

The American
Socialist

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Canadian Case

The action of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee in calling the late Canadian ambassador E. Herbert Norman a Communist aroused widespread indignation. But what the American people should understand is that this subcommittee, the Army, the Navy, and other governmental agencies, have been branding, smearing, and stigmatizing innocent Americans for years with little publicity and with extremely little indignation being expressed.

And what the American people should also understand is that the Eastlands, Jenners, Veldes and McCarthys are not confined to any one committee or even to Congress. Their type and their reckless and arrogant methods are commonplace in high officialdom in Washington.

If the most regrettable suicide of Ambassador Norman should now be the means of showing this whole shameful and un-American "security-loyalty" hocus pocus for what it really is, then the Hon. E. Herbert Norman did not die in vain.

Charles C. Lockwood *Detroit*

As a college student who distributes the *American Socialist* on his campus, I am proud that the American Left boasts such a lively and well-written magazine. Free of sectarianism and its partner, Talmudism, *AS* offers keen and vigorous analysis of the world's problems. Its treatment of socialist theory has done much to offset Stalinist perversions as well as the tract-quoting of various Trotskyist groups whose obsession with guarding the "purity" of Marxist doctrine, though principled, has often led to dogmatism and the stultification of creative thought.

In part of his characterization of the many anti-Stalinist splinter groups, I tend to agree with Robert Claiborne's letter in your April issue. But I believe Mr. Claiborne makes a serious error in putting the mistakes of revolutionary socialists on the same plane as the Stalinists' "mistakes."

Surely it is a truism acceptable to all that "while it is always pleasanter to examine the other fellow's mistakes, it is usually more profitable to examine one's own." However, the "bad mistakes" of the Stalinists constituted betrayals of working classes throughout the world and inhuman atrocities against genuine revolutionary socialists. The mistakes of the anti-Stalinists, on the other hand, consisted of "dogmatism, heresy-hunting, and True Believership," according to Mr. Claiborne. There is clearly a world of difference between these two kinds of "mistakes."

Moreover, the roots of the anti-Stalinist radicals' failure to attract a large following were far from entirely internal as Mr. Claiborne seems to suggest. The American CP during the 1930's represented part of an international movement on the march

throughout the world. It masqueraded as the truest and only defender of the Russian Revolution and its social conquests, and with such a compelling appeal was the most successful (in terms of numbers) among radical parties. In the face of the extensive Stalinist smear machine, besides ruling class opposition, it is a small wonder that any genuine radical tendencies even survived in America. And isolated and attacked as they were, it is understandable that the many splinters were prone to the political maladies for which Mr. Claiborne reprimands them.

Certainly the entire Left can stand much introspection during the present regroupment discussion. Respect for the past, as well as a clear perspective on the future, should be an integral part of this process.

College Student *Ohio*

In response to your fund appeal, I enclose herewith my check. . . . Having long been a supporter of *Monthly Review*, it occurs to me that there is a waste of talent and a loss of efficiency and influence because both magazines are operating in competition in a very limited market instead of combining and working together to publish one bigger and better journal to attract a much larger audience.

Both Braverman and Cochran are fine, lucid writers. So are Huberman and Swezey. Your respective policies (social attitudes, views on Russia, etc.) are about the same. In this day of mergers, consolidations and absorptions in the business world, it becomes increasingly clear that only the big can operate effectively and survive. There is room for all four of you editors (and many more) on one monthly

or semi-monthly that can reach out for one hundred thousand subscribers. That would also yield more support from advertisers, and attract many other fine writers from here and abroad who are disinclined to write for unimportant journals with small circulation. Why not explore the idea? . . .

I. F. Beverly *Hills*

Hopes and Aspirations

Through a friend, I learned about and had the opportunity to read your fascinating magazine. Although I am a socialist of old standing—as long back as I can remember—I have had little, if any, opportunity to carry on and develop my thoughts on the subject since arriving in America from my native Sweden. Therefore it was gratifying to find a magazine like yours, where one can again refresh the almost dying hopes and aspirations of true socialism.

L. S. Bronx

Am enclosing a contribution. . . . Frankly, I can't afford it, but I sure believe in working for a magazine such as yours. As for monthly contributions—well, I'll do what I can whenever I can. I'm a student so it's not too easy. Anyway, you're getting out a fine magazine.

When is the Left going to combine? It's adding fuel to the capitalist fire by being split up. For a starter, why can't *American Socialist*, *Monthly Review*, *National Guardian*, *I. F. Stone's Weekly* get together and put out a magazine? I like your periodical and view but I'm sure the cause of socialism would be furthered if there were one magazine. So what if there's some difference of opinions—that's how we'd learn. At least we'd be stronger, more well known, and probably better off moneywise. As a youngster, I haven't seen the gyrations, battles, or known the score on why radicals act like they do among themselves—but if that's ignorance on my part I'm

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Embarrassment of Riches

WE have had occasion to warn a number of times over the past few years that the economic structure of the country was taking on a dangerous and all-too-familiar lopsidedness. Consumer spending, we stressed, was beginning to flatten out, and its place as spearhead of the boom was being taken by spending for capital goods. In plainer words, as the demand for commodities on the part of the consuming public failed to respond to stimulus, the capacity to produce ever-larger quantities of goods with less and less labor was being constructed.

The economic trends of 1956 and the first quarter of 1957 have borne out these warnings with complete fidelity. The 1956 Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York summarizes: "Early in 1956 . . . major shifts in the pattern of expansion began to develop. Consumer spending on new homes, cars, and certain other durable goods slackened substantially. These easing tendencies in consumer demand were nevertheless fully offset by a remarkably strong expansion of business investment which provided the main generating force for a further growth of output, income, and employment over the course of the year." The Guaranty Trust Company of New York, in the January issue of its monthly *Survey*, went into greater detail:

In 1955 the American consumer was truly king, and it was he, more than anyone else, who shaped the pattern of business. . . . In 1956 some of this exuberance waned . . . Consumer spending continued to be the largest single element of final demand in 1956, but it was no longer the principal factor of dynamism in the economy. Instead, the dynamic role was assumed by busi-

ness investment. The 1955 boom in general economic activity appears to have prompted sharp upward revision in the expansion plans of almost all types of businesses. The curve of investment expenditure turned upward in that year and continued to climb steeply throughout 1956. . . . The annual rate of fixed business investment during the first three quarters of the year ran almost \$7 billion higher than in the corresponding period of 1955. This gain amounted to one-sixth, which is sensational by any standards. And it is particularly noteworthy that this rise in fixed investment accounted for almost a third of the over-all rise in GNP [Gross National Product] between the first three quarters of 1955 and the first three quarters of 1956, despite the fact that the ratio of total fixed investment to total GNP is only about one-tenth. In brief, fixed business investment played much the same role in 1956 as had consumer spending in 1955, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that over-all economic activity would have been much less buoyant in 1956 than it was if this had not been the case. In view of this fact, and also in the light of the strategic importance of investment in the business cycle, it is understandable that some analysts today are concerned over the possible consequences for business in 1957 if investment incentives should wane.

Consumption didn't gain very much during 1956. Retail sales showed up about 3½ percent above the previous year, but if price increases are discounted, very little, if any, gain remains. And, in the first quarter of this year, the same trend prevails. New housing starts, the Labor Department


reports, have culminated a two-year slide by hitting the lowest levels in eight years. Starts in March were down to an annual rate of 880,000, the lowest March since 1949. The total of housing starts for the year is now expected to be about 900,000, which will be the first time since before the Korean War that this total has fallen below one million. In auto, the spring seasonal upturn has failed to materialize for the second year in a row, and earlier estimates of a 6½-million-car year are now being revised in the expectation that 1957 will be no better than 1956's approximately 6-million. The production of major household goods, including furniture, appliances, floor coverings, etc., skidded in January to the lowest monthly total since the recession level of December 1954.

And, while all this has been happening in the consumer-goods field, spending for new plant and equipment continues to soar. According to present estimates, 1957 promises to exceed the record levels of 1956 by 6 or 7 percent. (It should be remembered that a dangerous imbalance between consumption and capacity can be created even without a growth in capital spending, just by capital spending remaining at a high level while consumption fails to grow.)

IT is not our purpose here to concern ourselves with the immediate prospects for the economy. The business analysts contend that, despite the weakness of retail trade, increases in government expenditures plus the continued strength of capital-goods spending will suffice, for the year or so ahead, to keep business at a high level. They may be right. What is of greater and more permanent concern is whether this economic pattern, so characteristic of the advanced stages of a capitalist boom, is not creating an excess productive capacity which will eventually take its revenge.

In the twenties, it is widely recognized, it was this feature of the economy which rendered it highly susceptible to a decline. How much was the excess capacity then? An article in the *Harvard Business Review* (November-December 1955) estimates that manufacturing production in the twenties averaged about 90 percent of capacity, but that estimate seems

CAPACITY AND PRODUCTION



IN the eleven years shown on this chart, manufacturing capacity has doubled (from 75 to 148, taking Dec. 1950 as 100), but production has gone up only 72 percent, according to figures supplied by McGraw-Hill. Operations averaged 93 percent of capacity in Jan. 1946, 94 percent in Dec. 1948, fell to 86 percent in the 1949 recession, rose to 100 percent in the Korean war boom, held at 91 and 93 percent in the two wartime years that followed, and then slid off to 82, 81, and 84 percent in 1953-54-55. In December 1956, production was 80 percent of capacity, the lowest since the war, and capacity is still being added, while consumer buying has stopped rising. The operating rate preferred by manufacturers averages about 89 percent.

too high in the light of the conclusion of the Brookings Institution, in its often-cited study of the 1925-29 period, that production was 80-83 percent of capacity. Whatever the precise figure, the general fact is not in doubt.

What about the situation after World War II? One radical economist got overly radical and worked out that roughly half of productive capacity was not being used in 1952 (*Science & Society*, Fall 1953). He did that by taking 1943, with its double and triple shifts, extra-long hours, and wartime overwork of both men and equipment, as his base. It is true that "excess capacity" is a very elastic concept, and can be defined in many different ways. A socialist economy would find great reserves of capacity that are, in a hundred different ways, wasted under capitalism. But defined from the point of view of its pressure upon business, there was very little unutilized capacity in the seven or eight years following the second World War. This seems to us to be a very important point to grasp, as it accounts in considerable measure for the prolongation of the boom beyond its expected duration.

DURING the depression of the thirties, capital expenditures were

not sufficient to make up for capital depreciation, so that when the war began, the real net value of privately owned structure and equipment was no higher than it had been in 1929 (see the Commerce Department's *Survey of Current Business*, November 1956). A lot of new plants were built by the government during the war, but as the wartime production effort was directed towards the fastest possible output of armaments, and building priorities were hard to come by, much private capital investment continued to be postponed. The war boom was thus somewhat abnormal in not permitting capital expansion as quickly as would be expected at a time when output was rising so phenomenally.

In these circumstances, and especially when one takes into consideration the great outburst of demand in the immediate postwar period, it was natural that excess capacity would not show itself in threatening quantities for a number of years, and the stage was thus set for a prolonged capital-building boom. But "prolonged" is far from meaning "eternal" (as our more impressionable pundits have thought), and the boom is now producing the kind of excess capacity that characterized the twenties.

Figures supplied recently by the

McGraw-Hill Department of Economics bear this out strikingly (see accompanying chart). The McGraw-Hill economists start with the assumption that in December 1950, under the pressure of the Korean war, production was running at 100 percent of capacity. One may quarrel with this; but it is a satisfactory hypothesis for working purposes and shows the trend. After hugging pretty close to capacity for seven years following the war, production began to diverge sharply from it, leaving an increasing gap. In the seven postwar years, well over 90 percent of capacity was in use, but since 1953, only slightly better than 80 percent has been utilized, according to McGraw-Hill.

AS many in the business press have inquired, why should businessmen continue to add capacity at a time when it is clear that consumer demand is not growing at a pace to justify it? Why indeed? Are the corporations so much less intelligent than socialists, or can't they master the tricks of simple arithmetic? The answer is that capitalism is not a planned economy, and it is foolish to speak of it as though it were. Each corporation can plan only within its own limits, and the compulsive drives which dominate

each business firm produce a situation which has not been willed by the business community as a whole, and which, as a matter of fact, is often very much against its wishes.

