


# AMZIL



**Art & Commitment:**

**ARTHUR MILLER**

**HAROLD ROSENBERG**

**LIONEL ABEL**

**PAUL GOODMAN**

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***CRITICS OF MILLS***

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***TOM MBOYA SPEAKS***

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**DAN WAKEFIELD:**

***PUERTO—NEW YORK***

**25c**

# Anvil & Student Partisan

a student socialist  
magazine

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New York 10, N.Y.  
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# Where Anvil Stands . . .

*Anvil and Student Partisan* expresses the ideas, criticisms, and proposals of young people who believe in democratic socialism. We oppose the status quo of private property interests, social inequality, and human oppression characteristic of capitalism. Yet, we are fully aware that Communist or any other totalitarian collectivism, with its even crueller exploitation and oppression, is the very anti-thesis of a democratic and equalitarian society.

We believe that democracy and socialism are inseparable. It is impossible to guarantee democratic rights to all people in a society based upon private ownership of the basic means of production. But there can be no liberty in a society that has nationalized its productive facilities and eliminated democratic controls. Socialism cannot exist without democracy. Democracy can flourish only when all human needs are satisfied. Furthermore, a socialist society can be attained only through the conscious, voluntary efforts of a majority of the people.

*Anvil and Student Partisan* is open to all who desire to re-examine and re-evaluate the socialist tradition. But, as our name implies, we claim no impartiality on the major social questions of our time nor on the forces behind them. In the United States we are committed to all forces that seek to make human dignity a reality: the civil rights movement, the trade unions, the fight for civil liberties. We defend colonial movements struggling for freedom from foreign domination, and at the same time we support those behind the Iron Curtain who are struggling against their oppressive masters. We seek to create sympathy for the aspirations of working-class movements throughout the world.

## Among our Contributors . . .

Dan Wakefield, contributor to the *Nation* is the author of *Island in the City*.

Hal Draper, former Editor of *Labor Action*, is a free-lance writer.

Robert Martinson, a sociologist at the University of California, was recently Socialist Party candidate for Mayor of Berkeley.

Eugene Glaberman, contributed the cover and illustrations for this issue.

# Congratulations!

The editors of *Anvil* join with our comrades and friends in sending greetings to Norman Thomas on his seventy-fifth birthday. He has given more, perhaps, than any other American of our time to the defense of intellectual and civil liberties and to the fight for social justice and a world without war. For over thirty years Norman Thomas has been the foremost spokesman of the Socialist movement in America. Even now he is its most active and tireless advocate. We, the younger generation on whose shoulders the burden must now also rest, want to take advantage of the occasion to express our appreciation to him for a lifetime dedicated to the cause of socialism and democracy.

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# A New Phase in the Cold War

EDITORIAL

**T**HE VISIT OF KHRUSHCHEV to the United States and the probability of more summit meetings is symptomatic of a new stage in the Cold War. The military conflict, dominant between 1946 and 1954 in a series of situations like the Berlin blockade, Korea, and Indochina, has lessened. Negotiations and discussions have become the focus of world politics.

This new phase represents a step back from the brink of World War III. As such, it marks an advance for all of the hundreds of millions who yearn for peace. Negotiations, even with the present negotiators, are infinitely preferable to armed struggles like the Korean War. Those who, like Dean Acheson, oppose them in the name of the old platitudes have adopted a logic which leads toward the conception of preventive war, for they are without any conception of a political alternative to H-bomb suicide. Some radicals and socialists, rightly concerned lest negotiations legitimize the totalitarian rule of Communism, mistakenly deduce an intransigence from this premise.

But realizing that negotiations as presently constituted mark an advance—or, more precisely, a retreat from the brink—is not the same as giving support to either Khrushchev or Eisenhower. Nor is it to believe that the two leaders will somehow cooperate in miraculously transcending the antagonisms of their opposing social systems. Co-existence is certainly superior to war, and this is the first proposition that must be understood in the present situation. But co-existence is not peace—particularly in the case of a truce between the two social systems that dominate the contemporary world. It offers potentialities for peace and this is why it is necessary to view negotiations actively and critically, to see in them a focus for further struggle for peace and not an accomplished fact that must be accepted passively.

For the fundamental problem of our time remains, even if in a new context. The rule of the few, the institutionalization of the line between the haves and the have-nots, is a permanent menace to peace whether it takes place within a single social system or between competing systems. This is particularly true today. On the one hand, the world is dominated by Communism, which denies all democratic rights to its citizens and tyrannizes over subject peoples. On the other, there is a capitalism whose domestic oppression is quite real (even if less harsh than Communist totalitarianism and admitting more possibilities of non-violent change), which seeks to organize the world in its own image and to its own advantage.

Such a situation is incompatible with peace. There can be accommodations and deals, there can be welcome concessions, but within limits. Still there cannot be peace, for the built-in explosiveness of minority exploitation in each system and the historic conflict between both of them remains in force. In a long-range perspective, then, the problem is: how to transcend both of these systems, how to find an alternative, a democratic way of organizing a world on the basis of freedom and abundance. In short, the epochal struggle for peace is also the struggle for democratic socialism, for the political pre-conditions of peace.

The alternative of democratic socialism is not on the agenda today. This means that the immediate political problem is to formulate a program directed toward the negotiations.

## Limits of Negotiations

First, it is necessary to understand the limits of negotiations. Neither Eisenhower nor Khrushchev sits down at the bargaining table to commit political suicide. Khrushchev is not going to propose democracy in Russia or freedom for the satellites in a moment of generosity. Eisenhower is not going to give up the interest of American capitalism in Middle Eastern oil as a gesture of good will. In short, each side will attempt to use the negotiations to protect its own sphere of exploitation and oppression.

Khrushchev's speech at the United Nations and the American response to it is an excellent case in point. The sweeping generalities of the Russian proposal to disarm down to the police level within four years has an obvious surface appeal. But the lack of any concrete steps for implementation gives this speech the quality of a cynical manipulation of man's yearning for universal disarmament. If Khrushchev's line were carried out, it would mean freedom for the satellite peoples—since, as events in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary proved beyond a doubt, Communist rule in these countries is maintained only through the presence of the Russian army. This, Khrushchev will not seriously put forward, in four years or in ten. On the other hand, the American reaction demonstrated more of a concern for the creaking structure of NATO than a desire to make a serious counterproposal.

Yet, if it is naive to think that the negotiators will dissolve the Cold War and dismantle their oppressive social systems, there is an area of exchange and movement. On the one hand, it is possible that freedom can be advanced because neither side has a paramount interest in a situation and both feel they will gain from a change: thus the Austrian

peace treaty. On the other hand, both parties may respond to political pressure and come to an agreement: thus the possibility of nuclear test suspension. A third area of possible transition is somewhat more vague. One side, through a dramatic political move, can force the other to a concession. If, for example, the United States were to put NATO on the table, to announce the unilateral withdrawal of American troops from Europe as part of a campaign for peace, this would act upon the Communists and weaken the political justification of the Warsaw Pact.

All of these cases point, however, to another possibility, one that underscores the potential danger of negotiations: a deal on the basis of the common interest of both sides in having the unchallenged right to exploit the people of their own spheres. Socialists and democrats can never condone such a deal. The people of Berlin and of Hungary, the masses of Eastern Europe are not pawns to be sacrificed for the peace and quiet of capitalist exploitation in Latin America or Africa. The colonial revolution, an epochal burst toward freedom, is not a possession of the Kremlin that can be bargained away in return for the right to oppress Eastern Europe. In short, the road to peace does not lead to the calm of a cemetery where the dead fight no wars; it leads towards peace with freedom and justice. But then, even the imperialist dream of a deal is an illusion, for such an accommodation simply postpones the conflict between the social systems, freezing the blocs for a few years but not moving toward peace at all. Given this analysis, two things are necessary if there is to be a positive program for peace directed toward the negotiations: first, the mobilization of the people, making them a party at the summit; second, the creation of a world sentiment, which acts as a pressure upon the negotiators to take the best alternative possible and which keeps them from concluding an imperialist deal. What, then, are the political demands that give substance to this second point?

### Change Through Negotiations

Disengagement in Central Europe is in the gray zone of possibilities of change through negotiations. Since the removal of Russian troops would shatter the Communist hold over the satellites, disengagement is not, like the Austrian peace treaty, a matter of small consequence. On the other hand, it would require a considerable change in the dogmas of the Cold War that rule in Washington, for NATO, or an exclusively military opposition to Communism, has been the dominant theme of American policy since 1946. Yet such a step would represent an enormous gain for peace and freedom. It would be a giant step back from the brink; it would offer hope to the millions who suffer under Communist tyranny in Eastern Europe; it would be a blow at militaristic reaction in the United States.

Disengagement, therefore, should be the key demand that is placed upon the negotiators. In the United States this means a vigorous campaign

against the militaristic psychology of the last decade, an insistence that NATO and the whole sorry system of alliances be scrapped. Specifically, there should be proposals to accept the statements of the Polish government and the various European socialist parties that they favor the creation of a non-nuclear zone in Central Europe. This should be seen as a first step toward the removal of all troops from these countries (usually Poland, East and West Germany, and Czechoslovakia are mentioned).

Then, the campaign for nuclear test suspension should be intensified. In many ways, this a simpler demand than the one for disengagement (and one that is less far-reaching in effect), yet it is one that has already caught the imagination of the world.

Thirdly, there should be a clamor for devoting the funds withdrawn from the arms race (and other funds as well) for providing massive aid to underdeveloped countries seeking to industrialize. Such aid cannot be tied to the special interests of the great powers, but should be administered on a multi-national basis, perhaps through the United Nations. The SUNFED project (Special UN Fund for Economic Development) has been pathetically under-supported, yet it points to a possible means of accomplishing the end of aiding these newly independent countries.

In this context, there is an important American problem. The labor movement in the United States has been torn in recent years. On the one hand, the sense of commitment to free labor throughout the world, inadequate and even pathetically minimal as it has been, has pushed the unions toward occasional championing of the right of self-determination (for instance, when the Tunisian and Moroccan issues were before the UN) and advocacy of a policy of massive aid for the people of the under-developed countries (Reuther's speeches). On the other hand, a consciousness of the job-creating powers of the war economy has turned some unions into lobbies for arms expenditures (the machinists for a big air force, the boilermakers for a big navy, and so on). If labor is to adopt a position in favor of a peace program, it must understand that production for massive aid is a positive, and infinitely preferable, alternative to the present commitment to the war economy.

Finally, in all of this, the relationship between the present demand and the problem of the historic period must be firmly kept in mind. It is exploitation which is explosive, which continually menaces the world with a war between rival exploiters. Negotiations between the exploiters are not going to solve this problem. What they can do, if the people mobilize, is to win time and to develop movements in the process-movements which understand that, if their short-range goal is to achieve the maximum from these negotiations, their long-range aim is the creation of an historic alternative, a world that is without war because it is without exploitation.

# Art and Commitment

Last spring, Anvil asked Lionel Abel, Arthur Miller, Paul Goodman, and Harold Rosenberg to participate in a symposium on art and commitment. Disturbed by the apathy and anti-political tendencies of many creative people, the editors asked these writers three main questions: is there, in fact, a drift away from politics on the part of writers; does the writer have an obligation to political commitment; is there a conflict between art and political commitment?

Lionel Abel is a playwright, the winner of the "Obie" award for the best off-Broadway play several years ago, and a critic whose work has appeared in many American journals. Paul Goodman has written on a wide range of subjects from psychology to community planning. His novel, *Empire City*, was widely acclaimed this year. Arthur Miller, the author of *Death of a Salesman*, is currently working on a new play. Harold Rosenberg, the art and literary critic, published a brilliant collection of essays, *The Tradition of the New*, this year.

## Arthur Miller

1) There is surely a lessened concern about public issues among writers, just as the same obtains generally among people. It is because the political route has trailed off to a weedy growth where it is impossible any more to know where you are going. It is also because we generally sense that things are decided by autonomous forces and not by strictly personal or even human decisions. Finally, morality appears to have no relationship to politics, whereas it traditionally was all that raised the passions of people toward political issues.

2) No, the writer has no "obligation" to be politically committed when, as stated above, there is nothing to commit to. Writers, personally, are probably liberal as a rule and as a class but fear programs. This need not weaken the humane force of their works, which is what mainly counts. He may, however, feel that he owes it to himself to stand up and be counted from time to time. That is good for him, just as it is for anyone who is not a writer. The important thing to remember is that virtue and political commitment are by no means equated. However, the reverse is equally true; the uncommitted or socially unconscious writer is no more esthetic a fellow than his opposite, *per se*. The value you seek, I believe must rest upon the question of whether a work of a writer—possibly even his life—is driving toward the expansion of our awareness of reality, or toward the further masking of reality. In this question one can, I think, speak of good and bad as being expressions of beauty or ugliness.

3) There is an inherent conflict between artistic integrity and any commitment. There is, however, also a conflict between it and having to pay taxes or being obliged to take a bath. The great thing for a writer, as for any citizen, is to embrace his conflicts so as to strengthen his character and his art. Assuming, of course—and it is a monstrous big assumption—that he discerns the difference between the neurotic conflict from which no creative issue results, and the conflict with reality from which the art of which I speak must spring.

## Harold Rosenberg

It is true that writers take fewer public stands than they used to, but the first thing to note is that there are fewer writers. When you say that a writer needs "political and artistic freedom in order to remain a creative being" you are in effect defining what a writer is—but by this definition the "writer" is almost an extinct species. The people whose products crowd the review columns today are literary journeymen, and they need freedom just about as much as a cabinet maker does or the operator of a shooting gallery. Are they even interested in being "creative beings?" In a sense everyone is, but issues arise for writers only when they insist on being creative in their work: then "freedom," which is our official ideology, suddenly turns out to be "anarchy." Press this point of freedom and you will have issues. But when writing is carried on as a job the only issue is the rate of pay, and this can be handled by the routine of trade-unionism.

In short, social protest by writers presupposes the presence in their profession of the habits of mind of artists, and one should not take these for granted. In our time dozens of professions are counted among the arts, without having anyone in them who thinks as an artist. And there's nothing that any political party can do about this.

Applying the test of artistic habits to the Left Front writers' congresses of the thirties, it is obvious that, while there was a lot of stand-taking then, it constituted action by writers only in the most dubious sense. Why speak of writers standing up for independence when actually they were hauled to their feet by squads of Party cheer leaders? The technique of the congresses was based on destroying distinction and creating a sense of unanimity among all who called themselves writers. This surrender of self-definition proved extremely attractive: to the obscure poet it brought the illusion of social identity; to the Hollywood scenario writer, the illusion of moral and historical existence. All lost their heads under a brave show of colors. But the assumptions (false) that they could agree as writers became the assumption that they had agreed about

everything. Acceptance of the need to act without individual judgment thus subjugated the writers to Stalinist distortions of which they could not fail to be aware.

"Mass" political action by writers can only result in conformity and the stifling of thought, particularly radical or creative thought. The writer and "creative being" has a special interest which he alone can express and which he can express alone, though there are occasions when this special interest coincides with the interest of all.

As a result of their experience of the thirties, American writers have become extremely suspicious of "position-taking," and this leads to increased consciousness of the relation between action and creation. To my mind, this is all to the good.

The failure of American writers to make a fuss about the Pasternak affair was an effect of this hypercaution in regard to what one is doing, rather than of general reluctance to avow social aims. To take a stand in favor of freedom for Pasternak and against the USSR was all too easy—one had simply to go along with Mr. Dulles' denouncing the absence of free expression under Communism. Many writers did this; the quickest to react were those who had been trained in the right reflexes by their present foe. But writers who had learned to take action seriously saw no point in casting their might into the vat of the Cold War. They wanted their participation in the event to reveal the truth about the present historical moment. Otherwise, why augment the chorus of editorials and broadcasts proclaiming the Communist scandal known for the past twenty years?

