

anvil

a student magazine

a new look at berlioz

sidney hook: the professor flunks

behind the mau mau terror

protestantism: + niebuhr, — the left

liberal heads in the sand

on taking sides with the west - dwight macdonald

augie. with love

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Youth and Student Highlights	2
Editorial: Democracy, Dissent and the Cold War Charles Walker	4
Sidney Hook: The Professor Flunks	6
Michael Harrington	
Behind the Mau Mau Terror	10
Olaf Fischer	
Liberal Heads in the Sand	13
Sam Bottone	
I Choose the West	16
Dwight Macdonald	
Protestantism Minus the Left	18
William Shirley	
Augie, With Love	21
Margaret Levi	
Berlioz Revisited	22
Shane Mage	

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Student Notes

Academic Freedom Week

THE NEW YORK Regional Chapter of Students for Democratic Action planned an Academic Freedom Week for May 5-12. The campaign was designed to promote the belief in the right and necessity of the expression of controversial viewpoints in college classrooms. It also supported the idea that competence in actual performance should be the criterion for judging the fitness to teach. Activities planned for that week included distribution of literature on academic freedom, and the holding of symposiums at which prominent defenders of civil liberties were present.

Conference on Freedom

An intercollegiate conference on freedom, which attracted one hundred student council delegates from throughout the East Coast, took place on February 26th. Sarah Lawrence College, well known for its liberal policies and progressive educational orientation, sponsored the event as a student activity with the full cooperation of the administration in regard to the use of buildings, auditorium and food facilities.

The conference began with a two hour address by Professor Henry Steel Commager, on the subject of 'freedom, which was a classic example of how not to say anything concrete.

The Politics Panel included Dwight Macdonald among others. It was sad to note this once firm civil libertarian talking of due process applying only to court cases and saying that "something has to be done" about the "Communist menace."

Speaking at the Education Panel, the famous sociologist, Robert MacIver, referred to the great number of private "patriotic" groups with lots of money from "certain economic interests" who want to stamp out "all ideas of later origin than Ricardo

and Adam Smith.” Most time was spent upon the relationship between this and the problem of Communism.

The Arts Panel noted the drive to conformity and discussed the need for greater individuality in conjunction with more state subsidization of the arts.

The Conference concluded with reports from the various panels and an excellent address by the President of the College, Harold Taylor. He attacked those liberals who fail to stand up to the hysteria, and ended on a well-worded note of hope.

The point of most interest was the composition of the students present at the Conference. The great majority of them were militantly liberal although not politically sophisticated. Most were strongly and articulately in support of the belief that controversial ideologies should be presented by their partisans both in and outside the classroom.” Though the witch hunt continues and voices of caution advise from all sides, fresh and vigorous sentiments seem to exist on campus.

Community Church Forum

The Community Church of New York has, under the former leadership of John Haynes Holmes, and now Pastor Donald Harrington, been a center for liberal, pacifist and socialist sentiment. It has a full youth program all year round, primarily for high-school and early college students.

On Sunday, February 27, it held a Youth Forum-Discussion which heard addresses from representatives of Young Republicans, Young Democrats, Labor Youth League, Students for Democratic Action, Students for America (Gen. MacArthur is Honorary President), and the Young Socialist League. The conjuncture of such a spectrum of views in one hall was organized and run for the church by the SDA.

The comments of the elderly representatives of the major parties were practically ignored by the audience. Their views can be summarized as: “Students—be cautious!”

This was the first public appearance of Students for America. It must be noted that the New York group does not consist of “know nothings”, but seems to have a Super-Taft “laissez faire” ideology: the '29 depression was a failure of Socialism, not Capitalism,

since Hoover was a socialist and the Federal Reserve System likewise! At the same time SFA distributes the literature of the national organization which grew out of Bob Munger’s Students for MacArthur and collects students’ names for the FBI.

The Labor Youth League (Stalinist), in line with its current attempt to build a “united front against McCarthy”, brushed aside as irrelevant such “minor points” as the principled defense of civil liberties for everyone, here and abroad. The SDA and YSL both insisted upon a principled defense of everyone—including Stalinists and fascists—when their civil liberties are attacked. Both were most concerned with this point. The spokesman for the YSL tied this up with the cold war, and pointed out that to be consistently for civil liberties one must oppose the war policies that generated the witch-hunt hysteria. The audience responded very favorably to this presentation.

It would be excellent if more such forums could take place elsewhere in the country.

Young Socialist League

THE WEEKEND of February 12th saw the formation of the Young Socialist League, which is now the sole organized group in the youth field which is both democratic socialist and opposed to the war drives of both Russia and the United States.

The Unity Convention brought together the Young People’s Socialist League, which had broken from its parent organization, the Socialist Party, late last year, and the Socialist Youth League, which was the youth section of the Independent Socialist League. Complete agreement on all basic current problems was the basis of the unity.

The new organization for the time being remains unaffiliated to any adult group.

Perhaps the most remarkable effect of this unity has been the flow of new and younger people to the organization. Added to this is a tremendous revitalization of the old members, and a growth of activity. We welcome this group and hope to see it grow, and with it a new militant campus movement.

An Editorial:

Democracy, Dissent, and the Cold War

IN RECENT YEARS, we have been witnessing in America the rapid erosion of our body of civil liberties. The measure of this erosion can be seen in the pervasive atmosphere of suspicion, the tangled web of repressive laws and procedures, the decline of effective political dissent and the phenomenon of McCarthyism.

No one cause accounts for this situation. Yet a basic consideration is that the cold war has served as the backdrop for these developments. The psychological insecurity and frustration of a world in turmoil lends itself readily to the scape-goat technique: our troubles are caused by the Communists. The "enemy" at home is identified with the national enemy, a task made easier by the slavish subservience of the Communist Party U.S.A. to the interests of the Soviet Union. The final step is to identify all dissent with disloyalty and service to the Communist cause.

There are also those who say: "We are already at war with Soviet Russia, although the nation isn't yet awake to that fact. We must smoke out these enemies in our midst who are allies of the Soviets. If there are some casualties in the process, they are in a real sense the casualties of war. The fact that a few of the innocent suffer must not divert us from rooting out these Communists in this life-and-death struggle." This is a view heard not only from the man in the street but also in the most sophisticated political circles.

Quite a few liberals do not go this far, but still believe "defense" needs supersede every other consideration. Therefore, while they may be restive over the tactics of Senator McCarthy and his cohorts, these liberals will tolerate such excesses rather than open themselves to the charge they are "soft on Communism" or are willing to "jeopardize our national security." When the Senate voted on continuing the appropriations for McCarthy's committee, the vote was 85-1 in favor, all but one of his most bitter critics joining in.

Another basic factor in the erosion of our civil liberties has been the decline of effective political dissent. The fragmentation and disintegration of the Left, and its absorption into the two dominant parties, has led to increasing sterility in our political life. More and more, the dissenter is the lone non-conformist. Organized dissent may be mobilized around specific issues, but there remains no sustained critique of the status quo embodied in a political movement.

The pressure upon the isolated dissenter to conform is tremendous. After a time, it takes its toll of

even the most courageous and constitutionally stubborn. We also know that "courage is contagious." Sustained opposition to the popular creeds of the day needs to be undergirded by a movement, by the fellowship of the like-minded. This makes all the more tragic the decline of the Left and of the libertarian spirit.

The disintegration of the Left has, in turn, paved the way for the open resurgence of the Right. Some extremely reactionary groups, often with fascist tendencies, have made an alliance with some veterans' organizations and fundamentalist religious groups such as the American Council of Churches, to produce an ultra-nationalist force of considerable influence. This alliance often engages in local vigilante action against radicals, liberals and sometimes even mild conservatives. It frequently operates an effective lobby at the state capitols. It has been such groups which have, for the most part, pushed through state loyalty oath bills and similar repressive measures.

One of the most pernicious long-run results of McCarthyism has been its spawning of numerous laws, regulations and procedures which operate against free speech and association. Even if the current hysteria abates somewhat, the vicious effects of these measures will persist. Censorship, deportation procedures, security probes, loyalty oaths and other devices enacted in the name of anti-Communism—these have produced a web of legal and administrative procedure which will take years to unravel. Pressure continues for a law to legalize wire-tapping and to permit information gained from it as evidence in court. Such "informal" procedures as black-listing add other roadblocks to freedom.

In dealing with Communists, of course, we are not simply dealing with a political party in the usual sense of the term. Communism has elements of both a conspiracy and a political movement. There could hardly be a more serious mistake than to lump all Communist activities together as a vast conspiracy engineered from Moscow, imposed on the masses from without by cunning and treachery. We need not be blind to its conspiratorial aspects. Nevertheless, in countries such as the United States, far removed from direct military pressure or the threat of internal revolution, the Communist Party serves for some as a means for protest and agitation. People go into the Communist Party from a variety of motives, and some never do awake to the hidden part of the story. In a country like France, where so large a segment of the electorate

is Communist, it would be ridiculous to say this was all the result of the Kremlin conspiracy.

The political life of a country may be considered poisoned to the extent that any political group masks its operations, and practices secrecy and deceit. It would be a healthy situation if people would be completely open about their political views, associations and affiliations. But we can hardly expect frankness and openness in an atmosphere of hysteria and repression. We cannot create a situation where Communists or former Communists or "pro-Communists" are considered outcasts and social pariahs, and then expect them to expose themselves readily to this stigma. It is no light matter to threaten the loss of employment and reputation, and then demand that persons make themselves vulnerable. Rather, it builds up bitterness at the assigned virtue and righteousness of the inquisitors.

There are those who say they have neither the time nor the inclination for considering such problems in the face of the menace now before the world. Who knows, they say, when a little war may suddenly blaze up into a big one? We cannot have "unreliable elements" who in that supreme moment when our national existence is at stake may turn against us.

A number of things need to be said in this connection. First, democracy is a patient and usually slow process. It requires persistence, magnanimity, mutual trust and a deeply rooted faith that the thorniest problems can be dealt with by people together concerned for the common good. There is always the temptation of trying to cut the Gordian knot by force or fiat, but then it is no longer democracy. The more perilous the situation and the higher the stakes, the more necessary it is to exercise patience and care.

Third, the maintenance of liberty cannot be considered a problem apart from the world struggle and the problem of war. It should be noted that the hysteria now so prevalent has been generated without a single bomb having fallen on this country. As the struggle intensifies, even greater departures from our traditional freedoms can be expected.

Authoritarian danger

It is imperative to distinguish between propaganda and protest activities, and those which are part of espionage or sabotage, for example. The latter will be dealt with by law. Political opinions and beliefs are not the province of any governmental investigating group. Only if we make such distinctions shall we be clear-eyed enough to carry on the political and moral struggle which alone can meet the challenge of Communism.

Second, in the present mood it would not be too difficult for the authoritarians to triumph, maybe more

easily than can now be imagined. It is characteristic of totalitarian regimes to require repeated and public declarations of loyalty to the State, to exact abject confessions of error or deviation, to insist on rigid formulae for "political reliability" of its public servants, teachers and opinion makers, to expect citizens to inform on their fellows, and to manipulate mass emotion for political and military adventures. This country, it seems to me, has traveled down that road a perilous distance. The way back may be slow, difficult and costly.