Although our society has become highly monopolistic, the competitive pressures bearing on each firm, even on the biggest, remain very great. Every businessman is in competition not only with other businessmen, but also with the problems of costs and profit-rates within his own business. A striking picture was drawn recently in an article in *Business Week* (March 23, 1957) on the so-called "profit squeeze." Looking at the table of contents, we read: "Management's No. 1 Worry. Greater volume is yielding a narrower margin of earnings, but businessmen see no solution but to boost volume still higher." The article amplifies the thought: "In the opinion of many businessmen, the trouble is simply one of too much production for the amount of demand, a situation that inevitably leads to depressed prices." And the remedy? "Most companies say they are actually intensifying their programs of expansion and modernization. They see new and more modern equipment as one of the chief ways still open to them in cutting costs, enlarging profits." And again: "They're going ahead with expansion plans, seeking still higher volume."

Each businessman, of course, hopes and strives for a greater share of the market. When asked, in surveys of capital spending, what they expect to be the trend of their own sales, companies respond by saying that they are going ahead on the theory that their own sales will expand faster—many say three times as fast!—than those of their competitors.

There doesn't seem to be any way that this tendency of capitalism, first noted by Marx and repeatedly verified by experience, can be rectified within the bounds of the system. Thus we have the spectacle of the three major automobile firms, already plagued by 25-30 percent excess capacity, feverishly competing to expand their plants, increase efficiency, and get in the position of being able to produce still more cars with still fewer workers—and this at a time when there are already 100,000 permanently displaced auto workers in Michigan. The

sad state the industry is heading for can be seen in the super-saturated refrigerator line, where, as Harold B. Dorsey, head of Argus Research Corp. recently pointed out, we have "the capacity to build 10 million refrigerators per year, whereas the economy can absorb barely 4 million."

WHAT then is the meaning and outcome of our growing excess capacity? While the legendary visitor from Mars might think the capacity to produce far more than we are consuming to be a happy situation, capitalism here again works its peculiar genius for turning things into their opposite. A quotation from Alvin H. Hansen (a leading American Keynesian economist) reproduced in the January-February *Harvard Business Review* formulates the idea cogently. (This quotation was the subject of lengthy refutation in that issue of the *Review*, but Hansen's antagonist doesn't even catch the thought, let alone refute it.)

Investment is the key to both short-run stability and long-term growth. If the rate of investment high enough to maintain full employment—historically about 16 to 17 percent of GNP—could be maintained indefinitely, we would have achieved both stability and a reasonable guaranty of long-term growth. Unfortunately, however, the rate required to maintain full employment is not maintainable. This is the dilemma. A boom level of investment, maintained for several years, causes the stock of capital to increase so rapidly that further investment eventually becomes unprofitable. It is this that sounds the death knell of every boom.

But, it will be objected, how about the huge armaments budget? Will not that, and other forms of federal spending currently in effect, prolong the boom indefinitely? We would be far from minimizing the effects of the war budget upon the economy, but there is no point in making a mystique out of it. The spending is, after all, of a definite and ascertainable size and effect, and has become pretty much of a constant in the economy. Our big federal budget had its greatest

impact in the years when it was a *growing* portion of the national product, and also in the years when it was financed partly by large budget deficits, so that extra purchasing power was added to the income stream greater than the amount removed by taxation. Beyond that, it has had another effect: The high tax rate on corporate profits and on upper-class incomes slowed down the rate of capital accumulation. In addition to devouring consumer income, high taxes also devour large amounts of speculative capital thrown off by the boom, and have therefore probably postponed the time when excess capacity becomes a big problem. But that postponement is drawing to its end.

THE point of all this is that capitalism's deadliest economic contradiction—between the limited growth of consumer spending and the sky's-the-limit growth of producing capacity—has not been resolved by recent changes in the economy. It means that we are in the advanced stages of a capitalist boom, and that, as Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey recently told the Joint Congressional Committee on the Economic Report: "Every boom contains the seeds of a depression."

What fruit those seeds will bear is another, and as yet unclarified question. When this present boom begins to bust, a great political contest will undoubtedly be set in motion between "welfare statists" and our business Bourbonry. No one can pretend to know in advance the outcome of that contest, what efforts will be made to slow down an economic decline, and what effect these as-yet-undetermined methods will have. An economic decline can be sublimated into other forms. Or, a political struggle can alter the shape of the economy far more than it has been changed until now. Or, contrary to the expectations of the economists, an unchecked depression of unforeseen depth could grip the nation. These are all possibilities of various degrees of probability.

But it is important to keep in mind that we are approaching a showdown in the economy, and not get lulled to sleep by fairy tales about our "peoples' capitalism."

The history of Zionism and the political structure and problems of modern Israel, presented from a Zionist viewpoint.

What Zionism Wants

by Larry Hochman

ZIONISM, or Jewish nationalism, originated in nineteenth-century Central and Eastern Europe. Out of the great current of revolutionary thought generated by the national uprisings of the 1830's and 40's came the first Zionist theorists. Financed largely by Baron de Rothschild, a group of Russian Jewish students known as BILU began the first Jewish return to Palestine since the Jewish expulsion some 2,000 years earlier.

Theodore Herzl, the first great political Zionist, a prominent Austrian lawyer and journalist, became converted to Zionism under the impetus of the Dreyfus affair. He wrote a pamphlet called "The Jewish State" (1896) maintaining that the Jews constituted a nation and that Jewish national life must be renewed. Less concerned with immediate immigration, he attempted to obtain a political setup which would permit an unhindered immigration to Palestine. To this end Herzl successfully negotiated with many of the most powerful representatives of European governments including the Turkish Sultan, who then controlled Palestine. These agreements allowed Jews to enter Palestine and buy land. Land was purchased through the Jewish National Fund (JNF), an organization of the colonists, from the Turkish Government and from Arab landlords living in Turkey and elsewhere. At no time was land bought upon which Arabs had been living, and no Arabs were directly displaced right up until 1948. One of the conditions for using JNF land (which was leased to the settlers for 99 years) was that no labor be hired to work upon the land. These settlements and those which followed were organized as collectives.

Some thousands of Jewish families had remained in Palestine all through the twenty centuries of the general Jewish dispersion. Spurred on by the anti-Jewish pogroms of the 1870's and 80's, the first wave of Jewish immigrants came to Palestine from Poland and Russia. This brought the Jewish population of Palestine up to about 50,000 by 1897. The second wave, between 1900 and 1914, came also from Eastern Europe—about 40,000 Jews. Whereas

Mr. Hochman, a Chicago Zionist-socialist, is at present on a trip to Europe and the Middle East.


the first group of immigrants was motivated by catastrophe, the second was motivated by conscious political Zionism. From this group come most of the leaders of present-day Israel. The third wave came between the two wars so that by 1939 there were half a million Jews in Palestine.

The ideologists of the second immigration came from the Russian socialist movement. Many of them later participated in the 1917 revolutions. The outstanding leaders were Vladimir Medem, who argued that a socialist national community of Jews should be set up in Russia, and those favoring Palestine: Haym Zhitlovsky, Nachman Syrkin and Ber Borochov. These maintained that the economic, social and cultural differences of the Jews from the majority inhabitants of every country made their life abnormal. Concentration in Palestine would solve this problem and Palestine must, furthermore, be built as a socialist state from the start.

The socialist pioneers wanted to create ties with the Arab majority. Their attempts were fairly fruitful on the level of Arab villages in proximity to Jewish settlements. But this level of contact was insufficient to solve the one overriding problem: the integration of a national movement of modern European background into an underdeveloped Arab world. What the rural settlements could accomplish with considerable success the Arabs and Jews of the cities often could not. Inevitable conflicts arose. After 1917, the fact of British overlordship in Palestine, the question of a future Arab, Jewish or binational state, and the existence of feudal Arab economies in the surrounding regions made a smooth integration impossible.

THE theory of Zionism starts from the premise that the dispersed Jews throughout the world constitute one nation. This is not the place to thrash out this premise. Nevertheless, one incontestable fact stands out: After a dispersion of 2,000 years there are still people in many countries of the globe who call themselves Jews. Why? Other peoples were driven from their lands and no longer exist. Where are the Phoenicians, the Assyrians? Some who regard Jewishness mainly as a religion will contend that a supernatural "Messianic Ideal" held the Jews to their separate identity. But other now-extinct peoples had their own strong beliefs and rituals. It is too much to believe that a people, scattered and without inter-communication through centuries in widely diversified cultures, would retain an identity on the strength of religious values alone.

There must have been another element which kept this people from assimilating out of existence. This element is that the Jews in whatever country they found themselves retained—in part were forced to retain—a separate *economic* identity. Through the centuries when humanity made its living chiefly in agriculture, the Jews were prohibited from owning or working land. Being displaced from the then-thriving commercial Mediterranean area, the Jews were confined to mercantile and artisan tasks. The Jews were first introduced into Europe as slaves. But other conquered peoples brought into Greece and Rome as slaves were made slaves on the soil. The



Jews were made slaves in the mercantile centers.

A traditional occupation pattern thus emerged for Jews and this pattern separated the Jews from the majority populaces. Jews were regarded, and regarded themselves, as strangers. The persecution that Jews encountered followed from the fact that they were an easily persecuted group. If a scapegoat is required, it is easiest to arouse passions against a group of "strangers." In turn, this persecution further strengthened the separate Jewish identity.

BOROCHOV coined the expression "conditions of production," including in it the Marxian "relations of production." He held that the Jews in every country found themselves in a common "condition of production"—that of being peripheral to the economy of that country; being dispensable; being part of what later became known as the middle class. Borochov claimed that one condition for a people being a nation is that the people have common conditions of production. (The other condition for nationhood is a common feeling of kinship.) The production of a normal capitalist nation is carried on in a territory in which upper, middle and lower classes struggle within one economic unit. By Borochov's reasoning, the Jews are a nation, but a "sick" nation. His "cure" for this sick nation is for the Jews to have a common territory where *the normal division of occupations* must come about. To further this aim, shopkeepers and students of Russia transformed themselves into farmers and workers in Palestine.

Obviously all Jews do not regard themselves as part of a Jewish nation and this is not an attempt to convince them otherwise. What should be recognized, though, is that there has been and continues to be a world-wide Jewish problem and that many Jews have attempted a national solution to this problem and that they are within their human rights in so attempting. The idea that socialism solves all national problems may be correct in some ideal world that we do not yet live in. But after 40 years of socialism in Russia there remains a physical and cultural Jewish problem. There was an early Soviet attempt to set up an autonomous Jewish republic in Birobijan. But there was no attraction to this territory for Russian Jewry. Then, Birobijan was so neglected by the Soviet Government that many of the few thousand Jews who did go there returned. About all that remains of this venture is the song "Hey, Zhankoye" which, ironically, means "thank you," the idea being "thank you, dear Stalin, for solving the Jewish problem with this barren piece of wasteland!"

A Jew certainly has the prerogative of assimilating into his nation of birth or residence if he is allowed to do so.

Perhaps in the U.S. and other places he can do so successfully. It should be remembered that the pre-Hitler German Jews were an assimilated group, or so they believed. Nevertheless, it should be accepted as a just aspiration that some Jews seek nationhood as a solution for their physical existence, their existence as a people and for the perpetuation of their culture.

POLITICAL forces in the Zionist movement and in Israel today cover a wide spectrum. With the creation of Israel, two labor parties emerged. The majority party, Mapai, is molded similar to the British Labor Party. Mapai is a social-democratic party with considerable strength in the rural settlements and overwhelmingly entrenched in the urban working class, also drawing ample support from some segments of the middle class. The leaders of Mapai were, by and large, the leaders of the Jewish Agency, the World Zionist Congress, and other bodies which carried on the political struggle for the creation of the state. Ben Gurion and Sharett are among them. One of the outstanding labor leaders of Mapai, a staunch proponent of Arab-Jewish friendship and a man who would have been one of today's key personalities, was Haym Arlosoroff, tragically assassinated in 1929.

Mapai "inherited," so to speak, the government of Israel. Before the birth of the state, Mapai called for a Jewish State in all Palestine but it quickly supported the UN partition plan of 1947 when it was proposed. Mapai is the controlling force in the Histadrut, the federation of labor. The Histadrut has created large cooperative industrial and commercial enterprises of its own. These enterprises comprise a considerable portion of Israel's economy—Solel Boneh is the largest contracting and building concern in the Near East, with about 25,000 workers. The Histadrut has holdings in transport, textiles, chemicals, shoes, baked goods, and other enterprises.

Along with all the other Zionist parties, Mapai calls for the ingathering of the Jews to Israel. Internally, Mapai's program includes a state-planned economy based on "constructive private enterprises." Under the Mapai governments, foreign investors in Israel have had many advantages bestowed upon them. On paper, the Mapai foreign policy calls for non-identification with any bloc. In actuality, the Mapai policy has evolved to identification with the United States. Considering Israel's economic and political situation, it is easy to criticize this policy but difficult to offer decent alternatives.

