt had certain positive aspects—it is generally greeted with satisfaction by the masses—it has almost always degenerated into petty-bourgeois nationalism, lowered interest in the cause of the world emancipation of the oppressed, forced attempts to develop the economy on a semiautarchic basis, so long as the movement for independence remains rigidly directed by the "national" bureaucracy.

The process as a whole tends to end in the creation of supplementary obstacles to the progressive international integration of the economic resources of the workers states, due to the fear of the masses over being exploited by the Kremlin; yet a rational and scientific integration would powerfully stimulate the growth of the workers states and their standard of living. The main responsibility for the deterioration lies with the current policies of the Kremlin and the other bureaucratic leaderships, all of them educated in the school of Stalinism. Only a new rise in political interest among the masses, and the victory of the political revolution in one or more workers states, or of the proletarian revolution in an imperialist country, providing practical examples of a return to Leninist internationalism, will be able to definitively reverse this direction.

-V-

SINO-SOVIET CRISIS

The aggravation of the Sino-Soviet conflict, particularly after the "Open Letter" published by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1963 and the long series of articles issued by the Chinese Communist party in reply, greatly deepened the differentiation of currents in the international Communist movement. The Moscow preconference of March 1, 1965, did not succeed in covering this up. (See the special document devoted by this Congress to this issue.)

The break up of the monolithism of

this movement led to more than the formation of pro-Moscow and pro-Peking tendencies. Not only does a centrist current exist separately from these tendencies, but both the pro-Moscow and pro-Peking tendencies are heterogeneous.

The group of pro-Peking formations extends from mass parties (particularly in Asia) to organizations of small size and little influence. Politically it extends from ultra-Stalinist formations (like the Albanian Communist party) to parties that are rather independent of the Chinese Communist party (like the Vietnamese CP and the left-wing CP in India).

Despite their approval of the general themes advanced by the Chinese Communist party in its polemics against Moscow, the pro-Peking formations follow orientations that reflect the character of their actual relations with the masses in their countries. Among the small formations (of which the Grippa group in Belgium is quite typical), a grotesque sectarianism engenders splits and self-destruction of the group. Among the big parties (particularly Indonesia and Japan), the approval of Chinese themes is accompanied by an opportunist policy of collaborating with the bourgeoisie or one of its wings, a policy which the Chinese leaders support out of diplomatic and factional reasons.

The pro-Moscow parties are much more variegated than the pro-Peking organizations. The Soviet leaders find their most solid bulwark in the Communist parties of the workers states of eastern Europe. Nevertheless, the leaders of these states and parties tend to utilize the Sino-Soviet conflict to push their "national" interests and to develop to one degree or another a course that is independent of Moscow, pointing in a "Yugoslav" direction. Among the advanced capitalist countries, the Communist party leaderships generally stand opposed to the Chinese position. But this has often served to facilitate evolving toward the right, even to degenerating into extreme neo-reformism. The Italian Communist party has gone the furthest along this line of evolution.

The Castroist current, whose influence is felt primarily in Latin America, constitutes an autonomous, fundamentally revolutionary tendency. It bows ideologically in neither Peking's nor Moscow's direction, as is particularly shown by its attitude toward the national bourgeoisies of the Latin-American countries. However, the possibilities of action open to the leadership of the Cuban state and party are objectively limited because of the blockade set up by American imperialism, compelling them to bear in mind that under these conditions Cuba is highly dependent on economic and military aid from the USSR. This situation has been additionally aggravated by the hyperfactional attitude of the leadership of the Chinese Communist party.

Still another new sign of the disintegration of the official Communist movement is the self-dissolution of certain Com-

munist parties whose members individually entered non-Communist mass movements (Algeria, Egypt). These operations were not carried out for tactical reasons but resulted from considerations equivalent to complete theoretical and political liquidation, the Communist parties involved renouncing what they had defended up until then as their historic role and ascribing to the Algerian Front de Liberation National and the Egyptian Arab Socialist Union the role of serving as the means required by the working class to build a socialist society.

-VI-

THE UNITED STATES

Johnson was returned to the presidency of the United States in November 1964 by the biggest majority in the history of the country. He defeated Goldwater, the Republican candidate, thanks to a coalition of heterogeneous social forces ranging from a significant segment of big business to the overwhelming bulk of the white workers and Negro people. This coalition favored Johnson largely out of fear of Goldwater, who was oriented toward the most reactionary and anti-Negro currents in the country and who called for intensifying U.S. involvement in the civil war in Vietnam even at the risk of war with China. Johnson outmaneuvered the brazen Goldwater by posing as a man of peace who favored serious civil-rights legislation, a "war on poverty," and the construction of a "Great Society" in America.

No sooner was Johnson sworn into office than the first rift came in his popular support. Students and intellectuals, shocked at his escalation of the war in Vietnam, initiated a protest movement that quickly spread through the colleges. Fuel was added to the flames when Johnson ordered some 20,000 U.S. troops to intervene and halt a popular uprising against the heirs of the Trujillo dynasty in the Dominican Republic. The "teach-ins" and associated actions culminated in nationwide demonstrations on October 16, 1965, which succeeded in mobilizing more than 100,000 participants.

This movement is spearheaded by radicalized elements among the country's 5,000,000 student youth. These antiwar militants belong to a new generation that reached its formative period after the crest of the McCarthyite witch-hunt and after the victory of the Cuban Revolution. They sincerely adhere to the principles of justice, equality and democracy which are incessantly preached to them as the guiding values of the "free world." They feel alienated by such features of American society as an educational system tailored to the needs of the industrialists and militarists, the commercialization of culture, and the distasteful lifetime prospects bound up with the jobs and careers open to them.

They are repelled by the more blatant evils and contradictions of capitalist society and are in moralistic and humanistic revulsion against them. They have been appalled and angered by the hypocrisy and lies of the men in power and are deeply disturbed by the discrepancy between what these figures say about democracy and peace and the brutal way in which they trample these underfoot.

The current resistance to Johnson's beligerent foreign policy differs from the old pacifist-led antiwar crusades. It flared up at the very beginning of Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam and has grown in scope and intensity with the extension of the conflict. In the history of twentieth century American imperialism, such early and widespread antiwar opposition is unprecedented. It introduces an inspiring new factor not only in the American political scene but in the world as a whole.

The attitudes of the participants in this movement are extremely variegated. Apart from the traditional pacifists who exert a certain influence, the movement is marked by two major tendencies which tend to head in opposite directions. A large contingent, despite their disillusionment with the war-mongering aspects of Johnson's foreign policy, still retain faith in coalition politics, failing to grasp that in actual practice this means subordination to the Democratic party and the capitalist rulers behind it.

They favor "negotiations" between Washington, Hanoi and the National Liberation Front of south Vietnam as the only "realistic" proposal under the circumstances. The demand for "negotiations" provides a common rallying ground for some critical voices in the capitalist class, the left liberals, conservative leaders of the antinuclear movement, the Social Democrats, and the pro-Moscow Communist party.

The radical and more militant wing of the new antiwar forces realizes that to call for "negotiations" plays into the hands of the demagogic diplomacy of Johnson and Rusk, who likewise claim to be for "negotiations." Against the appeals for "negotiations," the radical wing demands the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam in order to assure the Vietnamese people independence and the right to constitute a government and economic system of their own choice in a united nation.

The political character and general orientation of this promising antiwar movement will ultimately be decided by the outcome of the current contest between the liberal and radical tendencies.

If Johnson persists in his course of spreading the war in Southeast Asia, as he gives every indication of doing, antiwar sentiments among the American people will rise, perhaps at a phenomenal rate. As more youth are conscripted and sent to fight in the dirty war of colonial conquest, as the casualties mount and the costs soar and are felt by the population, the antiwar camp will re-



Malcolm X

ceive an accession of fresh forces and acquire a much broader mass base.

This prospect is already disturbing the Johnson administration. In addition to the risks it is taking in face of the unpopularity of the Southeast Asian adventure among its allies and a more cautious sector of the American capitalist class, it must constantly take into calculation the uneasiness and anxiety about the war permeating the American people.

Many of the youth who took the initiative in organizing the antiwar movement were first drawn into mass action through participation in the civil-rights struggle both in the North and the South. The youth attracted to the Freedom Now movement applied what they had learned there to the new arena of struggle against Johnson's war policy.

The Freedom Now movement of the American Negroes, which began developing along militant lines on a mass scale over ten years ago, is still on the rise.

The increasingly insistent drive of the Negro people for equality and emancipation has become a prime issue in the whole of American life. The highly explosive potential of this social force on the march can be gauged by the fact that the Negro poor, crowded into ghettos, now comprise up to half the population and even more in some of the major cities, including the capital, Washington, D. C., itself.

The revolt of the Negroes is a consequence of the double exploitation and oppression which they suffer in American society today: exploitation as proletarians relegated to the lowest levels in the social structure; oppression as blacks excluded from rights and opportunities enjoyed by even the most abject layers of the white workers. The reaction of the black masses thus necessarily develops in a dual way, corresponding to the dual form of oppression they experience. They conduct a simultaneous struggle on both a socio-economic and a nationalist level.

Under these circumstances, black nationalism plays a most progressive role in the dynamics of social struggle and has revolutionary implications. The irrepressible strivings of the Negro people to achieve human dignity, to unify their forces, and wield the power inherent in more than 20,000,000 members for their own aims feed what has become known as the *black* revolt. The possibility that the most militant, far-seeing, and courageous elements among the Negro nationalists could become sympathetic to socialist ideas was indicated by the evolution of Malcolm X whose murder was a tragic setback to this force.

Due to their double exploitation and high rate of unemployment—which comes close in many categories to that of the American working class as a whole during the great depression of 1929-32—to the gap between what is promised and their actual conditions of life and to the influence of the colonial revolution (particularly in Africa), the Negro people now constitute the most rebellious sector of American society.

The anger and impatience of the insurgent black masses continually clash with the efforts of the reformist and pacifist circles headed by the Rev. Martin Luther King to contain the movement within the framework of collaboration with the Democratic administration in return for small concessions. Such a leadership cannot overcome the resistance of the racists to integration in the South. The superficial civil-rights measures passed by Congress do not at all improve the situation in the North.

In the big ghettos from New York to Los Angeles and from Chicago to Birmingham, housing, education, unemployment, lack of opportunity, discrimination and police brutality are becoming more and more insupportable. No reformist proposals or attempted reformist remedies can eradicate these evils; they are rooted in the special function performed by the Negroes in the economy of the profit system where they serve as the decisive component of the industrial reserve army and the principal source of cheap and unskilled labor.

The incapacity of the moderate Negro leaders and the government program to either avert the effects or eliminate the causes of the grievances of the Negro people was most dramatically demonstrated by the explosion of the Watts area

in Los Angeles in the summer of 1965 which followed similar outbursts in Harlem in 1964 and Birmingham in 1963. The vehemence of this uprising, suppressed by the police and state troops, is indicative both of the power contained in the Freedom Now movement and the failure of that movement as yet to create a leadership, program and organization capable of directing it along the right lines.

The antiwar movement and the Freedom Now struggle have mounted as the United States reached the highest point of economic prosperity ever known and a rate of growth unequalled since World War I. However, these very economic conditions served to reinforce the conservatism and inertia of the more privileged white workers and helped to insulate them from the antiwar and civil-rights movements. This heavy default of organized labor cramps both of these struggles and restricts their tie-up with the potential power of the working class.


The top leadership of the trade-union bureaucracy under Meany and Reuther are the most malignant and vociferous backers of Johnson's imperialist foreign policy and they give no more than lip service to the cause of the Negro freedom fighters. Despite the disdainful treatment accorded these representatives of some 16,000,000 organized workers by the official executives of the ruling class, they remain the most servile followers of the Democratic party chiefs.

The extreme unevenness of the development of the class struggle in the United States creates exceptional difficulties for the American revolutionary Marxists. While the radicalism among the student youth and the black freedom fighters opens opportunities for the growth of socialist ideas and influence, the immobility of organized labor sets relatively narrow limits to the chances of gaining a mass base among the American workers in the immediate future. It likewise constitutes a major obstacle to promoting the strategic aim of unifying the Negro struggle for freedom and equality and the antiwar movement of the youth and intellectuals with the ultimately decisive anticapitalist class force in America.

It is difficult to predict how long the American labor movement will remain quiescent. The ruling circles certainly do not consider this to be a permanent feature of the white labor force, as is shown by their continued policy of tying in the labor leaders with the state, by the intervention of the government in union disputes and negotiations of any importance, and by the enforcement of restrictive anti-labor legislation.

Any one of several developments; or, more likely, a combination of them can break up the apathy of the labor movement, stimulate new oppositional currents within it, and provide a basis for an alternative to the two party system.

On the economic level, these include a possible rise in fear of unemployment or job displacement due to automation; the



Malcolm X

pressure of mounting inflation, particularly if coupled with attempts by the employers and the government to block efforts by the workers to maintain or improve their standard of living, or the advent of a new recession.

On the level of political understanding and outlook, the repeated failure of the Democrats and Republicans to make good their promises about leading America to a better way of life fosters impatience with capitalist politics. The ultimate outcome is disillusionment and an intensification of the deep-seated feelings of insecurity among the American workers. The repeated U. S. imperialist aggressions abroad have a similar cumulative effect. Each new military adventure deepens the fear that a chain reaction can be set off ending in a nuclear world war. The world-wide condemnation of Washington's imperialist policies reinforces the impact of this fear on the consciousness of the people.

The interweaving of these processes will intensify the readiness to turn to radical alternatives that offer a genuine way out. This will accelerate the changes in political thinking and the relation of forces already set in motion by the factors that have generated the Negro revolt and the antiwar movement. The ultimate consequences will be to shake the two-party system from top to bottom, open the way for genuinely independent labor politics and greatly expand the prospects for the swift growth of revolutionary Marxism in the United States.

-VII-

WORLD CLASS STRUGGLE

The class struggle has evolved in the other imperialist countries under the combined dialectical effect of the objective socio-economic situation and the role of the workers organizations.

In *Japan* the Socialist party has undergone a process of radicalization, bringing it in practice into a united front both with the trade union federation SOHYO—whose connection with the party has been strengthened—and with the pro-Peking Communist party. The deterioration of the economic situation, an offensive against the right of the workers in the public sector to strike, and mounting unemployment are becoming important factors, along with the wide opposition against the imperialist aggression in Vietnam, against the Japanese-South Korean pact and against the American occupation of Okinawa.

This evolution is leading to the slow polarization of the political forces, the influence of the liberal-democratic government party being progressively worn away to the advantage of the Socialist party, without the latter however posing the problem of the conquest of power as an objective in extra-parliamentary struggles of the masses nor formulating an

anticapitalist transition program that could lead to the overthrow of capitalism.

In *capitalist Europe*, where the mass Communist parties have pursued a more and more rightist course, the Social Democracy has undergone new stages of political degradation, which are analyzed in detail in the special document devoted by this Congress to the situation in Europe.

Thus the Belgian Social Democracy in 1964 shared responsibility for the intervention of the paratroopers in the Congo, overthrowing the revolutionary government in Stanleyville. The German Social Democracy in September 1965 organized an electoral campaign in which its political differentiation from the main bourgeois party, the Christian Democratic Union, was wiped out, everything being subordinated to "winning" a coalition with this party. The Italian Socialist party headed by Nenni, yesterday still so "leftist" and so well integrated in the "socialist camp," cheerfully identified itself with NATO. The British Labour party, returning to power in the fall of 1964, organized a big-scale imperialist repression against the masses of Aden and Southern Arabia while at the same time covering up and justifying the American imperialist aggression in Vietnam.

This evolution, combined with the rightist course of the Communist parties, favored the appearance of new centrist formations located either between the Social Democracy and the Communist parties or clearly to the left of them. The conditions under which they were established and the perspectives facing them are analyzed in the resolution devoted to Europe.

Under these conditions, certain trade-union organizations, retaining minimum autonomy in relation to the reformist apparatus and its policy favoring class collaboration, have played a special role objectively as a vehicle for the most advanced tendencies of the masses opposed to the integration of the workers movement in the bourgeois state. This was the case with the *Industrie Gewerkschaft Metall* and the *Industrie Gewerkschaft Chemie* in West Germany, of the *Transport and General Workers Union* and partially of the *Association of Supervisory Staffs, Executives and Technicians*, and the *Amalgamated Engineering Union* in Great Britain, the *Liege regional Federation Generale des Travailleurs de Belgique* and partially the *Centrale Generale des Services Publics* in Belgium.

The decline in the rate of profit, the aggravation of interimperialist competition, the loss of impetus in the boom, the intrinsic needs that flow from the acceleration of the renewal of fixed capital—all these factors determine a growing offensive against trade-union rights and independence emanating from management and the state, an offensive culminating in various anti-strike or anti-union laws. The fact that even the Wilson government is seeking to impose

similar legislation in Great Britain indicates that this is a general tendency, holding for all of capitalist Europe.

The reaction of the working class of capitalist Europe to this offensive, as well as to the efforts of management to limit or periodically skip wage increases, nevertheless continues to be quite vigorous, as was indicated by the opposition in Belgium to the "anti-strike laws" that were passed in 1963, the opposition of the West German trade unions to the emergency laws proposed at the last *Bundestag*, and the opposition of the Italian trade unions to analogous tendencies. If the Wilson government tries to actually apply similar legislation in Great Britain, it will likewise run up against the stubborn resistance of the working class.

The workers found themselves much more disarmed on the other hand in face of the sudden reappearance of unemployment, cuts in hours and layoffs in Italy and France in 1964-65. It is precisely in a defensive battle at the least favorable time in an economic cycle that the role of leadership appears most prominently, and the workers of these two countries had to pay a heavy price because of the absence of any overall strategy among the unions and workers parties.

With the exception of France, where the proletariat suffered a grave defeat with de Gaulle's coming to power and the way in which the two traditional workers parties accepted it, the working class of Western Europe has nevertheless retained its militancy and power of resistance everywhere. And when a conjuncture of various factors favoring a broad struggle occurs, this could break out on a scale climaxing anything seen in the past. This was found to be the case in Belgium in 1960-61. It was experienced again last summer in Greece.

The amplitude and the dynamism of the great mass demonstrations against the court's plot to bring down the Papan-dreou government, whose "liberal" policy was judged by the military clique, the big shipowners and certain American circles to be too risky, caught the reaction by surprise and for a time even left it at a loss. The reactionaries, however, gained a tactical victory, winning a majority for the reactionary Stephanopoulos cabinet after two previous attempts were defeated.

This success was above all due to the parliamentary cretinism and opportunism of the Communist party and the United Democratic Left, which deliberately kept the demonstrations of the masses within a framework of mere pressure on parliament, even refusing to launch the slogan for a *referendum* and for a *republic*, not to mention slogans calling on the masses to organize committees and bodies for self-defense or outright anticapitalist slogans. The militancy of the masses was thus simply drained away, the whole perspective being placed on elections to the legislature.

But this wave of struggle did not remain without effect on the level of con-

sciousness and organization of the vanguard workers. One of the tasks of the Greek revolutionary Marxists is to explain all these lessons as being only the first phase in a longer struggle and to organize in such a way that the next phases lead to an outstanding success for the mass movement.

-VIII- OUR TASKS

(1) The most urgent immediate task facing revolutionary Marxists on a world-wide scale is to strengthen the struggle against the imperialist aggression in Vietnam and for the Vietnamese Revolution:

(a) By doing everything possible to extend demonstrations upholding the right of the Vietnamese people to decide their own fate and demanding the immediate, unconditional withdrawal of imperialist troops from Vietnam.

Only demonstrations that mobilize a considerable sector of the mass of workers can have a decisive effect on the outcome. Wherever the bureaucracy of the labor movement constitutes an obstacle to this, it is possible in many countries to make an effective beginning through committees representing smaller forces and combining them in united-front actions on as large a scale as possible. Vigorous campaigns by such committees, including staging such demonstrations as are within their resources, can speed the process of bringing the workers into the struggle on a massive scale.

(b) By tirelessly stressing the need for an anti-imperialist united front on an international scale.

The proposed united front includes reuniting all the workers states on a governmental level, whatever their differences may be on other levels, combining all the big workers organizations of the capitalist world, the entire revolutionary movement of the colonial and semicolonial areas—all of this around a single central objective: opposition to the imperialist aggression in Vietnam and mobilization of effective military and material aid for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

(c) By organizing where practical, material and medical aid for the Vietnamese Revolution, particularly in areas like Western Europe where such campaigns have considerable opportunities for substantial success.

(d) By assiduously propagating and explaining the basic truth that the most effective way to weaken the imperialist aggression in Vietnam is through the intensification of revolutionary struggles in other countries.

In the opinion of the Fourth International, actions and educational work

conducted along these lines not only conform to the principles of international solidarity in a struggle of crucial importance, they can have a powerful effect in counteracting both the opportunist defaults of the pro-Moscow Communist parties and the factional defaults of the pro-Peking Communist parties with regard to support for the Vietnamese Revolution and in helping to bring together forces of sufficient weight to compel the White House to withdraw its military forces from the mainland of Asia, thereby reversing the present highly dangerous drift toward nuclear war.

While the top priority immediate tasks center around the struggle against the imperialist aggression in Vietnam, other tasks, some of which can be stated more generally, remain of central importance. These tasks do not stand in contradiction to the work of defending the Vietnamese Revolution; active defense of the Vietnamese Revolution, in fact is but one of the current means of furthering them.

(2) The unconditional defense of all the workers states, beginning with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, against imperialism. Of special concern in this field is the defense of revolutionary Cuba because of its exposed geographical position and the extreme measures taken by U.S. imperialism to crush it.

(3) Defense of the revolutionary conquests of Algeria against both imperialist pressure and domestic reaction.

(4) Defense of revolutionary movements under way such as those in the Congo, Santo Domingo, Venezuela, etc., against imperialist intervention.

(5) Support to the movement for unilateral nuclear disarmament in the imperialist countries.

The Fourth International holds that the anti-nuclear movement should be broadened and turned resolutely toward the plants and the big workers organizations. Every effort must be made to spread understanding of the fact that only through the workers taking power and abolishing capitalism in the imperialist strongholds, culminating in the United States, can the world be freed forever from the nightmare perspective of a nuclear war.

(6) Support to the efforts to achieve a positive outcome to the crisis shaking the international Communist movement.

To the questions being raised more and more by the most advanced Communist members, the Fourth International seeks objective consideration of the answers to be found in its program. The Fourth International has taken an independent position in this crisis and proposes to maintain it. As in the past, the Fourth International will continue to give critical support to the Chinese opposition against such key points of Khrushchevite opportunism as the drift of certain Communist parties toward Social Democratic positions; abandonment of the Leninist theory of the state and the party; advancing "peaceful coexistence" as the main

strategic line of the international Communist movement, spreading illusions about the alleged possibility of a "peaceful road" to socialism, etc., while bluntly criticizing the opportunist and ultraleftist aspects of Peking's policies (rehabilitation of Stalin; support of the opportunist politics of the leaderships of the Indonesian and Japanese Communist parties; promulgation of the theory of "revolution by stages" in flagrant contradiction to the concept of the "uninterrupted revolution"; issuing misleading propaganda about the "advantages" accruing to the revolutionary cause through U.S. imperialism deepening its military intervention in Vietnam, etc.).

(7) The Fourth International attaches particular importance to the working and student youth, who stand in the vanguard today in a number of countries. The social, political and cultural preoccupations of this youth are of the keenest interest to the Fourth International, as it is capable of attracting a growing number of them to its ranks.

The solving of specific political and organizational problems facing a series of sections is considered by the leadership of the Fourth International to be of special importance. These will be considered in a document to be published internally.

The world political situation has grown so complex and changes with such rapidity today that only the broad lines of developments of special current importance internationally can be indicated in a document of this character. This holds true even more so, of course, for tactical problems arising from national and local peculiarities. The grave events disturbing all peoples today speak with ever greater insistence on the imperative necessity to build a revolutionary socialist leadership in each country capable of working out in time the correct class-struggle solutions to the political and tactical problems facing the working people and the great mass of humanity.

But if the responsibilities facing national leaderships have greatly increased in recent years, this also means that the need for a genuinely revolutionary Marxist international has grown more imperative. It is no longer possible to find strictly "national" solutions to major economic, social and political problems. All key struggles are now fought out on an international level.

Against the formidable international counterrevolutionary forces defending and advancing the interests of the capitalist system, the working class and its allies require an international leadership, an international party of their own.

The basic program for this party and an important selection of cadres on a world scale already exist in the Fourth International. To strengthen the Fourth International means to hasten building the revolutionary socialist leadership capable of guiding the mass forces even now gathering to take the world into the socialist civilization of tomorrow.

The Progress and Problems of the African Revolution

Some ten years after the process of the formation of independent states began on a big scale, the African reality shows considerable differentiation. Nevertheless, while acknowledging their approximate and provisional nature, it is possible to take the fundamental tendencies and common or analogous elements and place them in definite categories or groups.

More concretely, three major sectors can be distinguished: the Africa where colonialism and racism still survive, the Africa of outright neocolonial structure, and the Africa where revolutionary transformations are occurring. An analysis of situations and tendencies in a certain number of countries in each of these sectors will provide us with a rather extensive picture, and enable us to single out the basic tendencies and work out some essential conclusions.

-I-

COLONIAL AFRICA

Colonial Africa, which geographically coincides in large measure with southern Africa, includes essentially South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). We will briefly analyze here the two epicenters of South Africa and Angola.

South Africa

The dominant feature in recent years has been the aggravation of national and economic oppression imposed on the indigenous population of South Africa by apartheid rule. Against this, violent forms of struggle have developed, re-

presenting a break with the methods advocated in the past by broad sectors of the nationalist movement; and, in principle, a turn was made in this field by the African National Congress (ANC) and the Communist Party (PC).

However, the liberal sectors in particular sought to draw advantage from acts of violence conducted in distinct separation from a broad mass movement. The hopes of those who thought that acts of sabotage would be sufficient to set off the powder keg have proved to be unjustified. The revolts which broke out at different times in isolated regions met with very harsh repression and were thus crushed.

Generally, the fundamental elements of the situation in South Africa remain unchanged. The presence of a high percentage of white masters inevitably points to a perspective of long, stubborn struggle. But, on the other hand, an economic and social structure relatively advanced for an African country, the lack of a genuine indigenous bourgeoisie, the existence of a quite large mass of proletarians and very broad masses of poor, even proletarianized peasants, are also factors of a nature to stimulate the revolutionary anti-capitalist and socialist dynamics of a revolution starting off as a national and democratic revolution.

In the final analysis, it is precisely the presence of these factors that explains both the scheme for a neocolonialist operation with the intervention of sectors of world imperialism and the extreme caution of the "liberal" bourgeois forces in opposition to the present racist regime. The neocolonialist operation envisages replacing apartheid rule by the granting of a few "liberal" political rights to narrow layers of the indigenous population.

The neocolonialist operation is, in fact, running into serious obstacles. all the


more so since no one can guarantee that the process, once launched, would stop at the point desired by certain "liberal" forces. Nevertheless, the possibility of success cannot be ruled out, particularly if certain conditions were fulfilled. A success would obviously affect the whole development of the revolution in South Africa.

In any case the task of the revolutionary forces at the present stage is to struggle in such a way that Verwoerd's possible downfall would involve the unleashing of a process of permanent revolution and not the reorganization of the country on a neocolonial basis. In relation to this aim, a struggle limited to acts of sabotage or to isolated actions is ineffective, even favorable to the projects of the neocolonialist forces.

