

The American **Socialist**

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CLIPPINGS

A SERIES of civil liberties victories over the past month emphasized the trend towards limitation of the witch-hunt within bounds, a trend resulting from growing protests and from concern in top ruling circles that it had gotten out of hand and threatened their own undisputed control. Coming on the heels of the Supreme Court decision in the Nelson case barring state laws on federal subversion, two important state decisions provided victories in hard-fought cases. In Michigan, the state Supreme Court ruled against major provisions of the Trucks Act, which punished "sedition" against the U.S. While other provisions of that act are still in doubt, the Citizens' Committee Against the Trucks Law, which enlisted the aid of organized labor and others in its militant fight, decided that its objective had been substantially accomplished and dissolved, urging members and supporters to continue their efforts in other organizations. And in Kentucky, the Court of Appeals reversed the 15-year prison sentence against Carl Braden, who had been convicted of sedition after helping a Negro couple buy a house in a segregated suburb of Louisville. There are still charges against Mrs. Braden and others in the case, which was started after racists dynamited the home the Bradens helped buy, but these are expected to be dismissed. However, the state Attorney General states that he still hopes to find some basis for a prosecution against the Bradens and others involved in the Louisville case.

ANOTHER important victory came with the reinstatement to his clerk's job with the Veterans Administration in Newark of James Kutcher, the famous Legless Veteran who was fired for admitted membership in the Socialist Workers Party. Kutcher, who reported for work on June 26 after eight years of administrative procedures and court litigation, was put back on his job on the decision of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that his rights under the Veterans Preference Act had been violated.

Among other important recent victories were the ruling of a referee in the Social Security Administration that employees of the Communist Party are eligible for old-age benefits, and the order of a West Coast federal judge that some 500 screened seamen be given back their shipping papers, in pursuance of last October's Circuit Court ruling outlawing government procedures used in screening West Coast seamen.

THE first hearing granted any group included on the U.S. Attorney General's "subversive" list took place in Washington during June and July. The Independent Socialist League, headed by Max Shachtman, defended itself against charges of advocating the overthrow of the government by force and

violence. Joseph L. Rauh, chairman of ADA, served as attorney for the group, and testimony was offered by, among others, Norman Thomas, and Daniel Bell, labor editor of *FOR-TUNE*, to the effect that the ISL does not advocate force and violence. As a last-minute stopgap, the government brought in James Burnham, leading McCarthyite intellectual. Burnham, an ex-radical, had helped form the Shachtman group in 1940, but quit within a few weeks, to move rightward with extreme speed. He quickly revealed that he had no special knowledge of the ISL since that time, and his testimony was a maze of "inference" and "hypothesis," making up in classroomish "analogies" what it lacked in facts, and sinking to a low point in a bland defense of lying in the interests of anti-communism. The hearing closed on July 11 with the examiner giving the government until August 22 to hand in its proposed findings.

LABOR'S merger trend got renewed impetus last month from a number of sources. In the AFL-CIO, the Building Trades Department called off its boycott against state and local mergers of AFL and CIO bodies after a formula to negotiate craft-industrial agreements was worked out by President Meany. Richard J. Gray, head of the Building Trades Department, had been holding up the local amalgamations over the issue of plant maintenance work, which is claimed by both industrial unions and construction craft unions. A six-man committee has been set up to negotiate outstanding disputes, of which there are about a score, and while the matter is

far from settled, Gray has been prevailed upon to send a letter to all state and local building trades organizations directing them to "discontinue your efforts" against merging of AFL and CIO councils. The first fruit of the compromise was the merger in Oregon of the AFL Oregon Federation of Labor and the CIO State Industrial Union Council.

Meanwhile, the Packinghouse Workers, formerly of the CIO, and the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, which had been part of the AFL, completed preparations for a merger convention, which may take place in the fall. An earlier date for merger fell through after last-minute snags on the composition of the officialdom of the new union cropped up, but these now appear to have been overcome, and the prospect is for the formation of a single union of almost one-half million members in the meat industry. . . And there are persistent rumors that John L. Lewis may bring his mine union into the AFL-CIO soon.

UNION campaigning against the so-called "right-to-work" laws, which prohibit union shop agreements, bore its first Southern fruit in the repeal of one such state law by the Louisiana legislature. Three Northern states—Maine, New Hampshire, and Delaware—had previously taken the same action. The rail union paper, *LABOR*, explained the Louisiana gain: "The victory climaxed an uphill battle by all branches of organized labor aided by prominent clergymen and other public figures. Also, the triumph spotlighted the tremendous importance of 'register and vote' activities by workers. Immediately after the law was passed in 1954, the union movement launched a drive to defeat the backers at the polls. That campaign got spectacular results when voters tossed out the great majority of state lawmakers who had originally voted for the bill to shackle labor."

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The Great Debate Goes On

COMMUNISM is in the midst of a convulsion the outcome of which will alter the shape of the world working-class movement even as it was altered by the historic split of 1919 and the creation of the Third International. That great upthrust came because of the collapse of the traditional Socialist organizations during the first World War and the Bolshevik victory in Russia. The present spasm started with the destruction of the Stalin legend because Stalinism had become an obstacle to the further progress of the Soviet system and was enmeshing it in difficulties which if permitted to continue could have proven mortal to the regime.

It is still too early to say what will be the final resolution. But the first scenes of the unfolding drama are holding a world audience spellbound as the realization is driven home that we are witnessing an upheaval of commanding importance in the movement of modern history.

The Twentieth Congress pushed the Communist parties into a crisis. But the crisis bore a different character in the East-European countries where Communism disposes of all the levers of state power, and in the Western world where the Communists form the Left opposition parties. The first reaction of the Western leaders—Togliatti, Thorez, Pollitt, Foster—to try to brazen it out, was quickly washed out by the savage assault of both the capitalist and non-Communist labor press, as well as the horror and disillusionment that swept over many sections of their party ranks.

By the end of March it was clear that the crisis, far from blowing over, was only beginning, and attempts to lay all the blame on Stalin's corpse, or as the Russian heads snappily phrased it, "the cult of the individual," were greeted with increasing skepticism and suspicion. Hardly a day went by without new disclosures which sent the

Communists whirling and kept the discussion at a white heat. But the admissions of the Rajk frameup, the Kostov frameup, the Slansky frameup, the *Volkstimme* revelations about the pogrom against the Jewish leaders, the debunking of Vishinsky, the admission to the French delegation of the existence of the forced labor camps—all these were like premonitory rumblings of the storm. The publication on June 5 of Khrushchev's speech to the closed session was the thunderclap that shook the house to its very foundations. With that the Communist heads decided that they had better do something, and we had the *démarche* of the Italian, French, British and American leaders calling on the Russian Communist party to give a better explanation for the rise of the Stalin tyranny.

The position of the Russian Communist oligarchs and those in the People's Democracies is a very difficult one at present. But in addition to their enormous responsibilities and problems, they have the power residing in the state machine and multitudinous institutions. They have power to repress, and power to make concessions. They can rectify grievances, they can enhance the position of this or that part of the population, they can propitiate the discontented, they can beat down opposition. In other words, they can tack and maneuver to establish a new equilibrium.

IT is entirely different with the Communist leaders in the West. Moral authority over their ranks and supporters is the *sine qua non* of their position. Even in France and Italy where they have big deputations in the parliaments, far-reaching influence in the unions, and disposal of considerable patronage, all this can quickly melt away if they cannot hold the loyalty of their thousands of humble followers, who cannot either be bribed or threatened. In the United States, even though

the party is a small propaganda group down to a hard core, the crisis hit, if anything, with even more shattering effect. Ten years of witch-hunt and prosperity had driven the party into its worst isolation, and the capitalist press had effectively stigmatized it as an unthinking agency of the Kremlin. The Twentieth Congress revelations burst over the head of a party already in an advanced stage of demoralization and disintegration.

The Western Communist leaders acted thus under extreme compulsion and fright. They had no alternative. To execute a flip-flop along the line of the new Khrushchev position would have made them a laughing stock in their own countries. To continue true to Stalin was manifestly impossible in the face of the damning evidence. They chose the only course left to them: They accepted the substance of the Khrushchev line but expressed dissatisfaction with his explanations and demanded a more thoroughgoing analysis.

"We cannot accept an analysis of such profound mistakes which attributes them solely to the capricious aberrations of a single individual, no matter how much arbitrary power he was wrongly permitted to usurp," read the statement of the American party's National Committee. "It is just as wrong to ascribe all the mistakes and violations of socialist principle to a single individual as it was to ascribe to him all the achievements and grandeur of socialist progress in the USSR." The American party was thrown for a loop also by the anti-Semitic exposes, as it has a large Jewish following. The statement demanded an additional explanation concerning "Khrushchev's failure to deal with these outrages." The French and British parties wanted a "profound Marxist" explanation; and Togliatti declared that by their denunciations of Stalin, the Soviet leaders had lost "a certain amount of their prestige," and that they had better get busy and "face up to the questions that have been posed."

These solemn declarations of the Western Communists were in the nature of a diplomatic by-play to get off the hook with their own constituencies, rather than representing a burning thirst for historical information. They wanted to shift the spotlight back on

the Russian leaders. The newspaper scribes who suggested that this dialogue was all part of a prearranged game merely exhibited their own bewilderment as to what was going on. There is no question about the genuineness of the crisis, or the difficulties of the Western Communist leaders.

THE demand for deeper Marxist explanations implied that they, Thorez, Togliatti, Foster, are unsullied Communist lambs who were led astray for twenty-five years by the ogre in the Kremlin. But this is no more flattering to their status of leadership than is Khrushchev's long alignment with Stalin in the midst of the regime's frame-ups and crimes. If, as so many have pointed out, the "cult of the individual" does not absolve Khrushchev and others of culpability, how then can it absolve the foreign leaders, who had far more elbow room? Either they had a fair idea as to the true state of affairs, and kept silent—in which case they were rascals. Or, they knew nothing—in which case they were fools. In other words, by calling upon the Russian leaders to talk up more clearly, they were trying to pass the buck.

Moreover, while demands for sociological explanations are very important, even more important would be proposals to do away with the dictatorial system, and the institution of democratic practices. By continuing to harp on "Marxist explanations" and vaguely mumbling about mistakes now being corrected, the Communist leaders are trying to evade the needs of the present in favor of a one-sided recitation of the past.

The discussion was going around in circles at this stage when Togliatti tossed the fateful word of "bureaucracy" into the pot. It was probably not accidental that the "break" in the discussion came from Italy. The Italian Communist party is the extreme Left of a highly volatile working class that has a strong tradition of democracy. Its position on the political stage rests on the bloc with the Left Socialists. But the Socialist leader, Nenni, was badly shaken up by the revelations, and could not, and did not, content himself with mouthings about "mistakes" which were now being "rectified." He got down to cases, and that without calling on Khrushchev to provide him with

the "profound Marxist explanations." (As if the Russian events of the past forty years are a padlocked book to which only Khrushchev and the Russian Politbureau have the key!)



KHRUSHCHEV

AFTER calling attention to the Moscow Trials of 1936-38, Nenni states:

It was evident from that time on that Soviet public life had undergone in the previous ten years a double process of degeneration. On the one hand, of the party and state machine toward forms of bureaucratization and terrorism, and on the other hand, of the internal opposition toward forms of conspiracy and palace revolution. . .

Let us ask ourselves one moment what the Seventeenth Congress of the USSR Communist Party was. It was the congress of the "victors." It was held in Moscow at the end of January 1934. It opened with "tempestuous" applause for the Central Committee and for Stalin. If one considers that the power of Stalin was not at that time what it became later with the war, it is evident that the massacres disclosed by Khrushchev involve responsibilities that were not Stalin's alone but of the whole directive apparatus. Terror, in conditions of time and place not justified by necessity, was the price paid for the suppression of all democratic life inside the party and the state. . .

The Khrushchev report lacks any kind of Marxist analysis of Soviet society, any historical reconstruction of the moment in which, under the influence of determinate objective

or subjective relations all power was transformed into the hands of Stalin . . . An attempt is not even made to answer the question: "How and why could these things come to pass?" It was known that the dictatorship of the proletariat had been changed into a dictatorship of the Communist Party. We learn that the dictatorship of the Communist Party had become the personal dictatorship of Stalin. We are not told either how or why this could happen. . .

Nenni ridicules Khrushchev's remedies to "condemn and uproot in the Bolshevik manner the cult of personality" and to "restore in full the Leninist principles." "Fine declarations," he says, "which, when Stalin was alive, were made a hundred times by Stalin and other Soviet leaders." He continues:

Now the whole problem of Soviet society . . . is reduced to the necessity for internal democratization, for the circulation of ideas, in a word, for political liberty, a necessity which has lain below the surface of Soviet society for many years . . . In this sense, the Soviet crisis covers not only the so-called errors of Stalin, but the Soviet system, as it has taken shape under the influence of factors which are in process of rapid transformation. . .

AS is evident, Nenni wasted no time in getting to the heart of the matter. Togliatti was in a difficult spot. He had to talk fast and his talk had to make sense both to his followers and the followers of his ally, else his political position might be jeopardized. In his big interview in *Nuovi Argomenti* he went a little beyond the well-trod ground of general sociological explanations about Russia's backwardness, its need to industrialize in a hurry, its existence as a beleaguered fortress surrounded by capitalist foes, the ever-present danger of war, etc., etc. It is not that these explanations lack merit, but that they are too general to solve the problem at hand, and in this sense, are an evasion of the solution. Russia, for instance, was in more desperate straits in the civil-war years, and yet retained a measure of democratic interplay under Lenin, especially inside the

Communist Party. Why did a one-man dictatorship and an omnipotent secret police arise only later after the successes of the first Five Year Plan?

After Nenni's outburst, Togliatti had to get down to cases better than the Russians had done. He broke the charmed circle of the discussion by his cautious suggestion that the Soviet regime had degenerated under Stalin, and further, that this degeneration was due to the rise of a bureaucracy.

No one up to this point had dared breathe a word about this subject in Communist circles. It has been tabooed, because it tells more about the nature of the present Soviet ruling circle than the latter is willing to admit, and because it resembles too closely the explanation of Leon Trotsky as to the causes for the rise of Stalin and Stalinism. The Russian Communist chieftains rapidly cracked down on the heresy.

Their explanation in the Central Committee resolution of July 2 is less than impressive. They argue that despite Stalin's misdeeds "the nature of the socialist state based on public ownership of the means of production" had not altered. But clearly Togliatti, and Nenni before him, were talking about the degeneration of the political superstructure, and not about any social transformation of the class nature of the Soviet state. The Central Commit-

tee resolution pontifically closes the subject by announcing, "There are no foundations for such a question." Indeed? If the admitted crimes of the



TOGLIATTI

Stalin era do not constitute a degeneration of the political structure, then words have certainly lost their meaning. As a matter of fact, to deny that there was such a degeneration during the Stalin era means to accept the capitalist argument that socialism is synonymous with dictatorship and terror.

ALL disquisitions about Soviet society of either the Stalin era or the present day will not rise above the level of American high-school civics if they ignore the reality that Soviet society is

stratified, that there exists a vast bureaucracy whose living standards are positively aristocratic in comparison with the rest of the population, and that the special interests of this privileged hierarchy exert an immense pressure on the affairs of government. Naturally, one cannot demand the simple abolition of this bureaucracy, but wouldn't workers' management committees attenuate the spread of bureaucratism, do away with a lot of waste and mismanagement, and put the bureaucrats under some kind of restraint and democratic control? And are such enormous disproportions in living standards still necessary forty years after the revolution?

The only reliable way to curb bureaucracy, to thwart the arbitrary exercise of power, whether by officials or police, is the possession of democratic controls in the hands of the people. For this you need freedom of press, freedom of unions to represent workers in dealings with factory management rather than unions manipulated by the state to regiment the workers. *Pravda* angrily rejects any proposal "of having in the USSR artificially created non-Communist parties financed by foreign capitalists and serving its interests." Agreed. But how about non-artificial, pro-Soviet, non-Communist parties financed exclusively by their own party members?

A Message to the Polish Government

THE following letter, signed by well known liberals and socialists from Minneapolis, was sent to the Polish Ambassador:

Mr. Romuald Spaskowski
Ambassador of Poland
Polish Embassy
2640 16th Street
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Spaskowski:

The undersigned socialists, progressives and friends of civil liberties do not protest attacks on democratic rights abroad while ignoring attacks on democratic rights in our own country.

Because we oppose Smith Act prosecutions and other despotic acts of our government against American critics and because we sympathize with the desire of Poles to build a more just social order, we feel we have the right to be heard with respect.

We are watching the conduct of your government toward the strikers and demonstrators of Poznan, a group of whom, according to press reports, are to be brought to trial. We want to see the accused treated in conformity with the principles of democratic legality, including the right of people to strike and demonstrate peacefully for redress of grievances.

We are anxious to have answers to five questions:

Will the accused be presumed innocent of any acts with

which they are charged unless and until they are proven otherwise?

Will they be given speedy and open trial in regularly constituted courts?

In the event of postponement of trial, will they be set at liberty under bail?

Will they have freedom to choose their own counsel?

Will self-incrimination, mutual denunciation of prisoners and the McCarthyite principle of guilt-by-association be considered insufficient and unreliable evidence of guilt?

We earnestly hope that the answer to all these questions is yes.

Please transmit this message to your country's government and press. We wish, in making this plea for democratic practices, to disassociate ourselves from remarks that may be made about the Poznan events by the U. S. State Department because no government, including our own, ought to complain about infractions on liberty in another country unless it is doing its utmost to maintain the liberties of its own citizens.

