



INTERNATIONAL

WORKERS OF THE WORLD — UNITE!

Special Number

COMPLETE DOCUMENTS

of the

SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS

of the

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL



Two Declarations by the International Secretariat



NEWS OF THE WORLD WORKERS' MOVEMENT AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL

WINTER 1960-61

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Contents

Announcement	1
Editorial: <i>For the New Stage, a New Leadership</i>	2
<i>The International Campaign to Free Pablo and Santen</i>	4
Documents of the Sixth World Congress of the Fourth International —	
Manifesto	7
Greetings	9
Political Document: <i>The World Situation and Our Tasks</i>	10
Economic Document: <i>Trends and Prospects of the World Economy</i>	18
Colonial Documents: <i>The Colonial Revolution: Its Balance-Sheet, Its Problems, and Its Prospects</i>	33
<i>On the Nature of the Cuban Revolution</i>	48
<i>On Ceylon</i>	50
Document on Stalinism: <i>The Crisis of Stalinism Since the XXIst Congress of the C P of the U S S R</i>	51
Other Documents: Two Declarations of the International Secretariat —	
<i>The Belgian Strikes: A Turn in the Situation in Western Europe</i>	59
<i>On the Assassination of Lumumba</i>	60
News of the World Workers' Movement and the International:	
Latin America: <i>Information Bulletin Now in Printed Form</i>	61
Belgium: <i>The "Loi Unique" will not be Applied; Pamphlet on the Strike</i>	61
Bolivia: <i>Example of the Influence of the Cuban Revolution</i>	61
Denmark: <i>Elections Show Sharp Polarization and Strong Leftward Trend</i>	62
France: <i>A New Stage in the Crisis of the French Communist Party</i>	63
U S A: <i>Election Results Show Big S W P Advance</i>	64

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FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

ENGLISH - LANGUAGE EDITION OF THE THEORETICAL ORGAN OF THE
INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Number 12

Winter 1960-61

ANNOUNCEMENT

The VIth World Congress of the Fourth International was held in Switzerland from 10 to 15 January 1961. More than a hundred delegates, fraternal delegates, and invited comrades, coming from about 30 countries of all the continents, participated in its labors.

In spite of the difficulties created by the repression which recently struck at the leadership of the International when, six months ago, its secretary, Comrade Michel Raptis (Pablo), was arrested as a result of his activities in aid of the Algerian revolution, the congress was highly representative of the strength of the Fourth International.

The large number of delegates from the countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa once more demonstrated the growth of the Fourth International and its increasing fusion with the colonial and semi-colonial revolution throughout the world. Four new sections (Cuba, Denmark, Indonesia, and Mexico) were formally recognized.

The congress was placed under the honorary chairmanship of Comrades Michel Pablo and Sal Santen, both members of the leadership of the International, at present in jail in Holland for their courageous revolutionary activity in aid of the Algerian revolution. The following agenda was adopted: the world economic situation; the crisis of Stalinism since the XXIst Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; the colonial revolution, and the nature of the Cuban state; the international political situation; the activity of the International; the situation in Ceylon; election of the new International Executive Committee.

On the first point of the agenda — economic document — a report and a counter-report (International Secretariat minority) were presented.

On the second point — Stalinism — the report was followed by two counter-reports (one presenting additions by the IS minority, the other by the British section). On the third point — the colonial revolution — the report was followed by a complementary report by the IS minority. The report on the activity of the IS was completed by a report on the activity of the Latin American Bureau.

In accordance with the democratic tradition of the International, the congress was preceded by a discussion lasting several months. At the congress extensive discussion took place in both the plenary sessions and in the commissions. After the inclusion of various amendments resulting from the discussion, the final texts were adopted almost unanimously. Resolutions were voted in support of the Cuban revolution, the Algerian revolution, and the strike of the Belgian proletariat. Greetings were sent to Comrades Pablo and Santen, and to Comrade Natalia Trotsky. The Congress elected a new IEC, which in turn elected a new IS. The World Congress decided to give, in both leading bodies of the International, a majority representation, broader than in the past, to the colonial and semi-colonial sectors of the world.

By its discussions and conclusions, the VIth World Congress of the Fourth International has armed our world party for wider intervention in the new phase of the world revolution characterized by: the colonial revolution, present centre and stimulus of the world revolution; economic, political, and cultural developments in the workers' states, preparing a new stage in the political revolution there; the deepening of the crisis of Stalinism throughout the world; the renewal of the struggles of the proletariat in the advanced capitalist countries.

Editorial

FOR THE NEW STAGE A NEW LEADERSHIP

The Sixth World Congress of the Fourth International took place amid an international situation of an unprecedented crisis of the capitalist system and an advance of the revolutionary forces in crucial sectors of the globe.

On the one hand, the American economy, despite its enormous possibilities, has bogged down in a stage of prolonged stagnation, with all the resulting political and social repercussions, and never was US prestige so low throughout the world.

On the other hand, the constant growth in the economy of the workers' states, in spite of bureaucratic malpractice, is increasingly representative of one of the dynamic elements of our period and objectively contributes to the steady upsurge of revolutionary forces throughout the world. These forces are seething, becoming conscious, organizing, fighting, and winning victory after victory, first in the colonial and semi-colonial world, main motive-force of the revolution at the present stage: the Cuban mass movement culminates in the formation of a workers' state, while the anti-imperialist revolt in Africa spreads to new zones and deepens in other areas such as, for instance, Algeria. Even in Western Europe, the stagnation of the struggles is now coming to an end: the Belgian workers have already shown the possibilities for the coming period.

In such an international context, a whole series of fundamental problems is raised for the international workers' movement and must necessarily receive an answer.

How will the proletariat be able definitively to win the battle on the world scale by overthrowing the capitalist regime even in its strongest citadels; how, in other terms, will it be able to complete the first stage of the transition from capitalism to socialism?

How will the masses of the colonial countries be able to give the finishing stroke to colonialism and above all how will they be able to ensure the gradual transformation of the anti-imperialist revolution into a proletarian, socialist revolu-

tion? How, in the workers' states, will it be possible to solve all the economic, political, and social problems now pending and thus secure a complete and harmonious use, on a world scale, of the inexhaustible possibilities inherent in the new collectivist production relationships and to reorganize from top to bottom the political and social structure on the basis of a genuine proletarian democracy freed from all bureaucratic distortion? How, last but not least, will the masses of the entire world be able to prevent imperialism at bay from trying to drag all humanity along into its own ruin by unleashing a nuclear war of total extermination? All these are the problems which nobody can evade.

Indeed, in the last two months it is basically these same problems which have been discussed in two international meetings of the workers' movement — the Conference of the Eighty-one in Moscow and our own World Congress — and one cannot underestimate the significance of the fact that certain traditional conceptions of our movement — even in a very partial and deformed way — have actually penetrated into the polemics among the CPs and especially between Moscow and Peking.

But apart from these analogies there were profound, essential differences between the two congresses.

The bureaucratized CPs sent their leaders to Moscow without even informing the militants and cadres about the topics of the discussions or giving them the possibility of expressing their ideas and their criticisms. Concerning the respective positions, only the top leaders were informed and often in a completely one-sided way, while concerning the real import of the discussions, which lasted about 20 days, a discreet silence was and is still being maintained. It is true that an extensive statement was issued; but it is conceived more for the purpose of camouflaging the differences and reaching a formal unity at any cost than of clarifying the basic problems and giving clear answers.

The Congress of the Fourth International was

prepared by a discussion which lasted eight months in all the organisms of our movement, from the International Secretariat to the rank-and-file cells. The discussions took place on the basis of draft resolutions written by the outgoing leadership and different positions were freely expressed, including by the presentation of counter-drafts, amendments, and counter-reports during the congress itself. Our aim was not to organize a propaganda demonstration, as is too often the case with big workers' organizations, but to discuss the burning questions and arrive at clear conclusions.

Our answers to the problems we have enumerated above are expressed in the documents published in the present issue.

We basically refuse, as utopian and implying in practice an opportunist line, the conception according to which it would be possible to carry out a transition to socialism in a more or less "peaceful" way on the basis largely of an economic competition between the capitalist countries and the workers' states. As has always been the case at the crucial turning-points of human history, as has always been the case during the whole last half-century, this transitional period will again be marked by extraordinarily acute conflicts, breaks, revolutions, wars. The proletariat needs to be armed for such a prospect, without any illusions: it must be more convinced than ever that it is only the revolutionary way of destruction of the bourgeois apparatus and not its "democratic" transformation that can lead it to power.

In the colonial and semi-colonial countries, we say that the fight against colonialism and neo-colonialism must be continued without truce or weakening, that an armed fight of the workers and peasants will always be the rule, that the national bourgeoisie, owing to its class nature, cannot lead this fight to the finish, and that the masses must everywhere themselves create a workers' and peasants' leadership capable of beating imperialism, liquidating all its aftermaths, and simultaneously beginning the socialist revolution.

In the workers' states, while emphasizing the very favorable objective developments which have marked the post-Stalinist period, we have insisted upon the fact that new revolutionary developments are being outlined as a result of the growing economic improvements. These developments are shaking and will shake more and more the foundations on which the bureaucracy stands, raising more and more imperatively the question of the reestablishment of socialist democracy. We still believe that the overthrow

of the bureaucratic power is the sine qua non for a real socialist blossoming and for the creation of a new civilization without any possible comparison with all previous ones.

And lastly, without neglecting any of the new elements and above all the nuclear power of U S S R, we are still convinced that in the last instance war can be avoided only if the revolutionary forces of the proletariat are in a position to paralyze and overthrow capitalism in its vital centres themselves.

In the last analysis, the primordial problem which is raised is that of a revolutionary leadership on the world scale. This has been true in a general sense for 30 years, but never was this necessity so concrete and so urgent as it is now. And never were the objective and even subjective premises for the achievement of this task so widely developed. The aim of our movement is to ensure the creation of this leadership, acting already as the most conscious, active, and centralized force expressing this need, and helping to organize the regrouping of the revolutionary forces which are developing in this direction.

We are of course aware of our present limitations, we know perfectly well that it requires not only expressing correct conceptions and working out correct analyses, but also and mainly acting in such a way that our movement gains everywhere a decisive mass influence. Still we have recorded important steps forward and new sectors of the Fourth International have developed, especially in the colonial and semi-colonial world — a fact reflected even in the composition of the new international leadership of our World Party. Furthermore, our cadres and militants are now much more deeply integrated in the mass movement of their countries than in the past.

But our confidence in the future is mainly based on the fact that the logic and trends of developments in the contemporary world are more and more working out in the direction which was foreseen by our movement in its basic analyses: that is why the Fourth International is the best prepared to understand the tasks of our period and to help the proletarian and peasant masses to accomplish them.

The fundamental meaning of the Sixth World Congress — besides the deepening of this analysis and of this understanding of the revolution — was precisely to provide our World Party, in view of the revolutionary decade which is before us, with the power and effectiveness needed to play a part corresponding to the great scope of the tasks set by the advance of the revolution throughout the world.

THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO FREE PABLO AND SANTEN

DECLARATION OF THE SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

FREEDOM FOR PABLO AND SANTEN!

The VIth World Congress of the Fourth International sends its greetings to and expresses its closest solidarity with Comrades MICHEL RAPTIS (PABLO) and SAL SANTEN, imprisoned in Amsterdam for their active militancy in favor of the Algerian revolution, in accomplishment of the tasks of the Fourth International.

We call on the militants, the organizations of the colonial revolution, of the workers' movement, of the socialist movement as a whole, actively to support these two victims of imperialist repression.

Faced by the repeated postponements of the trial, with the repeated provocations of the French, Dutch, and German police, with the attempts to conceal the political basis of this affair, we call on revolutionary and vanguard militants to redouble their campaign for the freedom of Pablo and Santen, to rely actively on the sympathy aroused in the mass movement by their fight, the fight of the Fourth International, the fight for the Algerian revolution.

We call for an extension of the campaign in trade

unions and factories, in living centres of the colonial revolution, so that each worker and revolutionary militant may learn of the fight of the Fourth International and of these two courageous leaders for the colonial revolution.

The whole action engaged in by Comrades Pablo and Santen, their entire lives, are courageous and worthy of respect. This is why the repression has struck them as it strikes hundreds and thousands of revolutionary militants in the service of the colonial revolution, as it strikes the masses who fight on every front for their liberation, against imperialism.

Let us all mobilize in the fight to free Pablo and Santen.

Let us ever more vigorously call on the workers and the revolutionary movement to intervene in this fight.

The most complete solidarity with Comrades Pablo and Santen!

January 1961



LETTER OF MICHEL RAPTIS (PABLO) TO THE EXAMINING MAGISTRATE

Why have I accepted all these responsibilities?

Here I owe an explanation which, while extending into the political field, seems to me necessary and even indispensable.

You are not unaware, Madame, as examining magistrate, that I belong to the Fourth International and that I form part of its leadership.

I had the honor of joining the historic movement of Leon Trotsky in my early youth, when I was a student at the Higher Polytechnic School of Athens in 1928.

It is from that time that I date my conscious life as a man, which I have wanted to devote to service in the cause of the oppressed and exploited of this world. I have endeavored ever since to make my actions as faithful as possible to that ideal of my youth, to the political ideas that I then embraced, and to the line advocated by the organization to which I belong.

Thus, at the time of the Second World War, which

I spent in France, while continuing my studies at the University of Paris (from which I have two diplomas, first in urbanism, and then in statistics), I engaged in militant action against Nazi oppression and aided its victims to the extent of my powers, quite apart from their nationality or religion.

Numerous friends whom I made in France — among whom I feel honored to quote the names of Mr Jean Guéhenno, the well-known writer and humanist, Mr Claude Bourdet, publisher of *france-Observateur*, Mr Laurent Schwartz, professor at the Sorbonne and scientist of world renown — will be able to testify to this activity.

Most of them, for that matter, have already had the kindness to testify in my favor by letters which they have sent to the Dutch Minister of Justice at The Hague.

Already at the end of the war and at the time of the upsurge of the emancipation movement of the

colonial peoples, I found my place — quite naturally and unconditionally — at their side.

The right of each subject people to national independence seems to me a right that is both democratic and elementary, which was well defended by all means at the time of the Nazi occupation of Europe, and which cannot under any pretext be denied to the colonial peoples.

For this reason, as a member of the Fourth International, I am proud of having taken my stand, right from the beginning of the struggle of the Algerian people for its national liberation, in support of this just cause.

It is quite true that I exerted myself greatly for this cause, as did all the members of the international organization to which I belong, starting in 1954.

In the files seized in the apartment that I occupy in Amsterdam, the police found papers belonging to me personally which illustrate this activity, and which I should like to see included in the documentation concerning my case.

Among these papers I cite the memorandum that I sent to the Conference of the National Liberation Front in Tripoli in the summer of 1959, and the report that I wrote on my return from a trip to Morocco and Tunisia (dated March or April 1959) concerning the aid that we ought to bring to the struggle for self-liberation of the Algerian people. It is quite true that I wished to give impetus, in Europe and elsewhere, to Committees for Free Algeria, Committees for Algerian Prisoners in France, and Committees for Material Aid to Algerian Children and Refugees in Morocco and Tunisia.

I was an eye-witness to the atrocious conditions into which the masses of the Algerian people, fighting for their liberation, have been cast.

I know from direct sources the enormous tribute of blood and sacrifices paid in this war to which the Algerian people are subjected: more than 700,000 killed, more than 1,500,000 displaced persons in

Algeria itself, more than 30,000 prisoners in France, and more than 200,000 refugees in Morocco and Tunisia, mostly old people, women, and war-orphaned children.

The war is certainly a cruel one on both sides, and I take no pleasure at all in the fact that it has made victims among the French laboring youth in uniform. But the Algerian victims are far in excess of those on the French side.

Furthermore, it cannot be forgotten that the Algerian people is fighting for its freedom and is therefore waging a just war, quite like the European peoples fighting for their liberation at the time of the Nazi occupation.

I know that the majority of the laboring people of France and the élite of its intellectuals, writers, artists, and scientists, are against the continuation of this abominable enterprise, and in favor of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and independence.

My own active struggle in favor of this cause was in no way directed against the French people, among whom I passed a very considerable part of my life, but was aimed against the forces who, for their own selfish interests, are plunging thousands of human beings, both Arab and French, into blood, tears, and sufferings.

The interest that I have taken in, and the effort that I have been willing to make in favor of, the struggle for self-liberation of the Algerian people, are in conformance, I repeat, with the ideal of my youth, with the political ideals that I profess, and with the line of the organization to which I have the honor to belong.

For me, there could be no question of betraying any of my very reasons for existing, even though it be at the sacrifice of my freedom and, if necessary, of my life itself.

16 December 1960



PROGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN

We are finally in possession of the text of the admirable letter sent to the Dutch Minister of Justice by FRANCIS JEANSON, the trial of whose "network" for aid to the Algerian revolution and to French conscripts who refused to fight against that just cause made such a sensation late last year:

Michel Raptis and Sal Santen have just become involved, in your country, in a criminal-court case; they are today being treated as if they were common criminals.

These two men belong to an organization toward which I have never shown much sympathy on the political level; this puts me more at my ease in protesting here against an accusation of a piece of dishonesty whose meaning is only too clear, in the present conjuncture, if their total devotion to the cause of the Algerian

revolution is taken into account. Everywhere that men are fighting, without reservations and without calculating self-interest, for justice and for the right of peoples to self-determination, there are other men who — under orders, in the shadows, and by sometimes atrocious means — are trying to intimidate these true militants in the cause of humanity, and to force foreign governments to take against them repressive measures the principle of which, as far as France itself is concerned, two-thirds of the world has already condemned.

Forgive me if I take a personal example. I have just been expelled from Switzerland, and this measure obviously fits into the constitutional framework of Swiss neutrality. On this formal level, I had nothing to object to con-

cerning the decisions of the Swiss jurists. The authorities of the Confederation having furthermore adopted an irreproachably correct attitude toward me, I could only yield to their decision, thus safeguarding the future of our relations. But it is quite evident that, in taking this decision, the Swiss government was above all concerned with safeguarding its present relations with the French government. I can understand that; but its concern seems to me already more or less anachronistic. From week to week, official France goes on banishing itself from the comity of nations; the Atlantic Alliance itself is no longer in a position to put up with its absurdities; and the internal situation of my country is being changed these days at a pace which we ourselves, who had predicted this revival, had not been able to imagine.

In six months, in one month, perhaps tomorrow, French truth will again become what it should never have ceased to be: the truth of free men. That is why today governments of countries that are friends of France must not let themselves be dragged into combinations aimed against the French people itself, against its basic interests, and, in fine, against the interests of all peoples who want to maintain genuinely friendly relations with it tomorrow. Overwhelmed by the army that raised it to power, fought against by all the living forces of the country, whom any eventual coup d'état would end up by uniting in an impassable opposition, the Gaullist government is moribund. It is not up to the free peoples to support it, when its final convulsions are inclining it irremediably toward a solution of a fascist type.

Michel Raptis and Sal Santen did not have my good fortune: their situation is much worse than mine. I appeal to your sense of justice and of history to act in such a way that they shall no longer undergo a fate which will soon make them appear, in the eyes of everybody, as the victims of a totally outdated colonialist solidarity.

From Bolivia a letter calling for freedom for Raptis and Santen was sent to the Dutch Prime Minister, signed by the following Parliamentary Deputies: ALBERTO JARA DAZA, HUMBERTO LOZAÑO, MANUEL NAVA RÍOS, GERMÁN CLAROS CARREÑO, SATURNINO LIMA TICONA, JORGE OROSCO LORENZETTY, PEDRO RIVERA ARUZAMEN, ELOY FLANGO, ALEJANDRO AVENDAÑO FLORES, ALEJANDRO GALARZA, ENRIQUE GUZMÁN MOYA, GREGORIO MENDOZA, and HERNÁN MEDEIROS. A manifesto to the same effect was signed by EDUARDO NOVOA MORALES, Dean of the Faculty of Economic Sciences and Secretary General of the University of San Andrés; EDUARDO LÓPEZ RIVAS, Member of the Research Institute of the Faculty of Economic Sciences; FERNANDO BRAVO, Professor of the Faculty of Economic Sciences; and J. ALBANACÍN, attorney.

In Chile, the general assembly of the Machinists' Union at the Aceros del Pacifico steel plant at Huachipato, voted a resolution of support to the Cuban and Algerian revolutions, which concludes:

And lastly, we declare that we make the struggle in defense of the Algerian revolution our own, and support it with full intensity; and we demand the immediate release of the workers' leaders Sal Santen and Michel Raptis, arrested and prosecuted for helping to defend the people of Algeria against the French imperialist yoke.

The resolution was signed by four union officers: Communist Party members ARTIDORO VILLIGRÁN and JULIO OLIVA; and ELEODORO NEIRA and ROLANDO CHÁVEZ, members of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (Trotskista).

In France, the campaign continues now under the aegis of an official committee composed of ARTHUR ADAMOV, ROGER BLIN, CLAUDE BOURDET, JEAN CASSOU, YVES DECHEZELLES, MAURICE JARDOT, YVES JOUFFA, MICHEL LEIRIS, MAURICE NADEAU, CLAUDE ROY, LUCIEN SCHWARTZ, PIERRE STIBBE, and PIERRE VIDAL-NAQUET.

In Holland itself the following have joined the campaign: Mr J RUGGE; Dr HUGEN LOLZ; Prof Dr DE GRAAF; Dr N v d VELD, Deputy; Prof Dr DE JONG; Dr K STRLID, theologian; Dr W BARNARD, poet; Dr P J MEERTENS, of the Academy of Letters; Mr WEGGERS; Dr J BUSHES, theologian; Dr A HUNDENBURG; Dr K L ROSHN, secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Party.

From Indonesia, the following persons have added their signatures to the appeal of the British Labour Party MPs printed in our last issue: MANDJI ANWAR TJOKROMINOTO, Member of Parliament, as president of the Afro-Asiatic Group in Indonesia; K WERDOJO, Member of Parliament (Communist Group); R B SITOHANG, Member of Parliament; I J KASIMO, president of the Indonesian Catholic Party; E A MARTALOGAWA, Member of Parliament (Communist Group).

From Peru, a demand for the immediate release of Raptis and Santen was sent to the Dutch government, signed by: MIGUEL YI CARRILLO, journalist, director of *Aquí Está*, former president of the Peru Federation of Journalists and of the Lima Federated Centre of Journalists; RICARDO NAPURI, leader of the A P R A Rebelde; Dr OSCAR GÓMEZ, dentist; EFRAÍN LUIS CARO, Partido Social Progresista Parliamentary Deputy from Cuzco; CARLOS MALPICA, Parliamentary Deputy from Cajamarca, and leader of the A P R A Rebelde; JOSÉ MARÍA ARGUEDAS, novelist and Director of the Institute of Ethnology of the University of San Marcos of Lima; Dr ANGEL CASTRO LABARELLO, attorney; JUAN PALACIOS LEÓN, general secretary of the FERTISA trade-union, and delegate to the Provincial Trade-Union Centre of Callao Workers; OSVALDO BALDERRAMA, organizational secretary of the Peru Metal-Workers' Federation, and delegate to the Peruvian Confederation of Labor.

MANIFESTO

To the Toiling Masses of the Entire World!—

The breadth and depth of the colonial revolution, the growing dynamism of the development of the workers' states, and capitalism's own constantly recurring contradictions, are sharpening the crisis of the capitalist regime and opening up an ever wider prospect for the socialist rebuilding of society.

While scientific discoveries, the enormous advances made with the application of atomic energy, and the tremendous successes in the exploration of space, show the incalculable possibilities that humanity possesses to free itself from need and destitution, in the same way the mobilization of hundreds of millions of men and women in the fight against the regime of imperialist oppression and the development of the creative spirit of the masses in building a new economy, show the tremendous subjective possibilities that humanity may count on in utilizing all this creative force, wresting away from imperialism its power of destruction, and constructing a harmonious society with a potential of development and growth hitherto unsuspected.

Never have the economic and social contradictions of humanity been brought into the open on so broad a scale, with so great a mobilization of forces. From Algeria to South Africa, from Cuba to Argentina, from Turkey to Indonesia and Japan, the masses are everywhere entering the arena, even those who were heretofore considered the most backward, the farthest removed from world problems. In a few years, and even months, these masses overcome their dispersion, their historical lateness, their backward forms of social and political organization, and by their irruption on the scene pose the most advanced and timely tasks of humanity for its development.

The powerful military and political apparatuses of imperialism — as also, on another level, those of the Soviet bureaucracy — are gradually losing their grasp and power of initiative in the face of the revolutionary initiative of the masses. The critical points that threaten a world conflict emerge from an uprising based in its origin on Cuban peasants, or Congolese semi-tribal sectors, or the most exploited masses of Iraq or Algeria.

The enormous human forces mobilized by the workers' states and their tremendous technical and scientific development, are confronted, on the other hand, by the fact that imperialism has maintained economic and military power and, for several years now, a relative social stability. It is these gigantic forces mobilized by the colonial revolution and the workers' states on the world scale, and the old forces of imperialism centralized for the defense of its regime, that pose the clash of contradictions on a scale and with a potential, and at the same time with a creative and destructive power, hitherto unknown to humanity.

The tremendous dynamism produced by this conjunction of the forces of the colonial revolution and the workers' states has overwhelmed the old Stalinist, Social-Democratic, or bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist leaderships, who must constantly adapt themselves or readjust their tac-

tics to the new developments that escape from their control. The Sino-Soviet contradictions; the deep distortions to which the "nationalist" leaders are subjected, and the qualitative changes taking place in them (as in the case of Cuba); and the new developments of the crises occurring in the Communist Parties and some Social-Democratic Parties — all these are showing how these old leaderships are lagging behind the new dynamics of this revolution.

The growing alliance between the workers' states and the colonial revolution and their interaction are giving a historical drive to this process, which requires a new leadership. To the extent that the European proletariat — as the Belgian strike showed — enters the arena, shaking the power of imperialism at its very centre, the dynamic elements of the situation can make a leap forward and render much more profound the process of the world revolution.

The revolution has entered on a new course of its development, on a course that is on the whole irreversible, that cannot be reabsorbed by imperialism with all its might, nor by the bureaucratic leaderships, which, on the contrary, are shaken and are being gradually broken at home.

The Cuban revolution, triumphing in the very jaws of imperialism, overthrowing capitalism and setting up a workers' state of a new type and of a special origin, is an indication of the irresistible power of the revolution, of its objective and subjective dynamism, which is winning out over all the limitations of its leadership of petty-bourgeois origin, overcoming the opposition of Stalinism, and triumphing over all the old tendencies and conceptions of the leadership of the colonial and semi-colonial revolution. Rather than the old leadership, it is this revolution today that is showing the road and the possibilities of the revolutionary action of the masses to the other peoples of Latin America and of other continents.

The great demonstrations of the Algerian masses have shaken all the plans of French imperialism. But at the same time they have given a new dynamism and a new dimension to the Algerian revolution, opening roads to new ideological and political developments.

The Congolese crisis demonstrates, after some months, a fact which, in a quite different context and form, is nevertheless comparable to what the Bolivian revolution has been demonstrating for years: simultaneously the lack of a current with sufficient clarity and strength to solve the situation by way of the proletarian revolution, and the powerlessness of imperialism to reestablish imperialist domination over these countries.

The Belgian strike, like the previous development and political successes of the left wing of the Labour Party in Great Britain, shows the revolutionary energies that the European proletariat has kept despite its retreats and partial defeats, as well as the lack of solid foundations for the stability that the imperialist regimes have enjoyed.

It is not by chance that this whole situation, together

with the pressure of the successes and economic and social developments within the workers' states themselves, is upsetting to the Stalinist leadership of the workers' states and the Communist Parties.

Bureaucratic administration and monolithic and Stalinist methods clash ever more flagrantly and clearly with an economy and a society in expansion, with a proletariat, peasant masses, and technicians and researchers who are engaged in deep creative efforts. The divergences of the Chinese with the conceptions of the Soviet bureaucracy are registering elements of differentiation under the pressure of this new stage of development of colonial revolution and internal growth. The attempt carried out at the Conference of the Eighty-One to stabilize the thought of the Communist Parties at a new level that maintains conceptions of conciliation with capitalism at the same time that new ideas, under the pressure of the colonial revolution, are opening up a way for themselves, is simply a compromise which cannot last. It also shows Stalinism's inability to adapt itself to the new requirements of a world leadership for this stage.

The discussion in the Central Committee of the Soviet C.P. and the crisis in the French and other C.P.s are an indication. The new attempt by Khrushchev to appeal directly to the rank and file over the heads of the middle cadres, at the same time that it makes plain the inadequacy of the bureaucratic apparatus concerning the new needs of growth of the economy, is also the indirect expression of concern and growing intervention by the masses in the problems of economic administration.

The workers' states are not divided into some that are more dynamic and others that are more conservative, but in a development clashing with the bureaucratic superstructures, which are stronger in the U.S.S.R., but they continue to develop everywhere in a way that is ever more dynamic and full of revolutionary possibilities.

This new course in the development of the revolution, which compromises the old leadership and spurs on its crisis, continues to provide the objective elements for the development of a new leadership.

The drive and audacity of the new revolutionary developments continue in general to be accompanied, in the way they are unleashed and carried out, by the growing intervention of the youth, generally not involved in the old orientations and leaderships, disposed to go forward under the pressure of the mass movement.

The Cuban revolution has been gradually overcoming the class limitations of its leadership and the opposition of the old leaderships, and developing its tasks into socialist tasks. The uprisings in Turkey and South Korea; the irruption of the masses in the big Algerian cities; the action of the South African masses; the struggle of the Belgian masses opening the way to a situation ripe for a change of regime; the actions kept up for years by the Latin American masses, leaving their old bourgeois and petty-bourgeois leaderships — all these are developing the objective and subjective bases for a new leadership.

The Fourth International, which has maintained and developed the programme for this stage of the revolution, the programme for the revolutionary mobilization of the masses of the entire world for socialism, must play an increasing part in building this new leadership to lead this new stage of the revolution.

This course of the revolution, which is developing incal-

culable forces, objectively goes beyond any prediction and programme save those of Trotskyism. The parties of the Fourth International, even though small, are able in various parts of the world to lead or play a part in the leadership of the revolutionary movements. The construction of this new leadership of the revolution requires more daring and aggressive action than ever by the revolutionary Marxist vanguard, since the old leaderships bring every pressure to keep their control, and try to channel, divert, and check new developments and the new strata who are entering into the struggle.

The problem of the alliance of the colonial revolution with the workers' states — which, as the Cuban revolution has shown, opens up very great and dynamic possibilities — the problem of the worker-peasant alliance in the colonial revolution, the growing importance taken on by guerrilla warfare in the development and centralization of revolutionary forces, require going beyond Stalinist and reformist methods, and open the way to the creative spirit and initiative of revolutionary Marxism. The experience of the masses ripens in a matter of months — what in other periods would have required years and decades. To develop, guide, and concentrate the most gigantic and dynamic forces that have ever moved humanity for the socialist reconstruction of society, and to build the leadership capable of doing so — this is the task that must be solved in the next decades, based on the new course of development of the revolution.

Youth of the Entire World! —

In the colonial revolution, in the workers' states, in the imperialist countries, this development of the revolution is connected with the entry on the scene of new strata capable of ridding themselves of the tradition of the old leaderships, capable of learning and acting with immediacy and the greatest daring. Where the youth have entered the arena they have provided a new channel for the masses by their intervention and the development of their struggle for the liquidation of colonialism, for socialism, and for the liquidation of Stalinist and reformist control.

Oppressed Women of the Entire World! —

In the immense revolution that is arousing the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, hundreds of millions of women are winning in high struggle their right to complete emancipation. From South Africa to Algeria, from Latin America to Asia, they are thus breaking the chains with which they have been loaded by a society based not only on the exploitation of man by man, but fundamentally on the absolute oppression of woman, keeping her in a situation of total inferiority. In China, the participation of women in the revolution is one of the essential bases for building the new society. In the capitalist countries, the participation of women in the struggles of the proletariat (as in the Belgian general strike) or in the struggle against colonial war (as in France) steadily increases.

In their struggle against a society of exploitation, women must take a place of capital importance in the leadership of the workers' and anti-imperialist movement and in the construction of the new revolutionary leadership required by the progress of the world revolution.

Toilers of the Colonial and Semi-Colonial Countries! —

Capitalism blocks the possibilities of development, of access to human living conditions. Drive out imperialism, overthrow capitalism! As in Cuba, it is necessary to

transform the revolution, to carry out the socialist tasks, to expropriate the capitalists, and to put all economic and human resources at the service of a planned development of the economy and of greater well-being!

Toilers of Cuba! —

The masses of Latin America, the masses of the other workers' states, the colonial masses, and the Trotskyist vanguard in every country, are with all their strength defending your workers' state, born of the peculiar conditions of your revolution, faced with imperialist aggression. Your revolution is regarded as the road to be followed in other countries. Develop your struggle with confidence. Develop workers' democracy, the direct government of the workers and peasants through their organs of power, so that this step, added to those already taken, will give the conquests of the Cuban revolution the force of a programme for all the masses.

North American Workers! —

It is on you that depends to a great extent whether humanity is swallowed up in a war of destruction, whether the steps forward taken by other peoples are checked by the armed action of North American imperialism. Support the revolutionary conquests of other peoples, support their right freely to choose their path, defend the Cuban revolution by opposing any attempt at counter-revolution-

ary intervention! Prevent your government from preparing its war-machine, fight against atomic war, for your own future!

Toilers of the Soviet Union, People's China, and the Other Workers' States! —

The example of your successes is opening up the socialist path to new sectors of humanity. But the bureaucratic police regimes are limiting your development and that of the rest of the peoples who are watching your example. The fight for the building of socialism can triumph only by breaking the oppression of a bureaucratic caste, of a police apparatus, reopening the road to soviet democracy!

Workers of the Imperialist Countries! —

Your struggle can be decisive for liquidating colonialism, the sanguinary war of Algeria, and oppression in vast regions of Africa, Asia, and other continents. Follow the example of the Japanese masses, of the Belgian masses: fight to overthrow the capitalist power in your own country. Amid the development of the colonial revolution and of the workers' states, your generalized struggle can fundamentally weaken imperialism and give a vast stimulus to the struggle for socialism.

Long live the World Revolution!

Long live the Fourth International!

THE SIXTH WORLD CONGRESS
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL



GREETINGS

The Vth World Congress of the Fourth International sends its warmest greetings to Comrade NATALIA TROTSKY, and assures her of the most complete attachment of the whole of the World Party which is continuing the work of its founder LEON TROTSKY.

★

The Vth World Congress of the Fourth International hails the heroic combat of the Belgian toilers who, by the scope and combativity of their general strike, show

the Western European working class as a whole the way to block the offensive of the bourgeoisies of those countries and to prepare the anti-capitalist counter-offensive.

★

The Vth World Congress of the Fourth International sends to the courageous life-companions of MICHEL RAPTIS (PABLO) and SAL SANTEN the expression of the deep solidarity and affection of all the members of the World Party for them in the struggle for which these two leaders of our movement are undergoing bourgeois repression.

THE WORLD SITUATION AND OUR TASKS

Under the pressure of the mounting waves of the colonial revolution and the continuous economic and technological progress of the workers' states, the global relationship of forces continues to deteriorate rapidly at the expense of world imperialism. The year 1960 has marked the beginning of a new phase in this process of deterioration, whose importance can be compared only with that of the year 1950 — the first military defeat suffered by American imperialism at the hands of the Korean and the Chinese revolutions.

The military superiority won by the Soviet Union in the missile field; the extraordinary progress of the Cuban revolution right at the border of the US homeland, and its growing alliance with the workers' states; the uprisings in South Korea and Turkey; the humiliation suffered by American imperialism in Japan; the spread of the colonial revolution in Africa, and the growing anti-capitalist tendencies of the Algerian revolution, which is accepting and receiving aid from the workers' states, and which has entered a new stage with the revolutionary irruption of the Algerian city masses in the struggles in the streets at the time of the December 1960 demonstrations; the rapid increase of influence of the Cuban revolution in Latin America, superimposing itself there on a continuous rise in the mass combativity and revolutionary aspirations of the workers and poor peasants — these are the striking recent features of this deteriorated world situation for imperialism. The fact that at the recent session of the United Nations Assembly, the imperialist bloc was for the first time since the creation of the UN put into a minority position on several issues only reflects symbolically this general tendency.

Since the failure of the "Summit Conference," there has opened out before us a new stage of expansion of the world revolution. In Southeast Asia, in Africa, and in Latin America, the revolutionary forces are developing in a spectacularly extensive way.

New advances must be expected in all these regions, which will still further alter the correlation of forces in favor of the revolution and to the detriment of imperialism. Never has the latter undergone such strong pressure from the de facto united front between the rising colonial revolution and the workers' states.

In the short resolution which follows, the scope and limits of this tendency are assessed, together with the possible reactions of imperialism, of the Soviet bureaucracy, of the colonial and semi-colonial peoples, and of the workers in the metropolitan countries. Short-term economic, political, and social perspectives are drawn from this interaction of factors. Deeper analysis of the fundamental tendencies of today's world is offered in the documents on the colonial revolution, on economic prospects, on Europe, and on the crisis of Stalinism since the XXIst Congress, approved by the VIth World Congress. This analysis is not repeated here, and is drawn upon only inasmuch as it bears on short-term perspectives.

1. A NEW STAGE IN THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

Recent events have marked a new stage in the colonial revolution — in a double sense. *It has been both geographically broadened and socially deepened.* With the end of direct Belgian colonialist rule in the Congo, the backbone of imperialism has been broken in Negro Africa, and this continent is for the first time gradually drawn into the process of the colonial revolution. With the rapid progress of the Cuban revolution, heading toward the nearly complete suppression of capitalist private property, a revolution in a colonial country has for the first time led to the birth of a workers' state in Latin America. *Also for the first time since 1917, a workers' state has*

been set up by workers and peasants led by forces not of Stalinist origin or under appreciable Stalinist influence. The long-term results of this decisive turn will be tremendous.

Coming on top of the growing influence of the People's Republic of China among the masses of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, of the increasing anti-capitalist evolution in Guinea, and of the anti-capitalist revolutionary possibilities in Algeria, *the victory of the Cuban revolution opens a period in which the leadership of the colonial revolution is tending to pass into the hands of proletarian or semi-proletarian forces.* The masses will be able to understand more and more clearly the alternative before which they are placed. Either the leadership of the anti-imperialist movement remains in the hands of the bourgeoisie or of petty-bourgeois nationalists who cannot break with capitalism, with the result that the fundamental goals of the colonial revolution will not be fulfilled; or the decisive break will take place, as in Cuba, and rapid historical progress becomes possible.