Four or five writers of the Left, long time anti-Stalinists but abstainers from the fashionable anti-Communism of a few years ago, attempted to draw up a statement that would point past the Cold War lineup to the actual drama of the creation and suppression of *Doctor Zhivago*. They soon discovered that true concern about an issue, as distinguished from raising one's hand and answering "present," could be as inhibiting as inadequate concern. To formulate a statement upon which all would agree proved to be immeasurably difficult. In the meantime, new developments were taking place—the premises upon which the common action was begun became obsolete.

### What does this prove?

Of course, it proves what everyone has suspected all along, that intellectuals are ineffectual creatures without practical people to give them their cue. If this is the case, writers will rise to issues only when these issues are handed to them ready-made by others along with instruction on how to react to those issues. But then, as noted above, the writers will not be acting as writers but as cohorts, and their activity will be in fact only another species of passivity.

Let's say then that our failure in the Pasternak case established something else than lack of concern or inherent lack of capacity. It indicated, I believe, that we have little basis at the present time for the correct way of acting in common as artists

and almost no experience in it. To act together freely, writers must share ideas, feelings, images, apart from any special or political issues—and today such communion hardly exists. Before they can hope to take any stand as writers on problems of the day, American writers will have to learn the art of being in touch with one another without subduing themselves to a common zero. In short they will have to advance toward solving the problem of culture.

## Lionel Abel

*Anvil's* letter, to which the following remarks reply, seems to me naive in the extreme, and to ignore the experience of the last twenty-five years. In that time, those of us who participated in politics in one way or another were able to form definite conclusions, some of which, at least, are of point and pertinence.

1. Writers cannot be attracted to a political movement by the idea that in joining it they will be able to safeguard their freedom as writers. Experience proves the very contrary. Writers, if attracted by a political movement, are willing to give up their liberties as writers. On the one hand, writers are more disinterested than *Anvil* presumes them to be. On the other hand, when it is a question of their own careers, they tend to think in individualistic terms. Writers tend not to be crazy about other writers, but they are capable of enthusiasm for political movements, political causes. Witness the appeal Nazism, Stalinism, and Fascism had for almost every eminent literary figure of the thirties. Certainly no writer went over to Nazism or Stalinism with the idea of safeguarding the freedom to write. The notion expressed by *Anvil* that, since freedom is an elementary requirement for creative work, creative people have a responsibility to defend such freedom whenever violated, seems to me unrealistic; it ignores what creative people are actually like. My advice is: don't try to show writers that socialist policies are in **their** interest. Try to interest writers in socialism, if you can.

2. The word commitment appears in *Anvil's* letter, and I presume was used in the same sense Sartre gave to the French word *engagement*. Should writers be committed to some program or policy? The assumptions here are again naive. First of all, writers do not form any definite group and express no group interest. As writers, they have to be individuals and are necessarily individualistic and not group minded. Every insight which comes to a writer separates him more and more sharply from his colleagues; and these colleagues can only exist spiritually by having quite different insights of their own. It may be that writers share a common stock of ideas which make up the cultural capital of all of us; nevertheless, each writer must strive to form his own ideas and add something extra to the capital he at the outset borrows from. To be sure, writers are subject to the same conditions of life that other people are: they are citizens, vote, do jury duty, and pay taxes; if there is a war, they may have to fight. But what this means is that they are capable of being appealed to politically. Such an appeal, how-

ever, should not be addressed to them as writers.

3. Again I want to insist on more clarity about the nature of the people you are talking to. When you use the word "writer," exactly what kind of person do you have in mind? Someone who makes a living by stringing sentences together and getting the public to be interested in his output? Now you may very well mean people of that sort. There is an abundance of them; and while, on the one hand, they obviously have very little interest in freedom, on the other hand, they do have a value to political parties able to attract their adherence. I, and I think others like me, found during the last twenty-five years that, when we mixed in politics, whatever talent we had to offer was of no special use to the organizations which wanted our support. We were of no more, and often of less, use than many people whom we, from our own point of view, regarded as utterly useless, in any case as useless to literature. The old phrase, "politics makes strange bed fellows," has a great deal of point.

By the term "writer" I mean, and *Anvil* may mean, something quite different. For my part, if the term as used before covered a great multitude, as I am using it now, it covers very few persons. What characterizes these people—and let it not be forgotten that, however few in number, they are the ones who give the term "writer" its honorific meaning—is, I believe, their effort to make some real discovery or contribution in their work. This sounds obvious enough, but let's look a bit further at what is really involved.

### Must Find Own Reasons

You are aware, I suppose, or should be, that what was once regarded as "reason" can hardly be so regarded any longer by a mind which has responded to what is new and significant in our time. All the interesting and creative thought of this century has followed from a very clear rejection of the "reason" of the Enlightenment. In the plastic arts, in music and in literature, in philosophy and in psychology, thought has directed itself to the penetration of what in the past seemed its very opposite: the irrational. What this means is that all the old formulas for rationality in literature: order, coherence, simplicity, for instance, are regarded by people I would call real writers as academic constructions, things to be avoided rather than cultivated. Your true writer has to discover "reasons" for himself and in areas where it would seem least likely to be found.

If you want to appeal to people of this group you have to show, I think, that you yourself are doing something comparable in the field of politics; in other words, that "reason" for you is not something cut and dried, already settled. Certainly in totalitarianism are utterly out of place. Years ago Marxists could lay claim to a kind of experimental "reason": the dialectic, though it must be admitted that they exploited this advantage in the interest of a shameless dogmatism. Nevertheless, the dialectic pointed to something better than the banalities of common

sense. Alas, you cannot lay claim to it any longer, nor should you. The recent discoveries of modern physics, of which atomic energy is only one, have rendered any dialectical view of history impossible. Why? The answer is obvious. One could maintain that the bad would lead to a higher good only so long as the bad was not equipped with sufficient power to terminate all dialectical development and render the next higher stage impossible. It must be remembered that not only Marx, but also Kant, thought that the evil in man was the basic motor of historical development. Perhaps so. But arm evil with hydrogen weapons and what will be the result?

You have had to give up the dialectic, but what have you replaced it with? It seems to me that socialist thinking in recent years has fallen back on the very type of old-fashioned rationalism which modern writers find they must fight against in their own work. Show some creativity in politics and you will attract creative people to you. Not only Lenin, but even Hitler and Mussolini evidenced a creative freedom from rationalistic formulas: this is what made them capable of creating political movements. Certainly Hitler and Mussolini went rather far in their anti-rationalism; I do not want to praise them for that. But it cannot be denied that they had a real sense of the age they lived in and of the kind of thinking necessary for dealing with modern problems. Besides, we have not finished with them. "Reason" of the sort now expressed in politics can only lead to a new cult of the irrational.

4. Again about the nature of the "writer." *Anvil* seems to think that the writer, by the very nature of his concerns, is likely to be politically "good." That is to say, if appealed to with sufficient force, he can be made to see that his own interests coincide with certain "good" policies. I should like to recall here that there is no correlation between literary achievement and moral worth. This, of course, is a banality. What is more interesting is the kind of moral unworthiness which in the twentieth century has gone hand in hand with great achievement in literature. The nineteenth century gave us the genius who was immoral in his personal life but almost always impeccably liberal in his political beliefs. I am thinking of Lord Byron and Alfred de Musset, for they are rather typical. The twentieth century, though, has shown us a quite different kind of immoralist, people like Hamsun, Brecht, Pound, and Celine, none of whom was, as far as I know, unscrupulous, devoid of feeling, or debauched in his personal life, but all of whom associated themselves with totalitarian movements, and with a full understanding of what these movements were. The twentieth century has shown us the writer of genius who seeks evil in his politics. Why? One can only speculate. I would suggest that our age has become so thoroughly ideological, and that individual experience has tended to become so unimportant, that the writer who wants to be acquainted with evil—after all, that is his subject matter—is forced to seek it in politics. It is well known in France that even André Gide was tempted by the Nazis during their occupation of France. The story is that he expressed his fascination to Paul Valéry, who thereupon urged him

to go to North Africa at once, very much as a moralist might have urged a young writer in an earlier period to avoid the company of women. Gide followed his friend's advice and, according to all the evidence, his political behavior was perfectly correct. But that he was tempted is undeniable.

5. American writers, it must be admitted, did not make a good showing when it came to writing a statement in defense of Boris Pasternak. I understand that the facts about this have gotten around. A committee was formed to draw up a statement and a document was finally produced which was very compromised—it reflected the many differences among the members of the committee. When a meeting was called of some two dozen writers, it became clear that agreement could never be reached on what should be said, or what should be stressed in what was said. As a result, the final statement was not worth sending out for signatures. But if there was one thing all the writers did agree on, it was precisely on the proposition that liberty of expression should be defended. This proposition evidently lacks political charm.

## Paul Goodman

I dislike to speak much about the cultural atmosphere in general. Let me speak concretely about my own situation: first, a problem that I have with regard to modern sociology; and then, present feelings and behaviors of mine that could be called political.

### I

When I think of what I know and the books I have studied, I am astonishingly blank in modern sociology; I hardly know the names of the authors, e.g., Parsons or Merton. This is partly no doubt their blame; they are too methodological and not practical enough (whether politically, morally or as utopians) unlike Comte, Marx, Veblen, Dewey, etc., whom I know as much as I tend to know things. But more importantly, it is a psychological problem of my own, since intelligent doctors do not waste their talents on nothing. The case is that I do not grasp the reality of their subject-matter; it does not interest me. What is the subject-matter of this sociology?

Now I am interested, I am even one of the authors, in social-psychology. I take this to be the extension—by projection, identification, and other mechanisms—of primary interpersonal relations into the wider secondary environment. Thus a man's attitude on his job will be like his pre-adolescent family relations; or, as Freud showed, behind the charismatic leader is the infantile father; or, the public feeling about war and the bomb is importantly grounded in primary masochism and creative block. These are propositions in social-psychology.

Sociology is something different; let us try to derive it. We are inherently social, share action, and

effect one another; this is the subject of psychology and social-psychology. But suppose there are group relations, shared activities, over and above, or quite distinct from, individual differences or the individual initiation of action. (Crudely, the folk on a bus.) And suppose that the accumulation and interplay of just these group relations comes to major existing facts like institutions which, in many aspects, strongly determine the behavior of their members, overshadowing personal psychology and social psychology. This is the main substance of history, politics, economics, the social scene. Then we can analyze such group behavior, make models of it and treat it statistically, make predictions; we have a science of sociology.

Where in this subject-matter and in the science of this subject-matter do I sign off? I strongly experience shared activity. But it is as the second supposition, the overshadowing of the social-psychology by the personally passive group relations, that I lose touch with the reality. In my own primary relations, as friend, lover, son, and father, I have been so little satisfied, I have so many unfinished situations, that I resist becoming further involved in events that would reduce me to a unit that may be counted in or out without being able to change the total, in groups that I cannot fairly immediately try to alter by personal decision and effort. I understand, of course, that my primary dissatisfaction is our average human condition; but whereas most people seem to inhibit their unsatisfied needs to throw themselves precisely into conformity and mass action for comfort and abreaction, it is just this that I resist and rather keep alive my close needs.

The result of what I do is disastrous both in my life and thought. By living all contacts too personally, I lose the advantages and accepted techniques of simply belonging. And my thinking, therefore, has a certain radical irrelevance and insubstantiality: I resist existing in the big areas of history and society, and therefore I am not serious about every individual's actual plight in the world. (I grant that I do, as a teacher and poet, seriously address his potentialities.)

No doubt my failure in these things does partly belong to me as a creative artist, for we artists do personally and idiosyncratically initiate; and we stay with our close conflicts. Artists cannot be sociologically summated or manipulated. There is likely no possible sociology of creative action; though there is plenty of social-psychology, if this allows, as it should, for novelty as a crucial principle of behavior. (Indeed, psychology is the study of creative adjustments.)

At the same time, when I do not matter-of-factly confront the big realities as basic conditions for others, I become conceited and a coward in myself and a pain in the ass and a bore who expects the impossible. Paradoxically, my withdrawal from being a sociological unit as if in the interest of maintaining my creative integrity—though I do not need to rationalize it this way, for I am secure in my integrity—is the same as my evident lack of per-



sonal dignity. Since I do not take the others in their actual plight, with the corresponding techniques, I do not assert myself as an equal in the social milieu, whether at the corner tavern or in the elections. Being above it, I cower. I do not think this is a general dilemma of artists but my own problem. An artist can have the dignity of his art and speak equally from that position; I have its grandeur and responsibility but get from it no dignity (and little joy).

My guess is that most people are in a neurotic situation just the contrary of mine: they are not enough in touch with their personal inventiveness, so they conform like sheep; but they have more humility, courage, and dignity in their secondary dealings. This same amalgam seems to me to characterize modern sociology: natural historical and group situations and neurotic inhibitions and errors, all taken as one social reality.

### Cannot Share in Nothing

Yet in my defense (that I am not merely arrogant, self-centered, and cowardly), let me make the obvious and now much-repeated reminder: that the present major group relations—whether we look at the standard of living, the front politics that has little place for rational persuasion, or the job-holding in Organizations—these are uniquely empty of human meaning to the point of metaphysical absurdity, so that the common man, the healthier artist, or myself are equally out of contact with Society, for you cannot touch nothing or share in nothing.

To sum up these complicated reflections on my coldness to modern sociology, I seem to mention three factors:

1. My own unfinished interpersonal situations, keeping me from group belonging.
2. The unsociological nature of all original creative behavior.
3. The unique emptiness of the major group activities in America at present.

### II

Nevertheless, I suppose I am political beyond the average man in the sense of having a lively concern and engaging in some action for the common welfare as such. How is this? If I examine my concerns in detail (let me say my patriotic concerns, for I feel them as such), I find they are such as belong to a man with the relation to sociological groups that I have been describing. (1) They are isolated and desperate, therefore quixotic, attempts to impose on people something better, about which they couldn't care less. This follows from my not taking seriously their actual plight. (2) I am concerned not for material improvement or safety but for conservation or innovation in our culture and humane ideals; I feel myself and my colleagues to be in special touch with the holy spirit. (3) And in the face of the

general absurdity, I consider it reasonable for us to act by arbitrary voluntary decision without needing historical warrant or—what comes to the same thing—using all human existence as our warrant. Point (1) here is not interesting; but I think that points (2) and (3) do give a strong and useful motivation for artists. Let me again offer my meaning concretely.

### Recent Outrages

Recently I tried to stir up some university—and publishing-world protest on the following issue: that the wavelength of our Discoverer IV satellite "has been withheld for unexplained reasons of military 'security.'" (N.Y. Times, March 6, 1959, p. 10.) The tack I took was that it was a shame that the grand and ingenuous enthusiasm of people, of my own children, for the adventure of space should be debased to the level of the cold war and business as usual. This was what moved me and not the horror of war as such (though I am a pacifist) nor the issue of scientific secrecy; rather, that we must not lose the ideal feelings that make life worth living.

Similarly, I have waxed indignant enough to speak up against a statement of Dr. William Kvaraceus (Times, Feb. 10), the government expert on delinquency, that the teaching of geometry should be curtailed because the kids fail at it and so it increases delinquency. Here again my tack is that we owe a duty to geometry as such, to Euclid, Archimedes, Newton, and we must promote it no matter what the consequences. But indeed, I would argue, the consequences of the doctor's proposition are calamitous; the root of delinquency is in the kids' dumb but accurate perception that our present society is not worthy of a man's effort; the doctor would strip it still further of the lovely sciences that are worthy of a man's effort.

I seem to turn the same attitude against my political friends. At the height of the Pasternak business, the usual gang of us held a meeting. I there insisted that any attempt to treat it in isolation was effectually a cold-war maneuver: I proposed (and had so written the papers in a letter they did not print) that the censorship of Pasternak, the recent suppression of the **Dublin An Tostal** because of the hatred of O'Casey by the Catholic hierarchy, and the suppression of some early Chaplin slapstick by the village of Hicksville should be treated as equally significant and blameworthy. This proposal managed to sabotage the meeting. (Let me say that William Phillips and Mary McCarthy were on my side.)

