

The American
Socialist


JULY 1957

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Gandhi and Socialism

That socialism in America has been dead these many years, no one would seriously question. Mr. Braverman's article in your June issue, "Did Gandhi Have the Answer," demonstrated, as clearly as a single piece could, the causes of its death as well as the unlikelihood of its resurrection. A lack of political imagination, a doctrinaire outlook, and a prejudiced selection of facts to fit the dogma are as characteristic of Mr. Braverman's essay as they have been of American socialism since the Debs era.

Yet Mr. Braverman's views of Gandhi and his movement are not shared by more informed, thoughtful socialist opinion. For example, George Bernard Shaw wrote: "Though Gandhi may commit any number of tactical errors, his essential strategy continues to be right." And the socialist, Dr. Albert Einstein, said: "I believe Gandhi's views were the most enlightened of all the political men in our time. We should strive to do things in his spirit. . ."

I. J. S. Palo Alto, Calif.

The June issue has been well received at the college here; in particular the article on Gandhi, which has started a few campus pacifists re-thinking. It is a fine piece of Marxist analysis.

A Student Ohio

Right to Face Accusers

President Eisenhower has stated repeatedly that the accused in all security cases has a fundamental right to face his accusers. If there is anything on which lawyers would agree it would be on this same fundamental and basic right.

But what happened at the recent Doctor Robert Greenberg Security Hearing in Detroit? At the beginning of the hearing, Lt. Col. McElroy, legal advisor, provided by the Army to the Hearing Board, stated that he had made a formal request on the Army to produce the accusers of Dr. Greenberg, but that the request had been refused.

In other words, the Army, headed by Attorney Wilbur Brucker, had arbitrarily turned down this very vital and proper request made by its own attorney and a high ranking officer. And because of this denial, we were at an enormous disadvantage in making our defense.

This is just one more reason why the widest publicity is essential in these cases so that the public will know just how stacked and un-American this whole disgraceful business actually is.

Charles C. Lockwood
Attorney-at-law, Detroit

Democracy is a wonderful thing. Main thing wrong is that a worker doesn't get enough of it.

Once every four years he votes. He's a free man on weekends, holidays and vacations.

But day in, day out, he spends eight to ten long hours under the iron heel of the world's worst bureaucrat—his boss.

For the vast majority of his waking hours—those he spends in the plant—he is dependent on the whims of a ruler he never elected and cannot replace; he lives by laws he had no voice in making and cannot change.

When he's too tired for much other than beer or television, he returns home to the world of democracy and sleep.

Wherefore does the boss have a divine right to rule over the shop, any more than George III had to reign in politics?

Socialism means, among other things, the extension of democracy—rule by the people—into the shop, into the majority of the worker's waking hours.

Metal Worker Chicago

Cause of Bureaucracy

I enjoyed immensely your expertly written article on Weber, Pareto, and others [February 1957], whose ideas were of tremendous significance to many of us as young students of socialist theory at the University of Chicago graduate school. Some of us came to the conclusion that Trotsky's theory of the cause of bureaucracy was entirely oversimplified. . . . If America were to have socialism, lots of party officials and other people would like

to have country estates, and it is obvious that every one of America's 160 million persons are not going to get that wish. Thus the question of the distribution of goods poses just as important a problem in America today as it did in the Soviet Union in 1917, or today.

H. W. Boston

I have been searching for a good, literate magazine espousing socialist views. I believe I have found that publication in the *American Socialist*. Please enter my subscription.

M. A. C. New York

Can't Buy Back Goods

Capitalism hasn't got a leg to stand on, yet none of the so-called socialist papers ever get down to brass tacks and explain how impossible it is for this country to carry on under the interest and profit system.

I learned long ago that all that honestly exists in the hands of the people to purchase the goods and services on the market is exactly what was paid for producing and distributing those things on the market, so if the people buy all the things they produce they have got to pay out more than they earn; in doing so they go broke and/or go in debt. If they didn't the corporations wouldn't make one cent.

It's just as simple as that and I can't understand why the socialists' papers don't make it that clear.

O. B. B. Illinois

Your recent issues have been so thought-provoking and so comprehensive of the major domestic and international issues, that I was compelled to revise my original intention not to renew—a decision originally reached because of lack of time (also money) rather than any reflection on your publication. Keep up your good work.

A. B. Massachusetts

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America Gets The Fall-Out Jitters

IN mid-May, the American correspondent of the conservative London *Economist* cabled his periodical:

To a scientist, a "critical mass" is that minimum amount of fissionable material which must be assembled before nuclear energy can be released. And just as the nuclear physicist can detect, in advance, that the critical assembly point is being approached, so political observers are now aware that a nuclear explosion is in the making in their field also. As a result of a Congressional investigation of atomic fall-out scheduled to begin on May 27 and the publication, this week, of a lengthy article in The Reporter magazine, analyzing and criticizing the Atomic Energy Commission's program for testing nuclear weapons in the continental United States, the controversy in America over such tests may soon reach a critical assembly point and set off a chain reaction.

Discounting the element of journalistic exaggeration which even staid British correspondents cannot entirely shun, this remains a really sensational report. If true, and there is much to indicate that it is true, it means that the long hypnosis of the cold war is at last coming to an end, and Americans are beginning to take the hitherto sacrosanct precincts of foreign policy and atomic weapons as legitimate areas for disagreements and controversy. Regardless of what the disputes may produce in their first stages, the development is one of surpassing importance. If American fears, American conscience, and American protests are now

to be added to the uproar that has engulfed the rest of the world for some years, then the first real chance of halting the drift towards annihilation is appearing on the horizon.

The growing outcry can hardly be traced to any cerebral re-examinations of the Dulles policy. Rather, it is the spread to America of a world-wide mass mood, what the *Economist* calls "a natural feeling of revulsion and fear in face of a dreadful prospect."



The ghastly criminality of Washington cold war policy is not yet appreciated here; one may assume without missing the mark by far that if Americans were given a way by which they could safely blow up Russia, many would readily agree to do it. But there's the rub: There is no safe way, and the trend of the arms race is towards suicide as well as destruction. Even more frightening, it is beginning to be

borne in upon us as a people that it may not even take a war to accomplish our suicide, or at least serious self-injury, if the present rate of nuclear testing continues.

MUCH of the turmoil is centered in the scientific community. A great debate is raging between the Atomic Energy Commission and many of the scientists employed by it on the one hand, and a large part of the nation's scientific personnel—perhaps the majority—on the other. The issue is the extent of the dangers inherent in present nuclear tests, and whether mankind ought voluntarily to subject itself to those dangers. When scientists disagree, that would seem to be a good time for laymen to be quiet. And yet, so much of the current debate turns on so-called "political and moral judgments," that it is clear this is no field of mysteries to be reserved only to initiates in the arcana of science.

The scientific differences are not so wide as appears from the headlines. The hearings of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy were summarized in these words by *Business Week*: "Behind the bickering over the degree and type of danger involved, virtually all of the scientists came to the hearings convinced that nuclear radiation now has reached dangerous levels." If this is the case, what is all the argumentation about? The uproar among the scientists arises from political rather than scientific disagreement, in the main.

The purge of physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer three years back was intended to establish the political monolithism of the AEC and all parts of the scientific community working with it. More than anything else, Oppenheimer was convicted of the "arrogance"—as it was called at the time—of having his own convictions on such subjects as the development of the H-bomb. Now Thomas E. Murray, industrial engineer and seven-year member of the AEC, has failed to get a re-appointment to the Commission, as a result of what the *N. Y. Times* calls his "reputation for frankness and independent judgment." (Mr. Murray's brand of arrogance goes beyond the H-bomb to—holy of holies—the private exploitation of atomic energy, concern-

Announcing the Formation of The American Socialist Clubs

THE "American Socialist" sponsored an important national conference on the weekend of June 1-2. It was held at the Chicago offices of the publication and attended by sixty of its active supporters, from all parts of the country, with the exception of West Coast backers, who couldn't conveniently attend. The conference, after reviewing the present situation of the American Left, resolved to set up an organization to be called "The American Socialist Clubs" which will consist of autonomous local bodies. The conference also elected a National Council of representatives from different parts of the country whose duty it will be to coordinate the work of the clubs. The Socialist Union of America, set up at the time of the founding of the "American Socialist," and which has not conducted independent activity in the recent period, voted to dissolve and participate in The American Socialist Clubs.

The conference adopted a statement of purpose which set as its objective "the education and organization of new socialist forces in order to prepare the way for the building of a new movement of democratic socialism in the United States. Since the new movement can have a solid foundation only with the clarification of the basic ideas of an American socialism that is viable in the present day and germane to the current scene, the American Socialist Clubs will devote itself to the organization of educational and related activities which will best help realize these objectives.

"The American Socialist Clubs will concentrate particularly on gaining the widest organizational, moral and financial support on behalf of the 'American Socialist,' as a prime force in educating a new generation of socialists and in perfecting firm foundations for a new socialist movement."

Some of the discussion that motivated the conference action can be summarized in this fashion:

It was the general feeling that the existing Left—split up into numbers of groups, sects, family circles, etc.—cannot and will not unite in the immediate period ahead as there is no appreciable moving together politically on the part of any significant groups, and no new pro-socialist forces have yet appeared on the scene that are exerting grass-roots pressure for a socialist unification. The liberal wing of the Communist Party missed its chance at that organization's recent convention to play a meaningful role

in a new start for socialism in this country. It has to be taken into consideration that this liberal wing—or what remains of it—clings to unity with the old-line crowd inside the Communist Party while much of the Communist movement has made a turn back to a modified version of Stalinism in the wake of the Hungarian events. The Social Democratic wing and its allies remain frozen in their mold of anti-Communism and pro-status quo adaptations. All of the groupings of the Left—singly or put together—have never been more isolated from the labor and liberal public. In a word, we are in the midst of the final disintegration of the old Left in this country. But the forces for the New Left still remain to be gathered, and its political basis still requires further elucidation and general agreement.

THESE circumstances dictate to all clear-thinking people on the Left to concentrate upon such activities as will facilitate the hammering out of the programmatic foundations of a new American socialism and the assembling of the pioneer forces which, when the time has matured, will be able to launch a new organization. A year ago, when it was necessary to break down the iron curtains between sections of the Left, there was virtue in simply calling for discussion of the various points of view. There has been a considerable confrontation of opinions in the interim, and by now it is out of date to limit oneself to the demand for discussion. It is up to everyone who has something to contribute to lay it on the line.

The conference participants felt that the "American Socialist" was a foremost contributor to sketching out the program and attitudes needed by a new American Left, but that it needed far more support than it has received in the past year, if it is to play the role that it should in re-orienting the movement. One of the purposes of the clubs therefore will be to invite new people to join up and participate in its educational efforts. If the response is sufficient, the "American Socialist" will undertake a more ambitious program of publication and activities in the coming years.

The conference voted to solicit membership and support. All inquiries concerning The American Socialist Clubs should be sent to the American Socialist, Room 306, 857 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y.

ing which he raised objections.) These are the two best-known highlights of a process by which the AEC and the personnel controlled by it have become, through selection and intimidation, an agency committed to a party line in science. The Oppenheimer and Murray cases made clear that scientists and administrators who work in or with the AEC have to believe—as a condition of employment, so to speak—that the dangers of developing and testing the H-bomb are less than the dangers of not doing so. The AEC and its supporters therefore approach the dispute with a built-in verdict as to what is the right "scientific answer."

DR. Willard F. Libby, the sole remaining scientist on the AEC, is undoubtedly a highly competent and authoritative scientific figure, as even the layman can sense from reading his

statements, and as his colleagues un-animously testify. He has been holding the line for the AEC like Horatio at the bridge, but a close examination of his reasoning shows what the real basis of it is. "I do not mean to say there is no risk at all," he says in the key paragraph of his reply to Dr. Albert Schweitzer's appeal against further bomb testing. "What I should like to demonstrate to you is that the risk is extremely small compared with other risks which persons everywhere take as a normal part of their lives. At the same time, I ask you to weigh this risk against what I believe would be a far greater risk—to freedom loving people everywhere in the world—of not maintaining our defenses against the totalitarian forces at large in the world. . . ."

One of Dr. Libby's favorite anecdotes is that we continue to ride in

automobiles at the risk of death or injury, and 40,000 deaths a year do occur. The risk must be balanced against the desired objective. From this type of reasoning, how short a step it is to the conclusion that nuclear testing, surely a worthier object than automobile joy-riding, is worth at least 40,000 deaths a year. The AEC is convinced, by Pentagon order, that nuclear armament, developed to the ultra, is the only way to avoid a war which we have just been told would kill more than 80 million Americans within a few days of its outbreak. Carrying that conviction to the ultimate, is it not easy to justify very large risks, even the certain death of quite large numbers of people through radioactive fall-out, even the twisting of our biological heritage out of all human recognition, to over-awe the Russians? The reasoning hasn't gone that far

yet in public, of course, but that is its essential structure.

