

Information, Education, Discussion

BULLETIN in Defense of Marxism

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Who We Are

The *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism* is published monthly by the Fourth Internationalist Tendency. We have dedicated this journal to the process of clarifying the program and theory of revolutionary Marxism — of discussing its application to the class struggle both internationally and here in the United States. This vital task must be undertaken if we want to forge a political party in this country capable of bringing an end to the domination of the U.S. imperialist ruling class and of establishing a socialist society based on human need instead of private greed.

The F.I.T. was created in the winter of 1984 by members expelled from the Socialist Workers Party because we opposed abandoning the Trotskyist principles and methods on which the SWP was founded and built for more than half a century. Since our formation we have fought to win the party back to a revolutionary Marxist perspective and for our readmission to the SWP. In addition our members are active in the U.S. class struggle.

At the 1985 World Congress of the Fourth International, the appeals of the F.I.T. and other expelled members were upheld, and the congress delegates demanded, by an overwhelming majority, that the SWP readmit those who had been purged. So far the SWP has refused to take any steps to comply with this decision.

“All members of the party must begin to study, completely dispassionately and with utmost honesty, first the essence of the differences and second the course of the dispute in the party. . . . It is necessary to study both the one and the other, unfailingly demanding the most exact, printed documents, open to verification by all sides. Whoever believes things simply on someone else’s say-so is a hopeless idiot, to be dismissed with a wave of the hand.”

—V.I. Lenin, “The Party Crisis,” Jan. 19, 1921.

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THE DEEPENING SOUTH AFRICAN CRISIS

by Tom Barrett

The South African crisis has entered a new stage as millions of South African Blacks and their supporters in other countries observed the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising. The Black industrial workers, especially the all-important miners, have emerged as the frontline fighters against apartheid, as the police were unable to stop the general strike called by the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) for June 14-16.

Black demands and methods of struggle are becoming increasingly proletarian, as it becomes clear that COSATU has the power to deal the kind of blows against the regime that the United Democratic Front (UDF)—through no fault of its own—could never do. The police have been able to prevent the UDF from holding a simple, peaceful march—and even attacked funeral processions. COSATU was able to shut down South Africa for three days, even with many of its leaders in jail. The government could not stop that strike.

As the working class demonstrates its power and raises its demands—which include, but also go beyond the abolition of apartheid—class divisions among Blacks are becoming sharper, in many instances leading to violent confrontation. The more astute white politicians in Pretoria, with no small amount of prompting from the United States and Britain, are recognizing that their one hope of preventing revolution in South Africa may lie with groups such as the "vigilantes" of the Crossroads or Zulu chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi's Inkatha.

Pretoria was badly stung by the success of the May 1 general strike, and the regime was determined not to let it happen again. Consequently, the tenth anniversary of the Soweto uprising was preceded by a massive government crackdown. Hundreds have been arrested and remain in jail, and many more are in hiding, including COSATU leader Jay Naidoo. (COSATU's president, Elijah Barayi, was arrested on July 1.) All rallies were banned with the exception of the one sponsored by Inkatha. Nevertheless, the general strike was successful.

International Solidarity

In New York City, 90,000-100,000 opponents of apartheid marched from the United Nations to Central Park to demand that the Reagan administration impose economic sanctions on South Africa. In London, over a quarter of a million marched. These mass protests have made it much more difficult for

the U.S. and British ruling classes—and indeed the ruling classes of the European Common Market countries—to stick to their policy of doing business with the South African racists.

Throughout the world one demand has unified anti-apartheid fighters and at the same time separated them from the imperialist politicians—the demand that severe economic sanctions be imposed on South Africa. All the important mass demonstrations have called for them; Britain, the United States, and the European Common Market countries have rejected them. In the United States students have raised the related demand of divestiture, that is, that their universities sell all stock in companies which do business in South Africa.

The U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill, sponsored by Democratic congressman Ron Dellums of California (a leader of Democratic Socialists of America, the U.S. Social Democratic organization), to impose sanctions. Whatever Dellums's own intentions may have been, for most congressmen it was a cynical maneuver, allowing them to pose as antiracist fighters, knowing full well that the Republican-dominated Senate was very unlikely to pass the bill, and, even if the Senate did, that it could never override Ronald Reagan's certain veto.

In spite of the U.S. Congress's action, the demand for sanctions in the present context is a good one. It helps to mobilize people; at the same time it helps to educate them on the true nature of the relationship between the imperialist powers and the Pretoria regime. Millions of dollars and even more millions of pounds sterling in profits are raked in every year by companies doing business in South Africa, and those superprofits are made possible by the low wage rates paid to Black workers—a direct consequence of the apartheid system. Of the South African economy's total capi-

To Our Readers

You will notice an improved look to the Bulletin in Defense of Marxism this month. We hope you like our new format. Please send along any comments or criticisms. With your help and support we can continue to make improvements.

Despite the smaller number of pages in this issue compared to previous ones, the more compact type allows us to put in twenty percent more words per page.

talization, 20 percent comes from foreign investors, the largest number of whom are British. South Africa's mineral exports are vitally important, especially to Western Europe. Israel, as well, depends on South Africa for the raw materials of its number-one export industry: cut diamonds.

South Africa has been preparing for over twenty years for the imposition of sanctions. It has become self-sufficient in arms and nearly self-sufficient in energy. Since its withdrawal from the British Commonwealth and proclamation of the Republic in 1961 it has sought to diversify its industry and reduce its dependence on imports. However, its economy, ironically, depends on an export market, since its domestic consumption cannot support its most important industries. Furthermore, withdrawal of foreign capital, which has begun already, and accelerated since Pretoria's moratorium on all principal payments on foreign debt, has had, and would continue to have deleterious effects on South Africa's economy. According to the July 21, 1986, *New York Times*, "capital flow from American companies, as measured by loans to South African subsidiaries and increased investment, has gone from \$71 million to South Africa in 1982 to a net outflow of \$17 million in 1985.

"This has battered the country's economy; its gross national product declined by five-tenths of 1 percent last year. . . . The rand, the South African currency, which fetched more than \$1.35 in 1981, is now worth about 38 cents.

"The currency crisis has contributed to the inflation rate of more than 17 percent. . . ." All of these problems have come into being *before* the imposition of sanctions by the U.S. and Western Europe.

Sanctions would be a serious blow both to Pretoria and to the multinational corporations who have taken advantage of what the *Value Line Investment Survey* has called "the pro-business environment." White House chief of staff Donald Regan, continuing in the tradition of Spiro Agnew, Earl Butz, and James Watt, exposed the true attitude of the business community when he argued that, if sanctions were imposed, "American women would have to give up their jewelry." No more comment is necessary on Mr. Regan's sexist stupidity; however, he would have been more honest had he said that if sanctions were imposed American military industries would have to give up their platinum, chromium, and vanadium sources. This has a great deal more relevance to Washington's South Africa policy, as Ronald Reagan made abundantly clear in his speech on South Africa on July 22.

The Debate on Sanctions Within South Africa

In South Africa itself the demand for sanctions has divided the Black community, separating the working class and its allies from those Blacks who have found a way to improve their own indi-

vidual situations in the Black townships or the Black "homelands." The latter group, which includes "homeland" government officials, owners of the "shebeens" (Black township "speakeasies"), and semicriminal elements, is quite similar to the urban underworld existing in most dominated countries. North Americans are most familiar with it in prerevolutionary Cuba and Vietnam. Having found a way to use the apartheid system for their own gain, they are more than willing to resist violently any attempt to dismantle that system.

Chief Buthelezi of KwaZulu is their most articulate spokesman. While he calls for equal civil and political rights for Blacks—he would be foolish indeed if he did not—he staunchly defends capitalism and opposes sanctions, claiming that sanctions would hurt Blacks the most. COSATU, on the other hand, which represents more Black workers than any other organization, supports sanctions. Whatever Buthelezi believes, what he says is clearly designed to curry favor with the Thatcher government and the Reagan administration. Just as the township entrepreneurs have made a place for themselves in apartheid society, Buthelezi is attempting to make a place for himself in imperialist statecraft.

Class vs. Race—as Reagan Sees It

Washington and London have made it clear that bourgeois class supremacy, rather than white supremacy, is their priority. One should not take their denunciations of apartheid as mere lip-service; for them white minority rule in South Africa has become a dangerous liability rather than an asset. The growing Black struggle has already begun to break through the limits of a bourgeois-democratic struggle in its demand for sanctions against the regime and in its use of proletarian methods of struggle—including successful general strikes. Reagan and Thatcher have good reason to be concerned.

Reagan's latest signal was his appointment of a Black businessman to be ambassador to South Africa. It was a signal on the class as well as race questions, for Robert Brown is the owner of a public-relations firm whose specialty is defeating union organizing drives. Though Brown "voluntarily" withdrew his name a week after being put forward, the point has been made. Reagan has promised to name another Black candidate for the post, and he will not name a trade unionist or civil rights activist!

While the charade performed around the Brown nonappointment may be laughable, Washington's commitment to keeping South Africa in the "Free World" is serious indeed. Though the problems they face are great, they are not insurmountable. Revolutionists must have a clear perspective on the relationship of class forces as they square off in South Africa.

Though the imperialists are willing to concede the race issue in order to fight the class battle, revolutionists would be making a mistake

to dismiss the Black freedom struggle as "irrelevant" or "unimportant" in relation to the working class. The democratic struggle and the working class struggle are dialectically inseparable in the South African context, for at least two reasons:

1) Most obviously, political and civil rights for Blacks *have not yet been won*. These are the primary demands which the Black masses are raising and around which they are willing to fight. The fight around this is a prerequisite to any struggle for economic and social liberation. *Reagan* may be willing to concede formal legal equality to Blacks, within the context of continuing exploitation, but *Botha* has not yet done so, and is facing increasing pressure from right-wing elements among whites not to do so.

2) Just as the ending of legalized segregation in the United States did not give Blacks genuine equality in American society, the abolition of apartheid will not end the oppression of South Africa's Blacks. Capitalist South Africa will continue to be white-dominated South Africa, no matter what happens to the racial separation laws. The capitalist class is not interested in social justice; it is interested in profit. It works in whatever social context already exists, with whomever it can, to make money. "Majority rule" with capitalism intact would mean nothing more than a national South African version of U.S.

ghetto politics—Black elected officials, but with whites exercising the real power.

This does not diminish the importance of the Black democratic struggle—it increases it. South African Blacks have made it clear that formal equality will no longer satisfy them. By continuing to fight against all forms of white domination Blacks of necessity fight against bourgeois domination. In South Africa—just as in the United States—history has created a special relationship between race and class. Revolution in both countries must of necessity be a *combined* class and national revolution.

A special relationship has also developed between the U.S. and South African Black struggles, a relationship which has been beneficial to both. North American Blacks and their white allies have made an invaluable contribution to the developing South African revolution; South Africa has given a new focus for Blacks and for radical students and workers in the United States. *Reagan* has not changed his "constructive engagement" policy, but when he spoke on July 22 he was clearly on the defensive. Successful mobilizations against his policy were held in June. The American Committee on Africa has announced plans for local demonstrations against apartheid on October 11. Their success will put added pressure on a president who, in the words of Bishop Tutu, "is the pits."

July 31, 1986

INDEPENDENCE DAY 1986

July 4 used to be celebrated as the victory of the first American Revolution, which ended in the independence of the thirteen colonies from England in 1776. The symbol of this holiday sixty years ago was three soldiers, one head-bandaged, the others playing the fife and drum.

The 110th anniversary in New York, made to coincide with the unveiling of the refurbished Statue of Liberty, gave the occasion to overlook 1776 and the fight to free the American people from the oppressive rule of England. Bringing up our own revolution would remind people of *Reagan's* foreign policy. Our country, now the richest in the world, attempts to dictate to underdeveloped nations how they should run their affairs: backing it up with belligerent actions, such as giving

financial aid to the contras in Nicaragua.

Ignoring the original nature of the holiday, the theme of the July 4 celebration this year was how America welcomes all immigrants with open arms. *Reagan* spoke three times echoing this sentiment. At the concert in Central Park, as the musicians were introduced, the speakers all played on the same string: How welcome immigrants are to our shores.

Here are some revealing figures that throw a little light on this much asserted claim:

Before 1808 it is estimated that 300,000 to 400,000 slaves were dragged here in chains. Many thousands more were smuggled in after that date when the slave trade became illegal.

From 1961 to 1970 there were 1,431,000 "illegal aliens" appre-

hended; 1,334,000 were deported or forced to leave.

From 1971 to 1980 there were 7,478,000 "illegal aliens" apprehended; 7,247,000 were deported or forced to leave.

In the year 1984 there were 1,379,000 "illegal aliens" apprehended; 1,359,000 were deported or forced to leave.

It is estimated that there are now at least three million undocumented workers in this country. More than half a million in New York State and most of these in New York City. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is trying to hunt them down and deport them.

(Figures for the years 1961-84 are from the Statistical Abstract of United States, 106th edition, 1986.)

D.B.

JUNE 14 AND THE U.S. ANTI-INTERVENTION MOVEMENT

by Samuel Adams

The U.S. anti-intervention movement and the movement to end U.S. support for South African apartheid have a great deal in common. Both movements focus on regions where battles are raging to determine who will hold state power, with the U.S. government deeply committed in support of some of the most brutal, terroristic, and reactionary forces found anywhere in the world. Both movements support the fundamental right of self-determination and stand in solidarity with workers, peasants, students, and all oppressed sectors of the population in their struggle for freedom and national liberation.

Both the anti-intervention and anti-apartheid movements in the U.S. enjoy significant trade union support, though there is considerably deeper and broader labor support for the anti-apartheid struggle. And finally, both movements enjoy majority support from the U.S. population as a whole, a far cry from the situation that the antiwar movement faced during most of the Vietnam war.

So much for the similarities. During the past six months, the *differences* between the anti-intervention and anti-apartheid movements in how they have mounted their struggles have become quite striking.

For both movements, this has been a period when crucial legislative issues have emerged. The anti-intervention movement has been deeply engaged in the fight to prevent Congress from approving contra aid. Activists around the country knew that an affirmative vote by Congress was tantamount to a U.S. declaration of war against Nicaragua. At the same time, the anti-apartheid movement was increasingly pressing the U.S. government to impose strict and comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. This, more than divestiture campaigns or boycotting individual companies, is the way to help bring the hated Botha regime to its knees. It could be accomplished by Congressional action.

The most prominent groups in the anti-intervention movement fought to achieve their objective primarily through lobbying. They called upon movement activists again and again to "visit, call, and write your Congressperson." They went over lists of the "swing vote" and tried to figure out who could influence whom. They set up headquarters in Washington, D.C., formed an umbrella coalition for lobbying made up of 14 Central America groups and threw themselves into the capitalist system's legislative workings. They entertained the hope that by dint of educating the legislators and

having them hear directly from their constituents, contra aid would be defeated.

To be sure, there were hundreds of demonstrations against contra aid in which tens of thousands of people participated. This was an extremely positive development for the anti-intervention movement, especially when compared with the relative absence of such actions in the second half of 1985. But the demonstrations were uncoordinated and limited. Because of the lobbying priorities of the movement's major organizations, the movement could not bring its full muscle to bear in organizing mass actions. Despite the fact that polls taken on the eve of the contra aid vote showed a two-thirds majority against contra aid, it passed. The repercussions for the Nicaraguan revolution will indeed be serious as a result.