The tension between freedom and order is a perennial problem for a democratic society. When this problem becomes overlaid with the requirements of the war system, the balancing forces are dangerously affected. The drive toward war produces a high degree of centralization and regimentation, in economic as well as political life. It then becomes increasingly difficult to restrain invasions of the federal government into the lives, beliefs and activities of its citizens.

Civil libertarians must not fail at a crucial point: defending the freedom of Communists to expound their beliefs. This does not imply they must join in united fronts with Communists, using the argument that not to do so and to criticize their methods severely is to engage in a form of Red-baiting. It is in the nature of such front groups to operate by secret caucuses, by subterfuge and concealment. The true purposes of the group are disguised, and are tailored to the interests of the Soviet Union and the Communist Party. One who engages in such front activity, even from idealistic purposes, is inevitably engaged in advancing such deceit and interests. The civil libertarian, even as he defends vigorously the right of Communists to dissent, must equally insist on his own right to set forth, in fidelity to the claims of truth, what he believes to be the true aims and tactics of Communists. Furthermore, such a policy is the surest guarantee against these wild swings of the pendulum between idealization or miscalculation of Communism on the one hand, and hysterical repression on the other.

The political and moral struggle against Communism must be carried on at the political and moral level, and by means consistent with our ends. Repression is not a sign of strength, but of weakness. It is a negative force. Even from a practical point of view, what few plots or few under-cover Communists are discovered by these irresponsible investigating groups cannot offset the immense damage inflicted upon the democratic process by these methods.

CHARLES WALKER

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Sidney Hook: The Professor Flunks

— A Criticism of "Heresy Yes, - Conspiracy, No"

"From time to time certain phrases catch the public fancy . . . Gradually these phrases begin to be employed in all sorts of contexts until they function not as summaries of thought, but as substitutes, like flags run up to show the color of our emotions."

Sidney Hook in "Heresy, Yes—Conspiracy, No"

THE PHRASE which Sidney Hook was preparing to rescue from its emotional content when he wrote the quotation above was "guilt by association." Yet his comment, whether or not applicable to "guilt by association," is certainly relevant to the title of his own book, *Heresy, Yes—Conspiracy, No*.

For Sidney Hook has become the theoretician of the liberal capitulation to the witch-hunt, and his distinction between heretic and conspirator is its slogan. The implied defense of the rights of the dissenter (*Heresy, Yes*) allows the liberal to identify with the American tradition of freedom. And the condemnation (*Conspiracy, No*) allows him to rationalize the reality of Smith Act, Attorney General's List, two McCarran Acts, a loyalty program, and on ad infinitum. The unintellectual liberal is somewhat more frank. As President Truman remarked, "I put my Reds in jail."

All this is done in the name of realism. Throughout his book, Hook violently attacks the "ritualistic liberal" who simply repeats the old formulae in the face of a radically different reality. Yet, paradoxically enough, the basic criticism of Hook's book is two-fold: that he himself presents an incredibly naive version of the actual reality, and an even more naive program for facing it. In these two areas, the empirical description of reality and the theoretical attitude toward it, Hook himself is not, however, ritualistic. He rather subordinates all of his thought to a higher realism: the support of American foreign policy and all which that implies in terms of domestic politics.

In *Heresy, Yes—Conspiracy, No*, Sidney Hook presents a hard-headed, pragmatic approach to the civil liberties problem. Yet his pragmatism is not in those areas where he announces it—in his naive description of the present reality and his theoretical interpretation of it—but is rather implicit in his political purpose of providing a basis for liberal support of the American war drive.

Reality of the present

What is the present reality in which we face the problem of loyalty?

The reality is not one of total innocence as the Stalinists and their fellow-travelers would have us be-

lieve. It is now a matter of established fact that espionage agents of the Soviet Union, American citizens, occupied positions of trust and influence in the Government for a period which lasted for fifteen years. There is no recent instance of the infiltration of traitors on so large a scale. And it is hardly surprising that the American public reacted in shock and anger to the disclosure of what had been going on. That this shock and anger translated itself into certain political manifestations is, however, part of a larger picture which we will treat of later.

Yet if the reality is one of sordid treason rather than of that total innocence which the Stalinists proclaim, how does this relate to Professor Hook's view?

In the world of *Heresy, Yes—Conspiracy, No*, ". . . some security regulations in government are questionable, . . . some blunders have been made." Thus the description of the reality. On the Attorney General's list: "We are assuming for purposes of this analysis that such groups have been correctly identified and the procedures by which this has been done are both public and subject to judicial review. That this has not yet been done is a serious weakness in the Federal loyalty program, but one which is not irremediable." Thus the political interpretation.

Yet the reality is clearly otherwise. The "some blunders" in security regulations have, in fact, included the continuous use (for over five years) of anonymous accusation of innocent people. Whatever the number of actual individuals who have been hurt, this program stands for a basic weakening of the very fabric of the American Constitution. In an article in the *New York Times* during January, 1954, Peter Kihns gave a dramatic account of how this process actually operates. Among the "security risks" temporarily suspended at Fort Monmouth was one who had been enrolled in the Young Pioneers in 1933 when he was twelve years old, and another who had been accused of attending lectures given by Max Lerner.

Reality of the blunders

The fact is that the security program has been going from bad to worse throughout its history. Originally, it rested upon a criterion of "loyalty" which was given loose administrative definition. It was then broadened to include discharge because of "risk," i.e., reasonable suspicion, without however, any attempt to grade "risk" according to the sensitivity of the job.

Under the Eisenhower Government, the two terms coalesced and, in effect, anyone fired from the Federal payroll, for any reason, was thereby suspected of disloyalty. In addition, independent review of the administrative decision was abolished.

This is the reality which Professor Hook defines as one of "some blunders." In the face of this reality, he states politely, in regard to the Attorney General's list, that the "weakness" of the Federal loyalty program is "not irremediable." He later proposes that the remedy is to have the Government adopt Roger Baldwin's position on this matter. (Baldwin proposes that the criterion for guilt be allegiance to a foreign power.)

Yet what is the political reality? The Attorney General's List has been in existence for over five years. Organizations were placed upon it by administrative fiat, without any opportunity for hearings, confrontation of accusers, etc. It was only last year that the first suggestion of possible hearings was raised—in a statement by Attorney General Brownell in which he prejudged the organization to which his Department is going to grant a fair hearing, the National Lawyer's Guild.

In view of this history, it is hard to see how Hook's glib statement that the weakness of the loyalty program is "not irremediable" has any political content. There is even less likelihood that Roger Baldwin's position will be adopted by the Government. Yet here again, the seeming naivete serves a hard, pragmatic purpose. For, once having made such a description of the reality and given it such a political interpretation, Hook can then substitute his analysis for the reality, and Roger Baldwin's position is much easier to defend against the carping of Europeans than what is actually going on.

Yet between these two higher pragmatisms—the Stalinist myth of total innocence dedicated to furthering their cause and Hook's myth of "some blunders" which furthers his cause—is stark reality. Real guilt has been attacked, but in such a way as to undermine seriously the very basis of American liberty.

Hook's Schizophrenic World

In two cases we can follow the details of Hook's almost schizophrenic world: in his analysis of the Smith Act and in his remarks on Academic Freedom and the rights of Communist teachers. The first involves a description of reality, the second, a concrete proposal.

In one part of his defense of the Smith Act, Sidney Hook states: "The main question, then, is not Section Three of the Smith Act which forbids conspiracy to do what is proscribed in Section Two [overthrow the Government by force and violence or advocate the same—M. H.], but section Two itself . . ." Why so?

According to Professor Hook, Section Three is not the "main question" because Justice Jackson ably defended its provisions making "conspiracy" to advocate in the future, a crime. Jackson's approach is to analogize the Smith Act provisions against **conspiracy to speak** to various anti-trust cases in which speech is accepted as evidence of **conspiracy to restrain trade**. In the one case, speech and conspiracy to speak are the very substance of the crime. In the other, speech is accepted as evidence of a crime.

But suppose that Jackson's argument did hold water. Would this be sufficient warrant for Hook to declare, "The main question then is not Section Three"? Hardly. For the actual form in which the Smith Act has come to the courts, the actual basis of the very real arrests and convictions (now in the neighborhood of seventy) is, in fact, under Section Three. Section Three is not merely the main question—it has practically been the only question.

A Defense of the Smith Act

Here again, Hook more or less bypasses reality in two or three paragraphs in order to place the issue on a grand, philosophic level. On such a level, two factors emerge: the Smith Act is much easier to defend, and the discussion has little to do with the living and breathing human beings who are now in jail because of Section Three. There are many other strange points in Hook's defense of this reactionary law—for instance the wonderful sentence, "The Smith Act is imperfectly phrased"—but it is in his treatment of Academic Freedom that Hook achieves the climax of his methodological schizophrenia.

The empirical basis of Hook's proposal is that Communists are conspirators rather than heretics. His documentation for a current proposal is almost exclusively drawn from the Thirties. From this evidence, he deduces that all Communist Party **members** are conspirators, and that **membership** should therefore be the criterion used in the firing of teachers.

The point which I want to raise is not that Hook's evidence from the Thirties is somewhat unconvincing (it is), but to go on to the concrete proposals which our doughty pragmatist offers. In this case, let us assume Hook's description of the reality to be true and see how he intends to act.

First, Hook calls for a faculty declaration of principles. "The second step in procedure would be the election of a Faculty Committee on Professional Ethics Wherever there was evidence that a Communist group was at work, or any other group organized for unprofessional practices, it would undertake investigation on its own initiative. The specific modes of pro-

cedure will vary from place to place and from faculty to faculty, but in all cases it will culminate in a fair hearing for any teacher charged with being a member of the Communist Party."

Fair hearing—or kangaroo court? Hook has proposed that a faculty shall constitute itself, first, as an investigative organ for the purpose of determining membership in the Party. Secondly, it is to become a court whose "specific modes of procedure will vary from place to place", and, given the judicial competence of a faculty, vary I am sure from traditional guarantees of the Anglo-American law. Thirdly, the investigative-judicial faculty is, in effect, to sit as a jury, deciding upon the factual accuracy of its own charges. The juridical theory underlying Hook's "fair hearing" is quite simply appalling.

An Escape from Hook's Logic

It is so appalling that even Hook is forced to qualify the utopian reaction which he advocates. He writes that even if a man admits Communist Party membership, "there may be sufficient reasons to forego taking disciplinary action" against him. Thus, the faculty is given a discretionary way out of the rigors of Hook's juridical theory. But the reason which he gives for the qualification is perhaps even more interesting than the qualification itself.

The reason that a faculty can forego disciplinary action is that **individual** consideration of the case may indicate that this is the thing to do. In other words, faced with a reality which contradicts Hook's a priori judgement that all Communist Party members conspire within the educational system; faced, for example, with a teacher-member who is simply not conspiring, at least in that area, Hook absolves himself and the faculty of the necessity of following his logic to its conclusion, though he does not re-examine the logic. But this attention to individual cases does not go too far. It is not mandatory. It merely invests the faculty with another function: that of the King who is above his own law and may change it at will. It adds another confusing element to Hook's juridical theory.