Of course, the AEC is entitled to present any reasoning it desires, but it ought to be completely open and above board about it, both as to facts and logic. Unfortunately, here is where one of our biggest dilemmas comes in. Unlike Britain, we have no independent agency to keep check on radioactivity and health conditions. The AEC is charged with the task of developing weapons, and the AEC is also charged with the public health; two responsibilities that are not at all in harmony. And the AEC has repeatedly demonstrated that, in cases of a clash between its objectives, the weapons-development side has overwhelming priority. Moreover, having decided in favor of risk-taking, the AEC is less than forthright in presenting the real risks, as the public at large is likely to get a bit "hysterical" and come to opposite conclusions about the matter. The whole drive underlying AEC policy and public relations is therefore in the direction of duplicity and fact-shading.

A correspondent for *The Times* of London (as relayed back by Cyrus Sulzberger of the *N. Y. Times*) quotes a Twin Springs, Nevada, farmer as saying: "You can't help feeling uneasy when you look up and see one of those clouds. You don't know what the hell it is all about—and as for the AEC—I wouldn't believe them on a stack of Bibles." The widely read *Reporter* article of May 16 by Paul Jacobs had this sentiment as the burden of its many pages. Its importance was not so much in establishing anything new about fall-out, although it did report a number of sensational illnesses, deaths, and radiation exposures not previously publicized, but what it had to say about AEC behavior. Out in Nevada, where the AEC is in closest contact with the American public, it is looked upon as "an army of occupation," and is almost universally mistrusted on account of its record of concealment, doubletalk and irresponsibility.

DESPITE its broad powers, its use of government secrecy classifications to cover up public information, and the cooperation of much of the press, the AEC is losing the battle for

the nation's mind. The scientific community is breaking through with five-alarm danger signals, and much new information is being put before the country, information that is shattering the comforting bromides of yesterday. Some of it represents facts that should have been made available years ago, and some of it is new evidence gathered from the continued testing.

The AEC has long peddled the soothing theory that the fall-out of strontium 90, a radioactive component of blast debris which lodges in the bones and causes leukemia and cancer tumors, is negligible. What is now being made clear is that the fall-out of this virile poison may be negligible *on the world average*, but in its concentrations in various spots it is far from harmless, and may have reached limits of extreme danger.

In the first place, it does not fall out evenly throughout the world, as Dr. Libby had been assuring us. Dr. Lester Machta of the U.S. Weather Bureau told the Congressional hearings that prevailing winds and the drift of the stratospheric air northward are tending to concentrate the fallout in the Northern Hemisphere, and particularly between the north latitudes of 30 and 60 degrees, which embrace all of the United States. The American Midwest appears to be a prime re-

Half a Loaf is Better than None

AT Congressional hearings in Washington on atomic radiation, Dr. Ralph E. Lapp, physicist and author, urged "a stockpile of human sperm," presumably refrigerated in the manner commonly practiced with prize bulls. In the radioactive shambles following an all-out hydrogen-bomb war, female survivors would thus have a source of prewar un-irradiated sperm to replace that of her irradiated husband.

"This would mean many children would have the same father, and even grandfather," Lapp pointed out. "But it would cut the genetic consequences [of all-out war] more than in half, since the female is less sensitive to radiation than the male in terms of the sperm versus the ovum."

Lapp quickly admitted that his suggestion might seem bizarre, but, he said, these "are the kind of things you come up against when you consider the awesome consequences of nuclear warfare."

Newsweek June 17

ipient of the favors of both the American and Russian tests.

Then, strontium 90 is concentrated by biological mechanisms: grazing animals and sea life gather larger quantities into their meat, bones, and milk, whence it is transferred to humans. Further, all children are themselves concentrating mechanisms, as their need for calcium, for which strontium is a ready substitute, causes them to draw into their bones concentrations of strontium 90 at a rate three to four times as fast as that of adults. This is especially marked in low-calcium areas.

THUS when Dr. Libby explains that decades of testing will bring the amount of strontium 90 in the atmosphere to only 3 percent of the Maximum Permissible Concentration, he is neglecting, as hundreds of scientists have pointed out, that this is the *average* atmospheric content. Where concentrations are piling up, the average figure becomes meaningless. Moreover, as strontium 90 has a long and persistent radioactivity, we are dealing with lifelong exposure, not the sporadic laboratory exposure for which MPC tolerances were established. So much strontium 90 has already been thrown so high into the stratosphere that the maximum fallout will not come for another 15 years. The Federation of American Scientists told us last October that: "It may well be true that in certain areas of the world the strontium 90 hazard has already passed the danger point, to say nothing of the additional production of this material in further tests." Dr. Walter Selove of the University of Pennsylvania told the Congressional committee that radiation from tests already held will cause some 50,000 cases of leukemia and bone cancer. Nobel Prize winner Linus Pauling—whose feat in gathering the signatures of 2,000 American scientists on a petition against further bomb tests is nothing short of miraculous when it is recalled that Pauling is under a cloud for his so-called "left wing" opinions—has stated:

I estimate that the bomb tests that have been made so far will ultimately have caused the death of about 1,000,000 people in the world.

These 1,000,000 people will have died 10 or 20 or 30 years earlier than their normal life span because the radiation has produced bone cancer, leukemia, or some other disease. I estimate also that these bomb tests will cause the birth of 200,000 seriously defective children in the next generation.

If there are quarrels as to whether radiation must pass some invisible "threshold" before it can begin to do physical damage, the world of science is in unanimous agreement that no threshold theory is applicable to the damage done by radiation to man's reproductive materials. The human germ plasm, it is universally accepted, is being subjected to an abnormal bombardment of radiation due to the nuclear tests, of a kind which mankind has never known in its years on earth. This means more mutations per generation, and the overwhelming majority of radiation-induced mutations are known to be harmful ones. Thus when Dr. Libby protests that fallout is increasing background radiation by "only 0.7 percent to 3 percent," what he is viewing with such equanimity is an increase in genetic mutations of at least 180,000 in each 30-year generation of Americans; a price that will increase as the tests go on.

While some may pretend confidence, no one really knows what the introduction of this new artificial degenerative factor will do to the human race in the long run. In the view of many scientists, it is quite possible that by going on this way we may tip the biologic scales enough to make a declining species of mankind, and sentence it to eventual extinction. That is why, although there is some disagreement among the physicists, the chemists, and the medical men, the geneticists are up in arms almost to a man in the current debate.

IN the midst of all the furor, President Eisenhower's famed moral conscience seems sunk in a lethargy from which nothing can arouse it. Dr. Schweitzer and the Pope may protest, the united scientific opinion of Western Europe and most of that of America may profess itself alarmed, 18 top West German nuclear scientists may

refuse to work on the bomb and even Konrad Adenauer may be forced to urge the West German Bundestag to vote in favor of a moratorium on tests, Japan may make an international incident out of every test explosion, and here at home the Gallup Poll may show that 63 percent of Americans, as compared with only 24 percent last fall when Stevenson raised the issue, favor a moratorium on tests—all of this may happen but Eisenhower's conscience is not aroused. He stands, he told his press conference, on the National Academy of Sciences report of a year ago, and on the AEC assurance that they are working with "clean" bombs.

What makes Eisenhower's response even more inadequate than usual is (1) the fact that the very scientists who wrote the NAS report are now in the process of revising some of its estimates in the direction of a more serious view of the danger, and (2) nobody but Eisenhower seems to take the AEC assurance of a "clean" bomb seriously. Even *Time* magazine, for example, severed this argument's head from its body by stating: "The fight for the clean bomb—a phrase now current in atomic discussion—is not a product of hard-headed military thinking. It is likely that more effort is being invested in designing bombs that create a maximum amount of short-lived radioactivity. Such weapons might depopulate whole countries without keeping invaders from living in the silent houses after a month or two."

But the Eisenhower vaporings at



press conferences are not as important as the general administration policy on disarmament, and this subject, in all its phases including the banning of nuclear test explosions, is coming strongly into the public eye.

THE official American position on disarmament for many years now, explained by Eisenhower at press conferences in his labored prose, or by Dulles in his corporation-shyster-lawyereese, or emerging from the various maneuvers at the conferences, is that the U.S. doesn't want any disarmament except on terms of a Soviet capitulation, and barring that, it intends to push the cold war and the break-neck arms race to the point of Soviet intimidation and surrender. A pretty fair sample of the reasoning is contained in these lines from a *N. Y. Times* editorial of June 17:

The fact that we, as well as the Russians, have to face is that there can be no real step toward disarmament until there is, as Mr. Macmillan [British Prime Minister] said, "a diminution in the world tensions that obliged us to set up our defense system."

The Russian contribution to this diminution of tensions must be greater than that of the Western powers, for the simple reason that Russia has done more than the Western powers to create tensions.

This is the political side of the Washington opposition to disarmament; what it says to the Russians in effect is that you must grant us at least a partial victory in the cold war between us, because we happen to be right, before we will grant you disarmament. Such an approach has never produced disarmament, but only war, which is the only supreme test as to which side has the power to prove that it is "right" in the argument.

On the technical side, the administration's opposition to disarmament is based on the notion that the U.S. will so decisively win the arms race as to gain it a decision in the cold war or an edge in a hot war. David R. Inglis, Senior Physicist at Argonne National Laboratory, wrote an article for the January 1957 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, in which he

The Only Thing We Have to Fear is Fear Itself

WE must not relax merely because the Kremlin appears ready to meet us halfway. The only secure basis for an agreement is our ability to negotiate from strength. Defense Secy. Charles Wilson was right when he said last week that "this is a poor time to take the chips and cards away" from the President and his policy makers.

By the same token, there is no reason for the business and financial community to be fearful of peace talk. A permanent peace would, of course, have a profound impact on our economy. The cost of defense—the payments for past wars and the preparations for future ones—is so large a part of government spending that any sizable reduction

would mean important readjustments. But the U.S. economy has demonstrated its ability to make sweeping adjustments. There is no reason to assume that given adequate time to make the shift it could not convert the money and resources now consumed by armament into higher standards of living for us all.

In any case, there is no such adjustment even remotely in prospect now. The very most we can hope for at present is a modest curtailment in defense spending. A reversal of the upward pattern would be welcome, but we must not cut back our defense until agreement is reached.

Wall Street might bear all this in mind before it gets the peace jitters.

Business Week June 1

made clear that this is indeed one basis for our government's opposition to disarmament, and stated his flat disagreement:

The Administration belief that we operate better under the present wide-open ground rules appears to be based on confidence that with unlimited research we shall make all important technical breakthroughs before the Russians do. The unpredictable nature of new developments makes this confidence seem unjustified, even after due allowance for our highly successful performance.

The military, with its Strategic Air Command and its ring of forward bases close to Soviet borders, undoubtedly has the edge over the Russians so far as the target delivery of nuclear weapons is concerned, and will continue to have such an edge unless and until the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile is developed by the Soviets. The entire military-bureaucratic machine is geared to the race to maintain and extend this edge.

Combine the political and military drives, and it is plain that what our cold warriors are most afraid of is some kind of denouement in the cold war that will start it unfrosting, make it difficult to keep up military appropriations, start loosening the bonds of the NATO alliance, and in general put the present war tensions on the skids. They make no bones about this fear, and it is because of this that the disarmament negotiations which start-

ed a year after the end of World War II have resembled nothing so much as a game of musical chairs: Each side makes proposals designed to maintain or build up its special martial strengths. Then, every time the Russians accept an American or British position, the West promptly vacates the position and makes new demands.

WE are now in a new round of negotiations, marked, at this present writing, by Russian acceptance of U.S. terms for banning of bomb tests, including a string of ground inspection stations within the Soviet Union (for which we must in our turn grant a similar string within the U.S. to the Russians). A great deal of "optimism" is being expressed as to the chances for such a partial agreement. It is not yet clear whether there are actual grounds for any optimism, or whether we are getting a build-up to justify a later rejection and another breakdown of the disarmament talks.

