

# Fourth International

## **U. S. and World Crisis**

•

**War, Peace and Revolution**

**China: A World Power**

**The Third Chinese Revolution--II**

**America Enters Its Social Crisis**

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## **IN MEMORY OF LENIN**

*Two Articles by Leon Trotsky*

*January-February 1951*

*25c*

## Manager's Column

The "American Labor Leaders" issue met with acclaim among our readers in trade unions. Literature Agent **Howard Mason**, for example, writes: "This latest FI is an excellent edition, especially for us here in Detroit. We decided to recommend a campaign based around it. There is, apparently, all the enthusiasm over the issue that could be hoped for and general appreciation of the presentation of the material in personal form, for it is far more attractive that way than it otherwise would be. Main emphasis will be placed on sales of single copies, for the virtue of the issue is that it doesn't require any broad political understanding to benefit from it."

The Detroit comrades hope to equal their previous all-time record of sales of the FI. To start the ball rolling they ordered 155 extra copies. Within a few weeks Howard wrote again that the campaign was doing well. "So far as individual scores go, by far the most outstanding success has been that of the youth comrades, selling on and around the Wayne campus, but the bulk of our sales have been to shopmates."

**Buffalo** likewise ordered additional copies of this FI. "I can't tell you how pleased we were to see this issue on the American trade union leaders," Literature Agent **Dick Gregor** comments. "It is very helpful to us in carrying our ideas to the advanced sections of workers and students. We expect it to find its way into the hands of more workers than any previous one we have distributed in several years."

A group of readers in the South, ordering extra copies, congratulated the editorial staff: "We were all very much impressed with this issue which we find is an excellent educational medium for our valued trade union friends..."

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**S.B.M.** of **Howrah, India**, thinks that the September-October "Asia in Revolt" issue "is one of the best numbers. Our library members highly appreciated this issue. We want more such articles on Asian questions and the program of the Asian Trotskyists."

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We frequently receive requests from workers in colonial lands for a subscription to the FI. Due to their poverty, to the high exchange rates, and in some cases government regulations prohibiting them from sending money out of the country, it's a difficult problem for them to pay for the subscription. Here's a typical plea from a town in India:

"We set up a club here and through this club we propaganda for Trotskyism. But we feel the need for a FI, because

the current articles of FI are very needful for us. So, if you send us a copy of FI, then after a few months maybe we can send you some money by installment. We hope that you send us same."

If any of our readers have a few dollars they would like to get some real value out of in these inflationary days, we suggest you invest in a subscription to the FI for a worker in a colonial country. Send us your contribution and we will do the rest.

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Besides requests for subscriptions to the FI we also get requests for books. A group in **Calcutta, India**, for instance, which was formed to study cultural problems, hopes to develop into "full-fledged Trotskyists." Telling us how much they appreciate the FI, they mention that a copy of **Literature and Revolution** by **Leon Trotsky** is "badly needed, as there is only one copy in the National Library."

If any of our readers has an extra copy of this rare book which he would like to donate to the study circle in **Calcutta** we shall be glad to forward it.

How great the need is for socialist literature in colonial lands is well illustrated by the following extract from a request from **R.S.B.** of **Ceylon** for books: "You must be thinking I am a nuisance; making all these requests with such rapidity. As an explanation I may mention that many of the books we could read in illegality six to seven years ago were handwritten copies. I still have handwritten copies of **Trotsky's Lessons of October** and even **Problems of the Chinese Revolution**. I spent three years in the movement without being able to read either **I Stake My Life!** or **Trotsky's Copenhagen speech**. None of the younger comrades here have read or even seen a copy of **Germany the Only Road or Germany, What Next?** So we have made a sort of vow that the newer members and those still to come to the banner of Trotskyism should be better off than we were."

Just to keep the record straight, we should add that despite their poverty, the Trotskyists in **India** and **Ceylon** have managed to reprint a number of out-of-print works of **Leon Trotsky**. Among them are **Marxism and Science**, **G.V. Plekhanov, The Lesson of Spain — The Last Warning! Whither Europe?** and **Permanent Revolution**. By making these rare items again available (they are obtainable from **Pioneer Publishers**), the revolutionary socialists of **India** and **Ceylon** have performed a most valuable service not only for workers in the backward colonial areas but also for those in the highly-developed countries.

# FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

VOLUME XII

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NUMBER 1

## Korea Opens a New Epoch:

# America Enters Its Social Crisis

By **ROBERT LANE**

President Truman's proclamation of a state of National Emergency signals America's entry into the social crisis from which it alone of all the capitalist countries had thus far escaped. The fatal step of placing American economy on a war footing and transforming the nation into an armed camp has been taken with the bluster and arrogance typical of the American plutocracy. But the pose can scarcely hide the reality: the gnawing feeling of uncertainty, the sense of impending disaster which pervades the ruling class. Beyond these feverish military preparations lies a catastrophic cycle of wars and revolutions that may well propel the mightiest imperialist power to its doom.

The metamorphosis of the world position of American imperialism within a brief five years is literally breathtaking, but characteristic of the rocket-like speed of the historic process in our epoch.

U.S. imperialism emerged from World War II the dominant capitalist power in the world. Its economy flourished with expanded productive capacity and a rising national income while its capitalist rivals in both camps were prostrated by the war, bankrupted by the huge expenditures of labor and capital required, ruined by monstrous destruction. While the rest of the world lay in mortal crisis America prospered, partly because of that crisis and partly at its expense.

Yet the world crisis could no more be ignored than an epidemic in the slums, which, left unchecked, must eventually penetrate even into the exclusive and remote habitats of the rich. For five years U.S. capitalism has been engaged in the most prodigious of rescue operations. Billions of American dollars have been injected like blood-plasma into the ailing capitalist system on both continents. With each succeeding year the enormity of the task grew instead of diminishing, until today America itself is being drawn into the vortex of the world crisis with the end further from view than ever.

### **Problems Overwhelming U.S. Imperialism**

The problem, no longer permitting of ambiguities, is now posed in all its terrifying scope: U.S. capitalism must abandon the profits and privileges of its insular position and domestic markets, it must commit all its accumulated reserves in an unpredictable military venture on a global scale and, in complete defiance of the most treasured tradi-

tions and sentiments of the people, it must convert the nation literally overnight into a garrison state, it must strain its productive capacity and manpower to the breaking point. With what end? Who of America's rulers, in the privacy of his own thoughts, excludes the possibility that U.S. capitalism will perish in the attempt?

Only the most restricted section of America's rulers understood the problem in these cataclysmic terms, and of these there were few who were ready to face the reality squarely. Bernard Baruch, multi-millionaire and evil genius of two world wars, stood alone like a prophet of doom with his grim warnings and demands for the immediate regimentation of American life. The American bourgeoisie was too fat, too sated with super-profits to listen, let alone to understand, and in any case unprepared by its whole past to cope with a problem of such magnitude. They cursed Roosevelt for Yalta, Truman for Potsdam and the "politicians" for being intimidated by the irrepressible demand of the American soldiers (echoed today in Korea and throughout the land to "Bring the GI's home!") to demobilize the armed forces after the victory over Germany and Japan. In the last resort there was always the smug consolation that the Almighty Dollar would take care of all their troubles; it always had in the past, why not now when American currency was in greater demand than ever before?

### **The Kennan Plan in Ruins**

Putting aside the reality like a bad dream, the ruling circles nevertheless could not evade the need for a global strategy, a long-range plan to take the place of daily improvisations. Since the end of the war, American foreign policy has been dominated by the conceptions of the young "wizard" of the State Department, George Kennan. "Communism," he believed, could be contained within its orbit, and eventually pushed back behind its Russian frontiers, there to be destroyed from within through aid from abroad. This was based on the one-sided premise that the Soviet bureaucracy feared war above all else, that it was despised by its own subjects who, with real encouragement from a powerful foreign force would settle their accounts with the Kremlin and open the gates of the Soviet Union once again to the flow of foreign capital. Therein was its fundamental fallacy, though not the only one. All that was needed,

according to Kennan, was to infuse economic and military strength into the capitalist world, so that it could become a mighty bastion from which to operate, to resist by force any encroachments on the periphery of the two worlds and even to take "calculated risks" to divest the Russians of control they already had.

Kennan's strategy received official sanction in the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and was implemented by the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Pact. For a time it appeared to be successful: in Iran, in Turkey, in the air-lift over Berlin, in the civil war in Greece and in the establishment of a certain equilibrium in the economy of Western Europe. In reality, compared to the task to be accomplished, these were minor victories, but they inflated the self-confidence of the American bourgeoisie. Everything was for the best in the best of all possible worlds. The ECA absorbed surpluses and created bigger markets, the armaments program took up the slack in production, and all the while profits kept rolling in, seemingly in an unending stream. The strategy had supplementary benefits at home in silencing opposition and protest and in intimidating the trade unions. In a moment of doubt, the American bourgeois could always comfort himself with the thought that if the U.S. was no longer the sole possessor of the A-Bomb at least it had better facilities to manufacture them faster and in greater number than the Russians.

This illusion received its first fillip from reality when the North Koreans crossed the 38th Parallel last June 25. And it finally died a bloody death on the banks of the Yalu. There in the frozen wastes and mountain passes near the Manchurian border lie the ruins not only of the only army U.S. imperialism possessed, not only of the reputation of its most touted general, not only of the prowess of American arms based on the last word in modern technology, but above all of Kennan's carefully elaborated world strategy and with it the Truman Doctrine. It is especially this latter aspect that has turned defeat in a small, isolated theater of war into a major disaster.

### Two Basic Reasons for the Quandary

The defeat has baffled and disoriented America's rulers, creating among them what Walter Lippman terms a "crisis of confidence" which has also gripped their capitalist allies in Europe who have added truculence and suspicion to lack of faith. What went wrong? What will happen now? Which way shall we turn? To Europe? To Asia? Will Stalin unleash the war now? Is there still time to prepare? The questions crowd on one another like a nightmare.

One examines the bourgeois press in vain for a serious political analysis of the causes of the debacle in Korea. A whole variety of reasons are given: Acheson's policy caught the country unprepared for a major engagement. MacArthur is responsible, he committed every military boner in the book. Truman should not have allowed us to become involved in such a hazardous conflict on the tip of the hostile Asiatic mainland. The Russians tricked us into a war where they could stand by as spectators while their North Korean and Chinese pawns did the fighting for them. These answers are all superficial, dealing only with effects;

they skirt but never probe the two basic reasons for the defeat.

First: What MacArthur encountered in Korea was not Kennan's conception of Stalin's tyrannical but frightened Politburo but a torrent of social revolution which is sweeping his armies into the sea. MacArthur was misled by the Kremlin's failure to provide adequate equipment to the North Koreans when victory was in their grasp on the Pusan beachhead last summer. This appeared to vindicate the thesis that, once faced with a stronger military adversary who would not hesitate before any risk, the Kremlin would abandon its puppets and retire from the scene.

Thus fortified in his megalomaniac notion that history is made by masters moving masses like pawns on a chessboard, MacArthur, despite innumerable warnings, gaily marched his army, with Christmas carols running through their heads, to the Manchurian frontier. There he was to discover, at the expense of his soldier victims, that if he could dare ignore the revolution in North Korea, the mighty anti-imperialist Chinese revolution did not choose to ignore MacArthur. He was to discover that if the Soviet bureaucracy could be forced to retreat in panic before the threat of war, the million-headed masses of China were determined to settle accounts with their imperialist enemies regardless of consequences. (To be sure MacArthur discovered much but understood little. He gives the palm of battle to the camel which, in the hands of these revolutionary Chinese, proved a mightier engine of war, he opined, than all his super-tanks and jet-propelled planes.)

The thundering lesson of Korea for the imperialists is that they confront not merely the Kremlin and the Soviet army but a revolutionary tide that is rising irresistibly throughout Asia and will eventually sweep all the continents. The Soviet bureaucracy may try to exploit this upsurge for its own ends, but it can no longer command, manipulate and betray it as in the past. Native Stalinist leaderships, like those in China and Korea, are far more sensitive to the pressure of their own revolutionary masses than to that of the Kremlin with whom they tend to maneuver as independent powers.

*The decisive military facts of the next war are to be found not in charts and tables at the Pentagon but in the alignment of social forces in Asia, and in the conclusions to be drawn therefrom for Europe. This is the lesson of Korea that Washington dare not face.*

Second: The defeat in Korea was due to an error, if you wish to call it that, which flowed in reality from an insoluble problem of global strategy. If Hitler's downfall from a military point of view was due in part to having to fight on two fronts in Europe, then how much greater is the dilemma of the Pentagon which must face adversaries in two remote and opposite parts of the world, both in Europe and in Asia! For five years Washington juggled with this problem but the trick could not be mastered because, in fact, it cannot be mastered.

### Unwanted Reversal of Policy

At the war's end U.S. imperialism, with the Kremlin's aid was engaged in putting out the fires of revolution both in Europe and in Asia. But after two years of fruitless,

but fabulously expensive attempts to bolster up the hopelessly corrupt Chiang Kai-shek regime, it was Marshall himself who authored the strategy of building a bulwark in Western Europe without regard to losses in Asia. Life did not permit the strict enforcement of this decision and, despite itself, American imperialism was constantly drawn back to the Orient. Mao's victory in 1949 had to be considered an ultimate threat to Formosa, Japan and the Philippines. The French were hopelessly enmeshed in a colonial struggle in Indo-China, compromising the position of France internally and threatening the loss of another imperialist base in Asia. With all these modifications, the decision to give Europe first preference remained the guiding line of the State Department until the outbreak of the war in Korea.

Then suddenly and without plan America became committed up to its neck in Asia — this after three years of abandoning Asia for Europe! It is quite possible, of course, that in their blind ignorance of the dynamics of class forces Truman and his advisors really conceived the action in Korea as a "police action" that would be quickly finished, that would teach the Russians an unforgettable lesson, that would enhance the confidence of West European capitalism in their American protector. But before many months had passed, the best part of America's military establishment was committed to Asia, where an embroilment had been considered most unfavorable, while Europe, deliberately chosen as the best bastion, remained completely defenseless. Had Stalin been the dynamic "imperialist" depicted by the frightened petty-bourgeois intellectuals, he would have marched to the English Channel at this propitious moment.

Then came the defeat. Once again Acheson rushed back to Brussels to convince Europe that the U.S. was still determined to carry out its original project even though the Atlantic Pact had remained little more than promise and wind. He found the German people hostile to rearmament, unwilling to see their country again become the cockpit of war; he found that the opposition of the French bourgeoisie to German rearmament was fed by defeatist moods which made France a poor risk rather than a "center of resistance."

### **Korean Defeat Alarms Europe**

The Korean war had had a sobering effect on an already badly frightened European capitalist class. In their eyes the policy of "calculated risks" has been seriously compromised. To take such a risk, for example, by beginning the rearmament of Germany might result in civil war and the speedy Russian occupation of all of Europe before the first contingents of the new army were assembled. An even more fundamental lesson that has been drawn from the Korean experience is that for Europe the alternative to Russian occupation is total destruction by American bombs. The net result thus far of the Brussels conference has been the appointment of General Eisenhower as commander-in-chief of a non-existing European army.

Inherent in this new situation, in this strong rise of neutralist moods among the European bourgeoisie is a new turn in America's foreign policy: a retreat from the main arenas of social struggle to the perimeters of the European

theater, to the building of bases in Spain, North Africa and Britain, to what can be in effect a variety of Hoover's "isolationism."

The inescapable conclusion from these precipitate switches, this jumping from continent to continent is that there is *no* viable long-term policy for U.S. imperialism. Truman was eminently correct when he asked his Republican opponents who were demanding Acheson's head, what other course they proposed to take the place of the one he and Acheson had followed. The only answer that has come is that of Hoover-Kennedy, which, in essence, is not an answer.

The most astute of the bourgeois journalists, Walter Lippman, can dream nostalgically of the days of Gladstone and the slower rhythm of the Nineteenth Century which permitted British imperialism to solve its problems at leisure and as they arose. But nostalgia is no substitute for a program and, in that field, Lippman can propose nothing better than that the U.S. drastically reduce its commitments in Europe and in Asia, in brief a policy resembling that of the isolationist *Chicago Tribune* which he has so sharply castigated over the years.

### **Fatal Alternatives for U.S. Capitalism**

A traditional phenomenon in American politics, "isolationism" has taken many forms and undergone many changes. If one can speak of isolationism today, it must be recalled that in the past ten years it has consisted of a demand to turn America's back on Europe and to concentrate on the Pacific and Asia. The significance of Herbert Hoover's new statement is that he, as the chief advocate of this form of "isolationism," now proposes to quit the Asian mainland as well as the European continent. (For Hoover and the capitalists for whom he speaks, the dream of China has turned to ashes: instead of 500 million customers for Coca Cola and Standard Oil there are 500,000,000 uncompromising foes with a military manpower of 40,000,000 to enforce their will).

Today such a policy represents a retreat on the world arena, in essence an abandonment of the dream of the "American Century." Its effect will be to compromise the rule of the 60 richest Families in their own domain, to create all the conditions for internal crisis and therewith for the most titanic struggle of the classes in history. The alternative course for the American plutocracy, equally bad, is to plunge into a suicidal war, without perspectives, without great hopes of victory. And in the end, after wasting America's resources, the plutocracy will not escape the explosion of class conflict at home which will be far vaster and more violent precisely because of the terrible privations the masses suffer during the war.

It is serious enough for the American bourgeoisie that a "crisis of confidence" exists, that they cannot find an effective policy. Far more serious is the fact that the dilemma of the rulers is beginning to enter, albeit slowly, into the consciousness of the American people. The defeat in Korea marks the beginning of moods of suspicion, distrust and eventually of opposition among the working people of the United States to the plans and policies of

Wall Street which will one day weigh far more heavily in the scales than all the atom bombs at Oak Ridge.

Up to the Korean defeat, Washington could proceed with equanimity in its global imperialist strategy without regard to the reactions of the masses. A situation of relative economic stability prevailed in the country. Profiting from its world privileged position and from its fabulous super-profits the bourgeoisie could afford to yield certain concessions under the pressure of the organized labor movement. They were not enough to make any radical improvement in the living conditions of the masses, which has never crossed very far over the borderline of poverty and insecurity — despite the post-war “prosperity,” one-third of the nation has remained ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed — but enough to lend a certain allure to Truman’s “Welfare State” demagoguery and to give the trade union bureaucracy a weapon against the advocates of militant action, independent labor politics and a bold social program.

