

Bulletin

OF THE WORKERS PARTY

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RESOLUTION ON THE PARTY

The failure of the masses to overthrow capitalism in its highest stage was due primarily, not to the conservatism or timidity of the masses, but to the failure of the revolutionary Marxist parties to provide adequate and competent leadership. The Second International, although hopelessly saturated with bourgeois reformism, has remained the only "socialist" alternative before the masses to the degenerated, totalitarianized Third International and its ghastly "workers fatherland". The intellectuals who rallied to the revolutionary movement under the impetus of the October Revolution and the rising tide of mass movements after the first World War were in full retreat before the first shot of the expected World War II was heard. The decline of capitalism since 1914 has been accompanied by the totalitarianization of society. The revolutionary Marxist parties entered the Second World War isolated and tiny, and they emerge no better.

In Russia in 1917 the proletariat and its party found that they had to take upon their own shoulders even the struggle for classical bourgeois demands, inasmuch as world capitalism had reached the point where a new national bourgeoisie was already reactionary before it even got into power. The Marxist parties can no longer count, to the same extent, on utilizing the progressive struggles of sections of the petty-bourgeoisie, and of the liberal bourgeoisie itself, as a milieu for socialist struggles. The revolutionary Marxist parties must themselves fill the gap left by the deserters. The proletariat has inherited, not only the unfinished tasks of capitalism, but even the task of preserving the historic gains once registered under capitalism: the principles of bourgeois democracy, expansion of consumer production (unbombed), universal education, civil and economic liberties for minorities, a rising standard of living for the masses, scientific (e.g. economic and sociological theory) and cultural advancement, etc. To say that the proletariat inherits these tasks means that its conscious vanguard must lead, and seek to lead, all of these forms of struggles.

Therefore, the Workers Party, seeking to initiate all-sided political activity, to lead progressive struggles on all levels of society, is resolved to eliminate the distance which today separates the scope and influence of the party from the size and urgency of its historic tasks. Knowing that only a bold and alert attitude of readiness to respond to political opportunities can project the party into reality, the party rejects the attitude of postponing or half-heartedly entering political arenas "until we have a firm basis in the union movement" as fatal to the growth of a Bolshevik party. The party is determined to break with the routinism that has grown up in the last few years.

The character of our party, and of its political core, will be determined by the character of the activity that the party engages in. Hitherto, our secondary leaders and party core have been

forged primarily in factional struggles inside the party. Our members must learn and grow in political stature primarily in political struggles against the party's enemies. It is because of the unhealthy emphasis on internal growth that the question of developing a cadre has arisen and become, regardless of intention, in almost every individual case a reflection of factional lines.

A party that is active on all the levels of social struggle will find that it can make good use of non-proletarian elements who accept the party's political program but not the perspective of living a worker's life. The party will find, too, that it will be far better able to retain and develop the workers it recruits if the scope of its activities opens up new vistas to those who have fought the bourgeoisie only in the factories. A party that is not both a training school for working class leaders and able to attract and develop intellectuals is doomed to political sterility and isolation.

The question of internal party democracy is fundamentally a question of political program and activity. The will to participate in inner party political life on the part of the rank and file, and the encouragement of such participation by the leadership, is an index of the morale of a party and of its prospects for healthy growth. However, a party-wide interest in solving the theoretical and practical problems of the movement can mean nothing but sterile scholasticism unless the interest and problems arise from the activity of the party. Our party, even though strengthened in its resolve to build a genuinely democratic party by the negative example of the SWP, cannot forever avoid demoralization and cynicism if it remains, as it has for the past six years, unable to break out of its isolation.

Already there exists an unhealthy gap between the ranks and the leadership. On the one hand this is indicated by the failure of new leaders to come forward from the ranks and the failure of experienced second rank leaders to function adequately, and on the other hand there is a tendency for the leadership to function as a closed group. A feeling of helplessness and dependency by the ranks is reflected in a feeling among the leadership that the ranks are helpless and dependent.

The leadership must institute steps leading to the development of self-confidence among the ranks and the encouragement and development of new leadership for the party. In particular:

- 1 - The top leadership of the party must institute an informal but deliberate policy of giving special attention to the training of individual members who show particular promise. It is understood, of course, that this cannot be a substitute for attention to the general education of the party which must always be a paramount concern of any democratic leadership.

- 2 - The Political Committee must institute an informal but deliberate policy of inviting to its meetings different party members who have indicated that they have something to contribute to some item

on the agenda.

3 - Summarized minutes of the non-secret portions of the Political Committee meetings should be published regularly in the internal bulletin.

The party is anxious to spread its influence in as many localities as possible, and for that reason will continue to colonize. The proper functioning of the party in those localities in which it is already established, however, is vastly more important than the existence of a handful of isolated party members in several dozen widely scattered localities. The dispersal of the party's meagre forces must be considered from the standpoint of creating concentrations that can engage in all-sided political activity.

The role of the Marxist party is to bring together the different struggles of society in order to focus them on the central problem of our epoch: the socialist reconstruction of society. The party must strive in all its activities and in all the groups to which it addresses itself to help the masses see that the struggle of each section of the people, each demand which appears all-important to a single group, is only a part of the total conflict. The Workers Party must contain within itself the embodiment of unity in dispersion; it must reflect in itself and its activities all the problems and struggles of contemporary society. Only such a party, and none other, can achieve the solidarizing of the masses and the leadership of the socialist revolution.