There is one possible ground for thinking that some limited agreement for restriction of bomb tests may yet come about, despite Washington's bulldog grip on its cold war policy and evident reluctance to change that policy. That is that the world mood of fear of the consequences of continued nuclear explosions may grow so powerful, and the protests so turbulent, that it will be impossible to resist them. Even the capitalist policymakers are not immune to such fears. In that respect, the atomic control problem is starting to resemble the slum and

public health problem of crowded cities: Vigorous public health measures were very much hastened by the capitalists' discovery that working-class plagues and epidemics spread very quickly to all segments of the population, including the capitalists themselves. One reads in *Business Week*, for example, keeping in mind that hundreds of thousands of influential businessmen will also read these words:

Atomic and hydrogen bomb tests to date probably have not endangered the health of U.S. residents. But continued tests at the present rate will almost certainly endanger persons living now and future generations. So the time has come to seek a cutback in test blasts.

This kind of pressure from within the capitalist class itself is bound to increase as the conviction gets around that the scientists are not all just "lefties" talking through their hats to scare us and help the Russians, but that they know what they're talking about. At the same time, the 63 percent Gallup Poll figure in favor of banning tests shows that a widespread popular protest movement is in the making. Dr. Libby, interviewed by *U. S. News and World Report* in its issue of May 17, added a bit of information on that subject:

Q *Do you get much mail from the general public, Dr. Libby, on the hazards of atomic energy?*

A *Quite a lot.*

Q *Is it mostly fearful about the fall-out?*

A *Yes. A good fraction of it is from people who are really worried.*

This kind of sentiment and pressure, building up both abroad and at home, may in the end force through a moratorium on bomb tests. No greater contribution to the cause of peace can be made than by making this issue one of the biggest things on the American scene, getting a lot of support behind it, and building it into a real movement. There is every sign that this is the issue which will finally create the long-awaited American peace movement, a movement that can bring the greatest beneficial consequences for the future of humanity.

Behind the magnificent skylines, a tangle of traffic snarls, slum rot, and archaic administration and finance. That is the modern city: a problem of the first rank for renovation and social planning.

Decay of the Cities

by Arthur K. Davis



WHO can look at the skyline of our great cities without a stir of admiration? Manhattan towers, Philadelphia from the Art Museum, lakefront Chicago; scores of such panoramas—these are the foremost creations of modern America. The metropolis, in many respects, exceeds all earlier cultural achievements. It is both the heart and the crowning symbol of capitalist civilization.

The city is also becoming a nemesis of capitalism.

My thesis is briefly stated. The American city is steadily losing ground on several major fronts. Its administrative framework is obsolete. Its financial methods and resources are falling ever farther behind its vital needs, even though more wealth is concentrated in the cities than ever before. It is slowly strangling in its own traffic snarls. Its parks and public recreational resources, water supply, schools, and air pollution are additional sore spots. Finally, the city is succumbing to the progressive spread of urban blight because of its inability to master the problems of housing, slum clearance, city planning and renewal.

The rapid growth of American cities occurred after 1865, as immigrants poured into the factories and mushrooming slums nearby. Steam power impelled cities to build compactly. Around 1900, electric power and the elevator stimulated upward growth—the next generation was an age of skyscrapers. Since 1920, the auto has generated an outward movement of people into residential suburbs, mostly middle-class. After World War II, another non-residential building boom intensified the downtown congestion, and the exodus of business and residents into the suburbs continued. Today, the fastest-growing residential and commercial areas are the outer rings of the metropolitan regions. But the middle zones stagnate. And some of the same conditions of congestion, urban blight, and poor land use that drove people out of the central cities are reappearing in the satellite fringes.

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The deterioration of our cities is a long-standing process. Echoes of British mercantile capitalism's flourishing tradition of town planning appeared in the American colonies and early Republic—Philadelphia, Washington, various New England towns. But most American towns grew up in a monotonous grid pattern set by custom and exploited by local real estate interests. The booming triumph of industrial capitalism after the Civil War was marked by the cancerous growth of slums and blight, brought on by land speculation, poorly planned building and street plans, unforeseen population movements, technological changes, inertia, and vested interests. Many working-class families crowded into decrepit tenements near the city core, and into hand-me-down conversions of upper-class families long since fled to the suburbs.

The chronic shortage of good residential housing at prices and rents that average-income families can afford is but one aspect of the matter. Slums are overcrowded residential areas where deterioration, both physical and human, has gone so far that life is a plague for the inhabitants and a burden for the community. A disproportionate part of the city's welfare and protective services is spent in the slums because poverty, crime, delinquency, and health menaces are concentrated there. Other, and larger, areas are subject to what is called "blight," a less extreme condition of neglect where economic obsolescence has set in.

IT is true that our stock of houses is better than that of any other industrial nation, according to a UN study. Overcrowding is less common than in most European countries; the proportion of unhealthy and unsafe housing appears to be smaller. Despite war shortages and postwar inflation, the 1940's brought a definite improvement in American housing. The percent of houses with running water rose from 70 to 83; with a private flush toilet, from 60 to 71. The number of overcrowded dwellings (more than 1.5 persons per room) decreased by one-sixth.

None the less, the gaps between what we have and what we need are great. Nearly half of our 1950 stock of houses was built before 1920; another fifth during the

twenties. Despite the current building boom, our production of houses has been and still is insufficient to provide for both population increase and housing depreciation. At the time of the 1950 Housing Census, nearly one-third of our 46 million dwelling units needed replacement or rehabilitation. The cost of replacing about 9½ million units and rehabilitating another 5.2 million is placed at \$67 billion (1950 prices), exclusive of parks, street changes, and other community needs. "In the United States," wrote housing expert Charles Abrams in a 1953 UN bulletin, "the lowest income third of the population cannot be provided with good housing at current costs and wage levels, nor can a good part of the middle-income group."

If we were to spread our needed rebuilding program over 15 years and allow conservatively for increases in households and for demolitions, we would need at least 1.55 million new dwellings a year. Our best recent rate has been about 1.2 million units annually—75 to 80 percent of the need. In May 1956, AFL-CIO spokesmen advocated 2 million new houses and 200,000 public housing units a year.

An important new study of home building since 1890 goes far to demolish our pride in the home-building boom of the post-World War II period. "Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate" (Princeton, 1956) demonstrates that this boom hasn't been bigger than that of the twenties:

When construction expenditures for 1951-55 are compared with those for the highest five-year period of the twenties, no gain is apparent. When net capital formation [total expenditures for new houses and alterations minus depreciation and demolitions] is compared for the same periods, the recent volume was below the best record of the twenties.

Yet the demand for housing in the next twenty years, the authors say, should be greater than ever before. New households are increasing, demolitions likewise, and conversions are declining:

If withdrawals from the housing supply of 300,000 dwelling units per year are added to an average annual net nonfarm household formation in the neighborhood of 1,000,000 . . . the average number of new dwelling units that would equal these two potential sources of demand by far exceeds any historical record for a similar period.

In the light of these facts, it is clear that the private housing boom has already passed its peak without solving the problem. Let us turn to government policies toward housing.

IN the 1930's, two new Federal policies were established, providing low-rent public housing and credit aids to private building. In 1949, a third was added: urban renewal—community planning and slum clearance. The housing Acts of 1933 and 1937 produced about 200,000 low-rent permanent dwelling units. The 1949 Act would have added another 810,000 in six years if its program

had not been cut back by the Republican Administration. Today we have about 430,000 permanent low-rent, federally subsidized, locally managed units. This amounts to less than 3 percent of all units built in the United States during the past 25 years.

Thus public housing in America is strictly a fringe item. By contrast, nine-tenths of British home-building since the war has been done under municipal or public auspices, and speculative building by private interests has been virtually ended. The inadequacy of public programs in this country is clearly shown in a 1955 survey of Lower Manhattan (below Fourteenth Street) by the *N.Y. Times*. Twenty percent of the worst slums have been demolished, but

slum dwellings still occupy 80 percent of Lower Manhattan. . . . Blackened rookeries that huddled at the Brooklyn Bridge anchorage and stood in unending rows along the shore front have been replaced as far north as Thirteenth Street by clean-lined housing units separated by green lawns and wide play areas. But the improvements only serve to mask the deeper squalor in the old unchanged core of this district. Ten low-rent city projects and a smattering of subsidized middle-income housing, privately constructed, have provided decent quarters for 9,000 families. Another 3,000 will be accommodated within three years. But there still are 40,000 families in dilapidated tenements devoid of all but the minimum light and air.

Much more important on the American housing scene has been the Federal provision of loan credit and mortgage insurance for private builders. For the ordinary Joe, this has meant lower down-payments and longer-term mortgages. The volume of private building has been considerably larger than it otherwise would have been. On the other hand, home ownership—a rigid form of debt—has been unwisely extended. Rental housing is often better suited to our increasingly mobile population. Whether residential mortgage debt is becoming too burdensome is not known. What is clear is that this form of stimulus to housing cannot continue to be expanded at the old rate. It has quadrupled since 1945, and its ratio to disposable personal income has risen to 40 percent—almost an all-time high. For the private building and lending interests, the Federal mortgage-guarantee policy has been a glorious bonanza. It has in effect guaranteed the profits of money-lenders and builders, and distributed risks and losses among the taxpayers. It is these same interests that are loudest in their cries against public housing, naturally.

OVERALL urban renewal has been restricted by the same problems, compounded by additional barriers. Private urban rebuilding projects have been very minor. Early efforts by the states to stimulate private corporations drew little response; Stuyvesant Town in Manhattan, built under a tax-abatement arrangement with Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., is the chief monument of that era. "Renewal has taken place voluntarily only in cases where there was a prospect of a more profitable land use

than that in existence." (M. Colean, "Renewing Our Cities," 1953.)

Under our present limited public program, slum sites are bought up, cleared, and then turned over at "written down" values for redevelopment, usually by private enterprise, although some redevelopers are non-profit or public agencies. The over-inflated values of downtown slum areas are thus shifted from owners to the public. The Federal share of the loss is two-thirds; the city's share, one-third. But, in most of these renewal programs, private residential housing at medium or high rents, sometimes running up to \$60 a room, is the major re-use (123 projects). Commercial and industrial re-use comes next, with 68 projects. Public housing was the major re-use in only 6 projects, of 216 well-advanced programs reported in 1955. In effect, our low-rent public housing program, always petty in scope, has been cut almost to nothing, and we are now subsidizing middle and high-rent housing!

Meanwhile, as the *N.Y. Times* reported (Jan. 31, 1957), "The cities are in a desperate race with the slums. As rundown areas are refurbished, other districts are slipping into ugliness; in some cities new slums spread faster than urban renewal." In Chicago alone, a *New Leader* correspondent notes, "where over 800,000 people swarm in 23 festering square miles of hopeless slum, surrounded by another 56 square miles of increasing blight, the pressure is such that on the North Side alone blight touches three new blocks each month." In the face of this situation, the few billions that we are spending are only a small fraction of the required amounts. Without a massive solution of our housing problems, without comprehensive metropolitan planning implemented in a context of regional and national planning, and probably without nationalization of land—genuine urban renewal is simply impractical.

IF we turn now to the growing snarl in transportation, we find a similar picture. "Paradoxically, metropolitan cities have now grown to the point where they threaten to strangle the transportation that made them possible. . . . Half a century of neglect has meant a long-term deterioration of transit service and failure to keep pace with technological change." (W. Owen, "The Metropolitan Transportation Problem," 1956.)

Since 1920, the number of private cars has grown five times faster than population. A recent *N.Y. Times* survey estimated that our present stock of 65 million cars and trucks may reach 100 million in 20 years. Vehicle mileage has doubled since 1945, but our road net, built mostly in the twenties and thirties, has not been really modernized. Our road net is built and maintained by state and local authorities. The states have heavily favored rural roads over city streets, even though by far the greater part of vehicular traffic has always been concentrated in metropolitan areas. There is still no Federal road system outside of parks and reservations. Federal grants to the states were about 10 percent of the \$75 billions spent on our streets and roads, 1914-52. The new 40,000-mile, \$33 billion Interstate Highway program, to be 90 percent federally financed, will raise the Federal share of our total road budget to 30 or 35 percent.

A 1955 survey by the Bureau of Public Roads found that half of our 320,000 miles of urban streets needs improvement. Only an infinitesimal part of our highways meets expressway standards. The cost of modernizing merely our city streets during the next 30 years is put at \$100 billion, and for meeting both urban and rural needs for the next 30 years the figure is \$300 billion. In the light of these figures, already outmoded by inflation, the 13-year Federal modernization program for 40,000 miles of main highways pales a bit. It will add between 2 and 3 billion dollars a year to present state and local spending, which has been running \$5-6 billions annually without getting us very far. It continues the misplaced emphasis on rural roads. However, it will give us our first real expressway net, and it will kill off the economically regressive toll-road trend. It is a long step forward. But it won't solve all our highway problems.