Like any long-entrenched party, Mapai has built up a massive and cumbersome bureaucracy. In the first Israel elections in 1949 Mapai polled 38 percent of the vote, but this declined to 33 percent in 1955.

The left wing of the Labor Zionists joined with Hashomer Hatzair, a collective-oriented Marxist group, to form the Mapam party. The bulk of the strength of Mapam comes from the most completely collective settlements. Such a collective is known as a "kibbutz." Mapam draws minimal support from the cities. Hashomer Hatzair had called for and worked towards the creation of a bi-national, Arab and Jewish, state in Palestine.

ONE of Mapam's main principles is the complete integration of the Israeli Arabs into the society. Mapam members were the backbone and leaders of the Palmach—the shock troops of the makeshift Israeli army in the 1948 war, which bore the brunt of many of the battles. Palmach officers had no separate quarters or identifying insignia. There was no saluting, and the officers did not carry pistols. The organization was disbanded after the war.

Mapam garnered 16 percent in 1949 and 13 percent in 1951. Between the '51 and '55 elections there was a split in Mapam, and a new group called Ahdut Ha-avoda was formed. Among other reasons for the split, Ahdut Ha-avoda was desirous of much less identification with the Soviet Union than Mapam displayed at that time. (At no time was Mapam the handmaiden of the USSR, although its sympathies lay there. For this role Israel has its own minute Communist Party.)

A smaller split occurred in Mapam in 1952. As a consequence of the Czech trials a Mapam member, Mordecai Oren, was imprisoned. Mapam condemned the anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic nature of the trials and placed no credence in the confession that Oren was forced to make. (Oren, recently released, verified that the confession was forced.) A small number of people in Mapam, with Moshe Sneh as leader, justified the whole trial, double-talked away the obvious anti-Semitism, and "proved" that Oren was truly guilty. This group was expelled and later joined the Communists. The 1955 election results were: Mapam 7½ percent, Ahdut Ha-avoda 8 percent and the Communists 5 percent.

Mapam's position has been in consistent opposition to the idea of a preventive war against Egypt and the Arab States. When Ben Gurion brought his Sinai plans to the cabinet last October, Mapam (part of the present government) voted against them. But when Mapam found itself alone in opposition it decided to support the military action rather than to bring about a government crisis by resigning. Mapam leader Meir Yaari explained his party's position as follows: "Mapam . . . believes that from the long view . . . even a shaky peace is preferable. But the die was cast, and when it happened, we . . . fulfilled our vow to be with the people defending its soil and with . . . the Defense Army of Israel."

The aforementioned Ahdut Ha-avoda party appears to be the most rapidly growing party in Israel today. The party strongly supported the activist retaliatory policy of the government in which it is a participant. Led by young, vigorous, and competent people, it is conceivable that Ahdut Ha-avoda will become the dominant force when Ben Gurion steps down.

The largest anti-labor party in Israel is Herut. Whereas

Herut received only 6½ percent of the vote in 1951, its vote jumped to 12½ percent in 1955 due to the chauvinism engendered, in some Jewish circles, by seven years of tension. Herut is strongly anti-Arab, anti-Histadrut, and in favor of an economy based solely on private initiative. Herut calls for a Jewish State on both sides of the Jordan River. For some time Herut has urged a preventive war.

HERUT is the political party that grew out of the former underground terrorist movement Irgun Zvai Leumi. The guiding spirit of the Irgun was Vladimir Jabotinsky, in whose works are found glowing praise of Mussolini and his corporate state. In the mandate days, the Irgun carried out terrorist raids against the British and against the Arabs. It also tried to break up Histadrut meetings and, at times, to break strikes. At that time, there existed the Haganah (Jewish self-defense), which effectively opposed the British by bringing in illegal immigrant ships, establishing new settlements, and initiating well-disciplined raids against British arsenals and such. Haganah did not engage in individual acts of terror. The Irgun had only a fraction of the strength of Haganah, but the bombastic nature of its bravado was well-publicized by its supporters in the U.S.

In April 1948 the Irgun perpetrated a massacre in the Arab village of Deir Yassin near Jerusalem. Added to the personal tragedy of this act was the political tragedy that this was the friendliest Arab village in the area. Only a short time before, the leaders of this village had refused Jordan's Arab Legion permission to occupy their village.

After this incident the Provisional Government, led by Ben Gurion, outlawed the Irgun and ordered its members to place themselves under Haganah control. But the Irgun made one last bid for power when it tried to bring to Israel a private arms ship during the first truce of the 1948 war. The ship was discovered by Haganah and ordered to surrender. When the order was ignored, a pitched battle ensued in Tel Aviv harbor and the Irgun was destroyed and the ship sunk.

The General Zionists are the more moderate right-wing party, representing the biggest industrialists and citrus planters. Their chief demand has been for an end to all economic controls. Their electoral strength dropped from 16½ percent in 1951 to 11 percent in 1955. This decline largely accounted for Herut's rise.

The strength of a coalition of religious parties has remained at about 13 percent. However, the influence of this bloc upon the country is far out of proportion to its strength. Mainly out of deference to the religious sentiment of many U.S. Jews, the religious forces in Israel have been able to impose their will on the majority of Israel. Fearing that funds from the U.S. would dwindle if the demands of the religious were rejected, Mapai has effected a situation where, among other things, public transport does not operate on Saturday (except in Haifa which, as the strongest labor town, did not allow this restriction), and all marriages must be performed by the rabbinate.

Of the remaining 8 or 10 parties (including 3 Arab parties for those Arabs who are not in the other parties) only the Communist Party is worthy of mention. It is



very small; its present strength is 5 percent of the vote. Although this figure represents its rock bottom support, it likewise amounts to about its "rock top" strength. It has few real roots in Israel and, standing in opposition to Zionism, its potential for growth is limited. Shortly before the Egyptian-Czech arms deal of 1955 was announced, there were rumors in Israel about this transaction. The Communists squelched these rumors with a blurb to the effect that Israel's socialist friends would never endanger her by selling arms to a hostile neighbor. When the deal was confirmed, the Communist paper announced that the arms sale would stabilize conditions in the area!

IN 1947, the UN adopted the plan for the partition of Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states. The Jewish Agency announced its plans to declare the State of Israel on May 15, 1948. From November 1947 on, the Jewish community was attacked, mainly by the Palestinian "National Liberation Army." The British, in their waning days of power in Palestine, ignored the attacks and continued their search of the Jewish settlements for Haganah arms. The Labor Government administration carried out the 1939 Chamberlain White Paper restricting Jewish immigration to 1,500 a month right to the last day of its control on May 14. At the same time Britain refused to allow the Jews, in the face of Arab attacks from within and threats from outside, to organize for defense. But Britain did countenance the occupation of parts of Palestine by the British-armed-and-led Arab Legion of Jordan. Britain obviously decided that the best way to secure her oil and other interests in the Arab world was to ensure a still-born Israel.

In one day (May 15) both the government and army of Israel were organized. On that same day, seven Arab nations attacked Israel—the most important being Jordan, Syria, Egypt and Iraq. Israel not only survived the attack but ended up with more territory than was allotted to it.

Since the provisional days there have been three elections in Israel. Until the 1955 elections, the governments were coalitions mainly composed of Mapai and, at different times, the General Zionists and the religious bloc. The first government disbanded the Palmach, to Mapam's displeasure, and established a regular national army—a process that had started during the war. This changed the character of the army and, to some extent, the character of the whole country. The present government is the first labor coalition, including Mapam and Ahdut Ha-avoda. Mapam entered the government with reservations on foreign and economic policy.

THE chief restrictions imposed upon the Israeli Arabs are those of travel and curfew. All Arabs must obtain permits to change their residence and Arab villages along

the borders are subject to curfew regulations. Arabs do not serve in the army, with the exception of one Arab sect—the Druse—which has volunteered to accept army service. In other respects the Arabs receive equal legal treatment. Arab workers, for example, must receive Histadrut wage scales. Segments of the Jewish population do, however, discriminate against Arabs in everyday life.

No socialist can deny that the Arabs have just national aspirations: independence, health, prosperity. Many new Arab nations have arisen—Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Sudan. Most Israelis welcomed these new states. These just aspirations need not be endangered by the existence of Israel. The desire to eliminate Israel is *not* a just aim. The uprooted Jewish people, many of whom have been in continuing need of a haven, must be allowed the luxury of a long-delayed return to their land—not at the expense of the other inhabitants of that land but in cooperation with them. The main responsibility for the historic lack of cooperation rests elsewhere than upon the Zionists. The foremost guilt lies with imperialist power in the Near East.

There is a complexity of reasons why the Arabs themselves have not made peace either with Israel or with the Jewish pioneers that preceded it. These range all the way from the desirability of using the Jews as a convenient scapegoat on whom to channel the emotions of their miserable subjects, to the fear of competition on the part of Israeli capitalism against nascent Arab industry.

Is it possible that Nasser and others really believe that Israel is an imperialist pawn? Some of Israel's votes in the UN on colonial questions would seem to indicate this. Israel deserves criticism on this voting record even though it is not hard to imagine what pressures were put upon her. But what these Arabs do not realize (or perhaps they do) is that they are *forcing* Israel to play this role since Israel cannot stand alone economically. Israel has stood alone politically and with unhappy results. Were Israel allowed peace there would be no danger to the Arabs and there would have been no action last October.

It is not in Israel's power to bring about a settlement alone. Israel has offered peace to the Arabs with no success. Israel has attempted to establish normal relations with Asia but has met response only from Burma. Israel could have aided the situation by a better treatment of her Arab minority, by more far-sighted stands in the UN and so forth. But the solution to the problem lies with forces outside Israel and mainly, perhaps, with the Asian democracies. There is some hope in this direction as evidenced by this statement by R. S. S. Gunewardene, Ceylonese ambassador to the U.S. in an American Forum discussion (November 11) with New Zealand's Munro and Israel's Eban: "I assure my colleague from Israel that the Asian nations are very greatly pained about the state of affairs that have existed for a number of years between the Arab states and Israel. A good many of us would have been glad to assist Israel and we also think that that fact, of course, has to be realized and we have to go on a basis of equality to all states and it is necessary to bring them all around together for a conference and have a negotiated settlement."

A Comment on "Socialist Revival"

by Hal Harper

I WAS deeply impressed by Joseph Starobin's article, "Toward a Socialist Revival" in the March issue of the *American Socialist*. I have been thinking for years in terms of an indigenous American Left, but I went along, withstanding the pushings of a tight bureaucracy, until 1949, when I saw there was no hope for the mechanistic structure which had been built.

But I'm glad to know that there are thousands of other people who have made no surrender of convictions, and that some of these are nuclei of "hundreds of well-defined groups of socialist-minded citizens." Some of these groups may well be "twilight" manifestations, as suggested in Mr. Starobin's article. Far more, I dare to hope, are symbols of some autumnal morning in this late season of the capitalist order. All of them, I know, are functioning on democratic and honest levels, without being crushed beneath a pyramid of "buros," "commissions," and the other ritualistic manifestations of what seems to me now to have been a highly orthodox, if anti-supernatural, church.

I doubt very much if we can be effective by pitching our approach to Americans in terms of the old radical slogans which once echoed across our frontiers, for the "green years" of America are gone with the buffalo and the homesteaders. I grew up, partially anyhow, in the old Debs movement of the Southwest, and trapped prairie dogs for a bounty of a nickel a head to help keep the old *Appeal to Reason* going. In that era of my boyhood, before World War I, the grassroot radical tradition was still strong in our country. But how weak that tradition has become is aptly illustrated by the pitiful vote that Henry Wallace and the Progressive Party polled in 1948—and by the increasing shift of population since 1920 from agrarian to urban areas.

We "old socialists" can be a great help to the emerging new American Left if we can function in it without imposing upon its eventual structure and platform our own nostalgia for an America where simplicity was a token of both collective and personal relationships, where the suburb had not eclipsed the village, and where the huge maws of the capitalist-type city had not swallowed up all that seemed to be so typically and graciously "native." Hence a new American Left must not attempt to return to yesterday. It must understand the significance of such dynamic events as the Montgomery bus strike and the rise of a united labor movement. All of which is prefatory to just what is the basic function of the Left.

Hal Harper is the pen name of a Brooklyn newspaperman and author.