Now more positively: Inspired by foreign travel and by reading a number of American Revolutionary documents, I have recently resolved to "do something for my country," just to be more proud of her. I have made me a little program of tasks to work at as much as I can, as follows:

1. I want to transform the physical-training and play periods in the public schools according to the

principles of character analysis and eurythmics. The aim is to unblock and animate so that school becomes a place of excitement and growth. Such techniques cannot be stereotyped but must be directed at the repressions in each child. The techniques are well known and in use in various places; what stands in the way of their acceptance generally is the anxiety aroused in the teachers.

2. To my heart the most dismaying incident in American life is the eighteen-year-old saying that he has no ambition to work at anything in particular. This is the disastrous result of our general social absurdity and it ought to arouse general shame and mobilize countermeasures. It is a problem of vocational guidance, but precisely not the kind we usually get. The task is not to fit the man into some useful place in the economy but to find what work will bring out the man, be his vocation. If there is no such job, then do something about that, not him.

3. I want to do something for the man-made landscape of our country. When I return from Europe I am struck with dismay at how ugly, shapeless, neglected our small places usually are, the towns of less than 5,000 people; whereas in Ireland, England, France, Italy every small place has a shape and often a difference. It is as if nobody ever thought, here, what the small place looked like, with its absolutely uniform yet helter-skelter gaspumps, Woolworth's, and diner.

4. To rid our language of foolish jargon, especially in business correspondence and social studies. Everybody is for this and I believe that an understanding and persistent effort could succeed.

5. Finally, I want to undertake something toward

our civil rights. We have a pretty good legal record in freedom of speech but in fact our system of mass communications is such that a wise, eccentric, or minority voice is deafeningly drowned out by sheer quantity; there is no need for "censorship." The letter column of the N. Y. Times, for instance, carefully screens out anything controversial with the result that there is no intellectual controversy such as enlivens the good press of the British Isles.

I have reported these incidents and program in order to illustrate a kind of political attitude with obvious weakness and strengths. The weaknesses seem to me to be: irrelevance to the issues that are in fact agitating people; a frigid emphasis on ideal values and profound aspirations, by-passing immediate needs and dangers; and a certain fastidiousness that makes solidarity difficult. But rather than saying what ought to be, I thought I might contribute more to your discussion by delineating where I, a strong and honest writer, happen to be.\*

\*Looking back over this whole paper, I am struck at how, in discussing either sociology or politics, I have not seriously considered the existence of state and government, either to reform them, destroy them, or use them. The case is that I so well learned the lessons of my years as a professing anarchist that the disregard of state and government has become second nature to me—their coercions to be simply evaded if possible, countered by fraud or force if necessary—and their positive functions being no different from the other foolish institutions of mankind. I could almost make friends with a cop, though not, I suppose, with an FBI-man. Attaining my present non-attachment seems to me a most powerful argument for anarchist indoctrination.

**Y**OUNG enough to fight against atomic war!

**P**RINCIPLED enough to want to end social and economic injustice!

**S**MART enough to know that capitalism and Communism mean oppression and reaction!

**L**IVE and build a new society with the . . .

## Young People's Socialist League

—I am interested in learning more about democratic socialism.

—I want to join the YPSL.

Name .....

Address .....

School .....

YPSL, 303 Fourth Ave., New York 10, N.Y.

# Youth Meet in Vienna and Berlin

Michael Harrington

**T**WO MEETINGS TOOK PLACE in Europe this summer. Between them they afforded a perspective upon the various tendencies in the political struggle of the Cold War: the Communists, the United States, the democratic socialists. The first meeting was in Berlin at the beginning of July. Under the sponsorship of the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY) some five thousand socialists from all over the world met in Berlin's Reyherge Park for a ten-day camp. At the same time, the IUSY Executive Committee held a three day session. The other meeting, much more widely publicized in the press, was the Seventh Youth Festival for Peace and Friendship in Vienna. Here a sharp struggle took place over a twelve-day period involving every serious political tendency in the world today.

These events had many ramifications, yet in general they confirmed the democratic socialist analysis of the world conflict: the Communists, armed with superior politics, are winning the Cold War; the "free world" led by the United States is incapable of countering the Communist offensive with a political response; democratic socialism is an answer, indeed the only one pointing the way toward a world of peace and justice, yet it has a long way to go if it is to translate its political superiority into a practical political force.

These aspects of the European meetings will perhaps emerge more clearly if one begins with the Vienna Festival. In the light of that event the significance of the IUSY Camp and Executive in Berlin is even more sharply defined.

There were some twelve thousand youths assembled in Vienna for the Festival. They represented delegations from practically every corner of the globe, and there was a particular emphasis upon those who came from Asia, Africa, and South America. The Festival was under the sponsorship of the Communist-controlled World Federation of Democratic Youth and was organized carefully so as to be a propaganda instrument for Moscow in the Cold War. According to the official line there was to be no politics and debate, only "peace and friendship." Differences, the Festival organizers explained tirelessly, lead to antagonism, argument, and conflict, not to peace and friendship. Therefore the opportunity for free exchange, for serious discussion of the issues confronting the youth of the world, was scrupulously hedged. However, some issues were declared "non-controversial," the common belief of all who genuinely supported "peace and friendship." Included in this category was indignation over the wrongs of Western imperialism—it goes almost without saying that specific cases like Kenya,

Nyasaland, Cuba, and so on regularly represented real injustice). On the other hand, mention of evils on the Communist side of the Iron Curtain fell into the category of disruption, opposition to "peace and friendship," warmongering.

In part, this line was maintained through the very organization of the Festival itself which was calculated to exclude discussion and debate. In part, it was enforced by tactics ranging from heckling to outright violence. It may well be that the American press overestimated the importance of the Communist goon squads, but their existence was a fact. This writer had the novel experience of requiring police protection in order to distribute socialist leaflets against colonialism in the public park outside the Messegalende Festival grounds. Even with six Austrian policemen in attendance, the "commando squad" from the Festival managed to rip up signs and tear up leaflets. Others, without benefit of police protection, fared somewhat the worse: one anti-Communist delegate wound up in the hospital for carrying a sign on Tibet during a Festival demonstration.

This, however, was as expected. More interesting was the political exchange that did take place either on the periphery of the Festival in private conversations or in underground fashion. The dispute in the American delegation, the best publicized event of the Festival in the United States, involved a range of political tendencies and was hardly a clear fight between "Communists" and "anti-Communists." On the anti-Communist side, for instance, besides the obvious plants of the United States government, there were a small contingent of McCarthyites, a considerable grouping of independent, liberal anti-Communists, and plain, naive tourists. On the "Communist" side there were Communists, students with illusions about Communism, people disgusted with some of the anti-Communist tactics (among them, anti-Communists), and plain, naive tourists. The original issue—democratic representation for the American delegation—was, in all justice, weighted in favor of the group opposed to the official Festival organization. But the whole question soon became obscured by a knock-down, drag-out struggle between tiny factions of intransigents on the extreme. The better members of the American delegation were eventually forced to ignore the whole affair.

And, indeed, the most interesting aspect of the Festival was the opportunity which it afforded to talk to young people from all over the world. Here the most interesting discussions regularly took place with youth from underdeveloped countries.

To begin with, a good number of youth organiza-

tions in Africa, perhaps the majority, had voted to boycott the Festival. So had the government-controlled youth of the United Arab Republic. Then, there was obvious selection in the composition of the delegates. It was a normal experience to encounter a Sudanese or Iraqi who had just come from his studies in Moscow. Still, one of the most important impressions of the Festival was the fact that the Communists have a disciplined, educated, and dedicated cadre in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. Face to face with these young people or, more importantly, with the uncommitted from these delegations, the American anti-Communists at the Festival were regularly at a loss. So long as they defended the official policy of the United States—the landings in Lebanon, for instance—they were unable to find a common ground with these young people. But if they stepped back and opposed the American action, from what point of view would they argue? The International Union of Socialist Youth ran an information program for the Festival delegates, and its politics were clear enough: opposition to all imperialism, to all exploitation, East and West. This was a frank, socialist response. Those Americans who could not make it were in something of a quandry.

Secondly, a fascinating aspect of the Festival was the obvious fear with which the Communists viewed the youth. The Russian and Chinese delegations, for instance, were carefully segregated from the bulk of the Festival participants. The members of these delegations whom one could meet were usually professional propagandists. The one major exception to this rule was the Polish delegation, which was qualitatively different from the other Iron Curtain country groups. But the fact remains: the Communists clearly continue to regard the youth as an unstable and dangerous element in their society.

Finally, there was the change which took place in the Americans at the Festival. Precisely because the one clear political response to the Communist challenge came from the International Union of Socialist Youth, there was considerable American interest in its information program. At the meeting at which Anna Kethly, the former minister in the Hungarian revolutionary government, and a representative of the Algerian nationalist movement spoke (the flags of the two movements were displayed together with the banner of the Austrian Young Socialists), perhaps a hundred Americans were in attendance. And from the point of view of the American experience at the Festival, that is perhaps a symbolic summary: that a socialist response, based upon opposition to both imperialisms, to the Communists in Hungary and the French with their American aid in Algeria, made sense; and that every other attempt to formulate an answer failed.

In sharp contrast to the Festival was the meeting of the IUSY in Berlin. At the Executive Committee there were representatives of all the European nations and delegates from India and Burma, from South America and the West Indies, from Ghana and Algeria. The discussion was completely free and open. The Committee took a firm and principled

stand in favor of Algerian independence and heard greetings from representatives of the Algerian revolutionary movement. In doing so, every delegation except the one representing the French (Mollet) youth voted for the Algerian revolution. On the question of peace the Executive stated that it considered the "non-nuclear club" stand of the British Labour Party an absolute minimum for an immediate socialist program, and it advocated that the socialist movements consider a policy of unilateral test cessation and weapons production. On a motion of the American delegate, vigorously seconded by the German delegates, the atomic give-away between the United States and Germany was denounced. And when the South Americans present offered their resolution condemning American imperialism in their area, the vote was unanimous in favor.

In the broad outline, then, the IUSY took a principled political stand against all imperialism and exploitation. It was this ideological clarity which gave the IUSY program at the Vienna Festival its distinctive character. At the same time, it would be foolish to pretend that these resolutions have turned the world socialist movement into an effective practical instrument for a democratic struggle for peace and freedom. The socialist youth have a considerable political clarity, but in Europe there is no question that there is an ideological crisis in the socialist movement as a whole. On the one hand, there is the problem of transcending the welfare state. Discussion of this issue is most vigorous in the British Labour Party, but I think it is fair to say that no socialist or labor party in Europe has a clear and determined position on this question. On the other hand, the continuing eminence of a figure like Mollet in the adult socialist movement makes it all but impossible to reach the people of the underdeveloped nations with the politics of democratic socialism.

These are serious, even fundamental, problems and it would be foolish to wish them away. Yet it is precisely the international socialist movement which contains the forces which can alone resolve these issues: the working-class militants of Europe, the new activists of the fledgling movements in the ex-colonial countries. The vigor and decisiveness of the IUSY deliberations are a sign of the possibilities that exist.

In short, the contrast between Vienna and Berlin is not one of black and white: rather, it is of hope as against totalitarianism. For all of the protestations about "socialism" and "democracy," the Communists who ran the Festival made it clear that they are interested not in discussion and genuine exchange but in propaganda (a last example: the Festival Committee ruled that each piece of literature distributed inside the Festival grounds had to be "approved!"). Some of the Western groups that tried to counter the Communists were all but paralyzed by their allegiance to the maintenance of injustice in their own part of the world. The democratic socialists, with all of their faults, with all of the work that remains, provided not a total and finished program but the clear and principled direction of the only possible hope.

# The Critics of C. Wright Mills

Robert Martinson

**W**ILL DEMOCRACY ITSELF prove to be an historically limited social device, doomed to pass away before the new synthesis of industrial "feudalism?"

To answer in the affirmative would be to reduce the socialist movement to a utopian quixotic protest against modern conditions: socialism and democracy are inseparable. To answer definitely in the negative would be to assume the stance of the rear-guard liberal, capitulating to the present. The work of C. Wright Mills is strategic and important because it faces the problem squarely and offers no solace to the weak minded. He is a major theoretician of the post-war stalemate.

**The Causes of World War III** is both a theoretical summation and personal political manifesto. As a personal document it is magnificent: grim, passionate, anguished, arrogant, drawn in the idiom of the theoretical lone wolf. As a programmatic statement for the democratic left the book is a disaster. It is addressed to the free-wheeling intellectual (an extinct breed typical of the late nineteenth century) whose powerlessness Mills so carefully documented in **White Collar**; it completely ignores the American labor movement as a major force for change (a position already apparent in **New Men of Power**—a hopelessly dated study); it leans heavily toward the private gesture of moral affirmation typical of Anglo-Saxon anarchists and some modern pacifists, long ago reduced to a caricature by Dwight MacDonal(d); and, finally, it fairly seethes with illusions about Stalinism. One small example (p. 116): "Peaceful change requires that we adjust to the changed relations of power brought about in the world by the economic, scientific, and military success of the Soviet Union." Most of the slogans appear: co-existence, peace, industrialization, negotiation, increased contact, and so on. Mills' program comes uncomfortably close to a guidebook for the new form of doughhead tourism (Why, the Russians are people, just like you and me!).

Ignazio Silone has pointed to what he calls the semi-Stalinization of European politics as the key to the post-war "stalemate" which inhibits a dramatic confrontation of programs. In the absence of "politics" the tendencies toward decay continue: in France, a semi-Bonapartist executive; in Spain, a traditional military dictatorship shored up by American aid; in Italy, severe constitutional limitations on majority rule. In the relatively more stable



capitalist democracies (especially the United States), class conflict has always been attenuated. Here, politics has been dethroned by sociology.

In the United States, therefore, the work of C. Wright Mills should assume an exceptional importance. It is the burden of his major theoretical work—the **Power Elite**—to locate those institutional forces in American capitalist society which are inexorably undermining parliamentary democracy by concentrating more and more power into the hands of an ever-narrowing group at the top of the social system. Institutional drift replaces the play of political struggle; change is slow, massive, cumulative. The result is the strangulation of democracy.

In the absence of major modal points in the recent social history of the nation, Mills confronts the thorny problem of constructing a scheme for the analysis of the distribution of power which will clearly demarcate the present from the past. This is no longer the America of Lewis' **Octopus** or Lundberg's **Sixty Families**. Mills locates his elite at the intersection of three major orders (institutional hierarchies) which dominate the present phase of monopoly capitalism in America: the corporation, the military machine, and the federal government. This is the social arena in which influence can be brought to bear on major decisions. The power elite is neither a class nor a political directorate, although it must necessarily include the latter. In Marxist language, it can be described as that layer of the ruling class which has some direct influence on high politics. Mills' method follows from the

Weberian injunction that power is a separate dimension of social life and must be studied in its own light. Having isolated his elite, Mills then proceeds to study other subordinate problems: the immensely complex and little-understood relations between the top members of the hierarchies; the degree of homogeneity within the group; the sources of recruitment; and the "style of life." **The Power Elite** has no equal as a path-breaking work on the configuration of power in modern America. It is a ruthless, empirical probe into a neglected area and necessarily re-opens the discussion of capitalism and democracy on a new plane.

## Dialogue Becomes Monologue

Insisting on the crudity of his work, Mills modestly invited the reader to become part of a "dialogue about the higher circles of America." The invitation was either strategic or naive; the response was more than could be hoped for. One is reminded of the little boy who insisted that the emperor had no clothes. Let no one object that the fulminations of the famous "liberal community" are a reaction to Mills' crude views about Stalinism. **The Power Elite** appeared three years ago.