Aaron Schneider
Morgan Soderberg
Jules Chametzky
Julian Markels
Stanley Tefft
Robert Edenbaum

Michael Baker
David Herreshoff
Betty Haggstrom
Mulford Sibley
Margaret Baker
Harold Orbach

Norman Bradford

Pravda not only insists on the one-party system now, but declares it will stay that way during the "entire struggle for communism." The old chestnut that since there are no conflicting classes there is no need for more than one party will find few buyers. More forthright Communists privately admit that the Khrushchev regime represents no socialist democracy but question whether such democratic rights can be afforded in a country still highly unstable and where the new order has not yet definitely been consolidated. Even if this fear has some legitimacy, it is still necessary forty years after the revolution to take preliminary steps to open up democratic channels.

Western radicals cannot take the attitude that they will leave it to the judgment of the Soviet leaders. People who have eaten of dictatorship are not the best judges of when the time is ripe for democracy. For very many of them the time may never be ripe. Marx said the job is not merely to explain the world but to change it. So it is with the Soviet Union as well. Along with probing the reasons for Stalinist degeneration, the job is to put through such changes in the political superstructure as to ensure democracy and to curb bureaucracy.

THERE are some who feel inhibited from calling for democratic rights in the Soviet bloc because they assume that Stalin's method of industrialization by a lopsided development of heavy industry while starving the masses for consumers goods—all under the bureaucratic whip—is both a necessary and correct policy. When one asks, isn't this a rather glib assumption, unsupported by evidence, attention is triumphantly called to Russia's victory over the Nazi armies in the war, and how this would have been impossible had Russia not become a strong industrial power.

Let no one imagine that this argument disposes of the matter and instructs us precisely what is the correct proportion of capital to be invested in heavy and light industries under socialist planning. From the same Russian victory over the Nazis, people used to glibly explain how Stalin was vindicated in doing away with most of his General Staff. Now, it is acknowledged that instead of aiding this vic-



SIGN OF THE (OLD) TIMES

tory, Stalin's act unconscionably raised the cost in human lives and material destruction.

The outburst in Poznan, like the similar June 1953 uprising in Berlin, are warning signals that human beings cannot be driven like cattle. That is, in the final analysis, the glory of the human animal. Premier Cyrankiewicz admitted that the Polish workers had legitimate grounds for bitterness, and the Polish Communist newspaper, *Trybuna Ludu*, declared that "Facts revealed so far by the investigation commission . . . show that the basis for the bloody riots was the dissatisfaction of the workers" and went on to accuse a "heartless bureaucracy of having lost every contact with the workers."

Nevertheless, the Communist publications bandy around accusations of espionage provocations causing the riots. We have to be very cautious about accepting these charges until and unless positive substantiating evidence is produced, especially since the same kind of accusation was falsely levelled at the Berlin uprising. In any case, the theory of "outside agitators" solves very little. Even if we gratuitously assume that espionage agents had a hand in the affair—and the most recent *Trybuna Ludu* editorial says nothing about this—the masses still had to be in a mood of desperate resentment to call a general strike and conduct themselves in the aggressive way that they did.

Naturally, the imperialists, whose lips are sealed on the shootings in Guate-

mala, the terror in Cyprus, the tortures inflicted on the peoples of Kenya, are shedding crocodile tears about the workers of Poznan. But their hypocritical campaign cannot be permitted to blind us to the realities of the Polish situation and the need for profound internal improvements.

It is a truism of economists that slave labor is notoriously uneconomical labor. Extending the analogy, can it be said that keeping workers ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed for years on end is the most economical and wisest way of industrializing a country?

The meaning of bureaucratic waste was brought home in a recent article in *Po Prostu*, Polish weekly, entitled, "Not Only Zeran." The article points out that in Poland's first automobile factory at Zeran the state lost 20,000 zlotys (about \$5,000 at the official rate of exchange) on every car turned out by the plant, and that the investment capital for the plant would have built an entire housing development. Can it not be that a more harmonious industrialization policy that takes better account of the people's needs and involves them in the projection and execution of the plans will enjoy more popular support and get better results? It may very well make the country stronger even from the point of view of military defense. The recent Russian Central Committee resolution states categorically: "The highest aim of the Soviet state is to raise the population's living standards in every respect. . . ." That ought to be the actual policy.

THE Russian leaders clearly want to bring the current discussion in the various Communist parties to a close and dispel any notion that one-party government is to be tampered with. The Western Communists asked for an explanation and Khrushchev answered them, in effect: "Here is your explanation. Now let's close ranks and have done with the talking."

This happy idea fitted in perfectly with the thinking of many of the Communist leaders themselves. The French jumped with alacrity and eagerness, "warmly approving the resolution" and declaring themselves "fully satisfied." Togliatti moved more carefully and held to his critical strictures, but also voiced his "unreserved approval." He also wanted to taper off the argument.

Dennis gave it as his opinion that "the resolution goes a long way in explaining—while clearly not justifying—what has become known as the growth of the cult of the individual . . ."

The European Communist parties have been sending delegations to Moscow to work out their new *modus vi-*

endi. At the same time, the Soviet press is hammering away at the limitations of the changeover, and in Hungary and Czechoslovakia they are cracking down on dissidents. We can assume that the first stage has come to an end.

But this is one instance where the

decision of the Russian leaders may not prove operative too long. The Twentieth Congress, bringing to the surface the most explosive contradiction of Communism, both in Russia and the West, set forces in motion that will not be exorcised out of existence.

Pierre Hervé on the French Communist Party

SHORTLY before the Russian Twentieth Congress Pierre Hervé, a leader and editor of the French Communist Party, was expelled for attacking the methods of its leadership in his book, "Revolution and Fetishes." After a period of silence, Hervé has again spoken out. His remarks come on the eve of the Fourteenth Congress of the French Communist Party. Since March 17, when *L'Humanité's* Moscow correspondent spoke of Khrushchev's "secret report," three weeks after its delivery, no direct mention of it has appeared in the official French Communist press. The following is a digest of Hervé's article, published in the June 21 issue of France Observateur, foremost independent Left weekly, in France.

* * *

MAURICE Thorez stubbornly tried to conceal from his party that the Soviet Union has heralded the end of Stalinism. In reply to certain questions one of his mouthpieces wrote: "There are things which concern Soviet Communists and not French Communists, and vice versa." Does this mean that there are now "things" which concern French Communists and not Soviet Communists?

After all these years of blind adherence to every variation of Stalin's line, this sudden affirmation of independence must be viewed in the context of the changes in the Soviet Union.

At no time in the past thirty years has any member of Thorez' group conceded the principle of autonomy for French Communists. But as soon as Stalin's methods are denounced, these ultra-Stalinists declare that the French CP is not "a section of the Soviet Communist Party." Members of the Political Bureau have stated that the approaching Fourteenth Congress of the French CP should not base its discussions on the Soviet Twentieth Congress. They have criticized foreign Communists for condemning Stalin, going so far as to say that it was improper for a "German" (Walter Ulbricht) to belittle Stalin. The real target, however, is the Soviet leadership.

Marcel Servin, a French CP leader, rejected a proposal that delegates to the Fourteenth Congress be elected by secret ballot, on the ground that this is justi-

fied only in a party where leadership reflects different tendencies. He and his cohorts, however, knew that the delegates to the Soviet Twentieth Congress were elected by secret ballot.

After their long stay in the Soviet Union, Maurice Thorez, his wife Jeannette Vermeersch, and others, must have known of Stalin's reign of terror. Other Communists who lived there under similar circumstances knew about it, and revealed it publicly.

Their justification: We live in a capitalist country, and Stalin was the symbol of the first socialist state. In other words, the truth had to be concealed.

But Thorez and his clique went beyond silence; they systematically copied Stalin's authoritarianism, brutal cynicism, methods of intimidation and repression. Could they conduct themselves in this manner were they not convinced that Stalin's methods are good? If they acted under pressure, and secretly abhorred Stalinism, why didn't they welcome the end of this tyranny? Why didn't they hasten to acclaim and publicize the new changes? Why didn't the new climate inspire them to rectify injustices?

None of this took place. Khrushchev's report indicates what Thorez and his cohorts would have done had they taken power in 1944-45. The truth is that Thorez and Togliatti knew all about Stalin, and agreed with him.

Let each take care of their own Stalinists—the Soviets of theirs, and we of ours!

It was no coincidence that *L'Humanité* criticized the Yugoslav paper, *Borba*, on the very day of Tito's arrival in Moscow. Thorez believes that the 1948 Cominform action was correct, and that the Cominform was a "positive" organization. Because *Borba* took issue with this view, *L'Humanité* accused it of "interference in the internal affairs of the French CP." Coming from a clique which for many years grossly slandered Yugoslav Communists, this testifies to extraordinary cynicism.

Thorez did not confine himself to Stalinizing the French party but often intervened brutally in the affairs of other Communist parties, such as those of the U.S., Great Britain, Belgium, Switzerland. In contrast with the Yugo-

slav CP, which has opened up new perspectives for the adherents of socialism, the Stalinist clique in Paris has polarized all the reactionary, obscurantist and anti-Marxist aspects of Stalinism of its last stage. This Stalinism will continue so long as Thorez and his followers remain at the helm of the French Communist Party.

THE vast changes which have occurred in the Soviet Union and in the entire world are non-existent in the central committee's thesis or in *L'Humanité's* "discussion" columns. All basic questions are avoided. Why did Jeannette Vermeersch so often use the expression, "The party of Maurice Thorez?" Who decided on the purchase in a fancy quarter of Cannes of a 28-million-franc (\$70,000) villa, which made Thorez a neighbor of the Aga Khan and of the aunt of the Queen of England? Was it in the spirit of Jules Guesde and Jean Jaurès that platforms were loaded with enormous portraits, and a strict order of priority prevailed among the leaders, reflected even in the printing type used by *L'Humanité*? Wasn't all this an imitation of Stalin?

I was recently told of a situation in a branch of intellectuals. The majority, profoundly shaken by Khrushchev's revelations, demands explanations and a change in methods. But others show that the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary spirit is alien to them.

This callousness toward the murder of thousands of Soviet Communists, and this scorn of truth, are paralleled by an increasing hostility toward the current Soviet leadership and Communists in other countries.

The comrade who described the situation in his branch added: "We are beginning to realize that an abyss lies between us; ideologically these members of the Communist Party are fascists . . ."

Fascism must be fought wherever found, including in the Communist Party. No democrat, no partisan of socialism stands to gain by the sharpening of nationalist and reactionary tendencies within the party. A new spirit and new methods can be achieved only in agreement with the conclusions of the Soviet Twentieth Congress.

The tenth anniversary of the independence of the Philippines is being celebrated, but, as this survey proves, the boasts of U. S. "liberality" do not ring true in the light of the evidence.

How We Rule An Unhappy People

by Bert Cochran

UP until recent years the government of the United States had a special hold upon international public opinion. This country went into the first World War for the same sordid reasons as the other major powers. Yet the European peoples, cynical about Clemenceau, suspicious of Lloyd George, welcomed Woodrow Wilson as a veritable savior and hugged his Fourteen Points to their bosoms as if it were the blessed prayer book itself. Roosevelt played power politics like the others at Quebec, Casablanca and Yalta. But he commanded a moral authority that Churchill never approached.

Up to the cold war, American political leaders, taking advantage of the absence of an American empire of the British or French variety, portrayed their country with singular success as an anti-colonial nation, both to its own peoples at home, and to others abroad. But outside its own borders, its anti-colonial reputation has been dealt irreparable damage in the past ten years.

The fact that the Washington colossus, with its manifold tentacles encircling the globe, can palm itself off to its own peoples as an anti-colonial government, and hypocritically tip its hat to the traditions of 1776, is a terrifying testimonial to the power of a modern state to manipulate public opinion. The precise techniques of American twentieth-century imperialism are so devious that they remain obscure even to many who understand in a general way that Washington controls the destinies of semi-colonial countries in Latin America, the Near East, the Far East, by its headlock on their economies. A recent study of the Philippines,* published under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, is particularly enlightening on this score, as it demonstrates with a wealth of data how a country can be nominally independent, but actually a trussed-up, exploited colony of the American Empire. A review of the Philippines' recent history furnishes us with an understanding of the new methods of the new imperialism, and how it maneuvers to maintain its ancient supremacy under new conditions.

**AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY TOWARD THE PHILIPPINES*, by Shirley Jenkins. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1955, \$4.

THE Filipinos, approximately 20 million strong, are a homogeneous people living in a series of islands where the climate is kindly, the soil is good, and where in the pre-colonial past, food came easily and economics played a minor role in the organization of life. Spain incorporated the Philippines into its imperial system toward the end of the fifteenth century and ruled the country as a colony for three centuries. The natives were attached servilely to the land, subjected to the political domination of the *cacique*, and absorbed into the fold of the Catholic Church. When the Americans took over in 1898 after Spain's defeat in the Spanish-American War, the long-standing revolutionary struggle for independence had reached a climax and the country was in the throes of a full-scale rebellion. The Americans proceeded to crush the independence movement, finding support among the landowners in many sections of the country.

After beating back its own doubts and hesitations, this country embraced its self-proclaimed "manifest destiny" of joining the rest of the imperial pack in carving up the backward countries. In his instructions to the delegates of the Paris Peace Conference, President McKinley said the United States had taken up arms against Spain in "the fulfillment of high public and moral obligations." But since they had apparently come into possession of some new real estate, he went on to remark that "incidental to our tenure in the Philippines is the commercial opportunity to which American statesmanship cannot be indifferent."

Senator Beveridge of Indiana, one of the spokesmen of the imperialist cabal, did not even bother with the circumlocution. Speaking in the Senate on the vast markets of the Orient, he was carried away by the dazzling prospects opening up before his class: "The Philippines are ours forever. . . . And just beyond the Philippines are China's illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either. We will not repudiate our duty in the archipelago. We will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient. . . . Our largest trade henceforth must be with Asia. The Pacific is our ocean. More and more Europe will manufacture the most it needs, secure from its colonies the most it consumes. Where shall we turn for consumers of our surplus? Geography answers the question. China is our natural customer. . . . The Philippines give us a base at the door of all the East."



Philippine guerrillas move against the Japanese on Leyte in 1944.

IN the next decade the traditional imperialist system had sunk its claws into the Philippine body, converted its people into raw-material suppliers of American economy, while the islands were made into a dumping ground for American manufactures. The dry statistics tell their story: For the decade 1920-30, sugar exports to the United States rose by 450 percent, coconut oil by 223 percent, cordage by over 500 percent. The Philippines, situated some 6,000 miles from the American mainland, with natural markets in the Far East, which exported during the Spanish period about 20 percent of its total to the United States, had its whole economic direction turned around to where three-quarters of its produce was going to this country. According to the Jenkins study: "The nature and extent of pre-war Philippine foreign trade illustrate, with some variations, the pattern of colonial development familiar throughout Southeast Asia. To the United States came agricultural raw materials and products needed for manufacture in this country, and from this nation went industrial goods and commodities vital to an underdeveloped economy. American exports also included foodstuffs such as wheat and flour, for owing to excessive specialization on export products the Philippines, though an agricultural nation, was unable to feed itself."

Luis Taruc, in his autobiography, spells out what this means to the Filipino, as a revolutionary independence fighter sees it:

The Filipino moves about in an American-made world. The clothes he wears, the cigarettes he smokes, the canned food he eats, the music he hears, the news of the world he reads (and the books and magazines) are all American, although his own country has the ability to produce all these. He eats pineapple canned in California, but he grows it in the Philippines. His country grows millions of coconuts, but he has to buy toilet soap made in New Jersey out of coconut oil. He buys sugar refined in American mills but grown on his own island of Negros; if he wants to buy Filipino-made sugar he must be content with muscovado or panotsa [brown sugar in crude form or in hard cakes]. He rides on American-made buses or an American-made train. On the radio, made in New York (if he is one of the very few who have a radio), he listens to recorded American programs. American movies dominate his theaters. His schools use American textbooks that explain science, economics, history, and politics from an American standpoint. . . . And finally, of American make, are the guns, the tanks, the planes, the artillery, the vehicles, and even the uniforms of the troops that have been used to shoot down the Filipino people who would like to see a Filipino-made future for their children.

Some small American industries have been established in the Philippines: cosmetics, soft drinks, electric

fixtures. They are subsidiaries of large corporations in the United States which have set up Philippine branches because they can hire cheaper labor and thus sell their products for greater profit.

Jenkins rounds out this picture by some pertinent statistical facts: "The Philippine economy has been primarily agricultural with 80 percent of the population dependent on the production of a few crops, all—except rice—for export. . . . The per capita income of Filipinos was estimated by Manuel Roxas, when he was Secretary of Finance in 1939, at \$40 annually."

In the recent decades, Americans, like the British, discovered that trying to rule a colony simply by the mailed fist was very expensive, and impractical for the long pull. In contrast to the sluggish Spaniards, the Americans, by their aggressive economic policy, were able to create a native Quisling group to rule for them. Home rule, as so often with the British, was meant not as a step in the direction of genuine independence, but as a cheaper way of administering an empire, or adapting oneself to the more assertive spirit of the native upper classes. America's intensive economic penetration brought into being the same native class which had become prominent in China and other parts of the Far East, the *compradores*. This was a group of people who acted as middlemen for the imperial masters. They were the brokers through whom raw materials were shipped out and the finished products came in. Completely dependent on imperialism, they became its political agency.