HOW about mass transit—subways and buses? Fares have gone up about 100 percent over the past decade, and patronage has declined. The present number of riders is roughly 25 percent less than in the twenties, despite heavy urban population growth. Faced with rising fares and overcrowding on mass transit, travellers in increasing numbers prefer to brave auto parking problems and traffic congestion. The long-run trend from mass carriers to automobiles is making congestion still worse.

With exceptions, the present state of big-city mass carriers ranges from precarious to chronic crisis. Attitudes towards riders are often arrogant, and much equipment is obsolete. Rapid transit equipment in 1954 had an average age of 31 years. Lately a trend toward public ownership of the biggest metropolitan carriers has emerged. This has generally marked a step forward. Ownership and operations have been centralized, and some renovation has been undertaken. But these reforms have not solved the crisis of public transportation. Boston and New York transit systems, both publicly owned and operated, are in perpetual trouble. Why? First, because the new public authorities strive to run enterprises that cannot be profitable (else why would the owners give them up?) along straight business lines, with the rider bearing the full cost of the service. Second, because a real unification of all transportation facilities, both highway and mass transit, on a metropolitan-area basis has nowhere yet emerged. It probably cannot emerge except in the context of a socialist planned society.

Some public services cannot possibly "make money," and these are the ones which generally get turned over to the government, where they serve the double purpose of throwing the loss onto the back of the taxpayer and at the same time furnishing a lesson in the "inefficiency" of public ownership. The post office in this country is operated at a loss, for the simple reason that the more profitable forms of communication have been kept in private hands where they pile up millions. In most European countries, post office service is not only far better and more frequent, but it is no burden to the taxpayer because it is financed out of profits from telephone-telegraph service, also state-owned.

Modern cities require efficient mass transit just as



much as they need fire protection and sanitary services. In no other way can so many persons be moved so rapidly and compactly. Low-cost, efficient transport is in the interest of both users and non-users. We don't expect a self-supporting fire department. Why should we expect public transit to "pay for itself?"

A definitive solution of the metropolitan transportation problem demands a unified and professionalized metropolitan government, with power to revise our obsolete grid pattern of city streets, re-schedule traffic loads, acquire union terminals and large parking areas, operate mass carriers, decentralize present concentrations of shopping and industry, and in general relieve the present strangulations through massive remedies, tailored to the conditions of each city.

NOT only does the social irresponsibility of capitalism permit many sores to fester, but remedies are repeatedly frustrated by the horse-and-buggy framework of municipal administration and finance. The present structure of local government was set a century and a half ago, and still persists though industrialism has transformed the nation. Today, nearly two-thirds of our 170 million people live in 174 metropolitan regions (built-up areas centering on a core city of 50,000 or more). Cities as socio-economic communities have far outgrown their legal boundaries—metropolitan New York is four times the territorial size of New York City. The functions of city governments have multiplied many times over—in 1815, Detroit's municipal government managed 23 functions; in 1940, 306.

The city's capital plant—especially its schools, streets, and inner-ring areas—has long suffered either from outright deterioration or from failure to adjust to changing conditions. Immense rehabilitation programs are needed for schools, housing, parks, amusement areas, transit, smog elimination, health and welfare programs. Yet the city's

main source of income is still the outmoded and regressive real estate tax.

In any case, cities lack the legal power to solve their own basic problems. They are legal creatures of the states, with only those powers explicitly granted by their state charters or by state legislation. Courts construe municipal powers very strictly. And state legislatures continue to be controlled, even in this advanced urban age, by rural areas, as the electoral machinery is gerrymandered to keep it that way. New York City has 60 percent of New York State's population, but only 40 percent of the representation in the State Assembly. Nor do the 48 states standardize their policies toward municipalities. In addition, many metropolitan areas lie across state boundaries or right on them, so that they are subject to conflicting jurisdictions. The manner in which corporate interests play upon state divisions was recently illustrated when General Motors threatened Michigan with evacuation of its plants from that state if higher tax rates were adopted.

The elaborate subdivision of competing and overlapping Federal, state, and local agencies prevents rather effectively the rise of single public authorities in any field capable of challenging the power of the great business corporations. A mass of jurisdictions makes up our governmental structure. In 1952 the number of counties, municipalities, townships, and special districts totalled some 50,000. School districts add another 60,000. All 110,000 share in local administration and finance. Metropolitan New York contains over 1,000 such units; Chicago about 960.

In these circumstances, rational planning, legislation, and administration become a pipedream, and the actuality a nightmare. Responsibility for highways in the greater Philadelphia area is divided among the State Highway Departments of two states (main roads), various counties and cities (other-than-main roads), two turnpike authorities, a port authority, and a bridge commission. Local

rail and bus transport in the same area is provided by private bus and street-car companies, some publicly owned transit lines, two railroads, the City Planning Commission, and the State Public Utilities Commission. Various Federal financing and regulating activities round out this picture. What is needed, of course, is a single metropolitan department responsible for planning, in the context of a comprehensive social plan for the whole society, and operating street and highway programs, terminals and parking facilities, mass transportation; and responsible also for representing Philadelphia on the higher regional authorities dealing with inter-urban highway and transport systems.

NEARLY every city is facing a mounting shortage of funds, just when the costs and needs for new services and capital plant are rising. This paradox of spreading municipal poverty in the midst of unparalleled national prosperity is a sure sign that our traditional patterns of city finance are basically out of tune with the times.

Local government tax revenues come chiefly (87 percent in 1954) from the real estate tax. Despite its equalitarian ring, the real property tax, in this day of widespread home ownership, is decidedly regressive, falling most heavily on lower incomes. It makes no allowance for debts against property, so that home "owners" who in actuality share their ownership with a bank are responsible for the full amount of the tax. The real-estate tax dates from the days when land and real property were the chief forms of wealth. These have been displaced nowadays by bonds, bank accounts, and other forms of intangible property. But the tax structure has not been accommodated to this change. Municipal taxes largely miss the major forms of wealth. Doubtless this is one reason why the vested interests so loudly praise local government.

Only property, sales, and income taxes produce sums large enough to be worth going after. Sales taxes are regressive, taking a far larger proportion of the income of poorer persons. Since the total tax burden of all government levels tends to be regressive today, the argument against additional regressive taxation should be irresistible. But sales taxes bring in large returns, and they are admirably designed to pick the citizen's pockets a little at a time. Both state and local governments are increasingly resorting to sales taxes.

Since 1940 a few of the larger cities (Toledo, Philadelphia) have initiated municipal income taxes. These are usually proportionate or flat-rate, rather than progressive. They permit large leakages, especially among self-employed business and professional people. The taxing capacity of a large governmental unit is greater than that of its subdivisions. The big unit is more efficient and impartial, better able to tax progressively and to coordinate its tax system. Multiplying local tax districts balkanizes the economy into petty and uneconomic tax jurisdictions. These points favor state over local, and Federal over state, taxation.

CITY problems have become acute because economic and technological forces have outgrown their institutional framework. New powers and structures are needed



to cope with these difficulties. The crux of most of our urban problems is not a lack of technical knowledge or lack of resources, but a deficiency of social organization to distribute our resources and to put our knowledge into effect.

The American version of the "City Beautiful" movement around the turn of the century tried to meet some of our needs. But the parks, boulevards, and civic buildings which that movement inspired—the Chicago lake front development for the 1893 World's Fair, for instance—did not affect the festering slums behind the imposing main-stem facades. City zoning became common after World War I, but this type of control has been negative and superficial. The New Deal initiated our midget public housing program and three small "greenbelt" towns—planned communities, interesting as experiments, but having no lasting impact.

The movement for city planning produced planning commissions in about 400 cities in the 1920's. This had spread to over 2,000 communities by 1950. In only a few of the larger cities, however, do these agencies have any real powers. Many are inactive or merely advisory; others are unable or unwilling to make headway against dominant real-estate, political, and other local interests; and all are badly hamstrung by the obsolete administrative and financial framework that governs them.

Americans who live in metropolitan areas, in other words, are faced with a series of basic problems, to deal with which they lack any adequate machinery.

I know of but one really practical answer—a comprehensive one. Productivity must be increased and waste greatly reduced by central economic planning and administration. Great resources must be made available to the commonwealth by progressive tax policies, by scrapping the Cold War and the voracious military budget, and by completely overhauling our antiquated political machinery.

Abandonment of the Federal-state division of powers seems clearly indicated. Perhaps this would require a new or revised Constitution. New local units, defined primarily on economic lines—admittedly not easy to determine—should hinge on large metropolitan districts and rural counties. Regional units on a TVA scale should probably stand between local and national governments. Policy-making councils should be popularly elected at every level to supervise the new professionalized administrative apparatuses. All taxing powers should be assigned to the national government, which would allocate funds to regional and metropolitan units by grants-in-aid—a

technique already well developed. The chief direct taxes should be progressively levied on personal incomes, supplemented perhaps by similar levies on net personal wealth and on inheritances. The real estate tax should be discarded. Other functions should be assigned to the smallest unit capable of carrying them out. Above all, there must be periodic readjustment to new conditions. Cities are dynamic—and refractory. They are not indefinitely plastic.

We have begun to repair some of our cities' multiple afflictions—housing, air pollution, urban renewal—generated by capitalist society. These are substantial gains when compared with initial conditions—witness the 20-percent

slum clearance in Lower Manhattan during the past generation. Measured against what remains to be done, however, present gains appear to be fringe reforms rather than basic solutions. Indeed, a fundamental cure of the city's ills seems to be blocked, under capitalism, by the same economic, political, and class forces that generate most of the problems in the first place.

It will take little less than socialism to mount a full-dress attack on the many critical issues confronting the city. But socialism, let us remember, is no panacea. It will simply clear the way for us to begin working effectively toward definitive solutions. This is more than we are doing now.

The Metropolis is Obsolete—Can the Farm Offer a Way of Life?

by Arthur W. Calhoun

WHEN in 1921 the press announced that Moscow was to be a city of fifteen million, I said to myself that the revolution was over. If the Bolsheviks had no more sense than to copy the nastiest aspect of capitalism, one could dismiss hopes. The metropolis was already obsolete; years before, I had declared that the first thing I was going to do after the Revolution was to abolish New York City; and now the Communists were succumbing to hypnotic influence of mere bigness!

Presently the press report was reduced to five million; but that did not alter the perspective, at a time when New York City was talking about building a high school to accommodate fifteen thousand. That gesture was cut down to five thousand, but the essential menace remained. Those in power were overlooking the fact that times had changed.

Originally the city had to be large because offices had to be close enough together so that boys could run apace from one to the other; but after we got the trolley car, the telegraph, the telephone, the automobile, not to speak of the later radio and television, there was no more reason for the metropolis than for the dinosaur. Today the big city would be a museum exhibit if we had grasped the principle of the cultural lag. There is no conceivable reason for a city over a hundred thousand except that twentieth-century man does not even profess to be a rational animal.

City economists can propose the rapid liquidation of the family farm as being a nineteenth-century hangover, and that at the very time when city dwellers are moving out in order to revive the farm, not for essentially commercial purposes, but for subsistence and a mode of life. People just putting down roots in the country mingle thus with pushing ruralists who blend agriculture and industry by taking city jobs to supplement farm income.

Of course the family farm as a mere business proposition is done for, and unfortunately that fact is wiping out the traditional basis of American life. Most American ruralists have never been, strictly speaking, farmers; they have also been commercialists and land speculators; so that farming as such will not hold either them or their children. People still idealize the family farm, but don't want to live on it, and as soon as they move to town they have surrendered. The family farm will not survive save in so far as families deliberately choose to live on it and to accept the satisfactions of that mode of life as a supplement to the cash income that pays them neither wages nor interest on their investment.

But even when families still choose to live on the farm, they cease to be farmers. Without chickens, without cows, perhaps without gardens or orchards, which are "too much trouble," they get a kick out of spending big sums at the

supermarket for inferior hams and bacon, such as their grandparents would have been ashamed to produce; for bread that their mothers would scarcely have deigned to feed to the pigs; for oleo that embodies the chemical industry rather than the freshness of life. It is so much more reputable nowadays to buy something than to produce it that the very basis of rural life is gone. When one says that forty years from now there may be no one living on a farm in Kansas, nobody registers pronounced dissent.

ECONOMICALLY speaking, then, the family farm is as obsolete as the metropolis. But socially speaking it is a valid ideal, as the metropolis is not. Americans have never taken seriously the Scripture that bids us "Despise not the day of small things"; nevertheless, the high-salaried engineer who deliberately moves out and establishes his family on a little farm is showing that the rural homestead has more vitality than commercialism has ever imagined. Moreover, there is a growing body of consumers who are going to go out and raise their own food rather than put up longer with the vitiated, devalitized, insecticide-laden stuff that today represents the highest product of the American "scientific" mind. The family farm as a way of life will be with us after the metropolis has been abandoned. Where it has already dwindled it will be restored. Perhaps most workers will dovetail agriculture with industry; but it will be village and town industry, and not the nightmares of Pittsburgh and Chicago as we have known them.