The strongest influence of these progressive developments will be felt in Africa, in the Arab world, and in Latin America. The closer alliance between the Algerian revolution and the PR of China, even if intended by certain forces inside the FLN only as a means of blackmailing American imperialism, will strengthen the left tendencies among the Algerian masses, will make any "Bourguibist" compromise solution of the Algerian war nearly impossible, and this will open up great possibilities for spreading the revolution toward Morocco and Tunisia in case of a political defeat and military withdrawal of French imperialism from Algeria or from the greater part of the country. The violent explosion of mass demonstrations in Algerian cities beginning 11 December; the victory of the abstentionists among the Moslem voters in de Gaulle's trick-referendum; the continuance since then of an extraordinary atmosphere of combativity in the mechtas — these are indications of the power of the revolutionary forces that any imperialist retreat would unleash in Algeria. It still further reduces the margin for manoeuvres with a view to a hypothetical "compromise," and does not fail to frighten all the "moderate" (and in reality pro-bourgeois) forces in North Africa itself. The revolutionary drive of the Algerian masses has constantly gone beyond the political plans of French imperialism. Today it threatens to take from the rear the whole military lay-out of the imperialist alliance in the Mediterranean.

The inability of world imperialism to reestablish its control over the Congo, and the break-up and dismay that are growing in the ranks of its native allies, while the control and influence of the nationalist sectors that stand for Lumumba — supported by Ghana, Egypt, and other African leaderships — are gradually spreading over the country, also act as a stimulus for breaking up the Central African Federation and for accelerating the explosion of the South African powder-keg. Both from the north and from the south these revolutionary influences make any stabilization of the pseudo-"independent" states of the French-African Community impossible, as has already been demonstrated by the example of Mali, and on the contrary are an objective stimulus to the trend toward African unification.

In Latin America, the immediate influence of the Cuban revolution has made itself felt above all in the Caribbean area, especially in Venezuela, where it has stimulated a new upsurge of mass struggle and a growing differentiation between the "official" "left" parties and new centrist and left-centrist forces identifying themselves with the Cuban revolution.

Everywhere in Latin America the influence of the Cuban

revolution is combined with the effects of an unbearable objective situation (inflation, "austerity" to wipe out the deficit in the balance of payments, unemployment, etc), to nurture strike waves, peasant uprisings, a growing opposition between the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, and general political instability. In this situation, the tendency of the masses to find their own political centralization continues and will continue to find expression through the political role and the embryonic dual power of their mass trade-union organizations in several Latin American countries, or through the creation or outbreak of guerrilla hot-spots in other places on the continent.

Guerrilla warfare will tend to become a more generalized form of struggle, not only because of the influence of the Cuban example, but also because of the fundamental characteristic of peasant war that the revolution must take on in most of the countries of Latin America. A predisposition thereto, and even attempts of this sort, are already spreading pretty much everywhere, from Central America to Colombia, Peru, and Paraguay. Guerrilla warfare will more and more become the expression of the more general character of civil war which is smoldering in several Latin American countries, and one of the tasks of our forces is to prepare themselves and to prepare the worker and peasant vanguard, both theoretically and practically, for guerrilla struggles (research, study of experiences, special cadre schools, etc).

Compared with the situation in North and Central Africa and in Latin America, the recent evolution in Asia is a little less favorable for the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist tendencies. As a result of the catastrophic policy of the local Stalinist parties, which sometimes comes near to real betrayal, excellent revolutionary possibilities have been missed in Iraq and in Indonesia, thus permitting the bourgeoisie to score and to develop certain trends toward military dictatorship.

In South Korea and Turkey, capitalist and pro-imperialist forces have succeeded for the moment in channeling the growing discontent of the masses, which was expressed by the overthrow of the hated Syngman Rhee and Menderes regimes. Above all, capitalist rule in India remains for the moment relatively stable, although under the surface tremendous forces of discontent and disruption are steadily building up. The recent events in Laos, however, showed that these pro-imperialist capitalist regimes in Southeast Asia often remain fundamentally unstable.

It is probable that imperialism, which remained almost incapable of any form of reaction to this world-wide process of disintegration of its rule in 1960, will now react, in the first place in countries which it considers strategically decisive for their geographic position, their economic potentials, and their objective weight. This reaction will be described below. It will most probably take a double form:

a) very serious financial aid to countries like India, Brazil, Iran, Venezuela, and perhaps Argentina — an aid whose scope will nevertheless fall more and more behind the growing needs for investments rendered necessary by the wide extent of the revolution if it is desired to slow down, even slightly, its march toward a proletarian leadership;

b) measures to prevent the "spread" of the Cuban revolution in the Caribbean area and the spread of the Algerian revolution in the Arab world.

But the weakest spot, from the point of view of possible imperialist reaction, is precisely North Africa, where de Gaulle's inability to stop the Algerian war might create a new Cuba right on the threshold of Europe. Therefore, the pressure of American imperialism on the Vth Republic to stop the Algerian war at almost any cost, as long as the coming Algerian Republic is not from the start a workers' state, will become overwhelming.

On the other hand it is the combination of the heavy blows received by imperialism and the abrupt new shift in the correlation of forces in favor of the world revolution that has prevented imperialism from making a military intervention in Cuba. Far more than the threat of Soviet missiles — important, it is true, but conditioned by the more general interests of the Soviet bureaucracy — what has checked imperialism's aggressive hand against the Cuban revolution has been the threat of the revolutionary reaction of the Latin American masses.

2. ON THE EVE OF A NEW RECESSION OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY

From the economic point of view also, the year 1960 appears to be a turning point in the postwar history of capitalism. Notwithstanding all the hopes US capitalism had pinned on the "Malthusianistic" function of the great steel strike, the end of that strike did not bring any new upsurge in productive activity. On the contrary, the American economy remained on a "plateau" from the beginning of the year, and since the Summer a downward trend set in. Steel production remained at nearly 50% of its capacity, and big unused productive capacity appeared in most of the durable consumer goods sectors (automobiles, electrical appliances, etc). On top of that, building activity fell sharply, and the stock market plummeted. As unemployment practically never fell below 5% of the labor force, it is correct to state that the American economy is sliding from the 1957-8 recession into a new 1961 recession without ever having experienced a real intervening boom.

In the capitalist countries of Western Europe and in Japan, a different development occurred. These countries nearly all succeeded in escaping a serious recession in 1957-8, especially France, Italy, Germany, and Japan. Contrary to what happened in the USA, they experienced to various degrees a real boom in the years 1959 and 1960. Today they are still suffering rather from the classical phenomena of overexpansion (acute lack of manpower, increasing deficit in the balance of payments, growing credit restrictions in order to prevent full-scale inflation, etc), than from the beginning of a recession.

But already the recession beginning in the American economy has started to influence the economic situation of European capitalism, quite unlike what happened in 1957-8. Exports (especially car exports) to the USA have fallen heavily. As a result, the European automobile industry is already hit by recession. American competition, including price-cut competition, on world markets is becoming heavier. For the first time since 1945, US imperialism is canceling any form of financial aid to European capitalism, even its contributions to local rearmament. As exports to colonial and semi-colonial countries either stagnate or increase at a much slower tempo than the general expansion of production, and therefore a growing part of this expansion must go the mutual exchanges among capitalist countries, i.e. to their inner market, it is only a question of time before this expansion knocks up against the limitations imposed by capitalism on the purchasing power of the masses, and in Western Europe a new recession sets in.

Caught in the dilemma of stimulating a new boom by essentially inflationary measures, and thereby increasing international distrust towards the dollar and the decline of the US gold reserves, or defending the dollar with essentially deflationary measures and thereby strangling the boom from its inception, the Eisenhower administration in practice chose the second solution, while even so being unable to prevent a growing deficit in the American balance of payments. No doubt the administration of the newly elected Kennedy will sharply reverse this policy. It will increase public spending in both the armament and the civilian sector (roads, schools, and the health

programme), and though it will cut or altogether stop financial aid to capitalist Europe and Japan, it will strongly increase financial help to the colonial bourgeoisie.

These measures might perhaps prevent the development of a recession sharper than that of 1957-8, which is a real threat to capitalism during the whole year 1961. They will not be able to offset all the forces working in the direction of a mild downturn of the economy before a new revival.

At the same time, the combination of these financial and economic measures, coupled with increased competition, will make a mild recession probable also in most Western European countries, and will above all tend to limit the new boom after the 1961 recession. Though it cannot be predicted with certainty that the forces of expansion have spent themselves in Western Europe and Japan, it is in any case certain that the limits of these forces now clearly appear, especially in the automobile, durable consumer goods, and building sectors.

Any new full-scale victory of the colonial revolution which would cause an important country to break out of the capitalist world market (e.g. such a victory in North Africa) would strike a heavy blow at the uneasy balance which at present maintains the relative "prosperity" of capitalism in Western Europe and North America, and would immediately increase the dangers of a military counter-blow by imperialism.

3. CONTINUOUS ECONOMIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, AND MILITARY PROGRESS OF THE WORKERS' STATES, BUT NEW CONTRADICTIONS FOR THE BUREAUCRACY

During 1960 the economic, technological, and military advances of the workers' states, especially of the USSR and the P.R. of China, have stood out in marked contrast to the near-stagnation of the American economy, and the confusion, failures, and partial paralysis which seemed to characterize the reactions of world imperialism in the technological, political, and military fields. The advance won by the Soviet Union in such matters as missile technique, space explorations, and automation technology seems to be maintained or even to increase. The constant high rate of growth of the Soviet economy makes it probable that the goals of the Seven-Year Plan will be slightly overfulfilled in the industrial field. At the same time, agricultural production continues to fluctuate wildly and especially grain production remains inferior to the hopes that Khrushchev put in the exploitation of the "virgin lands."

In China, after the slow-down of the excessive tempo of development which led to the disappointments of the "rectification of production figures," the rate of growth of the Chinese economy remains amazingly high, even if a growing stress is put on agriculture, and the standard of living of the masses remains low, above all given the tremendous pressure of population growth.

Mutual collaboration and integration among the economies of the various European workers' states also increase slowly, opening up new sources of economic growth through a more rationalized international division of labor.

This tendency is being shown in an empirical way, and runs up against great reservations on the part of the Soviet bureaucracy and the various national bureaucracies. But its strength will gradually increase because of the immense pressure of objective needs.

Under these circumstances, the Khrushchev leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy fundamentally holds on to its double line proclaimed at the XXth Congress and confirmed at the XXIst Congress: Khrushchevite "reformism" in internal politics, "peaceful coexistence and competition" in the international field. This means: *economic*

concessions to the masses and broadening of the basis of the dictatorship inside the bureaucracy in the USSR; attempts to get an overall deal with imperialism so as to "freeze" the present "spheres of influence" in the world, while supporting the colonial bourgeoisie's efforts to trade the revolutionary aspirations of the masses for a bigger share in capitalist world profit.

Even under this policy of concessions by the bureaucracy, a social and political crisis is simmering in the USSR. The needs for an increase in production, especially in the agricultural sector, objectively raise the problem of a greater participation in, and of control over, the economy by the masses. The role of the USSR in the world, the coming to age of new generations the conscious part of whose lives has not been marked by the reign of Stalin, the development of scientific and technical research — all these facts objectively require a new quality of leadership for the workers' state. Up till now the bureaucracy has adapted itself to this change by struggles and purges in its own ranks. But the continuation of the development of the USSR, combined with an exceptional revolutionary situation in the world, creates conditions for the penetration and reflection of this situation within the USSR itself. It will require a certain time, and new increases in living standards, before the toilers raise in an insistent and direct way the key problems of the democratization of the state and the economy, over the whole problem of their participation in the management of the factories.

But the problems of the social and political crisis in the USSR, as well as, for that matter, in the other workers' states, will tend objectively to find expression — even if empirical, deformed, and fragmentary — in programmes or programmatic solutions in various fields (economy, art, etc), before attaining complete and conscious expression in the political field itself. But the whole past and present of the USSR is creating the conditions for the appearance of this expression soon at relatively high levels. The possibilities for the intervention of our movement are growing and real, not only programmatically but also organizationally, even if in indirect forms at a first stage. Just like the course of the world revolution, the course of the crisis of Stalinism inside the USSR is taking on an objectively "Trotskyist" character which opens the doors to Trotskyism and simultaneously requires its intervention, as a programme and as an organization, for its revolutionary outcome.

But on the international field, after initial successes, the policy of "peaceful coexistence" led to disappointments and sometimes even to disasters. Notwithstanding its present superiority in the missile field, the Soviet bureaucracy was not able to wrench any important concessions from imperialism through "summit negotiations." The failure of the Spring 1960 Paris Conference was only, among other things, a belated reflection of this basic fact. At the same time, Khrushchev's attempt to "restrain" Communist Parties to a strategy of permanent submission to the colonial bourgeoisie beheaded the C.P.s of Egypt and Iraq, destroyed an excellent revolutionary situation in Indonesia, prevented possible progress of the C.P.s in several countries of Latin America, and led in the Maghreb and in Cuba to revolutionary explosions in which the C.P. could not play any important role.

This intolerable situation led to several developments. First of all, oppositional tendencies against this suicidal line developed in several C.P.s, either by the whole party (Moroccan C.P.) or by factions (Brazilian C.P., etc). Secondly, the Communist Party of China started to crystallize in the international field a "left opposition" to the line of "peaceful coexistence," regarding relations both with world imperialism and with the colonial bourgeoisie. And lastly, the Soviet bureaucracy itself was forced to adjust its line somewhat. Its threats of military intervention in

the Congo and Cuba were not exactly a faithful translation of the policy of "peaceful coexistence," and the "Moscow Declaration" of the 81 Communist Parties contains the liveliest criticisms of the colonial bourgeoisie.

It is probable that these three tendencies will continue to find expression in the near future, i.e., that the Kremlin will stick to the line of "peaceful coexistence," while adjusting it to be somewhat more "leftish" in order not to isolate itself completely from the advanced forces of the colonial revolution. It is also probable that this line will continue to work havoc inside the CPs of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, where oppositional tendencies will therefore grow; and lastly, that the CP of China will continue to crystallize internationally this uneasiness with "peaceful coexistence" in Communist ranks, and will increase its influence in most Communist Parties and proletarian or semi-proletarian tendencies in colonial and semi-colonial countries.

At the same time, an open rift between the USSR and the P R of China as *states* is extremely improbable, because their alliance is a vital question for both of them in the face of imperialist threats, and because the economic dependence of China on Soviet help remains very great. *The maintenance of the Sino-Soviet alliance, far from being a brake, acts as a factor contributing to deepen the ideological discussions and conflicts which the pressure of the colonial revolution on the one hand, and the Soviet bureaucracy's response of "peaceful coexistence" on the other, tend to stimulate inside the international Communist movement.*

What is now in question in this discussion and this inter-bureaucratic struggle is not whether one must be for or against war, but the fundamental problems of revolutionary policy in our period: the nature of imperialism; global correlation of forces among the classes; attitude toward the colonial bourgeoisie; problems of the permanent revolution; conditions for a victory of the colonial revolution; transition from capitalism to socialism; conditions for the international building of socialism, etc.

Although in a way that is of course deformed, the present discussion between the Khrushchevist and Chinese wings of the bureaucracy once more raises, draws attention to, and shows the validity of, all our basic ideas on these questions. For to the extent that the logic and dynamics of the international situation become "Trotskyist" in fact, the bureaucracy is obliged to face this — in its own way, of course.

There is thus opened up, for the first time since the consolidation of Stalinism, and in a much broader and deeper way than at the time of the Yugoslav "split," a new and decisive phase of the crisis of the international Stalinist bureaucracy, in the context of an unparalleled worldwide revolutionary situation.

Quite apart from the inevitable ups-and-downs of this crisis, and the possibility of its being apparently patched up, it can be considered that the break between that wing of the bureaucracy that may be properly called opportunist and rightist, and the wing with "centrist" inclinations is deep and lasting, and that it can be foreseen that the former, under the pressure of the latter, will find itself obliged to take the latter into account in its own behavior toward the masses, and even, partially, toward imperialism.

4. REACTIONS OF IMPERIALISM AND THE WAR DANGER

The near-paralysis which imperialism has shown in 1960 when confronted by a new grave deterioration in the global relationship of forces at its expense should be explained by exceptional and peculiar circumstances and not by a qualitative change in the world situation as it emerged from the victory of the Chinese revolution. It would be imprudent and irresponsible to suppose that the events of 1960 have proven that imperialism has be-

come a "paper tiger," i.e., that it has lost the necessary strength and resources to oppose the advance of the anti-capitalist forces on the world scale.

Ever since the victory of the Chinese revolution, we have correctly analyzed the existence of a war danger from the combination of two factors: the increasing deterioration of the global relationship of forces for imperialism; the conservation of tremendous economic and military resources by world imperialism, in the first place US imperialism, which enables it to engage in a desperate struggle for survival by answering each advance of the revolution blow for blow. A change in this conclusion could be made only at the moment we estimate that imperialism no longer has enough resources or power left to defend itself, i.e., when we estimate that it will passively capitulate to the advancing world revolution.

Today no economic, political, social, or military factors of importance warranting such an optimistic hypothesis exist, and will not exist so long as imperialism in the United States keeps its essential power.

The absence of any coördinated reaction by imperialism to the blows it received in 1960 must be understood, on the contrary, precisely as being a result of an exceptional combination of factors. Undoubtedly the two most important elements that explain this temporary paralysis are the unexpected ripening of the colonial revolution, whose leadership, at least in certain countries, is passing over into the hands of forces that have broken with imperialism. Within this overall situation there exist other factors, such as the advance of the USSR in the missile field; the political disorganization created by the present collapse of Eisenhower diplomacy, and the election campaign in the USA; the confusion and lack of central leadership inside the world imperialist alliance, as a result of the momentary collapse of the American leadership on the one hand, and of the changing relationship of forces among the imperialist powers on the other (see the theses on economic perspectives); and lastly the element of surprise, i.e., the facts that imperialism completely failed to foresee the developments in Cuba and the Congo, and that it was struck by the abrupt spread of the colonial revolution and by its alliance with the workers' states.

After the blow struck at US imperialism by the Korean war, Wall Street's international strategy was dominated first by the idea of a "roll-back of Communism" after a vigorous rearmament effort, and later by the idea of "negotiating from a position of strength."

But already before the disappearance of Foster Dulles, this strategy had stalled. The military correlation of forces was developing not in favor of but at the expense of imperialism. Far from rolling back Communism, imperialism was itself rolled back. The world situation created by the new wave of the colonial revolution and by the lead of the workers' states in the military field led to a reevaluation of strategy by the leading political personnel of the US bourgeoisie. This became evident during the Spring and Summer of 1960 when, on the eve of the election campaign, similar ideas about a new world strategy were developed in both the Republican and Democratic camps.

All this period of transition, however, contributed to paralyze political or military initiative by American imperialism, and in many bourgeois circles conservative resistance to such a reevaluation continues to be strong even today. The narrow margin of Kennedy's victory, after a Nixon campaign dominated by the absurd theme, "We have never been so strong as today," testifies to this resistance, as is attested in another connection by the opposition between the Pentagon and the State Department.

Nevertheless, it is probable that 1961 will mark the beginning of a sharper imperialist reaction against the

steady progress of anti-capitalist forces in the world. Even if the USSR holds its lead in the field of rockets and nuclear weapons, imperialism, by means of an increase in its military expenditures and a greater concentration of effort on rockets and atomic submarines, will tend to build up a strengthened striking force which enables it to keep the possibility of unleashing a total war or even initially limited wars, and will hold its own in the field of competition with the USSR in this matter, concentrating all its efforts to prevent the present Soviet lead from becoming completely definitive.

The spectacular development of the colonial revolution and the beginning of its entry, at least in certain countries, into the socialist stage, together with the growing difficulties of world capitalism and the growing power of European capitalist competition, will impel US imperialism to seek a closer alliance with the colonial and semi-colonial bourgeoisie. The latter, for its part, will tend more closely to combine its blackmailing of imperialism with a growing rapprochement with it for its limited perspectives of economic development. US pressure on Western European imperialism will become heavier and heavier both to give strength everywhere to the local bourgeois and semi-bourgeois forces, and to make it share more broadly in the financial effort in favor of the colonial bourgeoisie and the financial effort of rearmament.

Nevertheless, this tightening of the alliance is being carried out at a moment when the control of the bourgeoisie over colonial mass movements is diminishing more markedly than ever in the past, and when the attraction of the workers' states for the masses and their de facto alliance with the colonial revolution are clearly winning out over the declining prestige of imperialism among the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois strata of the population of those countries.

In the immediate future, the replacement resources that the workers' states can put at the disposal of the colonial or semi-colonial countries — though increasing rapidly and proving to be, in conditions of parity, infinitely more effective than imperialist "aid" — still cannot entirely wipe out the attractiveness of such "aid" for the colonial bourgeoisie, all the more so in that the latter appears closely connected with its need to maintain its political regime and the capitalist regime in general.

Even if this "aid" of imperialism could help slow down the deterioration of the economic situation, at least temporarily, in certain countries, nevertheless, in the key countries of the colonial revolution, the effects of such an aid on the standard of living and the revolutionary mobilization of the masses will remain negligible.

Imperialism itself understands this and has even tried to help "rejuvenate" the political and economic structure of some semi-colonial countries. It has favored the military coups in Pakistan, the Sudan, and South Vietnam, and has known how to utilize the military uprising in Turkey, as well as the student revolution in South Korea, with the intention of transferring power to petty-bourgeois nationalist groups less corrupt than the old governing cliques and more capable of favoring industrialization.

But even if Washington overcomes the particular economic interests of the US bourgeoisie hostile to that industrialization (as it undoubtedly did in Western Europe at the time of the Marshall Plan), it cannot destroy the feudo-capitalist structure of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, and its alliance with the colonial bourgeoisie will in the long run fail for this basic reason to stop the colonial revolution.

And lastly, the third form of reaction by the imperialists will be a tightening up of their military alliances. The decline of Britain as a world power will find expression in a growing dependence of that country, for defense matters, on US imperialism on the one hand and the NATO forces on the other. The emergence of the

NATO alliance as an "independent" nuclear power (i.e., the nuclear rearmament of the German and French armies) will lead to a "co-leadership" of the imperialist alliance by US imperialism and Western Europe, in which the German bourgeoisie will play a growing role.

The integration of these three reactions will in the near future create a new extremely dangerous turning point in the world situation when imperialism will have got ready a striking force more proportionate to the latest developments in the USSR, and will have tightened its alliance in Western Europe and with some colonial bourgeoisies. From now till this dangerous moment, the threat of war remains hanging over us, not so much because the Pentagon would launch a suicidal "counter-offensive" as because of a) the dispersal of nuclear bases throughout the world which strongly increases the danger of war breaking out by error or panic; and b) the overwhelming tendency to react in a military way to each new important advance of the revolution, especially in Latin America—a tendency that will more and get the upper hand, and can be transformed into a generalized counter-revolutionary war, and into an international civil war.

5. THE REACTIONS OF THE MASSES IN THE INDUSTRIALIZED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

Developments in Western Europe, since May 1958 have proved the correctness of the analysis of the document on European perspectives which predicted that the establishment of a Bonapartist regime in France would, in the immediate future, be an exception and not a rule, and that everywhere the working class and the labor movement would defend itself against the capitalist offensive on the economic and political fields.

Events have equally confirmed a) that this offensive would continue as a world-wide phenomenon in industrialized capitalist countries, in the first place under the pressure of growing competition; and b) that the degree of resistance of the toiling masses would depend essentially on the subjective factor, i.e., on the cohesion and relative combativity of the labor movement.

The capitalist offensive was expressed, among other things, by growing anti-union, union-baiting, or anti-strike legislation in the USA, in Japan, in West Germany, and in several smaller European countries. It was expressed by the attempt to set up a government coalition with the extreme right-wing forces (monarchists and neo-fascists) in Italy, in the preparation of anti-democratic legislation in Western Germany and Japan, in the first attempt at establishing an extra-parliamentary government in Belgium, and in the reappearance of right-wing or extreme right-wing forces in Austria and Japan. Economic attacks on the purchasing power of the workers were pushed through or prepared in nearly all capitalist countries, even if in most cases (the big exception being France) they were more than offset by the gains in real wages arising from the economic boom.

Violent reactions of the working class against this capitalist offensive and the slow tendency to install a "strong state" took place in Japan (student demonstrations, miners' strikes, etc), in Italy (downfall of the Tambroni government as a result of powerful demonstrations by the worker masses), in Britain (wildcat strikes of the seamen and left pressure inside the Labour Party) and especially in Belgium (leftward shift of the reformist party and the trade unions; strikes at the beginning of 1959 and the end of 1960). The election victories of working-class parties (especially of left parties) in Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and partially in Italy, must be set in the same framework. In Holland, a small increase in working-class combativity (especially as a result of the boom) has found expression in a series of strikes.

In Canada, the pressure of unemployment has pushed the unions on the road towards a Labor Party. In Western

Germany, which today appears together with France the weakest sector in the Western labor movement, as a result of the cynical betrayals by the turncoats of the reformist leadership, centres of resistance remain in the youth and the unions, especially in the metal workers' union. And, lastly, in France, the Gaullist regime's inability to end the Algerian war has produced a new rise of militancy both in the economic sector and in the fight against the Algerian war, especially among the youth.

Everywhere the fight against nuclear and general rearmament acts as a powerful stimulus for politicizing the surge of struggle against the capitalist offensive, and in some cases (e.g. Japan and Great Britain) gave or gives to this struggle the form of a counter-attack.

The great Belgian strike of 1960-61, which is to be explained in particular by the gradual maturity reached by a broad vanguard inside the workers' movement, broke out as an answer to a first attack against the toiling masses' purchasing power. By its exceptional extent and duration, and by forms of organization and struggle that connected up with the most daring experiences in the past, it thoroughly shook the power of the bourgeoisie, and in fact became transformed into a struggle to win transitional demands that only an overthrow of the reactionary government and its replacement by a workers' government could have obtained. It demonstrated the enormous reserves of combativity that remain available in the whole European working class, and the urgent need for the revolutionary Marxist forces to win positions and influence inside the mass movement such that they can fight for leadership against the reformists and Stalinists, in order to save this new coming wave from a new disappointment, if not indeed new defeats.

As the colonial revolution continues to develop, weakening the imperialist bourgeoisie and showing it up in defeat or retreat before the colonial masses, at the same time that their struggles serve as examples to spur on the toilers of the capitalist countries to overcome the resistance of their treacherous leaderships and go beyond their reformist methods; as inter-imperialist competition increases and its baneful effects on the workers' living standards often become clearer; as regional pockets of unemployment spread in many European countries, in the U.S.A., and in Canada; as the resistance of employers to making new concessions to workers grows greater; and as in several countries plans are put into effect to stabilize the economy at the expense of the workers' living standards (in accordance with the French example) — as these things occur and interact, it is probable that the struggles of the working class will increase in number and in extent, and that they will aid the strengthening of left tendencies, especially those basing themselves on the trade unions.

In Great Britain, the open defiance of the Scarborough Conference decisions shown by the Gaitskell fraction will operate in the same direction. In West Germany, the election disappointment due in 1961 to be the starting point for a renewed pressure of the left wing in the SPD and in the trade unions. In France, the inevitable defeat of imperialism in Algeria will be accompanied by an attempt by de Gaulle to strengthen the Bonapartist traits of his regime.

But if, between now and the moment of this defeat, the militancy of the masses increases, a new social crisis might very well accompany the weakening of imperialism after the victory of the Algerian revolution. The progress of the Canadian Labor Party, together with the influence of the colonial revolution on the Negro and Puerto Rican population in the U.S.A., and the force of attraction exerted by the Cuban revolution, will permit the left forces in that country to overcome their extreme weakness of recent years.

But it would be a mistake to believe that this near-equilibrium of forces — between the slow pressure towards

a «strong state» on the one hand and the defensive struggles of the workers on the other — can be maintained for a long time. The end of full employment, which threatens to occur almost everywhere by the next recession; the growing panic of capitalist and conservative petty-bourgeois forces in face of the deterioration of the world relationship of forces; the risk of a demoralization of the working class if repeated waves of struggles do not lead to decisive political changes or important tangible material results — all these impose a time limit on the present stage of transition, at least in Western Europe and in Japan.

The workers' movement must demonstrate its ability to go over to the offensive and organize the struggle for power through a struggle for decisive transitional aims. The ripening of the conditions for these struggles depends to a large degree on the way the revolutionary Marxist tendency develops, roots itself, and brings its leadership and organizing abilities to at least the key sectors of the mass movement. The Belgian strike has shown the immense possibilities of an offensive reaction by the working class, but it also shows that if that class does not succeed in breaking through the limits imposed on it by the reformist leadership — even that which is most leftist — and in going beyond the stage of exerting pressure on the capitalist state without bringing it openly into question, it cannot with all its strength break the barriers and halt the basic measures of the capitalist offensive.

On the contrary, if the workers' movement does not succeed in thus raising its sights in its struggle in this period, the forces of the right, in their turn, might finally break through the barriers under the pressure of economic or political developments — which would upset the awkward balance and produce a grave risk of a repetition of the French model in other countries.

It is the task of the revolutionary Marxist forces — by their audacious intervention, profiting by the objective and subjective developments which are now considerably more favorable to wide-scale struggles by the working class — to enable the European proletariat to overcome the braking action of the reformist leaderships, even the leftist ones, and to organize the struggle with methods and transitional demands that would lead to a ripening of the conditions for raising the question of power.

In the new world conjuncture, our movement has a great part to play. We are prepared by our whole past for these events, for the "Trotskyist" course of history, and ideologically are infinitely in advance of all the other currents in the workers' movement.

By our patient labor, both daring and methodical, inside the mass movement, we have here and there attained important positions and considerable experience. In the new favorable world context, we must persist along this path, while broadening our means of action.

Colonial work still remains the main field of work.

6. OUR TASKS

a) The colonial revolution in the next stage will continue to be the main centre of activity of the International, and the sector where it is possible to achieve the most rapid advances and development of our movement, both because of the existing conditions and because of the development already achieved by the International in a series of colonial and semi-colonial countries. In the colonial revolution, immense forces are developing and expanding, which escape from possible control by the traditional leaderships, whether these be Stalinist, reformist, or bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist. In the colonial revolution's new stage, in which the struggle for a proletarian leadership will become an immediate task in a series of countries, in the stage of its transformation into a proletarian revolution, as Cuba

demonstrates, the role of the Fourth International is immense. It is the only one that can prepare and open the road for the more harmonious development of these forces which are the basis for the new leadership of the revolution.

In all these countries, our parties must act as the centre to give impetus to the emergence and organization of this new leadership, to participate, lead, and prepare to organize and lead mass mobilizations through their present organizations or in the forms that they tend to take in these countries (guerrillas; etc).

Our parties must give the programme for the proletarian development of the revolution, the transitional slogans, and the tasks, but at the same time act as the organizers of the ways to this development, even in initially limited sectors, acting as the leadership even without yet being so in fact.

In the next period, there exists for the International the real possibility of leading, or of forming part of the leadership of, the revolution in some countries where the colonial revolution is developing, particularly in Latin America. It is necessary to act, starting right now, to win the leadership of at least some key sectors of the mass movement or mass organizations, from where we can make our programmatic and organizational weight felt, in action, by the overall mass movement of the country, and at the same time test our programme out in action, there before its eyes.

It is through the colonial revolution that there appears to be the most immediate opportunity for the International to develop in order to carry real weight, organizationally, not only from the viewpoint of ideas and programme, with the world revolution as a whole, in the process, already begun, of the ripening of conditions for a new revolutionary leadership to arise on a world scale, in the course of the crisis of Stalinism, in developments in the workers' states, etc. The labor and action of the International must be concentrated especially on this immense perspective.

In this task, we must also turn in the broadest fraternal spirit toward the new revolutionary forces, independent of the traditional parties, that are appearing at the head of mass revolutionary uprisings (Algeria, Cuba, Japan, Venezuela, South Africa, and Negro Africa in general, etc). Without hiding our reservations or our political criticisms toward their generally empirical approach to the revolution, we must make them, as always, after having demonstrated our right to criticism by a participation in and a vigorous support of these uprisings. The middle and lower cadres of these movements consider all problems of strategy or tactics with an open mind, without Stalinist or centrist prejudices. This creates immense opportunities for our penetration in the programme and action. The special tasks of the movement in the different sectors of the colonial revolution are described in the theses on the colonial revolution.

The International must also continue to mobilize its forces and call on the world workers' movement to defend the colonial revolution — today especially the Algerian and Cuban revolutions; tomorrow new blazes will appear. The International must continue, intensify, and coordinate on the world scale the important aid to the Algerian revolution that has already been developed. It must accord extreme importance to aid in all forms to the Cuban revolution, by continuing to develop on the world scale the work, already begun, of organization of or integration in defense committees, by calling for or organizing labor brigades, militia brigades, labor delegations, mobilizations of workers and students in defense of the revolution, etc; to mobilize the workers of the imperialist countries against imperialist intervention; to struggle in all the colonial or semi-colonial countries for a leadership that uses the present favorable

conditions in order to strike mortal blows at imperialism and capitalism.

b) The danger of a nuclear world war which would threaten not only civilization but the very existence of mankind is and remains real, as long as imperialism possesses weapons of mass destruction. To fight against this danger by means of propaganda for "disarmament negotiations," petitions, etc, or "economic competition," i.e, to remain generally within the framework of "peaceful coexistence," is a reactionary utopia. *The only effective fight against the danger of nuclear global war is the fight for the overthrow of imperialism and capitalism wherever conditions make such an overthrow possible, and the fight for the disarmament of imperialism (unilateral disarmament, above all unilateral nuclear disarmament) in all other capitalist countries.* We should everywhere be in the forefront of this fight, become its organizers and coordinators on a national and international scale, and try to link it up with the general movement of the working class for socialism, for the overthrow of capitalism.

c) In the U.S.A., the main task for revolutionary Marxists remains more than ever the development of the political consciousness of the working class. The defense of the positions of the unions, which are today more and more threatened; the defense of the Cuban and the colonial revolution; the fight against racial segregation; propaganda about the Canadian example, together with immediate independent political action — these are the main weapons for developing a *Labor Party based on the trade unions.*

d) In the workers' states, and especially in those of Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union, the first rebuilt nuclei of our forces must work out a programme of transitional demands which permit the formation of a new vanguard of the working class, in the present climate of "reformist" illusions on the one hand but of growing freedom of thought and non-conformism on the other. In the Sino-Soviet conflict we give critical support to the Chinese C.P. and try to promote an international discussion inside the Communist movement around the problems raised in that fight.

e) In Western Europe, the general task remains the one outlined in the document on European perspectives; essentially through the medium of entrism, to build up, inside the mass organizations and the labor movement, strong left wings which are capable of playing the role of rallying points and centralizers for various left-wing initiatives of the vanguard or of the masses, and which give these initiatives a central political perspective and an immediate programme of action, based upon transitional demands specific for each country. Special attention must be paid to the situation in Great Britain, where today the strongest left-wing tendency in Western Europe is developing under extremely favorable conditions for a decisive intervention by revolutionary Marxism. A big effort must also be made for the establishment of links and organizations in Spain and Portugal, where forces are assembling which are preparing a new upsurge of the labor movement.

The example of the Belgian strikes of 1960-61 puts on the agenda a more resolute activity in favor of a Workers' United Front in Europe, of a cartel regrouping all trade-union forces with a view to joint actions (especially to generalize the 40-hour week), but also to assert an active solidarity in case of an advanced struggle in a single country, so as to organize genuine international sympathy strikes.

In general, we appear in all countries as the force which most clearly, actively, and consciously gives expression to the immense revolutionary possibilities of our period. At a stage when, in the various sectors of the revolutionary movement and the world revolution, the conditions for a

new revolutionary leadership to arise are ripening in a more concrete way, when everywhere forces are arising and driving toward this new leadership that escapes from the control of all the traditional organizations of the working class, the International appears as the centre which, through its programme and its participation in the world revolutionary process, gives the most conscious impulse for the emergence and organization of this future leadership.

We are entering a new stage of expansion of the world revolution. The International must play therein the role of the conscious, dynamic, organizing, active revolutionary Marxist force, which, setting out from a series of key positions already won or being won, and by means of its understanding and mastery of the revolutionary process, acts as the guide in the process whereby the new leadership matures and emerges. For this, the International roots itself, and will root itself ever more solidly, in those sectors especially which at this stage show themselves to be the essential and accessible ones, those which today

reflect most directly today the "Trotskyist" character of our epoch: Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the colonial revolution in general; and the workers' states.

At the same time it will act as the force capable, through its positions in the big mass organizations, of spurring on and thoroughly exploiting the extremely broad and renewed revolutionary possibilities which are opening up in the advanced capitalist countries, in such a way as to give impetus to the fusion of the whole world revolutionary movement in the next period at a higher level, and fully to weld these possibilities and this activity in the capitalist countries with those developed by the masses of the colonial countries and the workers' states.

It is in this task that the International is building and will build its cadres in this period, its organizations for this process, in a word, its Bolshevik cadres and organizations fit to play their role in the leadership or together with the leadership of the mass movement, which continues to be the indispensable weapon for the worldwide victory of socialism.

TRENDS AND PROSPECTS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY

1. INTRODUCTION

In the course of the last ten years, the world economic situation has been dominated by the following three factors:

a) The rapid economic growth of the workers' states, first of all the Soviet Union, and later, more and more, the People's Republic of China. Not only has Soviet industry become the second greatest in the world; but the possibility that it will surpass the industrial might of the United States at a given point in the future has become for the first time a tangible one and is seriously examined by the US bourgeoisie itself. From now on, the share of the capitalist economy in the world economy is diminishing in an irresistible way.

b) Although slower than that of the workers' states, the economic growth of the imperialist countries of Western Europe has been more rapid and lasting than was foreseen — especially if it is compared with the period following World War I. This is especially the case for the countries of the European Common Market and — to a lesser degree — for Austria and Norway. Contrary to all predictions, both by Marxist and by bourgeois economists, the capitalist economy of the United States and that of Western Europe have not experienced a very grave economic crisis since 1938, i.e. for more than 20 years. None of the three postwar recessions, of 1949, 1953, and 1957, has prevented a relatively rapid recovery and a new boom after 12 to 18 months.

c) The permanent crisis in which the colonial and semi-colonial countries exist — which, in the capitalist world, is only the other side of the coin of the relative prosperity of the imperialist countries. It is caused by the contradiction between, on the one hand, imperialist exploitation through investments and trade if not by direct colonialist intervention, and, on the other, a deep and widespread mass movement toward political independence, the expulsion of imperialism, the overthrow of the old oligarchic regimes, agrarian reform, and industrialization. This contradiction of the imperialist system is expressed by:

- 1^o) the gradual liquidation of the colonial empires and of the division of the world among the great powers, as large areas of the world attain political independence;
- 2^o) the economic measures of expropriation of imperialist enterprises adopted by the colonial revolutions in the last decade: expropriation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the Bolivian tin mines, the Suez Canal and imperialist enterprises in Egypt; expropriation of Dutch enterprises in Indonesia; nationalization of the economy in Cuba; development of national oil enterprises in various countries; agrarian reform in Bolivia and Cuba; etc — while, in addition to the figures comprised in these measures, there are the crisis of imperialist domination and the insecurity of investments.

3^o) the break-up of the feudo-capitalist superstructure in various areas of the world as a result of the rising process of the colonial revolution — regimes on which imperialist domination was based.