I feel that it must resolve first and primarily to make socialism again a respected and accepted trend of thinking in American life. For a whole generation, due to the peculiar tactics of the Communist Party and its hegemony over the Left, the process of education for socialism has been sadly, inexcusably neglected. The leaders of that party deployed their members into all sorts of organizations which were already filling the purposes for which they had been established. The result was that socialism itself became discredited as a potential of society, all the more so because the American Communists were required to follow every bend and twist, every gyration and sophomoric pontification, of the neo-czars of the Kremlin.

WITHIN limits, therefore, I lean toward the idea expressed in Mr. Starobin's article of a Fabian Society—though that term may have unfortunate connotations among militant socialists. I preferred John Gates' concept of a political education and action association. But with either form, there is a danger of having the organization turn into a more intellectualized version of the SLP, whose orators always make the same speech, as Horatio Alger always wrote the same book. Somewhere along the line, tutelage must pass into action. But, recognizing this peril, we may be able to avoid it. I hope so,



because I have no wish to see a reincarnation of the "parlor Bolsheviks" of the twenties.

So far as the Russian Revolution is concerned, we need not, with a proper appraisal of history, "repudiate" it any more than we do the French Revolution. The weird psycho-pathology of a Stalin equates with that of a Bona-

parte. Stalinism was certainly to the international socialist revolution what Bonapartism was to the earlier capitalist revolution: a deviation toward Pareto glossed over by solemn and didactic quotations from Marx. Would we scrap the gains of the people in the bourgeois revolution because of Bonaparte? Would we deny the significance of socialist forms, however twisted, however immature, that were evolved in spite of Stalin? In each case, I think the answer has to be an emphatic no!

Everything has not been lost, everything is yet to be gained. All that we did on positive levels in earlier years has passed into the continuity of history, so that lamentations of defeat are unjustified. Within that perspective I feel that many of the ex-members of organizations and sects of the past will be vital members of a reconstituted American Left, though they will not be the whole show.

Do We Need a Different Label?

by Arthur Wallace Calhoun

I pondered . . . how men fight and lose the battle, and the thing that they fought for comes about in spite of their defeat, and when it comes turns out not to be what they meant, and other men have to fight for what they meant under another name.

William Morris

A RECENT British visitor to Pittsburgh declared that much of what has been done by way of making that city over would in Britain be called socialism, whereat the Pittsburgher said that one can get away with anything if he does not call it *that*.

Many seem to be satisfied on such a basis. H. G. Wells imagined a future Bank Holiday, on which a man at leisure would stroll into the British Museum and come upon shelves of books with "Socialism" in the names. "Socialism?," quoth he, "I wonder what that might be." Pulling out sundry books and reading, he began to beam: "Socialism! Why, that's what we have now!"

Would it, indeed, be? Or does the victory consist in the explicit triumph of a cause that has never lost its identity? That is to say, is not socialism a specific state of mind more than it is an external setup? And is not that why we have no socialist movement in the United States?

Even old crusaders take comfort in the thought that the Republicans and Democrats have delivered the goods ordered. Meanwhile, has not the word "socialism" become meaningless, partly because of the misuse by the opposition and partly by reason of bungling by the ostensible comrades? Is there anywhere in the world today a party entitled to the name "socialist" except the Socialist Labor Party? There is good reason to think that the word itself is hopelessly lost, incapable of being retrieved for any constructive use.

Dr. Calhoun, who served as Director of Studies in the famous Brookwood labor college at Katonah, wrote "A Social History of the American Family," "The Social Universe," and other social studies and labor-education works.

"Democracy" has likewise become what T. R. used to call a "weasel word." Historically it has everywhere signified the device by which the business interests established and maintained their rule, and its sentimental use for other purposes merely helps confirm that variety of sovereignty. We shall have to find another word to designate "government of the people, by the people, for the people" and leave "democracy" to the capitalists who invented it.

FRANCES Willard, whom most remember for her opposition to alcohol, was really a devotee of the labor movement and of socialism. Even alcohol she set in its place as an incident in an exploitative culture and she looked to the establishment of a world-wide cooperative commonwealth owning resources and industries and operating them for the common good, whereby incidental evils would be eliminated. What she wanted at the moment was a Commonwealth Party.

Now that is a hallowed name since the days of Cromwell, and states still cherish it, as in The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, The Commonwealth of Virginia. I even remember that an agrarian rising in colonial South Carolina was ascribed to "Commonwealth agitators from New England!" Frances Willard was a Commonwealth agitator from Illinois. In recent years, moreover, there have been at least two attempts to change the name of the Prohibition Party to Commonwealth Party, with a socialist program setting alcohol in proper perspective. Very possibly a Commonwealth movement is what is needed to cut across old loyalties and by-pass semantic obstructions.

As for concepts, "ownership" is rather technical and sterile. Hitler was in a measure right when he refused to boggle over title-deeds but insisted on the *control* he wanted, as are the Single Taxers, who won't fuss over ownership of land but will merely appropriate all its earning power. It is not necessary for the air to be owned, or the sunshine either, and as industrial equipment becomes superabundant the concept of ownership will fade as over against control and administration. To ask who owns TVA is a technical question, as it would be to ask who owns the ocean.

Maybe, then, the concept of proprietorship is one to be sidetracked in favor of administrative issues. If so, the verbiage of the Commonwealth movement may be unlike that of the old socialist movement even though the principle and purpose remain as they were. Such questions will bear investigation. It will do no good, however, to apply the name socialism or any other name to everything we admire.

William Morris had something, but it is too soon to say just what. Certainly the "socialist" governments today are not what the former fighters "meant," and it remains for "other men . . . to fight for what they meant under another name." Forces can not be rallied without a name and an emblem. When all the old names have been irretrievably spoiled we fall into the mood of the Psalmist: "When the foundations are torn down, what has the righteous done?" It may be arrogance to plume ourselves on our own rightness, and the answer of humility to the question is, "Not much!"

A quick tour of Mexican politics reveals no McCarthyism, but lots of pressure from the U.S., pressure which is hard to resist.

South of the Border

by Harvey O'Connor



MEXICO is a poor country. It lacks capital for export, hydrogen bombs, atomic submarines and intercontinental guided missiles. It also lacks political prisoners, guilt by association, spy scares, Smith Act trials, informers and Joe McCarthy.

There really aren't enough *frijoles* and *tortillas* to go around, but nevertheless Mexico has no McCarran-Walter Act to keep foreigners out. As a matter of fact there are some 30,000 or more Spanish Loyalists there, more than 10,000 refugees from United Fruit's Dullesized Guatemala, and hundreds more from Venezuela, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Colombia and Nicaragua. After Perón fell, the exile population thinned a bit as Argentines sped homeward, but that loss is balanced by the influx of refugees from the land of the free and the home of the brave, unwilling longer to breast the torments of the un-American and Internal Security committees on Capitol Hill. Quite proudly the land of the Eagle and the Serpent can boast that none of its sons or daughters lives "desterrado" in exile. The standard of living is rather low but the standards of freedom fly high.

Readers of the *American Socialist* may well pardon my curiosity about a Mexican McCarthy. Surely somewhere in the Republic lurk characters comparable. But no, there is no un-Mexican Activities Committee in either the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies. Nobody makes a career, or even a living, by putting the finger on former friends and associates. There is no political capital to be earned by calling former President Cardenas, recipient of the Stalin Peace Prize, a Red. Mexico's most famous Communist, Diego Rivera, has just celebrated his 70th birthday and all Mexico, from high Government dignitaries down to the lowly *campesino*, felt their country honored to harbor such an artist, and proclaimed that

Harvey O'Connor's most recent book in a long and widely read series is "The Empire of Oil." He writes regularly for the American Socialist. This article is the fruit of a recent trip to Mexico.

fact. The nation was pained, but not too surprised, when the Governor of Lower California, who has been fighting vice in Tijuana, was stopped at the border and denied admittance to the United States because, as the *San Diego Union* said, he might be a Red. The Mexicans have a word for it: "macartismo."

The staff members of *Excelsior*, the *New York Times* of Mexico, are not haled into court for contempt of Congress. Every political tendency from fascist to communist may publish its own paper. *La Voz de Mexico*, a tiny tabloid voicing the official Communist position, takes its place on the stands with the dozen or more dailies, mostly subsidized, published in Mexico City. A half dozen politics-cum-sex weeklies, venturesome ideologically, typographically and pictorially, with names ranging from *The Hour* and *Today* through *Tomorrow* and *The Week* to *Always!* cover the political spectrum. One and all, they had a field day when it was discovered that some hotels catering to the Yankee dollar were barring U.S. Negroes.

THESE evidences of freedom flourish in a one-party state. The Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI, residuary legatee of what is left of the Revolution) is the party in Mexico. To be sure, there is the Nationalist Action Party (PAN), representing the conservative and Catholic tendencies, and the Popular Party (PP), leftist. But their votes neither count nor are counted—much. Magnanimously, after the elections are over, PRI allots a few seats in Congress to PAN and PP to show that there are no hard feelings.

In Mexico the President reigns. He is the one untouchable whom no newspaper or writer may name in vain (like Eisenhower?). In the '*mística de la Revolución*' he is the symbol of national sovereignty, above the sordid conflict. While he reigns, as in the case of former President Alemán (1946-1952), none may mention his role in the corruption from which he profits. Perturbed by the flagrant grafting under Alemán, the Elder Statesmen of the

nation comprising mainly the other former Presidents, chose Ruiz Cortines, known for his probity if nothing else much, as successor. Ruiz Cortines now reigns for his six-year term, and when he visits the West Coast, as he did recently to bless new public works, all the press, from right to left, bow low in homage. Their columns may splutter in indignation against policies of his Ministers, against the penetration of Yankee capital in industry and commerce, against the widening chasm between rich and poor, but the debate never touches the austere person of *El Presidente*.

The current question is, who will succeed Ruiz Cortines in 1958? Ordinarily, discussion would be rife and candidates busy, even now. But *El Presidente* has decreed that speculation about his successor, designated as 'futurismo,' would unsettle the nation. The situation was pointed up by *Punto*, a lively weekly, when it commented that the voice of the President seemed to be the voice of God. An atomic energy treaty with the United States awaits confirmation. But the Senators are urged not to debate the treaty but merely to ratify it, because no one would wish to question the patriotism of the President who negotiated it.

The next President, it can be said now, will be a member of The Party (PRI). He will be selected from a slate of nominees by the former Presidents along with a very few of the other men of highest rank in the PRI hierarchy. This is known as "imposition" and is the method used to select governors of the states and members of Congress as well as mayors. The people are permitted later to ratify these choices.

THE silver cloud of liberty, it seems, can have a somber lining. *Punto* complains that "liberty of expression is purely theoretical," that elections don't count, that government jobs go to those chosen by "the mafia," in the same issue which carries a gaudy picture of *El Presidente*.

Appearances can be deceiving. There is plenty of freedom of expression, of a kind. The press was nearly unanimous in condemning the invasions both of Egypt and Hungary. The extermination of the Guatemalan govern-



ment by Secretary Dulles was almost universally condemned. Had not the Arbenz regime collapsed suddenly from internal treachery, the struggle in the little Central American republic might have changed the course of Mexican politics. In domestic affairs there is a constant drumfire of criticism, reflecting the vast *malaise* in the body politic. But somehow the criticism generally ends short of important targets, or when the target is hit, it is in Aesopian language.

Panicked in 1941, as we were, by the advance of fascism, the Mexican Congress made "social dissolution" a crime. As with us, no fascists have gone to jail but the law has been used as a bludgeon against the "Henriquistas," supporters of Ruiz Cortines' opponent in 1952, and against University and Polytechnic students. The University students, involved in a May Day incident, were held in jail nine months and freed only after a friendly lawyer happened to blunder into the courtroom where they were being "defended" by the public defender.

Vincente Lombardo Toledano, leader of the Popular Party, has made the point that only the ruling class can really commit the crime of social dissolution, namely, diffusing the ideas, programs or actions of a foreign government to the detriment of Mexican sovereignty. To him, the "foreign government" is that of the Colossus of the North and it is doubtful if he would object to the application of the law in that direction, for he is no "bourgeois liberal." Like many others, he approved the social dissolution law in 1941 when it seemed to be aimed, like our Smith Act, at partisans of Hitler.

Mexico, haven of exiled intellectuals from all the continents, drew the line on the Peking Opera, which had toured other parts of Latin America with notable success. It was found impossible at the last minute to grant visas to citizens of an unrecognized country, much to the disgust of opera lovers who didn't give a hang about the Peking players' politics—if any.