Mass Action on June 14

The anti-apartheid movement went about its business in a much different way. While this movement also has its share of lobbyists, the movement's main presence has been in the streets, not the legislative halls. When the AFL-CIO, with its conservative leadership, decided to sponsor anti-apartheid events last March, even it chose rallies and demonstrations in several cities to do so, passing up alternatives such as well publicized but hardly significant meetings with legislators.

By far the largest anti-apartheid action ever held in the U.S. took place in New York City on June 14. Sponsored by a broad coalition this regional action produced a turnout of around 100,000. Nothing comparable was organized or even attempted by the anti-intervention movement during this period.

Labor as the Spearhead

The driving force for the June 14 demonstration was the New York labor movement, particularly District 65 of the UAW. Tens of thousands of workers carrying union banners marched together in this inspiring action. It is a magnificent example for movement activists to point to when they talk about the importance of involving the labor movement in social struggles because of the power, numbers, and resources at its command.

By contrast, the National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador, the main labor arm of the anti-intervention movement, has studiously avoided organizing or

even endorsing demonstrations. Its entire focus has been on lobbying. This was also true for the several international unions that have taken anti-intervention positions. The two dozen or so independent anti-intervention labor committees that are loosely linked to the National Labor Committee followed its lead and concentrated on lobbying, though some committees did participate in locally called anti-contra aid demonstrations.

Focus

The organizers of the June 14 demonstration made clear that it was to be an *anti-apartheid* demonstration. Other social movements were strongly encouraged to participate and to march under their own banners. But the unifying theme that every group and marcher was asked to include was the demand for sanctions against South Africa and an end to all forms of U.S. support for the apartheid regime. And that's the way the message went out—undiluted by the addition of a host of other demands—all across the U.S. and all across the world. It was a powerful demonstration of support for the Black masses of South Africa.

The anti-intervention movement has proven far more susceptible than has the anti-apartheid movement to the argument that there is somehow something wrong about organizing a demonstration focused on the movement's central demand. "You want to call an action *only* on Central America? Just to protest the escalating U.S. war against Nicaragua, the bombing of Salvadoran civilians, the aid to the repressive Duarte regime, the massacres in Guatemala? Just that? What about the nuclear freeze, disarmament, and all the other foreign and

domestic issues we are confronted with? They should be included too." Pseudoradicals who with regularity raise these kinds of arguments at anti-intervention meetings do not dare to confront the anti-apartheid movement in a similar way. And no criticism has been voiced from any quarter against Cleveland Robinson and his co-workers who organized the June 14 anti-apartheid actions for not having raised "the other demands" in building it.

The U.S. is today waging an intense and brutal war against Nicaragua. If the movement in the U.S. that opposes this war is to acquire sufficient strength to stop it, it will have to concentrate its efforts on the Central America and Caribbean region—just as June 14 focused squarely on South Africa—and not permit itself to be diverted in ways that will blunt the movement's impact and effectiveness.

In the months ahead, the anti-intervention movement will face hard choices. Shall it now take the road to united mass actions or shall it concentrate on lobbying/electoral activities? Shall it go all out to involve the labor movement in its struggle, or shall it limit itself to inviting a labor speaker here or there? Shall it focus on Central America and the Caribbean with a special link to the South African struggle, or shall it take on disarmament, nuclear freeze, and other issues?

In finding answers to these questions, the movement ought to take a good, hard look at what happened in New York in the planning, building, and organizing of the June 14 anti-apartheid demonstration. There is much to be learned from that experience.

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HORMEL STRIKE—UFCW BUREAUCRACY IMPOSES TRUSTEE

by Dave Riehle

On July 15, 1986, Volume 51, No. 31, of *The Unionist*, the weekly voice of United Food and Commercial Workers Local P-9 in Austin, Minnesota, was delivered to subscribers. This was the first issue of what had previously been the voice of the workers at the George A. Hormel plant to be published since U.S. District Court Judge Edward Devitt ordered all P-9 assets turned over to the trustees designated by the UFCW International leadership in May. For the first time since the workers at the Hormel plant established their union, as Local 1 of the Independent Union of All Workers (IUAW) in 1933 through a strike and occupation of the giant packinghouse, *The Unionist* was issued without authorization by, or even consultation with, the union membership.

The front page of Volume 51, No. 31, was taken up with an "Open Letter to Local P-9 Members and Supporters" from Joseph Hansen, director of Region 13 of the UFCW, the trustee appointed to run the local. Under the heading "One Union, One Voice, One Contract," Hansen says: "You are to be commended for your dedication, militance, and courage exhibited during your long struggle. Our priority, as it has always been, is to end your months of misery and suffering. To prevent all your efforts from being for naught, we had to take the necessary steps to *save your jobs, to save your union, and to attain an honorable contract*" (emphasis in the original).

Hansen expressed somewhat different sentiments on Thursday, July 17, at a closed session of the Association of Labor Relations Agencies in St. Paul. Hansen appeared on a panel with Dave Larson, Hormel Vice President for Labor Relations. Apparently feeling he was among friends and colleagues at this convocation of professional parasites who prey on the labor movement in the guise of arbitrators and mediators, Hansen spoke freely. What he had to say was clearly intended to be off the record. However, an enterprising reporter from the University of Minnesota student newspaper had found a place in the audience.

As reported in the paper the following day, Hansen confided that "when Guyette (Jim Guyette, suspended president of Local P-9) talks about this solidarity shit, it makes me want to puke."

"Hansen criticized the negotiations that took place before Local P-9 went on strike last August," the report said. "He said the sessions weren't really negotiations, but 'a litany of union complaints.' The UFCW, however, didn't think a strike would last more than 4 to 6 weeks, and

decided to let the local 'get it out of their system.'"

"Hansen added that the UFCW didn't think a year before the strike that they could win it."

Hormel VP Larson didn't seem offended by the fact that Hansen had left him with little to say. He offered the opinion that he "still supports the concept of collective bargaining." "It's a concept that works," Larson said. "I am," he continued, "probably one of the all-time great compromisers."

Bosses and Bureaucrats

It is hardly surprising that Larson endorses the concept of collective bargaining practiced by the UFCW. Without their aid in attacking the Hormel workers from the rear, the Austin strike might well have already forced a retreat by the company.

The overfed arbitrators and union bureaucrats most likely nodded their heads approvingly and complacently when Larson put his stamp of approval on UFCW-style collective bargaining, like a coop full of fattened chickens getting another handful of grain from the farmer. The bosses, however, are not so foolish as to place the fate of their profits solely in the custody of these "labor statesmen."

"Labor unions are becoming virtually obsolete," says a front-line labor relations attorney here," reported the *Milwaukee Journal* on June 17, 1986.

"Unions haven't kept up with the times," contends Thomas P. Krukowski, the 41-year-old lawyer who represents the Geo. A. Hormel Co. in the meatpackers' celebrated dispute with striking workers in Austin, Minn.," the paper said. "If employees trust employers, there is no need for a third party," Krukowski added. "Where does the union fit in?"

The counterfeit *Unionist* of July 15 lists expiration dates for 35 packinghouse contracts in the remainder of 1986. There is little doubt that, despite the craven and treacherous attempts by the UFCW bureaucracy to curry favor with the packinghouse bosses, the Krukowski method of collective bargaining will be employed against the workers in those 35 packinghouses, despite the oily assurances of Hormel VP Larson.

The employers are determined to drive as hard and as far as they can in further beating down wages and conditions in the unionized packing plants. They naturally prefer to do it quietly, against demoralized and passive workers hamstrung

by the class-collaborationist Wynn leadership of the UFCW. But if the workers find a way to resist, as they have in Austin, the bosses are fully prepared to use their government, their courts, and their national guard and cops.

The union bureaucrats, some of whom understand this, are incapable of responding to it except by desperately hoping to convince some component of the employing class that they can police the workers more effectively and efficiently. Consequently, their very existence is threatened by the emergence of an uncompromising, militant, and independent struggle of the workers themselves, as has happened in Austin. Under these circumstances the UFCW bureaucrats have bestirred

themselves to fight—but only against the insurgent workers.

Scope of the Struggle

What is at stake here is much larger than the forces actually contending in the field. First is the strategic agreement made behind the backs of the UFCW packinghouse workers—alluded to, but never admitted openly. The UFCW leaders agreed not to oppose the drastic reduction of wages in the industry and the breakup of the national master agreement, with its common expiration dates and wage of \$10.69 an hour.

Life Under the Trustee

Although the July 15 *Unionist* is issued, according to the masthead, under the authority of "Joseph Hansen, Trustee," presumably acting on behalf of the union membership, the real authority the UFCW bureaucrats base their actions on is indicated on the back page:

"The following is being printed as a result of an Order issued by U.S. District Court Judge Edward Devitt on April 23, 1986. The trustee of Local P-9 urges all members to comply with the terms of the Order."

What follows is one of the many "Orders" issued by Judge Devitt over the course of the past year, this one demanding a cessation of all strike and picket activities. The trustees were apparently too modest to print the Order from Devitt installing them as the legal authorities over Local P-9 and its assets, and upholding their right to suspend the elected leadership and take custody of the Austin Labor Center—paid for by three generations of Hormel workers. In spite of the millions of dollars in dues money the employers collect for the UFCW leaders, their hundreds of paid staff, buildings, publications, and other resources, the Wynn leadership was incapable of politically and economically expropriating the Austin workers except with the authority of the capitalist courts. The union bureaucrats can issue orders, but

only a Federal Judge can issue an Order.

With the court order and the threat of intervention by 100 Federal marshals Hansen was able to move in and take over. Although Austin workers could have easily prevented the UFCW trustees and goons from doing so, defiance of the court order would have opened them up to sweeping victimization by the Federal courts and cops. Correctly assessing the relationship of forces, the workers turned over the Labor Center.

Basing himself on Devitt's Order, Hansen persuaded the U.S. post office in Austin to divert mail addressed to the former P-9 officers and union to him, and for a time succeeded in having the local bank sequester funds of the United Support Group, the organization of spouses and supporters of P-9, as well as getting *its* mail held up for a while.

The trustees mailed out scores of copies of Devitt's trusteeship order to P-9 officers and leading activists, as though it was a charter granting the right of absolute rule over the Hormel workers. They told many workers that any public expression of support for the Hormel boycott or the strike could be construed as contempt of court, and lead to long prison sentences. They demanded the removal of buttons and bumper stickers on the same basis, and even at-

tempted to convince a local butcher that his refusal to handle Hormel meat might place *him* in jeopardy.

Their construction of Devitt's order as suppressing all rights to free speech and association in Austin was somewhat overzealous. Although Devitt's undemocratic and antilabor decisions included ruling in 1985 that any distribution of union literature attacking the connection between Hormel and First Bank was forbidden, even 20 miles away from the nearest bank, the Federal courts clearly have a class interest in restraining union bureaucrats who begin to suffer under the illusion that they have been granted permission to exercise any form of political power independent of the courts and cops.

Eventually the United Support Group got their bank account and mail, and nobody was jailed for wearing a button. But the local union remained under the control of the trustees.

Those who hope to convince the ruling class to be fair could point to the fact that Judge Devitt is chairman of the Minnesota Committee to Protect the First Amendment, but the Hormel workers have decided to run their own candidates for county sheriff and other local offices. Their confidence in the impartiality of public officials is somewhat shaken by their experiences of the past year.

The UFCW leaders guaranteed their intervention into the ranks of the union to stifle any resistance to this deal in return for which they hoped to maintain continuing recognition from the packers without being forced to fight. It was this pledge which they had to make good on in Austin.

The leadership was alarmed and demoralized by the success of the packers in destroying union wages and organization through the dissolution of the traditional big meatpacking chains such as Armour and Swift, and the emergence of aggressively antiunion operations like Iowa Beef and Excell, owned by Occidental Petroleum and Cargill, respectively. They are now the number one and number two beef packers in the U.S.

All across the country former Armour and Swift plants were sold and the union agreements abrogated. The plants were then reopened with new employees at wages of around \$6.50 an hour. A brief attempt at resistance led by Lewie Anderson, head of the UFCW's Packerhouse Division, was slapped down by the packers, which thoroughly convinced the UFCW leaders that their only hope of retaining recognition lay in cutting a deal.

The UFCW leaders want a return to "normalcy," by which they mean more or less the conditions prevailing in the industry in the 1950s and early '60s. They are trying to restabilize the industry through the creation of a more or less uniform national wage at whatever level it can be achieved without a fight—somewhere around \$8 an hour right now, in their view. Through this they hope to bring a halt to what they see as the cut-throat competition operating in their industry—stimulated by unequal wage rates.

Outlook of the Bureaucracy

Basically, the bureaucrats' view of recent history is this: The meatpacking industry, saddled with old and inefficient plants in the sixties, was forced to restructure through massive closures and the introduction of new plants and technologies. The employers were able to take advantage of this destabilization to force local exceptions to the master agreement by blackmailing local unions with the threat of plant closings. This destabilization of wages created a new situation in the industry, where each employer was forced to drive down wages in order to remain competitive with other packers who had gained a temporary advantage by reducing their wage scale below the industry average.

Thus a downward spiral of wages was created, they thought, independent of the wishes of all participants. Even "good union employers," in order to compete, were forced to participate in this wage-cutting stampede.

The only way this dynamic could be brought to a halt, the UFCW leadership reasoned, was for the union to restabilize wages through a new uniform wage level that could stop the destructive competition. Then the two essential conditions for labor peace would be established: the industry

would be restored to profitability, and the anarchy of wage competition ended. The employers would have *no reason* not to agree to union representation.

It follows that until this ideal state is attained, any struggle by the workers will be futile at best, or destructive at worst. Since the union bureaucracy believes in its bones that the employers can never be *compelled* to agree to anything by the action of the workers, any resistance by the ranks constitutes a provocation.

Do the UFCW leaders actually accept this conclusion? Their words and actions are consistent only if they do. And it relieves them of the need to confront the employers. Having no confidence in the ability of the workers to fight and win, and with a superstitious belief in the eternal nature of the capitalist system, they cannot imagine any alternative.

Their urgent concern is to get the pressure of the employers' offensive off their backs, which means continually retreating and giving ground—hoping that each concession will be the final one, the one that establishes the new equilibrium. Closely interlinked with this, however, is their fear that continuing retreat will stir up the ranks of the union to look for alternative leadership, a threat which is advancing implacably around the axis of the Hormel workers' struggle.

A Futile Approach

The bankruptcy of this approach is revealed first of all by the fact that the UFCW's proposed goal of a uniform wage rate is conceived as a *ceiling*, not a floor. The old master agreement meant that a wage rate of *less* than \$10.69 an hour was unacceptable. The new scheme establishes—in theory—a uniform wage rate where anything *more* is unacceptable.

Although the UFCW attempts to base its argument on the historic conquest of a national master agreement, the real logic of their position is being revealed in Austin. By agreeing to a ceiling rate, rather than a floor, they are committed to fighting to *defeat* any attempt to raise wages by the workers, rather than defending the uniform rate as a minimum. The \$10.69 rate in the old master agreement was exceeded by various local and chain agreements through incentive pay, and other modifications. It is not true, as the UFCW maintains, that upward deviations from the uniform rate destabilize it and weaken its defense—or, as Lewie Anderson puts it: "Unions have a higher duty than fighting concessions *tout court* [*in brief*]: preserving the unity of their membership, and the unity of their movement as a defender of working class interests."

Actually, upward deviations from the norm reinforce it and provide continuing upward pressure. Only exceptions made beneath the norm begin to disrupt the workers' industry-wide united front on wages. This is because what is involved is not

an abstract theoretical postulate, but an expression of the class struggle.

