

# Fourth International

## **WORLD REPORT**

**China:** An Aborted Revolution

**Indonesia:** Is It Independent?

**Italy:** Sit-Downs and Farm Revolt

**France:** Chronic Political Crisis

**Yugoslavia**

**An Interview with TITO**

*January-February 1950*

25c

## Manager's Column

With this issue, *Fourth International* changes from a monthly to a bimonthly publication. Increasing financial difficulties have compelled us to make this retrenchment.

\* \* \*

Although the United States is the wealthiest country on the globe, genuine Marxist publications in America have never had an easy time from the monetary point of view. The political backwardness of the American working class as a whole has limited the circulation to a relatively small vanguard up to now.

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Lacking the support of high-paying advertisers and moneyed interests such as the prostitute capitalist press enjoys, *Fourth International* has always depended for its support on workers who thoroughly understand the need for a Marxist theoretical magazine. These supporters are often influential in the labor movement but they are not exactly well-heeled in the way of funds.

\* \* \*

Over the years, these informed politically-minded workers who stand behind *Fourth International* have managed to keep the magazine afloat and to extend its influence until today it is widely recognized as the voice of genuine Marxism in America.

\* \* \*

However costs have risen faster than circulation. We had to make a retreat. We hope that the financial squeeze will be broken in the not distant future and that we will then be able to resume publication on a monthly basis.

\* \* \*

Leon Trotsky long ago foresaw a stormy political development ahead for the American working class. Sooner or later the decline of capitalism, he predicted, would force the dynamic American working class to turn to politics to find the only possible solution to their economic and social problems.

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## CONTENTS

China: An Aborted Revolution . . . .	By C. L. Liu	3
Indonesia's "Independence" . . . .	By T. Van der Kolk	7
A New Stage of Struggle in Italy		
	By Ernest Germain	9
Political Crisis in France . . . . .	By Pierre Frank	15
Yugoslavia and Permanent Revolution		
	By Michel Pablo	18
Arsenal of Marxism		
Peasant War in China . . . . .	By Leon Trotsky	23
An Interview with Tito . . . . .		28

When that time comes, Trotsky was convinced, America will witness a tremendous growth in the popularity of Marxist thought. In his opinion the works of Karl Marx, for example, will yet become "best sellers" in the United States.

\* \* \*

This coming development also signifies a bright future for a publication like *Fourth International* which approaches the great events of our time and the seemingly insuperable difficulties facing the working people with the high-precision tools of Marxist thought.

\* \* \*

We confidently expect that we will not have long to wait for verification of Trotsky's prediction. On the campuses we already note a growing interest in Marxism. The working class, faced with a deepening economic crisis, with the growing threat of another world war that can mean the annihilation of humanity, will

surely outstrip all other sections of the population in rising to full consciousness of the historic tasks that must be carried out to open up the new socialist era of peace and boundless plenty.

\* \* \*

Meanwhile we appeal once again to our loyal supporters to do everything possible to spread the *Fourth International* and widen its circle of readers. What is done now will pay off ten and a hundredfold at a later stage. Let's do everything we can to help speed the political development of the American working class.

\* \* \*

We pass on to our readers a letter we very much appreciated from C. S. of Detroit which accompanied his renewal to *The Militant* and *Fourth International*. "Both my wife and I were careful to check when we would have to renew this subscription," he writes, "for we both realize how valuable your paper and maga-

zine are to anyone who wants to find out the truth about today's happenings. Not only do we appreciate and applaud your coverage of the news but we also look forward to reading your analysis of these events."

\* \* \*

The well-known lecturer and writer, **Scott Nearing of Jamaica, Vermont**, commented briefly upon renewing his subscription to *Fourth International*: "You spend too much ink and paper opposing Stalinism. If he is such a bad egg, why advertise him? Is Stalin (or the Politburo) the real enemy?"

\* \* \*

To which we reply: The real enemy is the whole bureaucracy and its foreign agents who are devouring the conquests of the Bolshevik revolution. As for advertising Stalin, he appears to be doing a job with the blood-stained police regime he heads that would be little furbished by our comments. Our feeling is that it is as difficult to stamp out Stalinism as it is syphilis without naming the disease.

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# FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

VOLUME 11

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NUMBER 1

## A Chinese Trotskyist Reports:

# China: An Aborted Revolution

By C. L. LIU

**Editor's Note:** The writer of this article is a veteran Chinese Trotskyist, prominent in the leadership of the Revolutionary Communist Party, Chinese section of the Fourth International. He spent several years in a Kuomintang prison where all the efforts of his jailers, including physical torture, failed to break his devotion to the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed. He wrote the following article in the Portuguese island colony of Macao, off the south coast of China, late last October, having just left Canton on the eve of the capture of that great south China city by the Stalinists. The article contains considerable information additional to that in the article on China which appeared in the December, 1949 issue of *Fourth International* and affords valuable insight into developments under the regime of Mao Tse-tung.

\* \* \*

Now that the new Stalinist masters of China are settling down to the task of consolidating their rule, it is important to take note of the centrifugal forces already at work in the direction of undermining their power. Some bourgeois commentators have elected to see in the transference of power from the Kuomintang to the Communist Party a finished "social revolution." This thoroughly superficial and completely false evaluation of events takes no account of the popular opposition to Stalinist rule which has developed concomitantly with the "Red" military victory. It ignores, too, the fact that the Stalinist program itself is dedicated to the protection and preservation of capitalist property relations.

A Marxist appraisal of the situation, based on fundamental class considerations, can be condensed in the following formula: The liquidation of the Kuomintang regime and the advent to power of the Stalinists represents the completion of *one stage* in the third Chinese revolution. Social forces already at work are preparing the next stages, which will bring the Chinese working class to the fore as a unifying force leading all the oppressed toward the establishment of a socialist dictatorship of the proletariat.

### Peasant Opposition to Stalinists

Peasant opposition to Stalinist rule is no longer a secret. It is all the more significant when it is remembered that land reform—"liberation of the peasants"—was the principal axis of the Stalinist program. The first inkling of peasant opposition was a report in a Kuomintang newspaper stating that a peasant uprising was in progress in the Kiangsu-Anhwei border region, close to Shanghai

and Nanking. The fighting slogan of the insurgents was: "Uproot the Kuomintang! Fight against the Communists!" Reports of other uprisings followed in quick succession.

Because of distortion and exaggeration, there was at first a tendency to ignore these reports, especially in view of their tainted source. But news finds its way and soon it became plain that the reported peasant uprisings against the Stalinists were not pure inventions of the discredited Kuomintang clique. At first, the Stalinists maintained silence. Finally, the Stalinist New China News Agency broadcasted an official report to the effect that uprisings were taking place.

Kuomintang press dispatches placed the strongest center of peasant rebellion in the Honan-Anhwei border region. In the province of Honan alone, we were told, some 300,000 peasants had taken up arms against the Stalinist rulers under the banner of the mystical Red Pearl Society, one of the more outstanding of the traditional secret societies of the Chinese peasantry. In Anhwei and Kiangsu provinces 100,000 peasants were reported in rebellion. Smaller guerrilla forces fighting Stalinist rule had appeared in eastern Shansi, Hupeh, Shantung, Chekiang and Kiangsi provinces. These forces had occupied old military bases abandoned by the Stalinists.

According to a Kuomintang spokesman, between 800,000 and one million peasants were in active revolt against Stalinist rule. Again allowing for exaggeration, there was pointed confirmation in a New China News Agency report from Hunan province dated August 20, 1949, which stated:

Everywhere we are making great progress in the work of exterminating bandits in Central China. In Hunan province, during the past year, about 38,700 bandits were killed, wounded, captured alive or forced to surrender. In Hupeh province, during the three months of May, June and July, the total number of bandits exterminated was more than 12,000... In Taiwo and the northeastern part of Kiangsi province, within three months, about 5,300 bandits were exterminated. Of these, about 3,300 put down their arms...

It is instructive to note that the Stalinists have taken over, without amendment, the terminology of the Chiang Kai-shek gang in referring to rebellious peasants. They are "bandits." The components of the insurgent forces, according to Kuomintang sources (the Stalinists give us no information) are: (1) peasants and dispersed soldiers; (2)

local gentry and officials; (3) students disillusioned with Stalinism who have deserted from the C.P. camp; (4) the local *Min Tuan* (armed thugs employed by the landlords) and Self-Defense Corps members who did not submit to the new regime; (5) dissatisfied Stalinist guerrillas.

Because of news censorship, exercised as stringently by the Stalinists as it was previously by the Kuomintang, we can learn but little of the political physiognomy of the new peasant uprisings. The multitudes who have again taken up arms are just "bandits." And the Stalinist newspapers seldom fail to add that they are "agents of the Kuomintang" and of U.S. imperialism.

The unexpected flare-up of a new peasant war has of course awakened new hope in the dying camp of the Kuomintang. Yet the rebellion of the South China peasants is certainly not occasioned by any desire to restore the hated rule of Chiang Kai-shek. Rather it is directed against the gross betrayal of the interests of the rural masses by the new Stalinist rulers of the country. Of this we shall have more to say later, when we deal with the Stalinist agrarian program as it has been carried out in reality—a program which raised high hopes now dashed to the ground in bitter disappointment.

### Finding a Scapegoat

The widespread character of the peasant opposition has of course occasioned alarm in the Stalinist camp. The top Stalinist leadership naturally admits no error, no betrayal of the interests of the rural masses. If there is blame to be apportioned, let it fall on the heads of "local leaders" and "political workers" who have "lost their class alertness." And in what did this loss of alertness consist? In failure to act in the interests of the people? By no means. The Stalinist commissars, it seems, "paid no attention to the timely extermination of bandits." Which, interpreted, means that they failed to crack down hard on any one who manifested opposition to the rotten policies handed down from the heights occupied by Mao Tse-tung and his clique.

But there was a problem: How to handle the growing rebellion? The Stalinist high command set up a special headquarters for "bandit extermination." Part of the regular field army was reorganized into local police corps. (Under Chiang Kai-shek they were called bandit suppression corps.) But Mao Tse-tung & Co. understood that brutal suppression alone could not halt the spreading fire of peasant opposition. On July 7, 1949, the birthday anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, Lin Piao, army commander and top Stalinist commissar in Central China, issued a directive to the party membership, emphasizing the serious situation in the countryside.

Power in the village, the directive pointed out, still rests in the hands of the landlords and local militarists. The peasants are neglected and abandoned to terrible conditions of living. "Our cadres," Lin said (meaning the local Stalinist functionaries) have become "content with city life." They consider they have earned a right to rest and comfort. They prefer to live in the industrial centers rather than in the grimy, grubby countryside. "That is a great

mistake." Command: "All cadres must prepare to return to work in the countryside."

The cadres evidently resisted reorganization into local police corps in Hunan province—the only area about which we have more or less definite information. Perhaps they shrank from throwing themselves into military opposition to the peasants. Or they may also have been motivated, in part, by the lure of the comfortable city life. At all events, their passive opposition called forth a new directive. The Hunan CP on Sept. 5, 1949 issued "Instructions Regarding Work," of which the following is the core:

Unwillingness to be reassigned to local police corps or to engage in minor campaigns for the extermination of bandits is contrary to the need for developing the revolution and harmful for the realization of the immediate tasks of the party and the final victory on a national scale. Any idea of sitting down to enjoy the crops, waiting idly, is incorrect. Notions of resting in a pleasant place, reluctance to work in wild and lonely mountain regions, yearning for a comfortable home life in the city—these are individualist ideas which do harm to our immediate plans and cause isolation from the masses. We must be vigilant and overcome this retrogressive tendency.

### Application of the Land Policy

As can be seen quite plainly, the blame for all evils is placed by the Stalinist tops on the sins of the lower cadres, which is in accord with the time-honored practice of the Moscow mentors of Mao Tse-tung & Co. But how did it come to pass that power in the villages continued to rest in the hands of the landlords and local militarists in areas which were supposed to have been "liberated" from their rule? In the answer to this seeming political riddle we shall discover the real causes for the new upsurges of peasant rebellion. Involved here are not just minor administrative mistakes of the lower functionaries on the provincial or district level. What is involved is the Stalinist land policy itself. When the new "liberators" overran the southern part of China, the program of agrarian reform as it had been applied earlier in the north was given a sharp twist to the right. The old land relationships were left virtually intact. From a policy of reliance on the village poor, the Stalinists, once national power was within their grasp, began more actively to carry out their avowed policy of collaboration with the exploiting classes. Collaboration with the capitalists necessarily means collaboration with the landlords, too, for the two are closely tied together by innumerable economic and social threads.

### In North China . . .

In North China, referred to in Stalinist documents as the "old and semi-old liberated areas," and comprising all territory north of the Yellow River, the redistribution of land among the peasants was more or less seriously carried out. Yet even here there is considerable dissatisfaction. Three zones were designated in this vast area, in each of which the land program was applied differently. A study of Stalinist documents on the subject, from which we shall quote in part, show how matters have gone in each of the three zones.

ZONE A: Here there "still exist a small segment of landlords and kulaks who possess more and better land . . . Many cadres among the political workers possess more and better land . . . The new class of kulaks has grown to a point where it surpasses in numbers the old kulaks. Their landholdings on the average are double those of the poor peasants and laborers . . . The poor peasants and laborers have become a minority, about 10 to 40 per cent of the whole rural population . . . In this area there is no longer any need for land redistribution." Stalinist agricultural statisticians make no effort to explain the strange fact that the number of poor peasants and laborers decreases while the new class of kulaks increases.

ZONE B: In this area "the number of landlords and old kulaks surpasses those in Zone A and almost all of them still possess more and better land. Many of the cadres (read party members) possess more and better land. The number of new kulaks is small. The number of middle peasants is about 20 to 40 per cent of the rural population . . . Their average landholding is generally double that of the poor peasants and agricultural laborers. The latter still number about 50 to 70 per cent of the population. The majority of them are not yet liberated . . . We should consider that in this area the distribution has been carried out generally but not thoroughly."

ZONE C: Here "the land has not yet been distributed

A great part still remains in the hands of the landlords and old kulaks. The poor peasants are still the majority and their landholdings are insufficient."

In North China, as we can see, the land reform has been carried out unevenly. Land hunger is still far from being appeased. And, as the foregoing excerpts from Stalinist reports show, a new class of "kulaks" among whom are included the hordes of party "cadres," has sprung into being. Thus, while supposedly tackling the land problem in a fundamental way, the Stalinist program has created the groundwork for a restoration of all the old inequalities against which the peasants rose in rebellion.

### In South China . . .

In South China . . . (the "newly-liberated areas"), on the other hand, there has been a cynical betrayal of the peasants' demands. For the program of land redivision instituted in the North there was substituted by decree an alternative program calling merely for reduction of land rents and interest rates. In other words, there is no pretense of expropriating the landlords in order to provide land for the landless.

This right turn was made under the official claim that it was necessary "to consolidate all strata of the Chinese people and eliminate all unnecessary obstacles to the establishment of the broadest anti-American and anti-Kuomintang united front in order to achieve complete victory in the people's liberating war." Here we encounter once again the classic formula of People's Frontism as opposed to the policy of class struggle.

To any one acquainted with the structure of China's

economy and the history of the country over the past half-century, the abandonment of land reform in South China represents a monstrous crime. For it is precisely in the South China provinces that the plunderings of the landlords assumed the greatest proportions and land hunger is greatest. South China has been a furnace of peasant uprisings throughout modern history. The peasant movement led by Mao Tse-tung was itself born in Hunan. And now, after many years of struggle, Mao returns to his native province, no longer as the pioneer leader of the peasant uprising, but as a prodigal son of the landowners!

Historical experience in abundance testifies to the fact that when power and the land, inseparably linked, remain in the hands of the landlords, all talk about reducing rent and interest is a cruel deception. One way or another the landlord always succeeds in taking back from the peasants anything he may be forced to concede by means of such "reforms." For the peasants of South China the Stalinist "liberation" has brought more staggering burdens than ever before. Not only are they still enslaved to the landlords, but their "People's Government" saddles them with requisitions of food and manpower. They must carry the burden of feeding the urban population and the swollen armies of Mao Tse-tung. The peasant is striking back as he always has done throughout history when his lot becomes intolerable. Yesterday he took up arms against the Kuomintang. Now he goes to battle against his false "Communist" liberators.