For this reason it is insufficient to take a position in favor of armed struggle. In truth, it is not at all simply a problem of method but primarily one of content. A neocolonialist and liberal wing can, it is obvious, conclude that in the complete absence of any legal avenues at all it is necessary to fight Verwoerd by means of armed actions, yet its basic orientation would remain fundamentally opposed to that of a mass revolutionary movement.

In reality, it is not possible to counter the neocolonialist maneuver and actually launch the process of the South African revolution except through a movement based on the broad masses, particularly the peasant masses. The touchstone for a revolutionary leadership is its capacity, starting from a mobilization for democratic and national liberatory aims, to assure at each concrete stage the slogans and actions capable of stimulating the anti-capitalist dynamics of the struggle.

The progress realized among the peasants and in the reserves by sectors of



Angola Freedom Fighters

the vanguard and the maturing of a considerable number of cadres in the mass movement are unquestionably positive signs.

The formation of a united front of the forces struggling against apartheid and imperialism remains a primary necessity, if only because of the bitterness of the prospective struggle which thus necessitates organizations functioning on a national scale. But no united front would be worth anything, or could accomplish the tasks for which it was set up, if the preliminary condition were not met of breaking with all the agents of imperialism and neocolonialism includ-

ing the indigenous and liberal agents.

Revolutionary Marxists are partisans of that kind of united front and offer their active support to all those who actually struggle, no matter what their specific orientation may be. They support in particular the vanguard sectors of the South African movement which are closest to the line of the permanent revolution and which have already succeeded, thanks to stubborn and courageous struggle, in gaining real mass influence, especially among the peasants (above all APDUSA, the African People's Democratic Union of Southern Africa) and the other organizations affili-

ated to the NEUM (Non European Unity Movement).

Angola

The national Angolan movement has undergone many vicissitudes because of internal as well as international reasons.

The massive effort of Portuguese imperialism, backed by its allies, has not succeeded in crushing the resistance of the Angolan people but it has been able to contain it at certain times. The developments in the Congo situation likewise had a negative influence, particularly after Tshombe, who is directly linked with the Portuguese, came to power.

Finally there has been the obstacle of the struggles within the national movement and its cleavages, the alternating positions taken by certain African states and the rather heavy intervention of the Soviet bureaucracy, which participated in the effort to discredit the GRAE (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile) and the FLNA (Angolan National Liberation Front).

In the case of Angola, the neocolonialist margin of maneuver (up to now very uncertain and vague, probably more under North American than Portuguese inspiration) has been quite limited. An indigenous bourgeois class that could serve as a social and political base for a possible neocolonialist operation does not exist in even embryonic form.

The defeat of colonialism – which would be the result in any case of a broad mass mobilization, particularly the peasant masses – would create a political and social vacuum that would strongly stimulate the anti-capitalist dynamics of the process. In an independent Angolan state, the specific weight of the masses, the peasant masses in the first place, would be determining and the masses would be pushed from the first phases to translate their victory into economic and social terms.

From this it follows that the revolutionary Angolan vanguard must set about elaborating a perspective of permanent revolution, clarifying in a systematic way the need for the national liberation struggle to have an anti-capitalist and socialist content. Some of the militants and nuclei have already reached this conclusion, utilizing the criteria of Marxist analysis and adopting socialist conceptions.

It also follows that the masses, during a probably rather long struggle, undergoing an immense experience, will not tolerate being robbed of their victory. This means that the necessary clarification and the possible elimination of opportunist or cowardly leaders, under the influence of forces foreign to the revolution, will be achieved during the struggle itself, in accordance with its own logic.

It is clear that a genuine revolution-



Angola Freedom Fighters

ary Angolan leadership does not yet exist and that internal conflicts and struggles of the nationalist movement will probably continue to appear for a whole period. In determining which field of action they will give preference, the fundamental criterion for revolutionary Marxists is who at a given stage exercises real mass influence and who is actually fighting, because that is where the logic of the revolutionary struggle most easily permits the formation of a revolutionary vanguard. The line of a leadership or a few leaders cannot be a decisive criterion, all the less so in the case of insinuations or suspicions about this or that person.

In the fifth year of the Angolan struggle, the following objective balance sheet, by and large, can be drawn up:

(a) The armed struggle inside the country is continuing and has even undergone a revival recently. The Angolan armed forces outside the country continue to exist, despite the grave limitations imposed on their struggle by the reactionary Congolese governments.

(b) The armed struggle inside Angola—which is being conducted especially by forces of peasant social composition—is being organized essentially by the FLNA, which represents the base of the GRAE. The MPLA (People's Movement of Angolan Liberation) succeeded during 1964 in establishing a base in the enclave of Cabinda where contingents of the FLNA were already in existence. Despite the considerable backing the MPLA has abroad, particularly from the Soviet bureaucracy, it has not been able to reverse the existing relationship of forces and cannot be considered at present as representing more than a minor component of the Angolan movement so far as mass influence is concerned.

(c) On the plane of conscious leadership, the MPLA claims to have a more progressive, even socialist, orientation. However, this has not prevented it from having ties with dubious formations and from continuing to follow a confused line. Its relative strength in negotiations is derived less from its intrinsic influence than from the support granted it by the wing of the Communist movement adhering to the Soviet bureaucracy.

Due to its size alone, the FLNA appears more heterogeneous than the MPLA, including the leadership level. A whole series of its elements have not crystallized politically, move in zigzags, work in a completely empirical way. It is very likely that some of them have been under American imperialist influence in the past or still are. However it would be a mistake not to note that certain representatives of the FLNA are capable of evolving. It would likewise be an error to leave out of consideration the fact that after splitting from the MPLA, a series of vanguard elements with a Marxist education and having a quite left orientation have entered the FLNA.

(d) The attitudes of certain African

states, including the more progressive, or those considered to be more progressive, have changed position on the Angolan national movement abruptly at times and without clear explanation. Their attitudes thus cannot be taken as a reliable criterion. No doubt particular diplomatic or tactical considerations have come into play most often, taking precedence over an analysis of the actual forces, the relationship of forces and the dynamics of the movement.

Without hiding its criticisms and while developing its own concepts on the nature of the Angolan revolution, the Fourth International will continue to solidarize with the forces in actual struggle, which are primarily the peasant forces organized at the present stage essentially in the FLNA. The Fourth International holds that the unification of the FLNA with other existing forces (which the FLNA says it favors in principle) would prove profitable, naturally on condition that it be realized in the struggle, on the basis of a clear anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist program, without which the indispensable unity in the armed struggle would suffer.

An upsurge of the struggle in the other Portuguese colonies, particularly in Mozambique (in so-called "Portuguese" Guinea the movement has already reached spectacular dimensions) would multiply difficulties for the colonialists, could lead them to give up certain positions and possibly offer some compromises—with the aim of strengthening the most important rampart. For a whole series of reasons, both geographic and economic, it is most likely that Angola will prove to be the place where the Portuguese will decide to hang on to the end. From this viewpoint, too, the perspective of a prolonged struggle is justified.

-II-

NEO-COLONIAL AFRICA

The countries that can be listed in this category—the countries of North Africa like Tunisia, Morocco and Libya, most of the former French colonies of West Africa, the former British colonies in the same region like Nigeria and Sierra Leone, the Congo, countries of East Africa like Ethiopia, Somalia and the former British colonies there, etc.—shows in itself the broad character of this classification and the rather wide differences that are involved. We will limit ourselves to referring to a few of the more significant cases in the various zones.

The Congo

The Congo offers in concentrated form the multiple contradictions of an Africa in upheaval in the process of emancipation. The central government rests in the hands of the man most detested by

the African revolutionists and even by certain moderates, and vast regions are the scene of a ferocious war, the current situation being due just as much to foreign intervention as to the limitations and internal conflicts of the forces on the scene.

The struggle in the Congo is not only for the territory itself. Involved in this struggle is the threat of consolidating a counterrevolutionary government that would bear down on other African countries and accentuate the differences in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the governments of the Organization Commune Africaine et Malgache (OCAM), first making an alliance with Tshombe, then Kasavubu and finally Mobutu.

From the point of view of imperialism, the Congo of the late fifties had reached a point where domination in the old style could not be continued any longer; nevertheless hardly anything had been done to prepare an alternative of even the most fragile kind. Because of this, particularly because of the absence in the Congo of even an embryonic indigenous ruling class, the 1960 operation ended in a chronic crisis. Not even the most moderate neocolonialist setup could be stabilized, so that in 1964 the imperialists went back to direct intervention, hardly camouflaged behind the hypocritical mask of rescuing whites and helping the "legal" government of Tshombe.

As for the anti-colonialist Congolese forces, their fundamental deficiency has been the absence of a genuinely unified political organization, the Lumumbist organization itself having only limited forces. That is why the solution envisaged at the "round table" quickly blew up and Lumumba, the only figure in position to play a national role, was eliminated.

For a whole period, the splintering of the movement and the lack of leadership slowed down resumption of the revolutionary struggle. The resistance could pick up again only later, first on a local and regional scale. The most concentrated proletarian force—in the Katanga mines—could play no role because of the pressure brought to bear by the whole colonialist and Tshombist machine. There is no doubt that the absence of a national party was due in the final analysis to the tribal divisions and the backward character of most of the country.

It must nevertheless be added that the international forces interested in counteracting the negative evolution of the Congo—the progressive African states and the workers states—even if one leaves aside the criminal responsibility of the Soviet bureaucracy in facilitating the intervention of the UN in July 1960, could not or did not want to contribute in a decisive way to lancing the Congolese abscess, even if they have granted the insurgents considerable aid since then.

As a result of the events at the end of 1964, the struggle has become explosive for imperialism and neocolonialism, and, in short, more to the advantage of the

revolutionary forces that have sprung up in different zones of the country. Thanks to a brutal and cynical policy, which does not bother about any camouflage and completely accepts the logic of a war of extermination, conducted particularly by foreign mercenaries, Tshombe reconquered some positions; but only partial successes are involved. His inability to stabilize his positions to any extent, the rapid resumption of inflation, his encounters with Kasavubu and the Bakongo tribal forces led to his downfall.

The deficiencies and weaknesses of the national movement have not been overcome, however. Coordination and unity are not yet assured. This is not specially due to the quite real geographical difficulties. Grave political differences remain. The reaction to the "Adoula" plan to stop the armed struggle in return for a neocolonialist solution spoke eloquently in this respect.

If there is an intransigent wing that wants to go all the way and reject an equivocal solution (Mulele), there is also another tendency, represented at the top and even in some sectors of the combat forces (for example, Gbenye), that is willing to accept a moderate neocolonialist solution in the final analysis. But such a solution would be impractical or short lived. The centrifugal tendencies would quickly reappear, the struggle would be resumed and the only result would be a grave division and confusion in the nationalist movement.

The only feasible solution is to defeat not only Tshombe, Kasavubu and Mobutu, but especially the domestic and international forces behind them. Such an outcome is possible only through the united national action of a revolutionary army—helped militarily by revolutionary Africa and the workers

states—on the basis of a political movement that struggles to uproot the imperialist domination (expropriation and nationalization of foreign holdings) and to eliminate the indigenous bureaucracy, allied to the neocolonialists and incapable of governing the country.

The present attitude of the African states is contradictory. The OAU has zigzagged; the neocolonialist states with moderate governments support the "legal" government; some progressive states of Africa grant the indispensable aid. Thus, not only are antagonistic internal forces in opposition to each other in the Congo, but also the different African tendencies, plus, of course, international forces. Hence the significance of a struggle whose possible victorious outcome could very shortly modify the tendencies in southern Africa, by creating the preconditions for the collapse of the most reactionary rampart on the continent.

Nigeria

Nigeria, in the British scheme of things, was to play the role of a pilot test in neocolonialism. It is by far the most populous country of Africa, centrally situated, and, thanks to these factors capable of greatly influencing the general evolution of the continent. Moreover a series of conditions existed that could justly be considered to be favorable from the neocolonialist point of view:

(a) The presence of a considerable amount of foreign capital in industry and finance as well as agriculture (plantation ownership).

(b) The existence of a relatively substantial nucleus of an indigenous ruling class in comparison with other African countries.

(c) Sufficient differences within this class and among the different zones of the country to assure the possibility of diversionary maneuvers to prevent the process of national anti-imperialist unification from coming to a head.

(d) The prior formation of a political layer, trained in the British school, a layer that even included some of the moderate trade-union leaders.

(e) Considerable economic resources, open to foreign exploitation.

All of this was crowned, so to speak, with another essential element: Independence was handed down without a revolutionary struggle involving the masses in a big way.

Five years after independence, Nigeria remains under neocolonial rule, suffering from a conservative, even reactionary government. No measures have either been taken or projected with regard to the imperialist holdings or in an at all progressive direction. In the field of foreign policy, Nigeria continues to take retrogressive positions, especially in relation to the most burning African problems, thus constituting one of the strong-

est counterweights to the action of the progressive African governments.

Nevertheless, the situation is far from having crystallized. In fact, as the events at the end of 1964 and beginning of 1965 showed, the country is undergoing a profound crisis. The regime is completely unstable, the ruling-class forces—even those that constituted the base of the governmental system for a whole period—are divided and in sharp internal struggle. Mass opposition, particularly in the most developed regions, is growing.

The political topography remains fragmented and contradictory (different and opposing political forces rule in different regions) and the unity of the federation itself is threatened. The British-style democratic parliamentary structures are only a masquerade, as is proved by the colossally fraudulent elections among other things, the measures taken against political opponents, even the most moderate, the harsh repression of representatives of the vanguard of the labor movement. In reality, the entire foundation of the political system inherited from the British empire is extremely precarious.

All this obviously reflects the structure of Nigerian society. The country is politically divided, even at the ruling-class level, because the degree of economic and social development is quite differentiated. As against the relatively developed regions stands the North, where feudal-type relations are still prevalent. In this context, tribal and religious factors play a big role. Of course this does not mean that the situation is completely static.

On the contrary, Nigerian society is in movement and capitalist relations have begun to penetrate even the North. However this penetration is not wiping out the influence of the feudal elements. What is occurring instead is a symbiosis such as other societies have undergone during transition periods (for example, feudalists also become contractors; the breakup of communal structures occurs in favor of tribal chiefs who seize the land, etc.).

A highly progressive element, one capable of playing an even bigger role in the future, is the dynamism displayed by considerable sectors of the urban masses, those most integrated in the modern economic web (e.g., the Lagos dockers strike, the June 1964 general strike, etc.).

Due to this situation and also to the international experience accumulated by young cadres (particularly during studies in Europe), vanguard groups already exist in Nigeria that proclaim themselves to be Marxist or revolutionary Marxist, who criticize the British-type trade unionism and who are wrestling with the vital problems of the Nigerian revolution and big international questions, going through conflicts and splits in the process. Among the recent experiences that should be mentioned in this respect are those of the Socialist Workers, Artisans

**THE
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IN
SOUTH AFRICA**

**BY
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THE ROAD TO STANLEYVILLE. The Congo, November 1964. U.S. financed and armed mercenaries pillage countryside during march to Stanleyville where they joined Belgian machine - gunners to slaughter civilian population.

and Farmers Party (SWAFP) and the Nigerian Labour Party (NLP).

An essential problem remaining to be clarified is the attitude to be taken toward the national bourgeoisie, which in Nigeria is not as spectral as in some other African countries, and which in any case has already revealed beyond mistake its conservative and pro-imperialist nature. Thus the problem is not at all to seek an alliance with this social layer—as the Nigerian partisans of the line of the Soviet bureaucracy maintain—but to appeal to the sectors of the people still under the influence of a vaguely progressive outlook (for example, the Action Group) on the basis of a revolutionary platform and to organize them under a consistent socialist leadership.

This specification is imperative in the more general case of the fundamental problem of the alliance with the peasant masses who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population and who are quite variegated socially (extending from agricultural laborers on the plantations to the classical poor peasants and serfs

of the feudal zones). The elaboration of a transition program for the agrarian revolution and the mobilization of the peasants (who in part still constitute the base of the most conservative tendencies) are key tasks for the Nigerian vanguard.

Ethiopia

In East Africa, the rampart of conservatism is the kingdom of Ethiopia, a backward society featured by feudal-type relations on which rests a genuinely despotic political regime. The feudal class welded together around the Negus and his family aims at consolidating its position through an alliance with foreign capital. The industrial sector, still quite limited, is entirely in the hands of capitalists of other countries who enjoy very favorable conditions for their investments.

The prestige acquired at the time of the fascist aggression, and especially the hypocritical position in favor of unity voiced at meetings of the African states by the emperor, constitute a cheap "pro-

gressive" ideological cover that among other things diverts attention from the concession of military bases in Ethiopia to American imperialism.

The revolt in 1960 was a preliminary grave sign of the tendencies undermining the kingdom's system. The quick defeat of the revolt is ascribable to its timorous character and to the nature of its leadership which had neither the ability nor the wish to bring broad sectors of the masses into action. More recently other straws in the wind have appeared insubordination of military contingents; student actions; peasant demonstrations; strikes, occasionally led by militant underground trade unionists, at other times occurring in more open and spectacular ways (for example, the Ethiopian Air Line strike in 1964).

The opposition, extending from the most moderate positions among the "enlightened" sectors of the upper layers to the armed resistance of sectors of the people, primarily peasants, is even expressed in organized forms. The Ethiopian People's Movement Council (EPMC), holding to



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... (The elaboration of "progressive" ideological cover that among

a program of advanced views and having cadres close to Marxist and revolutionary Marxist concepts, represents at the present stage a broad vanguard.

Its struggle for a republic, for the abolition of the feudal system, for a radical agrarian reform, for really popular government, against American imperialism and neocolonialism constitutes a foundation corresponding to the needs of the Ethiopian revolution at the present stage. The solidarity of the revolutionists of Africa and the entire world toward the EPMC and all those who are struggling with analogous aims is all the more necessary in view of the fact that the Ethiopian opposition has been received with coldness, if not hostility, by the most advanced African states and leaders due to their desire to avoid any diplomatic complications in their relations with the imperial government.

An important aspect of the situation in Ethiopia is the existence of strong national minorities struggling either for autonomy or for separation from the kingdom. In the case of Eritrea the movement has mounted armed peasant guerrilla actions for several years and has projected a political line of socialist coloration.

Former French Colonies

The former French colonies are, together with Nigeria, the main links in the neocolonial system of West Africa. Granted independence from above, without big struggles and popular victories, on the basis of a compromise with the former imperialist master, these countries have offered a favorable soil for neocolonialist operations, first of all because of their artificial boundary lines, their Balkanization. It can be said quite aptly that for them independence amounts to a flag and a national anthem.

The economic positions of foreign capital, most often French, have been maintained. At the same time, nuclei of often rather substantial indigenous exploiting classes have been consolidated (landlords, merchants, small industrialists, entrepreneurs in transport, intellectuals with a privileged standard of living and an aristocratic outlook, etc.). The tribal divisions, despite their declining influence, have been kept up in order to be utilized for conservative aims by the indigenous privileged layers and imperialism.

An important role—relatively new in relation to the period before independence—is being played by the bureaucratic layer in control of the state whose social privileges are based on this control. In other countries or at other times, layers of this kind either underwent osmosis with the economic forces or crystallized out as an instrument of economic expansion, giving birth to and nourishing what could be called a bourgeoisie of bureaucratic origin (e.g., the Mexican experience of the forties and the Indo-

nesian experience after the departure of the Dutch).

In other instances, these layers acquired a Bonapartist political physiognomy instead, seeking to balance between the different indigenous privileged sectors, imperialism and the mass movement. In general these layers swell completely out of proportion to their real functions and assume privileges for themselves that are all the more hated in view of the miserable standard of living of virtually the entire population. They display the most notorious corruption and malfeasance in office.

These two variants are to be found in the countries of neocolonial structure in West Africa. On the international level, these countries are tied to imperialism through France and through the Common Market. They represent the conservative wing of the African states, being surpassed in this only by the racist government of Verwoerd.

In such a situation the single party is an instrument par excellence of political control and repression. Any signs of opposition are harshly crushed even by figures who like to present themselves as the sponsors of a "democratic" and "non-totalitarian" Africa. In the final analysis this is a product of the intrinsic weakness of these systems which are incapable of freeing themselves from foreign domination, of guaranteeing the indispensable economic takeoff, and of ameliorating however little the standard of living of the masses.

(Occasionally a decline in the standard of living appears, due to the fact that the dissolution of the former precapitalist economic and social forms destroys certain possibilities of cooperation in eking out a living without assuring by way of compensation new openings, particularly through absorption into the expanding modern sectors.)

This does not mean that it is excluded that a precarious, crisis-ridden situation cannot be prolonged for a time by maintaining the present regimes (which could include changes at the government level and in political personnel). A radical reversal of the situation will not really

be possible until after imperialism is defeated in other sectors of Africa and the world or until the oppositional forces become capable of developing a consistent line of opposition and of establishing solid ties with the masses, especially the peasants, or through a combination of the two.

In north Africa neocolonialism established two relatively solid bases in Morocco and Tunisia where formal independence was gained following the struggle of a national movement but where economic power remained in the hands of privileged indigenous layers as well as foreign owners, often resident in the country.

The balance sheet of the years of independence is clear, confirming the easily made forecasts. The two countries have not overcome economic stagnation. A certain limited development, quite artificial in nature, has affected only very thin layers in the towns. The proletarian and plebeian masses, and the broad mass of the peasantry still suffer the utmost destitution.

In addition to the blindness of certain layers wedded to the status quo, it is this situation and the deep discontent of the masses that are at the bottom of the developments in the past year in Tunisia, among other things the crisis among the trade-union leaders and the relative shift to the left undertaken by Bourguiba, who still retains considerable influence.

In Morocco the task of the conservatives is more difficult due to the fact that a rather large working class exists there, concentrated and organized, while power is held by a leadership, the prestige of which does not derive from any participation in the struggle for independence. Hence the very sharp character of the social and political conflicts, the much clearer differentiations, including those in the ranks of the opposition, and the violence and repression employed by the regime where the king remains the pivot although his authority has been weakened. The recent explosion in Casablanca foreshadows the grave conflicts now maturing.

In the case of Morocco, it is particularly clear that the sole perspective for real progress is an anti-capitalist struggle for socialist solutions. Any strategy aiming at collaboration with the so-called national bourgeoisie will prove to be impractical and fictitious, because the existing system of exploitation and oppression is exercised directly—even in good part for the benefit of foreign capital—by indigenous owning layers, including a bourgeois layer, and the struggle against them cannot be separated from the struggle against the landlords and the foreign proprietors. These demands are objectively reflected in the socialist orientation adopted by the socialist Union Nationale des Etudiants Marocains (UNEM) and the position taken by the trade unions favoring workers self-management of industry.

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AFRICA IN REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION

The countries in this category reached independence through mass struggles, have adopted progressive, anti-imperialist and even anti-capitalist measures, and, at least at a certain stage in their evolution, have played a role in the breakup of the colonial and neocolonial system.

The most significant experiences up to now have been those of Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Egypt, Zanzibar and the Algerian Revolution. (A genuine revolution occurred in Zanzibar in 1964. But the situation was complicated by the fusion of Zanzibar and Tanganyika which, at least at this stage, had the aim and in part the result of putting a brake on the Zanzibar movement.)

Mali

Mali gained independence following a gradual process, but through the action of a centralized and militant political party having a rather advanced ideology. This means that Mali never experienced the political vacuum suffered by other African countries or the conservative retrograde evolution of which the parties of West Africa were protagonists although they were connected for a rather long period with the Union Soudanaise-Rassemblement Democratique Africain (US-RDA).

When independence came, Mali was an extremely backward country, with an almost completely agricultural and subsistence economy (around 80 per cent). It was the same five years later, the proportions of the different economic sectors not having changed.

The Malian leadership adopted a line rigorously favoring a mixed and planned economy. So far as the expansion of production is concerned, this has not yet yielded substantial results. The growth of production has been limited, having been deliberately and to a large degree inevitably concentrated in the agricultural sector. Most often the increases have been absorbed by a rise in consumption. This has meant stagnation in means for investment.

In industry, trade and transport, the government has affirmed the primacy of the state sector. Companies have been set up that belong completely to the state or in which the state holds the majority of shares (ENCON, SEMA, RTM, SOENA, etc.). The same system has been adopted for the banks (People's Development Bank, Malian Bank of Credits and Deposits).

A state company has also been formed for investments, but private initiative continues, regulated by a statute on investments. In principle it is to come under

state control in ten years. An important role is played in addition by Somiex, an export-import company that is supposed in principle to exercise a kind of monopoly over foreign trade. However, Somiex has not eliminated private trade, which continues, even in the form of trade carried on by foreign companies.

In the countryside, the regime chose the road of using and gradually transforming the communal tribal structures by introducing what is called the "collective field." It should be recalled that before independence, the land already belonged in substance to the peasants, the privileges of the traditional chiefs having been considerably curtailed. The experience with collective fields remains limited, however, since on the one hand it is not general and on the other only a quite modest part of the labor of the peasants is devoted to this sector.

The backbone of the independent regime is the single US-RDA party, led by cadres with a trade-union and Marxist education (insofar as an education acquired in the circles of the French Communist Party can be called Marxist), who have adopted democratic centralism and elaborated an indigenous version of Marxism. According to this, Mali is a society without classes, whether feudalistic or capitalist, which is gradually moving toward socialism.

In such a society, the tasks which it is the lot of the proletariat to carry out in industrial societies are accomplished by a people's movement that is not specifically proletarian, the vanguard of which is composed of white-collar workers, teachers and manual workers allied with other layers of the population (peasants and artisans). In other words, these layers of the people are supposed to represent the historic equivalent of the proletariat. Referring to Lenin, the theoreticians of the Malian party explain in addition that it will be possible to "leap over" the capitalist stage and advance towards socialism without passing through the other historically antecedent stages.

It is not denied that social differentiations can come about (by the formation, for example, of commercial layers and bureaucratic layers detached from the masses), but it is held that the fundamental dynamic is counteracting these tendencies.

The concept concerning trade unions merits attention. The Malians reject any reference to the traditional role of trade unions and set education and propaganda as their essential tasks (education in a trade, campaigns for production, etc.). "Laborite" tendencies are violently criticized and strikes are denounced as

completely counterrevolutionary. Trade unions are denied any role in the struggle over division of income and even in the defense of employment levels. This is carried so far as to include in trade-union tasks the duty of explaining the need for a wage-freeze (in fact, after independence, even wage reductions occurred).

Mali thus presents quite specific features and its sociological classification does pose a problem. It is clear, in fact, that it has no genuine indigenous capitalist class (either industrial, commercial, or landholding) and one cannot speak of domination by foreign capital. In this way it cannot be affirmed that the present political ruling layer directly serves capitalist or imperialist interests. However, a rather clear social stratification exists that does entail class conflicts.

First of all the state companies by their very structure do not exclude the participation, if only as a minority, of private interests. Secondly, a private sector exists; the commercial layers in particular enjoying privileged conditions which Somiex has not suppressed. Thus capitalist profits are formed in all these sectors and the social layers which get them have interests opposed to those of the other social groups in the country.