The dominant tone of the response was set by the slick, middle-brow magazines such as **Time**—"intellectually irresponsible," "nightmare-shored-by-platitudes—and **Atlantic**—"obvious," "tone of outraged discovery." The more respectable reviews, ordinarily quite genteel, soon indicated that the gloves were off: **New York Times**—"an angry cartoon, not a serious picture." **American Political Science Review**—"absurdity," "author's personal sense of frustration." **Political Science Quarterly**—"naive." **Saturday Review**—"too pat, too patterned—and too pessimistic." **American Journal of Sociology**—"too simple." **World Politics**—"utopian." And so on down the line to Daniel Bell who consigns poor Mills to intellectual purgatory with the epithet "outsider." No one stopped to ask why so much attention should be directed to such a monstrous pattern of errors.

Having contemptuously dismissed his efforts, the frantic philistines began searching for a niche in which to file the man away. Gadzooks! Mills is a tag end of the populist tradition, a latter-day Balzac or Veblen railing against the fleshpots of the mighty. Take Veblen. He was also critical of our American institutions, wrote in a flamboyant style, was somewhat of a non-conformist, and had unsavory relations with the radical left of his day. In **The Engineers and the Price System**—to make the analogy water-tight—Veblen left the shoals of academic responsibility and entered the dangerous reefs of partisan politics. Can anyone remember the names of the eminent critics who dismissed Veblen with so contemptuous a shrug?

Long on analogies, the critics are surprisingly short on theory. No one can refer to an up-to-date, reasoned alternative to Mills's "angry portrait" (A. A. Berle), and thus most of the critical remarks assume the peculiar form of a series of half-hearted amendments to his basic picture. Stuart Chase ad-

monishes Mills for attempting to resurrect the class struggle as a "key to the social structure" (the one thing Mills cannot be accused of doing), then presents in two or three impudent sentences his own *ad hoc* theory of a balance between Big Industry, Big Distribution, Big Labor, Big Government, and Big Agriculture. Although disturbed by Mills, A. A. Berle can do little better. "Old structures crumbled," he tells us, "the new forms are barely evident."

Daniel Bell insists that there has been a "breakup of the 'ruling class'" but withholds final judgment since the new "means of passing on the power . . . is not yet fully demarked and established." Talcott Parsons in **World Politics** derides Mills for a "utopian conception of an ideal society in which power does not play a part at all" and assures his readers that ". . . the main lines of social development in America are essentially acceptable to a humanistic ethic." He is remarkably reticent about revealing his version of the "main lines," although they evidently include the foreign policy of the late Mr. Dulles.

This theoretical impotence is not accidental. The American liberal approaches these rarified heights on his knees in fear and trembling. In the academic community there is a strong tendency (especially among the non-politicals) to exorcise the entire uncomfortable subject. As a British sociologist recently remarked: "There should be a ten year moratorium on the term 'power elite!'" And why not? Sociologists are hot on the trail of new discoveries in American social mobility; political scientists are busily assuring us that the two-party system is an inevitable ingredient of American politics; economists are celebrating America's new affluence; socialism is treated as a dead dog, buried for all time (thank God) in an enormous Princeton study.

But the academy's reserve has another and more fundamental dimension: the embarrassing convergence of the main lines of Mills' argument toward the basic preoccupations of elite theory and mass-society analysis. Elite theory is no longer an occult mystery practiced by a few devoted disciples of the great Italian masters; it is as firmly ensconced in sociology as the work of Keynes in the field of economics. Who does not know the names of Michels, Pareto, and Mosca, the related figures Weber, Durkheim, and Mannheim, and the minor satellites such as Sorel, Burnham, Arendt, and Erich Hoffer?

American social scientists, having given up the perspective of a renewal of democracy within capitalist society (yet unable to give up the ideal), have begun searching for "responsible elites." (If you have to have an elite, it might as well be responsible!) It is the burden of Mills' argument that it is in the nature of a mass society (a society without politically powerful and relevant publics) to give birth to congenitally irresponsible elites. The effort to revive democracy by shoring up "countervailing forces" is thus branded in the womb as utopian. The most that can be accomplished is a holding operation against the massive pressures of the main drift.

Mills has the temerity to suggest that without a radical transformation of the very sources of power in America the search for a responsible elite results, in fact, in a re-definition of the entire concept of democracy; the role of citizen is reduced to the modest activity of an idle spectator of vast, competing bureaucracies and, on the upper levels, this competition gives way to the higher unity of the power elite. A sobering prospect, and one which cannot be blinked away by inconsequential amendments as to the degree of unity or the degree of homogeneity in the higher circles. Mills faces the rearguard academic liberal with the terrifying logic of his own thought: elitist theory leads to the crowning of a powerful and irresponsible bureaucracy ruling over an abject population.

No wonder the dialogue has become monologue.

## The Sociology of Sociology

Consider the following paradox: Mills is the most popular and widely read social analyst of our day; he is, culturally speaking, our major social scientist. At the same time his stock in the academic community has fallen practically to zero; he is now open game for aspiring graduates, Assistant Professors, and other Heavy Thinkers. Only the most naive advocate of free will could interpret this monolithic response as a mere methodological difference. Mills strikes a terribly sensitive nerve. Let us probe this nerve somewhat further in the hope of eliciting a cry of pain (and a ray of light).

First, the field of sociology itself. Breaking away from utopian socialism as transmitted through Saint-Simon and Comte, sociology in the United States sought to be scientific on the model of the physical sciences and totally eschewed "wholistic" theories. Its empirical bent isolated and protected it from the fierce winds of doctrinal warfare that swept the European University following the First World War. Isolationist, social-welfare oriented, and parochial, it crept along pragmatically in the shadow of its elder European cousin. The emergence of America as a major world power changed all of this. Sociology went to war. The gigantic tome, **The American Soldier**, was a symbol of the decade. The problem of Stalinism, the industrialization of under-developed areas, the historical interpretation of socialism—everything became grist for the mill. The typical figure became Ruth Benedict writing **The Chrysanthemum and the Sword** as an assignment from the Office of War Information.

Under suspicion as "socialistic," sociology has become the master conservative doctrine of our time. Embedded in the focus of its intellectual pre-occupations is the central theme of elite theory—the very theory that Mills has now turned against it like a double-edged knife. The light begins to dawn on Talcott Parsons' dictum: ". . . the main lines of social development in America are essentially acceptable to a humanistic ethic."

The attack on Mills is a question not merely of the domination within the professoriat of those who Norman Birnbaum (in **Universities & Left Review**) has called the administrative technologists nor of the

fact that the public interest in his work endangers the precarious public-relations image of the social scientist as neutral consultant. The shrill tone of the debate has an ideological edge that is peculiarly American and peculiar, indeed, to the unique expansion of social science since the Second World War.

One of the chief intellectual facts of our epoch is that the burden of systematizing the new conservative ideology in America has fallen into the capable hands of the **ex-radical intellectuals**. They have been impressed into service in the mass-communications media, the trade unions, and the social science faculties—and not the least important ones at that. The lack of a traditionally conservative upper-class intellectual elite paved the way for this curious growth; the unprecedented expansion of the University aided the process; and the betrayals of Stalinism completed the damage.

As he rises in the University hierarchy, this mobile, ex-radical ideologue clutches at the new conservatism with a grip of steel and an alertness characteristically his own; he often has a neurotic fascination for the flora and fauna of the radical fringe and is usually more sensitive than others to deviations within the student body, more vulnerable to argument from the left.

## Daniel Bell: "Marxist"

For the moment, at least, Bell is on the left flank of the fraternity of ex-radicals. He has trod that now-only-too-familiar path which leads from the Socialist Party to the **New Leader** to **Fortune**, and now to the Sociology Department of Columbia, where presumably, he will do his best to counteract the insidious influence of Mills.

In his article "The Power Elite—Reconsidered," in the **American Journal of Sociology** (November 1958), Bell boldly professes in a footnote that he is in the tradition of Marx and Dewey. One immediately polishes one's glasses in the anticipation of finally reading a solid, scholarly, thorough appreciation of Mills (who is no holy object of veneration for Marxists). The only thing that is thorough is one's disappointment.

Much of Mills' work is motivated by his enormous anger at the growing bureaucratization of life . . . Many people do feel helpless and ignorant and react in anger. But the sources of helplessness ought to be made clear, lest one engage, as I think Mills does, in a form of 'romantic protest' against modern life.

Bell makes clear that any form of protest is quite foreign to his special brand of "Marxism," though one must agree that "romantic" protest, being politically impotent, is not worth anyone's powder. Why is Mills' protest romantic? Because he does not "make clear" the "sources of helplessness," which Bell admits is rampant in the republic. Bell locates three sources: (1) the security nature of many present problems; (2) "technical decision-making;" (3) "the extent to which our posture is shaped by the Russians." Bell's practical, unromantic program for reviving democracy involves (1) the declassification of atomic secrets; (2) thorough debate; (3) making peace with the Russians. Assuming a prolonged thaw in the cold war or a general

demarche, Bell's grotesquely trivial "sources" might wither away. Unfortunately, the "helplessness" would not.

Mills should have written another book, more to Bell's liking, a book dealing with politics rather than power. This book should revolve around the following wisdom which Bell imparts to the public after a lifetime of serious study:

Two 'silent' revolutions in modern society seem to be in process. One is a change in the **mode of access** to power insofar as inheritance alone is no longer all-determining; the other is a change in the nature of power-holding itself insofar as technical skill rather than property and political position rather than wealth have become the bases on which power is wielded.

The two 'revolutions' proceed simultaneously. The chief consequence, politically, is the break-up of the 'ruling class.' A ruling class may be defined as a power-holding group which has both an established **community of interest** and a **continuity of interest**. Being a member of the 'upper class' no longer means that one is a member of the **ruling group**. The means of passing on the power which the modern ruling groups possess, or the institutionalization of any specific modes of access to power (the political route or military advancement), is not yet fully demarked and established.

Since nothing in this unsteady universe is ever fully demarked and established, Bell blithely relieves himself of the responsibility of providing an alternative scheme of analysis. Instead, we are offered that marvel of marvels—a society with a ruling group composed of technically skillful but indigent politicians with neither a community nor a continuity of interest, ruling over a powerless upper class by means not yet fully demarked and established.

Bell, knowing such a book should focus on "types of decisions rather than elites," provides some advance copy by discussing that most important decision of all—foreign policy, a question that "Mills ducks completely."

It turns out that "United States foreign policy since 1946 . . . was not a reflex of any internal social divisions of class issues in the United States but was based on an estimate of Russia's intentions." One naturally inquires: whose estimate? The answer is not long in coming:

It was an estimate made by American **scholarly experts**, most notably by George Kennan and the policy planning staff of the State Department. These policies were not a reflex of power constellations within the United States. They were estimates of national interest and of national survival.

The power elite had nothing to do with it since the decision (the policy of containment) was made by the President. "And, rather than being a usurpation of power, so to speak, this is one of the few instances in the Constitution in which such responsibility is specifically defined and accountability is clear." The President (who is elected by the people, organized into little "interest groups") talked it over with a few cronies, ignored Congress, and thumbed his nose at the upper class; he coolly surrounded himself with his indigent but technically skilled political friends, launched the Truman policy, and convinced the na-

tion, which went along because the "broad imperatives were clear." Is it any wonder that some hot-headed Marxists speak of bourgeois sociology?

Mills is interested in those enormous institutional forces which have produced bipartisanship and made it possible for the nation to go war without the slightest pretense of a debate. Bell reduces foreign policy to a semi-Pavlovian Presidential reflex and ignores the very problem at issue: the ease and speed with which the Truman doctrine was accepted by the nation. (The Civil War was preceded by a decade of debate; Wilson moved like a snail; Roosevelt had to hoodwink the public; Truman merely called out the Marines). The concept of a power elite provides some explanation; Bell provides nothing but apologia. To assume, as he does, that the "broad imperatives" of American foreign policy were as instantly and obviously acceptable to the American people as they were to himself is to be blind beyond remedy and to reduce a sociology of power to the modest (and politically safe) task of identifying "the kinds of consequences which follow the different kinds of decisions."

But the real tragedy is elsewhere. Bell sees that the ". . . heart of the book is a polemic against those who say that decisions are made democratically in the United States."

Now, to some extent, this is true, but not, it seems to me, with the invidious aspect which Mills invests the judgment.

This remark deserves notice.

Bell's answer to Mills was the lead article in a Journal issue devoted to political sociology, but there is nothing particularly "sociological" about it. Mills is passionately concerned with extending democracy, Bell with rationalizing its destruction. Mills, in **White Collar** and **The Power Elite**, has plowed deep furrows in a highly sensitive area; Bell comes along behind with his rake to smooth over the ground. Mills is struggling, often mistakenly, with a difficult, unwieldy, slippery, subject matter; Bell has spent his time translating ancient shibboleths into comforting cliches. Mills suffers from inevitable errors of a cultural workman engaged in a pioneer effort. Yet Bell has the temerity to call Mills an "outsider" who has written a new **Iron Heel**, a modern Balzac attempting to reconcile "science with poetry."

There is a great deal at stake in this hue and cry over Mills. In a nutshell: will American social science (and especially sociology) become a cloak for the vested interests or an instrument of fearless investigation? If Mills' efforts are shown to be only partial approximations by future research, so much the better.

What is to be rejected in Bell is the ideological kernel, not the valuable (and often completely justifiable) criticism.

Mills proposes (implicitly) a focus for social science: a study of the conditions for a rebirth of democracy in America. Conducted to the bitter end, such a study must trod the toes of the mighty. Robert S. Lynd asked the question long ago: **Knowledge for What?**



# The Two Souls of Socialism

## Movement-from-Below

v.

## Socialism-from-Above

Hal Draper

**T**HE IMPACT OF STALINISM has shaken the socialist movement in many ways. Not the least has been its disorienting effect on the very concept of what socialism is.

For those of us who look on Stalinism as a force which is as anti-socialist as it is anti-capitalist, and which has nothing in common with socialism, it is an especially disconcerting fact that a very large proportion of the socialist movements in most countries (right as well as left) do look on the Russian system as a sort of "socialism," if only an undesirable "sort of socialism" which one should preferably avoid. That does not count the mass of sympathizers and dupes all over the world who indeed see Moscow's "socialism" as a great and progressive advance.

There are two especially important elements in this wide acceptance of Stalinism as a "kind of socialism." One is the assumption that statification equals socialism—that is, that increasing state intervention in society and economy is *per se* "socialistic." The other is the assumption, sometimes equally unspoken but at other times explicit, that at least one way of instituting "socialism" is to impose it—either on an entirely unwilling population by force or, less crudely, on a people who are too "ignorant" to accept the "socialism" that an elite kindly wishes to hand down to them and who have to be re-educated so as to be fit to receive that which is granted by the beneficent Guardian.

This concept deserves closer examination. For the socialist current most properly identified with the authoritarian, the widest and most inclusive concept, is that of **Socialism-from-Above**, by which socialism or a reasonable facsimile thereof will supposedly be handed down to deserving masses in one way or another. Opposed to it is the concept of socialism from "below," the self-emancipation of masses in motion, reaching out for freedom, mobilized in a struggle to take charge of their own destiny, as actors on the stage of history. This formulation of the two

souls in the socialist tradition does not prejudice the questions of organization, leadership, and state structure: the same disjunction runs right down the middle of these questions and not (in the anarchist sense) on one side of them. Its content can be considered to be the spelling out of what might be termed the "First Principle" that informed the life work of Marx—"the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves"—as put in the first sentence of the **Rules of the First International**.