Quite acidly *Siempre!* observed that absence of diplomatic relations does not prevent the artists of the Spanish bullring from practicing their art in Mexico. "Obviously," it said, "taurine relations are more important than diplo-



They Remember Haymarket in Mexico

THE Mexican Federation of Labor (CTM), the official labor movement, wants to have a monument erected in Haymarket Square to the "*Mártires de Chicago*."

To its consternation, the CTM has discovered that the only monument in Chicago on the Haymarket tragedy is to the police who shot into the meeting. This statue, in Union Square Park, shows a patrolman in ancient garb of flapping skirted coat and helmet.

"The workers movement of Mexico and of almost all the countries of the world," says the CTM, "commemorates the First of May, for on this day of the year 1886 occurred the Haymarket tragedy in Chicago," at the culmination of the struggle for the eight-hour day.

The recent convention of the CTM proposed that the AFL-CIO, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and its Latin-American branch, the ORIT, sponsor the Haymarket monument to the anarchist martyrs, that the cost be borne by workers in all countries of the free world, that on each May Day a meeting of commemoration be held before the monument and that a House of Free World Labor be opened in Chicago for international labor meetings and for worker-students to study the problems of the working class.

It would seem that the next step is up to Brothers Meany, Reuther, Beck and their comrades.

matic relations." The weekly blamed "the Embassy," and in all Latin America "the Embassy" means only one certain embassy, that of the USA. Spain, said *Siempre!*, enjoys good relations with the *Yanquis* and China doesn't. Mexico was in no great danger of communist propaganda from the Pekingese, the paper added, for "Chinese is not a language much understood in our plazas."

WHETHER or not a "telephone call from the Embassy" caused the Peking Opera suddenly to be denied visas, the Government's attitude was typical. It cares to offend no one who is in a position to be dangerous. The enormous pressures from the United States, leading the country back into semi-colonialism, are hardly resisted. There is talk of recognizing—at last—the Franco regime. The labor movement has been pushed into a very junior and uneasy position. The Church is urging its communicants to take an active part in politics, but the Government maintains a benevolent silence over this patent violation of the Constitution's strict injunction that the Church must stay out of politics. In this quietistic phase of affairs, *Siempre!* can comment that "no sector can say that the Government is hostile to them." This is an era of flaccid good will, in which the Ship of State drifts complacently even though the barometer may be dropping sharply.

The Church's bid to reenter politics despite the constitution comes on the eve of the celebration of the centenary of the Constitution of 1857 which separated Church and State. Every President since "la Reforma" of 1857 has been an anti-clerical Freemason; now a practicing Catholic is being mentioned for the Presidency. Still forbidden to appear in public in their garb, the priests push costumed altar boys into the plazas and arcades to beg alms for the Church.



The uneasy political situation in which deep currents swirl under the placid surface brings one back to a reconsideration of "*la mística de la Revolución*," the ideas and sentiments that hover over the dying embers of the great Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917, and to which all the functionaries, the bureaucrats, the careerists who constitute the ruling elite give lip service. In reality the Left is as torn to shreds and tatters as in the United States. If there were free elections and the votes of PAN were counted, the clericals might win a substantial minority and possibly a majority in Congress, for the provinces are still quite Catholic except in the North.

The possibility that reaction could win power through the open ballot and wipe out the Constitution of 1917 and the gains of the Revolution is the most compelling reason for many intellectuals and radicals to acquiesce in the mummery of rigged elections and to find shelter behind the facade of the one-party state. PRI, the labor movement, domestic industry and commerce, the intelligentsia still invoke the '*mística de la Revolución*,' and it is not for a North American, ignorant of the subtle pulls and pushes in Mexican politics, to opine.

May we close this piece on a cheerful note: Any Mexican, even if his name is Diego Rivera, can get a passport and travel anywhere in the world he wishes.

Viva Mexico!

Cardenas Refuses "Succession"

TO head off personal dictators, the Constitution of 1917 forbids reelection. When former President Cárdenas, the most popular and powerful figure in Mexico, was urged recently to be a candidate again because technically it would not be "reelection" (his term ended in 1940), he replied that he kept to the spirit as well as the letter of the Constitution. When it was then urged that his son, Cuauhtémoc, be a candidate, he snapped back: "Mexico is not Nicaragua," in reference to the son succeeding the assassinated tyrant, Somoza.

The postwar period surveyed: insecurity, rootlessness, militarism, and mental illness in the midst of prosperity. There is plenty wrong with capitalism, and worse problems ahead.

The Dismal Decade

by Bert Cochran

LIFE has not been pleasant in this country in the years since the war. Historians may call it the "Dismal Decade." Politics has been dominated by the witch-hunt and the cold war, twin scourges we have yet to conquer. And even in the economic sphere, the prosperity has led to an efflorescence of the most variegated neuroses, has bred dissatisfaction and hysteria and has speeded up the traditional rat race in all reaches of life.

We have enjoyed fifteen years of unprecedented prosperity—and sociologists report more insecurity and a greater feeling of rootlessness than ever before. We have more college courses on youth problems and a greater outpouring of scientific tracts and research studies in the field of social psychology—and there has never been such a wave of juvenile delinquency as disgraces the scene today. A phenomenal building boom on one side—and on the other, the slums in our cities are proliferating faster than new houses are going up. We have attained the pinnacle in gross national income—and the public school system is falling apart, with millions of children unable to get a decent education.

I could go on for hours listing the appalling contradictions, the startling inequalities, how unevenly the prosperity is divided, how fifteen percent of the population continues to live below the subsistence line, and so forth. But the fact is that this American way of life, the way it is operating right today, is trumpeted far and wide as the good life, as the best system that man has ever devised or perfected in his sojourn upon this earth.

The labor unions have never been more powerful—or

This article is an abbreviated version of a lecture delivered in San Francisco on Friday, March 22, under the auspices of the Independent Socialist Forum of the Bay area.

more tame. They are integrated into this so-called "peoples' capitalism," and content themselves with acting as a parochial pressure group within the status quo. The American workers are more numerous, more skilled, more productive than any in the world. They are also the most politically apathetic. In an age when the working people all over the world support Laborite, Socialist or Communist parties of one kind or another, the American workers continue to divide their allegiance between two capitalist parties. There has been a second World War; we have entered the nuclear age; revolution is sweeping the colonial world. But the American people, ensconced behind their TV sets, and proud owners of glistening new automobiles, are determined not to recognize the new social realities. They have but recently returned their golf-playing President to the White House so that they could assure themselves that they can recreate the normalcy of Harding and Coolidge of blessed memory.

This is also an age of breath-taking engineering advances. New golden vistas are opening up for the human race. But the pall of conformity has spread like a miasma from our colleges to our governmental staffs, from the scientists' laboratories to the newspapers and magazines. The atmosphere has grown so stifling that the very authors and pace-setters of conformity have grown fearful that the old Yankee ingenuity and resourcefulness may suffer and that America may fall behind in the race with other nations.

I DON'T evaluate the troubles and heartaches that are besetting us in the midst of prosperity the same way as the journalists of our slick magazines. Those tell us that difficulties are the lot of man—it is presumably the will of God—and when man is relieved of money worries, he hunts up all sorts of other things to make himself miserable. I read the American scene a little differently. I conclude that this prosperity, purchased by most on the installment plan and by many through husband and wife working, is attained at a price that is exhausting and nerve-wracking for the individual. Most wage earners rely on their sensitive tentacles and instincts in these things, and they are acting like they are desperate to get theirs while the getting is good. They act like they had better run harder and faster on the treadmill because they don't know what the morrow will bring. As far as they are concerned, the future is uncertain at best, and viewed with foreboding at worst.

Over this hot-house prosperity are gathered heavy clouds of war. When you can pick up your daily newspaper and read a casual account, as if it were nothing out of the ordinary, that some Congressmen are drawing up a bill which would authorize spending \$20 to \$40 billion on civil defense shelters, else, expert witnesses have testified, 75 to 100 million people will die "overnight" in the event of a nuclear attack on this country—I say, when this prosperity is enclosed in that kind of a package, is it any wonder that some of our activities take on the appearance of the St. Vitus dance?

Living as we do, and up against the anxieties and irrationalities to which we must submit, it is surely no wonder that many live on a diet of pills and so many

succumb to nervous collapse. The annual stockholders report of a leading chemical investment trust informed its members that "The full potential for tranquilizers and relaxers has not yet been realized. Last year's sales are estimated at about \$150 million compared with an estimated \$85 million in 1955. Further growth seems likely." In the thirties, the Lynds wrote their famous cross-section study of Americana and called it "Middletown." Now, we are reading about ourselves in "The Road to Mil-town." I read recently that every minute three people enter mental hospitals in this country. It is no surprise that tens of thousands fall out of the rat race. The wonder is that most of us get along as well as we do. It is a tribute to the adaptability of the human animal.

IS the picture overdrawn? Are the colors slapped on too luridly? After all, we know there are croakers, Cassandras, misfits, and prophets of doom and gloom in every time and age. No system is totally free of blemishes and shortcomings. Most Americans seem to be pretty well satisfied with the way things are going. By and large, they are giving their backing to the so-called middle-of-the-roads of the Eisenhower or Stevenson variety, people who don't want to rock the boat, who will maybe patch up this or that crevice, but on the whole, want to leave well enough alone. If things are anywhere near as bad as my description would suggest, why has political dissent all but died out in recent years? That's a good question.

I read a statement by one of our labor historians where he said that the old pre-World War I Socialist Party



filled a certain need and that's why it became a considerable movement; that it did not fill more than a restricted need, and that's why it never became more than a limited minority movement. I think this is correct thinking. What is one therefore to say of the present radical movement which has to all intents and purposes no following at all? That it fills no need whatsoever? Would that be correct?

Here, we come to face with the proposition, "Has American socialism a future?" Can we envisage any change in the years ahead, or is the stability of U.S. capitalism good for a couple of centuries? The first proposition I would consider in trying to answer this question is to enquire more closely into the nature of our prosperity. Is it true that capitalism has discovered the secret of enduring prosperity? Well, if it has, what is the secret? The built-in stabilizers, like unemployment insurance and old-age pensions? But no one seriously contends that these are more than thin cushions to break the downward crash, when and if it comes. Is it manipulation of the credit system? But that remains largely in private banking hands. Besides, the very nature of capitalism creates a confused and chaotic setup where it is impossible to accurately see the short-term trend, or plan the economy, except in a peripheral way. Look at the present situation. Some economists think the danger is inflation. Others think it is deflation. Some believe credit is too liberal. Others think it is too tight. Some think we are heading for trouble in the middle or end of 1957. Others think the boom is good for a while to come. With such divided counsel, no capitalist government will dare take the responsibility of clamping tight on speculative expansion and bring upon itself the possible onus of a government-initiated depression caused by its own nervousness, bungling, and maladroitness.

I have also read about something that's called "countervailing forces" that create an equilibrium in our society. But I have never seen a convincing description of what forces countervail General Motors, General Electric, U.S. Steel, and how they do it. Who is countervailing the oil trust today? In any case, it cannot amount to much, because they haven't countervailed the hike on gasoline and fuel oil prices, and no one has cancelled out Dulles' brinkmanship in the Near East.

I AM not trying to imply that American capitalism is the identical structure that it was in 1887, 1913, or 1929. I know it is not. For one, there is far more government interference and regulation; there is far more realization that extraordinary steps have to be taken against depression, as people will no longer take it as philosophical as they did in the past. Above all, there is government spending in chunks that no government would have dared risk in the era before the world wars. But certain essentials of the system have remained: Overall planlessness brought on by the clashing designs and activities of socially irresponsible, privately-owned-and-run monopoly empires. And the "under-consumption" of the masses due to their inadequate share of the total national product, a share which has not proportionately changed over the past half century.

Hitler licked the depression of the thirties in Germany



through war preparations. Roosevelt had indifferent success by means of limited public works, but really mopped up unemployment only after *he* started preparing for war. The explanations for the present long boom are many, varied and complex, but can one seriously suggest that the 40-50 billion dollar war budgets of recent years are not one of its mainstays? And yet so many of our learned economists circumvent this towering fact, and bewilder themselves and the public with their assortment of witch-doctor noises and incantations to explain the new depression-less capitalism. These vaporings are then parroted by irresponsible sociologists who tell us that the problem of material needs has been licked. And, heaven help us, in their wake, numbers of radicals have gotten swept away by this noisy propaganda and add their little mite to the babel of Babbitry and the din of calculated confusion.