Every upward step is a *victory* and it strengthens the union. Every backward step is a *setback* and it weakens the union. Here emerges the underlying political and philosophical question posed by the Austin struggle: Will the workers' interests be advanced through their own organization and their own efforts? Or are they to be pursued by relying on the benign character of the capitalist system?

Serious Analysis Needed

It is this underlying ideological divergence that the socialist press in the U.S. should be explaining—rather than simply repeating commonplace platitudes about militancy and solidarity, which most have limited themselves to.

Many workers think that the union leaders act as they do because they are being paid off by the bosses. Some undoubtedly are, but in reality, the bureaucracy could not be unified ideologically solely around corruption; nor could it hope to exert much influence on the ranks if that were the only glue which held it together. As has been established long ago, the union bureaucracy does have an ideological unity. It's called *reformism*. And it has been a glaring default on the part of much of the socialist press that the result of the UFCW leaders' reformist politics, as it is concretely manifested in the Austin struggle, hasn't been truly dissected.

The Wynn/Anderson strategy is not going to abolish the fundamental characteristics of capi-

talism. The meatpacking industry is monopolized and centrally directed by major financial interests as it has been for a hundred years. Its restructuring in the 1960s was a result of the irrepressible drive for profits expressing itself as the postwar expansion of American capitalism began to reach an end, and to some degree was also an anticipation of broader developments.

The UFCW's formula is utterly utopian. An organized retreat on wages, even if it took place in a disciplined manner, could not slow down, much less halt, the deepening crisis in the capitalist economy and the consequent drive against working people's standard of living. Its real effect, of course, is the opposite. Explicitly declaring themselves prostrate before the employers, the UFCW only accelerated the demands for takebacks.

The employers have an even larger stake in the outcome of the Austin struggle. The example of P-9's fight is enormously attractive to millions of workers, as has been demonstrated through the tremendous response of solidarity manifested by unionists throughout the country—despite the obstacles thrown up by the union bureaucracy.

Even worse, in the employers' view, would be if others began to emulate P-9's example. That could start to upset the delicate equilibrium established with the help of the union bureaucrats, as the bosses' takeback drive has advanced without any significant organized opposition until now.

July 31, 1986

[Next month: "Perspectives for the Hormel Workers' Struggle," by Dave Riehle]

The Trenton Siege By the Army of Unoccupation

By George Breitman
Introduction by Frank Lovell

"The Trenton Siege by the Army of Unoccupation" relates (and records) a dramatic moment in the struggles of the unemployed for their meager relief handouts during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Those were grim days and millions of unemployed workers led grim and desperate lives. But among the organized unemployed many were capable of humor and they experienced moments of triumph, as can be learned from the funny things that happened in Trenton fifty years ago.

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SOCIALISTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

by Paul Le Blanc

"I'd rather vote for what I believe in and lose than vote for what I don't believe in and win."

—Eugene V. Debs

This quote from one of America's greatest working class and socialist leaders has traditionally been offered as a reason for U.S. socialists not voting for Democrats. The standard follow-up to the quote is to point out that, no matter how "progressive" one or another Democratic candidate seems to be, the Democratic Party is a *capitalist* party. Simply in terms of its stated program, it sees the "free enterprise" system as an essential component of "the American way of life." The policies of the overwhelming majority of its representatives are consistent with this keystone of its program. This is hardly surprising, given the fact that elements within the business community provide decisive percentages of the funding necessary to finance the operations and electoral campaigns of the party. Such a concentration of economic power is naturally translated into substantial political influence, which means that top Democratic Party policy-makers, personnel, and candidates are either capitalists themselves, or are loyal employees of or assistants to capitalists (e.g., corporate lawyers), or are known to be firm supporters of the capitalist system. Whatever sympathy for working people and the downtrodden they eloquently articulate, and whatever social reforms they favor are—as they themselves sometimes point out—fully in harmony with the goal of making American capitalism more viable, more stable, more successful. And those Democrats who, in their heart of hearts, happen to believe in the ideals of socialism, or at least feel that human needs should be a higher priority than corporate profits, recognize that—if they hope to be an effective force within the Democratic Party—they must maintain a good working relationship with the partisans of capitalism. Thus, the Democratic Party, so the old argument goes, is not an institution which socialists should in any way support or work in.¹

Over 25 years ago the radical libertarian Paul Goodman offered a colorful description of the American political system which was accepted by a growing number of radicals at that time:

"Concretely, our system of government at present comprises the military-industrial complex, the secret para-military agencies, the scientific war-corporations, the blimps, the horses' asses, the police, the administrative bureaucracy, the career diplomats, the lobbies, the corporations

that contribute Party funds, the underwriters and real-estate promoters that batten on Urban Renewal, the official press and the official opposition press, the sounding-off and jockeying for the next election, the National Unity, etc., etc. All this machine is grinding along by the momentum of the power and profit motives and style long since built into it; it *cannot* make decisions of a kind radically different than it does. Even if an excellent man happens to be elected to office, he will find that it is no longer a possible instrument for social change on any major issues of war and peace or the way of life of the Americans."²

To the extent to which this is accurate, Democratic Party politics seems a waste of time for those who are serious about meaningful social change.

The Migration

Since the 1930s, the two largest currents in the radical movement have been the Communist Party (in its Stalinist and "post-Stalin" incarnations) and the Social Democracy (the Socialist Party of Norman Thomas, plus the fragments which emerged from its split-up in the 1970s, the largest today being Democratic Socialists of America). For many years both currents have waved aside these arguments against the Democratic Party as being "ultra-left" and "dogmatic" and "sectarian," characteristic of a handful of irrelevant "Trotskyites" and anarchists.³ During the 1960s, however, a profound youth radicalization took place which, for a few years, caused the bulk of the "new left" to reject the Democratic Party. The reformist and electoralist orientation of the CP and SP was dismissed with contempt. Beginning in the 1970s, however, increasing numbers of one-time "new left" activists have been changing their minds.

The migration back to the Democratic Party has been impressive. Former SDS leader Tom Hayden, the independent socialist author and editor James Weinstein of *In These Times*, G. William Domhoff whose *Who Rules America?* and *Fat Cats and Democrats* were classic exposes, and militant Black Panther leader Huey Newton were in the vanguard of this shift. They have been followed by a broad array of Maoists and former Maoists including the cadres of the now-dissolved Communist Workers Party, the "new left" socialists of the New American Movement even before their merger into Democratic Socialists of America, an impressive array of leftist intellectuals, and even some refugees from the Trotskyist movement gathered around Peter

Camejo's North Star Network. Such people are not only voting for Democrats and urging others to do so, but they themselves are becoming or seeking to become campaign workers, campaign managers, candidates, and Democratic Party committeemen and committeewomen.

Those on the left who refuse to join in the migration explain this all as a demoralization of the 1960s generation, whose romantic illusions were shattered after the radical upsurge failed to generate revolutionary changes which they'd so ardently believed were about to occur. They are, so the explanation goes, in the tow of the rightward shift of "establishment politics" which has taken place as the oppositional social movements of the 1960s and early '70s have fallen apart. The bureaucratized officialdoms of the labor movement, the civil rights movement, the women's movement—always tied to the Democratic Party—have succeeded, under these circumstances, in drawing the demoralized activists into their own reformist trajectory.

The radical migrants, on the other hand, see their shift as a practical-minded reorientation which promises to advance the struggle for basic social change. Their arguments are worth considering. It should be noted that they are being considered by many who have identified with the "revolutionary left"—whether in the pages of the prestigious British journal *New Left Review* or in the councils of the FSLN and FMLN in Central America (where confidence in the revolutionary potential of the U.S. working class is, not surprisingly, rather low).

Reasons for Being Democrats

A socialist in the Democratic Party might tell us something like this:

"You don't need to lecture us about the capitalist domination of the Democratic Party or the imperialist inclinations of those who have historically shaped its foreign policy. We know that the party includes militaristic 'hawks,' corrupt wardheelers and machine hacks, racists and reactionaries. But this is even more true of the Republican Party under Ronald Reagan. We can be sure that, to the extent that Reaganite Republicans are elected, they will seek to overcome all restraints to their racist, anti-working class, anti-feminist, anti-civil libertarian, militaristic, and imperialist policies. The Democratic Party is different: its base includes a liberal-labor-civil rights-feminist coalition in which concerns for peace and social justice have significant influence. If this potentially progressive force is able to increase its power within the Democratic Party, it can mitigate the effects of reactionary elements within the party and at the same time stand as a substantial counterforce to Reaganism.

"Of course 'stopping Reaganism' is not the be-all and end-all of our strategy—although it's not a bad place to begin. But we have a greater vision than that. We want a multiracial, democrat-

ic, predominantly working class movement for radical social change—one that will link the various issues for peace and social justice and move in a socialist direction. To achieve that you can't simply stand on a soapbox and wait for the masses to come to you. You have to be where the people are whom you want to reach. That happens to be in the Democratic Party. Those workers, Blacks, Hispanics, feminists, and young people who haven't given up, who aren't simply cynical and demoralized and apolitical, look to the electoral arena and see that the Democratic Party is the only viable political force which comes close to speaking for their interests. These are the people we must get to know, work with, help reinvigorate. As we build Democratic campaigns and ward committees, we can build trust as we help people understand that they *do* make a difference, that they *can* have a voice, *that they can change things*.

"It's not simply a question of getting people registered, getting out the vote, and helping to win elections. We can and must, at the same time, help to raise consciousness by helping to *shape* the electoral campaigns, which we can only do effectively by being an active and integral part of the Democratic Party on a grass-roots level. We can, at least on a local level, help to shape the party's platform and positions; ultimately we can run some of our own people and get some of them elected; and we can build a grass-roots base, drawn to *our* kind of politics, through this kind of work. And if we do our job right in enough localities, we can become a force in state and national politics.

"Is it really so difficult to see that this can become translated into having genuine political clout on the issues that matter to all of us? We can actually win certain reforms—saving important social programs that the reactionaries want to axe, blocking moves to curtail civil liberties, creating substantial obstacles to U.S. military intervention in the 'third world,' cutting down military spending while helping to create economic restructuring initiatives that would result in jobs not tied to militarism. In helping to shape such reforms, educating around them, and mobilizing people to help win them, we can develop a sizable constituency that will have the consciousness and the votes to win progressive victories.

"We are talking about building a grass-roots movement that can transform American politics. It can encompass important efforts outside of the electoral arena—trade union organizing and strikes, anti-apartheid and anti-intervention marches and rallies, neighborhood and community struggles to improve the quality of life and to give people control over their daily environment; and so on. But to deprive these efforts of an electoral focus will help to isolate them from each other and will deny them the possibility of actually culminating in political power. And if your electoral focus is outside of the Democratic Party, people will correctly perceive that you're

not serious, that you want them to throw away their votes for 'pure' candidates who have no hope of winning. Our strategy inside the Democratic Party can establish the basis for a mass left-wing party in the United States—either by transforming the Democratic Party itself, or when push finally comes to shove by the radicalizing grass-roots organizations and constituencies breaking away to form a new party.

"Either way, we'll be there helping to make it happen while you sectarian purists are spouting orthodox dogmas from the sidelines."⁴

Political Science

The questions that are raised by the Democratic Party socialists are as important as their answers are disastrous. The questions of how socialists can be relevant today and victorious tomorrow will be dealt with in a later article. But the answer to the question "should socialists join the Democratic Party" is this: *you should join the Democratic Party if you're ready to give up on socialism*. Of course, they don't see it that way, they intend something else, but the realities that we will examine can lead to nothing other than this brutal conclusion. If we sought to marshal all of the analytical insights of the great revolutionary Marxists—from Marx and Engels themselves to Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin and Trotsky, and beyond—the Democratic Party socialists would turn to us with a weary grin and the Reaganesque comment: "There you go again." But the fact is that the realities uncovered by contemporary political scientists are in harmony with the findings of the scientific socialists from days of yore.

In the 1981 textbook *Unfinished Democracy, The American Political System* we find the following admission: "The difficulty of accomplishing policy goals in the American political system is caused in part by America's peculiar party structure. The collective lack of party unity, ideological or policy firmness, control over nominations, and discipline of party members seriously reduces the parties' ability to promote and accomplish policy goals. When this problem is combined with the decentralization of power in Congress and the separation of power between the various branches of government, the obstacles to policy formulation and enactment are formidable. The combined problems substantially explain why the federal government has been incapable of responding to such problems as unemployment, underemployment, inflation, energy shortages, urban blight, and poverty."⁵ The authors of this textbook are Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. and—Michael Harrington (the same Michael Harrington who is National Chairman of Democratic Socialists of America).

This hardly seems a fruitful arena for social change, but these authors don't even fully state the problem. As Walter Dean Burnham suggests in *The Current Crisis in American Politics* (1982), "the relative weight of nonpartisan factors at the

top decision-making levels of the American political system has increased substantially over the past generation, and . . . , granted the massive scope of American involvement in the rest of the world alone, these factors will probably continue to grow in importance. Partisan politics, in such a case, will tend to be confined to a narrowing . . . range of activity." Burnham sees a degeneration of mass participation in the Democratic and Republican parties because "the relevance of these parties to any possible, potentially organizable needs of the lower classes in American society had been problematic at best in postagrarian America." In *The Irony of Democracy* (1970), Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler comment that "American parties do, in fact, subscribe to the same fundamental political ideology. Both the Democratic and the Republican parties have reflected the prevailing elite consensus on basic democratic values—the sanctity of private property, a free enterprise economy, individual liberty, limited government, majority rule [presumably limited by the previously mentioned "sanctities"], and due process of law. . . . Rather than promoting competition over national goals and programs, the parties reinforce societal consensus and limit the area of legitimate political conflict." Noting that "the voters cannot influence public policy by choosing between parties," Dye and Zeigler conclude: "Elections are primarily a symbolic exercise for the masses to help tie them to the established order."⁶

As Michael Parenti points out in *Democracy for the Few* (1974), "The parties are loose conglomerates of local factions organized around one common purpose: the pursuit of office. . . . But even as they evade most important policy questions and refrain from commitment to distinct, coherent programs, the parties have a conservative effect on the consciousness of the electorate and on the performance of representative government. They operate from a commonly shared ideological perspective which is best served by the avoidance of certain ideas and the suppression or co-optation of dissenters."⁷ Parenti—unlike the other political scientists we've quoted—is attempting to develop an explicitly Marxist analysis of U.S. politics. But if we turn to an honest maverick conservative like Garry Wills we can find an insightful analysis which develops these points in a non-Marxist but nonetheless informative manner.