That, under such conditions, there was no great thought or concern among the masses about foreign policy or world strategy is quite understandable. To be sure, there existed a certain disquietude about the frightfully destructive character of a new world war. But the bourgeoisie, possessed of a formidable apparatus for forming public opinion which is as highly trustified as the steel or auto industry and speaks with one voice and on the same general line — was able to successfully allay these fears. America’s position, the general conception held, was invincible; its industrial technique was unrivalled; there were dollars enough to buy allies, and force enough, especially atom bombs, to intimidate warlike enemies. War, therefore, was unlikely but if it came, America’s superiority in the air, and its ability to supply the armies of other countries, would quickly bring it to an end; with a few alterations and discomforts, life would then go on as usual. A minority, with a more realistic view of what war would entail, was driven to silence or isolated by an organized campaign of official repression.

### Changing Mood of the Masses

The defeat in Korea has uprooted these conceptions. Air superiority and bombs were not enough to win; soldiers, by thousands and hundreds of thousands were needed, and primarily American soldiers because other countries seemed reluctant to provide more than token forces. And these soldiers had to fight in territories thousands of miles from home surrounded by a hostile people, ignorant of the geography, language and customs of the land and living in constant dread of being ambushed by guerrillas. If the results of so limited an engagement as that in Korea have been so calamitous, what a terrible prospect is a war with Russia and China combined? This question is not one propounded by defeatists in the U.S. or by elements sympathetic to the Kremlin or even to communism. It arises from the very midst of the people in their effort to get a realistic view of what the plans of their rulers for world empire hold in store for them.

It is this deep dissatisfaction with the bankrupt policies and conceptions of yesterday, this searching for a new approach to the great world problems that marks the beginning in the ideological domain of the epoch of social crisis in the United States. As the former nervous and self-assured reaction — “*If there must be a war, let’s get it over with quickly*” — becomes untenable, the questions of war and peace will cease to be the private preserve of a tiny ruling clique and the road will be cleared for the entrance of the masses as an independent force on the political arena.

### Preconditions for Mass Resistance in U.S.

If the Korean war has laid the basis for a transformation of mass consciousness, then Truman’s proclamation of a National Emergency will create the conditions for gigantic struggles. The plans implicit in this proclamation include the transformation of the U.S. into an armed camp with millions of soldiers in time of “peace,” the creation of austerity conditions in the midst of abundance, the domination of all phases of American life by an arrogant clique of militarists and corporation executives. The Alsop brothers, arguing against certain hesitations in ruling circles, write:

“If the decision to create a real air superiority at whatever cost is finally taken, the effort involved will be far from painless. For any kind of balanced force, the other services will require comparable appropriations. This will mean annual budgets on the order of \$100 billion and a full war economy. It will mean real ‘guns instead of butter,’ the kind of lowering of living standards which this country certainly never experienced during the last war. But the decision to go the whole way is certain to be taken in the end, simply because with every passing day it becomes more bleakly obvious that halfway measures are not enough to insure the survival of the nation.” (*N. Y. Herald-Tribune*, Dec. 26, 1950).

This “decision” runs counter to the most cherished traditions of the American people, counter to their native understanding and instinctive reactions, and is bound to call forth an ever-growing resistance.

The United States today is not in the same position as was Nazi Germany. It is not starving and suffocating within narrow borders. It is not surrounded by hostile neighbors who have robbed it of territory, raw materials, burdened it with reparations. The watchword “Expand or die!” has no meaning to the American people. There is no large army of unemployed, no desperate, disinherited middle class. There have been no disappointing experiences, with reformism and Stalinism, no great defeats to make it appear that there is no other road than “guns instead of butter.”

Yet it must be remembered that, in spite of all these conditions favoring the warmakers, the resistance of the German people to the imperialist war program of their rulers was so great that it required a Hitler and the whip of fascism to beat them into submission. How much greater then will be the resistance of the American masses who must be wrenched out of their traditional ways at a time when popular dissatisfaction with existing conditions is at its lowest ebb, who must see their prosperity-created illusions

of attaining a measure of security smashed to bits! How much more difficult will it be for the American bourgeoisie to achieve its aims without a Hitler and in a capitalist democracy, distorted though it is by police-state laws!

### Role of Trade Union Bureaucrats

It is unlikely that the bourgeoisie will succeed in convincing the American masses that the rigors and loss of liberty of a war economy are required as an act of "national salvation." In any case that idea cannot penetrate deeply or last long. It must be quickly supplanted by the bitter realization that Big Business and the Big Brass in their desperation at being unable to solve their world problems have turned on the American people, that regimentation and Prussianization constitute an attempt to maintain their rule at home where it has failed abroad, that their own rulers and not some remote foreign enemy are plotting against their very lives.

The forces of great social conflict are gathering in the United States, the very citadel of world capitalism. It is futile to speculate as to the time they will mature. Suffice it to understand the trend and the magnitude they will assume. It was undoubtedly in anticipation of an eventual social crisis at home that the American bourgeoisie began almost three years ago to accelerate two processes essential to its survival: the integration of the trade union bureaucracy into the state machine; and official repression to crush all centers of opposition.

To enforce its planned regimentation of 15 million organized workers, under inflationary conditions with wages frozen, a shortage of consumers' goods and workers tied to their jobs, the services of the Murrays, the Greens, the Reuthers as a police apparatus within the unions will be more vital than ever to the American capitalists. Already the top leaders of the CIO and AFL have been summoned to Washington to be assigned their role. But even this conference revealed that, for all of their servility and cowardice, the union bureaucrats were aware that they could not play this role in the same manner as they had in World War II. They can no longer appear as the mere instruments of Big Business and the Big Brass within the workers' ranks. Hence the demand of the union leaders for representation in all echelons of the apparatus of the war economy which, they insisted, must at least appear as a "joint enterprise" of labor and capital.

Regardless of the precise outcome of this debased and treacherous bargaining, the trade union bureaucrats will be more identified and interlinked than ever with the war machine. They will function as the shield to protect the corporations and the government from the anger and the discontent of the workers. If this serves in the first stages to deflect and postpone the outbreak of workers' struggles, it will only assure their becoming more explosive and uncontrollable at a later stage.

### Perspectives of Labor Struggle

The ensuing class battles will tend to assume unofficial and "illegal" forms: wildcat strikes, job actions, rank-and-file movements. But as these struggles will encounter at

every turn the furious and violent opposition of the government and in the first instance of the trade union bureaucracy, a powerful stimulus will be given for rebellion within the unions. A new layer of revolutionary militants will be forged in battle and will come to the fore as happened in the Thirties in the struggle against the AFL moguls which led to the creation of the CIO. The premises will be created for the formation of a powerful left wing — so long arrested by peculiar American conditions and by the treachery of the Stalinists — on a far higher and more mature level than ever before.

Confronted by the suicidal foreign policy of their rulers and by the hostile intervention of the state in every instance, the new left wing will tend to develop a program that will go to fundamentals. It cannot fail to set as its principal task the formation of an independent labor party.

But generated by a genuine left wing, the mass party of the American workers will not be the tame, reformist formation it was in Great Britain in the relatively placid era at the turn of the century. It will tend to become, at least in its lower ranks, an instrument of class conflict directed against the ruling monopolists and their state, an expression of tremendous discontent and will to struggle. It will be fought by the ruling oligarchy as though it were a revolutionary party with all the ruthlessness of their robber-baron training, with official repression and extra-legal fascist-like terror. But this reaction, no matter how violent in form, will not succeed — as the whole history of class struggles in the U.S. proves — in intimidating or crushing the rebellious millions of American labor. On the contrary, it will steel them in their determination and assure their further revolutionary development.

This analysis is not to be construed as merely the expression of revolutionary optimism, although there is reason enough for the greatest confidence and hope. It is a prognosis clearly deducible from the new trends at work in American society, from the changing relationships of class forces. We are confident that the months and years to come will see its vindication in life.

### Other Possible Variants

To be sure, there are other possible variants which may alter this prognosis as to form and detail but not in its main trend. It is sufficient merely to cite the two other principal but opposite variants inherent in the present situation:

1. It is not excluded that, faced with the hopeless dilemma of its present world situation, Washington will decide to withdraw from the Asiatic and European arenas, to "reduce its commitments," as Lippman and Hoover propose, but in even more drastic form. And in doing so, it would have to abandon its all-embracing plans for a war economy. This would give rise to great convulsions in the American economic structure and must lead inevitably to the outbreak of a profound economic crisis, with millions of unemployed, and to the great class battles inherent in such a situation.

2. Also not excluded is the possibility that Washington may plunge into war in the early future. The precipita-

tion of war would temporarily arrest the development of class forces and struggles in the U.S., but only temporarily. All the trends described in the main analysis above would not only eventually come to the forefront but would be exacerbated to the extreme by the hopelessness of the war, by the terrible casualties and privations it would cause, by the repressions and brutality of the militarists and bourgeoisie toward the people at home.

The epoch of social crisis is opening in the United States. Its full impact may be postponed, though not for long. But it cannot be avoided. The workers of America are preparing their entry on the stage of world history. They, with their mighty hands, will decide the fate of the human race.

### Engels on America's Role in History

The prophetic words of Friedrich Engels, written well over six decades ago on June 6, 1886 to a friend in the U.S. are now in process of realization. It is appropriate to cite these lines now, because therein lies not only a brilliant vindication of Marxism and its method, but of the unflinching confidence of the great masters of social science in the progressive capacities and potentialities of the proletariat.

"The explosion of the class war in America," Engels wrote, "will be for the bourgeoisie of the entire world what the collapse of Russian Czarism will be for the great military monarchies of Europe — the downfall of their last great bastion. For America, after all, was the ideal of the entire bourgeoisie: a vast rich country on the ascendency, having purely bourgeois institutions untouched by feudal remnants and monarchical traditions and without any permanent and hereditary proletariat. There everyone has

been able to become if not a capitalist then at any rate an independent person, producing or selling by his own means, for his own benefit. And since *up to now* there have not been classes with opposite interests, our — and your — bourgeoisie believed that America was above the antagonisms and struggles of the classes. This illusion is now destroyed, the last bourgeois paradise on earth is about to rapidly change into a purgatory and can only be saved from becoming a hell like Europe by the advance of the American proletariat which is just beginning to sprout its wings. The manner in which the proletarians have made their appearance on the scene is absolutely extraordinary — six months ago no one suspected anything, and now they appear suddenly in organized masses on the point of throwing terror in the whole capitalist class. My only regret is that Marx did not live to see it!"

One can hardly reproach the old master, who so clearly saw the main lines of development, for being in error as to time. The changes which have occurred in the past 65 years require a few but not fundamental modifications in his analysis. American capitalism, which was the ideal of the bourgeoisie everywhere, now carries all of world capitalism on its back. It is indeed "the last great bastion." The American proletariat, almost completely unorganized in 1886, is now an organized force of 15 million strong. And if the absence of feudal remnants has created classic conditions for the class struggle, then the absence of strong Social-Democratic and Stalinist movements in the U.S. today favors the creation of a powerful Marxist revolutionary movement which can assure the victory of the American proletariat. Not world empire, but world socialism, will be their answer to the dilemma of American foreign policy.

# China: A World Power

By LI FU-JEN

When Wu Hsiu-chuan, representative of the Chinese government at Peiping, looked blustering Warren Austin calmly in the eye at a United Nations meeting, and said coldly: "I must tell you, we are not frightened by your threats," his statement was a dramatic emphasis of the fact that a whole epoch in relations between China and Western imperialism had come to a close and that a new epoch had begun. It denoted the fact that the old semi-colonial China, victim of imperialist appetites for more than a century, had gone from the scene and that in its place had come a mighty, independent China, a new world power.

Ever since the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5, when newly-risen Japan delivered a smashing defeat to the empire of the Czars — the first time in history that a "superior" white power had been beaten in war by "inferior" Orientals — a frightening specter had haunted the chancelleries of the West: the specter of an awakened, powerful and unsubmitive China. In story and cartoon

China was depicted as a slumbering giant who might one day awake to challenge his imperialist tormentors. The Hearst section of the American press harped endlessly on the theme of the "Yellow Peril."

### The Slumbering Giant Rises

Today, the specter has taken on flesh and blood. Grim foreboding has become alarming reality. The giant has arisen and smashed his fist in the face of the greatest imperialist power on earth.

Never before had the arrogant, bullying representatives of Wall Street been spoken to in the tone Wu used to Austin. They were accustomed to the obsequious and servile "Yes, sir" of Chiang Kai-shek or the Manchu government whenever they made complaints or demands — the proper mode of address by the slave to the master. Here was something strange and disturbing: "We are not frightened by your threats."



Wu was not using empty words. Eight thousand miles away across the Pacific, Chinese troops in alliance with the Koreans were hurling back an American offensive that was to have ended the Korean war by Christmas. A victorious American advance was suddenly converted into panicky retreat. Involved was the bulk of America's armed forces, using every weapon in the arsenal of war except the atom bomb. The imperialists, used for so long to having their own way with China, were stunned by the blow. It seemed incredible.

Clearly, a great change had occurred. To appreciate its scope and depth, it is necessary to recall some of the past, especially since a century of imperialist domination became an essential ingredient of the revolutionary present.

### A Review of the Past Century

In the Opium War of 1840-42, the British blasted open China's ports with their naval guns and forced surrender on the weak Manchu government at Peking. By the "peace" treaty of Nanking, China was reduced, in reality if not formally, to the status of a colony. In this and subsequent treaties, which the Manchus signed on the dotted line with all the major powers because they had no means to resist, treaty foreigners were exempt from Chinese laws and taxes (extra-territoriality), China's Customs were placed under foreign control (repayment of foreign loans and indemnities becoming first charges on the Customs revenues), an indemnity of some \$10,000,000 was imposed, Hongkong was ceded to Britain, territorial concessions were carved out of the principal cities and placed under foreign control, and the imperialists secured the right of free navigation in Chinese coastal waters and rivers.

The precipitating incident in the war of 1840-42 was the action of the Chinese authorities in Canton in burning a British cargo of opium brought from India. Britain was forcing opium on China against laws enacted by the Manchu government — a cheap means of evading payment in silver (then a scarce and valuable metal) for the teas, silks and spices which the British bought from China. In the indemnity which Britain imposed at the end of the war, there was included a sum of \$3,000,000 for the destroyed opium, the remainder being to cover Britain's war costs. It would be difficult to imagine a greater humiliation visited on a great nation by a foreign invader. But the Chinese were compelled to stomach it. There were no means of resistance.

For more than a century thereafter the humiliation was multiplied and intensified. Warships of the Western powers cruised menacingly in Chinese waters. Among them were American vessels, for the U.S. imperialists were not slow in demanding "most favored nation" treatment in their treaties with China, insisting on all the "rights and privileges" accorded to others. When the anti-imperialist hatred of the Chinese exploded in some violent incident, as it did quite frequently (often it was some missionary who was the victim of Chinese anger), the warships would bombard towns or villages. There would be a demand for an indemnity and an apology, invariably granted. The

Chinese government would be compelled to execute the "culprits" if it could find them. And new concessions would be wrung from the helpless country.

### "Jim Crow" in the Big Cities

In the great cities where the imperialists went about their business of sucking out China's wealth, foreign soldiers, sailors and marines were privileged to kick, cuff and curse Chinese citizens with impunity. These military forces had the task of guarding the concessions. If the Chinese could be humiliated further and made to feel inferior and helpless, the task became that much simpler. The methods were many. Notices in office and apartment buildings owned by foreigners forbade Chinese to ride in the elevators. "Jim Crow" sections were set aside for them in the streetcars. Shanghai's only downtown park once had this sign at its entrance: "Dogs, bicycles and Chinese not admitted." Moreover, the imperialists hung the sign "inferior" on the superstitious customs of the nation. Flocks of Christian missionaries came from a score of Western lands to impress upon the Chinese the superiority of Western superstitions.

Let no one say that the American imperialists were better than the older colonial powers. This writer observed, first-hand, hundreds if not thousands of incidents over a period of years showing the contempt in which Wall Street's representatives held the "Chinks." Acts of brutality were as common with them as with all the others. The only discernible difference between the British and the Americans was that while the British, for the most part, matched their words with their attitude and deeds, making no attempt to disguise their contempt for the Chinese, the Americans spoke unctuously about "equality" and assumed an air of "fraternization" that was but an ill-concealed condescension. (The American Club in Shanghai was the first to admit Chinese members). As a matter of fact, the seemingly more "liberal" American attitude was merely a weapon in the competition between the powers for China's trade.

### Anti-Imperialist Feeling Mounts

Chinese hatred of the imperialist freebooters crystallized in the Taiping Rebellion in the mid-nineteenth century. Although directed in the first place against the effete Manchu rulers, the anti-imperialist undertones were unmistakable. The Chinese people were alarmed by the endless concessions to imperialism of the court at Peking. The rebellion lasted 15 years (1850-65) and ended with the crushing of the Taipings by forces organized and led by an American, Frederick Townsend Ward.

Anti-imperialist feeling simmered beneath the surface, with only occasional outward flashes, until the beginning of the present century when it crystallized once more in the Boxer Rebellion. The Manchu Empress Dowager, sensing the rising anti-imperialist sentiment of the people, had given notice that China would not consider granting any further concessions to the foreign powers. As a defense against renewed imperialist aggression, she decreed the reestablishment of the old local militia. Militia bands were

encouraged to organize. By the summer of 1899, many of these bands had assumed the name of *I Ho Chuan* or "Fists of Righteous Harmony." The foreigners promptly gave them the name "Boxers." At the end of the year, the movement had assumed sizable proportions and the foreign powers demanded that the government dissolve it. But the Manchu regime, fearful of overthrow, dared not accede to the demand. In June of 1900, Marines were put ashore from foreign warships to "protect" the legation quarter in Peking. The Chinese government ordered the diplomats to leave the city within 24 hours. This was a signal for action by the Boxers, who laid siege to the quarter. The imperialists mustered a force of 2,000 men and marched them from Tientsin. Eight weeks of fighting in which many Chinese were killed ended in the lifting of the siege.

The imperialists then proceeded to mete out vicious retribution. The foreign army, in which Americans participated, sacked the ancient Chinese capital and subjected its citizens to cruel humiliations. Outstanding among their acts of savage vandalism was the looting of the beautiful Yuen Ming Yuen summer palace of the emperors on the outskirts of the city. After taking all they could, the standard-bearers of Western civilization put the palace to the torch and burned it to the ground. But this was only the initial vengeance. Under the Boxer Protocol, signed by China and the foreign powers on September 7, 1901, China was required to execute the leaders of the Boxer movement, to permit the permanent stationing of foreign troops in Peking and, naturally, to grant additional trade concessions. To cap it all, China was saddled with a huge indemnity of \$738,000,000.