THE Nacionalista Party, founded by Quezon and Osmeña in 1907 as a middle-class organization fighting for independence, was soon taken over by the *compradores* and became a servile tool of the Governor-General. More successfully than in the past, the nation was split up into conflicting, hostile sections, making it easier for the Americans to play one off against the other. The native merchant class, rather than becoming the banner bearer of independence, as the rising capitalist class was in the United States in 1776, was infected with the *compradore* spirit, and sold out to every imperialist overlord, the United States, then Japan, then later the United States again. The aggressiveness and independent organization of the peasants and city workers further pushed the upper classes into dependence on the imperialist overlord. The Philippine development followed close to the Chinese (rather than the Indian or Indonesian), and the mantle of the independence struggle fell on the shoulders of the worker and peasant organizations and representatives.

Internal developments in the United States meantime kept the issue of Philippine independence alive here. The all-inclusive character of our economy ill-suits this country for its role as an imperial power and the world's foremost creditor and exporter. Philippine independence had been a plank of successive Democratic Party platforms before the first World War, although the formulations grew increasingly vague as time went on. There always was a certain amount of liberal sentiment to grant independence, but the real drive came from the farm lobby which believed that Philippine imports constituted a threat to

domestic agriculture. As the farm crisis grew acute in the twenties, the pressure rose and finally the Hare-Hawes-Cutting Act was passed in 1933 over Hoover's veto which promised a spurious independence in time, limited free trade to a one-way proposition of American exports to the Philippines, guaranteed special American economic and political rights, including permanent military bases



and indefinite rights to the High Commissioner. Strict quotas were imposed on Philippine imports, however, and Philippine immigration was restricted to fifty persons a year. In 1934, under Roosevelt, the law was slightly modified under the Tydings-McDuffie Act, which promised independence in ten years.

AFTER Pearl Harbor the Americans had to clear out and the Philippines became part of Japan's short-lived empire. In the course of the war Philippine developments showed many features similar to the experiences of China and Yugoslavia. A government-in-exile was formed in Washington headed by Quezon and Osmeña, but (as in Yugoslavia) the bulk of the Filipino merchant and landlord class, led by Manuel Roxas, cooperated with the Japanese invader and furnished personnel for his puppet regime. At the same time, a national liberation movement, based largely on the peasantry and led by Communists and Socialists, became increasingly active, and fought a savage guerrilla war with the invader and his collaborators.

Communism had obtained a foothold in the Philippines after the visit of the Indonesian leader, Tan Malakka, in the late twenties, and in 1930, a Communist Party was organized. Two years later, when it was outlawed, and its leaders sent to jail for sedition, Pedro Abad Santos, the famed peasant leader of Pampagna, organized the Socialist Party, and in 1938, the two organizations fused. The united body commanded considerable support in Manila and Central Luzon, where it led strong labor and peasant unions. In line with the international Peoples Front policy of the time, the Communist Party drew up a 12-point memorandum after Pearl Harbor which it presented to President Quezon and to the American High Commissioner, the first point of which called for "National Unity for an Anti-Japanese United Front," and the last

point of which declared, "The Communist Party pledges loyalty to the governments of the Philippines and of the United States."

In the spring of 1942, under its inspiration, the Hukbalahap (*Huko ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon*—the People's Anti-Japanese Army) was born. As its name implied, and as its policy required, this was a guerrilla armed force which was to operate in a united front with the Filipino upper classes and the Americans. This type of policy was manipulated by Tito in Yugoslavia and Mao in China so that at all times the independent character of their own organizations was secured. In the case of the Philippines, the leaders often got entangled with their own Peoples Front slogans to their disadvantage. At any rate, the policy was a chimerical one, as the landlords collaborated with the Japanese and tried to fasten stronger chains on the peasantry, while the governments of Roxas and Laurel acted as the Petain and Darlan of the Philippines. As for the Americans, most of them had left with MacArthur, and those officers who remained were organizing a counter-guerrilla force, the USAFFE, which, as in the case of the Mikhailovitch guerrillas in Yugoslavia, worked often with the Japanese and collaborators to exterminate the Huks. Under the circumstances, there wasn't too much unity content in the unity program, but the Huk leadership tenaciously clung to the broad line of its policy, making repeated efforts to arrive at understandings with both the Filipino and American leaders.

IN three years, starting with small untrained bands, and with almost no arms, the Huks had built up a powerful force in Central Luzon, and established an enviable record of heroism and achievement. They fought innumerable engagements with the Japanese, capturing guns and supplies, and keeping the rice of these territories out of the hands of the invader. They took over the functions of the local governments, organized a democratic system of political administration, and put an end to the abuses of the *cacique*.

Taruc, the Huk Commander-in Chief, relates in his autobiography: "In a barrio between Mexico and San Fernando, our GHQ sat in January 1945, waiting for the American army to come. The Hukbalahap and the people were masters of Central Luzon. The enemy was everywhere in flight; Japanese stragglers were being killed in the barrios by women; puppets had been chased from their positions and the people were ruling themselves through their own elected provisional representatives. Victory was within our grasp. . . We trusted the Americans, although many of their representatives had given us good reason not to. In our united front frame of mind, we thought of them as allies in a war against a fascist enemy. We had not even considered that our allies themselves would turn to using fascist methods."

The U.S. Army leadership was proceeding from an entirely different policy. It began to disarm the Huks wherever it could, it massacred a number of squadrons that unsuspectingly had fraternized with American troops, and in quick order instituted a reign of terror in Manila and Central Luzon. With MacArthur's blessing, the government of Roxas and the landlord and *compradore* collabora-

tors was imposed again over the rebellious people. Whether the Huks were strong enough to have stopped this process, whatever their policy, is uncertain. But their political astigmatism played into the hands of their enemies. Taruc bitterly blames himself and his co-workers for this costly mistake. "We had neglected to point out," he exclaims, "that imperialism was the same, whether Japanese, American, British or Dutch. In doing so we had narrowed down and weakened the basic issue of World War II, which, in its positive aspect, was a war for national liberation. . . . We had left our people unprepared for what to expect from the return of the Americans. That is why our soldiers, gladly greeting the GI's and fighting beside them, were stunned when the same GI's turned around and disarmed them, arrested them, and permitted them to be massacred."

CLAUDE A. Buss states in his introduction to the Jenkins book that "Nothing has contributed more to the prestige of the United States in Southeast Asia than the fact that we made a promise and we kept it. . . . In spite of the war, and in spite of the enormity of the economic handicaps, independence was declared exactly as scheduled." That might have been the first effect of America's granting of independence on July 4, 1946. But as the true meaning of the gesture began percolating through, American credit got drastically discounted.

The Philippines had been a base of American war operations in the Pacific, and its re-liberation under MacArthur had cost the country dearly. A U.S. Congressional study declared:

Official reports, photographic evidence, and statements of those who have seen the ruin and destruction are unanimous in asserting that, of all the war-ravaged areas of the world, the Philippines are the most utterly devastated from the standpoint of the ratio of functional construction still intact to functional construction damaged or destroyed, the effect of destruction on functional economy, social facilities of the nation, and the effect of war damage on the capacity of the nation to rebuild and repair.

Buss summarizes the situation as follows: "Our defenses had been inadequate, our liberation policy cost their blood and devastated their property. The least we could do was to offer compensation to help rebuild."

After months of delay and haggling in the U.S. Congress, the Rehabilitation Act for the Philippines was passed on April 30, 1946 authorizing a total of \$400 million for compensation to private individuals. As assistance for reconstruction, a maximum of \$100 million worth of surplus property was to be transferred to the Philippine government, and an additional \$120 million was to be allocated to various agencies for essential public services. But even this modest help was not offered free and clear. A joker had been added: If the Filipinos wanted relief, they had to take it in a package deal which included the Bell Bill, later called the Philippine Trade Act of 1946. According to Jenkins' ultra-restrained scholarly review:

Underlying the Act was the assumption that Philippine economic revival depended on restoring trade with the United States and stimulating a flow of American investment into the Islands. Hence free trade was continued, though on a temporary and gradually diminishing basis; special privileges were granted to American investors; and the Philippine currency was tied to the American dollar. Philippine-American relations thus retained a quasi-colonial character. . . . In short, as it gained political independence, the Philippine Republic was still far from possessing economic sovereignty. The United States, on the other hand, retained some of the economic and military advantages of a colonial power, while it was relieved of the burden of administration and of direct responsibility for Philippine welfare. . . .

Naturally, there was a great outcry against this phony independence in the Philippines. The sentiment of going public opinion is well expressed in this quotation from a columnist in the *Philippine Press*: "Japan is occupied. So we are told anyway. The Philippines is supposed to be quote liberated unquote. Why not slap the Bell Bill on the Japs?" The heat was on and even the Nacionalista Party after fiery debates went on record against the act. It said the law would "condemn the Filipino people to slavery."

A statement by the Philippine Lawyers Guild read: "Through their chief agent and spokesman in these Islands, High Commissioner [now Ambassador] Paul V. McNutt, American business interests succeeded in railroading the Bell Act through the U.S. Congress. This law, falsely labeled as 'Reciprocal' is so onerous that if carried into full effect it will inevitably reduce the Philippine Republic to nothing better than its Jap-puppet predecessor." The Guild reported that on the very day that the news of Truman's signing of the bill had been published, a protest demonstration of 50,000 peasants and workers was held in Manila representing 23 civic groups. The *Manila Chronicle* stated editorially: "At the rate the U.S. Army is taking over Philippine territory, Filipinos will soon live like Indians, on reservations. . . . It seems that there is no need of amending our Constitution to grant Americans 'special rights' in this country. They are making themselves at home even without it, and driving us out into the backyard of our own house."

TO fasten by constitutional means this new set of chains on the Philippine people the U.S. Congress needed native collaborators. They had recourse to the same people who had been collaborating with the Japanese throughout the war, and were now in especial need of American support to shield them from the wrath of their own peoples. The *Philippine Press* admitted as much in its declaration to the outgoing president, Osmeña: "The price for the Presidency was . . . yielding to the imperialist demands of a former ally and friend in exchange for immediate but temporary benefits and aid. You would not bankrupt the country for a handful of government employees, you would not mortgage your country's in-

dependence for American relief with strings attached. And so you must go. Another man was prepared to pay the price. . . . He will be the President of the Philippine Republic."


Roxas, who split the Nacionalistas and created the new so-called Liberal Party, was elected to the presidency, as per schedule. But his election was no flaming testimonial to the people's will or choice. Elections have traditionally been very crooked in the Philippines, but the 1946 elections exceeded all bounds. Bernard Seeman and Laurence Salisbury, in their work issued by the Institute of Pacific Relations, "Cross Currents in the Philippines," give this description of the event:

The Roxas victory at the polls, which took place on April 23, 1946, should be judged against the background of these events: the Philippine Army, the government machinery, and the press were almost entirely in the hands of the Roxas group; the powerful landowning, business and financial groups backed Manuel Roxas; the Philippine Army, the Civilian guards, and the USAFFE guerrilla bands undertook a campaign of legal and extra-legal terrorism in order to prevent the strongest anti-Roxas areas from freely casting their ballots; High Commissioner McNutt, General MacArthur, and other American officials and businessmen, while ostensibly keeping "hands off," actually gave Mr. Roxas substantial support by ignoring the collaboration issue; Manuel Roxas capitalized on this support to promise the destitute Filipinos that the United States would give him the rehabilitation aid that President Osmeña had been unable to obtain; by remaining in the Philippines during the occupation, Mr. Roxas was able to take over control of a very substantial portion of the political machinery of the Nacionalista Party.

Finally, the nature of the Philippine elections must be taken into account. Out of an estimated 18,000,000 population, there were some 3,000,000 qualified, registered voters. Of these, only about 2,500,000 voted in the April elections. And, in large Philippine areas, peasants still voted as directed by their cacique, landlord, or plantation foreman.

Even so, Roxas was repudiated in Central Luzon, which elected to Congress six Democratic Alliance candidates (an electoral bloc formed under the leadership of the Huks). These six prevented Roxas from commanding a two-thirds majority in the lower house, which he needed to pass any constitutional amendment. Roxas' first move therefore after the election was to refuse the seating of the six opposition Congressmen as well as one Nacionalista Congressman and three Nacionalista Senators. With the opposition ruthlessly expelled, the rump parliament proceeded to jam through the constitutional amendment necessary for the approval of provisions contained in the Bell Bill. Shortly thereafter, Roxas signed another agreement granting the United States fifteen military bases on the Islands for ninety-nine years.

THE Philippine people were now to savor the bitterness of penury along with their political degradation.



At this flag ceremony ten years ago, the American flag was lowered and the Philippine flag raised, but the Philippines are still very far from real independence.

The feudal landlords saw the Roxas victory as the signal to crack down on the peasant movement. In Pampagna, they had their agent, Pablo Angeles David, installed as governor, and he proceeded to set up a private fascist army modelled on the Spanish Falange to terrorize Huk supporters and re-impose the old 50-50 system of share-cropping. Roxas' own laws called for a 70-30 division, but any peasant foolish enough to demand observance of the law would find himself speedily hounded off the land, if not worse. Thereupon the Huks began fighting back, and fierce civil war was to continue for the next six years until the guerrillas were finally overwhelmed by superior force. Despite frequent palaver about land reform, the fierce exploitation in the countryside continued without change. The Rivera-McMillan report of 1950 spoke of "feudalistic" conditions in the villages and concluded that nearly half the village residents were worse off than ten years before. The 1952 Hardie report on land reform created a sensation with its finding that the pernicious system of land tenure threatened the very existence of the Republic.

Nor did American relief money and surplus-goods allocations ease the lot of the average Filipino, although

it did enrich a thin stratum of government grafters, five-percenters, black-marketeers and speculators. As in Chiang Kai-shek's China and other compradore-run regimes, corruption in the Philippines was simply indescribable. Since the ruling clique maintained its favored position only by virtue of its foreign patrons, the national spirit was completely undermined, and the chase after money became cynical and unbridled. The disposal of surplus goods furnished one of the major scandals of the post-war years. In the spring of 1947, goaded into action by Congressional disclosures and press exposés, President Roxas ordered an investigation. By August, it was officially admitted that property valued at \$300 million out of an allotment originally worth \$435 million had been lost through pilferage and looting. The Philippine Surplus Property Commission estimated losses as high as 70 percent of money value. Jenkins comments: "The record of the surplus transfer, in itself an admirable scheme, showed how rehabilitation efforts could be frustrated by lack of effective controls." This is the thinking of one blinded by administrative routine. As if imperialism could prop the corrupt rule of greedy feudalists, and install a set of docile puppets to guarantee its overlordship, and expect to find high-minded saints to take on the job! Only self-seeking, cynical politicians are available for that kind of work, and they expect to get well greased for their efforts. One is scarcely justified in getting surprised that they act true to form.

The full flavor of the situation is conveyed in a dispatch carried in the December 15, 1946 *N. Y. Times*, reporting on a campaign trip made by Mr. Roxas and his official party:

At every place the party stopped they met reports of excessive unemployment and of the spreading influences of graft and corruption among government officials and influential moneyed people alike. . . . At all the stopping places . . . Mr. Roxas found graft and corruption prevalent. Maldistribution of crop loans through branches of the Philippine National Bank is one of the worst irregularities.

Through the National Land Resettlement Administration, a pre-war semi-government agency, millions of pesos were made available after the liberation for crop loans. Mr. Roxas was informed that rich planters and government officials had obtained the major portion of these loans.

It was found that loans had been made to fictitious tenants, supposedly secured by crops. Later it was found that there were no tenants and no crops and the money could not be recovered.

While the rehabilitation monies didn't do the common people very much good they did set off a sickly boom which aggravated existing ills. Prices skyrocketed. The cost-of-living index for a wage earner's family in Manila was 700 percent higher in 1945 than in 1941. In the last month of 1945 food cost over eight and one-half times what it did in 1941, and clothing over ten times as much. But the average daily wage in Manila had risen only from 2.3 pesos for skilled laborers to 5.3 pesos in this period, and from 1.2 pesos to 3.5 pesos for common labor.

MEANWHILE, capital poured into various non-productive luxury and speculative fields while basic production was largely neglected. The 1946 *Yearbook of Philippine Statistics* showed that 45 percent of new capital investment in the first six months of that year was in the fields of general merchandising and the import and export game. More new money went into cinema than manufacturing, more was absorbed by brokerage activities than by motor supplies. A 1947 U.S. Department of Commerce study reported "unmistakable signs of a trend toward the pattern of basic economy long characteristic of the Philippines." Jenkins explains: "This meant a return to concentration on a few export crops and a high level of imports, particularly of consumer goods."

By 1950 the economic situation had taken a serious turn. Unemployment was widespread and the Huk rebellion was mounting. Per capita production and living standards were lower than before the war, and showed no prospects of improvement. Faced with an increasingly difficult international position, the United States leaders felt some kind of ameliorative action was called for in the Philippines.

Accordingly, President Truman dispatched an Economic Survey Mission, headed by Daniel W. Bell, a private banker, to the Islands. The mission made an extensive survey and released its analyses and recommendations in October 1950. It is illuminating to summarize some of its findings as a testimonial to what happens to a country under the colonial pattern, new-style. The report dealt gingerly with the problems of graft and corruption, and then passed on to an economic evaluation:

... agricultural and industrial output is still below the prewar level. . . . The failure to expand production and to increase productive efficiency is particularly disappointing because investment was exceptionally high and foreign exchange receipts were exceptionally large during most of the post-liberation period. . . . The opportunity . . . has been wasted because of misdirected investment and excessive imports for consumption. . . . The strained relationship between the landlords and their tenants and the low economic condition generally

THE practical force of this economic argument in politics is strikingly illustrated by the recent history of the United States. Here is a country which suddenly breaks through a conservative policy, strongly held by both political parties, bound up with every popular instinct and tradition, and flings itself into a rapid imperial career for which it possesses neither the material nor the moral equipment, risking the principles and practices of liberty and equality by the establishment of militarism and the forcible subjugation of peoples which it cannot safely admit to the condition of American citizenship.