On the political level this is occasionally concretized in reactionary movements. It is necessary to take into consideration finally that even if the few existing foreign activities be left out of account, Mali, as a backward country which must face the advanced countries on the world market, suffers indirect exploitation by international capital. It is moreover an associate member of the Common Market.

As for the rural sector, there are few cooperatives or collectives, the traditional structures still predominating. An agricultural society of this kind may not experience the tragic conflicts of a capitalist society or a society in transition to capitalism, but it is condemned by and large to immobility and, in the final analysis, cannot avoid a whole series of imbalances following the finally inevitable breakup of the former equilibrium. The circle of the subsistence economy is no longer a closed one, and problems of displacement arise which purely negative measures obviously cannot resolve.

The political ruling layer, the source of which is in general the party and trade-union apparatuses (at the top, moreover, the same people are often involved), receives its income on the basis of the functions it performs in the state, the government, the economic machine, etc. In the given context, it is inevitable for tendencies toward the crystallization of privileges to appear despite the real or claimed equalitarian orientation of some of the leaders. Inevitably this layer is led to exploit its positions of power in order to assure for itself a stable standard of living distinctly higher than that of the rest of the population. The offi-

cial documents themselves indicate that such tendencies have already become established.

As against this, the tendency for the positions of political-bureaucratic privilege to fuse with the positions of privilege of economic origin, although inherent in this kind of society, has not separated out in a distinct way up to now. This could occur in the future, for example, by the overlapping of the commercial sectors with sectors of members of the political apparatus.

Moreover, cases of corruption, officially denounced, do not constitute incidental phenomena but have a deeper significance. In actuality, where an osmosis is not occurring between the political rulers and the owning layers in which certain privileges cannot be, or cannot yet be, legalized and consolidated (particularly because it would be politically inopportune), the "illegal" avenues and a hypocritical cover constitute an almost obligatory variant.

In any case it is clear that in the final analysis the social nature of the ruling layer of Mali will be determined by its concrete content; i.e., the kind of relations of production and social stratification which it objectively maintains and consolidates. Only a revolutionary mobilization of the masses, bringing forward a revolutionary leadership, could open up the perspective of a workers state. Despite its specific traits and the progressive measures that have been carried out, Mali remains within the framework of structures fundamentally of the past.

Guinea

Guinea achieved independence by voting to secede from the "French Community" in the Gaullist referendum of 1958. Its evolution has been analogous to that of Mali in a number of ways:

(a) An economic structure in which the agricultural sector and a subsistence economy hold preponderant weight.

(b) The absence of an indigenous owning class (landowners, industrial capitalists, etc.) and the existence of a political ruling layer whose base is in the state apparatus, the government and other political structures.

(c) A breakdown of the domination of the traditional chiefs before independence was achieved and a substantial restoration of the land to the peasants.

(d) The decisive role of a single party led by men who had a Marxist education and who worked out a specific analysis of their society.

During the first phase of its independence, Guinea played a vanguard role in Africa. In the economic field, the new regime envisaged economic planning and a considerable rise in the rate of accumulation, asserted the primacy of the public sector, represented by nationalized industries the construction of which was projected by the State Bank, by the Guinean

Department of Foreign Trade (an export-import company whose aim was to assure an extensive state monopoly of foreign trade) and by the Guinean Department of Domestic Trade whose aim was to control domestic trade.

At the same time, the formation of mixed international companies was envisaged (Guinea's participation to be 50 per cent), price regulations were introduced, and wage increases were passed. In the countryside measures of a cooperative type were advocated. The "human investment" was to be one of the important elements in the economic takeoff. In the field of international relations, Guinea signed agreements with the USSR, China and other workers states and became one of the main spokesmen of revolutionary Africa and African unity.

Subsequent evolution did not continue along this line, reassuring those who feared the birth of a "Communist" state in West Africa. This has also been reflected in foreign policy, where the retreat has at times taken spectacular forms.

In the economic field, the relative isolation imposed by imperialism in the first phase cost the country dearly—a monetary crisis was accompanied by a crisis or by stagnation in production. In industry little progress was made. Aside from isolated achievements (a cigarette factory, the Lumumba printing plant), advances were limited to the infrastructure (docking and airport facilities in Conakry, etc.).

In the agricultural sector, coffee production, which was scheduled to rise, took a sharp dip during the three-year plan, due among other things to a plant disease. Control over foreign trade turned out to be largely formal. The wholesalers and the retailers rule the roost. Speculation and smuggling (particularly in rice) have caused serious losses to the national economy. Statized domestic trade went bankrupt and was largely ended by 1963. The freezing of prices failed also.

A situation of scarcity followed which still remains. The gravity of the general economic situation, the extensiveness of smuggling, the wide speculation in money led to the new measures in November 1964 (re-issuing of commercial licences, checking of the wealth of party functionaries and officials, capital punishment for illegal trade, etc.), all of which were more spectacular in appearance than in real influence.

But the main element of the situation in Guinea is the fact that the exploitation of the mineral resources and industrial production remains entirely under the domination of foreign capital. Even in the radical periods, assurances and guarantees were still given to foreign capitalists. Significantly, the 1960 measures included a major exception in favor of the mining companies, the insurance companies, the air and maritime transport companies and the banks.

Later a very lucrative investment law was adopted. In 1963 they even went

so far as to denationalize the diamond mines. In November 1964 handicraft diamond operations were banned. The fact is that the basic resources of the country (bauxite, alumina) are exploited by the big international companies, with greater and greater participation by the Americans along with the French, the Swiss, the English and the Germans. For the exploitation of iron ore, a foreign French-British company has entered the scene (Societe de Conakry) to join Fria, Pechiney, Harvey Aluminium, etc., in exploiting the country.

The picture as a whole is thus clear. Guinea is a neocolonial state in the sense that foreign companies draw profits from it, that international and indigenous merchants take a commercial profit—often exorbitant—that raw materials flow to the world market under the well-known disadvantageous conditions, involving the collection of surplus value by international capital in this form, too. And a big part of the agrarian economy is stagnating at the subsistence level.

The ruling political layer has crystallized progressively through a series of privileges, associated in origin, in Guinea as elsewhere, with the exercise of functions (advantages drawn from the very high remuneration granted to functionaries in the colonial administration, even special remuneration granted retroactively, material advantages more or less in accordance with posts in the hierarchy, etc.).

These positions have been consolidated on the economic level. Modest forms of accumulation (purchase of apartments from which rent is drawn) are sometimes widened and made clearer (birth of a merchant who is at the same time a government official), extending to the very significant symbiosis of government officials in business administrations and their gaining the status of stockholders. In these cases, the genesis of a bourgeoisie of bureaucratic origin is visible concretely.

This whole process has been accompanied by a hardening of the bureaucratic apparatus and the adoption of repressive measures with regard to opposition demonstrations which can in no case be confounded with reactionary or pro-imperialist intrigues.

Ghana

Ghana gained independence on the basis of an agreement with British imperialism, but only after years of struggle and mobilization of the masses led by the revolutionary nationalist movement.

Marked from the beginning by prominent neocolonial traits (predominance of foreign capital, inclusion in the pound sterling bloc, presence of British administrative and military personnel, etc.) the new state moved rather rapidly toward very broad "Africanization," and particularly in 1962-63 adopted a series of

radical measures. At the same time the governing group around Nkrumah tightened its control more and more, suppressing opposition of any kind, severely disciplining the trade unions, reducing elections to a pure formality and imposing a phrenetic cult of the head of the state.

Following all the measures of expropriation and reorganization directed against the sectors of foreign capitalism, the economic and social reality of the country presents the following picture:

The agricultural sector continues to play an absolutely predominant role with a considerable percentage of subsistence economy and a virtual monoculture of cocoa. However thanks to the Cocoa Marketing Board, the domination of foreign middlemen has been broken and the government now buys the cocoa beans from the producers at a stable price for a whole period and sells them on the world market itself.

Thus the producers are not affected in an immediate and direct way by the oscillation of prices on the world market even if the very steep decline in recent years has meant catastrophic consequences for the Board and thus for the Ghanaian government. As for the structure of domestic production in the countryside, the government has promoted cooperatives of quite varied extent, which, however, include considerable economic and social differences. Alongside the cooperatives exist big indigenous landlords who employ wage labor, very often on a seasonal basis.

In industry and transport there is a rather large sector composed of completely government-held companies and mixed companies (the former being run generally with substantial liabilities). The expropriated owners have in principle been indemnified with interest-bearing state bonds (in the case of some mining enterprises the state simply bought them). Particularly in the most recent period, an indigenous capitalist class has developed in the consumer sectors of industry where they are protected by restrictions on imports. In trade there is a broad layer of people who often gain considerable commercial profits.

Finally, very large foreign properties remain (mines, for example) and American capital owns the Valco Company project for the exploitation of aluminum, which is linked in turn to the success of the Volta River project.

In addition in Ghana there is a bureaucracy of the state and the party which is guaranteed substantial privileges, corruption in office being included. Individuals in this category at times succeed in accumulating fortunes. This constitutes the basis of a genuine bureaucratic bourgeoisie.

As for the bottom layers living in the cities, the plebeian masses are without stable resources as in all underdeveloped countries, unemployment reaching high levels and wages being held to a minimum, as the official reports themselves show.

In the picture as a whole, the official "scientific" socialist ideology has no correspondence with the reality. It is true that in international politics and in Africa, Ghana has often taken really progressive attitudes and the structural changes noted above are not negligible. However the structure of the country remains essentially neocolonial—considerable profits are drained away by foreign capital and the subordination to the world market involves real plundering.

Industrial and commercial profits go to the indigenous capitalist sectors and in the countryside likewise privileged layers exist. On the political level it cannot be said that the popular masses and the workers, in the name of which the dominant party nevertheless claims to speak, hold any real power or exercise the right to genuinely democratic means of struggle, since the bureaucracy of the state and the party exercises very rigid control, at times employing severe repressions.

Egypt

Egypt differs markedly from the other African countries, having a much more advanced economic structure in which the specific weight of the industrial sector has grown considerably. The transformations of the most recent period have thus occurred not within the framework of a little developed or fluid primitive society, but in a society penetrated by capitalism in all its classic forms for many decades.

The development of Egypt after the revolution of 1952, represents without any doubt an exceptional historic phenomenon. The revolution began under a revolutionary petty-bourgeois leadership that revolted against the incapacity and corruption of the old regime. It proposed to modernize the country by striking at the old conservative and parasitic classes and by stimulating economic progress and particularly by seeking to end the imperialist domination.

Playing a pre-eminently Bonapartist role, this leadership objectively favored the strengthening of the industrial bourgeoisie in relation to the other ruling layers. It brought about, first of all, a change in political personnel at the top, began a series of reforms, struck directly at British imperialism and made itself the spokesman of the aspirations for Arab unity. These aspirations met with a favorable echo among the masses, but corresponded also to the aims of at least a part of the bourgeoisie, for whom the creation of a united Arab state would provide a considerably wider market.

The anti-imperialist measures—of which the nationalization of the Suez Canal was the most spectacular—strengthened the new regime, whose prestige spread to the other countries of the Middle East. The first agrarian reform was unques-

tionably of moderate nature, since it assured substantial indemnification, distributed but a very limited percentage of land, and brought no benefits to the great majority of poor peasants and field workers.

But, among other things, owing to the reduction of land rents, the class of landowners was hard hit both economically and politically and could no longer regain its position. The unification with Syria, undertaken after much hesitation, again increased Nasser's prestige for a time. It was greeted not only by the Egyptian bourgeoisie, but still more so by the Syrian bourgeoisie who considered it the only healthy course at a particularly critical juncture.

But measures taken in the first stage of the revolution did not give the results the leaders counted on. The old ruling classes maintained a hostile attitude. Despite the precautionary measures taken by the group in power, the capitalists involved in the state sector resorted to obstruction or blackmail, even refusing the necessary economic aid on certain occasions. Last but not least, capital did not flow toward the modern economic sectors; its owners generally preferring speculation or real estate.

Nasser had no way out but to widen considerably the state sector and to attempt to consolidate his position by winning mass support. A major measure was taken in 1960 with the nationalization of the Misr Bank, the pivot of finance and industry in Egypt. The Syrian affair—in which the downfall of Nasserism was threatened—gave a decisive impulse toward the new course which was concretized in the radical measures of the years 1961, 1963 and 1965.

Thus, not only was a second agrarian reform undertaken, but at the same time the state established its control over 80 per cent of the means of production; i.e., over all of heavy industry, the big banks and wholesale trade. The percentage of state investments rose, in relation to total investments, from 82.6 per cent in 1961-62, to 93.7 per cent in 1963-64. Imperialist ownership virtually disappeared.

At the same time, the regime posed the problem of renovating the political structures. The Nasserite movement was reorganized. In the national assembly, a formal majority of seats was granted to the workers and peasants. Rights were granted to the workers in the factories. A percentage of the profits was earmarked to be used for the needs of the workers; and minority participation by workers, chosen through elections, was envisaged on management boards.

Parallel to this, the ideological evolution of "Arab socialism" became noticeably more anti-capitalist. Nasser's socialism now advances the idea of a society characterized by the transfer of the means of production to the state, centralized planning, the continuation of small and medium land holdings, and the development of cooperation. However, up to now cooperation has been limited to the

buying of machines, fertilizers, and to the financing and sale of products.

Egyptian society is thus in a process of transformation that raises the question of its fundamental class nature. Some who characterized Nasserism as reactionary only yesterday are today ready to proclaim that Egypt is on the road to socialism; but even for those who have not conceded to impressionism or to diplomatic or propagandistic considerations, the question is raised whether the capitalist regime has been done away with and whether a workers state has been instituted.

There is no doubt that the petty-bourgeois revolutionary leadership that came to power in 1952 has undergone a profound transformation, becoming extremely radical. Does this mean that the creation of a workers state has occurred? No; for the following reasons:

(a) The agrarian structures do not include any collectivist sector, being based essentially on private property (cooperation not being practiced on the level of production), and the free buying and selling of land by the bourgeoisie up to a certain ceiling has not been excluded. This involves maintaining a high ground rent collected by private proprietors.

(b) Bourgeois layers of various origin remain which receive returns of a capitalist nature. They are often state "rentiers."

(c) Finally private sectors remain (small and medium industry, trade, real estate).

(d) The state structure inherited from the former regime remains largely intact.

(e) There are no organs of workers power, no independence of the trade unions in relation to the state, no independent workers party, and no socialist consciousness among the broad masses.

None of these factors should be taken independently of one another, but in their dialectical interaction they determine the social and political situation as a whole, all the more so in the absence of any revolutionary mass action.

Under these conditions, despite the sweeping statization of industry, commerce and banking, Egypt still faces the problem of making a qualitative leap in order to establish a workers state. As yet, history has not furnished us with an example of any country achieving this without a deep-going revolutionary mobilization of the masses except where the change has been accomplished through the military action of the Soviet bureaucracy. Egypt will not prove to be an exception to the rule.

Many forces are pressing Egypt in the direction of a new revolutionary upsurge—the objective demands of economic development, the weakness of the old ruling classes, the country's position in the international situation, the pressure of the masses of workers and peasants.

But there are powerful obstacles also—the extremely bureaucratic character of the Nasser leadership, its active op-

position to revolutionary mobilization of the masses, its deliberate policy of blocking the development of an alternative revolutionary-socialist leadership, the powerful levers still in the hands of imperialism (military diplomatic pressure, plus concessions such as shipments of food), and the pervasive counterrevolutionary influence wielded by the old state apparatus.

In addition, the fresh bureaucratic layer crystallizing in the state apparatus is closely linked with the directing apparatus of the economy, giving it a vested interest in maintenance of the status quo. This layer is on the whole a conservative force despite its capacity to use a revolutionary and socialist phraseology and even to take quite radical measures.

Nor should it be overlooked that the Egyptian process continues to develop under conditions that are difficult from many angles. The rate of growth in production remains limited, not even expanding as rapidly as the population. Thirteen years after the downfall of Farouk, per capita income remains stagnant, even if in some sectors, particularly the cities, some improvements have occurred. Unemployment and underemployment remain tragic. Foreign aid—even though above that enjoyed by many other countries—is not an inexhaustible source and cannot by itself substitute for the impetus that could be provided by establishment of a workers state.

The outstanding feature of contemporary Egypt is its ripeness for the establishment of workers state and the ease with which a proletarian victory can occur there with the resurgence of the masses.

The Algerian Revolution

Without repeating in detail the analyses made in many previous documents of the International, the fundamental features of the Algerian revolution before independence was won can be summarized as follows:

(a) From the very fact that it unfolded in a country occupied by a mass of foreign colonialists and against a big imperialist power committed to defending its positions to the end, the depth and duration of the Algerian revolution was translated into a profound mobilization of the masses and various social layers.

(b) Beginning as a national liberation movement, the revolution involved from the beginning two components of opposite tendency: On the one hand, the disinherited peasant masses (the majority of the fighting army), the toiling and plebeian masses of the cities, and the radicalized petty-bourgeois layers for whom the struggle had both a national democratic and social content; on the other, the very thin layers of the indige-

nous bourgeoisie and well-to-do petty bourgeoisie whose aim was formal political independence and the replacement of the ruling colonialist class by a native ruling class.

(c) Despite certain progressive positions (with regard, for example, to the need for an agrarian reform), the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) in itself was a socially undifferentiated front with vague political contours. For a considerable time it succeeded in presenting itself publicly as fundamentally united.

Unity of this kind, which was maintained moreover by a rigid apparatus, bureaucratic methods of leadership and compromises at the top, did not at all prevent a process of differentiation from occurring among the various military sectors and among the various levels of the movement as well as conflicts over orientation in the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) itself, where in general the moderate wing held sway.

Following a protracted development of grave contradictions (among other things different and even opposing attitudes towards the Evian agreement) topped by the urgency of the problems in the political and economic vacuum that appeared at the end of the colonial domination due to well-known conditions, the FLN burst into fragments with the breakup of the government and the division of the military forces.

The crisis in the summer of 1962 developed along lines that were sometimes unclear, involving among other things equivocal and ephemeral alliances and the momentary passivity of healthy elements and forces, but it marked fundamentally a victory for the Ben Bella-Boumedienne team, which, at the time, at the level of the mass forces, was the most conscious and most resolute expression of the outright anti-neocolonialist, revolutionary-democratic and socialist-minded orientation.

Thus the second stage of the revolution opened, featured by a dynamics tending to cross over to socialism. It was primarily the vacuum created by the emigration of the colonialists that determined the mass actions and the decisions by the leaders that led to the rapid social deepening of the revolution.

The rising curve reached its climax in March 1963, extending to the new measures of expropriation taken in October the same year. The landholdings of the colonialists were expropriated in their entirety, the Algerian landholders being hit at the same time. A part of the industrial sector was also taken away from the former masters. The expropriated sectors were turned over to self-management by the workers under very advanced forms.

Particularly during the decisive weeks of March-April, the adoption of all these measures was accompanied by immense mass mobilizations, in which the union of the most advanced wing of the leadership with the masses occurred at the



Ahmed Ben Bella

highest pitch. This wing, expressing the interests of the workers and peasants up to the government level, drove the conservative and pro-bourgeois elements away from the Political Bureau and the government.

At the same time, the Ben Bellist nucleus and a rather broad layer of cadres developed their own ideological concepts, going as far as to adopt ideas close to revolutionary Marxism on certain problems and to critically considering some of the main experiences of the international labor movement and of the establishment of workers states. The Algiers Charter, approved by the April 1964 congress, was the ideological expression of this process of growth.

In noting this process, the United Secretariat of the Fourth International called attention in February 1964 to the fact that a Workers and Peasants Government had been established in Algeria. Among other observations, the United Secretariat declared:

"As is characteristic of a Workers and Peasants Government of this kind, the Algerian government has not followed a consistent course. Its general direction, however, has been in opposition to imperialism, to the old colonial structure, to neocolonialism and to bureaucratism. It has reacted with firmness to the initiatives of would-be new bourgeois layers, including armed counterrevolution. Its subjective aims have repeatedly been declared to be the construction of socialism. At the same time its consciousness is limited by its lack of Marxist training and background.

The question that remains to be answered is whether this government can establish a workers state. The movement in this direction is evident and bears many resemblances to the Cuban pattern. A profound agrarian reform has already been carried out, marked by virtual nationalization of the most important areas of arable land.

"Deep inroads have been made into the old ownership relations in the industrial sector with the establishment of a public and state-controlled sector. Yet to be undertaken are the expropriation of the key oil and mineral sector, the banks and insurance companies, establishment of a monopoly of foreign trade and the inauguration of effective countermeasures to the monetary, financial and commercial activities of foreign imperialism."

Through the 1963 measures, Algeria thus entered a phase of revolutionary development characterized among other things by the following elements:

(a) The positions of colonialism were eliminated in the agricultural sector of the economy and dealt a serious blow in the industrial sector.

(b) The indigenous landholding bourgeoisie were likewise dealt some blows, while certain measures, apparently secondary, were passed which in principle can hinder or block the process of embryonic capitalist accumulation and possible consolidation of indigenous bourgeois nuclei (expropriation of movie houses, hotels, cafes, etc.).

(c) In the most dynamic and economically most important sector of agriculture (most important likewise from the angle of the formation of the surplus product) not only was ownership, both landlord and capitalist, ended, but forms of democratic management were introduced capable of assuring consolidation of the mass bases of the revolution.

(d) On the economic level in general, a mixed economy was envisaged in which the public sector—government operated or self-managed—was conceived as coming to be the most dynamic, the specific weight of the private sector being gradually limited.

(e) The Algerian state established international links with the workers states, involving particularly Cuba and its revolutionary experience, and placed itself in the vanguard of the progressive African front.

However this process did not develop in a straight line. In fact, a period of slowing down, of pause, even of stagnation, opened after the rise of 1963. This cannot be explained solely as due to the objective need to "digest" the results already achieved nor due to the unquestionable existence of serious obstacles. The subsequent progress of the revolution has been held back particularly by social and political resistances.

The forces hostile to the new measures (for example in the area of agrarian reform) have made gains. This was not in contradiction to the successes won by

the regime in its struggle against the open and illegal opposition. The extreme right wing (Chaabani) could not gain any serious base. The Kabyle wing (Ait Ahmed) had no real perspective, being compromised by a whole series of actually counterrevolutionary attitudes and its taking to the road of adventure. The sector headed by Boudiaf did not elaborate a line and lost all prestige.

The forces hostile to the revolution, both on the domestic and international level, never seriously counted on these opposition movements and, beginning with 1963, chose the tactic of obstruction, sabotage and struggle within the regime, its state apparatus and even the party.

1964 Congress

The FLN congress in 1964 was significant in this respect, the conservative and rightist elements not engaging in struggle over the program—adopting it unanimously and without much discussion—but infiltrating into all levels of the party, including the Political Bureau, acting as a brake and as a stubborn opposition which clearly gained results. French imperialism itself has followed a line up to now not of rupture but rather of seduction, of setting conditions, of pressure extending from blackmail to threats of rupture.

Due to the pause during 1964 and the beginning of 1965, in which some measures were passed that were more spectacular than of real import (such as the expropriation in October 1964 of collaborators with the counterrevolution), the economic and social structures of Algeria became relatively crystallized into a series of different and opposing sectors. If, in a stage of overturn, the relative rise of percentages is more important than the absolute figures, in a static period it is the absolute proportions that represent the decisive criterion.

Algerian society was marked by the coexistence and conflict of different and antagonistic forces and sectors. On the one side stood; (a) the modern, self-managed agricultural sector; (b) the self-managed industrial sector; (c) the state industrial sector; (d) the state sector of transport and services; (e) the secondary self-managed sectors.

Against these there remained: (a) a considerable agricultural sector dominated by Algerian landowners; (b) the private capitalist sector, which includes industries, banks, commercial enterprises; (c) the sector of foreign capital (oil, gas); (d) the still heavy weight of French imperialist aid (direct subsidies to the budget and investments) and American aid (distribution of food to the mass of unemployed); (e) the quantitatively preponderant sector of agriculture which was not touched by the agrarian reform and which includes the gamut of poor peasants and small peasants in general.

At the same time Algeria remained



Ahmed Ben Bella

integrated in the zone of the French franc and a very high proportion of its foreign trade was with France.

In the social field, the following class interests and social layers stood in opposition: (a) the industrial working class and the workers of self-managed farms; (b) the poor peasants; (c) the poor masses in the towns; (d) the urban petty bourgeoisie (white collar workers, intellectuals, etc.); (e) the big and middle Algerian landowners; (g) the well-to-do petty bourgeoisie; (h) international capital (oil companies, banks).

This general outline is sufficient to show that criticizing the prolonged pause of the revolution did not signify indulging in revolutionary phrasemongering but was based on recognizing that in the absence of fresh measures breaking things up, a situation was crystallizing in which capitalist-bourgeois relations, including the presence of foreign capital, remained preponderant.

The orientation placing the collective sector in opposition to the private sector has no real progressive content—in the Algerian context—unless a constant change in the relation of forces occurs and the collective sector is actually conceived as an instrument to wear away the private sector. If this does not occur, the state collective sector can become either complementary to the private sector—in the final analysis in the interest objectively of preserving the latter—or can be partially or gradually reabsorbed in the private sector insofar as this proves to be profitable.

The problem is particularly serious for the collective self-managed sector since the private sector is specially interested—more from the political and social angle than the economic—in bringing it into difficulty. As long as the private sector remains preponderant in industry, finance and trade, as long as there is no genuine monopoly of foreign trade, as long as planning has not been introduced to block or control the free play of the market in accordance with the logic of capitalism, self-management will be gravely handicapped and threatened with bankruptcy or with being drained of its revolutionary social content.

The delay in carrying out a new radical agrarian reform was damaging on the political level, since it opened up fissures in the revolutionary front. Since the new regime failed to improve their economic and social conditions, although they had made a major contribution to the armed struggle, the landless peasants were no longer inclined to give active support to the revolution.

In addition to the resistance already referred to of the conservative social layers, two factors served in particular as a brake in the revolutionary process: the composition and structure of the state apparatus and the government in general and the defectiveness of the party.

The state and government structure remained essentially as it was set up by the colonial regime. This meant that far

from being a means of transmitting the will of the masses and an instrument for translating a revolutionary orientation into practice, this apparatus constituted a barrier separating the masses from the real exercise of power, a means of paralyzing and rendering null decisions that were correct in the abstract, an arena for the crystallization of conservative and reactionary forces and tendencies.

The integration into this apparatus of elements who participated in the struggle for freedom did not bring about any qualitative change, the problem being political, social and structural, not one of the composition of the personnel. In fact it is the logic of the apparatus, as it was constructed, that is operating and it is precisely through the medium of this apparatus that the conservative forces, including the foreign ones, express their influence and maintain political force, whatever the composition of the government and the executive power may be in general.

Bureaucratic Layer

In the case of Algeria, the question of the apparatus is also important in another way, since it engenders and consolidates a bureaucratic layer which, in the absence of democratic structures based on the active and decisive participation of the workers and peasants, is concentrating enormous power in its hands, inevitably nourishing privileged positions. Although certain nuclei of the FLN, including the tops, were aware of the problem in theory, the bureaucracy developed and became relatively crystallized.

To the old layers of the colonial period were added new layers, issuing from the ranks of the revolution. Thus another element must be included in the Algerian social stratification: a bureaucracy of the state, the government, the growing economic apparatus and the military apparatus, a bureaucracy that in reality enjoys a privileged share of the national income, even if the quantity is still modest, and that holds a position of strength in relation to the popular masses.