The present shifting scenes are registering themselves in the complexion of politics. The states will not forever persist in giving most of the representation in the legislature to the thinly peopled areas. As a socially desirable distribution of population comes about, outlooks on representation will alter. Moreover the fortunes of the political parties will shift. Of course the old parties are as obsolete as the buffalo and the prairie dog, but the Kansas voters have been too busy puzzling over price-support programs to do any real political thinking. For the first time, the Socialist Party is off the ballot in Kansas, which state was the fountain-head of popular socialist propaganda in the days when the old *Appeal to Reason* emanated from Girard by the hundreds of thousands weekly. We are between eras, and Kansas has no Populists left to urge farmers to "raise less grain and more hell."

Each old party still needs the dwindling farm vote in order to make sure of winning a national election, and what farmers are left will have to be taken into consideration in any new political alignment. In that regard, the key position is held by the Farmers Union, which knows how to collaborate with the AFL-CIO, so that farmers and city workers may get rid of misconceptions about each other, may come to understand each others' problems, and thus grow into a united political front facing in a single direction.

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An American radicalism, says this analysis, must arise if this nation is forced to choose between a devastating war and a fundamental reorganization of its social structure. The Left will play a key role if it can mature rapidly enough to forestall a nuclear war.

The Choice Before Us

by William Appleman Williams

DOMESTIC radicalism has long been associated, in the thought of the Left and the Right alike, with unsettled international conditions. War and revolution have been linked together in the hopes of the rebels and in the fears of the reactionaries. Even more restrained observers tend to assume, or try to establish, a simple one-to-one relationship between war and radicalism. A great deal of pseudo-history has recently been written, for example, supposedly proving that the Bolshevik Revolution caused every war since 1917. And, since the Suez affair at any rate, everyone is familiar with the argument that the Western powers must at all costs avoid disagreements because another war among themselves would produce a Communist world.

Let it be granted that this familiar thesis does account, at least to a degree, and in the latter stages of the process, for some aspects of radical changes. The fact remains that it begs the crucial point about the relationship between radicalism and international affairs. Overlooked in all this free association between war and revolution is the hard truth that revolutions, whatever the suddenness of their eruption, are not spontaneous affairs. Major revolutions, or truly radical changes without violence, are preceded by a period of time during which the society in question is faced by a choice between competing solutions to the fundamental problems of political economy and social relationships. Almost without exception, these various ap-

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proaches ultimately narrow down to two alternatives: a continuance of the existing order devolving into a costly and devastating war, or a radical reordering of domestic society. It is possible to specify examples which appear to contradict this proposition (Guatemala and Hungary come to mind), but closer inspection of such cases suggests that they fall into the category of revolutions occurring in the spheres of influence of major powers for which the central thesis remains valid.

This is not to say, and most emphatically not to imply, that a radical reconstruction is certain to emerge from such circumstances. No one needs to open a reference book to recall instances in which this choice has been resolved in favor of war. It is only to advance the proposition that such circumstances constitute the environment for the inception, growth, and maturation of domestic radicalism. Hence the most general statement of this hypothesis holds that radicalism is the child of developing contradictions during a period of peace. Applied to major powers, including the United States, it asserts that no domestic radicalism can arise and become effective unless and until the nation in question is forced to choose between, on the one hand, a war that threatens it with devastation and, on the other, a fundamental reorganization of society.

AMERICA offers striking verification of this hypothesis, but lest it be thought that this proves nothing but the uniqueness of the United States, it is useful and illuminating to test it briefly by recourse to the twentieth-century history of Russia, Great Britain, France, and China. No better support for the general validity of the proposition can be offered, indeed, than the events which occurred in these countries prior to the advent of nuclear weapons. All the A-bomb has done is to make it clear that the proposition is valid for the United States, and to dramatize its relevance for other nations.

Radicalism became a serious and militant force in Russia only after 1870. It became apparent that, on the one hand, the legal emancipation of the serfs had not opened the way for the solution of fundamental questions of political economy and, on the other hand, Czarist expansion was leading the nation toward a debacle in foreign affairs. Japan's successes in the war of 1904-05 clarified this fact, and led Russian radicals to call openly for a Japanese victory to dramatize the point that the old system offered but two alternatives: repression or defeat. The rallying cry of Peace and Bread, which symbolized both the March and the October revolutions of 1917, documents the close inter-relationship between the rise of radicalism and the threat of grave defeat unless basic changes were made in the existing order.

A similar pattern developed in Great Britain and France. The depth and extent of the radicalism correlated with the degree to which the coming wars appeared to promise defeat, as well as with the seriousness of the internal crises. In foreign affairs, the key event was the rise of a Prussianized Germany in the 1870s; and in domestic affairs the period spans the same years during which the reforms of the Third Republic and Gladstone Liberalism proved insufficient. Thus the crisis of the 1890s found Britain hemmed in by the colonial antagonisms symbolized

by the occupation of Egypt and the Boer War, Germany's naval building program and Berlin's assertiveness in Africa and the Far East, the agricultural depression of the 1880s, and the Great London Dock Strike of 1889.

By 1893, with the founding of the Labor Party, the options were clearly defined: a new Britain or a war of doubtful issue against Germany for supremacy in the old order. And in France it was the even more militant radicalism of Jean Jaurès—arising in the context of the Panama scandal, the Moroccan crises, the Dreyfus affair, and the revival of Royalism—which offered the only viable alternative to another (and even more costly) war against Germany and an extended campaign to hold the colonies.

CHINA'S experience during the same period was even more extreme. The reigns of Kuang Hsü and Hsüan T'ung, last of the Manchus, were incapable of dealing effectively with the problems of political economy confronting the nation—despite Western loans and rationalization of the Maritime Customs Union. As for war, it was threatened and practiced on all sides: by France in the 1880s, and then by Japan and the West during the 1890s. One of the central explanations of Sun Yat-sen's difficulty in organizing effective radical activity lies in the fact that China lacked the opportunity to propose and select between alternatives. Its choice was very simple, albeit very harsh: fight or disappear as a nation. Domestic radicalism was not added to anti-foreign nationalism until the years of relative international peace following the First World War. And it did not mature save as it became the increasingly obvious alternative to continued foreign domination.

These examples, and the Russian and Chinese experiences in particular, dramatize the value for Americans of a re-analysis of the relationship between radicalism and war. Perhaps the wrong lesson has been learned—and much too well. The accepted conclusion seems to have been that war is necessary for basic reconstruction, and this confines both the Left and the Right in a theoretical and programmatic straightjacket. Radicals tend to wait for the war, even though they squirm at the prospect,


while the Right tries to avoid it by policies which insure its outbreak. Thus the Right goes off hunting the Snark of security, and the Left, uncomfortable in its reliance on war, sheepishly trails along.

It would seem fruitful for the Left to give serious consideration to the thought that radical isolationism is not the bugaboo that the advocates of *status quo* internationalism constantly assert it to be. The consequences in foreign affairs could not be any worse, for *status quo* internationalism always fights its wars from a very weak strategic position, and a war undertaken by a radical isolationism would have the great virtue of being waged for the right reasons and for viable objectives.

War would transform radical isolationism into radical internationalism, an outlook that is both aware of, and much better prepared to cope with, the central problem of achieving economic integration and development without economic, political, and cultural imperialism. British Labor offers an excellent illustration of this proposition. For whatever the degree of Labor's responsibility for Britain's weakness in the Munich crisis, two crucial points stand out: 1) Labor support for armaments would not have prevented Hitler from continuing his assault upon the world, and 2) Labor's concentration on a program of basic reconstruction made the war much more meaningful and rewarding for Englishmen (and Indians) than would otherwise have been the case (or was the case, for example, for Americans).

ALL of these considerations suggest that America has never been an exception to the central proposition about radicalism and peace, or to the consequences; not even in the pre-atomic era when its geographic good fortune served to mitigate the less devastating character of conventional warfare. The key to the conservatism of American liberalism, and to the weakness and one-sidedness of its radicalism, lies not so much in the absence of feudalism (though that has relevance) as in the usually overlooked fact that between 1803 and 1950 the United States was able to expand without serious opposition, and hence without the probability that a war would bring extensive damage or defeat. And the only apparent exceptions to this rule, the rise of Eugene V. Debs and the more radical period of the New Deal, in fact bear out the central thesis; for in both cases the nation did have to consider the cost of an industrial war against powerful enemies.

From the era of the American Revolution through the Fair Deal, and from Left to Right, Americans have approached their difficulties with an expansionist philosophy of history which holds that the solution to all problems of political economy, and to all social tensions, lies in an increase of quantity rather than through an improvement of quality and a more rational and equitable use of existing opportunities. Because the most striking and overt statements of this interpretation of history did not come until 1893, when Brooks Adams and Frederick Jackson Turner offered it to the elite and the general public respectively, it is easy to overlook the fact that Benjamin Franklin, Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, James Polk, Franklin Pierce, Stephen Douglas,



William Seward, Benjamin Harrison, and James G. Blaine all operated on the same assumption.


For that matter, all of them put it into words. Franklin argued the need to sustain freedom by expansion across the Appalachian Mountains. Hamilton asserted the necessity of a mercantile empire. Jefferson sought and justified the Louisiana Purchase on the grounds that more land would bring more democracy. Jackson, Tyler, and Polk applied the same logic and rhetoric to the Pacific Basin as well as to the continental West. Pierce, Douglas, and Seward urged and defended further expansion as the way to prevent the Civil War.

VIEWED from any perspective other than orthodox nationalism, it can be seen that the central characteristic of this period of American history was a labor imperialism based upon the conquest and colonization, in the style of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European imperialism, of the trans-Mississippi West. This fact has been neglected for the same reason that the policy worked so well: Neither the natives (the American Indians and the Mexicans) nor the competitors (England, France, and Russia) were capable of offering significant opposition. Hence we treat our wars of conquest as benevolent police actions undertaken in the cause of democratic civilization. It was their grasp of this pattern which enabled Marx and Engels to understand the lack of a truly radical movement in the United States: "America after all was the ideal of all bourgeois; a country *rich, vast, expanding.*"

Secretary of State Seward also saw this relationship, and undertook, in line with the switch from agrarianism to industrialism, to shift the nature of the expansion from territorial acquisition to overseas economic and strategic penetration. Markets, raw materials, and bases became his objectives—as witness his forays into the Caribbean, the Pacific Basin, and (in Korea) on the mainland of Asia itself. In many respects, indeed, Seward is the real Jefferson of America's contemporary industrial liberalism; combining as he does the rhetoric and ideals of freedom with the pragmatic ability to accept the Existing Establishment on the basis of reform through further expansion. Harrison and Blaine lacked his comprehension of this process of democracy by expansion, but their frenetic diplomacy was predicated on the same assumption.

Not until the crisis of the 1890s did Americans face even the possibility of a choice between radicalism and a damaging war. Even then, however, the ease with which Spain was defeated served temporarily to strengthen the assumption, so recently and so precisely formulated by Turner and Adams, that democracy was the sprightly handmaiden of expansion. But a bit later, between 1900 and 1917, events did structure the circumstances for the rise of an American radicalism. At home, it became apparent that the limits of political and economic democracy were closing in on every citizen. Abroad, meanwhile, expansion slowed down in the face of vigorous opposition from Japan, England, France, Russia, and Germany.

The threat of a serious war against Japan over China took the edge off America's crusading fervor. Theodore Roosevelt was forced to give up the struggle for Man-



churia and take up the rhetoric of domestic radicalism. Woodrow Wilson's success was based on doing the same thing more convincingly, though not necessarily more thoroughly. More revealing was the effect of these developments on the movement led by Debs. It gained strength steadily until Wilson's New Freedom, a failure at home, expanded into a crusade to save the world for late Victorian democracy. That meant war: abroad against the Germans and the Bolsheviks, and at home against the radicals.

DEFEATED in that engagement, domestic radicalism did not revive until midway through Franklin Roosevelt's first term, at which time it became even more apparent that continued expansion (for whatever purpose) meant war. Instead of following the policy of British Labor, which offered long-range benefits despite short-term disadvantages, this American radicalism of the mid-thirties chose to follow the course laid out by Wilson. It abandoned radicalism for a crusade to save the *status quo*. But by whatever other name—and Doctor Win-the-War and the Fair Deal are in fact rather feeble diversionary rallying cries—the *status quo* is still the *status quo*. The end result of all this was the political mutation known as the Vital Center, which combined Theodore Roosevelt's bellicose nationalistic expansion with Wilson's crusading Victorian liberalism. It should not really surprise anyone that the Truman Doctrine reads like the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, or that John Foster Dulles is an evangelical preacher in the same tradition and style as Woodrow Wilson. The thesis that expansion is democracy, and democracy expansion, is America's version of Orwell's Doublethink.