As you may have gathered, I am not of the school that believes that American capitalism has solved its internal problems. War economy plus secondary welfare-state social security provisions slowed down the traditional economic cycle and transmuted it into a crisis of different tempo, aspect, and form, but it no more exorcised capitalist crises than the stage magician by a sleight-of-hand really caused the rabbit to disappear. We are coming through one of the longest booms in American history, and as in all previous booms, it has given rise to a cacophony of theories of permanent prosperity. But there is no more substance to them today than there was in the learned lucubrations of the twenties when the pseudo-scientists thought that Henry Ford had solved the problems of underconsumption with his \$5-a-day wage.

The United States is a colossus the like of which this globe has never seen. Before its wealth pale the riches of all empires ancient and modern. Its military power spans the seven seas and its air fields and bases dot the continents. Its fabulous resources give it ability to tuck and maneuver internally as well as externally on a scale and with a massiveness that dwarfs all comparisons with the past. All this is true. But true also remains the fact that

at its economic heart is the fatal disease that will once again rip its vitals and blow up its equilibrium.

WHERE is all this piling up of armaments, this cold war hysteria, this rising crescendo of insults and threats hurled across the oceans, where is all this going to lead? We know where similar conduct led in the past—to wars of annihilation. Will it be any different now? Outside of a thin stratum of maniacs, the people of this country, indeed of all countries, want peace. But I am sure most people wanted peace in 1914, or in 1939. So what the peoples want in a purely passive way may not count. Militant, purposeful peace movements that embrace large masses can stop a gang of war-makers. But I am not giving away any state secrets of the Left when I indicate that we have no such peace movement in this country today.

What is saving the peace today, and may save it for some years to come, is not the conscience of statesmen. Their conscience is no stronger than it has been in past history. It is not the UN, which is a forum, an international jockeying society, not a world government. It is not the mass movements of the Left around the world. These are not organized for action, and in most cases, are not independent of the two major war blocs. What is chiefly saving the peace, in my opinion, is what Churchill called “the balance of terror.” Both sides have the means not just to hurt, or even cripple each other, but to destroy each other. This chilling knowledge has brought peace, such as it is, to the world. There have been peripheral wars in Korea, Indo-China, and the brief escapade in Egypt. There may be others. In each instance, up till now, both sides hesitated to spread the conflagration and pulled back before the dread eventuality of total nuclear war.

But, as everybody can recognize, this “balance of terror” is a mighty uncertain reed to have to rest on. Any peripheral war, any local conflict, can spread like a forest fire and get beyond anybody’s control. The armies are trained for nuclear warfare, they have the weapons, and once the big guns start to boom, an irreversible movement may sweep us into the dark night.

WE are living in a revolutionary epoch, and a formidable shift is taking place in the spectrum of power. The old empires are disintegrating, colonial nations have risen to their feet, Russia has emerged as the world’s second industrial power, and China, with the largest population of any country in the world, has begun the long climb to winning the status of a modern state. If we in this country can utilize the time which a blessed Providence has placed at our disposal to build in the coming years an effective peace force, we can re-direct the foreign policy of this country along more constructive lines, and the awful storm that menaces us all may well pass over. The horror of a third World War may be averted forever if we escape it in this difficult interim while a new equilibrium is established in the world. I think this is a realistic course, an attainable objective. I hope I am not guilty of wishful thinking.

Of course, there is a sharp snap in the cold war in the wake of Egypt and Hungary. But the cold war will go on

Trends on the Left: A Tour Report by Bert Cochran

I WAS absent from our office for almost a month beginning with the middle of March, during which time I lectured in Detroit, Chicago, Berkeley, San Francisco and Los Angeles, and, in addition, participated in a great number of house meetings attended by anywhere from fifteen to a hundred people. A brief rundown on some of these meetings has interest beyond house-organ commentary, as they mirror the trend of some of the Left activities in the country's main centers.

I lectured in Detroit to an audience of about 130 under the auspices of the Detroit Labor Forum. This is a non-partisan forum organization in which quite a number of unattached radicals are participating. It was set up about a year ago through the efforts of supporters of the American Socialist and independent radicals and has by now become the most impressive institution in town for the organization of forums, debates and general discussion. Because it is genuinely non-partisan, attempts to address itself to the independent radical, and seeks solutions to the great problems of our times rather than devoting itself to the intra-mural bickerings of small sects, it has won a position and attracts larger audiences than Detroit has seen in the past decade. As will be shown, this development is not unique with Detroit.

One other little sidelight is of more than passing interest. My lecture was attended by a scattering of Auto Union people as well as a group of students from Ann Arbor, and I had a two-hour discussion with the latter at a house gathering after the forum. There was a reason for the attendance of each group. The UAW in Michigan is seething with grievances and nervousness as a result of unemployment, speed-up and the shift of plants to other parts of the country. We are still a long way from socialist consciousness or even interest, but as always, a pool of social discontent produces a freer atmosphere, and numbers of isolated individuals begin thinking in more fundamental terms and get interested in more basic discussions. As for the students, I cannot be sure as to the full meaning, but I have observed in a number of spots that small radical grouplets are sprouting up on a number of campuses. I think the general picture drawn in the *Nation* some weeks back is eminently right, but I also think that the political atmosphere is slightly balmy, and that consequently intellectual discussions are reviving in isolated corners of some of the larger campuses among the few who are unhappy at playing Babbitt and are choking in the climate of conformity.

They have a Eugene V. Debs forum in Chicago that is very similar to the Detroit proposition, operates on pretty much the same conception, and attracts a similar audience. What brought me to Chicago this time, however, was the third anniversary reception for the American Socialist. It was

a gala affair in every respect. All of us are indebted to Harvey and Jesse O'Connor for offering the use of their home and for their splendid help. The cordial greetings sent to the gathering by Paul Sweezy of *Monthly Review*, I. F. Stone, Joseph Starobin and others were cherished by all. And finally, thanks are due to the large group present for their financial contributions. Everyone had a good time. The atmosphere was festive. The food and drinks were superb. And the speeches were pretty good.

IN San Francisco an almost identical development has taken place as in Detroit and Chicago. George Hitchcock, well-known figure in San Francisco both as a playwright and political activist, decided several months back that the town needed a central discussion center. He called together some of his friends and they set up "The Independent Socialist Forum of the Bay Area." Their first public meeting featuring Carey McWilliams attracted a good-sized audience. I was the second speaker and addressed an audience in the neighborhood of 175. It is noteworthy that Hitchcock and his friends had come to the same conclusion as others in different parts of the country: That what is required is a discussion of the big problems of our times and addressing ourselves primarily to the unattached radicals and people who are first becoming interested in socialist thought.

Incidentally, my lecture in San Francisco must be considered a historic event as it was delivered on the day of the biggest earthquake that the city experienced since 1906. I had thought that the meeting would surely be cancelled or postponed, but the arrangements committee went right ahead. Obviously it takes more than an earthquake to ruffle the hardy San Franciscan pioneering stock (some of it recently transplanted from New York). The quake pointed up the great American genius for organization—tinged with ballyhoo. I turned the radio on within a matter of minutes after the big jolt at 12:13 noon. The Mayor was on the air giving us the lowdown on the situation and the considerable arrangements that were in full operation (and incidentally putting in a plug on how he was right on the job). In two minutes I had a picture of what was transpiring throughout the area, what the experts thought, what the public authorities were doing, and what safety steps I was expected to take. After a couple more city officials filled in details, a chorus came on to soothe my jangled nerves, singing, "Don't take my love, my dear, unless you really care." Everything was under control.

What with the successful forum, the several house meetings with trade unionists and others, the student forum I addressed in Berkeley, and the half hour radio interview over Station KPFA, I feel that the *American Socialist* is much better known in the area, and our circulation there ought to

go up appreciably.

The symposium at the Embassy Hotel in Los Angeles, addressed by Vincent Hallinan, Dorothy Healey, William Warde, Carl Marzani, and myself and chaired by Reuben Borough, was attended by over 1,000 and made a big impact on radical circles. The first impression of this type of meeting is invariably favorable, audiences react well initially (before the thing is overdone), in the hope that a new approach can be found to revive radicalism in our day. Here, too, I found a strong sentiment for the establishment of an independent forum, and very likely, the Embassy meeting will serve as the preliminary for such a project. In Los Angeles, I had my biggest round of receptions, house gatherings and the like, and have big hopes that the American Socialist will now enjoy substantial support.

MY overall impression is that the old Communist movement has had its moral authority destroyed, is disintegrating apace, and nothing is able to take its place, as yet. The various sects have no attractive power, and they have never demonstrated this so conclusively as this past year. The various Left periodicals, groups, or what-have-you, lack either the know-how, desire or substantial enough acceptance to be able to step forward as the new leading center to bring order out of the chaos and purposefulness out of the disorientation. Hence, the indescribable confusion and babel of voices. Everything is up for grabs. For a period of time, discussion, clarification, re-formulation of socialist premises, and a sorting out of people will remain on the order of the day—and all attempts to rush into organization are still premature and will prove stillborn.

Out of the discussion and churning will come sooner or later a new intellectual center that will enjoy the authority to enable it to take the lead. It will not come about through organizational hocus-pocus. Such a center will only be created—and the year's experiences bear out this thought—by a general acceptance of a program on the matters that count today. The formulation and acceptance of a program is not a matter of reeling off six or eight planks on civil liberties, integration or shorter hours of work, or by utopian attempts to fuse tiny quarreling sects.

We face a big job of intellectual labor, of re-orientation, of broad acceptance of a new world outlook and set of tactics, of the creation of a new morale. It will take place only when there is an ideological breakthrough, and when there is a consensus of outlook established on the part of significant numbers of American radicals, dissenters, free-thinkers. That is what we have to work for. That is how the new American Left will come into being. The American Socialist—herald of the New Left—has to rededicate itself to this effort.

for a decade, if not for decades, and we can expect many ups and downs on the barometer. There will be innumerable aggravations and mitigations. If we can through all of it keep the peace, the hypnotic spell of the witch-hunt will wear off at home; the customary give-and-take will return again to American politics. And the labor movement will re-focus on its real foes, will no longer divert its attention on imaginary threats and dissipate its energies on fictitious issues.

WE can get a better picture of the coming trends if we try to chart a graph of the moving lines of both the trade union and radical movements in the recent decades. When the depression struck America in 1929, total union membership numbered a little under 3½ million, about eight percent of organizable workers. The Communist Party, the main radical organization on the scene, reported at its 1929 convention a little less than 10,000 members. The major strikes first broke in the NRA period, and it was only with the formation of the CIO two years later that the mass production workers smashed through in the basic industries and established strong unions of their own choosing. It is not my purpose to dwell at this time on the series of magnificent battles which at the time amazed the whole world, and galvanized a hitherto unorganized and ill-confident working class. The rise of the CIO, the unionization of the basic industries, the recognition of collective bargaining, was the high point of the period and the most fundamental of the New Deal's long-term achievements. If we return at this point to our chart, we will see that at the conclusion of this New Deal period, which for convenience sake we will place at 1940, total union forces were probably well over the nine-million mark, better than a two-and-a-half-fold increase in the ten years since the start of the depression.

But although New Deal Rooseveltianism absolutely dominated the labor political picture, and Roosevelt stood as the first leader in the minds of American labor, the Communist movement, popularly accepted as the extreme Left, multiplied in this decade approximately eight-fold. It is also a matter of common knowledge that it began to exercise considerable influence inside many of the new unions as well as in other spheres of American endeavor. I don't want to delve here into the nature of its program, activities, or tactics, and whether it made good or poor use of its opportunities. I am simply trying to get the point across that the movement that was popularly accepted as one of extreme radicalism was able to prosper and grow, albeit in a minority status, concomitant with the majority progressive movement which dominated the political stage. If I had the time, I could demonstrate that the old Socialist movement from the turn of the century to 1912 similarly rode the wave of pre-World War I Populism and Progressivism.

I think the meaning in a nutshell is this: The lushness of the country, the relative mobility into the lower middle classes, the relatively high living standards, naturally channelled most discontent into the middle-class reform movements. These had to become the first vehicles for social change. They had to get the first crack to solve things. They had the leaders with the big names, they

had access to the public press and media of communication, they appeared more practical and gave promise of some immediate returns. The very thinness of their programs assured them respectability and easy if transient successes. At the same time, their superficiality antagonized numbers of the more far-seeing and honest who saw the need for more substantial innovations. And they



often lacked appeal for the more deprived sections of the population who felt the need for radical changes. This two-fold relationship is a fact. The record is clear that radical movements flourished in this country in the very periods when progressive reform movements were at the center of the stage.