Is this a mere wild freak of spreadeagledism, a burst of political ambition on the part of a nation coming to a sudden realization of its destiny? Not at all. The spirit of adventure, the American "mission of civilization," are, as forces making for Imperialism, clearly subordinate to the driving force of the economic factor . . .

It is this sudden demand for foreign markets for manufacturers and for investments which is avowedly responsible for the adoption of Imperialism as a political policy and practice by the Republican Party to which the great industrial and financial chiefs belong, and which belongs to them. The adventurous enthusiasm of President Roosevelt and his "manifest destiny" and "mission of civilization" party must not deceive us. It is Messrs. Rockefeller,

of the tillers of the soil compose one of the main factors retarding the recovery of agricultural production. . . . The land problem remains the same or worse than four years ago. . . .

The Bell report went on to propose that the law on the books providing for a 70-30 crop division be enforced, and that a program of resettlement and resale be started with rural credit made available at modest interest rates. It further recommended a U.S. grant of \$250 million over the next five years under stricter American controls than in the past.

Jenkins calls our attention to the fact that the problems of the Philippines had been astutely dealt with previously in a whole series of earlier reports in 1947 and 1948—with no results. "It might, in fact, be said that the way to crisis in the Philippines has been paved with good reports. Such surveys, however, valuable as they may have been, suffered from some of the same weaknesses as the Bell Report. . . . For example, the Bell Report analyzed the Philippine Trade Act, not primarily in terms of its effect on the Philippine economy, but rather from the point of view of whether or not it served American commercial policy in the Pacific. Furthermore, the Bell Report did not attempt to discuss either the political realities in the Philippines or the degree of change necessary to reach full implementation of its own recommendations."

Today, no half-informed person in the Islands, whatever his political persuasion, takes seriously the claim of Philippine independence. The old servitor relationship is manipulated more indirectly and with greater complexity and finesse, but it is there just as in the past. American imperialism has changed the techniques but not the reality of its overlordship. Taruc was clearly not exaggerating, judging by this survey of an American scholar, when he bitterly concluded that "American imperialism has kept us a backward, colonial people, with the majority living in the misery of poverty and ignorance."

Pierpont Morgan, Hanna, Schwab, and their associates who need Imperialism and who are fastening it upon the shoulders of the great Republic of the West. They need Imperialism because they desire to use the public resources of their country to find profitable employment for the capital which otherwise would be superfluous.

It is not indeed necessary to own a country in order to do trade with it or to invest capital in it, and doubtless the United States can find some vent for their surplus goods and capital in European countries. But these countries are for the most part able to make provision for themselves: most of them have erected tariffs against manufacturing imports. . . . The big American manufacturers and financiers will be compelled to look to China and the Pacific and to South America for their most profitable chances; protectionists by principle and practice, they will insist upon getting as close a monopoly of these markets as they can secure, and the competition of Germany, England, and the other trading nations will drive them to the establishment of special political relations with the markets they most prize. Cuba, the Philippines, and Hawaii are but the *hors d'oeuvre* to whet the appetite for an ampler banquet.

J.A. Hobson, "Imperialism," 1902

Notebook of an Old-Timer

by George H. Shoaf



War and Peace

A LOT of people will complain—why make war a subject of discussion? Isn't there anything more constructive, more sensible and pleasant to write about? Why not consider some of the problems which vex our domestic economy, point out how these problems could be mitigated or abolished, and advance measures the implementation of which would tend to make life more livable in the United States? Let us cease talking of war, writing of war, thinking of war. Despite the comforting assurances involved in this line of reasoning, voiced by good people humanely inclined, the fact remains that the biggest menace that confronts the world today is the menace of war. This menace constitutes the most sensational story handled by newspapers and magazines, and affects fundamentally the life and fortunes of every man, woman and child on earth.

I can best stress this point by referring to an episode which occurred when I was an assignment reporter for Hearst's *Chicago American* at the time of the Iroquois fire. I had been working on another story and had gone home dead tired to rest. The telephone rang, and M. Koenigsberg, city editor, inquired what I was doing at home when the biggest story of the century, the Iroquois Theater fire, needed to be covered. Get down there at once, and get busy, he ordered. When I arrived at the scene of the fire, every news reporter in Chicago was on the job. The deaths of hundreds of men, women and children, and injuries to

hundreds more, did constitute a story that was outstanding, and everything was sidetracked to give the story ample coverage.

Could there today be a story of more vital interest to the human race, the mere writing of which would make the most sensational reading, than the story of a war between the United States and the Soviet Union, preparations for which are still ominously proceeding in deadly fashion? Irrespective of the humanities, and regardless of personal feelings and prejudices, it should be obligatory on every American to canvass the situation thoroughly, to understand the economics promoting this menace, to ascertain who is responsible for the drive toward war, and try, with others, to take such action as will end the menace and avert the war.

This article is written on the assumption that war between Soviet communism and American capitalism is not inevitable, that coexistence is possible and practicable, and that conflicts between the two sides can be ironed out through negotiation. However, the two sides—advocates of peace and promoters of war—are given a hearing.

FIRST, the inherent longing for peace resides in virtually everybody. There can be no questioning this fact. Only those in this country expecting to profit by war, such as armament and munitions makers, militarists desirous of promotion many of whom officiate in the Pentagon, in Washington, D.C., and certain politicians who imagine that outspoken bellicosity will guarantee their reten-

tion in office, actually want war. Naturally, there are many young men, inexperienced, filled with the spirit of adventure, who are willing to present themselves as living sacrifices to the God of War; but where one youth feels so inclined, thousands have to be forced to the battle front by conscription.

It is also a known fact that from the beginning of the Soviet regime, Soviet leaders stood for peace. At the League of Nations, Litvinov introduced a measure pledging the League to perpetual peace. Agents of the Western nations refused to adopt the measure. From then to now, Soviet leaders have repeatedly proposed universal peace.

Incontestably, the greatest opponent of peace and the causative agents making for war lie embedded in those nations afflicted by capitalist economy. War is of the essence of capitalism. Capitalism emerged from feudalism through war and revolution and, as Marx said, it will go down to defeat with blood streaming from every pore. To arrive at an understanding here, one must consider the economics involved. What is about to be written has been stated repeatedly in every liberal and radical paper and magazine, but at no time has the commercial press ventilated the matter. As a result, Americans are ignorant of the real cause of war, why capitalism experiences periodic depressions, and what could and should be done to prevent depressions and abolish war. Further, Americans do not know and have not been told that depressions have been permanently liquidated in the Soviet Union, and that Soviet economy does not require war to make it function as a going concern.

CAPITALIST economy, which is the American way of life, involves a struggle for existence by those who live within its framework. It is a fight by every individual for survival and to get ahead, with the devil taking the hindmost. The very operation of capitalist economy breeds larcenous hearts. In actual military war, Christians, active followers of the Prince of Peace, are the most militant on battle fields and the most rampant in taking part in human carnage. The reasons are everywhere evident.

The economy is based on private

Mr. Shoaf was an editor and the famed "war correspondent" of the *Appeal to Reason*.

ownership with profit its animating motive. Individual action to acquire and possess property irrespective of right or wrong procedure is the besetting sin of capitalism. The weak succumb to the strong, and if they manage to survive, that is due largely to the bestowal of contemptuous charity by the strong. It is only in recent years that poor houses were replaced by pension schemes for the benefit of the unfortunate victims of capitalist economy. Individual struggle, whether for personal or other reasons, is symptomatic of war. During the last hundred years it is a historic fact that capitalism has experienced a war every fifteen or twenty years, and that unless it goes through the horrors of war with frequent recurrence, it would collapse.

Now we are on familiar ground. Overproduction, due to factory operation by regimented labor, and underconsumption, due to the inability of labor to buy and consume the product because of insufficient wages, produce a surplus that becomes the nation's curse. When the surplus accumulates, production suspends. When the suspension is general, depression, with millions of jobless workers begging for bread, threatens the nation's economy. If the threat becomes serious, according to the big-wigs of industry and finance, domestic revolution might result. For they have sense enough to observe "Ye are mighty; we are few"; and rather than take a chance on revolution, they order their political and military agents to kick up a foreign war. Depression has preceded every war the United States has fought from the war on Mexico to the "police action" against North Korea.

Just prior to the Korean war, when this country began to witness the creation of an unemployed problem, and when the warehouses and stores were jammed with unsold commodities of every description, I remarked to a Costa Mesa, California, merchant that it appeared we were going to have a depression. "No," he corrected, "we will have war first." The Korean war staved off depression by putting young men into the army, and the jobless workers into the armament and munitions plants. American capitalism simply cannot afford to countenance world peace. Suppose the cold war

were to end with a negotiated peace between American capitalism and Soviet communism. War factories and plants would have to shut down, thereby making jobless millions of workers. The army, navy and air force would have to release several million men from the service, virtually all of whom would be added to the army of unemployed. Actions such as these are cumulative. In no time, other industries would be affected, and these, too, would have to suspend, thus giving additional strength to the unemployed army which, if it realized its strength in unified action, would provoke the big-wigs of capitalism to shiver with fear and trembling.

WHAT factor under capitalism would or could then give the unemployed millions lucrative jobs? The loaded and overstocked market would offer neither incentive nor inducement for industrialists and business men to open up their factories, plants and business enterprises. The only remaining potential employer would be the government of the United States. Jobs in the matter of highway construction, building dams across waterways, and harbor improvements, would be about the only relief from unemployment in sight. But would the masters of Wall Street consent to the government activating itself in such fashion? Would they countenance the "socialism" involved in such government action? From their attitude toward socialism, communism and those countries that have adopted socialist economies, it is very unlikely that they would. And it must not be forgotten that it is the masters of Wall Street that control and direct the policies of the United States government.

Meanwhile, the unemployed millions would be begging for bread!

Fact of the matter, the contradictions of capitalism have grown so glaring that even the average American moron is beginning to get a glimmer of them. The impasse between production and consumption has become so obvious and so menacing that bankers are notifying their clients to get rid of their overstocked inventories as quickly as possible even if they have to take a loss. The crisis-stalemate, which informed economists know capitalist operation is bound to produce,

is here. What do politicians, inspired and spurred by Wall Street, propose to do? At this point friends separate, take sides, and the argument begins. On one side are those who say: there is just one thing capitalist leadership proposes to do. Let us face it frankly. As always, there is just one thing, under capitalism, that capitalist leadership can do, and that is to throw the country into the maelstrom of war. Who and what is the target of attack? Why, the country that Americans have been propagandized to fear and hate since the Russian revolution—the Soviet Union.

Opponents of war advocate letting their opposition to war be known by writing their congressmen and senators to that effect, bombarding the Presidential office in Washington with letters opposing war, holding indignation meetings from one end of the country to the other by citizens angered and aroused to the danger of war. Will such action by war opponents be effective or do any good? In the first world war it is estimated that fifty thousand opponents of war were jailed for their opposition. That apparently taught war opponents in the second world war a lesson. Few Americans opposed military action against Germany. The "Beast of Berlin" had been replaced by Adolf Hitler, who proved himself to be more resourceful in his ruthlessness and in his determination to exterminate all opposition than ever "Kaiser Bill" dreamed of doing.

THE point attempted to be made in this connection is that with the United States reposes the responsibility for peace or war. Under socialism this country could enjoy peace; under capitalism war is an imperative. Irrespective of the desire for peace on the part of the American people, because of the nature and operation of the economy under which and by which they live they are destined to face and experience the horrors of war. War could be avoided, of course, if Americans adopted and enforced the principles and procedure of socialism, but Wall Street vociferates NO!

A friend asserts there will never be another war in this era of H-bombs, guided missiles and poison gas. She speaks for a large contingent of Americans who abhor war. War in the old

days, she says, was fought by working people and slaves. They died that their masters might live. Americans are a free people, she stresses, and will refuse to fight. Now that war threatens the masters as well as the workers, it is obvious, to save themselves from destruction, the masters will avert war by negotiating peace. The logic of this argument would be unanswerable if the United States possessed a socialist economy, and had no surplus to destroy. Unhappily, the United States is a capitalist economy with a surplus it must liquidate if its economy continues to function. So far, the only method capitalists have for the disposal of the surplus is through war.

Concerning the fear capitalist masters allegedly have for themselves in the event of war, it can be written down that this fear does not exist. Compared to working people—those who employ their hands instead of their heads—the big-wigs of capitalism are more aggressive, more adventurous, more ruthless, and more willing to stake their lives on an issue. Rather than see socialism supplant capitalism, they will fight to the death to prevent it. Their very aggressiveness and lack of fear, with their willingness to take chances with destiny, combined to put them at the top of the capitalist world, and they will attempt to retain their positions, and the economy which enabled them to gain wealth and power, or perish in the attempt.

When spears and bows and arrows replaced stones and clubs, wise ones said that fighting had grown too bloody to tolerate. When rifles and revolvers took the place of spears and bows and arrows, war was on the way out, exclaimed philosophers and seers. When heavier and deadlier military equipment was employed, as in the second World War, idealists and others proclaimed that war had to be abolished to insure the survival of the human race. But notice. Superior and deadlier weapons of warfare did not minimize or abolish the cause of war—private ownership inspired by the profit motive—nor did it deter the urge of men to fight. The cause of war—the profit system—remains. The reader may speculate respecting what will probably follow.

WHEN one begins to appreciate the enormity of flagrant nonsense in-



involved in the American way of life—boom, bust, depression and war—with the accompaniment of class stratification, congested wealth and widespread poverty, of uncertainty and the gambler's chance of making a living, with its unplanned economy and social irresponsibility, would not one think that Americans would tire of the process, would awaken to reality, realize the American way of life is not the grand and glorious way Wall Street cracks it up to be, and would cast about for a change?

Fortunately, there is another way of life. It has been envisaged by seers and sages. It is the objective of socialists the world over. Jesus prayed for its coming when He pictured the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. The very trend of events is making for its realization. The evolution of society from savagery, through barbarism and feudalism to capitalism presages the continuity of the social process and, unless a nuclear war decimates earth's population and devastates the fertile region

of the globe, the society of the future will make its appearance as certainly as day follows night. Debatable as it may be, the fact persists that the Soviet Union, despite the early ignorance of the people, and the embargo and repeated invasion by capitalist armies, is today "building toward socialism," and is succeeding in the enterprise. So much so, that, militarily, Soviet equipment and readiness for war are exceeded by no other nation, and industrially, under its socialist economy, it is making progress by leaps and bounds. What the ignorant slaves of the Russian czar have done, certainly the free citizens of the United States can do, and do better!

In the new social and economic order, which, admittedly, will require time for its realization, common ownership will replace private ownership, cooperative endeavor will take precedence over private enterprise, the service motive will supplant the profit motive, the very incentive to crime and war will disappear, and for the first time in the history of the race people the world over will enjoy real democracy and lasting peace. In short, society will become a social organism, scientifically arranged and ordered, and the people, all of them, will hold themselves responsible for its continuous and successful operation.

BUT such a society is impossible, exclaim Christians who daily pray for the coming of the kingdom of heaven on earth. Men and women are conceived in iniquity and born in sin, expostulate Christians, and they can be made wholesome and free only through the redemptive blood of Jesus Christ. For man to undertake the abolition of social and economic disorders and injustice and to attempt the establishment of a society such as socialists envisage without the interposition and aid of Almighty God, further asserts the Christian fraternity, would not only constitute presumptive interference with God's plans, but would be denounced as blasphemy against the Author and Creator of heaven and earth. According to this position and attitude, it is useless for man to do anything in the matter of seeking to improve the material conditions of life. All that men and women need to do is to sing and pray, "believe on Him," and in His own good time God

will act to make wrong right by the inauguration of the heavenly kingdom.

One day a farmer was standing near the fence enclosing his farm, which was growing a bounteous crop, when the village minister approached. Said the minister:

"Well, neighbor, I see you and the Lord have done a good job on this land. By working cooperatively, the two of you have made the soil yield abundantly. Praise be the Lord!"

Replied the farmer: "You should have seen this land before I got down to the job while the Lord was working it alone. It was nothing but a mass of weeds and a mess of filth. I don't know about the Lord, but I know it was my labor that wrought the transformation you now behold!"

Methods by which man gains a livelihood have evolved from the simple to the complex, from individual to mass production, from the wooden plow and blacksmith shop to motor-propelled gang plows on bonanza farms and to huge factories and plants where cooperatively toil hundreds of thousands of hired men and women. Because of modern methods and improved machinery famines need no longer curse the earth. One twentieth-century worker with machinery can in one day accomplish what it required a week or a month for his ancestor to accomplish with hand tools a hundred years ago. For reasons easily explained, the United States has forged ahead in production, changed economy, and in other aspects, until it now produces more than the people are able to buy and consume with the result the government is compelled to purchase and either store the surplus or ship it abroad to petty despots and fascist powers whom, by these gifts, it hopes to induce to become military allies when the irrepressible conflict between capitalism and socialism breaks.

The political set-up of the Founding Fathers, and the social arrangements accompanying that set-up, because of the changed mode of production no longer apply to the current American scene. The original government was projected to permit individual initiative, personal endeavor—small farming, small business, small industry—with the minimum of government interference. Private enterprise carried the implication of democracy with the

maximum of personal liberty. In those days the individual's house was his castle sanctuary, and no government agent dared invade it.