The right wing of this bureaucracy is trying, in a more or less conscious way to consolidate a neocolonial type regime. Its left wing is partisan to an authoritarian bureaucratic socialism. Objectively both of them play a conservative role. The left wing itself not only is opposed to constructing a socialist society based on the self-government of the masses, but is also blocking the elimination of capitalist and imperialist structures, the survival of which is not necessary, however, to maintaining its own functions and privileges.

The fact that the problem that exploded in the summer of 1962—of reconstructing the FLN on a new basis—was not

resolved and that the party still functioned in a precarious and bureaucratic fashion, with real activity concentrated particularly at the top, served as a concomitant factor in reinforcing the bureaucratic tendencies as well as the uncertainties and the retreats of the stage that followed the measures of 1963.

The same can be said of the trade unions whose profound crisis was not overcome and whose main deficiencies were recognized officially, so to speak, at the March 1965 congress. In reality, the bureaucracy was rooted in the party as well as the trade unions, the proclamations about the need to separate the state apparatus and the party apparatus remaining without practical results up to now.


The political and leadership system adopted entailed, moreover, the logic of a Bonapartism personalized to the extreme. The real power of decision—of decision and not of application, since after a decision forces came into play to block or neutralize it—was concentrated in the Central Committee and particularly the Political Bureau to which all the other bodies, from parliament to the trade-union leaderships, were subordinated in the final analysis.

The multiple functions and omnipresent activity of Ben Bella by themselves stamped and symbolized the Bonapartist concentration. In certain situations of confusion and general deficiencies, this Bonapartism was able in the past to play a positive role objectively, particularly when the Bonapartist action, in conjunction with the movement of the masses, broke the conservative resistance. But it is obvious that it could not be conceived as a permanent element, as the norm in the exercise of power. In the long run, it could only be risky and of benefit in particular to the conservative bureaucratic forces.

The June 19 Coup

Despite its sudden and unexpected character, the coup d'état of June 19 was the culmination of a situation which had already seriously deteriorated and in which different and even opposed forces were looking for a way out of the blind alley.

Within the leading group itself, behind the facade of unity around Ben Bella's Bonapartism, tendencies and groups were involved in a stubborn struggle which sometimes came to the surface (for example at certain trade-union congresses). The prevailing disorder, particularly in the economic structure was taken by a bureaucratic tendency rooted in the economic, governmental and administrative machines as the basis for driving for centralist solutions and abandoning or at least rigorously restricting the experience of workers self-management which it considered to be a failure, an element of disintegration



The Tri-Continental Congress, from the Cuban newspaper *Granma*, December 25, 1965.

and chaos and even a luxury that the country could not afford.

Another tendency—of which men like Mohamed Harbi and Hocine Zahouane were the best known spokesmen—were not only for the defense of workers self-management but fought for a real application of the March decrees, for democratization and effective functioning of the trade unions. At the same time they also raised the problem of radically transforming the state apparatus. In the army, tendencies crystallized around Boumedienne which were dissatisfied with the lack of a clear orientation, with the degeneration of certain political circles that had lost the zeal of the revolutionary period, with the continuing economic imbalances which were even tending to become worse in the country.

They came to the conclusion that more authoritarian solutions were required and that all the elements who were exercising an influence on Ben Bella and his limited team, which they considered harmful, would have to be eliminated. In addition to all these tendencies whose positions were the same as that of the regime installed at the end of 1962, there were still other groups and figures of the old opposition (Boudiaf, Ait Ahmed, Khider, Ferhat Abbas) who, with but few exceptions, were in almost complete isolation.

With regard to the social classes and layers more specifically—the landed proprietors, the native bourgeoisie, the shopkeepers and other petty-bourgeois strata; i.e., all those who had already been hit or who considered themselves threatened by the regime—these continued to remain hostile despite the prolonged lull in the revolutionary process.

At the same time a rather open opposition, violently opposed to any kind of modernization of ideological views and

customs, appeared among the religious sectors linked to the privileged layers. In this field, Ben Bella's attempts to flatter the Moslem circles by concessions and to counteract their conservative weight by propagandizing for a so-called socialist interpretation of Moslem texts failed pitifully.

As for the masses, the delay in the new agrarian reform, which was frequently promised but always postponed, and the persistence of crying inequities between the situations in the cities and hilly regions on the one hand and most of the other sectors on the other led to passivity among the majority of the poor peasants and loss of interest in the revolution.

At the same time the complete failure to apply the March decrees, bureaucratic maladministration, the delays in the distribution of bonuses, sowed some demoralization even among the layers of agricultural workers in the self-managed sector, who were main beneficiaries of the revolutionary measures of 1963. The most positive developments since the end of 1964 occurred among the workers in the self-managed sector and even in the state and private sectors—strikes against the employers and machinations of the bureaucrats, lively discussions, critical ferment, movements supporting the left wing, particularly in the trade-union congresses.

Finally in the petty-bourgeois urban circles, especially among the students, the regime retained considerable support, but this sector also voiced criticisms from the left.

The objective combination of all these elements, particularly the passivity of the masses—for which Ben Bella both bore responsibility and fell victim due to his failure to appeal for action from the masses even when he must have

realized that a serious crisis was imminent—made the June 19 coup possible and its success relatively easy.

The representatives of the old oppositions had no hand whatsoever in the June 19 coup, as events very quickly demonstrated. Likewise it cannot be said that the indigenous conservative layers, the forces most interested in crystallizing a neocolonialist society in Algeria, played an active part. Nor does it appear that there was direct intervention on the part of foreign conservative and reactionary forces, since the misgivings of the imperialists had been relatively allayed for some time by the attitude of the Algerian leaders and in any event they did not wish to risk a repetition of the Cuban business.

Thus the coup was primarily an undertaking of the Boumedienne group which had established a fairly strict control over the army since 1962 and which could count on collaboration from the best known representatives of the bureaucratic wing, without mentioning the inevitable retinue of careerists whose ambitions were threatened or had been frustrated. The precarious position of the trade unions caused them to be completely passive at the time of the coup; since then they have supported the regime but without any enthusiasm.

In other words, the overturn was prepared and headed by men who were in the forefront in establishing and consolidating the regime and who in principle should not be regarded as deliberate promoters of neocolonialist and pro-imperialist solutions. Nevertheless the coup marked a turn to the right, a backward step in relation to the past, regardless of the subjective intentions of some of its organizers. The following points must be emphasized:

(a) The Ben Bella regime was estab-

lished on the basis of the mobilization of the masses, although this movement was restricted to the critical turning points and became exhausted some time ago. The Boumedienne regime was installed thanks to the action of an army, which while having a revolutionary origin and still being responsive to the pressures and influence of the popular masses, enjoys relatively privileged conditions so far as the cadres are concerned.

(b) During the Ben Bella period, the functioning of the party and the leading bodies of the state were certainly not guided by the criterion of revolutionary democracy; and the way the new crew came to power was such as to still further reduce their role, to increase the distrust and skepticism of the masses, and to further restrict the participation of broad sectors from political life.

The reorganization of the party has been effected by purely bureaucratic methods, including putting a military man at the head, while certain so-called national organizations (particularly that of the students) have been subjected to still more revolting interference. The trade unions themselves despite the extremely timorous attitude of the leaders have also been subjected to pressures of all kinds and bureaucratic measures which have in addition led to the elimination or spontaneous withdrawal of a whole series of cadres, among them the most valuable.

(c) On the ideological level an attack has been unleashed against Marxism, while at the same time a campaign is being waged for an "Arab" or "Algerian" socialism or for an utterly vulgar pragmatism. These have been fed by feelings of hostility toward concepts and organizations summarily condemned as alien to the traditions of the country.

(d) While praise of self-management has not been given up, the emphasis is now placed on the criteria of profitability and efficiency. The result of this has been that not only has no step been taken to get out of the existing blind alley but that workers self-management is threatened more than ever. Certain measures, although isolated ones for the time being—for example, the return of the Norcolor factory to the former owners—bode ill for the future. As for the agrarian reform, the vehement denunciations of the inequitable conditions in which the bulk of the poor peasants find themselves have not yet been followed up by any concrete action.

(e) Ben Bella's attempt to create a people's militia ended in an almost complete fiasco. But the new regime undertook their outright liquidation. In reality the "danger" of an effective militia organization undermining the power of the army was one of the most decisive motives in Boumedienne's action.

(f) Despite the official declarations to the contrary after some weeks of relative tolerance (except, to be sure, for the arbitrary treatment accorded Ben Bella and some of his closest associates), the

new government adopted repressive measures striking particularly at left elements, Trotskyist militants and militants of the former Algerian Communist Party, including the use of torture.

(g) A gamut of groups and reactionary forces well disposed toward the coup d'etat, raised their heads, at times expressing warm support to the new regime and developing a rather explicit restorationist offensive. From this viewpoint, the June coup had the effect of still further depressing the mass movement and encouraging those forces most hostile to a socialist outcome of the Algerian revolution.

(h) Despite the official declarations designed to give assurances about the continuity of foreign policy, the fact is that since June 19 the relations between Algeria and the majority of the workers states have deteriorated and it is symptomatic that there has been almost a break with Cuba, whose experience had previously been considered as closest to that of Algeria. On the other hand, the relations with France and the United States have improved and the imperialist powers have clearly indicated that in their eyes the Algerian situation has undergone a rather positive evolution.

If the Ben Bella regime, after having carried out the revolutionary measures of 1963, became bogged down in a rather prolonged stagnation which represented a growing threat to the future of the revolution, there is today not the slightest indication of any intention to regenerate the movement and to prepare to deliver new blows to the indigenous exploiting classes and imperialism.

On the contrary, insofar as it inclines to express any line, the regime seems to envisage a reorientation on the basis of existing structures without undertaking any new deep-going agrarian reform, or envisaging any reduction of the private industrial sector, or any cutting loose from the monetary and financial tutelage of the French.

Boumedienne Regime

The Boumedienne government will try to achieve more effective functioning of the productive apparatus by leaving the relations of production and the proportions of the different sectors as they are, to utilize the greater advantages derived from the agreement with France on oil and gas, and to create a climate of greater "discipline" and "austerity."

The government of Col. Boumedienne is thus proceeding along the line of jelling the status quo in the economic and social fields. Such a jelling signifies the relative maintenance and consolidation of the predominantly neocolonialist economic structures, involving the exploitation of the Algerian workers and peasants for the benefit not only of the indigenous possessing classes but also of

foreign capital which controls veritable enclaves.

It signifies an inevitable further consolidation of the bureaucratic layers on different levels of the economic and political apparatus, with the tendency to transform them into a genuine bureaucratic bourgeoisie. It signifies an ever greater subordination of the masses to whom will be applied the proposed guidelines for discipline and austerity. In short, if the present tendencies continue, the new government, regardless of the ideas advanced by the authors of the coup, will assure the maintenance and functioning of a neocolonialist society with essentially capitalist structures.

In the last analysis, the situation can change only through the upsurge of a new mass movement, the resumption by the masses of active participation in politics. Such a development would inevitably generate a crisis in the present ruling group by creating differentiations among them which would facilitate the formation of a new alternative leadership.

The presence of a left tendency thoroughly aware of the dynamics of the struggle and the objectives to be achieved, and linked with the masses, is a requisite for success, that is, the culmination of the mobilization of the masses in the establishment of a workers state.

Revolutionary Tasks

The platform of the revolutionary left trying to work for the triumph of an orientation corresponding to the fundamental necessities of the revolution must begin from this. It should be concretized around the following essential points:

(a) To stimulate a dynamic growth of the noncapitalist sector of the economy, the specific weight of which must constantly increase at the expense of the private sector. This means that it is necessary to envisage new expropriations in the industrial sector and the resolution of the problems of nationalization of credit and the commercialization of the products of the public sector.

(b) To give priority to the sector of self-management in the noncapitalist sector that already exists or that must yet be set up.

(c) In the sector of gas and oil not to accept the perspective of a crystallization of the present situation involving the formation of veritable imperialist enclaves. It is necessary to work for the deepening of the contradictions and the progressive erosion of the positions of international capital. Workers control should be the concrete form for carrying this out.

(d) To establish an effective monopoly of foreign trade and to introduce economic planning. Such measures have been shown to be necessary to prevent, among other things, the strangulation or the distortion of the self-managed sector.

(e) To apply a radical agrarian reform in the sectors not touched by previous measures, by expropriating the big Algerian proprietors, introducing rigorous limits on the right to own land, banning the free buying and selling of land, reorganizing the traditional agriculture on a cooperative basis and modernizing it.

(f) To elaborate an over-all plan based both on the new agrarian reform, the human investment and industrialization, with the aim of absorbing in the near future unemployment and under-employment, the main plagues of the Algerian countryside.

(g) To completely rebuild the state and government apparatus by creating organisms of workers and peasants power and putting up a new government structure corresponding to the new economic structures, particularly the structures of self-management whose real functioning must be imperatively assured. To replace the present Bonapartist

pyramid with a popular power built on a diverse and extensive framework.

To find at each stage the formulas and means best suited to realize this objective. To wage a stubborn struggle against bureaucratic privileges by stimulating the equitarian tendencies (limitation of remuneration, necessary common sacrifices, participation by all in production, if only for limited periods, etc.).

To assure the defense of the revolution both externally and internally by genuine, nonprofessional workers and peasants militia.

(h) To rigorously separate the party apparatus from that of the state.

(i) To democratize the trade unions, the leaders of which must be elected by trade-union bodies, leaving out of consideration membership in the party. The right to strike must not be put in question by any a priori limitations. The decision as to the economic or political opportuneness of a strike must not be the prerogative of bureaucrats, or lead-

ers at the top, or the state power, but should belong to the workers involved, who will know how to weigh all the implications of their attitude in each instance.

Self-management does not end the need to use the right to strike, economic high-handedness not having been eliminated on a national economic level. Trade unions should not be conceived exclusively as an instrument of education, of propaganda or of stimulating production, but also as an instrument of struggle against both the opposing classes and the bureaucracy, as an instrument of the workers in the struggle over distribution of the national income.

(j) To conduct a systematic campaign for a revolution in the field of customs, against all forms of traditionalism, and in the first place for the genuine liberation of the women in Algeria.

(k) In maintaining respect for the freedom of religion and opposition to any administrative or repressive measure in this field, it must not be forgotten that religion plays an objectively conservative role as an ideological cement. Thus, confusionist formulas must be rejected, and with all the more reason, state financial support in any form for a church or defense of any concepts in the field of customs that in the final analysis weaken revolutionary mobilization.

-IV-

CONCLUSIONS

Africa today is the scene of conflict among social forces and political tendencies, which, while retaining their marked specific features, are part and parcel of the dynamics of the contemporary world. Problems are posed belonging to communal tribal societies, the struggle against colonialism, traditional racism and the new forms of neocolonialist exploitation at one and the same time as problems flowing from the formation of special social layers and the more general problems of transitional phases.

The continent is advancing deeper into a period of big overturns and profound transformations. On the one hand this is tied in with the transformations of the contemporary world, with the rise of the revolution in other areas of the globe, and with the development of the workers states. It flows on the other hand from the action of narrower domestic factors shaking African society, including the most backward sectors (penetration of capitalism, rapid general diffusion of a mercantile economy, dissolution of primitive tribal forms, exhaustion of the soil, demographic expansion, exodus from the rural regions, etc.).

With regard to the sector of Africa that is still colonial and racist, the resistance of the reactionary classes and forces can-



CONFRONTATION. Algiers, January 1960. French Foreign Legionnaires in foreground manning stone barricade against revolutionaries.



CONFRONTATION. Algiers, January 1960. French Foreign Legionnaires in foreground manning stone barricade against revolutionaries.

not be regarded as simply a rearguard action. Historically the regimes of Verwoerd, Smith and Portuguese colonialism are obviously hopelessly doomed. But this does not necessarily imply victory for the anti-colonialist forces within the near future.

The fierce and stubborn nature of the resistance, the effectiveness of a very rigid and relatively solid apparatus of domination and repression, the quite considerable interests of international capital, including some that are important to its political strategy, justify the hypothesis of a very difficult and protracted struggle. In any case what is most important is that no major victory can be gained without mobilizing the masses, without big struggles, including armed struggles in particular, and without substantial material aid from the progressive African states and the workers states.

Mobilizations of this character are likewise necessary to avoid pseudo-liberal diversionary operations, such as those being prepared by certain forces in South Africa for example. In these instances, the problems of a consistent line of struggle, of active mobilization of the masses, above all the peasant masses, of careful delimitation with regard to forces committed to questionable platforms, are posed in a particularly sharp and urgent form.

In neocolonial Africa, the reality is quite varied and multi-form. Nevertheless, one general characteristic is observable—while international capital has a certain room for maneuver, it is difficult

for it to consolidate a relatively stable indigenous base. Virtually all of the neocolonial regimes appear very precarious, resting on autocratic structures and under the constant necessity of using ferocious repression to smother any germ of opposition, however weakly organized. Revolts of broad layers of the population, of sudden revolutionary movements and abrupt reversals of the situation, are always possible.

The essential task of revolutionists in this sector of Africa is to work for the political crystallization and organization of oppositional forces among the urban workers, the plebian masses of the shanty towns, the agricultural workers of the plantations and the broad peasant layers. In certain cases, critical support must be granted to existing organizations, while trying at the same time to advance the work of political clarification.

Under certain conditions, the unions can be used effectively in mobilizing sectors of the masses and educating them. The program of struggle must place on the agenda the expropriation of international capital and whatever native appendages it has, a radical agrarian reform, and a struggle against the privileges of the bureaucratic summits of the state apparatus and the bourgeoisie of bureaucratic origin.

The countries of Africa in revolutionary transformation are not yet differentiated from the countries of neocolonial Africa in the field of economic structure and social base. The differences involve primarily the political context, the historical process, the specific genesis of independence, the degree of mobilization of the masses during the anti-colonialist struggle or at the present stage, the existence or absence of progressive political organizations playing a unifying role and offering a relatively homogeneous leadership with genuine mass influence.

Consequently, the objectives of revolutionary struggle in this sector can be identified in large measure with those called for in the neocolonial countries: elimination of foreign capitalist properties, agrarian reform, struggle against the indigenous capitalist layers, particularly the commercial layers, struggle against the privileges of the state bureaucracy, utilization of the unions to assure a more favorable distribution of the national income to the wage workers and the disinherited layers, effective monopoly of foreign trade, etc.

However, the strategic and even more the tactical orientation of this revolutionary struggle must be different. In certain cases the particular problem for quite a while will remain that of becoming integrated in the already developing struggle and participating as the most consistent elements, seeking to further the process toward its logical outcome while at the same time critically supporting the progressive measures adopted by the current leaderships (for

example certain measures taken in Mali and Guinea during the period of upsurge). It is obvious that quite particular tasks are posed in Algeria and Egypt as indicated above.

The theoretical amplifications carried out by our movement on the basis of certain Asian experiences and the Cuban revolution are likewise pertinent in relation to Africa, particularly with regard to the dynamics of the revolutionary process, the fundamental motor forces, the special role of the poor peasants and the nature of the leaderships, which, under the pressure of objectively powerful factors and in conjunction with mass movements, can take a far-reaching anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist course despite their empiricism, their bureaucratic deformation and their non proletarian origin.

It is necessary to add however that in countries where a considerable communal sector exists, the revolutionary process will unfold in very specific forms; and it will probably be possible to avoid the conflicts and difficulties that are inevitable in countries of different historical formation and different agricultural structure.

But the peasant sectors there will play a much less important role as a revolutionary striking force. In Mali and Guinea, for example, the overturn brought about by the campaigns to defeat the traditional chiefs helped and enormously stimulated the struggle for independence, but at the crucial moments, the fundamental support came from other sectors (radicalized urban petty bourgeoisie, wage workers, plebian masses).

The problems posed by the survival, sometimes considerable, of tribal factors cannot be projected in broad general formulas, but must be examined in each concrete context. If, in principle, such factors will not die away until after the progressive dissolution of the old structures and the penetration of modern economic forms (industrialization, spread of the means of rapid transportation, etc.), their negative influence (disintegrating tendencies that objectively aid the maneuvers of imperialism and neocolonialism, etc.) can be counteracted by the action of national unifying political formations that overcome tribal characteristics in the composition of their membership as well as within their leadership.

A centralizing and unifying struggle against tribal limitations has a progressive meaning, of course, only if it avoids any repressive or administrative measures and is not a hypocritical cover for domination by a particular tribe. The advanced nature of the process in certain of the states of Africa in revolutionary transformation, including Mali and Guinea, is linked among other things to the existence of national centralizing political movements.

The African revolution as a whole is developing against the background of enormous revolutionary developments on a world scale, the lessons of which

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VISITING HOUR. Wife and child of imprisoned Rhodesian wait outside Wah-Wah concentration camp, 150 miles from Salisbury, last October.

have been absorbed in an elemental way by the masses throughout the continent. "Darkest" Africa has become at the same time the Africa of the transistor radio, the Africa learning about guerrilla war from the Chinese and the Cubans. The masses are aware of the successes of the Soviet Union and how they came about, of the revolutionary victory in China and what this signified for a quarter of the human race, of the great liberating struggles in Vietnam.

Cuba's brilliant example has inspired them. Imperialism stands as a colossal obstacle to progress, the main enemy to the great mass of people, the hated foreign colonizer who invaded the country and devastated it, pumping away its wealth and leaving it in poverty and desolation ravaged by innumerable social and economic ills. Thus socialism has become a popular goal even for those sectors barely emerging from the tribal structures of the stone age.

This great leap in the understanding of the African masses is one of the main sources for the enormous pressure in all these countries to expropriate the imperialist properties, to block the birth and crystallization of national capitalist sectors (or to eliminate them progressively where they exist), to carry out agrarian reforms, to introduce a monopoly of foreign trade and to block

out economic plans, to strike at the power of the traditional ruling classes linked with the foreign imperialists and their economic system and to establish close ties with the workers states.

Such measures not only meet the objective needs of economic development in breaking through the ancient pattern of poverty and misery—they are immensely popular. That is why political leaders throughout Africa, who make any pretense at all of voicing mass aspirations, talk in terms of socialism. That is also why many of them are capable of undertaking radical measures.

But experience, fully confirming Marxist theory, has shown that measures along these lines are not stable unless they are backed by a profound revolutionary mobilization of the masses. The experience in Cuba, which is particularly germane for Africa, speaks for this in the most positive way. The experience in Guinea, on the other hand, offers negative evidence. In Guinea, where no profound revolution occurred, the apparently revolutionary measures proved to be without genuine substance, forms without much content, and they did not prove to be enduring. In Cuba, on the other hand, the deep-going mass revolution assured the stability of the revolutionary measures.

The lesson of Cuba and Guinea should

not be lost on the African vanguard. In fact, it can be confidently predicted that as in Cuba, revolutionary leaderships will rise in the very course of revolutionary struggles. The experience of Zanzibar is most enlightening in this respect, even though it occurred only on a small, almost laboratory scale.

Africa, so long considered in the white, imperialist West as the most backward of continents, will provide the world with some of the most inspiring examples of man's capacity to leap across entire ages and to make unique contributions to the revolutionary heritage of mankind.

The problems of the African revolution cannot be posed exclusively from the angle of rejecting neocolonialism and struggling against bureaucratism in itself. Unquestionably, Africa has gigantic economic problems that involve extreme perhaps insurmountable difficulties even for countries possibly completely freed from any neocolonialist domination and organized democratically. These problems can be outlined as follows:

(a) The backwardness of some of these countries which lack even a minimum material infrastructure and the cultural knowledge necessary to put into operation contemporary techniques (existence of nomadism, illiteracy, extremely primitive agricultural technology, etc.).

(b) Economic growth, where it exists, is in any case slow and deformed. Most often it is not even succeeding in keeping up with the growth of the population.

(c) The margin for investment is narrow. Internal sources are generally insufficient and often, even leaving aside the growth of population, the increases in production are absorbed by increases in consumption that are objectively necessary, even to increase the productivity of labor.

Investments of the neocolonialist type, besides extracting surplus value from the indigenous workers, are incapable of bringing about an economic takeoff because of their limits, their unilateral character, the drainage of resources which they involve. With only a few exceptions, help from the workers states is limited (in addition aid is sometimes applied in a negative way) and it is difficult for such aid to play a completely determining role in the relatively near future.

(d) The problem of sources of accumulation is often complicated by the existence of very large, even preponderant zones of a subsistence economy and, more generally, structures involving stagnation in production. This is particularly negative due to the fact that in these countries the economic surplus can only come mainly from the agricultural sector. Nevertheless the problem can be solved in part thanks to the human investment, particularly in light of the existence of a relative abundance of land.

(e) The splintering of Africa into often very small states involves complex problems both on the plane of normal economic functioning (limited resources, too



VISITING HOUR. Wife and child of imprisoned Rhodesian wait outside Wah—Wah concentration camp, 150 miles from Salisbury, last October.

narrow markets, etc.) and on the plane of phenomena like smuggling, illegal exports, speculation in money etc., which often have grave effects on the economy in general.

(f) As backward countries furnishing raw materials, almost all the African countries participate in the capitalist market under unfavorable conditions and suffer the exploitation inherent in economic relations of this kind, even leaving aside the steep conjunctural drops in the prices of raw materials which sometimes affects the balance of trade, financial reserves, etc. (for example, the consequences for Ghana of the evolution of the price of cocoa).

All this shows in the most decisive way that the development of the African revolution is intimately linked to a whole series of inter-African and international factors. It is particularly clear that the fundamental economic problems cannot be resolved within the framework of the present national entities of separated economic structures, all the more so since many of the African states are artificial creations due to the imperialist insistence on Balkanizing them: i.e. the demand for African unity and the verification of the revolutionary Marxist concept of a Socialist Federation of African States; or at least, during a transitional period, the perspective of sufficiently large regional units and the need for a single world pooling of raw materials through collective action of the underdeveloped countries. The attempts made up to now have unfortunately failed, having had only a mere propagandistic scope. But they imply recognition of a fundamental tendency.

The OAU

This also applies to the Organization of African Unity whose appearance was unquestionably due to the multiple demands for African unity—unity in the struggle against remaining colonialist ramparts, unity to counteract neocolonialist domination, unity for economic growth. However, the OAU was conceived with the objective of self-preservation by most of the governments belonging to it; that is why it has suffered setbacks and is now going through a crisis which could reduce it to a formula without any real content.

At the same time all this demonstrates that a major role could be played by the economically advanced workers states if they were to grant disinterested aid on a very big scale. In other words, African reconstruction requires access to resources such as could be provided by workers states in the industrialized countries of Western Europe and North America. In this way, revolutionary victories in this sector of the world correspond to very concrete and immediate interests of the African revolution.

The dynamics of the African revolution are thus in all respects the dynam-

ics of permanent revolution. Within each country, the fundamental tendency is to cross over, i.e., to continue uninterruptedly from the bourgeois democratic stage to the socialist stage. At the same time the inescapable need to go beyond the frontiers of the national states becomes ever clearer.

Socialist Perspective

This in no way means that the objective necessities will be automatically met. The necessity for economic growth and the satisfaction of elementary needs, which has pushed the masses into struggle, requires going beyond the bourgeois democratic stage and divisions along national lines. This implies—from the social and political angle—that an alliance with the so-called national bourgeoisie in carrying out the indicated objectives cannot possibly work out.