THE New Deal, as is commonly acknowledged nowadays by scholars of note, was a fairly conservative movement, in that it introduced no structural alterations in American society, and effected no basic redistribution of income. During the CIO upheaval the workers employed positively revolutionary methods—but for the realization of very limited and modest objectives. Once these were achieved, the movement quickly subsided into a variety of traditional trade unionism.

But Roosevelt didn't really clean up the mess that Hoover left. He hardly got started tackling the job when a special confluence of circumstances—the Second World War—enabled him and his successors to sweep the problems under history's rug for a spell. Thus attention was diverted from the basic structural deficiency of the social system; this has down-graded the urgency of the problem for a decade, but it has not eliminated it. Now the day is approaching when we will have to devote ourselves again to some of the problems that plagued us in 1940, because they have not been solved, but only transposed into a different arena, sublimated into altered forms, and directly tied up with the affairs of the whole world.


When the next progressive movement grips America I don't think it will be a repetition of the New Deal, or that we will begin the march where we left off in 1940. The world has swung rapidly in the intervening years, and there is no turning back. The Negro people don't want to take off from where they were left standing in 1940. They are already way ahead of that point. They want to move on to integration and full equality. Even the unions cannot use 1940 as their starting point. They grew enormously during the war and their membership got a taste of what an expanding economy could mean for them. When the new push begins, they will never

accept the slim pickings and servile role that they took for granted inside the Democratic Party during New Deal days. In its time, that was a big advance over anything labor had enjoyed in the past, but it will not pass muster against labor's power and aspirations of the present and the near future.

The American people have learned that the system can produce abundance and they expect to partake of its fruits. The American people have now been taught that economic security is a social responsibility, and they expect the government to make good on that. From Wilson to Roosevelt, an immeasurable distance has been travelled. We have every reason to believe that the next progressive wave will carry the country over more extensive territory beyond its previous point of rest. Because the new tasks of our era lend themselves far less than the old to mere tinkering. Palliatives will undoubtedly still be very much

in order, but preventive medicine will also be demanded and cannot be entirely avoided. The New Deal was first promulgated to an unorganized working class and it created the climate which helped set up the mass unions. The next progressive era will have to take into account an existing labor movement 16 million strong. It has been correctly described as a "sleeping giant." But if this giant awakens and starts to move, he can shake the world.

If the past is any guide, the new progressivism will, as a matter of course, be accompanied by a swift revival and advance of Left radicalism. But this time, after the inevitable initial experiments and disillusionment with casual patching, the radical wing will experience a stormy growth. Because for the first time in our history we will be up against dilemmas unsolvable by New Deal-type alignments, programs, and methods.



Exposing a Myth

BLACK BOURGEOISIE by E. Franklin Frazier. The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1957, \$4.

THERE have been two main currents in the movement of the American Negro (omitting from consideration the Garveyite "back-to-Africa" nationalism, which had a brief though flamboyant vogue some forty years ago). The first traces its descent back to Booker T. Washington, the Tuskegee Institute, the Rosenwald philanthropies and the Urban League. The other had its inception in the Niagara movement and the pioneering efforts of W. E. B. Du Bois, and developed through the NAACP, the organization of black workers in the mass production unions, the World War II March on Washington movement, and currently in such struggles as the Montgomery bus boycott.

These two currents have crossed and intermingled in their philosophies and tactics, but generally speaking the former has stood for an obsequious attempt, under the tutelage of wealthy whites, for the Negro to ingratiate himself into a niche in America on segregationist terms. The latter current, by contrast, has been powered by the Negro's feeling that he is entitled to equal rights and opportunities, and in the last analysis to full integration without regard to skin color.

While Professor Frazier's book is primarily devoted to the dissection of the Negro middle class, it is aimed also at the servile philosophy of accepting segregation, and of placing the chief onus for

the Negro's inferior position upon his own lack of education or skills. Frazier is chairman of the Department of Sociology at Howard University, a past president of the American Sociological Society, and winner of the MacIver Lectureship (with this book) in 1956. His book is well documented and coolly written, but its clinical detachment of style doesn't prevent it from being a savage and devastating critique of the new Negro middle class and its outlook. With the rise of the Negro's fight for equality to first rank among the nation's issues, much is being written on the subject, but this book is sure to stand out both for its illuminating analysis and its practical implications.

DURING the last decade of the nineteenth century, the Negro was completely disfranchised and increasingly hemmed in by Jim Crow laws. It was at this same time that Booker T. Washington, with a lot of upper-class white support, rose to prominence and influence with his program of "industrial education." As he made clear, his idea was for the Negro to accept his subordinate status in society, and fit himself for such labor as the white man would give him by learning various trades and skills. But he often confused ancient handicraft skills with modern industrial training. Thus, while industry was becoming revolutionized and mechanized, Tuskegee Institute was dedicated to training students in certain handicraft abilities that were going out of use. In practice, of course, his movement was forced to concentrate upon the teaching of menial and domestic trades like cooking and gardening, as these were the chief occupations in which openings existed for Negroes.

Booker T. Washington's efforts did not succeed in any significant degree in integrating the Negro into industry or making him more independent. But the overall ideology which he represented blossomed out in the Negro middle class, which was soon to begin to take shape. This class is extremely weak as an economic group-

ing, as Professor Frazier shows: "The black bourgeoisie is constituted of those Negroes who derive their incomes principally from the services which they render as white-collar workers. Despite the dreams of Negro leaders at the turn of the century that Negro businessmen would become organizers of big industries and large financial undertakings, Negroes have not become captains of industries nor even the managers of large corporations. . . . What has come to be known as 'Negro business' has consisted chiefly, with the exception of a few insurance companies, of a number of small banks, and newspapers, of small retail stores, restaurants, undertaking establishments, and similar enterprises which serve the needs of the segregated Negro communities."

"Black bourgeoisie," as Frazier makes clear, is a rather grandiose term for the phenomenon. In the main it is a class which in the total American socio-economic scale is more lower middle class, even if it is an upper class among the Negroes. The average income of all Negroes is only a little more than half the average income of whites; in 1949 only 16 percent of Negro families had incomes above \$3,000 a year. Thus the "black bourgeoisie" in its majority, Professor Frazier calculates, is below \$4,000 a year in income, or under the average level of factory wages. Only one half of one percent of Negroes have an income of \$5,000 or more. This is the consequence of Jim Crow, and it is also an index to the pathetic insignificance of the Negro "upper classes."

FRAZIER goes on with his analysis:

"Since the black bourgeoisie is composed chiefly of white-collar workers and since its small business enterprises are insignificant in the American economy, the black bourgeoisie wields no political power as a class in American society. Nor does the black bourgeoisie exercise any significant power within the Negro community as an employer of labor. Its power within the Negro community stems from the fact

that middle-class Negroes hold strategic positions in segregated institutions and create and propagate the ideologies current in the Negro community. In the political life of the American society the Negro political leaders, who have always had a middle-class outlook, follow an opportunistic policy. They attempt to accommodate the demands of Negroes for better economic and social conditions to their personal interests which are tied up with the political machines, which in turn are geared to the interests of the white propertied classes."

The following graphic example is given by Mr. Frazier, who notes that he is compelled to conceal the name of the city: "The economic and political life of this small northern city, which borders a southern State, is dominated by a large manufacturing corporation. This corporation provides employment for many Negroes as unskilled laborers and a large proportion of the whites as professional and white-collar workers. The white political leader is an official of the large corporation. At the same time, he is the owner of several local business enterprises including a cinema and a restaurant, neither of which admits Negroes. The white political leader finances the business enterprises of the Negro political leader who owns a cinema attended solely by Negroes. When the Negroes started a campaign for their admission to the 'white' cinema and the 'white' restaurant, the Negro political leader discouraged them and urged them to be loyal to Negro business enterprises. On the national scene, the white political leader plays the role of a friend of Negroes. He is influential in securing a contribution from the large corporation to a fund-raising campaign for Negro education, of which he is a director. Moreover, he consented to become a trustee of a Negro college in the South which receives money from the fund-raising campaign. In the eyes of the black bourgeoisie of this city, some of whom send their children to the Negro college, he is a friend of the Negro. The few Negro intellectuals who have dared to express disapproval of the existing system of control over race relations have been labeled Communists."

Negro business, Frazier makes clear, is a "social myth"; it has never developed into anything significant, as most of the money the Negroes spend goes into the regulation channels and brand names of American commerce. Efforts to bolster the myth often involve, as in the instance above, attempts to maintain segregation, as without the segregated pattern what little there is of a specialized Negro business class catering to the race would be weakened, even if the lot of the Negro people as a whole would be immeasurably improved.

BUT Negro business is not the only myth of the "black bourgeoisie." As Frazier describes the class, it has been seized by a veritable mythomania of pretenses and play-acting. The Negro press creates a "make-believe world into which the black

bourgeoisie can escape from its inferiority and inconsequence in American society." Negro "society" lacks the economic base of white Social Registerism, but is maintained anyhow "to differentiate the black bourgeoisie from the masses of poorer Negroes." Mr. Frazier's most biting thrusts are reserved for the pathetic imitation of bourgeois upper reaches. He has very little use for bourgeois standards of life and behavior in general, and even less for its



echoes among Negro teachers and undertakers: "The emphasis upon 'social' life or 'society' is one of the main props of the world of make-believe into which the black bourgeoisie has sought an escape from its inferiority and frustrations in American society. This world of make-believe, to be sure, is a reflection of the values of American society, but it lacks the economic basis that would give it roots in the world of reality. In escaping into a world of make-believe, middle-class Negroes have rejected both identification with the Negro and his traditional culture. Through delusions of wealth and power they have sought identification with the white America which continues to reject them. But these delusions leave them frustrated because they are unable to escape from the emptiness and futility of their existence. . . . The black bourgeoisie suffers from 'nothingness' because when Negroes attain middle-class status, their lives generally lose both content and significance."

Professor Frazier has written an excellent book, and a courageous one as well. The uncompromising frankness and directness with which he debunks the shibboleths and punctures the egotisms of middle-class Negroes will leave a lot of lacerated feelings. But the book ought to do much good. The craving for "respectability" is still very much alive in the black bourgeoisie, even in the NAACP which was formed to oppose Booker T. Washington's influence. That is why workers do not feel very much at home in many NAACP branches; that is why the NAACP sticks so closely to legal efforts in the fight against segregation, and why the great innovations in the shape of the recent bus boycotts and other new forms of resistance have sprung up outside the NAACP. Anyone familiar with the Negro community in one of our large cities knows

that the fight of the Negro people for their rights has to be carried on in part by Negroes against Negroes; by militants against fainthearts, Uncle Toms, and Negro businessmen and professionals who thrive on the segregation imposed on their own people.

One final comment: Mr. Frazier fails to give credit to the many individual Negroes of the professional world who have, like Rev. Martin Luther King, played an entirely different role than that which he describes for the black bourgeoisie. Undoubtedly, he is merely taking the point for granted.

H. B.

The Crystal Ball

AMERICA'S NEXT TWENTY YEARS
by Peter F. Drucker. Harper, New York,
1957, \$2.75.

THE thirst for economic information and prediction has created a new breed of journalist, who has taken the subject off the business pages and out of the specialized periodicals, and divested it of its heavy-handedness. Sylvia Porter is a prime example of the syndicated newspaper economist; Mr. Drucker is the Sylvia Porter of the magazine field.

While this form of journalism has its attractive features in readability, informativeness, and a lay viewpoint closer to the popular mind, it has brought to a polished peak of perfection a number of faults. Simplicity and superficiality are naturally preferred to complexity and depth; a breathless optimism sells better than dry realism; facts are sometimes treated more casually than is good for them; and the search for novel modes of journalistic attack is often confused with boldness and original thinking.

Mr. Drucker states his theme succinctly: "*The major events that determine the future have already happened*—irrevocably. . . . There is no need for crystal gazing. We can find plenty to occupy us in what we know about America's next twenty years from events that have already occurred." In one sense this is obvious truism, but while our future is inherent in great forces which have already been unleashed, this is no guarantee that the economic forecaster can arrive at predictions by simple straight-line extensions of selected statistical trends. It is a prime weakness of economic journalism in its popular form that it leans heavily upon one of the most primitive interpretations of science, that of pure extrapolation—which is an intriguing, but deceptive, form of crystal gazing.

Extrapolation is a game in which one takes a current statistical trend and extends its marvels into the future, thus: "At the current rate of switching to sports clothes, we shall all be going to work in bathing trunks by 1999," or "The decline in the art of conversation is so pronounced that, extrapolating the present trend, we find that within thirty years

we shall not be speaking to each other at all." The more persuasive practitioners will generally show great magnanimity ("Even if this rate is cut by 30 percent in the coming decades . . .") but they get to the same conclusion eventually.