TODAY, all has changed. Science and invention have played havoc with the old methods of production. In a way, science and invention have affected the ideology of the public mind. Big business, bonanza farms, big industry, modern methods of exchange, have displaced the methods in vogue a hundred years ago. Several factors, however, have not changed during the process. First, the political set-up, established to care for the situation a hundred years ago, remains unchanged. The political reaction of most Americans is what it was in the time of Washington and Jefferson. Today, this hour, Republicans, anti-progressive in their political concepts and attitudes, when they vote the Republican ticket imagine they are voting for the principles and ideals championed by Abraham Lincoln. They do not appear to realize that the old party of Lincoln has been requisitioned by Wall Street, transformed in content and purpose, and today represents the interests of huge private corporations, trusts and combines that have transformed what once was a Republic into an unbridled oligarchy of wealth and power. And so with the Democratic Party. Pro-



feeling to reflect the aspirations and interests of the "common people," once in office the political scalawags who head it vie with the Republicans in catering to the malefactors of wealth in the matter of enabling the plutocracy to continue its reign of robbery.

To fool the people, the political forms and procedure, not the substance of action, remain what they were when Jefferson led for democracy and Lincoln for the rights of man. The people, deceived, and holding to the illusion that the American way of life, including its outmoded political apparatus, is the greatest, the grandest, the most sublime social order ever conceived, are holding back and refusing to get in line and keep step with the really advanced nations in the onward march toward a better organized and a more improved, scientifically planned way of life that will function to serve the needs and interests of all the people.

LET it be stressed here that Soviet economy requires peace for its development, not war; while capitalist economy depends on periodic wars for its continuance. Should peace throughout the world prevail, socialism behind the so-called "iron curtain" would become glorified with success. Continued world peace, on the other hand, would result in capitalism's collapse. The one country whose ruling class spends the major portion of the governmental income on preparation for war, is the United States of America. To the credit of the inarticulate American public let it be said with emphasis that it does not want war, and the masses, if permitted, would vote down war now and forever. But the plain people of America haven't a blessed thing to say anent internal or external policy, or whether or not war is on the national administration agenda. When the situation becomes critical and war is essential to avoid domestic collapse, war will be declared, and the sons and daughters of the plain people will be drafted to fight the war to their death.

Reactionary politicians and subsidized radio commentators continue the fiction that the United States is part of the "free world." In the name of all that is grand and glorious, exactly how "free" are the American people?

Views on Issues Raised in Two Recent Books

The Uses of Power

by Paul Mattick

C. WRIGHT MILLS' portrait of the top layer of America's power hierarchy ("The Power Elite" by C. Wright Mills) is as true and unpleasing as Sutherland's painting of Churchill. And just as the latter has reportedly been put out of sight, so Mills' portrait is deprecatingly called a caricature rather than a work of art. In both cases, however, the artist's object is a caricature. Mills' canvas, done with infinite care, cannot really be challenged. This is exactly how the decision makers look and how they operate; disturbing, perhaps, to those whose well-being depends on their rule and benevolence. The trouble with his work is that it is only a portrait, however well done. Within its limitations there is no need for criticism, but to get all its implications it is necessary to go beyond its frame.

Despite its many pages and exhaustive data the content of the book may be expressed in a single sentence: that highly centralized American capitalism and imperialist competition brought into being a power elite composed of corporation leaders, politicians and military men. This is not to say that this is an empty book, for the mere description of the power elite involves a consideration of the whole political and economic panorama of recent history. But it is a panorama—set up to be looked at—with no real clue to its conception and from which no moral is derived, save that which the reader forms himself.

There is, however, often great indignation. Mills makes clear that he does not like what he presents. It is obviously not lack of courage which prevents him from probing deeper and which lends his book an air of despair. Its limitations stem from the author's academic approach despite serious attempts to transcend it. Mills looks into the dwellings of the rich, the haunts of cafe society, the conference rooms of corporations, onto the golf-links of exclusive clubs and into the labyrinth of the Pentagon. He observes executives, lawyers, politicians, heirs, entertainers, admirals and generals, and is amazed at both their arrogance and ignorance. He finds unchecked power concentrated in irresponsible hands, in an elite representing none but themselves. And yet, these revelations with all their terrible allusions remain somehow a mere sociological study. This may be necessary these days to make critical observations acceptable, but it is also a way of dulling their impact.

ELITE theory, originally designed in support of the ruling classes—or at any rate to discourage revolu-


tionary attitudes by pointing to the inescapability of social class relations which, at best, only allow for the replacement of one elite by another—became a vogue with the rise of fascism and Bolshevism. The reduction of political democracy to a mere ritual, covering up the authoritarian rule of labor organizations, Big Business and government, make American proponents of elite theory appear as critics of current institutions. Their criticism appears in a further debunking of democratic illusions by way of descriptions of modern corporations and the inter-twining of politics and business. But they merely describe what is. To be truly critical their works would have to deal with the social dynamics that led to the present state of affairs and with future possibilities inherent in this situation. This, however, is rarely done.

Although Mills sticks close to his selected topic—the power elite—a definite and irrepressible Marxian undertone often lifts his work out of the narrow field of bourgeois sociology. But his criterion for the present is not the future but the past. The "higher immorality" of the ruling elite within "the American system of organized irresponsibility" is the final product of a long development. Historical circumstances and the centralization of the means of power created a situation wherein the decisions, or lack of decisions, of the existing elite involves "more consequences for more people than has ever been the case in the world history of mankind."

This is no doubt true, as it was true for the Nazi elite and as it is true for Bolshevism, or any other centralized power structure. Their control extends over always larger masses with the growth of populations, the increasing interdependency of world economy, imperialist expansion, and the polarization of society into a mass of ruled and a handful of rulers, as predicted by Marx a hundred years back. According to Mills there is not only an increasing concentration of power in the hands of the elite but also the deterioration of the elite itself, so that America "appears now before the world a naked and arbitrary power, as in the name of reason, its men of decision enforce their often crackpot definitions upon world reality. The second-rate mind is in command of the ponderously spoken platitude."

All this is so, but the question arises whether the world would be better off if first-class minds would constitute the ruling elite. After all, there are many first-rate minds around, as may be seen from various accomplishments in special fields. And yet these possessors of first-rate minds support and are controlled by the ruling mediocrity. Moreover, is Truman's decision to drop the atom bomb more irresponsible than Einstein's suggestion to produce it? Does Eisenhower's decision to quit the Korean war show less irresponsibility than Roosevelt's manipulations to enter the

second World War? Were there elites in history preferable to, or less disastrous than those that rule today? To raise such questions is to recognize that they lead nowhere; that an attack on the elite, or individuals representing the elite, though unavoidable and even necessary, accomplishes little unless widened into an attack upon the socio-economic system that gives rise to an elite, and in which all elites, regardless of their qualifications or lack of such, can only make decisions detrimental to the powerless of the earth and finally disastrous to themselves.



MILLS prefers the term power elite to that of ruling class, as in his view class is an economic term, and rule a political one, so that "the phrase 'ruling class' contains the theory that an economic class rules politically." This he finds no longer true because of the presence of "non-economic" men within the power elite. The "simple Marxian view which makes the capitalist the real holder of power," which Mills rejects is, however, not the Marxian view. Marx spoke of capitalism as a mode of production for the extraction of surplus-labor, enabling a ruling class and its retainers to live well and amass wealth and power. The distribution of surplus-value is a social phenomenon involving government decisions in the economic sphere and national power politics. What else could power concentration mean than the centralization of all forms of control, including that over the means of production, into the hands of a closely integrated group? This does not contradict but only verifies Marx's concept of class rule.

Whether capitalists, managers, financiers, politicians, generals, ideologists, or clowns, members of the elite personify capitalist class rule by performing, in order to perform at all, functions that secure the given system of labor exploitation. The division of functions between the top, the center, and the base of the controlling hierarchy does not alter the fact that it is the whole of the social power structure which confronts the powerless as a class. Like intra-capitalist competition and monopoly, the elite is a problem of the ruling class. For the ruled, however, it is the abolition of classes, and therewith of all further stratification within the classes, that really matters.

According to Mills, with all decisive power concentrated in a relatively small number of individuals, the powerless are no longer just the working classes but all people outside the elite. By mass society, Mills means a situation such as prevailed in Nazi Germany and still exists in Bolshevik Russia, in which ideology is centrally manipulated via the modern mass communication media. Whereas the more democratic past allowed for a variety of public opinions identifying different social groups, the growing totalitarianism leads to the political fragmentation and impotency of an amorphous conglomeration of controlled people facing an increasingly unified power elite.

THE rejection of the class concept implies more than just supposedly better description of prevailing social power relations. It is utilized in support of the idea of the "classless" Russian "socialism," as well as for that of the "classless" American "people's capitalism." As the need for centralistic controls are still generally acknowledged, the social problem becomes thus one of replacing bad with

better elites. Social aspirations limit themselves to getting rid of Hitler's elite, or Stalin's elite, or the a-social American power elite, even though the social dilemma consists in a social production and distribution based on the class appropriation of surplus-value. What at first sight appears a more precise description of reality is rather its further obscuration.

An undue concentration upon the power elite and the amorphous mass in an increasingly politically controlled capitalism tends also to an underestimation of the persistent economic contradictions of capitalism. In Mills' book they have all but disappeared, and the impression is created, if even unwillingly, that the temporary expediency of a militarized capitalist economy may be a permanent solution determining the structure and features of modern "mass society." However, this can be mentioned only in passing, as a fuller discussion of the matter would lead too far away from Mills' book, which, despite the reservations here expressed, remains a valuable contribution not only to the understanding of present-day American capitalism, but also in the struggle against it.

Communist Teachers

by A Student

THIS is the most perceptive, stimulating and elegantly written book on academic freedom of its time. It is also the least appreciated.

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ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN OUR TIME, by Robert M. MacIver. Columbia University Press, New York, 1955, \$4.

Rabinowitz Foundation. The Project's Executive Committee was composed of a host of responsible educators with Dean Louis M. Hacker of Columbia's School of General Studies as Executive Secretary and Robert M. MacIver as Director. Nothing shady, disreputable or unacademic was connected with the sponsorship of this study. Professor MacIver is not a radical, not a Fifth Amendment hider-under, nor is he on the staff of the Fund for the Republic. He is Lieber Professor Emeritus of Political Philosophy at Columbia and the author of many works esteemed by scholars.

In spite of, or perhaps because of, the aura of propriety surrounding his book, MacIver has been gracelessly assailed by a number of leading authorities on academic freedom, notably Sidney Hook, Professor of Philosophy at New York University, writing in the *New York Times Book Review*, and Harry D. Gideonse, President of Brooklyn College, in the *New Leader*. The burden of their criticism is that Mr. MacIver has greatly overestimated the limitations upon academic freedom in this country and underestimated the dangers of Communist attacks upon academic freedom. Writes Professor Hook:

There is nothing in it which indicates that although the number of criticisms against colleges and universities from outside their walls has increased, never in the history of American education have teachers cared more for academic freedom, never have they been so resolute and embattled and, despite some defects, so successful in its defense.

Besides implying an original definition of "success," this statement does not seem to be a very accurate reflection of the academic-freedom situation in the United States. That Communists and others have exaggerated the restrictions upon academic freedom is doubtless true. Yet it has recently become clear that for all practical purposes the universities have decided to abandon in the case of Communists the standard of individual competence in hiring faculty members, that objectivity in the teaching of controversial political matters has been discouraged rather than furthered by this departure from traditional principle, and that students have become far more apathetic, cynical, cautious and opportunistic in their political behavior than they were ten years ago.

IN OTHER words, the universities have not been able to defend themselves from domestic cold-warriors without noticeable damage. Some of that damage, it is hoped, is being repaired. But it will be a slipshod and temporary job unless there exists widespread sympathy and understanding. For liberals and radicals this means a determination to reject anti-intellectualism, to defend the rights of all—including fascists, anti-vivisectionists or Communists—and to oppose the suppression of academic freedom in Communist countries as well as its restriction here. Beyond this it means a genuine sympathy and identification with the notion that the universities have a goal beyond the inculcation of "correct" political ideology. Too often American radicals have affected an unbecoming hostility toward the institutions they should be energetic in supporting—perhaps it has been an attempt to appear work-

ingclassish. And it is not because they are radicals that they should have been defending genuine academic freedom, but because they have professed to desire the expansion and maximization of the benefits of freedom rather than its elimination in the interest of reforestation or national security.

It has been argued that the number of people who have denounced the trend toward conformism disproves the significance of such a trend. No one has argued that mental illness has become less of a problem since publicists have become concerned with it, but apparently a similar argument is applicable to civil liberties. It is probably unfair to criticize Professor MacIver for not undertaking further consideration of this side of the problem, but it is one of the gaps in the information about academic freedom which makes his position and that of many other liberals appear more vulnerable to attack by Hook, *et al.*, than it really is. Any argument which starts from the assumption that things are not really so bad enjoys an advantage which cannot be removed merely through counter-assertion.

THE central issue of recent years in this field has been the problem of Communist teachers. This is probably unfortunate since it has conveyed to the uninformed and ill-willed an impression of widespread leftism and subversion in the schools. The extreme Right has skillfully manipulated this situation to assist in discrediting an ideal of academic freedom which has never been extensively appreciated in the nation, least of all by the working class. In Senator McCarthy's book, "McCarthyism: The Fight for America," he manages to suggest that the only thing alert and patriotic citizens may do to assist him in his struggle is to extirpate subversive teachers from the schools. If liberals can be said to have had any answer to this challenge at all, it has been to accept the premise that Communist teachers are dangerous and to insist that they, liberals and democrats, are better qualified to perform the necessary rooting-out without unnecessary injustice. There are many difficulties with this position, not least of which is the feeling it generates that if the liberals have permitted widespread and harmful infiltration in the past, they can hardly be trustworthy allies as late-comers to the true view.

Professor MacIver undertakes lengthy discussion of the Communist-teacher problem, concerning himself with the "three charges brought against Party communists as educators," those of intellectual subservience, commitment to the destruction of fundamental liberties, and advocacy of violent overthrow of the government. His conclusion is basically that:

The question at issue is whether the Party Communist should be suffered to teach in a college or university. The evidence showed convincingly that anyone who accepted without important reservations the methods and policies characteristic of the Party was not a fit and proper person for an academic position. Whereas, if he did make such reservations while still remaining in the Party, his attitude was equivocal and engendered a reasonable doubt concerning his qualifications.

Yet, he says, in light of the consequences which would

follow a rigid policy of Communist-hunting, the general principle is subject to modification. The colleges should have the right to decide for themselves whether an individual Communist is competent. The weight of evidence appears to be that he would not be—but when it comes to the firing of an already employed professor, with the resultant publicity and the possible effects on the independence and integrity of the faculty, it appears to him that a concentrated inquisitorial effort to discover and dismiss Communist professors is not worth while. The weighty disadvantages of loyal oaths, committee investigations and questioning of faculty members offset the desirability of protecting the youth from indoctrination or incompetent teaching.

... *The case against the Party Communist as educator is primarily based on his relation to political activities of a suppressive or conspiratorial character, and not at all on his economic theories. It is the essence of democratic liberty of opinion that no one is restrained or penalized merely because the majority disapproves of his opinions. No competent educator should therefore be dismissed or disciplined merely on that account.*

AND who can quarrel with such an approach? It would be foolish to deny that Communists have themselves cast serious doubt on their academic competence in areas affected by political controversy. And yet, how many teachers, no matter how free from moral or political corruption, no matter how remote from any disciplined political participation, can honestly be said not to be open to serious charges of bias or special pleading? If the Communist teacher is far from being a free agent because of his voluntary submission to party discipline, is the teacher who submits to loyalty oaths or excuses American racism less reprehensible? Is it possible that in the long run we are merely faced with a choice between alternative forms of indoctrination—one harsh, political, and unpopular, the other relaxed, self-satisfied and popular.

The judgment, it seems to this reviewer, must remain personal. To keep it personal may be harder than we yet realize, but the possibility of choice and decision is what needs defending. It is certainly not to support one form of indoctrination against another that Professor MacIver has written his book; it is to defend reason against indoctrination, decision against authority. Perhaps that is why so few people seem happy with it.

White Citizens' Councils Organize in Michigan

RECENT press reports reveal that one of the most rabid of the race-hating Southern groups, the Alabama White Citizens' Council, has sent organizing agents into Michigan.

The Detroit press announced that an agent for this group had rented office space in Dearborn, across the street from the City Hall, in the name of the "Homeowners' Association of the State of Michigan."

Both the daily press and the Detroit Mayor's Interracial Committee have stated they have been unable to get information about or names of any of the officials of this secret undercover group.

The only person who is scheduled to be out in the open for the group, according to press statements, is James Douglas Carter, younger brother of Ace Carter, editor of the *Southern* and executive secretary of the Alabama White Citizens' Councils.

The outfit claims a membership of 125,000 in Michigan and a goal of 300,000. This has all the earmarks of grossly inflated organizing propaganda. It must unfortunately be conceded, however, that the widespread racial prejudice which prevails today, especially in management, political and journalistic circles, does aid such a group.

The *Michigan Chronicle* has stated that it had been officially verified that chapters had been organized in Flint, Highland Park, and Dearborn, where race-baiting Mayor Hubbard rules. Detroit and Lansing have been added to the list.

The significant thing is that this movement dares make such an effort in Michigan, home of the UAW, and especially in its key auto centers. Any kind of a success here would be a big boost to the race-haters nationally.