### What Happened in the Cities

So much for the situation in the countryside. What about the urban centers and the industrial working class? Mao Tse-tung came to Shanghai as a Messiah. To the workers he represented himself as their spokesman and defender in the coalition government-to-be. In reality, he said, they were now the masters of the country. But at the same time he turned politely to the bourgeoisie with the assurance that their properties would be protected and that they would be given every opportunity to develop their enterprises. "A reasonable profit," a high Stalinist official told the worried capitalists, "is not exploitation." He promised that production would continue smoothly under "a reasonable regime of harmonious cooperation between capital and labor."

The workers took their supposed "liberation" much more seriously, as a signal to free themselves from iniquitous exploitation. Strikes marked by the boldest demands took place. The workers succeeded in establishing the price of rice, their staple food, as the basic measure of wages. In some instances they laid rough hands on factory administration. The capitalists complained and their flood of grievances quickly reached the sensitive ears of the new rulers. In some instances the capitalists closed down the factories rather than concede workers' just demands. Unemployment increased rapidly. Inflation added to the miseries of the poor. Attempts by the Stalinists to blame everything on Kuomintang saboteurs and American imperialism were not convincing. In this menacing situation the Stalinists were obliged to act. True to color,

they acted not against the capitalists but against the workers.

Compulsory arbitration of all labor disputes by the Labor Bureau of the Shanghai Municipal Government was decreed. Lin Piao, the Stalinist commander, declared that all conflicts between capital and labor must be eliminated in order to "promote the prosperity of urban industry and commerce." Workers were coerced into taking wage-cuts and lengthened working hours. To cope with the growing unemployment, a decree of compulsory evacuation was issued which called for removing three million, or two-thirds, of the Shanghai population out of the city. The attempts to execute this decree met fierce resistance. Shanghai's population had been swelled by poverty-stricken people from the countryside who hoped to find means of survival in the city. Lin Piao's "solution" for their plight was to dump them back in the countryside again.

While attempting to thin out the population by forcible evacuation measures, the new rulers also decreed a plan for thinning out industry. The pretexts for this were various and unconvincing. The most likely explanation is that the Stalinists, fearing future working-class opposition and revolt, want to thin out the proletariat of this largest of Chinese cities and thus reduce its effectiveness as a class force. At all events, several smaller factories were forced to dismantle and move. Owners of the larger plants, together with the workers, objected to their plants being moved.

An order was issued to the Sun Sun Textile Factory No. 9 to dismantle and move to Manchuria. Workers barricaded themselves in the plant to resist. Troops of the Stalinist "liberating" army were sent to carry out the order. A bloody clash ensued in which 10 workers were killed or wounded and three soldiers killed. There was irony in this incident, for only a year previously, before Shanghai's "liberation," the Stalinist leadership in this same plant had provoked a bloody clash between strikers and Kuomintang police! We may be sure that this lesson, showing up the true character of the Stalinists, was not lost on the Shanghai proletariat with its lengthy tradition of class struggle and revolution.

### The New Coalition Gov't

On October 1, 1949 the Stalinists formally proclaimed the establishment of the Chinese People's Democratic Republic. Everything was arranged in advance by a hand-picked Political Consultative Conference, that is, behind the backs of the masses whom the new government is supposed to represent. The new government power is a "coalition" of the People's Front variety in which the Stalinists have joined hands with the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie represented by the Revolutionary Kuomintang and the Democratic League. Abandonment of the land reform in South China was part of the price Mao Tse-tung paid for securing the cooperation of these elements. The Democratic League is a varied assortment of groups and individuals—professors, petty politicians, professional negotiators and defeated generals—who speak for no one but themselves.

The more substantial partner in the coalition is the Revolutionary Kuomintang, led by the Cantonese ex-warlord Li Chi-sen. It is around this new party that important elements of the bourgeoisie rallied as they scurried away from Chiang Kai-shek's sinking ship of state. The Revolutionary Kuomintang is the new political axis of the exploiting classes, the wide-open gateway through which they jostled into the safe haven of the new "People's Republic." Through it they hope to restore the damage to their fortunes and, in due time, get back into the political saddle.

### Some of Mao's Allies

A brief glance at the political biographies of some of the leading lights in the new government will enable us to appreciate the class character of the Revolutionary Kuomintang and the infamous composition of the new government.

*Li Chi-sen:* Cantonese warlord and Kuomintang general who lost his position twenty years ago as the result of an abortive palace plot against Chiang Kai-shek. Notorious as the butcher of the Canton commune in December, 1927. Now sits alongside Mao Tse-tung as one of the six vice-chairmen of the "People's Government."

*General Chen Chien:* Old-time Hunan warlord and Kuomintang satrap. Conducted mass slaughters of workers in Wuhan (Hankow) and peasants in Hunan province in 1927. Now heads the Hunan "People's Provincial Government" and is a member of the National Military Committee headed by Mao Tse-tung. The General's partners in the crimes of Wuhan and Hunan, Tung Hsing-tze, commands a detachment of the "Liberating Army" in southern Hunan at this writing.

*Wong Yuan-pei:* Careerist politician in the reactionary pre-1927 government in Peking. "Elected" to the Central Committee of the "People's Government" and one of the vice-presidents in the new cabinet.

*Chiang Lan:* Supporter of the imperial dictator Yuan Shih-kai in 1914. Now vice-chairman of the "People's Government" alongside Mao Tse-tung.

*Generals Lung Yun* (ex-warlord of Yunnan province), *Chen Ming-shu*, *Tsai Ting-kai*, *Fu Tso-yi*, *Chiang Chichung:* All old-time militarists who played prominent roles in the various Kuomintang campaigns against the Communists after 1927. Now members of Mao Tse-tung's National Military Committee.

### New Crisis Developing

Under the new regime, the contradictions and conflicts of Chinese society, far from being mitigated, will inevitably become more acute. The new regime can be no more stable than the relationship of classes. Because the needs and aspirations of the masses have not been satisfied, nor a foundation laid for their satisfaction, the class struggle will continue. This struggle has both national and international aspects.

South China, where land reform has been abandoned and where the real power continues to reside with the

landlords and capitalists, furnishes a counter-balance to the North, where a more or less radical land reform has been accomplished. It is the North which Stalin seeks to convert into a defensive bastion on the eastern borders of the Soviet Union. That is why Peiping, rather than Shanghai or Nanking, was chosen as the seat of the new national government.

When social crisis rears its head the stability of the new regime will be threatened. In the sphere of international relations it will be the same. Today, the bourgeois representatives in the coalition join in the Stalinist chorus against American imperialism. But the material basis is decisive. Capitalist and landlord property, sanctified by the Stalinists, inevitably projects South China toward the orbit of imperialism. The bourgeois spokesmen

in the coalition will function more and more openly, as the situation develops, as transmitters of the pressure of the capitalist world in the West. In carrying out his plans for economic recovery, Mao will encounter only disappointment in his dealings with the Kremlin. The imperialists will capitalize on this disappointment, as they did with Tito, and do everything they can to push Mao toward a westward orientation.

At present, in order to blackmail the American imperialists, Mao pays ostentatious court to the Kremlin. In order to win complete power by a short cut, he compromises with the bourgeoisie at the expense of the peasants and workers. Thus is the way being paved for new internal and international upheavals.

Macao, October 20, 1949.

## Indonesia's "Independence"

By T. VAN DER KOLK

The House of Representatives of the Netherlands and the K.N.I.P. (Indonesian Provisional Republican Parliament at Jakarta) have accepted the decisions of the Hague Conference. In the Netherlands, representatives of the right-wing organization and the Stalinists voted against ratifying the agreement. At Jakarta the Partai, Murba (the Proletarian Party founded by Tan Malakka) and the Indonesian CP (Stalinist) as well as a certain number of other Deputies who broke party discipline, voted against acceptance of the Hague agreement. The Socialists cast blank ballots.

In order to understand the meaning of the agreements it is necessary to mention that the Minister of Justice of the Indonesian Republic declared to the K.N.I.P. that his Government will prosecute all those implicated in the Communist uprising of September 1948. The criminal Stalinist adventure in the putsch of Madioen had already considerably weakened the workers' movement. The Indonesian bourgeoisie is now exploiting this situation to the full against all proletarian militants. A comparison is in order here between the present agreement and the one concluded two years ago between the Indonesian bourgeoisie and Dutch imperialism at the end of the first colonial war. That agreement was immediately followed by a declaration of Prime Minister Sjarifuddin on the prosecution of Tan Malakka.

### A Few Pages from History

The Hague agreement will most certainly be followed by suppression of the workers' movement. But the Indonesian bourgeoisie, on which the Hatta-Soekarno regime rests, does not represent an important force by virtue of its position in the economy of the country. Prior to the Japanese invasion there was no native capital outside of commercial or usury capital, and even that was mostly in Chinese or Arab hands. After the Japanese invasion the rising native bourgeoisie began to establish some enter-

prises; but under the conditions of war and revolution this could only be done on a relatively restricted scale.

The economic position of the Indonesian bourgeoisie was absolutely inadequate as a base for a leading political role of the Hattas and Soekarnos. Clearly aware of the relationship of social forces, the Hattas and Soekarnos are really republicans in spite of themselves. Two characteristic incidents illustrate this fact.

On August 17, 1945 Soekarno and Hatta issued a very moderate and vague proclamation announcing the establishment of the Indonesian Republic. They summoned the masses to a meeting where the proclamation was to be announced. Leaflets calling the meeting were distributed by the *Pemudas* (groups of young nationalists who had some military training under the Japanese). The Japanese authorities, who acting on an Allied Mandate to maintain order prohibited the meeting and deployed machine-gun detachments at the gathering place. Soekarno retreated at once. He had new leaflets printed announcing that the meeting would not be held because of the ban. The *Pemudas* crossed out the phrase calling off the meeting; and despite the presence of detachments of Japanese machine-gunners, a great crowd gathered at the indicated place. Groups of *Pemudas* went to the homes of Soekarno and Hatta and forced them to come and speak. Thus was the Indonesian Republic proclaimed.

In December 1948 Dutch parachutists occupied Jakarta, the Republican capital. While resistance was being organized which later inflicted military defeat upon Dutch imperialism—a defeat obscured by the intervention of the UN—Hatta and Soekarno allowed themselves to be arrested in their homes. They were deported and interned outside the territory of the Republic, on the island of Banka. The eyes of the entire world were fixed on them. Did they show by a hunger strike or even by passive resistance that they desired to support the struggle of the laboring masses? Their only action was to note the good

treatment and excellent food they were receiving from the imperialists while a bloody partisan struggle was raging on the islands of Java and Sumatra.

### The Role of American Imperialism

The prosperity and independence of Dutch imperialism were based exclusively on the exploitation of colonial possessions sixty times the size of its metropolitan territory—that is, of an empire as vast as all of Europe west of the iron curtain. This empire was threatened with extinction when in June 1948 an enterprising American businessman, Matthew Fox, obtained from the Republican Government the exclusive right to sell all export products of the principal islands of Java and Sumatra. The Truman administration denounced the monopoly character of the Fox Agreement. Dutch imperialism on its side, viewing all export products as the property of the Dutch plantations imposed a rigid blockade over the whole territory of the Republic. But the Fox agreement remained in force and the promulgation of the famous "Point Four" of the Truman program (the development of backward regions by investment of American capital) was a direct threat to the dominant position of Dutch imperialism in the East Indies.

Thus the colonial war launched by the Dutch bourgeoisie in December 1948 was not directed only against the Indonesian revolution. It was also a revolt of Dutch colonial capital against the dollar. Due to the action of the UN and its commission for Indonesia, under the unchallenged leadership of the American, Merle Cochran, Soekarno and Hatta were brought back from their temporary exile to the capital. And at the same time the UN avoided the occupation of Jokjakarta by the partisans.

The Hague agreement thus clearly bears the trademark: *Made in USA*. For this very reason, Palar, the Indonesian delegate at Lake Success, refused to issue a joint declaration with the Dutch delegation on the satisfactory character of this agreement. Indonesia, he said, had not concluded any pact but that one had been imposed upon her. And he immediately clarified his statement by emphasizing that Indonesia did not need the Amsterdam stock exchange to act as intermediary for trade agreements with the rest of the world, adding that he had invited American capital to make substantial investments in his country.

On his side, Netherland's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stikker, also a beer exporter, explained the nature of the pressure American imperialism had brought to bear on his government. It had been continually threatened with suspension of Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands while Marshall aid to Indonesia had actually been suspended. A US boycott of Dutch shipping was averted only through the intervention of a secretary of the Dutch trade union movement who explained his government's "motives" to American trade union leaders.

The president of the Dutch Labor Party, Vorrink, contributed his share in improving the international position of "his" country by flying to Oslo to explain to the Norwegian Social Democratic Government, a new member of

the Security Council, the legitimacy of its national colonialism.

Minister Stikker thus disclosed the special character of social democratic internationalism which will undoubtedly find expression in the new "free" World Trade Union Federation, founded in London and electing a Dutch reformist, Vermeulen, as secretary.

### The Terms of the Agreement

The results of the Hague Conference are as follows:

1. The Netherlands transfer complete sovereignty to the "United States of Indonesia," comprising the territory of the Republic and the separate vassal states set up by Dutch imperialism.

2. Between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia there is established a "free and lasting Union" which is headed by Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands and her legitimate heirs. ("Free" and "lasting" are contradictory terms: If the Union is to be lasting Indonesia is not free to secede from it. The agreement is full of such contradictions which indicate only that Indonesia has not at all been detached from the Netherlands.)

3. All properties belonging to Dutch or foreign persons will be returned to their "legal" owners. (With one very important exception to which we shall refer later.)

4. The directors of the Indonesian currency bank can be named only by agreement with the Netherlands. The Netherlands maintain their control over Indonesian finances. Indonesia recognises a debt of 4.5 billion florins to the Netherlands.

5. Collaboration in the establishment of relations with other states is stipulated. This collaboration is obligatory concerning relations with other European countries.

6. The naval base of Surabaya shall be placed at the disposal of the Dutch navy which will remain the only important navy in Indonesian waters. Dutch troops are to be withdrawn from Indonesian territory within six months to the degree that vessels are available for this evacuation. A Dutch military mission will assist in the establishment of an Indonesian army.

7. The Dutch part of the island of New Guinea will remain Dutch property for one year. During this time the Indonesian Commission of the UN will decide upon a statute for this island. Various distinct sections of Indonesia can enter into special relations with the Netherlands and Indonesia if it is so decided by plebiscite under the auspices of the UN Indonesian Commission.

8. Differences between the partners in the "Union" can be settled by an impartial foreign power named as arbiter by the UNIC.

It may be said that this agreement gives the Indonesian Republic a greater degree of independence than was obtained at Linggajati in December 1946. It may even be said that the rising Indonesian bourgeoisie today is more "independent" than it is "bourgeois." This contradiction is explained by two facts: The masses who support the partisan movement in no case would have accepted even a temporary agreement on a less favorable basis than that concluded at



the Hague; and behind the impotent republican leaders, Soekarno and Hatta, stands the protective shadow of the United States. Without American intervention this impotent bourgeoisie would have been crushed a long time ago between Dutch imperialism and the mass movement.

But the United States itself is powerless to arrest the development of social relationships in Indonesia. Its attempt to at least halt the revolution already implies the acceptance of certain gains made by the agrarian movement. The Hague agreement actually includes a clause which stipulates the plantations on which dwellings have been built or on which, since the Japanese occupation, products for native consumption have been cultivated, shall not be returned to their former owners "in order not to provoke disturbances." In such cases, former owners are to be compensated.

The application of this agreement will not be smooth, especially with regard to the return of the colonial businessmen to their former plantations. Coming to power effortlessly and not by its own strength, the Indonesian bourgeoisie cannot maintain power without constantly using violence against the workers and the poor peasants. This cannot be done without active aid from abroad and the Indonesian bourgeoisie will find it impossible to carry out its tasks. After the withdrawal of the Dutch troops,

native troops will have to safeguard the existence of the vassal states, whose populations will strive to join the Republic. The very existence of these vassal states thereby becomes problematical. The working population of these states will only be able to join the Republic and transform the United States of Indonesia into a United Indonesian State by eliminating Soekarno and Hatta.

It is impossible to determine the actual strength of the intransigent parties, like the Partai Murba and the Partisans of Darrul Islam. It is even impossible to learn the names of the revolutionary or Stalinist leaders still alive. As long as the "lack of available vessels"—a very elastic phrase—keeps Dutch troops on Indonesian soil, the government will feel strong enough to attempt the liquidation of various "extremist" forces. The question is: Has it the necessary forces?

Violent social and political struggles are on the order of the day in Indonesia. The task of the workers' movement of the whole world is to intervene actively in the struggle by demanding the break-up of the Dutch-Indonesian "Union," the expropriation without compensation of all colonial property, the elimination of naval bases, etc. The Indonesian revolutionary movement, for its part, will surely make itself heard.