It was not until the early 1950s, when the full significance of Russian possession of the A-bomb began to undercut this expansionist philosophy of history, that

Americans slowly realized that democracy by expansion was apt to turn into repression for and by war. The first product of this awareness was the Geneva Conference, where the policy of containment-liberation—so clearly the classical expression of the expansionist philosophy of history—was tacitly (albeit not formally or rhetorically) abandoned, at least for the moment. Since that time the American scene has been characterized by a general formlessness and meaninglessness. Outmoded policies are sustained by nothing more than the habit and the inertia of expansion. Existing political leaders unsuccessfully rummage through their rhetoric for a relevant idea. And the morale and mores of the society disintegrate into the pulpy pap of an indiscriminate togetherness.

These developments have already sparked a flickering in the ashes of the American Left, as well as a much stronger and more vigorous reaction in British socialism. The key question is not whether such a new radicalism will arise in America, for it is already in existence, but whether or not it will mature intellectually and politically in time to forestall a nuclear war. Given the general, though unfocused, dissatisfaction throughout American society, the crucial problem is intellectual. A rigorous analysis and a positive program would appear to have much more than a fighting chance to win widespread support.

THE theoretical problem is threefold: 1) to formulate and specify a domestic radicalism that will infuse power with a purpose beyond its self-perpetuation and the continued mass production of the banal, the vulgar, and the irrelevant; 2) to define and adopt, for the immediate and vital purpose of disengaging from the Cold War before it devolves into nuclear war, a foreign policy of radical isolationism; and 3) to outline and develop, as an ultimate foreign policy, a radical internationalism

which will strengthen political and cultural independence within a framework of economic integration and planning.

In the circumstances of the inter-continental ballistics missile, this appears to be the most promising program for replacing corporate capitalism with democratic socialism, and for transforming an empire into a commonwealth. Lacking this alternative, the existing American Empire will ultimately find itself isolated in a socialist and communist world. And, as with most empires of the *status quo ante*, it will very probably prefer to risk nuclear war instead of accepting its decline and fall with dignity. For it was, after all, only the militance of British Labor that gave Winston Churchill the opening for a graceful retreat from imperialism. He could withdraw abroad because he was challenged at home as well as checkmated overseas. Had he been secure at home, he would have had to fight abroad, even in the face of certain defeat. Anthony Eden was not so fortunate, for he was challenged by Nasser at a time when the Labor Party was immobilized by the conservatism of its own leadership. But Eden's tragedy does have the value of dramatizing the central point.

The same considerations make it imperative for American radicalism to accept its opportunity and its responsibility to perform a similar service for American society (and, indirectly, for existing American leadership). For the obvious is never obvious, nor the inevitable ever inevitable, until someone points it out or makes it so. The only other source of such action is the Russians, and the only teaching aids they have at their disposal are very apt to destroy the student with the lesson. Anyway, it is long past time for American radicals to abandon the Freudian sublimation of their frustrations in romantic illusions, self-righteous crusades to save someone else, or adjustment to the *status quo*, and turn instead to the Marxian challenge of changing their own world.

The White Baby Plan to End Racial Segregation

Some months ago, the Carolina Israelite, a sparkingly unorthodox journalistic pot-pourri edited and written by Harry Golden in Charleston, S. C., came forth with the Vertical Negro Plan to solve the segregation problem. He proposed that, since Negroes and whites are allowed to mix standing up—in post offices, etc.—the answer for the schools would be to remove all seats and let the kids integrate standing up. A short time later, he followed this up with the Golden Out of Order Plan. It seems that Mr. Golden persuaded a department store owner to put an out-of-order sign on his “white” drinking fountain, and, hesitantly at first, but pretty completely after a few days, everyone was drinking out of the same fountain. He advises that this be tried out everywhere in the South. And now, in his latest issue, we have the Golden White Baby Plan, which we reprint here.

* * *

THE Vertical Negro Plan is actually being implemented to some extent in Atlanta, Georgia. The Negroes buy their bus and railroad tickets and proceed immediately to the platform where they are free to walk up and down unsegregated. The waiting rooms with all the concessions and beverage coin boxes, etc., are empty.

Now this White Baby Plan offers another possible solution.

Here is an actual case history of the White Baby Plan to End Racial Segregation. Some months ago there was a revival of the Laurence Olivier movie, “Hamlet,” and several Negro school teachers were anxious to see it. One Saturday afternoon they asked some white friends to loan them two of their little children, a three-year-old girl, and a six-year-old boy, and, holding these white children by the hands, they obtained tickets from the movie-house cashier without a moment's hesitation. They were in like Flynn.

This would also solve the baby-sitting problem for thousands of white working mothers. There can be a mutual exchange of references, then the people can sort of pool their children at a central point in each neighborhood, and every time a Negro wants to go to the movies all she need do is pick up a white child—and go.

Eventually the Negro community can set up a factory and manufacture white babies made of plastic, and when they want to go to the opera or to a concert, all they need do is carry that plastic doll in their arms. The dolls of course should all have blond curls and blue eyes, which would go even further; it would give the Negro woman and her husband priority over the whites for the very best seats in the house.

Youngest of the world's nations, Ghana has won political independence. But it remains economically a colony of British interests. Will the new African nation be able to alter that relationship? And what path will Gold Coast socialism take in the future?

Ghana Faces Its Future

by E. Glinne

ON March 6, Ghana, joining Liberia, Ethiopia and the Sudan, enlarged the group of non-white African states which are politically independent. Only Ghana, uniquely, has achieved independence with democracy. Its national tradition has been interrupted for nine centuries and yet, despite divergences and quarrels, the peoples appear to manifest that "will to live together" in which consists the fact of nationhood. Ghana's entry into the British Commonwealth, moreover, enrages Mr. Strijdom, head of the Union of South Africa, and it provokes the resentment of Sir Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland which is dominated by a minority of racist colonials and is seriously affected by the South African contagion.

Why, one might ask, has the Colonial Office raised Kwame Nkrumah to the rank of Prime Minister of an independent state while Jomo Kenyatta, leader of the Africans of Kenya, is doing a long stretch in prison? The answer is that in the regions which constitute Ghana, just as in Nigeria and the French sectors of Negro Africa, the population of European origin has always been tiny and the population of Creole descent has been equally sparse. In the Gold Coast and neighboring territories the whites, because of the climate, have never exceeded the few thousands making up the administrative framework. The ownership of the soil has thus always remained in the hands of the indigenous population. In Kenya, two thousand European colonists have appropriated ten thousand square miles of the best lands, "reserving" thirty thousand square miles for the five and a half million Africans.

The soil of Ghana, instead of being divided into great



COCOA: Drying the beans near Accra

plantations belonging to the whites, has been worked by small African farmers and their families, who have themselves introduced the cocoa tree. No Asian minority of importance, whose presence could block access to the lower-middle-class commercial and professional callings, has developed. Thus the economic and social structure has retained a large mobility and a significant indigenous middle class has taken shape. The Africans, to a degree which is indicated by this evolution, have expressed their political demands in a relatively calm and peaceful manner, and the British governments, including those of the Tories, have been able to make concessions at a reasonable pace because they were not under the pressure of a powerful lobby of colonists.

In contrast, in French North Africa and in British Central and East Africa, the minority of white landowners and employers of agricultural labor see the political advance of the Africans as a menace to their economic positions. They exert considerable influence on the home governments, and at times, as was the case in South Africa, and as will possibly be in the case of the Rhodesian Federation, they break the tie with the mother country in order to disencumber themselves of the relatively progressive public opinion of the latter, in their attempt to reduce the Africans to economic servitude.

IN the Gold Coast, the independence movement, beginning in 1920, was led principally by the agricultural and commercial middle classes organized by Casely Hayford, an African educated in America, and later by Dr. Danquah. In 1946, under the Labor Government, a native parliament with an indigenous majority was granted. The United Convention of the Gold Coast, led by Dr. Danquah, waged a campaign for several years which aimed at winning autonomy and which appealed to the popular masses. At the very moment when the Convention, tired of its efforts, was being transformed into a conservative movement, Kwame Nkrumah became its general secretary. Then

Mr. Glinne is one of the founders of La Gauche, a new independent Belgian socialist periodical.

came a split, the creation of the People's Convention Party, and the militant intervention in political life of the masses of the people. The elections of 1951 followed, which gave a smashing majority to Nkrumah. The Nkrumah government since 1954 has been composed exclusively of Africans, the Governor General keeping defense and foreign relations in his control. Thereafter Ghana could not have been compelled to wait long for complete political independence.

In achieving democracy the African peoples have to surmount two serious difficulties which are rooted in their communal tradition, especially as industrialization and detribalization have this far made little progress. The first difficulty is that the choosing of a political leader tends too much to inspire clan or tribal solidarity. In the second place, political life, after being united in opposition to the European, runs the risk of degenerating into tribal rivalries to the detriment of national unity. These two perils have already made their presence felt and continue to trouble Ghana, although since 1951 the Government has succeeded admirably in maintaining the unity of the Fanti, Evé, Ashanti and Ga peoples, strengthening their feeling that what they have in common is more important than their divergences.

The People's Convention Party, which received a big majority of the votes and 71 seats out of 104 at the last elections in July 1956, is trailed at a distance by the Northern People's Party (15 seats) and the National Liberation Movement (12 seats); other small groups hold the remaining seats. The People's Convention Party extends throughout the country and possesses a national character which the other two important political formations lack, limited as they are to the Northern Territory and the region of the Ashanti. These latter two parties have as a point of departure denunciation of certain real injustices and irregularities occurring in the administration of the Cocoa Board, an agency which is staffed with supporters of the Convention Party.

THE two minority parties demand a federal constitution and have gained especially in the Ashanti region the enthusiastic support of the traditional chiefs who are anxious to take revenge on the young politicians of Accra for establishing universal suffrage. Beaten in the elections of July 1956, the federalist leaders have nonetheless persevered, and it required reiterated appeals to national unity, substantial concessions, and also British pressure to end their obstructions. Sufficient guarantees (notably with respect to the chiefs and the regions) have been given to the opposition, but it seems that certain representatives of the minority parties are all the more inclined to identify their party with the state and their adversaries as political criminals. Let us note that participation in the last election, which was 91 per cent in the Gold Coast, was only 28 per cent in the Northern Territory. This points up the backward character of the Northern Territory and also possibly to the very restricted feeling for democracy of certain representatives of the opposition who are hostile to a suffrage which they have never experienced.

Ghana is certainly the richest country in West Africa. Its population numbers about five million. But its essential-


ly agricultural economy suffers from dependence on one crop, the cultivation of cocoa.

Ghana today supplies about 30 percent of the world cocoa crop, although its productive capacity fell from 300,000 tons in 1937-38 to 225,000 tons in 1955-56 because of a destructive and costly malady which has afflicted the trees. The fluctuations of the market are violent: from more than \$1,400 at the start of 1954 the price per ton sank to \$616 in 1955. The supply at present exceeds the demand to the point that last November, in Brussels, the minister of agriculture of the Gold Coast had to propose to the Cocoa Research Council an international publicity campaign designed to increase consumption of cocoa. And cocoa represents two-thirds of Ghana exports and the revenues from this trade constitute the main source of state finances.

THE political changes introduced since 1951 by Nkrumah and his followers do not seem until now to have been accompanied by any corresponding changes on the economic plane. The Gold Coast, it should be made clear, remains a "colony" of British interests. The principal banks, most of the mines, the maritime and insurance companies, are entirely in the hands of Britishers and other foreigners. The United Africa Company, subsidiary of Unilever—an institution which no one would mistake for a philanthropic foundation—controls a third of import trade and is the largest purchaser recognized by the Cocoa Board. Since 1951 the sums which the sterling bloc withdrew from the Gold Coast surpassed by \$123 million the investments which it made there. Moreover, the Gold Coast has had to contribute to the dollar fund of the sterling area: It earns with its exports many more dollars than it pays out for imports from the dollar area. The dollar surplus cannot be employed except "within the limits imposed by the balance of payments situation of the sterling area."