Joe Leonard
Chet Marco

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STATEMENT OF POLICY ON VETERANS
WORK

INTRODUCTION

December 1941 to September 1945 mark the years of America's active military participation in World War II. The four years of war were, however, amply preceded by a gigantic program of militarization. This program, already apparent as early as 1939, was publicly codified with the passage of the "Selective Service Act" and heralded in October-November 1940 the inauguration of the first pre-war draft in American history. Given its "modified" post-war forms, the militarization program remains in effect to this very day. By its very nature, the war represented only one, its most intensive phase. The termination of the war is now accompanied by a modification, but not a suspension, of the militarization program. What we are witnessing today is merely an adaptation of the militarization program to the post-war period. Militarization, via continuation of the draft, war surplus board (the colonel's organization), vital role of strategic stockpiles, etc., has become an integral, organic construction of the period itself.

This phenomenon has injected into the American class arena a variety of new problems. These problems bear upon the given tactical approach on the part of the revolutionary and labor movements toward the period itself, and toward that section of the population most immediately and directly affected by the militarization program. Not the least of these is the problem posed by the return of the worker-veteran to civilian life. Neither organized labor nor a political party which seeks to win the masses of workers to the banner of the Socialist Revolution can afford to neglect that section of the population designated as "veterans."

The American bourgeoisie in its untiring efforts to placate, to divide, to crush labor, seeks to exploit the militarization program to the maximum advantage of its over-all aims. Beginning with the anti-labor indoctrination of the soldier, the American ruling class is now embarked upon a vigorous and a skillful campaign to divide the worker-veteran from his class; to set him apart from the working class and to exploit this division as a weapon against labor. The concept which defines the veteran as an "apolitical" group transcending economic and social characteristics of existing classes, and hence standing aloof from (i.e. above) the classes, is reactionary and is a decoy for the capitalist snare.

The Workers Party rejects emphatically the concept of a veteran's immunity to social and class forces in society. The veteran does not emerge as a new class. Rather his own ranks are socially heterogeneous and are delineated according to the basic class divisions. Needless to say, the overwhelming majority of the veterans come from and belong to the working class.

But the Workers Party does not combat the reactionary concept which assigns to the veteran a "new class" or a "bonapartist" distinction by ignoring the fact that there exist among the worker-veterans powerful ties deriving from a common background

and welded by many analogous post-war economic, social, and psychological problems. On the contrary, taking as its point of departure the recognition of the existence of a special veterans problem, the Workers Party engages these from a class point of view. To the specific problems confronting the worker-veteran as a veteran, the Party directs a specific approach. To the demands which the Party advances for the working-class in general it "adds" specific demands relating to the worker-veteran within the framework and as an integral part of its general program for the working class.

This document is confined to the Party position on the veteran question. It does not propose to treat with such problems as "revolutionary military policy", "army reforms", etc. Such problems are beyond the realm of this resolution and must be treated as such. The material which follows may be divided roughly into two sections. To acquaint the Party with the nature of what is a relatively new problem, the first section is devoted principally to an exposition of the question: "Who and what are the veterans?" The second section develops a partial program of immediate and transitional demands for the worker-veteran.

SECTION A. WHO AND WHAT ARE THE VETERANS?

I. There are about 14,000,000 men and women who have been pressed into the armed services of the United States between the years 1941-1946. Save for a relatively small number, all of these were drafted. The 14,000,000 continue to increase in number as a result of the perpetuation of the draft. The overwhelming majority of the veterans are young men between 20 and 30 years of age. 14,000,000 young veterans constitute a significant and, in view of their age, social composition and special experience, perhaps a decisive section of the American population, viewed from the aspect of the future class struggles.

II. The 14,000,000 men who have been in uniform represent 10% of the population. Most of the veterans, however, are now married, many having families whose interests are, of course, intimately bound up with those of the veterans. Considered, therefore, from the aspect of political potential, the veterans and their immediate families compose today over 25% of the national population.

III. Although no break-down of figures as to the social composition of the army has appeared, it is reasonably certain that its ranks were composed in an overwhelming proportion of young workers and farmers and of students from working class families.

IV. Joined psychologically by a vast and a protracted common experience and a common life, the veterans have emerged from the war with a unity of interest and outlook, generated and nurtured by their singular experience. The psychological ties are enhanced and the group outlook further crystalized by the numerous analogous post-war problems commonly confronting the returning veteran. The label "veteran" is the designation of a mass group identity.

V. Torn from their homes and families, callously separated

from their accustomed way of life and catapulted into an existence of brutal regimentation and, for many, of extreme violence, the soldier led an existence of personal deprivation, devoid of normal (often any) social life. The feeling of bitterness at their common lot has matured the sense of distinction and of solidarity. The veteran has emerged from this war a potent force in society, conscious of his distinction as a veteran, welded together by the common experiences of the past and by similar economic and social problems of the present.