Nevertheless it goes without saying that the conservative forces, the national bourgeoisie, the neocolonialists can prevail thanks to a given relationship of forces. But in this case, there is no economic growth, no satisfaction of the elementary needs of the masses, the new ruling class having imposed structures that block any expansion of production and any amelioration of the standard of living as they seek to tie down the springs that have driven the process forward from the beginning.

The abysmal record of the Social Democratic and Stalinist parties in the West, during the different stages of the African revolution, compounded by the bankruptcy of the African reformist or Stalinist parties (particularly in Algeria and Egypt) gave rise to serious reservations with regard to Marxism among many African revolutionists—which has not prevented them, however, from feeling great respect for the USSR and still more for China and Cuba.

But from their own experience, they are coming more and more to the conclusion that the peculiarities of the revolution in their continent and in the various countries of this continent do not eliminate the profoundly integrated and combined character of the tendencies operating in the contemporary world which, in the final analysis, also determine African developments. In this way they will come to see the world-wide validity of Marxist concepts and its method

The task of revolutionary Marxists is to struggle for policies that will enable the exploited masses of Africa to bring their revolution to a successful outcome, completely destroying the power of imperialism, the neocolonialist forces and the indigenous propertied classes. To accomplish this it is necessary to organize genuine revolutionary parties of the workers and the poor peasants, to fight for the complete expropriation of capitalist property, for genuine workers management of the expropriated enterprises,

against any crystallization and consolidation of a privileged bureaucratic layer.

These tasks cannot be carried out effectively without directly participating in the struggles of the African revolution, without mobilizing the forces of the International in solidarity with this revolution, without the development of Trotskyist cadres among the ranks of the oppressed African masses themselves.

The Fourth International already has a positive balance sheet in this respect. From the beginning of the trade-union and political struggle of the Egyptian workers, Trotskyist cadres joined in the struggle for a revolutionary Marxist leadership.

The entire International participated in the defense of the Algerian revolution, and is proud to have been the first and for a long time the only tendency in the labor movement in many countries to come to the aid of the FLN militants during the most difficult period of their struggle.

The appearance of an independent workers movement in Nigeria, as shown in the remarkable general strike in 1964, led to the creation of the first Trotskyist nucleus integrated in the mass movement and trying to influence it in a revolutionary direction.

In South Africa in particular the Trotskyist movement has a long tradition going back thirty years; it has many cadres tempered in a struggle that has been marked by an especially harsh repression; it has been able to win a place in the front ranks of the anti-imperialist organizations; and it has worked out, with the aid of the International, a correct line of armed insurrection based on the peasant masses. Here our movement is destined to play an important role in the vanguard of a revolution that will have an impact on all of black Africa.

The revolutionary Marxists participate in the national anti-imperialist liberation movement in every country. They grant critical support to every step forward taken by this movement under nationalist leadership in the struggle against imperialism and its neocolonialist agents (nationalizations in Egypt, Guinea's leaving the zone of the French franc, seizures of imperialist properties in Tanzania, aid granted by Ghana to the Congolese revolution, etc.). At the same time they appeal to the masses of the people to press this anti-imperialist struggle forward to a complete break with foreign and domestic capitalism in order to achieve their own freedom.

In the course of this struggle, they seek to establish ties with the most radical and most conscious elements of the anti-imperialist movement, to educate them in the principles of revolutionary Marxism, to create together with them the first Trotskyist nuclei and to determine, on the basis of the particular conditions in each country, the ways and means to build genuinely revolutionary tendencies and parties.

The Evolution of Capitalism

In Western Europe

Against the world background of a continual rise in the colonial revolution, an ever deepening crisis in the Soviet bureaucracy, and the temporary stabilization of capitalism in the imperialist countries due to the betrayal of the revolutionary upsurge of 1943-48 by the reformist and Stalinist leaderships and the possibility opened to capitalism of a new phase of economic growth in these countries, the evolution of capitalism in Western Europe during recent years has been dominated by:

(a) An economic boom in which the motor forces have nevertheless begun to lose power and which has ended in a new economic situation, the contradictory dynamics of which are shown in at least some of the West European countries by periodic recessions.

(b) A prolonged crisis in classical bourgeois democracy, leading to attempts to install a "strong state" each time a sudden turn in the political, economic or social situation gives it urgency from the bourgeois point of view and it is made feasible by the weakening of the resistance of the labor movement.

(c) The necessity for the working class to energetically oppose the more and more frequent attempts to reach a new level in integrating the labor movement into the bourgeois state.

(d) The possibility of transforming economic struggles for immediate gains, or for the defense of previously won gains, into struggles for transitional demands that could create a prerevolutionary situation and objectively pose the question of power.

(e) The more than ever decisive role of the subjective factor in arriving at this result.

Revolutionary Marxists have the duty to adjust their transition program to the precise needs and possibilities of this phase, in which the periodic possibility

of overturning capitalist rule is provided both by the unresolved contradictions of bourgeois society and by the fighting capacity of the proletariat which remains intact in most of these countries.

-I-

THE NEW SITUATION

(1) In 1963 the economic situation of European capitalism began to change slowly but definitely. A phase of unprecedented expansion of the productive forces, of industrial growth and of the national income in all the European capitalist countries gradually gave way to a phase of uneven development, in which various capitalist countries have undergone *contradictory evolution*.

(a) Throughout 1964 expansion continued and even accelerated in West Germany. Greater stability of prices than in the other countries of the Common Market (reflecting in the last analysis a higher level of productivity) supported an extraordinary rise in exports, firstly to the European countries hit by inflation (Italy, France); secondly to countries overseas where purchasing power has been stimulated by the American economic boom.

(b) A series of European capitalist countries underwent a slowing down of expansion (Great Britain, and Belgium beginning in the second half of 1964) and an aggravation of their balance of payments deficits.

(c) Other countries, especially Italy and France, have been affected since 1963 by new inflationary pressures, forcing the bourgeoisie to take deflationary measures which precipitated the beginning of a recession, first in Italy, then in France. Altogether more than two and

a half million workers suffered wage cuts or layoffs.

Moreover, in spite of "technical" recoveries (due to seasonal needs or the necessity of replenishing stocks) various branches of European industry today have considerable surplus capacity: coal mining, steel, ship building, synthetic textiles, automobile manufacture. If certain of these branches of industry are obviously suffering structural stagnation or decline (e.g., coal mining), others such as synthetic fibres and automobile manufacture were among the principal driving forces of the expansion in the preceding phase.

Nevertheless, a high level of employment, production and income still constitutes the prevailing feature of the capitalist economy of Western Europe as a whole. Full employment still exists in many countries. A large number of workers from more backward regions or countries (Southern Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Turkey) continue to be absorbed by the demand for labor in countries or regions where expansion is continuing. West Germany and Switzerland particularly are in the process of becoming genuine melting pots for hundreds of thousands of foreign workers, limited, as in most West European countries, to the least qualified and most repellent jobs, and living under conditions that have little in common with the so-called affluent society.

(2) This contradictory evolution of the various capitalist countries could have had two outcomes: Either the recession could have spread from Italy and France to the other countries of Western Europe, beginning with Belgium and Great Britain, then to the whole Common Market through the mechanism of progressive reductions of imports; or else maintenance of the boom in most of the countries of Western Europe, particularly West

Germany, would have rapidly brought the recession in France and Italy to an end, enabling these two countries to resume expansion without great dislocations.

The actual course of events followed the latter alternative, beginning with the second half of 1965. This was due in particular to continued high demand from abroad (growth of exports in relation to both capitalist Europe and the United States, the boom continuing in both areas, and the semicolonial countries whose buying power has increased as a result of the American boom).

However, the fact must be emphasized that this revival in France and Italy, essentially "induced" from abroad, remains sluggish and tentative due to the relatively low level of investments and the progressive exhaustion of the main motor forces that made possible the lengthy boom in the European Common Market. Under these conditions it becomes improbable that a vigorous expansion can be generated in these two countries during 1966 and the beginning of 1967 to make up for the American expansion as a stimulator of expansion in West Germany. Thus West German expansion runs the risk of flagging in the course of the next months. The economic situation in the United States will then definitively determine whether a phase of general expansion will open in Western Europe or whether the tendency toward a progressive subsiding of the expansion will become accentuated, giving way to a general recession in 1967.

Even in the latter case, however, it would be only a recession, and not a serious economic crisis like that of 1929 or 1938. The reason for this, amply considered in previous documents of the International, is the possibility which imperialism has to "amortize" crises by increasing state expenses, at the cost of continually lowering the purchasing power of money.

The Profit Rate

(3) The combination of slowed-down growth everywhere (except in West Germany), of sharpened competition both on the European markets and the world market, and of still generally full employment, has at various times since 1963 brought strong pressure to bear on the average rate of profit enjoyed by the bourgeoisie in the different countries of Western Europe.

The slowing down of growth and the rise in international competition make it difficult to increase wholesale prices of industrial products, while full employment and even a labor shortage favor a rise in wages, even partially reducing the rate of exploitation of labor power (due to greater shifting of labor from plant to plant, lowered "work discipline," a rise in wild-cat strikes and all kinds of work stoppages, etc.).

In general the workers have utilized

these favorable conditions to gain considerable wage increases. In both 1963 and 1964 these increases came to around 10 per cent or more in countries like Italy, Holland, Belgium, etc. In 1963, a slower rise in wages aided the British capitalists in regaining some previously lost markets, especially in Europe; but in 1964 the drive was not followed up. This was due particularly to a lower general level of productivity than that of West Germany.

In face of this trend towards erosion of their rate of profit, the European bourgeoisie react in two fundamental ways (as did the American bourgeoisie during the preceding decade):

(a) By attempting to destroy, or at least to reduce, the strength of the trade unions and their ability to utilize the general shortage of labor to gain a significant increase in wages. The main weapon in this is the "incomes policy" and pressure for collective contracts of some years' duration. In the last analysis, it involves attempting to suppress trade-union autonomy in negotiations, and reaching a new level in integrating the trade unions into the bourgeois state.

The effort to integrate the trade-union organizations into the state apparatus and to impose an incomes or wage-freeze policy on them corresponds to the objective necessity to plan the degree of exploitation of the labor force and thus the rate of profit for long periods. Consequently the trade unions tend to become converted into the agency responsible for controlling the attitudes of the working class in relation to the bourgeois state and capitalist "programming," the objective being to maintain "social peace" inside and outside the plants. The bourgeoisie itself is not interested in carrying this to the point where the unions are so totally housebroken that they become incapable of maintaining a mass base and thus lose the capacity to control the workers. That is why the bourgeois state grants an illusory margin of independence to the trade unions, provided that they stay within the limits of pure and simple trade-union bargaining, as "modern" as they wish, but always functioning within the framework of the system.

(b) By attempting to build up an industrial reserve army by carrying automation and rationalization of enterprises through to the end, and by following a policy of importing foreign workers on a big scale. In conjunction with this, brutal deflationary measures, such as those taken in France (stabilization plan) and in Italy (anti-inflationary program), lead to the same result of "easing off the labor market."

The bourgeoisie is clearly not unanimous in advocating these two ways of defending their rate of profit. The general interests of capitalism often conflict with the interests of particular sectors. In Italy especially, the trusts producing durable consumer goods were more or less opposed to the anti-inflationary program,

which was primarily in the interests of finance capital and the industries most tightly under its control.

In France a considerable sector of the bourgeoisie (particularly small and medium concerns, and light industry) revolted against the "stabilization plan" and against all the "planning" under the tight control of the big monopolies. In Great Britain the bourgeoisie were likewise quite divided over the advisability of the Tory economic policy known as "stop-go." Nevertheless, given the persistence of the fundamental contradictions in the capitalist system there is no way in which capital can defend its threatened rate of profit except by one of the two methods indicated above, or by a combination of the two.

The Common Market

(4) Under the prevailing conditions of economic expansion—even though it is slowed down—the trend towards the progressive economic integration of the capitalist countries of Western Europe, above all the countries of the Common Market, has continued, insofar as it corresponds in particular to the inevitable imperatives of productive technique (size of enterprise required to cross the threshold of profitability), so that markets greatly transcending the frontiers of the national state become a necessity.

At the same time, however, the use of the "national state" as an instrument to defend the particular interests of the bourgeoisie in each of the six states is kept up in the very heart of the Common Market. This has been shown in all the many crises that have marked the advances of the Common Market (e.g., the crisis over a common market for grains; the crisis over the adoption of a common attitude towards the GATT negotiations for an international reduction in customs duties; the Italian reaction when faced with a decline in the market for Italian automobiles, etc.).

These two contradictory processes—the slow creation of a community of interests among the capitalists of Western Europe; the self-defense by each European bourgeoisie of its own particular interests—will coincide and overlap for quite a period. They express two contradictory realities in the very structure of the capitalist system.

This system remains essentially a "national" capitalism in each of the main capitalist countries of Europe (that is, most of the stock in the main enterprises in these countries remains in the hands of the capitalists of these countries); but alongside this "national" capitalism, a "European" capitalism is developing; born of the interpenetration of capital originating from some or all of the Common Market countries (and often from Great Britain, Switzerland, if not the U.S.). The longer the Common Market lasts and the more it becomes institutionalized (including particularly the adoption of

a common currency), the more "European" capital will gain in importance in comparison with "national" capital, and the more the Common Market will become irreversible.

However, the point of irreversibility has not yet been reached. It will most likely not be reached until a general recession occurs in Europe. Faced with such a recession, two reactions may appear among the capitalists of the main European countries:

(a) A protectionist retreat, defending the "national market," if necessary by re-establishing customs duties when the situation deteriorates.

(b) A "flight forward"; that is, the application on the Common Market level of "antirecession" techniques which have proved their efficacy on a national level ("European programming," "managed currency" on a European scale, etc.). This flight forward would require creation of a strengthened European executive and a European currency. These would constitute a decisive stage in reaching the point of no return for the Common Market.

Which of these two methods will be preferred by the bourgeoisie of each of the main capitalist countries of Europe will be shown in practice. The choice will be influenced in turn by the relative gravity of the recession and by the international political and economic context.

(5) The same ambivalence displayed by the bourgeoisie of the capitalist countries in relation to the phenomenon of European economic integration is likewise displayed by them in relation to American imperialism and the world market as a whole.

On the one hand, the relationship of forces between American imperialism and the main imperialist powers of the European continent has been shifting for more than a decade to the advantage of the latter and at the expense of Yankee imperialism. This inspired renewed optimism among the European bourgeoisie and even a revival of aggressive attitudes on the world market; a change that is particularly noticeable in West German imperialism.

(In 1954 exports from the German Federal Republic rose to 33 per cent of U.S. exports; in 1964 they reached 70 per cent. On a per capita basis, the German Federal Republic exports more than three times the U.S. in manufactured goods.) On the monetary level, the European bourgeoisie is attempting to cast off the tutelage of the dollar and to shift to an "international currency" regulated jointly by the central banks of the imperialist countries (with a European majority).

On the other hand, despite the shift in the relationship of forces, the technological superiority of American imperialism (which flows in particular from the greater size of its enterprises) remains pronounced, and the European bourgeoisie (especially in France) are finding to their dismay that while they are

reconquering world markets, American capital is "colonizing" European enterprises. Similarly, the European bourgeoisie (above all in Italy and the minor capitalist countries) are terrified at the prospect of a collapse in the dollar, which would threaten to set off a chain reaction in the monetary system of the capitalist world and precipitate a break down of the whole international capitalist economy.

Finally, the European bourgeoisie display two different attitudes with respect to the world market, attitudes which strongly influence their behavior with respect to the Common Market itself. Some (the majority of the West German bourgeoisie in particular), holding that their productive forces are already suffocating within the boundaries of the Common Market, do not fear competition with American imperialism and therefore demand a Common Market open to Great Britain and the rest of capitalist Europe as a transitional stage towards the "Atlantic zone of free trade" likewise sought by American imperialism.

(This is the material basis of the "pro-Americanism" which de Gaulle holds against Erhard.) The others want to consolidate the Common Market first, protect it against the "invasion of American capital," strengthen its competitive capacity, especially through a powerful movement to amalgamate enterprises and trusts, before opening the stage of sharpened and unprotected competition with American imperialism.

American imperialism retains crushing superiority over the European imperialist powers, especially in nuclear arms (a superiority which is even increased by the decline of British imperialism's "independent deterrent"). The European imperialist powers cannot reasonably conceive defending their system on a world scale in face of the continuous rise of the anticapitalist forces (strengthening of the workers' states, progress of the colonial revolution) outside of their alliance with American imperialism. All this weighs heavily on the whole situation and definitively limits the European bourgeoisie's freedom of maneuver.

This is why the European bourgeoisie attach the greatest importance to obtaining access to nuclear arms (and to the rapidly evolving nuclear technology, on which American imperialism holds an almost complete monopoly), whether under the form of a multilateral or Atlantic nuclear force, or "an autonomous striking force" (French or "European").

-II-

POLITICAL CHANGE

(6) During the long period of capitalist prosperity that unfolded in Western Europe, traditional bourgeois democracy, far from being revived or consol-

idated, continued to follow its process of slow decline. This decline corresponds in particular to an objective situation in which the key forces—in principal place the big capitalist monopolies, the banks, finance capital—decide on a series of questions involving political, economic, financial, monetary, commercial and sometimes even cultural policies, which were formerly prerogatives of parliaments.

If we add to this the continual strengthening of the executive power of the bourgeois state, and the more and more distinct encroachment of international organizations on important political questions (NATO for military problems; the Common Market, the European Coal and Steel Community, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for commercial and economic questions; International Monetary Fund for monetary problems, etc.), it is clear that the actual influence of parliaments on public life is becoming more and more limited.

This process of progressive and uninterrupted erosion of bourgeois parliamentarianism expresses in the last analysis the fact that parliament, which was never an instrument for the conquest of power by the proletariat, is more and more ceasing to be an effective instrument for the defense and consolidation of the power of the bourgeoisie itself. Its real function used to be to enable the bourgeoisie to gain a collective understanding of its class interests at a time when it was greatly divided by disparate regional and sectional interests as well as clearly differentiated political currents.

But the more the process of capitalist concentration continues and economic life falls under the control of a handful of large trusts and monopolies, the more the latter use the state machinery to defend their particular profits and industries, the more the "personal union" between the monopolies and the state machinery progresses, and the more the expression of the interests of big capital and the centralization of the bourgeois forces take place outside the bounds of parliament, even before its debates begin.

The evolution towards a "strong state," underlying the whole evolution of the European bourgeoisie during the past decade, thus corresponds with a double objective: to adapt the functioning of the state to the needs of the monopolies (providing them with a more stable and "technocratic" executive power in order to ensure a more effective defense of their profits); and to limit the possibility of the labor movement threatening the stability of the bourgeois state through an unreserved struggle for its rights (by limiting the right to strike and demonstrate and by strengthening the organs of repression).

It is significant that this tendency has appeared in recent years in all the countries of Western Europe, even in those reputed to be the most democratic, and under all forms of government, includ-

ing those headed by Social Democrats or in which they participate.

(7) However, up to now the tendency towards installing a "strong state" has succeeded in only one country, France in the special Bonapartist form of Gaullism. Obviously the extreme personalization of power existing in this country is not the only form the "strong state" can take. Everywhere else this tendency persists only latently, certain objectives being carried out little by little, but without reaching the point of qualitative change. On the contrary, an objective balance sheet of the five years since 1959 shows that the executive power of the bourgeois state has been *weakened* in a series of countries (particularly Greece and Italy), at least in its capacity to prevent expressions of resolute working class struggle or to reduce their extent. Even in France, where the Gaullist regime seems stable, this stability is bound up in large measure with the survival of its leader, and the bourgeoisie itself doubts the possibility of maintaining this regime, at least in its present form, after de Gaulle has gone.

The fact is that instituting a "strong state" in its classical French form *presupposes* a serious defeat of the working class; and such a defeat has occurred nowhere in Western Europe in recent years. In fact capitalist prosperity itself has had a contradictory, dialectical effect on the behavior of the working class in Western Europe. If it has clearly weakened understanding of the necessity of a revolutionary overturn of capitalism, it has, thanks to the decline in unemployment, created conditions propitious for an outbreak of economic struggles.

This, especially in countries where the integration of the unions in the bourgeois state had been previously institutionalized, can prove to be the point of departure for a new rise in the militancy

of the workers. The European proletariat, even in countries where it has been affected by the tendency towards political apathy, is still passionately attached to the defense of its economic rights and its unions, while establishment of a "strong state" requires not only deep political apathy among the workers but also the castration of the trade-union movement.

Bourgeois Weaknesses

For all these reasons, although tendencies towards setting up a "strong state" come to the surface each time the weakness of the executive of the bourgeois state is sharply illuminated (in Italy at the time of the presidential election in 1964-65; in Austria at the time of the last crisis inside the main bourgeois party; in Greece in relation to the upsurge of the workers which occurred under the Papandreu government, etc.), these tendencies cannot really triumph until after a phase of intense class struggle culminating in a serious defeat and deep demoralization of the proletariat.

Even in France, the beginning of a revival among the workers, which is shown by the economic strikes launched under the banner of unity of action among the trade unions and by a still hesitant, uncertain and contradictory evolution towards a united front of the PCF-SFIO (Communist Party and Social Democrats), threatens to undermine the stability of the "strong state" when de Gaulle and his personal prestige are gone. For this reason the French bourgeoisie envisages changing from a Bonapartist to a presidential regime, but without assurance that the attempt will succeed.

The events in Greece during the summer of 1965 constituted a striking confirmation of the preceding observations. Capitalist Europe has rarely witnessed a more vivid and cynical illustration of the way in which parliament and the parliamentary majority are by-passed nowadays in choosing a prime minister, constituting a government and exercising power. In the absence of an open military dictatorship—which under the given relation of forces could not be installed except at risk of provoking an outright revolutionary reply from the masses—the crown, leaning heavily on the reactionary heads of the army, maneuvered patiently and without regard for niceties in order to erode and then reverse Papandreu's parliamentary majority. The mass movement, despite its breadth and its spontaneous character, was virtually paralyzed so far as the outcome was concerned due to the parliamentary cretinism of the United Democratic Left and the Communist Party, which were anxious to conform to parliamentary rules and procedures and which sought only to "democratize" the monarchy.

(8) The tendency towards a "strong

state" is to monopoly capitalism in a time of prosperity what the fascist tendency was to the same capitalism in a period of economic crisis and mass unemployment. In each case an attempt is involved of adapting the degree of centralization of political power to the concentration achieved by big capital in the economic field. In the one case, the mass base of the movement consisted of a dispossessed, pauperized petty bourgeoisie mad with despair; in the other, the mass base of the movement is a prosperous enriched petty bourgeoisie without an inferiority complex (composed mainly of technocrats, cadre elements and, in general, the new middle classes).


Similarly in the one case it was a question of crushing the working class, destroying its organizations and brutally lowering its standard of living; in the other case it is rather a question of emasculating its organizations by integrating them more deeply into the regime and by corrupting the workers with a higher standard of living linked with potent measures to foster political apathy among them.

The climate of economic prosperity prevailing in Western Europe the past five years has not favored the rebirth of the fascist danger. On the contrary, the fascist cells which survived or were recreated in countries like West Germany or France, have grown weaker, if they have not disintegrated. They could only reappear in a time of economic, social and political crisis carried to a paroxysm, and even then would lack substance in the absence of mass unemployment.

On the other hand, we have seen the development almost everywhere in Western Europe of *Poujadist tendencies*, expressing the revolt of the "old middle classes," hit by the capitalist concentration, who are seeking to maintain an independent position in the economy. It is primarily small peasants and middle-aged small shopkeepers, inexorably condemned by the progress of agricultural mechanization and commercial concentration, who are to be found in the forefront of these tendencies.

These groups sometimes find expression within the traditional parties (for example, the resistance among the British Conservatives to the abolition of resale price maintenance; the resistance in the West German Christian Democratic Union—Christian Social Union to a common market in grains; the expression of Poujadist tendencies within the Belgian party of Liberty and Progress, etc.); sometimes they create new parties, mostly of a quack nature (like, for example, the "peasant party" in Holland) and without any future.

The fact is that the displaced petty bourgeoisie can easily find new jobs—often of higher status—within the framework of capitalist "prosperity." In the absence of a prolonged recession or a big drop in the rate of expansion, their revolt is based more upon nostalgia for



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the past than any present misery. This situation, however, could change in the event of a general recession in the Common Market; we would then certainly see the emergence of more powerful Pougjadist tendencies.

Racist Tendencies

A relatively recent phenomenon has been *the appearance of pronounced racist tendencies* on the political scene in Western Europe. This phenomenon has two roots: on the one hand, the exacerbated feeling of frustration felt by the petty-bourgeois layers in face of the progress of the colonial revolution and the loss of "empire"; on the other hand, the reaction of petty-bourgeois circles and the less politically conscious layers of the working class in face of the immigration of a large number of foreign workers, sometimes (especially Great Britain and France) of colored workers.

The material causes of these racist feelings, at least in working-class groups, are tangible enough—a housing crisis and fear for the stability of employment. These racist feelings are, moreover, less racism proper than xenophobia. Whereas the target of the most virulent demonstrations in Great Britain is black or Pakistani immigrants, in Switzerland it is the Italian immigrants. These sentiments are no less potent in the hands of the bourgeoisie as a weapon to divide the working class. The labor movement, or in its absence, the vanguard, must of necessity take systematic and energetic countermeasures.

(9) In recent years the two fascist regimes still surviving in Europe, the Franco and Salazar regimes, have undergone a profound crisis. In the case of Portugal, this crisis results primarily from the extension of the colonial revolution into the Portuguese colonies (so-called "Portuguese" Guinea, Angola, Mozambique). This undermines the financial stability of the dictatorship through the military expenditures involved, and in the long run undermines its economic stability insofar as it drags Portuguese imperialism, the weakest of all the imperialisms, into colonial wars which it has no hope of winning, and which will finish by destroying its very foundation.

In the case of Spain, the crisis of the regime has more complex causes; it is due to the economic revival, which fostered a renewal of economic struggles by the working class thanks to a decline in unemployment; to the appearance of a new generation of workers and students who do not feel the weight of the demoralizing defeat in the civil war; to the influence of the Cuban Revolution and the revolutionary struggles in Latin America; to the necessity felt by the Spanish bourgeoisie to become integrated into capitalist Europe, etc.

The fundamental scheme of the bourgeoisie is the same in both Portugal and Spain: to move from a fascist regime to

an "enlightened" and "liberal" Bonapartism without a real upheaval. This would permit them to legalize the economic struggles of the working class, diverting them into purely reformist roads; to solve their colonial problems; and to integrate themselves into capitalist Europe on an equal partnership basis (formal membership in the Common Market—and for Spain undoubtedly also in NATO, or in a Mediterranean pact—would register this coveted status).

But many obstacles stand in the way of this operation. Despite accelerated industrialization, which has already made the working class the most numerous in Spain's population, the two countries still have highly explosive agricultural situations. The agricultural proletariat ekes out an existence in terrible misery. The economic situation in the two countries, both of which are clearly "marginal" to the economy of capitalist Europe, is very vulnerable, quite likely to be hit harder than the others by a Common Market recession (which would involve in particular a massive return of emigrant workers).