Although the industrialization of the colonial and semi-colonial countries has made advances under the favorable conditions of the Second World War and the "Korean War boom," their economic growth has not only not been in proportion to that of the capitalist states of Western Europe (not to speak of that of the workers' states), but has scarcely followed the rhythm of growth of their population; it has not even allowed of neutralizing the unfavorable evolution of the terms of exchange. *The result*

is that the gap that separates the degree of industrialization and the standard of living of the colonial and semi-colonial countries from those of the industrialized countries is today more pronounced than 10, 20, or even 50 years ago.

Certain special cases — like that of Japan, which for the moment is experiencing an exceptionally rapid industrial expansion — do not enter into this diagramme, which nonetheless summarizes world economic developments in their main outlines and fundamental trends. The present document specifies to what degree these trends will be maintained, to what degree they will be changed, in the next ten years, and what will be the principal economic, political, and social consequences thereof.

A warning, however, is necessary. In order to study medium- and long-term economic trends, it is necessary to leave aside social and political changes, outbursts of revolutionary violence, in the field of economy. The Fourth International is more convinced than ever that these outbursts are necessary and inevitable. It is convinced that the coming ten years will be no more years of status quo than were those of the 10 or 20 years that have just gone by. In this sense, any Communist policy centred around the idea of "economic competition between the two blocs" is both utopian and demobilizing: the strategy of the international workers' movement must not be that of ensuring this peaceful competition, but rather that of overthrowing imperialism and capitalism. The conclusions of the present resolution, furthermore, present objective and subjective reasons to confirm this thesis.

Nevertheless, as Marxists, we must study the trends of the evolution of capitalism and of the bureaucratically degenerated or deformed workers' states in the hypothesis that these regimes will still continue to exist during a certain historical phase. It is only in this way that we can know the objective forces that underlie all political developments. Without this hypothesis and this study, it is not possible to have an overall view of reality, and to draw up an effective revolutionary strategy, especially in order to neutralize certain of the objective forces thus revealed, or to use certain others as a basis.

The theses on International Economic and Political Perspectives adopted by the Vth World Congress already stated that they wished

to distinguish the general trends, in the years to come, both in the capitalist economy and in that of the workers' states, insofar as they can be deduced on the basis of the current situation and dynamics of both types of economy, and in the purely theoretical eventuality of the lack of any major conflict during this period [. . .].

They specified in addition that "this method of proceeding by extrapolation, taking as starting-point the current situation and dynamics, and ignoring the possibility of major disturbances is the only possible method if it is desired to determine general trends and perspectives."

By applying the same method and by furthermore confirming in their main outlines the conclusions of the Vth World Congress, we are emphasizing the need for a scientific understanding of the objective forces which, in the last analysis and in the long run, determine world developments — an understanding without which any judgment about the prospects for revolutionary action run the risk of being tinged with subjectivism.

At the same time we perfectly understand — just as, for that matter, the theses of the Vth World Congress also

specified — that real developments will not be a simple reflection of these long-term economic trends, but will be the result of the *interaction* of these trends and the conscious intervention of men (both the revolutionary action of the anti-capitalist forces and the conservative action of the possessing classes and of other social forces

that fear the revolution) — an interaction that can profoundly modify and sometimes even totally reverse the objective trends revealed by such a process of extrapolation. Among these extra-economic factors, the revolutionary action of the masses is playing, and will increasingly play in the coming years, a decisive role.

I

ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE WORKERS' STATES

2. THE ECONOMY OF THE WORKERS' STATES IS GROWING MORE RAPIDLY THAN THAT OF THE CAPITALIST STATES

In the last ten years, the rate of growth of the workers' states has been very rapid, even if it has varied from country to country, period to period, and economic sector to economic sector. It has been more than double that of the capitalist economy as a whole. Comparison with the capitalist states that have experienced the highest growth (West Germany, France, Italy, Japan) is a little less flattering for the workers' states; it nonetheless reveals a still sharp difference in rhythms of growth, especially long-term ones.

From 1950 to 1959 the average annual rate of growth of industrial production has been:

	11.8%	in the USSR
	13.3%	in Poland
	10.8%	in the German Democratic Republic
	10.7%	in Czechoslovakia
	24.8%	in the People's Republic of China
as against	14.0%	in Japan
	10.0%	in the German Federal Republic
	8.5%	in Italy
	5.8%	in France
and	2.8%	in the USA
	2.5%	in Great Britain

(Sources: *Etudes sur la situation économique de l'Europe en 1956*, by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, and *Thirtieth Annual Report of the Bank of International Settlements*, 1960.)

From 1955 to 1959, the average annual rate of growth of industrial production works out as follows:

	13.5%	in Yugoslavia
	10.8%	in the USSR
	10.4%	in Czechoslovakia
	10.0%	in Poland
	8.2%	in the German Democratic Republic
as against	11.8%	in Japan
	8.2%	in the German Federal Republic
	8.0%	in Italy
	6.7%	in France
and	3.3%	in the USA
	2.1%	in Great Britain.

3. CAUSES OF THIS SUPERIORITY

The superiority of planned economy over capitalist economy thus appears in a striking way. The reasons for this superiority are worth being recalled:

a) To the contrary of the capitalist economy, the economy of the workers' states experiences a growth that is *uninterrupted* by crises, recessions, abrupt drops in industrial production. It experiences *permanent full employment* of the toilers and of the means of production (though this does not necessarily imply optimum employment).

b) Centralization of the most important decisions about

investment permits the *avoidance* of useless repetition of work, of *excess capacity*, and of the waste and unproductive overhead generally caused by capitalist competition and "free enterprise" even in the epoch of monopoly capitalism, although bureaucratic administration partly neutralizes these advantages.

c) Nationalized ownership of the means of production *removes the powerful brakes on technical progress* constituted in capitalist countries by the private interests of the owners of fixed capital still to be amortized.

d) Nationalized ownership of the means of production permits a *more rapid standardization* of production, the application of mass production techniques to such products as machine-tools which, under the capitalist regime, are subjected to jealous surveillance by patent-holders, etc.

e) Planned economy and nationalized ownership of the means of production permit a distribution of the national income that reduces certain wastes from the viewpoint of economic growth (excessive distribution costs, excessive spending on luxuries, etc.). The bureaucratized regime, however, still maintains these unproductive and useless expenditures at too high a level.

In addition, the genuine cultural revolution which the USSR and most of the other workers' states have carried out has paid high dividends in the field of economic expansion. The USSR has at its disposal today an army of engineers, inventors, technologists, and technicians, which considerably surpasses in numbers that of the United States. *As a result it keeps up a rhythm of industrial innovation that is superior to that of all the capitalist states.*

Normal access to higher studies for all gifted elements does away with the waste of talents inherent in the capitalist regime. Higher expenditures for teaching, and a thirst for knowledge systematically aroused and encouraged, permit the formation of a higher number of university teachers. Thus, in quality as in quantity, technological innovation is far more strongly stimulated in the USSR than in the advanced capitalist countries — not to mention the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

In the coming years, there is no reason to foresee a fundamental change in these rates of growth — or in their lead over those of the most important capitalist countries. It is true that the rates of industrial growth have been sharply reduced between 1950-55 on the one hand and 1955-1960 on the other,¹ and that even this lower rate of expansion could not be maintained in the USSR — the reason why the Sixth Five-Year Plan had to be abandoned.

¹ Percentage of growth of industrial production for the whole of the period envisaged:

	1950-1955	1955-1960 (1955 plans)
Czechoslovakia	70%	50%
German Democratic Republic	90%	55%
Hungary	102%	48%
Poland	118%	53%
Soviet Union	85%	65%

(Source: *Study of the Economic Situation of Europe in 1956*, by the United Nations European Economic Commission.

On the one hand, pressure by the masses had obliged the bureaucracy to make a more constant effort to increase consumption by the people, though without more democratic administration that could simultaneously stimulate expansion — which would have permitted maintaining or even increasing the rate of growth. On the other hand, bureaucratic administration and especially overcentralization of the economy had contributed to slowing down these rates of growth. These latter obstacles have been partially overcome by Khrushchev's reforms, which have permitted again achieving the rates of industrial growth foreseen for the Sixth Five-Year Plan, except in certain sectors.

4. CHINA, ABOUT TO BECOME THE FOURTH GREATEST WORLD POWER

Under these conditions, the most important new factor that will produce changes in the economy of the workers' states during the next decade will be the appearance of the *People's Republic of China as a first-rank industrial power*. Even if we retain a certain skepticism toward Chinese statistics (since the revision of the figures about the results of the "great bound forward"), we can accept the fact that the current rate of growth of the national income in China is two to three times higher than in the U S S R. This very high rate is explained partly by the fact that the base from which it started was much lower, and that the creation of new enterprises in various sectors, especially heavy industry, permits increasing production therein right away by high percentages.

It is, however, also explained by two contributory causes: the aid from the U S S R and the other workers' states, which, though it is still plainly insufficient, nonetheless constitutes a measurable contribution that was lacking to the U S S R at the period of its first Five-Year Plans; the possibility of avoiding a series of negative experiences, especially concerning the extreme bureaucratization of the management of the enterprises and the fall in agricultural production, which had braked the rise of Soviet industry. The fact that Chinese agriculture has been able to avoid the long phase of stagnation which in the U S S R, because of forced collectivization, accompanied the stage of rapid industrialization, has permitted eliminating an important brake on a more rapid industrial growth in the Chinese P R.

Even though in coming years the rate of growth of Chinese industry will be reduced — a phenomenon that is inevitable as soon as a first substructure of heavy industry has been created — it is probable that it will remain higher than that of Soviet industry, and considerably higher than that of the most advanced capitalist countries. By comparison with India and the other semi-colonial or colonial countries on their way to industrialization, the gap will be particularly striking. Whatever may be the avoidable sacrifices that certain bureaucratic methods have imposed and will continue to impose on the Chinese laboring masses, the Chinese example of rapid industrialization will exert, as during recent years, an exceptional power of attraction on all colonial and semi-colonial peoples.

It can be foreseen that in the coming decade Chinese industrial production will considerably outstrip that of Japan and of Great Britain. The Chinese P R will thus become the fourth-ranking industrial power in the world. It will still, however, remain below that of the European Economic Community (Common Market), the U S S R, and the U S A. Under these conditions, it seems hardly realist to predict that the overall production of the workers' states would exceed half the world's industrial production in 1965, unless of course capitalism were abolished in new and important industrial powers.

It must not be forgotten, furthermore, that, despite all the successes attained on its way to industrialization, China, which has more than 600 million inhabitants, remains a very poor country if per capita production is taken into

consideration. For it to attain Japan's present level of industrialization, its steel, electric, machinery, and textile productions would have to exceed Japan's by six times (i e, reach the level planned for the Soviet Union in 1970-72). It is unlikely that this goal could be reached before at least two or three decades.²

5. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS OF THE ECONOMIES OF THE WORKERS' STATES

The faster growth of the economy of the workers' states compared to that of the capitalist countries is its most fundamental, its dominant, feature. It is not the only one, however. The advance of the economy of the workers' states is marked by an *uneven rhythm of development in the different sectors*, which, together with structural defects due to these states' bureaucratic deformation or degeneration, raises a series of problems to be solved, creates difficulties or tensions during economic growth, or even causes the appearance of a series of bottlenecks.

The uneven development among the different sectors of the economy is first of all an *uneven development between industry and agriculture*. Agriculture remains more than ever the Achilles's heel of the Soviet economy. This problem is still not solved, either by Khrushchev's tactic of "getting round" the peasant by cultivating the "virgin lands," or by the very serious concessions granted the peasantry (sale of tractors and farm machinery to the kolkhozes). As a result of the special agronomic and meteorological conditions of central Siberia, the virgin lands produce only one good harvest out of two — which causes Soviet grain production to fluctuate enormously from year to year:

(in millions of tons stored)							
1937	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
96	82.5	88.5	108	127.8	104.8	139.4	110 ³

The two major obstacles to a definitive solution of the problem of agriculture's falling behind industry in the U S S R are the insufficient interest of the kolkhoz members in a steady growth in production, and the inadequacy of investments in agriculture (especially the limited use of fertilizers). These result in an average productivity in farm labor that is very much lower than that of the United States, not to mention that of western and central European countries, with their intensive agriculture.

Khrushchev's reforms, especially the revision of prices received by the kolkhozes in return for products furnished to the state, and the sale of tractors and farm machines to the kolkhozes, have unquestionably permitted a certain increase in agricultural production. They have simultaneously given birth to a new problem, that of the accumulation of huge sums of money by the kolkhozes. Their income has grown from 50,000 million rubles in 1953 to 95,000 million in 1956 and to 150,000 million in 1959, i e, they have tripled in six years.

As the supplying of the villages with means of consumption has certainly not increased in the same proportion, the kolkhozes have in fact accumulated an enormous purchasing power with nothing to offset it. Khrushchev has partly absorbed it by the sale of tractors and farm machines. The sale of certain industrial means of production is also made more and more easy to kolkhozes, which establish light industry plants, develop an industry for building materials, and sometimes even start selling the products to the townspeople. A new element is thus introduced in the

² China is currently producing 14 million (metric or long) tons of steel; to attain Japan's present per capita production, it would have to produce 102 million tons (six times 17 million).

³ If population growth is taken into account, this production is, per capita, lower than that of 1937!

economic structure of the USSR: the state plants lose their de facto monopoly of industrial production. It is evidently a purely marginal problem which does not affect heavy industry and represents only a very small fraction of current production.

The uneven rate of development among different industrial sectors — and between industry and the transportation system — remains also very pronounced. In general, in the new plans drawn up since 1955, the rates of growth of light industry have got very close to those of heavy industry, though without reaching them. But in carrying out the plans, priority is still granted to the sectors of heavy industry, thus producing a delay in the development of the textile industry and the durable consumers' goods industry, compared to forecasts, both in the USSR and in the majority of "people's democracies."

The inequality of development between the basic industries (power and metal ores) and the manufacturing sectors had produced dangerous bottlenecks in a great number of the countries of Eastern Europe, especially in the 1953-1956 period. These bottlenecks have been eliminated by means of the forced development of lignite in Eastern Germany and the mass supply of oil-products of Soviet origin to the region (the network of pipelines which is being built will encourage the trend towards the replacement of coal by oil in the majority of these countries).

6. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF WORKERS' STATES AND THE PRESSURE OF CONSUMERS

The problem of the integration of the economies of all the workers' states (or even European workers' states), has not yet been solved. The COMECON is not a tool for economic integration: it is satisfied to deal with the specialization and division of labor in certain branches (automobiles, machines, and machine tools) and in foreign trade. It does not even coordinate investments (see Gomulka's recent complaints in this regard) or overall planning programmes for all the workers' states together. This deficiency is due to the special interests of each national bureaucracy, including the Soviet bureaucracy.

The pressure of objective forces (for example, risks of competition in the field of power resources) and subjective forces (pressure of consumers) will be such in the years to come that the *Soviet bureaucracy will be obliged to move towards a greater economic integration of its entire "zone of influence"* — which will produce new internal conflicts and will weaken the "monolithic" myth in the direction of the economy.

This trend toward developing international planning of the economy of the workers' states, already expressed in the COMECON, will grow greater, as is proved by the agreements arrived at on this subject at Bucharest and the resolution of the Conference of the 81 Parties at Moscow. This development will raise again, and on new bases, the question of the participation of the masses in the administration of the economy, with all the consequences that arise therefrom.

This pressure from consumers, moreover, will steadily increase both in the USSR itself and in the majority of the other workers' states. This was already the case in the early fifties. But now that the first wave of Khrushchev's reforms has had its effect, and people are better fed and clothed, this pressure will again increase considerably. It will be centred in three fields: *quality* (especially of clothes, but also of foodstuffs); *durable consumers' goods*; and the *housing problem*.

"Buyers' strikes" occur more and more frequently (the Soviet press has just acknowledged a recent specimen of these in the field of plastics), and the pressure of consumers is today the strongest threat to bureaucratic dictatorship, as was shown by the Kazakhstan riots in 1959, when

thousands of young people rebelled against the lack of minimum comfort and consumers' goods.

Khrushchev's propaganda, promising "to catch up with and overtake" the average standard of living in the United States, will increasingly boomerang on him, stimulating mass demands concerning the supply of durable consumers' goods. If this pressure, especially with a view to obtaining private cars, gets too strong during the next decade, entirely new problems will arise for the Soviet steel industry, only a negligible fraction of whose production is now destined for the auto industry (contrary to the situation in the USA and Western Europe).

On the other hand producers' pressure with a view to greater participation in the management of enterprises increases at a slower pace. But the improvement in the standard of living and especially the reduction of working hours (general introduction of the 7-hour day) and the improvement of the average level of culture and skills will strengthen it in the years to come.

7. A FEW PARTICULAR CASES

Some workers' states in Europe are experiencing special economic problems:

Jugoslavia: This country has today the highest rate of growth, both of industrial production and of national income, among all the workers' states in Europe. This can be explained by the special characteristics of its economic policy: a weakening of bureaucracy due to the self-management of enterprises, which gradually becomes genuine; an agricultural policy which avoids both forced collectivism and markets dominated by private peasants; a more harmonious integration in the world market which allows it to take more advantage of the world division of labor.

The quantity and quality of durable consumers' goods supplied to the Yugoslav toilers is increasing faster than in most of the other workers' states. The Yugoslav economy, however, will run up against two dangers: excessive spread of the market economy in the industrial sector, which involves a danger of a growth of social inequality (cfr the recent lining up of rents to the "real cost price," which has ended up in a redistribution of the best housing in favor of the privileged strata at the expense of the workers); excessive integration in the world economy, which can involve a growing dependence (in credits and foreign exchange) on the international capitalist economy, and its prolonged isolation (through the fault of the Soviet bureaucracy) from the increasing international planning of the workers' states.

German Democratic Republic: Although it is likely that the inhabitants of this country already enjoy the highest standard of living of all the workers' states in Europe, the gap between it and that of West Germany remains very noticeable, even though it is lessening little by little. Given the relatively high rate of growth of the West German economy, the total abolition of this gap is unlikely in the near future, unless West Germany should be stricken by a grave economic crisis.

This gap plays a key role today, not only on the political plane, but even on the social plane: it causes East Germany to be a real breach in the whole set-up of the "people's democracies." It is one of the causes that produces the steady exodus of skilled elements (workers and intellectuals) — an exodus that is a real drain on the economic resources of the German DR.

Ulbricht's pressure with a view to "solving the Berlin question" is explained to a large extent by his determination to put a stop to this drain. The narrow dogmatism and bureaucratic brutality of the leadership of the SED, moreover, has further aggravated this situation, especially by the forced collectivization of all agriculture (even though it be a "collectivization" that formally maintains the private property of a good part of the peasants).

Czechoslovakia: The Czechoslovak economy has the most diversified and best balanced structure of all the countries of "people's democracy." After a slowdown around 1953-55, it has renewed its rapid upsurge. But since the demand for certain products seems to be amply saturated in this country, there are now being experienced, for the first time

in a workers' state, *problems of adjustment of supply and demand of durable consumers' goods.* To be solved in a harmonious and progressive way, these problems require a much more active participation of producers and consumers in drawing up plans, both within the enterprises and within the local collectivities (cities or districts).

II

ECONOMIC GROWTH OF INDUSTRIALIZED CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

Contrary to what Marxist and non-Marxist economists had foreseen before the end of World War II, it was not followed by a grave capitalist crisis of overproduction of the 1929 or 1937 type, but by a period of reconstruction, then by a period of economic boom, interrupted only by recessions of rather short duration and of less gravity than the between-war crises. This economic boom is currently continuing in Western Europe and in Japan, although in the United States it has given way to a situation where the economy has been for several years just marking time.

8. CAUSES OF THIS BOOM AND OF THE ABSENCE OF GRAVE CRISES

The causes of this new boom of the capitalist economy in the industrialized countries cannot be brought down to one single main factor. The boom is the result rather of a *concourse of circumstances*, of a series of transformations, either in the policy of the bourgeoisie (and of the bourgeois state), or in the structure of the capitalist enterprises. The main factors that explain this relative stability and stimulate this unforeseen growth are:

a) *The growing role of the state*, which limits the cumulative process of economic crises, and stops them at a first level (US statistics indicate that in 1957 the first stage of the recession was almost as dramatic as the first stage of the 1929 crisis; what distinguished 1957 from 1929 was the fact that it was stopped at this first stage, whereas the 1929 crisis was constantly aggravated by its own effects during three years).⁴

It is necessary to distinguish between the growing role that the bourgeois state plays *in a permanent way* in the capitalist economy, and its possibility of intervening abruptly in order to *allay the shock of crises*.

Public expenditures today absorb from 15 to 35% of the national income in most of the industrialized capitalist countries. The state is therefore one of the main sources of investments (especially in the military sector, and, in a subsidiary way, in those of transportation and power), and one of the main sources of the income of worker and white-collar consumers (the army of public functionaries, workers in nationalized or municipalized enterprises, etc). It simultaneously carries out payments of important transfers which reduce the losses in purchasing power suffered by the toilers as a result of the basic insecurity of being proletarians (payment of pensions, unemployment benefits, insurance toward the costs of illness or industrial accidents, etc). It is true that these payments are for a large part covered by contributions coming from the workers themselves. Nevertheless most of the industrialized capitalist states also contribute thereto by subsidies.

Taken as a whole, these public expenditures, practically independent of the momentary conjuncture, tend to ensure a more stable volume of consumers' investments and

income, and therefore play *a permanent anti-cyclic role*.

In addition, the bourgeois state has at its disposal a whole arsenal of instruments for absorbing the shock of crises right from the moment they occur: increase of transfer expenditures in general (deficit financing); reduction in the cost of credit; subsidies and bonuses to private investments, to exports, etc.

In the last analysis, this growing role of the bourgeois state in the economic life of the capitalist countries means that *in the social and political worldwide crisis that capitalism is going through today, non-economic factors are playing and will play a growing role in the economy.* That implies that the bourgeoisie, collectively, is sacrificing the interests of the stability of its currency and the future of its long-term profits (as well as the immediate interests of certain sectors), to the interests of immediate self-defense of the system, independently of its longer-term consequences.

Far from lessening in acuteness, this factor will play a more and more important role in the coming years, especially in the United States, as a result of the steady change in the correlation of forces on the world scale at capitalism's expense.

It is useful to add that this analysis, far from approving the revisionist thesis according to which capitalism might now be able "to avoid crises," confirms on the contrary the Marxist thesis according to which the alternation of good and bad conjunctures, of booms and crises, *is an inherent and incurable ailment of the capitalist economy.* The only thing the bourgeois state can bring about is to limit the extent of this ailment for the moment (at the cost of aggravating it in the future), but not to eliminate the ailment itself. It must furthermore be added that this possibility itself is not unlimited, that it can neither avoid the recession's outbreak itself, nor, despite growing state intervention, prevent recessions from becoming gradually graver.

b) *The great explosion of technological innovation* (essentially prepared by the Second World War) which has ended up in a fixed rate of investment in private industry that is much higher than in the between-war period, has contributed to a shortening of the capitalist cycle (recessions are breaking out every 4 to 5 years, and not every 7 to 10 as in former times), and continues to be stimulated in part by arms production (nuclear and electronic technics). This technological revolution, which finds its most striking expression in the advances in automation, is at the same time the fundamental answer that the capitalists are able to make to the strengthening of the workers' trade unions and the rise in wages in the first postwar years: increase of relative surplus-value and growth of the army of industrial reserves due to a frantic increase in productivity and by means of technological unemployment.

In the United States, this social aspect of the technological drive has already appeared the most clearly: unemployment no longer drops below three million, even in a period of good conjuncture. In Great Britain and in the Common Market, this phenomenon is a little late (in the Common Market especially because of the high rate of growth, still higher than the very substantial increase in productivity). But it is likely that what is going on in the

⁴ During the first nine months of the 1957-8 recession in the USA, industrial production fell 13.1% as against a fall of 15.9% during the first nine months of the 1929 crisis. In the 1957-8 recession, orders for durable goods dropped 20.1% as against a drop of 26.5% during the equivalent period of the great economic crisis.

United States today is announcing the future evolution of the capitalist states of Europe.

c) The demand for consumer goods by the toiling masses has undergone a structural change. The centre of gravity is more and more shifting from food and clothing to housing and durable consumers' goods. This evolution is partly the result of a *prolonged first stage of full employment* and a relative rise in real wages. It is also the result of the more and more unbridled use of consumers' credit and of advertising pressure (i.e., it also a matter of a replacement of spending on the first category by spending on the second, e.g., a certain qualitative degeneration in food consumption in certain cases).

As a result, the purchasing power available for durable consumers' goods is going up much faster than that available for the textile industry, while the purchasing power for agricultural products is diminishing relatively if not absolutely. Also due in part to the increase in the standard of living, the consumption of heavy products like grains, potatoes, and pork is beginning, furthermore, to lessen in an absolute way.

The shift in demand by the toilers, at first the result of a certain period of relative prosperity and a high level of employment, later becomes a main support of that prosperity, by the boom in the durable consumers' goods industry that it brings about. This is well translated by the quite different indices of growth in the different sectors of the Common Market economy:

(1953 production = 100)

In 1959.

automobile production	340
total industrial production	158
textile production	122
agricultural production	104

The very high rate of growth in the "new" sectors (durable consumers' goods, petroleum products, plastic products, electronic apparatus, automatic machines, etc) definitely explains the rather high average rate of expansion of the industrialized capitalist economy, especially in Western Europe and Japan.

The shift in purchasing power is further expressed by a *more or less permanent crisis of agricultural overproduction* in the advanced capitalist countries. To keep up an income, even a decreasing one, in face of the general tendency of agricultural prices to fall due to a stagnation in sales, especially for grains, potatoes, and pork, the peasants have considerably increased agricultural productivity, by an extreme mechanization of farm tasks, an increased investment in fertilizers, and more and more improved agronomic techniques. This increase in productivity would normally have eliminated the weakest farms and led to the abandonment of the more mediocre land. But the policy of artificial price support followed by all the capitalist governments for essentially electoral and social purposes (the peasantry generally forms the most conservative social stratum in the advanced capitalist countries) has artificially kept up the exploitation of these lands, has limited the rural exodus, and has thus translated the increase in productivity into conditions of stagnant demand and more or less permanent overproduction. Only the more "noble" products (high-quality meats, citrus fruits, etc) still escape this trend.

d) As for the *industrialization of the colonial and semi-colonial countries*, despite the limited character of their industrial development, there has taken place through this process, even with its limitations, a broadening of the market for capital goods, which has partially replaced the export of consumers' goods, threatened by this industrialization.

While the industrial products of the imperialist countries have increased in price, there has been permanent

pressure on the prices of the raw materials exported by the colonial and semi-colonial countries.⁵

This labor not paid by the imperialist countries to the colonial and semi-colonial countries is another element that contributes to the prosperity of the imperialist countries, who thus cast off some contradictions that fall on the backward countries.

9. PROSPECTS OF THE CAPITALIST ECONOMY IN THE NEXT DECADE

What will be the short- and medium-term evolution of these four factors? What conclusions might be drawn about the future of the economic growth of the industrialized capitalist countries?

The intervention of the state — of non-economic factors — in the capitalist economy will continue stronger than ever; it will have a tendency to become more pronounced. The imperative demands of "economic competition" with the workers' states will oblige the great capitalist powers to expand the production capacity of their key sectors, by means of state guarantees, even when it seems that this expansion will not "pay off" (in view of an already considerable excess capacity). This is already especially the case in the US steel and oil industries. The trend among the big monopolies to draw up long-term "investment programmes," more independent than formerly of the specific short-term conjuncture, facilitates this intervention.

The evolution of the correlation of class forces, on which the evolution of the correlation of forces between the colonial revolution and imperialism depends, will determine the degree to which the growing intervention of the state will be of the "austerity" type (financing of investments at the cost of the toilers), as in France under the Debré-Pinay government, or of the inflationary "paternalist" type (sharing the fruits of growth between profits and wages), as in the postwar USA and Great Britain until about 1953-4.

The wave of technological innovation will roll on, though slowing down in the United States (except in certain sectors like steel). In Europe, technical backwardness compared to the United States still allows of a considerable increase in productivity and a high volume of investment during the first part of the coming decade. The history of capitalism, however, shows that these "technological explosions" cannot be indefinitely prolonged, for an interval has to be inserted between two "explosions" in order to permit the new fixed installations to be fully and entirely developed, as well as amortized. Toward the second half of the next decade, the wave can gradually become flattened out. That will doubtless make itself felt with the beginning of the second recession of the '60s.

The change in the structure of mass consumption has ceased to play the role of a stimulant in the United States. *On the contrary, the importance taken on by the sector of durable consumers' goods is today a growing factor of instability*, for the demand for these products fluctuates much more strongly than the demand for non-durable consumers' goods. It is in this sector that excess produc-

5 The exports of Western Europe to the backward countries in 1958 had increased to 150% by value over 1953, while imports of raw materials increased only to 112% in the same period. The United States, during the same period, increased exports by 41%, while the value of raw materials imported in 1958 was 2% below that of 1953. This phenomenon is in fact older than this. Argentine prices, for example, since the world depression of 1930-33, are 19% below the average prices of the period extending from the beginning of the century up to the depression. This means a loss of annual average profit of \$238 million, according to the calculations of the C E P A L.

tion capacity exists in the most striking way, and even increases from cycle to cycle.

In Europe there is doubtless some time still before this situation is reached. But if it is observed that automobile production capacity at present reaches 5 million cars a year in Western Europe (including Great Britain, Sweden, and Austria), and that this capacity, in full expansion, will be raised to an annual production of 7 to 8 million cars by 1963 — and this for a population scarcely larger than that of the USA, which produced a maximum of 7 million cars in 1955, for consumers having an average income 250% higher than the average income in Western Europe! — it is to be foreseen that during the next decade, in the field of durable consumers' goods, the same state of saturation will be reached in Europe as that which the USA is experiencing today. This factor will therefore gradually lose its role as a stimulant to relatively rapid industrial growth in Western Europe.

The fourth factor (investments in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, as well as trade with these areas) is the one tied up with the most profound and lasting changes for the imperialist system as a whole. In the immediate future, to the degree that imperialist "aid" tends to increase, its effects as a stimulant to the imperialist economy will also increase, owing to increased export of machines, industrial equipment, etc., to the colonial and semi-colonial countries. But the gradual transformation of the colonial revolution into a proletarian revolution will, on the contrary, strike heavy blows at imperialism.

For all these reasons, the most probable variant in the short run is therefore a much faster rate of growth in Western Europe and in Japan than in the USA, and, in the medium-long run, a general slowing down of the growth of the capitalist economy, a growth furthermore interrupted by frequent recessions, which will have a tendency to become deeper and deeper, and to leave behind them growing residues of technological unemployed on the one hand and excess capacity on the other.

The rhythm and scope with which this slowing down of economic growth in the capitalist countries will show itself and the phenomena of heightened competition and the pressure on wages in which they will end up, will determine to a large extent the objective conditions of the struggle of the working class, both in Western Europe and in North America, even though they are not conditions sine qua non for a revival of the workers' movement in these parts of the world.

10. CHANGE IN THE INTER-CAPITALIST CORRELATION OF FORCES

It is within the limits of these prospects that the very important changes in the inter-capitalist correlation of forces in these last years must be placed.

As a result of the growing gap between the respective rhythms of economic expansion in the USA and in Western Europe, and as a result of the setting up of the European Economic Community, the absolute supremacy in the capitalist camp which American imperialism had attained just after the Second World War and which it had kept during the whole early postwar period (the reconstruction period, then the period called "the Korean War boom") is beginning to be brought into question again. This relative decline of the supremacy of US imperialism within the capitalist camp is the result of a large number of indications. Here are a few examples:

Steel Production (in millions of metric or long tons)

	1929	1946	1953	1959
USA	57.3	61	101.3	84.7
Common Market	35.6	11.8	39.7	62.3
Great Britain . .	9.8	12.9	17.9	20.5

Automobile Production (in millions of units)

	1937	1950	1953	1955	1959
USA	3.90	6.70	6.10	7.95	5.60
Common Market	0.51	0.58	0.90	1.50	3.10
Great Britain . .	0.38	0.52	0.60	0.90	1.20

Exports (in thousand millions of dollars)

	1913	1928	1938	1950	1955	1957	1959
USA	2.4	5.0	3.1	10.1	15.3	20.9	17.4
Common Market .	5.1	7.3	4.8	9.5	18.2	22.4	25.2
Great Britain . .	2.7	3.5	2.3	6.0	8.0	9.3	9.8

As the rate of growth in industrial production is at present at least twice as high in the Common Market as in the USA and in Great Britain, the gap between production in the EEC and in the USA will be rapidly reduced, in view of the already rather high starting level of the Common Market. In the coming decade, the EEC might be able to catch up with and even surpass American production capacity for most durable consumers' goods. But this movement will be partly braked by a relative sag in the purchasing power of European toilers.

At the same time, it emerges from the above-mentioned figures that, compared to the "Big Three" in world industrial production (USA, USSR, and the Common Market), Great Britain is in danger of becoming a fourth-rank power, even though its per capita exports still slightly surpass those of the Common Market. In the coming decade the Chinese PR, and even Japan, might be able to surpass British industrial production. The pressure that certain capitalist circles are exerting on the Conservative government for Britain to join the Common Market is consequently comprehensible. It is at the same time comprehensible why US imperialism, favorable especially for political motives to the creation of the Common Market, opposes Great Britain's entering it: the industrial power that would be created by such a fusion would exert an enormous pressure on the world market (it would buy more than 50% of world exports), and might soon be able to equal, if not surpass, the industrial power of the USA itself.

An important reaction of US imperialism to this change in the correlation of inter-capitalist forces has been the growing export of capital toward European countries, in the first place toward Great Britain and West Germany. This trend aims simultaneously at two goals: to use European wages, lower than American wages, in order to beat its European competitors by taking advantage especially of more advanced technological processes; to build up the army of industrial reserves in the United States, which would permit exerting a growing pressure on American wages.⁶ This trend will be kept up for several years; it will, furthermore, contribute to giving the economy of Western Europe a rate of investment and a rhythm of growth higher than that of the USA.

It is true that very grave political or social crises in Europe (a new Berlin crisis, a still possible new upsurge of the mass movement, revolution in the Iberian peninsula with international repercussions, fall of the Gaullist regime, etc) might be able to modify this situation, slow down the accumulation of capital in Western Europe, and even set off a vast exodus of capital toward overseas countries. New springs forward of the world revolution — e.g., victories of historic scope in India, Argentina, Japan — would also be able to shake the growing confidence that the bourgeoisie of Western Europe is for the moment showing in its destinies. But in case of such changes in the correlation of forces, catastrophic from the viewpoint of capitalism,

⁶ Already US firms like Remington Rand and Ford and General Motors have decided to carry out the whole of the production of certain of their products in Europe, whence they will be re-exported to the USA.

the danger of war could become major, and a new and augmented wave of arms production might be able partially to offset this lack of confidence of the capitalists and private enterprises.

11. POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

The pre-Congress document, "Situation and Prospects of the European Labor Movement, and Our Tasks,"⁷ has already sketched out the essential reasons for the birth and development of the European Common Market. It corresponds both to the needs of development of the productive forces in general, which have for long rebelled against the limits of the small national states in Europe, and to the logic of the development of the great capitalist monopolies, which had long since extended their power beyond the national frontiers, and were seeking ways to "normalize" and legalize a new expansion.

But to this dual origin there corresponds also a dual dynamic. On the one hand, the liberation of exchanges and the creation of a broader market contribute to a more rapid — although more differentiated — expansion of industry in general. On the other hand, the alliances and interpenetrations of the capitalist monopolies corner the profits of this expansion, intensify competition in the branches and groups of enterprises that have been left behind, and even prepare, for a later stage, far-reaching battles within the groups of monopolies for domination over the Europe of "the Six" — which will cause abrupt interruptions in the generalized expansion.

It is the West German economy which was in the best position to profit by the possibilities of expansion created by the Common Market. The Gaullist regime in France, however, personifies the dynamic and aggressive wing of French employers who are also seeking to ensure themselves a vigorous expansion within it. In many fields, a Franco-German co-leadership is thus set up, which in practice finds its expression in the Paris-Bonn political axis that today dominates the Common Market. In Italy the Fanfani-Mattei tendency also represents the bourgeoisie's most dynamic wing, which is attempting a maximum exploitation of the Common Market's possibilities to its own profit.

This situation will remain basically established as long as the high rate of expansion of the European economy as a whole raises the problem only on the level of the sharing up of profits. But already in several "lagging" industrial sectors — coal, textiles, and, tomorrow, various branches of metallurgy and heavy chemicals — excess productive capacity is appearing in the Common Market as a whole. From this point on, it is the sectors and countries working with the highest cost prices that are first to undergo losses: Belgian and German coal industries; French shipbuilding; Loire steelmaking; Italian iron mining; etc. As soon as the investments for modernization shall have lost their drive, and the market shall be gradually saturated with durable consumers' goods, the "competition and rationalization" tendency will get the upper hand over the "expansion and good understanding" tendency. The struggles in which the various monopoly groups will engage among themselves, and the repercussions of these struggles on the living standards of the toilers, will facilitate the struggles — at first defensive and, in case of success, offensive — of the working class in Western Europe, struggles which must end up in a general revival of the workers' movement around the transitional demands sketched out in the European document.

This whole prospect presupposes the maintenance, at least during the transitional phase, of an economic struc-

ture still marked by the maintenance of predominantly "national" private property in each of the six countries of the Common Market. At the end of this transitional phase, the interpenetration of capitals ought to take the upper hand over mere alliance. But these prospects will be permanently brought into question by new blows struck at capitalism by ever more critical recessions, the revolution throughout the world, and the struggles of the European workers' movement, such as they have been characterized above.

12. SOME SPECIAL SITUATIONS

USA: Political, economic, and social developments, which have, on the world scale, become more and more unfavorable, face the US bourgeoisie with a series of choices which have been clearly demarcated during the 1960 presidential election campaign.

To face up to the growing competition of the other capitalist powers on the world market, the US bourgeoisie ought to exert growing pressure on wages, refuse any new social reforms, concentrate on the effort to increase productivity, and use the growing mass of unemployed to reserve the profits of this productivity exclusively to the employers and the strengthening of the stability of the dollar. In order to defend its long-term interests, it ought also to rationalize new investments to the limit, oppose any new increase in public spending, and, in case of an increase — from its viewpoint, "inevitable" — in military expenditures, to reduce civilian expenditures in the same proportions.

The attitude of the steel bosses showed that a fraction of the bourgeoisie is ready for such a policy. But the reaction of the Republican administration, however, has clearly indicated that the majority of the responsible leaders of the US bourgeoisie, both in the Democratic and Republican Parties, understand that such a policy would, on the pretext of consolidating the regime in the long run, destroy it in the medium run.

Indeed it is clear that a virulent attack against the rights of the trade unions, accompanied by a blocking or lowering of wages, at the very moment when the USSR is ready, for the first time in its history, to introduce new and daring social reforms (the 7-hour day, then the 35-hour week), would immediately produce a violent reaction by the workers (as the steel strike demonstrated), shake up the political apathy and indifference that have paralyzed the labor movement for many long years, and prepare a grave social crisis in the USA.