VI. Almost all of the social-economic problems of the working class in general obtain, in one form or another, for the worker-veteran. However, the problems often assume forms bearing their own peculiar characteristics. The worker-veteran, like the laborer, belongs to the working class. It is this precisely which directs that his problems be approached from the point of view of the class struggle, and which makes it incumbent upon us to engender, by this approach, his class-consciousness. Nonetheless, this does not detract from the fact that he is confronted with problems peculiar to him alone; nor from his conviction that his problems emanate from a status growing out of his service in the war, thereby distinguishing him in this respect from other workers, without differentiating him from the working class itself. If some of his problems vary in form, they do not vary in their essence from those of the working class. However, given his psychology, coupled with the distinct form his problems assume, he demands and merits a special, a distinct approach. Such an approach must be calculated to meet the problems of the veteran upon his own ground; to identify his struggles with those of the working class; to cultivate his class-consciousness; to help to integrate him into the class struggle. The worker-veteran will understand his struggles as being inseparably linked with those of the working class; the solution of the problems of the working class as the solution to his own.

The Government and the Veteran

VII. In recognition of the fact outlined in point VI and perceiving that in the peculiar psychological characteristics and social problems there lies a festering threat, the government has sought to parry the threat by meeting the problems of the veterans upon the separate plane dictated by their special outlook. The assumption by the Veterans Administration of a place of importance in government, heretofore unprecedented, the drafting and execution of an elaborate program of "Veterans Readjustment", the extension of "privileges" for veterans codified in the "G.I. Bill of Rights", testify to the recognition on the part of government that the veterans constitute a given "category" in American society and to their conviction that this "category" must be reckoned with upon its own special levels. It is further testified to by the wide play given to veterans' acts and needs in the press, by special columns in almost every newspaper, including the labor press, devoted to the veteran. While this is a reflection of the existence in a distinct form of a special veterans problem, it has readily served to encourage the apparently prevalent feeling among veterans that they constitute a "special category" in society.

The bosses and the government are engaged in a conspiracy which plays upon the distinctive qualities of the veteran problem endeavoring to artificially extend these as a means of marking the worker-veteran off from the working class. The government has proceeded with manifest skill, executing a preconceived program of reactionary design. Its purpose, as already stated, is to break the worker-veteran from his class by fabricating the distinctive characteristics of the veteran problem and psychology into a "social category" in society. The "G.I. Bill of Rights", while serving the end of placating the veteran, serves simultaneously as a vital cog in the government's reactionary design.

It is important to understand that the efforts of the government take the form of CAPITALIZING upon an already prevalent view on the part of the veteran, a view that is as widespread as it is ambiguous, namely that the veterans constitute a "special category." While the government seeks to divest this "category" of any class basis, the Workers Party seeks to inculcate the worker-veteran with class consciousness and seeks to demonstrate that the worker-veteran is a "special category", so-called, within the working class. That is to say, the worker-veteran has special problems within the general framework of the problems of the working class in general.

The Factors Distinguishing the Veterans of the Two World Wars

VIII. The sense of unity which characterized the veteran of the first world war manifested itself in the emergence of influential veterans organizations, patriotic in their essence, pretending to rise "above" the classes and primarily concerned with the fostering of an effective lobby in Congress in behalf of the veteran. Their perception of a unity of interest was sufficiently deep-seated and genuine to generate a spontaneous resurgence of independent, militant actions by the veteran, twelve years after the termination of the war (1929-1933), which actions, it is significant to note, proceeded in opposition to the official veterans organizations and were in keeping with the main stream of the actions of the unemployed. This experience is a portent which, currently projected, forecasts actions upon a new and higher level presaged by the manifold conditions which moulded the respective outlooks of the veterans of the two wars.

1. The first world war pressed into service approximately 3,700,000 men and caused 250,000 casualties. The current war placed 14,000,000 men in uniform and caused over 1,000,000 casualties.

2. The first world war saw some 2,000,000 men overseas; the second, almost 10,000,000.

3. For America and the bulk of its 4,000,000 soldiers the first world war was an interlude of one and one-half years duration. The current war endured for four years - or, more accurately, for half a decade if measured from the inauguration of the draft in 1940 to V-J Day. And the draft continues. The disparity between one-and one-half years and five years cannot be computed merely in terms of an arithmetical difference. Four or five years of a young man's life is not an interlude, it is a sizable fragment of his conditioning period.

4. The first world war began in a popular wave of ardent patriotism and jingoism and ended before disillusionment could set in. The current war was heralded not by a wave of enthusiasm but by a melancholy resignation; Men were pressed into service on an enormous scale. They went with reluctance and without illusions. The second world war ended in an unprecedented, not to say unheard of, wave of demobilization demonstrations, politically motivated and conducted upon a scale so vast that they could neither be stayed nor suppressed; it ended with a mounting feeling of bitterness of betrayal, with recriminations and vociferous charges by the soldier against the army, the army caste system, against its codes and justice, and which even challenged the wisdom and leadership of the general staff and headquarters in their plans and conduct of battle. The soldier donned "civvies" in an attitude of belligerent defiance, impatient and demanding.

5. The veteran of world war I returned to a social milieu which proved capable for an "extended" period of absorbing his small numbers, integrating and adjusting him socially and economically, that is, of "resolving" his basic economic problems. Such a prospect is utterly precluded for the greater section of the veterans of world war II, as it is for the working class in general in this period.