But yet another factual stumbling block faces the author Hook. For though **membership** is to be the criterion for firing, Hook admits that it is often hard to pin it down. Indeed, the Communist no longer even has a party card. Therefore, "Sometimes, membership will have to be construed from a complex pattern consisting of activities, participation in key front organizations, publicity in party line organs, content analysis of variations in position establishing close correlation with the official Communist Party line." And thus,

"The faculty committee will serve as a kind of academic jury."

Thus, Hook's total proposal is that a faculty committee, using the admittedly delicate criterion of "membership" (which will, perhaps, have to be inferred) will serve as investigator, judge, jury, court of appeal—and all in the interest of a "fair hearing."

Yet, here again, Hook's reactionary procedure is utopian. For the universities, in general, do not fire according to such a sophisticated and reactionary manner, but rather more simply. Almost any teacher who invokes his Constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment is out of a job.

Heresy, Yes—Conspiracy, No; the slogan sounds like sweet reasonableness itself. Yet it is based upon a tragically inadequate description of the reality which we face and upon incredible proposals. A court would be the only body which **might** be able to make such a distinction fairly, and the courts have not been doing so. Hook proposes that we extend the distinction, and the competence to make it, to the administrative body, to the faculty, to the liberal-on-the-street. Yet, even more tragically, the administrative body, the University and the liberal-on-the-street have already arrogated greater rights of judgment and claims to competence than Hook would ask for.

The Political Basis

But if the analysis so far has given the impression that Sidney Hook is merely naive, it is misleading. His book does have a hard, pragmatic, political purpose.

The first assumption on which this book rests is that America is the leader of the free world and that the cause of freedom is served by American foreign policy. One of the main sectors of the attack against this policy is that area where the European points to the witch-hunt as a phenomenon belying the American rhetoric and revealing the American reality. It is to this attitude that Hook addresses himself.

This political basis is occasionally revealed in his book. Hook writes, "American economic and **military** aid on the whole has no political strings attached. It does not even remotely imperil European independence." It is with such an estimation as his basis (in the face of our dealings with Adenauer, the Vatican, Franco, Chiang, Bao Dai, Syngman Rhee etc.) that Hook sees the relation between his judgment on American foreign policy and the domestic problem of the witch-hunt.

His motive is not necessarily base, for I am sure that Professor Hook is sincerely convinced that the cause of American foreign policy and freedom are one.

What is revealing is not his individual psychology, how he arrived at the decision on America, but the immediate consequence of that decision, not only for Hook but also for the American liberal.

Foreign Policy and the Witch-Hunt

By in effect, admitting the interdependence of foreign policy and witch-hunt, Hook, and liberals like him, are forced to minimize, or even defend the witch-hunt. **For they are obviously part of a piece.** But once having made this hard, pragmatic judgment, Hook is faced with the reality of the witch-hunt, and it is here that he is pushed into nonsense and naive descriptions of what is going on and proposals to remedy the situation.

Hook and the liberal meet the same problem when they tackle foreign policy. For here, they must interpret the reality of America's reactionary role in Europe and the colonial areas, from Adenauer to Rhee, in terms of the rhetoric of "bold new programs" and "the free world."

Therefore, in order to answer Hook the first thing to point out is that the interdependence which he recognizes between the American war-driven foreign policy and the domestic witch-hunt is quite real. Thus, if we level our criticism against the witch-hunt, we destroy the internal precondition of our foreign policy.

The first step, then, is to state clearly that the foreign policy of the United States is of a reactionary nature, everywhere putting down the genuine revolutions of oppressed peoples, everywhere propping up the decadent forces of feudalism and capitalism.

And here we come to the domestic witch-hunt which is the corollary of the foreign policy. Hook is forced into his strange description of reality and his reactionary proposals by his other judgment on the nature of the United States, leader of the "free world." We are not. Therefore we can, and must, state a clear and unambiguous position on the reality of civil liberties today.

We must realize that a substantial body of American freedoms are still intact, but that the last five or so years has seen a continuous process of corrosion and even destruction of traditional liberties. The "some blunders" include the use of the Smith Act, the Attorney General's List, the two McCarran Acts, the Loyalty and Security Program, etc.

Secondly, we must make careful theoretical distinctions on what the government can and should do. We cannot ignore the evidence of treason and infiltration. We cannot suggest that a government, a democratic government above all, must commit suicide and allow treason in the name of civil liberties. A demo-

cratic majority is by no means required to stand by while its own citizens become spies. But even a democratic majority must act in consonance with its Constitution and with its spiritual commitment to the rights of the individual.

The reality we face has not been guided by the Constitution or concern with the individual. It has been thriving for over five years on the curtailment of free speech, guilt by association and anonymous accusation. Therefore, in the practical order, the immediate problem is not to oppose the theoretical right of the government to loyalty programs, but to oppose the programs themselves, as they have been and as they are. Moreover, we are committed to make concrete proposals, for we admit the reality of the problem. Look at a few cases.

Defend the Democratic Rights of All

In *Loyalty and Security*: there should be no anonymous accusation. Informers should be required to present themselves in open hearings. Actual agents of the government should be identified to the hearing board at the very minimum. Independent review of loyalty decisions and legislative and judicial control over administrative procedures should be initiated.

In the matter of *Academic Freedom*: the criterion of competence must be defended; a faculty, deciding on the basis of an estimation of the professional competence of the teacher, should be the authority for firing.

On the *Smith Act* and the *Attorney General's List*: the only demand possible is that of outright repeal.

These proposals at least have the virtue of recognizing the situation and interpreting it from the standpoint of a principled defense of civil liberties.

Heresy, Yes—Conspiracy, No is a truly pragmatic book, not in its content which has little or no relation to the present reality, but in its political function. With this seemingly libertarian slogan, a melange of legal analogies and the leavings of the American tradition of freedom, the liberal is enabled to defend his adherence to the reactionary policy of the United States with at least the rationalization for a clear conscience. It is a hard-headed position, an unritual position, only in its clear subordination to American military and economic aims. It is as tied in strings as *Point Four*, the *Marshall Plan* or the *Mutual Security Administration*. It is the liberal's justification for that garrison state which he must accept as the corollary of his judgment that America is the "leader of the free world."

MICHAEL HARRINGTON

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Behind The Mau Mau Terror

— *The History of Repression in Kenya*

THE TRAGEDY of Kenya is that of the whole of Africa; it is that of an awakening and restless native population held in check by a small white aristocracy of landowners and civil servants.

The situation is tense, arising from years of mismanagement by the European settlers. Nothing but a radical change from the present discriminatory policy of the British and Kenyan governments, to one of earnest cooperation, can prevent the inevitable uprisings and revolts, which, let it be said straight away, the Africans must win sooner or later, whatever their temporary setbacks.

Newspapers throughout the world have been filled with reports of the racial conflict in Kenya—and of its most violent symbol, the Mau Mau terrorism. What has presented itself to the world as a sudden violence is actually the product of a situation which has been years in the making. The cultural disintegration, the land hunger, the impoverishment of city workers, all leading to the unrest, had its beginnings in the 1880's, when Britain, in the struggle for wealthy East African territories, gained Kenya and Uganda. The Imperial East African Company surrendered its charter in 1894, and under the Imperial British Government, European colonization was then strongly encouraged.

Kikuyu Culture

The present Mau Mau activities spring from the Kikuyu tribe, which has always been the most advanced and the most important in Kenya. British imperialism in Kenya had as one concomitant the breaking down of the Kikuyu culture, of its system of social organization and religious belief.

The beliefs of the Kikuyu can be divided into four prevailing ones:

- (1) Belief in an anthropomorphic God, very similar to the belief expressed by Christians.
- (2) Belief in ancestral spirits which at one and the same time were spirits of a past ancestor and communal spirits for each clan. These had to be placated by worship and offerings.
- (3) The belief in inanimate spirits pervading trees, waterfalls and epidemics, which were

separate both from the conception of God and of ancestral spirits.

- (4) A very strong belief in magic, both black and white. This included faith in herb medicines and the like (not of course always just magic) and also the binding powers of oaths.*

This strong religious spirit was accompanied on the social side by a remarkably well planned social organization, which before the arrival of the European, worked extremely well.

Most important for the running of the tribe was its system of education and initiation. The tribe was divided into different age-groups, each with responsibility according to the stage it had reached. From the time they were very small, children of the same age living in the same locality would grow up together and learn through experience the duties which they would gradually be required to perform. Later on they would be taught the tribal customs, the tribal rituals, and religion, until they finally became accepted as full members of the tribe. If they did not accept the will of their own age group they risked complete social ostracism. Their training, therefore, was thorough and valuable to them when they later became leaders of the clan. The coming of the European destroyed their faith in the efficiency of their system.

One small example will suffice to show this. Kikuyu custom forbade a woman to have a child until the previous child was fully weaned—which in Kenya was seldom before the age of two, so children would be spaced in at least three year intervals. The white man showed, indirectly perhaps, that there was no physical reason why a child should not be born sooner, so the birth rate increased. That the limitation of birth was important in an economic sense was never explained to the Kikuyus.

No European Substitute

This is not to say that Kikuyu life was ideal—far from it. There were frequent clashes with neighboring tribes, particularly the Masai; women were, and still are, expected to do heavy manual work, but something

*This in particular has been exploited by the Mau Mau.

was definitely taken from the Kikuyu by breaking their social system down, something for which the Europeans offered no adequate substitute.

The Arrival of the Settlers

It was around 1902 that the first European settlers, as opposed to administrators, came to Kenya, and quite naturally they wanted land to farm. To them there seemed to be plenty of fertile land, grazed only by a few cattle belonging largely to the Masai tribe. The British entered into negotiation with a few self-appointed chiefs about the purchase of the fertile land in the Highlands.

Contrary to popular belief, most African tribes did not have chiefs before the British arrived, and this was also the case with the Kikuyus. Those who entered into negotiations with the British were either abusing their powers as chairmen of the councils of elders, or had been appointed administrators by the British to look after British interests. As the land was owned in family units, it was not theirs to sell in any case. Also, if land was to pass to or from the Kikuyus a ceremony of "mutual adoption" between the two interested parties had to take place. Thus, altogether, the transactions which took place at this juncture were not legal from Kikuyu point of view.

That the highlands of Kenya had been left idle at the time of the arrival of the first settlers was due to exceptionally severe disasters which had successively befallen the Kikuyu. First a great smallpox epidemic, then a great rinderpest outbreak, followed by drought, famine and locust pest. As a result the Kikuyu who survived tended to leave the area which was affected, and move to safer one, awaiting the return of better times. But it in no way lessened his right to the property. As often as not, a father, son, or another member of the family was left behind to look after the property pending the time when the rest of the family could return.

It was these people and a few elders, then, with whom the first European settlers came into contact. These Kikuyus were often given a smattering of education by a missionary school, and while often not accepting Christian doctrine, they lost faith in Kikuyu magic, and in consequence rejected other and better features of Kikuyu culture.