It is the concept of Socialism-from-Above which, in the field of political psychology, largely motivates the acceptance of the Stalinist counterfeit as good coin. It is important to stress that this concept of emancipation-from-above or justice-from-above requires no special exposition to account for the power and tenacity of its hold on men's minds. It is the all-pervading principle of millennia of class society and oppression. It is the permanent promise held out by every ruling power to keep the people looking upward for protection instead of to themselves for emancipation. It has the inestimable advantage of being the safe way instead of the bold way, the prudent way instead of the way of action. All pressures push in that direction. No movement for freedom has ever gotten under way except after overcoming its allure. In its varied, Protean, and insidious forms it permeates every movement after that movement is under way, seeps into it, and seeks to transform its character.

The history of the socialist movement has been a continual and largely unsuccessful effort to free itself from this influence. The following references to socialist history are intended to illustrate some of the forms and meanings of Socialism-from-Above.

I

If we turn first to utopian socialism before Marx

and the even earlier "forerunners," from our present standpoint we must note something rarely if ever remarked by the socialist historians. With scarcely an exception, insofar as they are socialistic at all, they represent Socialism-from-Above in a crass and even extreme form, varying from the paternalistic regimentation of Owen's schemes to the totalitarian-like regimes sketched out by Saint-Simon.

It is not a question of derogating their (other) real and great contributions or of passing anachronistic judgment upon them. But we should see clearly in what forms socialism first came on the scene.

## Lycurgus and Plato

Among the "socialists" of antiquity once listed by Karl Kautsky we find the names of Lycurgus and Plato. The first is named as the (probably mythical) founder of Spartan "communism" as described in Plutarch. The less important point is that the Spartan system was neither socialistic nor communistic, being based on the equal division, but private possession, of the land only, and even this species of equality did not apply to movable wealth; as a matter of fact the land also tended to re-concentrate. The more important point is that it is impossible, I think, for a modern socialist to read Plutarch's account of the Lycurgan regime without feeling that he is meeting not a socialist ancestor but a fore-runner of fascism. I refer not to the terroristic regime imposed over the Helots, though even this was quite different from the conditions of the slave class of Athens. That does not concern us at the moment. My reference is to the regime within the Spartan ruling group itself, which was organized as a permanent disciplined garrison in a state of siege.

The case of Plato's **Republic** is well-enough known. It too is neither socialistic nor communistic as a social system, the sole such element being merely the prescription of a type of monastic communal consumption for the small elite of "Guardians" who constitute the governing bureaucracy and army. More important is the fact that the model set forth, and the argumentation adduced to back it up, constituted for at least 2300 years the most powerful literary and philosophical source of the conception that perfect government is by an aristocratic elite, whereas democracy means the deterioration of a well-functioning society.

It is not a question of dealing approvingly or critically with the role of Plato or Lycurgus for their own time. It is a question of wondering what image of socialism made it possible for Kautsky (and of course others) to put the label of socialism on these two model societies even at the risk of anachronism.

Kautsky wrote the passage quoted a long time ago; Martin Buber's **Paths in Utopia** was written only yesterday (1949) and is, moreover, specifically intended to draw democratic socialist lessons from the experience of Stalinism. But in two or three chapters dealing with the pre-Marxian utopian socialists he

does not even hint at the anti-democratic nature of their utopias; he virtually paints them as libertarian anarchists in a remarkable exercise in obfuscation.

## Saint-Simon

Yet Saint-Simon tirelessly and repetitively argued and called for a government of the natural "aristocracy of talent," which he specifically spelled out to mean leading industrial capitalists and bankers and/or the scientists and engineers. At one time he would propose that only the richest industrialists should comprise the electors, since the index of capacity was wealth; at another he would advocate a veritable technocracy of "savants" acting as a ruling priesthood around a scientific papacy; and at another, he would abolish the English parliamentary system for a self-perpetuating oligarchic council restricted to practicing bankers and industrialists. Like Owen, he wooed the latter as the people required to impose his various schemes; when not appealing to them, he called on Napoleon or his successor, Louis XVIII, to put the schemes across in a royal dictatorship, for which, typically, he drafted detailed ordinances. Only toward the end of his life did his orientation take on even the Owenite flavor of a philanthropic appeal on behalf of the poor, who in return should recognize the employers as their natural chiefs. A systematic racist and a militant imperialist, he was the furious enemy of equality and the scornful denouncer of liberalism, the French revolution, and the very idea of liberty as non-sensical.

There is indeed an "anarchist" tinge: it lies precisely in his proposals to replace the political state with an "economic" administration by an elite composed of businessmen and technicians who run society as a joint-stock company. In other utopians there is an element of localism. This partly accounts for Buber. But if Buber can see the libertarian anarchist spirit in Saint-Simon, or for that matter in Fourier's phalansteries and the like, then it is hard to see why Paul Sweezy should be abused for seeing a kind of low-grade "socialism" in totalitarian Russia. At stake is our own conception of what-socialism-is, not that of the old utopias.

As a matter of fact, in all of pre-Marxian utopian socialism and in all of the "forerunners"—also in all of the non-socialist utopias—the conception was anti-democratic and elitist, involving the imposition of a benevolent aristocracy from above. There was scarcely a single even semi-democratic utopia to be recorded. That was not because the concept of democracy required a flight of imagination beyond the powers of men who anticipated modern ideas on everything from the rights of women to progressive education. Utopianism tended to reject democracy and a role for the people from below because it was by nature **prescriptive**, under historical conditions which could not allow for the attainment of the prescriptions by the existing social forces acting among the masses. The prescriptions could be realized only by plans willed from above and imposed by an elite.

Thomas More and Thomas Munzer—Kautsky tells us in his afore-quoted work—both have claims for being considered the first “modern socialist.” The gulf between these two contemporaries penetrates to the heart of our subject. More’s *Utopia* is, like all of them, a picture of a society more reminiscent of 1984 than of socialism. It is elitist Socialism-from-Above. But Munzer’s plebeian-communist movement of social struggle not only was filled with the spirit of arousing the self-activity and mass participation of the people mobilized from below but—and therefore—also struck notes that are among the first democratic intimations in the record of the “socialist forerunners.”

If it is not anachronistic to call More a socialist, then it is not anachronistic to raise another question. Of whose conception of socialism is he the “fore-runner,” of those (today) who would include totalitarian Russia within their image of socialism, or of those who maintain that the Russian system is basically alien to socialism? We raise this not to abuse More as a “Stalinist” but to emphasize that the ambivalence in the concept of what-socialism-is has not been created by Stalinism but was what the socialist movement started with. This whole sector of the socialist tradition is on the side of Sweezy and Deutscher, not ours.

## II

Utopianism was anti-democratic and elitist to the core because it was utopian—that is, it looked to the prescription of a model example, the dreaming-up of a plan to be willed. Above all, it was hostile to the very idea of transforming society from below, by the upsetting intervention of freedom-seeking masses, even where it finally accepted recourse to the instrument of a mass movement for pressure upon the Tops.

### Marxism: Self-Emancipation

It was Marx who first firmly welded the conception of a socialist aim to the conception of transformation-from-below, by the self-mobilization of an organized mass movement winning its own emancipation, rather than by conversion of the Tops. This is the heart of Marxism; “this is the Law; all the rest is commentary.” *The Communist Manifesto* (1848) marked the divide; as Engels repeated in his preface to the 1888 English edition, it launched the movement “whose notion was from the very beginning that the emancipation of the working class must be the act of the working class itself.”

Only five years before the *Manifesto* the 23-year-old Engels had still written in the old elitist tradition: “We can recruit our ranks from those classes only which have enjoyed a pretty good education; that is, from the universities and from the commercial class; and in either we have not hitherto met with any considerable difficulty.” German socialism was superior to the French, he wrote, because the former proposed that the officers of the socialist society should be chosen “not by a majority of the community at large” but only by those with the requisite technical knowledge; “the nominators are

to select the fittest person, by means of some kind of prize essays. . . .”

This was still traditional stuff in 1843; it was the *Manifesto* that was the “deviation,” the break with the past, the break with Socialism-from-Above. The indications are that, of the team of two, it was Marx who was the decisive spirit in the great change.

### Movement-from-Below

It was as a result of their violent reaction against the prescriptive Socialism-from-Above of the utopians that Marx and Engels so fervently insisted on eschewing the very thought of prefabricated plans. The motor force of socialism for them was not the willing of a plan but the stormy self-mobilization of the masses, who would make their own way. As it often is, this was an overreaction; but the important thing is to see how fundamentally their faith in the movement-from-below was linked to their rejection of “planism” or planning-from-above.

Modern critics are at liberty to denounce Marx and Engels for failing to detail their vision of the new social order in a sort of blueprint; it is doubtful whether they know what vital issue they are touching in making this complaint. “Planism” is precisely the conception of what-socialism-is that Marx came to destroy.

There is an instructive instance of what happens when an American-type academic anti-Marxist runs head-on into what we are writing about. Professor H. B. Mayo’s *Democracy and Marxism* set out to prove that Marxism is by nature anti-democratic; most of his exposition does not concern us here. He announces to begin with that he is defining Marxism as “the Moscow orthodoxy” and is deliberately leaving out of account any other “school;” he proves next that what is anti-democratic about Marxism is its theory of historical materialism and such things.

But in the course of his inquiry Mayo seems to have adopted a rather drastic expedient: he read Marx. What he ran into was the fact that nowhere, in acres of writing and a long life, did Marx evince special concern about more power for the state, but rather the reverse. Marx, it dawned on him, was not a “statist:”

The popular criticism leveled against Marxism is that it tends to degenerate into a form of “statism.” At first sight [i.e., reading] the criticism appears wide of the mark, for the virtue of Marx’s political theory, like that of most of the early socialists, is the entire absence from it of any glorification of the state.

Let us overlook the uninformed reference to the early socialists. The observation itself offers a remarkable challenge to our Marx-critics, who know in advance that Marxism must glorify the state. Mayo solves the difficulty in two statements: (1) “the statism is implicit in the requirements of total planning. . . .” (2) Look at Russia. But as we have seen, the identification of “total planning” as socialism is exactly what Marx revolted against. No matter; the critics will attack him also for that.

Professor Mayo then proceeds from puzzlement to bewilderment:

An incidental point of some importance arises. In one sense, those who are nearest in spirit to Marx are not the social democrats, Fabians, or Keynesians, who wish to use political power to modify and improve the going economic system, but the laissez-faire economists and their spiritual descendants of the present day. There is little difference on this point between Marx and, let us say, Professor Hayek. They united in their deification of economic power and their belief in the futility of political action to build a free and just society.

What Mayo is talking about, without any inkling of it himself, is Marx's rejection of Socialism-from-Above, of the "planist" conception of what-socialism-is; namely, his First Principle. If this calls to Mayo's mind laissez-faire and Professor Hayek, it is only because he has no other frame of reference for the strange idea.

Yet we also find a more knowledgeable man linking Marx with the "Individualists" as a representative of nothing less than laissez-faire. In 1912 H. G. Wells published an essay on "The Great State" which proposed a remarkable classification of concepts of what-socialism-is.

Wells' own brand of socialism is styled the "Constructor" wing: it is the "extreme right" and is counterposed both to the Fabians, whose conception of socialism is "bureaucratic," and to "the Marxist and the democratic socialist," whom he calls Planless Progressives. "A council of democratic socialists in possession of London," he writes, "would be as capable of an orderly and sustained administration as the Anabaptists in Munster. But the discomforts and disorders of our present planless system do tend steadily to the development of this crude socialistic spirit in the mass of the proletariat; merely vindictive attacks upon property, sabotage, and the general strike. . . . As for Wells' own orderly administration, we may note that he solves the problem of disagreeable labor by a system of general conscription, which he associates with "the high educational and disciplinary value of universal compulsory military service." He proposes to replace the term socialism with the term "The Great State," a sufficient indication of what we have here.

It is in this essay that he attacks the "sinister gloom" of Marx's socialism, which is "curiously close" to "that type of mind which is irritated by and distrustful of all collective proceedings, which is profoundly distrustful of churches and states, which is expressed essentially by Individualism."

He [Marx] contemplated a continually exacerbated Class War, with a millenium of extraordinary vagueness beyond as the reward of the victorious workers. His common quality with the Individualist lies in his repudiation of and antagonism to plans and arrangements, in his belief in the overriding power of Law.

Their common influence is the discouragement of collective understanding upon the basis of the existing state. Both converge in practice upon laissez faire. I would therefore lump them together under the term of Planless Progressives, and I would contrast with them those types which believe supremely in systematized purpose.

This is how Marx might be seen from the stand-

point of the elite "Samurai" in one of Wells' many fictional Socialism-from-Above utopias. If Marx is, then, to be classified with the laissez-faire individualists, shall we not by the same token classify Wells along with those other "types which believe supremely in systematized purpose" in a "Great State" and whose physiognomy has become somewhat clearer to us today than it could have been for Wells in 1912?

What makes sense of this otherwise peculiar talk about laissez-faire Marxism is its highlighting of the fundamental counterposition involved between Socialism-from-Above and the conception of socialism as a self-emancipatory movement of masses in struggle. In Wells, the spirit of Plan, Order, and Systematized Purpose shudders at the Class War and "this crude socialistic spirit in the mass of the proletariat."

### III

In Wells vs. Marx we have a rather extreme counterposition; it would be misleading to consider only extremes, for one of the important features of Socialism-from-Above is precisely its capacity for mutation. Up to the nineteenth century it can almost always be found in opposition to the concept of mass movement; after Marx the conception of socialism as a people's movement is too firmly rooted; and then Socialism-from-Above begins to permeate the conception of mass movement itself. We begin to get a new political phenomenon, still confusing today: the mass-movement-from-below for **Socialism-from-Above**.

### Lasallean Socialism

This was the kernel of the antagonism between Marx and Lassalle, and the kernel of ambiguity in the Lassallean socialism on which the German social-democracy was founded. Like so much else, the germ of the phenomenon can be found in Saint-Simon: finding that the industrialists and bankers, the predestined rulers, could not be convinced by him to take their proper burden upon their shoulders, Saint-Simon conceived the idea "to use the workers as agents of conversion in persuading their employers of the worth of his system" [Frank Manuel]. He composed a model speech for workers to address to their natural "chiefs," petitioning them to usher in the new order.

This was twenty-seven years before the **Communist Manifesto**. Fifteen years after the **Manifesto**, Lassalle was writing to Bismarck to persuade him

how true it is [wrote Lassalle] that the working class feels an instinctive inclination towards a dictatorship, if it can first be rightly persuaded that the dictatorship will be exercised in its interests; and how much, despite all republican views—or rather precisely because of them—it would therefore be inclined, as I told you only recently, to look upon the Crown, in opposition to the egoism of bourgeois society, as the natural representative of the social dictatorship, if the Crown for its part could ever make up its mind to the—certainly very improbable—step of striking out a really revolutionary line and transforming itself from

the monarchy of the privileged orders into a social and revolutionary people's monarchy.

Bismarck rejected the overtures because (as he explained to the Reichstag publicly in 1878) Lassalle had nothing to offer in exchange for the revolutionary reforms he asked. This was not exactly true; Lassalle was offering the support of the mass movement to back the Crown against the liberal bourgeoisie. Bismarck would not buy.

We see that the organization of mass movements from "below" can have functions other than the self-emancipation embodied in the First Principle. For Lassalle it was a built-in ambivalence. For modern Stalinism, the function of the mass movement as an auxiliary to Socialism-from-Above has itself become the principle. But there is a line which leads from one to the other. Marx was often unjust to Lassalle, to be sure, and wrongly suspected him of trying to sell out the workers' movement to Bismarck. It turned out to be more serious than that.

#### IV

The Fabian socialists, on the other hand, never thought in terms of being or becoming a mass movement. The society was designed to be pilot fish to a shark. At first the shark was the Liberal Party. When, despite the Fabians, labor organized its own class party, the pilot fish reattached itself. Or, to get back to dry land, the Fabians constituted themselves as the elite of brain-trusters who would lead the leaders of society into the most efficient channels for the inevitable collectivization of society. There is perhaps no other socialist tendency which so systematically and even consciously worked out its theory as a Socialism-from-Above. As a result, the Fabians very early drew attention to the dichotomy in the socialist concept with which we are here concerned.