Furthermore, a policy centred around "budget stability," with military expenditures kept at a very high level, would limit not only social expenditures inside the United States but also the aid to underdeveloped countries, would dangerously slow down the US economy's rate of growth, and would run the risk of causing US imperialism to lose within a short time what remains of the influence it still possesses with the colonial bourgeoisie.

The Eisenhower administration has partly followed such a policy; that is the reason it is entirely discredited. After the 1957 recession, there was only a semblance of a boom, and already in 1960 worried economists are wondering whether we are witnessing a leveling-off of the economy or a new recession. Through Rockefeller's mouth, as through Kennedy's, the most representative circles of the big American monopolies are calling for — and, beginning with 1961, will carry out — a reversal of policy. For the conservative policy of "stabilization of the dollar" — a policy that is not *anti-crisis* but *anti-cyclic*, and which causes the economy to mark time — they will again substitute a policy of increase in public expenditures, considered as the main stimulant of faster economic growth. They will increase both military public expendi-

⁷ See our Winter 1959-60 issue, p 43

ture and aid to the colonial and semi-colonial countries, in a last effort on a great scale to reverse a worldwide evolution that is condemning the world capitalist system to destruction within a time that is no longer very far off. A country which has at its disposal a national income of \$500,000 million and is still able to dip into immense reserves can risk such an adventure without fear of immediate collapse. In so doing, the US bourgeoisie will deliberately sacrifice long-term stability to short- and medium-term palliatives. But, in the world situation today, it has in reality no other choice.

Nevertheless, at the same time, the imperative requirements of competition force US employers to harden more and more their opposition to increases in real wages (the increase in social expenditures by the state can cushion the shock of this policy among certain strata of the working class). Hostility toward the trade-union movement, and attempts to wear down its forces, will increase. Objective conditions will thus become more favorable to a certain politicization of the workers' vanguard in the unions. These conditions will be aided by the influence that the colonial revolution exerts on certain sectors of the American laboring population (the African revolution on the Negroes, the Cuban revolution on the Puerto Ricans and the intellectuals, etc). The attempt in Canada to found a labor party based on the trade unions would, in case it succeeds, be able to serve as an example for the US toilers.

Japan: The Japanese economy is marked by the combination of a sector of very modern big industry, which manufactures capital goods and durable consumers' goods for the domestic and foreign markets, and a sector of home and handicraft industry, working with archaic and primitive methods, and continuing to exist exclusively because of its ferocious exploitation of very cheap labor. The coexistence of these two sectors explains both the strength and the weakness of Japanese capitalism, for which the MacArthur agrarian reform, despite its limita-

tions and inadequacies, did unquestionably create a vaster internal market.

In periods of international high conjuncture, this capitalism has at its disposal practically unlimited reserves of manpower (besides the manpower employed in handicraft industry, it can also mobilize those masses suffering from actual underemployment in agriculture). The pressure of this potential reserve army on wages keeps them at a very low level, even in a boom period. As a result, the rate of accumulation can surpass everything normally known in Western Europe or the U S A.

But in another respect the contradiction between its industrial power in rapid development and the almost stagnant purchasing power of the Japanese people renders Japanese capitalism still more dependent on its exports than before the Second World War. Now it has lost some of its classic markets, and its attempts to broaden its positions on the world market run up against the violent opposition of its competitors, either old ones (Great Britain, West Germany) or new ones (India, Hong Kong, and the Chinese PR, especially for textiles). As a result, the Japanese economy is more unstable than that of the European Common Market or of Great Britain, more subject to serious recessions, and obliged to carry out vast structural reconversions (development of a powerful export industry in capital goods; relative decline of the textile industry; beginning of a decline of the coal industry, etc).

This instability does not automatically favor the workers' movement. Under conditions of trade-union split, of growing fear of unemployment among the workers of the big factories, and of lack of consciousness among the workers of primitive industry, it can temporarily even cause a relative decline in the workers' movement. But the inevitable awakening of the most exploited masses, together with greater economic instability, will end by creating in Japan a situation that is the most explosive of all the capitalist countries.

III

THE CRISIS OF GROWTH OF THE COLONIAL AND SEMI-COLONIAL COUNTRIES

All the partial, conjunctural phenomena of the economies of the colonial and semi-colonial countries are overshadowed by a general phenomenon: the commencement of the liquidation of the imperialist and semi-feudal regimes, the beginning of a transformation of the old economic and social structure, a movement for agrarian reform and industrialization.

Just as, in the imperialist countries, the governments try to sustain the economic conjuncture by direct and permanent intervention, so, in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, it is the masses who sustain the process of structural change, who force nationalizations, or who simply prevent the stabilization of imperialist and capitalist domination.

Since the end of World War II, this process has already given birth to the workers' states of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba, and it never stops spreading and deepening. It is that which gives drive to the crisis of imperialism, beyond any temporarily favorable conjuncture in the imperialist countries themselves, and which definitively gives drive to the crisis of the capitalist regime as a whole.

While the workers' states and the advanced capitalist states have to various degrees been experiencing and are still experiencing a rapid economic growth, the colonial and semi-colonial countries observe an increase in their lag behind the production and consumption levels of the advanced countries. As a result, they are passing through a real economic and social crisis which underlies

the colonial revolution — the dominant fact of the last decade, which will doubtless still dominate the coming one

Granted, if we speak of an economic crisis, we must specify that it is a matter of a crisis *sui generis*, a crisis of insufficient growth, and not one of classic overproduction, even though certain symptoms (slump in the sales of certain products, mass unemployment, drop in the real wages of the toilers, etc) are common to both types of crisis. Despite this crisis *sui generis*, the increase in industrial production, i.e., the process of industrialization, goes on, but at a rhythm inferior to that of the advanced countries, totally insufficient to modify the country's structure, and above all impotent to improve the masses' standard of living.

Thus industrial production in Latin America has risen from the index number 91 in 1950 to 100 in 1953 and 136 in 1958. This increase, however, remains very much lower than that of the Europe of the Six, not to speak of Japan or the U S S R and China. Most underdeveloped areas in the world, moreover, have had an increase in production less than that of Latin America; that is especially the case for the Indian peninsula and South-east Asia.

The more and more inadequate growth that has marked the economy of the colonial and semi-colonial countries has both conjunctural and structural causes. The first concern *the trend to a fall in the prices (and sometimes even in the volume) of exported raw materials*, which form

the main element of export for these countries. The second concern the main consequences of the feudo-capitalist structure of these countries, which acts as a powerful brake on a rapid industrialization.

13. THE IMPERIALIST SYSTEM AND THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

The profits reaped by imperialist capital invested in the backward countries, which play an important role in the metropolitan countries, prevent possible primitive accumulation in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. To the contrary of what is currently said by the propagandists of imperialism, it is the backward areas of the world which partly finance the advanced zones.

Traditionally, it is the export of raw materials which has enabled the economies of backward countries to profit partly from the resources of the capitalist world market. The unfavorable evolution of the terms of exchange, however, limit even this possibility.⁸ The situation is aggravated by the development of the production of raw materials in the imperialist countries themselves (oil and synthetic oil; synthetic rubber; rayon, nylon, and other synthetic fibres; etc), and by the development of raw materials in new zones such as Africa (especially coffee, cotton, cocoa, copper, tin, aluminium, etc).

Furthermore, there was, especially after the Korean war, a conscious and organized effort by imperialism to drive down the prices of raw materials. The United States, as a means of pressure, used mainly its own internal resources, especially agricultural surpluses, products of the unheard-of growth of the productivity of farm labor, together with its own mine and oil production, etc. For the raw materials which the United States and the other great imperialist powers do not produce in the metropolitan countries themselves, they resorted to the organization of big consumers' markets to impose their conditions and prices on the producing countries. Such is the case of the International Tin Council,⁹ the International Sugar Agreement, and agreements about coffee, cotton, etc.

Some of the counter-measures decided on by the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois nationalist regimes of the semi-colonial countries were to limit the repatriation of the profits on foreign capital, to establish different foreign-exchange systems, and to take protectionist measures in favor of local industry, particularly to raise the prices of imported manufactured products. But imperialism actively intervenes to force open the gates that are closing against its expansion. It profits by the crises, the bottlenecks, and the threatening deficits in the balance of payments of the semi-colonial countries to impose a "freedom" from all economic and financial controls. In Latin America especially, the Eder Plan (Bolivia), the Klein-Sachs Plan (Chile), the Prebich Plan (Argentina), and then the direct intervention of the International Monetary Fund, by forcing the liquidation of foreign-exchange controls, showed to what a degree imperialism considers it necessary to keep these economies open to its exploitation, and to what a point it needs this in order to defend the dollar.

When imperialism tries to pacify the contradictions thus exacerbated, by means of alleged plans of "aid," it

can in reality solve none of the problems raised. The aid of imperialism is the equivalent of only a small part of the surplus-value that it is itself extracting from the backward countries. To ensure their industrialization and their overall economic development, the colonial and semi-colonial countries would need not only to capitalize all the surplus-value produced in the country and obtain fair prices for their raw materials, but also to receive aid in the form of net investments of an amount at least ten times greater than the total sum of the "aid" given annually today by all the imperialists and all the workers' states.

Certain regions of the "third world" have received investments and undergone a not unimportant industrial development: such as the Union of South Africa, the two Rhodesias, the ex-Belgian Congo, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Chile, as well as India and other areas of Asia. Venezuela and the oil-producing countries of the Near East have received very important royalties which, however, have not calmed social contradictions, but have rather accentuated the polarization of the classes, and the explosiveness of their internal situation.

Agrarian reform or the struggle for agrarian reform raises the problem of the incorporation of more than half of humanity in civilized life. It is shaking the power of the native landowners or white settlers who hold the best lands (especially in Algeria, Kenya, Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa), it enters into direct conflict with the system of capitalist plantations, and knocks down the age-old partitioning walls that cut the communal or tribal communities (in Tropical Africa, Peru, Bolivia, and India) from the rest of the world.

The awakening of these populations, who generally comprise the majority of the peasants in these countries and occupy most of the lands (though not the most productive ones), requires great investments to bring them out of their backward state. The long stagnation of the Bolivian agrarian reform is a proof of this. The reform itself and the problems of economic development that it raises cannot be solved within the framework of the capitalist regime. It requires the expropriation and expulsion of the present masters, a wide-scale plan of investment based on the millions of small peasants to whom the land they till is granted. The development of the agrarian reform for this reason accentuates the crisis of the imperialist system and offers an objective — and to a growing degree, even a subjective — support to the proletarian and revolutionary forces that are driving toward the worldwide liquidation of capitalism.

The other great economic process set going by the colonial revolution is industrialization and general economic development. Like agrarian reform, it has its roots in the masses' deep desire to change their living conditions. And, like agrarian reform, it soon runs up against capitalism itself, the one-sided division of labor imposed by imperialism, the narrowness of the internal market, the Balkanization of Latin America, the Arab world, and Tropical Africa, the penury of capital, and the repatriation to the imperialist countries of an important part of the surplus-value produced in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Capitalism is unable to incorporate broad strata of the population in the internal market by wrenching them out of their vegetative existence by means of the agrarian reform.

Only accumulation by the state can partly solve this problem, especially by the expropriation of the foreign enterprises and of the native landowners. Thus social surplus production can be concentrated in the hands of a workers' and peasants' government, which will use it both for economic development and for the improvement of the masses' standard of living, by means of a large-scale mobilization of the productive forces that are drowning in the immense masses of unemployed or insufficiently

⁸ According to information issued by the GATT, between 1953 and 1958, the proportion of the manufactured articles that the non-industrialized regions as a whole could pay for by means of their exports fell from 90% to 64%.

⁹ In cases like that of tin, the United States resorted to the formation of big stocks at low prices, which are kept down by foreign-exchange operations and the pressure of these stocks on the market when prices tend to rise.

employed toilers. This is the alternative that is posed to the colonial revolution, which has already entered on this road through the Chinese revolution, which today is reaching Cuba, and is beginning to open up paths for itself in some areas of Africa.

14. FEUDO-CAPITALIST STRUCTURE, AN OBSTACLE TO RAPID INDUSTRIALIZATION

Beside the conjunctural factor represented by the reversal of terms of exchange at the expense of the colonial and semi-colonial countries beginning with 1952-53, the feudo-capitalist social structure of these countries remains the principal brake on rapid industrialization. In general, especially in Negro Africa and in Southeast Asia, the extreme poverty of the peasants who form the overwhelming majority of the population and who either still live under primitive conditions or have the blood squeezed out of them by the alliance of landowners, usurers, and tradesmen — produces the lack of a sufficiently broad domestic market to stimulate the private development of big industry. The Balkanization of these regions — Latin America, Negro Africa, and the Arab countries — still further limits the domestic market. It follows that the resources available for accumulation, which are not always limited, are invested especially in land speculation, trade, and usury, or else are exported.

Such is the explanation of the mystery of countries such as those that are big oil producers (Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Koweit, Qatar) which in the last decade have accumulated thousands of millions of dollars in royalties without for all that having gone through a genuine process of industrialization. Most of this considerable capital has gone on works of substructure or on prestige building (at Caracas, Teheran, and elsewhere), on the mass importation of luxury products, and on the creation of industries that are simply complementary to oil production (refineries, ports, chemical plants). In countries like South Vietnam, South Korea, Turkey, and Pakistan, which during the same period received several thousand millions of dollars in American aid for essentially strategic reasons, this waste has been repeated on an even vaster scale.

The initiatives taken by the native national bourgeoisie, even in countries where it is relatively strongest (India, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico) have been limited to the sector of consumers' goods. The effort to create a national heavy industry, in direct opposition to and competition with the imperialist countries, has generally had to be entrusted to the state. It runs up against more and more powerful social and economic obstacles as the shift is made from plans or preparations to carrying them out in reality, and is frequently brought into question again by fractions of the dominant classes (Turkey under Menderes, Argentina under Frondizi, etc).

In countries such as Mexico, Egypt, Indonesia, or Bolivia, where important interests of imperialism have been expropriated but where the capitalist management of economy has been maintained, this nationalized property is tending to become the business domain of private property and the source of private enrichment of functionaries and bureaucrats — which sows failure and casts discredit upon the nationalized property, and unfits it for being a source of accumulation for economic growth.

The agrarian reform contemplated by these regimes, as in Egypt, Mexico, Betancourt in Venezuela, or Nehru in India, is only a capitalist repurchase of lands and an attempt to alleviate contradictions in the countryside without solving the fundamental problem of conveying the land to those who till it, and without making investments aimed at developing agricultural production. The bourgeoisie itself, under the pressure of imperialism, is shaken by internal contradictions. Frondizi's attempt to develop heavy industry by leaning upon imperialism has been

perhaps achieved at the cost of the short-term prospects of light industry — which was developed during Perón's government — to the extent that it tends toward the accumulation of capital by means of an increased exploitation of the working class and of the popular strata, i.e., a limitation of the domestic market for light industry.

It is the working class which has simultaneously led a permanent struggle against these plans of industrial demobilization and really defended against the bourgeoisie itself the level of industrialization already reached.

The attempts to overcome Balkanization through regional agreements are only ineffective measures — as were the previous agreements concerning Central America and Greater Colombia, or the present "free trade" zone in Latin America, which only serve to maintain some privileges of regional trade that existed prior to the agreements with the I.M.F. Generally speaking, even among semi-colonial countries, the differences are so great that regional agreements will mean privilege for the more developed countries, which would be in a position to block the attempts of industrialization of the more backward countries.

15. ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

The colonial revolution has not failed to influence the capitalist economic system as a whole, and it will continue to undermine it in the coming years. Its effects are felt both directly in the colonial and semi-colonial countries and in the metropolitan countries themselves.

In the underdeveloped countries, the colonial revolution, by stimulating the masses' aspirations for well-being, hinders or prevents capitalist financial and economic "stabilization," undermines the rate of profit, and renders any long-term private investment more and more speculative and risky. By exerting a powerful pressure in favor of the industrialization of this zone, the colonial revolution tends to reduce the outlets still open to the metropolitan capitalist countries, which have for that matter already suffered amputations from the destruction of capitalism over a vast zone of the world. It likewise stirs up new competitors to the metropolitan industrial producers, and, to the degree that it spontaneously tends to ally itself with the workers' states, it threatens other capitalist outlets which will be taken over by exports from the U.S.S.R., the German D.R., Czechoslovakia, etc.

In the advanced capitalist countries, it reduces the possibility of finding in exports to overseas countries the safety valve against a tendency to overproduction inherent in capitalist production. By lessening or wiping out the income from capital investments exported to the colonial and semi-colonial countries, it shakes the equilibrium of the balance of payments, reduces the bourgeoisie's margin of manoeuvre in its struggle against the proletariat, and tends to force it to a policy of austerity that runs the risk of setting off a social crisis.

These economic effects of the colonial revolution, however, make themselves felt only in the long run, and precisely to the degree that it succeeds in detaching the colonial and semi-colonial countries from the world capitalist economy as a whole. Now during the whole first phase, imperialism has tried to conserve what is essential in its positions in underdeveloped countries by transferring the power there to the national bourgeoisie. Such a transfer is a very hard blow for imperialism only in the sole case that it is accompanied by a nationalization of foreign capital invested in the country and by a basic reorientation of its foreign trade. Despite some spectacular nationalizations in the last decade (Iranian oil industry, Suez Canal), in general most countries drawn into the colonial revolution have not by-and-large detached themselves from the world capitalist economy. This is the main factor that has up till

now limited the immediate economic effects of the colonial revolution on the economy of the metropolitan capitalist countries.

In this connection, the experience of the Cuban revolution opens a new stage in the colonial revolution. For the first time, this revolution, before even giving itself a proletarian leadership, has ended up in the nationalization of the principal foreign capital invested in the country, as well as in a fundamental reorientation of Cuba's foreign trade toward the workers' states. If the immediate economic effects of these developments on the US or European capitalist economy are insignificant, they are nonetheless of historic importance as a *sketch of a future general tendency*. To the degree to which, in the coming decade, the colonial revolution goes beyond the stage of bourgeois-democratic leadership in several countries, its economic effects on the metropolitan capitalist countries will become more important. And if entire blocs of the "Third World" (India, Brazil, the Middle East) were to escape from the capitalist world market, these effects would become disastrous.

The colonial revolution today is expressing in an acute form the *world crisis of the capitalist system*. But this crisis is transformed into a *crisis of the world capitalist economy* only to the degree to which it undermines the economy of the most important industrial capitalist countries: the USA, the Common Market, Great Britain, Japan. Experience permits us to declare that in the short run this degree is determined more or less exactly by the *degree to which the colonial revolution goes beyond democratic-bourgeois leadership*.

16. FACTORS WHICH HAVE HERETOFORE LIMITED THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

The main paradox of the last decade lies precisely in the fact that, *despite* a capitalist world market that unites the underdeveloped zone with the industrialized zone, *despite* the enormous advances of the colonial revolution, and *despite* the global evolution of a correlation of forces unfavorable to capital (which more and more undermines the long-term security of investments), the advanced capitalist countries have been able to enjoy relatively rapid industrial growth. In the last analysis, this can be explained only by the fact that there enter into play a series of factors which *momentarily* limit the economic effect of the colonial revolution on the metropolitan capitalist economy. Most of these factors have already been pointed out by the Vth World Congress theses on economic and political perspectives:

a) *The maintenance of important imperialist positions in the countries where the colonial revolution has begun.* This applies both to capital investments and outlets for

industrial products. The most striking case is that of Iraq, where, despite the beginning of the revolution, important dividends are still flowing to the City. In all, Great Britain continues each year to get income of some £ 350 million (\$ 980 million) from its foreign investments. As for outlets, in 1959 53% of British exports, 44% of French exports, 27% of Italian exports, and 25% of West German exports, still went to colonial and semi-colonial countries and the British dominions.

b) *The replacement, inside the underdeveloped zone, of lost outlets by new outlets.* Thus the losses of outlets suffered by Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands in their former colonies have been in part offset by a boom in exports to other "associated" territories (for Great Britain, especially Australia, South Africa, Canada, and the Central African Federation; for France, especially Negro Africa and Algeria; for the Netherlands, the Dutch West Indies) or to the colonial or semi-colonial zones of their partners.

c) *The replacement of exchanges with the colonial and semi-colonial countries by exchanges among the industrialized countries.* In a general way, since 1953, the exchanges among the industrially advanced capitalist countries have been developing more rapidly than the exchanges between advanced capitalist countries and underdeveloped countries. Two phenomena have often been striking in this connection:

The USA has become an important market for most of the colonialist powers which have there found again part of the outlets lost elsewhere:

Percentage of Total Exports Sold to the USA				
Country	1928	1938	1950	1959
Great Britain	6%	4%	5%	11%
France	6%	6%	4%	8%
Italy	11%	8%	6%	12%
Netherlands	4%	3%	5%	6%
Belgium	8%	7%	9%	14%

As for Japan, it is currently sending 30% of its exports to the USA.

Exchanges within the Common Market are developing much more rapidly than between the Common Market and the rest of the world.

d) *The replacement of formerly imported products by domestic products (and outlets).* This applies both to the development of synthetic or nationally new raw materials industries (oil in Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands; methane gas in Italy and France; uranium in the USA, Canada, and France, etc) and to the steady replacement of purchases abroad of foodstuffs or textiles by national manufacture of synthetic textiles and durable consumers' goods industries.

IV

PROSPECTS OF THE WORLD ECONOMY IN THE COMING DECADE

From the analysis of the basic economic tendencies of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, worked up here and in the resolution on the colonial revolution, it clearly appears that these countries are for the moment continuing and will doubtless continue for a whole period to evolve in the *opposite direction* to the rest of the world. While, in the industrialized areas of the world, production and per capita income have already attained a high level, or are in growth that is very rapid (workers' states) or rapid (Western Europe and Japan), in the colonial and semi-colonial countries per capita income and product continue to stagnate or to raise themselves very slowly, starting out from a very low level.

The industrialized capitalist countries and the workers' states, confronted by this situation, are trying to face up

to it according to the resources that they have at their disposal and according to the class forces that they incarnate. The prospects of the capitalist economy will nevertheless be more and more dominated by the deepening crisis of imperialism, especially to the extent that the colonial revolution comes under proletarian and semi-proletarian leaderships.

17. COMPETITION IN AID TO UNDERVELOPED COUNTRIES

From the purely economic viewpoint, the capitalist states today have at their disposal resources superior to those of the workers' states for being able to launch a greater movement of aid to the colonial bourgeoisie. Not only are they far richer, able to make their reserves in ma-

chines and men bear fruit for this purpose, and able to dip into a more abundant current production of capital goods, but also they are not, like the U S S R, under constant pressure from a powerful ally of the dimensions of the Chinese P R that wants to drain off most of the available resources for the benefit of its own development.

The advantage of the workers' states is based on the fact that their aid, even if lower in quantity and also granted for political reasons, is generally directly connected with movements and enterprises which tend to transform the backward structure of these countries. This is why this help is much more important and fruitful and will be increasingly so in the coming years. The Cuban example has shown, as the examples of Egypt and other countries have already, that this aid serves as support to escape from the reprisals and attempts at economic blockade on the part of imperialism.

It is true that the Republican administration in the United States, alarmed by the unfavorable evolution of the American balance of payments, has for a certain time been even putting the brake on the movement of grants and credits to underdeveloped countries, on the pretext of using this blackmail to force its allies in Western Europe — first of all, West Germany — to make greater sacrifices. But this policy — which finally ended up in political passivity and immobilism, and leaves the U S bourgeoisie the choice only between systematic military intervention in face of any new spread of the colonial revolution and just plain capitulation — is causing more and more irritation in the leading circles of world capitalism, both in the U S A itself and in Western Europe.

It is probable that in the near future this policy will be changed, and that we shall observe an American aid to underdeveloped countries far greater than in the past. This aid will very likely be *selective according to which zones Washington considers the most critical and the most strategic*: Latin America (first of all Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and perhaps Argentina), India, Turkey, Iran, and perhaps Indonesia.

But this concrete possibility for imperialism to carry out this plan nevertheless runs up against serious difficulties, especially regarding the condition of American imperialism, financially weakening under the tremendous loads of armaments and preparation for war.

In addition, it runs up against different social obstacles in the colonial and semi-colonial countries themselves, which in the last instance will strongly limit the effect of these plans of "aid."

a) *Private capital is little inclined to create in colonial and semi-colonial countries conversion industries that enter into competition with metropolitan industry.* The aid granted for this purpose will be to a large extent state aid (and limited by the resources of the states), for the U S government can, in the collective interest of the capitalist class, go beyond the narrow economic interests of certain sectors of this class, as it already did after 1945 in Western Europe.

b) *The very scope of such a plan is not sufficient to change within a short time the destitution and dissatisfaction of the masses and to check the revolutionary upsurge in the colonial and semi-colonial countries.* It is only in certain limited cases, and after a certain time, that it might be able to raise the masses' standard of living — which, furthermore, does not have an automatically demobilizing effect upon those masses.

c) *In most colonial and semi-colonial countries, there is not a broad enough bourgeois social stratum to be able to channel the whole of this aid in a productive way toward a genuine economic upsurge.* Examples, not only old ones like Chiang Kai-Shek, Syngman Rhee, and Ibn Seoud, but even more recent ones like Iran, Turkey, South Vietnam, and Laos, are significant in this matter.

In any case, the "aid" programmes will not in any way

succeed in stabilizing the economic situation of these countries, due to the revolutionary process and to the fact that whatever be the nature of the capitalist stratum which receives this help, it will in the last instance always find itself in opposition to the movement of the masses.

Indeed, the attempts of imperialism to reach an agreement with the national bourgeoisies which are transitionally leading the movement of the masses are made at the expense of the achievement of the progressive tasks: they avoid as much as possible the expropriation of enterprises; they replace the agrarian reform by inadequate measures; they favor the accumulation of capital at the cost of an overexploitation of the workers, which leaves all the contradictions untouched, and contributes to separating the revolutionary movement from the national-bourgeois leadership.

Under these conditions, therefore, the most probable eventuality is the following: *in the coming years, American, capitalist, aid, as well as Soviet aid, to the underdeveloped countries, will go on increasing, and U S imperialism will make an exceptional effort thus to tie up to itself certain sectors of the colonial bourgeoisie by making important concessions to them. But this aid, in the present social and political context of these countries, will not be able to check the colonial revolution in the short or medium run.*

18. ECONOMIC COMPETITION BETWEEN WORKERS' STATES AND CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

As for direct competition between the U S S R and the U S A, and between the workers' states and the capitalist states as a whole, supposing that the present trends roughly continue, it can be concluded that *it is extremely improbable that Soviet production will, in 1970-72, surpass current American per capita production, and that it is even more improbable that, already in 1965, the production of the workers' states will surpass that of the capitalist states*, as Khrushchev stated in his report to the XXIst Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These two predictions could become real only on the very improbable condition of a total stagnation of the economy of the U S and the other capitalist countries. Soviet sources themselves admit, for example, that in 1959, power production in all the workers' states had reached only 20%, and steel production 31%, of world production. These figures give the measure of what would have to be accomplished in six years to fulfill Khrushchev's not very serious prediction.

Granted, it is not excluded that in this or that field the production of the U S S R may catch up with U S per capita production, especially if the year in question (either 1965, or 1970, 1971, or 1972) is one of grave recession. But it would be deluding oneself to deduce therefrom that either the economic correlation of forces between the two countries or the living standards of the two peoples would already be equal.

As for the economic correlation of forces, it is production capacity and not current production that must be taken into account. As for living standards, it is the mass of durable consumers' goods accumulated over one or several decades which must be added to current production. *For all these reasons, the coming 10 to 20 years give promise of being the last historical period during which the capitalist states will keep a certain lead over the economy of the workers' states.* But this lead will steadily shrink. As, gradually, the recessions grow broader, the gap between production capacity and current production gets wider in a growing series of branches of industry, and the colonial revolution pulls more and more countries out of the capitalist world market, this superiority could be punctuated by brief stages during which the workers' states already pull themselves up to the same level of current production as the capitalist states.

It must be further considered that the economic dynamics of the workers' states, imperialist countries, and colonial and semi-colonial countries are supported by extra-economic factors: state policy and the mobilization of the masses for building the first category of countries, the intervention of the state in the second, intervention of the revolution in the third.

The success of the nationalized and planned economy, in contrast to the capitalist economy, is measured not only by its growth rate and its present successes, even under bureaucratic leadership, in raising the level of consumption by the masses, but also by the fact that experience is showing that it is really the only system which allows the colonial and semi-colonial countries — i.e., three quarters of humanity — to get out of their backward condition, have access to modern economy, and be in a situation to utilize their resources in accordance with the masses' needs. This is confirmed by the comparative examples of China on the one hand, and, on the other, India and all other countries that have attained their political independence. This fact becomes a concrete stimulus for the revolutionary movement of the masses.

The competition between the workers' states and capitalism in the next period will be carried out, not only through the Five-Year Plans of the USSR and China, and the resources which the imperialist states can mobilize to avoid worse crises and maintain a favorable conjuncture, but also through the capacity demonstrated by one regime or the other to solve the needs of growth of the colonial and semi-colonial masses.

It must be added that the American bourgeoisie is conscious of the decisive stakes in this competition. It will bring into play all the resources at its disposal to raise the rate of expansion of US industry, to keep up a certain technical and technological superiority of its industry over that of the USSR, and to force a showdown before it has lost its last strong card.

19. POLITICAL CONCLUSIONS

The new upsurge of the colonial revolution, the crisis of the imperialist system, and the narrowing of the economic lead which the capitalist states still enjoy over the workers' states mean a *new and important change in the correlation of forces between the capitalist and anti-capitalist forces in the world*, in favor of the latter and at the expense of the former. This change in the correlation of forces will successively move over from the social to the politico-military plane, and end by moving over also to the economic plane. Our movement, which, already in 1950, was the first to lay the emphasis on this fundamental change, has no reason to abandon this evaluation just because the leaders of the Soviet bureaucracy and the heads of the Stalinist parties throughout the world are — years late — taking it up in their turn.

The alliance between the workers' states and the colonial revolution may, in the coming years, increase by leaps and bounds this change in the correlation of forces. This alliance has at its disposal incalculable possibilities through the mobilization of human resources unknown in past history, and through the mobilization on a world scale of economic resources for the first time on a non-capitalist basis. This combined development — colonial revolution and workers' states — is operating against both the imperialist system and bureaucratic control, even though new transitional bureaucratic forms may appear.

This powerful revolutionary development is not only jeopardizing the rule of imperialism and of the Soviet bureaucracy, but also opening up for the revolutionary vanguard in the coming years the possibility of having increasing influence, by proposing a harmonious and scientific solution, on the problems of economic development, on the basis of control and leadership by the workers and exploited masses. The preparation of a

transitional programme for economic transformation and the management of the economy during this stage of development will be greatly needed for guiding these revolutionary movements in the next period.

What distinguishes our evaluation, however, from the mechanist one of Khrushchev and the CPs is that it is dialectic, i.e., that it includes the whole of the contradictory elements of today's reality. We understand that, *despite* this change in the correlation of forces in favor of the anti-capitalist forces in the world. *American imperialism still possesses a real economic superiority and enormous potential reserves, and that capitalism has experienced and is experiencing a new upsurge in Western Europe that is translated by the increased self-confidence of the bourgeoisie* (sometimes exceeding even the self-confidence of certain sectors of the American bourgeoisie).

Under these conditions, it is absolutely illusory and dangerous to expect a radical change in the world situation through the lessening (or even the wiping out) of the economic lead of the United States over the U S S R.

To cut down this lead would not take away from American imperialism any of the weapons which permit it and will permit it to set off a war of suicide-defense at any decisive moment of the process of change in the correlation of forces.

In addition, given the economic development that capitalist Europe is now going through, it is equally improbable that the economic advances of the USSR would automatically change the relationship of social forces there in favor of the proletariat, not to mention the Communist Parties.

The so-called "peaceful coexistence" strategy, which expects wondrous results just from the economic advances of the workers' states, is therefore based on two totally unrealistic hypotheses. It expresses less the determination by broad layers of Soviet society to have "peace at any price" (a determination that unquestionably exists after decades of uninterrupted sufferings and sacrifices) than the fear of the Soviet bureaucracy in face of the new advances of the world revolution. It is deeply conservative and demobilizing, for it tends more than ever to reduce the role of the international workers' movement (including the masses of the colonial countries) to that of simply bringing pressure on imperialism and the colonial bourgeoisie, in order to lead them to accept "coexistence."

Granted, there can be no question of requiring the Soviet government to use in its turn a "nuclear strategy," to profit by its superiority at the moment in nuclear-headed missiles to smash capitalism in this or that country, or even in the entire world. Such a policy would end up, not in the world victory of communism, but in the disappearance of civilization or even of all humanity itself.

It is a question of understanding that the danger of nuclear warfare will continue to exist as long as imperialism shall have at its disposal the forces which it still has today — and that no developments inside the workers' states will be able to take those forces away from it in the two coming decades. As a result, it is a question of using to the maximum the favorable conditions that exist today in a certain number of countries, in order to strike blows at world capitalism, from within, by the laboring masses of those countries, so as to ensure a revival of the workers' movement in the countries where it is momentarily stopped. This is the only means of definitively disarming imperialism and preventing nuclear catastrophe.

Those who assert that such a policy by the workers' parties would "provoke" imperialism forget to explain why they are not also in favor of putting a stop to the economic growth of the USSR and the Chinese PR, which is "provoking" imperialism in the same way.

Only victorious revolutions in the most powerful capitalist countries can definitively make a world war "avoidable." The fear of this war, far from demobilizing the mas-

ses, can become one of the principal forces of radicalization of the toilers of the capitalist countries (as is already the case in Japan and Great Britain). To transform this fear into a mighty *anti-capitalist* weapon — that is the duty of the workers' parties, which the C Ps have up till now scandalously betrayed. Because, for revolutionary Marxists, the overthrow of capitalism does not necessarily presuppose the existence of a grave crisis of overproduction; it can be put on the agenda by political and social crises that permit the revolutionary mobilization of the masses despite the absence of catastrophic economic circumstances.

To spur the colonial revolution by every means to new victories over capitalism and imperialism is increasingly to undermine the relative stability of the capitalist economy, and thus also to contribute to the revival of the movement in the capitalist countries.

It is this strategy — revolutionary, realistic, and responsible — that the Fourth International sets up against the myth of "peaceful coexistence," which sows demoralization and passivity among the ranks of the toilers and which leaves capitalism the forces to hurl them sooner or later into the nuclear holocaust.

THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

Its Balance-Sheet, Its Problems, and Its Prospects

I

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. THE CAUSES WHICH MAINTAIN THE UPSURGE OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

The continuing rise of the colonial revolution in the last decade has been in striking contrast with the prolonged stagnation of the revolutionary workers' movement in the advanced capitalist countries.

The upsurge of the colonial revolution in this postwar period is produced by a whole series of causes which were lacking or ceased to exist with the same intensity as previously in the advanced capitalist countries.

The process of relative capitalist stabilization in these countries has occurred simultaneously with the worsening of the economic and financial situation in most of the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

Capitalism in the advanced countries has profited by the mass injection of American capital and by the enormous worldwide needs in reconstruction and industrial development created by the war, to set in motion a new cycle of expansion on a higher level of productivity. The colonial and semi-colonial countries, on the contrary, having quickly exhausted the capital accumulated during the war and the first years thereafter, saw themselves more and more left behind by the advances, both absolute and relative, achieved by the advanced countries.

The economic evolution of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, marked by a process of industrialization which, though jerky and uneven, has not ceased on the average to be continuous, has favored the industrial expansion of the advanced capitalist countries.

At the same time the capitalist countries have profited both by technological and scientific advances to increase their independence from certain imports of agricultural products and raw materials and by the fall in prices of such imports, to maintain a favorable balance of trade toward the dependent countries and a better protection against inflation. The dependent countries, on the contrary, have seen their balance of trade deteriorate and are struggling against the feverish upthrusts of endemic inflation.

The lag of dependent countries after advanced countries is aggravated in terms of both absolute production and per capita production by the fact that the population of the dependent countries is increasing at a faster rate than their production.

At the basis of these developments lie the facts that the dependent countries have a different social and economic structure, and are historically belated. For a country to be able to catch up with the present development of the advanced capitalist countries it is necessary to have as starting-points a developed economic substructure, technically skilled manpower, and a very high per capita rate of investment.

Now the dependent countries are structurally handicapped in this race. They lack an adequate economic substructure, have a relatively low national income at their disposal, and do not accumulate sufficient capital, both because of their present limited income and because of the facts that a large part of the surplus-value created goes back to the imperialist countries and that a large part of the capital belonging to the native oligarchies tends to be directed toward usury, trading profits, and rent.

In any case the rate of accumulation of 15 to 20% of the national income considered necessary for large-scale industrialization proves to be, in these countries, beyond their present practical possibilities. Even this rate, in most of these countries, would be insufficient if it were not backed up by other resources.

In the case of countries whose structure is already capitalist, these resources would normally have to come from foreign capital, in the form of public investments (for the substructure) or private reinvestments on the spot. Such resources, even if they were found — despite capital's reservations about investments not producing the average rate of profit — would have to be immensely higher than the total of current annual expenditures going to the "under-developed" countries (including from the U S S R): from \$4,000 million to over \$20,000 million, if not considerably more.¹

It is excluded that capitalism can agree to such an effort. Under these conditions — and without at all minimizing imperialism's new attempts "to aid" on a broader scale the so-called "under-developed" countries (India, Latin America, Africa, the Arab countries) — what must be foreseen is rather that the gap, both *absolute* and *relative* (in the meaning indicated), between these countries and the advanced countries will be aggravated in the years to come.

This means that these countries' economic and industrial development, which nevertheless will not fail to be steady, will be accomplished under conditions that are highly explosive and very different from those of the advanced countries, with real depressions, and not just recessions, unemployment, and inflation.

It is this different economic situation — resulting both from the historical tardiness of the dependent countries compared to the advanced countries launched on a new cycle of expansion, and from the obstacles set up to their development by their economic and social structure, feudal-capitalist, and indeed in places tribal with capitalist infiltration — which fundamentally explains the gap between the powerful and constantly renewed revolutionary activity of the masses in the dependent countries, and the decline of the revolutionary workers' movement in the advanced capitalist countries.

Another cause that is at present stimulating the upsurge of the colonial revolution is obviously the decline of imperialism in comparison with the rising power of the workers' states, and the new relationships established in this postwar period by the leading strata of the colonial revolution with imperialism on the one hand and the bureaucracy of the workers' states on the other. These leading strata, Bonapartist in function, composed mainly of elements who aspire to a national economic development, profit by the existence, the power, and the increased possibilities of the workers' states, as well as by their

¹ United Nations experts have put forward the estimate that the sum annually needed to promote, within 35 years, a doubling of the living levels of populations now having at their disposal \$100 per capita per annum (i.e., some 1,600 million people), would reach \$20,000 million. But other estimates raise this sum to \$50,000-\$60,000 million, and even more.

antagonism toward imperialism, precisely to increase their Bonapartist role and to advance far in their efforts to free themselves from the direct grasp of imperialism.