Dr. L. S. Leakey in his book, "Mau Mau and the Kikuyu", has shown convincingly that as a result of the clash of two cultures there were many people left in a spiritually void world, who would accept any doc-

trine of racial violence if progressive leadership were not forthcoming.

But a world devoid of purpose would not, by itself, cause the present terrorism in Kenya and the tension between the races. The breakdown in the culture has been an important factor in the current Kenyan scene, but the main elements causing the terrorism and unrest are the landhunger of the Kikuyu peasants and the starvation wages paid to those Kikuyu who work in the towns.

Land Hunger

By gradual encroachment and dealings with unofficial chieftains, white settlers obtained all of the land in the highlands. This situation was legalised by the enactment in 1915 of the Crown Land Ordinances. This undemocratic law provided 16,000 square miles for 2000 European settlers, while 5½ million Africans were reserved 50,000 square miles. But even here, if it can be proved that there are mineral deposits in the ground, the Africans can be moved off their land. According to one European expert, Dr. Leys, "about half the land in Kenya that is worth cultivating is owned by the whites." With so little land to divide between so many Africans it is obvious that each peasant has a woefully small plot from which to extract a living. Apart from those who own their own small plot of land, there is also a large class of African squatters on European farms, who occupy a position similar to the serfs of medieval times in Europe.

A familiar pattern in the breaking up of feudalism is visible here. Many Africans are emigrating to the towns to work in the new factories. But conditions are very poor, and wages are low; the minimum monthly wage in 1952 was 24 shillings and 25 cents per month. Life in the towns obviously provides insufficient security for the Africans to settle there. This means that while working in the towns, they contribute to the overcrowding of the land by still holding onto a little plot on which to retire if town life proves incapable of supporting them.

For Africans who do live on the minimum wage, life is obviously intolerable; wages have risen very little since before the war while the price of posho, the staple diet of the Africans which is made of corn, has increased by 600 percent since 1939.

With such glaring discrepancies between the whites and the blacks, there can be no support for the claim that there is equality between the races. And in fact, there is racial discrimination everywhere: each race

lives in a different part of the town, eats in different restaurants, goes to school in different classes, and is treated in different hospitals.

With the coming of Mau Mau activity, the situation became far worse, for immediately all members of the Kikuyu tribe became suspect, including those who openly expressed anti-Mau Mau views. A ban has been placed on all African public meetings, and collective punishment has been imposed upon certain Kikuyu settlements.

Meanwhile the extremist settlers demanded, and have received, General Erskine, who has been put in charge of the emergency operations against the Mau Mau, with a force consisting of twenty thousand Kikuyu "Home Guards", twelve thousand police and a Royal Air Force bomber squadron. The shocking activities of these forces have been given recent coverage in the world press.

Necessary Answers

How can the present problem in East Africa be solved? Few can believe that the present repressive actions can solve it; they can lead to nothing but complete distrust between the Africans and the whites. Only one prong is left of Sir Evelin Baring's much publicized two prong method of dealing with the Mau Mau. These two were suppression of the movement first, together with the implementation of reforms. While the authorities are using every possible method, with varying degrees of success, to suppress the Mau Mau, no reforms have as yet been forthcoming.

Fenner Brockway, the British M.P. who knows Kenya intimately, has listed the minimum reforms needed:

- (1) The distribution of all uncultivated land, whether in the White Highlands or not, to the landless Kikuyu peasants. The irrigation of desert land to make this fertile for use.
- (2) The abolition of the virtual serfdom on the European estates and the establishing of minimum wages.
- (3) The establishment of a system of cooperative farming. (That would be the best way of overcoming the present backward techniques, and the best way to make production by the small peasant profitable. The old tribal system of the Kikuyu would be easily adaptable to cooperative methods of farming.)

- (4) Better wages in the towns. These must be sufficient for the African to live decently, so that he would be able to give up the land he still owns. (This would mean the creation of a new light industry, based on the processing of the products of the land.)
- (5) This should lead to a complete restoration of liberties for the Kikuyu, an ending of the color bar, and finally the establishment of full democracy for all races in Kenya.

There is little time for the whites to decide; already the chances of a settlement leading to gradual emancipation are slipping away. The only answer to the severe racial conflict, to the Mau Mau terrorism, is a reversal of the policy being presently pursued.

OLAF FISCHER

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Liberal Heads in the Sand

- *The Theory and Practice of American Liberalism*

THE TWENTY YEARS of the New Deal and Fair Deal, the so-called "Roosevelt Revolution", are significant both in terms of actual changes they have brought about, and in terms of the effect upon political thinking which has been caused by the myth of New Deal effectiveness.

During the early days, the New Deal appeared to liberal and labor leaders as the birth of a new social order in which there would be a fundamental redressing of the power between "big business" and the "people". There was the feeling, in answer to radical critics, that the New Deal was dynamically on the road towards ending the depression and building a better America.

Today liberalism is on the defensive all along the political line. No longer does it wave its banner as it advances, but rather seeks consolation in defeat along the terms which Arthur Schlesinger Jr. used after the Stevenson defeat in 1952:

"The Roosevelt Revolution was now complete. We are all New Dealers today—even the new Republican administration."

Thus, liberals attribute to the New Deal the power of having answered, with such obvious success, the crisis of capitalism, that even its formal opponents have actually, though secretly, been converted.

In order to make a realistic assessment of the substance contained in American liberal theory, we must analyze this legendary Roosevelt Revolution with which it is so readily identified. For the future of liberalism is intricately bound up, not with the rhetoric, but with the actualities of that past from which it draws nourishment. If liberalism has enough vitality to produce a social and economic program, rather than simply slogans, it will derive this strength from an extension of the **content** of the New and Fair Deals, and not from the legend.

The ending of the "Roosevelt epoch" with the election of Eisenhower afforded one of the chief theoreticians of liberalism an opportunity to define the recent liberal past. Writing after the Stevenson defeat in the British journal, *Twentieth Century*, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. offered this analysis:

"Essentially, the New Deal and the Fair Deal were the victims of success. They arose in response to bitter national needs; and they made the fatal mistake—in politics—of meeting these needs. As a

consequence, their functions began to disappear. Once the New Deal reforms had become so much a part of the landscape that even the Republicans would be hard put to dislodge them, it was increasingly difficult to treat them as live political issues. Yet the liberal leaders realized this all too rarely, and consequently expended their energy in summoning the American people to ancient crusades, blowing the bugles for forgotten wars."

If the New Deal was, as Schlesinger writes, a "victim of success", we must define that success. Was it the accomplishment of its announced aim, the ending of the depression?

New Deal Didn't End Depression

Unfortunately for Schlesinger, it cannot be seriously stated that the New Deal ended the depression. It **did** enact a series of reforms—social security, minimum wages, some farm legislation, controls on the stock exchanges, guaranteed bank deposits—which helped to put a floor under the worst parts of the depression. But this commendable accomplishment is far short of justifying a characterization of the New Deal as having been victimized by success. For the depression ended, not through the stop-gap measures, but only when Dr. Win-the-War replaced Dr. New Deal. After five years of the New Deal, in 1937, there had been a serious "recession", and in 1940 there were still almost ten million unemployed.

This situation was accurately described by Frederick Lewis Allen in 1940, in his book "Since Yesterday", where he included a bare outline of the dimensions of the failure:

"... a nation one-third of whose citizens were ill-fed, ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished ..."

"... There were 9½ million people unemployed. The colossal enterprise of work relief was becoming every day more clearly a tragic makeshift, demoralizing, as the years dragged on, to many dependent on it.

"Though it had produced some fine achievements, nevertheless as a permanent institution the W.P.A. offered an intolerable prospect . . . and it was getting to look all too permanent. The farm problem was still unsolved . . ."

"Now at last it looked as if the New Deal were through. It had played its cards, and had no new ones to offer. . . . The social salvationists were losing their zeal for legislating prosperity. Now, like Roosevelt himself, they had become tense with excitement about foreign affairs, and had half forgotten the dismal unsolved problems on the domestic front . . . **Yet the secret of prosperity still remained undiscovered.** (My emphasis—S. B.)

This blunt fact of failure has never been squarely faced by liberals in any way that affects their program. It was indeed an unusual thing for Chester Bowles, former Ambassador to India and a leading Fair Dealer, actually to have stated the reality of the New Deal in a recent letter to *The Reporter* magazine. He wrote:

"I believe that the Democratic Party has got to stake out a somewhat new position, and I hope that we will use this period to do some ardent soul-searching. One of the first things we must realize is that in the 1930's we never really did find the answer to full employment. Only the defense program in 1940 put our people to work and only the war and the cold war that followed have kept them at work."

As official evidence that the liberals still prefer the Schlesinger myth to Bowles' description of the truth, the 1954 Draft Program of Americans for Democratic Action talks in terms of its belief in the American "system". All this, despite the evidence that the New Deal was saved only by the advent of the war economy.

Schlesinger's explanation of the current political scene had not only the New Deal dying of success, but the Fair Deal as well. Since liberals also accept this vision of the Fair Deal, let us see how the facts square with the legend . . .

If the depression of the thirties was ended only because of the advent of World War II, then the prosperity of post-war America has remained a war prosperity. Once the pent-up demand and savings of rationing and priority-ridden years of war had spent themselves, there came, in 1949, a recession in which unemployment rose to five million. The problem was solved, not by unique Fair Deal economic policies, but by Korea and the intensification of the cold war. Then, in late 1953 and early 1954, a reduction of the armaments appropriation resulted in unemployment which is nearing four million at this writing. If the next few years do not hold another war in store, there is no reason to believe that the New or Fair Deals, Roosevelt-Truman-Stevenson or Eisenhower version, can solve the problem.

"The New Capitalism"

But liberal theoreticians, even in cases where they recognize the importance of the war economy to the New Deal, tend to accept an evaluation of the post-war economy which resembles that made by Frederick Lewis Allen. Allen says, in "The Big Change":

"After some years (of the New Deal) there was considerable uncertainty whether the engine would ever run again without wheezing and knocking. But when World War II came along, we discovered that if Washington jammed the accelerator right down to the floor boards the engine began to run smoothly

and fast. And when the war was over, and Washington released the accelerator, it still hummed."

Taking as truth Allen's **misapprehension** that the American economy is functioning with but a light tap on the accelerator, the liberal has searched to discover the "real" reason for this performance, and has come up with the all-embracing answer: the Roosevelt epoch had bloodlessly created a new type of capitalist society in which a way had been found, under the Democratic administrations, to stabilize the economy. That patchwork revision of the capitalist system (the income tax laws, social security legislation, minimum wage laws, regulatory laws like the Securities and Exchange Act, and the subsidies granted to business and the farmer) had finally solved the tremendous insolubles inherent in the classic capitalist system.

The very best case that can be made for this view is that there is no way of proving it. There has not been a substantial period in the last decade and a half when the decisive sector of the federal budget has not been related to war expenditures. The "new hybrid American system" had been born crippled—or at least it had spent its entire life on crutches.