The first mention I know of dates back to 1899, in E. Belfort Bax's *The Peasants War in Germany*, as an outburst by Bax in the midst of the story of Thomas Munzer. He takes off from the thought that the new in history "almost uniformly adopts the garb of the old to which it opposes itself" and jumps to the contemporary socialist movement, coming to the observation that there is always a Scylla and a Charybdis:

In modern Socialism again, we have the state-socialistic tendency known in this country as Fabianism, which hugs old bureaucratic forms, and, on the other hand, we have the anarchistic tendency, which would abruptly abolish all existing administrative organizations.

This early recognition of Fabianism as a bureaucratic type of collectivism seems to have been more widespread than Bax. Perhaps defiantly, perhaps proudly, it was adopted by Mr. and Mrs. Fabian themselves, namely, the Webbs. G. D. H. Cole has reminded about it:

The Webbs, in those days, used to be fond of saying that everyone who was active in politics was either an "A" or a "B"—an anarchist or a bureaucrat—and that they were "B's"; and I think no one who knew the Fabian Society of that time would be in any doubt that it was collectively on the side of the "B's" even if

there were some few dissident "A's" among its members.

### Critics of the Fabians

In 1912 Hilaire Belloc distinguished, in *The Servile State*, between two types of socialists. The disjunction he makes is not ours; but his Type B (to be quoted later) is one whose "collectivist ideal" is basically bureaucratic. There is no doubt he was writing about the Fabians. They represented the carriers of the Servile State.

In the same year, as we have already mentioned, H. G. Wells lambasted the Fabians as holding a bureaucratic conception of socialism: their "project was the compulsory regimentation of the workers and the complete state control of labor under a new plutocracy," he charged. "Our present chaos was to be organized into a Servile State." (Well's own variety of elitist collectivism was different; he had unsuccessfully tried to convert the Fabians to his brand of Socialism-from-Above from 1903 to 1908.)

The basis for all these attacks was quite solid, as is well known. The Fabian conception of socialism—as conveyed through the Webbs and Shaw, who were Fabianism—was through-and-through managerial, technocratic, elitist, bureaucratic, authoritarian, "planist." The gospel was order and efficiency. Carlyle and Nietzsche were the intellectual ancestors. The people were fit to be ruled only by competent experts. Class struggle, revolution, popular turbulence, were insanity. In *Fabianism and the Empire* imperialism was bluntly praised and warmly embraced. If ever the socialist movement developed its own bureaucratic type of collectivism, this was it.

The sequel is equally well known. Bernard Shaw, who thought socialism needed a Superman, found more than one. In turn he embraced Mussolini, Hitler, and Stalin as the benevolent despots who were fit to hand "socialism" down to the Unwashed. In the 1930's the Webbs went to Moscow and found God. In *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization* they proved, right out of Moscow's own documents and Stalin's own claims, that Russia is the greatest democracy in the world; Stalin is not a dictator; equality reigns for all. There is no alternative to the one-party system for such uneducated people; the Communist Party is an organ for bringing civilization to the Slavs and Mongols; it is a self-elected elite but still a thoroughly democratic organization; political democracy is pretty much a failure in the West anyway; and there is no reason why political parties should survive in our age.

As Shaw has explained, the Webbs did not exactly rush to the support of "the Russian revolution which changed crude Tsarism into Red Communism." No—"The Webbs waited until the wreckage and ruin of the change was ended, its mistakes remedied, and the Communist State fairly launched." That is, they waited until the rebellious masses had been strait-jacketed, the revolutionary leaders cashiered, the efficient tranquillity of death had settled on the scene, the counter-revolution firmly established; and then they came to pronounce it the Ideal.

Was there really a "misunderstanding" of socialism involved here? Was this some gigantic "blunder" for the Webbs or for Shaw? Or was this indeed the

"socialism" they had always been talking and writing about, give or take a little blood?

## V

In the German Social-Democracy a different variety of Socialism-from-Above developed. Eduard Bernstein's impulsion came from Fabianism, from which his "Revisionism" differed little in essence but much in form. The Fabians' repudiation of Marxism could be made with contempt and scorn; they were so alien to the spirit of its socialism as to be almost incapable of grasping what it said. In Germany it was not possible to repudiate Marxism like that; the reversion to Socialism-from-Above, *die alte Scheisse*, had to be presented as a "modernization," a "revision."

Revisionism, like Fabianism, found its socialism in the inevitable collectivization of capitalism itself; it saw the movement toward socialism as the sum of collectivist tendencies immanent in capitalism itself, the self-socialization of capitalism from above. The equation of statification and socialism was systematized here, not in Stalinism. The repudiation of workers' democracy as a *sine qua non* of socialism was likewise not invented by our Stalinoids or fellow-travelers as a means of justifying Stalinist "socialism;" it was first developed systematically by the Bernsteinians and Fabians, and subsequently captured the Second International. This theoretical heart of the Stalinist concept of what socialism is, is also the heart of the reformist social-democratic concept.

Given the fact that the collectivization of capitalism which Revisionist social-democracy looked to was in its essence the process of bureaucratization, which is increasingly prominent, it can be stated with scientific rigor that Bernstein was, above all, the theoretician of the **identification of bureaucratic collectivization** with socialism and, in turn, of the identification of this concept with a castrated "Marxism."

It was in opposition to the Bernsteinian trend that Rosa Luxemburg developed most clearly her conception of socialism as a movement of struggle from below—a conception sometimes labeled "theory of spontaneity," a misleading label which yet expresses the point we are interested in here.

## VI

In the record of American socialism we have one of the most prominent examples of the vital role of a Socialism-from-Above conception in the roots of the movement. This is Edward Bellamy's **Looking Backward**. It is right in the tradition of the utopias—anti-democratic from one end to the other. Suffice it to say that its socialism is that of an elite ruling over an "industrial army" system in which the entire working class is regimented in military style and universal suffrage has been abolished.

It was this vision of socialism which was the biggest single force in building the early socialist movement here. That fact can be viewed in different lights. Daniel Bell does it this way: "... it was the 'indigenous, homespun made-in-Chicopee-Falls' vision of that religiously-minded New England journalist rather than the Marxian dogmatics of organized socialism which introduced the idea of social-

ism to millions." That this horrible dream ("homespun vision") had nothing in common with Marxian "dogmatics" is true enough.

Bell writes that a modern reading of **Looking Backward** only arouses revulsion. It was not always so, of course. John Dewey once wrote a panegyric on the book, hailing it as a great exposition of "the American ideal of democracy."

The antagonism between the Marxist socialist standpoint and the Bellamyite concept of socialism has often been put as one between a "native" socialism and a "European" socialism. While Bellamyism indeed was as native as Technocracy, surely there is something else to be learned about it today.

The exposition of socialism which, in America toward the end of the last century, ranked second to Bellamy is not as well known but is not less deserving of attention: Laurence Gronlund's **The Cooperative Commonwealth**. Gronlund went successively through an Icarian (Cabotist) utopian colony, Bellamy's Nationist Movement, the Socialist Labor Party, and the American Fabian Society.

His book is the only one I know of where "democracy" is bluntly redefined as "Administration by the Competent," as against "government by majorities," on the basis of a modest proposal to wipe out representative government as such as well as all parties. All the "people" want, he insists, is "**administration—good administration**" and not "any 'government' at all." (Martin Buber should hail him as a libertarian too; the "anarchist" touch is there.)

In his next chapter Gronlund proclaims that men should find "the right leaders" and then be "willing to thrust their whole collective power into their hands." Here too we learn that what is to replace representative government is the plebiscite and, finally, that the whole scheme of "administration" which he puts forth will undoubtedly work well because it works fine for the hierarchy of the Catholic Church!

Bellamy and Gronlund were the overwhelmingly popular educators of the "native" wing of American socialism. Their conception of socialism continued to echo through the non-Marxist sectors of the American socialist movement well into the twentieth century.

An outstanding example is Charles P. Steinmetz's appalling exposition of "socialism" in **America and the New Epoch** (1916). Here we find set down in dead seriousness exactly the dystopia which was satirized in the science-fiction novel **The Space Merchants**, where Congress had been replaced by direct senators from DuPont and the other great corporations. Steinmetz, presenting the giant monopolistic corporations (like the General Electric for which he worked) as the ultimate in industrial efficiency, proposed to disband the political government in favor of direct administration by the associated giant corporate monopolies.

American socialism also offers the world's most vibrant antithesis to Socialism-from-Above in all its forms: Eugene Debs. Debs versus Bellamy sums up the picture on this side of the water, as does Luxemburg versus Bernstein on the other side.

It is only within the framework of this antinomy, rooted deep in the history of socialism, that a whole series of political phenomena should be considered.

One is the impact of the New Deal on the socialist movement in the Thirties. The elite vision of a dispensation-from-above thrilled and attracted everyone whose conception moved within its limits. The type was heralded by Lincoln Steffens, the liberal-socialist who, like Shaw (and Georges Sorel), was as attracted to Mussolini as to Moscow, and for the same reasons. It became a nine-month political wonder with Upton Sinclair, who launched his End Poverty in California movement with the manifesto revealingly entitled **I, Governor of California, and How I Ended Poverty** to bring Socialism-from-Above with real expedition. It can be explored through a dissection of Stuart Chase and his zigzag course from the League for Industrial Democracy to Technocracy, of all of the Stalinoid intellectuals who sublimated their joint admiration for Roosevelt and Russia.

If the Socialist Party in those days was decimated of such types, the driving concepts should be identified. As example, one can cite Paul Blanshard, who defected to Roosevelt and LaGuardia in 1933 on the ground that Roosevelt's program of "managed capitalism" had taken from the socialists the initiative in economic change. Washington filled up with "the Phi Beta Kappa revolutionaries." The New Deal, so often called with reason America's "social-democratic period," was also the big fling at Socialism-from-Above (Roosevelt's social-monarchy) for a whole group of elitist types. This enthusiasm did not at all stand in the way also of acceptance of the Communist Party's variety of the same.

To this day the pattern has the power. Only recently Cuthbert Olsen saluted the New Deal and the Fair Deal as "creeping socialism," and added that "the same thing can be said of every statute establishing government control of specific segments of the national economy and social welfare provisions. All are based on the principles of socialism, however remote they may seem from an over-all establishment of socialism and abolition of capitalism." On this basis, clearly, Russia is socialism. Olsen confirms: "Soviet Russia is making socialism work . . ."

It is the allure of Socialism-from-Above that unites the package of New Dealism, "creeping socialism," Stalinoid-liberalism, and illusions about Russia.

## VII

We have to stop somewhere short of reviewing the entire history of the socialist movement in favor of some summarization of the many-hued forms of Socialism-from-Above.

In the first place, who or what is "above?"

(1) It may be a benevolent despot—Plato's philosopher-king; Thomas More's Prince; for Saint-Simon, whoever happened to be the reigning monarch; down to Shaw's *Fuerher-Duce-Vozhd*. For Proudhon it was a series of power figures to whom he looked, at one time or another, to impose his "anar-

chist" program by dictatorship-from-above: Louis-Philippe, then Louis Bonaparte, next Prince Jerome Bonaparte, and finally Tsar Alexander II.

(2) It may be God—as it was for some Christian chiliasts.

(3) It may be the existing state, by conversion or infiltration—as illustrated in the case of Bernstein and Lassalle; in general, the reformist concept.

(4) It may be a special elite or self-selected aristocracy. We have given numerous examples.

(5) It may be the philanthropic rich—perhaps the least complicated example of Socialism-from-Above, typified by Robert Owen.

There is some overlap between this method of summarization and another which is perhaps more fruitful: a separation out of the constituent "strains" or ideological currents within the concept of Socialism-from-Above.

(1) We can start with **Philanthropism** again; it is an easily identifiable strain, though usually associated with one or two of the others.

Socialism (or what-have-you) is to be handed down in order to do the people good. As the **Communist Manifesto** put it, "Only from the point of view of being the most suffering class does the proletariat exist for them."

It is easy to see that the very last thing the poor downtrodden should do is get rambunctious, and let us have no nonsense about self-emancipation. As T. D. S. Bassett wrote contrasting the utopian "liberal communitarians" with the Marxists: "They were more apt to solicit capital from capitalists than to speak of the people's winning their rights."

(2) Probably the single most important strain: "**Planism**."

The key words are: efficiency; order (tidy and neat); regulation; regimentation; engineering; and, of course, planning, system. Naturally democratic socialists also insist on planning and efficiency, and there is nothing wrong with neatness; in fact, it is important to demonstrate (in an analysis of Stalinism, for example) that the "planism" of bureaucratic collectivism defeats the ends of efficient planning for socialist purposes. The key to "planism" is precisely that it substitutes something else for socialist purposes.

"Planism" is likely to be associated with a mechanical view of inevitability as against a perspective of struggle. Morris Hillquit was quite certainly unaware that he was touching on a basic dichotomy in socialism when he once wrote that bourgeois idealists may join the socialist movement "either because they perceive in its lofty social ideal the realization of justice and freedom, or because they have become convinced, through a scientific analysis of modern tendencies of social and economic development, of the inevitability of socialism."

The most interesting pages in Hilaire Belloc's **The**

Servile State are those devoted to sketching impressionistically his two types of socialists, whom he represents as "distinct" and "antagonistic." The first regards socialism "as the only feasible solution of our modern social ills." Belloc, who himself advocates an eccentric medievalist reversion in society, seems to think this type is not so bad. The knife is reserved for Type B, who, as we have noted, is the Fabian incognito.

Type B "loves the collectivist ideal in itself . . . because it is an ordered and regular form of society. He loves to consider the ideal of a State in which land and capital shall be held by public officials who shall order other men about and so preserve them from the consequences of their vice, ignorance and folly."

And again: "In him the exploitation of man excites no indignation. Indeed, he is not a type to which indignation or any other lively passion is familiar . . ." (Belloc has his eye fixed hard on Sidney Webb). . . "the prospect of a vast bureaucracy wherein the whole of life shall be scheduled and appointed to certain simple schemes . . . gives his small stomach a final satisfaction."

Twenty-seven years later Max Eastman was working out something similar. This, remember, was Eastman-1930 and not Eastman-Readers Digest. He distinguished three "motive patterns of socialism," the first being around the axis of "the concept of human freedom." Another's axis was "efficiency and intelligent organization . . . a veritable passion for a plan . . . businesslike organization." For such, Stalin's Russia has a fascination:

It is a region at least to be apologized for in other lands—certainly not denounced from the standpoint of a mad dream like "emancipation of the workers and therewith all mankind."

In those who built the Marxian movement and those who organized its victory in Russia, that mad dream was the central motive. They were, as some are prone now to forget, extreme rebels against oppression. Lenin will perhaps stand out, when the commotion about his ideas subsides, as the greatest rebel in history. His major passion was to set men free . . . if a single concept must be chosen to summarize the goal of the class struggle as defined in Marxian writings, and especially the writings of Lenin, **human freedom** is the name for it . . .

(3) Eastman's main contribution in this article is his pinpointing of the third strain or "motive-pattern." Eastman describes it in "those yearning with a mixture of religious mysticism and animal gregariousness for human solidarity—the united-brotherhood pattern," "the gregarian or human-solidarity socialists." It is not to be confused with the ordinary spirit of comradeship, nor is it peculiar to the socialist movement; it appears there. Mike Gold, for example—writes Eastman—"had been seeking for submersion in a Totality, seeking to lose himself in the bosom of a substitute for God."

We can add others: The best example anyone can wish for is Harry F. Ward, the Communist Party's hardy clerical fellow-traveler, who has documented this oceanic yearning subjectively as a political an-

alysis; J. Middleton Murry is another classic case.

The appeal is the warmth of a beehive; incidentally, the literal metaphor of the beehive as the model for society crops up in Plutarch's presentation of Lycurgus' Sparta. Bellamy's youthful notebook entries show the tendency clearly: he writes about the longing "for absorption into the grand omnipotency of the universe," and his "Religion of Solidarity" shows his distrust of the individualism of the personality, his yearning to merge the individual personality into Something Greater.