These episodes in the relations of China with the imperialists were thoroughly characteristic and illustrate graphically the cruelty, contempt and arrogance of the imperialists towards the Chinese and the searing humiliations to which they subjected this vast nation. But the long night of oppression did not end with the Boxer outbreak and its suppression. The next half century witnessed much more of the same thing.

### **The Aborted Revolution of 1911**

In 1911, the Manchu dynasty was overthrown by a revolutionary movement with distinct anti-imperialist antecedents and foundations. But because there was no new, strong class to grasp the helm of power, the revolution stopped where it began, with the liquidation of the monarchy. The native bourgeoisie was then only a class in embryo. It consisted of brokers and agents (compradors) of the foreign capitalists and traders. The proletariat was practically non-existent in a land where handicrafts were still almost the sole form of industry. The national power which slipped from the hands of the Manchus fell apart and passed in segments to local satraps who lost no time in making their arrangements with the imperialists. China was as far away as ever from independence and the formal national unity of the dynastic era disappeared. Moreover, all the acute contradictions of an outmoded social and economic life, exacerbated by foreign domination, remained unsolved. Thus was the stage set for the stormy revolutionary uprisings which swept the country in 1925-27.

Before that, however, World War I intervened. After sampling imperialist brutality and oppression for so long, China was now to taste the perfidy of the foreign powers. Placing faith in Woodrow Wilson's talk about freedom and democracy, and the "inalienable right of self-determination" of all nations, the Chinese government entered the war against the Central Powers on August 4, 1917, hoping at the end of the war to achieve complete independence. Characteristically, the only participation China was permitted in the war was the contribution of thousands of laborers for "coolie" work behind the lines in Western Europe. The payoff came in the Treaty of Versailles, when, over China's outraged protest, the large Chinese province of Shantung was transferred by the Allies from Germany to Japan! China refused to sign the peace of Versailles and negotiated an independent treaty with Germany.

World War I had one more important consequence for China in the emergence of a modern proletariat. Preoccupation of the Allies with the war in Europe, and the tremendous world demand for goods of all kinds, stimulated a growth of large-scale Chinese industry and therewith brought into being an industrial working class. This was to have a decisive influence on the revolutionary events which shaped up less than a decade later.

### **Second Revolution Crushed by Chiang Kai-shek**

The first strong winds of the gathering revolutionary storm were felt in 1925 when British warships bombarded the Yangtze river port of Wanhien, killing and maiming numerous peaceful civilians. The action was taken to compel the local warlord, Yang Sen, to release a British vessel carrying a cargo of arms to Yang's rival. In Canton, far to the south, seat of the rising revolutionary movement, a gigantic protest demonstration took place against the bombardment. The British huddled in fear on their island concession of Shameen in the Pearl River, a stone's throw from the city, and mounted machine guns on the bridges leading to it. As the demonstrators approached, they raked them with a murderous fire. The "Shameen massacre" roused anti-imperialist hatred to fever pitch. The next day, British Hongkong was paralyzed by a general strike and the British ladies were faced with the tragedy of having to do their own washing and cooking. The protest movement spread to Shanghai, which was likewise paralyzed by a general strike.

But the great revolutionary movement, which rose to magnificent heights in the ensuing months, embracing both workers and peasants, went down to crushing defeat when in April 1927 it was drowned in blood by Chiang Kai-shek, who led the nationalist movement only in order to betray it to China's imperialist enemies.

We have recited the salient facts of China's modern history only in order to indicate the weightiness of the past in the events of more recent times. When Wu Hsiu-chuan hurled the defy in the face of American imperialism, there hovered in the background the memory of a century of wrong, a long trail of bloody repression and galling humiliation. Are we, perhaps, giving undue weight to the subjective factor of righteous outrage? Let us remember that, considered dialectically, not only is there no absolute

dividing line between the subjective and objective, but also there always exists an interrelation between them. Marxism rejects the notion of fixed and immutable categories. The subjective anger of a people against its imperialist oppressors becomes one of the *objective* ingredients of the colonial revolution.

### A People's Anger Explodes

Like the revolution of 1911, the great upheaval of 1925-27 left all of China's urgent problems unsolved. Chiang Kai-shek's bloody march to power paved the way for the subsequent Japanese invasion of the country. But it also placed on the calendar of the future — the Third Chinese Revolution! All the explosive material lodged in class and international relationships remained, ready to be touched off when circumstances favored. The explosion came after World War II had run its course.

It is not necessary to our purpose — which is to explain the reasons for China's rise to the status of a world power — to trace Chinese events of the post-war years. This has been done fairly recently in these pages. The question we must answer is this: what were the main factors which in the space of a couple of years converted China from a land of nearly 500,000,000 colonial slaves into an independent world power?

The Manchus, the warlords and the Kuomintang regime all bowed down or were forced into submission by the imperialists. Chiang Kai-shek never dared to summon the people to resist imperialism, for a great mass movement would have gone beyond his control and sealed the doom of his regime as the representative of the landlords and capitalists. Chiang preferred a junior partnership with imperialism. But imperialist domination, allied with archaic social relationships within the country, which plunged the masses into ever deeper poverty and misery, lit fires of revolt which flared continuously for twenty years before the great upheaval which followed World War II. The Communist Party placed itself at the head of the revolting peasantry and built a mighty army which in the end smashed the Kuomintang regime and thereby ended China's subjection by imperialism. During the war, hoping thereby to bolster Chiang and preserve their economic positions in China, the powers "voluntarily" relinquished their extra-territorial rights and turned back the foreign concessions to China. What remained of imperialist privilege was liquidated automatically with the overthrow of the Kuomintang.

Had 1948 been 1848, the foreign powers would have sent their armies and navies to smash the insurrectionary movement. But the termination of the war with Japan saw the whole colonial world, including China, aflame. The victorious powers emerged weakened from the war. Their soldiers wanted no more war, and demanded to be sent home. World capitalism was in crisis. After fruitless efforts to mediate the civil war in China and keep Chiang Kai-

shek in power, the powers were obliged to watch helplessly while the armies of Mao Tse-tung swept the country.

### Source of Mao's Power

The source of Mao's power was and is the great mass of the people of China, above all the peasantry. Stirred into action by abysmal suffering, fired by visions of freedom and a tangible stake in the land of their birth — "the land to the peasantry" — they pounded their way irresistibly to victory. It was the great flood-tide of revolutionary mass ardor and determination, still far from receding, that stood back of the defiant words used by Wu Hsiu-chuan at the United Nations. In the past, if the masses had any program at all, it was the program of suffering and submission preached by reactionary rulers. Today they have a program of their own. Limited it may be, but in it they can readily discern their own interests.

The fact of the mass entry of the Chinese people on to the political arena, with the corresponding class pressures, should be pondered by those who contend that Mao Tse-tung is just a "puppet" of Moscow and the Peiping government merely a creature of the Kremlin. Such a view ignores the reciprocal relationship between party and class. It must be recognized that in recent times Mao has manifestly acted more in response to the pressure of his own popular support than in obedience to any Kremlin directives. The potency of mass pressure caused him to execute an about-face on the land question toward the end of the war, leading the movement of agrarian expropriation when the peasants would no longer wait for the land.

Moscow's line was to preserve the "united front" with Chiang Kai-shek at almost any cost and, to that end, not to encourage social conflicts. Again, when the war was over, Moscow's policy was to engineer a coalition government between Chiang and the Chinese Communists on the basis of a few democratic concessions by Chiang. But the intense hatred of Chiang's regime and the flaming agrarian revolt compelled Mao to break off negotiations and declare all-out war against the Kuomintang. These weighty, incontestable facts should give pause to those who declare that Mao is *simply* a push-button stooge of the Kremlin.

### China's Third Revolution Roars

The China that now speaks to the world is a *revolutionary* China. It is this dynamic quality that imparts such tremendous power to China's moves and pronouncements in world politics. In this connection, it is also of interest to note that the present-day leaders of China, despite long years of Stalinist corruption, have not forgotten the elementary principles of socialist internationalism. At a press conference in New York, Wu Hsiu-chuan was careful to distinguish between American imperialism and the American people when charging the United States with moving toward the abyss of a new war.

When we speak of China as being revolutionary, we are not by any means suggesting a completed revolution, but rather a *revolution in progress*. Properly defined, the overthrow of the Kuomintang, the winning of national independence, the setting up of the Peiping regime, and the

partial shake-up of agrarian relations, represent the completion only of a *first stage* of the unfolding Third Chinese Revolution. That the revolution has not advanced beyond this stage and been deepened in the sense of a fundamental change of property relations in all spheres — above all in industry — is very largely due to the half-way, semi-reformist program within the confines of which the Communist leaders have tried to keep the movement of the masses.

Mao's program of a "New Democracy" has appeared as a road-block in the path of revolutionary advance. It has slowed down the logical course of development by its insistence, among other things, on the inviolability of capitalist private property, thus preventing a fundamental solution of pressing economic and social problems. This program is destined to collide more and more with the needs of life and with the onward urge of the masses. The Communist Party, under popular pressure, will then either swing to the left or prepare the way for its own replacement by a new revolutionary leadership. It was the masses who pushed Mao to the pinnacle. They can push him off, too.

### Pressures on Mao

In considering the factors which will make for a resumption of the interrupted course of revolutionary development in China, we should not overlook the pressures from outside. There are two main factors:

1. Mao's program calls, among other things, for the protection of foreign business enterprises in China, together with those of the Chinese capitalists. But the economic blockade of China which the U.S. imperialists have imposed in connection with the Korean war may force the Peiping government to seize the numerous and large American industrial enterprises and make them serve the Chinese people instead of the Wall Street moneybags.\* Thus Mao would be going considerably beyond his own proclaimed program. Nor would imperialist pressure necessarily mean that the Peiping regime would draw closer, politically, to the Kremlin. Beset by external threats and driven forward by the masses, it could take a swing away from its narrow nationalism and toward genuine socialist internationalism, staking its fate on the sympathy and aid of the world proletariat.

\* Shortly after this article was written the Chinese government ordered (Dec. 28) immediate seizure of all United States property and all private and commercial American bank deposits, in retaliation for similar U.S. action Dec. 16 on Chinese assets in the U.S. The principal American enterprises in China are: (1) The Shanghai Power Co. largest electric power company in the Far East that burns coal. (2) The Shanghai Telephone Co., subsidiary of A. T. & T. (3) Numerous Standard Oil and Texas Oil installations throughout the country. (4) Even more numerous missionary properties: hospitals, schools, churches, etc. (5) National City Bank of N. Y. (6) Extensive properties of the U.S. diplomatic establishment.

Total value is variously estimated at between one and two hundred million dollars, U.S. currency.

2. The whole colonial world in Eastern Asia is being swept by the flames of revolution — Korea, Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines. China is the vast powerhouse of this movement. Today the peoples of these lands look to China, much more than to the Soviet Union, as the great leader in their fight for liberation. There can be no doubt that geographical proximity and racial affinity, common burdens and problems, and like aspirations, make for a deep reciprocal sympathy and solidarity. China's masses, feeling far from alone in their fight for a better life, are lifted and inspired by the great movements on their borders. Here is an additional assurance that the present period of marking time in China will be followed by a fresh revolutionary upsurge, one in which the working class may be expected to play the leading role, that will carry the revolution to another and higher stage.

### Resources for Revolutionary Victory

China, the powerhouse of the colonial revolution? This is no rhetorical exaggeration. This ancient land with an enviable culture reaching back into the dim ages is the habitat of almost 500,000,000 people. In area it is larger than the United States. The factors of population and area alone are sufficient to place China in the forefront of the colonial revolution. We can add to that immense natural riches and an enormous economic potential. The country's economic and social backwardness is merely the legacy of foreign domination now ended. In the three northeastern provinces of Manchuria, despite considerable looting by Stalin's armies during the 1945-46 occupation, there is a great industrial complex built by the Japanese which draws its raw materials from on-the-spot deposits. This can serve as a basis for elevating the whole country economically while giving needed assistance to neighboring countries.

Socialism in one country? Not at all. The socialist revolution begins on national grounds but can reach completion only on the international arena. Nevertheless, China's industrial resources guarantee that she will not be strangled into submission by imperialist blockade. By the same token, revolutionary China presents itself to its neighbors as a powerful ally and source of strength in the battles they are waging for national liberation and social advance. Their courage is buttressed, their fighting spirit enhanced as they march toward great and resounding victories.

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# War, Peace and Revolution

The following editorial translated from the current issue of *Quatrieme Internationale*, the theoretical review of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International published in Paris, deals with the broad historical perspectives arising from the Korean crisis. We publish it as a timely contribution to the discussion of the Asian revolution and its relation to the U.S.A.-USSR conflict, to which this issue of our magazine is largely devoted. — Editor.

\* \* \*

Human thought, even at its most profound, is able to follow reality all too tardily and can hardly grasp all at once the whole of the infinitely rich and complex development of life itself. When history steps up its tempo of evolution, when this evolution does not proceed along a straight line but is rather choppy, full of abrupt turns and constantly confronting us with new situations, even revolutionary Marxists find it difficult, in their generalizations and theoretical forecasts, to seize all the twists of the actual historic process and the full wealth and originality of its content. The times in which we live, the whole period opened up in the course of the Second World War and its aftermath, serve as a first-rate illustration of this.

To be sure, we sensed the *new* and altogether *unique* character of this period compared with the whole past of capitalism. We were even the only ones to express and correctly define a series of fundamental characteristics of this period. But new events have constantly enlarged the historic scene, deepened its meaning and better illuminated its significance for us.

Only superficial, ridiculously near-sighted and limited minds can reproach us for abruptly changing our orientation and our tactics, for dropping from our ideological equipment, outmoded concepts which no longer correspond to the new reality, for adjusting our line to new conditions. We have done so to the extent that events themselves demand from us a wider and deeper understanding of the period we are living through, which is marked by swift and abrupt developments.

The Korean war was one of those events which suddenly reveal to the consciousness of revolutionists a whole series of changes that have entered into the situation but which were previously ignored by them or remained in the background of their minds. It was one of those events which can aid us to correct and render more precise our revolutionary orientation. In this editorial we shall confine ourselves to bringing forward and stressing these fundamental modifications and their consequences.

The war in Korea has clarified the question of the relationship of forces between imperialism and the forces opposed to it in a far more vivid light by demonstrating that *this relationship of forces is at present evolving to the disadvantage of imperialism*. This is caused by the weight of the colonial revolution in Asia which is proving more deepgoing and more decisive than anyone anticipated. The effects of this revolution fundamentally alter the conditions

of stability and survival for the capitalist system in the whole world.

This colonial revolution has also had its impact on another and no less fundamental plane. By giving birth to a number of independent countries, and especially to the regime of Mao Tse-tung in China, it has introduced new factors in international politics, including the politics of that power bloc which has been led by the Kremlin. The same holds for the world labor movement.

The future development of China, raised to the rank of a major world power by its revolutionary intervention in the Korean war, will have a considerable and perhaps decisive influence on the question of a new world war, on the time of its outbreak, as well as on its outcome. It will have a similar influence on the further evolution of Stalinism.

The war in Korea has, furthermore, given a much more precise and clearer meaning to the Marxist concepts of peace, war and revolution and to their interrelationships, as well as to the strategy and tactics of the proletarian revolution.

The Korean war which is at one and the same time a civil war and an anti-imperialist war, a revolutionary war, provides a striking illustration of the nature of wars and revolutions in the imperialist epoch as defined by Lenin. In our time wars and revolutions *succeed* one another and become more and more closely *combined* to the extent that the relationship of forces between imperialism and the opposing revolutionary elements changes in favor of the latter.

*The new idea particularly illuminated by the war in Korea is this: that the war, that every war waged at the present time by imperialism, is at bottom a war against the Revolution, and that a war launched within the present relationship of forces becomes swiftly transformed into an international civil war, into a revolution.*

Does that mean that this kind of war is to be desired? That it should be called for? That we must ignore and override the profound fears of war anchored in the hearts of millions of people throughout the world? To pose the question in this manner would show a complete lack of understanding for a situation which is developing outside of us, independent of our desires and our fears; and confuse a Marxist analysis, aimed at enlightening the vanguard, with the program designed to arouse the masses to revolutionary action.

The revolutionary vanguard must be alert to the concrete conditions in which the struggle for socialism is unfolding at present. These conditions are those of the entire epoch and of the present period of wars and revolutions which have become interlinked to so great a degree that "peace" is nothing but a brief interval, limited in space as well as in time, between two phases of a convulsive process that is fundamentally explosive and revolutionary. The peace for which the masses, who are terrified

or tired of struggle, rightfully aspire, can come only after the culmination of the contradictions which impress their character upon this period. That kind of peace can come only through the victory of socialism on a world scale.

Pacifism was never characteristic of revolutionary Marxists, not because Marxists have any fondness for warlike sentiments, but because pacifism constantly runs counter to the entire course of contemporary reality.

The choice is not between "peace" and war. It is between revolution and war. And even this counterposing of alternatives is only relative. The colonial masses of Asia who wanted to throw off the imperialist yoke after the Second World War, could attain this aim only by means of civil and anti-imperialist war. That has been the price of "peace" in Asia.

As for the European proletariat which is at present disoriented and hemmed in between "Atlantic" capitalism and the dreaded perspective of Russian occupation in case of war between the two blocs, "peace" for them can only mean a neutrality with one of the two following alternatives:

1. Neutrality with a continuation of the bourgeois regime, which would signify for the proletariat of Western Europe a truce in the class struggle and acceptance of the perspective of stagnation and crisis resulting from such a solution. All this — assuming that the European bourgeoisie is still capable of pursuing such a "neutralist" policy.

2. Neutrality under a socialist regime in Western Europe, with the proletariat coming to power on its own steam by rejecting the Stalinist leaderships as well as control by the Soviet bureaucracy. Such a unified socialist Europe, grouping together Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain, would naturally be a force capable of holding out for an entire period against both Yankee imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy; capable of postponing the perspective of war, and of bringing about revolutionary transformations in each of the two blocs which could change the whole further course of history.

But such an eventuality would not be possible without severe struggle and civil war, and would very likely involve war as such against interventions by American imperialism as well as by the Soviet bureaucracy, both of whom would be interested in seeing that experiment fail.

Thus the most probable and the most realistic historic combination is counterposed to the concepts of "peace" and of "war," each regarded separately or as one of two poles of an alternative. It is that of *Revolution-War*, that is, of revolution which is extended into war or of war which becomes transformed into revolution. *These transformations are directly related to the extreme sharpness that the contradictions and the large-scale collapse of the capitalist regime have resulted in.* Revolution, either before or along with a war, is on the order of the day, and nothing else.