All of these are factors which have "deepened the roots", have conditioned the crystallization of a spirit of unity among veterans upon a scale never before known, i.e. never before known in this country. The veteran is conscious of his status as a veteran and will project this consciousness which will be immeasurably sharpened with the first appearance of a new social crisis.

The Government's Anti-labor Indoctrination Program

IX. In the experience of the post-war period of the first world war (especially in Europe) we have ample testimony that the bourgeoisie will seek to play upon the peculiar character and to exploit the background, training and the position of the veteran, will seek to set them off from and pit them against the working class, that the bourgeoisie will make a determined effort to drive a deep wedge between the worker-veteran and the worker, and to channelize the veteran into reactionary and fascist camps. This process begins, in fact, with the basic training of the soldier. The calculated cunning of the war department during the war illuminates this course.

The "subterranean" campaign, painting visions of fabulous war wages, of fantastic bank accounts, of "Roman Holiday" debaucheries by the workers, the pernicious yarns of "4-F's" (identified with all deferred workers) abusing wives and sweethearts of the soldier absent from home, all feed upon receptive minds of soldiers, frustrated in their helplessness and embittered by their lot. The brutal exploitation and persecution of the soldier by the imperialist government was thus deflected upon the working class. The campaign against war-time strikers (notably the miners' strike) was presented as an enormous act of sabotage, perpetrated by the lust and greed of the whole of the working class and di-

rected against the individual soldier at the front who was "sacrificing his all for his country." Wherever and whenever possible, the inefficiencies of the services of supplies, or logistical break-downs, were attributed to the acts of the "disloyal workers who, while 'coining the dough', were as much as shooting in the back the soldier facing the German and the Jap."

This policy, transparent in design and pernicious in purpose, is being projected by the bosses and their government upon the new post-war terrain. The attempt to present the worker at the bench as the thief of the veteran's job has been launched through various devices, outstanding of which is the hypocritical insistence of industry to the granting of "super-seniority" rights of employment to veterans. The "betrayal" of the veteran by his former employer is concealed in obsequious gestures of so-called favoritism. This patronage is, in reality, an inseparable part of the conspiracy of the bosses and the government to smash prevailing wage scales and the unions by exploiting the newly flooded competitive labor market and creating a division in labor's ranks. "Super-seniority" is a crude and blatant attempt by the bosses to turn the vet against the unions.

While gestures of "patronage" are extended, we witness simultaneously the crassest exploitation of veterans under the apprentice and vocational training clauses of the "G. I. Bill of Rights." Here veterans are employed under the apprentice clauses at standard jobs but are paid miserable apprentice and student wages. It serves the double purpose of reducing production costs for manufacturers and of further dividing labor and the veterans.

Techniques of the Bosses

X. The techniques conceived in the conspiracy of the bosses are only in their formative, i.e. experimental, stages. It is not yet possible to generalize from the few available experiences what precise methods will be ultimately employed. The existing indications, however, must be scrutinized and subsequent symptoms followed with vigilance and exposed at every stage.

XI. It is to be noted that among the more conscious and the more far-seeing sections of the bourgeoisie, such as Ford's, blanket advantages with respect to hiring and on the job rules are afforded the veteran in a spirit of "generous patronage." Employment policy gives preference to the veteran except, of course, in the case of the Negro veteran whose status in the eyes of the bosses has not been altered by the Negro soldier's sacrifices in the war. A "sympathetic" patience is displayed by the boss and the foremen toward the veteran worker at the bench. And the attractive conditions of the veterans trade schools in the auto industry in general and at Ford's, in particular, have not been equalled. Wherever it can be done with impunity, "privileges" are extended the veteran vis-a-vis established union standards for the workers. The veteran's first day at Ford's, for example, is spent in orientation. He is treated to a display of consideration and paternal interest, introduced to the department heads, treated to movies and to meals. After that the veteran is urged

to bring his grievances not to the shop steward but to the company's veteran adviser. While we are not aware of how widespread this policy, pioneered by Ford and the auto industry, is, we know that it is not confined to the auto industry. This policy can be exposed and countered by a union front. The education of the veteran and non-veteran worker by the unions can effectively turn this policy against the perpetrators of the division of labor.

XII. Elsewhere (especially in the middle and small industrial establishments), motivated primarily by pragmatic considerations of immediate profit, an entirely different course is pursued. This is, nevertheless, productive of the same end result. In such plants we witness a vicious exploitation of the veteran, a "violation" of rehiring pledges, etc. The restiveness of the returning veteran, a belligerent "I've taken enough" and "I deserve better for the sacrifices I've made" attitude, a general dissatisfaction with their present lot (difficulty in finding suitable jobs, low wages, housing problems, disillusionments, readjustment problem, poor health, etc.), all contrive to make the veteran "unproductive" in the eyes of employers who cannot "afford" a long range view. These have found adequate clauses in the Selective Service Act to escape (where they have not ignored and flouted them from the start) their "guarantees" of the rehiring of the soldiers for one year following their return. The exploitation of the veteran in this form, whatever its immediate objective, has the effect of fostering the split in labor's ranks and pitting the worker-veteran against the worker.