Martin Buber calls it "community." Here is the authentic note:

The real beginning of a community in which its members have a common relation to the centre overriding all other relations: **the circle is described by the radii, not by the points along its circumference.** And the originality of the centre cannot be discerned unless it is discerned as being transpicuous to the light of something divine. [My emphasis.]

Nothing could be clearer. Buber goes on to invocations to "the Nameless," "a living togetherness," "real togetherness," which unites the collectivity of the group. We might coin the term "Communionism" for this tendency which has so often permeated communistic aspirations.

(4) The strain of elitism, which we have already dealt with considerably, should also be separated out here. It includes Shaw's Socialism-for-Supermen.

(5) Last is a strain to which we have paid only passing notice, not quite subsumed under what has so far been said. This is the conception of **socialism-by-model-example**, a sort of socialism-from-outside, which in its own way will also make it unnecessary for masses to be mobilized from below. It provides a line which goes straight from the pre-Marxian utopians to the Stalinists, for these show the purest cases.

The utopians had to try to build their model examples from scratch. The Stalinists have it provided by Russia. A basic element in the pro-Stalinist ideology is the conception that, at least some day, the practical example of a "socialism" that works in the sight of all will sweep the world off its feet: Keep on pointing to the Russian example and it will save the trouble of mobilizing for self-emancipation.

## VIII

We have been dealing primarily with the development of socialist **concepts** and only incidentally with their social and historical bases, as would be necessary in a more rounded inquiry. But even so there are conclusions of some moment that suggest themselves. Here are three stated summarily:

(1) Democracy in society, in general, and, even more particularly, the democratic nature of a given socialism depend most reliably on an indissoluble foundation in mass self-activity and on the masses' participation in determining their own destiny. The autonomous mass movement from below is the Gaea to socialism's Antaeus, if we are speaking of



genuine socialism. It is the polar-opposite conception to that of our "New Conservatives" and other new elitists.

Professor H. B. Mayo, who as we have seen, thinks Marxism is anti-democratic, advances a definite proposal for the key definition of political democracy: "as a unique method [it] may be defined in one proposition: the ability of a people to choose and dismiss a government. To call anything else political democracy is only to abuse words."

This is radically misleading as a statement of the key meaning of democracy. It comes remarkably close to a plebiscitary conception, the classic Bonapartist and elitist substitute for democracy. It suggests the conception of democracy as merely the right to vote once a year.

On the contrary the key idea is: that society is most democratic which most successfully evokes the permanent mass intervention of the people into the practice and problems of running themselves, in which the people most readily become actors and participants instead of being spectators and off-stage applauders. This applies to democracy as to revolution, to the state as to socialism: the criterion is **mass movement below**. The problem is not to dispense with the organization of the state (the anarchist method of throwing out the baby with the bath water) but how to tie state, socialism, and society firmly to the self-activity of masses in autonomous motion.

There is no suggestion that this problem has been solved; neither does Mayo suggest that for himself of course. It is a question of what-democracy-is, as also of what-socialism-is.

(2) It follows from what has been said here that Marxism—that is, Marx's Marxism, not the various caricatures painted to replace it, on both sides of the Iron Curtain—has made the essential contribution to the meaning of a truly democratic socialism. At bottom this is so because its First Principle, the self-emancipation of labor, provides the basis for a solid alternative to the all-pervading intrusion of Socialism-from-Above in its various forms.

(3) Socialism-from-Above is closely connected with reformist socialism; its rejection in every form necessarily involves the acceptance of a revolutionary socialism, a class-struggle socialism.

Belloc, the eccentric impressionist, clearly saw the relationship between the Type B socialist who was so repugnant to him and reformism. He wrote:

But all those other things for which such a man cares

much more than he cares for the socialization of the means of production—tabulation, detailed administration of men, the coordination of many efforts under one schedule, the elimination of all private power to react against this Department, all these are immediately obtainable without disturbing the existing arrangement of society . . .

Already the greater part of such reformers who, a generation ago, would have called themselves "Socialists" are now less concerned with any scheme for socializing Capital and Land than with innumerable schemes actually existing, some of them possessing already the force of laws, for regulating, "running," and drilling the proletariat without trenching by an inch upon the privileges in implements, stores, and land enjoyed by the small Capitalist class.

The so-called "Socialist" of this type has not fallen into the Servile State by a miscalculation. He has fattered it; he welcomes its birth, he foresees his power over its future.

It is rarely pointed out that Robert Michels formulated his notorious "Iron Law of Oligarchy" not from the experience of revolutionary movements but largely from the bureaucratization of the German social-democracy and its trade unions. His **Political Parties** can be read usefully as a tract on the inner connections between reformism and bureaucratically collectivist practices and concepts, if the cynical element is abstracted.

Michels, for example, describes the change in the trade union as it grows in size and, no doubt, respectability, and as the "agitator"—the organizer who is "rebel" and "apostle"—gives way to the employee-technician:

The qualities requisite for the leadership of an organization whose finances are still weak, and which devotes itself chiefly to propaganda and strikes, must necessarily differ from those requisite for the leadership of a trade union supplying an abundance of solid benefits and aiming above all at peaceful practical results . . . The commercial traveler in the class struggle is replaced by the strict and prosaic bureaucrat, the fervent idealist by the cold materialist, the democrat whose convictions are (at least in theory) absolutely firm by the conscious autocrat.

**Class struggle—idealist—democrat:** these are the terms associated as against the bureaucrat and autocrat. That is quite true; they are associated. If it is not an Iron Law, it is an ineradicable tendency.

As we remarked at the beginning, the history of the socialist movement has been a largely unsuccessful effort to free itself from the influence of the Dispensation-from-Above concept that pervades all the rest of society. This effort is co-terminous with the fight for socialism itself.

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# Puerto-New York

Dan Wakefield

SEVERAL YEARS AGO one of the more revealing political rallies in New York City was held in East Harlem. The audience was, with two or three exceptions, made up entirely of Puerto Ricans, and the speakers were the three candidates for City Council from that particular district. Jose Lumen Roman a Puerto Rican running on the Liberal Party ticket, translated questions that the audience addressed to the two non-Spanish speaking candidates. The Puerto Ricans, evidently naive about politics on the mainland, were blunt and realistic. "Why is it that the Americans hate the Puerto Ricans?" one woman asked. Jose Roman, hastily intervening for his momentarily tongue-tied opponents, told her that it was only low, uneducated Americans who hate the Puerto Ricans, that true Americans don't hate the Puerto Ricans at all. A gentleman stood up then and asked if that meant that newspapermen were not true Americans.

Discrimination against Puerto Ricans as against any group is, of course, based largely on ignorance, and I believe that this ignorance is based largely on isolation. Although Puerto Ricans live throughout Manhattan, in every borough of New York City and every state of the Union, and although we are all self-styled authorities on what is ineptly, boringly, and misleadingly called "the Puerto Rican problem," few of us ever talk to any Puerto Ricans. We read the headlines inscribed by American reporters, hum the tunes from West Side Story, and click our tongues knowingly when taxi drivers (who next to sociologists and barbers are perhaps the greatest purveyors of misinformation in our society) tell us how the "Puerto Ricans are taking over."

Although this ignorance and isolation accounts for much of the prejudice, there is another source of discrimination which is quite distinct—people who, though not necessarily ignorant, are interested primarily in personal profit. This kind of discrimination is the most blatant, if not always the most vicious.

In the area of jobs it has involved union leaders as well as employers. At last winter's AFL-CIO Executive Board meeting in San Juan, Puerto Rico, John McNiff, head of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU), reported on union exploitation of Puerto Ricans, which ACTU alone had publicized, bringing it to the attention of newspapers and the public. McNiff's report showed that conditions were unchanged despite all the conferences, banquets, and talk, and were probably even worse.


The "racket union" exploitation is often based upon the "sweetheart" contract. In a shop that is mainly Puerto Rican an "organizer" goes straight to the boss and says, "I will take care of you and give you a union so that another union that might actually demand things for the workers won't be able to come in." The employer and the alleged union leader sign a contract and the workers don't even know

they are in a union, though the dues are taken out of their pay. These organizers are out for a quick buck and the Puerto Ricans, new in the city and on the mainland, many of them fluent only in Spanish, are not aware of laws protecting them or what good unions can do for them.

The situation first came to the notice of ACTU, *El Diario*, and eventually the Puerto Rican workers, who began reporting case after case. One of the most dramatic complaints involved a letter sent to the AFL-CIO and later, after nothing happened, to ACTU.

We, the employees of the Stark Design Company, are writing this letter to call to your attention this problem. We belong to Local 122, International Jewelry Workers, and we are not in accord with the agreement of this union. We have to pay three dollars monthly dues and we do not know the benefits we derive from this. We want somebody to come and investigate this. If not, we won't come in this week. Thank you for the attention given to this letter.

The letter was signed by forty-nine Puerto Rican workers. Within a month all of them were fired.



One of the most revealing incidents has to do with how these cases are "solved." The conditions were highly publicized: I wrote a piece for *Nation*, the *New York Post* did a series, the *New York Times* picked it up, and *El Diario* carried it. Several weeks later I got a call from Lloyd Klenert, Secretary-Treasurer of the United Textile Workers. His union was one of those whose membership included a number of Puerto Ricans working for \$42.00 a week, with no vacation, pension, or sick leave, and paying \$3.00 a week in dues. Klenert said he was going to New

York to take care of the situation. He was going to hold a membership meeting, which he invited me and Murray Kempton to attend.

Klenert gave the main speech at this meeting, telling how, as a young man on the Lower East Side, he had worked in the sweat shops and how he had worked his way up through the labor movement and become an executive of this great movement, which stood for the people. Klenert then said that he wanted to help his members and asked for complaints from the floor. One woman stood up and said that after working in a garment shop for thirteen years she was earning \$42.00 a week. Klenert jotted her name down on a slip of paper and he took note of the others who spoke after her. Later on, he remarked that he had heard some talk of forming a Spanish-speaking union because the Spanish-speaking workers didn't trust American unions. He thought this was terrible and urged these workers to remember how Samuel Gompers had fought for them. Of course, almost nobody there besides Klenert had ever heard of Gompers.

The climax came two weeks later when I picked up the *New York Times* and saw on the front page a picture of Lloyd Klenert. He had been accused of embezzling \$50,000 from the UTW.

Having lived in East Harlem for a while and then talked to people outside, I find that some of the worst discrimination comes from second-generation European immigrants who say, "we went through it, they should go through it too." Yet it is these very people who are often leaders in the liberal movement. Like the father who walked to school three miles through the snow and thinks his son ought to do it also because it's character building, they say that the Puerto Ricans ought to experience what they did. Some say the Puerto Ricans have it "easier" because of increased social services.

Aside from the absurdity of these claims, one reason the Puerto Ricans do not have it "easier" is that, unlike the earlier European immigrants, they have to deal not only with the language problem but also with the color problem.

Among the most widespread forms of discrimination is profiteering in the area of housing. At the time most of the East Harlem tenements were built, at the turn of the century, they served at least one function for people who didn't have much money and were working their way up. They provided cheap living quarters. With hall toilets, overcrowded rooms, and bad facilities in general, they may have been miserable places in which to live, but they rented cheap. Now the tenements are fifty years older and they are no longer cheap. In many of them one room rents for \$80 a month or even \$25 a week. But the landlords have yet another way of exploiting newcomers, who know nothing of housing regulations and building codes—the regulations on overcrowding, for instance. A Puerto Rican may rent a one-room apartment and have six people living there. When something goes wrong, such as no heat or hot water in mid-winter, the tenant might complain about it. But the landlord answers that the apartment is being occupied illegally in violation of statutes limiting the number of occupants and, if the charge is pressed, he threatens to evict them.

The quest for personal profit shows up also in the realm of politics. Though there have been Puerto Ricans in New York since the turn of the century, the Democratic Party in Manhattan never ran a Puerto Rican for elective office until last fall, when they sent a Puerto Rican to the State Assembly.

I covered the campaign of Jose Roman when he ran for City Council from the assembly district that includes East Harlem. He failed, as everyone expected. In many ways the campaign was pathetic, especially because of the isolation. I remember speaking with his campaign manager. "Our district," he said, "is not entirely in the Spanish-speaking area. We extend into Yorkville and on up Fifth Avenue." Then he showed me a map of the district. "Up here," he said, "is an Italian district and we need an Italian speaker; over here is a German section and we need a German speaker; here is an American district and we need an American speaker to go in there. We can't go in there because of our accents and because we don't speak too well. We did get one girl, an Italian, to speak for us, but we weren't able to get any Germans or Americans." And most of the campaigns there are conducted in this way—according to the old nationality groups. In the end, the only people who helped were from one of the unions—the International Union of Electrical Workers, which had some Puerto Rican members. I was at campaign headquarters on election night. When it was obvious that Roman had lost badly, one of the workers said to me, "Are you Spanish?" I said, "No." And he said, "Sholem Alechem."

I went to a Tammany rally where one of the speakers said that the Puerto Ricans shouldn't be fooled by the fact that Roman was a Puerto Rican. They should vote for the Democrat, even though he didn't speak Spanish, because it would give the Puerto Ricans a good name in the mayor's office and because next year they would be able to get little favors from the mayor. I looked around at the people standing there and, whatever they needed, it wasn't little favors.

Another issue that came up recently involves the Puerto Rican's voting rights. For over twenty-three years New York State has had a literacy requirement stating that all voters must speak and read English. This may seem logical at first. But New York is one of the few states that has such a requirement, and the Spanish-speaking people in the United States are not limited to New York or to Puerto Ricans. Even excluding the Puerto Ricans, there are four million people who speak Spanish or are of Spanish descent, mostly in the southwestern United States. In many of these states citizens literate in Spanish have the right to vote. One of the favorite arguments against it is that one has to be literate in English to know the issues. Of course, nobody knows the issues anyway, but I won't talk about that. The Puerto Ricans have two Spanish-speaking dailies, two television stations, and a number of radio stations and periodicals. Actually they can be as well informed on political issues as anyone else. It is interesting that in Puerto Rico usually 80 per cent of the adults turn out to vote whereas in New York approximately 35 per cent turn out, due mainly to the literacy requirement. One Puerto Rican leader

told me why it isn't made easier for Puerto Ricans to vote. "It is because they have a block of about 200,000 voters. First, everyone figures that they are going to vote Democratic, so the Republicans don't want it. Then the Democrats don't want it because it would mean a whole change or revision in the party when it comes to who gets what. There are other people in line ahead of us. Therefore, they are not going to push it." Actually, it would take an amendment to the New York state constitution to change voting requirements, and that looks unlikely in the near future.

Another type of discrimination, involving the Puerto Ricans in the schools and the teaching of English, originates in laziness. The problem can be traced back to the island itself, where United States policy has changed several times. Originally Spanish was the language of the island and English was a course of instruction. Then in the 1930's a small group of anti-American nationalists began to stir up trouble, and Congress initiated an investigation of the subversive activity and violence. The Senator who was sent down to investigate rode around the island and quickly arrived at an answer to the terrorism. These people were talking a foreign language. The Senator was William H. King of Utah. Here is an excerpt from Earl P. Hanson's account of his trip in the book **Transformation**:

Federal officials took King in tow and organized a motorcade to visit all parts of the island to show the Senator how the Puerto Ricans live and what they are doing. But he was in no way interested in slums or in reconstruction projects but only in whether little boys and girls spoke English. Every time the car stopped he dove out to some child standing across the road and asked whether he spoke English. Invariably he got no answer at all. Even if the child had known a few words of English he would have been so embarrassed and frightened by the august Senator that he wouldn't have been able to say anything. At crossroad after crossroad the car stopped to enable the Senator to pick out some child and ask his unvarying question: "Do you speak English? Answer me." At crossroad after crossroad that rather direct form of academic research brought the same negative result, with the Senator growing redder and redder in the face, but convinced that he had the answer to the Puerto Rican problem. Then in the southern part of the island he came to a river crossing where the car caravan was delayed. Naturally, a group of boys gathered and the Senator had his golden opportunity. He accosted the group, and almost immediately the boys began to dance around him like Comanche Indians, "Do you speak English, do you speak English?" With fiendish bursts of derisive laughter and impolite gestures, they danced around the Senator in unholy glee. King dove back into the car to smolder in defeat. But the insult from the youngsters was to have far-reaching results.