This revolution is more permanent than ever before in history. *Permanent in the sense that the struggle begun by the colonial masses against their ruling classes and against imperialism, by the proletariat against capitalism, by imperialism against the USSR, can no longer be halted. It will become deeper and wider, increasing its pace, embracing ever new forces, breaking down all equilibria, carrying off in its torrential sweep the foundation stones of all the decayed institutions and regimes, up to the moment of the final victory of world socialism.* Stalinism, in its turn, in spite of episodic successes here and there, will likewise disintegrate during this whole period, which will be the most revolutionary known to history.

These perspectives do not settle all our tactical problems. They are nevertheless necessary. For the revolutionary vanguard, in order to orient itself correctly and to hold firm, has to raise itself to a certain historical level which brings adequate theoretical understanding. This is needed as an antidote to the lamentations of those petty-bourgeois preachers who predict the end of the universe resulting either from the war itself, as some view it, or, according to others, from the Stalinist domination of the world.

# The Third Chinese Revolution

## II. Nature and Perspectives of the China of Mao Tse-Tung

By ERNEST GERMAIN

(Editorial Note: This is the second and concluding section of "The Third Chinese Revolution." Part I, "Origin and Significance of the Victory of Mao Tse-tung," appeared in the *Fourth International*, September-October 1950. Footnotes will be found at the end of the article.)

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From the Portal of Celestial Peace in Peiping, Mao Tse-tung on October 1, 1949, proclaimed the People's Republic of China. Military operations had not yet come to an end on that date. Canton, metropolitan center of Southern China, did not fall until 15 days later. Chungking was occupied at the end of October and Kunming, capital of Yunnan, last province of the south-west to be liberated,

was taken December 10. Nevertheless, October 1 can well be considered as the date all of China came under a new central power dominated by the Chinese Communist Party.

Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the People's Republic of China in the name of a pre-Parliament, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Council, which met in Peiping from September 21 to December 1 and adopted a governmental platform and a provisional Constitution. The Consultative Council was a body set up from above by the Chinese CP through the various mass organizations it controls, together with the other political parties participating in the government. In fact it is a coalition government —

officially, the Central People's Government Council — which today reigns in China. This government is periodically accountable, not to the People's Political Consultative Council, a top heavy body of 576 members, but to the 149 members of the National Committee of this Council. Mao Tse-tung, as Chairman of the Republic, Chairman of the Central People's Government Council and Chairman of the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council, combines within his person all the legislative and executive powers of the Chinese People's Republic.

It must not be assumed by any means that the present coalition government simply represents stage scenery set up to hoodwink the public while the real power remains with the CP. Among the political parties participating in the government with the Chinese CP are two which can be considered genuine representatives of social classes other than the proletariat or poor peasants: The *Democratic League of China*, banned October 13, 1947 by the Chiang Kai-shek dictatorship, is composed of numerous teachers, professionals and petty bourgeois intellectuals as well as some generals of "liberal" renown. It represents the cultured middle classes of the cities and has some 50,000 members (81). The *Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang*, primarily a regrouping of generals in Southern China who deserted Chiang Kai-shek, must be considered as representing the interests of a section of the Chinese bourgeoisie of the South. Among the "great" of People's China there are, in fact, a number of former Kuomintang dignitaries whose hands were often red with the blood of workers and farmers. Thus the Vice President of the Central Government, Marshal Li Chi-sen, is known as the butcher of the 1927 Canton Commune. General Chen-chien, butcher of the Hankow workers and the farmers of Hunan province in 1927, is today head of the provincial "People's" government of Hunan. General Lu-han, Kuomintang governor of the province of Yunnan until December 1949, and General Liu Wen-hui, once known as the butcher of the farmers of Szechwan, are members of the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council. This integration of former reactionary cadres is not at all limited to instances in top government circles. In the city of Tsinan, capital of the province of Shantung, 75 to 80 percent of the functionaries kept their places (82). This phenomenon, duplicated throughout the country (83) is a source of corruption of the Spartan ways of the Chinese Communist leaders (84). It is highly characteristic that in the cities a good part of the police force was taken over by the new authorities, with results that might well have been foretold:

"To a considerable degree, vestiges of the traditions of the former reactionary police force have contaminated our public security corps where a part of the former personnel have had to be reintegrated." (85)

Nevertheless, in the countryside the transformation of power was radical and is in fair way to be completed. Wherever the agrarian reform was carried out, the former political regime disappeared with the former property relations. The *Peasants' Associations*, embracing tens of millions of members, carry out the agrarian reform and

are in fact invested with all power on a local scale. The *People's Courts*, genuine revolutionary organs of the insurgent peasantry from the beginning, are developing in Central and Southern China where the agrarian reform is only beginning to be carried out. They are composed half of members *appointed* by the district authorities (including the chief Judge and the assistant Judges), and half of members *elected* from below by peasant organizations (86). The higher bodies (district and cantonal authorities) are likewise beginning to be elected. It is only when we pass to the level of the province that we find authorities exclusively appointed from above. This likewise holds for mayors of the large cities, directly subordinated to the central power. From the point of view of *form*, the Chinese People's State appears as an agrarian democracy capped by a political dictatorship exercised primarily by the CP.

### The Struggle Against Economic Chaos

At the time the People's Central Government was constituted, the collapse of the Kuomintang's power had brought to a climax all the factors of economic decomposition that had characterized Chinese society for a number of decades. Runaway inflation raged. Barter had replaced commerce. Industry was paralyzed. The middle classes were ruined. Relations between the cities and the countryside were broken. The productive forces had fallen into ruin. Floods, famine, epidemics added their ravages along the road of retreat of Chiang Kai-shek's armies.

Of the three fundamental tasks of the bourgeois revolution remaining to be achieved in China — solution of the agrarian question; elimination of the predominant influence of foreign imperialism, completion of genuine national unification — the third was needed the most urgently to overcome the economic chaos which sapped all the living forces of the nation. Without genuine central administration, there could be no serious collection of taxes, no standardization of money and no genuine struggle against inflation. Without reconstitution of a unified system of national transport, no genuine revival of commerce and no revival of industry was possible in the big coastal cities that remained cut off from the agrarian hinterland. Without the combination of an effective central administration and a unified system of national transport, there could be no genuine struggle against famine. Such a struggle demands the creation of a *nation-wide market of food products*, replacing the hundreds of autonomous markets of provincial, departmental, district and even county-wide size that permitted famine to develop in isolated areas, within 300 miles of an abundance of food. Consequently the new central government has devoted its major efforts to the actual realization of national unity and it is in this field that it has achieved the most rapid and most remarkable successes.

The struggle against inflation was not at all easy and victory was far from assured at the beginning. The necessity of financing the enormous Liberation Army, whose forces tripled within a year, forced the new power to continue printing a considerable amount of paper money. As a consequence, the new monetary unit, the "People's Dollar," underwent rapid depreciation. The index of prices in Peiping rose from 100 in June 1949 to 407 in October; to

1,107 in November; to 1,454 in December and doubled once again between that date and March 1950. In Chungking, liberated later, prices tripled between January and March 1950 (87). At the same time, speculation raged, provoking scarcity of many prime necessities.

### Measures to Check Inflation

The reaction of the new power to all this, prepared by a conference of financial specialists in Peiping in February 1950 was, however, made easier by a sensible measure taken at the beginning which acted as a strong check to the havoc of inflation. Instead of imposing an artificial market price on the "jen min p'iao" (People's Dollar) and thus aggravating the ruin of all those with fixed incomes, the Chinese government applied the *sliding scale* to all wages, salaries and bank accounts. A "parity index" called the FEN was set up, equal to the average wholesale price of eight pounds (six catties) of rice or millet in the six largest cities of China (88). The purchasing power of the bulk of the urban population, expressed in this "parity index," was stabilized, thus permitting an early commercial and industrial revival which limited the effects of inflation and speculation.

Then the government set about drastically reducing the *budgetary deficit*. In the first place, taxes were increased and above all *centralized*. On one hand this eliminated at a single stroke the principal source of corruption under the Kuomintang regime whereby the land owner himself was most often the village tax collector, not paying anything himself and letting the biggest part of the taxes squeezed from the peasants disappear in his own pockets. On the other hand, it reestablished the *fiscal equality* of city and countryside by levelling numerous surtaxes on luxury products (wines, liquors, cosmetics, custom cigarettes, etc., from 60% to 120%). In the second place, considerable income was derived from the big industrial, commercial and banking institutions of the State. Thirdly, a forced loan was levied, called the "Victory Loan," which the Communist-functionaries extracted often not without brutality (89) from owning circles in the cities and countryside. Normal revenues of the State now cover 80% of the expenses (against 33% in 1949!). The Loan in turn must have absorbed close to two-fifths of the remaining deficit, the balance being covered by the printing of bank notes (90).

These measures prepared the ground for the final assault against inflation. Due to the important industrial sectors which it controlled, the government like the private merchants had retained enormous stocks of finished products during the inflationary period. With the collection of taxes, considerable quantities of grain were likewise concentrated in its hands—taxes paid in kind predominate in fact in most of the agricultural regions of China. Now began an enormous stabilization operation that created at one stroke a unified market in China. To the regions deficient in food products, the government services sent huge quantities of grain and rice. During the first three months of the year, more than 20,000 carloads, amounting to more than 600,000 tons of grain, were shipped from Manchuria to Eastern China. In the following months, more than 200,000 tons from Manchuria and more than 300,000 tons from Southern

China were likewise sent to deficit regions (91). The result of this operation was a successful struggle against famine in regions hit by natural catastrophes in 1949 (92) and the abrupt halt of price rises in the cities. At the same time, the government dumped on the market the masses of consumer goods stocked during the preceding period. At once, the merchants and speculators began to unload their stocks too in fear of seeing them depreciate in the fall of prices, and inflation was arrested (93). In Shanghai prices fell 10% within a month, in other large cities even more: in Canton an average of 35% from March 13 to April 13; in Hankow the price of rice fell 25%, etc. (94).

The arrest of inflation created the preliminary conditions for industrial revival. But only the preliminary conditions, since the whole heritage of the past continued to weigh heavily on the economic life of China. A big part of the industrial equipment remained idle. Even in Manchuria where the revival had been under way for a year, industrial production at the end of 1949 stood at only 29% of the level of 1943 (95). The productive forces revived slowly, profiting first from the restoration of agriculture, the transport system, and above all from the first year of genuine internal peace China had known for a half century.

### The Structure of Industry and Commerce

The victorious struggle against inflation constituted not only an indispensable precondition for industrial revival in China. It also permitted the central government to modify perceptibly the relations between the State sector and the private sector in industry, and above all in commerce.

In decreeing expropriation without compensation of "bureaucratic capital" belonging to the four monopolist families of the Chinese big bourgeoisie (96), the People's Political Consultative Council in September 1949 gave the State the key position in the national economy. Although opinion varies on the exact weight of the State sector, the most moderate estimate puts its weight in the various industrial branches of China south of the Great Wall as follows:

Metallurgy	60%	Electrical	62%
Oil	53%	Paper	72%
Textiles	55%	Cement	37%
Machine Tools	70%	Chemicals	89% (97)

As for Manchuria, the North-East Inspection Commission sent into that region by the Shanghai bourgeoisie after the liberation of the city estimated the weight of the state sector in industry at 87.5%. For China as a whole it is certain that nationalized capital represents between two-thirds and four-fifths of the industrial capital. To appreciate this figure at its true value, however, the fact must be taken into account that Chinese industry does not produce more than 10% of the country's national income.

### Consequences of the Stabilization

The measures taken at the beginning of 1950 in the struggle against inflation brought about the ruin of numerous private industrial enterprises. First of all, the forced loan was often imposed without regard to the real



status of the treasury. Next, enforcement of the new legislation compelled industrial companies to continue paying wages to their employees and workers even when production was halted. Then came the bankruptcy of numerous firms, above all the foreign ones in Shanghai when the Nationalist blockade cut off supplies of raw materials for many an industry (98). Finally, stopping inflation likewise meant stopping the race for products of all kinds and the reestablishment of the normal functioning of the laws of the market. It then appeared that many industries had enjoyed false prosperity due to speculative buying during the inflationary period; their markets abruptly disappeared. In the same way it turned out that many firms had abandoned all concern for productivity during the period when "anything sold"; among them too many shut-downs occurred. The first consequence of financial stability was consequently the closing of a great number of plants, above all in Shanghai, where out of 4,671 plants in 41 branches of industry, 3,205 were functioning in April 1950, a decline of 30% (99). Finally, the social changes occurring in the country brought about a redistribution of purchasing power which rendered obsolete the industrial structure of the big coastal cities. Actually these had turned in the first place toward satisfying the *luxury needs* of the old owning classes, and not toward satisfying the needs of the immense peasant population of China (100).

More important still were the modifications the government struggle against inflation brought about in the structure of trade. Already in Manchuria in 1949, 34% of retail trade and the greater part of wholesale trade passed through the State stores and cooperatives (101). To combat inflation effectively, the central government at the beginning of 1950 took a series of far-reaching measures. On March 14, six State trading companies were set up to control the entire trade in food products, textiles, salt, coal and construction materials, farm products, and miscellaneous goods. Branches of these centralized companies were established in all the big cities and provinces. These bodies were in fact entrusted with the management of State trade and the "giving of directives to the private commercial companies aimed at stabilizing the local markets" (102). Following these measures, the network of State stores and cooperatives spread rapidly. In August 1950 there were 38,000 cooperatives with 20 million members, a fourth in Manchuria alone. In one year, the number of cooperative members in Northern China rose from one to six millions and four million new members were recruited in Eastern China (103).

### Alarmed by Their Success: A NEP Follows

It goes without saying that at the same time, the government established trading companies to control foreign trade, representing a stage toward the establishment of a monopoly over this trade. In fact a monopoly was established over the export of a certain number of products: pig bristles, tung oil, hides, furs and minerals (104).

The complete statization of the industrial means of production, however, requires a certain level of development of the productive forces to meet the criterion of economic efficiency. Hadn't the Chinese CP leadership

understood this in advance of the conquest of power? Hadn't it sought in the low level of development of the productive forces in China the reason why socialism, in its opinion, cannot be built now, China having to pass through a period of mixed economy, half-Statist, half-capitalist, the so-called "new democracy"? Hence, the Chinese government itself appeared alarmed at the radical results of its struggle against inflation. At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese CP early in June 1950, several days before the session of the National Committee of the PPCC (People's Political Consultative Council), Mao Tse-tung sounded the alarm and dexterously outlined the retreat under the form of a veritable NEP. The slogan of this NEP, developed more fully in the reports to the National Committee of the PPCC, was "readjustment of the relations between the State sector and the private sector of the economy." The two principal corollaries were: the beginning of a new "course toward the rich peasant of the countryside," and the opening of an energetic struggle for the reduction of State expenses, particularly through the demobilization of a big part of the Army.

### Beginnings in Planning

This new economic policy was not long in producing its effects. The State granted generous credits and handed out huge orders to private industry, which visibly recovered from its slump. The production of cotton goods in private industry in Shanghai rose 70% from March to August; paper production increased seven fold in the same period (105). The number of State stores and bazaars have been reduced and not permitted to sell more than six different products (106). Even in the export field private initiative has been encouraged. In Manchuria the State abandoned its monopoly on export of soya, cotton and peanut oil established the year before, and even sold back to private firms, for commissions of one to five percent, products which had been reserved to the monopoly (107).

At the same time, strict relations were established between the Communist directors of economy and the representatives of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie. Early in June 1950 a conference was held in Peiping between the principal heads of State and private industry. Proposals made by the private sector, such as the prohibition of the sale of certain products by the State stores, were ostentatiously adopted with great publicity (108). In his report mentioned above, Chen-yun, Chairman of the Financial and Economic Commission of the Chinese government, openly declared:

"In China, a country poorly exploited from the industrial point of view, the development of industry and industrial investments undertaken for a long time by the national capitalists, if they remain progressive in character, will be useful to the State as well as to the people. Although Chinese commercial capital causes inflation in the big cities, we take into account that China is a vast country where small, dispersed production plays a predominant role and the existence of private traders is inevitable." (109)

In order to prevent this revival of private trade and industry from shortly reproducing the chaos from which

the country had just emerged so painfully, measures to organize the economic life were taken which represent the first rough draft of future planning. A first national conference of heavy industry was held in mid-July 1950 to elaborate a series of "control figures" for certain branches of industry such as steel, smelting, machine tools and chemicals. The fundamental aim of this conference was to re-orient the development of Chinese industry so as to modify its essentially colonial structure of a producer of raw materials (110). The incorporation of private industry in this planning operates through the distribution of State orders. These measures were reinforced by the decision of the regional government of Manchuria (111) to start a unified and planned distribution of ten essential raw materials in order to avoid seasonal production slumps, particularly in the coal mines (112). Although the Chinese authorities strongly insist on the necessity "of not exaggerating the possibilities of planning at the present stage" (113), it is clear that we are dealing here with a series of experiences that will facilitate the preparation of integrated national planning at the opportune time.

### Agrarian Reform Continues

The new economic policy inaugurated by Mao Tse-tung in June 1950 opens, we have said, a "course toward the rich peasant." In his speech of May 1, 1950, cited above, Liu Shao-chi criticized the too brutal fashion in which the Communist cadres had imposed the Forced Loan on the rich peasants. But the real problem of the attitude to be taken toward the village bourgeoisie arose in a sharp form the moment the government prepared to continue the agrarian reform south of the Yangtze, which had been stopped in 1949. The manner in which this agrarian reform was approached and carried out is highly characteristic of the transitional stage through which China is passing today and of the contradictory elements in the politics of the Communist Party.

The CP leadership sought to postpone as long as possible carrying out the agrarian reform in Southern China, for economic as well as political reasons. From the point of view of production, the agrarian reform inevitably provoked, if only for one harvest, supplementary difficulties through the overturns of all kinds which accompanied it in the village. From the point of view of a revolutionary movement *fighting for power*, these difficulties cannot be considered as anything but overhead expenses of the revolution. In history up to now it has not been possible to achieve any revolution without provoking a temporary setback of the productive forces, a setback which appears inevitable even from the viewpoint of the subsequent development of these productive forces. The Chinese Communists by contrast found themselves in the unique position of having *already conquered power* while the revolution which they headed had not yet been effected over the major part of the national territory! The fundamental aims which this position posed were not only social but of an economic nature; it was a question of conquering famine and inflation and along this road anything that could diminish agrarian production, even one harvest, appeared harmful. This point of view exerted its weight

not only in the delay and hesitations with which Mao Tse-tung decided on the development of the agrarian reform in Southern China. It also stamped its seal on the very methods of the reform.