Confessions of a Conservative

"Our electoral system," writes Wills, "is simply not an instrument for making decisions. Americans are always discovering that truth, then letting it slip through their fingers. At every election we are told this is the time to discuss 'the issues.' And in every election we are told the issues are being evaded. Of course they are. That is what elections are meant to accomplish. Issues divide people, and getting elected depends on an ability to unite voters in a broad coali-

tion. Hard decisions on prickly matters get made between elections—preferably well before the next one.⁸

What happens in an election campaign? "Each party puts up a candidate, by a process of prior compromise, who can speak for that party's natural constituency (or for most of it—why, otherwise, put him up in the first place?)." A substantial component of the Democratic Party's constituency is the liberal-labor-civil rights-feminist coalition as we've already noted. "This natural constituency must be given certain conventional assurances and recognition, in platform, staff, scheduling, etc.—after which it can be taken largely for granted." Wills goes on to explain: "the dynamics of an election compel a candidate, as he nears the end, to leave serious people alone (as already committed, or as needing efforts of discussion, debate, and reflection that no harried candidate has time for) and to court the fickle. . . . In the course of his campaign, each candidate feels fewer and fewer constraints from his original base of support. Party faithfuls tell each other that the candidate 'has' to say whatever he is saying while he runs. . . . And, after all, the vague formulae of the campaign's later stages are hardly challenging to the party's orthodoxy, or to any clear position. Thus there is no reason for the candidate to deprive himself of the fruits of the [opinion] polls that he has paid for. He will try to say what the people want to hear, just hoping that he says it a shade better than the other candidate. . . . It is often noted that candidates say almost exactly the same things in the last stages of their race. They have 'middled in' toward that central group of waverers each still hopes to win."⁹

Wills's lack of a Marxist analysis blurs his next important point: "One might think these rhetorical antics are bound to cease after the election, each candidate snapping back to his true form. But a funny thing happens to office-holders. Even after the election they find their greatest freedom of movement is *out* from their constituency." The factors which have decisively shaped the actual decisions of national political figures are the pressures, structures, "expert opinion," threats, and bribes emanating from the most powerful forces in our society. All campaign promises and loyalty to one's constituency are necessarily modified in the face of this reality, which from the 1940s through the 1970s resulted in the kind of consensus (encompassing flaming liberals and rock-ribbed conservatives) described in 1970 by Dye and Zeigler: "Both parties have supported the public-oriented, mass-welfare domestic programs of the 'liberal establishment'—social security, fair labor standards, unemployment compensation, a graduated income tax, a national highway program, a federally aided welfare system, counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies, and government regulation of public utilities. Finally, both parties have supported the basic outlines of American foreign and military policy since World War II—

international involvement, anti-communism, the Cold War, European recovery, NATO, military preparedness, selective service, and even the Korean and Vietnam Wars."¹⁰

Under "normal" circumstances, then, it has been the perspectives of the corporate-liberal capitalist elite which have shaped the major decisions of American politics. Sometimes these "normal" circumstances do not prevail—an important and multifaceted question (encompassing, among other things, "Reaganism" and the Rainbow Coalition) which we will examine in a later article. What can be affirmed now, however, is that the politicians' "freedom of movement" away from their constituency traditionally flows from their adaptation, after taking office, to the needs and dynamics of American capitalism.

But to return to the question of elections, Garry Wills's comments capture much of the reality: "A kind of delayed Victorianism once claimed that 'polite' society does not discuss anything so ruffling to the sensibilities as religion or politics. One might say that elections, too, are not the time to talk religion or politics. Senator McGovern claimed, after his 1972 race, that he could have convinced people that the Vietnam War was immoral if there had not been an election going on at the time."¹¹

Genuine moral passion over real issues and honest articulation of substantive policy alternatives are naturally and necessarily blurred in mainstream politics. Says Wills: "The voting process succeeds—it expresses a consensus; but only by stripping away the debatable, the new, the risky, the different. . . . This returns us to a point made earlier—that elections settle questions of legitimacy, not policy. They tell us who will govern, not how they will govern. They settle the rotation order among our rulers. And they do this with extraordinary success." He adds: "Hilaire Belloc and Cecil Chesterton, in *The Party System* (1911), described elections as fake battles staged to distract the populace while their pockets were being picked." He concludes: "Of course elections ratify (retrospectively) change that has already taken place through elite decision (the New Deal) or established consensus (support for the school system). But what resisted change for the good ever made its way principally through elections, or got more help from them than hindrance?"¹²

Movement-Building vs. Electoralism

This brings us to some Democratic Party socialists' expressed intention to utilize their new found party's campaigns for the purpose of "raising consciousness" and building a mass multi-issue movement with radical implications. This perspective will necessarily put them on a collision course with serious rank-and-file reform Democrats who might be expected to be their allies. As Robert Brenner has pointed out, these sincere reform Democrats "are serious about the electoral

road, they want to win, and because they want to win they will have no truck with leftist plans to use electoral campaigns for mass organizing or left propaganda." Brenner explains the correctness of the reform Democrats' position in terms that must soon become obvious to the more leftist elements: "In the short period of an electoral campaign, it is almost never in practice feasible even to try to call such a movement into existence. It can rarely be done, and it would be absurd to predicate a campaign on succeeding in doing it. To win an election, one must essentially accept consciousness as it is and try to adapt. . . . Winning, moreover, is everything, for unless the candidate takes office, absolutely nothing can be gained. . . . Because of this logic, the reform-minded rank and file Democrats can have little or no sympathy for radicals who want to use the campaign 'not only' to win, but to build organization and change consciousness. First, they understand that if the candidate were associated with radical ideas (as he/she would be if his/her followers were spouting left ideas in the campaign), it would be much more difficult to get the moderate vote. They understand, too, that the same is true, only more so, for any sort of mass organizing of militant direct action, for this is guaranteed to frighten moderate potential voters."¹³

These are realities to which Democratic Party radicals will have to adjust if they hope to survive and build their influence within the organization in almost any area in the United States. Their own pronouncements and activities will have to become subordinated to these facts of life. As they seek to draw young working class and student activists, Blacks and Hispanics, feminists and antiwar militants into political activity, they will have to help educate them to these "facts of life." They will have to explain how the muddledness and evasions and half-truths (or worse) of Democratic candidates either make "good political sense" or are at least unavoidable. They will have to explain how registering voters and "selling" the candidate constitute a higher form of political activity than mobilizing thousands of

people in politically independent and militant demonstrations (which might divert energy away from, or even embarrass, the candidate). The defeat of the compromised and muddled candidate will be projected as a demoralizing defeat for "the Movement" as a whole. No less demoralizing, ultimately, will be the victory of such a candidate—who will be incapable of meeting the expectations of those who are persuaded that such a victory can be meaningful.

Assuming a "rosy scenario," let's imagine that the entire American left throws itself into the Democratic Party; Ted Kennedy and Jesse Jackson head up a national ticket, with 20 to 30 percent of the Congressional candidates being solid left-liberals and radicals (the others being moderate liberals, neo-liberals, and conservatives), and they all win. Will they provide solutions to the mounting problems of capitalism—or will they generate great expectations and then prove incapable of satisfying them? If the latter is the case, and there's nothing to the left of them, it seems likely that the "left" will be discredited and the country will move to the right in a more fundamental way than ever before. This outcome is unlikely only because: 1) it is highly improbable that socialists inside the Democratic Party will be able to generate such transformation and (initial) success; and 2) some elements of the American left, rather than committing themselves to the Democratic Party, will concentrate their energies on building effective alternatives outside of, to the left of, and politically independent of both the Democratic and Republican parties.

If the logic of socialists working in the Democratic Party has unhappy consequences, we still have a responsibility to examine more closely the logic of socialists *not* working in the Democratic Party—particularly what they *should* be doing instead to fight "Reaganism" and advance the socialist cause. This will be the focus of our next article.

Next month: "The Socialist Approach to Defeating Reaganism," by Paul Le Blanc.

NOTES

1. For a fine recent restatement of this position, see Stephanie Coontz, "No Alternative: Reagan's Reelection and the Democratic Party," in Mike Davis, Fred Pfeil and Michael Sprinker, eds., The Year Left, An American Socialist Yearbook, 1985 (London: Verso, 1985).
2. Paul Goodman, "Getting Into Power," in Goodman, ed., Seeds of Liberation (New York: George Braziller, 1964), p. 443.
3. Aspects of this history are discussed in James Weinstein, The Ambiguous Legacy: The Left in American Politics (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), and Eric T. Chester, Socialists and the Ballot Box, A Historical Analysis (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985). Weinstein's critique of the Communist Party's ties to the Democrats is especially interesting, given his later decision to go and do likewise. Chester's book also looks at the CP but goes on to critically examine the evolution of a revolutionary current led by Max Shachtman into a reformist force which entered both the

Socialist and Democratic parties; DSA spokesman Michael Harrington was a member of this current, which once identified with the Trotskyist tradition. Both volumes indulge in superficial sniping at the Socialist Workers Party, despite its vastly superior record.

4. Elements of this argument can be found in numerous sources, for example: contributions by Michael Harrington, Stanley Aronowitz and Carl Haessler in Duncan Williams, ed., The Lesser Evil? The Left Debates the Democratic Party and Social Change (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1977); G. William Domhoff, "Why Socialists Should Be Democrats," Socialist Revolution, Jan.-Feb. 1977; Harry Boyte, "Building the Democratic Movement: Prospects for a Socialist Renaissance," Socialist Review, July-October 1978; Mark E. Kann, The American Left, Failures and Fortunes (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 209-30; Manning Marable, "Jackson and the Rise of the Rainbow Coalition," New Left Review, Jan.-Feb.

(continued on page 32)

THREE LESSONS FROM FIVE REVOLUTIONS

by Steve Bloom

In a matter of months in 1979 the world witnessed three major mass mobilizations of working people and the oppressed in economically backward countries, which brought an end to hated dictatorships in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Iran. Now, in 1986, we have seen two more, just weeks apart, in Haiti and the Philippines.

Despite the common threads which unite them, these five revolutions vary widely in the kinds of regimes which they established. There have been profound differences in the concrete results for the masses in each case. In Nicaragua, Grenada, and Iran, seven years have passed, and the course of the process begun in 1979 can be assessed with some exactness. In Haiti and the Philippines things remain in a more volatile state.

A look at these five countries—and at the paths which might be taken by future developments in them—can reveal a great deal about the process of revolution in the colonial and semicolonial world today. Of particular interest are the questions of class alliances in the struggle, the kind of organization necessary for the masses to advance successfully, and the overall social goals of the revolutionary process. Even a cursory examination will demonstrate the continued validity of the basic strategic considerations on these three points which have long been put forward by the revolutionary Marxist movement.

Nicaragua

In Nicaragua we have the only one of our five examples where a government truly representative of the workers and peasants has come to power and has remained in power. Here significant strides continue to be made in winning independence from imperialist domination, although the process is limited by the country's economic backwardness and is threatened by the contra war, the U.S. economic embargo, and the danger of outright imperialist military attack.

What has allowed this revolution to survive and consolidate its power over the last seven years? We can see the combination of two essential elements: 1) the continuous active mobilization of the masses to fight for their own interests, and 2) the emergence of a conscious proletarian leadership for the struggle.

These factors first came together in the course of the insurrection which overthrew Somoza. The new government took power as a result of the active intervention of the workers and peasants in the political process, and that government still

depends on the continued mobilization of the masses to enact the kinds of social legislation which it desires. At the same time, it uses state power as a means of maintaining and encouraging this process of mass mobilization. This is what is fundamental in Nicaragua—a mutual dependence of the government and the masses on each other.

Such a relationship requires constant attention by the leaders of the revolution. They must pay attention to the problem of advancing the interests of the workers and peasants. Without this kind of leadership, the mutual interdependence which has allowed the process to move forward would inevitably break down and the overthrow of the Nicaraguan revolution—or else its degeneration into just another petty-bourgeois reformist revolution in the colonial world—would be the most likely outcome.

This, of course, is not to say that the FSLN has not made or will not make mistakes in the process. Mistakes are inevitable on the part of any leadership. What is key is recognizing and correcting mistakes before they do irreparable damage. An example of the way the Nicaraguan leaders try to solve problems and overcome mistakes before they create an insurmountable crisis can be seen in recent sweeping changes in the Nicaraguan agrarian reform law. (See article, "New Stage for Land Reform in Nicaragua," by Charles Andre Udry, *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism* No. 31.)

Class Alliances in the Revolution

Much has been said, especially by sectarian critics of the Sandinistas, about the kinds of class alliances made with various representatives of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie, first in the insurrection which overthrew Somoza and then in the new government. Even today, when the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie has completely withdrawn from the government, the Sandinistas continue to advocate a policy of "mixed economy" designed to maintain the existence of a dominant private economic sector. These policies are not infrequently denounced as "popular frontism" or as some similar betrayal of working class interests.

This question of class alliances in the revolution is one of the key aspects of the revolutionary process in the colonial and semicolonial world. Those who accuse the Sandinistas of betrayal have only looked at the surface of things, and fail to understand the actual problems involved.

It is correct, of course, that a popular front or similar reformist policy has, as one of its primary features, an "alliance" between the workers and peasants, on the one hand, and a liberal "anti-imperialist" or "anti-fascist" wing of the ruling classes on the other. But the key here is not *simply* the *presence or absence of bourgeois elements* in a coalition with proletarian and peasant forces. What makes such an alliance a popular front, what makes it so treacherous for the workers and peasants, is that the anti-imperialist and anti-fascist goals of the masses (not to mention their anti-capitalist goals, which in essence amount to the same thing) become subordinated to the *maintenance of the alliance with elements of the old ruling class*.

Yet it is precisely this element—subordination of the interests of the masses with a view toward maintaining an alliance—which has been rejected by the FSLN in Nicaragua. One can argue, of course, about whether this or that tactical step was well advised at each point in the struggle. But it can be stated with assurance that whenever the Sandinista leadership has been forced to make a definitive choice between abandoning the goals of the workers and peasants in the revolution or breaking with any liberal bourgeois allies they might have had, they have unhesitatingly charted an independent class course.

The entire bourgeois ruling class has common interests which unite it, but this in no way makes it a monolithic entity. It is even possible for *individual* bourgeois to abandon their own class and throw their lot in with the workers and poor farmers. In a revolutionary or prerevolutionary situation, differentiations and conflicts within the old ruling classes are exacerbated to the extreme. This is especially true in a country like Nicaragua, where the oppressive weight of an exaggerated autocracy was exercised in gangster-like fashion by one wing of the bourgeoisie (one bourgeois family, in fact) against its rivals. A similar dynamic had its effect in Iran and the Philippines.

Not only is it perfectly principled for the leadership of the masses to take advantage of such a situation, it would be foolish of them not to. The key thing, however, is *not to rely on* the differentiations within the bourgeois classes to bring about any kind of lasting changes in the interests of the workers and peasants. That is impossible—not primarily because of ideological factors, but because of the iron laws of bourgeois economic life in a world market dominated by imperialism. Only a government led by the working masses themselves can exercise sufficient control over the economy to break out of the vicious cycle created by the world market, a market designed to keep the less developed countries trapped in a deepening cycle of indebtedness and dependency.

One of the primary tasks of revolutionary leadership is to constantly explain to the masses, even while tactical alignments may be made with one or another sector, that we must be prepared

for an inevitable clash of class interests with the bourgeoisie as a whole. As the Sandinistas have put it, "only the workers and peasants will go all the way."

Grenada and Iran

With these factors in mind, we can profitably look at the less successful revolutionary experiences in Grenada and Iran. Since the essential element of mass mobilization was initially present in each of these cases, the failure of these processes must be located elsewhere.

In Grenada, as in Nicaragua, the revolutionary upsurge was led by a conscious proletarian organization which attempted to establish the proper relationship with the masses—maintaining its power on the basis of mass mobilizations in support of programs and policies which were advancing the interests of the toilers. But there were some key differences between Nicaragua and Grenada.

In Nicaragua the FSLN took power only after a prolonged struggle, in the course of which it had already developed strong ties with the masses and a large number of cadres. In Grenada, the New Jewel Movement remained a relatively small organization, even in proportion to the population of the island. It established its authority with the masses only *after* and *as a result of* carrying out a governmental takeover. The success of the NJM's action in seizing power was completely dependent on the subsequent mobilization of the workers and farmers of Grenada in support of the new regime, but the connections between the leadership and masses remained much more tenuous than they were in Nicaragua.