The result of this insult was that now everyone on this Spanish-speaking island was to be taught in English. This was about as easy as teaching them in Arabic. All of the courses had to be taught in English, and as this obviously didn't work out there were subsequent changes in language instruction—four in all—each one dictated from the United States.

On the mainland there has been a different kind of school problem, dating back to the nineteenth century. Until 1948 no recognition was taken of the

fact that Puerto Rican students knew a language other than English. The results of this blindness have been described by a Puerto Rican mother, herself a high school graduate still trying to learn English.

The first couple of years are lost on the kids. It takes a couple of years before they are able to understand enough English to know what is going on. Then, of course, they have lost the instruction they should have been getting the first two years in other subjects. They never really catch up. Never catching up often means never really learning to read and write English.

Finally, in the last year, a new system has been introduced whereby there is at least a study program for teaching Spanish. In the past it was up to individual principals, and no one really knows yet how effective it has been. There are very few Spanish-speaking teachers. In general, the old program was a massive Berlitz course, requiring the child to sit in class until he got it. And by that time he had missed the first three or four lessons in every other course.

Finally, there are all the problems—and these are the most damaging—that derive from personal ignorance. A woman taking me through the schools, for instance, commented that she couldn't understand why, when there used to be two classes for retarded children, now there were enough students to make up only one, because they used to have a much higher type of people. A Puerto Rican woman working in the Lower East Side Neighborhood Association commented on the insults she had to take from people who thought that Puerto Ricans came from some sort of jungle where they dressed and ate like savages. One person, she said, went so far as to ask whether they ate with forks and spoons.

It is the government, the mass communications media, and all the agencies dealing with the public that are responsible for this situation. When a Puerto Rican commits a crime it makes headlines across the country, but no one bothers to remind the public that Puerto Ricans have been American citizens for over fifty years, that many of them died in our wars, that many of them are doctors or nurses or lawyers, while others are musicians, poets, painters, and film stars.

These facts are more real than all the statistics.

A friend of mine who was born in Puerto Rico but brought up in New York told me of this experience when he was in the army recently. He happened to have been stationed in the South, and he knew that life was going to be more difficult for him there. But he did not quite know how to deal with the problem when he and a couple of friends got their first leave from their base in Alabama. They went into town and into a bar, and sat down. They happened to be of fairly light complexion, but when they ordered some beer the bartender came over to them and said that "niggers" weren't served there. My friend said that they were Spanish. "What do you mean?" said the bartender. "We are Puerto Ricans and we are Caucasians. It says so on our army identification cards." "Let me see," said the bartender. So my friend pulled out his card and, sure enough, it said "Caucasian." The bartender looked at it, then handed it back and said, "Boy that's propaganda."

# Tom Mboya Speaks

*Tom Mboya, the leading spokesman for Kenyan independence, is head of the Kenya Federation of Labor and chairman of the Peoples Convention Party of Kenya.*

*A socialist, Mboya was the first African to be elected in the Kenya legislature. In March 1957, in the first elections ever held in Kenya, he successfully opposed the slogan adopted by his principal opponent, "Africa for the Africans," in favor of "democratic equality for all people regardless of race or color." He was elected chairman of the All-Africa People's Conference in December 1958.*

*This article is from a speech Mboya gave in New York City on April 15, 1959—Africa Freedom Day—as part of a world-wide tour.*

**A**FRICA DESIRES TO BE UNDERSTOOD and to be recognized from the viewpoint and perspective of its own people. Africa is no longer willing to be referred to as British, French, Belgian, or Portuguese Africa. Africa must create and assert its own personality. It cannot be a projection of Europe, and it can no longer be spoken for by self-appointed interpreters.

The Conference of Independent African States at Accra in April 1958 marked the birth of the African personality. The representatives of the African States unanimously agreed on the need for Africa to rise and be heard at all the councils of world affairs. To effectuate this objective they created the Organization of African States, which now consults on all questions affecting Africa before the UN and which represents the united will of all Africans on such issues. Equally important was their decision that Africa's total liberation was the task for all Africans.

To implement the latter decision non-governmental representatives of African people from the entire continent met at the All-African Peoples' Conference in Ghana in December 1958. That conference gave birth to the African community. Delegates from political parties, nationalist organizations, trade unions, and similar groups from every part of Africa agreed to work together for the total liberation of Africa. At both conferences it was agreed that the independence of one territory is incomplete and meaningless unless it is accompanied by total independence for all territories.

The year 1958 also saw the inauguration of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This marked the UN's functional recognition of Africa's legitimate place and role in the world's economic and social community and provided a long-needed vehicle for pan-African economic planning and coordination.

People who complain that the discovery of Africa and the African personality and community by Africans is taking place at too fast a pace should be reminded that Africa is many years behind the rest of the world and that, in these circumstances, it cannot afford the luxury of wasting time. They might well remember the old but true adage that "he who is behind must run faster than he who is in front."

Africa must not only run faster but must also try to avoid the mistakes and pitfalls of those who "run before us." Lest any believe we are really running too fast, let me remind them that colonialism has existed in Africa for over four centuries.

Most people seem to agree that colonialism is on its way out. Yet nations which are signatories to the United Nations Charter and which committed themselves to the Declaration of Human Rights have not found it possible to give effective support to the African's struggle for freedom.

Of 220,000,000 Africans only 70,000,000 live in independent states free of white-minority domination. The rest have yet to be liberated from colonialism and European domination. Surveying the situation of the 150,000,000 people still not free, one will immediately see what the African talks about when he condemns colonialism and European settler domination.

Take my own country, Kenya. Until the Mau Mau eruption, few people had heard of Kenya, and today few understand its basic problems—most of them created by British colonialism.

Politically speaking, the British government, through its colonial office, has toadied to the European settlers and condoned, if not encouraged, their domination of every phase of life. Under the present constitution 60,000 Europeans are represented by the same number of elected members (4) as the country's 6,000,000 Africans. Although the Europeans have voted on the basis of universal suffrage since 1923, Africans are restricted by an entirely arbitrary, multiple-vote franchise. This multiple-vote franchise is related neither to the standards for white and Asian voters, nor to those set for African voters in surrounding British territories. Thus the bewildered African in Kenya may vote if he has an annual income of \$336 and may cast not more than two additional votes if he meets certain other requirements. In adjoining Uganda literacy in the vernacular is enough to qualify an African to vote, but he is never entitled to a multiple vote. The income requirements for African voters are \$420 in Tanganyika and \$2,100 in the Rhodesias.

Economically, the government until recently forbade Africans to raise the profitable cash crops (cof-

fee, tea, sisal, etc.), and it even now subjects them to discriminatory licensing, credit, and other restrictions which are not applied to Europeans. Far more serious to the Africans, the government has reserved the entire cool, fertile highlands for white settlers only—refusing to allow Africans to farm even unoccupied sections—while as many as 700 to 900 Africans per square mile are crowded onto the poor semi-arid land not wanted by the whites.

Socially, segregation still prevails in far too many areas, particularly in such presumably public facilities as schools and hospitals. Discrimination in education is singularly frustrating to Africans, for they all realize that schools provide the keys to a better and happier life for their children.

Yet while Europeans have compulsory education, education for Africans is neither compulsory nor free. The Kenya government spends \$89.60 per year for each European child's education; for each far more needy African child it spends only \$14.

To add to other grievances, Africans in Kenya are now living their sixth year under the state of emergency proclaimed during the Mau Mau uprising. Thousands of Africans have been arrested and detained; restrictions upon movement, assembly, and the press are still arbitrary. Shortly before I left Kenya, the police invaded my house in the middle of the night and searched it, suppressed the newspaper printed by the Nairobi Peoples' Convention Party, and arrested scores of party members. About 2,000 political prisoners remain in detention camps, among them Jomo Kenyatta, despite recent revelations that two principal Crown witnesses were paid \$5,000 and that at least one of them admitted perjuring himself at the trial. To all our representations and appeals, the British government has turned a deaf ear, and our people, naturally, are becoming more and more restive.

### **Apartheid in Central Africa**

Unfortunately, many other parts of Africa have even more grim and horrible reports to make on conditions under their colonial governments.

Thus the situation in the Central African Federation must disturb everyone who has faith in democracy. In 1953 a federal constitution was imposed on the three territories composing the Federation despite the unanimous objections of the Africans, who constitute a twenty to one majority in the area. Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, being protectorates, demanded self-government and rejected any union with the segregation-minded government of Southern Rhodesia, but in vain. The Federation since then has moved further and further toward the *apartheid* policies of the Union of South Africa. Britain has lost control over the territories, and the African now must defend himself. Witness the recent shootings of fifty or more unarmed Africans, the declaration of a state of emergency based on the pretext of a "murder" plot about which not one shred of evidence has been produced, and the arrogant deportation from Northern Rhodesia of a Brit-

ish member of Parliament. Today all African organizations in Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia are proscribed, and the leaders are indefinitely detained without trial, often in distant parts of the Federation.

In the silent colonies of Angola and Mozambique a system of repression at least as severe as that in the Union of South Africa is concealed behind the convenient legal fiction that these territories are constitutionally self-governing, like the Portuguese metropolitan provinces. In these colonies forced labor—slavery—still exists openly, and opposition is brutally suppressed by beating and by shipping trouble-makers to the "death island" of San Tome, from which they seldom return.

### **French Settlers in North Africa**

In North Africa self-determination and autonomy are denied 9,000,000 Algerians by the refusal of the 1,000,000 French settlers there to permit any political settlement which does not protect their political and economic domination. Thousands of lives have been lost, homes have been destroyed, the countryside ravaged, and the whole Mahgreb has been kept from fruitful development by the French colons. Yet the Christian and democratic nations look the other way and see no evil. How does an African distinguish between oppression of Algerians by the Frenchmen and of Hungarians by the Russians?

Indeed, despite its force as a stimulus to Africa's economic development, colonialism has been the biggest hindrance to the development of the indigent people. Under colonial rule, little attention has been paid to the need to invest in education, health, technical training, and general community development for Africans. The African's potential as a local market for consumer goods has been ignored. Partition of Africa and the use of territories as sources of raw materials for metropolitan economies have not allowed planning for continental or regional development. Instead, colonial divisions have treated each territory in isolation from others.

Africans are convinced that economic and social conditions cannot be considered apart from their political setting. Self-government and independence open great possibilities for economic and social development. Self-government not only permits people to embark on development programs serving purposefully the needs of their own country, which they know best; it also permits them to establish relations with other countries on the basis of equality and to progressively coordinate the economy of their country with that of others. Full economic and social emancipation is not possible without political emancipation. It is by mastering their own fate that the people will release their energies for the arduous task of economic and social development.

The argument for delay ignores the fact that it is only after independence that most of our countries have embarked on large-scale economic and educational projects and that it is only after independ-

ence that the world has begun to be conscious of our economic and social problems. In fact, the foundations for stable government have been laid only after independence, which makes nonsense of the plea of colonial governments that they are training us for self-government. But colonial powers have left their African territories only when the organized pressure of our people has made it impossible for them to govern without serious consequences.

In addition to crying "Caution," "Go slow," opponents of African freedom have raised other objections. While most of the opposition arises from those who fear that independence will cost them status, economic advantage, or other special privileges, I would like briefly to consider the questions that are posed to me time and again by non-Africans.

I have repeatedly been asked about the use of violence to achieve freedom and can only answer that we are totally committed to non-violent positive action. Nevertheless, I must call attention to the wise words of the great English reformer, John Bright, who in 1866 declared:

I have never said a word in favour of force. All I have said has been against it—but I am at liberty to warn those in authority that justice long delayed, or long continued injustice always provokes the employment of force to obtain redress. It is in the ordering of nature and therefore of the Supreme that this is so, and all preaching to the contrary is of no avail. If men build houses on the slopes of a Vesuvius, I may tell them of their folly and insincerity, but I am not in any way provoking, or responsible for, the eruption which sweeps them all away. I may say too that Force, to prevent freedom and to deny rights, is not more moral than Force to gain freedom and secure rights.

Secondly, there are people who fear, with a sense of guilt perhaps, that Africans may yield to the temptation to victimize minorities—particularly the formerly dominant whites—when we gain independence. To them I can only repeat what we resolved at Accra in December—that Africa will be developed towards a democracy where individual rights will be recognized and guaranteed, regardless of race or color. Our quarrel is only with colonialism and European domination. With these we shall never compromise.

Lastly, there are those who are only too ready to try to make capital out of some of our teething problems. Expecting perfection from us, they lie waiting to ridicule our demand for freedom every time they see—or fancy that they see—any error or misjudgment by an African. I am flattered by these people because; though they have not yet attained perfection themselves, they believe we are better fitted to achieve it before them. Though we need make no apologies and will always welcome constructive criticism, we do not and cannot allow interference with the sovereignty of our independent states. Any problems we meet during our early stages of independence reflect on the utter failure of colonialism as a training ground. We have no reason to believe that if the colonial government had another hundred years the situation would be better.

Let us, therefore, join together and match the internationalism of communism, item by item, with the internationalism of democracy. If we cooperate

in the effort to eliminate disease, poverty, and ignorance from the face of the earth, we shall deal a death blow to the root causes of most of the "isms" that currently bedevil the world.

To those who seek security against false prophets by establishing military bases in colonial areas without the consent of—or even notice to—the local inhabitants, I recommend a thorough study of recent events. Military agreements negotiated with colonial powers will be necessarily, as they are today in Morocco, subject to the will and the needs of the African people when they gain their independence. Only Africans, whatever their color, background, or race, may rightfully decide matters that vitally affect the future of Africa. Africans seek the same peace, stability, security, and well-being that all decent people seek the world over, and we are unwilling to be used willy-nilly as pawns in a great power struggle. For this reason we adamantly oppose the use of any African territory, even the most desolate wastes of the Sahara, as a testing ground by non-Africans for their new and ever more devilish instruments of destruction.

The task of Africans seeking that standard of well-being now recognized to be the decent and proper right of all peoples was clearly summarized by Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Prime Minister of Ghana, when he called upon the African peoples to aim at four stages of advance:

- 1—The attainment of freedom and independence;
- 2—The consolidation of that freedom and independence;
- 3—The creation of unity and community among the free African states;
- 4—The economic and social reconstruction of Africa.

Because of its history, its background, and its stand for democracy, the African people have come to expect greatness of the United States. We are often surprised, puzzled, eventually frustrated and disillusioned when we see the United States government acquiesce in the French army's use of American arms, allegedly for NATO, against Algerians; or abstain from voting on the Algerian question in the UN; or lead the defense of Portugal's refusal to declare and make reports on its colonies in Africa; or avoid condemning government brutality in Nyasaland; or refrain from taking any positive steps to bring about the international control of South-West Africa. These faults may appear small to Americans, but in the end they will determine how far Africa's confidence is to be won or retained. Whereas most African leaders support the condemnation of such suppression as occurred in Hungary and now in Tibet, they cannot accept the apparent contradiction in standards and values where Africa is concerned.

You are the descendants of the tiny brave band of men who "fired the shot heard round the world." Its sound has been slow to reach Africa, but now the echoes rebound from every corner of the land. For the same freedom and right to a better life that your ancestors won with so much pain and suffering, we Africans now also strive. To this achievement for every African in every portion of the continent, we too pledge "our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honour."