In thus taking the economic point of view on the agrarian problem, the leadership of the Chinese CP at the same time chose in full consciousness a definite political and social orientation. The desire to "limit casualties," to "maintain a maximum of stability in the countryside" went against the aspirations and desires of the poor peasants who had waited for decades for their liberation from the yoke of the land owners, the money lenders and tax collectors. Now, in Southern China, as we have already indicated, the urban bourgeoisie represented the predominant element among the land owners in many provinces (114). The present orientation of the Chinese CP, however, is that of making a "bloc" with this "national bourgeoisie" whose representatives sit beside the Communist leaders in the Central Government of People's China. Agrarian reform in the South thus risks undermining the very base of this bloc. Concern not to cut this alliance prematurely no doubt enters heavily into the delay with which the agrarian reform has been launched in the South.

Nevertheless, absolute necessity forced the CP to carry out the reform; and the factors which had delayed its execution ended up by influencing above all the *form of its application*. Without agrarian reform in South China, richest and most advanced part of the country, no unified national market for the industrial products could be created and all the plans for industrialization of the country would miscarry. Without continuation of the agrarian reform in the South, the CP risked, in addition, loss of support from the Southern peasantry at the very moment when the first enthusiasm of the peasants of the North for the agrarian reform carried out there began to calm down. The relation of forces in the government itself would have become modified from this viewpoint; the bourgeoisie would have regained confidence, economically and politically, in its future and the South would have become the base of operations for the counter-revolution. In fact, it is in this part of the country that the Kuomintang bands have maintained their activity without cease since the end of the war on the mainland (115). To cut the ground from under their feet through the agrarian reform was certainly not the least important objective sought by the Chinese CP in following this policy. And the existence of real peasant pressure for the reform was frankly admitted by authoritative Communist sources (116).

### Yielding to Pressure of Masses

To prepare the reform and contain the impatience of the peasants until after the first harvest of 1950, the government on February 28, 1950, published "directives on lowering the rate of taxes and on collecting taxes in kind in the newly liberated zones" (117). In accordance with these directives various cuts in the tax rate were granted by the different regional and provincial authorities. In the region of Eastern China a limitation of 35% maximum of the farm crop had already been granted several weeks previously (118). At the same time, the government was

concerned above all with not diminishing its own revenues. Since some land owners did not dare claim payment of the tax from the peasants, they found themselves without means of covering their obligations to the state (119). Because of this the directives insisted that taxes be paid regularly and that the land owners and peasants fulfill their obligations. In fact, the directives prescribed that "the number of those obliged to pay taxes in kind shall not be less than 90% of the total rural population" (by district).

Announced by Mao Tse-tung in his speech before the Central Committee of the Chinese CP June 7, 1950 ("100,000 cadre elements are ready to launch the agrarian reform in the newly liberated regions"), the Law on Agrarian Reform was presented by Liu Shao-chi before the National Committee of the Political Consultative Council June 14 and finally adopted June 28, 1950. The text of this speech as well as the text of the Law makes clear the important limits of the reform which we have summarized in the formula "course toward the rich peasant." It represents a considerable step backward in comparison to the manner in which the agrarian reform was carried out in Northern China. Liu Shao-chi declared:

"In the period between July 1946 and October 1947 in many regions of North China, Shantung and Northeast China, the peasant masses and our rural militants were not able (!), in carrying out the agrarian reform, to follow the directives published May 4, 1946 by the Central Committee of the Chinese CP, directives laying down as inviolable in the main the land and property of the rich peasants. They did it according to their own ideas and confiscated the land and property of rich peasants as well as the big land holders." (120)

He explains at the same time that the CP was obliged in this period to tolerate these "excesses" to obtain the support of the village poor:

"... we authorized the peasants to requisition the land and excess property of the rich peasants, and to confiscate all the property of the big land owners to satisfy in a certain measure the requirements of needy peasants so that the peasants would join with greater revolutionary enthusiasm in the people's war of liberation." (121)

To block confiscation of the land is not only an economic necessity; it is also a means of limiting the revolutionary activity of the masses in the countryside:

"If the peasants take the initiative in undertaking the agrarian reform, it is necessary to dissuade them. . . we must not let disorder be established and we must no longer tolerate the deviations and disorder for long without remedying them. . . The implementation by the People's Government of a policy of maintaining the holdings of the rich peasants will enable us generally to neutralize them and it will thus be possible to better protect the middle peasants and to bring to an end the useless agitation among the peasants. . ." (122)

And if these admonitions were still not sufficiently clear, they were accompanied by an open threat:

"If, in certain regions, deviations and a certain disorder appear when the agrarian reform is begun, deviations and disorder which are not susceptible to rapid liquidation, it will be necessary to halt realization of the agrarian reform in those regions in order to correct these deviations. . ." (123)

Naturally the speech of Liu Shao-chi as well as the text of the Law on Agrarian Reform state flatly that all commercial and industrial enterprises belonging to land owners, urban bourgeoisie and rich peasants must be left untouched. The Law does not even broach the question of cancelling the debts and mortgages which in Southern China more than elsewhere constitute the main component of the misery of the poor peasant.

As for the rest, the Law continues the essential forms on carrying out the division of the land in force since the agrarian reform in the North. Confiscated land is to be taken over by the Peasants' Association and distributed "in a rational, uniform and equitable manner among the poor peasants who possess little or no land and lack other means of production" (124). Draft animals and tools are confiscated along with the land. Big forests, irrigation works, extended reaches of uncultivated land, salt-marshes, ore bodies, lakes, rivers, ports are to be nationalized. Big tea plantations, mulberry cultivations, etc., already worked according to large scale methods can be nationalized in certain cases. Finally, this limited agrarian reform as a whole is to be applied gradually in the winter of 1951 and even 1952. It should be underlined that in certain provinces where the "interlacing" of the old Kuomintang cadres and Communist cadres is farthest advanced (Yunnan, Szechwan, etc.), the reform is postponed until 1952.

### A Condition of Dual Power

We shall examine later the economic consequences of this reform; but the political and social consequences are clear. Whether it wished to or not, the government found itself compelled to institute a genuine *dual power* in Southern China. On the provincial and district level, the majority of the old cadres remain in place; on the local level their class enemies, the poor peasants of the *Peasants' Associations*, bid fair to seize all the actual power in carrying out the agrarian reform. In vain the central government tries to block the present stage of the development of the class struggle in the countryside. Despite the government, the class struggle manifests itself in all the regions of China. Even while Liu Shao-chi spoke against all "useless agitation" among the peasants, the *New China News Agency* reported in its daily bulletin of June 11, 1950 that the peasants of Hupeh province had imposed a radical change in the tax structure:

	Formerly	In 1950
Owners as a whole paid	3.2%	They paid 50%
Rich peasants paid	7.9%	They paid 8%
Middle peasants paid	29.0%	They paid 15%
Poor peasants paid	61.0%	They paid 8%

At the same time, the poor peasants complained that in this province alone no taxes had been paid on 2,520,000 acres of unregistered land held by land owners and rich peasants. We dare say these various changes have "agitated"

the villages of Hupeh not a little despite what Liu Shao-chi might have desired. . .

It was by basing itself on the peasantry that the Chinese CP was able to conquer power, and that is why the nationwide extension of the agrarian reform was inevitable. But what happened when the peasant armies entered the big industrial cities of Eastern China? To properly answer this question it must be understood that these peasant armies were headed by a party that in program as well as political perspectives, tradition, consciousness and tempering of cadres did not issue from the peasantry but remained for close to three decades the main spokesman of the Chinese proletariat. To be sure, this party fought for the bloc of "four classes," it came out in favor of collaboration with the "industrial bourgeoisie," with the representatives of which it constituted a coalition government. But it affirmed at the same time that "the working class has become the ruling class of the nation" and that it is only a question of time until the construction of a socialist society can be undertaken in China.

### The Working Class and the "New Democracy"

These contradictory aspects of the policy of the Chinese CP are faithfully reflected in its attitude toward the workers and in the reactions of the workers toward it. On the one hand, with its entrance into the big cities, the Peoples' Army of Liberation promised complete protection of private property. It repressed all disorders and attempts of the workers to create on their own initiative the "big overturn" announced by the Chinese CP (125). But at the same time it lifted all restrictions on trade union action and favored a rapid rise of the trade union movement that thoroughly upset the relation of forces between employers (Chinese and foreign) and workers. The struggle, organization and development of class consciousness of the workers likewise received an immense impulse on the arrival of the Communist armies, since the workers took at their word the CP leaders who talked about the "leading role of the working class." Quickly disappointed by the passive attitude of the Communist leaders toward them, they have since then fallen back into an attitude of cautious expectancy toward the regime, an attitude all current observers have noted (126).

The two most important concessions the workers received from the new power were establishment of a genuine sliding scale of wages based on purchasing power in kind, and enactment of the first social insurance and health laws to be generally imposed on all factories. The rest, they conquered themselves through the stormiest economic action. Thus official statistics show in Shanghai 9,027 labor disputes between May 1949 and May 1950 (127). Avenging their past miseries and humiliations, the Shanghai workers forced payment in particular of enormous back wages, ruining certain foreign firms (128). In certain cities, above all in Shanghai itself, these gains were however in large measure neutralized by the agonizing development of unemployment. Out of an industrial proletariat of 1,200,000 persons in Shanghai, 350,000 were listed without work in

December 1949 - January 1950 (129). The evacuation of part of Shanghai's industries and the ensuing dispersion of the vanguard of the city's proletariat were certainly not unrelated to the fear the leaders of the Chinese CP must have felt before these workers, militant and strongly conscious of their own class interests.

The anxiety of the CP not to alienate at one blow the sympathy or even the goodwill of the workers seems however to have been sufficiently strong during the first period after the constitution of the People's Central Government to prevent any measure tending to run counter to the proletariat. It was not until the government felt itself firmly seated in power, after the successful stabilization of its money, that it began to harden its attitude toward the working class.

### Attitude to Workers' Struggles

Li Li-san speaks of the exaggerated demands of the workers, of the necessity

" . . . of correcting the workers' persistent (habit) of occupying themselves exclusively with their own interests without taking into account the general interests. . . of correcting (the error) of workers who in their own narrow interests make exaggerated, inadmissible demands" (130).

These remarks, repeated by other government officials, culminated in the setting up of "consultative commissions of Labor and Capital" which established a general system of compulsory arbitration (131). These commissions do not grant the workers any right of management or control over private industry, but do allow measures tending especially to increase production. Decisions cannot be made except by common agreement, and in important decisions, the entire staff of the concern must be consulted. Within the framework of the new economic policy inaugurated by Mao Tse-tung in March 1950, the measure in fact lays down the principle in Chinese private industry of "producing first, demanding better conditions later"; and represents a serious setback for the Chinese labor movement in comparison with the rising militancy from the spring of 1949 to the spring of 1950.

Nevertheless, while marshalling demagogic arguments to implant the idea that increased production in private industry represents the common interests of workers and capitalists, Li Li-san insisted in his speech on the legitimacy of a certain limited militancy on the part of the workers:

" . . . The Department of Labor cannot, naturally, eliminate altogether the conflicts existing between labor and capital. In fact, so long as private capital exists, conflicts between labor and capital will continue to exist. . . (it is necessary) to extend everywhere the system of collective agreements. . . etc., etc." (132).

In the same fashion, the new trade union law reflects the contradictory elements of this labor policy of the Chinese CP at the present stage. For the first time in China, the law recognizes the right of wage-earners, including gov-

ernment employes, to organize. At the same time, the following clause limits this newly conquered labor right:

"Every union upon being organized must apply to the Chinese General Confederation of Labor. . . so that, after examination and approval, the Chinese GCL. . . files for its registration with the People's Government of the place where it has been established. . . All other groupings which are not constituted in accordance with the requirements (cited above). . . cannot be called trade unions or enjoy the rights provided in this law" (133).

In practice this establishes the absolute monopoly of the Chinese CP, since it can, through the GCL, dissolve or force into illegality any union which disagrees with this or that aspect of its labor policy, thus clearly demonstrating that the party leadership fears such reactions from the working class.

### Workers' Role in Nationalized Industry

In nationalized industry, where the biggest part of the industrial proletariat is concentrated, factory councils have been created. Contrary to the Stalinist theory prevailing in the USSR as well as in the "people's democracies" with the exception of Yugoslavia, the Chinese Communists have not refurbished the pernicious myth of "the identity of interests between the management of (nationalized) enterprises and the workers." In the report cited above, Li Li-san explicitly declares:

"In the State enterprises there is no longer a conflict of classes, but other conflicts, partial or general, still exist. . . Certain people deny the existence of such conflicts; they hold that the head-foreman acts in the name of the State, his instructions are equivalent to a law or ruling which no one can oppose. This point of view is false. . ." (134).

And in an article commenting on the trade union law, the same author, a specialist of the Chinese CP on labor questions, writes:

"In the State enterprises, the policy (to be followed) must consist of taking into account public and private interests, and the unions have the duty of protecting the interests of the mass of workers." (135).

This conception, half-way between the Stalinist bureaucratic conception and Leninism, is expressed quite fully in the statute on factory councils, which, according to the provisional Constitution, possess the "right of control over production" but in practice have only a consultative function and are presided over by the heads of the enterprises. The Yugoslav Communists say on this subject:

". . . the People's Republic of China has begun to introduce workers' councils and management committees, and this only in the nationalized enterprises. The system of management in the People's Republic of China is in fact a compromise between the Soviet principle of bureaucratic-administrative management and the principle of Marx, 'the factories to the workers.' The management committee is dominated by the manager. . . and the latter possesses greater and more decisive powers than the organs elected by the worker collectives." (136).

Other Yugoslav sources report that a Soviet magazine held the Chinese legislation on factory councils to be too "liberal." Kao-kang, head of the regional government of Manchuria, reported that in some factories the unions have a tendency to completely replace the manager, which is a strong indication of the pressure toward workers' management pure and simple (137). He also extols Stakhanovism, but in terms which seem almost a criticism of the Stalinist system:

"It is necessary however to understand that increased output is, after all, a function of human capacity. Any output exceeding human capacity is incorrect. This means that in the movement for the establishment of new records we demand a rational output according to average human capacity and the technical conditions at our disposal at present. We must at the same time stimulate and encourage the initiative of the workers and specialists. . . This will permit all the workers to attain certain new records which up until now have been made only by a minority" (138).

*The Economist* (November 18, 1950) asserts that Chinese Stakhanovism operates at the expense of industrial equipment, which is not in contradiction with the concept outlined by Kao-kang.

Among all these contradictory tendencies, the Chinese CP tries to maintain an intermediate position, basing itself on the working class in order to keep the bourgeoisie in hand; limiting the action of the workers so that it can continue the present stage of collaboration with private capital.

### Soviet Bureaucracy and the Revolution

We can thus assume that on a certain number of problems of political and organizational orientation, the Chinese CP has not simply copied or imitated the "solutions" and institutions of the Stalinist bureaucracy in the USSR, but has tried to elaborate its own conceptions, corresponding to its own experience. In fact, the very victory of Mao Tse-tung over the rotten Chiang Kai-shek regime is due in large measure to the fact that even before the war the Chinese CP began to work out its own political orientation and does not seem to have been guided by directives coming from the Kremlin.

The fundamental conception of the politics of the Chinese CP was elaborated in Mao Tse-tung's book, *The New Democracy*, published in 1940 when direct relations between Moscow and Yen-an were interrupted. It looked like a public insult when Chen Po-ta, in an article celebrating Stalin's contributions to the victory of the Chinese revolution on the occasion of the 70th birthday of the "Father of the Peoples," candidly explained:

"It was only after the 1942 movement of ideological reorientation that Stalin's numerous works on China were systematically published by our party. . . Many comrades of our party who in fact led the Chinese revolution never had occasion to make a systematic study of Stalin's numerous works on China. Among them was Comrade Mao Tse-tung" (139).

In fact, the new statutes and program of the Chinese CP adopted in May 1945 did not even mention the name of Stalin (140) but openly declared that the programmatic foundation of the party was represented by "Marxism-Leninism and the Thought of Mao Tse-tung." It is difficult to believe that many present leaders of the Chinese CP, who either participated intimately in the leadership of the party during the great revolution of 1925-27 or lived abroad for long periods since then, can be ignorant of the real role played by the leadership of the Communist International, and especially by Stalin, in the organization of the great defeat. In their official writings, they continue the tradition inaugurated by Stalinism, of making Chen Tu-hsiu, General Secretary of the Chinese CP from 1921 to 1927, the scapegoat for all the opportunist mistakes committed under direct orders of the Kremlin. But they must know that a week before Chiang Kai-shek began to massacre the Communists in Shanghai, Stalin declared in a speech in Moscow, April 5, 1927:

"Chiang Kai-shek is submitting to discipline. The Kuomintang is a bloc, a sort of revolutionary parliament (!), with the Right, the Left, and the Communists. Why make a coup d'etat? Why drive away the Right when we have the majority (!) and when the Right listens to us? . . . Chiang Kai-shek has perhaps no sympathy for the revolution, but he is leading the army and cannot do otherwise (!) than lead it against the imperialists" (141).

### Recent Hostile Acts of Stalin

They cannot fail to note, especially if they study all of Stalin's works on China, how for years the leadership of the Communist International defended a position diametrically opposed to the one they themselves advanced beginning in 1940, in regard to the impossibility of carrying out the bourgeois-democratic revolution under the leadership of the bourgeoisie in China. Above all, they cannot forget that coinciding with the Japanese debacle in the summer of 1945, when they began to move toward the rapid occupation of northern China, Stalin sprung a surprise agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, recognizing his government as the only legal government of China and stabbing the Chinese Communists in the back! (142) They cannot forget that at the beginning of the civil war in 1945-46, the Kremlin helped Chiang Kai-shek install Kuomintang functionaries in Manchuria by prolonging Russian occupation of Manchurian centers, on express demand of the Chinese marshal, until the arrival of Nationalist reinforcements. Nor can they forget the evacuation of Harbin, when the Russian troops took with them the hated Kuomintang functionaries, giving them safe-conduct to Nationalist territory (143); nor that in 1947, on the eve of their great offensive to liberate the whole northern plain of China, Stalin counseled them not to attack the big cities but to continue their guerrilla struggle.