It is certainly possible that the patchwork of New Deal reforms may tend to soften the blow of a depression, or even shorten its duration, or that a program of public works could keep a couple of million workers off relief rolls. But to grant this is a far cry from the positive assertion that the cycle of boom and bust can be prevented under a capitalist society, hybrid or any other kind, without the workings of a war economy.

This tendency of liberals to ignore the fact that it was not the New or the Fair deal, but rather the War deal, which solved the problems of the capitalist economy, this fond belief that they have been "victimized by success", is perhaps best reflected in their willingness to accept Adlai Stevenson as their current father image.

If the New Deal and Fair Deal were the victims of success, then the only reasonable program would be to call for honest and efficient administration of the social revolution. And Stevenson has done no more than that. He is not interested in a program and did not put one forth during his presidential campaign because he does not believe that a new one is needed.

This is evidenced in Stevenson's attitude toward his political party. His view of the role of the Democratic Party involves an entirely different concept from that of the labor leaders and left liberal elements who advocate sticking with the Party. The latter persistently defend the Democratic Party as the vehicle for social reform, even in the face of a completely unenacted

program. They do so on the grounds that the Fair Deal was sabotaged in Congress by the Dixiecrat-Republican coalition which has dominated every Congress since 1938. They claim that the Fair Deal still remains a valid program to meet the needs of the American people, that all liberal and labor elements should draw closer to the Democratic Party in order to exert pressure for the necessary legislation. Since it was this Dixiecrat-Republican coalition which passed the Taft-Hartley Law and prevented its repeal, has prevented the passage of any civil rights legislation, refused to raise the minimum wage rate, lifted price controls after the second world war, refused to enact adequate price controls during the Korean War, supports the AMA's adamant opposition to a housing program, etc., they conclude that the first step toward enacting a militant Fair Deal program would be to eliminate the tremendous influence of the Southern Democrats in the party.

Administration, Not Reform

Adlai Stevenson, in contrast, pursued a policy with reference to the Southern Democrats, which clearly showed that **administrative effectiveness** rather than any militant reform program, was his primary interest. In the cause of the unity of the Democratic Party as a political machine, his presidential campaign in the South pursued a line of argument which involved acceptance of reactionaries in the legislature and could only mean the defeat of the Fair Deal program. Countering the argument that the South could gain greater influence through the Republican party, he said, in a speech at Nashville on October 11, 1952:

"I would suggest, in particular, a careful perusal of the list of committee chairmanships in both houses. And I would ask these gentlemen to explain just how the South would be better served by Richard Nixon of California as presiding officer of the Senate rather than John Sparkman of Alabama; by Joe Martin of Massachusetts as speaker of the House rather than Sam Rayburn of Texas; by Senator Saltonstall of Massachusetts rather than Senator Russell of Georgia as chairman of the Armed Services Committee; by McCarthy of Wisconsin rather than McClellan of Arkansas on the Expenditures Committee; by Millikin of Colorado rather than George of Georgia on Finance . . ."

This is the kind of argument which is possible only when liberal **governmental administration** is more important than a militant **legislative program**. It is the kind of argument which can be made only by a liberal who looks about him and is satisfied that all of the crusades have been fought, that basically all is well.

For all that Stevenson's "status quo" attitude may jar with that of the more militant liberals, actually his tendency toward the administrative, rather than the legislative, answer, is reflective of an entire pattern of

liberal thinking which has been conditioned by the twenty years of New and Fair Deal bureaucratization.

Bureaucratic governmental organization has been, in our epoch, the answer to the major social and economic problems of war and capitalist crisis. Not that one can quarrel with the principles of old age pensions, unemployment benefits, public housing, with taking the restrictions off the organization of labor, and the like, or that one can deny that the federal government simply required more personnel and more organs for the administering of these programs.

However, the consequences of this geometrically expanding bureaucracy have included the growth of unfortunate attitudes towards the dynamics of the political process.

Most importantly, social change has come to be viewed as a product of the personal initiative of the bureaucrat rather than as the result of mass pressures and needs. The approved way to change has become, in this New Deal-conditioned view, not the rational guidance of popular sentiments and pressures through democratic political organization, but the accretion of gains through the technically competent activities of the more enlightened administrators and "statesmen". The democratic aspect comes only with the sort of "vote of confidence" of occasional elections. Liberals most thoroughly permeated with this concept of political workings have reached the point of considering the existence of the CIO as a sort of gift from the White House. They have come to conceive of the bureaucracy as not simply the big government necessary to the administration of large scale social change, but more positively, as the source of impetus for this change. And the people? They simply put their OK on the measures, are a more or less minor element in the channels of memoranda which become so important in government-by-bureaucracy.

Thus, Adlai Stevenson's administrative answer to social problems can be seen not as his unique contribution, but rather as a major by-product of twenty years of New Deal-Fair Deal governmental development.

And so, modern American liberalism, regardless of the exalted view it may have of itself, can hardly stand much close inspection, in terms of that which it accepts as economic theory and as political dynamics. This liberalism, whose economic theory is based upon myth, and whose administrative approach to social change bypasses the democratic process, does not seem equipped to answer, with a meaningful program, the need for social and economic progress.

SAM BOTTONE

Sam Bottone is on the Editorial Board of ANVIL.

I Choose The West

—An Opposition to the Anvil Viewpoint

Why We Print This Article

During the Forties, Dwight Macdonald was the editor of *Politics*, one of the main centers of American radical journalism. His magazine was the common ground of revolutionary socialists, pacifists and anarchists. It printed classics, such as Simone Weil's "Illiad as a Poem of Force", re-evaluation of socialist theory, and political reports from abroad. In all this, *Politics* was a resolutely anti-war and revolutionary magazine.

The Editors of ANVIL are in major disagreement with many, if not most, of the points made in this article by Dwight Macdonald. Yet we feel that Macdonald's statement has an importance as a document. As the current position of one of the better journalists produced by American radicalism, it stands as a comment on the disintegration of the left in the United States. As a human document representing the candid position of an honest man, we feel that this selection has a worth of its own.

This article is excerpted from some new material which is appended as a reprint of two articles, "The Responsibility of Peoples" and "The Root is Man."

I choose the West—the U. S. and its allies—and reject the East—the Soviet Union and its ally China and its colonial provinces, the nations of Eastern Europe. By "choosing" I mean that I support the political, economic and military struggle of the West against the East. I support it critically—I'm against the Smith and McCarran Acts, French policy in Indo-China, etc.—but in general I do choose, I support Western policies.

During the last war, I did not choose, at first because I was a revolutionary socialist of Trotskyist coloration, later because I was becoming, especially after the atom bomb, a pacifist. Neither of these positions now appears valid to me.

The revolutionary socialist position assumes there is a reasonable chance that some kind of popular revolution, a Third Camp independent of all warring sides and hostile to both, will arise during or after the war, as was the case in Russia in March, 1917. Nothing

of the sort happened in the last war, despite even greater destruction than in 1917-18 because the power vacuum was filled at once by either Soviet or American imperialism. The Third Camp of the masses just doesn't exist any more, and Lenin's "revolutionary defeatism" now becomes simply defeatism: it helps the enemy win and that's all.

As for pacifism, it assumes some degree of ethical similarity in the enemy, something in his heart that can be appealed to—or at least something in his traditions. Ghandi found this in the British, so his passive resistance movement could succeed, since there were certain repressive measures, such as executing him and his chief co-workers, which the British were inhibited from using by their traditional moral code, which is that of Western civilization in general. But the Soviet Communists are not so inhibited, nor were the Nazis. So I conclude that pacifism does not have a reasonable chance of being effective against a totalitarian enemy. Pacifism as a matter of individual conscience, as a moral rather than a political question, is another thing, and I respect it.

Radical cultural difference

I choose the West because I see the present conflict not as another struggle between basically similar imperialisms as was World War I but as a fight to the death between radically different cultures. In the West, since the Renaissance and the Reformation, we have created a civilization which puts a high value on the individual, which has to some extent replaced dogmatic authority with scientific knowledge, which since the 18th century has progressed from slavery and serfdom to some degree of political liberty, and which has produced a culture which, while not as advanced as that of the ancient Greeks, still has some appealing features. I think Soviet Communism breaks sharply with this evolution, that it is a throwback not to the relatively humane middle ages but to the great slave societies of Egypt and the Orient.

Having now stated why I am no longer a pacifist and why I will probably support this country if it comes to war with Soviet Russia, just as I approved of Truman's action in resisting the invasion of South Korea with force, let me edge back again, not toward pacifism but toward scepticism and indecision. If it comes to a world war, I think we are done for, all of us. In supporting measures of opposition, including military ones as in Korea, against the Communists, I reason that the best chance of postponing war and perhaps avoiding it altogether is for the West to keep up its military strength and to be prepared to counter force with force. Appeasement didn't work with the Nazis and it won't work with the Communists. I admit that the results of the Korean war have been disastrous, especially for the Korean people; if I were a South Korean, I'm not sure that I should not have preferred to have just let the North Koreans to take over peacefully. Yet perhaps in terms of world politics, the results of not making a fight to defend the Korean republic would have been even more disastrous, like the results of letting Hitler absorb the Rhineland, Austria and Czechoslovakia without a fight.

Problems are insoluble

Perhaps there is no solution any longer to these agonizing problems. Certainly the actual working of history today yields an increasing number of situations in which all the real alternatives (as against the theoretically possible ones) seem hopeless. The reason such historical problems are insoluble now is that there have been so many crimes, mistakes and failures since 1914, and each one making the solution of the next problem that much more difficult, that by now there are no uncorrupted, unshattered forces for good left with which to work. A decent social order in Europe after

the first world war, for instance, would have made Hitler's rise impossible; even after he took power, a Loyalist victory in the Spanish Civil War or some radical reforms in France by Leon Blum's "Front Populaire" would have made his position very difficult. But none of these things happened, and when the Reichwehr marched into Poland, what solution was possible? Some of us felt it was our duty as socialists to "oppose the war," i.e., to refuse to fight the Nazis under the flags of existing governments; we also had illusions about the historical possibility of a "third camp" of the common people arising and making it possible to fight the Nazis with clean hands, so to speak. But this alternative, it is now clear, existed only on the ethical and ideological plane; it had no existence on the historical level. The only historically real alternatives in 1939 were to back Hitler's armies, to back the Allied armies, or to do nothing. But none of these alternatives promised any great benefit for mankind, and the one that finally triumphed has led simply to the replacing of the Nazi threat by the Communist threat, with the whole ghastly newsreel flickering through once more in a second showing.

This is one reason I am less interested in politics than I used to be.

DWIGHT MACDONALD

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THE EDITORS

Protestantism Minus the Left

The Effect of Neo-Orthodoxy Upon Radical Dissent

AMERICAN Protestantism has traditionally contained a significant dimension of radical dissent. Along with the conservative, the bourgeois—the almost puritan—currents of American Protestant thought, there has always been a strong tendency that was radical, socially oriented, part of an historic tradition of opposition to entrenched authority. This culminated in the mass anti-war movement which swept the various student Christian groups in the Thirties. Yet this radical tendency seems to have disappeared, or at least diminished tremendously in recent years. Why?