The gap between the European wage level and wage levels in Spain and Portugal remains a source of constant agitation and growth of revolutionary consciousness among the proletariat of the two countries. The revolutionary movement thus has the possibility to defeat the plan of the bourgeoisie and to transform the crisis of fascism into a crisis of capitalist rule instead, opening the way to a proletarian revolution. But the realization of this possibility depends on political and organizational conditions, the achievement of which has already suffered a serious delay.

-III-

THE WORKING CLASS

(10) During the past five years the European labor movement continued to undergo the influence of international factors determining the broad lines of the evolution of world politics: the continuation of the colonial revolution which has gained new spectacular victories; the deepening of the crisis of the Stalinist bureaucracy, which resulted in the Sino-Soviet conflict and the prolonged crisis in the international Communist movement; the prolonged period of boom in the United States which bolstered the capitalist prosperity in capitalist Europe, etc.

Nevertheless, the determining factor in the evolution of the labor movement in Western Europe continued to be the objective situation in which the European working class itself is placed. The strategic and tactical problems posed by this situation can be definitively resolved only through the internal contradictions within European bourgeois society.

The key problem for the West European labor movement continues to be that of successfully resisting the attempts of the bourgeoisie and its agents to integrate the movement deeper into the bourgeois state. This problem is intimately bound up with another key question: the search for and the formulation of an alternative strategy for the labor movement and its revolutionary vanguard as against the ultra-reformist if not openly bourgeois strategy put forward by the big parties of the European Social-Democracy, and the neo-reformist strategy advanced more and more by the official Communist parties of Western Europe.

The formulation of this alternative strategy—indispensable in constructing an alternative leadership—cannot consist of the simple repetition of past formulas, particularly when these formulas corresponded to an objective situation characterized by mass unemployment, the stagnation of the productive forces and the immediate threat of facism—which is not the objective situation in most European capitalist countries today.

(11) In opposition to all the reformists and neo-reformists, and a number of centrist currents influenced by them even at the periphery of the revolutionary vanguard, the Fourth International insists that the capitalist prosperity, far from having resolved "all the economic problems," leaves enough economic, political and social contradictions in capitalist society to make revolutionary struggles objectively possible that could end in the overthrow of capitalist rule and the conquest of power by the proletariat.

The contradictions persisting within the prosperity itself and the fundamental instability of this prosperity which leads periodically to national or international recessions together with the inevitable periodic attacks which the bourgeoisie must launch against the living standard and against the most militant unions of the workers, all create conditions propitious for an outbreak of struggles which, under the influence of a broad vanguard within the mass movement, can be transformed into offensive battles for transitional demands leading to a revolutionary situation and the establishment of organs of dual power.

Such objectively revolutionary struggles remain possible, as was brilliantly shown by the Belgian general strike of December 1960-January 1961, the great movement of the Greek workers in the summer of 1965, and to a lesser degree by the revival of the Italian labor movement in 1962-63. In any case, as these struggles demonstrated, there is no direct mechanical connection between the growth of capitalist prosperity and workers' wages and the lowering of the revolutionary consciousness of the masses influenced by communism.

But these examples likewise confirm that the actual transformation of workers' struggles for purely economic demands into struggles for transitional

demands which objectively pose the question of power, depends on the activity of the subjective factor within the mass movement to a much greater degree than on different objective conditions.

From this point of view, the union movement, especially its left wing (left reformist, centrist or Communist not dominated by Khrushchevist neo-reformism), has progressively become of greater and greater importance in the recent evolution of the labor movement in Western Europe. This importance corresponds to the nature of the struggles—almost all of which begin as struggles for economic demands; to the sterility of the mass parties of the working class, and to their increasing differentiation, which does not create any point of crystallization sufficiently attractive for a coalescence of the various currents of the labor movement. It is still within a united union movement (as in Great Britain, West Germany or in Sweden), or within a class-conscious union (as in Italy or in Greece) that this coalescence can come about with the fewest hindrances.

From this flows a clear danger, namely, that the trade-union milieu will weaken the programmatic content of the alternative strategy formulated by the various tendencies in the workers movement, and that anarcho-syndicalist tendencies will thus appear which, under cover of workers "autonomy" or a refusal to be integrated into the organisms of the bourgeois state, will in fact strengthen the tendency towards political apathy among the proletariat, the No. 1 objective of the big bourgeoisie and one that happens to be fostered by the objective situation.

For revolutionary Marxists, the only reply possible is to continually link the question of power, of the government, to the defense of material interests of the workers as the culmination of the whole anti-capitalist strategy, in the absence of which "workers autonomy" implies tacit acceptance of the permanency of the bourgeois order.

The same danger is implicit in the "turn toward a strategy centered on the job level" which was projected more or less simultaneously by the centrist or "left" forces of the Italian, West German, British and Belgian trade-union movements. In itself, there is nothing reprehensible or negative about paying more attention to the problems of speed up, the bad effects of automation in a capitalist framework, and the need to offer, even on the job level, a workers plan

in opposition to "capitalist programming."

Under a revolutionary Marxist leadership, an orientation of this kind would lead to the demand for workers control and to propaganda in favor of workers management, the revolutionary impact of which has actually increased as technical progress brings about increasing exploitation of the worker, as a producer, in the factory.

But when this orientation is divorced from the problems of power and government, when it aims at actually scattering the struggles and refusing to engage in struggles of the class as a whole, the only kind capable of shaking capitalist rule on the job as well as on the state level, it constitutes an ideal platform for neo-reformism that leads only to new forms of class collaboration if not to bitter defeats and fresh demoralization.

Stalinism

(12) The evolution of the Communist parties in Western Europe has been profoundly influenced in the recent period by the developments and various ups and downs of the international crisis of the Communist movement. But the overall effects of this crisis on most of the parties have been contradictory.

If "de-Stalinization," the slow disappearance of all orthodoxy and all "supreme authority," and the wide differentiation engendered by the Sino-Soviet conflict have undoubtedly heightened the critical judgment of Communist members and re-established, to various degrees, the possibility of real political discussion within these parties (however, only the Italian CP has developed anything that resembles genuinely free discussion), the immediate political effect of this change in climate has been to accentuate the rightist course of these parties under the combined influence of the opportunist tradition of the old leaders (particularly Togliatti in Italy and Thorez in France), the Khrushchevist line promulgated at the Twentieth Congress along with "de-Stalinization" ("peaceful coexistence, general strategy of the Communist parties"; priority of "economic competition between the USSR and the USA" over any revolutionary orientation in Western Europe; attempt at rapprochement with the Social Democracy, etc.), and the climate of capitalist prosperity so conducive to the flowering of new rightist deviations in an essentially opportunist milieu. Important changes in social composition, particularly among the active cadre, have occurred in the last decade, notably in the Italian Communist Party.

In Italy in particular this contradictory effect of "de-Stalinization" has been felt, but other cases—like that of Sweden where the Communist Party openly adopted a reformist orientation, or Belgium where the leaders of the CP argue for the idea of their party being reab-

sorbed by the Social Democratic Party—confirm this general rule.

It is a product of the long period of opportunism in the Communist parties. Only with the profound radicalization of significant layers of the workers and the outbreak of big spontaneous struggles could this be reversed, bringing forward a broad Communist left in the mass CP's that would move toward a revolutionary strategy under the pressure of the masses and the stimulus of the revolutionary Marxist forces.

In almost all the countries of capitalist Europe, the Sino-Soviet conflict has led to the appearance of nuclei of pro-Chinese groupings. Their members fall generally into two categories: on the one hand youth and militant workers disgusted by the rightist opportunist line of the official CP's; on the other, men of the CP machines who yearn for the days of Stalin.

The relationship of forces between the two tendencies determines the relative size of the groupings. These go from obviously ridiculous groups as in Switzerland to formations of a certain strength like the pro-Chinese Belgian, and Austrian organizations, and groups of somewhat greater importance like those in Italy. But even in these cases their possibilities for growth were cut off when elements of the Stalinist type took over the leadership, toeing the Chinese line 100 per cent and sinking into sectarianism and demagoguery.

Nevertheless, experience showed that these groups, particularly when they were forming, brought together a considerable number of valuable elements in search of revolutionary solutions. It is the duty of our sections to find the means to open a dialogue with these elements and to win them to our program and our movement; otherwise the whole experience threatens to end with their being lost to the labor movement.

Social Democracy

(13) During recent years, the evolution of the Social Democracy toward the right has proceeded at an accelerated pace in almost all the countries of Western Europe. Two motor forces that must be carefully distinguished are at the bottom of this evolution:

(a) In some cases the classical arguments and motives of reformism in a boom period are at work, without this necessarily implying a decline or modification of the traditional working-class base of these parties. This is particularly true of the Austrian Socialist Party and the British Labour Party to a certain degree indicated below.

(b) In other cases what is involved is the expression of a profound modification in the social composition of these parties. The administrative bureaucracy of the state and municipalities, the new middle classes, even small and middle capitalist businessmen, have displaced

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the workers as active members of these parties. The process of degeneration, which has gone farthest in West Germany and the Netherlands, is marked by a complete break with the ideology of the past, the official renunciation of Marxism and the class struggle, a refusal even to speak of any kind of socialization of the means of production or the extension of workers rights in the plants as aims of socialist politics, and even official promulgation of reactionary concepts like the "inclusion of workers among stockholders" and "deproletarianization through the transformation of the workers into individual owners."

Even in the case of the Dutch and German parties, the electoral base remains working class, and the phenomenon of an electoral polarization around these parties can continue to occur when, in the absence of worthwhile alternatives, the proletariat is compelled to consider a party like the German Socialist Party as the only possible alternative to the bourgeois parties. But in such cases the votes won by these parties are gained literally *despite* their program, their leaders and their orientation, and not because of them.

The Labour Party represents a special case. Like the Austrian Socialist Party, it represents the only Social Democratic party that continues to be followed, due to historical reasons and the structure of the workers' movement, by virtually the entire politically conscious working class of the country. The death of Gaitskell and his replacement by Wilson, plus the strengthening of the left wing in the trade unions and the bankruptcy of the rightist policy in the 1959 elections, led to a small shift to the left in this party during 1963-64 in contrast to all the other Social Democratic parties in Western Europe.

But the financial crisis to which Wilson's cabinet fell heir, together with the classical fear of these reformists, both of the right and the left, to lead a struggle, no matter how weak, against the "national" and international class enemy, led them to place the burden of their difficulties on the backs of the Labour voters and to become worse adherents than ever of the world politics of British and American imperialism.

In covering up the aggressive policy of American imperialism in Vietnam, in waging an imperialist repression themselves in Aden and South Arabia, in introducing legislation on immigration which goes further along the road of racism than the measure passed by the Tories, in introducing a bill for an incomes, or wage-freezing, policy, and in seeking the passage of anti-union and anti-strike legislation, the British reformist leaders are acting like faithful servants of their own bourgeoisie. For the time being, before they have finished their foul task, their masters are not interested in ousting them, despite their hairline parliamentary majority.

The true meaning of this shameful



BELGIAN MARCH. Poster reads: "Today thousands of Americans demonstrate in the United States against the military intervention of the USA in Vietnam. We are in solidarity with their action and we answer their appeal in favor of an International Day of Demonstrations."

policy, however, is clear at the moment only to the politically minded vanguard. The broad masses still hold illusions about the class character of this government. Only when Wilson's policies induce conflicts at the plant level and in sectors of industry will a comparable rebellion break out on the rank-and-file level.

(14) To the intermediate centrist formations that appeared in the preceding period, of which the most important were the Danish and Norwegian Socialist People's parties (SFP), the French United Socialist Party (PSU), and the Dutch Pacifist Socialist Party (PSP), two new centrist organizations were recently added: the Italian Socialist Party of Proletarian Unity (PSIUP) and the Belgian Left Socialist Union-Walloon Workers Party (UGS-PWT). The latter parties have a quite different origin from that of the Danish and Norwegian SFP's and the PSU, which were ideological movements or "moral" revolts within the SP's or the CP's.

Objectively they are products of upsurges in the class struggle in these countries in the recent past and of the actual radicalization of the first layer of the mass movement that appeared during these upsurges. The Danish, French and Norwegian formations have a program-

matic base that is confused in general and just as neo-reformist as that of the Khrushchev CP's if not even further along the road of neo-reformism. The PSIUP and the UGS-PWT on the contrary seek a Marxist programmatic base, and without thereby going beyond left centrism, they are farther to the left on some points than the official CP's.

Two criteria will prove decisive for the future of these new formations—their capacity to win a real mass base in the plants and, as a consequence of this, to play an effective role in the trade-union movement, and their determination to play an independent political vanguard role in the labor movement, outflanking the official CP's to the left.

If they succeed in carrying out these tasks in a positive way, these parties will be able to serve as poles of attraction to a vanguard within the CP's exercising a continual pressure on them that can limit their opportunist maneuvers and thus constitute a positive element in constructing a revolutionary mass party that will include a good many of their members. But if they fail in this dual task, they will rapidly become transformed into more and more heterogeneous centrist swamps given to incessant factional struggles in the image of the PSU.



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-IV-

OUR TASKS

(15) The central task of revolutionary Marxists during the entire coming period, insofar as it is objectively determined by the succession of phases of capitalist prosperity and more or less limited recessions, continues to be the one already indicated: to prepare, to justify, to coordinate, to widen and to generalize the struggles of the proletariat in defense of immediate material interests (whether against inflation or against the threat of unemployment, against the attempt to slow down wage increases and impose a wage freeze, or against cuts in hours and layoffs) and against the integration of the workers movement into the bourgeois state apparatus, by linking economic demands to transitional demands. These, starting from the immediate aspirations of the masses, could lead to a pre-revolutionary situation, even the creation of organs of dual power, if struggles of broad sweep are launched to win them.

Success in these tasks involves maintaining the orientation of integrating our militants in the mass movement while at the same time maintaining an independent sector.

Entrist work will continue to be applied in the CP's in France and Italy, in the Labour Party in Great Britain, in the SP in Austria, in the SFP in Denmark.

A modification in tactics, already carried out in large part by our forces, is called for in West Germany and Belgium. In West Germany the possibilities for work inside the Social Democracy have worsened from year to year. Without doubt they will be very limited in the next period. Under these circumstances membership in this party is primarily justified today because it facilitates trade-union work. However, this does not mean that the participation of revolu-

tionary Marxists in this party now has only a passing tactical significance and that the original strategic aim has been abandoned.

It remains most likely that the current trend will continue—the radicalization of the working class will first occur in the trade unions before appearing in the Social Democracy. It is true that the conditions under which the process may unfold have become more unfavorable because of the political degeneration of this party and the withdrawal of the workers from its internal political life. Thus the indicated outcome has been rendered less probable although it has not been ruled out.

In Belgium, the formation of the PWTUGS created the possibility of advancing revolutionary consciousness. The revolutionary Marxists must support this development in order to shape a force out of it that can contribute effectively to the birth of a revolutionary mass party.

(16) The general strategy of revolutionary Marxists in Western Europe ought to be based essentially on the perspective of undermining the strongest point of the imperialist system by liberating Europe and the world from the danger of a nuclear conflict through developing the class struggle and the revolution in the very heart of capitalism. Concretely this struggle ought to be directed against the imperialist and capitalist fusion that is being effected in the present stage both inside and outside the Common Market.

This is being done with the prominent participation of the forces of the Social Democracy which even more than in the period between the two wars now plays the role of steward for the capitalist system in its most up-to-date forms. What is required is the elaboration of a program of struggle corresponding to the immediate interests of the workers but bearing a transitional character leading to the overturn of the system through continuous developments in a socialist direction.

This program must first of all offer to the proletariat effective means of defense against attacks by the bosses carried out under the slogan of "slowing down wage increases" in a period of full employment, or in the form of cuts in hours or layoffs in a downturn of the economic cycle. The defense against cuts in hours is all the more important since it is in general the marginal revenue of the workers that constitutes the basis for raising their standard of living (buying durable consumer goods on credit), and the loss of these revenues in the workers' budgets can represent a disproportionate fall in their standard of living.

In opposition to the inflationary threat to the income of the workers, revolutionary Marxists demand the sliding scale of wages, the automatic adjustment of wages to rises in the cost of living with the index of the cost of living computed by the trade unions themselves, and safe-

guards against the imposition of progressive income taxes on the supplements to nominal income.

In opposition to the "incomes policy" and in general against any attempt to tie down the workers movement through a "joint agreement economy" ("économie concertée") the revolutionary Marxists propose that the trade-union movement demand that the discussion on prices, wages, productivity and profits should be preceded by opening the books of the bosses, doing away with business secrets and establishing workers control over production.

In opposition to cuts in hours, the threat of layoffs, which appear at the time of downturns in the economic cycle, and in opposition to the general threat of capitalist rationalization and automation to full employment, the revolutionary Marxists demand establishment of the 40-hour and then the 35-hour week, a guaranteed monthly wage, social insurance (including unemployment insurance) of 75 per cent of the average wages, workers control over hiring and firing. They demand that plants closed by the bosses which the workers believe ought to be kept running should be put into operation under workers control; they demand that along with this, to absorb unemployment where it exists or reappears, new plants should be built at government expense and operated under the management of the workers themselves.

In opposition to the general economic dislocations which capitalist prosperity has left untouched or even accentuated in all the capitalist countries of Western Europe, the revolutionary Marxists demand the nationalization of every big industry and the whole credit system, without purchase or indemnification, running them under workers control and with the elaboration of an economic development plan centered on different priorities (particularly collective consumption) than those of "economic programming."

So that there will be no ambiguity about this workers plan and to prevent it from becoming a new tie-in with capitalism like the "counter plan" of the PSU, it must be specified that it can be carried out only by a workers (or workers and peasants) government, and that it involves the creation of dual power.

In order to meet the situation arising from a leap forward of the productive forces and new needs of the proletariat, revolutionary Marxists demand extensive development of free collective consumption—free medicine (national health service), free collective urban transportation, free education up to the highest university degrees with free meals and free lodging for students, socialization of building sites and free collective services in big living complexes (national housing service). They press the masses and the workers organizations to oppose the models of bourgeois consumption and to adopt models of consumption

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that are both more rational from the viewpoint of the individual and more equalitarian and human from the social point of view.

Against the exploitation which workers have suffered since the beginning of capitalism as producers and which has been aggravated by the progress of capitalist rationalization and automation, revolutionary Marxists struggle for workers control over the organization and speed of work, over the plans for re-tooling plants and plans for production, etc.

The slogan of workers control appears as the central slogan of this stage of struggle to which all the other transitional demands lead as the main lever for bringing about dual power within the plants, logically ending in the question of political power, the expropriation of the bourgeoisie and the objective of workers management after the overthrow of capitalism.

(17) This program involves the necessity of formulating for each country a precise transitional slogan on the governmental level to concretize, in accordance with the tradition, the currents of opinion and the prevailing mood of the working class, the general slogan of a "workers government" or a "workers and peasants government." It is a question of accustoming the workers to counterpose to bourgeois governments or coalitions with the bourgeoisie the idea of a government that expresses the political will of the working class, of that will—not as revolutionary Marxists would like it, but as it really is at a definite stage.

For this slogan to have its full mobilizing effect, it must be intimately tied up with the transition program which this government is supposed to carry out. It must also be formulated in such a way as not to appear manifestly absurd (a "workers government" headed by Willy Brandt is hard to conceive); that is, the trade unions, the mass workers parties or the left wings of these parties, as the situation may require, must be represented as constituting the essential bases of these governments.

United Front

(18) The revolutionary Marxists advance their propaganda and their agitation in favor of a united front of all the trade-union organizations within the Common Market without excluding anyone, favoring representation for the French General Confederation of Labor (CGT) and the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) within the consultative bodies of the trade unions in the Common Market and broadening this united front to include the trade-union movements of all of capitalist Europe.

The struggle for these objectives—the realization of which must be tied to the convocation of a big European Congress of Labor—becomes of extreme importance as the Common Market takes on structure and more and more institutions are set

up, and as the monopolies and bosses organizations gain a degree of strength and organizational centralization going beyond what has been achieved on a national level. As against this concentration of capitalist power, the labor movement has only a front torn into two or three sectors which refuse to collaborate internationally. The result of this is a steady shift in the relationship of forces in favor of the bosses within the Common Market.

As against a capitalist United States, which could be born in part of Europe, it is necessary to stress propaganda favoring a socialist United States of Europe.

(19) The problem of building a revolutionary leadership in Spain, of a revolutionary party of the proletariat is of *primordial* importance. Present conditions there are characterized by: (a) a considerable increase in economic and democratic struggles of the workers, peasants, the poor, students, etc.; (b) the efforts, at times successful, of the bourgeois opposition, more precisely the Christian Democracy, to head the movement, in order to control it and to try to use it in the final analysis to help bring into being a neo-capitalist and Bonapartist system.

The party that is needed will not be built in a laboratory but in struggle. The revolutionary Spanish militants must actively participate in the vanguard of the present big struggles which open possibilities of action infinitely superior to those that existed a few years ago.

Participating in the economic and democratic struggles of the workers, agricultural laborers, students and other layers of the population, advancing *unifying* slogans to raise the class consciousness and militancy of the workers, proposing wherever possible forms of struggle that sweep over the limits more or less "tolerated" by the bourgeoisie, following the magnificent example of the Asturian miners who, at Mieres, attacked the police station where miners were being held, with cries of "U.H.P.!" (the Unión de Hermanos Proletarios of 1934) and "Long Live Communism!," the revolutionary militants must, at the present stage of the struggle, work for the most rapid possible success in coordinating the workers struggles and actions on a national scale, as well as forming an effective alliance between the struggles of the industrial workers and the agricultural workers—indispensable conditions for proposing more ambitious mass actions in form as well as content, capable of leading to pre-insurreccional situations.

With regard to one of the central slogans of the present struggle, "trade-union freedom," the revolutionary militants must, in opposition to attempts by the party apparati (both labor and Christian Democrats) to create their own more or less clandestine trade-union sections, advance the slogan of factory, local, regional and even national committees or councils, and participate in creating unifying and really representative committees of the

workers, organs of the class struggle of all kinds, where of course representatives of the Communist, Socialist and Christian trade-union militants would be represented.

The indispensable unity of action in the plants must find an organic form on a national scale. Revolutionary militants must struggle along these lines to create a genuine workers front of political organizations and groups that would go beyond the vague slogans about "democracy," showing from facts of daily life the need for a socialist alternative to the present crisis of the Franco regime.

But one of the indispensable conditions for getting beyond the schemes of the political forces of the monopolies and initiating solutions leading to the socialist revolution is the creation of a revolutionary party of the proletariat. The revolutionary militants must take an active part in the still timid attempts at rapprochement among the revolutionary Marxist groups along these lines.

Specific Demands

(20) It is necessary to develop a program of specific demands and activities:

(a) For the defense of the colonial revolution, particularly the revolution unfolding in the colony or ex-colony of the imperialism where each of our sections is operating. For aid, free from all political strings, to the new politically independent states, especially those which, in search of complete freedom from imperialism, are carrying their revolution over into a permanent revolution.

(b) For withdrawal from NATO and from all imperialist military pacts. For a struggle against nuclear arms (for unilateral disarmament, against any multilateral force), and against the threats of world war launched by imperialism in general, a campaign that must combine participation in the anti-nuclear movement with the struggle for an anti-capitalist program, together with the propaganda that only the world victory of socialism will put an end to the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

(c) For the intervention of our movement in the crisis of the world Communist movement, an intervention adapted to the special features of the Communist movement and its differentiations in each country of Western Europe.

(d) For specific action of our movement among the youth, who are mostly outside the sway of the traditional organizations, who are particularly vulnerable to downturns in the economic cycle, and among whom definite layers in a state of latent or open rebellion against society in general can be led through action into becoming revolutionary adversaries of capitalism and any society founded on exploitation and oppression. The rebelliousness is also linked in certain countries with the anti-imperialist struggle, culminating in a rebirth of interest in politics among the youth.

The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the Crisis of the International Communist Movement

In taking a position on the Sino-Soviet conflict in June 1963, the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International considered the differences between Peking and Moscow under four headings:

(1) "Peaceful coexistence" and the struggle against war.

(2) The revolutionary struggle in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

(3) The "peaceful roads to socialism" concept which was made official at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and which places in question in particular the Marxist-Leninist concept of the state.

(4) The passage to socialism on a world scale (the Kremlin holding it will be assured mainly by the Soviet Union pulling ahead of imperialism economically, Peking holding that the fundamental role will be played by the revolutionary forces on an international scale).

In May 1964 the plenum of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International brought the subsequent development of the Chinese position up to date, noting the following:

(1) Peking stepped up and brought out more clearly its attack on the subordination of Communist parties in other countries to the Soviet CP.

(2) In line with this, Peking attacked the idea that a pact between the Soviet state and a capitalist state implies that the Communist party in the country involved should make an unprincipled compromise with the capitalist class and its government.

(3) The Chinese contended that behind the ideological argument used by the Kremlin about international socialist cooperation, an exploitive relationship is involved; namely the subordination of certain primary interests of the less developed workers states to the Soviet Union.

(4) The Moscow treaty came under heavy attack as an unprincipled effort to maintain the status quo in monopoly of nuclear weapons, the aim being to exclude China from nuclear armament, thus assuring the USSR a leading role at this decisive military level.

(5) The rightist line imposed by the Soviet leaders on a whole series of Communist parties (Iraq, France, Algeria, Cuba, India, etc.) was cited to prove the damaging consequences of Khrushchevism. Peking demanded that the document issued by the conference of 81 parties with regard to the roads to socialism be corrected.

(6) The right of majorities and minorities to exist in the international movement was upheld, Peking arguing that a correct position can sometimes be advanced by a minority.

In noting these new developments, the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International reasserted its strong disagreement with Peking's position on a number of points:

(1) Peking's campaign to rehabilitate Stalin.

(2) Peking's concept that it is necessary to reinforce the repressive apparatus in order to handle conflicts arising from continuous intensification of the class struggle during the transition from capitalism to socialism.

(3) The one-sided interpretation of the Twentieth Congress in which Peking singled out only the outright revisionist aspects.

(4) The rigid bureaucratic conception of the role of art and culture in general maintained by Peking.

(5) The erroneous view that capitalism has been restored in Yugoslavia and that a "bureaucratic comprador bourgeoisie" now rules there. By way of analogy, Peking offers an erroneous characterization of the Soviet Union,

Khrushchevism being considered as the expression of bourgeois layers headed toward capitalist restoration.

The Sino-Soviet dispute continued to develop in numerous fields. On the general ideological and political level, the Chinese leaders criticized the social differences in the USSR and the degeneration of the Soviet economy and society. They affirmed the need for equalitarian principles and norms in order to avoid the development of a gulf between the leaders and the masses. They brought up problems of an economic nature, as, for example, criteria in industrial management, fixing of prices, etc. On current political questions, a frontier dispute flared between China and the Soviet Union; the events in Vietnam in the early summer of 1964 became a subject of sharp dispute as did the Soviet attitude in the Congolese question, and several issues involving the United Nations (assessments, a joint "peace" force, Indonesia's withdrawal).

The downfall of Khrushchev led to a temporary suspension of polemics; and the two sides opened new negotiations. But the decision of the CPSU to convoke a consultative conference in Moscow, the disapproving Soviet attitude on the Chinese test of an atomic bomb, the continuation of relations with capitalist India without modification, the incidents in Moscow during the anti-American demonstration of the Asian students, and particularly the flaring up of the international crisis over Vietnam, ended with the Chinese resuming their attacks. They have even gone so far as to accuse the Kremlin of being in collusion with the imperialists.