An especially disappointing and critical development is the failure of the Stellato leadership of Ford Local 600 to measure up to its responsibilities in its home town, Dearborn. Under Carl Stellato's guidance, Local 600's Executive Board formally adopted as a policy a refusal to challenge Mayor Hubbard's publicly proclaimed policy of segregation.

Ford Facts of April 21, in an official Executive Board statement, presents the Local's general position in favor of civil rights and in opposition to the Dixiecrats, but then includes

the following unbelievable words: "However, we will not get into the luxury of personal arguments with those who, *as is their right*, differ from us on this matter, since personal arguments will not establish civil rights." This meant a decision not to challenge Mayor Hubbard.

It was an answer to a statement made to the *Montgomery Advertiser* by Mayor Orville Hubbard, who was quoted as saying he was in favor of "complete segregation one million percent on all levels," and bragged how he had carried out this policy in Dearborn and would continue to do so.

APPARENTLY the political ties to Hubbard's regime mean more to the Stellato administration than the welfare of its membership. Certainly Local 600's failure to actively challenge Hubbard encouraged the racists to try their luck in Dearborn.

The Local 600 FEP Committee, however, did oppose the Stellato regime on this issue. It unanimously adopted a strong statement which declared, "It is our firm belief that an issue can never be resolved by running away from it, or by taking a 'hands off' policy. . . ."

"We, of the FEP Committee feel that this pro-segregationist should be answered bluntly and straight-forward by Local 600."

This position was debated and lost in the General Council of the Local. Carl Stellato mobilized his backers and demanded a rejection of the FEP resolution as a vote of confidence. In a statement carried in *Ford Facts* of May 19 (which also carried the FEP resolution and the vote of the Council delegates), Stellato says in part: "However, unfortunately, there are a few who act as though our union were organized just for the purpose of fighting for civil rights. They are the ones in this Local who say for their own political reasons that the officers and leadership are not doing enough on the question of civil rights.

"For their benefit I want to say that Union Officers are not elected to fight only for civil rights. . . ."

Stellato then went on to list the other general objectives of the union. This line of reasoning deals the proponents of civil rights a low blow, because it provides all those who wish to avoid the issue with a slick alibi.

In the Land Of the Krupps

by Fred Gross

RETURN TO POWER: A REPORT ON THE NEW GERMANY, by Alistair Horne. Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1956, \$6.

DURING his recent trip to Washington, Konrad Adenauer reaffirmed his intention to rearm West Germany and to "liberate" East Germany. Gone are the days, however, when a Washington pilgrimage would boost the tottering prestige of a foreign statesman. German opposition to Adenauer has been growing, and as one conservative German newspaper put it, the Chancellor is "swimming against the flood."

Mr. Horne, for two and one-half years Bonn correspondent for the British *Daily Telegraph*, has written a book that helps us understand the recent developments in West Germany.

The signing of the Bonn Conventions and the European Defense Community treaty in May 1952 marked the rebirth of West Germany out of the ashes of the "Grand Alliance" between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The agreements provided for the restoration of West German sovereignty and the participation of half a million Germans in the European army. Allied forces were to intervene only in case of "subversion of the liberal-democratic order." An important aim of the agreements was the achievement of a "unified Germany, enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution, like that of the Federal Republic and integrated within the European community." This was clearly a statement of intention to restore capitalism in East Germany.

Reunification is the crucial question in Germany. This of course involves more than who is in favor of what kind of elections. The status of Germany is intertwined with the entire cold war, and with the existence of antagonistic social systems in the two zones. The failure to make this fact a touchstone for his observations is



ADENAUER

the reason why much of Mr. Horne's book does not rise above competent fact-gathering. It leads him to take the long series of diplomatic conferences—important as they are—at their face value, instead of viewing them as reflections of deeper conflicts.

Rearmament has not been popular in Germany. A 1952 public-opinion poll showed only 21 percent in favor of a new *Wehrmacht*. In 1953 Theodore Blank, whose job it was to implement the military provisions of the treaties, exhibited equipment which revealed advanced technological preparations for the proposed army. His most formidable opponent, however, re-

mained popular anti-rearmament feeling. Memories of goose-stepping troopers, the certainty of Germany becoming an atomic battlefield in case of war, and a spreading Social Democratic campaign, produced the slogan "Ohne Mich!" ("Without Me!"). In spite of much fanfare about a "civilian army" and official slaps at a Nazi-influenced group whose leader had been head of Blank's Military Planning Branch, remilitarization was a flop. After more than two years of drumbeating, Blank's war office had received a mere 120,000 volunteer applications, many of them from desperate refugees.

UNDER Ollenhauer (who succeeded Schumacher as party head on the latter's death in 1952), the Social Democrats began the attack against Adenauer on the issue of reviving Nazism, charging that "two-thirds of the men responsible for contemporary German foreign policy had served under the Nazis." By the end of 1954 most war-criminal cases had been removed from Allied jurisdiction, and "correspondents were no longer allowed access to the various case histories." According to figures which Mr. Horne secured with great difficulty, Federal courts in 1950-51 "had tried 2,058 cases of war crimes. Of these only 730 had received sentences; the rest were acquitted. Of the 730, only 96 were sentenced to more than two years' imprisonment while 372 received purely nominal sentences of up to one year. . . ."

The Blank office was well-staffed both by members of the "Julyist Group" (those who had been associated with the July 1944 attempt by Count Stauffenberg to assassinate Hitler) and by their opponents, who contended that the *Fuehrer* represented legal authority and that opposition to him was treason. The author, incidentally, takes pains to point out that resistance to Hitler was not confined to a military clique, but that a considerable role was played by "strong Socialist elements."

In the midst of the furor over the question of "tyrannicide," Herman Wouk's "The Caine Mutiny" met with a resounding success. The American best-seller, which debates the problem of whether military subordinates are justified in rebelling against an ir-

responsible superior, seemed to fit right into the discussion about Hitler and the attempt to assassinate him, and the Hitlerites felt, with justice, that Mr. Wouk had given them the last word in the argument by the ending of his book, which stressed the duty of subordinates to obey a crazed commander, instead of presuming to judge him. (Mr. Wouk, the most publicized orthodox Jew in the United States, may be pained now to learn of the use to which his book is being put in Germany, but that was the chance he took when he wrote a novel with an authoritarian theme.)

IN one of his few philosophical asides, the author bewails German inability to distinguish between that which is "legal" and that which is "legitimate." But in discussing the case of Philip Auerbach—a Jewish official put on trial for embezzling state funds and sentenced to a two-and-one-half-year term in spite of widespread belief in his innocence—Mr. Horne shows a similar confusion when he comments: "It was unfortunate that, despite Jewish protests, the trial started during Passover. It was even more unfortunate that, of the five judges trying Auerbach, three, including the President, were ex-Nazis. There was, however, little doubt in the minds of Allied observers that—in the strictly legal sense—the trial had been fair and the sentence a just one."

There is grim irony in the author's observation that, while anti-Semitism in post-war West Germany is "negligible . . . much of it is undoubtedly due to the tragic truth that Jew-baiters cannot thrive where there are no Jews. Instead of the 600,000 Jews who lived in Germany before Hitler came to power, the Jewish community now numbers only 25,000" (of whom more than a third are over 65). The point is added that anti-Semitism unleashed by the Slansky case in the East sector caused half the Jewish community there to flee west.

The U.S. anti-Soviet campaign bears a heavy responsibility for current Nazi activity in Germany, by feeding the growth of the legend that Germany had been "stabbed in the back" by Hitler's opponents. Many who sincerely believed that Washington was motivated by a genuine fear of Russian

aggression were pushed toward neutralist views when it became known that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency had been financing a "guerrilla" group which had singled out 80 prominent Social Democrats, including Ollenhauer, for liquidation in the event of war. American propaganda also suffered serious blows when Germans watched the cowering of U.S. officials before McCarthy's Cohn-Schine team. The atmosphere of disillusionment and cynicism is reflected in Germany's biggest literary success, Ernst von Salomon's "Fragebogen" (a remarkable book describing, in part, brutality in American military camps, available in an English translation under the title "The Questionnaire"). The climate promoted the mushrooming of many fascist organizations, whose background and interconnections are traced at length in this book.

AN event that shook the country was the defection of Otto John,

West German security chief, who had been among the Julyists and had become worried about stepped-up Nazi activities within the Federal government. His return to the West hardly lessened the impact of his broadcasts from East Berlin. "One could not help wondering," says Mr. Horne, "whether there was something deeply rotten in the West that could cause a man of John's integrity to take so desperate a step. . . . [It] shook the Adenauer coalition probably more than any single event since the creation of the Federal Republic."

The belief that Washington was gearing its policies to the probability of war was daily growing stronger. In the course of maneuvers "U.S. units had deployed with guns aimed—but at the enemy—but at the civil population, forecasting measures that would be adopted to control mass panic in the event of atomic war." Developments such as these led even open Hitlerites to favor a neutralist posi-



tion and a rapprochement with the Communists (who were not reluctant to make use of these elements). Seeking above all the reunification of Germany, many nationalists anticipate nothing but catastrophe from Adenauer's policy. Mr. Horne manages to cast very little light on these telling symptoms of the German crisis, however, when he seeks to explain them by the "eternal intimacy between Bolshevism and Nazism."

The "miracle" of German economic recovery has helped to obscure the forces of disintegration that were beginning to sap the ruling coalition. During 1948-54, industrial production increased by 230 percent, and Big Business expanded rapidly. The author devotes some interesting pages to the *Volkswagen*; American car-owners may be interested to learn that this company maintains a list of fixed charges for most standard repair jobs, which prevails throughout the world.

A low incidence of strikes, widely publicized welfare schemes, and the co-determination-of-industry plans (under which workers are supposed to have something to say about the running of the factory) both reflected and boosted Big Business confidence. As long as this situation prevailed, large numbers of Catholic workers and the industrialists could co-exist in Adenauer's Christian Democratic Union. By 1953, trade union membership had dropped to little more than 35 percent of all German workers. A 1953 International Labor Organization survey found that, in spite of a 48-hour week, purchasing power was a third that of American workers. German workers were in a state of demoralization, a fact which may be partly attributed to the influx of eleven million refugees to swell the working population. A drive against the 48-hour week failed.

The cockiness of German industrialists is evident in these words of Dr. Nordhoff, head of the *Volkswagen* interests: "No doubt, a Saturday off would for many be a nice gift, but for many others a curse. Most people live anyway only to escape from themselves. For them another weekday without work would only increase the emptiness and the disconsolateness caused by the idling away of spare time." (Mr. Horne's comment: "What an

extraordinary insight into the German soul!")

THE decisive switch in Allied policy from the early Morgenthau Plan which proposed to strip the country of its industrial potential is pointed up by the rebirth of the Krupp empire. Sentenced to a 12-year jail term as a war criminal in 1945, with complete confiscation of property, Krupp was released in 1951 and assured full compensation for his losses. In 1955, the Krupp interests numbered 60 companies in West Germany alone.

In the face of remaining restrictions within Germany before the restoration of sovereignty, Krupp had already expanded enormously abroad. He was but one of numerous German industrialists who discovered that penetration of under-developed countries was a better business bet than arms production. In their search for new markets they sharply cut into British foreign trade, which lends interest to these comments in 1952 by the British High Commissioner in Germany: "If we do not support a German arms contribution we shall be encouraging competition in the field of foreign trade which may eventually ruin us. . . . I fear German tractors more than German tanks." During the first half of 1953 British exports to the Middle East dropped one-third, while in the same period West German exports rose 40 percent.

German industrialists are currently among Adenauer's foremost critics. They are increasingly colliding with American policies. They see Eastern Europe as a big potential customer, and the prospect of its renewed accessibility (even though under different circumstances than existed before the war) is a very inviting one. Here, too, the cold war and Adenauer's position are being undermined.

The aggressiveness of German capitalism is evident in the Saar issue. The domination of this territory by Germany reflects French weakness. The French High Commissioner in Germany was not far off when he stated that without his country's control over the Saar's rich resources there would be a "lean France and a fat Germany." The pro-Germany vote in the Saar referendum was influenced by greater West German prosperity, agitation by previously banned German parties, and

a strong dislike of the French occupation, which the author partly attributes to indiscriminate recruitment for the French Foreign Legion. He states that 60 percent of Legion troops engaged in Indo-China's "dirty war" were of German origin, often spirited away from their country under circumstances that can best be described as obscure. It appears from other sources, however, that these recruits—many of them former Nazi troopers—were not quite the helpless victims Mr. Horne makes them.

The relative prosperity of West Germany was not paralleled in the East zone. Large-scale Soviet dismantling, the scarcity of technicians—many of whom had been enticed to the West—and a serious 1952 harvest failure caused great hardships. In the face of these difficult conditions, collectivization was speeded up, the country was fined \$200 million for failure to maintain reparation payments, and work norms were increased up to 10 percent. The post-Stalin "New Course" offered concessions to the middle class, but the workers received little relief. In fact, new work-norm increases were announced with retroaction involving great losses of pay. This, to no small extent, contributed to the quiescence of West German workers, and provided the background for the June 17 working-class explosion. Added to the more favorable conditions in West Germany, it substantially helped return Adenauer's coalition in the 1953 elections. The Communist Party failed to get any seats, as against the 15 it had won in 1949. Adenauer lost no time in announcing the forthcoming "liberation of our brethren in slavery in the East."

HARDLY had the flush of victory subsided when a powerful strike for higher wages erupted in West Germany, spearheaded by the predominantly Catholic Bavarian metal workers, earlier among Adenauer's most loyal supporters. Toward the end of 1955 there was another strike wave, independent of the official trade union leadership. This jolted the Social Democrats, as it became clear that "German labor is developing a new and possibly ugly mood."

In Germany, as elsewhere, the Geneva conference acted as a powerful catalytic agent. As the danger of a

nuclear war became more remote, paralysis receded and political activity became more vigorous. Improved conditions in East Germany after the June 17 events, and changes in the Soviet Union, contributed to the swelling anti-Adenauer protest.

The right-wing Free Democratic Party, which broke away from the coalition, now favors direct talks with the Russians. Heinrich Brüning, former Chancellor of the Weimar Republic, caused a sensation with his

warning that re-unification was ruled out as long as the United States could impose its policies and that Germany should become less dependent on the American economy.

There is growing evidence that Washington is about to attempt an agonizing adjustment to the political facts of life in a nuclear age. Such a new course will hasten the complete disintegration of Adenauer's policies. Within Germany, he is widely identified with a bankrupt program. The

Chancellor is indeed swimming against the flood, and there is a likelihood that the Social Democrats will emerge as the strongest political force in the 1957 general elections. They have recently declared that a reunified Germany must maintain and extend the social gains achieved in East Germany. The Social Democratic Party constitutes the main stream of German labor, and it is the focal point around which the German crisis will come to a head.



A World Seen with Astonishing Clarity

THE MANDARINS, by Simone de Beauvoir. World Publishing Co., Cleveland and New York, 1956, \$6.

"THE Mandarins" created a sensation in France when it was published two years ago and won the coveted *Prix Goncourt* award. Recently issued in this country in an excellent translation by Leonard M. Friedman, it has for several weeks been listed in the *N. Y. Times* best-seller list. It is a *roman à clef*, built around the post-war conflict between Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus, and it succeeds with consummate artistry in transporting us into the strange, exciting and somewhat rudderless world of the French intellectual elite.

Henri Perron, a Resistance hero, becomes a literary sensation after the war with his book on the wartime struggle. He continues as editor of his important independent Resistance newspaper which he now plans to issue as an independent non-Communist (but not anti-Communist) Left publication. After many negotiations and much soul-searching, he consents to the paper becoming the official voice of an independent political group led by the great scholar and political literary figure, Robert Dubreuilh.

Out of this set of circumstances arise two tragic breakups of past relations and associations.

First, the solidarity of the Resistance people begins to crumble. That solidarity was based on a simple and commonly held purpose of freedom from the foreign oppressor. Now that France has regained her national freedom, the old shibboleths are drained of their past content. Some want

to continue the battle against the collaborators. But others want to let bygones be bygones and not disturb the unity of the nation. Then, the new political events shake up France, and some want to take sides with Russia, others with America, others want to cling to neutralism. Some want to make money, and others want to continue their association with the camp of the exploited and poor.

Anne Dubreuilh, the wife of Robert, a fictionalized figure of the author, who plays the role of a sober, reasoning, but thoroughly sympathetic chorus to the other characters, discourses on the themes of the betrayal of the dead and the betrayal of the past. The dilemma is a cruel one, and alas, how confused, involved and jumbled things get (at least in the world of Simone de Beauvoir) when one seeks to carry through one's ideals!

PERRON, the past hero of the Resistance, writes a play to stir the flagging memory and conscience of his countrymen about that grand period of sacrifice and struggle. But the first night audience that applauds his performance is composed in great part of profiteers, salon ladies, ex-collaborators and careerists on the make. Josette, the lovely young woman who plays the lead, and who has become Perron's mistress, is the daughter of a notorious collaborator, and as he later learns, carried on a love affair during the war with a young German captain who was subsequently killed on the Eastern front. To mix up the signals still further, Perron, in the course of making the necessary connections to get his play produced, becomes enmeshed with a motley crew of the fashionable world—and then the author cannot resist the temptation, and has him committing perjury to get some unsavory collaborator who denounced victims to the Gestapo off the hook in order to protect Josette and her mother, out of fear that his mistress would otherwise commit suicide. Like everything else, this too is related with that same reasonable, tolerant and slightly ironic air that pervades the book.