The answer is, of course, a complex one not admitting of an explanation on the basis of a single cause. Yet, partly as symptom and partly as cause, a deep theological division within American Protestantism, and world Protestantism, supplies a striking starting point for analysis.

This theological division is between liberalism and neo-orthodoxy. It has been a crucial issue within the United States for years. And at the meeting of the World Council of Churches in Evanston this summer, it will reveal itself on an international scale. Yet, more important for analyzing the social dimension of American Protestantism, this division has an immediate consequence in the political orientation of American Protestants. It can at least partially explain the fate of the student Christian anti-war movement.

Within world Protestantism, theological liberalism has been strongest in the United States and England. Indeed, its premises are analogous to the secular liberalism which has been the main tradition of these countries.

Theological liberalism is strongly humanistic, with overtones of an unquestioning faith in semi-automatic progress. It tends to ignore or interpret the classic doctrines of Protestantism out of all Biblical and historical context. For the theological liberal the Bible becomes, more or less, a collection of moral homilies in which he sees Christ as a teacher, perhaps the greatest, but nevertheless as a teacher among other teachers. Within such an analysis, the doctrine of original sin is especially repugnant, and the emphasis is on an optimistic view of man.

This theological position was at its height in the twenties and thirties, and its connections with other areas of thought were quite firmly established at that time. The liberalism in theology led to a kind of liberalism in politics. It lent itself to a perfectionism, to an under-estimation of the complexities of any social-political position in the modern world. It also sometimes went hand in hand with a certain kind of self-righteousness. Thus, some pacifist conscientious objectors within this tradition felt that they had freed themselves from all guilt and responsibility for war by the simple act of refusing to serve in the army.

An immediate consequence of this attitude was an over-simplification of social reality and a fairly naive scheme-work of social analysis. Within the pacifist movement, for instance, liberal theology saw the problem of war as one of converting a few more individuals to a conscientious objector position. The complex causation of modern conflict was solved by an individualistic, good versus the bad, description, and the political problem was reduced to a question of individual wills.

In many cases, these people moved toward socialism, which resulted in the substitution of socialism for religion. On an explicit level, the theological liberal would, of course, deny such an equation. But implicitly, religion and socialism were treated as being at least synonymous, which was usually neither good religion nor good socialism. Vague and naive, this position was often victimized by the Stalinists in the twenties and thirties, and in the late forties it led the theological liberal into the Norman Thomas wing of the Socialist Party and toward an uncritical endorsement of the western bloc in the cold war.

The Rise of Neo-Orthodoxy

But during the thirties a new theological current (or rather, as its name implies, a new discovery of traditional doctrines) was in the ascendancy. This was neo-orthodoxy. In the United States it is most closely associated with Reinhold Niebuhr at Union Seminary in New York.

Perhaps the most striking theological difference between liberalism and neo-orthodoxy is in the attitude toward the doctrine of original sin. In opposition to liberalism's perfectionism, neo-orthodoxy emphasizes the category of original sin and all which it implies with regard to a limitation on man's freedom and evil in the world.

In its zeal to correct liberalism's overemphasis on man's inherent goodness, neo-orthodoxy has sometimes seemed to be obsessed with the doctrine of original sin to the point of paralyzing men from any action at all in the light of their inherent evil natures—although this has certainly not been the intention of its American advocates. To neo-orthodoxy, the Bible is more than a great book of ethical insights to be placed along with other great books. It is, rather, a unique and indispensable authority, though not necessarily an absolute authority.

This is not, of course, a return to a simple Biblical literalism—to American Fundamentalism—but it is a drastically different emphasis from that of theological liberalism. In the same way, the neo-orthodox attitude toward Christ is in marked contrast to that of the liberal. For neo-orthodoxy, the accent is on the historical doctrine that Jesus Christ was man and also God in human form. As a result, a renewed concern with trinitarian doctrine emerges. Certainly these theological positions had been affected by the developments of scholarship within the last hundred years and were not an insistence on the exact verbiage of historical doctrine. Yet they served to mark off a significant difference between the liberal and the neo-orthodox in the field of theology.

This division continues in the area of social orientation. For twenty years, Niebuhr has, for example, been anti-pacifist. There is a direct relation between this attitude and his theological premises: a rejection in the social order of the liberal perfectionism which he had already decisively rejected in the theological order. Politically, the neo-orthodox position as interpreted by Niebuhr, lends itself to reform rather than to revolution, to an acceptance of the conditions within the world rather than to radical dissent.

Yet, it must be made clear that this has not been the **only** social interpretation of neo-orthodoxy. In Europe, Karl Barth has been the leading theologian of this movement for years. Currently, he advocates a kind of neutralist position, almost amounting to "a plague on both your houses." For within his interpretation of the social consequence of neo-orthodoxy, the distance between an omnipotent God and a sinful man is so great that action is paralyzed.

But even though Niebuhr's interpretation does not follow necessarily from his theological premises, the American liberal movement has been unable to cope with his arguments. Optimistic, naive in many of his social beliefs, tending toward the self-righteous in others, the American liberal has been losing the decisive intellectual battle with Niebuhr's point of view, and only a few within the neo-orthodoxy have risen to challenge the social implications which Niebuhr draws from it.

It is obvious that neo-orthodoxy did not develop in a vacuum, but rather within a world context of global conflict, concentration camps and genocide which were in plain contradiction to the liberal view of man. Therefore, we cannot speak of neo-orthodoxy as the cause of the decline in Christian radicalism. Yet this division, between the theological liberal and the neo-orthodox, and the intellectual victories of the latter, is probably one of the most striking symptoms of what has happened to the tradition of Protestant dissent.

Effect upon Anti-War Movement

One area where this change in Protestant attitudes, theological and social, has been most visible is that of the student Christian anti-war movement.

In the Thirties, thousands of American Protestant students signed the famous Oxford Pledge and participated in the anti-war movement. Even during World War II there were as many men with Methodist affiliation in Civilian Public Service (the politely named forced labor camps for objectors in the last war) as there were from an historic peace church like that of the Quakers. In fact, the Methodist student movement was one of the strongholds of anti-war sentiment.

In the post-war years, this pattern has changed markedly, in line with the theological division which has already been described. A striking example of this change is the metamorphosis of the magazine, "MOTIVE," official organ of the Methodist student movement. Once virtually a pacifist publication, one could hardly call this magazine anti-war, let alone pacifist, today. As part of the same process, there is the failure of the student Christian groups to produce any sizable number of conscientious objectors in the recent period.

One of the major reasons for this change is obvious in our analysis of the split between theological liberalism and neo-orthodoxy. With the invasion of American Protestant thought by neo-orthodoxy, pacifism was caught without theological defenses, or rather, was caught identified with theological liberalism. In the swing toward neo-orthodoxy, pacifists found that they

no longer spoke a theological language which was vital and challenging. Above all, the pacifist movement, the radical Protestant movement, was unable to combat the intellectual and personal influence of so vigorous an anti-pacifist as Reinhold Niebuhr.

In this regard, the personal stature of Niebuhr cannot be under-estimated. With the development of a specialized student ministry in many Protestant denominations, a great number of the young ministers came out of Union Seminary in New York, where Reinhold Niebuhr holds forth, and from Yale Divinity School where his brother Richard teaches. Most of these young ministers accepted the neo-orthodox position and, for the most part, the current social-ethical applications which seemed to go along with it. These largely anti-pacifist applications of Niebuhr have thus been passed along to several generations of student Christians, with considerable force and persuasion.

But again, it must be emphasized that neo-orthodoxy and its **American** social interpretation did not arise in a vacuum. There are obviously the influences of the cold war psychology and of fear within the Protestant churches as within every area of American society and Protestant pacifism, wedded as it was to theological liberalism, spoke an optimistic language which was unable to cope with the development of either politics or theology.

Need for a New Approach

This all leads to the question of the path by which the tradition of dissent may be reawakened within Protestantism.

Even throughout the period which we have been discussing, there were always Protestant theologians who have understood and appreciated the neo-orthodox critique of liberalism, but who have not abandoned their radical social approach because of it. Unfortunately, they have not applied themselves to the problem of relating their theological position and their social position, their pacifism for instance.

Recently, however, there has been some stirring of thought which has produced several books in this particular field. The best is probably, "The Christian Response to Atomic Crisis" by Edward L. Long. Long, incidentally, spent three years as Niebuhr's graduate assistant at Union Seminary without retreating from his pacifist position. In the area of relating a basically

neo-orthodox theological statement of Christian faith to an adequate set of tools of social analysis, "The Christian Significance of Karl Marx" by Alexander Miller is the best available statement. Miller displays an extremely acute grasp of Marxian socialism with all of its revolutionary implications, yet he states his Christian faith clearly and never loses sight of it.

Any resurgence of radicalism in Protestant student activity will probably have a different theological basis than it did in the Thirties. In doing so, it may well avoid some of the pitfalls of that movement. If it is not grounded in an over-optimistic and perhaps even self-righteous theology, Protestant pacifism can face the reality of the world and can talk a challenging language within its Church.

Moreover, such a development would **not** be a substitution of anti-war socialism for religion. Socialism is not religion, and religion (especially theological liberalism) has demonstrated that religion is not social analysis. If a Protestant anti-war movement arises, it will thus **not** be on the basis of subordinating faith to political and social analysis, but of an interaction of the two which preserves to each its proper sphere.

The destruction of the student Christian anti-war movement is a tragic consequence of the garrison state and the war economy as these realities have reflected themselves in the theological shift from liberalism to neo-orthodoxy. Yet the naive pacifism of the Thirties itself failed the test of reality. One of the chief reasons for this was that it lacked any clear socialist analysis of war and the causes of war.

If there is a resurgence of Protestant pacifism it will probably be on the basis of a different theological attitude and it must be based on a more intelligent social analysis. If it comes, it will not come to substitute socialism for religion but to allow them to work fruitfully together, each making its own contribution.

Niebuhr's support of the American side in a third world war is, from both points of view, socialist and religious, open to vigorous criticism.

It is to be hoped that a Protestant movement will arise which can make this criticism, thus restoring the tradition of religious and social dissent to its rightful place within the Church.

WILLIAM SHIRLEY

(William Shirley is a student at the Yale Divinity School.)

Augie, With Love

The Adventures of Augie March, by Saul Bellow. Viking.

You just can't resist Augie. He is an affirmation of the human spirit, risen amidst all of the morbid inner probings, themes of alienation, prognoses of doom, which pervade contemporary literature.

The hope which shines out in Augie March is not one created out of a naive optimism, but rather has its huge force largely in its struggle with adversity — both in terms of Existence and of the tremendous problems of existence in the contemporary world. (Both the reciprocal bone-picking of Bellow's last novel, "The Victim", and the paralyzing milieu of his "Dangling Man" exist in "The Adventures of Augie March", as definite parts in that compound which is Augie's experience.)

Experience means for Augie something of what it meant for Stephan Dedalus in the famous last lines of "Portrait of the Artist."

And so I go forth for the millionth time to encounter the reality of experience, and to forge within the smithy of my soul the uncreated conscience of my race.