The colonial revolution is not finished by the attainment of its primordial goal: formal independence from imperialism. It continues with the search for a general liquidation of the whole aftermath of imperialism, and of all structural economico-social fetters on a rapid economic development and industrialization. The essential need, felt in a constantly more imperious and irresistible way by the masses of the dependent countries, is rapidly to reach the level of the advanced industrial countries and to make up their historical lateness.

It is for this reason that in a general way the national anti-imperialist phase of the colonial revolution, during which bourgeois and petty-bourgeois leaderships have been able to play a leading part, is now giving way to a higher phase that brings forward the imperative *economico-social* needs of the dependent countries. This is particularly the case with the formally independent countries of Latin America, the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Ceylon, etc. In Cuba the logic of the process of the permanent revolution has already caused that revolution to break through the limits of capitalism.

Under these conditions the colonial revolution occupies the vanguard place in the world revolution and operates as its main force, including for the reawakening of the revolutionary struggle in the advanced countries. As a result of the historical lateness of the revolution in the advanced capitalist countries, which is the result of the dialectical interaction of the betrayals of the leaderships and the new economic evolution of capitalism, the colonial revolution is objectively the driving force of the world revolution, combined with the rising force of the workers' states.

The reawakening of the revolution in the advanced capitalist states, particularly of Europe, has every chance of appearing historically as the result, at least in part, of the exterior pressure of these combined forces, in a new economic conjuncture less favorable than at present to capitalism in these countries.

2. THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION AND IMPERIALISM

Under the irresistible drive of the masses, pushing the colonial revolution steadily to a more advanced position, imperialism sees itself forced to resort to more indirect and flexible forms of dependence. All the recent examples given by British, French, and Belgian imperialism clearly show this tendency: the promotion of territories that yesterday were still colonies to the status of self-government, or of dominions within a more and more flexible association with the metropolis; and states that formally are completely independent.

Imperialism — at least its more clear-sighted wing — is at present seeking to safeguard what is essential in its economic positions through a transfer of power to the native élites, which it is trying to develop and bribe, thanks to its political and economic power. This wing is aware of the impossibility of ruling for long either in the form of direct European domination or in the more flexible form of native governments that are not broadly independent.

Wherever native élites exist — intellectuals and various other categories of actually or potentially bourgeois or petty-bourgeois elements — imperialism is endeavoring to base itself on them by granting them political power, either immediately or in stages, and by bribing them by associating them in a joint economic exploitation of their respective countries. But the big difficulty for imperialism in this enterprise is the lack of native strata sufficiently developed to play such a part, in face of the impetuous

movement of the masses, who from now on demand living conditions which capitalism cannot ensure.

The specific position of each of the principal imperialisms depends on its strength and the concrete situation with which it has to deal.

British imperialism, which extricated itself in time from Asia, while succeeding in safeguarding the essential part of its interests in countries like India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and even Malaya, is now trying to carry out the same operation in Africa, while taking into account the special situations in that continent: Central Africa; South Africa, with its large implantation of Europeans, and with very great invested capital at stake. But even in these territories imperialism is now coldly visualizing the day when the explosive policy of the colour-ban and of the dictatorial supremacy of the European minorities will be obliged to make way for the power of the native majority, in spite of the fierce and prolonged resistance by these minorities that must be foreseen.

French imperialism itself is at present obliged to jump over stages, going from the Empire to the paternalistic "Community" and from that to the "renovated" Community, namely, an association of more or less formally independent states like those now attaining "international sovereignty." It is desperately resisting only in Algeria, a land heavily settled by Europeans and endowed with the incalculable wealth of the Sahara.

Belgian imperialism found itself forced to grant independence to the Congo after a slight inclination toward a resistance that was as brief as it was futile.

Portuguese imperialism — which knows that the independence of its colonies will toll the knell of the dictatorial regime, both by showing up the weakness of the regime and by drying up a large part of its economic and financial resources — still resists, defending its slave style of domination. But this is all the more reason why, in the present international and African contexts, its inevitable fall will be all the more violent.

As for US imperialism, its colonial policy is more varied. Eschewing direct domination, save in the case of Puerto Rico, it does not hesitate to support brutal native regimes in all parts of the world where it possesses very considerable economic and strategic interests (Central America, South Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand, etc). In Africa, on the contrary, where it has to struggle against old imperialist adversaries, compromised by direct domination, it adorns itself with the mask of the "liberator," the "liberal," while trying to get in the good graces of the native bourgeois strata in formation, by means of its material "aid."

For imperialism, the economic and in part strategic importance of the colonial and semi-colonial countries does not cease to be still vital (both for its supplies of raw materials and for the export of its industrial products and even of capital, the importance of this last factor having, however, diminished by comparison with the two others). Furthermore, the strategy of atomic war, which favors surprise attack, and raises the problem of survival, leads to the dispersal of bases around the world.

In the decisive race in which, by the force of events, imperialism finds itself setting out against the workers' states, the maintenance of its influence over dependent countries will take on an importance still greater than in the past. For this competition — supposing that it stays "peaceful" for a period — involves a race even hotter than in the past for economic power, the most important reserve of which still remains the resources and the industrialization of the dependent countries.

In the decade that is beginning, imperialism enters this race handicapped from several points of view: compromised by its past in the eyes of the masses; incapable, by its structure, of granting effective aid; divided within its

own ranks among powers that have reestablished and surpassed their past potential and are throwing themselves into keener competition precisely in the field par excellence for accumulation: the industrialization of dependent countries.

The only chance for imperialism in this field lies in the help that can be brought to it by the colonial bourgeoisie in formation. The next stage of the colonial revolution depends on the race in time between the formation of such strata, to which imperialism conduces by every means, and the revolutionary movement of the masses looking for radical solutions and therefore a radical leadership.

But even the transition via a native neo-bourgeois leadership can turn out historically to be of short duration and finally also economically ruinous for imperialism. For any important development of a native bourgeoisie cannot but diminish in the long run that share of the surplus-value still cornered by imperialism.

3. THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION AND THE WORKERS' STATES

In the present historical phase of the formation, side-by-side with capitalism, of a system of workers' states, the alliance between the colonial revolution and this system of workers' states ought to be establishing itself quite naturally and almost automatically. The convergence of interests in the common struggle against imperialism is obvious, and ought to give rise to an active and unconditional support of this struggle by the workers' states.

Furthermore, in the field of economic exchanges, the workers' states will gradually have the possibility of advantageously replacing the "aid" granted by imperialism, and of diverting the present circuits with imperialism into their own orbit. The workers' states can grant low-cost financial and technical aid for the real economic development of the dependent countries, and without imposing political conditions.

They can furthermore establish — though this case may not be general — trade relations on the basis of the complementary nature of their economies: agricultural products and raw materials coming from the dependent countries against material for industrial equipment coming from the workers' states. The development of such relations with the dependent states in a historic perspective will make clearly apparent the enormous possibilities potentially possessed by the workers' states in this field and the fatal risks run by imperialism in the eventuality of a prolonged "peaceful competition." It is only the nature of the political regime in the present workers' states, degenerated or deformed by the bureaucracy, that limits the possibilities to be exploited, and handicaps and deforms the de facto alliance between the colonial revolution and the workers' states.

Naturally, no objection could be raised to the economic aid which the bureaucracy of the U.R.S.S. or of the other workers' states is granting to the bourgeois regimes of the dependent countries so that they may momentarily resist imperialism or develop more freely. But to the degree to which this aid is granted in exchange for the "neutralist" policy of the colonial bourgeoisie and that the Communist Parties in the dependent countries find themselves forced to subordinate their autonomous class policy to the requirements of the diplomacy of the workers' states, this runs the risk of ending up practically in the consolidation of bourgeois regimes which invariably turn against the workers' movement in their own countries, and, at a more distant stage, against the workers' states themselves. From this point of view, the examples

provided recently by Nehru, Sukarno, Nasser, Kassem, and other beneficiaries of the aid of the workers' states, speak eloquently.

Still, the aid of the workers' states can objectively help the process of the masses' becoming mature and consequently appear to capitalism to be an objective threat. This explains, among other things, the attitude of certain bourgeoisies, such as those of Brazil and Bolivia. The objective alliance between the colonial revolution and the workers' states is expressed in all its dynamism by the case of Cuba, where the Soviet bureaucracy found itself forced to override the policy of peaceful coexistence to offer its missiles for the defense of the revolution. In its new stage, the colonial revolution is factually joining forces with the workers' states despite the efforts of the Soviet bureaucracy and petty-bourgeois leaderships to prevent it.

This alliance must be stimulated in all fields, particularly among the masses. The Fourth International will have to promote the alliance of the central labor organizations, the trade unions, and peasant and other mass organizations with the organizations of the workers' states, as a concrete way of establishing this alliance.

4. THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIE

The native comprador oligarchies, obtaining their income from trading profits, land rent, usury, or acting as functionaries at the service of imperialism, are strata now in decline in the dependent countries, to the advantage of new social formations, which are reflecting the process — steady, in spite of everything — of economic and industrial development in these countries. It is these strata which, directly or through their petty-bourgeois demagogues, are at the present stage cornering for themselves the leadership of the colonial revolution.

The importance of these strata, called national bourgeoisies, is highly variable in the different dependent countries according to the degree of economic development achieved.

In cases such as India, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, the matter is one already of a genuine class, sufficiently powerful and conscious to take direct political power, even if it risks losing it momentarily to the benefit of other fractions more tied up with the oligarchy and imperialism.

In the case of other Asiatic and Latin American countries, the importance of the national bourgeoisie compared to the comprador oligarchy is less.

In certain cases its power is often exercised through Bonapartist political regimes (such as Sukarno, Nasser, Kassem, Nkhrumah, et al) which are operating historically for the benefit of the national bourgeoisie.

In other cases, which can turn out to be frequent in Africa, the very weak formation of native élites, other than the tribal chiefs and the functionaries at the service of imperialism, can give birth to new comprador bourgeoisies closely associated with imperialism for the economic coëxploitation of their own countries.

Everywhere the principal instrument for the development of the national bourgeoisie proves to be Bonapartist political power. It is this power that renders it possible to face simultaneously the oligarchy, imperialism, and the masses, and to find the important amounts of capital required for building the substructure and the financing of large-scale enterprises. It is furthermore through the exercise of the political power and the economic functions of the state that the cadres of this bourgeoisie are partly formed, by the enrichment of functionaries, their infiltration in the enterprises, their corruption, etc. The Bonapartist state becomes, under these circumstances, a genuine

nursery for capitalist development in the dependent countries.

The ideology which best corresponds to the Bonapartist state is the de facto dictatorship of the Single Party, which boils down to its leadership taking power. In the case that this party is truly proletarian and socialist through its programme and ideology, such a dictatorship, based on the masses organized in democratic committees or communes, would unquestionably have a historically progressive meaning. But the pretext of the so-called classless colonial society currently used by certain people to justify in Africa the Bonapartist dictatorship of the Single Party, engaged in a capitalist economic development and without democratic control by the organized masses, is to be rejected.

Though it is true that the multi-party regime of socialist democracy cannot be transplanted, just as is, into a society scarcely emerged from tribalism, it would be impossible for all that to neglect the need for such a possible Single Party to have a class character with proletarian ideology and programme and to base itself on the masses democratically organized in *peasant communes* and *urban committees* which control the government and hold the power.

In any case the International cannot give up the conception according to which the right to have several workers' parties represents an essential guarantee of a genuine socialist democracy.

No illusion is permissible about the real tendencies of the national bourgeoisie. Although in its formation it is obliged to struggle to a certain extent against imperialism and the oligarchy, to ally itself with the proletariat and its trade-union organizations, and to advocate and even put into practice for a certain period nationalizations and a "mixed" economy, it invariably tends, precisely through its increase in strength, to act like the classic bourgeoisie of the advanced countries: to turn against the workers' movement and to draw closer to imperialism both by "freeing" its "mixed" economy (in order to attract foreign capital and to stimulate native private capitalist initiative) and by lining up diplomatically with imperialism. Nehru's India, one of the first countries that obtained its independence and formed a serious national bourgeoisie, is the mirror in which there is already clearly reflected the national bourgeoisie's inevitable historical evolution, regressive and counter-revolutionary on a relatively short-term basis. (Other examples are: Tunisia, Egypt, Ghana, Argentina, Brazil.) The greatest danger lying in wait for the colonial masses in revolution is to be lulled by the mystique of national unity with their bourgeoisie and to sacrifice to this mystique their autonomous class policy and organization.

5. THE CAPITALIST ROAD OR THE SOCIALIST ROAD?

The colonial masses' aspiration to political independence and rapid economic development is everywhere profound and irresistible.

The national bourgeoisie is trying to fulfil this mission, both to profit by it itself and to pacify the masses. But it stumbles over the impossibility of attaining the goal of rapid economic development by capitalist roads.

The national bourgeoisie shows itself everywhere unable to nationalize definitively (after a few stages that turn out to be necessary) the essential part of the surplus-value extorted by the imperialists in the dependent countries, as well as the land rent of the native feudalists, and to valorize the enormous resource represented by the unused manpower of these countries. Nowhere has it been able or willing to expropriate without indemnity the imperialist enterprises in agriculture, mining, and trade; to expropriate without indemnity the feudalists and give the land to the

peasants; to nationalize and plan the economy, and mobilize for its service the masses of the country.

Now the agrarian question is fundamental everywhere. The land for the most part is everywhere hoarded by the native feudalists, colons (big settlers), or foreign imperialist firms, and only a part of it (whose importance varies according to each concrete case) is cultivated on a private basis by native peasants or collectively in tribal reserves (of Negro Africa, for example).

Even these free peasants who are neither serfs nor sharecroppers nor rural laborers are for the most part poor peasants compared to the standards of the peasants of the advanced capitalist countries, and have to struggle desperately to continue to exist as peasants. From this there arises the primordial importance of a radical agrarian reform, accompanied by the effective material and technical aid of a genuine proletarian state.

The agrarian reform is above all the distribution of the land according to the free will of those who till it. According to the concrete case, this can take the form of the distribution of the lands of the feudalists and the colons to landless or almost landless peasants, accompanied by effective aid by the state to the peasant coöperatives; or else the form of a collective management of the land right from the beginning by communes on a village or broader scale, and collectives of agricultural workers and sharecroppers of the great plantations and estates; or, most frequently, a mixed system.

For economic development, the national bourgeoisie counts only on the main contribution of foreign capital. Now its volume and the conditions for granting it render it an illusion to expect an even slightly rapid industrialization of the dependent countries so as to catch up with the advanced countries. The comparative examples of China and India become decisive in this field (without insisting on that of the U S S R). The example of Jugoslavia is another. The Chinese experience is extremely valuable as an indication of a specific road for the rapid and balanced economic development of a colonial country that starts out from a very low level of the productive forces.

The organization of peasant masses into communes contains elements that might be able to be profitably applied in other cases, especially where the communal traditions of the peasants are still relatively strong. The political and economic organization of the commune permits productively employing the whole available laboring mass by using the productive means and forces on the spot and thus beginning the rapid and balanced economic development of the country.

The setting up of the communes in general might be criticized only from the viewpoint of their possible bureaucratic administration, which would have the tendency not to take sufficiently into account the masses' living conditions and the need for their voluntarily joining this new type of economic and social organization. But in the case where the bureaucratic excesses might be limited — thanks mainly to the democratic organization of the masses managing the communes — the communes as an institution might turn out historically to be one form for the rapid, balanced, and more productive development of the "under-developed" countries, by using fully and judiciously all the available resources, and a school for a more communal social life.

The Jugoslav example on its side is valuable as an experiment in the rapid development of an "under-developed" country in which private small farm property predominates, thanks to an economy which, while being a workers' economy in its nature, remains open to the advantages of the world market, and thanks also to the close democratic association of the producers in the control and even the management of the economy (workers' councils).

The "under-developed" countries, far from being caught

in the dilemma of either stagnation or a capitalist-type development thanks to the contribution of foreign capital, have the real possibility of taking, according to their concrete case, the "Chinese road" or the "Jugoslav road" or any combination of the two, rid of their negative elements.

But the primordial condition for such a possible development is the setting up of new economic and social structures of the socialist type. This means that the struggle for real liberation from imperialism, and for economic development and industrialization, is inseparable from the struggle for the socialist revolution. Only those dependent countries which have known how to combine the anti-imperialist struggle with the struggle for the socialist revolution have been able really to break loose from the imperialist system and to open wide the road to their rapid development and industrialization.

6. THE PERMANENT CHARACTER OF THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

Instinctively, the masses who have thrown themselves into the anti-imperialist struggle against direct or indirect imperialist domination, are pushed toward goals that lie beyond that of formal independence. In the present international and national contexts of the colonial revolution, it has inexorably a tendency to develop as a permanent revolution, putting more and more in the forefront the economic and social goals of the broad peasant and worker masses who are carrying it forward: agrarian reform, nationalization and planning of the economy, emancipation of women.

In this process the clash with the national bourgeoisie also becomes inevitable at a given stage of the struggle. Though the bourgeoisie in the dependent countries inevitably sets out on a sort of de facto united front of all the social classes (except the feudalists and the comprador bourgeoisie) against direct or indirect imperialist domination, the deepening of the struggle no less inevitably differentiates this front along class lines. The national bourgeoisie soon finds itself at grips with the radicalism of the movement of the peasant and worker masses who aspire to agrarian reform, nationalization and planning of the economy, and the emancipation of women — all objectives incompatible with the regime of the national bourgeoisie. This obliges the bourgeoisie to turn against the mass movement and to resort to a regime that is, whether overtly or not, dictatorial.

The prestige acquired by the national bourgeoisie during the phase of the united anti-imperialist struggle can — in the absence of a genuine revolutionary mass party — win credit for it among the masses and allow it temporarily to stop the revolution halfway (e.g., Nehru, Sukarno, Bourguiba, Nasser, Kassem, Nkrumah, et al). Thence arises the need never to subordinate the autonomous revolutionary movement of the masses to the political leadership of the national bourgeoisie, never to "prettify" it, never to stop criticizing and exposing it, while agreeing to give critical support to all concrete anti-imperialist measures that it might be led to adopt, to the degree that it continues to have credit among the masses of workers and poor peasants. Revolutionary Marxists do not exclude, under exceptional circumstances, the united front with parties of the national bourgeoisie on precise objectives which permit the revolution to go forward. But the anti-imperialist united front is generally the rule when it is a matter of revolutionary movements led by non-bourgeois or petty-bourgeois forces.

The prominent role now played in the colonial revolution by the national bourgeoisie, or by petty-bourgeois formations with an ideology that is in the last analysis bourgeois, is partly the result of the policy of Stalinism, which has

subordinated the autonomous revolutionary movement of the masses to the interests either of the metropolitan bourgeoisie or of the colonial national bourgeoisie. If this policy is not radically opposed, and if a stop is not put to treating the revolutionary movement of the masses simply as a contributory force to the game of the bourgeoisie and its relations with the Stalinist bureaucracy, there is a risk of enormously slowing down the progress of the colonial revolution to a higher level.

Revolutionary Marxist elements who operate in these dependent countries do not always have the possibility of opposing from the outside and in a completely independent way the existing national movements with bourgeois leadership or ideology, for in this case they would run the risk of cutting themselves off from the broad masses and remaining in practice ineffective. While taking on everywhere the task of open revolutionary-Marxist publications which clarify the problems and trace out a clear perspective, they may find themselves obliged to carry on the essential part of their activity inside the existing national movements of a mass and revolutionary character, and to advocate within them a wing of a proletarian and socialist orientation. This orientation may in places take the transitional form of a class party, a mass Labor Party based on the trade unions.

The politicization of the trade unions in several dependent countries can operate in favor of the revolutionary workers' movement or of the national bourgeoisie. This bourgeoisie will try to domesticate the trade unions as a leading political force both for its combat against the other bourgeois fractions, the comprador feudo-bourgeois, and for its economic development. From this arises the possibility and necessity of directing the organized force of the young and dynamic proletariat of the dependent countries toward the transitional idea of the Labor Party based on the trade unions.

But any orientation exclusively toward the proletariat, which in fact neglects the peasantry, can turn out to be fatal for the victorious outcome of the revolutionary combat. Besides the need of an adequate programme for the agrarian question, taking into account the peculiarities of each case, it is necessary constantly to link up the workers' struggles with the peasants' struggles, and to root the revolutionary organization in the countryside by daily work.

In many dependent countries, conditions are propitious for the organization and maintenance of a guerrilla, fed by the contribution of peasant forces and by the help and protection of the peasant population. The adequate combination of the armed struggle of the peasants with the mobilization of the city workers, can enormously strengthen the vigor and effectiveness of the revolutionary combat, and speed up the fall of the imperialist or comprador regimes in the dependent countries.

The maturity and effectiveness of a revolutionary leadership in several present cases must be shown by its spirit of initiative, its capacity, its audacity in seizing an occasion for starting an armed struggle of the peasants in order to back up and spur on the national revolutionary movement and to leave the adversary no respite for reconsolidating his positions.

The reevaluation of the revolutionary possibilities of peasant warfare, in the light of the experience of China as well as of Algeria, Cuba, and elsewhere, is a duty for every leadership placed in analogous conditions, and one of the most valuable and important lessons, to be thoroughly assimilated, of the experience of the colonial revolution. The modern revolutionary party, in several dependent countries, must be the one to show itself the audacious organizer of the armed struggle of the peasants, raising the revolutionary process in the country right away to a higher level, involved in the seizure of power.

II

THE VARIOUS EPICENTRES OF THE COLONIAL
REVOLUTION AND THEIR PECULIARITIES

7. INDIA AND INDONESIA

In the dependent countries of the Far East the direct political power is at present to be found in the hands of the national bourgeoisie (India), of Bonapartist governments acting on its behalf (Indonesia and Burma), or of comprador cliques closely tied up with imperialism (South Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Ceylon, Malaya, and South Korea). In all these cases, where we now have to deal with formally independent states, the bourgeoisie's inability to complete the revolution, including the bourgeois-democratic one, is now obvious. The most flagrant example is India, far and away the most developed of these countries.

India, far from progressing along the road of a more and more "socialist," nationalized, and planned economy, of a radical agrarian reform and of a real national unification, thus laying the foundations for a rapid economic development, is in reality going in the opposite direction. Its "mixed" economy is being developed especially in its private sector, wide open again to foreign capital, while neither the Community Project and National Extension Services Programme nor Vinoba Bhave's unofficial programme of "land gifts" have solved the practical distribution of land to the peasants and their ensuing effective organization in coöperatives.

Because the superannuated structure of India could not yet be fundamentally overturned, the economic goals of the government of the bourgeoisie remain limited and subordinated to outside capitalist aid. This causes the country's rate of economic development, both industrial and agricultural, to remain low, and even to lag behind the rate of population growth.

The country's weak economic development and its only slightly shaken feudo-capitalist structure furthermore prevent the liquidation of regional antagonisms and various obstacles — of customs, languages, religions, etc — which stand in the way of a genuine national unification, and of the country's rapid economic and cultural development.

As with Indonesia, various regions of Africa, and even Latin America, it is in India the lack of a radical revolution that perpetuates the aftermaths of pre-capitalist ways of living and barbarism, tangled up with those of imperialist domination and aggravated thereby, and that hinders both the process of national unification across the superannuated or artificial frontiers set up by regionalism, communalism, tribalism, or imperialism, and an economic and cultural upsurge.

There follows therefrom the prospect, in the years to come, of explosive developments which will cause the power of the bourgeoisie, after a period of maintaining itself with a parliamentary and democratic façade, to turn toward more open dictatorship. Under the combined pressure of the alarming gap between production increase and population increase and of the revolutionary influence of the successes steadily achieved by China, the Indian bourgeoisie is from now on visualizing the day when the prestige accumulated by the Congress Party and by Nehru personally in the period of the struggle against British imperialism will be completed exhausted.

The break-up of the Congress Party, already begun, and the crystalization on its right of more militant feudo-capitalist and pro-imperialist formations, are signs of an evolution that might lead to an open dictatorship similar to that already experienced by Pakistan. Thus the proof will be given in the case of India as well that the regime of the national bourgeoisie is everywhere doomed to the same economic and political bankruptcy.

In Indonesia, another country where the national bourgeoisie and its leaders were able — thanks to the failures of the Communist Party during the war — to acquire a scarcely deserved national prestige, the parliamentary acrobatics of the bourgeoisie have ended in its setting up its open Bonapartist power, based on the army. It is the treacherous policy of the Indonesian C P which has enabled Sukarno, the "hero" of the weak Indonesian national bourgeoisie, to survive all the grave crises that have succeeded one another in this country since 1945, and now to consolidate its Bonapartist power, prior to turning more decisively against the masses and the workers' parties.

True, even now the power of the Indonesian bourgeoisie remains weak in face of the country's unsolved problems (agrarian reform, real national unification, effective liquidation of the whole economic aftermath of imperialism, industrialization), and of the discontent of the masses, who see their standard of living lowered by the insufficiency of the rate of economic development, inflation, and unemployment.

A radical change in the policy of the workers' leaderships toward the national bourgeoisie might enormously aid new waves of revolutionary struggles within a relatively short time, both in India and in Indonesia. This eventuality being unlikely, organizations like the Revolutionary Communist Party in India and the Partai Acoma in Indonesia have even more the task of working up a concrete transitional programme which completely exposes the power of the bourgeoisie and turns all the revolutionary forces toward the struggle for the workers' and peasants' government.

The defense of the Chinese revolution and the popularization of all its valid achievements (including the conception of the communes) is not only a duty but a very powerful weapon in the hands of the revolutionary Marxists operating in these countries. Furthermore, a Leninist united-front policy between the revolutionary Marxist party and the C P's and other workers' tendencies is necessary both for carrying on an effective fight against the bourgeoisie and for causing an inevitable ideological differentiation within the traditional workers' parties.

The Indian and Indonesian revolutions are the two great events to be faced in the coming years, for which it is necessary to prepare with extreme seriousness, starting right now.

Despite the differences that exist in the respective economic development of India and Indonesia, in the relative strength of their bourgeoisies, and in the structures in the rural regions, the decisive equivalent factors in the two cases are the following. Both in India and Indonesia the masses have obtained considerable experience with the direct rule of the national bourgeoisie, with its inability to solve the agrarian question, the question of real unification, and that of industrialization, in the face of a growing population and also with its dictatorial evolution. The blind alley into which this policy has led, which contrasts more and more with the revolutionary achievements in China and with the international context, can only lead to an explosion.

It is probably the outbreak of the revolutionary crisis in one of these two countries that will be able to touch off a new revolutionary avalanche in a whole series of other countries of the Far East at present under the domination of comprador cliques actively backed by American imperialism.

Revolutionary Marxists must further be aware that a situation favorable to revolutionary struggle is becoming

clear in South Vietnam, where at the present stage there exist in various regions revolutionary hot-spots that are spreading and are more or less autonomous, under the leadership of middle cadres who have already had experience in the fight against French imperialism. The task of revolutionary Marxists is to participate in this armed struggle, which, in the specific situation in that country, can open the way toward the conquest of power and the reunification of the country.

The Ceylonese revolution, even before then, might form an exception, due to the existence in this country of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party with a solid mass base. But for the LSSP to play its full part, it must strengthen its Bolshevik structure and link itself up better with the peasant masses by means of systematic work among them, backed by the party's labor influence, on the basis of a concrete programme of economic and political transitional demands.

As for the South Pacific, even though the population of the islands of this area is small and they have been little developed in the capitalist way, the effects of the colonial revolution elsewhere have had their effects.

The main economic feature of the region is the self-sufficient agricultural economy, broken into to a greater or lesser extent by merchant capitalism that exploits to a small extent tropical production, mainly in copra. Politically they are colonially administered, through the tribal chiefs.

There are, however, several important exceptions to this general economic backwardness.

First, in the British colony of Fiji, there is a highly developed sugar industry, run by peasant proprietors, but effectively controlled by the Australian sugar monopoly, Colonial Sugar Refineries. The majority of the population is of Indian origin, who feel particularly the influence of the world colonial revolution. Under petty-bourgeois nationalist leadership, the well organized trade unions engaged last year in a strong struggle with the colonial government; and 1961 will see new explosions unless some agreement is reached between the petty-bourgeois leadership and the colonial government, that is, unless independence of some sort is achieved.

Second, in the French colony of New Caledonia there is a substantial proletariat working in the nickel mines and processing plants. A very depressed French peasantry exists, living at the standard of the natives. There have been episodic demands for nationalization. The native population have also the tradition of militant struggle against the French, which comes up to very recent times.

Third, on some islands (Tahiti, Samoa) there is a struggle in progress against the colonial administration. West Samoa will become formally independent in 1961, although effective control is in the hands of the chiefs. Nevertheless, it sets an example.

Fourth, in Australian New Guinea there are signs of a political awakening. The struggle for West Guinea by Indonesia raises the question of the Australian half. The question of the incorporation of the whole of New Guinea into Indonesia must be seriously considered.

The centre of the revolutionary upsurge in the South Pacific will most likely be Fiji. This upsurge will have important political effects both in Australia and in New Zealand.

The Fourth International must raise the question of the United Socialist States of the South Pacific, the only solution to the geographical isolation of the various islands. Imperialism will attempt to limit this political integration and particularly try to isolate possible areas of revolutionary upsurge. The slogan of the United Socialist States of the South Pacific will play a decisive role in the development of a socialist revolution in that area.

8. THE ARAB REVOLUTION

IN THE MIDDLE EAST

At the other end of Asia, in the countries of the Middle East, there now stands out the epicentre of the Iraqi revolution; this forms a particular part of the Arab revolution.

After having gone forward for a whole period, carrying out important measures in the expropriation of some imperialist positions, agrarian reform, emancipation of women, and the trade-union and military organization of the masses, it has for a certain period now been marking time and even going backward.

As in other analogous cases, the Iraqi revolution has raised to power a staff of "national" officers, of petty-bourgeois origin, with aspirations for a more rapid economic development, rid of the control and fetters of imperialism. Such staffs are caught between adverse social forces characteristic of the Arab countries of the Middle East: the feudalists and the trading and money-lending comprador bourgeoisie, the limited layers of the national bourgeoisie and the urban petty-bourgeoisie (craftsmen, clerks, functionaries, intellectuals), and the revolutionary proletariat and peasantry, and they take on a pronounced Bonapartist character. As such, however, they are doomed either finally to succumb again to the influence of the feudo-bourgeois, or in the best of cases to become the tool of the policy and interests of the national industrial bourgeoisie and of the urban petty bourgeoisie won over to the same aims.

The evolution of Kassem, more rapid than that of Nasser, is characteristic in this connection. In order to consolidate his Bonapartist power, Kassem was obliged for a whole period not only to tolerate the revolutionary movement in the cities and the countryside and the organizations claiming to represent it, but to base himself partly thereon in order to stand up to the comprador feudo-bourgeoisie and to the pro-Nasser circles that were aiming to overthrow him.

Kassem has gradually become the tool of the policy of the Iraqi ruling circles who think to exploit the considerable wealth of the country on their own account, and who, in connivance with other Arab leading circles, especially in Syria, are competing for supremacy in the Middle East with the Egyptian bourgeoisie lined up behind Nasser. The Kassem-Nasser rivalry, as well as that which sets Nasser against Bourguiba, destroys the myth of Arab unity set above inter-class antagonisms, and shows that the historically progressive search for the effective unity of the Arab nation will be the work not of the Arab bourgeoisie but of the Arab revolutionary masses engaged in the combat against imperialism, and at a given stage equally against their own ruling classes, including the national bourgeoisie.

The relative consolidation of Kassem's power has been greatly aided by the treacherous policy of the Iraqi C P, which has "idealized" Kassem, has enormously helped in building up his prestige, has subordinated the autonomous policy and organization of the revolutionary movement to Kassem's leadership, and has not been able to use this movement to raise the revolution to a higher level. As in the case of Nasser and the Egyptian C P, which for a whole period glorified Nasser and his regime, and also of the Moroccan C P's attitude toward the sultan, the monarchy, and his regime, the Iraqi C P is now reaping the contempt and the repression of the idol it adored.

That is why, though it is correct and necessary to support them critically against the attacks of imperialism or the native feudo-bourgeois, it is vital to dissipate the illusions of the masses about them and to promote an autonomous class policy aimed toward the workers' and peasants' government.

The replacement of a transitional programme which

links up the masses' elementary economic and political demands with the transitional demands, properly so called, and the prospect of the workers' and peasants' government, by a merely bourgeois-democratic programme ensuring the economic development of capitalism, can lead only to certain defeat for the revolutionary movement and to the dictatorial rule of the bourgeoisie or even of the comprador feudo-bourgeois. For only the proletarian leadership of the revolutionary movement of the masses, setting up a workers' and peasants' government, can solve the bourgeois-democratic tasks in the dependent countries (agrarian reform, liquidation of the aftermath of imperialism, real national unification) and start industrialization off on the basis of a nationalized planned economy that productively mobilizes all the country's unused manpower.

After the Mossadegh experience in Iran and the Nasser experience in Egypt, the experience of the Iraqi revolution forms the most advanced point reached up till now in the Middle East by the colonial revolution.

This experience also shows that without a proletarian and socialist leadership of the revolutionary movement of the masses, the revolution has no chance of solving the bourgeois-democratic tasks and of seriously tackling industrialization. On the contrary, the Bonapartist staffs in power fatally succumb to reactionary native forces and to the influence of imperialism, and turn against the masses in order to keep their movement within the limits of a capitalist development of the country, based on the essential contribution of foreign capital and the superexploitation of the native masses.

Kassem's power, however, is still weak, and the revolutionary potentialities of the Iraqi masses, though stricken, have not been exhausted. The rectification of the situation remains possible provided that the mass movement clarifies its position toward the bourgeois Bonapartist power of Kassem, breaks off the permanent alliance subordinated to his leadership, and opens up in Iraq the prospect of the workers' and peasants' government.

More generally, revolutionary Marxists must fight for the formation of both a United Socialist Republic of the Arab East and a Maghrebian Socialist Republic, first stages toward the formation of an Arab Socialist Republic.

THE ALGERIAN REVOLUTION

At almost the other extremity of the Arab world the Algerian revolution is continuing its already more than six-year-long combat against the essential part of the repressive forces of French imperialism.

The Arab world is thus caught in between two hotbeds of active revolution, Iraq and Algeria: these have to take into account, beside their own internal difficulties of development, the hostility of imperialism, the very relative interest of the Soviet bureaucracy, and the attitude of the Tunisian, Moroccan, and Egyptian bourgeoisies. The bourgeois wing of the Arab revolution has been considerably strengthened, and, left to its own dynamics, would keep the revolution at a level similar to that in the semi-colonial countries of Latin America.

The Algerian revolution is at the present time a plebeian force not tamed by the bourgeoisie of the Maghreb or by any imperialism. Despite the existence of a seriously breached feudal class and of a relatively important urban and rural petty bourgeoisie, the depth of the revolutionary process is causing the peasant and proletarian base of the Algerian revolution always to exert a preponderant influence, compared to the few bourgeois elements at the top and the petty-bourgeois elements who stud the apparatus of the F L N.

But a serious danger arises from the structure of this organization, its political apparatus formed in emigration being insufficiently linked up with the fighting forces of the revolution and controlled by them. This factor, com-

bined with the facts that the F L N's social and political doctrine is still not specified, and that the aid from the French and international proletariat has been insufficient, has contributed to the constant pressure on the revolution by external bourgeois and imperialist forces from the outside, and bureaucratization of the F L N.

Such an evolution could be fought against only by the contribution of effective proletarian aid, first of all in France itself, and by the creation inside the F L N of a tendency with a specifically proletarian and socialist orientation, linked up with the fighting base of the revolution, the combatants in the interior and the population, and the proletarian immigration in France.

For six years it has sacrificed a great part of its living forces in an unequal combat against a powerful imperialism, and without substantial aid from the world proletariat. At the same time it has been able in combat to arrive at an unquestionable maturity, to create cadres, to expand the network of its international propaganda, to touch public opinion, especially that of the Arab and African countries, and to subject French imperialism to a material and military effort that gravely handicaps its interests and plans in various fields.

At present, in order that it may face the eventuality of a new long period of struggle with French imperialism, it needs — in addition to the aid of the workers' states, the international proletariat, and the Arab and African people (in the form of material, diplomatic, and moral help) — to raise to a higher political and organizational level the organization that leads it. Otherwise the immense losses, wear-and-tear, and combat fatigue might possibly lead to a defeat — not of the struggle for the goal of independence in one form or another, but of the revolution for the goal of a real independence that opens the road to the rapid industrial economic development of the country. Anyway, the plebeian base of the Algerian revolution has already acquired enough experience so that the eventuality of a pure and simple Bourguibist development of the revolution can be excluded.

An ideological differentiation within the F L N, with a break into two tendencies — one bourgeois, Bourguibist, which would try to corner the leadership of the country on the basis of a compromise with imperialism, and the other more proletarian — is possible, if not in the long run inevitable. In this case the process which is going on in the Istiqlal in Morocco will take place also in the F L N, with this difference: that the Bourguibist tendency will turn out to be weaker right from the beginning, while the left tendency may turn out to be much more radical than the Moroccan left, and will be able to turn toward a mass party based on the trade unions.

The December 1960 mass movements marked a new stage in the revolution characterized by: a) the active mobilization of the masses in the cities; b) the spontaneous nature of the demonstrations, which went far beyond the cadres and directives of the F L N; c) the participation of new generations that have been formed during the war and have had no previous political experience, and the blossoming forth of new cadres emerging from these youthful strata; d) the mass participation of women, who played an extremely important role in the struggle; e) the functioning of embryonic committees that ensured the de facto leadership of the movement.

As a result of all these factors, taken together, the plebeian left of the F L N comes out of this new stage strengthened and consequently holds increasingly strong cards in the hypothesis that an agreement is achieved between the F L N leadership and de Gaulle (this agreement cannot in any way imply a capitulation of the F L N under the present objective conditions).

The Algerian revolution is a powerful stimulus not only to the entire Arab revolution, but also and especially to the whole African revolution. In the lack of an effective

aid from the French and European proletariat, it is still the advances of the African revolution that might be able, more than any other factor, to influence later developments in the Algerian revolution. Furthermore, the Algerian revolution forms an integral part of the Maghrebian revolution, the coming resurgence of which depends to a large degree on developments in the struggle in Algeria. Within the general framework of the Maghreb, a very important part will be played by the revolution in Morocco. In this country there is to be found the numerically most important, most concentrated, best organized, and most combative working class, and in fact the feudo-capitalist classes took power after a bitter fight against it (the opposite of Tunisia, where the bourgeoisie reached power with the support of the popular forces). Several factors indicate that the class forces facing each other are engaged in preparing for a decisive show-down and that this show-down may even occur soon.

Whatever may be the future of the Algerian revolution and the FLN, it is not possible to be satisfied with criticizing such an organization from outside it before having brought a genuine international aid to the revolution and having worked within the very ranks of this organization. After the December days of 1960, revolutionary Marxists must in particular try to make connections with the middle cadres who have emerged in the movement, who represent in an embryonic form the first nuclei of proletarian leadership.