*Amsterdam, Dec. 14, 1949.*

# A New Stage of Struggle in Italy

## *Factory Occupation and Agrarian Revolt*

By ERNEST GERMAIN

The revolver shots fired by the obscure Sicilian student, Pellante, on July 14, 1948 at the Stalinist leader Togliatti set off the broadest movement of the Italian proletariat since the insurrection of 1945. The gun shots of Minister of Interior Scelba's police, which slew two farm workers in the Apulia region on November 29, 1949, resulted in a general strike ordered from above which proved to be a two-thirds failure. The entire evolution of the Italian workers' movement in the last 18 months is bracketed by these two incidents.

The general strike of July 14, 1948 came like a sudden explosion of all the discontent stored up during the preceding months. The enthusiasm evoked by the launching of the electoral campaign of the "Democratic Peoples' Front" and then squandered by the parliamentary cretinism and the petty-bourgeois phraseology of its leaders found expression despite the electoral defeat of April 18, 1948. The victory won by the bourgeoisie in the April 18 elections had not yet been translated into a defeat of the proletariat in action. The trade union movement was still united. The motorized police were still on the defensive. The employers still hesitated to launch a frontal assault on the workers in the large industrial centers.

The proletariat in its general strike of July 14 made a

magnificent attempt to regain the initiative in the class struggle. Its failure was not due to any lack of spirit or courage. On the contrary, for twenty-four hours bourgeois authority was shaken in the principal centers on the peninsula. The cynical capitulation of the Stalinist leaders to bourgeois rule stabbed the workers' offensive in the back and at the same time gave rise to an inevitable wave of discouragement and demoralization among the advanced workers, who felt themselves betrayed by their own leaders.

The general strike of December 1, 1949 took place after a lengthy period of working class defeats and of successes of the bourgeoisie in actions against them. The trade union movement, first split in 1948 by the formation of the Christian unions (General Italian Confederation of Free Labor—*LCGIL*) was then split again in 1949 by the creation of the "social democratic" trade unions (Federation of Italian Labor—*FIL*). The employers unleashed a full-fledged offensive by laying off thousands of workers in the factories. A system of intimidation was instituted in the offices and banks against all militant elements and even against those who merely held membership in the *CGIL* (largest Italian trade union federation led by the Stalinists)

A series of movements in separate industries taken up by all the workers with admirable tenacity (farm workers' strike at the beginning of June 1949 which lasted six weeks; bank employees' strike in September 1949), ended in complete defeats. These successes enhanced the boldness and arrogance of the representatives of the capitalist state. They began to systematically hurl the police against peaceful demonstrations, inaugurating a new bloody series of massacres of workers as in the infamous days of pre-Mussolini "democracy."

### The Southern Proletariat to the Rescue

It is highly significant that, in these conditions of rear-guard battles carried on by dispersed ranks of the industrial workers, the farm workers of Southern Italy came to the rescue. During the last two months their actions signalized the beginning of a serious resumption of the workers' movement in the entire peninsula. These actions are not to be explained by particularly marked development of the class consciousness of the Southern masses but by an indescribable poverty which makes daily existence intolerable.

This miserable mass of day laborers or owners of tiny parcels of land, with an average *annual* income of \$150, works about a 100 days a year, lives in wretched hovels and sees its children permanently undernourished while immense tracts of land owned by the big landowners lie fallow. Result: The periodic outbreak of local revolts over control of the land.

Since the fall of fascism, this development has been channelized by the formation of *peasant cooperatives* which have the right to request the assignment of fallow land. Although these assignments are supposed to be made by courts, and although in Southern Italy even more than in Northern Italy, judicial power is intimately tied to the local proprietors, the first months after the "liberation" were marked by a certain flourishing of these cooperatives. The government sought in this way to *legalize land seizures* which occurred in that tumultuous period. As the central power was strengthened and the state apparatus rebuilt, the cooperatives isolated within an economy directed by their enemies and lacking credits, machinery and skilled personnel began to fall apart.

Two months ago a new movement of land seizures broke out, less spontaneous than the one immediately after the war, but better prepared and stimulated by the *Confederterra* (farm workers' union under Stalinist leadership). The movement began in Sicily and Calabria where the untitled "latifundia" (big estates) was most extensive. The land seizures were genuine; the peasants immediately sowed the occupied land.

The government therefore, combining tactical sagacity with judicious use of armed force, decided upon some unavoidable concessions. Prime Minister De Gasperi made a trip to the Sila region, one of the most backward provinces, embraced the inevitable little boy, delivered the inevitable "progressive" speech, and legalized the assignment to the cooperatives of some 30,000 hectares of land. 3.8 million hectares of land are owned by big landowners,

in other words 25% of all cultivable Italian land is divided among 8 million agricultural enterprises.

Following this governmental action, the second stage of the land seizures which occurred in Lucania, Apulia, Campania and in the vicinity of Rome lost the momentum of the initial movement. Most of the time, the trade union movement limited itself to a "symbolic" seizure. The "occupied" land was not worked. In many areas, notably in Sardinia, the prefects succeeded in preventing seizures by promising the peasants to speed up assignments of land by legal methods. It should be noted that one of the rare concessions made by the government to the peasants was the transfer of authority to assign land to the prefects who are considered to be more "liberal"

However it was in the course of this second stage of the land seizures that there occurred the violent incidents in Torremaggiore in Apulia which led to the outbreak of the strike of December 1. Four weeks previously in the province of Crotona, in Calabria, other bloody incidents had occurred in Melissa which cost the life of three farm workers, murdered by "the forces of law and order." In Torremaggiore, the De Gasperi government once more clearly demonstrated the kind of "order" it was preserving, the kind which proscribes trade union meetings and instructs the police to open fire on a disarmed crowd gathered to hear a report on negotiations between the unions and government authorities.

And, pathetic illustration of the condition of the *braccianti* (farm laborers): the agitation which led to the incidents and the slayings of November 29 did not even occur over a demand for improving the conditions of the workers. Its sole aim was to enforce the law of "the labor quota," which obliges big landowners to employ workers numerically proportionate to the size of their estates. Thus the *braccianti* had demonstrated in Apulia for the *preservation* of their wretched wage of about \$25 a month. And following in the tradition of the Italian clerical gang, the government gave them lead and gunshot...

### Layoffs in the Big Factories

The urge to defend the very existence of their wives and children led the farm laborers of Southern Italy to pick up the gage of battle at the very time when the combativity of the proletariat had sunk to what seemed to be the vanishing point. Likewise the brutal attack by Big Business against the industrial proletariat, which takes the form of mass layoffs and mounting lockouts, seems to be the signal for a serious revival of the militancy of the workers of Northern and Central Italy for the next period.

Italian industry operates at a permanent deficit. Technological backwardness and the absence of an adequate internal market renders big Italian industry incapable of competing on the world markets with the heavy industry of the advanced capitalist countries. Living and operating solely, by virtue of government orders and credits, the crisis which industry has experienced since the "liberation" has been aggravated by the success of the workers in preventing layoffs. Hence, when the relation of forces was

altered\* and the employing class felt itself strong enough in relation to a divided working class, it everywhere began to repudiate the anti-layoff agreements and workers by the thousands were thrown into the street. In the Milan region alone the Caproni plant, employing 6,000 workers, and the Safar plant were shut down; 5,000 out of 10,000 employed in the Isotta Fraschini establishment were laid off.

Under conditions of general unemployment at least 2½ million fully unemployed and several hundred thousand partially unemployed) a layoff in a big plant actually means the loss of all possibility of work for many months. That is the reason the workers do not accept these employer conditions without putting up a desperate resistance to this condemnation to poverty. Occupation of factories shut down by the employers are widespread.

Three typical cases took place at the end of November: In the Breda factories in Venice, in the OMI factories in Rome, in the Fonderi Liguri plants in Genoa. The first of these followed a threat of layoff and a demand by the workers to inspect the employers' books. The second case followed the non-payment of wages, an indirect lockout measure currently used by the employers. The third occupation was a reply at the time to layoffs and to the dismantling of the factory by a bankrupt company.

### The Art of the General Strike

How has the bourgeoisie and the capitalist state reacted to these factory occupations which are a direct threat to private property in the means of production? It is not at all surprising that the occupations have produced an unexcited reaction, one which inclines to allowing the workers "to go through their own experience" just as they did in the movement of factory occupation in Turin in 1920. The employer is content to protest, to refuse to pay wages and in cases where the workers continue production to shut off the electric current after a few days. That's all he need do. What necessity is there for the intervention of the authorities or for trying to evacuate the premises by force? He is very well aware that, left to themselves, the workers occupying the factories find themselves in a blind alley from which they emerge sooner or later utterly demoralized and without any confidence in their trade union organizations...

The tactic adopted by the Stalinists is right down the employers' alley. For many months, the Stalinist leadership of the CGIL was systematically opposed to any extended occupation of the factories, limiting themselves to "symbolic" 24-hour occupations. Under pressure of the workers affected by the layoffs and prepared for any sacrifice, the Stalinist leaders were compelled to beat a strategic retreat. Today they sanction and even discreetly approve of occupation movements but attempt to limit them and to studiously restrict them to a single establishment.

\*Where this change did not occur, the workers continued to make serious gains. Thus at the Ansaldo plants in Genoa, they have just won the 24-hour work week at 40-hour pay.

The worker occupants first undertake to put the machinery in working order and to clean up the premises and then with great difficulty start up production. In the meantime the trade union leaders organize financial assistance in the region and in the best case set up a free commissary for the workers. Then, one, two, three weeks go by and as the employers refuse to pay the workers, the workers' meager reserves are soon exhausted and their families are literally penniless. They cannot sell the products they have manufactured; the Stalinist tactic does not permit this transgression of bourgeois law. There is then nothing for them to do but to pull out defeated, harboring bitter feelings toward their "leaders."

It is obvious that this tactic of isolated movements does not hold out any concrete perspective to workers threatened with layoffs, and threatens to discredit the strike weapon as well as the occupation of the factories in the eyes of the workers. The "war of attrition" chosen by the Stalinists—a token of their remarkable tactical skill—at the very moment when the economic interests of the employers require a temporary cessation of production, can only play into the hands of the bourgeoisie. They can only be compelled to retreat before a full-scale attack all along the line.

Partial movements for very limited aims are of decisive importance only insofar as they enable the working class to reconstitute the unity of its ranks, only insofar as such movements revive the workers' self-confidence. But to fulfill this function, these isolated and limited movements must be *victorious*. However, the Stalinist leaders first organize limited movements which are doomed to defeat in advance and then they periodically crown them with "general strike demonstrations," like that of December 1, which lead to even more resounding defeats. So, combining opportunist errors with disorganized adventurism, the Stalinist leadership continues to do everything in its power to squander and destroy the reserves of militancy of the Italian proletariat which is now being reawakened after 18 months of defeats.

A factory occupation, limited to one plant and aided only by financial support, is doomed to certain defeat if the leadership is not prepared to go the limit. To be able to go the limit, it must act according to a *plan*—this term is used in the Bolshevik sense and not in the sense of the miserable project called "the GIL plan" which is acceptable to the bourgeoisie and even to that old reactionary politician, Nitti.

This is what acting according to plan entails: Choose a key enterprise threatened with lockout, preferably one whose raw materials are produced in Italy itself; organize a national agitation around its occupation (it is characteristic that all the agitations on the factory occupations were limited by the Stalinist leaders to a regional scale); proceed to the production and to the sale of the manufactured products if the employer refuses to pay wages; organize this sale through workers' and peasants' cooperatives in accordance with the needs of the population; illustrate through these test cases that the crisis of Italian industry is a crisis of capitalist industry working for the market, and

that the *needs* of the population do not call for a closing of plants but for a tremendous *rise* in *production*; organize a movement of national solidarity with the workers in the occupied factory, proceeding if necessary to the confiscation of raw materials by workers or miners in the extractive industries, and to free transportation by railroad workers of the finished products.

*In other words, confront the employer with the acting and active solidarity of the working class orienting through a series of rapid successes to a general strike for the attainment of a clear and precise program whose first point should be: Re-open all the closed factories and operate them at government expense under workers' control. It is not the responsibility of the workers in bankrupt factories to shoulder the burden of capitalist bankruptcy. Money to float these industries should be obtained where it is plentiful: in the strong-boxes of the banks and Big Business.*

Beginning with that, we have the whole program of the socialist revolution which can be explained simply and concretely to the masses with the help of transitional demands combined into a *workers' and peasants' plan* to be realized by a workers' and peasants' government.

Such a strategy, avoiding both hopeless and disorganized struggles, would moreover have the great advantage of *educating* the workers on the significance of their struggle. A defeat which is presented as a stage in the attainment of an objective leading to the solution of the most burning problems of the class can serve as a stimulus to the militancy of the masses. A useless purposeless defeat is a sure cause of further demoralization. That is why the criminal tactic pursued by the Stalinist leadership is not only responsible for the defeats, resulting from the unfavorable relation of forces confronting the working class, but also for the demoralization caused by this senseless policy.

### **The Crisis of the Italian Communist Party**

Organizing proletarian resistance to capitalist layoffs; preparing and guiding the counter-offensive to guarantee tolerable conditions of life to all Italian workers—which is impossible without taking some of the principal citadels of capital by assault—these are tasks which are neither desired nor can they be attained by the present leadership tied to the leading strings of the Kremlin. A *new revolutionary leadership* must be created, a leadership whose first elements have been shaped in the crucible of the negative experiences of recent years. Its formation can be considerably accelerated if the revolutionary vanguard succeeds in regrouping and in organizing the vanguard militants who, as a result of their own experiences, have already broken or are on the point of breaking with the CP in the principal regions of Italy.

The crisis of the CP is still in its initial stage. The December Central Committee meeting of the CP indicated an early purge which would rid the party of numerous "deviationist" elements. It is difficult to forecast the scope and real significance which the next stages of the crisis will have. But some of its general characteristics can be sketched now.

Let us note first of all that the present crisis of the CP has a contradictory character because it appears at a time when the CP is embarked on a "leftist" policy, at least verbally. While vanguard militants are breaking away to the left because they realize that the CP policy is contrary to the workers' interests—and that explains the opportunist as well as the adventurist errors—on its right the CP is losing a considerable section of those who had joined it on the basis of its policy of "national unity" and who now condemn its class phraseology as "antidemocratic."

This phenomenon is especially important in intellectual and Catholic circles. It should not be forgotten that there are many members of the CP in Italy deeply attached to the Catholic religion who have been struck a heavy blow by papal excommunication (although the measure has been very circumspectly applied).

Suffice it to say that the Communist mayor of Turin, the most important industrial and proletarian center of Italy, had one of his children married in the church, sent another child to a religious school, and organized cultural gatherings addressed by the Catholic ministers of the De Gasperi cabinet at the expense of the municipality! The opposition of these circles, which weighs heavily on the party, should not be confused with that opposition which expresses, however confusedly, the revolt of proletarian class consciousness against the acrobatic tactics of the Stalinists.

It should also be pointed out that the Yugoslav question has sowed confusion in Italian communist ranks. During the period of the "national unity" policy, the Italian CP went through some particularly revolting contortions to harmonize its ultra-chauvinist agitation with its unreserved support (at least in public) of the "anti-Italian" policy of the Yugoslavs in Istria and Trieste. The leaders of the party were not really at ease until the break of the Cominform with Tito enabled them to take their place in the chorus of the chauvinistic anti-Tito agitation, long carried on by all "official" public opinion.

But many militants, who the day before had had to "swim against the stream" on this particular question, could not make so sharp a turn and became greatly bewildered. Many Stalinist cadre elements had also fought as partisans during the war side by side with the Yugoslav partisans. Today, *Unita*, central organ of the CP, tells them that the partisan struggle in Slovenia was really organized by the Gestapo. And it is not easy for them to swallow this new morsel of Stalinist wisdom.

Some of them have even openly opposed the anti-Titoist line of the leadership and have agreed to organize visits to Yugoslavia. They have been expelled for "political treachery and connections with Trotskyist and Titoist provocateur elements," a formula that is repeated in almost every issue of the main regional CP papers.

Finally, there is a third characteristic phenomenon of the crisis of the CP: A number of old members, often founders of the movement, are beginning to break with the party on the basis of personal experiences, restricted to a regional or plant-wide scale, after a series of particular incidents which were too much for them to swallow. Two typical

cases are those of Avico, general secretary of the national oil workers union and Morelli, former mayor of the important metal center of Terni. Cases of personal corruption and malodorous petty intrigues which the cadres have observed in their dealings with the national leaders have proved decisive in causing their break with the CP.