Despite hot replies and massive propaganda, the Soviet leaders have found themselves mostly on the defensive. Even when they have sought to shift from merely replying to the Chinese attacks

and to open a counterattack, the defensive aim has been quite evident. Leaving aside the details and the mass of particular arguments, of examples and quotations, the Kremlin's polemicists have developed their position along the following lines:

(1) They accuse the Chinese of irresponsibility, of playing into the hands of the extremists in the imperialist camp on the question of war and particularly the possibility of a nuclear conflict.

(2) They hit at certain weak points in the international concepts of the Chinese, among other things their idea of a so-called "intermediate zone." (In reality the idea of an "intermediate zone," including countries like France, is only ideological camouflage for certain Chinese diplomatic transactions aimed at avoiding isolation and establishing economic relations with the weaker imperialist countries.)

(3) They accuse the Chinese of autarchy and of nationalist and racist tendencies in foreign policy.

(4) They criticize as revisionist the Chinese thesis about the most explosive contradictions at this stage being those which oppose the colonial peoples to imperialism on the ground that the Chinese thereby wipe out the fundamental class contradiction between the workers states and imperialism on the one hand and between the proletariat and the capitalist class of the industrialized countries on the other. They maintain that in practice the economic and military aid granted by the USSR to the newly independent countries and to the colonial freedom movements is much greater than granted by China.

(5) They attack the Chinese for their bureaucratic concepts of the workers state, for their cult of the personality of Mao and defense of the cult of the personality of Stalin, for "adventurism" in their economic policies as they go from one extreme to the other, for their bureaucratic concepts in the field of culture, for the bureaucratic internal regime in their party and their violations of statutory norms such as failing to hold congresses, for their wrong theories of the character of the Chinese state following the revolutionary victory, and for their subsequent empirical course.

In order to refute certain accusations as slanderous, and to maintain or to gain influence in some sectors of the Communist or revolutionary movement in the colonial countries, the Soviet leaders have sometimes shifted away from their rightist positions, offering "centrist" or "leftist" interpretations of their line. At the same time they have sharpened their tone in certain international disputes, including those in the diplomatic field. A notable shift has been their criticisms of the extreme rightist positions expressed in some Communist parties.

Even more, with regard to the dynamics of certain colonial revolutions, while holding basically to the formulas of the conference of the 81 parties, they have

talked about socialism being under construction in countries like Algeria and Egypt (which does not prevent them from continuing to flirt with the conservative Indian bourgeoisie, with the aim among other things of countering Peking). It is clear, in addition, that on some key questions in domestic policy, the Chinese have had to take some blows, often without replying to the Soviet accusations.

Balance Sheet

From the over-all balance sheet of the dispute for the past five years it is clear that up to this point the Soviet leadership has been hit the hardest in a conflict in which it stood to lose in view of the leading position held by the USSR and the CPSU at the beginning. The downfall of Khrushchev constituted a considerable success for the Chinese even if his role in the conflict was only one of the factors that led to his forced resignation.

The failure of the campaign for a new world conference of the Communist parties was still more obviously a victory for Peking. Only a limited number of parties showed up at the preparatory meeting and some of them did not hide their disagreement. The end result was indefinite postponement of the showdown meeting that Khrushchev had aimed at.

The international crisis over Vietnam provides an acid test of positions in the dispute.

The Chinese leaders accuse the Soviet leadership in brief of not having granted the People's Republic of Vietnam the necessary political and military aid and of having continued to seek a compromise solution with the imperialists in the face of their criminal aggression. In stressing Moscow's failure to react at the time of the imperialist provocations in the Gulf of Tonkin and its failure to consider the attack against any workers state as an attack against the USSR itself, they lay bare one of the things that has brought the world to the brink of nuclear war in the current international crisis.

But no matter how correct the criticisms and general proclamations of the Chinese are, the practical possibilities open to them are something else again. Even if it were true that Chinese military aid in the first months of the American aggression was limited by the desires of the north Vietnamese themselves, who stated they did not need more aid at the moment, the fact remains that China is threatened with a nuclear attack while still lacking sufficient nuclear arms to deter the Pentagon. Consequently, if the Kremlin has not done what it could have done in order to dissuade the imperialists from their aggression (thus facilitating the outbreak and escalation of a tragic crisis), China is in no posi-

tion to follow up its declarations in a consistent way.

At bottom this is an expression of the fact that despite everything, the USSR retains its preponderance among the workers states. And just as in the economic field, Cuba, for example, could count at first only on Soviet support, so in the decisive military field, the Kremlin leaders hold a power which the Chinese have no possibility of gaining in the near future.


Peking is trying to a certain extent to escape from this reality in an unrealistic way. Correctly rejecting the illusions about "peaceful coexistence" with imperialism, the Chinese at the same time project questionable prognoses, taking as the most probable variants those that are most favorable to their resources and concepts. They give the impression, in fact, not only of forecasting but even desiring escalation of the American aggression, including massive landings of troops in north Vietnam and China itself.

They go so far as to talk about a war between China and the United States that would not involve the USSR and would not lead to a general nuclear conflict. A variant of this kind would have the result of exhausting the United States in an endless ground war on the continent of Asia in which China's defensive capacity could come into full play. The Mao team would thus emerge as the genuine opponents of imperialism, the Soviet Union would be shoved to the side, losing all chance of playing the key role in the Asian movement and the colonial and semicolonial countries in general.

All that is wrong with this perspective is that Washington will scarcely choose such a disastrous road; and a Sino-American conflict, which in any case would involve terrible blows for China, could not be limited to the use of classic arms. Moreover, the war itself could not be limited; failure of Moscow to intervene on China's side would place the Soviet Union in mortal danger, a situation its leaders could scarcely fail to recognize and to act upon.

Peking Factionalism

In line with its unreal perspective, Peking has sought to turn the American aggression to factional advantage in the Sino-Soviet conflict, thus weakening the defense. Its own responses to Johnson's escalation of the attack gave the impression throughout the crucial first period of being largely verbal. The charge that it even blocked or slowed down Soviet military aid was not effectively refuted. Its rejection of Soviet overtures (even if they were insincere) to form a united governmental front in meeting the American attack was sectarian and highly damaging. Its failure to consider the suggestions of the Cubans with



Cartoon from the *New Statesman*, February 4, 1966.

regard to a vigorous and quick response further disrupted the kind of defense that could have compelled the Americans to hesitate and draw back before they became still more deeply committed. Peking's course thus served to help encourage the Americans.

If in events like those in Vietnam and Santo Domingo the appraisal held by the Chinese leaders of the tendencies of imperialism and their criticism of "peaceful coexistence" have enabled them to make an impression even among sectors inclined in the Khrushchev direction, their perspective in Southeast Asia reveals the holes in their concepts and the relative weakness of their position. In reality it is impossible at the present stage to conceive an effective reply to major imperialist military aggression without the support of the USSR, which remains the key power in the anti-capitalist camp.

In any case, the factors at the bottom of the evolution of the position of the Chinese leaders in the conflict remain absolutely clear. The Soviet bureaucracy now has an economic base sufficiently solid for them to envisage competing

with the advanced capitalist countries. They possess a mighty armament justifying a predominantly military view of the country's defense. Their bureaucracy is highly developed in size and in function, with privileges on an accompanying scale. Their outlook is extremely conservative.

At the same time, due to the development of the productive forces, the growth of the working class and the considerable improvement in its cultural level, along with the formation of a more and more demanding layer of intellectuals, the Soviet bureaucrats cannot escape complex economic and social problems that constantly compel them to seek empiric adjustments in all fields and to deviate from the forms of economic management and political domination in force under Stalin's rule. The Chinese bureaucracy, on the other hand, cannot seriously conceive of victory in economic competition with the advanced capitalist countries for an indefinite period and it is thus driven, even in self-defense, to weigh the possibility of extending the revolutionary struggle of the masses in the colonial countries where it is aware

of the revolutionary pressures, especially in Asia.

The extremely difficult situation in which the Mao leadership found themselves led to an increase in such phenomena as intensification of the cult of Mao.

A Stalinist Cycle?

Due to the hardening of Peking's bureaucracy, and the campaign for the rehabilitation of Stalin, certain theorists have come to hold that China is going through a Stalinist cycle such as overtook the Russian revolution and from which the Soviet Union is still suffering. The idea has even been advanced that this cycle is inevitable, something inherent in every revolution in a backward country.

It is undeniable that bureaucratism is one of the evils that every successful revolution must face, particularly in countries of low economic and cultural level. Widespread poverty and want tend to give the bureaucracy an inordinate role, thus opening the door to special privileges which the bureaucracy then

seeks to consolidate through political means. The appreciation of this phenomenon held by revolutionary Marxists today began with Lenin and was developed by Trotsky. The experience of recent years has only confirmed their contributions in this field.

The development of the Chinese revolution following the seizure of power in 1949 has provided its own body of evidence. The growth of bureaucracy in China, with its concomitant expressions in the sphere of ideology, is due in the final analysis to the poverty of the country and the impossibility of linking up adequately with an economically advanced center such as Japan, Western Europe or the United States until socialist revolutions occur there. The primary tendency toward bureaucratism has been reinforced by the fact that the Maoist group lacks a Leninist-Trotskyist appreciation of this phenomenon and its dan-

gers, even going so far on the contrary as to elevate the very incarnation of bureaucratism, Stalin himself, into a key place in the official state iconography. Peking's opposition to the de-Stalinization process and its campaign to rehabilitate the figure of Stalin testify eloquently enough to the bureaucratic tendencies and mentality of the Maoist top leadership.

Can it then be said that China is undergoing the same experience as the Soviet Union, with all the logical consequences flowing from this, and that there is a universal necessity for a stage of Stalinism, no matter how reprehensible and morally objectionable this may be? The facts speak to the contrary.

First of all, the international relationship of forces which fostered and fed Stalinism and which was ultimately responsible for its victory, has changed unalterably. The new China was born

in a constellation of already existing workers states from which much could be learned, including the need to avoid what the Chinese themselves call "Stalin's errors." More importantly, this existing system of workers states was a source of material aid unavailable to the young Soviet state in the supremely difficult days of Lenin and Trotsky.

This alone made a decisive difference in establishing the foundations for a much more rapid rate of economic growth in China than was possible in the early days of the USSR no matter what the subsequent vicissitudes in Sino-Soviet relations. China's capacity to produce nuclear weapons is the most decisive proof of this. Still more important, the Chinese people look out at a world charged with revolutionary unrest and constantly upset by uprisings and elemental outbursts. The perspective of more revolutions that can come to their



A Vietnamese mother and children flee U. S. bombs.



A Vietnamese mother and children flee U.S. bombs.

aid appears wholly realistic in contrast to the outlook facing the Russian people, particularly after the defeat of the Chinese revolution of 1925-27.

The Cuban victory came only ten years after the Chinese victory as a payment on account. This success alone can be considered to be of decisive significance, having something of the impact that a successful Chinese revolution might have had internationally ten years after the October victory in Russia. On top of this, world capitalism—despite the monstrous economic and military power of the United States—stands on much narrower and obviously weaker foundations than in the decades before World War II.

The importance of all this, so far as the theory of an inevitable period of Stalinism is concerned, is that the material forces that gave rise to such a hardened and fully crystallized bureaucratic caste as appeared in the Soviet Union no longer exist anywhere in the world. The final proof of this is the growing instability of the Soviet bureaucracy itself and the efforts of the heads of the bureaucratic caste in the Soviet Union to gain time by such concessions as "de-Stalinization."

One of the consequences of this new relationship of forces on a world scale is that the Maoist group itself, however fixed its bureaucratic pattern of thinking and practice may be, is not at all merely repeating the policies and views of Stalin. They display a decisive difference with Stalin, for example, in the key concept of building "socialism in one country," advancing instead the idea of "uninterrupted revolution." Particularly since the disastrous experience of the "great leap forward" when Mao set out to build "communism in one country"—and at a faster rate than either Stalin or Khrushchev—the Chinese leaders have been emphasizing the need for socialism to triumph in other countries.

Likewise in the field of economic policy, the Mao group for all its rigidity, its incapacity up to now to achieve harmonious planning, and its empirical zigzagging which did grave injury to China in the "great leap forward," proved capable of undertaking a fundamental reorientation (a turn helped by the appearance of strong undercurrents of political opposition in China going right up to the top circles), and giving up the Stalinist pattern of putting excessive emphasis on the expansion of heavy industry at no matter what cost.

Again in relations with the masses, while political opposition other than the token existence of remnants of petty-bourgeois parties is banned, the Mao leadership has not engaged in gross crimes on a mass scale such as featured Stalin's rule in its worst days. Even if this may be ascribable in part to the absence of a massive, stubborn and experienced Leninist political opposition such as Stalin had to face in usurping power and establishing his authoritarian

rule, the fact remains that the Mao group has sought to prevent the bureaucracy from differentiating out in a too glaring way, doing this under the banner of equalitarianism. (Stalin ended by branding equalitarianism as a petty-bourgeois concept.)

The Chinese Communist Party cannot be considered to have been a Stalinist party in the strict sense of the term; that is, subordinated since the twenties to the bureaucratic leadership of the Kremlin. The Mao leadership had its own personality; and its policies, although often marked in practice by compromises with the Moscow leadership which led to the gravest deviations, had a generally centrist character leaning toward the left. The Mao leadership was also shaped by long years of difficult struggles and it underwent the impact of the great popular revolution that brought it to power.

Thus in the light of the international relationship of forces, the dynamics of the Chinese revolution, and the special features of the Maoist leadership, it can be concluded that the bureaucratism in China, bad as it is in and of itself, is not the same as the bureaucratism that developed in the Soviet Union into a powerfully consolidated caste. It was Trotsky's view that the *Stalinist* experience, viewed in all its concreteness, was due to a completely special combination of forces and circumstances. His forecast that it would never be repeated still holds.

The differences between Stalinism and Maoism are involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict and are an important element for revolutionary Marxists in determining which side it is better to offer critical support in the interest of advancing the world revolution. But to insist on the differences between Maoism does not imply that the bureaucratic nature of the Chinese regime can be forgotten or that criticism of the persistent cult of Mao can in any way be attenuated. The world Trotskyist movement maintains its independence from all bureaucratic formations. In all the workers states it stands against bureaucratic rule and for proletarian democracy. In China the struggle against the bureaucracy and its regime, and for proletarian democracy, cannot be won except through an anti-bureaucratic struggle on a scale massive enough to bring about a qualitative change in the political form of government.

Pro-Peking Tendencies

The developments in the past five years and particularly the splits that occurred in 1964 have led to an international pro-Peking tendency composed at present of the following:

(1) The Communist Parties of the two Asian "people's democracies" (Korea and Vietnam).

(2) The Albanian Workers Party.

(3) A group of Asian parties of which the Indonesian, Japanese and Malayan Communist Parties are the most important.

(4) The left-wing Communist Party of India which was formed as the result of a split in the CP in 1964 and which starts out with a considerable mass base.

(5) A group of parties in colonial and semicolonial countries resulting from splits, some of which have a certain influence, but most of which are very small organizations; and some small organizations in some of the West European countries.

(6) Groups and members in favor of the Chinese positions who still remain inside Communist parties controlled by pro-Moscow leaderships.

(7) Nuclei and cadres working in revolutionary movements in the colonial countries, particularly Africa.

Heterogeneity

The mere classification itself shows that the pro-Peking bloc, despite its relative homogeneity on the issues in the international dispute, is rather heterogeneous in composition. This is due in the first place to differences among the various parties, secondly to differentiations within each party, despite the facade of monolithic unity, and, most important of all, to the different objective roles played by the parties or groups in their own countries or in a sector of the international workers movement.

Among the parties in the people's democracies, the one in north Vietnam is both the most important and the most independent; different tendencies have always existed in it. It could not help but be critical of the attitude of the Soviet bureaucracy, especially during the summer of 1964. Thus it shares the Peking line to a considerable extent (even sometimes reaching more consistent theoretical conclusions with regard to uninterrupted revolution). But at the same time, it cannot reject aid which only the USSR is able to assure it; and on the other hand it is legitimately concerned that China should not gain too determining a weight in the country—hence its hesitation in asking for volunteers.

As for the Albanians, they are correctly considered to be the extreme Stalinist wing of the pro-Peking front, their outlook being determined by the background of the leading group and the forms through which they gained control of the party, by the absence of popular support and the isolation of the country in the European context. The refusal of the Hodja group to bow to the will of the Soviet bureaucracy constitutes the only real claim that can find favor in the eyes of the masses.

Among the Asian parties, the left-wing Indian CP represents a special case, particularly because of the existence of a pro-Moscow party in the same country

that presents a major political problem due not only to its influence among the masses but to the fact that differences within it were not at all ended by the split. Thanks to its mass base, especially in several areas of the country, to the capacity of some of its leaders, to its long continuity as a left wing (going back some years) and to its variegated composition (the centrist wing went with the left wing in the break), the left-wing Indian CP stands more as an ally than a partisan of Peking.

And the fact is that it has already shown its independence, even on the international issues in the dispute. As for its own line, it combines analyses and criticisms that are correct, by and large, on the nature of the state in India and the character of the politics of the Congress Party, with formulas that are in part mistaken, in part completely centrist (for example, in relation to the "democratic front of the people" and the "democratic state of the people.") The limits of the bloc between the centrists and the left within the left-wing CP were nevertheless manifested when the main centrist leader of the party, Nambudripad, came out in favor of defending India during the recent Indo-Pakistan war. He at once ran into resistance from the left elements in his own ranks.

The Japanese Communist Party is the only pro-Chinese party in an advanced capitalist country with a mass base. Its orientation thus has special significance as a test case. The fact that the party almost as a whole, including the great majority of its leaders and cadres and the entire national apparatus and local organizations, lined up with the Chinese constitutes in itself an indication that its politics in Japan has not changed fundamentally. In fact, the party has limited itself to supporting the Chinese leaders in their international polemics without translating this into the slightest move toward the left.

Such tests as the strikes in the spring of 1964 and again in 1965 revealed a deep opportunism and an orientation, expressed in the most recent documents (aside from the propagandistic proclamations of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, etc.), that is only a particular application of the well-known line centering on the struggle against American imperialism and not on an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggle. The main slogan is for a united front of all the so-called democratic forces for a coalition government, against the Moscow treaty, against revision of the constitution and for improvement of the standard of living of the masses.

The Indonesian Communist Party, which acquired its present physiognomy during prolonged struggles lasting up to the recent period, and which without doubt still has many internal differences, has been collaborating for some years up to the governmental level with the wing of the national bourgeoisie represented by Sukarno. Such a policy, in-

spired by the concept of a democratic stage of the revolution in which it will be necessary to collaborate with the so-called national bourgeoisie, has resulted in the party deliberately not trying to take advantage of the revolutionary crises that have flared up in the country. Instead it has sought to hold back the mass movement and to get it to retreat from certain positions already gained. It did this even before the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict, in agreement just as much with the Soviet leadership as the Chinese, both of which were eager to reach an alliance with Sukarno.

Indonesian Disaster

However, despite this opportunist line, the Indonesian masses, in the absence of an effective alternative organization, remained under the influence of the Communist Party which in 1965 had the broadest base in its history. This fact, coupled with an extreme tension in social relations (due to a precipitous decline in the standard of living caused primarily by worsening inflation and shortages) led inexorably to a test of strength between the Communist Party and the reactionary forces headed by the generals.

The leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party appear to have sensed this in their own way and to have shifted their line some months before the military coup d'etat. They called for the arming of the workers and peasants; they appealed to the masses to seize the plants. But such propaganda, unaccompanied by any genuine revolutionary anti-capitalist perspective and genuine organization of the masses for action, could only precipitate a violent reactionary move, against which the leadership of the Indonesian Communist Party could find no other solution than to support an attempted putsch by leftist officers.

Thus its rightist opportunism was complemented at the decisive moment by a left opportunism which was all the more disastrous when, even after the anti-Communist offensive of the generals was unleashed, the leadership of the Indonesian Communist Party refrained from calling upon the masses for an all-out reply and continued to bank on Sukarno although he was becoming an outright captive of the army. Overwhelmed by the repression, confronted with a choice between political suicide and a turn toward guerrilla warfare, the leading faction of the Indonesian Communist Party, at least those who survived the October 1965 disaster, seem to have chosen the latter alternative.

This choice was facilitated by the fact that parallel to its line of class collaboration, an opposite tendency existed in the ideology of the Indonesian CP. Some of its concepts are rather close to the Chinese concepts on the uninterrupted revolution; the Indonesian CP

constantly explained that the peasants are the fundamental revolutionary force, that even in the democratic revolution the leading role belongs to the workers and peasants, and that the formation of a government of the people's democracy type constituted its immediate aim.

But these contradictions were confined within a strategic line of "revolution by stages," within a policy of coalition with the national bourgeoisie headed by Sukarno. This led the Aidit leadership to put brakes on the mass movement, to hold the masses prisoner to "Nasakom" — the "national front" of the three main political groupings (the Sukarno nationalists, the Moslem Religious Teachers and the Communist Party). This paved the way to the bitter defeat suffered by the biggest Communist party in the capitalist world.

To promote its diplomatic maneuvers with the Sukarno government, Peking approved the opportunist policies of the Aidit group which were not essentially different from the line of the French and Italian Communist Parties condemned by Peking because of the support these parties give Moscow.

The crushing of the Indonesian Communist Party represents an even greater victory for imperialism and setback to the colonial revolution than the counterrevolutionary coup d'etat in Brazil in April 1964. Nevertheless this victory of the reactionary forces in Indonesia can turn out to be only provisional. In face of the mounting economic difficulties and the social unrest which these engender, the situation in Indonesia can take a new revolutionary turn in the relatively near future.

The struggle of the Indonesian masses will continue until the most conscious and critical Communist militants, united with the Indonesian Trotskyist cadres, forge a revolutionary party capable of leading the working class and peasantry upon the only road to victory — the road to the conquest of power.

Latin America

In Latin America the pro-Peking tendency remains very limited. Castroism is by far the most powerful catalyzer of the Communist and revolutionary left in this area of the world. Even in the case of Venezuela, if the Sino-Soviet conflict has had unquestionable influence and the Venezuelan left is more inclined to Peking's line rather than Moscow's, it is the Cuban revolution that has played the main role in its evolution toward armed struggle. As for the Pro-Peking Communist Party of Brazil, helped along by the extreme opportunism of the Prestes leadership, it was formed before the Sino-Soviet conflict broke into the open. Its influence remains very limited and its line on questions of such primary importance as the nature of the Brazilian revolution and the social forces

which should lead it is completely incorrect.

In Peru, the pro-Peking CP, while inspired by criticism of the rightist line of the old leadership, has not developed consistent revolutionary concepts, has shown Stalinist features and, despite a certain influence in the peasant area, is far from playing an important role in the workers and peasants movement of the country. In Bolivia the split is more recent and the differences are centered much more around national problems than international issues, the Peking faction appearing to have grown stronger in recent months. In other Latin-American countries, the pro-Peking groups are very small, often divided, and incapable of going beyond the domain of general propaganda for the Peking theses among narrow circles. The same holds for North America.

In Western Europe, too, the pro-Peking groups are primarily propagandistic without much to show in the way of gains. The Grippist CP in Belgium, the only one which had any base, has shown its sectarian traits and bureaucratic concepts in various fields. The failure to understand either the nature or need of a transition program has condemned the Grippists to oscillating between abstract proclamations of final aims and immediate demands that are insufficient in themselves to initiate a genuinely revolutionary action.

The resistance of the Chinese leaders to the de-Stalinization process has negative effects here as in many other fields. As part of the justification for their own bureaucratic internal regime, they uphold Stalin, even alienating the anti-bureaucratic currents among the masses in the Soviet Union and blocking an alliance with them against the Soviet bureaucracy on the basis of their own more militant international line.

Among the groups and parties supporting Peking as against Moscow the cost is even heavier. For some of them, it means political suicide to attempt to refurbish the image of Stalin. Something even more significant is involved. The fact that the Maoist leadership would deliberately seek to inject the poison of Stalinism into the minds of millions of youth—even if that is done with admissions about the "errors" of the despot who butchered Lenin's generation, and even if contradicted by advocacy of policies that are not Stalinist—says much about the kind of international movement that Peking is assembling together. It is dominated from its inception by bureaucratic concepts having nothing in common with respect for truth and independent-minded internationalism.

Pro-Moscow Tendencies

As many events during the past year have shown, particularly the polemics around the projected conference of Com-

munist parties, the publication of Togliatti's testament, the commentaries around the downfall of Khrushchev, and attitudes in face of the crisis over Vietnam, the Khrushchevist tendencies are still more differentiated and centrifugally inclined than the pro-Peking tendencies. At the present point the following broad list can be made of the forces that reject the Chinese theses in favor of the general concepts of the Soviet leadership:

(1) The majority of the parties in the European "people's democracies."

(2) Almost all the Communist parties of Western Europe.

(3) Some of the Asian parties, most of them weakened by splits, and some Latin-American parties, likewise affected by splits.

(4) Tendencies or groups either within parties where the majority is pro-Peking or expelled from such parties (Japan).

(5) Groups working in the revolutionary movements of the colonial and semicolonial countries.

Holding power in countries located between the Soviet Union and the capitalist states of Western Europe, still largely under Soviet domination in the economic as well as military field, the Communist parties in the people's democracies constitute the most solid rampart of the Khrushchevist tendency outside of the USSR, despite the considerable range between the absolutely conservative positions of the Bulgarian party and those of the Czech party, which is now coming close to some of the Yugoslav concepts.

If in youth circles, certain Chinese positions arouse some interest and sympathy, the Chinese attitude on "de-Stalinization" drives them away. Only if the Soviet bureaucracy were to make grave compromises with imperialism at the expense of a "people's democracy" would the Chinese have any serious chance to reverse the present relationship of forces, including those at the level of the ruling groups.

The main point is that the bureaucratic leaderships of the "people's democracies" and doubtless the cadres at different levels, too, are much less under the influence of the colonial revolution than their Asian homologues, and for a whole series of obvious reasons (geographical location, relationship of forces, etc.) rely essentially on the "Soviet shield" in their defense against imperialism. The problems that have given rise to tension, friction and conflicts are those connected with their own economic development and with economic relations in the COMECON, especially relations with the USSR (questions of prices, of the socialist division of labor, the tendency to widen relations with the advanced capitalist countries, etc.).

The existence of a workers state like China provides the leaderships of the "people's democracies" with greater room for maneuver and some aspects of the

Chinese arguments also find an audience (such as those exposing the Soviet contentions about socialist cooperation and those defending demands pertaining to less developed workers states). However, a possible evolution of a people's democracy away from the Soviet bureaucracy is much more likely at this stage to follow the "logic" of Yugoslavia than China.

The example of Rumania can be taken as typical. In 1964 this country stepped up its moves towards "independence," virtually making it official by not sending a Rumanian delegation to the Moscow conference. It is undeniable that at the root of Rumania's attitude are elements analogous to those in the Yugoslav affair. It was fundamentally problems of economic growth and economic relations with the USSR and the COMECON that pushed the Bucharest leaders, objectively favored and encouraged by the Sino-Soviet conflict, to back away and make overtures to the capitalist countries.