The other tragic break occurs between Dubreuilh and Perron, the two old-time friends and political associates, over the question of publishing information about

the forced-labor camps in Russia. This dramatic clash between the two sides of the controversy is played out superbly on all keys, both personal and political. Anne is talking to her husband:

YOU always wanted to be both an intellectual and a revolutionary," I said. "As an intellectual, you've taken on certain commitments—to tell the truth, among others."

"Give me time to think it over," he said a little impatiently. . . .

"You say that if I remain silent about the camps I'd be an accomplice," he said. "But in speaking out, I'd become an accomplice of the enemies of the Soviet Union, that is, of all those who want to keep the world as it is. It's true that those camps are a horrible thing. But you mustn't forget that horror is everywhere."

SUDDENLY, he began speaking volubly. He isn't the type for great historical frescoes, vast social panoramas, and yet that afternoon, as the words tumbled from his mouth, all the wretchedness of the world fell over that sun-drenched countryside: weariness, poverty, the despair of the French proletariat, the misery of Spain and Italy, the enslavement of the colonial peoples, the famines and plagues of China and India. All around us, men were dying by the millions without ever having lived; their agony blackened the sky, and I wondered how we still dared to breathe.

"So you see," Robert said, "my duties as an intellectual, my respect for the truth—that's all just so much idle chatter! The only question is to know whether, in denouncing the camps, you're working for mankind or against it."

And then the final break between the two friends. Henri Perron is saying:

"This matter has to be taken in hand by the Left. The Communists are used to the slanders of the Right; they leave them cold. But if the whole Left, throughout all of Europe, rises up against the camps, there's a good chance it might upset them. Situations change

when a secret becomes a disgrace. Russia might even end up by changing its penitentiary system."

"You know that's a dream!" Dubreuilh said scornfully.

"Listen," Henri said angrily. "You've always maintained that we could exert certain pressures on the Communists; in fact, that's the whole idea of our movement. Here, if ever, is the time to try. Even if we have only a slim chance of succeeding, we've got to risk it."

Dubreuilh shrugged his shoulders. "If we're the ones who open the campaign, we'll deprive ourselves of any chance of working together with the Communists. They'd put us down as anti-Communists, and they wouldn't be wrong. Don't you see," Dubreuilh continued, "the part we're trying to play is that of an opposition minority, outside of the Party, but allied with it. If we appeal to the majority to combat the Communists on any question whatsoever, then it becomes something more than just an opposition. We'd be declaring war on them, changing sides. They'd have the right to accuse us of being traitors."

[Perron answers:] ". . . In short, in order to be able to influence the Communists at some later date, you refuse to use the weapons we now have at hand. Opposition isn't permitted us except insofar as it has no effectiveness. Well, I don't buy that," he added decisively. "The thought that the Communists are going to spit all over us isn't any more pleasant to me than it is to you. But I've thought it all over very carefully: we have no choice. . . . Being a non-Communist either means something or it means nothing. If it means nothing, let's become Communists or go pick daisies. But if it does have a meaning, that implies certain duties—among others, to be able, if necessary, to tangle with the Communists. To humor them at any price without joining them outright is to choose the easiest kind of moral comfort. It's plain cowardice."

THIS outline of two of the themes running through the book might convey the false impression that "The Mandarins" is a political novel. Actually, it is a sensitive and expert probing into the lives, thoughts, manners and morals of the Parisian intellectual set. Although the stage abounds with several principals, wives, lovers, mistresses, relations and friends, almost all the characters come to life with astonishing clarity and sureness, and the many incidents, amours, quarrels (aside from Anne's periodic trips to America and her love affair with a Chicago author), are all woven into an integrated pattern that is both rich and pleasing.

Simone de Beauvoir drives her themes home in the same slow-moving, relentless and sometimes painfully involved fashion as does Theodore Dreiser. But she has a more fluent style and a better command of language. The drama is set on as im-

posing a stage as his, and her main characters come to life as forcefully as do his. And yet her tragedy is nowhere nearly as tragic, and her poignancy never as poignant. Why? It is difficult to put your finger on the exact reason why this splendid book seems to miss greatness. Possibly, it is too intellectual, and the flow of our emotions is interfered with by the inundation of talk and explanations; too great reasonableness and understanding is displayed about all manner of actions and all sides of a controversy, even in the midst of the author's satiric, biting thrusts. Possibly, the French intellectual of St. Germain des Prés is not the ideal personality to whip us with Shakespearean passions. Whatever be the truth of the matter, Simone de Beauvoir has written about the world she knows in the way she feels it and understands it, and the result is one of the notable novels of the post-war period.

A final word should be added about the world in which the French intellectual moves as contrasted with the American. The French intellectual can take up Communism, or any variety of Leftist politics, and retain, as his abilities allow, access to the world of the theatre, to the commercial publishers, even to the metropolitan press. He is not hemmed in, like the American, in a narrow world of conformity, which he dare not question or resist, on pain of ostracism. With far greater freedom, he can write about life as he sees it, without fear of losing his publisher. Hence, he is not limited, as is the American, to turning his insights pretty exclusively inward on the individual, or essaying new explorations on the eternal triangle, or probing into the mysteries of love-making in a vacuum. The French intellectual takes himself seriously and believes he has an important mission to perform, and he is accepted as a serious figure by society. It is out of such an atmosphere that the Existentialist philosophy, of which Simone de Beauvoir is a prominent exponent, could arise, which holds that the intellectual must "engage himself with the reality of action and responsibility."

B. C.

Months of Madness

RED SCARE: A STUDY IN NATIONAL HYSTERIA, 1919-1920, by Robert K. MURRAY. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1955, \$4.75.

A CONSCIENTIOUS and scholarly job of depicting the great red scare of the post-World War I days has been done by Mr. Murray, and his book is pretty near as complete as it need be. While he writes with a settled animosity towards the radicalism of that day or of today, some of his judgments carry greater weight on that account. Students of the history of American radicalism will find the book very helpful. But they should be careful to give a wide berth to such weighty remarks tossed in by Mr. Murray as his observation that the

members of the American Legion "had already been instilled with love of country by their Army experience."

The Russian Revolution and the post-war wave of radicalism in Europe were the direct causes of the Red Scare, and the militancy of the (non-radical) labor movement in America in its campaign for organization and improvements helped capitalist fears along. Special interests, such as the open-shop campaigners and ambitious politicians like Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, exploited the trend, but the basic cause was a hysteria among American ruling elements at the rise throughout the world of forces that they could not understand and that threatened their return to McKinleyesque "normalcy."

The wartime repressions had, by spurring violent patriotisms and still more violent prejudices, laid the groundwork. During World War I, teachers of German extraction were driven from the schools, along with the German language. The works of German composers and writers were branded as products of the hated "Hun." German delicatessens became the alleged centers of "poison pickle plots." Those who refused or even hesitated to subscribe to the war loans were fired from jobs, and in some cases tarred and feathered and driven from town. Conscientious objectors, such as the Quakers and Mennonites, were beaten and tortured.

Congress and the state legislatures piled up a bushful of sedition and espionage laws that were used against political dissenters. Murray quotes an editor of the *New York World*: "Government conscripted public opinion as they conscripted men and money and materials. Having conscripted it, they dealt with it as they dealt with other raw recruits. They mobilized it. They put it in charge of drill sergeants. They goose-stepped it. They taught it to stand at attention and salute."

FOLLOWING the end of the war, a wave of labor militancy aroused the selfish apprehensions of men whose fears for their fortunes had already been stimulated by the Russian Revolution, and a great preventive campaign was resolved upon. The three most dramatic issues used by the press to whip up hysteria were the Seattle General Strike, the Boston Police Strike and the coal and steel walkouts.

The Seattle General Strike, begun early in 1919 under the leadership of the Seattle Central Labor Council to support 35,000 embattled shipyard workers, was immediately greeted as an insurrection. "Reds Directing Seattle Strike—To Test Chance for Revolution" cried the newspaper headlines. One Senator rose on the Senate floor to shout, "From Russia they came and to Russia they should be made to go!" Seattle Mayor Ole Hanson made a national name for himself by accusing the striking workers of a plot to "take possession of the American government and duplicate the anarchy of Russia." Hanson subsequently carved out a career touring the country conjuring up the specter of Red Revolution.

When the policemen of Boston went on

strike to win recognition, the Philadelphia *Public Ledger* went Hanson one better: "Bolshevism in the United States is no longer a specter. . . Boston in chaos reveals its inner substance." The *Wall Street Journal* tore itself away from the stock ticker long enough to cry out, "Lenin and Trotsky are on their way." President Wilson called the strike a "crime against civilization." And Governor Coolidge became the saviour of the country and a cinch for the White House by uttering his second most famous aphorism, "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime."

Both the Seattle strike and the Boston strike had one actual purpose: to organize unions. Both were broken in the storm and fury of the Red Scare. Next came the steel strike against the open shop. Under the cover of the witch-hunt, police vigilantes, and company-paid thugs destroyed all semblance of civil liberties in the mill towns, and the strike was crushed. A few weeks later the coal miners struck. The *N.Y. Herald Tribune* said the miners were "thirsting for a strike. . . . Thousands of them, red-soaked in the doctrines of Bolshevism, clamor for the strike as means. . . of starting a general revolution in America." Although a federal injunction was issued, 394,000 miners walked out. After a terrific barrage from the government Lewis called off the strike, stating, "We are Americans, we cannot fight our government."

The advance of unionism was stopped in its tracks by these three defeats.

IN April 1919, packages delivered to the homes of the mayor of Seattle and a prominent citizen of Atlanta proved to be homemade bombs, one exploding and injuring a servant. A New York Post Office employee, reading about the incidents, recalled sixteen similar packages laid aside for insufficient postage, and these were found to be bombs as well. They were addressed to prominent officials, judges, and financiers. Eighteen others were subsequently intercepted. Their origin was never traced. Some have said that they were the work of "one or two half-witted anarchists"; the radical and liberal journals of the time branded them as provocations by rightists.

May Day, which followed within a day after the discovery, was greeted with raids and riots against defenseless radicals who gathered for meetings or parades in Boston, New York, and Cleveland. Two persons were killed and scores injured, and while vigilante groups were everywhere the aggressors, among the hundreds arrested only socialists were to be found.

By this time, a number of vigilante organizations had taken the field, foremost among them the Ku Klux Klan, re-established in 1915, and the American Legion. A U.S. Senate committee and a New York State investigating group swung into action, and specialized in revelations of imminent "bloody revolution." The Rand School, a socialist college in New York operated by moderate and academic radicals, was raided, but the raiders failed to secure the closing of the school when Supreme Court Justice



John V. McAvoy threw the proceedings out of court.

"By the late fall of 1919," the author relates, "Bolshevism actually had a stranglehold on the nation. But, ironically enough, this was not the result of any revolutionary activity on the part of Bolsheviks or the ideological appeal of their program. Instead, it represented the willful action of the American people themselves. Through their unintelligent thinking and intolerant actions they were rapidly accomplishing what no number of domestic radicals could have achieved by themselves."

The schools and colleges were the scene of hundreds of accusations of "Bolshevism," and a number of teachers were fired from their jobs. Super-patriots denounced various church agencies and clergymen, among them Dr. Harry F. Ward and Rabbi Stephen Wise, as "followers of Lenin and Trotsky." The American Civil Liberties Union was condemned as a "Bolshevist front," and both the National League of Women Voters and the Foreign Policy Association were charged with being "tools of radicals." The pogroms perpetrated against the Negro people in Washington, D. C., and Chicago, Illinois, were excused on the ground that the Negroes were being infiltrated by radicalism.

THE climactic event of the red scare was the terrible clash in Centralia, Washington. One of the only two IWW halls in that state was in the little town of Centralia, and just before Armistice Day 1919, rumors circulated that the hall would be raided under the lead of the Centralia Protective Association, a businessmen's group. The IWW issued an appeal asking tolerance, but when the day came, a parade with the marchers carrying lengths of rope passed the hall, and a number of Legionnaires headed towards it. Shots were fired in defense of the hall, and three raiders fell, one of them as he was breaking in the door, a fact which belies the later claim of the Legionnaires that they were just passing by. Wesley Everest, a local IWW member, was run down by a

mob, one member of which he killed, and later that night, the lights were turned out all over Centralia and Everest was lynched to the accompaniment of indescribable brutalities. His body, with its foot-long neck, was laid out in the jail in front of the other Wobblies.

The Centralia events touched off an explosion of West Coast police raids and mob violence against the IWW, with mass arrests and demolition of radical halls. The headlines across the nation screamed violently that "'War to the Death' is Declared Against IWW," and, later on, seven other Wobblies were sentenced to 25 to 40 years.

During the months of November 1919 to January 1920, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer directed a vast operation that was later to be called "Palmer's Reign of Terror." Palmer was an ambitious politician who, by all indications, was motivated at least in part by the hope "to use his aggressive stand against the Reds as the primary means by which he could project himself into the presidency." Receiving a special appropriation of a half-million dollars for the purpose, he set up an anti-radical division within the Bureau of Investigation, appointed young J. Edgar Hoover to head it, and swung into action. The author notes, "Certainly the hunt for radicals during the 1919-20 period 'made' the Bureau of Investigation and started it on the road to becoming the famous FBI of the present day."

PALMER did not start at once with mass deportations. Fifty-four "alien radicals," seized during the Seattle strike, had been brought East for possible deportation, but such an outcry developed that the Justice Department dropped the plan, and only three of the 54 were deported. But this was only a temporary setback. With the furore around the coal strike and the Centralia events, and by cleverly building up public sentiment through raids on radical halls and offices, the way was prepared for mass deportations. Dragnets were flung out and brought in hundreds, with the non-citizens being held for deportation and the citizens turned over to the States for prosecution under criminal syndicalism laws.

On December 21, 1919, 249 deportees were shipped from New York harbor past the Statue of Liberty and on to Finland, whence they were sent to Russia. "Twelve of the men on board left behind wives and children, who earlier had attempted to break through the Ellis Island ferry gates in a vain attempt to join their fathers and husbands—an action which had been reported by the press with such ridiculous headlines as 'REDS STORM FERRY GATES TO FREE PALS.'"

On January 2, 4,000 more "suspected radicals" were rounded up in 33 cities, and imprisoned, in many cases under barbarous conditions, being forced to sleep on floors and in dark, windowless corridors. In Detroit, 800 prisoners tried to share one toilet, and all were denied food the first 24 hours, and thereafter fed on what their families brought them. On January 7, 1920, five Socialist members of the New York Legisla-

ture were barred from their seats by a vote of 140 to 6. They were later to win reelection in a special poll, and were again expelled.

"The month of January 1920," Murray writes, "marked the height of the Great Red Scare. . . Then, suddenly, the crest of hysteria passed. Thereafter public fear was never again as intense. Surprisingly enough, during the following months of 1920 anti-Red hysteria subsided almost as quickly as it had developed. . . ." The Red Scare died out, Mr. Murray believes, because of a dawning realization that there had never been any real cause for alarm, because of a growing opposition among certain prominent and respected public figures, because of the "localization of bolshevism" in Europe, and because "the temper of war was giving way to the temper of a peace."

On June 23, a Massachusetts District Court decision holding that even membership in the Communist Party did not necessarily subject an alien to deportation slowed the deportation mania. From November 1919 to January 1920, about 5,000 arrest warrants had been issued, of which 3,000 had actually been used in making arrests. Some 556 deportations were upheld out of this mass. In total, over 800 persons had been deported.

JUST before May Day 1920, Palmer made a sustained effort to re-create the former atmosphere, issuing warnings of red plots to "kill high government officials" and a plan to seize government buildings and declare a general strike. The press gave him considerable cooperation, and a fever built up briefly again, but the day passed in complete calm.

Murray relates: "Of course, the Justice Department immediately claimed that its timely warnings had headed off an impending revolution and the country had been saved. But this time the nation was not fooled and, torn between laughter and rage, heaped coals of fire on the Attorney General's head. Except for a very few newspapers, the press, whether radical, liberal, or conservative, agreed that the scare had been a 'mare's nest hatched in the Attorney General's brain' and denounced him as 'little of hot air,' 'a national menace,' and 'Little Red Riding Hood with a cry of Wolf.'" That was the beginning of the end for A. Mitchell Palmer. J. Edgar Hoover survived.

The Great Red Scare was a true hysteria. If we compare it to the present witch-hunt, we are struck by the relatively cold, calculating, and enduring air surrounding current repressions. The earlier witch-hunt was based upon the firm conviction that had been implanted in the public mind that a violent revolution was really due to break out momentarily. The hysteria matching this fantastic proposition was extreme. But it could not survive long the puncturing of the myth. The powers-that-be were frightened of the spread of Bolshevism, but when the latter was localized, they calmed down. Their present fears of Communism are growing rather than abating.

The present witch-hunt has been grounded

in a careful legal structure which considerably abbreviates the rights of *opinion*, as it is not founded on the proposition that immediate actions are being undertaken by radicals, but that unpopular opinions should be destroyed to prevent remote and long-term "dangers." The contrast is that where the brief moment of rage and hysteria in 1919-20 passed by and left a nation not too greatly altered, the present drive has already worked a serious structural change in the foundations of American democracy, and threatens worse.

A.S.

Mankind Divided

HISTORY OF THE COLD WAR by
Kenneth Ingram. *Philosophical Library*,
New York, 1955.

THE purpose of this book is not a justification of either side, but an objective presentation of the essential facts and a brief statement of the interpretation given by each side to the issues and events under dispute. Mr. Ingram succeeds remarkably well in this thankless task, to the point where his book, while it may not change the viewpoints of committed partisans, can furnish a guide and sort of factual handbook to all sides. Needless to say, nobody but a Britisher would have chanced such a cricket-umpire's job. And while what is in the book might not startle Europeans, in America such a book is a considerable novelty, as everything but ferocious anti-Communist tracts is *streng verboten*.