XIII. The American bourgeoisie has found in such organizations as the American Legion, The Veterans of Foreign Wars, The Catholic Veterans of America, the Jewish Veterans of America, willing instruments for their reactionary designs. These organizations have served as reactionary corrals for the veteran and have been used (particularly the American Legion) as red-baiting and anti-labor forces. With the addition of some 14,000,000 young veterans, three major trends are to be observed as bourgeois policy: (a) to safeguard, if at all possible, the dominance of the already existent veterans organizations; (b) to sponsor the so-called liberal World War II veterans organizations such as the A.V.C. and the Amvets; (c) to organize out and out fascist organizations of veterans such as G.L.K. Smith's "Christian Veterans of America", and semi-fascist organizations such as the Irish Republican Veterans group.

Unless labor and the labor unions make a concerted drive in behalf of the veteran, unless the labor unions can resolve the apparent, though not real, conflicts arising in the shops between veteran-worker and worker, unless labor can educate and integrate the veteran into the labor movement and demonstrate that the special problem of the veteran can be resolved only in conjunction with and as an integral part of the problems of labor in general, the bourgeoisie will succeed in driving a wedge between the worker and the worker-veteran. This vivid speck on the horizon has the earmarks of a destructive "twister" that will tear the working class asunder and suck its gains into the vacuum. It is the imperative political obligation of the Workers Party to give the alarm, to amplify its views and to develop a program of demands for veterans

linked with those of labor. It is the duty of the Workers Party to champion the cause of the worker-veteran, to develop his struggles along socialist lines, to win the veteran as a soldier for Socialism.

The Labor Unions and the Veteran

XIV. From many highly important quarters we witness staunch resistance by the veteran of World War II to the insidious plans of capital. The demobilization demonstrations and the post-war anti-army campaigns by the soldier and the veteran (surplus property scandal, Rapido River investigation, the boycott of the Red Cross drive, campaigns for army reforms, etc.) are in themselves terrible body blows to American imperialism. The participation of the veteran in the recent strike wave demonstrated a wholesome pro-labor inclination of the worker-veteran who turned to his union for the solution of his economic problems. The initial pro-labor sentiment of the veteran has exceeded the most optimistic expectations.

There were (early 1945) approximately 3,500,000 union workers in the armed forces. On April 6, 1944, R. J. Thomas reported that there were 250,000 members of the UAW alone in the army. It is likely that the number of union veterans has swelled to 5,000,000 by this time; for example, the 250,000 UAW members in the armed services in April 1944 swelled to 400,000 in October 1945. Most of these have returned to their unions. One steel mill in Lackawana reports that 3,800 of its union employees are veterans of World War II.

It is not a matter of decisive importance whether there were 3,500,000 or 5,000,000 union members in the service. What is of tremendous importance is the fact that the number represents a high proportion of the organized workers. What is important is that we have today a union movement where the veteran constitutes a substantial force, varying in estimated strength from 25% to 50%, perhaps greater.

The very power of the unions would almost automatically assure such widespread recruitment. The reactions of the soldier upon his return (as we shall demonstrate below) turned thousands of them to the labor movement in search of answers to their economic problems. And while the unions commendably provided for retention of their members who were away in the service by waiving dues payments of servicemen (of 39 CIO unions, 38 waived dues payments for members in the service and 36 secured their seniority - cumulative - rights), inducements to non-union veterans were extended in the form of waiving initiation fees for veterans. (Of 39 CIO unions, 37 have waived initiation fees for veterans. Exceptions: the Newspaper Guild which asks \$2.00 initiation fee for veterans and the Marine Engineers who refer the right of initiation assessments of veterans to locals.) Whatever the number of union members who went into the service, it is reasonable to assume that the unions have undoubtedly recruited many thousands of veterans in the last year who have never before known union affiliation.

But the unions, and especially the union bureaucracy, were largely unprepared for the multiplicity of problems posed by

the returning veteran. Unable to grasp the situation nor to understand its magnitude and its implications, the bureaucracy found itself "fighting" a disorganized defensive against the premeditated offensive of the bosses. The most obvious exhibition of the floundering unpreparedness of the union officialdom is offered in the super-seniority issue which is treated in detail below. With the proclamation of V-J Day, the bosses (initiated by giant ads of the General Motors Corp.), posing as the great friends of the veteran, offered super-seniority employment to all veterans. When the unions struggled to their feet they found themselves embarrassingly divided and vulnerable. Not one union had offered a suitable answer to this shrewd maneuver of the bosses. To all appearances the bosses stood as the friend of the veteran, the union as the obstacle to the employment of the veteran.

What was true of the super-seniority issue is applicable down the line. The union officialdom, i.e. the general leadership of the CIO and AFL, had no program for the veteran and is only now beginning to flounder toward the development of one. Its veterans planks do not flow from a comprehensive understanding, or from a rounded program. The union planks on veterans are the product of pragmatic responses to the offensive of the bosses. They reflect the yielding to pressures from every direction. It is necessary to declare that this failure by the union bureaucracy has already resulted in serious damage to the union movement.