As a result, when the factional struggle broke out with full fury in the New Jewel Movement, there was no pathway by which the masses themselves could make their voice heard in the discussion, or bring their weight to bear in determining the outcome of events. By the time Bernard Coard placed Maurice Bishop under house arrest and consolidated his grip on the state apparatus, the point had already passed where a severe crisis could have been avoided through a democratic discussion of the problems facing the Grenadan revolution within the population as a whole. Yet until then, most Grenadians had no idea that any dispute was even taking place in the NJM. They certainly had no opportunity to mobilize themselves in time to avoid the final defeat of the revolution.

Grenada illustrates full well that the relationship between leadership and masses in the revolutionary process—the mutual dependence of one upon the other which we discussed in terms of Nicaragua—is not something which can be taken for granted, even after it is once established. It must be constantly struggled for and renewed as the revolution unfolds. The failure to understand this truth constituted a fatal contradiction of the Bishop wing of the NJM, and must be recognized

as such despite the many strong features of that political tendency.

Had Bishop acted in a timely way to inform the masses of what was going on and mobilize them in support of a correct policy, or—better still—had formal institutions of democratic control existed for the masses to debate and discuss the course of the revolution rather than having that discussion bottled up in the small circles of the NJM, the tragedy of Grenada may well have been avoided.

Iran's course of development was qualitatively different from either Nicaragua or Grenada. Here there was no proletarian leadership which gained mass support and the key problem was the question of class alliances both during and after—especially after—the struggle against the old autocratic regime. While allying themselves with the wing of the clergy led by Khomeini in the struggle to overthrow the shah, the working masses, who were the driving force of the Iranian revolution, failed to develop their own independent organization which could pose an alternative to bourgeois rule in the inevitable clash of interests with the Shiite clergy. (In the final analysis that clergy represented the interests of one wing of the bourgeoisie, the bazaar merchants in particular, which did not profit from and was therefore opposed to the "white revolution" instituted by the shah.)

The failure of most of the Iranian workers' movement to understand what needed to be done in this situation was typified in the approach taken by the Tudeh Party (the Iranian Communist Party). It embraced Khomeini and urged the masses to subordinate their own struggles to support for his "anti-imperialist" regime. This is a classical example of a popular front policy, and like many previous applications of the popular front this one paved the way for the savage repression ultimately meted out against Tudeh and similar currents after they had aided Khomeini by helping to successfully demobilize the Iranian population.

To be sure, there were large political groups which opposed tying the workers and peasants to the new government—the Mujahadeen and Fedayeen for example. But these organizations tended to expend their energies in futile military actions which lacked a mass base, and demonstrated their own illusions in alternative bourgeois figures, such as Bani Sadr.

The result is that a promising opportunity for revolutionary change in Iran has been transformed, at least for now, into its opposite—the consolidation of a new repressive bourgeois regime and the demobilization of the workers and peasants. Again, the way out of the contradiction lies in the development of a new leadership, a proletarian leadership, which can explain the need for an independent struggle of the workers and poor peasants culminating in the overthrow of Khomeini and the creation of a government which represents the toilers.

How can the lessons drawn from the three revolutions of 1979 be profitably applied by fighters today in the Philippines and in Haiti? The basic features of events are the same (though the forms may be different) and the basic requirements which must be met for the workers and peasants of Haiti and the Philippines to move forward are the same as well.

In the Philippines there seem to be many similar illusions in the Aquino government by segments of the mass movement as we saw in Iran with regard to Khomeini. Mass organizations have been put together which are taking the name "Cory Aquino Peoples Power." Appeals are made for Cory to "uproot Marcosism." But Aquino will not and cannot "uproot Marcosism," if by "Marcosism" is understood the corruption and repression which so brutally oppressed the Filipino masses under the ex-dictator.

Aquino represents the selfsame class forces which created "Marcosism" in the first place, and "Aquinoism" will not bring much in the way of benefits to the people. It is imperative that revolutionary forces in the Philippines take no action which expresses even the slightest confidence in Aquino or her government.

During the snap elections called by Marcos, many in the Filipino workers' movement chose to give support to Aquino's candidacy—with greater or lesser degrees of criticism and differentiation. The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), by contrast, took a position urging a boycott of the elections. Today there is a major discussion about that policy in the CPP.

The Central Committee of the party has issued a self-criticism, which appeared in the May issue of the English-language edition of its paper, *Ang Bayan*. It declares, "The election and the major events it unleashed constituted the *climax* of the people's long-drawn struggle against the Marcos regime. During and after the snap election, the historically determined central political struggle was *the showdown over the very existence and continuance of fascist rule*. The snap election became the main channel of large-scale mobilization and deployment of the masses for the *decisive battle* to overthrow the dictatorship.

"This being the case, it was tactically necessary for the revolutionary forces to participate critically in the snap election" (from reprint in *Intercontinental Press*, July 28, 1986, pp. 486-487, emphasis added).

It is certainly true that the Philippine elections, and the rallying of the masses to the Aquino campaign, presented difficult tactical problems for revolutionary forces in that country. And it is also true that the main argument presented in defense of the CPP's boycott position—that it was a necessary principled stand in the case of fraudulent bourgeois elections—represented a sectarian line of reasoning. But the conclusion of the majority of the CPP to the

effect that it should have given critical support to Aquino's campaign is not the solution. An expression of *political confidence* in Aquino, which is what a call to vote for her was, would only have contributed to the spread of illusions about what a victory by her in the elections could actually accomplish.

The statement of the CPP reveals such illusions. The installation of Aquino in office was *not* "the climax" of the struggle. Nor was it "the showdown over the very existence and continuance of fascist rule." And it wasn't "the decisive battle"—even in the struggle "to overthrow the dictatorship." Aquino has already accommodated considerably to the old fascist and dictatorial elements in the country. And she herself will be forced to resort to dictatorial and oppressive methods to maintain her rule and the rule of the class she represents—or else she will be overthrown by a rightist coup—unless state power in the Philippines is actually taken out of the hands of the exploiters. The task of revolutionary forces in the Philippines is to prepare, in the course of the present struggles, for that *truly* decisive battle, that *genuine* climax of the struggle.

It is important, of course, to keep in mind the difference between participation in or support for Aquino's election campaign—no matter how critical such support might have been—which is completely unprincipled for proletarian revolutionary forces, and participation in the mass movement which arose after Marcos's vote fraud *for the implementation of the democratic decision of the Filipino people*. It was this mass movement, and not the election campaign itself, which resulted in the overthrow of the Marcos regime. For proletarian revolutionaries it is not only permissible, it is absolutely incumbent to join in and try to give leadership to such basic mass struggles for democratic demands.

In Haiti, of course, things have happened somewhat differently. Here there are few illusions that the new ruling junta represents anything

qualitatively different from Duvalier. Yet here too, as long as an active mass opposition to the regime continues, the key question will be the development of proletarian leadership and the growth of understanding by the workers and farmers that they need to take the power themselves, independently of any and all bourgeois forces, in order to reorganize the economy, break the stranglehold of world imperialism, and improve the standard of living of the Haitian masses.

The Three Lessons

We can, then, summarize the three lessons promised in the title of this article: 1) While the working class and the poor peasantry must utilize and exploit any and every contradiction which arises in the ruling classes, it must do nothing which sacrifices its own independence in the revolutionary process. 2) They must have no confidence in any wing of the bourgeoisie, *and express none*, relying only on themselves to carry through the tasks necessary for the completion even of the democratic struggle. And 3) they must organize a revolutionary party; a party which needs to maintain organic links to democratically functioning mass organizations both in the process of the struggle for state power and in the process of consolidating that power and implementing workers' rule after a successful insurrection.

These aren't new lessons. But they remain vital for revolutionists throughout the world today as they have been in the past. They must affect the outlook of those in places like the Philippines and Haiti, where hated dictatorships have been overthrown and where mass mobilizations continue to pose the question of who shall rule; like South Africa, where the overthrow of the old government remains the first order of business in the course of a revolutionary upsurge; as well as in those countries where activists are still waiting for the start of the mass activity which will place these questions on the agenda as immediate and burning issues.

The Iranian Revolution and the Dangers That Threaten It

by Steve Bloom and Frank Lovell 75¢

Poland, the Fourth International, and the Socialist Workers Party

by Steve Bloom 75¢

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International solidarity needed after Bujak's arrest

IN THE WAKE of the decision of the International Monetary Fund Board of Governors to admit Poland, the Polish political police arrested the main underground Solidarnosc leader, Zbigniew Bujak.

CYRIL SMUGA

On the same day, the police arrested other known activists in Warsaw — Konrad Bielinski, a member of the underground regional leadership of the union; Ewa Kulik, editor of *Tygodnik Mazowsze*, the main underground journal of Solidarnosc, with a weekly circulation of several tens of thousands; and Henryk Wujec, a former elected leader of Solidarnosc in Warsaw.

Wujec was a member of the Workers' Defence Committee (KOR) and founder of the first workers' journal in "People's Poland," *Robotnik* (which ceased publication in 1981). Unlike Bielinski and Kulik, Henryk Wujec was not underground. This roundup threatens seriously to weaken the Warsaw regional leadership of Solidarnosc.

This blow against Solidarnosc was struck at a time when the very right-wing Warsaw correspondent of the Paris daily *Figaro* was writing: "The Polish government hopes to be able to get the population to accept unpopular but necessary reforms by hiding behind Western experts."

Bujak's arrest was a severe blow for the Polish workers' movement as a whole. This former worker at the Ursus tractor factory in Warsaw made contact with the KOR at the start of 1980.

When the Polish government raised food prices in July 1980, he led the first strike in Ursus. At the time, he tried to organize a workers' commission modeled on the Spanish ones.

Elected chair of Solidarnosc in the Warsaw region, he was also a member of the union's national leadership.

In the fall of 1981, he tried, like the unionists in the Lodz region, to impose social control over distribution in order to combat shortages.

Managing to escape arrest at the time of the December 13, 1981, crackdown, Bujak was one of the founders of the Provisional Under-

ground Leadership (TKK) of Solidarnosc. To the general-strike strategy advocated in particular by unionists in Lower Silesia, he counterposed that of building a counter-society ("an underground society"), which was supposed to force the bureaucracy to negotiate.

To the detriment of building coordination among the factory organizations, this line favored developing other areas of resistance. It was



opposed to any perspective of a central confrontation with the bureaucratic regime and accentuated the divisions within the Polish social movement.

One of the consequences of this has been the recent emergence of political currents within the social movement, in particular a revolutionary socialist current known as the Workers' Opposition, whose perspectives focus around generalizing workers' struggles.

But while Bujak's authority was widely challenged by the Solidarnosc cadres, he remained in the eyes of all the symbol of determined resistance to General Wojciech Jaruzelski's normalization schemes.

Within the TKK, Bujak was the last national leader elected before the imposition of the state of war, and thus he symbolized the continuity of Solidarnosc.

Bujak's arrest comes in the wake of a long series of other arrests of underground leaders. Three union leaders in Lower Silesia (Wladyslaw Frasnuk, Piotr Bednarz and Jozef Pinior) were jailed in 1982-83. The Cracow union leaders Stanislaw Handzlik and Wladyslaw Hardek were arrested respectively in 1982 and 1983.

The Poznan underground leader, Janusz Palubicki, was seized in 1983. The Gdansk leaders, Bogdan Lis and Bogdan Borsewicz, were picked up respectively in 1984 and 1985. And finally Tadeusz Jedynek of Upper Silesia was taken in 1985.

All these arrests have weakened not only the TKK but the movement as a whole. These leaders, properly elected in 1981, represented the continuity of the resistance movement.

Today, the TKK has been reduced to two underground activists, Jan Andrzej Gorny from Upper Silesia and Marek Muszynski from Lower Silesia. Since neither was in the leadership of the union movement before December 1981, their symbolic value is less.

The Communist Party bureaucrats meeting in Warsaw in preparation for their upcoming congress greeted Bujak's arrest with an ovation. But if Jaruzelski hoped to reduce Solidarnosc to impotence by this roundup, his hopes were immediately dashed.

In Warsaw, Wroclaw and Gdansk, the news of Bujak's arrest provoked spontaneous demonstrations. On the same day in Cracow an antinuclear demonstration of several thousand people, organized by the independent organizations, took up the demand for Bujak's release.

Despite increasing repression, the mass resistance to the bureaucracy is continuing and needs international solidarity more than ever. □

THE FAKE DEBATE ON THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL (Part 2)

by Frank Lovell

Many crucial issues that were debated over the years in the life and work of the Fourth International are referred to by Doug Jenness in the first of his "debate" articles which appeared in the April 7 *Intercontinental Press*, using as a foil the present leaders of the Workers Revolutionary Party in Britain, who last year broke with their former leader Gerry Healy. Among the issues mentioned in passing by Jenness are the following: how the Fourth International was formed; the conduct of FI cadres during World War II (in Europe and the U.S.); the importance of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions, and their impact on the FI; the 1953 split in the leadership of the FI and the reunification ten years later; and the special significance of the Cuban revolution.

All these issues are important and merit study, but (as Jenness says) "it would be a diversion to go into them here." What interests us in this examination of how he reworks the history of these events is what he includes and what he leaves out. He mentions that the issues over which the 1953 FI split had occurred "had receded by 1956, and discussion began shortly afterward to reunify the International." He fails to mention what had happened in 1956 to precipitate this discussion: 1) on February 24 and 25 Khrushchev confessed and denounced the crimes of Stalin at a closed session of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and 2) on October 23 a mass uprising in Budapest brought down the repressive Stalinist regime, and a new popular government took power in Hungary. These two events were hailed by both wings of the divided FI, and that is why the issues that prompted the split "had receded." Jenness omits these events because he now has a different appreciation of Stalinism than the vast majority of the FI, and because he is anxious to describe in some detail his new appreciation of the 1959 Cuban revolution. The subtitle of his April 7 *IP* article is "Workers Press' must face up to lessons of the Cuban revolution."

The Cuban Axis

What are the lessons of the Cuban revolution, according to Jenness?

1) "The struggle to construct a new revolutionary world movement in continuity with the internationalist program and strategy of the Communist International in Lenin's time took a giant

leap forward with the arrival of the Cuban leadership on the scene." That's the first lesson.

2) "The Cuban leadership has pursued a proletarian internationalist course and deepened its communist understanding in the quarter century since that time. And the victories of the Grenadian and Nicaraguan revolutions, and the course charted by the Sandinista leadership since 1979, give us every reason to reaffirm Hansen's judgment today." Lesson number two is pointedly linked to the judgment of Joseph Hansen, a leader of the SWP and the Fourth International who was instrumental in turning the world movement toward the Cuban revolution in the 1960s. We will return to this subject shortly.

3) "The Cuban revolution did not develop in the way that the Fourth International had anticipated—that is, as its cadres had been educated to expect on the basis of its theory of 'permanent revolution.'"

(Here Jenness introduces a corollary consideration to bolster the credibility of his third "lesson." He notes that "a National Committee statement adopted in March 1963 [by the Healyite Socialist Labour League, predecessor to the WRP] argued that 'only a course of construction of independent working-class parties aiming at workers' power, based on the programme of Permanent Revolution, can prevent each national revolution from turning into a new stabilization for world imperialism.'" Jenness adds a further observation, "Twenty years later the WRP still clung to this fetish," i.e., Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution.

(The implication is that since Healy was wrong about the class character of the Cuban revolution; and since Healy claimed that his analysis was based on Trotsky's theory; therefore, the theory is false. What about the veracity of Jenness's "lessons," quite aside from his faulty logic?)