9. NEGRO AFRICA

The most spectacular developments in the recent unfolding of the colonial revolution are taking place in Negro Africa.

At an amazing speed the territories under direct colonial control in the region are attaining self-government and even formal independence, skipping over stages. British as well as French and Belgian imperialism have found themselves obliged either to retreat here and there before the movement set going by the masses demanding their liberation from the direct colonial yoke or even to proceed to split such movements by turning the formal power over to native élites. There are still only Central Africa, South Africa, and the territories under Portuguese control that are lagging behind in such an evolution.

The reasons driving imperialism to this greater flexibility are various:

The awakening of the African masses as a result of the events of the war and since then (the strengthening of the workers' states, headed by the USSR, the victory of the Chinese revolution, the Arab and especially the Algerian revolution) has been further aided by the development of the capitalist economy in Africa, urbanization, detribalization, the insecurity introduced into the economic and social life of the autarkic societies of earlier days, the birth of a concentrated and dynamic proletariat and strata of intellectuals, and even in places potentially bourgeois elements who aspire to administer the power themselves. Furthermore, all of Africa (and Negro Africa in particular) containing very considerable and still almost unexploited wealth in minerals, sources of power, and agriculture, has become since the war the principal colonial reserve of imperialism. Its strategic positions have also increased its interest for imperialism.

And lastly, the rivalries among the imperialist powers who are competing for the continent, as well as the East-West antagonism, have helped the self-confidence of the native élites in the possibility of their exploiting the situation to reach direct power. The trend of British imperialism, as well as of French, Belgian, and American imperialisms, in Africa, now sufficiently clear, is to speed up the formation of limited native élites, turn the political

power over to them, and associate them, by bribing them, in the economic coexploitation of Africa. In the lack of a classic-type class structure and the lack of a bourgeoisie, and even a petty bourgeoisie with an organic structure, the limited élites that exist — a few intellectuals, a few functionaries, a few trade-union cadres, a few tradesmen and businessmen — constitute potentially, if not already actually, new comprador strata, on which imperialism bases its hope to see them develop and stabilize as such.

But on the other hand the still extreme social, economic, and political weakness of these limited élites, faced with a powerful mass movement that is eager for radical reforms and solutions, as well as the awareness of these élites that they have the possibility of staking on the rivalries among the imperialists and the East-West antagonism, pushes them to a sui generis role not only *politically* but also *socially*, in the following more specific sense:

Not having yet taken form and root in rapidly changing African society, these élites constitute, at the present stage, less the embryo of a neo-bourgeois class than the embryo of a *state bureaucracy* manœuvring between the plebeian mass of present African society and imperialism. It is only in cases like Ghana or the Ivory Coast, where capitalist penetration in agriculture has already created a peasantry and an urban petty-bourgeoisie (studded with a few genuinely bourgeois elements), both mercantile, that the embryo of a native bourgeois power is to be found.

This specific social role peculiar to present-day African society can just as well evolve toward a clearly bourgeois character as toward a quasi-proletarian character, according to the strength of the mass movement, and its relations with imperialism and the workers' states. At the present moment the Guinea of Sekou Touré is the most advanced example of this phenomenon. The Kenya of Jomo Kenyatta may turn out tomorrow to be an analogous example, as well as the Cameroons, the territories under Portuguese control, and others. In all these examples the fundamental element of future evolution is the state and the stratum which administers it.

In the case where the economy is aimed toward nationalization of the few key mining, agricultural, and trading enterprises, the collectivization of agriculture on the basis of the tribal village or of broader communes, and the structure of the state on the basis of peasant and urban communes, there is beginning the development of a workers' state based essentially on a nationalized and planned economy.

The nationalization of the foreign enterprises can, furthermore, be carried out by stages, provided that they expatriate only a limited part of the profit, while reinvesting the rest on the spot, and submit to control by the state and by their workers organized in councils.

The collectivization of agriculture can turn out to be enormously facilitated by the survival in Negro Africa of communal tribal customs, particularly strong in this field. The essential aid (scientific, technical, and material) of the state to agriculture, in order to fight effectively against unfavorable climatic conditions and to increase yields can also enormously facilitate such a collectivist trend in agriculture right from the beginning. In these countries the most important resource for their rapid economic development lies in the productive use of all available manpower, hitherto largely unused.

But such a mobilization is impossible without the climate of a genuine revolution, of a genuine workers' and peasants' government, in the framework of a nationalized and planned economy. Naturally it is not a matter of aiming at the construction of an autarkic "socialist" economy, which could only keep the living levels of the masses very low, and make the political regime degenerate toward a bureaucratic dictatorship. It is a matter of profiting broadly by all the possibilities of the world market in both its

capitalist and socialist sectors, as well as by the development of the inter-African market and trade.

The socialist revolution in Negro Africa inevitably presents peculiarities owing to the fact that we are dealing here with an economic-social level lower than that of the dependent countries of feudo-capitalist structure in other parts of the world, in Latin America or Asia. In Negro Africa we are generally dealing with more specific structures of a still largely tribal society, breaking up under the penetration of imperialism and capitalism that is destroying the autarkic subsistence economy, commercializing native small-scale agricultural production side-by-side with capitalist large-scale agricultural production, and causing the concentration in the cities, the mining centres, and the imperialist plantations of the manpower released by the break-up of the traditional national economy.

Because this degree of economic development did not throw up native ruling classes — for the limited European minorities, up until very recently, administered and directed the economy themselves, while they entrusted local civil administration to the traditional chiefs and their own functionaries — present-day society in Negro Africa is a specific form of combined development of the structures of natural economy, simple market economy, and imperialist economy, while the links of a feudal economy or of a native capitalist economy are still totally or largely lacking.²

It is from this that there arises the specific role of the limited native stratum which is acceding to power and controls the state, in an equally specific international and national context unknown in the past. This stratum possesses in the state a force per se, without undergoing the precise influence or control of a ruling class whose agent it is. It is by its administration of the state that this stratum is developing and acquiring social importance, and not by the intrinsic needs of production and its role in production. Under the historical conditions prevailing in the past and up till the last war, such a stratum could have evolved only toward a comprador bourgeoisie in the service of imperialism.

But under the specific present conditions, where it inevitably is subjected to the influence of the powerful movement of the masses and of the rising power of the workers' states, and knows that it can profit by the East-West antagonism, this stratum is taking on a Bonapartist role which it imparts to the whole state, whose economic and social structures are not yet definitively oriented toward an inevitably classic capitalist development.

The boundaries of the present African states are artificial and absurd, and correspond to the lines of the carve-up into zones of influence, a division carried out by imperialism toward the end of the last century (Congress of Berlin, 1885). It is necessary to proceed to a regroupment of the existing states into broader formations, in the direction of the African Federal State, grouping all the Negro-Hammite peoples' south of the Arab countries of North Africa.

These peoples are not strictly homogeneous from the viewpoint of ethnic origins, language, and religion. But common customs, a common civilization, and a common destiny have been forged on the basis of an identical tribal, economic, and social organization through the centuries of slave exploitation by the whites and the native mercenaries under their orders, and now the beginning of an African common national consciousness through the struggle that is being carried on for liberation from the imperialist yoke. The Pan-Africanism that stirs the African élites and more and more carries away the vanguard sectors entering into the decisive struggle against imperialism, corresponds to a

confused search for African national unity, forged by those common origins, destiny, and struggle.

Granted, Pan-Africanism can also become the ideology of the African bourgeoisie now in formation to overshadow differences and the class struggle and to exploit for a whole period for its own class profit the revolutionary potentialities and labor power of the masses. (Pan-Arabism is undergoing such a fate at the hands of a Nasser and of other spokesmen of the rising Arab bourgeoisie.) It is necessary to distinguish between Pan-Africanism in the mouth of a Nkrumah and Pan-Africanism as an idea of national unity of the whole African Negro people, a powerful revolutionary force urging on the African masses in their struggle against imperialism.

The concrete stages of regroupment of the African nation, by fusion or federation, cannot be foreseen and advocated as early as the present moment. But it can be said that the tendency to unification must be everywhere favored, encouraged, written into the programme of the African revolutionary party. If the radiation of the Guinea of Sékou Touré is destined to grow in all Negro Africa as an attempt at a non-capitalist development, the revolutionary hotbeds to be noted in Negro Africa in the coming years are South Africa, Angola and Mozambique, Central Africa, Kenya, the Congo, and Nigeria.

The revolution that has begun in South Africa has every chance of developing in the coming years as a second Algerian war at the other end of the continent. This struggle, a combination of a guerrilla and a revolutionary mobilization of the proletariat in the cities and the mines, will have the active support of all Negro Africa, which constitutes the hinterland. The human reserves of the peasantry, as well as the geographical advantages of the country, are extraordinarily favorable to a guerrilla. Furthermore, the industrial, agricultural, and mining proletariat of South Africa is vital to the country's economy. A revolutionary uprising of the South African masses, based on a genuine revolutionary organization of a national character, is capable of putting a relatively rapid end to the fierce resistance of the European minority. But in any case, it is necessary to take this inevitable resistance into account: not to minimize it and to make preparations on the basis thereof.

The South African revolution will inevitably have to take on the aspect of a proletarian and socialist revolution, overthrowing the regime — slavery-minded, racist, sui generis — of the economically most advanced capitalism in all Africa. Both during the phase of struggle and by the significance and results of its victorious outcome, the South African revolution will pull all Negro Africa up to a higher level of its revolutionary development. What is at present necessary in South Africa is to build on a national scale a revolutionary organization of the non-European masses which, while setting out from these masses' economic and political national demands, will be aimed toward the armed uprising and the proletarian revolution.

Without decisive action in this direction, without participation in all the mobilizations of the masses, without flexible tactics so as not to get cut off from the masses even when they take false steps, there is a great risk that the revolutionary potentiality of the masses may be for a whole period spent in explosions without a future, and that the effective leadership of them may pass over to activist elements who are incapable of keeping up a long-term struggle nationally organized and steadily raising itself to higher levels.

As in the case of the Arab countries — and in places even more in the case also of the countries of Negro Africa — the organization of the revolutionary Marxist tendency, necessary everywhere, will have to do the bulk of its work for a whole period inside the existing national mass movements and in the trade unions where these exist. Its general goal will be the creation of class

² With the exception, however, of certain regions such as the northern part of Nigeria, where feudal agricultural property predominates.

parties of a mass character, based on trade unions, to be organized everywhere.

These parties will have to work up a transitional programme, corresponding to the specific conditions in each country, while taking into account their regroupment and orientation toward the African Federal State (or the Socialist United States of Negro Africa). The organization of trade unions and their autonomous federation on the Pan-African scale is a task to be ardently pursued everywhere, for the trade unions are called on to represent everywhere the main organized force that the governments will try to domesticate to their service (as well as, in addition, the nationalist parties of the bourgeoisie now in formation).

10. THE NEW PHASE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION

THE CAUSES OF INSTABILITY IN LATIN AMERICA

The revolution in Latin America is reaching the highest level attained by the colonial revolution at the present stage, having gone beyond the phase of formal independence and acquired a considerable experience of the comprador oligarchy and even of the national bourgeoisie.

The capitalist development in Latin America is the most advanced of all the dependent regions, and in certain cases, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, has even reached a level which brings these countries close to being capitalist states, admittedly behindhand compared to the advanced capitalist states of today, but materially close to the average pre-war capitalist level. Yet even in these cases the imperialist grip is still strong, as well as that of the comprador landed and trading oligarchy, which implies a combined structure in these countries, full of contradictions, and of discontinuities and disequilibriums characteristic of their economic development.

The process of industrialization of Latin America has been considerably speeded up during the war and since, and, despite its jerky character, does not fail to be continuous. Of all the dependent regions, Latin America has received the greatest part of the investments of European and North America origins.

But it is also from there that imperialism has extorted the greatest part of surplus value, far surpassing the total of its "aid" without productive reinvestment on the spot. It is the conditions of imperialist exploitation of Latin America's enormous resources in agriculture, power, and mining, combined with that of the parasitical landed and commercial oligarchy, which holds back the economic development of this region and causes the discontinuities, crises, and disequilibriums characteristic of this development.

The formation of capital productively reinvested on the spot is hindered by the repatriation of the greatest part of the surplus value extorted by the mining, petroleum, agricultural, and other imperialist enterprises; by the speculative turn given to its investments by the oligarchy; by the very weak rate of internal savings, due to the present low income of the population. The importance of this last factor in capital formation is nevertheless limited compared to the other two factors.

As long as Latin America's agricultural and mining exports profited by scarcities in the world market during the war and immediately thereafter, the formation of local monetary capital was on the rise and considerable in amount. That, together with other factors, aided speeded-up industrialization. But since these exports have been suffering from the drop in prices and even relatively in volume, this source for the formation of local capital has been diminishing.

Latin America's superannuated feudo-capitalist and imperialist structures, moreover, prevent the balanced expan-

sion of the internal market. The peasant majority of the population has little or no land, and is without adequate aid from the state, the workers' wages are generally low, while a developed substructure (communications, power, various constructions of public utility, etc) are lacking. As a consequence the internal market is both limited and disjointed.

As a result of the fact, moreover, that the economy often depends on the export of a very limited range of products, if not of one single agricultural or mining product, these countries feel recessions in the world market as genuine economic crises, and struggle in the throes of chronic inflation. This does not tend to broaden the internal market or to aid the formation and investment of local capital.

The artificial frontiers — an inheritance from imperialist colonization and domination and from the regional interests of the comprador oligarchy — also prevent the market from being expanded to the full extent of its natural confines: all of Latin America; or, to begin with, South America on the one hand, and Central America, Mexico, and the islands of the Caribbean on the other.

It is North American imperialism that is opposed, with the firmest determination, to the free development of the Latin American revolution. Latin America's resources in agriculture, power, and mining, from Mexico to Patagonia, passing through the wealth of Venezuela and Brazil, constitute for the highly developed economy of the U.S.A., which is exhausting its own national resources, absolutely necessary reserves. Latin America is, moreover, the most important outlet for the industrial products and capital of Yankee imperialism, while its strategic interest is also vital for the latter.

It is North American imperialism which, having gradually supplanted the European imperialisms in Latin America to a great extent, has become the main reactionary force, allied with the comprador oligarchy, in hindering this region's free and balanced economic development and industrialization, and in maintaining both the anachronistic social structures and the extreme Balkanization of the region.

Its grip on it since the war, however, has not ceased to encounter the violent and sometimes victorious opposition of the new rising forces of the Latin America revolution. Its hold is equally undermined by revived imperialist competition, as well as by that begun by the workers' states.

To the degree in which, despite everything, the economic development and industrialization of this region have continued and even speeded up since the war, the social configuration of these countries has been seriously modified, and is very different from, far more developed than, that in the other dependent regions of the world.

Besides the peasantry — share-croppers, rural laborers, and poor individual peasants — who still form the great majority of the population, and also besides the considerable urban petty bourgeoisie — intellectuals, office-workers, functionaries, small businessmen, and craftsmen — there has been formed a concentrated and dynamic industrial proletariat, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico, as well as in the mining or oil centres of Chile, Bolivia, Peru, and Venezuela.

Furthermore, besides the classic comprador landed and commercial strata, there have been formed new strata of the industrial national bourgeoisie, who hope for a freer economic development, less hindered by imperialism and the oligarchy. It is these strata which, in various Latin American countries, either directly or through the intermediary of Bonapartist political regimes, are endeavoring to corner and hold on to political power, and to channel for their own profit the powerful anti-imperialist

and revolutionary movement of the masses of the peasantry, the proletariat, and the radicalized urban petty bourgeoisie.

But the resistance of imperialism and the oligarchy to such experiments is still very strong. What is more, the national bourgeoisie itself is afraid to trust too much the support of the revolutionary masses and is incapable of radically opposing imperialism and the oligarchy. This political factor, in interaction with the economic difficulties, the acuteness of social contradictions, and the power of the revolutionary movement of the masses, is at the basis of the chronic instability, the almost permanent revolutionary crisis, which characterizes Latin American countries at the present stage.

Since the dictatorship of the regimes of the comprador oligarchy, relying on the army and the police, proves in most cases to be henceforth impossible or inoperative, and since the power of the national bourgeoisie, caught in between the opposition of imperialism, of the oligarchy, and the radicalism of the mass movement, proves to be profoundly unstable, political crisis in Latin America becomes endemic. It thus reflects on the political plane the revolutionary transformation now going on in Latin American society, full of contradictions, discontinuities, and disequilibria, in the present international context of the general crisis of imperialism, the rise of the economic and military power of the workers' states, and the international rise of the colonial revolution.

The prolongation of instability and revolutionary crisis in the Latin American countries is moreover the expression of the lateness — or rather, inadequate parallel growth in maturity — of a revolutionary proletarian leadership capable of bringing this crisis to a victorious outcome in the immediate future. But the objective conditions are eminently favorable for such a rapid growth in maturity and for the formation of a revolutionary proletarian mass leadership.

The objectively revolutionary situation which at present more or less generally characterizes Latin America is clearly reflected both in the power of the revolutionary movement of the masses and in the extreme division and acuteness of antagonisms among the leading classes.

The uninterrupted struggle of the Argentine proletariat since the fall of Perón, the maintenance of the fundamental gains of the Bolivian revolution since 1952, the rise in influence of the worker's parties in Chile, the fall of the dictatorships in Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, the Cuban revolution, and the struggle now begun against the dictatorship in Paraguay, are so many eloquent signs of the rising extreme power of the revolutionary movement of the masses.

On the other hand, the divisions within the ruling classes in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and elsewhere, as well as the inability of the army — traditional tool of reactionary dictatorship in these countries — to intervene effectively and thwart the chronic crisis, are also significant signs of the depth of the instability and of the objectively revolutionary situation that marks Latin America.

THE TRANSITIONAL PROGRAMME AND THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN REVOLUTION

The level that the Latin American revolution will reach at the next stage will depend on the formation of a revolutionary proletarian mass leadership capable of replacing the bourgeois or petty-bourgeois staffs that are leading the revolutionary movement of the masses. This task is at present possible provided that the revolutionary Marxist tendency operates with audacity and ingenuity in the mass movement, taking into account the special conditions that prevail in each country.

Everywhere combining independent activity with entrism

work in the proletarian or even plebeian mass formations of a revolutionary nature, it will have as its task to work up and to advocate a transitional programme toward a workers' and peasants' government and toward socialism, which includes in particular: a radical agrarian reform, distributing the land to the peasants who till it, and an effective aid by the state to the latter's coöperative organizations; a plan for economic development and industrialization on the basis of a fundamentally nationalized economy that takes into account the resources of the world market, especially of the unified Latin American market, and of aid from and exchanges with the workers' states.

On the general Latin American level the slogan of the *Socialist United States of Latin America* must be tirelessly propagandized.

What is everywhere necessary is not abstract propaganda for the proletarian power and the socialist revolution, but a concrete answer to the vital problems of each country, to be solved by the workers' and peasants' government based on the political and trade-union workers' organizations and on the organization of the masses into militia and committees.

The agrarian reform must lead to distributing the land of the oligarchy to the peasants who till it and to envisage their immediately collectivist exploitation only in the specific cases where still deep-rooted communal customs facilitate this solution, as also in the case of plantations which the state transforms into model collectivist exploitations run by collectives formed by their workers. The agrarian reform must also be accompanied by a programme of specific aid on the technical and financial level by the workers' state, favoring coöperative exploitation by peasants.

As for nationalizations, although those of the banks, transport, some key enterprises, and foreign trade are indispensable right from the start, as for the rest, measures will be taken according to the criterion of continuity and the increase in production, within the possible limits of state control over enterprises (including foreign ones).

As in the dependent countries less developed than those of Latin America, in this region also one of the main resources for speeding up economic development and industrialization according to a plan is the productive mobilization of the immense manpower of a population, growing at one of the highest rates in the world, that is at present largely unused. But only the radical revolution led by the proletariat, under the power of a workers' and peasants' government, can create the moral and practical framework needed for such a mobilization.

The working up of the concrete political transitional programme should go hand in hand with the search for the transitional organizational road toward the mass revolutionary party. The goal in this field, everywhere in Latin America at present, must be to form class political organizations having a mass influence, that are distinct from the most advanced formations of the national bourgeoisie and the radical petty-bourgeoisie which are cornering the leadership of the revolution.

A characteristic of the Latin American revolution, more marked than elsewhere, is the important role (including a political role) played in several Latin American countries by the trade-union movement (Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile especially). In all these countries the national bourgeoisie has sought to domesticate the trade unions as a force to fight against its adversaries and to develop itself. To offset this tendency and to exploit fully the social and political importance acquired by the unions, it is necessary to propagandize systematically the idea of the *mass Labor Party based on the trade unions*, and of a workers' government based on the trade unions (where the objective conditions for such a slogan exist). Furthermore, in order to strengthen the union movement's own power, it is necessary to call for and fight for trade-union unification in each

country (one union per industry and one single trade-union federation) as well as for the creation of a single revolutionary union centre of the toilers of Latin America. Agitation for the anti-imperialist united front, always combined with that for the proletarian united front, is the agitation corresponding to the needs of this period.

The immense revolutionary potentialities of Latin America's landless peasantry have been shown in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Central America, and above all in Cuba. The worker-peasant alliance is the decisive factor for the victory of the revolution in this country.

The revolutionary mobilization of the peasants is possible on the basis of systematic propaganda for the programme of radical agrarian reform, and of no less systematic work among them which will root the revolutionary organization in the rural regions and create peasant cadres. But above all it is necessary to seize a politically propitious moment during the period of acute revolutionary ferment to organize and audaciously launch an armed struggle by the peasants for the land, and to connect it up with the workers' mobilizations. Thenafter the peasant guerrilla may prove to be a powerful stimulus to the workers' struggles and deprive the class enemy of the advantage in case of a possible partial defeat or ebb of the workers' movement.

In Latin America the revolutionary Marxist tendency has a field that is more propitious than elsewhere for its rapid development. Apart from the objectively favorable conditions, neither the existing Socialist nor Communist Parties have become deeply rooted in the masses. The sole exception is Chile. There, under the pressure of the masses, the Socialist Party (whose class composition and influence are entirely different from those of the other SPs in Latin America) and the Communist Party (which has kept a considerable rank and file) set up a united front (the F R A P). The action of the Socialist left wing, within which Trotskyism has played a decisive role, has also contributed to correct partially the C P's line of support to the national bourgeoisie. The opportunist and timorous policy of the C P's and S P's elsewhere, in tow to the bourgeoisie, does not correspond to the revolutionary aspirations of the Latin American masses and to the urgency of a radical solution.

Under the pressure of the powerful revolutionary movement of the masses, the divisions and crisis within the ruling classes, the weakening of imperialism internationally, and the rising power and prestige of the workers' states, important left-centrist wings are at present developing in certain Socialist Parties (Chile, Uruguay, Argentina).

The Communist Parties, on the contrary, are centred round the sole goal of bringing pressure on US imperialism for the benefit of the momentary interests of Soviet diplomacy, by staking exclusively on the quite relative antagonism between the national bourgeoisie and that imperialism — whence their abandonment of any autonomous class policy and unfolding of an ultra-opportunist policy that relegates them to the role of powerless super-numeraries, without prestige and invariably "betrayed" by different politicians of the bourgeoisie looking for a highly appreciated "left" cover.

SPECIAL SITUATIONS

In the present context, which is in general objectively revolutionary in Latin America, there stand out the more special situations in *Argentina, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Cuba*.

In *Argentina*, the spontaneous combativity of the working class is equalled only by that of the masses in Japan. Under these conditions the stabilization of the regime is constantly put off, but neither do the masses succeed in giving a revolutionary outcome to the country's chronic crisis. Only the creation of a class political party based on the trade unions, which will know how to seize the propitious moment for organizing the masses in committees

and militia, mobilizing the peasants and the agricultural proletariat, and aim the whole struggle toward the workers' and peasants' government, can bring the country out of its blind alley.

In the situation created by the revolutionary mobilization of the proletariat, there have appeared at various moments, at least potentially, elements of *dual power*; these will also probably appear again. It is necessary to work in such a way that these elements take on specific organizational form (committees, militia, guerrilla). In such a situation, propaganda, increased tenfold, for the *Labor Party based on the trade unions* can then produce more substantial results, swinging the radical wing of the Peronist trade unions in this direction — which would speed up by interaction the whole revolutionary process in the country. Because, stuck as it now is in the blind alley of an activity that is, from the political viewpoint, largely of the revolutionary-syndicalist type, there is a risk that in the long run it will, at least temporarily, exhaust the activist interest of the masses and cause a stabilization — temporary and quite relative — of the open or camouflaged dictatorship based essentially on the army.

In *Bolivia* we are witnessing a new relative upsurge of the revolutionary movement of the masses which is expressed in the sanguinary defeats among the peasants and miners suffered by both the rosca and the right wing of the M N R. But for lack of a sufficient strengthening of the revolutionary party, there is a risk that this upsurge be monopolized once more by the left-centre wing of the M N R (Paz Estenssoro), seconded by the centrist leadership of the C O B (Lechín) and the M N R left.

It is the power of the revolutionary movement of the masses that permitted the maintenance of the fundamental conquests of the revolution and heretofore victoriously repulsed all assaults by the reaction and by the pro-imperialist right wing of the M N R. It is the weakness of the revolutionary party that has prevented the revolution from ending up in the workers' and peasants' government.

With the prospect of a return to power of the Paz Estenssoro - Lechín centrist alliance and of the present favorable Latin American context, a new rise of the masses is inevitable. It is necessary to profit by this situation to put the whole mining region under the effective administration of the workers (committees and militia), to generalize the agrarian reform under the pressure of the peasants' militia and unions, and to impose an economic plan taking into account the country's real resources, including its labor power, and the aid of the workers' states and exchanges with them.

The slogan of the Special Congress of the C O B, to settle — with the help of the committees and militia — the question of power, of agrarian reform, and of the economic plan, can under these conditions become timely again. The key to this possible and necessary development remains, however, the strengthening of the party on the national scale, and especially among the miners and peasants, where the essential part of its daily activity and its leadership should be.

In *Venezuela* the party borne to power by the revolutionary masses must confront pressure from imperialism and from the masses eager for a radical transformation, for a real outcome to the revolution they began. Past experience in this country has shown that all governments, in however "revolutionary" a way they may have begun their career, invariably succumb to the pressure of Yankee imperialism and of its enormous interests in Venezuela's fabulous oil and mining riches.

The *Acción Democrática* is a heteroclit formation reminiscent of the A P R A or the M N R, with a radical petty-bourgeois leadership, which has already become differentiated into a reactionary and pro-imperialist wing and a wing more pervious to the influence of its radical base.

Without the organization of workers' and peasants' militia and committees, it will prove to be impossible to force the party and the government to broaden the conquests of the revolution, to proceed to a genuine agrarian reform, to nationalize the country's oil and mining riches, to promulgate a plan for the diversified and rapid development of the economy, profiting by the country's considerable financial resources, and thus effectively to defend the revolution against the inevitable new assaults by imperialism and reaction.

Entrist work of the revolutionary Marxist tendency inside the left wing of the AD must lead to advocating the formation of a Labor Party based on the trade unions.

In *Cuba*, the achievements and teachings of the Cuban revolution, advanced post of the whole Latin American revolution, are already numerous and important.

The Cuban revolution has demonstrated the effectiveness of a guerrilla based on the active support of a poor peasantry eager for a radical agrarian reform, combined with the mobilization of the proletarian and petty-bourgeois masses of the urban centres, including, at a given stage, in the form of armed action by limited squads surrounded by the sympathy and protection of the population.

The Cuban revolution, under the impetus of the revolutionary masses — peasants, proletarians, and radicalized urban petty-bourgeois — and in face of the fact that the comprador forces were so extremely compromised with the sanguinary dictatorship now overthrown, is developing rapidly and powerfully as a permanent revolution, in spite of its disparate official leadership and the lack of a mass revolutionary party.

The leadership of the Cuban revolution, purged of a whole series of flatly bourgeois-liberal elements, is at present a Jacobin staff subjected in varying degrees to the revolutionary influence of the masses — that is to say, a staff which, despite its non-proletarian social origins and ideology, has found itself forced to go beyond the limits of capitalism and seriously to undermine its equilibrium. But it has not yet overthrown this regime, and it will not be able, in its present form, to do so, without the creation of a mass revolutionary party, linked up with the masses' militia, committees, and trade unions.

By the scope already attained by the agrarian reform,

by the few measures of nationalization of foreign imperialist enterprises, by the thorough purge of the state apparatus, and by the creation of militia and people's tribunals, the Cuban revolution has already gone considerably outside the frame of capitalism without having completely broken it and replaced it by a state of a new type based on a nationalized and planned economy. What is important at the present stage is not so much the completion of the economic and social measures that will confirm the overthrow of the feudo-capitalist regime, but rather the organization of a proletarian political power by the extension and institutionalization of militia and people's tribunals, and the organization of communes and committees as organs of local power.

The economic and social measures in the direction of an effective nationalized and planned economy can in this case be spaced out in accordance with the strengthening of the revolution internally and internationally, without provoking premature reactions by Yankee imperialism and without causing production to suffer disproportionately. The key to the victorious development of the Cuban revolution lies, inside the country, in the rapid formation of the mass revolutionary party with a clear proletarian and socialist programme, integrating all the country's valid revolutionary elements, and, outside the country, in an international organization for the defense of the Cuban revolution, especially in the countries of Latin America.

The echo and repercussions of the Cuban revolution in all this region are already immense and will continue to increase. Hence these are to be expected fierce efforts by Yankee imperialism and the Latin American comprador oligarchies to beat down the Cuban revolutionary regime by any means, or to bring it to capitulate and go bourgeois.

For this reason the safety of the Cuban revolution lies finally in keeping up its effective defense in the Latin American countries, in a clear indication addressed to Yankee imperialism that any military intervention it might make in Cuba would stir up a regular hurricane in all Latin America, in the spread of the Cuban revolution to other countries of Latin America. The movement of organization of *Committees for the Defense of the Cuban Revolution*, as well as *volunteer corps*, must be rapidly extended through all Latin America.

III

THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION AND THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

11. CONCLUSIONS

One of the most positive aspects of the colonial revolution is the fact that immense masses of humanity — who were still up till yesterday crushed by the exploitation of imperialism and the comprador ruling classes, poverty-stricken, uncultured, passive — have got into movement, irreversible and irresistible, to win for themselves a material, cultural, and social level in conformance with the present possibilities of humanity.

From this point of view a qualitative transformation has been produced in humanity by this revolutionary awakening to the highest civilizing aspirations, and by the results of this awakening on, for example, the status of women and the family, now being radically changed. All humanity is already benefiting from this qualitative transformation by the revolution of masses who have long lived on the edges of civilization, a revolution which by this fact speeds up its general movement toward the new socialist civilization.

In fact, the worker and peasant masses of the colonial and semi-colonial countries are engaged in achieving their political maturity by leaps and bounds, rapidly springing over stages. Driven by their own experience, stimulated by the successes achieved by sectors of the masses of

other backward countries, by the victories of the revolution now going on, by the economic advances of the workers' states, and especially of China, the colonial masses (more and more capable of turning toward the ideas of Trotskyism and our movement) will find the way to a rapid progress of their political consciousness, and serious strata of their vanguard will make the direct leap to the ideas and most advanced programme of humanity: the ideas and the programme of the Fourth International.

Granted, it is not a question of exaggeratedly embellishing the fact that the colonial revolution at the present historical stage occupies the vanguard of the world revolution. The revolutionary Marxists are also fully aware of the drawbacks inherent in the lateness of the socialist revolution in the advanced capitalist countries for raising the ideological level of the masses, for creating genuine mass revolutionary Marxist parties, for overcoming the phenomena of bureaucratization in the movement and in the workers' states, and for rapidly building a socialism that is immediately, and not just in some distant future, of benefit to the masses.

But it is a question in any case of taking as a point of departure the present historical realities, and of making the most of them. It is now clear that the process of the world revolution is developing from the periphery, from

the colonial and dependent countries as well as from the existing workers' states, toward the capitalist countries of Europe, and the United States (very probably the last of all).

The Fourth International, heir to the revolutionary traditions and principles of the Third International of Lenin and Trotsky, under these conditions cannot do otherwise than, quite naturally, carry on the essential part of its activity in the living field of the revolution, where the masses, and the world's most oppressed and exploited peoples, are struggling.

For valid historical reasons the development of the Fourth International was during a whole period centred on the advanced capitalist countries, considered, until the eve of the last war, as the N° 1 epicentre of the world revolution.

Now it is necessary for the Fourth International to reorganize its activities as an International in terms of the principal sector of the world revolution, which is the colonial revolution, and carry on in this field, for a whole period, the essential part of its efforts.

The immediate future of the International lies in countries and regions like India, Indonesia, the Arab lands, Negro Africa, and Latin America, as well as in Japan, where immediate and rapid gains are possible.

The Fourth International must show itself capable of organizing in all these fields valid forces which without any sectarianism link themselves up with the revolutionary

movement of the masses and provide effective answers to their aspirations.

Indeed, the Fourth International is already playing an important though still limited part in various centres of the colonial revolution. The dynamic action of the Fourth International in its theoretical and practical support of the Algerian revolution raises it to the highest levels. In Cuba the action of the Cuban section and of the Trotskyist delegation to the Latin American Youth Congress enabled our movement to win important though diffuse influence within the Cuban revolution and contributed to its progress. In Argentina, the section fused in the last elections with an important current of the Peronist workers' movement.

All this demonstrates that in the next period the Fourth International has the possibility of fusing with important mass movements and leading, or sharing with other currents the leadership of, revolutionary movements in certain countries or regions of the colonial revolution.

The extreme degeneration of the Social-Democracy, in tow to moribund imperialism, and of Stalinism, in tow to the conservative Soviet bureaucracy, leave the field of the colonial revolution wide open to the strategical and practical audacity, the tactical ingenuity, of the revolutionary organizations of the Fourth International.

It is by its close and total fusion with the emancipating struggle of the masses and the most disinherited peoples in the world that the Fourth International will prove its full historical justification and impose its role as the leading revolutionary vanguard.

ON THE NATURE OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

1. Pre-revolutionary Cuba was marked to the highest degree by the contradictions typical of a semi-colonial country in the grip of imperialism; industrial development was very limited and conditioned by the economic needs of the imperialists; agricultural production was largely one-crop in nature, directly dominated by foreign trusts; unemployment was very high, with a considerable percentage of the labor force not utilized; the masses in general existed at very low living levels; the "national" bourgeoisie was limited, incapable of the slightest autonomous development, and essentially parasitical and graft-ridden; the political power was dictatorial, based on ferocious repression and lacking any bourgeois-democratic guarantees or rights.

In the given context of the international and Latin American situations, these underlying objective conditions were eminently favorable to the revolutionary initiative shown by the Fidel Castro vanguard. Despite the very serious difficulties it had to face at the outset, its links with sectors of the poor peasantry of the Sierra Maestra produced deep changes in the initial prospects of the movement. In these circumstances Fidel Castro began to sketch a draft programme of agrarian reform. Under these conditions the Fidelist vanguard was capable of allying itself quite rapidly with sectors of the peasant masses, of gradually broadening its influence by winning the support of other strata of the laboring population, of establishing itself in one region of the country, and thus of preparing within a relatively short time the victorious insurrection. It is basically the birth, growth, and maturity of a very powerful mass movement, unprecedented in this part of the world, that caused the defeat of the Batista dictatorship, made possible the broader and broader offensive, first against imperialism, and then against the native capitalist forces, and represented the n° 1 obstacle to the aggression by which the imperialists would like to try to overturn a situation disastrous for their interests.

2. The Cuban revolution has so far had three phases: the first, in which, after having limited its goals and its methods to a programme of "moralization of the regime" and of armed action exercised by a limited group which tried to win over a sector of the army, the Fidelist movement developed a programme of struggle against the regime, mainly aimed at bourgeois-democratic demands and at more and more advanced peasant demands; the second, marked by the first revolutionary conquests and especially the agrarian reform; and the third, whose culminating points were the mortal blows against imperialist property in the Summer of 1960 and the decisive wave of nationalizations, including those of native capitalist properties, in October of the same year.

On the specifically political level, in the first phase the people's revolutionary forces signed (July 1958) a pact with the representatives of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois democracy; the second phase was marked by the formation (January 1959) of a government participated in by liberal-conservative elements, with Urrutia as President. Finally the inevitable break with these last-named occurred — a break caused above all by the promulgation of the agrarian reform.

In its first two phases, therefore, the Cuban revolution developed as a radical anti-imperialist democratic revolution, whereas in the third it carried out its transformation into a socialist revolution that eliminated not only the imperialist economic bases, but also native capitalist properties. On the level of political leadership, the evolution

had far more form than substance, for the real power was in the hands of the Ejército Rebelde and the Fidelist staff, even during the period of dual power *sui generis* that ran from the taking of power to the fall of Urrutia.

The Cuban revolution represents a new and brilliant confirmation of the permanent nature that the revolution cannot fail to have in a colonial or semi-colonial country if it is really determined to triumph over its enemies, carry out its fundamental purposes, and give an answer to the masses' elementary economic, political, and social requirements.

3. In the eminently transitional period through which the revolution is now going, Cuba has ceased to be a capitalist state, and is becoming a workers' state through the application of the nationalization measures of October 1960. This sociological characterization is based essentially on the three following factors:

a) After the measures nationalizing foreign enterprises and properties, the Cuban bourgeoisie, while having lost its political power, still maintained its economic position and even the new post-revolutionary structure permitted it to continue to accumulate its surplus value. But after the government's decisions of 14 October, the economic power of the native bourgeoisie is also eliminated, and capitalist property — including the sugar-plantations — practically disappears from the island. It is true that sectors of medium-sized and small property continue in principle to exist, and even to enjoy a certain aid, but they represent, especially in a country like Cuba, an entirely secondary economic and social element which under the given conditions would not be able to be decisive from the viewpoint of social characterization.

b) The agrarian reform has not involved and probably will not within a short time involve, a genuine socialization of relations in the rural regions — which, for that matter, has not been carried out in the USSR and the other workers' states, either. But what is in question is a very advanced reform that has eliminated imperialist property and the capitalist latifundia and created a very broad coöperative structure on its way to rapid development. With the INRA as intermediary, the state has, moreover, every possibility of intervening and exercising control, by preventing potentially capitalist petty-bourgeois elements from exploiting to their own advantage the contradictions that are inevitable at this stage in the new agricultural structure (economic differentiation among the coöperatives, conflicts of interests between the peasants who are members of the coöperatives and those who are not, the hiatus between the sector where the agricultural structure is coöperative and that where individual peasant property continues to exist, etc).

c) The state has set up what is essentially a monopoly of foreign trade, and can by this means exercise a decisive influence on economic life (this measure is all the more important in that Cuba is a country where foreign trade has played and still plays a role of capital importance).

In Cuba, consequently, a workers' state of peculiar origin and of a new type has been created.

4. The apparatus of the old bourgeois state has been essentially destroyed by the revolution: this destruction is expressed particularly in the form of the destruction of the apparatus of military and police repression.