This phenomenon occurs much later than in France, Germany, Great Britain or the United States. Because of the victory of Fascism in 1922, the ideological evolution of numerous Italian communist cadre elements had been arrested for 21 years. Thus today there is to be found in the ranks of the oppositionists—alongside of the young militants whose experience with Stalinism is of recent date—even founders of the party whose experience with Stalinism in the *mass movement* also does not antedate 1944.

### The Crisis of Italian Socialism

Contrary to what has happened in most of the countries of western Europe, the serious crisis of Stalinism has not led in any way to the strengthening of social democracy, either in members or in votes. On the contrary, at the very time the crisis of Stalinism is beginning to break out in the open, Italian social democracy itself is undergoing an especially serious crisis which is expressed in the existence of three socialist parties. And the Calvary of Italian social democracy is far from ended. . .

This crisis of Italian social democracy, joined to that of Stalinism, expresses a fundamentally *healthy* development of the Italian workers' movement. The combativity of the Italian working class, the sharpening of the class contradictions, the desire of the militant working class youth for ideological clarification—all these factors preclude a *retrograde* development of the most advanced sections. Becoming conscious of the betrayals of Stalinism or reformism, they are seeking a new road to regroupment without returning to one or another of the two movements of class misleadership.

The crisis of Italian social democracy broke out the first time in January 1947 when the unified party split into two fragments. Unfortunately the split did not occur along clearly demarcated ideological lines (i.e., revolutionary Marxist tendencies against reformist and collaborationist tendencies) but "for or against unreserved unity of action with the CP." The PSLI (Italian Socialist Labor Party), the new social democratic party which emerged from the split, comprised at the time a part of the traditional reformist right wing (Saragat, Daragona, Simenini), and a part of the extreme left centrist wing (M. Matteoti, Zagari and the Socialist Youth).

Less than a year after its foundation, this new party was confronted with a serious crisis when its leaders, violating their solemn commitments, entered the De Gasperi government. Most of the centrist elements capitulated to this flagrant abuse of confidence by the reformist right wing: Only the cadres of the Socialist Youth broke with the PSLI at its Naples convention in January 1948. Losing all contact with the working class, the right wing drew all the logical conclusions from its purely petty-bourgeois

course. It accepted the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic Pact enthusiastically. It organized the split in the unions. It came out in favor of an electoral bloc with completely bourgeois parties like the Republican Party.\*

The "left centrist" tendency, eternally wavering between its oppositionist inclination and its fears of "the responsibilities of power" in the party—an expression of its inability to concretely formulate a policy in opposition to that of the reformist right wing—then sought its salvation in "socialist unification," that is, in allies outside the party.

It found them in other groups which had broken from the PSI (Socialist Party of Italy) after the January 1947 split, namely in the Silone group (*Union of Socialists*) which had no precise political platform but with a certain reputation for "political honesty"; (the scarcity of this commodity has boosted its price); and the reformist tendency led by that old political fox and careerist, Romita, who had broken from the PSI during the year. Its patrons on Comisco† had envisaged a "genuine" social democratic unification including the PSLI plus Silone plus Romita. At the last moment, the PSLI right wing, not having obtained adequate guarantees that it would control the "unified" party like it now controls its own (through a "democracy" which mobilizes for conventions thousands of votes of paper "members"), withdrew from the combination. "Socialist unification" therefore turned out to be merely another split, the center and left of the PSLI joining the Silone and Romita groups at the Florence convention in December 1949 to form the Unified Socialist Party, PSU. (Let us note in passing that the right wing of the PSLI, which is so "passionately" attached to formal democracy, disbanded entire federations and acted more bureaucratically than the Stalinists ever dared do in Italy.)

The speeches, declarations of principles, and other feature defining the character of the new party clearly indicate that it does not intend to differentiate itself in any way from the PSLI. It is not opposed to collaboration with the bourgeoisie in the government; it favors such collaboration on better conditions (it wants at least five portfolios against the paltry three that Saragat is satisfied with). It is not against the Atlantic Pact, it is only for its transformation into a "peace pact." It is not in favor of the split in the trade unions; it merely explains that the split is an accomplished fact. . . Under such conditions it is clear that no major obstacles exists to an eventual fusion between the PSU and the PSLI provided the "unified" party pursues a strictly Saragat policy. The unfortunate knight-errants of centrism, who feel as out of place today in Silone's house as they did yesterday in Saragat's, fervently hope to re-

\*At the Naples convention, Saragat justified participation in the government by the need of checking the government actions of the Christian Democrats. At the Milan convention in 1949, he explained that this collaboration was required because social democracy and Christian democracy were both "profoundly democratic and socially animated parties."

†Committee for International Socialist Conferences. A liaison center for Social Democratic Parties in Europe, a kind of successor to the pre-war Second International.

turn to a more familiar atmosphere in the house of Saragat, Silone and Co. They are deceiving themselves. Following an eventual fusion, only a split will open new perspectives for them.

The PSI, the other social democratic fragment, has not experienced such complicated and bewildering convolutions as those of the PSLI. There are four tendencies in its ranks: A pro-Stalinist tendency led by the infamous little Cominform agent, Pietro Nenni; a "left" tendency led by Lelio Basso who has been dubbed "the little Lenin of Italy" (although his only resemblance to Lenin consists of a goatee) and who systematically refuses to differentiate himself from Nenni; a right wing tendency, strictly reformist, led by Romita, and finally a so-called "center" tendency led by former partisan leaders like Riccardo Lombardi who comes from the Action Party. This latter tendency is regrouping all the elements within the party who are vaguely discontented with the Nenni policy.

But unlike its rather politically formless base, these centrist leaders, who have recently been moving toward Marxism, are making an honest effort to formulate a policy which corresponds to the interests of the workers.

The electoral defeat of the "Democratic People's Front" on April 18, 1948 was above all a defeat for the PSI. As in all social democratic parties, it was the signal for a change in leadership. For more than a year Nenni-Basso allowed the representatives of the "center" to take the helm. But like all centrists, they feared nothing so much as applying their own policy. Placed in the leadership of the party by the masses of discontented members, these new leaders tried to differentiate themselves as little as possible from Nenni. They did not offer the workers any different perspective than that of the Stalinist policy of defeat. They do not know how to stem the collapse of the party. The 1949 convention saw the withdrawal of Romita and gave the majority to Nenni who leads the PSI like a Cominform party. At the December Central Committee meeting, Nenni attacked the Yugoslav CP for having gone over to "the imperialist camp." (Nenni himself was an ardent supporter of the first and second imperialist wars!) The discontent in the party has again risen against this Cominform policy. And again, the "center" is unable to give the members any concrete policy, besides embarrassed allusions to a needed decentralization of the workers' movement.

### Toward the Revolutionary Party

Nevertheless the fact that Riccardo Lombardi and his friends have never once been influenced by the comedy of the so-called "socialist unification" is an excellent sign of their fundamental orientation. They must now draw the conclusions from their negative experiences with reformism, Maximalism (left centrism) and Stalinism. They must find the courage to clearly formulate, at least for themselves, the perspective of *the building of the new revolutionary party* of the Italian proletariat. Above all they must rid themselves of any inferiority complex toward Stalinism. There are thousands of workers in the Italian proletariat and *in their own party* who understand that Stalinism is the antithesis and not the continuation of Leninism.

An evolution on their part in a revolutionary and internationalist direction, that is, in a Leninist direction, would rapidly transform them into a pole of attraction for everything healthy in the left social democracy, among the followers of the Basso faction in the PSI and the left wing members of the PSU. They would thus render an important service to the building of the Italian revolutionary party, to the regeneration of the European workers' movement in general.

But whatever the further evolution of the "center" in the PSI, revolutionary cadres who know their task already exist in Italy. For most part they have come from the Socialist Youth and, having assimilated the Leninist program through their own post war experiences, these cadres have joined the Fourth International and laid the first basis for building the revolutionary party. After having organized the militants who came from the social democracy, their immediate task now is to organize the militants and groups who are breaking with the CP. To bring the Bolshevik program to the broad masses, to participate in their daily struggles, to enable the vanguard workers to see in action a new leadership, however embryonic, that is different from the Stalinists—these are the aims this cadre will seek to attain in the coming months.

The possibilities of development offered by the objective situation are excellent. If they know how to utilize them, they will be able to give a powerful impetus to the development of the Italian revolutionary movement and—through their own successes which will be the successes of the program and organization of the Fourth International—they will speed up the progressive evolution of oppositionist groups inside and outside the traditional parties toward the World Party of the Socialist Revolution.

December 15, 1949.

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# Political Crisis in France

By *PIERRE FRANK*

A year ago the miners went back to work defeated after an eight weeks' strike which demonstrated the admirable militancy of a proletariat whose reserves have been squandered and exploited by agents of the Kremlin. This defeat of the workers had important effects in 1949 on the evolution of French capitalism as well as on the development of the Stalinist party.

French capitalism, reduced to a second rate imperialist position, can only hope to hold its own by transforming its political regime and establishing a "strong state"—that is, by establishing totalitarian rule under which the standard of living would be greatly depressed and the working class unable to make any improvements. But the road to the "strong state" poses great difficulties. During 1947 and 1948, capitalism began to create the instrument for the achievement of this policy in the form of the "Rally of the People of France," (RPF) led by General de Gaulle, which in several elections since has received a very substantial vote.

Thus, violently opposed to each other, two forces—CPF (Communist Party of France) and RPF continued to clash, disregarding the new governmental and parliamentary combination, the "third force" composed of the Socialists, the (Catholic) MRP and the "Radicals," (a capitalist party), a combination with enough votes to constitute a majority in the National Assembly although its base of support in the country at large was rather insignificant.

As in 1935, however, Big Business is apprehensive of the dangers of a direct imposition of the "strong state." The working class is still too powerful; the influence of the French CP still too great and, in the period of "cold war" the CP is quite capable of giving an impulsion to the workers' struggles, especially in case of a Gaullist attempt to take power. Finally, although Gaullism is not at all identical with German Nazism or Italian Fascism, these two examples demonstrated to the bourgeoisie that recourse to such extra-legal formations, even if successful, could create great difficulties. Nothing like this was involved in a complete utilization of the existing state apparatus.

Nor did American imperialism—at least in its leading circles—indicate any sympathy for de Gaulle. This was not because of its love of democracy as against the authoritarian tendencies of the general. America's political rulers have generally preferred to place their trust in the politicians of the French bourgeoisie whom they felt were better equipped to play the subtle and adroit game required in a perilous situation. What American imperialism demanded from French as well as European politicians was a policy of enforcing capitalist order against the labor movement.

## After the Communists, the Socialists

The defeat of the miners gave French capitalism its

opportunity of initiating the policy of "Gaullism without de Gaulle."

This defeat, inflicted on an isolated union whose battle could not be won without a general struggle of the entire working class, was the opening wedge for a redoubled offensive of the employers against the working conditions and living standards of the workers. Wages remained frozen, except for the rare occasions when they were supplemented by inadequate bonuses. Piece work was instituted in full force in the factories and the speed-up greatly intensified. Factory discipline became ever more severe.

At the same time, the government strengthened its apparatus of repression. Hundreds and even thousands of militant miners were imprisoned. To restore police morale, weakened during the years of the German occupation, they were more and more frequently deployed against street demonstrations and on occasions where their intervention was completely unjustified even from considerations of "public order."

The government launched an attack against the CPF. Its publications were persecuted as in the days of Tardieu (a reactionary politician who was the French Premier in the early thirties). The minister Jules Moch denounced foreign subsidies allegedly received by the CPF. Hundreds of natives of Eastern European countries were expelled from France. A purge was set in motion in all government departments, in the old apparatus—there are no longer any Stalinist prefects and very few active Stalinist functionaries in higher positions—as well as in the new administrative council of the nationalized industries, where the Stalinists had established some important strongholds for themselves.

Finally, the year 1949 provided the occasion, during the Cantonal elections, for a considerable reduction of Stalinist representation in local governments. This was done through a balloting system which allowed for all sorts of combinations on the second ballot, so that representation for the approximately 30 percent of the electorate which voted for Stalinist candidates was completely wiped out.

But the bourgeoisie, which thus scored considerable points, does not have a parliamentary representation that corresponds to its present political needs. The Stalinists have more than 180 representatives out of a total of 600; and the socialists (SP) have a representation corresponding to the number of votes they received in 1946, which was much greater than they have been getting recently. The present parliament started out with a three-party majority (CPF, SP, MRP). With some difficulty a "third force" majority (SP, MRP, "Radicals") was contrived, due to the support of a few "independents" of various shadings. But it is not practically possible to produce a Right-

ist majority without the SP, except by including the Gaullists and creating split-offs to the left within the MRP and the "Radicals."

Both of these organizations, the "Radical" party which dominated in the pre-war Third Republic and the MRP, which was the most important bourgeois party during the first years of the post-war Fourth Republic, include the whole gamut of shadings and tendencies from the extreme left to the extreme right. Behind the "Radicals" stands Free Masonry; the MRP is linked to the Catholic Church.

This situation has given rise to an acceptance of the demand for a dissolution of the National Assembly and for new elections, a demand previously restricted to the Gaullists. Apparently this demand is accepted today more or less tacitly by everybody. The Gaullists are, of course, for dissolution, but they put their emphasis on a revision of the Constitution. The "Radicals," the MRP and some independents have also taken up the idea of new elections. The majority of the SP has also declared itself prepared for new elections. And in CP circles it has been said: "If you want new elections, we don't see any obstacle."

(The Constitution provides that in case of dissolution an interim government shall be set up by the President of the National Assembly which shall include the leader of each parliamentary group. Accordingly, the Stalinists could once more enter the government for a short time. That is also a reason for hesitation among the other parties.)

But unanimity on this point is confined to these general declarations. Each party as a whole, and each deputy individually, is concerned over the *results* of eventual elections. And this raises a question over which there is wide divergence: The method of balloting.

The system of proportional representation, used in 1946 is supported by the Stalinists and the MRP, but it is unanimously rejected by all the others, except perhaps by the Gaullists. Elections on the basis of proportional representation would result in a new Assembly in which the Stalinists would retain their present numbers and the Gaullists would be more numerous. In other words, it would be even more difficult if not impossible in the new Assembly to form a working majority for the bourgeoisie.

On the other hand, in the present Assembly, the CPF and the MRP can almost certainly block the adoption of any other system balloting, particularly that of the majority vote on two ballots, which would considerably reduce the Stalinists' representation (their vote totals being the same) and the MRP would lose representatives in a large number of districts.

But electioneering mechanics do not suffice to explain why there is little likelihood of legislative elections in 1950. (A new Assembly is due in 1951, in the normal course of things.) Big Business would find the means to line up a sufficient number of MRP votes on the question of the balloting system. It is not impossible to replace a deputy's seat with some other material advantages. But there are political dangers to make them pause. With new elections, there is no way of knowing—no matter what balloting system is used—how strong Gaullist representation will become.

French capitalism, at this time, does not want a government with Gaullists as part of the parliamentary majority. New elections, based on the system of the majority vote on two ballots, could very well result in a new Assembly differing from the present one only by the replacement of the Stalinist fraction by a strong Gaullist fraction.

That is why, for the present, the most probable perspective is the continuation of this system of government based on insignificant majorities, in which the fragility of the social edifice in France is wedded to the adroitness and cunning of several of its politicians.

Of course, this kind of policy cannot result in anything stable in the long run. The bourgeoisie is merely gaining time and weakening the workers. But there is no other solution than a showdown whose outcome will either favor the workers or a combat formation represented by Gaullism.

### The Crisis in the French Communist Party

The other important fact in the French situation is the development of the crisis in the Cominform organization in France. It is well known that outside of the "Peoples' Democracies" the French CP was the strongest Communist party after the "liberation." To be sure, the Italian CP had more members than the CPF and still has, and has been favored by more explosive domestic conditions. But the CPF, benefiting from the support of a majority of the working class and from strong sympathies among the rural as well as the urban petty bourgeoisie due to the twenty years in which it was able to function legally, had at its disposal a network of tens of thousands of worker-militants.

A connecting link between the Central Committee and the working class, these militants transmitted the policies of the leadership to which they were devoted, into the ranks of the workers, among whom they had acquired authority in the course of long years of struggle. The CPF has undergone numerous fluctuations in the size of its electoral support, the circulation of its press and participation in its demonstrations. But throughout all of its twists and turns, it has retained a skeleton structure of worker-militants unshakably loyal to the leadership and harboring no doubts as to the final objectives and the destiny of this party.