It is this which Delmore Schwartz seemed to minimize in a recent interpretation of the theme of the book in *Partisan Review*. Schwartz wraps the book up into:

Thus by hoping for the best and being prepared for the worst, Augie proves that there is an America, a country in which anything might happen, wonderful or awful, but a guy has a fighting chance to be himself, find out things for himself, and find out what's what.

The setting is America, yes. And Schwartz's generalizations do reflect some of the meaning of the book. But this novel, which opens and closes with, and is in this sense literally bounded by, reference to America, is in an extremely important way free of the America qua America limits with which Schwartz insists on burdening it. For Bellow is speaking, too, in at once a more personal and a more universal sense.

The opening line, "I am an American, Chicago born—Chicago, that somber city"—serves, as the entire first part of the book does, to set Augie specifically in time and space, to give him roots, to explain that in his personality which is environmental.

America also closes the book. But what a difference in the use to which the word is put! After all of the big adventures, Augie, in Europe, is generalizing upon his experience:

Why, I am a sort of Columbus of those near-at-hand and believe you can come to them in their immediate "terra incognita" that spreads out in every gaze. I may well be a flop at this line of endeavor. Columbus too thought he was a flop, probably, when they sent him back in chains. Which didn't prove there was no America.

Evocation of Quest

The words "Columbus" and "America" have their fullest meaning here in their mythic sense—in their evocation of the quest and the hope. America here is symbol, in a sense relating to the actual place, but in a more important one transcending physical reality—for the Augie who embarks upon the Adventures as American, Chicagoan, lower middle class, part-intellectual, Jew, also embarks as Odysseus.

Like his distinguished predecessor on the twenty year jaunt, Augie is submitted to Life, capital L and full blast. He

comes to the experiences with the complexity, the contradictions, which are his by nature and conditioning. He brings with him the classic Yiddish matriarchal demand that he must "make something of himself", and it is with the blood that he inherits mama's weakness for giving her love (and never-seen papa's capacity for taking and leaving it without a backward look); he is also part feeble-minded Georgie, with best intentions and poorest judgment. And there was the short time at the University of Chicago.

The adventures have little pattern, repeat themselves, run the gamut, exist in abundance. And Augie is a microcosm containing it all. Not that he is an undifferentiated mass—indeed he is centrally propelled by two forces: by his human spirit—he is above all and in all senses a lover; and by the quest for a fate good enough for him. A Fate good enough for him. Which places that warm-hearted guy from Chicago at the core of the famous difficulty of Western man. He is involved in the whole concept of individualism, in the idea of the necessity for utmost fulfillment in our own personal lives.

He is at once, with more heart than judgment, giving freely of himself, and yet, in the very nature of the commitment to finding "a fate good enough", vitally involved in this most egoistic concept of all. The one can be nourished only though openness to all of life, the other involves a choice, that selection viewed by Augie as bondage.

There are many neat fates presented on the way. Augie is assailed by seducers: the intellectuals, the radicals, the petty schemers, the social climbers, the bourgeoisie. And he responds to each, for they are aspects of life, and Augie is a lover. But none provides for all that is Augie, and always it would mean capitulating to the closing-in process of other people's solutions to the chaos. And so he goes on.

It is clear that Augie's brushing the shores of Ithaca is something less than the triumphant repossession. Augie considers having knocked around as the steep admission price to the "happy, peaceful life." But having paid the admission, he finds himself in Paris, making a living at a marginal occupation, waiting for the wife who refuses him the most important things he asks of her. It is in no sense the "fate good enough for him."

Still, when challenged by the question, "How are things working out?" the answer from the lover is simple and immediate: "I love her." But the adventurer is not at peace with his commitment:

"... I'm in the bondage of strangeness for a time still. It's only temporary. We'll get out of it."

The Sense of Being

So this is what it comes to: Augie states it as a synthesis. "A man's character is his fate," he says. Which is at once a necessary rationale for the form of his existence, and a sad acknowledgment of ultimate responsibility. But it is above all the expression of that central thing in Augie March, the sense of being. It is why he never 'learned' anything, why through depression, labor struggle, the Great Ideas, World War II, he remained Augie. We saw him operate by this all along the road. Augie himself becomes consciously aware of it only after constant repetition of experience. But by the end he can answer Hooker's greeting in Paris: "... what a surprise to run across you, Augie, in the City of Man!" with

For a minute I felt rather insulted that he should laugh when he asked me what I was doing here. It might be incongruous, but if it was for Man, why shouldn't it be for me too?"

Continued on Page 22

Berlioz Revisited

DECEMBER 11, 1953, marked the 150th anniversary of the birth of France's great composer, Hector Berlioz; it seems about time to take stock of the standing, among modern listeners, of the music of the Great Romantic.

Berlioz' artistic career was a stormy one, its every success acquired only through great tribulations, and the fortunes of his music after his death have been no smoother. On the contrary, Berlioz' musical legacy has given rise to the most violent controversies. There have been those who, like George Bernard Shaw, Mahler, Busoni, Romain Rolland, Albert Schweitzer, and others rank Berlioz among the greatest composers who ever lived. There have also been some critics who considered his music virtually that of a madman, and few intermediary viewpoints have lacked spokesmen.

Yet, amid all this sound and fury, one fact has remained clear, at least in the United States: the music loving public has known Berlioz exclusively through that small and unrepresentative segment of his total musical output which enjoys a solid place in the "standard repertoire." The average concert-going audience, thoroughly familiar with the *Symphonie Fantastique*, the *Roman Carnival* overture, and the *Racy March*, has been exposed rather less frequently to the second symphony (*Harold in Italy*), instrumental excerpts from the third symphony (*Romeo and Juliet*) and some of the overtures. His greatest music, *The Requiem*, the *Damnation of Faust*, the bulk of the dramatic symphony *Romeo and Juliet*, and the opera *The Trojans*, as well as such other masterpieces as the *Te Deum*, the *Funeral and Triumphal Symphonie*, *Lelio*, the sequel to the *Symphonie Fantastique*, the oratorio *L'Enfance du Christ* and the operas *Benvenuto Cellini* and *Beatrice and Benedict* remained dead to the mass musical audience, except for occasional and widely scattered revivals.

Why was this the case? An obvious answer would be that they are simply not good enough to maintain popular favor. But this superficially plausible explanation cannot be reconciled with the high esteem these compositions enjoy among musicians, and their many successes in European countries; nor does it correspond with the fact that most audiences have had no chance to judge these works for themselves. The real reason for their failure in the past lies in a combination of several circumstances:

1. The difficulty of assembling the choral forces required for many of Berlioz' works, especially in a country devoid of any real choral tradition, like the U.S., and the persistence of

Continued from Page 21

When we look at it all and see that he has accepted the closing-in of a commitment, that he is leading a disappointed life, that he has gained nothing, learned nothing after the quest, then what is the meaning of this self that he is affirming anyhow? The last scene takes place on a raw day, with Augie driving along the beach toward Dunkerque. This trip reflects the other longer one. He describes the sea:

"The back of the ancient water was like wolf gray. Then on the long sand the waves eroded white; they spit themselves to pieces. I saw this specter of white anger coming from the savage gray and meanwhile shot northward, in a great hurry to get to Bruges and out of this line of white which was like eternity opening up right beside destructions of the modern world, hoary and grumbling."

And the answer lies in his character:

"I thought if I could beat the dark to Bruges I'd see the green canals and ancient palaces."

Which is why we love Augie.

MARGARET LEVI

the legend that Berlioz could write only for huge forces and aim for bizarre effects.

2. The fact that all the music of Berlioz exhibits a degree of subtlety and complexity which requires real effort in order to be understood both by the performers and by the audience.

3. The unfamiliarity of the melodic idiom, whose unusual length and finesse can lead the superficial listener to conclude that there is no melody (whereas Berlioz is, in fact, one of the most melodically gifted of all composers).

We had here of course a vicious circle, since the only way in which these conditions could be overcome was by repeated listening to the music itself (the only process by which the mass audience can learn unfamiliar music), but while these conditions persisted, such repeated hearings were impossible.

The solution to this dilemma lay in the phonograph record, whereby a single performance can be repeated as often as desired. It is no accident that, precisely at the time when electrical recordings were introduced, the proportionate share of Berlioz' music in the programs of American symphony orchestras began to increase, and its curve has ascended steadily right up to the present time; Berlioz is now the seventh most performed composer.

This steady change, nevertheless, remained one of degree, for it was largely the "standard" Berlioz repertoire that was recorded, and the percentage increase came mostly from more frequent and more widespread performance of the "standard" works.

It was in the years 1948 and 1949 that two events transpired which are destined to restore Berlioz to his rightful place among the greatest composers, and which have already, in fact, substantially achieved this. They were the introduction of long playing records in 1948 and the publication of Jacques Barzun's *Berlioz and the Romantic Century* in 1949.

The Barzun book illuminates the work of Berlioz as a theorist, critic, conductor as well as composer and is a virtual prerequisite to a serious knowledge of the music of the romantics.

Even more important has been the effect of the Long Playing Record. At last the great works whose performance is too expensive for the limited budget of the average symphony orchestra, as well as those compositions which stay unperformed for lack of a sure-fire audience, now become available in the home of the average music lover at a very moderate cost. The unperformed and infrequently performed masters, Palestrina, Monteverdi, Vivaldi, Gluck, Bruckner, Faure, Mahler, can now be heard on records and at last receive the respect and love which is their due. The benefits to Berlioz have been no less.

And here the vicious circle reverses itself and becomes benign, greater familiarity leading to more frequent performances. For example:

1. Columbia's recording of *Harold in Italy* was the best selling classical recording of 1952. This fall, within little more than a month, two great orchestras, one conducted by Mitropoulos, the other by Toscanini, performed the symphony on nation-wide radio broadcasts.

2. The Little Orchestra Society of New York stimulated such enthusiasm with its performances of *L'Enfance du Christ* that it has become an annual Christmastime event.

3. The Boston Symphony Orchestra, in February of this year, performed the complete *Romeo and Juliet* symphony at a regular concert, and repeated it in August, at Tanglewood,

before an audience of over 10,000. In September its complete recording of the work was issued.

Expanded Record Repertoire

It is thus plain that the long-playing record had, to a significant degree, fulfilled its task of familiarizing music lovers with Berlioz' masterpieces. Yet, in evaluating the degree of this accomplishment, it should be noted first of all that major lacunae still remain. Neither the *Te Deum*, nor the operas *Benvenuto Cellini*, *Beatrice and Benedict*, and part one of *The Trojans (The Fall of Troy)* have been recorded. Nor has a great portion of the miscellaneous vocal and orchestral compositions. But compared to five years ago, the recorded repertoire has been greatly expanded. Today, all the symphonies, *L'Enfance du Christ*, the *Requiem*, the *Damnation of Faust*, and *The Trojans at Carthage* (Part II of *Les Troyens*) are available.

Secondly, in order to have their full effect, these records must not only be available, they must be listened to, and radio broadcasts of the records scarcely suffice. Especially for students, unable to expend large sums on record libraries, the problem of which recording to select is a very thorny one. The readers of *ANVIL* will, I hope, be helped in solving it by the ensuing critical discussion of the Berlioz discography.