The Veteran in the Recent Strike Wave

XV. The return of the veterans in large numbers to civilian life coincided with the first great wave of strikes since the outbreak of the war. The veterans participated militantly in these strikes as veterans - in numerous instances mounting the picket lines in uniform and displaying placards with a special veteran appeal. Often the veterans constituted the militant spearhead of the picket lines. In several cases (New Jersey, Detroit, New York) striking veterans have appealed to non-striking veterans and to veterans organizations (VIA - AVC) for active participation in their strikes. In a demonstrative exhibition of solidarity, these responded to the appeal by mounting the picket lines alongside their buddies. However few are these instances, the very fact that the appeal was made as it was and received the response it did is a factor of significance. It illuminates the spirit of solidarity embracing the veteran as such, and reveals the possibilities for identifying the struggle of the worker-veteran with the struggles of the working class in general, pointing, too, to the common character of their struggle and solutions to their common problems.

Union Veterans Committees - Union Veterans Organization

XVI. The beginning of the reemployment of the veteran was accompanied by the organization within the unions of veterans committees. In most cases these were elected as intra-union committees and acted as advisory bodies on veterans questions within the union. In a few instances these bodies were granted powers by the union to deal (negotiate) with shop grievances of veterans. In most cases, however, this latter matter was correctly handled by

the regular union grievance apparatus to which bodies representatives of the veterans committees had been added. Nurtured by the strikes, these committees in several instances blossomed into mass trade union veterans organizations, mobilizing and organizing the participation of the veterans in the strikes and giving emphasis to the aspects of the union demands as they were related to the veteran. (These organizations, however, judging from present indications, may for the present experience only an ephemeral existence, thanks to the absence of genuine support from the trade union bureaucrats.) Nevertheless, this instructive phenomenon, unseated, for a time at least, the attempt of the labor bureaucracy (which refused to give credence to the existence of a special veterans problem) to reduce the question to one of "welfare" for the individual veteran. The foundations were laid in the strike struggles; the innate trend has been demonstrated by the reality; the conclusion is inescapable. Unless checked by the stupid artifice of the labor bureaucrats, a national union veterans organization in one form or another is nigh unavoidable.

XVII. The trade union bureaucrat faced the problem of the returning veteran in a narrow, short-sighted and pragmatic way. Having neither understanding nor solution within the limitation of trade unionism to the social problems of the working class, his union difficulties accentuated and placed in danger by the reconversion lay-offs, he viewed the returning veteran only as a threat to the established gains of the union. To the problems posed by the veteran in his union he reacted generally in one of two ways - both dangerous. He either refused to give any credence whatever to the special problems of the veteran, in which case he gave encouragement to the mounting friction between the worker-veteran and the non-veteran worker, or, being unable to understand or cope with the problem, he permitted veterans committees to spring up without giving them any direction or qualifying their function. Given the many problems which appear to the veteran to be directed in their solutions against the old workers, there is the danger, though not prevalent, that the veterans committees will tend to operate not in common with but independently of the general interests of the union. In such instances the veterans committees become pressure blocks within (and perhaps against) the union; that is, its energies are directed as a group against another group of union workers, rather than with the union as a whole in a coordinated assault against the bosses. Such is neither the indicated role nor the likely course of development of these committees. The union veterans committees have the principal function of consultative and advisory bodies to the union policy-making bodies, advising in the enunciation by the union of demands for veterans in conjunction with and supplementary to the general program of the respective unions. They serve as an agency of special union propaganda and under some circumstances, organization among the veterans. They are the nuclei for the formation of a mass trade union veterans organization.

It is evident too that part of the opposition by the labor bureaucrats to a national union veterans organization stems from the implied threat that such an organization would, by its very nature, tend to transcend local union problems and to see these problems in their all-encompassing social perspective. Such

an organization would, of course, provide a receptive field for our transitional program. But most important, a national union veterans organization would be the most effective instrument of labor in countering the bosses in the veteran field. A union veterans organization would be an instrument of labor, educating, organizing, rallying veterans in class opposition to the bosses.

The Workers Party declares for:

1. The formulation and presentation by the unions of an economic and social program of demands for the veterans.
2. The establishment of veterans committees in all the unions.
3. The formation of a national, mass trade union veterans organization open to all veterans, employed and unemployed, notwithstanding union affiliation.

XVIII. The strikes, moreover, have given form to the implicit role of such union veterans organizations. In the course of the strikes the veterans were organized for the defense work indicated by their special training. The trade union veterans organizations could become the broad basis of the union defense guards assigned to the protection of the workers and workers organizations against the physical assaults of the bosses and their fascist agents. It must be explicitly defined as one of the major functions of the union veterans organization.

The Negro Veteran

XIX. Of the 14,000,000 men and women in the armed services, over 1,100,000 were Negroes. Public relations and War Department propaganda declaring liberal policies of racial equality were belied by repeated demonstrations by Negro troops. Only the most serious of these ever reached the public. The armed services were, in truth, rife with the most invidious practices of "Jim Crow". The Negro soldier was butt, to one degree or another, to all the indignities which plagued him in civilian life. The apparent practices of this scheme are well known. We cite here a few examples of the subtler forms.

Negro soldiers were assigned to "Jim Crow" outfits. These Negro units were, with rare exception, officered by whites. Many of these white officers were "shanghied" to Negro units as a form of punishment, often as the alternative to "reclassification" for incompetence or its equivalents.