What is the balance-sheet of French Stalinism in the five years since the "liberation?"

We have already mentioned its elimination from posts in the state apparatus. But this tends to work in its favor within the working class. The crisis of the CPF is not at all apparent in the partial electoral results. It can be predicted with certainty that in general elections the majority of the city workers will continue to vote Communist. The SP does not have any visible hold on the working masses, although the latter do not respond to the appeals of the CPF or of the CGT (General Confederation of Workers), which openly acts as the trade union branch of the party.

This aspect of the situation is reflected also in the trade union movement itself. The CGT has lost a great many



members, but neither the "Workers' Force" nor any of the other new trade union federations, let alone the Catholic trade union organization, have benefited from these losses. In elections of shop delegates, the candidates of the GGT most often receive the highest votes among the industrial workers.

The crisis of the CPF appears in various forms. The circulation of the CP press has fallen off considerably. *L'Humanite* has a circulation of 240,000 today as compared with 450,000 five years ago. A number of its provincial dailies and weeklies have been discontinued. The decline of the Stalinist press, noted at a national conference of the CPF held early in 1949, has continued uninterrupted throughout the rest of the year. Demonstrations called by the CPF or affiliated organizations are much smaller than in the past. In Paris, the CPF has made much less use of the *Vel' d'Hiv*, which has a capacity of 20,000 seats, and more frequently confined itself to smaller meeting halls. CP membership has dropped, although it is impossible to obtain precise figures on this point.

(In the post-war period, at the same time as it adopted a frankly social democratic policy, the CPF also adopted social democratic organization forms, which—in France—means complete vagueness about figures.)

The Stalinist youth organization, UJRF, up to recently showed signs of life only in a few localities. It is not excluded however, that, as a result of the new policy of opposing the war against Viet Nam, the UJRF may undergo a certain revitalization and begin to recruit again.

But the crisis has been evidenced in a much more precise fashion. The first to show their doubts or disagreements were evidently those elements of a petty bourgeois social character such as the intellectuals, both party members as well as fellow travelers. The crisis among these elements began some months ago, during the Lysenko affair and when the Stalinists issued their proclamations on "socialist realism" in the arts.

The Stalinist party leadership has taken advantage of the fact that the first open breaks have occurred among such elements in order to denounce the petty-bourgeois who deserts when the struggle becomes more difficult. Naturally, since the CPF was able to attract a number of great names in science, literature and the arts, among whom some are indeed very far from Communism, splits among these elements can lead to the Right, into the camp of the good old bourgeois family, as well as into the camp of the revolution.

But the moral terror which the Stalinist leadership has tried to develop cannot prevent the extension of the crisis into the workers' ranks. There have been open disagreements expressed in a number of workers' units of the party. The division occurs among those who want to apply the Cominform line at all costs, and those who, aware that the Zhdanov theory of successful advances of the democratic forces is a bluff, tend to tone down that line in order to re-establish contact with the masses.

The most symptomatic phenomenon in the crisis of the CPF is the appearance of the bulletin of a secret faction, *La Lutte*. The authors remain anonymous and this gives

rise to many speculations, such as: Some of the leaders are preparing to break with Moscow; they are rank and file members supporting the Yugoslavs; it is a provocation organized by the leadership to detect oppositionists and expel them one by one. In any case, the very existence of such a publication—the like of which has not been seen for more than fifteen years—is characteristic of a deep-going crisis.

Another indication of the decline of the CPF in the political life of the country has found expression inside the Socialist Unity Party (PSU), which was formed by the pro-Stalinist wing of the SP and broke away from that party in 1948 during the height of the "cold war." In the course of some eighteen months of its existence, the PSU acted as a mere appendage of the Stalinist party. But at its recent national convention (December 1949) the first signs of loosening the ties with the Stalinist party appeared among its leading elements.

No clear political differences have been formulated as yet, but the PSU has shown a tendency toward independent existence and, more significantly, adopted a decision to hold a national gathering soon to discuss the Yugoslav problem. That means it is no longer content to trail behind the Stalinists automatically on the very point on which they are now most sensitive.

The political core of the crisis in the Stalinist party lies in a combination of the effects of the Yugoslav affair and in reflection on the situation in France over the past five years. At the time of the "liberation" the CPF was in a position to literally pick up state power. Instead, it brought de Gaulle to power. It participated in several bourgeois governments. Its members were ordered to restrain the masses and to torpedo their struggles.

And then, as the workers continued to be beaten in partial struggles, disoriented and weakened, thrown back into a defensive position and facing increased onslaughts from the bosses, the leadership of the CPF ordered its members to carry out an ever more aggressive tactic, thus contributing to a further weakening of the working class and to a further isolation of the CPF within the working class. There is hardly a worker militant to whom all this is not as plain as the nose on his face.

In this situation, the Yugoslav affair demonstrates to these militants that what is involved is not a mistake which the leaders will easily correct; that what is happening in France is linked to the international politics of Stalinism; and that these politics are dictated by considerations which the leadership cannot explain frankly to its members and to the working class.

The Stalinist leadership has been reacting very vehemently and very violently. Its press campaigns, on the Yugoslav question and against the intellectuals, are naturally characterized by the utmost political poverty. It must argue against overwhelming evidence, at a time when, aside from the Far East, Stalinism is undergoing only defeats. Publications (biographies, memoirs, novels) giving an inside view of the methods of Stalinism are more numerous. On no plané can the Stalinists go over to the offensive. In the columns of *L'Humanite*, they can celebrate

the gifts sent to Stalin on his 70th birthday; but the worker militants of the CPF in the factories were embarrassed by this campaign. To improve relations with the rank and file, Thorez, travels all over France, on the pretext of autographing the revised and abridged edition of his book, "Son of the People."

But the Stalinist leaders who are accustomed to such problems, resort mainly to organizational measures to overcome the present difficulty. In one instance after another they are replacing old cadres by new ones, often by inexperienced youths who are useful to the Political Bureau because of their ignorance in many matters and because they are more pliable. The adventurist demonstrations undoubtedly also serve to bring about a certain selection of young people that can be enrolled in the apparatus. Such

means, if they cannot halt the spread of the crisis in the party, nevertheless enable the leadership to face its difficulties with a party that is seemingly more coherent.

\* \* \*

At the beginning of the new year it is difficult to outline clear perspectives. The economic situation threatens to become worse. The last few months of 1949 gave evidence of a serious drop in iron and steel production. A sharpening of the crisis would be exploited by the Gaullists among the middle classes. The working class is facing a number of lock-outs and, in view of its distrust of the old leaderships, it is still, too early to foresee what its reactions will be. Whatever turn events take, it is certain that the crisis in the relationship between the working class and its old leaderships will continue to deepen.

## A Review of Two Titoist Pamphlets

# Yugoslavia and Permanent Revolution

By MICHEL PABLO

The Yugoslavs claim that they have been the first to have grappled "theoretically" with the problem of relations between socialist countries. The second world war gave rise not only to "socialist" Yugoslavia but to a whole galaxy of "people's democracies." All of the countries gravitating around the USSR, according to the Yugoslavs, comprise the post-war "socialist" world. Theoretically there should be a peaceful co-existence and a close and unselfish cooperation between these "socialist" countries, say the Yugoslavs.

Yet in practice there is nothing of the kind. The leaders of the USSR, "deviating" from Marxism-Leninism, have established "anti-socialist" relationships, against which the Yugoslavs have justifiably revolted. In two pamphlets, recently issued in French translation\*, two Yugoslav leaders, M. Djilas and M. Popovitch have undertaken a theoretical study of what, in their mind, relations between "socialist countries" should be, and what has happened under the leadership of the USSR.

Djilas' study is mostly concerned with the political aspect of these relationships; the one by Popovitch with their economic aspects. One appears to be a necessary complement to the other but it is to be regretted that Djilas did not probe into the contemporary economic reality with the same penetration that characterizes Popovitch's study. That would have saved Djilas from treading so precariously on the ground of "the law of uneven development," which was "discovered by Lenin." There is no perceptible disagreement between the two treatises, but it is quite apparent that Popovitch, operating in the sphere of economic realities, is much closer to the idea of the *universality* of

contemporary economy, the organic interdependence of national economies, which in reality are all part of a higher entity, *world economy*, and is therefore drawn to the *international* aspect of the building of socialism.

Let us now examine more closely how each of the two authors elaborates his subject and arrives at his conclusions.

\* \* \*

### Relations Between Socialist Countries

In the entire first section of his study, Djilas attempts to catalogue Lenin's views on what the relations between countries and particularly between "socialist" countries should be, and by this method highlights the striking contrast between Leninist doctrine on this question and the present methods of Moscow and the Cominform. By citing passages of well-known writings of Lenin, dealing especially with the national question and the self-determination of peoples, Djilas proves that Lenin was for a) the right of every oppressed nationality to have its own independent national state if it so desires; b) freedom of choice regarding the form of relationships which every people (every state) desires to engage in with other states (federation, confederation, independent states).

This *equality* of relationships between countries and between "socialist" countries, in particular, has been completely nullified by Moscow which has substituted for it the principle of the *leading nation* (in this case the USSR) which *commands* its satellites and imposes upon them its own views on all questions. That, Djilas correctly says, is the complete negation of Leninism and constitutes a deviation from Marxism-Leninism, which is not confined to the national question alone but "necessarily spreads like an epidemic to all fields of Marxism, from philosophy and the question of culture to the problem of the state and the future of socialist construction."

\*M. Djilas: *Lenin and Relations between Socialist Countries*; M. Popovitch: *Economic Relations between Socialist States*. Published by Yugoslav Publishers.

There would be nothing to add to all this and to the whole indictment Djilas makes in his work against the practices of the Kremlin towards Yugoslavia, the other "peoples' democracies" and the Communist Parties in general, if Djilas had not had the unhappy idea of stuffing his analysis with the "theory of the law of uneven development" which he attributes to Lenin. He borrows this conception from earlier studies from Stalinist manuals like "The History of the Russian Bolshevik Party." According to this monument of vulgar Stalinist falsification, the law of "uneven development," "unknown" to Marx and Engels was "discovered" by Lenin, and this law "deprives" the Trotskyist "theory" of "world revolution" of "reality" (p. 46).

### Djilas' Simultaneous World Revolution

Djilas' ignorance on this subject leads him to create (or, more precisely, to recreate by borrowing elements from the Stalinist arsenal) a veritable mythology on what he calls the "theory of world revolution." The creators of this theory, Djilas says very seriously, "were in reality Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg: basing themselves on a passage from Marx erroneously understood which they defended in the name of 'permanent revolution.'" Later Trotsky stole this "theory" from them and circulated it as his own. (p. 47) And of what does the "theory of world revolution (or permanent revolution)" consist, according to Djilas? In the assertion of "the impossibility of the victory of the *revolution and of socialism* in one country without a *simultaneous* world revolution." (p. 47, my emphasis, MP) Later we find a slightly different definition: "The necessity of unleashing the revolution *at the same time* in the entire world, or in the majority of advanced countries." (p. 73)

To this "theory," Djilas counterposes the conception based on the "law of uneven development" discovered by Lenin, that is to say, the "theory of the possibility and of the inevitable character of the *revolution and of socialism in a single country*." This theory "has thus replaced the theory of Marx and Engels on the *simultaneous* revolution in several advanced countries which has *become outmoded* in the conditions of the epoch of imperialism." (p. 48) "As everyone knows," Djilas goes on to teach us, "Lenin dealt with the question of the world revolution by taking as his basis the law of the uneven development and the contradictions of capitalism, which come into especially bold relief in the era of imperialism; i.e., he deals with it as a question of the breaking of the capitalist chain sometimes in one place and sometimes in another, as a question of the inevitable, possible and necessary unleashing of the *revolution*, and of the *victory of socialism* first in several countries, or even in a single country, and then in the other countries." (p. 48)

There are as many errors here as there are words, and an unpardonable ignorance, especially for revolutionists who are justly indignant at the methods of false information, lies and slanders introduced by Moscow on so gigantic a scale in the workers' movement. To re-establish

the truth about the history of the international workers' movement, the Yugoslav militants would do better to go to *primary sources* instead of borrowing their learning and their arguments from Stalinist writings and of proceeding like Djilas, who naively bases his references to "the works of Lenin and to his doctrine on imperialism and the revolution" on the version supplied of these works and of this doctrine in "The History of the Communist Party (Bolshevik)!" (p. 37)

Djilas finds that "even children" know today "that there is no simultaneous world revolution, that is, one embracing the entire world at the same time." (p. 47) We can assure him that neither Marx, nor Rosa Luxemburg nor Trotsky ever went through this "infantile" stage in the elaboration of their revolutionary theoretical conceptions. And when Djilas attributes to them *his* conception of "world revolution" he is in reality breaking through open doors. There was never any question of a *simultaneous* world revolution, not for Marx, nor Rosa Luxemburg, nor Trotsky. Marx had other ideas on the development of the revolution, some of which are still valid and others are in part outdated by the present conditions of imperialism.

### What Marx Really Said

The first idea of Marx is that the revolution does not halt at its bourgeois democratic stage, but progresses in constant struggle with all the class forces which want to restrain it, to limit it to this stage only and to prevent it from flowering into a socialist and communist revolution (definitively abolishing all forms of class rule). It was in this sense that Marx spoke of the *permanent* character of the revolution in our epoch (capitalism). This idea established by Marx still remains valid, and all subsequent experience has confirmed and reinforced it. Moreover, in the imperialist epoch, it is impossible to conceive of a revolution halting at the democratic stage which would permit the proletariat to organize peacefully and so gradually, by broadening the conditions of democracy, to evolve into socialism.

This conception, which counterposes the democratic stage to the socialist stage is in reality that of reformism and of the vulgar "Marxism" of the Mensheviks, etc. This idea was revived by Stalin and Bukharin after Lenin's death and applied with disastrous results in China (1925-27) and then in Spain. We come across it again as the basis of the theory of the "peoples' democracy" as it was set forth by the leaders of the USSR and the Communist Parties until their switch in December 1948 when they began to identify "peoples' democracy" with dictatorship of the proletariat.

The second idea of Marx was that the revolution would begin first in the most developed and industrialized countries of Europe (England, France, Germany) and then extend to the less developed countries. Marx foresaw this because of the dynamism of the bourgeois democratic revolution in these countries, a dynamism capable of pushing the revolution to its socialist phase. We know now that the democratic revolution of 1848 was unable to turn into a socialist revolution, and for this self-same reason was un-

able to be consummated as a democratic revolution (i.e. to effectively resolve the problems of a bourgeois democratic type).

Marx was wrong on the timing of the process but not on its methodological character. Marx never envisaged a simultaneous world revolution. He envisaged the possibility of a revolution which could triumph in one country and then spread to the others, to be sure in a brief span of time which experience has now shown us to be much more protracted. But not only Marx was wrong on the timing of the propagation of the revolution *from one country to another*; but with him Lenin and the entire Third International. Doesn't Djilas know that Lenin considered the victory in Russia as the first stage of the world revolution which would rapidly conquer in other countries, particularly Germany, and that the whole policy of the Soviet Union and the whole strategy of the Third International between 1919 and 1923 in reality revolved around his perspective?

There is no *methodological* disagreement between Marx and Lenin on the development of the revolution, for both shared the same understanding of the "uneven development" of capitalism. However this uneven development in Marx' time actually placed the developed countries of Europe closer to the revolution than the backward countries. To the degree that we enter into the imperialist epoch, other links of the capitalist chain become "weaker," and therefore more favorable for the victory of the revolution.

### Law of Uneven Development

Stalin's ignorance led him to say that the "law of uneven development" was first discovered by Lenin in 1915. This law in reality is a universal law characterizing the development of all human history, of all societies and not specifically capitalism or its imperialist epoch. Mankind has never progressed *uniformly* neither on the economic nor on the cultural plane. It has progressed *unevenly* and in a combined manner both between peoples and different countries as well as within a given people or country. For example, capitalism developed as a new economic and social system on the ground of an extreme diversity, of extreme inequality inherited from the past of the different countries.

Capitalism did not abolish this uneven progress in its development; it acted upon it in a *dialectic way* which the Stalinist theoreticians never understood or never wanted to understand, for this knowledge was radically contrary to their theory of "socialism in one country." On one side, capitalism, by extending itself over the world, by moving from country to country, from metropolis to the colonies, brings the economic and cultural levels of the different countries closer together and tends to equalize them.

But in this process, capitalism operates by its *own methods* which are not those of cooperation and of harmonious and balanced international planning; by its anarchic and antagonistic character, it sets one country against another, and within each country one branch of economy against another, in one place promoting the de-

velopment of certain productive and cultural forces; and in other places stopping or even brutally destroying them.