I have discussed only those recordings which contribute substantial musical values. Those which are unsatisfactory for reasons of inadequate performance, poor recording technique, or incompleteness, have been skipped over. The prices stated are the manufacturers' list prices. However, almost all purchasers of records should be able to secure discounts of at least thirty percent from any major New York dealer. (I am unaware of the price situation in other cities, but these discounts generally apply to mail orders also.)

An Introduction to Berlioz

We will begin by considering two pieces which, while not the composer's very greatest works, are a perfect introduction to Berlioz for the listener who knows him only through the *Symphonie Fantastique*, or who is under the influence of the legend according to which Berlioz always requires huge masses of performers, and is at home only in the monumental or fantastic. In the song cycle *Nuits d'Ete* and the *Sacred Trilogy*, *L'Enfance du Christ* nothing of the sort is to be found. Here, there is only tenderness, melody, balance.

Nuits d'Ete (summer nights), written in 1834, is a setting with orchestral accompaniment of six poems by Theophile Gautier. All deal with aspects of love, their emotional gamut ranging from the simple rustic joy of *Villanelle* to the passionate despair of *Au Cimetiere*, in my opinion, the best song of the six. It is to these songs primarily that Alfred Einstein refers when he says that, "With his lyrical 'minor miscellaneous works' Berlioz sowed the seeds for the entire musical lyricism of the nineteenth century in the French language—in its color, noble sentimentality, and refined sensuousness and grace."

They are sung with great sensitivity by Suzanne Danco, accompanied by the Cincinnati Symphony, (London LL 407, \$5.95). The recording is generally good, although the orchestral background is not reproduced with the full clarity that one has come to expect from London.

L'Enfance du Christ is an oratorio in three sections, *Herod's Dream*, *The Flight into Egypt*, and *Arrival at Sais*. In the first part, a nocturnal march, Herod's song *O Misere des Bois* and an invocation of the dervishes create, by their ingenious rhythms, harmony, and tone color, an atmosphere of mystery and terror in which the *Massacre of the Innocents* is made psychologically realistic.

The second part contains the loveliest music of the entire work, the narrative of the *Holy Family's Rest*, based on a 45

bar continuous melody sung by the narrator. This selection was Brahms' favorite among Berlioz' works.

The oratorio concludes with the arrival of the Holy Family in Egypt, where after their appeals are rejected by the rich and powerful they are received by a humble Ishmaelite carpenter, the music expressing their naive joy and pious thanksgiving.

The recording by Andre Cluytens, the Paris Orchestra, and soloists, (Vox PL 7120, \$11.90), is uniformly excellent. Unfortunately, neither French text nor English translation is provided either with this recording, or with that of the *Nuits d'Ete*.

These pieces provide a perfect introduction to Berlioz' four greatest works: the *Requiem*, the dramatic symphony *Romeo et Juliette*, the dramatic legend *La Damnation de Faust*, and the epic music drama *Les Troyens*. These works contain the quintessence of his art, and are his highest achievements.

Berlioz' Highest Achievements

1. *The Requiem*, like the later *Funeral and Triumphal Symphony*, was written to honor the dead of the revolution of 1830. Many have heard of the Tuba Mirum of this work, which requires four brass choirs placed around the hall. This musical vision of the day of judgment is one of the most moving and powerful moments in all music, but it is itself only a carefully integrated portion of Berlioz' overall scheme. It is a climax that has been prepared with minute care from the very beginning of the work, and which does not fall into the trap of overbalancing it.

The Requiem can be characterized as a vast architectural conception carried out in the finest and most delicate manner possible. The "Dies Irae" and portions of the "Rex Tremendae" and "Lacrymosa" represent the monumental aspects of the work. The other seven portions are in a mood of restrained but passionate devotion. Especially beautiful are the a capella chorus "Quarens Me," the hushed, prayerful "Offertory," the "Sanctus" with tenor solo, a breathtaking example of sheer melodic beauty, and the coda of the "Agnus Dei" which uses sixteen kettledrums to achieve a decrescendo from piano to pianissimo, a good example of huge forces used to create an exquisitely intimate effect.

The recording (Columbia SL 159, \$12.90), while not up to present day technical standards, is considerably better than that of the *Damnation of Faust* (see below). Jean Fournet conducts the Passani Chorus and Orchestra in a competent performance. Georges Jouatte, tenor, is magnificent in the

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DISSENT

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"Sanctus". I have never heard a bigger, more beautifully controlled, tenor voice. The album includes the Latin text and an excellent poetic English translation.

A Dramatic Symphony

2. **Romeo and Juliet.** In 1838 Berlioz' first opera, **Benvenuto Cellini** was produced in Paris, but was a failure with the audience. A short time thereafter, however, Paganini, who had attended the premiere of **Benvenuto**, saluted Berlioz in public as the successor to Beethoven, and presented him with a gift of 20,000 francs. This present guaranteed him the free time necessary for the composition of his Third symphony, **Romeo et Juliette**. Written for chorus, soloists, and orchestra, this work represents the culmination of a striving for union of the symphonic form with a dramatic content, already evident in Beethoven's Ninth and Berlioz' own first two symphonies. The form of the symphony is at the same time simple, rigorously logical, and ingenious. It is this: a perfectly recognizable instrumental symphony of five movements—Adagio-Allegro, Andante, Scherzo, Funeral March, and Finale (the sung portions at the beginning of the love scene and during the funeral march are virtually vocalization), preceded by a Prologue and followed by an Epilogue.

The whole work is closely unified by the fact that the main themes are all first stated in the Prologue, which thus serves as a "thematic catalogue" to the rest of the work, as well as an introduction and statement of the dramatic content. (**Das Rheingold**, in Wagner's "Ring" cycle, serves an identical purpose.) The dramatic action is expressed through the instrumental portions, and the Epilogue presents a resolution and apotheosis of the drama.

The impact of the uncut performance of this symphony is overwhelming. The poignancy of the "Tristesse" followed by the brilliant "Grand Fete chez Capulet", the ecstasy of the "Scene d'Amour" and the indescribable magic of the "Queen Mab Scherzo" are quite well known through concerts and records, but when heard in their true context their effect is enormously increased. And what a treasure of melodic beauty is revealed to the listener in the songs for tenor and contralto of the Prologue, the funeral procession of Juliet, the tomb scene with its eerie invocation and heart wrenching denouement, based on distorted fragments of the Love theme, and the superb song of Friar Laurence in the Epilogue, subduing the blood-anger of the rival clans and uniting them at last in peace and friendship.

This symphony, in my opinion second only to Beethoven's Ninth, stands above all other Nineteenth Century symphonies. Its fertility has been enormous; a great number of composers, from Wagner on, have borrowed from its music and have been inspired by its structure.

The recording (RCA Victor, LM 6011, \$11.42) by Charles Munch and the Boston Symphony Orchestra is superb in every way. A great orchestra, first rate singers and chorus, the ultimate in modern recording techniques, and an inspired performance make it an indispensable component of any serious record collection.

The Faust Legend

3. **The Damnation of Faust.** American audiences have known only a few orchestral excerpts from this "Dramatic Legend". Taken out of context, they supply no idea at all of the original work. What the American concert audience misses is a highly original and powerful dramatic work which is, at the same time, both "A bunch of the loveliest tunes in existence" and a profound philosophical statement. It is one of the most concise works ever written, and there is far too much in its two hours to permit more than the enumeration of what are to me its high points: The scene in Faust's study and the Easter chorus at the beginning of part II, Mephistopholes' serenade and the chorus of sylphs in the "Elbe Scene", the chorus of students and soldiers at the close of part II, Mephistopholes' sardonic serenade "Devant la Maison" sung to an "orchestral guitar" the like of which no other composer

could ever fashion, Marguerite's song "D'Amour L'ardente Flamme", and Faust's great aria, "Nature Immense". This work, like all of Berlioz' music, grows on the listener with repeated hearings; there is always some new beauty of harmony, counterpoint or rhythm to be discovered.

The recording (Columbia SL 110, \$18.85) is, unfortunately, cut in four places, two of them important; the concluding trio of part III and the "Pandaemonium" chorus at the close of the work are almost entirely excised. The other two cuts are minor. The singers, Laurena (Marguerite), Cabanel (Mephistopholes), and Jouatte (Faust), are never less than very good, and Jouatte is as superb as he was in the **Requiem**. The conducting, however, is undistinguished, and the recording sounds dull and unresonant. All in all, a new recording, if possible utilizing the same vocalists, is needed. Meanwhile, the present recording is still serviceable as an introduction to the music.

The three records of instrumental excerpts (conducted by Van Beinum, Mengleberg, and Sabastian) all have their virtues. The choice should be based on individual preference with regard to the music on the reverse side of the record.

4. What the foregoing three pieces are in their respective fields, **Les Troyens** is in the field of opera. "It is monumental", says Barzun, "in being the longest of Berlioz' dramatic works, the most varied and grandiose in subject matter, as well as the model of the epic style in music drama."

The Epic Style in Music Drama

The story is taken from books two and four of Virgil's **Aeneid**. The opera is in two parts (meant, however, to be both played at a single performance), **La Prise de Troie** and **Les Troyens a Carthage**. Only part II has been recorded at present.

Berlioz himself wrote the libretto; it is a delight to read in itself and a credit to the French language.

The action of **Les Troyens a Carthage** is of course based on Dido's ill-fated love for Aeneas, and the music penetrates the characters in a way that makes Purcell's beautiful little opera **Dido and Aeneas** look by comparison like an artificial trifle, although the comparison is, of course, unfair. This psychological insight is expanded and made concrete by Berlioz' grasp of the relationship between these leaders and their peoples, and by the fact that, for the first time in opera, a people itself is made a vital part of the drama. It is music of grandeur and of great dramatic intensity.

The recording (Westminster WAL 304, \$18.50) is generally excellent. Scherchen, a great conductor, leads the Paris Conservatory Orchestra. The singing ranges from merely competent to first rate. A French libretto with a fine English translation is supplied with the album. Before leaving this discussion of Berlioz' recordings let us turn briefly to two other major works.

1. **Symphonie Fantastique.** There are three fine recordings of this popular work on L.P., Van Beinum (London LL 489, \$5.95), Ormandy (Columbia 4467, \$5.95), and Monteux (Victor LM 1131, \$5.72). The Ormandy-Philadelphia Orchestra record is the finest from the point of view of sheer sound, but I find it a routine interpretation. Monteux contributes a finely moulded interpretation (too much so for some tastes), but the sound is dated. Van Beinum's, a vigorous performance, well recorded, seems to me to be the best of the three.

2. **Harold in Italy.** This symphony with viola solo has won real popularity, and deservedly so. It shows off Berlioz' brilliant orchestration, singing melody, and polyphonic clarity to good effect.

The Beecham-Primrose recording (Columbia ML 4542, \$5.95) is just about definitive, and while it may be equaled by future recordings from Toscanini of Scherchen, it is virtually certain not to be surpassed.

SHANE MAGE