There is not the slightest evidence anywhere that "the arrival of the Cuban leadership on the scene," throughout the course of its development from 1959 to 1979, produced a "giant leap forward" in the construction of any "new" revolutionary world movement either theoretically or organizationally. It is true that the Cuban revolution had a profound effect on the FI (the only world movement at the present time which can claim such a "continuity with the internationalist program and strategy of the Communist International in Lenin's time") and was undoubtedly the precursor

of a protracted debate over strategy and tactics for ten years, from 1968 to 1978. In dispute was the role of guerrilla warfare in Latin America. This dispute is recorded in the book by Joseph Hansen, *The Leninist Strategy of Party Building* (Pathfinder Press, 1979). But this is not what Jenness is writing about, nor does he wish to call attention to it.

Jenness quotes Hansen to the effect that the Cuban revolution "had something *qualitative* about it as a culmination of the overturns that began in Eastern Europe. With its signal that the stage is now opening for non-Stalinist revolutionary leaderships, it even appears as a major turning point in the whole postwar period." This quotation is cited from Hansen's book, *Dynamics of the Cuban Revolution*.

If *IP* readers are prompted to read that book, they will find there a report for the SWP Political Committee by Hansen on the "Cuban Question" (Jan. 14, 1961) in which he traces the year-long development of the revolution from the overthrow of the Batista dictatorship to the establishment of a workers' state. He explains the support of the SWP leadership *from the beginning* as expressed in the pages of the *Militant*. He said, "it obviously was a part of the whole colonial revolution that had been sweeping the Far East, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Therefore, we supported it, as an automatic reflex. We supported it with all the more energy because it involved American imperialism, our own enemy right here at home. That's the approach on a political level."

That was also the approach of the majority on both sides in the divided ranks of the FI, and this common appreciation of the Cuban revolution influenced the 1963 reunification of the FI more than the important events between 1953 and 1956.

The analysis of the Cuban revolution was a continuation and further application of the method employed in previous analyses of the post-World War II colonial revolution, beginning with events in Yugoslavia and China. Hansen's subsequent appreciation of the Cuban leadership did not cause him to revise this analysis. Nor did the Castroist appreciation and description of the Cuban revolution add anything to Hansen's analysis.

The second Jenness "lesson" is that the Castroist leadership in Cuba has pursued a "proletarian internationalist course" from the beginning. In the absence of any qualifications, the reader must understand this to mean a *consistent* proletarian internationalist course. However, continuing analysis of the Cuban revolution revealed serious shortcomings in the leadership. This was the expressed opinion of the leaders of the SWP prior to 1980. It is the opinion of the leaders of the FI today, as expressed at the 1985 World Congress.

When Soviet tanks invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 and crushed the mass uprising of students and workers in Prague, Castro endorsed the invasion.

He was cautious, saying that there were progressive signs in the uprising. But in his speech on August 23 he announced that the Cuban government was convinced that the new anti-Stalinist regime of Alexander Dubcek "was heading toward capitalism and was inexorably heading toward imperialism." To the leaders of the SWP at the time this did not sound like an expression of proletarian internationalism.

In December 1968 Joseph Hansen published an article in *IP* (he was then editor of the magazine) in which he expressed our differences with Castro. Hansen said (among other things), "The accumulating evidence more and more confirms the opposite view—that a political revolution was maturing in Czechoslovakia which, if Moscow had not intervened, would have succeeded in bringing a revolutionary socialist regime to power." (Hansen's article was reprinted as part of the pamphlet "The Invasion of Czechoslovakia," and is included in *Dynamics of the Cuban Revolution* under the title, "Fidel Castro and the Events in Czechoslovakia.")

The limitations of the Cuban leadership's "revolutionary internationalism" were revealed not only in their hostile attitude to uprisings in Eastern Europe (their support of the oppressive military dictatorship in Poland today), but also in Latin America in their support and endorsement of Salvador Allende's doomed Popular Unity government in Chile and even to the "progressive" military junta in Peru in the early 1970s, which they saw as perhaps opening "new paths to socialism." Such attitudes betray an adaptation to Stalinist policies.

There may be a link between the Cuban leaders' incomplete understanding of Stalinism and some of their own erroneous practices in Cuba. In August and September 1971 the *Militant* carried a series of articles by ex-editor Harry Ring, which soon appeared in pamphlet form, entitled "Cuba & Problems of Workers' Democracy." Ring wrote that "it must be recognized that the present crackdown on intellectuals represents an adaptation to the pressure of the Moscow bureaucrats and their junior counterparts in Havana."

He also noted "previous adaptations to Stalinist pressure," calling attention to "Fidel's January 1966 attack on Trotskyism" (later deleted in Radio Havana broadcasts), and to the jailing of "individual revolutionaries and small groupings."

Ring concluded that the lack of proletarian democracy in Cuba was in no way comparable to the bureaucratic degeneration in the Soviet Union. But, he said, "the Cuban leadership has committed some grievous errors, the importance of which cannot and should not be minimized."

When Joseph Hansen wrote the introduction to *Dynamics of the Cuban Revolution* (May 1, 1978), he summarized the position of the SWP in three points: "1. For defense of the Cuban revolution against all its enemies. . . . 2. For the development of proletarian forms of democracy in Cuba. . . . 3. For the formation of a Leninist-type party that guarantees internal democracy."

This was the declared position of the SWP leadership, including Jenness, prior to 1980. Jenness may believe that for the last quarter century the Cuban leadership "has pursued a proletarian internationalist course and deepened its communist understanding," without qualifying that in any way. But this only shows that somewhere along the line since 1980 Jenness changed his mind.

The third "lesson" Jenness wishes to teach is that Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution is false, conclusively disproved by the experience of the Cuban revolution and the 1979 victories in Grenada and Nicaragua. He cites as further evidence "the course charted by the Sandinista leadership since 1979." He says, "The lessons of the Cuban experience helped us take a new look at the overturn of capitalist rule in Eastern Europe, China, and Vietnam and to see more clearly than we had at the time the process by which workers' states were established in those countries." And this is all linked to "Hansen's judgment."

Jenness does not say who "us" is, those of "us" who were forced to take a "new look" at post-World War II history (i.e., to reject permanent revolution). But one thing for sure is that Joseph Hansen was not included in that company.

Hansen wrote an article, "Theory of the Cuban Revolution," in 1961 (included in *Dynamics of the Cuban Revolution*). In this article he contends that the theory of permanent revolution was again confirmed by the Cuban events, and that it was a necessary tool for an understanding of those events as they were developing. The following is an excerpt: "The Cuban revolution is not the first to have given the theoreticians something fresh to consider. The Russian revolution exceeded it in that respect. In 1917 the entire world socialist movement was caught by surprise, including the Bolshevik Party—not excepting even Lenin. Socialists wielding power at the head of the workers and peasants in a backward country like Russia! It wasn't in the book. Well . . . most of the books.

"The Russian revolution was fortunate in having a leadership as great in theory as in action. Four decades ago it was common knowledge in the socialist movement that one at least of the Russian leaders had accounted in theory for the peculiarities of the Russian revolution in all its main lines—*some twelve years before it happened*. His name was Leon Trotsky."

The Problem of Revolutionary Leadership

The post-World War II revolutions in the colonial world presented a serious theoretical problem, but not with the theory of permanent revolution as Jenness pretends. The real problem has to do with the Leninist concept of the vanguard party. It was stated most succinctly in an article on this subject by James P. Cannon, which appears in the book *Fifty Years of World Revolu-*

tion (1917-1967), published by Merit Publishers in 1968. Here is how the problem was stated: "The conquest of power by the Communist parties of Yugoslavia, China, North Korea, and North Vietnam had induced not a few radicals and ex-Trotskyists to assume or assert that Lenin's teachings on the party, and Trotsky's reaffirmation of them, are out of date. These developments prove, they argue, that it is a waste of time, a useless undertaking, to try to build independent revolutionary parties of the Leninist type as Trotsky advised, since the exploiters can be overthrown with other kinds of parties, especially if these are supported by a powerful workers' state like the Soviet Union or China."

The advent of the Cuban revolution added another dimension to this problem, as noted by Hansen. A non-Stalinist revolutionary leadership had taken power in spite of and in opposition to the program and policy and organizational maneuvers of the Communist Party of Cuba. This feature of the Cuban revolution, Hansen said, "has something *qualitative* about it." This does not mean, however, that the question of how the revolution can succeed without benefit of a Leninist-type party has been resolved.

Cannon submitted the following answer in relation to Cuba: "Once the Cuban freedom fighters had become sovereign in the country, they found not only that they could not dispense with a vanguard party, but that they desperately needed one. They have therefore proceeded to construct one along Marxist lines and are still engaged in that task nine years after their victory."

It is now 27 years after their victory, and this year the Cuban Communist Party opened its Third Congress on February 4. The question remains, is this a Leninist-type party? This is a serious debate among revolutionists. Those who are primarily engaged in preparing revolutionary struggles in their own countries are painfully aware of the Stalinist-like features of the Cuban Communist Party. The Barnesite leadership of the Socialist Workers Party in the U.S. holds the opposite view. Jenness and his factional collaborators have proclaimed the Cuban Communist Party the model of Leninist organization and have reorganized the SWP accordingly, outlawing opposition factions and bureaucratically expelling oppositionists. These are specific questions about which a serious debate has begun within the ranks of the Fourth International.

In his second installment of the fake debate that Jenness is conducting with the ex-Healyites in Britain (*IP*, May 5), "Answering Healyite myths about SWP," he corrects many of Healy's false accusations directed against the SWP leadership for 25 years. Over time Healy often repeated the same groundless charges that the SWP was opportunistic, engaged in selling out the working class, revising the Trotskyist program, capitulating to the pressures of U.S. imperialism, and otherwise abandoning the revolutionary struggle. Healy repeated these charges so many times and with so

many twisted examples, and conducted such bombastic polemics against his own concocted image of the SWP, that leading ex-Healyites (identified with the British weekly *Workers Press*) have lately repeated the Healyite version of SWP and FI history more or less out of habit. Healy's apparent successor, Michael Banda, even extends and deepens the old subjective-sectarian approach. Jenness undertakes to straighten all this out, and by contrast to Healy's and Banda's inventions, his political history of the SWP and its previous leaders seems like a scholarly effort to unearth the truth.

Not much research is required to document Healy's falsifications, since many of his political acts and the sectarian tendency he personifies are recorded in two *Education for Socialists* compilations, prepared by the SWP education department, one in 1974 and the other in 1978. Both appeared before Jenness received his revelations about the superiority of Castro. The first is *Marxism vs. Ultraleftism: The record of Healy's break with Trotskyism* (edited with an introduction by Joseph Hansen), and the second is *How Healy and Pablo Blocked Reunification* (Documents, 1956-58).

The SWP Under Cannon

The subtitle of the second Jenness "debate" article is, ironically, "A genuine political discussion can take place only with facts." This much is true; the facts must be established. But the purpose of a discussion is to discover how facts are misunderstood and distorted. Jenness has a knack for distortion.

One of Healy's standard charges against the Cannon leadership of the SWP is that Cannon capitulated to "left-Rooseveltism," and that even Trotsky was unable to correct this pernicious tendency. The most recent formulation, as quoted by Jenness, is that Cannon and Trotsky clashed "in the famous discussion of the capitulation of the SWP to Left-Rooseveltism and their refusal to consider the U.S. Communist Party as a legitimate part of the working class."

Jenness undertakes to answer this canard by quoting Farrell Dobbs, who was present at the "famous discussion" which was about whether to endorse the candidacy of Earl Browder for president in the U.S. general election of 1940, at the time of the Stalin-Hitler pact and the first stage of World War II. Trotsky proposed it as a tactic in order to differentiate the SWP from the prowar "progressives" in the unions, and to attract the attention of workers in the Stalinist movement and others opposed to the imperialist war. Cannon did not agree with that tactic. He thought it would not be understood in the unions or in the radical movement of this country.

In retrospect Dobbs said that he thought Trotsky was right, that he believed "the Browder tactic could have been helpful," according to the quotation offered by Jenness. But this afterthought came more than thirty years late. In 1940

Dobbs expressed complete agreement with Cannon, and for many years thereafter.

Cannon reported the meeting with Trotsky, and his report was published in the October 19, 1940, *Socialist Appeal* (later included in the book *The Socialist Workers Party in World War II—writings and speeches of Cannon, 1940-43*, "The Stalinists and the United Front"). The Cannon report included the following points:

* "Nobody in the delegation agreed with the Old Man on this drastic proposal."

* "Trotsky made a compromise proposal. . . . If we would take his proposal as one possible maneuver, and would devise some method of united-front approach which would really enable us to penetrate the Stalinist ranks, he would accept it as a compromise."

* "Nobody in our Political Committee wanted to sponsor the policy of critical support to the Stalinists in the election campaign. I think this is one time we disagreed with Trotsky correctly."

* "The united-front tactics, as devised and perfected by Lenin, are in no sense the expression of a conciliatory attitude toward opponent organizations in the labor movement."

* "We must classify the Stalinists and the reactionary and 'progressive' patriotic labor fakers as simply two different varieties of enemies of the working class employing different methods because they have different bases under their feet. It brings us into a complicated problem in the trade union movement. It has been our general practice to combine in day-to-day trade union work with the progressives and even the conservative labor fakers against the Stalinists. We have been correct from this point of view, that while the conservative and traditional labor skates are no better than the Stalinists, are no less betrayers in the long run, they have different bases of existence. The Stalinist base is the bureaucracy in the Soviet Union. They are perfectly willing to disrupt a trade union in defense of the foreign policy of Stalin. The traditional labor fakers have no roots in Russia nor any support in its powerful bureaucracy. Their only base of existence is the trade union; if the union is not preserved they have no further existence as trade union leaders. That tends to make them, from self-interest, a little more loyal to the unions than the Stalinists. That is why we have been correct in most cases in combining with them as against the Stalinists in purely union affairs."

This dispute with Trotsky in 1940 over an approach to the workers in the ranks of the CP did not directly or immediately indicate a reevaluation of the SWP trade union policy of the previous period. No one at the time thought so, not Trotsky and least of all Farrell Dobbs. Cannon alone showed an awareness that such a review and critical reexamination was a possible implication, and that is why he spoke clearly and precisely in support of the party's trade union policy in his report on the meeting with Trotsky.

Jenness quotes the belated agreement expressed by Dobbs with the "Browder tactic" not because he hopes to show that Dobbs was thinking of reevaluating the trade union policy with which he was so closely identified in the 1930s. But Jenness himself is interested in a reevaluation of that policy because the present SWP leadership has a new and different appreciation of Stalinism. Just as they project themselves as the *bona fide* Castroist party in this country, so they have begun to conjure up the possibilities of an alliance with U.S. Stalinists in the arena of "anti-imperialist" radical politics. Thus Jenness finds Dobbs's disclaimer of Cannon's disagreement with Trotsky useful. The sole purpose is to whittle down Cannon's stature as the leader of the SWP in preparation for a future open attack on the trade union policy which he initiated and defended.

The Cannon Tradition vs Barnesism

The Barnes group in control of the SWP today has other reasons for sniping at Cannon and seeking opportunities to chip away at his method of party building and his concept of leadership. As a product of the American working class and a leader in the class struggle, Cannon was in almost every essential respect the exact opposite of the Barnesites. They look forward to "salvaging Cannon" in the same way they claim to have salvaged all that is useful in Trotsky—by repudiating his theories and discarding his methods.