From this dialectical operation of the law of uneven development there results a *complicated, combined process, both unifying and centrifugal, both equalizing and differentiating*. Far from moderating the *dialectical unity* of these two opposing tendencies, imperialism strengthens and deepens their content. The uneven development of imperialism makes possible and even inevitable the breaking of its chain at its weakest links, i.e., in the countries which have accumulated the most explosive charge of contradictions, countries which are often the most backward. Hence flows the possibility of the victory of the revolution in a single country without a simultaneous world revolution (or without a revolution simultaneously victorious in a large number of advanced countries).

### Interdependence of All Countries

But the uneven development of the imperialist chain should not lead us to overlook the chain itself, arising from the organic interdependence of all countries, tied by a thousand links over the whole expanse of capitalist development and the formation of world economy, the world market, the international division of labor. Consequently when speaking of uneven development one must not conclude that one country is *independent* in relation to the others.

When Djilas tries to deduce the possibility of the victory of the *revolution* and of *socialism* in a single country from "the law of uneven development" he is repeating a Stalinist assertion which gained currency in the workers' movement only after Lenin's death.

The *uneven* resistance of different capitalist countries to the pressure of the revolution permits its triumph, i.e., the taking of power in a single country, often a backward country. But the organic *interdependence* (which is now greater than ever) of all countries in the imperialist epoch does not permit the economic isolation of one country from the rest of the world market and thereby permit the building of socialism in each country separately with its own forces and on the basis of its own resources.

World economy today does not consist of the juxtaposition of autonomous national economic units. It is a higher economic entity than the national units of which they are organic parts. And if this is the case for capitalism, socialism, which will be characterized by an infinitely superior development of the productive forces than that of the most advanced capitalist country (now, the United States) can even less be conceived as the juxtaposition of autonomous national socialist units.

It must also be understood that "the law of uneven development" also operates within each country by causing the inadequate development of certain economic sectors on the one hand, and the "excessive" development of other economic sectors on the other hand. Only the equilibrium established by the world market can absorb surpluses and make up for the inadequacies of each national economy. The productive forces might not conflict with the national boundaries only if "the socialist country" is con-

ceived of in the sense of a Malthusian and austerity policy which *equalizes and "socializes" poverty and deliberately obstructs* the development of certain productive forces.

### Reactionary Utopia of National Socialism

To build, that is to complete socialism in a single country, must, according to Marxist doctrine, signify the disappearance of classes which is possible only in a society of material abundance. To complete socialism, to build a socialist society, signifies arriving at the threshold of the stage where, thanks to material abundance, it will be possible to apply the maxim of "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." Such an aim is unrealizable in each country separately, even if that country is Russia for which Stalin in 1924 evolved the theory of "socialism in one country" on the assumption that its exceptional "material resources" were "necessary and sufficient" for this task.\*

Thirty years of effort since the October Revolution have not sufficed "to build socialism in the USSR." Despite the lying declarations of the imposters who lead the USSR and the Communist parties, that country is still extremely far from socialism, the great majority of Russian workers and peasants still live in conditions of poverty, and only a thin layer of the population, some millions of bureaucrats enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of the bourgeoisie of the capitalist countries.

Thanks to the size and wealth of its territory, the USSR was able to permit itself an autarchic experiment, naturally to the greatest detriment of the standard of living of the great mass of the population. But what would happen to a country like Yugoslavia, Greece, Rumania, Hungary, etc., which attempts to "build socialism" by itself? What sense could such an undertaking have? In every step they take in the reconstruction of their economies, all these countries literally depend on the external aid of their exchange with the world market.†

Thus, whenever the Yugoslav leaders speak of the possibility of the "victory of socialism" and of the "building of socialism" in a single country, there is an ambiguity:

\*Lenin never spoke of the possibility of building, of completing socialism in a "single country." Lenin often used the expression, "victory of socialism in one country," either in the sense of the possibility of the victory of the revolution in one country, of the taking of power in a country, or in the sense of the necessary and sufficient **political prerequisites** (statification of the means of production, dictatorship of the proletariat, etc.) for building socialism in a country. This is clear to any careful reader of Lenin's writings, who has freed himself of the scholastic Menshevik method and of the dishonesty of the Stalinist leaders, who by flinging quotations and phrases arbitrarily torn from context, try to "prove this or that."

†The case of Yugoslavia itself is very striking; it actually trades with 46 countries and its reconstruction effort is actually maintained only thanks to exchanges with the world market. What would happen to Yugoslavia if, for example, there was added to the present blockade by the USSR and the other "people's democracies" a more or less general blockade by the capitalist countries?

Either they mean simply that the victory of the proletarian revolution and the beginning of the building of socialism—the national elements of the international socialist society of tomorrow—are possible in a single country, and we are perfectly in agreement on this point\*; or they want to make us believe that they will succeed in completing a socialist society within the national boundaries of Yugoslavia. In the later case, their whole orientation is naturally false and can only lead to a repetition of the nationalist deviation which we have seen in the USSR and which has served in reality as "theoretical" camouflage for the Soviet bureaucracy.

It is true that neither Djilas, nor Popovitch, deny the need for close economic collaboration with other countries, particularly the "peoples' democracies" and the USSR. It is even true that Popovitch considers, that in the absence of such collaboration and with the maintenance of relations only with capitalist countries, socialist development in each country will be greatly "hampered." Nevertheless, the ambiguity, on the meaning of "socialist construction" remains, and the Yugoslav leaders have nowhere attempted to clarify it. This is a cardinal point, one which can become the point of crystallization for a full-blown, opportunist position with all its consequences for the internal and external policy of Yugoslavia and its relations with the international workers' movement.

### Distortion of "Permanent Revolution"

It is impossible to ignore the way that Djilas presents the "theory of permanent revolution" which Trotsky presumably "stole" from Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg. Trotsky never concealed what he borrowed from other Marxist theoreticians because he never presumed to elaborate his line without basing himself on all the positive achievements of Marxist thought (and of human thought in general). In 1905, the period of the elaboration of his theory of the permanent revolution, Trotsky had views concerning the Russian Revolution of 1905 which were close but not identical to those of Parvus (the German Marxist who had achieved a certain standing before his degeneration). (Among other things, Parvus assigned exclusively democratic tasks to the dictatorship of the proletariat while Trotsky specified that the dictatorship of the proletariat would combine the solution of those tasks with

\*There is nothing pessimistic about this perspective. On the contrary, it is the only realistic, the only true perspective, one which consolidates the revolution on the national scale while awaiting its extension on the international arena. In reality it signifies the following orientation: Instead of pursuing the utopian aim of building, within national boundaries, a "socialist society" independent of world economy, the aim is to attain the most favorable tempo of socialist construction from the point of view of conditions, namely those which flow from internal and external economic conditions, by strengthening the position of the proletariat, by preparing the national elements of the future international socialist society and at the same time and above all systematically improving the standard of living of the proletariat and strengthening its ties with the non-exploiting masses of the countryside.

placing socialist tasks and their solution on the order of the day.)

The theory of the permanent revolution, in its elaborated and systematized form, belongs exclusively to Trotsky who knew how to develop and synthesize into a coherent whole the scattered views of Marx and Lenin on the mechanism and dynamics of the proletarian revolution in our epoch as well as the practical experiences of the international workers' movement on this point.

Some of the Yugoslav leaders have,\* thanks to the experience of their own revolution in Yugoslavia, very correctly grasped two of the elements of the permanent revolution, namely: a) That the democratic tasks (independence and national unity, agrarian reform, etc.) lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat and that *it alone is capable of resolving them*, besides placing the socialist tasks themselves on the order of the day; b) that once having triumphed, the revolution does not stop, it is not ended, but is in constant internal struggle against all opponent forces, and over a lengthy period transforms social relations (on the economic, technical, scientific, moral plane, etc).

The third element of the permanent revolution which the Yugoslavs do not yet seem to understand consists in the *international* character of the proletarian revolution in our epoch, namely: that the revolution begun in an isolated country, progresses through internal and external difficulties which increase simultaneously with successes registered in the building of socialism and which are only finally resolved with the victory of the proletariat over an area embracing a decisive part of world economy. Viewed in this way, a revolution on a national scale is not an end in itself but only a link in the international chain.

These three elements form a coherent and organic whole, and this is the theory of the permanent revolution, which it must be said has been atrociously distorted by Djilas.

\* \* \*

A final word on the explanation given by Djilas of the "revisionism" of the leaders of the USSR and the Cominform.

Up to now, Djilas along with all the Yugoslav leaders seem to attribute this "revisionism" to a lack of understanding on the part of the leaders of the USSR, to "their refusal to understand what is essentially new in present conditions." (p. 123) Popovitch refers to the "revisionism" of the Second International and to the "*coup de grace*" it received from Lenin. But in the case of the Second International, Lenin explained its revisionism and its opportunism precisely by exposing *their economic and social roots* in the corruption of the workers' leaders (trade union and political) and of a whole layer of the proletariat, thanks to the superprofits of imperialism; by the formation of a *workers' bureaucracy* based on the "*aristocracy of labor*."

A similar phenomenon has appeared in the USSR, namely, the formation, under conditions of prolonged isolation of the USSR and its backwardness, of a powerful bureaucratic strata which has raised itself materially and politically over the masses of the workers, which has

become omnipotent and follows a domestic and foreign policy which reflects only *its own interests*, necessarily distinct and even hostile to those of the Russian proletariat and the world proletariat. So long as the Yugoslav leaders do not grasp this *sociological explanation* of the revisionism they speak of, they will remain in the sphere of effects, epiphenomena and not the primary and profound causes of the evil.\*

\* \* \*

### Economics of World Exploitation

The aim of Popovitch's study is to set forth two main ideas: a) that under the conditions of the world *capitalist* market, the more developed nations exploit the more backward countries from the twofold vantage point of *prices* and the *structure of exchange*; b) that in its relations with the "peoples' democracies," the USSR, instead of altering these *capitalist* conditions of trade and welding all these countries economically into a "socialist bloc" which could attenuate the effects of the world market on them, maintains and even often aggravates these capitalist trade practices.

Popovitch analyzes the first point in detail. He shows the concrete mechanism of world trade through which the exploitation of backward countries is effected by the more industrialized ones, and how there is actually established a hierarchy among all the countries, in which those possessing an organic composition of capital above that of the world average, obtain, thanks to the formation of world prices, a superprofit at the expense of countries whose organic composition of capital is lower than the world average.†

The exploitation of countries in this category is not limited to the question of prices but also extends to the

\*In the last issue of the magazine **Communist**, theoretical organ of the Yugoslav CP, there appears the first installment of an article called "Some questions on criticism and self-criticism in the USSR," which seems to grapple with the problem of the Soviet bureaucracy and the internal situation in the USSR. Unfortunately we have only a synopsis of the article. The writer accuses the Kremlin of leading the USSR in a manner "unbelievable for a socialist country," and emphasizes the fact that the foreign policy of a country is only an expression of its domestic policy. The writer denounces the situation in which criticism of aspects of Soviet life is monopolized by the Central Committee of the Russian Bolshevik Party and by Stalin in particular; this monopoly makes all "conflict of opinion" impossible. Throughout the country, the leaders conduct themselves as aristocrats "strangling even the economic development of the people." This monopoly by the leaders leads to the exploitation and subjugation of the Soviet masses. We shall probably return to this study which appears to be the most advanced in its criticism and understanding of the leaders of the USSR and their policy.

†In accord with the Marxist theory of value, he takes into consideration the socially necessary labor time on a world scale in the formation of **world prices**. It follows that national inequalities in the intensity and productivity of labor operate in favor of the developed countries to the detriment of backward countries, and that as a result, as Marx said, "the favored countries (the more developed ones) receive more labor in exchange for less labor."

structure of exchange, the countries in question exporting only raw materials and agricultural products.

As the capitalist era evolves, this twofold exploitation becomes aggravated because the monopolies exercise their influence over the world market in the following two ways: "a) By increasing the price of finished goods that the capitalist monopolies produce and sell to the backward countries; b) by reducing the price of agricultural raw materials furnished by the less developed countries and by the colonies." (p. 25)

Different economic relations ought to prevail between "socialist countries"; according to Popovitch they should consist of the following; a) In each backward country the capital funds produced by the workers should be determined and not be permitted to be syphoned off through inequitable exchanges with other more developed countries. In other words, the more developed socialist countries should avoid exploiting the less developed socialist countries. The more developed socialist countries should give real economic assistance to the less developed ones which is impossible if they trade and grant loans according to capitalist rules of profit.

### "Inequality, Plunder, Exploitation"

"Real economic equality," Popovitch states "does not exist among present socialist countries, the USSR and the other peoples' democracies." (p. 120) "Instead there is inequality, plunder and exploitation." He says (pp. 134-35) that "socialist" relations are necessary for two principal

reasons: a) So that the development of the productive forces of socialism in a given country are not "objectively hampered and curbed to a great degree" by subjection to the laws of the capitalist world market; b) so that they can effectively and even successfully counterpose to the world capitalist market a socialist bloc, a "union of socialist states with equal rights forming an economic whole" whose very constitution would "demonstrate its vital and far superior force to that of imperialism" and would deliver "the most effective blow" to the Marshall Plan and to the other imperialist plans.

The understanding which Popovitch brings to this question, although it still does not lead him to the conclusion of the utopian and completely irrational character of the building of "socialism in one country," is completed by another progressive point which we believe necessary to underscore.

"The internationalism of the communist parties of the capitalist countries," he writes, (p. 113) "should above all be that of a stubborn intransigent struggle against *their* capitalism, against *their* bourgeoisie, which at the same time constitutes the most effective and the most real aid they can furnish the countries which are building socialism."

This conception essentially differs from that of the Stalinist leaders of the USSR who in practice assign as the first task of the international proletariat "the defense of the USSR" through the medium of compromises and pressure on the bourgeoisie of each country.

## Arsenal of Marxism

# Peasant War in China

By LEON TROTSKY

**EDITOR'S NOTE:** The triumph of the Chinese peasant armies led by the Stalinist Mao Tze-tung over the Chiang Kai-shek regime lends particular timeliness to the re-publication of this article by Leon Trotsky. It was written eighteen years ago as a letter to the Chinese Trotskyists and deals primarily with the peasant revolts in that country which were then becoming the subject of considerable interest and comment.

After the defeat of the Second Chinese Revolution (1925-1927)—due principally to the capitulation of Stalin's Comintern to Chiang Kai-shek—the Chinese Stalinists turned their backs on the cities and the city workers. They quit the urban centers almost entirely to try to gain leadership over the peasantry whose risings followed belatedly in the wake of the defeats of the proletariat in the cities.

By 1932, the peasant bands under Stal-

inist command, which they had named the "Red Army" had won control over a fairly large area called "Soviet China." After the second Stalinist deal with Chiang in 1937, the armies and the area it controlled were re-named to harmonize with the People's Front policy, names which were in fact, more in accord with their real class character.

In all essentials Trotsky's predictions have literally proved prophetic. The peasant armies under Stalinist leadership conquered the big cities as an anti-proletarian force. The class character of the Mao Tze-tung regime is shaped by its peasant, i.e. its petty-bourgeois base, rather than by its ritual acceptance of Marxism, the science of the working class in its struggle for socialism. The conflict with the workers became an actuality in the very first city that Mao's troops entered.

While the peasants had been granted certain reforms such as division of the land, reduction of rent and interest, workers' demands for an improvement of their terrible conditions have been brutally denied by the Stalinist warlords. Strikes have been violently smashed, the "ringleaders" executed and the workers driven back to the factories and ordered to "work harder." For reports of such incidents we refer the reader to the report from Hong Kong, in the December Fourth International, to C. Liu's article in the current issue.

These were further confirmed by Drew Pearson who wrote in his column on February 12th that a riot of 20,000 textile workers in January in Shanghai had been suppressed by troops with machine guns and the arrest of 100 workers. During their struggle against the cancellation (in effect) of their an-

nual bonus, the workers tore down pictures of Mao Tze-tung and Chu Teh.

The report does not say that the Stalinists accused the workers of being "counter-revolutionary Trotskyists" but we know from rich experience that this is how they characterize all working class and revolutionary resistance to their reactionary policies. For as Trotsky points out the "struggle between... the Stalinists and the Bolshevik-Lenin-

ists bears in itself an inner tendency toward transformation into a class struggle."