The book deals with the period from the end of World War II to Stalin's death in 1953, but the author is the first to admit that the origins of the cold war cannot be traced within the confines of these years. The antagonisms between Russia on the one side and the Western capitalist nations on the other started with the revolution that established the Soviet state. The alliance between the two during the war did not end that antagonism, despite shallow predictions to that effect by "analysts" on both sides. When Churchill welcomed Russia into the war in June 1941, he deliberately compared features of the Communist structure to Hitlerism, and an obscure U.S. Senator of that time by the name of Truman told the world: "If we see that Germany is winning we ought to help Russia, and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way let them kill as many as possible."

As the war developed, it was clear that Britain and the U.S., despite many formal efforts to hold to correct protocol, were in a common front apart from Russia in the making of decisions. They tried, as early as 1941, to frown down the Polish government which Moscow was holding in reserve, not out of concern for the Polish people but in an effort to contain the inevitable Russian expansion into Eastern Europe in the event of a victory in the war. The A-Bomb development program

was a jointly shared project between London and Washington, and the Russians were first told about the bomb at the Potsdam conference in July 1945. The clash over the second front was another expression of the antagonism. Although the American command did not go along with Churchill in his attempt to make the scene of invasion the "soft underbelly" of Europe so that the Allied armies would penetrate immediately into Central Europe to confront the Russians, they argued the matter out among themselves as a matter of joint policy and decision.

FROM the first days of the postwar period, the scene was set for a flare of hostility. The chief immediate cause was that Russia, having by its victory in the war gained military-economic supremacy in Eastern and Central Europe (as a matter of fact there was no power on the entire continent to challenge it), was attempting to cash in on the victory and consolidate a cordon of friendly states around its periphery, from Finland to Iran. This bid might have been compromised in an international deal had Russia been another of the European capitalist powers—indeed it most likely would have. But, as the implications of the spread of a powerful Communist colossus into the heart of Europe began to dawn on the protectors of capitalism's interests, they concluded that what might have been normal and acceptable in dealing with a Russia of the Czars was not to be countenanced in dealing with an antagonistic social system. The postwar political instability in most parts of the world, including the spread of colonial revolt and the rise of the Communist Parties in France and Italy, Social Democracy in Germany, and Laborism in Britain, helped push the Western rulers to conclude that measures of containment must be taken.

In their earliest efforts, the diplomats of the West met with a measure of success. Greece was handed over to them by Stalin in accordance with wartime agreements, and a courageous partisan mass movement betrayed and massacred in the process. Russia tried to hold on in Iran, where her troops had entered during the war, but soon acceded to Western representations and evacuated. However, when strong diplomatic pressure began to be applied with respect to the Russian-dominated regimes in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, the Soviet Government refused to yield, and pointedly inquired why Japan was being occupied as a private preserve by an American government which was trying to dictate terms for Eastern Europe. This invitation to a "you hold your sphere and keep your nose out of ours" arrangement, standard procedure in deals between imperialist powers, was ignored by the West, and the cold war was launched in full force.

In the early stages, the West moved insistently into every area out of which Russia could be forced. That was the case with the British in Greece. In Iran, the process is well described in a para-

graph which Mr. Ingram quotes from the American newsmen, Howard K. Smith:

"The Western Powers rightly condemned Russia's behavior in the Security Council, and the pressure of opinion eventually forced the Russians to withdraw from Persia [Iran]. . . . What is not widely known about the sequel is that as Russia moved out—America moved in. Not with troops and noisy revolution, but silently with dollars in support of the *status quo*. The Persian Government received American funds and a set of American—including military—advisers. Persia is in effect today an American satellite. If America does not already have military bases in Persia, she can have them any time she wishes. . . . America had accomplished exactly the nefarious end Russia sought. . . . Moreover, this 'defense' base that America had for the taking was six thousand miles from her shores, but on Russia's most sensitive border. Russia could legitimately press the West to answer the question which the West put to her: 'Where does security end short of domination of the whole earth.'"

THE full and formal launching of the cold war was accomplished by Winston Churchill, then out of office but possessing great influence, particularly in American corporate and political circles. He called for a joint stand of the "English-speaking peoples" and "continuance of the present facilities of all naval and air force bases in the possession of either country all over the world" in his famous speech at Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946. While his words may sound mild in the light of the storms which have raged since then, at the time they constituted a call to battle order—a reversal of all of the stated objectives of the West in bringing the world to peace, demobilization, and binding up the wounds of the last war—and declared openly a new belligerent purpose. He was, of course, merely stating in public what had been going on for a year in actuality.

The cold war raged on, about Germany, Trieste, reparations (the Russians demanded heavy payments, particularly from Italy), trade, visas, Russian wives of American and British soldiers and officials (who were not permitted to leave and join their husbands), and many other issues. But at the heart of the dispute was the Western determination to *at least* push Russia back to its old borders and destroy its influence in Europe and Asia, and on the other side Russia's refusal to accede. Many of the subsequent disputes, about which the diplomats took such hard positions—at times not justified by the actual stakes—must be understood as bargaining points and means of bringing pressure to bear. That is why those fair-minded individuals who try to assess each quarrel "on its merits" so often go astray, as international conflicts are complex labyrinthine affairs with the real issues emerging only from time to time.

The Marshall Plan revealed Western intentions pretty fully, and put the seal on the division of Europe. That war-torn con-

continent had been threatened with famine and human disaster without outside help. Lend-Lease had been cut off abruptly in 1945, and UNNRA, the UN relief agency, was due to close up shop in 1947. In the 1946 UN discussions around a new aid setup, America and Britain made clear that no new international agency was to be set up similar to the old—this was eight months after Churchill's speech—and that the governments would give aid to those countries they deemed ought to get it. This plan was at that time so novel that even Fiorello H. LaGuardia, though an American serving as UNNRA's Director General, was horrified: "Does the Government of the United States intend to adopt a policy which will make innocent men and women suffer because of the political situation which makes their government unacceptable to the United States?"

That was precisely what was intended. The new Marshall Plan setup was put in business as a weapon to fight Communism, and for those to whom the matter was not clear, General Marshall bluntly made it so by declaring to Italy in March 1948 that "benefits under ERP will come to an abrupt end in any country that votes Communism into power." Mr. Ingram declares that "The effect of Marshall aid was thus of extreme importance. It consolidated the two blocs, it drove a deeper wedge than had hitherto existed between the Communist world and the West. Henceforward Soviet policy was directed to a welding together of the East European states so that a scheme, rivalling the Marshall Plan, could be developed and the Communist orbit rendered as economically independent as possible of the West. The rift was now complete. The Soviet Union was finally convinced that it was faced with an organized Western group, sustained by the vast resources of America, and intent on crushing out Communism by attaining world domination. Conversely, the West was assured that the accelerated and intensive preparations by which the satellite states had bound themselves, politically and economically, to Moscow could only mean that a Soviet offensive against the West, probably of a military character, was contemplated."

IN the next several years, two great issues stood out: Germany and Korea. Both countries had been partitioned by the occupation—in each sector a political regime was hardened, despite the fact that the "boundaries" had been for occupation purposes only. Mr. Ingram understands the nature of the jockeying over Germany well, and sets it forth in this paragraph:

"The Western States had now committed themselves to the objective of raising a West German force and binding it in military alliance to themselves. They were also committed in principle to the objective of reuniting East and West Germany and of setting up an all-German government, on condition that the Soviet Union consented to free elections for such a government and that adequate provision

for such elections was carried into effect. How far were these two objectives reconcilable? How could a united Germany be formed, if one-half of it was militarily allied to the West and the other half was not? Presumably the official Western view was that the whole of Germany should enter into military alliance with the (West) European Defense Community. But it was as inconceivable that the Soviet Union would agree to the formation of a rearmed united Germany, embraced by the American and Western group, as that the West would consent to such a Germany bound to the Cominform. No attempt appears to have been made by Western statesmen to explain their answer to this dilemma."

In Korea, however, what was only latent in Germany became a flaming fact. Both sides fought a war to try to take the whole of the country, a war that appears to have been initiated by the Korean Communist side. Although in the end neither succeeded, each side had scored a point. The Chinese Communists, who entered the war when MacArthur's troops were at their border, punctured the long-standing myth of Asian inferiority to the white man's arms, and emerged as a major world power in their own right. And the West got across the lesson that the processes of social struggle inside a nation would not be given free rein so long as Washington has any say in the matter, but would be considered part of the cold war.

MR. Ingram has not written a weighty or analytical tome. But one important conclusion, which Americans need very badly to digest, emerges from his account: The cold war cannot be assessed in bar-room brawl terms—who started it? or who is being too stubborn about it? The cold war is a complex of social, economic, political, and military antagonisms which can never be "settled" in the ordinary sense of the term. It involves an inevitable hostility of two social systems, and a lot of the views which one will have about it hinge on one's view's about the capitalist system and its decline, about socialism, and about how Russian and Chinese communism fit in with the rise of a new and democratic socialist society.

But one thing more remains to be said about the period in the cold war which opened after Mr. Ingram's book closes. The Russian leaders have made a series of gambits towards ending the cold war and towards transferring the competition from the military onto the economic and political planes. In the light of what an atomic war would mean, that is the only sensible proposal which mankind can entertain. Washington has clearly been reluctant to make the shift, and that alone speaks volumes about its lack of confidence in the outcome of such a competition and about who it is that keeps the cold war going. Will Americans begin to speak out in such numbers and with such force that the Pentagon and Wall Street will be forced to give up the cold war? That is where we stand at the moment.

H. B.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

We Dare Not Read

I read the sample copy of the *American Socialist* and then burned it. I believe much of what you print but I am afraid to have such a magazine in the house.

As a progressive Southerner, I want, more than anything else, the right to read, and for my children to be able to read, such publications as the *American Socialist*. Under the Brownell-McCarthy dictatorship we do not have this right. Living or working within 25 miles of the nation's capital today is like living and working under a Nazi regime. We dare not read. We dare not talk. We are afraid to think.

I wish that I might subscribe to your magazine. I dare not. Only persons living and working in this area know the feeling of hatred and terror that exists. Newspapers do not print the truth. Your magazine only hints at it. Our local library will not even subscribe to the *New Republic* and all so-called "progressive" books are banned. Please continue to speak for those of us—"the cowed and the meek"—who must remain silent to protect their families and their jobs. Perhaps our children may know a free America?

R. C. Virginia.

Your article "The New America" (July 1956) is the most amazing absurdity I have read in years. I have yet to encounter such a naive misreading of the facts.

As a reporter during the period from 1925 through 1950, and as a participant in various movements during the same quarter-century I can say that during that period everywhere was activity, voices were being heard, the reactionaries were being put to rout. But today—one vast silence the length and breadth of the land.

I can hardly believe that I have read such an article. Do you believe that because one Joseph McCarthy has been obscured, for the time being, that this represents other than manipulation?

Do you realize that the leisure time of the average worker is almost totally wasted riding nowhere in automobiles, listening and viewing dull-wittedly radio and television programs that become worse and worse?

Aside from "Marty," what movie worth spending five minutes on has been produced in America—and could one be? As a matter of fact, "Marty" had to be produced away from Hollywood.

No, Ortega and Veblen were right.

Do you consider the vast increase in church attendance a "cultural" revival or an advance in "enlightenment"?

Come, come, let's have no more such nonsense. The worker "voting as a class." Piffle, when they divide evenly between Eisenhower and Stevenson. What's the difference?

G. A. F. Hartford, Conn.

Please send me a trial subscription to the *American Socialist*. I looked over two or three issues and they seem very good. . . .

It seems to me there is need for some organization which will perform the same general social function as the British Fabian Society (though definitely not with the same strategic-ideological content). Do you yourselves feel this way? . . .

J. A. New York City.

More on Fluoridation

First allow me to say that your magazine is very good, and your articles are some of the best published. But there are a few which are very misleading, one of which is "The Fluoridation Controversy," in the June issue.

After reading this article I am forced to wonder if Dr. Friedman has not himself been guilty of either overlooking the facts, ignoring the facts, being a paid stooge of the drug trusts, or just plain ignorance. I prefer to think it is the first fault, which seems to be a common trait of us humans.

A well-nourished tooth will not decay. At least not in the short space of a lifetime. A proper diet of fresh fruit, vegetables, and nuts will supply all the vitamins necessary for good tooth structure. The eating of such devitalized foods as all-white flour and white sugar products, and the habit of all people (but mostly the young) to consume ice cream (so-called) and soft drinks of all kinds, are a few of the causes of tooth decay. I am quite sure Mr. Friedman is aware of these facts.

As for the fluorides, they are all poison (as are all drugs) and serve no useful purpose in the human body. True, fluorides are needed for tooth development, but they must be processed through and from the vegetable kingdom.

Mr. Friedman resorts to a bit of name-calling which means nothing constructive. If he or any other person wants to take his fluorides raw, that is his right. But it is not his right to force them down the rest of us innocent bystanders when there is a far safer and superior way to obtain them.

I am 35 years old and have a perfect set of teeth, no decay, no cavities, no fillings, no teeth pulled, and have never had a toothache in my life. And all without the aid of fluorides.

I am aware of the fact that this letter will likely not be published. I have found the radical press (which always boasts its belief in freedom of the press) to be just as lopsided in its views, and just as much a dupe to the AMA, as are the giant papers of the commercial reptile press.

E. S. Washington.

I want to say amen to everything written by A. W. Calhoun in his letter in your

July issue. Fluoridation, milk of magnesia, refined sugars, phosphoric acid beverages, vegetable fats, are all harmful, and I would add chlorinated water (I use rain water) and last but not least refrigerated foods!

I wish our progressive literature would pay more attention to diet as the cause of all disease instead of following the stranglehold the A.M.A. has on the people; we are indeed a nation of guinea pigs.

Mrs. E. S. Washington.

Russian Councils Assessed

With reference to the discussion of "Stalin and the New Look," it strikes me that most of those taking part in that discussion have failed to evaluate one very important factor in the situation. I have long since shied away from the "great man theory of history." While giving due credit to outstanding individuals, they have been outstanding only in relation to other factors in their environments. This goes for the villains as well as the heroes in the historical drama.

In the case of Russia, the determining factor seems to me to have been the *soviet* itself. That formation is the monumental achievement of democracy in the twentieth century. From the proletarian grass roots in the remotest Russian farm or village up through the social strata to the Politbureau, the soviet constitutes the basis for the unifying and vitalizing forces. Any "interference control" by Stalin or by the Communist Party must have been directed toward the development of the soviet toward greater efficiency, or disturbing social effects would become serious. Such effects undoubtedly occurred in Stalin's later years at least, and now the pressure from below appears to be forcing a return toward the normal functioning of the soviet.

Stalin's contribution for good or evil will have to be judged in relation to the extent of his adherence to or deviation from the soviet norm. I could not attempt that evaluation in the absence of sufficient facts. Suffice it to say that neither Stalin nor the Communist Party could override, kill, or otherwise prevent the soviets from achieving that remarkable unity of ten or more Federated Soviet Republics with their wide linguistic, racial, and traditional diversities, which one of my friends rightly says "has no equal in all history," but which I cannot, as he does, ascribe mostly to Stalin's work. If we try to view this development objectively we cannot but modify the "great man" theory, and realize that the Council of Workers, Peasants and Soldiers has been the fundamental factor in Russian history since the beginning of the Revolution, and now looms as the basic instrument for worldwide social change.

Ben H. Williams Michigan.

Your magazine is steadily improving; your outlook continues clear. I think the New Look Stalin is getting should be the least of our worries. We have plenty of things to make better here, and should be looking after that job.

M. W. Iowa

Why We Can't Hold Our Horses

ONE of our readers, whose subscription was expiring wrote us recently, upon receiving our final notice: "Hold your horses. After all, this is only the second letter." This note made us think that perhaps some explanations are in order.

Most of the big commercial magazines send out many letters and notices of expiration to their subscribers—a dozen or more in some cases. Meanwhile, they continue to send the magazine. Their reasoning is quite simple. Keeping a subscriber on the list long after his subscription has run out is worthwhile to them because subscription income is not their most important source of revenue. They would rather lose money in that way and keep their circulation figures well padded for the audit bureau of circulation to impress advertisers, who are their major source of revenue. And, of course, they have large financial reserves enabling them to go in for that kind of expensive by-play.

In our case, the situation is entirely different. First, we could not possibly afford the many mailings urging readers to renew. And second, we do not believe in continuing to mail this magazine free of charge after payment for it has expired. Aside from the financial waste entailed, it seems reasonable to us that anyone who really wants the magazine will go to the slight trouble and expense of renewing.

And so our procedure is as follows: Shortly before a subscription is due to expire we send a notice to that effect, with a return envelope for renewing. Then, the last issue which the subscriber is due to get contains a notice of expiration. Lastly, a final notice letter is sent out, which you should get in time to renew without missing an issue, also with a return envelope. That completes our notifications to you. It is all the mailing we can reasonably afford, and it has proved generally to be enough.

THE summer months are, unfortunately, a time of heavy expirations on our subscription list, as this magazine was launched with a January issue and many of our early subscriptions were six-month introductory which were then renewed annually. This summer, the wave of expirations is again large, but we are happy to report that we are holding our own nicely, and may even gain a bit despite the slack that summer brings. But there are renewals that we know we are going to get sooner or later, and we urge those who have put off acting to send them in at once so that they will not miss any issues.

Also, don't forget to introduce a friend or two to the AMERICAN SOCIALIST this month. Use the blank below.

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