As Jenness concluded his second "debate" with the ex-Healyites, he lectured them on the importance of facts. "Members of the WRP and others may have different views about the SWP's past and present policies. Fine!" he says. "But we insist that a precondition for a serious discussion is to start with facts." Well said.

He goes on to commend WRP leader David Bruce for acknowledging that the Healyites for years have proscribed all SWP publications, including the published writings of Cannon, Dobbs, and Hansen. "The WRP has now taken the first step to break out of its isolation from genuine political discussion," Jenness says. These are brave words that he and other Barnesites in control of the SWP ought to take to heart. They have more in common with the past practices of the Healyites than they care to acknowledge.

* They have instituted a monolithic party structure.

* They have effectively curtailed the circulation of English-language publications of the FI's United Secretariat—*International Viewpoint* and *International Marxist Review*—so as to keep the SWP membership uninformed of the debate within the International about the fundamental programmatic and organizational concepts upon which the International was founded. In this way they continue the bureaucratic practices of Healy which kept the WRP membership in ignorance.

* They have proscribed all opposition publications—*Bulletin IDOM*, *Socialist Action*, and *Against the Current*—just as Healy sought to isolate the WRP membership and protect himself from criticism.

The one-sided fake debate Jenness is conducting with ex-Healyites is a foil to extend the SWP attack on the leadership of the Fourth International, and split off unwary groups in the national sections who may more easily accept the Barnesite liquidationist line when presented as an attack on Healyite ultraleftism.

As for respect for facts: cynicism prevails as is evident in the current revision of SWP history by Jenness and other writers in SWP publications. As a history major in college Jenness knows that undergraduates are not permitted such trickery with facts as he tries to palm off in his "debate" articles. He apparently thinks his training to detect such tricks licenses him to practice them. But this requires a completely innocent and trusting and unsophisticated audience. We think Jenness is stretching his credibility.

We are prepared to submit further evidence of intellectual stealth and treachery on the part of the Barnes faction, and to argue in open public debate with them on these charges.

We look forward to an expanded debate within the International over the causes and consequences of Barnesite liquidationism as a healthy replacement for the sterile discussion about Healy's ultraleftism.

We believe the validity and efficacy of Trotsky's theory of permanent revolution will be tested and demonstrated in the unfolding events in South Africa today and on the continents of Europe and North America tomorrow. We hope this will become the central issue of our discussion in the FI, and that the Barnesites will summon the courage to participate as a requirement to validate their claim that they are loyal builders of the International.

May 14, 1986

INTERNATIONAL GREETINGS TO THE GEORGE BREITMAN MEMORIAL MEETING

In this issue we are continuing to publish messages and speeches to the June 7 New York memorial meeting for George Breitman. The Fourth Internationalist Tendency has announced plans to compile and publish a special collection of all of the talks and greetings from the meeting.

From Charles Michaloux, for the Political Bureau of the Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire, French section of the Fourth International:

We learn with sadness that Comrade George Breitman is no longer. In this painful moment we salute the memory of this great militant who devoted his life to the defense and enrichment of revolutionary Marxism in the United States.

George would not have liked funeral orations. We recall his intelligence, his humor, his tenacity in the struggle. This made him an irreplaceable figure in the history and fights of the American Trotskyists.

Additional messages in tribute to George Breitman were received from the following organizations and individuals:

International

From Canada: Alliance for Socialist Action and ASA Vancouver branch; Ruth Bullock, Ross Dowson, Bob Fink, Ann Thomson. *England:* Socialist Labour Group; John Archer, Eileen Gersh, David King, Charlie van Gelderen, Harry Wicks. *Scotland:* Brian Heron, Louis Sinclair. *France:* Pierre Broue, Rodolphe Prager, and the Leon Trotsky Institute; Gerry Foley, Daniel Guerin, Matti, Michel Pablo, Richard Patry. *Australia:* Socialist Workers Party.

United States

Committee for Social Responsibility, Concerned Collective, Freedom Socialist Party, International Socialist Organization, Internationalist Workers Party, Socialist Action; Robert J. Alexander, Alan Benjamin, Clara Brodsky, Greg Cornell, Charles Curtiss, Harry DeBoer, Les Evans, Ada Farrell, Milton and Tiby Genecin, Dan Georgakas, Albert Glotzer, Asher and Ruth Harer, David Herreshoff, James Kutcher, James Lafferty, Marilyn Levin, Herb and Paul-ine Lewin, Phyllis Miller, Eric Poulos, Patrick Quinn, Ellen Robinson, Franklin Rosemont, Dan Rosenshine, Dot and Ted Selander, Carole Seligman, Adam Shils, Regina Shoemaker, Nat Simon, Melissa Singler, Michael Smith, David Thorstad, Myra Tanner Weiss.

To the F.I.T. and his companion Dorothea, the French section of the Fourth International extends a fraternal show of solidarity.

From the Partido Socialista Revolucionario, Colombian section of the Fourth International:

For us, Latin American Trotskyists who are struggling against capitalist and imperialist domination of Colombia, the memory of Comrade George Breitman will last forever. He was one of the "old guard" who survived the ebbs and flows of the class struggle for several decades, and never gave up his principles or his convictions, in spite of the difficult conditions for an American Marxist during the cold war.

Together with other comrades like Joseph Hansen (who undoubtedly would be among you this evening), Farrell Dobbs, Tom Kerry, Frank Lovell, and, above all, James P. Cannon, Breitman kept alive the light of revolutionary Marxism and the need to build a Trotskyist organization in the bulwark of imperialism. They guided us with their brilliant analysis about the world situation; they showed us there were many people inside the U.S.A. who longed for a liberated world, free from imperialist exploitation. The Socialist Workers Party, decidedly, was the work of those pioneers; the tradition of revolutionary Marxism was their guideline; the achievement of world and American revolution their goal.

Now, when Comrade Breitman is dead, we cannot help mentioning his last struggle against revisionism and Castroist tail-endism of the present leadership in the SWP, which has caused a virtual split inside the FL. The SWP of Australia has broken and left the FL Jack Barnes and Mary-Alice Waters, Barry Sheppard and Larry Seigle, have led the party into a blind alley and have rejected the tradition of revolutionary Marxism personified in people like Comrade Breitman.

We supported Comrade Breitman in his last struggle, and will remember him as one of the most important leaders in our movement.

Long live the memory of Comrade Breitman!

From Y. Sakai, for the Political Bureau of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Japanese section of the Fourth International:

We have lost another Fourth Internationalist/Trotskyist teacher-comrade, George Breitman. We have translated your obituary, "George Breitman (1916-86): More Than Half a Century of Revolution-

ary Dedication" into Japanese, and the coming issue of our weekly, *World Revolution*, is to publish it. The whole life of Comrade George Breitman and his continuous revolutionary dedication will inspire all our Japanese comrades.

Comrade George Breitman represented the revolutionary potential of U.S. young workers of the 1930s, and he continued as a dedicated Fourth Internationalist until his very last days. "His hangouts were his neighborhood corner, which later became known as 'Trotsky Square' because so many of his gang joined the Trotskyist youth, and the Newark public library. Fifty years later, George still spoke of the Newark library with affection" (your obituary). He was a worker-Trotskyist of the 1930s, and, as such, he devoted his fifty years to

the U.S. Trotskyist organization and the Fourth International.

During the late 1960s and the early 1970s, members of the Japanese section learned much on the revolutionary potential of the U.S. Black movement and Malcolm X through various writings of Comrade George Breitman. Since the early 1970s, we have been translating-publishing the *Writings of Leon Trotsky* in Japan, and our comrades read them. We think that the Japanese section has inherited some of the revolutionary activities of Comrade George. The Japanese section will continue his struggle for the Fourth International and its program of permanent revolution.

Please pass our internationalist condolence to Dorothea.

GEORGE BREITMAN

by Paul Le Blanc

When I was still a "new left" activist in the 1960s, I knew and respected the work of George Breitman. After I joined the Trotskyist movement in 1972 and the Socialist Workers Party in the following year, my respect for him deepened.

One of the things that particularly impressed me in his writing and in classes he gave was the quality of his Marxism—which took theory and principles and past experience very seriously, but then applied them in a creative and critical-minded way to new realities in a manner that was illuminating and intellectually exciting. If new realities—whether Malcolm X or the youth radicalization or (later) the Sandinistas—didn't conform to theoretical preconceptions, he was inclined *not* to reject the new realities but to enrich the theory by using it to understand what was new. He showed a capacity to appreciate certain limitations of those he agreed with, and to appreciate certain insights of those he disagreed with—and in this way he helped to deepen our own understanding of the genuine complexity of political reality as it unfolds.

This was in dramatic contrast to other educators who tended to reduce party history and Marxist theory to glib and simplistic certainties—which might make us feel superficially confident and superior, but which didn't make us think too much. Breitman had a reputation for being better than that. And he was seen as someone who wasn't afraid to say what he thought, even if it went against the grain, even if it didn't conform to what were "safe thoughts" among those who wanted

to be synchronized with the current fashions within the party.

By 1981 it seemed clear to me that the party was in crisis. The central leadership was betraying a trust—although I was unable to know then just how deep the betrayal was. My first reaction was to consider resigning from the Socialist Workers Party "for personal reasons." After all, if the central leaders of the best socialist organization were so dishonest and so manipulative, what hope was there?

But then I decided that I had a responsibility—to the party I had joined, to the revolutionary socialist ideals and principles I was committed to, and to myself as a political person—to stay and raise every question and every criticism that I had, to say what I thought even if it went against the grain. And as I was doing this, I found that George Breitman and others who were close to him were raising many of the same kinds of questions and criticisms. By the time of the 1981 party convention, I was ready to join what became known as a "Breitman caucus." It was at that time that I first met George personally. I think a certain deep sense of kinship developed between us, and that is something that I have valued very much. For me he represented some of the finest qualities of American Trotskyism, and he was one of the finest people I have known.

I don't want to overstate this, but I don't want to understate it either. Every major piece of writing that I have done over the past five years was in one way or another inspired and influenced by George Breitman. He encouraged Dianne Feeley, Tom Twiss, and me to gather together Trotsky's thoughts on the revolutionary party, thinking this would make a valuable Education for Socialists Bulletin for the SWP; by the time we'd completed

Paul Le Blanc is on the editorial board of the Bulletin IDOM. He never delivered this speech to the June 7, 1986, memorial meeting for George Breitman due to the late hour and crowded agenda.

it, the party leadership was hostile to such a product—but the F.I.T. later published *Leon Trotsky and the Organizational Principles of the Revolutionary Party*. George believed that there was a need for a serious Trotskyist analysis of the Sandinista revolution, to demonstrate the value of a nondogmatic utilization of revolutionary Marxist theory, and he hoped this would be contributed to the anticipated 1983 preconvention discussion of the SWP. That discussion never took place, and I was expelled as I was completing the manuscript, but the result was *Permanent Revolution in Nicaragua*. George felt that it was essential that a thoroughgoing answer be written to refute Jack Barnes's anti-Trotskyist "Their Trotsky and Ours," and the result was the pamphlet by Dianne Feeley and myself—*In Defense of Revolutionary Continuity*. None of these projects would have been undertaken had it not been for George Breitman; each of them is a result of his influence and bear the traces of his input. In a sense, they are part of his legacy. Even with the many other things I've written independently of his suggestions, George represented a certain standard which has influenced what I have done.

At the same time, I didn't always agree with him—and that was okay. He wasn't so insecure as to feel threatened by disagreements. Sometimes he would reconsider, conclude that he had been wrong about something and not be afraid to say so. What he found difficult to tolerate was the kind of "diplomacy" that hid what people actually thought, that wasted time and blurred over honest differences. For about a year, he and I had an honest difference over whether the Fourth Internationalist Tendency should exist, or whether we should all be in Socialist Action. I finally concluded that he was right in this case, but before I did (despite his disappointment and irritation over what he felt was my short-sightedness), we were still able to maintain a genuinely comradely relationship. And he had enough patience and respect not to try to "win me away" from Socialist Action, recognizing that I would have to develop and make my own choices based upon my own experiences.

I would like to try to convey a sense of this man for whom I felt a fierce affection, and I've thought of talking about things that happened and were said in one or another visit to his apartment, or to his hospital room, or of quoting from

The three pamphlets mentioned by Paul Le Blanc in these remarks are available from:

F.I.T.

P.O. Box 1947
New York, N.Y. 10009

Leon Trotsky and the Organizational Principles of the Revolutionary Party — \$5.00

Permanent Revolution in Nicaragua — \$3.00

In Defense of Revolutionary Continuity — \$4.00

one or another of his letters to me (which he always ended "Cordially, George"). I would like to weave words together in a way that might bring this friend back to life. But I can't do that. So I'll conclude with a couple of reflections on what he was about.

George recognized that the process of rebuilding the American Trotskyist movement would be more difficult and protracted than some of us wanted to believe. He had no illusions that the Fourth Internationalist Tendency would by itself be the nucleus around which such a movement would coalesce. But he believed that we had something to contribute to the process which none of the others seemed prepared to give serious attention to—the tenacious preservation and enrichment of a living heritage, more than half a century's worth of ideas and experience in which indigenous and international traditions were blended, that revolutionary activists of today and tomorrow could draw strength from and utilize in building a broad, democratic, working class movement capable of bringing socialism into being.

Despite all of the pain and frustration which he had to endure, his life was a triumph. To the very end, he lived his life according to his beliefs. He remained clear on what was happening, and he never lost faith, he never gave up, he never stopped contributing to the very best of his abilities to the struggle for human liberation. What he was able to contribute was very substantial, and it makes us stronger, and it inspires us to carry on the struggle.

A TRIBUTE TO ALICE PEURALA

by Carolyn Jasin

Alice Peurala, an unrelenting union fighter for the working class, died of cancer June 19, 1986, at her home in Chicago. She was 58 years old.

Peurala made union history when elected president of United Steelworkers of America Local 65 in 1979. She was the only woman president of a basic steel production and maintenance local in the international.

After her victory, in answer to an interviewer's question asking if being a woman helped her campaign, she said, "No, I don't think it had much to do with it. There are 7,000 men in the plant [United States Steel Corp., South Works] and 500 women. I won because people know I'm a fighter."

At that time Local 65 was part of the 130,000-member District 31 covering Chicago/Gary, representing the largest concentration of steelworkers in the United States and Canada. In the 1970s this area's steel mills were swept in a wave of reform led by Ed Sadlowski (a past president of Local 65), resulting in his 1977 challenge for the office of USWA international president, which was unsuccessful. Sadlowski's Fight Back slate ran on a program for membership control of all union affairs to combat the union leadership's collaboration with the bosses.

Hired in 1953

Alice was hired in the South Works mill in 1953. She was always active in union politics, supporting LW. Abel against the "tuxedo unionism" of David McDonald in 1965.

While she was working in the metallurgical department as an observer, U.S. Steel denied Alice, a single mother of one daughter, a promotion which would enable her to work a steady day shift with weekends off. Instead, men she had trained were promoted. Alice, without union support, filed a sex discrimination suit against U.S. Steel in Federal Court under the Civil Rights Act. She won in an out-of-court settlement in 1969.

In her new position as a products tester, Alice had to cover the entire 15-city-block mill. Her plant-wide activity for militant unionism developed into a caucus, Steelworkers for Change. She ran for recording secretary in 1970 and grievor in 1973. She was elected a division grievor in

1976 and was repeatedly elected delegate to the union's international conventions.