Not to be overlooked is the unwritten policy "prohibiting" Negro combat units. There were, to be sure, half a dozen or so Negro combat regiments, but they were rare exceptions offered as a sop to liberal protests. Negro units were almost all non-combat units of the service forces, i.e., quartermasters, construction engineers with a smattering of MP's to patrol the Negro quarters of southern towns where were always marked "off limits." In this we observe not a routine act of discrimination but an act with far-reaching political implications.

There was, to be sure, some limited "latitude" granted Negro troops but these were largely verbal. Where they extended beyond the verbal (notably in Europe) they were the barest concessions dictated coldly by military necessity. There was just enough departure to kindle a small hope in the minds of many Negro soldiers that "things would be different." But much of this was smothered by "orientation" lectures of Negro troops at the demobilization centers where they were reminded that "in the good old U.S.A. things are different than Europe, where a Negro could ride in the same car, eat in the same restaurant and drink at the same bar with whites."

The full measure of this last injunction is being pressed upon the Negro veteran. There is no super-seniority for Negro veterans; the USES gives him the "old army game" with respect to job offers and itself practices discrimination in the employment of its own staffs. Region #7 (six southern states, one-third of whose population is Negro) "has a staff of 2,240 employees; Of these only 30, i.e., less than 2%, are Negro and most of the 30 have jobs as janitors."

Long before any concrete problem arose, it was apparent that Negro veterans would be denied in fact the privileges of special training under the G. I. Bill of Rights. The war has not altered the discrimination policies of northern schools and in cities with bi-racial school systems, "the Negroes get the crumbs from the educational curriculum, have no facilities for special training." More recently it has been revealed that the benefits of the G. I. Bill of Rights to which the Negro veteran is entitled on a par with any other veteran is being denied him in part or in full; and, moreover, that this denial likewise applies to Mexican and Nisei veterans. To the Negro veteran, looking for "things to be different," the perpetuation and, in some degrees, accentuation of the injustices appear as a double "betrayal."

Student Veterans

XX. A goodly portion of the veterans are students of working class families drafted out of the schools or are young workers with almost no background as workers. The major portion of their mature years have been spent in the army. It is the only life they have known. Lacking experience and sound class roots, it is these especially who feel most acutely the insecurity of the "new" civilian life. It is to these especially that appeals for reenlistment are directed. Devoid of class roots, these veterans are the most prone to reactionary use. Unless they are oriented from a labor-socialist point of view and are integrated into the labor movement, they will constitute a vast reservoir for reaction. The unions as well as the Party, outlining a program of demands and pursuing a struggle in behalf of the veterans, can embrace these elements and direct them to their rightful place in the class struggle.

XXI. The Party has a great advantage in its very large percentage of veteran members. We must utilize these as our principal agent for proselytizing, for maintaining contact with the veterans through their organizations and in the unions and participating with and leading them in their struggles. However, it is false

to assume that work among veterans is the exclusive property of our veteran comrades. It is a political function of the party as a whole. Veterans committees of the Party, while composed largely of veterans, must not necessarily be so constituted exclusively. Non-veterans also must be drawn into the work especially those who are active in the unions. This is especially important in the immediate period because our veterans work must be closely linked with activities in the union, and, of course, at all times with party work. The unions and the existing veterans organizations offer us our best field for veterans work. Where union veterans committees or union veterans organizations exist all eligible Party members will join and participate actively in their work. Every veteran comrade must join a veterans organization.

XXII. It is neither feasible nor wise at this time to establish a list of preference for veterans organizations. The general situation is in a state of flux. New veterans organizations are springing up, nationally and locally. In both old and new organizations, the situation varies from locality to locality. For the present, therefore, our position, save in cases where union veterans organizations exist, must be tentative, one of exploration. (Where union veterans organizations exist, the choice is clear.) In each city, on the basis of examination of the field, the branches are to make assignments for membership in veterans organization. A workers composition, alertness of the organization to social and political problems, a general pro-labor complexion and orientation, these must be the primary considerations of selection. A national orientation may be indicated in the future when the veteran organizations become more clearly crystalized and program and activities more clearly defined. This should in no way cause any delay in joining the veterans organization which appears in each given locality to present the most favorable arena for us. Every veteran must join and become active in a veterans organization.

XXIII. Although it is as yet impossible to ascertain with any degree of certainty, present trends would indicate that the veteran of world war II is seeking an organization of a type which the old veterans organizations (American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars) cannot furnish in their present form. Both these organizations, and especially the first, are at present dominated by and composed largely of successful business men in their 40's or 50's. Their age and social status make for interests that separate the veterans of the two wars. The prospects are, therefore, that either these organizations will be taken over by the younger and more numerous veterans of World War II, or that the veterans of World War II will rally to one or more of the newer veterans organizations, with the latter as the more likely prospect.

SECTION B: A PROGRAM FOR THE VETERANS.

The foregoing is our point of departure in the consideration of the veteran question and forms the basis for a program of demands advocated by the Workers Party. In the veterans committees of the unions themselves we advocate the adoption of this program as an answer to the veteran question and as the only effective answer to

the labor splitting tactics of the bosses. It is a program which will eliminate friction (or reduce it to an absolute minimum) between the veteran and the non-veteran worker, and direct a united attack against the bosses. In championing the struggle of the worker-veteran, the unions not only perform a vital duty but also solidify the ranks of organized labor for the great labor struggles that lie ahead.