They cannot forget that upon the popular uprising in the province of Sinkiang, the Soviet bureaucracy helped Chiang Kai-shek to dissolve the new insurrectional power and return a part of the old feudal rulers to power in a coalition government which the people had to overthrow a second time (144). Belden even affirms that he heard

many Chinese Communists declare that in the USSR the farmers are "serfs of the State" (145). The Yugoslav example shows us how important these experiences are for determining the future course of the Chinese revolution, even if at the present stage the Chinese Communists abstain from delimiting themselves publicly from the Kremlin.

### Present State of Sino-Soviet Relations

Nevertheless, a break between Peiping and Moscow in the near future would be a surprise. Powerful objective forces still make such a break highly improbable. The intervention of the Soviet bureaucracy in People's China is different in form and substance from that in the European "buffer zone." Unlike the mixed companies set up by the Kremlin in eastern Europe, all of which represent simple exploitation by the Soviet bureaucracy of the *already existing* industries and manpower, the mixed companies established in China (Sino-Soviet oil company, Sino-Soviet company for the development of rare and non-ferrous metals in Sinkiang, Sino-Soviet civil aviation company) involve a real investment of capital on the part of the USSR that favors early development of the productive forces, objective No. 1 of the Chinese Communists (146).

And if the Sino-Soviet treaty, concluded by Mao Tse-tung in Moscow after lengthy negotiations testifying to the independent spirit of the Chinese, imposes on the People's Republic of China the payment of indemnities to the USSR for expenditures on the Chinese railway construction in Changchun, Port Arthur and Dairen, the return of these Soviet enclaves to China represents a satisfaction, as the agreement openly states, "to the national honor and dignity of the Chinese People" (147). Moscow drew some conclusions from the break with the Yugoslav CP and is trying not to irritate the Chinese Communists by a condescending attitude on secondary questions. The Kremlin's distrust of Peiping is, however, indicated by the fact that deliveries of modern arms, particularly jet planes, are made in such a way that control of the materiel remains in Soviet hands, and by the fact that the USSR seems to have established military bases in Sinkiang (148).

As long as the Chinese retain essential control of the Communist movement in a series of Asiatic countries (Indo-China, Malaya, etc. — as demonstrated by the exclusively Chinese leadership of the conference of Asiatic and Australasian unions held at Peiping from November 16 to December 3, 1949), and thereby clash directly with imperialism, they will have to maintain close relations with the Kremlin. As long as imperialism maintains its factual blockade of China as to the principal raw materials and so-called "strategic" equipment, the restricted economic aid which they can obtain from the USSR will seem all the more appreciable. And above all: as long as the revolutionary forces independent of the Kremlin are unable to appear as an important political factor in Asia or elsewhere, the Chinese CP, drawing conclusions in turn from the current evolution of the Yugoslav affair, will essay only with extreme caution to draw away from the Kremlin.

In the long run, however, the social forces of the Chinese revolution and not the political or economic considerations of its leaders will determine relations between Peiping and Moscow. The development of the rural bourgeoisie, the eventual difficulty of maintaining industrial equipment, the eventual modification of the international relationship of forces in favor of imperialism, the appearance of capitulatory Rightist tendencies in the Chinese CP, could, under a condition of prolonged passivity and feebleness of the proletariat, bring about a reversal of Chinese foreign policy. An attempt, not yet excluded, by the Kremlin to reach an understanding with the State Department at the expense of China, could have similar results. Contrariwise, a new development of the Chinese revolution, an upsurge of the labor movement, a leftist orientation of the CP, the favorable development of revolutionary forces in the world, above all in India, Japan and western Europe, could bring about at a later stage a break "to the left" between Chinese Communism and the Kremlin. To be realized, however, the two possibilities require rupture of the new class equilibrium in China today, the equilibrium on which the Chinese CP bases its power.

### Role of the CP

This equilibrium is not the product of accident alone in China's historic process. It was consciously prepared during long years by the CP of that country in the course of an ideological evolution which led it to reconsider the fundamental problems of the Chinese revolution.

In the fall of 1936, Mao Tse-tung, summing up the experiences of the revolution and civil war, wrote a small book called *The Strategy of the Revolutionary War in China* in which, without basing himself on a Marxist analysis of class relations in Chinese society and drawing only the empirical lessons of the past struggles, he reached the following conclusion, a complete revision of Stalinist conceptions of China:

"The enemy of the revolution has been not only imperialism but also the regime of the big bourgeoisie allied with the big land owners. The national bourgeoisie has become an extension of the big bourgeoisie, leaving only the Chinese C.P. to lead the revolution. Complete command in the hands of the Communist Party is the basic condition for ability to guide the war to a successful conclusion." (149).

In the same work he assigns a negligible, secondary role to the proletariat in the Chinese revolution and arrives at the conclusion that a revolutionary victory in China is impossible without a victorious war of peasant armies led by the CP.

Only a few copies of Mao's book were printed at the time and it did not at all influence the immediate strategy of the party. Quite the contrary: In 1937 Mao made a "bloc" with the Kuomintang against Japanese imperialism in which he openly abandoned all struggle for agrarian reform in the liberated regions. Up to now he has not been able to name a single advantage of this coalition with the land owners in northern China. Moreover, it must be added that this bloc was broken only under the pressure of

the masses, who began to divide the land themselves in 1946 without waiting for directives from the CP. (150).

In the meantime, however, reconsideration of the character of the Chinese revolution by the leaders of the Chinese CP has progressed considerably. Beginning in 1940 in his book, *The New Democracy*, published in printed form several months before *The Strategy of the Revolutionary War* (which appeared in March 1941), Mao characterized the revolution as follows:

"This stage of the Chinese revolution. . . by its social character is a bourgeois democratic revolution of a new kind; it is not yet the socialist revolution of the proletariat, but it already constitutes a part of the world socialist revolution of the proletariat. . . This first stage cannot be the construction of a bourgeois society under hegemony of the capitalist classes in China, but the creation of a new, really democratic society through union of the various revolutionary layers of China. . ." (151).

Several years later, speaking before the Seventh Congress of the Chinese CP, Liu Shao-chi declared still more clearly:

" . . . because the fundamental motor forces of the Chinese revolution are the masses of the people, with the peasantry as principal force and the proletariat as guide, the Chinese revolution cannot be either a bourgeois-democratic revolution of the old type nor a proletarian socialist revolution of the new type. . . In this revolution, the principal motor forces are the proletariat, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie." (152).

Finally, reviewing after the event the development of the victorious military campaign, the Central Committee of the Chinese CP thus defined the character of the third Chinese revolution:

"The people's democratic dictatorship, led by the working class, based on the alliance of workers and farmers, demands that the Communist Party of China seriously unite the whole working class, the whole peasantry, the revolutionary intelligentsia as the guiding forces and as the basic forces of that dictatorship." (153)

It was with this conception that the armies led by the CP were launched toward victory in 1947 on a formidable wave of peasant insurrections. To carry out the tasks of the bourgeois revolution completely through conquest of power by the Communist Party without touching a single one of the tasks of the proletarian revolution—this appeared to be the program of the Chinese CP which permitted it to achieve victory in the first stage of the revolution. This victory was possible only because in practice the CP dropped the Stalinist idea of carrying out the bourgeois revolution in a fifty-fifty bloc with the "national" bourgeoisie and even under the periodic hegemony of the "national" bourgeoisie.

### Contradictions in Policy Revealed in Practice

But with the conquest of power, the limitations of this program became apparent. The CP wished to construct a "democratic" capitalist economy, but three-fourths of industry was already nationalized. It wished to halt the struggle against the "national" bourgeoisie for a period, but realization of agrarian reform in the south constantly

placed this struggle on the order of the day. It wished to avoid all planning for the time being, but the task of industrializing the Chinese mainland appeared immense and planning seemed to be the only means of getting it going. It wished to leave the road to accumulation open to the rich farmers of the countryside, but despite its intentions, the class struggle blazed up more vigorously than ever. The whole logic of the situation pointed to the conclusions of the Trotskyist theory of the permanent revolution. The present equilibrium of forces cannot last. In the near future the CP will have to decide to sharpen the struggle against the urban and village bourgeoisie, basing itself on the proletariat and poor farmers, if it does not wish to capitulate before the enormous bourgeois pressure which the beginning of peasant "prosperity" is preparing. Will it know how to make this choice?

### Is a Left Turn Possible?

Many reasons permit us to hope for such a development. More than any other Communist Party, the Chinese CP has been obliged to keep a less bureaucratic and centralized structure, to maintain a constant metabolism between its own aspirations and preoccupations and those of the masses. The objective situation pushes it along this road. The party cadres became habituated for years to the regime of *Kung Kie Tche* (guaranteed food, housing, clothing), a Spartan egalitarianism. In his report cited above (p. 75), Liu Shao-chi says that in 1945 half the villages of the liberated regions did not have a single member of the CP! Under such conditions how could the agrarian reform be carried out without permitting relatively free development of the initiative of the masses? The vastness of the Chinese mainland and the extreme density of its population does not at all permit the rapid establishment of bureaucratic control over the awakened masses. The formidable power of this awakening, of peasants freed from the tyranny of the land owners, of women liberated by the new marriage code, of youth finally given a future of hope, of masses avid for education and culture (154), make such control all the more difficult. Thus it was no more than an expression of this objective situation when Liu Shao-chi, submitting the CP statutes to the Seventh Congress, affirmed again and again the party's "faith in the self-emancipation of the people" (op. cit. p. 56), rejecting the whole idea that "the cadres decide everything" and even insisting on the rights of minorities within the party, the majority possibly being wrong during political debates! (Op. cit. p. 83-4). In 1945 such remarks could never have been heard in a party linked to Moscow for a long time. Of course, they have only a formal value. In 1931 and particularly in 1937, on the occasion of two "turns to the right," the leadership of the Chinese CP organized violent campaigns "against counter-revolutionary Trotskyism." But Belden tells how a Communist newspaper in the "liberated regions" publicly criticized the too moderate directives in the application of the agrarian reform. (Op. cit. p. 503). And all observers are unanimous on the extreme "liberalism" at present of the Communist power, the restricted limits of any political repression, the absence of Stalinist-type control of the revolutionary forces in the countryside. If it remains alert

to the voice of the masses, a new turn to the left by the CP is not at all excluded. It fails to heed that voice, its bureaucratization and its course toward the right will signify at the next stage a course *against the masses*.

### Straws in the Wind

To estimate the chances of such a turn to the left, we must not forget the fact that the leadership of the Chinese CP, contrary to the affirmations of some people, has never ceased to consider itself as a *proletarian* leadership. True, the party is composed of an overwhelming majority of petty-bourgeois peasant elements. Its rapid growth (30,000 members in 1937, 1,200,000 in 1945, 4,000,000 at present) signifies an extremely low ideological level. But at the Seventh Congress, when the party was still cut off from the cities, it did not cease insisting on the proletarian character of the party, on the necessity of the non-proletarian members assimilating the proletarian ideology; they even inscribed in the statutes different conditions for admission of workers, poor farmers, middle farmers and intellectuals, etc., increasing the difficulty of their entrance into the party to the degree their mode of existence departs from that of the proletariat (155). Nevertheless, a certain number of rich peasants succeeded in infiltrating into the party and caused it to deviate from its class line in regard to the village. The Central Committee reacted violently to this danger with its February 22, 1948 "Directives on the agrarian reform and the reorganization and purge of the party in the formerly liberated regions" (156). And when the People's Army of Liberation reached the big proletarian centers, the same Central Committee made a resolute change in its attitude toward the relative importance of the working class:

"On account of the disproportion between the popular forces and those of the enemy after the defeat of the Great Revolution of 1927 up to now, the center of gravity of the revolutionary struggle of the Chinese people has been the rural sector, gathering together the rural forces . . . to encircle and take the cities. . . The period when this way of working had to be adopted is now ended. . . The center of gravity of Party work must be placed in the cities" (157).

This turn found its logical conclusion in the halting of peasant recruitment to the Communist Party, which from now is concentrating on winning the industrial workers. The difficulties on this road will remain numerous as long as the Party leadership has nothing to offer the workers except the perspective of increasing production. On this plane likewise, a future turn to the left would correspond to the main concern of the Communist leaders and alone permit the party to become the principal force among the proletariat

### Whither China?

The first stage of the Chinese revolution ended with the overthrow of the power of Chiang Kai-shek. It carried out most of the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, particularly emancipation from imperialist domination (even though foreign capital has not yet been completely



expropriated) and the realization of national unification. It has not yet resolved the agrarian question to the degree demanded in the south, or carried out the expropriation of the urban bourgeoisie and, above all, the cancellation of debts and mortgages. The coming stage, in definitively solving the agrarian question and in order to realize the conclusive victory and consolidation of the revolution, will sharply pose the solution of the proletarian tasks, certain of which have already been outlined. That is why China is still passing through a *transitional period* between the downfall of the old and the definitive establishment of the new regime. Politically it is a *Workers and Farmers Government* still maintaining a coalition with certain elements of the big bourgeoisie. The alliance between the proletariat and the peasantry is in brief the revolutionary alliance with the poor farmers in the North, in the Center the temporary alliance with the rich peasantry and in the South the uncertain alliance with the *urban exploiter* elements who dominate agriculture. Dual power, existing on the village scale, is also reproduced on the national scale in the opposition between various zones and inside the government itself by the presence of bourgeois ministers in its ranks.

The future of China is in the first place the future of 90 million peasant holdings (158). To the degree that agrarian reform is achieved, the immediate future appears brilliant. Under the old regime, rent and taxes, not to mention interest on loans and other supplementary charges, took, on an average, more than 50% of the peasant's crop; in certain prosperous regions, the percentage even reached 75% (159). Today taxes take only an average of 17% of the farm income, and taxes are based on an average yield per acre, so that an increase in yield lowers the proportion of the levy (160). The Chinese peasantry suddenly sees its purchasing power enormously increased, and industry, particularly the textile industry, sees an unlimited market opening before it. In Manchuria where the agrarian reform was carried out first, the levy on the peasantry reached a total of 2.3 million tons of food products in 1949 against 8 million tons under the old regime (161). Consequently in 1950 they were able to buy 9 million bolts of cotton goods as against 3 million in 1949 and 0.8 million in 1947 (before the reform) (162). The cause of the defeat of agrarian revolts of the past — the need to crush the peasantry under a burden of taxes in order to construct a centralized state apparatus — seems to have been checked in People's China thanks to the elimination of corruption, to the frugal ways of the new government, to local self-administration, and above all, to the development of the productive forces.

Only when the agrarian reform is completed throughout China, will a new differentiation of social forces appear in the village on the basis of the private accumulation and the competition of millions of small peasant enterprises. The Mao Tse-tung regime will then experience its first serious test. Before this first crisis is reached, several years remain in which to concentrate on developing industry and raising the standard of living, consciousness and organization of the proletariat. On success in these two domains as well as on the aid the international revolution can give

People's China, depends the future fate of the Chinese revolution.

The victory of Mao Tse-tung smashed the bases of the century-old imperialist domination of Asia. Driving the *H.M. Amethyst* under artillery fire from the Yangtze in 1949, then driving the proud Yankee army from North Korea in 1950, the Chinese People's Army overturned the relation of forces on which the capitalist world has been based for a century. It has avenged the victims of the Taiping and Boxer rebellions, the Shanghai workers of 1927, the peasants of Kiangsi and the millions of other victims of imperialist savagery in Asia. From now on China will no longer develop under the stigma of bandits and opium; modern industry will advance in giant strides and these strides will resound like a death-knell in the ears of the industrialists in Manchester, Bombay and Osaka (163). It is not only through the revolutionary forces which it is unleashing in all of Asia that the Chinese revolution is undermining the world domination of imperialism; it is likewise dealing a mortal blow to the economic foundation of its existence which is rooted in the exploitation of the backward, under-developed countries.

The workers of the advanced European countries and the United States as well as the proletarians of Japan, India, Ceylon and Indonesia are not compelled to follow the tortuous road of Mao Tse-tung—23 years of mass suffering in his country before smashing the enemy. Lenin's road remains all the more on the order of the day while the revolutionary forces of the masses continually grow on a world scale: decisive blows, and audacious strategy make possible today, as in October 1917, an early victory. But they can achieve this victory only if they make their own—without any sectarianism and despite all the reservations due to the opportunism of the leadership of the Chinese CP—the cause of the great Chinese revolution. For a fourth of humanity this revolution sings, and will sing for many years, the Carmagnole of the people in arms and the Marseillaise of the workers.