Nevertheless, the old apparatus has not been replaced by a new one corresponding to the new ownership relations, by a democratic apparatus based on workers', peasants', and soldiers' councils, and this grave deficiency is at the

present stage the main weakness of the revolution. But in substance the Ejercito Rebelde — whose role is far from being purely military — and the militia have ensured a specific though quite inadequate form of renovation of the apparatus, on the basis of the peasant, worker, and radical petty-bourgeois classes.

On the other hand, in spite of important bureaucratic limitations, the masses have taken a more and more active part in political life through the unions, coöperatives (whose leadership is elected, not appointed), the 26th July political movement, and other political groups. Mass participation in gigantic meetings and the attention paid to televised speeches, etc — these are another form of mass mobilization, a form of “plebiscitary democracy,” which, though essentially paternalistic and laden with dangers, has nevertheless had so far a concrete meaning for the masses, compared to pre-revolutionary political conditions.

5. The advanced nature of the Cuban revolution is confirmed by a whole series of reforms which either preceded or followed the underlying structural reforms: reforms — such as those in education, in rents and housing, in conditions of certain disinherited or declassed categories, etc — which have a really revolutionary scope and represent a complete break with a barbarous past.

6. The Cuban revolution has both features in common with other revolutions of our period and features specific to the country itself (or to a category of such countries).

The features in common are: a) the preponderant weight of the peasantry, especially up to the taking of power; b) the fact that the proletariat of the cities, despite quite serious political and trade-union traditions, played a less decisive role than that of the revolutionary army, socially composed predominantly of peasants; c) the part played by the cadres emerging from the intelligentsia and petty-bourgeois strata.

To explain the victory of the revolution, however, account must be taken of certain specific factors:

a) the peasants were able to play an eminently revolutionary role not so much because of their numerical preponderance (which is much less in Cuba than in similar countries), as because of their particular social composition (decisive weight of the agricultural workers and extreme poverty of the small land-owning peasants); it must be added that in the Cuban rural regions, certain historically retarding ideological factors (e.g., the influence of the Church) operated to only a very limited extent;

b) the presence of an important number of workers in the sugar industries who worked in the rural regions and had many connections with the peasants, aided a de facto alliance between the peasants and the far more concentrated proletarian nucleus;

c) the hard grip of Yankee imperialism gave anti-imperialist motives a great and explosive radius among the widest popular sectors, while the existence of the ferocious Batista dictatorship aided the mobilization of the petty bourgeoisie and even of certain liberal bourgeois sectors.

And lastly it must be specified that, though the role of the proletariat was not decisive for the overthrow of Batista, it was essential in preventing a petty-bourgeois or liberal bourgeois grip on the new regime, and, a fortiori, is permitting the consistent anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist development of the revolution.

All these factors, taken together, made possible the victory of the revolution — given the fact also of the extreme weakness of the native bourgeoisie and its complete dependence on imperialism and of a world context where imperialism was not in a position to intervene directly in order to support the old ruling classes, unable by themselves to face the powerful movement of the peasant and proletarian masses.

7. The Fidelist leadership emerged as a Jacobin staff, of non-proletarian and petty-bourgeois social composition and

ideology, but it linked itself right from the beginning with the peasant masses, and later, especially after taking power, with the proletarian masses. In a situation such as that in Cuba, and in the given international context, it was to undergo more and more the influence of these masses, free itself of the petty-bourgeois and even conservative bourgeois elements with which it had reached temporary agreements, and adapt itself empirically but audaciously to the logic of the permanent revolution by going far beyond the goals that it had itself conceived.

Even in estimating the nature and role of the Fidelist leadership, the radical character of the peasantry with which it was linked up must not be forgotten. Furthermore, on the ideological level, despite their theorizations infused with fundamentally petty-bourgeois eclecticism (“humanism”), Fidel Castro and his companions have never expressed a flatly capitalist ideology, and above all they quite soon demonstrated a clear political consciousness of the driving forces of the revolution. This much reduced the negative range of their empirical procedures.

Neither must we underestimate the undeniable fact that, in the Fidelist leadership, an important part was played by men who had learned and understood the fundamental lessons of Marxism.

8. The importance of the Cuban revolution cannot be limited to its internal extent, even though that is immense.

The 1959-60 revolution has struck a tremendous blow at the prestige of US imperialism, for which it has represented a major political defeat. It has contributed to a further deterioration of the correlation of forces on a world scale to the disadvantage of capitalism.

It is destined to have a very great influence on the evolution of the mass movements in colonial or semi-colonial countries, especially in Latin America, where it is already exerting a powerful force of attraction.

It has, what is more, permitted a further concretization of the de facto alliance between the workers' states and the colonial revolution.

9. From the Cuban experience the revolutionary Marxist movement can and must draw a whole series of political and theoretical lessons of primary importance.

The Fourth International must concentrate its full attention on these problems by seizing so priceless an occasion to enrich its theoretical heritage and it must work up the proper strategy to be able to be prepared to intervene in similar phenomena which could occur in countries of analogous structure and in analogous situations.

The lessons to be drawn concern particularly: the role of advanced peasant strata in certain specific situations, the scope of a guerrilla with a predominantly peasant base as a form of anti-capitalist revolution, the role of the cadres emerging from the radical petty-bourgeoisie, the rapid generalization of a coöperative experiment in the rural regions, the organization of militia, and the role that the revolutionary army can play at certain exceptional periods, even for economic organization. Above all, however, the problem is raised of the genesis, training, formation, and coming to maturity of a new revolutionary leadership under conditions that are specific though probably not unique; for the most original element, in a revolution that is nevertheless so original in many aspects, is that for the first time a capitalist regime has been overthrown by a movement whose leadership was not linked up with the traditional workers' parties or influenced by the Soviet bureaucracy.

10. If the successes of the Cuban revolution can without any exaggeration be described as historic, the tasks that remain to be accomplished are gigantic.

In the immediate future Cuba must confront the threat, even the military threat, of imperialism. But apart from possible military defense, the fate of the revolution depends on its capacity to ensure to the country a harmonious

economic development based above all on a real industrialization. On the political level, a new proletarian-democratic structure has to be built from scratch.

The revolution is now enjoying total popular support: that is due both to the revolutionary political results achieved and to the economic advances already accomplished, as also to the improvement in the masses' standard of living. But it is necessary to strengthen this position, steadily to advance, gradually to eliminate the contradictions that remain.

The task of our Cuban comrades is especially to work up a detailed transitional programme to be proposed to the Cuban workers, peasants, and intellectuals.

Here we shall limit ourselves to stressing in general the following points:

a) The revolution must make sure of the active solidarity of the masses in the other colonial and semi-colonial countries, especially in Latin America, and of the proletariat in the advanced capitalist countries. It is a basic duty of the sections of the International to stimulate and organize in all countries every form of solidarity with the Cuban revolutionaries, among others that of encouraging the sending of technicians, the formation of Committees for the Defense of the Cuban Revolution, and brigades of volunteers.

b) In a situation which will in any case be difficult in various ways for a rather long period, the new regime can strengthen itself and become unshakable only by organizing a genuine workers' and peasants' democracy that ensures to the workers and peasants the real and direct exercise of political power and the leading role in economic management. Such a proletarian-democratic structure would obviously be nothing like the traditional bourgeois democracy mourned by the capitalists.

c) Economic planning with a view to industrialization becomes a more and more pressing objective necessity. It cannot be carried out without setting up a whole series of democratic organs of planning, composed of technicians, workers, and peasants.

d) The popular masses will support the revolution without weakening if it is able to avoid any bureaucratic deformation in a spirit of socialist equality. A return of economic privileges to administrators, technicians, and political, economic, and military leaders in general must be avoided.

e) It is the duty of the workers to make the sacrifices imposed by the economic development of the revolution, but they must have the guarantee that their specific interests will be adequately defended. That means that they must keep their full right to trade-union organization, and that the unions must remain independent of the state, while ensuring to it their collaboration in building socialism and in defending the revolutionary state.

f) All proletarian and peasant political parties, groups, and tendencies that accept the new revolutionary legality must keep the right to organize and to express themselves freely.

In the later phases of the revolution, in the process of industrialization and economic planning, the working class is destined to play a decisive role. At the same time, the need for a much more organic and less monolithic economic and administrative state apparatus is objectively becoming more and more necessary. On this level also, the role of the working class will be irreplaceable.

Thus simultaneously the need becomes greater and the conditions more favorable for a consistent revolutionary Marxist leadership, capable of overcoming the empiricism, the limitations, and the contradictions of the present leadership.

The role of the revolutionary party will be, basically, to ensure that the revolution in its later stages has this leadership, conscious of the revolution's final goals, and capable both of wisely selecting transitional objectives and of choosing adequate means thereto.

This leadership must at the same time carry out the destruction of the last vestiges of imperialism and native capitalism and be on the watch against the danger of a bureaucratization which, though limited today by the dynamism of the masses, fundamentally exists wherever there are to be found the objective conditions now present in Cuba (backward economic situation, low cultural and technical level, pressure on the revolution from outside).

The revolutionary party must furthermore insist on the prospect of a Socialist Federation of Latin America as the real solution to the economic and social problems of this region of the globe, beginning by putting forward the strategic task of the Socialist Federation for the whole of Central America, as a powerful element for the mobilization of the masses.



ON CEYLON

The Sixth World Congress, after having discussed the situation in Ceylon, states that it disapproves the political line adopted by the Lanka Sama Samaja Party following on the election defeat of March 1960.

The Congress condemns more especially the vote of parliamentary support expressed on the occasion of the Speech from the Throne, and the adoption of the budget by the party's M P's.

The Fourth International does not exclude support for the adoption of progressive measures, even by a national bourgeois or petty-bourgeois government in a colonial or semi-colonial country. But the social nature, composition,

and general programme of the Bandaranaike government does not justify the support which was accorded it.

The World Congress appeals to the Lanka Sama Samaja Party for a radical change in its political course in the direction indicated by the document of the leadership of the International.

The Congress is confident that the next National Conference of the LSSP, in whose political preparation the whole International must participate, will know how to adopt all the political and organizational decisions necessary to overcome the crisis which was revealed following on the results of the March 1960 election campaign.

THE CRISIS OF STALINISM

Since the XXIst Congress of the CP of the USSR

1. "Destalinization" was a series of empirical operations carried out by Stalin's successors to overcome the contradictions built up at the end of his reign, which had reached an explosive pitch in the USSR itself and in the "people's democracies." The crisis became acute in 1956-57, not only in the USSR and the other workers' states, but also in the CPs of the capitalist countries.

The Khrushchev leadership, which succeeded in consolidating itself in the leadership of the CP of the USSR in July 1957, tried to overcome the crisis by a series of economic and political measures, and by defining a line of regroupment for the leaderships of the workers' states and the Communist Parties, in order to establish the framework and limits of a "destalinization" that could be carried out in a way controlled by itself. This line of regroupment is to be found in the declaration adopted in Moscow on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the October Revolution by the leaders of the CPs, with the exception of those of the Yugoslav League of Communists.

This document, setting forth Stalin's "qualities and defects," limited explanation of the past to the "personality cult" of Stalin in the last period of his life, i.e., it fell short of the Khrushchev report to the XXth Congress, and disappointed of any attempt to enquire into social differentiations in the USSR, which would have been detrimental to the bureaucratic power. This document also reasserted the policy of "peaceful coexistence," i.e., the policy of subordinating the Communist movement to the needs of Soviet diplomacy.

The line thus defined on the fortieth anniversary remained integrally within the limits of the bureaucratic regime for the USSR and the other workers' states, and of a monolithic system for the Communist Parties throughout the world. It formed a line of defense, a barrier against workers' democracy, whether in the workers' states or in the Communist Parties.

The Khrushchev leadership attempted to stabilize the bureaucracy's power at a new level, liberal compared to that in Stalin's time, and to reestablish the authority of the leaderships of the Communist Parties.

These attempts have obtained certain results which culminated at the XXIst Congress of the CP of the USSR (January 1959), concerning the reestablishment of bureaucratic domination and have caused considerable changes both concerning the structure of the governments of the workers' states and the relations inside the Communist Parties. These attempts of the bureaucratic leadership to adapt itself to the new situation have contributed to opening new roads to the development of the crisis of Stalinism and to the political revolution.

But there was thus set up only a very limited equilibrium, both among the leadership of the Soviet Union, the bureaucracy, and the masses, and among the various strata of the bureaucracy, and a no less relative equilibrium between the leadership of the USSR and the leaderships of the other workers' states and the Communist Parties, if account is taken of the new relationship of forces, unfavorable to the Soviet bureaucracy, that exists in the "Communist world."

All the reforms undertaken have been made with the aim of self-defense of the power and the main bureaucratic privileges, and have not brought anything of even very slight value in the way of workers' democracy. This the Soviet workers will obtain only through their own action, through their struggles rising to the level of a *political revolution*. The whole evolution in the USSR

since Stalin's death, however extensive it may have been, has never gone outside the frame of the bureaucratic regime. And so this extensiveness itself emphasizes the unavoidable necessity for a political revolution which will throw the bureaucracy out of power as a social stratum with interests distinct from those of the masses, and reestablish Soviet democracy at a level corresponding to the huge economic and cultural advances of Soviet society. During these three or four years of a certain stabilization, new contradictions have ripened, replacing or predominating over a part of the old contradictions. These new contradictions are generally located on a higher level than the old ones, and will tend to give the crisis of the bureaucratic regime the political forms that are indispensable for making concrete the way to the political revolution in the USSR and the way to the creation of a new international revolutionary leadership of the proletariat.

2. Besides these internal contradictions in the Communist world itself, an absolutely new fact is now weighing on it. For the first time, there have been for several years now developing in the world strong rising revolutionary movements, the spearheads of revolutionary combat, which escape from the control of the Soviet bureaucracy, and which are driven to seek a socialist doctrine outside this control. The two most characteristic examples are precisely the two main present revolutionary movements: the Algerian revolution, where the Algerian CP no longer has any chance of developing, and the Cuban revolution, where the Stalinists play a role only because they are tailing the movement and publicly show no disposition to take control of it. This is also the case for various movements in Negro Africa.

Thus for the first time the Communists of the entire world see challenged — no longer by small vanguard groups of a predominantly ideological nature, but by mass revolutionary movements which are spearheads in the struggle against the capitalist world — Moscow's leading role, which was recognized even after the dissolution of first the Comintern, and then the Cominform. Thus powerful revolutionary movements are implicitly raising the question of a new international revolutionary leadership. This has been added to the fact that the Khrushchev leadership, after having practically condemned Stalin's action toward the Yugoslavs, did not succeed in bringing the leadership of the League of Communists back into the Moscow orbit, thus leaving a still open wound in the Communist world properly so called.

THE MAIN CONTRADICTIONS OF THE PRESENT COMMUNIST WORLD

3. Under the influence of the rise of the masses in the workers' states, of the rise of the colonial revolution, and of the new worldwide correlation of forces on the level of the masses and states, new contradictions are developing in the present Communist world, which are bringing into question the hegemony and the policy of the Soviet leadership over this world, and are thus preparing the terrain for a new stage toward the renewal of communism.

The Chinese-Soviet dispute, even in the forms in which it has been presented and developed up till now, is the most striking and serious manifestation of these contradictions, which have brought into question the essential problems of the Communist movement's policy on international relations, relations with world capitalism, with the national bourgeoisies of colonial and semi-colonial countries, on

the roads to the conquest of power, the paths to the building of socialism in the countries where capitalism has been overthrown, etc.

The Sino-Soviet dispute did not arise from a desire for theoretical clarification by the Chinese C P, but from the problems raised for it by the needs of transforming Chinese society and under the pressure of the colonial revolution. While the Soviet C P is the political instrument of a bureaucracy which crystalized long ago and is eminently conservative, the Chinese C P, in spite of important bureaucratic characteristics, is much more sensitive to pressure from the world revolution. Therefore, although the opposition between the Chinese C P and the Soviet C P is not that between a revolutionary party and a conservative one (in the workers' state), this opposition has considerable consequences for the revolutionary struggle in the world.

Now and henceforth the unity of views of the Communist Parties is either explicitly or implicitly brought into question on the following problems:

A) DANGERS OF WAR AND PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

On the question of international relations, since the end of the Second World War, the line of the Soviet leadership, under Khrushchev as under Stalin, both in moments of "détente" and in moments of the greatest tensions of the "cold war," has been invariable: to reach an agreement with world capitalism at any price, including the sacrifice of the revolutionary movements throughout the world, while the Communist Parties and the Peace Movement brought pressure in the capitalist states with a view to obtaining a twist of policy in a direction favorable to the propositions of Soviet diplomacy — whence the fundamental orientation of all the Communist Parties since the end of the war. The struggle for power by the overthrow of the bourgeois state has been replaced by the "struggle for peace," by an agreement with wings of the bourgeoisie, both in advanced capitalist and in colonial and semi-colonial countries.

The differences between Stalin and Khrushchev arise only from the evolution of the correlation of forces in favor of the workers' states. In Stalin's time, when the USSR did not yet possess nuclear weapons, it was the Stockholm Appeal that was launched. With Khrushchev, propaganda is made for disarmament, presented as an attainable result, which is then to ensure a mere economic competition and ideological struggle between the two camps.

The opportunist, pacifist, petty-bourgeois orientation thus followed by the C P's and their fellow-travelers had not been challenged by the various C P's, especially not by the Yugoslavs. Because of the international and national conditions under which the permanent revolution has been developing in China, the Chinese leadership has brought the Soviet Union's fundamental orientation into question on the plane of international relations. The Chinese are in favor of peaceful coexistence among states and also of disarmament proposals. But they challenge — and quite rightly — Moscow's ideas about peaceful wings opposed to warlike wings in the bourgeoisie; they also dispute the possibility of disarmament under the capitalist regime. They recall that war is a phenomenon inherent in capitalism, that one must not be fooled by peaceful proposals by capitalist leaders, that illusions must not be sown among the masses on this subject, and that the rejection of disarmament proposals must be utilized to educate the masses in the direction of the struggle against capitalism.

Without drawing conclusions in an explicit way about the orientation of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries, the Chinese are thus quite rightly opposed to Moscow's essential conceptions, although their own argumentation may have been defective or dangerous on certain points (American imperialism as a "paper tiger," under-

estimation of the dangers of a nuclear war for humanity). They afterwards made corrections on these subjects, in a more or less clear way.

B) ATTITUDE TOWARD COLONIAL REVOLUTIONS AND TOWARD THE NATIONAL BOURGEOISIES OF COLONIAL AND SEMI-COLONIAL COUNTRIES

The Soviet leadership is guided in this question only by diplomatic considerations, apart from any notion of anti-imperialist and class solidarity. Thus, confronted by the Algerian revolution, the Soviet government, in hopes of reaching an agreement with de Gaulle, has long considered the Algerian question as a "French affair." The Chinese government, on the contrary, has recognized the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.

The Soviet leadership seeks out and backs up the national bourgeoisies or fractions thereof which are in favor of its line of "peaceful coexistence" with imperialism. It causes the Communist Parties to support these "allies" and to subordinate to them the struggles of the worker and peasant masses. The most striking examples are those of Kerala in India and the attitude imposed on the Iraqi C P toward the Kassem government. To justify this conduct, Khrushchev's "theoreticians" only repeat Stalin's about the bourgeois-democratic stage of the revolution in these countries and about the progressive role that the bourgeoisie might play in these revolutions.

Without formally repudiating what was the fundamental conception of their party for more than 20 years, that of the revolution by stages, the Chinese, both because of their own experience and because of their relations with bourgeois governments of colonial and semi-colonial countries, put forward a conception of "uninterrupted revolution" which tends to encourage the class action of the worker and peasant masses in these countries, independently of and against bourgeois leaderships. It is not a question of an absolutely clear and principled attitude, apart from any consideration of foreign policy by the Chinese state. But on this point also the orientation of the Chinese is headed toward the correct path.

C) PARLIAMENTARY AND PEACEFUL PATHS TO SOCIALISM

Beginning with the XXth Congress, Khrushchev had made explicit a conception underlying the activity of the Communist Parties in most capitalist countries, especially in France and Italy — that of the conquest of power by peaceful and parliamentary paths, with the question of the destruction of the bourgeois state blurred over. The reservation concerning the fact that these paths could prove to be blocked in case of a fierce resistance by capitalism or by certain of its fractions, was only a literary flourish, for the policy of the Communist Parties is based only on parliamentary and peaceful paths, and the C P's, like the Social-Democratic Parties, are organized only for that perspective.

This conception, warmly accepted by the leaderships of the Communist Parties, had caused worries and resistance in their rank and file. The Chinese, on this question, pull these equivocal formulæ in the opposite direction to that adopted by Khrushchev. They insist on the inevitable resistance of capitalism, and on the reasons that render the bourgeois parliament an obstacle to the revolutionary transformation of society. They also insist on the need for the construction of a new state, that of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

D) "MODELS" FOR THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM

Just after the war, and especially after the start of the "cold war," when the "people's democracies" were structurally assimilated, they began in a servile way to

copy the Soviet model, each setting out to build its "socialism in a single country" (extreme industrialization, forced collectivization of agriculture, etc).

The first resistance to this servile copying, in which all the Stalinist errors were renewed and amplified, came from the Yugoslavs, who worked out their own way. Other resistances were shown in 1956, especially in Hungary and Poland. And lastly the Chinese — especially owing to the "communes" — are following a different path for the building of socialism.

Thus three different "models" for the building of socialism exist and confront one another: the Soviet model, the Chinese model, and the Yugoslav model.

Each of these models, while containing characteristics inherent in the conditions of the countries where they are being developed, take as their starting-point different and even opposed conceptions about social relationships, and so the masses of the workers' states have the possibility of contrasting these conceptions and judging their results.

The Soviet model carries weight because of its seniority and the economic and technical results already achieved, which make the USSR the second most powerful state in the world. But, in spite of all the reforms carried out since Stalin's death, it is essentially marked by the weight of the bureaucracy in Soviet society, its omnipotence in every domain, its profoundly conservative nature, as well as by the tendencies to personal interest which are dominant among the bureaucracy. In addition, its Stalinist past (especially the forced collectivization of agriculture and the frightful purges) remains on the debit side for the workers' states of Eastern Europe and in the workers' movement of Western Europe.

The Chinese model is above all marked by the experiment of the communes. Despite a bureaucratic functioning that has its causes both in the conceptions of the leadership and in the conditions of China's economic and cultural backwardness, the experiment of the communes consists of an attempt to mobilize the masses on a collective basis, and not on the basis of strictly individual interest. The experiment of the communes is to permit this collective effort to bring the whole of Chinese society out of the extreme backwardness that characterized it. At the same time, it permits very considerable advances on the social plane, especially on the plane of the liberation of women from the state of extreme inferiority in which they were in China. The Chinese model exerts considerable attraction on countries throwing off the colonial yoke, which find therein valuable teachings for their own development through an appeal for the collective participation of the masses. On the contrary, the Chinese model is feared by the Khrushchev leadership, which sees in the example of the communes a potential danger in the long run for the authority of the bureaucracy, and which is seeking to discredit it by falsely identifying it with Stalin's forced collectivization.

The Yugoslav model is the first "model" which, despite its limits and inadequacies, is trying — *on the level of the enterprises, and to a certain degree on the local and regional levels* — to base itself on the initiative and free consent of the masses, both in urban and rural regions, to favor the control and administration of the workers in these fields, in order to fight consciously against bureaucratic tendencies. The limited character of this policy appears in the fact that in Yugoslavia there is no economic and political democracy on a national scale (maintenance of the regime of one single party, without tendencies). Nevertheless, it is above all to this reliance on the masses against bureaucratic tendencies that Yugoslavia's important advances are due. The experiment has also proved fruitful on the level of the agricultural economy, in the attempt to favor its gradual collectivization, with a regard for its technical possibilities and with the voluntary contribution of small peasant proprietors. It is especially as the begin-

ning of a practical example of the antibureaucratic struggle that the Yugoslav model and the leadership of the League of Yugoslav Communists are combated by the leaderships of the other workers' states and Communist Parties.

E) INSUFFICIENT COÖRDINATION OF PLANNING BY WORKERS' STATES

There are no longer to be found in the relations between the USSR and the other workers' states the abuses and roughnesses that stirred up the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict to the point of a break, and then the tensions, especially with Poland and Hungary. Contradictions and tensions, however, continue to exist, and were echoed by Gomulka recently in a session of the Central Committee of the Polish party.

The Comecon is not a global planning organism of the workers' states' economies; it only ensures a certain division of labor. The reason for this is that the ruling bureaucracy of each workers' state, and first of all the Soviet bureaucracy, have interests that are above all national, and are aiming at results that they consider the best for their own position in their own country — and this even to the detriment of the others. In Eastern Europe, it was the leadership that was put most at a disadvantage by this situation, the Polish, which pointed out the danger.

The development of the economy of all the workers' states will render more and more acute the contradiction between the predominantly "national" character of the planning by countries, and the need for these economies to have international planning. The development of this contradiction will be an important factor in bringing into question the hegemony of the Soviet Union over the workers' states of Eastern Europe, and as a result will also contribute to the development of the crisis of Stalinism.

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These new contradictions of Stalinism decisively finish off the monolithism of the apparatuses of the workers' states and Communist Parties. Except for the case of Yugoslavia, it is in the heart of the Communist world, where there have been no breaks for a whole period, that gigantic contradictions have appeared and are confronting each other. Taken as a whole, these contradictions are beginning to trace out a revolutionary policy as against the opportunist policy of the Soviet leaders, on both the international and national planes: workers' control and administration, progress of socialism in the rural regions, relations of equality and collaboration among workers' states, support of the colonial masses, including against their own national bourgeoisies, revolutionary paths to socialism, and the fight for peace through the revolutionary struggle against capitalism.

But none of the mass forces which today are in contradiction with the Soviet policy and leadership formulates its opposition in a wholly consistent way and brings together all of these contradictions in an overall and fundamental criticism of Stalinism. On the contrary, the confronting positions among the different leaderships of the Communist Parties and the workers' states are visibly tangled and intersecting. Thus, the Albanians are supporting the Chinese on account of some of their positions and methods which are very different from those on account of which the Brazilians, for instance, are supporting them. It is therefore necessary, in order to decide on a correct intervention of our movement, to avoid any overall simplified juxtaposition, which could lead to wrong estimates about the different currents which are showing themselves in the crisis of Stalinism, and it is important to know in each case how to distinguish exactly the characteristics of each current concerning the motives which are impelling it and the tendencies, methods, and positions which are peculiar to it.

In addition, none of these forces formally brings into question the monolithic conception of the parties, defends

the right to tendencies in the parties, not to speak of the right to a plurality of workers' parties in the workers' states.

In different fields we see the emergence of the opposition between the progress of the workers' states and the policy of "socialism in a single country," which remains the central point of the orientation and the thought of all the leaderships of the Communist Parties. Objectively, the situation, especially that of the Chinese revolution, raises for the first time before a party leadership the problem of the permanent revolution in its three combined aspects: setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat to solve in passing the bourgeois-democratic tasks, development by bounds (by "great bounds") in all domains of social life, and international expansion of the revolution already victorious on the national plane.

Thus the contradictions of Stalinism have arrived at a degree of political ripeness eminently favorable for raising in more concrete terms the question of the political revolution and the renewal of the Communist movement, as well as that of the new mass international revolutionary leadership.

The political positions of the Chinese C P are far from those of revolutionary Marxism but they demonstrate its huge possibilities and are opening a field of work such as Trotskyism has never had in the past. The condition for our movement to make the most of this exceptional field is fully to understand the progress marked by the Chinese positions in order to go forward in the building of consistent communist tendencies free from the present limitations of the Chinese C P leadership, offering a rounded prospect to the Communist militants of the entire world and to the other revolutionary forces which are outside the C P's influence.

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE OF THE 81 COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' PARTIES

4. After two attempts (first in Moscow, then in Bucharest) which did not produce any lasting result, the Russians and Chinese endeavored at the Moscow Conference, held on occasion of the 43rd anniversary of October, to find a compromise putting an end to their dispute. They were obliged to associate in their efforts the leaderships of all the parties owing allegiance to Stalinism, given the fact that the problems at issue affected the whole Communist world.

Already by its very duration — more than three weeks — the Conference of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties has borne witness to a considerable change compared to the Stalin period in which unanimity was automatically reached by following his "genius." Monolithism has been replaced by discussion. But this is not a sign of democratic renewal in these parties: the discussions went on in secret among leaderships anxious to avoid revealing their difficulties and their differences to the militants and workers, as was done in the time of Lenin and Trotsky.

Beside the Conference's duration, the document which it issued expressed the determination to find a compromise which might be lasting.

In a general way the agreement seems to have been reached on the essential positions of the Soviet bureaucracy: the text is centred around the fight for peace through "peaceful coexistence" and disarmament. The Chinese had fought these ideas, but not in a clear and straightforward manner. The text repeats the Soviet formulæ but introduces, concerning each position, each political affirmation, reservations and considerations taking into account the positions defended by the Chinese. In particular, it is no longer a question of a capitalism divided into war-mongering and peace-loving wings, and the aggressive character of American imperialism is vigorously emphasized, in words which have nothing to do with the Camp David state of mind and favor the Peking press.

The Chinese retreated on "uninterrupted revolution": we now see a new formulation appear — "the state of national democracy" — a state without a class nature, the definition of which would depend, not on the nature of production relations, but on the eminently changing nature of its policy. Behind this formula we in fact find again the old Stalinist theory of a revolution standing halfway between capitalist society and the dictatorship of the proletariat, a social stage which would be neither capitalist society nor a workers' state, a society which has never yet been seen in history.

The Chinese have offsettingly obtained very serious concessions on the question which they certainly had at heart, i.e., the attitude towards the national bourgeoisie of colonial and semicolonial countries. The "dual role" of these bourgeoisies, opposed — but in a very unequal way — both to imperialism and to the worker and peasant masses, is denounced. The document is far from being correct on this point but it contains formulæ which the Chinese can utilize to good effect in the question of their relations with the underdeveloped states, still economically dependent on imperialism, in which the national bourgeoisie is seeking, not the improvement of the masses' conditions, but a more important share of the surplus-value produced in these countries. Given the place which is now occupied by the colonial revolution in the world revolution, it is evident that this is not only an important concession thus made to the Chinese, but also a leftward step — however timorous and contradictory it may be — in relations with imperialism on the scale of world policy. In practice, this concession to the Chinese could prove of very great importance by the consequences it may involve.

The text repeats more or less what was said at the XXth Congress about the ways toward socialism, which was interpreted in one way by the Russians and in another by the Chinese. On this point there have been no new developments; and nothing will prevent the discussion from being renewed on the first occasion, just as in the past.

On the question of the Communes, to which the Chinese accord a preponderant place as a form of development of society toward socialism, the silence of the text shows that the divergences persist. The most the Chinese obtained was that it is a question of a "correct" application of the general laws for the building of socialism, taking into account the national peculiarities of each country and the interests of the socialist system as a whole. This is little enough if it is remembered that, for them, the system of the Communes was rather for generalized application.

The resolution denounces, but in a different and unequal way, revisionism and dogmatism. The latter is presented as a secondary and anonymous danger. The Yugoslavs, on the contrary, are violently attacked as revisionists and, what is more, they are falsely accused of having proclaimed that Marxism-Leninism was "obsolete" and of committing "subversive actions" against the socialist camp and the world communist movement. The excess of these attacks testifies to how much the bureaucrats are afraid of the Yugoslav attitude — however limited it may appear — faced by the contradictions of the parties and states represented in Moscow.

On a point raised by the Poles concerning closer planning among the workers' states, they obtained satisfaction.

The text seems to show that no change has occurred on the point of the "guiding party": the Soviet C P keeps its title as the universally recognized vanguard of the world Communist movement, etc.... This formulation has never bothered the Chinese when they wanted to fight the Soviet leaders' policy.

In the official communiqué announcing the holding of the conference and the list of participants, it may be noticed that the Soviet C P is no longer put first but is

named in alphabetical order between the Turkish and Uruguayan. In so hierarchical and bureaucratic a world as this, this tiny indication has a symbolic value.

The document adopted by the conference shows that in fact the differences have not been resolved and that there is rather "an agreement to be in disagreement," provided it be sufficiently discreet. During the conference, the Chinese, although in the minority, received the support of several Communist Party leaderships. Other leaderships, moreover, intervened in a conciliatory role.

The international situation and the general conditions which gave birth to the Sino-Soviet differences, far from having a pacifying effect, will nurture them and tend to make them still more acute than in the past. We must consequently direct our action with the prospect of a renewal of the conflict, a rebounding of the differences, more and more important signs of tensions and crises inside the Communist world, without its being possible now to determine exactly the moment, the precise forms, and the parties from which the crisis will start again.

The Conference of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties has shown that the spread of the revolution in the world and the strengthening of the productive forces in the workers' states have not ceased, since the Second World War's end, to stimulate the crisis of Stalinism and that no solution can be found within the framework of bureaucratic power through agreements among bureaucratic leaderships. These only manoeuvre against the requirements raised by the situation itself, namely the reestablishment of workers' democracy and the reestablishment of a Communist International basing itself on democratic centralism.

PROBLEMS AND CONTRADICTIONS OF SOVIET SOCIETY

5. The general tendency shown by the Soviet leadership since Stalin's death in the direction of raising living standards has been kept up and developed. The leadership has had to take into account the egalitarian tendencies which had been ferociously repressed in Stalin's time. It has had to raise very low wages, though the inequalities still remain very great. The improvement in the living conditions of the masses puts an end to or tones down the most elementary demands, but they give place to new demands. The toilers are more and more conscious of the enormous contradiction between the economic power of the Soviet state and the still modest level of their own lives (observe the various remarks at the time of discussions about the sputniks). This explains the insistence with which Khrushchev promises to surpass US living standards, and also his campaign for a "détente," in order to transfer part of the heavy military expenditures over into the domain of mass needs.

Buyers are showing themselves to be more and more demanding and exacting about the quality of consumers' goods, which was heretofore neglected, for quality was directed toward heavy industry, military needs and objectives connected therewith (space missiles, etc).

It must be pointed out that, in the movements that took place in Kazakhstan, the workers accorded great importance to demands of a social nature: crèches, theatres, cinemas, sports fields, etc.

In the field of life in the enterprises, the authorities have taken various measures which could in themselves be considered liberal (powers of certain trade-union organisms in the enterprise, transfer of the administration of certain institutions to the enterprises or the trade unions). Whatever use that the workers may make of these measures in a still indeterminate future, they have generally been dictated above all by the needs of better administration, which remains of a bureaucratic type. They are parallel to the measures of decentralization taken in the economy in

general, in planning, for the old forms of extreme centralization were incompatible with extremely developed and extensive organisms.

The bureaucracy is the object of numerous criticisms on grounds of its forms and methods of leadership, and not — at least in an openly expressed way — as a social category. The Soviet working class, so strong numerically and spread over a large number of urban centres, has not up till now expressed demands for democratization in the enterprises, which would normally form the bridge toward more general demands of a political nature aiming at the reestablishment of soviet democracy in the workers' state.

Since the agricultural economy is still the weak point of the Soviet economy, the leadership has sought both to improve the conditions of the peasantry by stimulating the personal interest of the kolkhoz members, and to bring pressure on them by production obtained by utilization of the "virgin lands." The results obtained by these two means have been mediocre, and it cannot be otherwise so long as the peasantry is dealing with bureaucratic authorities.

The intelligentsia, even though its income has been reduced, remains a very privileged social stratum, but always on condition that it shows itself conformist toward the authorities. In the field of artistic and literary production, after a period of "thaw," the Khrushchev leadership, while parading an appearance of liberalism and giving up certain absurdities specific to Stalin, has gone on to tightening up control over the intellectuals. It fears that, through them, political criticism of the bureaucratic regime may make its way. The notions of "party literature," "party art," are maintained, although with broader limits than in Stalin's time. The important fact is that there is a resistance in the intelligentsia to the reestablishment of controls. In addition, besides official literary and artistic production, there exists a non-conformist production that circulates in a semi-clandestine fashion.

In the youth, especially the university youth, new currents, new absolutely non-conformist tendencies, are already ripening. It is from them that there will arise the revolutionary forces that will fight for a genuine "return to Lenin." The existence of such tendencies has been demonstrated in various forms and under varying circumstances, but for the moment still in a rather embryonic stage (studies to rediscover the genuine history of the Russian Revolution, hostility to the intervention in Hungary, etc).

Various strata of the bureaucracy, especially the highest ones, have both undergone a limitation of the most outrageous and exorbitant of their privileges, and obtained some stability, a guarantee of being alive tomorrow, unknown in Stalin's day. There are no longer mass purges. The question of being "in the line" has a more and more formal character. The most important consideration is "efficiency" in one's post, under pain of being sent down to a lower rung of the ladder.

The present liberalism does not mean that the bureaucracy as a whole has a voice in policy. Only a few very high functionaries are associated with the discussions which take place in the party's Central Committee. Only this organism has recovered, compared to the Presidium (ex-Politburo), some rights that it had completely lost; it was thanks to the C C that Khrushchev was able to put an end to the "anti-party" tendency which had put him in a minority in the Presidium. The state apparatus, including the Supreme Soviet, is only an instrument for carrying out the decisions of the C C.

The new conditions of easing social relationships cause the party apparatus — which is the only political cement of Soviet society — to be more isolated than ever from the various strata of society. Nevertheless, since this apparatus, more specifically the C C, is the only really political organism in the country, it is probable that it is within it that, at the beginning, a great political crisis of Soviet society

will find expression. The present C.C., with rare exceptions, is made up of new figures, without political pasts and without genuine political attachments.

The importance accorded and the insistence shown by the Soviet leaders in combating in the party press the conceptions advocated by the Chinese, the warnings on this subject spread through the party organisms, permit thinking that there are in the C.P. of the USSR currents that share the viewpoint of the Chinese or are turning in the same direction in regard to the policy of "peaceful coexistence" and its results. Nothing justifies the assertion that this was a matter of ex-Stalinists, partisans of the old so-called "anti-party" tendency. It seems rather to be a matter of manifestations coming from new layers, thus proving that since the XXIst Congress an evolution has taken place, the ripening of a new phase in the crisis of Stalinism in the first workers' state.

The political atomization of the masses which is the basis upon which the absolute domination of the bureaucracy is based is now beginning to be replaced by some tendencies among the masses to make demands and by the creation of some study and discussion centres among the vanguard. The growth by leaps and bounds of the Soviet economy is preventing any stabilization of the administrative apparatus and is forcing it to adapt itself; by doing this, it lays itself open to criticism.

Administrative problems are continuously and openly discussed by the Soviet press. The dynamism of Soviet society is constantly jarring bureaucratic conservatism. The colonial revolution is having a strong effect on Soviet society.

SITUATION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES IN CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

6. Pretty much everywhere in these parties, the 1956-57 crisis had taken spectacular forms, and in certain cases it had even been necessary to proceed to changes of leaders or of leading staffs. Afterwards the beginning of a tendency struggle appeared. Then, in a general way, the leaderships of the parties recovered their control over the Communist organizations. But since the 1956-57 crisis a deepening of the crisis in the C.P.s could be observed everywhere, within parties of greater or lesser importance, even if the aspects of this crisis were no longer spectacular.