Will the political independence of Ghana now enable it to alter this relationship? The government, up against the dangers of an agricultural economy, multiplies its inducements to foreign capital. It tries to ensure that employment conditions favor to the maximum the progress of the Africans. It also reserves to itself special rights, where the participation of the state would serve the national interest. With the exception of the essential public services (at present: roads, electricity, housing and hospitals), foreign capital is invited to invest in all sorts of new enterprises. The government has pledged not to control prices except in the case of monopoly, and not to interfere with the removal of the profits of foreign capital or the repatriation of the capital itself. The government at present has no intention of nationalizing. It has even inscribed in the constitution a clause providing that equitable compensation must be accorded in the event of nationalization.

It must be admitted that for a long time to come the people of Ghana will remain incapable of furnishing the capital and the technical know-how for broad industrial development. The funds derived from cocoa could not reasonably support the burden of industrialization—at least if the living standard is not to be reduced by authoritarian methods which are justly repugnant to the present leaders.



GHANA ASSEMBLY: March 6

WHAT is the future of democratic socialism in Ghana? Kwame Nkrumah, after his imprisonment, liked to call himself a Marxist. "I have revived," he often affirmed, "many of Lenin's ideas about the local organization of the party." The Prime Minister nowadays readily recalls his trade-union past: as a worker in a shipyard in the United States he was a member of the CIO. He seems strongly inclined to favor free trade unionism for Ghana. In British quarters, certain colonial Bourbons persist in seeing in Nkrumah a dangerous crypto-Communist. That this insinuation is wide of the mark, however, is suggested by Nkrumah's expulsion of two Communists who were pioneers of the Convention Party, and his banning of Communist literature. Beyond this, whatever may be the personal intentions of Nkrumah, it is necessary before all else to study the peculiar conditions of West Africa and particularly of Ghana, as well as the composition of the Convention Party, which at present dominates political life.

The struggle against colonial domination clearly has many aspirations in common with the international socialist movement. The leaders of the independence movement naturally identify themselves with the struggle of British socialism. However there are not two authentic socialist parties in the whole of British West Africa: the only one at present appears to be the United Workers Party which has its strength in eastern Nigeria.

This does not mean that there are not many socialists within the national movements of British West Africa or that measures which can be called socialist are not taken by the governments. Furthermore, a considerable part of the economy is in the public sector. The railroads and ports have always been public property. Certain mines and most sources of electrical energy are government-controlled. More than 75 per cent of arable land is communal property and, through agencies for marketing agricultural products, the governments of West Africa can keep a strong directing hand on the economy.

But the present governments and nationalist parties (including the Convention Party of Ghana) have a hetero-

geneous composition: They bring together reactionaries, conservatives, socialists, and also Communists and fascists. All are united in the common cause of independence. But these parties, if they are veritable national fronts, have heterogeneous domestic interests which must be analyzed in order to discover whether the tendency is toward, or away from, the application of socialist principles. The Convention Party of Ghana, in this light, is no more socialist than the Congress Party in India.

AN example: The present government of Ghana talks favorably about the cooperative movement, but in order to help out private African interests it takes measures to sharply limit the cooperative movement which now markets one-fifth of cocoa production. Another example, taken from Nigeria: The leader of a party, the proclaimed aim of which is to transform Nigeria into a "socialist commonwealth," has recently demanded that the railroads, which are state-owned, be returned to private ownership. One should not, then, minimize faction fights within the national movement and the weight of indigenous conservative forces. These movements at present, according to a British Laborite who has studied them on the spot, seem to be dominated by what may be called elements of the "right of center." African socialists who want to stimulate a leftward trend face the obstacle that all too often the tribes remain the primary political units, and political success depends more on the support which candidates find in their tribes than political and economic theories. An organizational success for the distinct Left of the national movement is therefore very difficult at the moment.

The first signs of consciousness are appearing in the still not too numerous working class. The workers criticize the rise in the cost of living, which has doubled since 1948 while wages have risen only 20 percent. They complain about the lack of retirement pensions and health insurance. Strikes have taken place in the gold mines. Despite his remarkable achievements up to now, Nkrumah must keep moving without letup if he wants to retain the trust of the mass movement which he has roused.

At the fifth Pan-African Congress, held in Manchester in October, 1945, Nkrumah called for independence for the Gold Coast and also demanded the creation of a Federation of West African Republics. He does not seem to have renounced this project and the French weekly *L'Express* has already expressed anxiety about it. Territorial regroupment, however, is not as important for the future of Africa as the watch word uttered by Nkrumah which reflects the sentiment of a growing number of Africans from one end to the other of the dark continent. Asked two years ago by the American Negro writer, Richard Wright, about how to unify the African peoples, Nkrumah gave this answer in which is mirrored the Bandung era: "We will unite against Malan" [the Southern African racist leader]. The very next years are crucial. International socialism can put them to good use by bringing about—not in words but in deeds—a decisive alteration of their colonial politics. Truly, it is no longer possible to hesitate between support for the rights of peoples and support for the rule, as anachronistic as it is inhuman, of racist minorities and financial overlords.



BOOK REVIEW

Charles A. Beard and the Meaning of Our History

*THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF POLITICS
AND RELATED WRITINGS* by Charles
A. Beard. Vintage Books, New York,
1957, \$1.25.

AS Charles A. Beard was fond of pointing out, an economic interpretation of history and politics is more readily applied to the United States than to almost any other modern nation. The collateral religious, racial, and military conflicts were at their minimum here as compared with Europe, and so the bare economic issues can generally be traced with ease, and without the necessity of untangling them from a complex of political and ideological overlay. The American Revolution was fought out here pretty much as a straight clash of material interests, with political sloganeering a clear derivative, while in the English Revolution one must first unravel the intense conflicts over how to interpret the Bible before getting to politics and then to economics. This nation has been more frankly materialistic in its orientation than just about any other—at least until the Soviet Union came on the scene.

While official American doctrine has set a face of sanctimony against any and all economic interpretations, in reality most Americans of the world of affairs believe implicitly, if not in an economic reading of history, at any rate in an "economic man"—that much-scorned bogey erroneously attributed to Marxists. Most Americans, and especially the materially successful and the nation's rulers, find it impossible to grasp any concept of man other than as being dominated, immediately and selfishly, by his financial interests. We need only consider the incontrovertible fact that there is no creature so rare in America—and what is more important, none so incomprehensible to fellow Americans and so mistrusted—as the person who willingly sacrifices significant monetary interests in the pursuit of any ideal.

Perhaps this is one of the reasons why, when American history first started getting a materialist treatment, the method used was a grossly oversimplified "economic determinism" rather than the far more complex and subtle approach developed by European Marxism at its best. Perhaps another reason is that the pragmatic climate of American opinion made it difficult even

for a Charles A. Beard—with his unusually speculative and theoretical cast of mind—to present his picture in anything but a bold-line drawing.

THUS when Beard wrote his epoch-making early works, economic interpretations of the Constitution and of Jeffersonian Democracy, he couched them almost exclusively in terms of the direct personal interests of the leading participants. His book on the Constitution is largely a dossier on the holdings and material ties of the members of the Constitutional Convention; his account of the Hamiltonians bears down most heavily on the interest of the members of Congress in the national and states debts they were causing to be funded or assumed by the Federal government. Evidences of material involvement, which for a Marxist would enter as one important factor in an overall class analysis, often became for Beard the totality of the analysis.

This valuable paper-backed volume consists of excerpts from Beard's writings—chiefly the 1916 Amherst lectures published under the title "The Economic Basis of Politics" and the 1928 volume "The American Party Battle"—intended to define and illustrate his historical method. The first half is theoretical; it sets forth the approach in its general form. Beard displays here his brilliant argumentative talents, his unusually broad erudition ranging from the ancient world through the history of Europe, on into American affairs where his knowledge was of course incomparable. Socialists who have been raised on the materialist doctrine in its specific Marxist-developed form will be delighted by the range of citations largely unfamiliar to them—not just the well-known Madison quotation from Number 10 of the *Federalist Papers*, but Aristotle, Machiavelli, Locke, Daniel Webster, John C. Calhoun, and others who knew the steel of which the historic framework is built.

And yet, with all of this equipment, Beard seems to find himself in dire straits whenever the working tools required get more complicated than a simple and direct relationship between economic interests and political power. He wrestles unsuccessfully with the problem of an independent military establishment, and in the end is forced to capitulate by adopting Daniel Webster's crude formula: "In the absence of military force, economic interests will come to expression in political power." The entire massive Marxist literature in which an independent military of the Bonapartist type, which raises itself above the struggle of contending classes when they are deadlocked and rules as a surrogate for basic economic interests, seems to have escaped him. It is not that he rejected it; it is more accurate to say that such analyses, where the chain of relationships is made of many intermediate links and indirect connections, remained outside the scope of his pragmatic approach. That is why to the Marxist—whom Beard accused of being "rigidly" and "mechanically" deterministic, Beard's

reading of history often rings rigid and mechanical.

But, for all his oversimplified economic determinism, no one has yet approached Beard in his insight into the ultimate springs of American politics and culture, nor in his dazzling canvases of the national panorama. What he lacked as strict methodologist was time and again compensated for by his intuition and by that rare quality in a man of science, an artistic instinct. He may never have set down the theory of the "superstructure" on which Marxists pride themselves, but no Marxist has yet rivalled Beard in those amazing chapters of "The Rise of American Civilization" wherein the cultural superstructures that rose on the economic foundations of American society are portrayed in their development and change as the economic scene evolved. The Marxist statement that "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle" may have sounded too abstruse and Hegelian to Beard, but no American Marxist has approached Beard in his analysis of the class struggles that make up the history of hitherto existing American society.

A PART from the methodological, those sections from Beard's writings included in this book that have the greatest current interest are the foreign policy analyses. Beard was a product of the Progressive and Populist tradition of the turn of the century, and much of the Progressive ideal continued to be his until his death, in a greatly changed nation, in 1948. Of all the Progressive planks, that which he held dearest was anti-imperialism. During the first World War, his stalwart attitude made him the hero of the liberal and radical forces; at the time of the second World War, Beard's pacifism was stigmatized as "isolationism" by the liberals and many of the radicals who had been converted to interventionist doctrines, and he ended his life quite separated from the progressive community which had long been his natural milieu. And yet how prophetically his warnings now read.

Beard saw, in his own lifetime, the consecutive victories of the imperialist ideal, first in the "rounding out" of the continent, then in the Caribbean and Pacific basins, and finally, as he died, apparently on into the vast spaces of China and its contiguous areas. The program of Secretary of State Seward, announced shortly before Beard's birth, seemed to be inexorably destined as the American future. Beard fought it all his life as an unworthy and undesirable course. Yet he hardly ever doubted America's power to carry it out to a Roman end; it was the Roman end that he feared, the legacy of Caesar that he rejected. He died barely too soon to see William H. Seward get his first decisive and irreversible defeat—at the hands of the Chinese Revolution. There is no need to speculate on what would have been Beard's stand as to current dreams of empire; he would have opposed them, as always. But would he also have understood

that American imperialist policy is not merely undesirable, but has now become historically impossible; that this is the age of the twilight of imperialism and a new world is taking shape in which America must find its place?

H. B.

The Grand Gesture and the Rolling Phrase

MAZZINI, by Gaetano Salvemini. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1957, \$3.75.

SALVEMINI'S book, first published in 1905, has been a standard text, although in the intervening years much new research has been done on the subject, particularly in Italy. For its present excellent English translation by I. M. Rawon, the author has inserted some additional material, but in the main the book stands in its original form. In Italy, it has a special value, as the name of Mazzini remains inextricably intertwined with the country's history. Here, the work will be of interest primarily to the student, especially since Salvemini devotes half of his study to a discussion of Mazzini's ideas, which have no special importance in the stream of modern thought.

To most English-speaking people, Mazzini represents a dimly remembered name vaguely associated with figures like Garibaldi, Kossuth, Ledru-Rollin, all part of a distant glittering period of workers' barricades, heroic cavalry charges, violent struggles, intense ideas, passionate declamations, unfathomable revolutionary romanticism. The whole epoch, with its theatrical figures addicted to the grand gesture and the rolling phrase, is utterly remote and indescribably alien to this skeptical and punch-drunk generation. Nationalism, now raging in the colonial countries, has long since divested itself of its revolutionary associations in the Western world.

Mazzini's teachings, a melange derived from Dante, Rousseau and Saint Simon, bolstered with Jacobin rhetoric of a deified People, and with its contradictory cracks and fissures veiled over with a neo-Catholic mysticism, doesn't read too well under the jaundiced eyes of modern criticism. Salvemini tries to be more than fair in his exposition, but when he is all through, he can only conclude: "We need not stop to criticize the thinker in Mazzini thereby making the same mistake that he himself made in regarding himself as a philosopher. Let us rather consider the believer, the apostle, the man of action." Therein, in truth, lies Mazzini's sole importance, a man whose whole life was fanatically devoted to the cause of Italy's independence.