The reader should bear in mind that this letter was written in 1932 when the Trotskyists still considered themselves a faction of the Communist International and the Communist Parties, whose chief aim was to bring about the Marxist reform of these parties. The designa-

tion "Left Opposition" was changed in 1934 after Hitler's rise to power had proved that reform of the Communist Parties was no longer possible. New revolutionary parties and an international had to be created. Similarly life itself had demonstrated that the characterization of Stalinism as "bureaucratic centrism" was no longer valid; it had become an open counter-revolutionary force.

Dear Comrades:

After a long delay we received your letter of June 15. Needless to say we were overjoyed by the revival and the renaissance of the Chinese Left Opposition after the most ferocious police persecutions it had endured. So far as one may judge from here, handicapped as we are by extreme lack of information, the position expressed in your letter corresponds to ours.

Our irreconcilable attitude toward the vulgar democratic Stalinist position on the peasant movement has, of course, nothing in common with a careless or passive attitude to the peasant movement itself. The Manifesto of the International Left Opposition ("The Tasks and Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution"), that was issued two years ago and that evaluated the peasant movement in the southern provinces of China, declared: "The Chinese revolution, betrayed, crushed and bled white, gives us proof that it is alive. Let us hope that the time is not far off when it shall once again lift up its proletarian head." Further on, it says: "The far-flung flood of peasant insurrections can unquestionably provide the impulse for the revival of political struggle in the industrial centers. On this we bank firmly."

Your letter bears witness that under the influence of the crisis and of the Japanese intervention, against the background of the peasant war, struggle of the city workers is flaring up once again. In the Manifesto we wrote on this score with the necessary caution. "No one can foretell whether the bulwarks of the peasant uprisings will maintain themselves without a break through the course of that extended period which will be required by the proletarian vanguard to gather its own strength, to lead the working class into the battle, and to align its struggle for power with the general offensive of the peasants against their most immediate enemies."

At the present time, it is obvious, there are substantial ground for expressing the hope that—through a correct policy—it will be possible to fuse the workers, and the urban movement, in general, with the peasant war; and this would constitute the beginning of the third Chinese revolution. But meanwhile this still remains only a hope and not a certainty. The most important work lies ahead.

In this letter I should like to pose only one question, which appears to me, at least from afar, to be important and acute to the greatest degree. Once again I must remind you that the information at my disposal is altogether insufficient, accidental and disjointed. I would indeed welcome all amplifications and corrections.

The peasant movement has created its own armies, has seized great territories and has installed its own institutions. In the event of further successes—and all of us, of course, passionately desire such successes—the movement will become linked up with the urban and industrial centers and, through that very fact, it will come face to face with the working class. What will be the nature of this encounter? Is it certain that its character will be peaceable and friendly?

At first glance the question might appear to be superfluous. The peasant movement is headed by Communists or sympathizers. Isn't it self-evident that in the event of their coming together the workers and the peasants must unanimously unite under the Communist banner?

### The Russian Experience

Unfortunately the question is not at all so simple. Let me refer to the experience of Russia. During the years of the civil war the peasantry in various parts of the country created its own guerrilla detachments, which sometimes grew into full-fledged armies. Some of these detachments considered themselves Bolshevik, and were often led by workers. Others remained non-party and most often were led by former non-commissioned officers from among the peasantry. There was also an "anarchist" army under the command of Makhno.

So long as the guerrilla armies operated in the rear of the White Guards, they served the cause of the revolution. Some of them were distinguished by exceptional heroism and fortitude. But within the cities these armies often came into conflict with the workers and with the local party organizations. Conflicts also arose during encounters of the partisans with the regular Red Army, and in some instances they took an extremely painful and sharp character.

The grim experience of the civil war demonstrated to us the necessity of disarming peasant detachments immediately after the Red Army occupied provinces which had been cleared of the White Guards. In these cases, the best, the most class conscious and disciplined elements were absorbed into the ranks of the Red Army. But a considerable portion of the partisans strived to maintain an independent existence and often came into direct armed conflict with the Soviet power. Such was the case with the anarchist army of Makhno, entirely kulak in spirit. But that was not the sole instance; many peasant detachments, which fought splendidly enough against the restoration of the landlords, became transformed after victory into an instrument of counter-revolution.



Regardless of their origin in each isolated instance—whether caused by conscious provocation of the White Guards, or by tactlessness of the Communists or by an unfavorable combination of circumstances—the conflicts between armed peasants and workers were rooted in one and the same social soil: the difference between the class position and training of the workers and of the peasants. The workers approach questions from the socialist standpoint; the peasant's viewpoint is petty bourgeois. The worker strives to socialize the property that is taken away from the exploiters; the peasant seeks to divide it up. The worker desires to put to common use palaces and parks; whereas the peasant, insofar as he cannot divide them, inclines to burning the palaces and cutting down the parks. The worker strives to solve problems on a national scale and in accordance with a plan; the peasant, on the other hand, approaches all problems on a local scale, and takes a hostile attitude to centralized planning, etc.

It is understood that a peasant also is capable of raising himself to the socialist viewpoint. Under a proletarian regime ever larger masses of peasants become re-educated in the socialist spirit. But this requires time, years, even decades. It should be borne in mind that in the initial stages of revolution, contradictions between proletarian socialism and peasant individualism often take on an extremely acute character.

### Leadership Molded by Environment

But after all aren't there Communists at the head of the Chinese Red Armies? Doesn't this alone exclude the possibility of conflicts between the peasant detachments and the workers' organizations? No, that does not exclude it. The fact that individual Communists are in the leadership of the present armies does not at all transform the social character of these armies, even if their Communist leaders bear a definite proletarian stamp. And how do matters stand in China?

Among the Communist leaders of Red detachments there are indubitably many declassed intellectuals and semi-intellectuals who have not gone through the school of proletarian struggle. For two or three years they live the lives of partisan commanders and commissars, they wage battles, seize territories, etc. They absorb the spirit of their environment. Meanwhile the majority of the rank and file Communists in the Red detachments unquestionably consists of peasants, who assume the name Communist in all honesty and sincerity but who in actuality remain revolutionary paupers or revolutionary petty proprietors. In politics he who judges by denominations and labels and not by social facts is lost. All the more so, when the politics concerned is carried out arms in hand.

The true Communist party is the organization of the proletarian vanguard. Meanwhile, we must not forget that the working class of China during the last four years has been kept in an oppressed and amorphous condition and only recently has it evinced signs of revival. It is one thing when the Communist party, firmly resting upon the flower of the urban proletariat, strives, through the workers, to lead the peasant war. It is an altogether different thing

when a few thousand or even tens of thousands of revolutionists assume the leadership of the peasant war and are in reality Communists or take that name, without having serious support from the proletariat. This is precisely the situation in China. This acts to augment in the extreme the danger of conflicts between the workers and the armed peasants. In any event, there will be no dearth, one may rest assured, of bourgeois provocateurs.

In Russia, in the epoch of civil war, the proletariat was already in power in the greater part of the country; the leadership in the struggle was in the hands of a strong and tempered party; the entire commanding apparatus of the centralized Red Army was in the hands of the workers. Notwithstanding all this, the peasant detachments, incomparably weaker than the Red Army, often came into conflict with it, after it victoriously moved into peasant guerrilla sectors.

### Heavy Influence of Peasantry

In China the situation is radically different, and moreover completely to the disadvantage of the workers. In the most important regions of China the power is in the hands of bourgeois militarists. In other regions, in the hands of leaders of armed peasants. Nowhere is there any proletarian power as yet. The trade unions are weak. The influence of the party among the workers is insignificant. The peasant detachments, flushed with victories they have achieved, stand under the wing of the Comintern. They call themselves, "the Red Army," i.e., they identify themselves with the armed forces of the Soviets. What results consequently is that the revolutionary peasantry of China, in the person of its ruling stratum, seems to have appropriated to itself beforehand the political and moral capital which should by the nature of things belong to the Chinese workers. Isn't it possible that things may turn out so that all this capital will be directed at a certain moment *against* the workers?

Naturally, the peasant poor—and in China they constitute the overwhelming majority—to the extent they think politically—and these comprise a small minority—sincerely and passionately desire alliance and friendship with the workers. But the peasantry, even when armed, is incapable of conducting an independent policy.

Occupying in daily life an intermediate, indeterminate and vacillating position, the peasantry, in decisive moments, can follow either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie. The peasantry does not find the road to the proletariat easily but only after a series of mistakes and defeats. The bridge between the peasantry and the bourgeoisie is provided by the urban petty bourgeoisie, chiefly by the intellectuals, who commonly come forward under the banner of Socialism and even Communism.

### Danger of Peasant-Worker Conflicts

The commanding stratum of the Chinese "Red Army" has no doubt succeeded in inculcating itself with the habit of issuing commands. The absence of a strong revolutionary party and of mass organizations of the proletariat renders

control over the commanding stratum virtually impossible. The commanders and commissars appear in the guise of absolute masters of the situation and upon occupying cities will be rather apt to look down from above upon the workers. The demands of the workers might often appear to them either inopportune or ill-advised.

Nor should one forget such "trifles" as the fact that within cities, the staffs and offices of the victorious armies are established not in the proletarian huts but in the finest city buildings, in the houses and apartments of the bourgeoisie; and all this facilitates the inclination of the upper stratum of the peasant armies to feel itself part of the "cultured" and "educated" classes, nowise the proletariat.

Thus, in China, the causes and grounds for conflicts between the army, which is peasant in composition and petty bourgeois in leadership, and the workers, not only are not eliminated but on the contrary all the circumstances are such as to greatly increase the possibility and even the inevitability of such conflicts; and in addition the chances of the proletariat are in advance far less favorable than was the case in Russia.

From the theoretical and political side, the danger is increased manifold because the Stalinist bureaucracy covers up the contradictory situation by its slogan of "democratic dictatorship" of workers and peasants. Is it possible to conceive of a snare more attractive in appearance and more perfidious in essence? The epigones do their thinking not by means of social concepts, but by means of stereotyped phrases; formalism is the basic trait of bureaucracy.

The Russian Narodniki ("Populists") used to accuse the Russian Marxists of "ignoring" the peasantry, of not carrying on work in the villages, etc. To this the Marxists replied: "We will arouse and organize the advanced workers and through the workers we shall arouse the peasants." Such in general is the only conceivable road for the proletarian party.

### Not the Road of Russian Marxists

The Chinese Stalinists have acted otherwise. During the revolution of 1925-27 they subordinated directly and immediately the interests of the workers and the peasants to the interests of the national bourgeoisie. In the years of the counter-revolution they passed over from the proletariat to the peasantry; i.e., they undertook that role which was fulfilled in our country by the S.R.'s when they were still a revolutionary party. Had the Chinese Communist Party concentrated its efforts for the last few years in the cities, in industry, in the railroads; had it sustained the trade unions, the educational clubs and circles; had it, without breaking off from the workers, taught them to understand what was occurring in the villages—the share of the proletariat in the general correlation of forces would have been incomparably more favorable today.

The party actually tore itself away from its class. Thereby in the last analysis it can cause injury to the peasantry as well. For should the proletariat continue to remain on the sidelines, without organization, without leadership, then the peasant war even if fully victorious will inevitably arrive in a blind alley.

In old China every victorious peasant revolution was concluded by the creation of a new dynasty, and subsequently also by a new group of large proprietors; the movement was caught in a vicious circle. Under the present conditions the peasant war by itself without the direct leadership of the proletarian vanguard can only pass on the power to a new bourgeois clique, some "Left" Kuomintang or other, "a third party," etc., etc., which in practice will differ very little from the Kuomintang of Chiang-Kai-shek. And this would signify in turn a new massacre of the workers with the weapons of "democratic dictatorship."

### Conclusions for Program

What then are the conclusions that follow from all this? The first conclusion is that one must boldly and openly face the facts as they are. The peasant movement is a mighty revolutionary factor, insofar as it is directed against the large landowners, militarists, feudalists and usurers. But in the peasant movement itself are very powerful proprietary and reactionary tendencies and at a certain stage it can become hostile to the workers, and sustain that hostility already equipped with arms. He who forgets about the dual nature of the peasantry is not a Marxist. The advanced workers must be taught to distinguish from among "communist" labels and banners the actual social processes.

The activities of the "Red Armies" must be attentively followed, and the workers must be given a detailed explanation of the course, significance and perspectives of the peasant war; and the immediate demands and the tasks of the proletariat must be tied up with the slogans for the liberation of the peasantry.

On the bases of our own observations, reports and other documents we must painstakingly study the life processes of the peasant armies and the regime established in the regions occupied by them; we must discover in living facts the contradictory class tendencies and clearly point out to the workers the tendencies we support and those we oppose.

We must follow the interrelations between the Red Armies and the local workers with special care, without overlooking even the minor misunderstandings between them. Within the framework of isolated cities and regions, conflicts, even if acute, might appear to be insignificant local episodes. But with the development of events, class conflicts may take on a national scope and lead the revolution to a catastrophe, i.e., to a new massacre of the workers by the peasants, hoodwinked by the bourgeoisie. The history of revolutions is full of such examples.

The more clearly the advanced workers understand the living dialectic of the class interrelations of the proletariat, the peasantry and the bourgeoisie, all the more confidently will they seek unity with the peasant strata closest to them, the more successfully will they counteract the counter-revolutionary provocateurs, within the peasant armies themselves as well as within the cities.

The trade union and the party nuclei must be built up; the advanced workers must be educated, the proletarian

vanguard must be fused together and must be drawn into the battle.

We must turn to all the members of the official Communist party with words of explanation and challenge. It is quite probable that the rank and file Communists who have been led astray by the Stalinist faction will not understand us at once. The bureaucrats will set up a howl about our "underestimation" of the peasantry, perhaps even about our "hostility" to the peasantry. (Chernov always accused Lenin of being hostile to the peasantry.) Naturally, such howling will not confuse the Bolshevik-Leninists. When prior to April 1927 we warned against the inevitable coup d'etat of Chiang Kai-shek, the Stalinists accused us of hostility to the Chinese national revolution. Events have demonstrated who was right. Events will provide a confirmation this time as well.

The Left Opposition may turn out too weak to direct events in the interests of the proletariat at the present stage. But we are sufficiently strong right now to point out to the workers the correct way and, by depending upon the development of the class struggle, to demonstrate to the workers our correctness and political insight. Only in this manner can a revolutionary party gain the confidence of the workers, only thus will it grow, become strong and take its place at the head of the national masses.  
PRINKIPO, September 1932.

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P.S. In order to express my ideas as clearly as possible, let me sketch the following variant which is theoretically quite possible.

Let us assume that the Chinese Left Opposition carries on in the near future widespread and successful work among the industrial proletariat and attains the preponderant influence over it. The official party, in the meantime, continues to concentrate all its forces on the "Red Armies" and in the peasant regions. The moment arrives when the peasant troops occupy the industrial centers and are brought face to face with the workers. In such a situation, in what manner will the Chinese Stalinists act?

It is not difficult to foresee that they will counterpose the peasant army in a hostile manner to the "counter-revolutionary Trotskyists." In other words, they will incite the armed peasants against the advanced workers. This is what the Russian S.R.'s and the Mensheviks did in 1917; having lost the workers, they fought might and main for support among the soldiery, inciting the barracks against the factory, the armed peasant against the worker Bolshevik. Kerensky, Tseretelli and Dan, if they did not label the Bolsheviks outright as counter-revolutionists, called them either "unconscious aids" or "involuntary agents" of counter-revolution. The Stalinists are less choice in their application of political terminology. But the tendency is the same, malicious incitement of the peasant—and generally petty-bourgeois elements against the vanguard of the working class.

### Centrism Seeks Support from the Right

Bureaucratic centrism, as centrism, cannot have an independent class support. But in its struggle against the

Bolshevik-Leninists it is compelled to seek support from the Right, i.e., from the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie, counterposing them to the proletariat. The struggle between the two Communist factions, the Stalinists and the Bolshevik-Leninists thus bears in itself an inner *tendency* toward transformation into a class struggle. The revolutionary development of events in China may draw this tendency to its conclusion, i.e., to a civil war between the peasant army led by the Stalinists and the proletarian vanguard led by the Leninists.

Were such a tragic conflict to arise, owing entirely to the Chinese Stalinists, it would signify that the Left Opposition and the Stalinists ceased to be Communist fractions and had become hostile political parties, each having a different class base.

However, is such a perspective inevitable? No, I do not think so at all. Within the Stalinist faction (the official Chinese Communist Party) there are not only peasant, i.e., petty bourgeois tendencies but also proletarian tendencies. It is important in the highest degree for the Left Opposition to seek to establish connections with the proletarian wing of the Stalinists, by developing for them the Marxist evaluation of "Red Armies" and the interrelations between the proletariat and the peasantry in general.