December 10, 1950

(81) Jean Jacques Brioux, *La Chine du Nationalisme au Communisme*. Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1950. P. 411. (82) New China News Agency, March 1, 1949. (83) May 1, 1950, speech of Liu Shao-chi, Vice-President of the Government and member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party. In *New China News Agency*, daily bulletin, Prague edition, May 1, 1950. P. 13. (84) Report of Chen-yun before the National Committee of the People's Political Consultative Council, June 15, 1950. In *La Situation Interieure de la Chine*, published by *La Documentation Francaise*, October 21, 1950. (85) *Kiai Fang Je-Pao* ("Liberation"), Shanghai daily official organ of the Chinese CP, August 10, 1950. In *La Situation Interieure de la Chine*, published by *La Documentation Francaise*, October 21, 1950. (86) *New China News Agency*, daily bulletin, July 26, 1950. P. 2. (87) *Problemes Economiques*, November 14, 1950. (88) *Problemes Economiques*, April 25, 1950. (89) Speech of Vice-President Liu Shao-chi. *Op. cit.* (90) *Problemes Economiques*, April 25, 1950. (91) *New China News Agency*. Daily bulletin, June 6, 1950. (92) The Chinese Communist press acknowledged that great natural catastrophes had hit certain provinces of eastern China in 1949, Shantung, Kiangsu and Anhwei. According to an editorial in *Kiai Fang Je-pao*, March 9, 1950, more than 15 million victims suffered from famine in these three provinces. (93) *New China News Agency*, September 20, 1950. (94) *Problemes Economiques*, June 20, 1950. Most of the reports on China print-

ed by this review edited by *La Documentation Francaise*, come from France's commercial adviser in China. (95) Report of Kao-kang, head of the government of Manchuria, to the regional Congress of the CP, March 13, 1950. In *La Situation Interieure de la Chine II*. (*La Documentation Francaise*.) (96) See part I of this article in the *Fourth International*, September-October 1950. (97) Tsu Ti-tsin. *La Voie Economique de la Chine*. (98) See *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, October 1, 1950. *Le Soir*, September 2, 1950, etc. (99) *La Situation Interieure de la Chine II*. P. 28. (100) Speech of Liu Shao-chi, May 1, 1950. Op. cit. (101) Report of Kao-kang. Op. cit. (102) *Problemes Economiques*, June 13, 1950. (103) *New China News Agency*, daily bulletin, August 15, 1950. (104) *Problemes Economiques*, December 5, 1950. (105) *The Times*, London, June 7, 1950. *New China News Agency*, daily bulletin, October 27, 1950. (106) Report of Chen-yun before the National Committee of the PPCC, June 15, 1950. In *La Situation Interieure de la Chine I*. P. 25. (107) *Problemes Economiques*, December 5, 1950. (108) *New China News Agency*, daily bulletin, June 5, 1950. (109) Report of Chen-yun before the National Committee of the PPCC. In *La Situation Interieure de la Chine I*. P. 24. (110) *New China News Agency*, daily bulletin, July 21, 1950. (111) At present there are six administrative regions and one autonomous region (Inner Mongolia) each of which has a regional government. (112) *Ibid.* August 19, 1950. (113) *Ibid.* July 21, 1950. (114) See Part I of this article. (115) See the government declaration in the *New China News Agency*, December 6, 1950. (116) *La Situation Interieure de la Chine II*. P. 20. (117) *La Situation Interieure de la Chine I*. P. 9. (118) *Ibid.* P. 15. (119) *La Situation Interieure de la Chine I*. P. 9. (120) "Pour une Paix Durable. . ." (Cominform paper in French) July 21, 1950. (121) *Ibid.* (122) *Ibid.* (123) *Ibid.* (124) Text of the Law on Agrarian Reform in *La Situation de Chine I*. PP. 11-18. (125) It appears nevertheless that cases are strictly limited where the Army repressed movements of the workers by violence. These were only due to the initiative of certain "field commanders" and not to directives of the CP. In these cases the peasant nature of the Army came into collision actually with the opening of the proletarian development of the revolution. (126) Among others: Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World*; *Economist*, September 16, 1950. Jean-Jacques Brieux in his book *La Chine du Nationalisme au Communisme* (p. 392) speaks flatly about the present "unpopularity" of the government among workers. This is all the more remarkable since he espouses in general all the propaganda theses of the Chinese CP and is strongly influenced by Stalinism in all his views on the labor movement and Marxism. (127) Report of the deputy-mayor of Shanghai. In *La Situation Interieure de la Chine II*. P. 23. (128) *The Neue Zuercher Zeitung* of October

1, 1949, mournfully describes how the workers and employees of the American and British general consulates in Shanghai used similar "methods of blackmail." (129) Li Li-san gives the total number of workers in Shanghai in an article reprinted in the *New China News Agency*, September 22, 1950. The figures on the unemployed are derived from the statistics on employment published in *La Situation Interieure de la Chine II*. P. 25 (130) Speech, March 8, 1950, at the first conference of the Chinese Department of Labor. In *La Situation Interieure de la Chine I*, p. 37. (131) *New China News Agency*, May 12, 1950. (132) *La Situation Interieure de la Chine I*, p. 37. (133) *Ibid.*, P. 32 (134) Op. cit. P. 37. (135) *New China News Agency*, daily bulletin, July 9, 1950. (136) Dr. Jovan Djordjevic: "New Management System." In *New Yugoslav Law*, No. 2-3, 1950, P. 27. (137) *La Situation Interieure de la Chine II*, P. 9. (138) *Ibid.*, P. 10. (139) *China Weekly Review*, January 21, 1950. (140) Reprinted in *On the Party* by Liu Shao-chi (Foreign Languages Press, Peiping, 1950, PP. 155-204). (141) Cited by Harold Isaacs. *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, London, 1938. Secker and Warburg. P. 185. Isaacs tells how this speech was suppressed in the official publications of the USSR after events had so cruelly contradicted Stalin. . . (142) Jack Belden, *China Shakes the World*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1949, P. 69. (143) *Ibid.* P. 375. (144) *Tanjug Bulletin*, April 4, 1950. (145) Belden, op. cit., P. 68. (146) *New China News Agency*, bulletin, Oct. 2, 1950. (147) "Pour une Paix Durable. . ." (Cominform paper in French) Feb. 17, 1950. (148) See the revelations of Kyril Kanov in *The Reporter* for Sept. 26 and Oct. 10, 1950, published in *The Militant*, Oct. 16, 1950. Also see the articles by C. Sulzberger in the *N. Y. Times*, May 5, 1950 and by Eric Downton in the *London Daily Telegraph*, June 19, 1950. (149) Mao-Tse-tung. *La Strategie de la Guerre Revolutionnaire en Chine*, Paris 1950. Editions sociales. P. 33.). (150) Belden, op. cit., P. 169. (151) Reprinted in J. J. Brieux, op. cit., P. 329. (152) Liu Shao-chi. *On the Party*. Op. cit. P. 37. (153) *New China News Agency*, bulletin, March 29, 1949. (154) Liu Shao-chi, *On the Party*. (155) Cited in *Le Developpement du Communisme en Chine II*, PP. 28-9. (Edited by *La Documentation Francaise*, June 29, 1950). (156) Resolution adopted by the Central Committee of the Chinese C.P., March 1949, *New China News Agency*, March 29, 1949. (157) According to the 1934 statistics republished in *Le Developpement du Communisme en Chine II*, P. 45. (158) *Quatrieme Internationale*, May-July, 1950. (159) *New China News Agency*. (160) *Ibid.* (161) *Ibid.*, Sept. 22, 1950. (162) Highly characteristic of the transformation of China: it is no longer raw materials, but semi-finished products and cotton goods which today head the exports of Tientsin, China's foremost port. *Problemes Economiques*, Dec. 5, 1950.

## On the 27th Anniversary of Lenin's Death

# Leninism Lives!

It is 27 years since Lenin died. Every day, around the clock, since then, the parasitic Soviet bureaucracy with its huge resources and world-wide machine, under the leadership of Stalin, has labored to subvert the teachings of Lenin, to snuff out the spirit of Leninism and to convert this titan of the proletarian revolution into an ikon. In vain. Leninism lives.

Leninism lives in the mighty challenge of the Asian peoples to world imperialism, whose echoes are today reverberating throughout America. Leninism lives in the struggle of the Balkan peoples, in the first instance in Yugoslavia, where capitalist rule has been discarded and the domination of the Stalinist bureaucracy rejected. Leninism lives in the stirrings of the West European working

class to free the old continent from the bondage of the Dollar which alone props up bankrupt European capitalism.

Leninism lives above all in the world movement of Trotskyism, the conscious expression of the needs and tasks of the insurgent masses, that alone rises to the level now demanded by history.

The European bourgeoisie, and its arrogant counterpart across the Atlantic, have long been prepared "for any and all savageries, bestialities and crimes in order to defend the doomed slavery of capitalism," as Lenin pointed out in 1913. The Russian Revolution, headed by Lenin and Trotsky demonstrated for the first time that this system of enslavement and degredation could be swept from our planet.

Today capitalism in alliance with the most barbaric survivals of Asia's past is being pulverized by the Chinese, Korean, Indo-Chinese and other Asian masses. The same forces unleashed in Czarist Russia in October 1917, and organized by Lenin's genius, are now at work in the colonial world. Lenin's incomparable revolutionary role was graphically preserved for us by his friend, the famous Russian writer Gorki. A cultured Frenchman once accosted him with the following query: "Don't you find that Lenin is a guillotine equipped with a human brain?"

"The workings of his thought," said Gorki, "I would compare with the strokes of a sledge-hammer which, possessed of vision, pulverizes into dust that which should have been annihilated long ago."

### The National Question

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the first of this highest school of thought who walked this earth, discovered the central power-house of revolution and progress, where those before them at best decried poverty or bemoaned misery. Lenin, a man equal in stature to his genius-teachers and standing on their shoulders, was able to discover the revolutionary aspect of the super-exploited and super-oppressed nationalities and colonial peoples.

And here it is fitting to yield the floor to Lenin's great co-worker and continuator, Leon Trotsky had the following to say about Lenin's theory of the role of the national problem in the epoch of the world proletarian revolution — a discovery matched in importance only by the discovery of the labor-theory of value (Marx) and by the theory of the permanent revolution (Trotsky):

"While depicting how capitalism draws into its vortex backward and barbarous countries," wrote Trotsky in 1937, "the (Communist) Manifesto contains no reference to the struggle of colonial and semi-colonial countries for independence. To the extent that Marx and Engels considered the social revolution in the leading civilized countries at least, to be a matter of the next few years, the colonial question was resolved automatically for them, not in consequence of an independent movement of oppressed nationalities, but in consequence of the victory of the proletariat in the metropolitan centers of capitalism. The questions of revolutionary strategy in colonial and semi-colonial countries are therefore not touched upon at all by the Manifesto. Yet these questions demand an independent solution. For example, it is quite self-evident that while the 'national fatherland' has become the most baneful historical brake in advanced capitalist countries, it still remains a relatively progressive factor in backward countries compelled to struggle for an independent existence."

This "independent solution" was provided by Lenin. "The credit for developing revolutionary strategy for oppressed nationalities belongs primarily to Lenin," Trotsky points out.

### World Historic Import

Its historical importance was likewise elucidated by Trotsky: "A complete purge of feudal rubbish from society is conceivable only on the condition that the proletariat, freed from the influence of bourgeois parties, can take its stand at the head of the peasantry and establish its revolu-

tionary dictatorship. By this token, the bourgeois revolution becomes interlaced with the first stage of the socialist revolution, subsequently to dissolve in the latter. The national revolution therewith becomes a link of the world revolution. The transformation of the economic foundation and of all social relations assumes a permanent (uninterrupted) character. For revolutionary parties in backward countries of Asia, Latin America and Africa, a clear understanding of the organic connection between the democratic revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat — and thereby, the international socialist revolution — is a life-and-death question."

The world-shaking significance of Lenin's discovery is now being proved to the hilt in the revolutionary developments in Asia, particularly in China, and in the long-oppressed Balkans, above all in Yugoslavia. Further advance by the revolution in these areas can only take the line of development traced by the great architects of the victorious October.

The Russian Revolution and its leaders armed the coming Asian revolution not only spiritually but materially as well. It was under Lenin that all Czarist privileges in China were abrogated. Thereby the colonial masses received a practical lesson on how the imperialist yoke could be cast off. Later on, in the early Twenties, the Soviet Republic supplied arms and ammunition to the national revolution in China, then headed by the bourgeois revolutionist Sun Yat Sen. With remarkable breadth of vision, it also initiated the organization of the Whampoa Military Academy. That West Point of rising China trained military leadership for both sides in the civil war that ensued, but it also proved indispensable for the organization of the future anti-imperialist armies, not only in China, but in Korea and elsewhere in Asia.

Despite the subsequent treachery of the Stalinist bureaucracy the early impetus given by Leninism to the Asian revolution has thus brought forth the most serious threat to imperialism the world has yet seen. The record of Stalin's treachery and its relation to the complicated problems of the Chinese and Asian revolution is a subject for an independent study. Suffice it here to note that great as that treachery has been, the power of Lenin and Trotsky's October is nevertheless emerging as the force impelling oppressed Asia to victory over imperialism. It is a token of the coming triumph of Leninism over the Stalinist bureaucracy on a world scale.

\* \* \*

That which came from the Russian peasant in Lenin combined with Marxism proved more than sufficient to wipe out Czarism and to rid the Russian people of the rule of landlords and capitalists forever. Our readers will be able to gather for themselves what a force was generated by this unequalled combination from the first article by Leon Trotsky that follows. What will Leninism combined with the native ingenuity of the Asian masses produce? This our generation, and especially the youth, is privileged to witness with its own eyes.

The two articles by Leon Trotsky we republish appeared up to 1923 in commemorative literature published in the Soviet Union on the successive anniversaries of Lenin's death, until Stalinism rose. The translation from the Russian text is by John G. Wright. — Editor.

# V. I. LENIN

(Born April 9, 1870 -- Died, January 21, 1924)

Two Articles by LEON TROTSKY

## On His Fiftieth Birthday

Lenin's internationalism needs no recommendation. It is best characterized by Lenin's irreconcilable break, in the first days of the world war, with that counterfeit internationalism which reigned in the Second International. The official leaders of "Socialism" used the parliamentary tribune to reconcile the interests of the fatherland with the interests of mankind by way of abstract arguments in the spirit of the old Cosmopolites. In practice this led, as we know, to the support of the predatory fatherland by the proletarian forces.

Lenin's internationalism is in no sense a formula for verbally reconciling nationalism with internationalism. It is a formula for international revolutionary action. The world's territory in the clutches of the so-called civilized section of mankind is regarded as a unified arena where a gigantic struggle occurs, whose component elements are constituted by the individual peoples and their respective classes. No single major issue can be kept restricted within a national framework. Visible and invisible threads connect such an issue with dozens of events in all corners of the world. In the evaluation of international factors and forces Lenin is freer than anyone else from national prejudices.

Marx concluded that the philosophers had sufficiently interpreted the world and that the real task was to change it. But he, the pioneering genius, did not live to see it done. The transformation of the old world is now in full swing and Lenin is the foremost worker on this job. His internationalism is a practical appraisal plus a practical intervention into the march of historical events on a world scale and with world-wide aims. Russia and her fate is only a single element in this titanic historical struggle upon whose outcome hinges the fate of mankind.

Lenin's internationalism needs no recommendation. But at the same time Lenin himself is profoundly national. His roots are deep in modern Russian history, he draws it up into himself, gives it its highest expression, and precisely in this way attains the highest levels of international action and world influence.

At first glance the characterization of Lenin as a "national" figure may seem surprising, but, in essence, this follows

as a matter of course. To be able to lead such a revolution, without parallel in the history of peoples, as Russia is now living through, it is obviously necessary to have an indissoluble, organic bond with the main forces of the people's life, a bond which springs from the deepest roots.

Lenin personifies the Russian proletariat, a young class, which politically is scarcely older than Lenin himself, but a class which is profoundly national, for recapitulated in it is the entire past development of Russia, in it lies Russia's entire future, with it the Russian nation rises or falls. Freedom from routine and banality, freedom from imposture and convention, resoluteness of thought, audacity in action — an audacity which never turns into foolhardiness — this is what characterizes the Russian working class, and with it also Lenin.

The nature of the Russian proletariat, which has made it today the most important force of the world revolution, had been prepared beforehand by the entire course of Russian national history: the barbaric cruelty of the Czarist autocracy, the insignificance of the privileged classes, the feverish growth of capitalism fed by the leeches of the world stock market, the escheated character of the Russian bourgeoisie, their decadent ideology, their shoddy politics. Our "Third Estate" knew neither a Reformation nor a great revolution of their own and could never have known them. Therefore the revolutionary tasks of the Russian proletariat assumed a more all-embracing character. Our past history knows no Luther, no Thomas Munzer, no Mirabeau, no Danton, no Robespierre. Exactly for that reason the Russian proletariat has its Lenin. What was lost in way of tradition has been won in the sweep of the revolution.

Lenin mirrors the working class, not only in its proletarian present but also in its peasant past, still so recent. This most indisputable leader of the proletariat, not only outwardly resembles a peasant, but there is something inwardly in him strongly smacking of a peasant. Facing the Smolny stands the statue of the other great figure of the world proletariat: Karl Marx, on a stone pedestal in a black frock coat. Assuredly, this is a trifle, but it is impossible even to imagine Lenin putting on a black

frock coat. Some portraits of Marx show him wearing a dress shirt against whose broad expanse something resembling a monocle dangles.

That Marx was not inclined to foppery is quite clear to all who have an inkling of the spirit of Marx. But Marx was born and grew up on a different national-cultural soil, lived in a different atmosphere, as did also the leading personalities of the German working class, whose roots reach back not to a peasant village, but to the corporation guilds and the complex city culture of the middle ages.

Marx's very style, rich and beautiful, in which strength and flexibility, wrath and irony, severity and refinement are combined, also contains the literary and esthetic accumulations of the entire German socio-political literature since the days of the Reformation and even before. Lenin's literary and oratorical style is awesomely simple, utilitarian, ascetic, as is his whole make-up. But in this mighty asceticism there is not a trace of a moralistic attitude. There is no principle here, no elaborated system and, of course, no posturing; it is simply the outward expression of inward conservation of strength for action. It is a peasant's practical proficiency but on a colossal scale.

The entire Marx is contained in the **Communist Manifesto** in the foreword to his **Critique, in Capital**. Even if he had not been the founder of the First International he would always remain what he is today. Lenin, on the other hand, is contained entirely in revolutionary action. His scientific works are only a preparation for action. If he never published a single book in the past, he would forever enter into history just as he enters it now: the leader of the proletarian revolution, the founder of the Third International.

A clear, scientific system — the materialistic dialectic — is necessary for action on such a historical scale as devolved upon Lenin — it is necessary but not sufficient. Needed here in addition is that irrevealeable creative power we call intuition: The ability to judge events correctly on the wing, to separate the essential and important from the husks and incidentals, to fill in mentally the missing parts of the picture, to draw to conclusion the thoughts of others and

above all those of the enemy, to connect all this into a unified whole and to deal a blow the moment that the "formula" for this blow comes to mind. This is the intuition for action. In one of its aspects it merges with what we call shrewdness.

When Lenin, screwing up his left eye, listens over the radio to a parliamentary speech of one of the imperialist makers of destiny or goes over the text of the latest diplomatic note, a mixture of bloodthirsty duplicity and polished hypocrisy, he resembles a very wise mouz-hik whom words cannot cajole nor sugary phrases ensnare. This is the peasant shrewdness elevated to genius, armed with the last word of scientific thought.

The young Russian proletariat was able to accomplish what it has only by pulling behind itself, by its roots, the heavy mass of the peasantry. This was prepared for by our whole national past.

But precisely because the proletariat has come to power through the course of events, our revolution has been able suddenly and drastically to overcome the national narrowness and provincial benightedness of Russia's past history. Soviet Russia has become not only the haven for the Communist International, but also the living embodiment of its program and methods.

By paths, unknown and as yet unexplored by science, by which the human personality is molded, Lenin has assimilated from the national milieu everything he needed for the greatest revolutionary action in the history of humanity. Exactly because the socialist revolution, which has long had its international theoretical expression, found for the first time in Lenin its national embodiment, Lenin became, in the full and true sense of the word, the revolutionary leader of the world proletariat. And that is how his fiftieth birthday found him.

Pravda, April 23, 1920.

is orphaned. The working class is orphaned. It is this feeling that wells up over all the others at the news of the death of our teacher, our leader.

How shall we go forward? Shall we find the road? May we not go astray? For Lenin, comrades, is no longer with us!

Lenin is no more, but Leninism lives on. The immortal in Lenin, his doctrine, his work, his method, his example, lives on in us, lives on in the party he created, lives on in the first workers' state he headed and guided.