Where Communist Parties are mass parties, there was nowhere a profound deterioration of the party ties with the working masses as a consequence of the discussions linked with the "personality cult." But there is a constant crisis characterized by a weakening of the leaderships' authority, the expression of doubts among more or less important strata in these parties concerning the policy followed by these leaderships, and sporadic demonstrations of opposition arising up to now in rank-and-file organisms when some circumstances in the country contribute thereto.

Concerning smaller Communist Parties whose influence among the masses was weak, the 1956-57 crisis expressed itself almost everywhere through walk-outs and an appreciable loss of influence. Since then contradictory developments could nevertheless be observed. Thus, as was the case in Great Britain and Australia, due to a certain radicalization among the working class, and in relation with the Labour Party, certain Communist Parties could win new elements and recover the ground they had lost. On the contrary, it has been seen how in Denmark the former main leader of the party, Axel Larsen, built a centrist party, the P.S.P., and succeeded in winning an election victory mainly at the expense of the Danish C.P.

Several factors are from now on tending to deepen the international crisis of Stalinism and the crisis within each Communist Party, i.e., the crisis of capitalism which raises problems which the Moscow policy does not answer,

the mass movements, the Sino-Soviet dispute and more generally the internal fights of the bureaucracies resulting from the progress of events and the movements of the masses.

Those elements are now weighing most heavily on the parties of the colonial and semi-colonial countries. In some cases, the development of the colonial revolution has eliminated the Communist Party from political life. The most striking example is that of Algeria where the Algerian C.P. has literally paid with its own existence the fact of having been an instrument of the French C.P. and of its "national" policy even on the Algerian problem. In most cases the Communist Parties of the colonial and semi-colonial countries are undergoing with more or less intensity the pressure of the mass movement of their own country while they simultaneously undergo pressure either from Moscow or from Peking. This has caused the formation in these parties of diverging currents, opposed tendencies (India, Brazil) and sometimes splits (Iraq).

The Communist Parties of advanced capitalist countries, especially the big parties, are much more influenced by their alignment with Kremlin policy, by the rightist and opportunist character of their policy. A new and broad development of the crisis in these parties can result either from the spur they could receive from a new important crisis, especially a crisis in the USSR itself, or from a new rise of the working-class movement and its effects on the medium and rank-and-file cadres of these parties who can make up their minds to express an opposition only in case that mass pressure offers them a real prospect for a militant policy, a left-opposition policy.

As a result of the effects of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the Communist Parties, we are now more and more confronted by parties whose policies will differ from one country to another and which will consequently need an appropriate orientation in each case. In the case of parties in which the Moscow influence is predominant, it will be against a rightist and opportunist policy that the fight must be made, by setting up in opposition thereto first of all the action programme dictated by a policy of left opposition. In the case of parties or tendencies in the parties influenced especially by Peking, we shall be faced by a left centrism of a new type which could, if we did not adopt a correct attitude towards it, become an obstacle to our own development during a certain period. In such cases, we must take as starting point the progressive positions reached by these parties, to put forward the necessity for the militants and currents following such an orientation to conduct a consistent theoretical and political fight, that is to say, go beyond the positions already reached to arrive at the positions of revolutionary Marxism.

In any case, we must start from the general consideration that contradictions will continue to grow in the Communist world, that national and international problems will reciprocally act within it and that *all* Communist Parties, whatever their present policy may be, will constitute a more and more favorable field for the growth of the revolutionary Marxist ideas of the Fourth International.

Among the important Communist Parties in the capitalist countries, there can be observed the fan-like extent of all these different manifestations of the crisis of Stalinism:

The French Communist Party, which has the most Stalinist leadership and the strongest apparatus, presents a very fallacious appearance of unity of views. A heavy uneasiness is rife in its ranks and among its cadres. The leadership is aware of the existence of oppositionals who "are waiting for their hour" (Thorez dixit). The exacerbation of the political situation in France or a new manifestation of open crisis in international Stalinism would not fail to stir up a big crisis in this party.

The Italian Communist Party is the one that follows a systematically right-wing policy (with, in case of need,

left turns), while yet showing a certain liberalism concerning internal political life.

The Indian Communist Party has never ceased to be ideologically divided, and the failure at Kerala and the Chinese-Soviet dispute cannot fail to aggravate its divisions.

The Brazilian Communist Party, which has experienced several very serious crises in the past, is again divided by a big tendency fight, in which divergences created by Brazilian politics are combined with problems stirred up by the Chinese-Soviet dispute.

The Indonesian Communist Party, which has also experienced serious crises in the past, has in the last period gone through abrupt variations (within the general limits of a policy of support to Sukarno), variations that are probably explicable as a reflection of divergences among the party tops.

Even if the visible effects of the Chinese-Soviet dispute in the form of an open crisis are at present limited to the Brazilian C P and to a few other parties in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, it is inevitable that in the long run this dispute — which the Chinese and Soviet leaderships have not succeeded in smoothing out — will nurture all the contradictions that exist in the Communist Parties, and will tend to make big crises emerge. First, because it raises problems concerning the general policy of the Communist Parties on the national and international scale. And second, because of the immense weight of China on the world stage.

THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL AND THE NEW PHASE IN THE CRISIS OF STALINISM

7. The new phase in the crisis of Stalinism which is now ripening confirms the fundamental analyses of the preceding World Congresses and their main perspectives. It renders more imperious the task of our movement to exploit this new phase in order to bring about — in the Stalinist circles which, in both the capitalist and the workers' states, form the richest reserve of worker militants close to revolutionary Marxism — the advance of our ideas, to hasten the formation of sections of the Fourth International in the workers' states, of mass revolutionary Marxist parties, and thus to prepare the political revolution in the workers' states and the revival of an international leadership of the mass movement.

a) *In the Soviet Union and the Workers' States.* Most of the points formulated in the 1938 Programme of the Fourth International and in the Theses of the Vth World Congress remain on the agenda for a programme of action in the workers' states:

The struggle against social inequalities, for only a few too flagrant abuses have disappeared. In this field, the "return to Lenin" more than ever requires the limitation of salaries to the wage of a skilled worker.

The struggle against political oppression, which has not disappeared with the suppression of the omnipotence of the secret police. All the organizations and institutions in the U S S R are not free organisms, independent of the state power. The restoration of workers' democracy remains the principal task of the political revolution: the reestablishment of essential freedoms (of meeting, of association, of the press), the autonomy of the trade-union organizations, and the right to a plurality of soviet parties. Without the existence of these rights, there cannot be genuine soviets and a genuine soviet democracy.

Without soviet democracy there cannot be a reorganization of the Soviet economy that puts it under the effective administration of the producers.

The reestablishment of truth about the history of the U S S R, the Bolshevik party, and the Communist International, is not simply an exigence of scientific honesty, but an indispensable political necessity in order to allow the Soviet masses and the Communists of the entire world to

rediscover an orientation which really ties up with Leninist policy of the first years of the October Revolution.

Without questioning the need for the Soviet power to negotiate with the capitalist states and to work with a view to avoiding a new world conflict, the Chinese-Soviet dispute renders of intense present interest the demands of the 1938 Programme for a revolutionary international policy, for unconditional support to the workers' movements and the movements of the colonial masses, against any attempt, by the procedures of secret diplomacy, to reach a global agreement with imperialism at the expense of the interests of the masses in any country whatever.

b) *In the Mass Communist Parties.* The orientation of work defined as a result of the Third World Congress (entrism sui generis) has proved justified both by the forms in which the crisis of Stalinism has developed, within existing organizations and not by massive splits in them, and by the results which were shown in the crisis years of 1956-57, i e, of oppositional formations tending to organize themselves to carry out a tendency struggle inside the Communist Parties. The paths to the formation and organization of tendencies inside the Communist Parties are entirely different from those inside the Social-Democratic Parties, for they require as a precondition a long period of clandestine, illegal, work.

The more and more evident manifestations of conflicts among the leaderships of Communist Parties of different countries cannot fail to contribute to aiding the formation of tendencies within any given Communist Party, for every member of a party is or should be a communist before being French, Italian, Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslav, etc. One of the first demands on this subject is that there be placed at the disposal of party members a complete and honest documentation on the questions in dispute, by the publication of texts even of leaderships that are opposed. That is the first condition for the party members being able themselves to discuss and to judge for themselves, and not to follow, by an abusive interpretation of discipline, the viewpoints of their national leadership.

Such a conception cannot fail to lead to the need for an international organization of the Communist movement and to clarify the idea of a world party of the socialist revolution based on democratic centralism. The evolution of the relations among the Communist Parties since the dissolution of the Third International has been marked by a series of failures of the Soviet bureaucracy (formation of the Kominform, bilateral relations, and now occasional conferences among a greater or lesser number of leaderships). All these failures testify to the growing and ever more difficult necessity for the bureaucracy to dodge the objective requirement of a new international leadership of the communist vanguard. The Moscow Conference of the 81 Communist and Workers' Parties is, in its own way, an involuntary homage paid to the need for a world party based on democratic centralism, which at present only the Fourth International represents, not only theoretically but practically, in the international working-class movement.

Honest information, democratic discussion among the rank and file, international confrontation of divergences — these are the general demands in the Communist Parties, at the same time that we put forward our essential positions for bringing together a left current on a large scale in the mass Communist Parties. The general lines of such a programme are rendered more and more specific by the great problems of the international situation and by the divergences that it has already aroused between the Soviets and the Chinese: the struggle for peace through a struggle to disarm capitalism by driving it out of power; unconditional support for colonial revolutions and help to the revolutionaries of the colonial countries for the creation of independent workers' and peasants' organizations carrying

out specific class action; denunciation of the concept of the peaceful and parliamentary paths, return to the conceptions advocated by Lenin in *State and Revolution*; struggle for power in the capitalist countries on the basis of a transitional programme and by means of the tactic of the united front of all the workers' organizations.

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In conclusion, the events since the end of the Second World War have more and more confirmed the Trotskyist thesis that Stalinism, i.e., the subordination of the Communist movement to the Soviet bureaucracy, was a phenomenon incompatible with any great revolutionary development. The Yugoslav revolution very quickly found itself breaking with Stalinism. Then, in the USSR and in the other workers' states of Eastern Europe, a series of contradictions appeared about the masses' immediate demands, which caused explosions (the Polish and Hungarian Octo-

ber). Despite all the Khrushchev leadership's attempts to reabsorb the crisis by a "reformism" not lacking in dynamism and based on the Soviet Union's immense economic and technical advances, new contradictions ripened, especially because of the development of the Chinese revolution.

Up till then, each of these crises was accompanied by limited demands which were contained in the general programme of the Fourth International or which went in the direction of these demands. At present the new phase of the international crisis of Stalinism raises a constellation of problems which are those of the world revolution and of the international transition toward socialism, and, behind them, that of the new mass international leadership. The new phase in the crisis of Stalinism that is ripening will thus be eminently favorable to the progress of Trotskyism and its organization, the Fourth International.

[See also, on page 4, the Congress Resolution on the case of our imprisoned comrades Michel Raptis (Pablo) and Sal Santen.]

Two Declarations of the International Secretariat

THE BELGIAN STRIKES *A Turn in the Situation in Western Europe*

1. The Belgian strikes of December 1960 - January 1961 are a total confirmation of the analysis contained in the Theses of the XXIInd Plenum of the International Executive Committee concerning the prospects of the workers' movement in Western Europe.¹ These theses took as their starting-point the idea that we are at the beginning of a capitalist offensive against the living standards and liberties of the working class in Western Europe, as a result of the trend towards a slow-down in economic growth and an exacerbated competition among capitalists on a world scale, especially within the Common Market. They indicated as a general prospect that, faced by this offensive, the European working class had everywhere (except in France) kept its fighting potential intact, that it would not "let itself be done in," that it would make a vigorous answer, and even, by the wide extent of its spontaneous reaction, overcome the present braking action which its traditional leaderships apply even in defensive struggles. The theses on European prospects concluded therefrom that if objective conditions do not at present permit foreseeing in Western Europe revolutionary struggles on the 1918-1921 or 1944-1947 pattern (i.e., struggles developing into crises of collapse of the capitalist economy and state), they nevertheless render perfectly possible broad struggles, objectively revolutionary, for transitional demands, such as the 1936 struggles in France and Belgium. It added that every vigorous defense against the capitalist offensive would broaden out into struggles of that kind. That is exactly what happened in Belgium.

2. The Belgian general strike was a spontaneous answer of the Belgian proletariat to the "Loi Unique," that is to say, against the bourgeois attempts to load on to the laboring masses the cost of an economic and financial "rehabilitation," an operation similar to the Rueff-Pinay devaluation in France. It was prepared and made possible by means of a slow radicalization and ripening process among a broad workers' vanguard, a process which steadily developed, from the 1957 strike of the metal-workers through tendency struggles inside the mass organizations (FGTB [General Federation of Belgian Workers] and the PSB [Belgian Socialist Party]), the Borinage strikes, and the 24-hour general strike of 29 January 1960. It was aided by the fact that these mass organizations adopted an action programme called "of structural reforms," which in itself is ambiguous and contradictory and may be interpreted either as a programme for patching up capitalism or as a programme of transitional demands opening the way to a period of dual power in the country. The adoption of this programme has been accompanied by propaganda which got firmly into the heads of vanguard Belgian workers the idea that Belgian capitalism has failed, that it is unable to secure a better economic future

for the country, and that it must be replaced by a new social system, based on socialist transformations. The decline of Belgian imperialism initiated by the accession of the Congo to political independence; the worldwide weakening of the capitalist system; the successes won by the USSR and the workers' states in the economic and technological fields — these have contributed to discrediting Belgian capitalism in the eyes of the workers of this country, and opened up, at least for a broad vanguard, the prospect of a decisive struggle against the forces of capital.

3. Owing to the drive of this vanguard, the forces it could spontaneously mobilize, the organizational forms it adopted (local strike committees, locally or regionally coordinated strike pickets), and the means of struggle it used, this strike — which was in any case the most powerful in all Belgian history and one of the most extensive ever seen in Europe — tied up again with the most advanced traditions of the past and partly went beyond them. It has completely refuted all the nonsensical talk about how the working class has been rendered so bourgeois by high wages that it would no longer be capable of engaging in revolutionary struggles. As a matter of fact, these struggles have been characterized by a level of consciousness and methods of action which are objectively more revolutionary than all that the Belgian proletariat was able to achieve in the years of deep destitution or deep depression before the First or Second World War. Conclusions must be drawn from these events concerning the revolutionary potential, which remains enormous, regarding the future struggles not only of the Belgian working class but also of the whole European working class. The Belgian experience thus follows the lines of the experiences in Poland and Hungary in 1956, and in Italy in 1960 — all of which show at different levels that any new explosion by the workers in Europe, far from having to start from zero, will start from the highest level previously reached.

4. A general strike may be victorious only if it spreads at lightning speed and ends up in a rapid capitulation of the government and/or the employers. As soon as the bourgeoisie has had time to organize the repression and the counter-offensive, the general strike can be victorious only as armed insurrection. A treacherous or inadequate leadership prevented the Belgian strike from triumphing in either one way or the other.

As the Belgian proletariat is more or less equally divided into Christian trade-union (CSC) members and Socialist trade-union (FGTB) members, the strike spontaneously set going by hundreds of thousands of vanguard workers of the FGTB could become a general strike only if it drew the Christian workers into the struggle. In such a case, it would have put on the agenda the creation of a PSB-FGTB-CSC government, that is to say, a workers' government. But the rightist reformist

¹ Published in our Winter 1959-60 issue, q v.

leadership of the FGTB (Major wing) deliberately refused to utilize the most appropriate moment to swing the Christian workers into the strike. As soon as the Cardinal had delivered his Christmas message condemning the strike, as soon as the repression was organized and the backward strata were intimidated by this combination of the sabre and the aspergillum, this appropriate moment was gone. Hence the leadership of the CSC could play a fink role: the majority of the Flemish workers did not participate in the strike, which thus did not succeed in paralyzing the whole economic life of the country and was a general strike only in the Walloon part of the country.

Nevertheless it could still have been a smashing success if the workers had thwarted the government's policy of repression and had mobilized their enormous fighting potential in the direction of goals of centralized action (occupation of the factories, formation of defense militia, march on Brussels, etc). By so acting they would have prevented the government from breaking the strike bit by bit, beginning with the weakest sectors. This would have required a strike leadership capable of leading the fight to the finish, one equal to the emergency. Such a leadership did not exist in the Belgian strike.

Faced by the contemptible abdication of the right-wing reformist leadership of the FGTB (Major wing), it was the FGTB left, centrist, wing, the Renard wing, which took over the official leadership of the strike. For the huge majority of the workers, it was identified with the strike and was considered as validly representing the vanguard of the Belgian proletariat. But if Renard differs favorably from the more rightist currents by an undeniable combativity and an absence of parliamentary or electoral cretinism, he has many a time in the past confirmed his centrist nature by refusing to engage in decisive fights or refusing to lead to their end struggles already begun. This was once more the case. Refusing to adopt goals of action of sufficient value to mobilize all the forces engaged in the strike, he replaced them by adventuristic forms of action, e.g. calling off the job the final security squads — which in addition were finally not applied — or opportunist ones (Walloon nationalism), which had a demobilizing effect and could not prevent the strike from ebbing. The workers finally went back to work, but with an iron morale and the firm decision to "start it all over again" at the next opportunity.

5 There was no possibility at all, during the strike itself, to replace the Renard leadership by an alternative one. This would have required the previous existence of elements of such a new leadership on a wide scale to allow them to get themselves accepted within a period of just a few days; it is indeed impossible to improvise a revolutionary leadership, and it is well known that prior to the strike, only a small, even though admittedly valuable,

nucleus of such a leadership existed, much too small to be able to lead the strike. Besides, it was only during the strike that the official right-wing leadership was replaced by the Renard centrist one. A few weeks of strike were not sufficient to allow the masses to learn from their experience with this new leadership. And, lastly, though very clear tendencies for the masses to go over the heads of the trade-union apparatus appeared during the strike, these tendencies were rather rapidly reabsorbed in the areas where the "Renardists" controlled the apparatus; only the most rightist fractions of the apparatus remained isolated from the masses. Therefore strike committees that were really autonomous from the apparatus existed only in a minority of areas (in part of the Charleroi district, partly in Antwerp and Brussels); everywhere else the strike committees were, in fact, under the control of the Renard tendency. Though these strike committees were actually in an embryonic way organisms of dual power, it was impossible to get them to play this part in practice on the national scale, to federate nationally, or to become conscious of this role during the strike itself.

As an offset, thanks to the strike and during the strike, a new stratum of rank-and-file militants has been forged, true natural leaders of their class, composed partly of old experienced militants, partly of young elements aroused for the first time from the "anonymous" rank and file, who are beginning to assimilate the lessons of the strike and who represent valuable elements for forming a replacement workers' leadership, around the existing revolutionary Marxist nuclei. To educate and regroup these elements, and to help them to feel revolutionary consciousness, is the most important task of the Belgian revolutionary Marxists.

6. Even when the sharply marked national peculiarities are taken into account, the Belgian events allow us to predict that, when confronted by capitalist offensives — absolutely unavoidable in a quite near future — the workers of a series of countries in Western Europe (above all Great Britain and Italy, but probably also West Germany and even France) would react in the same way and in the same general direction as the Belgian workers did. It is urgent that all vanguard militants, and especially the revolutionary Marxists, in all these countries study the experience of the Belgian strikes, the mechanism of interaction that exists between spontaneous explosions and the evolution of tendencies within the workers' movement, and the conditions for the rise and reinforcement of a new vanguard. They must be deeply convinced that this prospect is by far the most likely and that the Belgian example in itself will help the Western European proletariat to set out along the same road.

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

1 February 1961



ON THE ASSASSINATION OF LUMUMBA

The International Secretariat of the Fourth International stigmatizes the new crime of colonialism in the Congo which aroused the indignation of international public opinion among the workers, and expresses its solidarity with the Mouvement National Congolais for the loss of its most representative leader, PATRICE LUMUMBA.

LUMUMBA was murdered by the Belgian colonialists and their agents, under the hypocritical cover of the U N O, because he was leading a just struggle for the independence and unity of the Congo. But his elimination will not profit the murderers, for the fight of the Congolese people

will continue and develop in ever sharper forms.

The Fourth International takes its stand, without any reservations, in favor of self-determination for the Congolese people, its right to total independence and unity, the elimination of any and all imperialist influence, either direct or indirect, in the Congo, and the departure of the U N troops.

Long live the independent and united Congo!

THE INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

15 February 1961

News of the World Workers' Movement and of the International

Latin America

INFORMATION BULLETIN NOW IN PRINTED FORM

The *Boletín Informativo Latinoamericano e Internacional*, which for two years had been brought out in duplicated form by the Latin American Bureau, began with its December 1960 issue to appear in 12-page printed form.

The *Boletín Informativo*, which contains translations from *The Internationalist*, fortnightly information bulletin published by the International Secretariat, plus news and commentary of more specifically Latin American interest,

has proved very useful, not only to our numerous agitational newspapers in Latin America, but in direct distribution among the worker and student vanguard in the various countries there.

Fourth International sends its congratulations to the *Boletín Informativo* for this step forward, and best wishes for regularity of issue and long life.



Belgium

THE "LOI UNIQUE" WILL NOT BE APPLIED; PAMPHLET ON THE STRIKE

Despite the unbroken spirit, and determination to renew the attack on the first favorable occasion, with which the Belgian workers returned to the factories, mines, and offices after the great strike of 1960-1961, the bourgeois press cried victory, because both houses of parliament had finally passed, in amended form, the iniquitous "Loi Unique" which was the initial cause of the strike action. Less emphasized was the fact that the strike had toppled the government of Premier Eyskens, the "tough" weakling who had pig-headedly insisted on the passage of the law, since parliament was dissolved and new elections called for 26 March.

But now even the "victory" of the vote of the "Loi Unique" has turned to ashes in the capitalists' hands.

It was supposed that the outgoing coalition cabinet would, as is the usual practice, remain simply "to expedite current affairs." But when the Liberals, who were never keen for the "Loi Unique" in the first place, learned that Eyskens and the Christian Democrats actually meant to *apply* it in the intervening period, they blew up and resigned. Their mental processes can well be imagined: it was all very well to vote the law as a matter of prestige and not "yield to the pressure of the

street," but to *apply* it, and probably provoke new and incalculable explosions of popular indignation — ah, no! There was frenetic activity among the ministers and party leaders, a fine scramble in what the French neatly call "a pretty basketful of crabs"; and it was finally announced that none of the fiscal measures of the "Loi Unique" would be applied in the pre-election period. So that even on this disputed point, the strike was successful.

Meanwhile, by a joint effort of our Belgian and French comrades, a 32-page pamphlet has been issued — *La Grève Belge de 1960-61: Force et faiblesse d'un grand combat*, by the Belgian comrades Jean de Vries, Fernand Charlier, and Emile Decoux. This excellent study analyzes the strike in its origin, methods, and development; characterizes from both the political and trade-union viewpoint the behavior of the various organizations and tendencies of the Belgian workers' movement; and draws from the whole complex experience the necessary lessons and their application to future actions.

Those of our readers who read French may obtain the pamphlet from PIERRE FRANK, 64 rue de Richelieu, Paris 2 (1 new franc).



Bolivia

EXAMPLE OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

From *Lucha Obrera*, fortnightly newspaper of our Bolivian section, we are reprinting below excerpts from a message sent to the Cuban revolution by the Peasants' Union of Omasuyos on the Bolivian altiplano, which exemplifies not only the solidarity that the Bolivian peasant masses feel with the Cuban revolution, but also their revolutionary understanding of its methods and their universal application in underdeveloped countries elsewhere in Latin America and in the world.

Since 1 January 1959 many changes, the deepest in Latin America, have been made in Cuba. Under the drive of the peasant masses, the revolutionary

government has [...] carried the agrarian reform very far, distributing land, tractors, and other farm tools on a wide scale, because the agrarian reform means, not simply the dividing up of a few estates, but the bringing of technical progress to the rural regions and the organization of production for the benefit of the masses and the country. We peasants of Omasuyos are watching with admiration the process going on in Cuba, we support the Castro government, and, with fighting ardor, we offer our solidarity to our brothers of the Cuban rural regions. What is taking place

there immensely encourages us, and with this force we are fighting to make the Bolivian revolution go forward and not stall or backslide.

We also hail the wide-scale arming of the workers and peasants of the Republic of Cuba. We are organizing the peasant regiment "Los Colorados de Bolivia," because we are convinced that only the arming of the masses forms a solid guarantee of the revolution.

The experience of the Bolivian revolution has taught us many things. *Only the peasant organizations in alliance with the workers' organizations can guarantee the continuity of the revolution.* The minute the toilers stop being their own leaders, far from any pressure contrary to their interests, the revolution runs the risk of being lost. Here on the Altiplano in these moments fighting is going on among the peasants, and instead of sowing seed in the furrows, they are shedding the blood of their brothers.

May this not happen to the Cuban revolution,



which in this period is the banner-bearer of the Latin American revolution. May the lands entirely pass over into the peasants' hands. Let farm production be organized nationally in the form of coöperatives. Let technical progress in the rural regions be carried through to its culmination. Let the distribution of products be carried out under the direction of joint organisms of workers, peasants, and government representatives. Let the unions gain daily more deliberative power, and the armed peasant militia more executive power. Let the worker-peasant alliance find real expression: in technical aid, in exchange of products, in centralized unity on a national scale, and in joint mobilization in defense of the Cuban revolution.

★

Comrades! Your revolution is the living part, in this period the most living part, of the Latin American revolution. Let us set up against barbarous imperialism a firm revolutionary solidarity of the masses of this continent!

Denmark

ELECTIONS SHOW SHARP POLARIZATION AND STRONG LEFTWARD TREND

The theory that the Western European workers have gone bourgeois and become politically either conservative or apathetic was given another disproof in the recent Danish elections. Denmark, noted as a "welfare state" under a coalition government of the Social-Democrats and two small liberal parties, has been enjoying a prolonged boom, with full employment and increased wages — a situation supposed to block any leftward trends.

Yet even before the elections, there were advance signs. Many wildcat strikes broke out, against the opposition of the Social-Democratic trade-union bureaucracy. Outstanding was the strike of Copenhagen postal workers: a strike against the state itself, unheard-of in Denmark. And three weeks before the elections, a three-day march from Holbæk to Copenhagen, in protest against nuclear armament, was a great success.

Denmark has a long tradition of anti-militarism, but none of the old parties were offering the voters a chance to express it. The Social-Democrats have a completely pro-NATO policy; and the traditionally anti-militarist Radical Party voted for it. Even the Communist Party was against total disarmament.

One party, however, was taking a strong stand for total disarmament, with the slogan, "Not one krone, not one soldier, for defense." This was the new People's Socialist Party, formed in 1959 by a major split in the Communist Party (reported on in *Fourth International*, Spring 1959) led by the party's long-time president, Aksel Larsen. The rest of its programme, while hardly revolutionary, was much to the left of the Social-Democracy.

The results were decisive. The Communist Party vote fell from 72,000 (1957) to 27,000; and it lost all its seats in the parliament, which were picked up by the new Socialist People's Party. But the new party, with a smashing vote of 150,000 on its first try, bit into the Social-Democracy too, for five more seats, as an estimated 100,000-odd usually Social-Democratic voters thus showed their radicalization. As a result of deserting its traditional anti-militarist policy, the Radical Party saw its votes cut by a quarter, and the other government party, the Justice Party (standing for the ideas of Henry George) lost all its seats. The Social-

Democratic Party compensated for its loss on the left by picking up six seats from the conservative opposition.

On the right, the "moderate" Conservatives and the liberal Farmers' Party lost seats to a new and more reactionary rightist formation.

The picture of increased polarization is clear: a leftward-moving left, a very weakened centre, and a rightward-moving right.

The Social-Democracy's behavior in forming the government was typical and will further open the eyes of its increasingly uneasy membership. It had a numerically equal choice in parliamentary support by making a coalition government with its fellow Socialist party or with the Radical Party. True to its incurable reformism and dependence on big business, it of course chose the Radicals.

Whether the new People's Socialist Party will prove any less reformist than the Communist Party from which it sprang remains to be seen. Aksel Larsen's own strongly reformist inclinations find an audience in those members who are either non-Marxist or not fully trained Marxists, and the pure pacifists. But many others want a more radical and even revolutionary policy, and vigilant rank-and-file opposition against bureaucratization has so far maintained internal democracy in the party, as was exemplified when Aksel Larsen's attempt to keep the bulk of our Danish comrades from joining it was blocked.

It is thus a promising field of work for our Danish comrades, to organize in this still relatively fluid organization a conscious left wing around a programme of revolutionary Marxism.

Denmark is not the only Scandinavian country where a strong left trend is visible. The Swedish general elections last autumn demonstrated a strengthening of the two workers' parties and a weakening of the Radical Party. In the Norwegian Labor Party, a strong and growing minority, with its own organ, *Orientering*, has adopted a clear and consistent policy of opposition to the NATO.

All these trends parallel in their own way the more spectacular phenomena in Belgium, Italy, and Great Britain, to show that it is, to say the least, somewhat premature for bourgeois propagandists to cross off the European working class as a factor in coming events.

France

A NEW STAGE IN THE CRISIS OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

The bitter fight that has broken out in the French Communist Party, with the Thorez leadership attacking Marcel Servin and Laurent Casanova, is the conclusion, according to the testimony of Maurice Thorez himself, of polemics that have been going on "for years" within the leadership of the C.P. What is the significance of such a situation at the heart of the monolithic leadership of the most monolithic of the mass Stalinist Parties in the capitalist countries? On what were these polemics centred? Why did Thorez feel the need to break them off abruptly just now, before the XVIth Party Congress is held? Such are the main questions raised by this new episode in the continuing crisis inside the French C.P., which thousands of workers in that C.P. and in the workers' movement in general are asking.

This is the third important "affair" concerning influential members of the leadership that has broken out since 1952, when the Marty-Tillon business exploded. It is therefore a process of almost uninterrupted crisis that has been shaking the leadership of this party. It cannot, moreover, be considered as a phenomenon limited to this leadership, but rather as the expression of a deep crisis which, quashed by this party's extraordinarily bureaucratic and rigid methods, has nevertheless been going on steadily for more than ten years.

The Servin-Casanova affair differs from previous episodes in ways that it is important to note, for they express precisely the fact that this French C.P. crisis is really different, if not in kind, at least in degree.

First of all, the leaders who are called up on the carpet today were able for several years — since 1958, at least — to present, inside the C.P. leadership, positions that were hardly those of Thorez. Marty and Tillon were not accorded such tolerance, which is explicable this time only by the fact that it was impossible for Thorez to liquidate with the same brutality as in the past any contradiction or opposition to his policy.

Next, Servin and Casanova (between whose positions, what is more, there exist serious differences, Casanova being of a rightist tendency, and Servin having for some time now expressed criticisms leaning to the left) were not the only ones concerned. Other cadres, among them Kriegel-Valrimont, Calas, Pronteau, and Vigier, are objects of Thorez's spite in one way or another, and, it seems, do not engage in self-criticism; whereas earlier victims, especially Marty, remained isolated when faced by Thorez's attack.

And lastly, the very tone used by Thorez is more flexible and even more defensive than in the preceding affairs. He is, so far, using the arguments of a politician rather than those of a cop. It is also not without interest to note that, whereas in earlier cases other members of the leadership acted as prosecuting attorneys, this time it is Thorez himself who is playing that role — which indicates a different situation inside the top leading staff and forces Thorez himself to undertake a chore for which he was not able to find anyone else who was capable... or willing.

As for reactions among the party rank and file, it is also worthy of note that, whereas in the case of Marty, who enjoyed immense popularity throughout the party, the leadership very quickly obtained mass condemnation of him, the present defendants, even though far less popular (especially Casanova, held in contempt by the intellectuals especially), have not been the objects of rapid mass condemnation. What is more — something quite new in the party — many rank-and-file organisms are asking to hear the defendants' point of view.

All this denotes a deep change both in the relations

between the ranks and the leadership of the French C.P., and in reactions among the party ranks themselves. For all those who have for years been following the quite extraordinary phenomenon of this super-bureaucratized mass Stalinist party, these symptoms of change, even though they are still only rather furtive flashes, are nevertheless the fore signs of the breadth and violence of the crisis that will shake the party under the influence of an internal and international conjuncture of intensified class struggles.

And what are the polemics about? In view of the Stalinist method of making known only the indictment without publishing the defendants' point of view, it is mainly from that indictment itself that the ideas in controversy can be deduced. And this time, *because he has to defend himself at the same time that he attacks*, Thorez, while engaging in deformations and amalgams according to the best Stalinist methods, permits us to deduce a lot of the accusations brought, in particular by Servin.

First of all, during his analysis of the referendum, Thorez uses a curious expression to characterize the attitude of the Algerian Communist Party (whose wretched past as a satellite of the French C.P. cut it off from any possibility of playing an important part in the present stage of the Algerian revolution, despite the personally heroic attitude of certain of its members). The Algerian Communist Party, he said, "didn't behave badly at all" — which seems to be precisely the answer to criticisms tending to show that it did behave quite badly.

But the combined attack-and-defense of Thorez shows mainly that it was the essential points of the Stalinist and even Khrushchevian policy that were brought into question during the polemics — first of all peaceful coexistence, in which the defendants saw "the consolidation of the governments of the imperialist countries as a result of coexistence." To this Thorez answered, with utter lack of logic, by citing the examples of Turkey, South Korea, and Belgium — as if the anti-capitalist fight of the masses in those countries was a result of the "coexistence" policy!

As for France itself, the defendants criticized the lack of any Communist Party policy permitting a consistent anti-capitalist struggle; the lack of a policy in favor of a proletarian united front (running from the shameful vote of special powers in 1956 to the refusal to participate in the 27 October 1960 demonstration against the war in Algeria; and the lack of any effective fight against the Algerian war in general. On this point Thorez defended himself by a brutal attack on the most positive forms of vanguard demonstrations that have occurred in recent months — the Letter of the 121, and networks for support of the F.L.N. and of French deserters — branding them means of "disorienting the masses."

On the matter of disorienting the masses, which the policy of the French C.P. has certainly done, the oppositionals must also have attacked. This fact emerges from a sentence used by Thorez: "We have not understood the idle discussions about the order of our tasks: which comes first, which has priority." The discussion is not idle, however, for those who know that, at the moment when the whole rhythm of political and social life in France is determined by the struggle between French imperialism and the Algerian revolution, the C.P. puts forward as the essential goal of its policy... the struggle against German rearmament and the setting up of German bases in France. It doesn't matter, Thorez answers: "We think that to struggle for disarmament helps the combat of the Algerian people for its liberation."

The obvious feebleness of such answers also indicates how precarious is Thorez's position compared to that in the struggles he has carried on in the past. We shall not conclude, certainly, that he will not once more succeed in imposing his position on the party ranks. But in view of the pitch of the crisis inside the French C P, the level of the problems raised, and the extensiveness of the stratum of militants who are bringing up one or another of these problems, "the oppositionals," whose existence since 1956-7 is now officially recognized by Thorez — another very important change in the bureaucratic yoke on the P C F — will not for all that be reduced to silence.

Why is it just now that Thorez abruptly attacks, after so long a discussion in the Political Bureau? In his deciding on the moment to launch this attack against the opposition within the leadership, the principal reason was certainly the development of the crisis in the international post-Stalinist movement. His attack came just after the Conference of the 81 Parties in Moscow

and just before the XVIth Congress of the French C P. The Thorez clique could not tolerate the continuance in the party leadership (and perhaps in the party itself — later operations will be revealing) of persons likely to head up a whole current in the party on the basis of problems concerning such points of international Stalinist policy as coexistence and their Thorezian application in France itself.

Thorez will no doubt once more win out over his opponents. Nevertheless, the positions on which he so solidly built the dictatorship of his clique are now fundamentally undermined both internationally and in France. A spreading and deepening of the crisis of international Stalinism, currently expressed by the Sino-Soviet polemics, might well worsen this situation in a definitive way. The revival of the workers' movement in France and the fight against a dictatorial regime which will be its outcome will prove to be the other shattering blow that will finish off the Thorezian period in the French C P.



U S A

ELECTION RESULTS SHOW BIG S W P ADVANCE

Official figures on the vote for the candidates of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party in the November 1960 elections, which were not known in time to appear in our last issue, are now in hand, and are most encouraging: 40,174 votes. These, compared with figures in previous elections — 1948: 13,613; 1952: 10,312; 1956: 7,233 — represent a big advance, both in number and, especially, in percentage. The results are particularly creditable when it is remembered: 1) that before engaging in the election campaign itself, the S W P had to fight long and exhausting battles to get put on (or keep from being illegally thrown off) the ballot in numerous states; and 2) that in unnumbered cases the votes for the S W P candidates were simply not counted (as was proved in many election

districts where S W P party members voted yet not a single vote was reported).

But perhaps even more important than the number of votes was the fact that the election campaign permitted the S W P to carry the message of socialism to literally millions of hearers by radio and television — despite the adoption of new and illegal measures to limit to a minimum the air-time of all candidates save those of the two main capitalist parties. As a result, letters have flooded in to S W P national headquarters from every part of the U S A expressing approval of the party's programme, including all-out support for revolutionary Cuba, and asking for further information about the socialist cause.

Special Offer

TWELVE ISSUES OF *Fourth International*

With the present special issue, devoted to the documents of the Sixth World Congress, *Fourth International* completes a series of 12 issues that began with the similar special issue devoted to the documents of its Fifth World Congress, three years ago. To mark this event, it is making a special offer of these 12 issues at the exceptional price of \$3.50 or £1/7s, postpaid. These are mint copies suitable for binding.

Since the number of complete sets available is limited, this offer automatically expires when they are exhausted, so it is advisable to place orders without delay. Order from:

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TO APPEAR IN PAMPHLET FORM

THIRTY QUESTIONS AND THIRTY ANSWERS about the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*

By ERNEST GERMAIN

Since the XXth Congress, the crisis within the Communist Parties all over the world has never ceased, sometimes simmering, sometimes boiling when the fuel of new revelations or disputes is added. Rank-and-file Communist militants are repeatedly asking the question, "But what happened? What are the real facts?" The recent Sino-Soviet polemics have started a new outburst of such questions.

Many of the answers, clear, principled, and mercilessly documented, are given by Comrade Ernest Germain in his "Thirty Questions and Thirty Answers about the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*," which appeared in the Summer and Autumn 1960 issues of *FOURTH INTERNATIONAL*. We are now preparing to publish this as a pamphlet.

In this compact and convenient format, it will provide a most useful weapon, especially for those comrades whose party tasks bring them into daily discussion with honest but misled Communist Party rank-and-filers who are trying to find the truth amid the obscurantist lies of Stalinist and the deforming half-truths of Khrushchev "explanations."

The format will be uniform with the two pamphlets of Comrade Michel Pablo: *The Fourth International: What It Is; What It Aims At*; and *The Arab Revolution*. Order early.

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