MAZZINI was one of those men of 1848 who had the misfortune of trying to be national Jacobins at a time when the upper middle classes had concluded an

alliance with the older aristocracy and were turning a face of flint toward all varieties of Jacobinism. Through most of his life, he was engaged in secret conspiracies to organize uprisings of the masses, but all the while he was cautioning workers against setting up class organizations or making class demands, as this would break the national unity needed to achieve Italian independence. "Mazzini who, in the political struggle against the Austrians, against the Papacy, and against the despotic rulers of Italy, unceasingly preached the necessity of insurrection, and who was not even averse to regicide, opposed any sort of violence in the field of social conflict and insisted on peaceful and gradual change."

Max Beloff, in his essay reviewing the defeats of the 1848 revolutions, has written that "the intellectuals had failed to understand or use power." The criticism sounds very apt in connection with the worthy rhetoricians and impractical schemers that dominated those nineteenth-century councils. But actually Mazzini, Kossuth and others were not ignorant of the need for power, nor lacking in desire to attain it for their revolutionary purposes. Their political impotence, frothy ideology, and pathetic inadequacy stemmed not exclusively from personal lacks. They were caught in a period of history when the middle classes, for whom they wanted to speak, were no longer revolutionary in their decisive sections, and when the plebian orders, whom they viewed as objects of humanitarian philanthropy, were still a motley, gelatinous, and largely apathetic mass which had not yet metamorphosed into a modern working class. (In France, at the time the most advanced country of Europe, the growth and organization of the working class led to the shattering of the United People into antagonistic elements and the outburst of ferocious battles between the classes.)

That is why Mazzini's insurrections usually reduced themselves to isolated forays, why he continually had to confront his enemies with a broken sword, and why the leadership for Italian independence eventually passed to other hands. The revolutionary representatives of the middle classes in both Italy and Germany having proven helpless to achieve the goal, the job was carried through in the two decades following 1848 from on top, through bureaucratic imposition, diplomatic maneuvers, and national wars, by the aristocrats, Cavour and Bismarck, representing the royal houses of Savoy and Hohenzollern.

SOME writers have described Mazzini as one of the pioneer socialists, but this is an error arising from the fact that his moralizing about justice and improving the lot of the working classes had similarities to the preachings of the Utopian Socialists up to 1848. These early schools of socialism all advocated a union of classes as the solution of the social problem, and saw the new improved social order coming into being when the upper classes became imbued with a better moral spirit, which would presumably take place once the truth of the existing dis-

tress was impressed upon them. So long as this was the going conception of socialism, Mazzini considered himself a socialist. "But little by little as the proletarian movement assumed a more revolutionary character, and the word socialism became removed from the idea of a simple, cooperative form of democracy and grew to be identified with that of the class struggle—as happened during the three years from 1848 to 1851 under the impulse given by Blanqui and Marx—Mazzini became profoundly antagonistic towards this new movement with ideals differing so widely from his own." In 1852, after Louis Napoleon's *coup d'etat*, the whole responsibility for which he attributed to the French socialists' frightening the bourgeoisie into Bonapartism, Mazzini declared, "We must show abhorrence for the *coup d'etat*, but no mercy towards the socialists."

Salvemini is probably correct in crediting Mazzini's insistence on the necessity for reciprocal trust and mutual harmony between the classes with holding back during his lifetime socialist organization in Italy. "Had such teaching emanated simply from the conservative element in the country, it would certainly have been regarded with suspicion by the young intellectuals and the workers, and might well have had the opposite effect from that intended. Coming, however, as it did, from a man whom all were accustomed to consider an inveterate revolutionary, who during his whole life had suffered persecution at the hands of the government, it could not but make a deep impression, and for a long time it served as a barrier to the spread of communist ideas, and facilitated the concentration of all forces on what was the necessity of the movement: united action against the enemies within and without the country, for the conquest of national independence.

"Once this was achieved, the new political situation gave rise to nothing resembling that concord of all classes from which Mazzini expected the solution of the social problem to be evolved. Industrialism, which he believed to be an anomaly appertaining to England and France, quickly developed in Italy. The national fund which was to provide capital for the workers' associations never materialized; Church property was squandered, communal property almost everywhere seized upon, the railways handed over to private companies; the whole basis for Mazzini's humanitarian mission was lacking. Inquiries into agrarian conditions revealed appalling distress, without arousing any resolute action to remedy it; while the system of taxation was contrived as to promote a brutal class war of the strong against the weak. Education for the people was the last thing to interest the new ruling classes. Thus, the new Italy found herself subjected to a rapacious oligarchy intent upon exploiting its political position to its own advantage.

"Mazzini's social theories then revealed themselves as a generous but Utopian dream; they showed the workers the goal, but forbade them to take the only way that led to it. And while the newcomers of the

middle classes, satisfied with national unity, gave their allegiance to the monarchy, those of the lower classes and the young intellectuals went over into the ranks of socialism. . . ."

B. C.

After Reconstruction

THE ORDEAL OF MANSART, by W. E. B. Du Bois. Mainstream Publishers, New York, 1957, \$3.50.

AS he approaches his 90th birthday Dr. Du Bois has given us a new novel, his first in thirty years. What is more, he announces this as the first of a projected trilogy! One has to go back four hundred years to the aged Titian painting his heart out in Venice to find any parallel for such creative enthusiasm in one so full of years.

Dr. Du Bois is internationally famed as one of the greatest scholars and spokesmen produced by the American Negro people. A founder of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, he was the editor of that organization's magazine for some thirty-three years and for more than seventy years he has been in the forefront of the fight for the rights of his people and—concomitantly—for those of all Americans.

In "The Ordeal of Mansart" he has set out to recapture in semi-fictionalized form some aspects of that lifetime of struggle. The book deals with the state of the Negro in the South from 1876 to 1914, with Atlanta, Georgia, the focal point although by no means the only scene of action.

However, Dr. Du Bois should be allowed to explain his own method. "The basis of this book is documented and verifiable fact," he declares in a postscript, "but the book is not history. On the contrary, I have used fiction to interpret those historical facts which otherwise would not be clear. . . . In the great tragedy of Negro slavery in the United States and its aftermath, much of documented history is lacking because of the deep feeling involved and the fierce desire of men to defend their fathers and themselves. This I have sought to correct in my study of the slave trade and of Reconstruction. If I had had time and money, I would have continued this pure historical research. But this opportunity failed and Time is running out. Yet I would rescue from my long experience something of what I have learned and conjectured and thus I am trying by the method of historical fiction to complete the cycle of history which has for a half century engaged my thought, research and action."

LET me say at the outset that "The Ordeal of Mansart" is a puzzling, badly constructed, and often irritating book. As a work of fiction it is a lamentable failure. Characters appear and disappear with little discernible logic. We shift backward and

forward in time with hurricane velocity. Fact, fiction and often plain error are inextricably tangled. Many characters seem to be created, not for any reasons of the story, but solely to be given historically unlikely speeches on one or another aspect of the central problem. Of the protagonist, Manuel Mansart, we learn so little that his decision, at the age of 40 and after some 300 pages, to remain in Atlanta, and fight for his people there seems almost completely unmotivated.

In addition, if the book was edited at all prior to its printing, the job was miserably done. Lest I be accused of unseemly harshness, let me give a few examples.

On p. 160 we are told of Dr. Baldwin, the 75-year-old liberal white educator:

"His theories on race and progress came to be seriously at odds with those of his trustees and many of the alumni. He could not be summarily dismissed from his position; he had become an institution and a legend. It was better to leave him alone," etc., etc.

Eleven years and a hundred-odd pages later we again meet Dr. Baldwin. Although he is now 86, things have not changed much with him (p. 270):

"His theories on race and progress came to be seriously at odds with those of his trustees and many of the alumni. He could not be summarily dismissed from his position," etc., etc. For another paragraph we are treated to a word-for-word repetition of the text on p. 160. And this is only one of several similar instances.

On p. 243 we are told that "In San Francisco in April [1906] earthquake, fire and flood (sic!) engulfed the city, killed thousands of men, women and children." On p. 250 a character tells us that only 500 died. The actual figure was a little over 400.

On p. 237 we are informed that in 1900 "Movies, radios and autos became common."

AND yet these examples of slipshod editing and construction may, in the long run, seem mere cavilling. For the fact remains that, despite its faulty construction, solecisms, and rambling method, "The Ordeal of Mansart" remains almost continually interesting and instructive. If it is accepted for what it really is—a series of historical essays on the post-Reconstruction South—we cannot help but find it fascinating.

Dr. Du Bois revives such long-forgotten figures as Tom Watson, the Georgia Populist leader; his Negro adviser, Sebastian Doyle; Ben Tillman, the white supremacist agitator; Booker T. Washington, and many others. Each of the portraits he gives us is fresh and illuminating, and the chapters on the Atlanta race riots, the rise and fall of Southern Populism and the social structure of the small Southern town, are all superb.

In short, the historical and sociological material is first rate, although not always well organized. By its means we draw fresh insight into the forty years in which the

gains of the Civil War were snatched from the hands of the Negro people and the victory of Sherman at Atlanta ironically converted into a defeat for his cause. No man living so intimately knows the lessons of that period. And, whatever the flaws of his book, we must be grateful to Dr. Du Bois for sharing these lessons with us.

GEORGE HITCHCOCK

Too Much Rhetoric

THE ROSENBERGS—POEMS OF THE UNITED STATES, edited and with an introduction by Martha Millet. Sierra Press, New York, 1957, \$3.

NO matter how worthy the motive behind it, denunciatory verse is apt to make very dull reading. The present volume is a case in point.

Miss Millet has here assembled the contributions of some twenty-five writers who have spoken out against the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. Critical standards for the acceptance or rejection of work submitted appear to have been totally absent. As a result, most of the work included is indescribably bad. In addition, the book's slender size is padded out by contributions from writers—A. B. Magil and Michael Gold are examples—who, whatever their other talents, have never come to my attention as poets before this.

The general tenor of the verse is pompous, declamatory and flatulent. One looks almost in vain for lines which bear the stamp of simple emotion uncolored by rhetoric. One or two competent poets—Alfred Kreyborg and Leslie Woolf Hedley—confine themselves to simple, prosaic statements which stand out in relief from the overblown exhortations of their fellow-contributors. In occasional lines Eve Merriam and Walter Lowenfels show the motive power of genuine poetic expression.

But in its totality the volume does no service to poetry and is unlikely to be of much help to the memory of the Rosenbergs, or to the release of their still-imprisoned co-defendant, Morton Sobell.

A testimonial to Sobell by his wife is included and, for some reason, Miss Millet has also inserted sections of Bartolomeo Vanzetti's last speech to the court. Vanzetti, without making any pretensions to verse, still comes far closer to real poetry than do any of the other contributors.

Miss Millet writes that the editors "saw in the publication of this anthology a means to voice the American conscience, and a way of putting in lasting form what the Rosenberg case meant to those who fought for the lives of these young parents."

I write this notice overlooking Morton Sobell's place of imprisonment on Alcatraz Island. The money and effort allocated to the publication of the present volume would, I think, have been far better spent on a good popular pamphlet to aid in his release.

GEORGE HITCHCOCK

The Drama of Our Times: Abroad, and at Home too!

OUR newsstand sales, as we have reported previously, have increased quite a bit over the past year. We are sure readers would also like to know to what extent newsstand sales vary with the topic featured on our cover.

There is an unmistakable correlation. Issues dealing with Russia, the crisis in world Communism, Hungary, Poland, etc., have sold consistently better, to the extent of 25-30 percent, than issues featuring American topics, such as labor, Negro integration, the economy, etc.

The same has been true of public meetings. When meetings have been called to discuss an aspect of the crisis of Communism, invariably some heated questioners demand to know why we should be criticizing Russia; we ought to be talking about the situation in Mississippi instead. Yet meetings called to analyze the Negro campaign for equality always run quite a bit smaller than those dealing with above-mentioned topics, and, we must add, the objectors who demand discussions of Mississippi instead of Hungary never seem to make it.

Leaving aside the practitioners of the small hypocrisy described above, most of us have had our minds strongly drawn to the dramatic developments of world socialism, and to the extremely important problems posed by them. That is natural, and we intend to continue our analyses and articles in this field. But it's no reason to neglect the Ameri-

can scene, which, once you get well into it, is fascinating and rewarding as well as important for American socialists.

All of this is another way of advising that you read the AMERICAN SOCIALIST regularly, as, properly viewed, happenings in this country are just as dramatic and important as those abroad.

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