Our hearts are now so overcome with boundless grief, because all of us, thanks to history's supreme favor, were born contemporaries of Lenin, worked shoulder to shoulder with him, and learned from him. Our party is Leninism in action, our party is the collective leader of the toilers. In each of us flames a particle of Lenin, and it is that which is the best part of each one of us.

How shall we go forward? We shall go with the torch of Leninism in our hands. How shall we find the road? — With our party's collective mind, with our party's collective will we shall find it!

And tomorrow, and the day after, and next week and the month after, we shall keep asking ourselves, is Lenin really no more? For his death will long continue to seem to us incredible, and impossible, and a monstrous, arbitrary deed of nature.

Let that same sharp stab which we feel, which our hearts shall experience each time at the thought that Lenin is no more — let this become for each of us a reminder, a warning, a summons: You have a greater responsibility now. Be worthy of the leader who taught you!

In grief, mourning, and sorrow we firmly close our ranks and hearts; close them more firmly for the new battles ahead. Comrades-brothers-in-arms, Lenin is no longer with us. Farewell, Ilyich! Farewell, our leader!

Tiflis, Railway Station.  
January 22, 1924.

## Lenin Dead

Lenin is no more. No more Lenin. The blind laws governing the work of the blood vessels have cut short his life. Medicine has proved impotent to accomplish what was so passionately longed for, what millions of human hearts demanded from medicine.

How many are there who would have unhesitatingly given their own blood to the last drop to revive, to regenerate the work of the blood vessels of our great leader, the one and only Lenin-Ilyich — the unduplicatable, the unique! But no miracle came to pass there, where science proved impotent. And now Lenin is no more. These words drop upon our consciousness like a giant cliff dropping into the sea. Can we bring ourselves to believe it? Can our minds be brought to accept it?

The consciousness of the toilers of the whole world will rebel against accepting

this fact. For the enemy is still fearfully powerful, for the road is long, and the great work, the greatest in history, remains unfinished. For the world working class needs Lenin as perhaps no other man was ever so needed in the history of mankind.

More than ten months did the second attack of illness last, more severe than the first. And the blood vessels, as the physicians bitterly put it, kept "playing up" all the while. In this terrible play the life of Ilyich was at stake. It was possible to expect an improvement, almost complete recovery, but also possible was a catastrophe. All of us awaited recovery, in its stead catastrophe came. That part of the brain which controls the breathing refused to function — and the source from which came the thought of greatest genius was thus snuffed out.

And now Ilyich is no more. Our party

## The Lysenko Case

By R. H. MONROE and JOSEPH HANSEN

I.

The Stalinist outlawing of genetics in the Soviet Union in 1948 profoundly stirred the scientific world. The proscription of this important science and the liquidation of world famous Soviet geneticists had repercussions that have not yet died down. The *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*,

ordinarily absorbed in problems of its own field, devoted an entire issue (May 1949) to a review of the events. Other scientific and cultural magazines took up the issue. The general public, hitherto little interested in what appeared to be a minor, obscure science, tried to puzzle out the truth about the arguments and the reasons for the purges; and

two popular books appeared, explaining the complex questions in dispute: *Heredity East and West*<sup>1</sup> by Julian Huxley and *Death of a Science in Russia*<sup>2</sup> by Conway Zirkle.

Those few geneticists outside the Soviet Union who support the Stalinist regime at first viewed with interest the rise of T. D. Lysenko, the obscure Ukrainian plant breeder who spearheaded the attack on genetics. Lysenko is now an embarrassment to them. J. B. S. Haldane, long known as an apologist for Stalinism, for a time clung to a "wait and see" attitude, shielding himself as best he could from the stinging remarks that fell his way from leading scientists. Finally, irritated by the Stalinist outrages on genetics, he lodged a public protest. In "Marxist circles," he complained, referring to his political co-thinkers, "I believe that wholly unjustifiable attacks have been made on my profession (genetics). We are not infallible, but we certainly do not hold many of the opinions which are attributed to us."<sup>3</sup> Not exactly the most devastating understatement ever made, but it no doubt cost Haldane much torment of soul.

### Scientists Aroused

Only the professional poison-pen artists of the Stalinist machine and their dupes still profess to see in Lysenko an "innovator" of science battering at the oppressive wall of conservative theoretical tradition. Outside of those circles possessing vested or emotional interest in Lysenko's success, not a single well-known scientist has rallied to his defense. On the contrary, he has been the universal butt of ridicule, irony and a devastating marshalling of fact and argument.

Part of the heat was no doubt generated by the cold war which was mounting in intensity at the time of Lysenko's political triumph over his scientific adversaries inside the Soviet Union. But the brutal purge of genetics in the USSR places the Moscow bureaucracy and its sycophants in a particularly vulnerable position, war or no war. The truth is that scientists everywhere felt genuine alarm and indignation at the ukase of the Central Committee officially approving Lysenko's doctrines, outlawing those of Soviet scientists of opposite views, and commanding a nationwide purge of men, books and institutions. Scientists, generally inclined to internationalism, rallied to the defense of science in the Soviet Union. Many for the first time really felt the impact of the purges which they vaguely knew had been occurring in other fields for a decade and a half.

### Fear of Similar Trend in U.S.

In addition, the destruction of genetics in the USSR gave occasion for many scientists to voice their fear and

<sup>1</sup>*Heredity East and West, Lysenko and World Science*, by Julian Huxley. Henry Schuman, New York. 1949. 246 pp. This book gives a clear, readable account of the Lysenko dispute and the basic issues involved.

<sup>2</sup>*Death of a Science in Russia*, by Conway Zirkle. Univ. of Penn. Press, Phila. 1949. \$3.75. 319 pp. In the main, this book has republished articles, speeches, and declarations from the Soviet Union and other countries concerning events leading up to the final purge in genetics, subsequent recantations and the reverberations abroad.

<sup>3</sup>"In Defence of Genetics," by J. B. S. Haldane. *The Modern Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 3, pp. 194-202.

resentment of similar trends apparent in the United States particularly in the field of atomic science. Some even warned openly against mistakenly considering the totalitarian danger to science confined to the Soviet Union. The editors of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, drawing the lessons of the Lysenko case in their May 1949 issue, warned of the dangers of "statism" to the "free growth of science." And in the same issue, Richard B. Goldschmidt, former Director of the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Biological Research in Berlin and now Professor of Zoology at the University of California, underlined the danger of government-financed and government-sponsored "scientific big business" linked with universities where "sooner or later leadership will fall to the university politician, the promoter, the men who make the headlines." This trend can lead, Goldschmidt feels, to the appearance of the "Lysenko type" in America. "Though our political system will not give him a chance to act as savagely as is possible in Russia," he says, "he could do enormous damage to the progress of science and the freedom of research if not checked in time."

By holding up Lysenko's triumph as the monstrous result to which such tendencies lead, American scientists hoped to draw an object lesson that might give pause to the ominous trend only too apparent in Truman's "loyalty" purge, witch-hunt and oppressive censorship of scientific thought in atomic research.

## II.

The destruction of genetics in the Soviet Union closed a struggle that had been going on since the early Thirties. A Ukrainian plant breeder, T. D. Lysenko, and a professor of philosophy, I. I. Prezent, at that time began a sustained attack on the biological study of heredity, advancing a doctrine held by I. V. Michurin, a Russian plant importer and horticulturist (1855-1935). Their opponents, headed by the famous N. I. Vavilov, were men who had come into prominence in the days of Lenin and Trotsky, when science was free in the Soviet Union. Their work in genetics had gained such renown that the USSR was considered foremost in sponsoring development of this field.

In the murky atmosphere of the great purges and Moscow Frame-up Trials, the Lysenko-Prezent team moved to the forefront. Even before 1934 they had tasted blood. In 1936 the Medico-Genetical Institute for Study in Human Genetics, the largest of its kind in the world, was "dissolved." During the war heads rolled in increasing numbers among the geneticists, and finally in 1948, Lysenko's views were made official dogma. S. Kaftanov, Minister of Higher Education in the USSR, followed up the decree by an order:

"Curricula and programs, textbooks, and methods of teaching and of research must be re-examined and re-organized as must the entire system of education and training of cadres of scientists and the activities of publishers and of journals. All biological chairs and faculties must be held and supported by qualified Michurinists. . . ."

"Thanks to the Bolshevik party and, personally, to Comrade Stalin, ways for the further triumphant march of the most progressive Michurin biological science are now

clear. The scientists of our colleges will apply, from now on, all their energy to the propaganda of Michurin's biology and to the support of undivided rule of Michurin's biological doctrine in our higher institutions of learning."<sup>4</sup>

### End of a Science: Genetics Banned

In the establishment of Lysenko's doctrine as Stalinist canon, some of the greatest scientists of the Soviet Union met an untimely end. Vavilov, who, on the founding of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences, had been made its head at Lenin's suggestion, died in northeast Siberia in 1942 of hardships beyond his endurance, according to report. He had been arrested and condemned during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact as a "British spy." Besides Vavilov, others who perished were Agol, Ferry, Levit, Karpechenko, Levitsky, Chetverikov, Efroimson, Kerkis, Philipchenko, Serebrovsky, Avdoulov, Aljin, Koltzov, etc.

Others succeeded in saving themselves, perhaps only temporarily, by "recanting" as did Galileo in his day. Among the "dismissals" in 1948 were Academician Dubinin, world-famous geneticist, Academician L. A. Orbeli, one of the USSR's leading biologists, Academician I. Schmalhausen, one of the world's best known theorists on evolution. Also Academicians Gershenzon, Grishko, Kholdony, Nemchinov, Polyokakov, Yudintsev, Tretyakov, Zhebrak, Savodovsky. These are only the major figures.

The Laboratory of Cytogenetics was liquidated along with the Laboratory of Plant Cytology and the Laboratory of Phenogenesis. The Institute of Morphological Evolution was "reorganized" as well as the Institutes of Cytology, Histology and Embryology. Genetics was labelled a "foreign" science, its leading representatives, "bourgeois." At the 1948 Agriculture Congress that marked the death of genetics in the Soviet Union, Prezent boasted: "We shall expose them as the representatives of a harmful, ideologically alien, imported-from-abroad tendency. (Applause.)"<sup>5</sup>

The cheering of the Stalinist clique at this witch-doctor's pronouncement was fitting accompaniment to the somber end of a science which had shown promise in the Soviet Union of far outstripping achievements in the western world.

### III.

Stalin, the obscure "practical" revolutionary, usurped power from the Marxists under the banner of the ignorant and reactionary theory of "socialism in one country." Lysenko, the obscure "practical" plant-breeder, displaced the geneticists under the banner of the ignorant and reactionary theory of inheritance of "acquired" characteristics.

<sup>4</sup>Science, Vol. 109, pp. 90-92. Reprinted from *Izvestia*, Sept. 8, 1948.

<sup>5</sup>From Zirkle, op. cit. p. 247. However, in *The Situation in Biological Science* (Proceedings of the Lenin Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the U.S.S.R. July 31 — Aug. 7, 1948 — Complete Stenographic Report), International Publishers 1949, the translation of this quotation (p. 602) reads: "They want a discussion. But we shall not discuss with the Morganists (applause); we shall continue to expose them as adherents of an essentially false scientific trend, a pernicious and ideologically alien trend, brought to our country from foreign shores (applause)."

Just as the ideological dispute with Stalin involves the whole science of Marxism, so the dispute with Lysenko involves the whole science of biology. To judge Stalin's pretensions correctly it is necessary to know the fundamentals of Marxism. To judge Lysenko's claims it is necessary to know something about the fundamentals of biology.

Lysenko claims to defend dialectical materialism. Under this protective coloration he advances beliefs that are closer to primitive magic than to either dialectics or materialism. Thus one of his disciples explains in accordance with the tenets of the master that from the milking action on a cow's teats one can confidently expect increased yield of milk in the cow's descendants. (Shaumyan.)<sup>6</sup>

### Lysenko's Postulates

Lysenko's central postulate is that the *immediate* environment *directly* and *simply* molds the characteristics an individual transmits to the offspring. He consequently rules out an *indirect* and *complex* mechanism difficult to control in our present state of knowledge. ("There is no organ of heredity: there is no hereditary matter separate from the soma."<sup>7</sup> The sex cell is not "chemically" complex.)

If you can influence heredity directly and specifically by simple changes in an organism's food, surrounding temperature, etc., it is not necessary to carry on large-scale, expensive experiments involving plants in the hundreds of thousands and requiring intricate statistical methods. You can use a handful of seeds and put statistics in the ash can. Exacting scientific controls are no longer needed — no organism is exempt from the direct influence of environment. ("By ridding our science of Mendelism-Morganism we will expel fortuities from biological science. We must firmly remember that science is the enemy of chance.") (Lysenko's italics.)<sup>8</sup>

According to the Lysenko school scientists need not monkey around with colonies of the *Drosophila* fruit fly. This fly, introduced by Muller into the Soviet Union in 1922, was of epic importance in the work leading to the discovery of the gene as the carrier of heredity — a landmark in genetics as great as the discovery of atomic structure in physics. Why bother with studying chromosomes in the cells of the salivary glands of the tiny *Drosophila* when you can improve hog types simply by giving the present herds better food and cleaner pens? ("Who wants what by their very nature are useless *Drosophilas*?" Babajanyan.)<sup>9</sup>

As for the most elementary laws of heredity discovered by Mendel, these can be crossed off as "reactionary." ("In our opinion, free unlimited selective fertilization in plants leads, as a rule, to one heredity being completely consumed

<sup>6</sup>*The Situation in Biological Science*, pp. 250-262. This book, published by the Stalinists, contains the speeches of some 50 Lysenkoists.

<sup>7</sup>Huxley, Op. cit., p. 103.

<sup>8</sup>*The Situation in Biological Science*, p. 615.

<sup>9</sup>*Ibid.* p. 163.

by the other. The maternal heredity most frequently consumes the paternal one. The reverse happens also, though rarely." Lysenko.)<sup>10</sup>

These grossly mechanical concepts are topped off with what might be expected — belief in a mystic "life impulse"<sup>11</sup> and a basic denial, despite lip service to the contrary, of transitional forms between living and non-living matter. ("*Virus* is a concept which is not accepted by Soviet biologists.")<sup>12</sup>

Lysenko's dogmas stem from the Eighteenth Century views of the Chevalier de Lamarck, a French biologist who first popularized the theory of "Inheritance of Acquired Characteristics." This theory was proved untenable more than 40 years ago, yet Lysenko's bid for immortality in science rests on experiments which he claims confirm this outmoded theory. For instance, Lysenko "changed" summer type wheat into winter varieties by subjecting the summer wheat to cold temperatures at its early growth stage. After a few generations of this "*vernalization*" treatment, a new species was formed — winter wheat. Could clearer proof be demanded of the correctness of Lamarck's views?

Unfortunately for Lysenko's niche in the halls of science, the "*vernalization*" technique was used by Allen in 1846, Klippart in 1858 and Gassner in 1918. But these experimenters were *not* able to change summer cereals to winter types permanently. They found that no matter how long the "*vernalization*" was imposed, the new winter types lasted only one generation. After that they reverted to summer types. These experiments, as well as more recent repetitions, speak against the view that "*vernalization*" can change a species.

In defense of Lamarck it must be said that in his day no satisfactory explanation existed of how organisms evolve from primitive types. Lamarck in seeking a basis for evolution assumed that the *immediate* external environment is capable of molding new species since nothing was then known of "cells," of "genes," of the many variations that arise within species independently of the immediate environment or of the complex nature of the relation between organisms and their environment.

### Lamarck's Fallacy

At present, all one has to do is look around, as Darwin did, to see that those varieties with less adaptable qualities in specific environments are slowly or quickly supplanted by those with more adaptable qualities, whether the "choosing" or "selecting" agent is the natural environment or man. We, for example, take those variations which produce more meat, eggs, milk, or give greater yields and use them for planting or breeding. The less useful types are displaced. Texas long-horn cattle are today virtually extinct.

In nature too, those preyed-upon varieties whose color more closely approaches the area in which they live will

<sup>10</sup>*Heredity and its Variability*, by T. D. Lysenko. Translated from the Russian by Theodosius Dobzhansky. King's Crown Press, 1945. p. 60.

<sup>11</sup>Lysenko, *Ibid*, p. 51.

<sup>12</sup>Conversation with Lysenko reported by Eric Ashby, in Huxley, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

supplant similar varieties with less protective coloration. Certain darker types of moths and butterflies are becoming dominant in smoke-grimed urban and industrial areas where lighter types used to be more common. Insecticides like DDT kill off some varieties while more resistant types survive and multiply. Orchard owners have run into this recently on the West Coast.

Lamarck and others who came to believe in evolution puzzled over how new species can arise. The Lamarckian postulate that new species are formed *directly* by the influence of the *immediate* environment was a big step forward as it helped advance the concept and study of evolution. To cling to it today, however, indicates at best ignorance of insuperable objections:

For instance, an animal's teeth wear down. If *acquired* characteristics can be inherited, future generations must certainly be born with more and more worn-down teeth. Yet in the evolution of certain types of horses, size of teeth increased at a faster rate than body size although the horse's diet of grass is very abrasive. And even stranger, in nearly all animals, the form of the teeth is very well adapted to the type of food eaten. *Yet the only effect any food can have is to wear down the teeth.*

### Cases of Oversimplification

The Lamarckian explanation breaks down just as badly in another case as easily observable as Dobbin's tooth. The external skeleton of many insects hardens upon their emergence from the immature "larva" stage and does not change any more. Since the skeleton does not change, it is impossible according to the theory of Lamarck and Lysenko for new characteristics to be "acquired" at all by the adult and passed on to the offspring. Yet it is well-known that new varieties with new skeletal parts and differences constantly arise among insects.

And here is a still more telling case, if that is possible. Among the social insects — certain species of bees, ants and termites — one or a few females, "queens," whose form is quite different from "workers," act as egg-laying machines, reproducing for the entire community. The "workers" being sexless cannot reproduce. How then can changes "acquired" by the "workers" in their environment be transmitted through the "queen"?

Also, in many species females are born in a certain definite proportion to males. What in the environment leads to the "acquisition" of these various proportions?

Did a primitive peacock brush against a cave painting of stone-age man to "acquire" its intricately designed tail? Did flying in a rainbow perhaps cause the brilliant feather colors of the parrot? And how did insects that are practically indistinguishable from sticks and leaves "acquire" their stick and leaf characteristics?

Facts like these could be multiplied by the thousand. Their secret remained an impenetrable mystery as long as biology saw the relation between environment and heredity as simple and direct. The solution came when science discovered that nature is far more complex than the pioneers of Lamarck's time suspected.

(To be continued in the next issue)