Peurala was an outstanding fighter, defending what she believed in with a driving dynamism seldom equaled. An example of her determination to confront U.S. Steel was shown in her campaign for the 1979 presidency when she had to oppose two other candidates. One of them was incumbent John Chico, who was endorsed by Sadlowski. Chico ran on a record of active union support to striking iron ore miners, striking coal miners, and defense of steelworkers at Newport News, Va., among other unprecedented activities for the local.

Undaunted, Alice threw her hard hat in the ring, prompting Chico to remark "Peurala certainly is to the left of me." Her upset victory in that election, however, was not shared by her running mates on the Steelworkers for Change ticket. Alice won, but the slate lost. Once elected, Alice withstood unrelenting pressures to discredit her from opponents on the executive board.

During the Iranian revolt against the Shah of Iran and U.S. interference in Iranian politics, opposition members circulated a rumor falsely claiming Alice had authorized \$10,000 from the union treasury to be given to the Khomeini regime. They called a special membership meeting to denounce Alice when she was out of town. A lynch-mob atmosphere filled the union hall, and a previously endorsed civil liberties resolution defending Iranian nationals was rescinded.

An Inspiration and an Example

Alice was a great inspiration to women in the mills, as was demonstrated by a standing ovation and chants of "Alice, Alice," in tribute to her at a USWA Chicago/Gary Women's Conference in 1981. Women were so proud of her. She established union committees that were open to all, promoting union democracy at all levels in the union.

Alice courageously spoke and organized for many social and political causes, in contrast to the craven conduct of union officers who stake their careers on AFL-CIO treachery.

During her reelection bid in 1982, massive layoffs started hitting the steel mills, throwing thousands out of work. Plant closings became a common occurrence.

Electioneering to fight harder than Alice for job security for workers, her opponent blasted Alice in a leaflet saying, "We've done all the marching that we're going to do for you, Alice. We intend to spend 100% of our time in the office

Carolyn Jasin, a District 31 steelworker, has sent this contribution to the Bulletin IDOM as a tribute to Alice Peurala.

right here at South Works representing Local 65." Further, her opponent accused her of "being concerned only with herself—getting her photograph in the newspapers and her image on TV. In short, she's nothing but a media junkie!" Alice, running on a Fight Back slate to combat contract concessions, narrowly lost the election.

In 1985 Alice was vindicated by the steelworkers in her mill. While recuperating from a mastectomy, she campaigned again to become Local 65 president and was resoundingly elected. With unbelievable personal fortitude, Alice later ran for Chicago/Gary district director. Predictably, she lost that race, since it was common knowledge she was undergoing chemotherapy treatment in a recurrence of cancer.

Alice described herself politically as an "independent." She had been a member of the Socialist Workers Party in earlier years, but she had a rocky relationship with the SWP, having

numerous political differences with the party as well as with the various leftist groups which converged in the steel mills.

Peurala endorsed many liberal Democratic Party candidates but she remarkably maintained her staunch support for the needs of working women and men. Alice was one of the few union leaders who dared to criticize Mayor Jane Byrne for betraying her campaign promise of a contract for Chicago firefighters, forcing them to strike.

Mayor Harold Washington attended her wake. The *Chicago Tribune*, *Chicago Reader*, and *New York Times*, as well as local radio news broadcasts, acknowledged the passing of Alice. A memorial meeting is scheduled at Local 65's hall on July 27.

Alice Peurala's epitaph reads, "Do not go gentle into that good night/Rage, rage against the dying of the light" (Dylan Thomas).

July 10, 1986.

HAROLD R. ISAACS

By Alan Wald

Harold Isaacs, a founding member of the Socialist Workers Party and author of a classic Trotskyist study of the aborted Chinese Revolution of 1925-27, died at age 75 in Boston on July 9, 1986, from complications resulting from heart surgery. In 1976 he retired from his position of Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Isaacs was born in New York City on September 13, 1910, and graduated from Columbia University in 1930. Seeking a career in journalism, he accepted a job as a reporter for the *China Press* in Shanghai and Peking. There he befriended a South African journalist who was sympathetic to Trotskyism but had been collaborating with the Chinese Communists through his association with the author Agnes Smedley. A facile writer with a sharp mind, Isaacs soon established further secret connections with Trotskyists during an investigation of a rebellion in the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party).

After being introduced to Smedley, he was able to obtain funds from the Communist Party to establish an English-language paper called *China Forum*, which he edited for two years. He then issued a public statement, "I Break with the Chinese Stalinists," (published in *New Internationalist*, vol. 5, no. 4, September-October 1934, pp. 76-78), and returned to the United States. He immediately joined the Workers Party of the United States, which had been formed at the end of 1934 from a fusion of the Communist League of America and A.J. Muste's American Workers Party.

When the proposal was first made by James P. Cannon and Max Shachtman for the WPUS to consider

the possibility of carrying out the "French turn" in the United States, which might involve dissolving and entering the Socialist Party, Isaacs was vehemently opposed. But his personal correspondence with Trotsky from early February to early March 1934 demonstrates a complete turnabout, and he remained a supporter of the Cannon-Shachtman leadership for the rest of the decade.

Under the pseudonym H.F. Roberts, Isaacs played an important role in the Trotskyist movement of the late 1930s. When the Trotskyist newspaper *Socialist Appeal* was launched in late 1937, Isaacs was for several years its real editor—organizing the staff, assigning articles, and editing most of the contributions—despite Max Shachtman's name on the masthead.

In 1938 he published his classic *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, with an introduction by Trotsky. As early as 1935 Isaacs had begun his collaboration on the book with Trotsky, travelling to Norway for a series of discussions in the summer of that year. Both Trotsky's introduction and Isaacs's diary notes from the interviews are available in *Leon Trotsky on China* (New York, Monad, 1976, pp. 578-91 and 541-46).

Although Isaacs supported Cannon and Trotsky during the 1939-40 split with Shachtman, he was discouraged by the assassination of Trotsky and left the SWP soon afterwards. In 1943 he began a new career as *Newsweek* editor and correspondent. In 1951 *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution* was reissued with Trotsky's introduction deleted and the revolutionary Marxist conclusions expunged. That same year Isaacs inaugurated his academic

career, teaching at Harvard University, the New School for Social Research, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The most famous among Isaacs's subsequent books is *Idols of the Tribe: Group Identity and*

Political Change (1975). In 1980, Isaacs and his wife Viola returned to China and reestablished relations with people they had known in the 1930s. An account of this visit was published as *Re-Encounters in China* (1985).

Intercontinental Press, 1963-1986

The editors and publishers of *Intercontinental Press* announced on August 11 their decision to scrap the biweekly magazine. The announcement was made in its last issue, Vol. 24, No. 16.

IP began as a weekly publication in Paris in September 1963 as *World Outlook* under the editorship of Joseph Hansen. The staff included Pierre Frank, Livio Maitan, and Ernest Mandel, leaders of the Fourth International.

In 1966 Hansen returned to New York after a serious illness

in Paris, and *World Outlook* came with him. He remained editor until his death in 1979. It was renamed *Intercontinental Press* in 1968. *IP* ceased as a weekly in August 1982 and appeared every two weeks until its demise.

This is part of a new publications project now being initiated by the Barnes group in control of the Socialist Workers Party. Former *IP* editor Doug Jenness says it is "aimed at strengthening both the *Militant* and *New International*," the SWP's weekly newspaper and occasional theoretical journal, respective-

ly. Jenness will become co-editor of the *Militant*. The expectation is that the staff of *New International* will be enlarged and it will appear more regularly. It began with the "Fall 1983" issue. There were two issues in 1984, two in 1985. The next *NI* is scheduled to appear this fall.

We regret the passing of *Intercontinental Press*, the end of another landmark that once distinguished the Socialist Workers Party as the U.S. representative of revolutionary Marxism, the party of world Trotskyism.

CRISIS IN THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

An Answer to Jack Barnes

BY CLIFF CONNER

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Once Again on the P-9 Strike

I must take up my pen once again in defense of my letter in the *Bulletin IDOM*, issue of June 1986, on the P-9 strike. In the July issue "A friend" responded to my letter (a welcome exchange) criticizing my main theme which was to the effect that the bosses and the union bureaucrats were lying in the same bed in a marriage of convenience, which has been the traditional view of revolutionary Marxists. "A friend" contends that the bosses would prefer to remain single, that is, not have any marriage or relationship at all with the union bureaucrats. The idea of the union bureaucracy as a "partner" or ally of the bosses "is an illusion cherished by the top layers of the AFL-CIO. But it is not shared at all by the capitalists." Really?

We agree that the bosses would indeed prefer to break the trade union movement, bureaucracy and all. *No trade unions at all* is a dream cherished only by the capitalists. But history has demonstrated that the only way they can do that is by outright fascist dictatorship, which the ruling class only resorts to as a last resort. Meanwhile a union can be completely broken here and there, such as happened when Reagan broke the air controllers' strike. But alas for such Reaganite actions, there are already rumblings of a new air controllers' union being formed and inevitably that is what will happen. In short, trade unionism is here to stay as long as the facade of bourgeois democracy is maintained and the bosses are successful in housebreaking the unions to their needs.

Before proceeding further with this analysis, a polemical note is in order. In my original letter I pointed out that Comrade Riehle indicated that there were shortcomings and mistakes made by the P-9 leadership but "all those things," he said, "can be learned, corrected, and improved upon." I expressed the hope that Comrade Riehle would spell out those shortcomings and mistakes so that we could all learn from his criticism. Unfortunately, "A friend," in defense of Comrade Riehle, does not touch on this point. Its importance, however, lies in the fact that it is of a piece with the whole, i.e., on the one hand an underestimation of the militant P-9 leadership and on the other hand an overestimation of the power of the bosses without the active collaboration of the bureaucracy.

What is the importance of a correct assessment of the different forces involved in this unusually militant struggle of the P-9 strikers? Well, first of all, Marxists like to call things by their right names. Secondly, it is just not possible to develop the correct tactics and strategy for the life-and-death struggle of the P-9 strikers if there is not a correct

assessment of the dialectical reality of the situation. To say that the bosses would prefer to break the bureaucracy as well as the strike is not to understand the reality of the boss/bureaucrat relationship as it exists.

The P-9 strike is a classic demonstration of what the boss/bureaucrat relationship is all about (including the support of the top layers of the AFL-CIO to the Wynn bureaucracy) and it takes place before our very eyes. What the bosses, the scabs, the cops, the National Guard could not do, it looks like the UFCW bureaucracy will do, i.e., break the strike. If the strike somehow survives, it will not be the fault of the International bureaucracy. What boss in his right mind would not embrace this class collaboration?

Is the bureaucracy considered a "partner" by the bosses? "A friend" says no. Partnership, he says, is a bureaucratic illusion. This will sound strange to the P-9 strikers who see the "partners" in action as the bosses' hatchet men, dealing the most vicious blows against them. If the bureaucracy is not in partnership with the bosses, then their pro-boss actions are strange indeed. Is it indeed possible that the executors do not appreciate their executioners?

It is the responsibility of revolutionary Marxists to denounce and expose this partnership, the buddy-buddy relationship of the bosses and the bureaucrats, rather than blur that relationship by telling us what the bosses would "prefer." The revolutionary Marxists (as well as the P-9 leadership) must focus on the immediate central threat that the UFCW officialdom poses and it must lay bare the "partnership" that exists between the bosses and the bureaucrats. That is the major lesson of the P-9 strike.

A reader
New York.

Some of the main issues taken up by "A reader" are discussed by Dave Riehle in his article about the P-9 strike in this issue of the Bulletin IDOM.

Breitman Memorial Meeting

Enclosed is a money order for the amount of twenty-five dollars to help support the *Bulletin IDOM* and in memory of George Breitman. I thought the June 7 New York tribute to George a moving acknowledgment of this great revolutionary and an educational on the history of American Trotskyism.

Gary Yost
Philadelphia

Note from England

I have just returned from an "International" forum on Libya and heard the sad news about Comrade George Breitman. My heartfelt condolences and sympathy goes out to all of you—especially Dorothea. Although I have never met any of you I feel as though I have known you all through reading the *Bulletin in Defense of Marxism* on a regular basis. My only regret remains my consistent inability to contribute to your struggle.

As a Trotskyist of just three years standing, and having been forced out of the Socialist League through the dominance of a Castroist current (as in the U.S.), it is sad to hear of the loss of yet another dedicated comrade. I must say that reading about, and the articles of, people such as George inspires young people like myself (I'm 23).

Michael Calvert
London, England

Renewal

Please renew my subscription to your excellent bulletin, starting with the June 1986 issue. In clear and reasoned terms it puts forward your point of view without distorting the views of other currents in our movement and beyond. Keep up the good work.

Robbie Mahood
Winnipeg, Canada

("Notes," continued from page 14)

1985; and articles by Marable and David Plotke in Davis, Pfeil, Sprinker, eds., *The Year Left*.

5. Harrell R. Rodgers, Jr. and Michael Harrington, *Unfinished Democracy, The American Political System* (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1981), pp. 241-2.

6. Walter Dean Burnham, *The Current Crisis in American Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 115, 152; Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, *The Irony of Democracy, An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics* (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 177, 150, 151.

7. Michael Parenti, *Democracy for the Few*, second edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977), pp. 205-6.

8. Garry Wills, *Confessions of a Conservative* (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1980), p. 84.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 85, 88, 89.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 90; Dye and Zeigler, p. 177.

11. Wills, pp. 114, 115.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 115, 157.

13. Robert Brenner, "The Paradox of Social Democracy: The American Case," in Davis, Pfeil, Sprinker, eds., *The Year Left*, pp. 69-70.

Two Errors

In the July-August 1986 issue of your magazine there appear a number of tributes to the late George Breitman.

It will not do anything to enhance the fine reputation that George earned in his political work as a Trotskyist over half a century by exaggerating his accomplishments and attributing things to him which are untrue. He does not need that.

For example, in his message to the New York memorial meeting Ernest Mandel begins with the following: "With George Breitman, the Fourth International has lost the last survivor of the central cadre which founded the Socialist Workers Party and assured the continuity of revolutionary Marxism in North America for half a century, a mainstay of that continuity on a world scale too."

There are two errors in this sentence. First, while George was indeed a founding member of the Socialist Workers Party, he was not then a part of the "central cadre" of the Trotskyist movement. He was too new a member to be in that category. The central cadre was made up of comrades like James P. Cannon, Max Shachtman, Martin Abern, Rose Karsner, Vincent R. Dunne, Carl Skoglund, Arne Swabeck, and some others who were by then old-time Trotskyists. Of course, George later became a part of the central cadre, but this was years later.

Second, he was not the last survivor of this layer of comrades who became part of the central cadre; there are others who are still alive and kicking. Like George himself, these comrades became part of the central cadre after 1938 when both the SWP and Fourth International were founded. Some of these comrades are presently living in California and I am sure that they would resent being buried prematurely.

In another tribute, by Evelyn Sell, the formation of the Friday Night Forum in Detroit in 1954, attributed to Breitman, is reported as though such an institution had never previously existed in the party. This is also untrue as many party branches had regular weekly forums, some on Friday nights and others at different times, long before this was allegedly established in Detroit.

I lived in Toledo, which is close to Detroit, from 1947 to 1951 and spoke at and attended forums in Detroit at various times during that period. There were regular weekly forums in Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and other branches prior to 1954.

George Breitman had enough in the way of accomplishments. His reputation does not need to be "improved" by statements such as those above that I have criticized. I think that the truth will be enough to ensure that he and his work will not be forgotten.

Milton Alvin
Los Angeles

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