The great attraction of this method is that it is so simple in its execution and so convincing in its appearance. Its great fallacy is that it circumvents all the most complex and demanding aspects of science and arrives at conclusions that have no validity in themselves, as they hang on too many unstated if's. When, in 1955, the auto industry produced close to eight million cars, the extrapolators promptly saw, only a few years off, a ten-million car industry. But 1956 brought a drop of sales to six million, and 1957 is running in that same neighborhood. This year, therefore, the extrapolators have nothing to say on the auto industry. They are trying their luck elsewhere.

MR. Drucker's first chapter is called "The Coming Labor Shortage," a conclusion he divines, with a great flourish and show of authority, entirely from recent trends in the birthrate and the rate of college and high school attendance. His reasoning is so simple that one wonders why one hadn't thought of it first. The whole complex of economic analyses is reduced to a tempting two or three point chapter which, if sound, could outmode an entire profession and throw thousands of economists out of work. But, even leaving aside all that Mr. Drucker so breezily leaves aside, he has obviously no real way of deducing the state of the labor market twenty years hence from the birth and education rates of the recent past, for the reason that the state of the labor market will itself determine, in large part, the birth and education rates.

Our birth rate has been high and our school attendance climbing because we have been in an economic boom. Thus what Mr. Drucker is saying, in essence, is that the population trends characteristic of an economic boom make a depression impossible, a proposition historically without foundation, which goes to show how extrapolation can lead you up the garden path.

The more sensational and breezy forms of economic journalism do not favor precision and care in the handling of facts, as Mr. Drucker proves more than once. Thus, on page 29 he gets so far carried away by his argument that small companies will benefit from automation more than large ones as to say that the small tool-and-die shops of Detroit "enjoy greater stability than General Motors"; on page 28 he asserts that Norbert Wiener, one of our great mathematicians and automation theorists, has "predicted" that automation will lead to the "human use of human beings" when he is talking only of Wiener's hope and prayer; on page 38, he says, "The democratization of business ownership by the fiduciary investor is an achievement without parallel in economic or social history," but on page 51 he says "we are concen-

trating legal ownership of industry in the hands of a comparatively small number of fiduciary investors."

IN a chapter called "America Becomes a 'Have-Not' Nation," Mr. Drucker bears down on the trend to dependence of this country on the nations which produce primary raw materials. From this fact, he draws the economic need to aid the raw-materials countries in industrializing their economies. Now, whatever reasons may be given as to why we should aid these nations in their striving to develop modern industry, and there are many good ones, the reason chosen by Mr. Drucker is worthless. For the raw-materials nations to become industrialized means very simply that they establish the means whereby they can work their own raw materials up into manufactured products, instead of sending them abroad to the present workshops of the world, among which this country is the chief one. To say, because we have more trade with Switzerland than with India, that we would solve any prospective raw materials shortages by helping India to become industrialized, is just verbal legerdemain. This is worth noting not to be picayune, but because it highlights the very important fact that the industrialization of the raw-materials countries means the end of the old role of the advanced capitalist countries, and, as a matter of fact, could set forces in motion that would finally spell the doom of capitalism on a world scale.

This last proposition is typical of the hidden-ball tricks with which Mr. Drucker conceals the real state of affairs as much from himself, we suspect, as from his readers. The liberal spirit displayed in many of his proposals is praiseworthy, and likewise his efforts to paint on a large canvas, but he gets carried away by empty rhetoric, and the economic tools he works with are oversimplified.

H. B.

Socialism in India

INDIAN APPROACHES TO A SOCIALIST SOCIETY, by Margaret W. Fisher and Joan V. Bondurant. Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, July 1956, \$1.50.

NEHRU and the contrasting developments of India and China are at the center of international discussions today. This monograph, which is part of a series of Indian press digests, provides the interested student with an array of collateral information and side-lights on one of the dominant questions of our time: the industrialization and modernization of underdeveloped countries. The exposition, largely in the form of quotations from various newspapers, periodicals and statements of Indian personalities, properly ties in questions of economics and programs with political parties and struggles, and gives a

flesh-and-blood character to a subject which is too often treated like a statistician's abstraction.

It is hard for an American to grasp it, but the idea of socialism has great appeal in India, and all politicians must pay it some lip service. "So pervasive is this connotation of good and desirable that Indian political parties from Left to Right freely adopt the word socialism in divergent statements of objectives proceeding from widely separated points of departure," our authors inform us. The Congress Party, India's dominant political organization, has been playing with socialist avowals for a long time. At its January 1955 convention at Avadi the party went a step further in adopting a program which included "planning . . . with a view to the establishment of a Socialistic pattern of society, where the principal means of production are under social ownership or control. . . ."

WHILE Nehru and other Congress leaders maintained a studied vagueness as to the precise meaning of the program, the Indian press turned a powerful searchlight on the proposition in an attempt to plumb its true significance. *Times of India* acidly suggested that the old "Cooperative Commonwealth" terminology might be "too clumsy and unwieldy a stick to beat the opposition with"; that "Socialism" sounded "more radical," but "Socialistic pattern" was well adapted to the Prime Minister's "all too flexible" approach, with its "distaste for details and a penchant for soaring well above the earth." The Communist *New Age* took a similar view. Its correspondent declared that those who wanted to know "what it meant" had not "grasped the beauty" of the resolution, which was "meant to be 'a catchy slogan' and not meant to 'say what it meant.'" *Times of India* several days later assured its readers that there was nothing to be alarmed about: "Socialism can mean entirely different, even contradictory, things to different persons."

The Avadi resolution produced a crisis in all other parties. The Forward Bloc (originally organized by Subhas Chandra Bose) decided to rejoin the Congress Party. The Communists suffered shortly thereafter an electoral defeat in their stronghold at Andhra, and the Praja Socialist Party split when some of its leading personalities proposed cooperation with Congress. There was no question that the *Deccan Herald* was correct when it called the Congress resolution a "political masterpiece" and that Communists and Socialists found themselves for the time being "robbed of Socialistic evangelism."

The monograph is exclusively expository, so beyond connecting the threads and elucidating the quotations, the authors do not attempt to evaluate the materials. A full-bodied study of Nehru Socialism is very much in order today to lay out in comprehensive fashion just what is the design of the so-called democratic or alternative path to the Chinese in industrializing a backward country.

A lot of the Indian Congress talk is undoubtedly sheer electioneering demagoguery. But there is more to it than that. In an ex-colonial country, where native private capital resources are very sparse, where the country's independent foreign policy precludes investments on a needed scale from abroad, the only way to industrialize is by means of government investment, government ownership and planning. Yet the Congress Party is basically a creature of big capitalists, landowners and the middle-class intelligentsia. Can these classes drive through a program of this kind by means of a mixed economy, and while the basic agricultural structure remains in the hands of its traditional feudal *zamindars*?

According to the figures compiled by the UN, India's national income rose only 2 percent in 1956 (to \$22 billion) as against 10 percent in China (to \$41 billion), India re-invested 8 percent of its income,

China 22 percent. Nehru admitted that the expansion under the first Five Year Plan did not even keep pace with the population growth and that there was more unemployment than before. Is Nehru Socialism viable? The burden of proof rests with its proponents—a burden which they have not satisfactorily discharged, as yet.

THE second section of the study is devoted to Gandhian Socialism expressed in the *Sarvodaya* movement (literally "uplift of all") which embodies some of the ideas of Gandhi, with overtones of Ruskin and Kropotkin, and out of which has come the *Bhoodan* technique to elicit land donations from landowners by means of moral suasion. The information here is extremely valuable, and at times, fascinating. Unfortunately, because of the overly descriptive presentation, it is impossible for the reader to come to any conclusion as to

how widespread is the influence of *Sarvodaya*, and how much land it has collected and organized along *Sarvodaya* lines, as well as its net impact upon agriculture as a whole.

The monograph omits any study of Indian Communism on the grounds that it adheres "to Muscovite socialism, and this approach belongs rather to a study of International Communism than to a study of Indian approaches to a socialist society." The explanation does not hold water. The Indian Communists have just won 27 seats in Parliament (against the Socialists' 19), and they are taking over the State administration in Kerala, one of India's fourteen states. Whatever one's analysis and whatever be the truth of Indian Communism, it is an important part of the Indian political scene, and it cannot be ignored.

A. S.

LETTERS

(Continued from page 2)

glad of it. There's no reason for more socialist papers and parties but there is need for socialist education, and one open-minded but (when it comes to the money-lenders) uncompromising magazine would be a lot better. And about these left-wing cults (and I mean the slew of them)—I wonder if they realize just how moldy they've become. Can't they see if they want to attract young blood they're going to have to quit bickering . . . ?

M. S. St. Paul

The House Committee on Un-American activities has decided to hold hearings in Baltimore on May 7-8. The Socialist Study Club of Baltimore will sponsor a Town Meeting and panel discussion on "Are Congressional Investigations and the Security Program a Safeguard or a Threat to Democracy?" This meeting is open to the public and free. It will take place on Friday, May 10 at 8 P.M. at the Mt. Lebanon Baptist Church, 2320 Reisterstown Road.

A. Robert Kaufman *Baltimore*

Joseph Starobin, in his article in your March issue ["Toward a Socialist Revival"], concludes his gloomy description of the past and present by the proposal of a new Fabian Society as a means to "save the best of American socialism and restore its prestige" in the present and future developments of the American movement. You can imagine what this suggestion means to a reader who was a member of that old Fabian society before the first World War and in the interval between the wars—and even then as a left-wing opponent of the Webbs and other educational and moderating leaders of the "Fabian way." If that earlier Fabian attempt proved unable to open a way for a radical socialist workers' movement, how little is the chance that its resurrection

at the present time and under American conditions could fulfill Mr. Starobin's dream of a new militant labor movement. . . .

I have no axe to grind against anybody, and most certainly not against Mr. Starobin, whom I heard, and afterward read, and who in fact greatly impressed me by the broadness of his view and experience. All the same there remains, for one reader, a wide difference between the ways foreshadowed by Starobin's article and, say, Braverman's "New Birth of Freedom" in the February number. . . .

K. K. *Cambridge, Mass.*

I agree with Joseph Starobin's "Towards a Socialist Revival" [March 1957] when he shows that American socialists have been on the wrong track in their failure to draw more fully upon the political genius of their own people. The democratic spirit is still striving to assert itself in the United States despite individual and institutional shortcomings.

I think American socialists are still too prone to bear a more than grudging respect for a Marxist interpretation of history. Only as we are able to transcend the limitations of the crude single-factor analyses of either a Marx or an Adam Smith, a Lenin, or a Keynes, may socialists stop looking at their fellow Americans as faceless "masses" and "classes" and capitalists, as "producing and consuming units." What we must keep in mind is that Americans are people, most of whom still desire for others what they desire for themselves.

However, Mr. Starobin's suggestion of a socialist educational effort in the United States similar to that of the Fabian Society, an effort designed to enlist the keenest minds from the arts, sciences, and education, would provide American socialists a new vision and a new direction. This would be a creative enterprise worthy of the pioneers of socialism and free from the weary and fruitless bickerings of all splinter groups which live outside the mainstream of American life.

But we must recognize that the old socialism is dead. Socialism cannot be revived in America by simply warming over the tired notions of economic determinism, government ownership of the instruments of production, consumer cooperation, and the defense of civil liberties. American socialists have missed the boat every time they have dissipated their energies on such limited reform programs as securing better housing, obtaining extra union benefits or pushing anti-discrimination laws, needed as these are.

Many Americans have been alienated from their government and this is expressed in the failure of so many to vote at the polls. What our people do need in a giant industrial society such as ours is a restored sense of participation and personal effectiveness. This, I believe, may best be done in a government where the people replace the legislature and conduct national legislation by national referendum. Once the people are in power the needed economic and social reforms will follow as a matter of course. The representative institutions of our pseudocracy, however useful they may have been in the past, today only serve to divide and rule the people for our industrial, political, and military oligarchs.

W. J. H. *New York City*

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Money has been coming in from readers, has passed last year's level, and is beginning to cut in on our deficit—but only slightly. We still need a big push from those who haven't yet sent in a contribution. We have received donations thus far from many of our "regulars," who have contributed each year, and also from a goodly number of readers who contributed this year for the first time. But, in scanning the lists and comparing them with previous results, we notice a lot of stalwarts who haven't mailed their donations yet. We know from our regular correspondence and from other indications that they like the AMERICAN SO-

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