While maintaining its political independence, the proletarian vanguard must be invariably ready to assure the united action with revolutionary democracy. While we refuse to identify the armed peasant detachment with the Red Army as the armed power of the proletariat and while we have no inclination to shut our eyes to the fact that the Communist banner hides the petty-bourgeois content of the peasant movement—we, on the other hand, take an absolutely clear view of the tremendous revolutionary-democratic significance of the peasant war. We teach the workers to appreciate its significance and we are ready to do all in our power in order to achieve the necessary military alliance with the peasant organizations.

Consequently our task consists not only in not permitting the political and military command over the proletariat on the part of the petty-bourgeois democracy that leans upon the armed peasants but also in preparing and assuring the proletarian leadership of the peasant movement, its "Red Armies," in particular.

The more clearly the Chinese Bolshevik-Leninists comprehend the political environment and the tasks that spring from it, all the more successfully they will extend their bases within the proletariat; and the more persistently they carry out the policy of the united front in relation to the official party and the peasant movement led by it, all the more surely will they succeed not only in shielding the revolution from the frightfully dangerous conflict between the proletariat and the peasantry, and in assuring the necessary united action between the two revolutionary classes, but also in transforming their united front into the historical step toward the dictatorship of the proletariat.

PRINKIPO, September 26, 1932.

# An Interview with Tito

**EDITOR'S NOTE:** The following interview with Marshal Tito has been translated from the Dec. 30 French daily bulletin of Tanjug (New Yugoslavia Telegraphic Agency) and appears for the first time in **Fourth International**. Its particular interest derives from the nature of the questions the interviewer addressed to Tito.

These questions, as the reader will observe, deal principally with the problems of tactics and strategy of the international workers' movement and the attitude of the Yugoslav leader to them. Tito's answers are at least as interesting in omission as in direct reply. They indicate the centrist position of the leadership which, having broken with the Kremlin, is still groping for a new political platform, still removed from consistent revolutionary Marxism.

Tito is on the firmest ground when he attacks the bureaucratic methods of the Kremlin and its suppression of democracy in the relations between Communist Parties and the satellite states in the Russian orbit. But beyond that his answers become vague and confused. His "diplomatic" refusal to commit himself on the policies of the French Communist Party indicates the lack of clarity which still prevails in top Yugoslav circles on such questions as social patriotism, people's frontism, participation in capitalist governments and, in fact, on the main problems of proletarian strategy in our time.

Tito's glaring misconceptions on the need and role of a revolutionary international follow inevitably from this failure to grapple with programmatic questions. The real causes for the degeneration and finally the dissolution of the Communist International elude him completely, at least in his answers to Dalmas' questions. He can only see their effects—the great evil of Kremlin domination and dictatorship. As a result he falls victim to the equally pernicious social democratic idea of the character of the workers' international. Tito's description of the function of the international as a clearing house for an exchange of information and advice is borrowed entirely from the discredited practises of the now defunct Second International. They are remote from Lenin's conception of the international as "the general staff of the world revolution."

Tito's position on this question is the logical outcome of his view that the

struggle against war is not the struggle against capitalism, but against the "aggressor." It is precisely this fundamental departure from Marxism which led to the social patriotic crimes and betrayals of social democracy and then of Stalinism. Thus the UN becomes the substitute for the workers' international, maneuvering between the great powers the substitute for the class struggle. The working class is deliberately deceived, and thereby disarmed, into thinking that this center of world counter revolution, this breeding ground for imperialist war is an instrument of peace.

Tito's recognizes that the policies of the Kremlin are not the result of "accidental" mistakes but "constitute a dangerous revision from the science of Marxism-Leninism. This obviously marks a big step forward in the thinking of the Yugoslav CP leaders. But his explanation of this revisionism shows how superficial their understanding still is. Although Tito talks about fundamentals he does not cope with the degenerate character of the privileged Soviet bureaucracy and its theory of "socialism in one country" as the central causes and expression of this "revisionism."

What he says about the "Red Army" is entirely correct, although it is only a derivative question. As a theory it cannot explain the Hitler-Stalin pact and the Moscow Trials and perhaps that was one of the reasons Tito refused to answer those questions. The Kremlin's whispered promise that the Soviet Army will "liberate" the workers from capitalism is an afterthought, a cynical alibi to revolutionists it has deceived and betrayed to ward off criticism of its treacherous and counter-revolutionary deeds. It does not explain the source of the Kremlin's policies; but it is to be hoped that it will serve as the starting point for a more thorough analysis by the Yugoslav leaders of the problems of the workers' movement of our epoch.

\* \* \*  
BELGRADE, Dec. 29.—Marshal Tito replied as follows to questions put to him by the French journalist, Louis Dalmas:

**FIRST QUESTION:** The Yugoslav Communist Party has posed the problem of equality in relations between socialist countries. Does this formula, applicable to the people's democracies

also apply to progressive organizations which are not in power in the "Western" countries? And could it not be rounded out with the demand for equality in relations between the Communist parties, that is, for their independence from Moscow?

**ANSWER:** Equality in relations between socialist countries flows from the theoretical premises of the science of Marxism-Leninism and consequently relates also to Communist parties outside of the socialist countries and the countries of people's democracy.

As for the independence of the Communist parties from Moscow, the question is posed as follows: The Soviet Union is a socialist country; it is the result of the great October Revolution; and it is just for that reason that not only the Communist parties, but also all of the progressive forces in the world look upon this socialist country with sympathy and respect. This sympathy and this respect is therefore entirely justified. But if they try to transform the sympathy and the unlimited confidence which has existed and still exists for the Soviet Union among progressive people in the entire world into blind submission through orders from Moscow issued by the leaders of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of the USSR, then inevitably enormous damage is done to the progressive movement in the world, and in the last analysis, to the Soviet Union itself, because the USSR inevitably loses prestige in the process.

The case of the differences between the CP (B) of the USSR and the Yugoslav Communist Party, which was later transformed—because it could not be otherwise—into differences between the USSR and the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, that is, differences between states, is the most eloquent confirmation of the above assertion. The whole world knows, that the persistent and ceaseless work of the Yugoslav Communist Party is responsible for the immense confidence and sympathy toward the Soviet Union that was cultivated among all the peoples of the new Yugoslavia. I can say without exaggeration that no people has been so completely devoted to the Soviet Union as the peoples of Yugoslavia. But by means of their non-socialist methods against our socialist country the Soviet leaders have succeeded in a very short time, in transforming this great sym-

pathy nurtured by our peoples into an immense indignation, and in transforming the old unlimited confidence into distrust. Sooner or later, the Soviet leaders will have to draw a lesson from this. This proves that inequality and dependency are harmful to the progressive movements in the world.

**SECOND QUESTION:** The Yugoslav Communist Party, has on many occasions denounced the domination of the Cominform by the CP (B) of the USSR; and you yourself, Mr. Marshal, have declared that the governments of the people's democracies were strictly controlled by Stalin. On the other hand, it seems that the "Western" Communist parties are also at least bound, if not fettered by Soviet decisions. In your opinion, how should or could the French Communist Party liberate itself from the Moscow yoke?

**ANSWER:** The Communist International was dissolved in 1943 on the initiative of Stalin himself, and the reason was that it had become a brake on the development and the activity of the Communist parties throughout the world; these parties had reached a point of maturity which enabled them to lead the progressive movements in their countries with the greatest success. As a result the forum, whose decisions would have been obligatory for all Communist parties, ceased to exist.

The Cominform was created in 1947 with the sole aim of coordination and consultation between the Communist parties, but without the right to adopt decisions that were obligatory on the various parties. The CP (B) of the USSR is even less entitled to this right. It follows that the leaders of the French Communist Party cannot justify their behavior by any obligation whatsoever to anyone outside themselves. All the successes and lack of success in their country depend upon them alone and they are responsible for their behavior above all to the labor and progressive movement of France.

**THIRD QUESTION:** French militants frequently discuss problems of tactics. Do you believe that the Yugoslav Communist Party has the right to express an opinion on the tactics of the progressive organizations of other countries?

**ANSWER:** I believe the Yugoslav Communist Party has the right to criticize every Communist Party or progressive organization just as they have the equal

right to criticize the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. But criticism should be constructive, loyal—and not destructive and slanderous. It is true that in the course of the first session of the Cominform, our representatives criticized some of the leaderships of the Communist parties, as for example those of the French Communist Party and the Italian Communist Party. But the same criticism was formulated by the representatives of the Soviet Union, that is, they agreed with ours. And this criticism was well intentioned and constructive, criticism among comrades.

I will add, on this subject, that the attack launched against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia by the Cominform, and in the first place by the leaders of the CP (B) of the USSR, has nothing in common with constructive criticism. Well-intentioned criticism may be accepted or not, that depends on the realism and the usefulness of the criticism, that is, it depends upon whether the critic is right or not. A typical example of ill-intentioned criticism is the letters of the CP (B) of the USSR to the Yugoslav Communist Party. In its reply to the first letter, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia requested the leaders of the CP (B) of the USSR to send delegates to our country, to examine on the spot the accusations made in the letter and to ascertain how absurd they were. We repeated this request several times later on, but in vain; the leaders of the CP (B) of the USSR were not interested in establishing the material truth first-hand, and in verifying what was true or not in these letters. On the contrary, they knew very well what the real state of affairs was in our country, but in view of their own non-socialist aims, it was necessary for them to intimidate us; and, not succeeding in this, they had to compromise us at all costs in the eyes of the international labor movement.

**FOURTH QUESTION:** In the exchange of letters between the CPY and the CP (B) of the USSR, published in Belgrade in 1948, the letter of the CC of the CP (B) of the USSR dated May 22, 1948 contains the following passage: "When the Information Bureau was founded, the nine Communist Parties included agreed to present reports to the Bureau and to criticize other member parties if they desired. At the September 1947 session the French and Italian parties were severely criticized by the Bolsheviks. We know that the French

and Italian parties at the time did not dispute the right of other parties to criticize their errors. We also know that the Yugoslav comrades utilized the opportunity to criticize the errors of their French and Italian comrades." What were the errors attributed to the French communists by the Yugoslav representatives at the Cominform session of September 1947 and in what terms did the Yugoslav party criticize the French party?

**FIFTH QUESTION:** What is the opinion of the Yugoslav Communist Party on the tactics of the French Communist Party under the Nazi occupation and during the liberation? Were mistakes made? If so, what were they?

**SIXTH QUESTION:** What is the opinion of the CPY on the "ministerial" and "parliamentary" tactics of the French CP from 1944 to 1947?

**SEVENTH QUESTION:** What is the opinion of the CPY on the strike movement in France in November 1947 and on the "opposition" tactic pursued by the CPF since it left the government?

**ANSWERS:** The replies to questions 4, 5, 6 and 7 are contained in the preceding reply.

**EIGHTH QUESTION:** Do you think that the work of the progressive organizations of the entire world, who have set themselves the same socialist objectives, ought to be coordinated at least by an exchange of their mutual experiences? What forms, in your opinion, should such coordination assume?

**ANSWER:** It goes without saying that the work of the progressive organizations of the whole world, having the same aims, ought to be coordinated. Such coordination must be based on equal rights. With a view of strengthening these progressive forces an exchange of experiences becomes necessary, but the experiences acquired in one country and under specific circumstances should not at all be imposed upon organizations of another country where entirely different economic, political, cultural, social conditions exist. The basis for effective and fruitful collaboration consists of full equality of rights. Without respect for that equality, such an international collaboration of the democratic forces of the world proves to be impossible. The progressive movement of each country should have the right to borrow from

the experiences of other countries only what it deems necessary and useful to its own country, whatever strengthens it internally instead of weakening it, whatever speeds up its development instead of impeding it.

The healthiest forms of international collaboration are: First, the exchange of cultural attainments; second, mutual visits and learning the facts at first-hand; third, intensive struggle against lying propaganda and misinformation; four, tenacious struggle to safeguard peace; five, reporting the truth about the socialist countries in the press and in conferences to the progressive masses, without fear of revealing various weaknesses and difficulties.

There exist today international organizations such as the International Union of Progressive Youth, the International Organization of Anti-Fascist Women, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Union for Peace. It is necessary to fight against these organizations becoming the instrument of the policy of a power—if this policy is directed against another socialist country—even if this power is socialist. In short, these organizations should carry out the aims for which they were created, that is, they should become a powerful and effective means in the struggle for peace.

**NINTH QUESTION:** You have frequently denounced the slanders and lies of the Cominform regarding Yugoslavia, and posed the problem of the methods utilized by the Soviet leaders. Are these methods the deeds of men who have "chosen" to act that way (by premeditation, by bad faith, or by mistake), or are they the result of a more profound evolution of the entire international Communist apparatus? In other words, is the attitude of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of the USSR and of the Cominform toward Yugoslavia an "isolated accident" due to the decision of the leaders (who, in that case, could change their minds) or is it a "logical" element in the transformation of the character of the Communist International?

**ANSWER:** The non-socialist methods and the slander campaign conducted by the leaders of the CP (B) of the USSR and of the other Communist parties, far from being the result of certain mistakes or of an accidental fact, constitute a dangerous revisionist deviation from the science of Marxism-Leninism, re-

gardless of the efforts of the leaders of the CP (B) of the USSR to harmonize this deviation with this science. The crassest revisionist deviation consists in this: That the leaders of the CP (B) of the USSR try to impose upon the international workers' movement the point of view which holds that the decisions and evaluations made by the leaders of the CP (B) of the USSR regarding the other parties are infallible. Furthermore, according to certain premises put forth in the letters of the CP (B) of the USSR addressed to the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the revolutionary transformation would have been impossible without the aid of Red Army. In other words, they deny the capacity of the progressive movements of other countries to acquire a better social organization with their own resources; they kill the faith of the proletariat in its own revolutionary forces, and they impose upon it the un-Marxist view that only occupation by the Red Army can bring about a new socialist order. These same leaders, and with them the entire Cominform declare, as a result of the conflict with socialist Yugoslavia, that it is impossible to build socialism without the aid of the USSR, although practice has demonstrated completely the contrary in our country.

Today, practice has sufficiently demonstrated that every occupation, even that of the Red Army, bears within itself obvious elements of all the non-socialist phenomena possible. They lead inevitably to national oppression and economic exploitation, equality disappears and unconditional submission is effected for the benefit of the occupant. Even more ironically, such an occupation is today dubbed "liberating" and is regarded as aid.

**TENTH QUESTION:** The CPY has criticized the revisionism of the Cominform. Wherein lies the origin, in your opinion, of these mistakes and deviations? Did they only appear at the time of the Yugoslav conflict, or before? If before, on what occasion and in what fashion?

**ANSWER:** I have already replied to this question in my reply to the 9th question.

**ELEVENTH QUESTION:** What is the opinion of the Yugoslav CP on the Soviet-German pact of 1939?

**TWELFTH QUESTION:** In the light of the Rajk and Kostov trials, do you

think that the big trials organized in the USSR in 1936 and 1937 could have been "staged" in the same fashion?

**ANSWER:** I shall not reply to the 11th and 12th questions.

**THIRTEENTH QUESTION:** Do you think that the Yugoslav experience will arouse echoes in the other progressive organizations sufficient to oblige Moscow to change its attitude? In other words, do you think that the deviations of the Cominform can be remedied from within? If so, how?

**ANSWER:** The Yugoslav experience will inevitably arouse broad divergences of views in the progressive movement of the entire world. The repercussions will be all the stronger as it becomes clear that the New Yugoslavia is marching resolutely and unshakably towards socialism. The lying and slanderous propaganda will lose ground and, as a result of the vitality of the new and socialist Yugoslavia, the champions of this present propaganda of the Cominform, which is contrary to culture, will have to change their tactics and beat a retreat, because only such a retreat can, up to a certain point, make good the mistakes committed on their side up to the present.

**FOURTEENTH QUESTION:** On the other hand, do you think, that the deviations of the Soviet leadership are so deep-going that it is necessary to prepare a new future organization of the workers' movement? If so, in what sense, and how?

**ANSWER:** No other Communist organization should be created as it would only further impede the activity of the various existing parties; besides, since the dissolution of the Comintern, such an organization does not exist any longer. In the present conditions, it is necessary, first of all, for the Communist parties to mutually help each other, to be loyal to one other, to exchange experiences, and for full equality to prevail among them. Secondly, it is necessary that in each country the Communists and the progressives fight for a better social order, for the purity of socialist morals and for truth, and also against every deviation and every abuse of the science of Marxism-Leninism on part of anybody; it is necessary for them to apply this science to the specific conditions of their country and to determine on the basis of these conditions, what



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