The Rumanian bureaucracy is thus trying to assure expansion of the economy in accordance with models which it considers best fit its own interests, without major concessions to the USSR or to the other COMECON countries. At the same time it wishes to exploit its "independence" in relation to the USSR—matching it with several measures of prudent liberalization—with the aim of improving its relation with the masses.

As for Yugoslavia, which is going through a new phase of rather considerable structural changes, it has not ceased to occupy a relatively autonomous and original place, being rather an ally than a genuinely integral part of the pro-Moscow tendency. This position has been concretized by a series of reforms and measures, especially in economic reorganization, which have converted the Yugoslav Communists in a certain sense into the very spearhead of both de-Stalinization and Khrushchevism.

The experiments with workers councils remain by far the most positive feature, whatever their limitations; and there is no doubt that the councils and certain measures aiming at counteracting bureaucratism are to be credited for the considerable rate of economic growth recently experienced by the country. However, this progress has been accompanied on the one hand by grave distortions in the economy and on the other hand by deepening social differentiations that have strengthened the bureaucratic layers.

By virtue of their economic links with the capitalist countries and their relations with the bourgeoisie of the third world and in accordance with the logic of an anti-revolutionary foreign policy already coming to the fore at the time of the Korean war, the Yugoslav Communists stand at the extreme right, appearing as an out-and-out opportunist current. Even during the recent period they

Italian Communist Party

continued to sow absurd illusions about the peaceful role of the UN, took impermissible attitudes against the Cuban revolutionists, and, finally, advanced proposals for "negotiations" at the time of the imperialist aggression in Vietnam.

There are signs that the Rumanians might follow their example even in this field. In the final analysis this is to be explained by the role of bureaucracies seeking to establish a policy of rule that is relatively moderate in relation to the masses and autonomous in relation to the Kremlin. They can hope for success in this course only if the international situation is relatively quiescent and does not call for immediate and difficult decisions.

The bureaucracies of the Communist parties in the advanced capitalist countries could react in only a negative way to Peking's positions as a whole. In a social and political context in which they are compelled to operate in most cases against powerful Social Democratic parties, Peking's theses on war, on the methods of anti-imperialist struggle, on the role of the colonial revolution were not very attractive. At the same time, particularly where they have a relatively broad base, these bureaucracies could not favor the Maoist attitude toward de-Stalinization.

But it was especially Peking's criticism on the "peaceful roads to socialism" and the Chinese defense of the Leninist concept of the state which the overwhelming majority of the Communist leaders of the West felt they necessarily had to reject. In fact, their rightist evolution goes back to the period of the popular fronts and the experience of collaboration with the bourgeoisie during the war and immediately afterward.

This, together with the ultrarightist impulse given by the Khrushchev theories at the Twentieth Congress and the supplementary pressures rising almost constantly during the sixties, led to a profound neo-reformist degeneration of the Communist parties. These parties have come to a reformist strategy that is fundamentally gradualist as a whole, which envisages as its strategic objective a social structure in which the monopolies are eliminated or limited and capitalism continues with its logic of profits and its basic economic laws, a strategy which affirms the possibility of a peaceful, democratic road to socialism and the conquest of the state apparatus from within, with the aim of gradually transforming it.

These bureaucracies seek alliances even with capitalist layers. What is involved is a series of common concepts which the Italians have expressed in the most clear and systematic way. Recently, during the presidential campaign, the French Communist Party took a new step toward neo-reformism by backing the "left" bourgeois candidate Mitterand, partisan of the Atlantic pact, as a variant to Moscow's policy of supporting de Gaulle.

The evolution of the Italian Communist Party remains significant not only because it concerns a party with a very big mass base in which de-Stalinization has gone much further than in any of the other parties, but also because tendencies have emerged or are emerging which will likely appear elsewhere and which have serious implications for the entire workers movement of the advanced capitalist countries.

If the Chinese arguments have not given rise to a big pro-Peking current up to now (the response being limited to old circles with nostalgic memories of the Stalinist period and to youth of little political education), the Sino-Soviet dispute itself has stimulated the maturing of broad layers of militants and cadres to a considerable degree and compelled the leaders themselves to develop the course they adopted at the time of the Twentieth Congress. Thus these leaders have now reached the point of renouncing monolithic concepts of the Communist movement, of considering internal conflicts or differences as normal, of accepting the idea that decisive victories over imperialism and even the overthrow of capitalist power can be won by non-Communist parties and leaderships, and of permitting political conflicts within the party to be expressed, including the presentation of different or opposing documents and the formation of temporary and unorganized tendencies.

The internal vicissitudes at the end of 1964, and the beginning of 1965, against the background of a certain evolution of the Italian situation, of growing difficulties for the party particularly in maintaining organized and stable ties with industrial workers, and the decline in authority caused by the death of Togliatti, have ended in much more marked differences than in any other period since the end of the twenties.

However, this evolution has been concretized in a more and more clearly marked opportunist line, which will have a tendency to persist and even to worsen, at least until a possible turn occurs in the objective situation in Italy and Western Europe and has gone along with a pronounced alteration of the party into an electoral formation incapable of assuring an active political life to the extensive sectors it influences. In fact, if the Italian CP has gone further than its sister parties in theoretically expressing neo-reformist concepts, the practical application of this line is objectively still further to the right, not being qualitatively different in the domestic field from the traditional activity of the big Social Democratic parties of worker composition.

In face of such concepts and concrete orientations, inspiring not only the apparatus but also wide layers of cadres and militants, the nuclei of the left are

only at the beginning of their battle, and for a long time they will not have much chance to counteract the rightist course. It should also be added that a right wing of the apparatus, represented at the level of the Secretariat, too, has expressed still more extreme ideas, going so far as to propose liquidating the party or diluting it in a united socialist organization.

Under the pressure of this right wing and certain events of the Italian labor movement, and in accordance with the logic itself of the general concepts accepted by the party, a very big majority of the Central Committee came out in June 1965 in favor of forming a new united socialist party on the basis of a political and ideological platform adapted to the needs of certain sectors of the Italian Socialist Party which have collaborated with Nenni up to the governmental level and which continue to reaffirm their positions favoring an alliance with the left center in principle.

In Italy a phenomenon is openly visible that is less clear but nonetheless present in the other Communist parties outside the workers states and which is profoundly affecting their structure and even character. In Stalin's time, the line of the Communist parties was determined mainly by the needs of the policies of the Soviet bureaucracy, while the needs of the mass movement in each country and the needs of the "national" bureaucracy played an absolutely secondary role. Today the tendency is to reverse the order, and in the Italian case this has already been achieved while it is only beginning in France.

The demands of the indigenous bureaucracy—often "embarrassed" by the decisions and turns of the Soviet bureaucracy, and driven by the nature of its domestic strategy to present itself as independent from any state or party guide—are becoming more and more preponderant. Despite everything, the complete "Social-Democratizing" of the Communist parties should prove to be difficult—even the Italian Communist Party continues to be fundamentally linked, if only by ties of a bureaucratic nature, to the workers states and the anti-capitalist camp—because of the fact that these parties are operating in a world context constantly upset by revolutionary crises that tend to counteract the social and political pressure of the bourgeoisie.

Among almost all the countries of Latin America, the Communist parties have less chance than ever to play a decisive role in the revolutionary rise of the masses (the exceptional case of Venezuela has already been mentioned). The development of Castroism together with the Sino-Soviet conflict have further weakened them, condemning them to repeated crises. The Chilean CP itself, the only one still having broad mass influence, under the combined circumstances of a setback to its platform of a "peaceful" road to socialism, the

pressure of the Cuban experience and the guerrilla struggle in several countries of the continent, was finally caught up in internal conflicts and grave crises, which will ultimately prove decisive for the reorganization and reorientation of the Chilean labor movement.

A complete panorama of the Communist party movement should also include sectors that have given up an autonomous existence in recent years, both organizational and political, in order to integrate themselves in mass movements of non-Communist origin. The policy of dissolution has involved parties of mainly rightist and pro-Moscow orientation up to now.

In the case of Cuba, the entry into the united party under Castroist leadership was objectively correct because it was a question of a revolutionary leadership to be supported and strengthened in the Marxist direction in which it was evolving. (The correctness of this decision was however counteracted by the policies practiced by the leading cadres of the former Partido Socialista Popular after the unification which played in with the tendency toward crystallization of a hardened bureaucracy.) In the case of Algeria, the tactic of seeking integration in the Front de Liberation Nationale was also correct, but what was involved in the case of the Algerian CP was a deeply opportunist outlook that signified complete political and ideological liquidation. This holds all the more so in the case of the Egyptian CP.

Castroism

By participating in the last Moscow conference, the Cuban Partido Unido de la Revolucion Socialista (now the Communist Party of Cuba) was virtually officially included in the Communist party movement. Despite the independent attitude of the delegation, a concession to the Soviet leadership was clearly involved, since parties with a pro-Moscow orientation criticized the initiative and the Rumanian Party even stayed away.

The attitude of the Fidelista leadership with regard to the Sino-Soviet conflict has been confirmed since the conference. Inasmuch as the ideological dispute, carried to bitter extremes by graduates of the school of Stalinism, weakens the anti-imperialist front—as the events in Vietnam have demonstrated—a leadership in the position most exposed to American imperialism could not help but deplore this conflict.

The desire of the Cubans to avoid becoming deeply engaged in the dispute is understandable and they have not hidden their negative reaction to the pressures to which they have been subjected. The Cubans are compelled to bear in mind that in the economic and military field, the USSR is objectively in a much better position to aid them than China. In addition, as against the Chi-

nese arguments about the role of imperialism and the opportunism of the Communist parties, the Cubans have had to weigh their attitude toward de-Stalinization and their sectarianism with regard to Cuban appeals for a united front against imperialism.

In any case, the essential fact remains that the choice of sides in the Sino-Soviet conflict remains secondary for the Cubans. They constitute an autonomous and fundamentally revolutionary current of the Communist movement owing ideological allegiance to neither Peking nor Moscow. They have proved this in all the fields that are decisive in characterizing a revolutionary tendency—in their struggle against bureaucratic deformations and their equalitarian spirit in building socialism, in showing the Latin-American peoples the road to consistent revolutionary struggle without compromising with the so-called national bourgeoisie, in explaining that only the constant creation of revolutionary centers in all corners of the globe can block imperialism and only an energetic reply can compel them to retreat, and finally in projecting original organizational forms, aiming at preventing the revolutionary party from becoming an instrument of bureaucrats and careerists of all stripes and losing vital contact with the masses of workers and peasants.

The imperialists have not remained neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The extension of the conflict from an inter-party to an intergovernmental level greatly weakened the cohesiveness of the front of the workers states and the imperialists have sought to take full advantage of this in various areas (putting Tshombe in power in the Congo, escalating the war in Vietnam, invading the Dominican Republic). At the same time, the imperialist powers and their agents, such as the Social Democratic leaders in Europe, have clearly shown their preference for Moscow as against Peking.

This attitude is not due to the Chinese position on nuclear war. The American imperialists in fact pay little attention to Peking's theories discounting the importance of nuclear arms, whereas they study with the utmost attention the growth of Moscow's stockpile both quantitatively and qualitatively. The American imperialists favor Moscow in the Sino-Soviet conflict because they understand very well that the Soviet bureaucracy seeks a deal with imperialism to maintain the status quo. While Moscow seeks to put a brake on revolutionary struggles, a conservative attitude that meets with approval in the imperialist camp, some of the theses advocated by Peking tend to stimulate revolutionary struggles, particularly in the colonial world. A victory of the Chinese position in a Communist party signifies a much more hostile attitude toward imperialism and its "national" allies (e.g., India), while a victory for Moscow's theses fosters an ultra-opportunist policy, if not

the liquidation pure and simple of the Communist movement.

The imperialists are aware at the same time that one of the results of the conflict is a "revolutionary rivalry" in certain countries which can even go so far as to impel the Kremlin to tolerate parties under its control moving toward the left, particularly with regard to the colonial revolution, in order to avoid a complete loss of influence. This has occurred in certain countries in Latin America where the effects of the Sino-Soviet conflict have combined with Castroism.

Washington is more and more brazenly intervening on a world scale in the affairs of other countries in its efforts to beat back every new revolutionary advance. One of the cornerstones of this policy is continuation of the understanding with the Soviet bureaucracy to maintain the status quo (the imperialist version of the theory of "peaceful coexistence"). Thus, Washington hailed the Moscow treaty to partially halt nuclear tests as a big strategic success. It has every reason to continue this policy and to seek to counter any tendency in Moscow to concede to the pressure from Peking for a firmer anti-imperialist attitude.

On the other hand, Washington continues to single out Peking as the main enemy in the anti-capitalist camp. From the beginning it sought to isolate the Chinese revolution and to weaken it through an economic and diplomatic blockade which included barring its entry to the United Nations. This policy has now reached the point of direct counterrevolutionary intervention. The Pentagon is openly debating whether or not to launch a nuclear war on China, hitting first of all at the centers where China has succeeded in establishing the beginnings of a nuclear industry.

It is beyond question that world imperialism considers China to be the principal source of danger to its system today—the principal source stimulating revolutions in other countries in the colonial world, and a potential force that in a few decades can utterly and irretrievably destroy Wall Street's dream of dominating the globe. This hardened opinion cannot be explained by the hypothesis that the imperialists as a whole are mistaken about their own class interests. In the final analysis even de Gaulle recognizes Peking not in order to strengthen the Chinese revolution but in order to put France in a better bargaining position with the Kremlin in the common game of blocking the advance of the revolutionary process on a world scale.

The Ultimate Gainer

The Fourth International has stressed many times that fundamentally the Sino-Soviet conflict involves two bureaucracies. But revolutionary Marxists never limit themselves to bare characterizations like

this which cannot solve the problem of what specific attitude to take in each concrete case. They have never identified the workers states or the Communist parties with the bureaucracies heading them; nor have they viewed the bureaucracy as nothing but a single reactionary mass without internal distinctions.

On the contrary, they have tried in each concrete case to determine wherein the bureaucrats are only defending their own reactionary caste interests and wherein they are compelled by their own social position to defend at the same time—in their own way—the acquisitions of a revolution. Similarly they have explained the stratification of the bureaucracy and how conflicts can arise between different layers under the pressure of conflicting objective factors and clashing social forces.

Transitional Program

For instance, the Transitional Program, written by Trotsky in 1938, pointed out the various currents in the bureaucracy and indicated that the Fourth International would not remain neutral or indifferent to the outcome of a struggle between a Butenko and Reiss faction. In 1948, while not forgetting the real nature of the Yugoslav leadership, the Fourth International advocated defending the Yugoslav CP and the Yugoslav revolution against the attacks and campaign of slander mounted by Stalin and the parties of the Cominform and their blockade of Yugoslavia and threats of military intervention. In 1953 in East Berlin and in 1956 in Hungary and Poland, the world Trotskyist movement noted again that in face of an open and dramatic break between the masses and a bureaucratized party, the layers of bureaucrats closest to the workers lined up on the side of the masses.

The attitude of the world Trotskyist movement in relation to the Sino-Soviet conflict flows from the same logic. It supports the Chinese Communists in their defense of the Chinese revolution and the People's Republic of China against the economic blockade mounted by the Kremlin and against the military aid granted by the Kremlin to the Indian bourgeoisie. It supports the Chinese Communists in their struggle against the Khrushchevist concept of conjuring away the danger of imperialist war through "peaceful coexistence," and their attitude toward the colonial revolution, and their criticism of the neo-reformist orientations of most of the Communist parties.

This does not imply that the Fourth International soft-peddles or remains silent about the other positions held by the Chinese Communists in their international polemic. Nor does it imply in any way giving automatic support to any pro-Peking party or group, whose policies in a given situation can prove to be harmful despite formal adherence

to the criticisms of Khrushchevism made by the Chinese leaders.

The attitude of the world Trotskyist movement in the Sino-Soviet conflict involves something more than supporting the valid criticisms of the Chinese Communists and standing on their side in defending the Chinese revolution. In reality the Sino-Soviet conflict represents but one of the aspects of the breakup of Stalinist monolithism, the revival of the world revolutionary Marxist movement on a mass scale, and the construction of a new revolutionary leadership. The Fourth International has intervened in the Sino-Soviet conflict from the beginning under its own banner, with its own independent line on all the major questions, with its own program to offer Communist militants seeking the road to a socialist victory in their own country and on an international scale.

Both the Kremlin and the Peking bureaucracies recognize in their own way that their dispute raises the spectre of Trotskyism in the workers states, not to mention the Communist parties in the capitalist countries. That is why each of the bureaucracies accuses the other of playing into the hands of Trotskyism, or even adopting objectively "Trotskyist" positions. As proof they have gone so far as to cite Trotskyist documents, particularly those adopted at the Reunification Congress of the Fourth International in 1963.

"Trotskyist Danger"

Moscow accuses Peking of advancing the Trotskyist theory of the permanent revolution and the Trotskyist criticism of the bureaucratic degeneration of the USSR, citing in support of this quotations from the Trotskyist documents giving critical support to the Chinese positions on these points. In the same way, Peking accuses Moscow of rehabilitating Trotsky through its denunciation of Stalin's crimes and its campaign for de-Stalinization, citing in support of this extracts from Trotskyist documents giving critical support to the accomplishments of the Twentieth and Twenty-second congresses of the CPSU with regard to de-Stalinization. Both bureaucracies, in fact, accuse the other of "playing into the hands" of Trotskyism—which, as they well know stands against any kind of bureaucratic rule.

Both bureaucracies have an infallible instinct when it comes to smelling out the "Trotskyist danger." Although the rift in Soviet-Chinese relations has had injurious effects upon the solidarity of the workers states against imperialism, the world working class stands to gain from clarification of the issues in dispute. The movement for the Fourth International gains from the radicalization of the revolutionary struggle in the semi-colonial countries and the strengthened tendency against "socialism in one country" stimulated by Peking.

It gains from the tendency toward de-

Stalinization stimulated by Khrushchev and his heirs. Both currents, in the final analysis, only express the fundamental change in objective conditions which gave rise to the Stalinist bureaucracy and its triumph in the USSR and the world Communist movement—the defeats suffered by the world revolution that ended in the isolation of the first workers state in an economically and culturally backward country. Objective conditions today are moving in the opposite direction—in favor of the rebirth of a world-wide revolutionary movement independent from any ruling bureaucracy, a movement that will tie in with the struggle for proletarian democracy in the workers states.

Conclusion

The Fourth International holds that the Sino-Soviet conflict is carrying the world crisis of Stalinism toward a climax. It has opened a period of profound reorientation and reorganization of the Communist movement as a whole. As part of this immense process, sectors of the bureaucracy, as the Sino-Soviet conflict has revealed, can take attitudes that objectively favor the revolutionary struggle of the masses and the revival of the workers movement. This must be recognized and utilized by revolutionary Marxists. But the limitations of this process must also be recognized.

The deeply conservative interests of a bureaucracy as a social layer bar it from accepting revolutionary Marxism, from engaging in the field of revolutionary struggle and thus from any capacity to solve the problem of creating a revolutionary leadership. This is shown in a rather spectacular way by the tendency toward "polycentrism" that has been fostered by the Sino-Soviet dispute among the partisans of both Moscow and Peking. For while polycentrism has favored development of the debate, its logical direction is toward the fragmentation of the Communist movement and the very opposite of an international revolutionary Marxist movement based on democratic centralism.

Consequently the Fourth International entertains no illusions about the possibility of any bureaucratic leadership whatever being able to carry out the fundamental historic tasks of constructing a genuine socialist democracy in the workers states, of crossing over from colonial revolutions into socialist revolutions, of overthrowing capitalism in the industrially advanced capitalist countries, the only road offering humanity escape from a nuclear holocaust. These tasks can be carried out only by revolutionary leaderships able to lead mass movements and to translate the revolutionary program of Marxism into reality. The participation of the Fourth International in the Sino-Soviet conflict aims at helping to solve this key problem of our times.

...Letters

(Continued from Page 34)

conomic orthodoxies I think most harmful to a humane, efficient, and expanding international socialism.

With very best wishes for your future work,

Fraternally yours,

John McCormack
Toronto
November 23, 1965

Reply:

The operations of "market laws" allow "supply and demand" to balance — *after the fact*. This is obviously preferable to crude rule-of-the-thumb "balancing," or to extreme scarcity and extreme sacrifices imposed upon consumers by universal rationing dictated by the authorities.

However, socialists have long known that this after-the-fact balancing of "supply and demand" has many deficiencies, and quite a few liberals agree with them.

First of all, the "market laws" do not balance "supply" and *human*, physical and psychological demand; they only balance "supply" and *effective* demand, that is, disposable purchasing power. In a society still characterized by great inequality of income and by very low basic incomes for the millions of citizens, "market laws" simply substitute one type of rationing ("rationing through the purse") for another.

In the second place, after-the-fact balancing through "supply and demand" involves great waste, periodic destruction of goods and equipment (not to speak of periodic and permanent unemployment).

In the third place, with the tremendous international inequalities of income between nations, laws of "supply and demand" are unable to induce any rapid process of industrialization in the underdeveloped world countries, without which these countries can overcome neither poverty nor huge under-employment, nor backwardness. It is precisely through an application of

the "law of supply and demand" on the scale of the world market that the underdeveloped countries have been "specialized" in the production and export of primary products, and have thus been trapped in monoproduction and dismal poverty.

In the fourth place, the richer a country becomes, the more basic physical needs can be satisfied by existing resources, and the more "market laws" become absurd, because by their very nature they are rational under conditions of scarcity.

For all these reasons socialists prefer to have "supply and demand" balanced *beforehand* and not afterwards, through conscious prior allocation of resources and not through blind operation of "market laws."

Here are three examples:

1. Surely Mr. McCormack will agree that it would be nothing less than scandalous to have the distribution of medical services, pharmaceutical products and access to higher education "rationed" in a socialist country through the contents of the citizen's purse! Even in capitalist countries socialists generally stand for free medicine and free education (and a few left socialist parties in Western Europe already call for a "national housing service," in analogy to a national health service).

But what else does this mean but the elimination of any "market law" determining the balance of supply and demand in these fields? The demands are established first, on a physical basis, in as scientific a way as possible; and the necessary resources are then detached from the national income to make possible the satisfaction of these needs (either immediately, or within a certain number of years).

This is the substitution of the socialist principle of production according to needs for the capitalist principle of production according to profit.

2. In Western Europe, we have witnessed for several years the so-called eggs cycle, which is quite similar to the famous "hog cycle" in North America, but much more wasteful. Every 18 months, hens

are slaughtered by the hundreds of thousands because the prices of eggs have fallen too much. The slaughter of the hens causes a shortage in the eggs, prices start to rise (as much as two or three times as high as they were at the beginning of the cycle!). This rise in prices induces chicken farmers to increase the number of egg-laying hens they keep. Egg production is greatly increased, and eventually there comes a new glut, prices crash, and the cycle starts all over again.

Now Mr. McCormack will probably also agree that in any advanced country the predictable consumption of eggs during a year could be easily established with great accuracy. The consumption of the previous year is known. Long-term series give near-exact income elasticity formulas. It is sufficient to combine these figures—established on the predicted annual increase in *per capita* income in the various income groups—with the increase in population to get a fairly accurate estimate of the annual rise in egg production necessary and sufficient to balance "supply and demand"—before the fact.

If one would object that the annual rise in *per capita* income cannot be foreseen exactly in a country like the Soviet Union, it can be replied that what would be involved here are possible mistakes of one or two per cent, which can easily be taken care of by allowing inventories to fluctuate. But the "balancing" by "market laws" the like of which we now suffer in Western Europe involves annual "mistakes" and "waste" on the order of 20 to 30 per cent, which cost the community and the consumers in the long run in the millions of dollars. Surely the pre-planned balance would be largely preferable!

3. When a new type of equipment is invented, which enables the community to economize thousands of working hours, it would be obviously irrational in a socialist economy to let "market laws" determine the price of equipment. As it is rare and its producers enjoy actual monopoly, prices would tend to go up to the point where the introduction of the new equipment

would only be marginally economical, and only for the richest producing units (those which could pay the highest prices).

Surely from the point of view of the economy taken as a whole, it would be much more rational to sell this new equipment as cheaply as possible (even to the point of subsidizing the plants which manufacture it), so as to enable the maximum number of producing units to introduce the maximum number of pieces of equipment of that type as quickly as possible.

In other words: It is simply not true that "whatever is profitable for one plant is also profitable for the economy as a whole" (or that social profitability is but the sum total of the profits of all the units). The economy is an organic unit of its own, where higher overall profitability can very well result from deliberate losses imposed upon certain plants.

All these examples are only given to show that a socialized economy cannot consider that regulation of the economy through these laws is an ideal objective to be reached. It must, on the contrary, assume that it should try to substitute as much planned balancing for after-the-fact balancing as is economically rational, given a certain level of development of the productive forces. This is what is meant by "the principle of planning." This principle finds itself in a dialectical combination of struggle against, and coexistence with, the "market principle" during the whole period of transition from capitalism to socialism.

Why can't the principle of planned balancing of supply and demand become generalized? Obviously because of the still existing scarcity of resources. Withering away of commodity production and "market laws" cannot be "commanded" by authority; it depends upon relative abundance of resources, or physical saturation of needs which is only another way of stating the same idea.

This is why consumer goods will generally remain commodities during the transition period (which does not imply at all, however, that their prices should necessarily be established by "market laws" and by

"rationing of the purse"). But, the more productive forces grow, the more goods and services are characterized by inelastic demand, or even decline of demand, given a growing income, the more the principle of distribution according to needs can be extended to new categories of needs. However, as long as relative scarcity reigns in many fields, a certain amount of "market economy" must still be integrated with the "planning principle."

Mr. McCormack is afraid that some "party," or "central committee," or "political executive" will dictate the "needs," which the "principle of planning" balances beforehand with existing resources. This fear is a logical reaction to the experience of Stalinism—and even to the political regime presently existing in the Soviet Union.

But Mr. McCormack certainly cannot have missed the point of what he calls our "motherhood slogans": workers self-management, true proletarian democracy, etc. What else do these mean but a determination *by the majority of the people, freely expressing itself*, of the priority of goals of economic development, of the needs which must have priority for being covered *from the start* by existing resources, of the goods and services which must be distributed according to needs?

Even in bourgeois democracy, Britain and Saskatchewan have voted for a free health service without causing a collapse of the economy.

Why couldn't one visualize the mass of the toiling people in any socialized country based upon proletarian democracy, determining through free discussion, a free press, a free vote and free choice between various alternative plans, the exact amount of sacrifices it is ready to undergo as consumers, and the forms of sacrifices it refuses to accept here and now?

And isn't it obvious that this conscious selection of planning goals by the mass of the people, under conditions of socialist democracy, is much more democratic, much more rational, much less wasteful and much less oppressive than *both* the systems of resource allocations through the tyranny of market laws under monopoly capitalism (which implies "rationing through the purse," huge waste and huge injustice), *and* resource allocation through an allegedly omniscient bureaucratic Planning Board, freed both from control by the workers and control by the market?

This is why the present reforms of the Soviet economy, while they substitute some operations of the market for some operations of the Planning Boards, without going in the direction of workers self-management or proletarian democracy, do not solve the difficulties and contradictions of that economy, but only substitute one type of contradiction for another.

E. Germain

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