While the Workers Party advocates union adoption of this program, the party accepts this as its own program for the veteran. With this program as supplemental to the general program of the Party and through all its organs of agitation, propoganda and organization, the Workers Party makes a forthright appeal to the veterans to join our party, as the political party of the working class, as the party of socialism.

Jobs for Veterans

I. Most urgent of the numerous problems confronting the veteran upon his return is that of a decent job at a living wage. Reconversion cut-backs and lay-offs coincided with the en masse demobilization of the soldier. The employment prospects had narrowed considerably. Thousands upon thousands of veterans returning to old jobs confronted serious obstacles to reemployment. For those who had never known employment or were in search of new jobs capable of supporting newly acquired obligations (wives, families, etc.), the prospect was even more bleak.

Current estimates by the Veterans Administration place the figure on unemployed veterans at well over 1,000,000 (250,000 in New York State alone). These figures are based upon the files of veterans now receiving readjustment allowance benefits. The number of unemployed veterans continues to grow. It is estimated that there will be 600,000 veterans unemployed in New York State alone by mid-summer. This staggering fact is not in its entirety an accurate reflection of the employment situation. To be sure, jobs are to be had to a greater degree than this picture would suggest, but conditions on the jobs are so miserable and the take-home pay so low that the \$20.00 per week readjustment allowance, however inadequate, is nevertheless deemed preferable.

The prevailing conditions have charged the atmosphere with a desperate competition for jobs. The Selective Service Act experienced renewed attention, underwent close scrutiny, and was hurled into the center of the competition. The initiative of the bosses shifted the focus from the Selective Service Act to "super-seniority", that is to say, sought to shift the responsibility of unemployment of the veterans from the bosses and their government onto the unions. The super-seniority question has become a critical test for the unions. There can be no doubt but that the super-seniority proposals of the bosses will remain the focal issue of the "jobs for veterans" situation. For this very reason, and also as an example indicating an approach to the presentation of our general program for veterans, we subject this question to detailed treatment.

Super-seniority and Alternatives

II. There are three types of seniority for veterans proposed or in effect:

(a) Super-seniority - This gives any and every veteran highest priority right in employment, superceding (i.e., nullifying) the highest seniority of every non-veteran worker.

(b) Cumulative seniority - The seniority of an employee who left employment for service in the armed forces continues to accumulate during his service period and is so credited upon reinstatement (within 90 days of his discharge or, if disabled, within 90 days after disability is ended) in the plant. Cumulative seniority is effective policy in all CIO unions and in almost all AFL unions. The Workers Party supports this policy.

(c) Retroactive seniority. "Any veteran ... who was not employed by any person or company at the time of his entry into the service ... and who is hired by this company ... shall, upon having been employed for 30 days ... receive seniority credit for the period of such service subsequent to May 1, 1940 ..." (U.A.W. model contract.)

III. Super-seniority was posed and ballyhooed, significantly, by the bosses. The unions, appreciating this hypocritical "interest" in the welfare of the veteran as an anti-labor, strike-breaking facility, haltingly declared against it or tried to ignore it or hedged. Opposition to super-seniority is justified and upon the grounds given. But that is not enough. The opposition per se to super-seniority appears to be directed against the worker-veteran who feels that he has a more just claim to the job than has anyone else. Failing to offer an alternative, however, the present formula of the unions plays directly into the hands of the bosses. The game of the bosses, pitting the worker-veteran against his fellow workers on the job and turning him against the union, is inadvertently augmented. The veteran is deluded in the impression that it is the union which stands opposed to his right to a job. The bosses' sham of super-seniority must be exposed. The super-seniority issue must be turned against the bosses who are using this as a device to shift responsibility and to crush organized labor by fomenting the division of labor.

The Workers Party demands jobs for all veterans. We are for the cumulative seniority rights for veterans returning to their pre-draft jobs. We make this demand on the propositions of the Selective Service Act which legally "guarantees" the "right" of the veteran to his job for a period not less than one year following his return. More accurately, this "right" is an impression deliberately disseminated at the time of the inauguration and thoroughly cultivated throughout the highmark period of the draft. Every soldier was given the impression by means of calculatedly delusive propaganda that his job would be waiting for him on his return. The Selective Service Act provided this delusion with the stamp of authority. The drafted soldier, however, was not apprised, by either the government or his boss, of the mealy-

mouthed escape clauses which permeated the section contained in that Act pertaining to reemployment. The bosses and the government, therefore, deliberately perpetrated a fraud upon the veteran who was drafted from his job. The Workers Party exposes the conspiracy of the bosses and the government in foisting this deception upon the veteran and demands the fulfillment of the "pledges" of reemployment for at least one year following the demobilization of the veteran. In all cases where these jobs, for any reason whatever, are not available on a cumulative seniority basis, we demand that the bosses make good their obligation to the drafted soldier by paying that veteran the prevailing union wage scale, plus all benefits accrued to all other workers in the plant with the same length of service. We demand that this be payed by the bosses out of their swollen war profits.

DEMANDS:

1. That the provisions of the Selective Service Act which guarantees the return of the veterans' jobs be enforced by eliminating the escape clauses of the reemployment provisions of that act.

2. Reemployment on a cumulative seniority basis. Wages at the prevailing union scale, plus all benefits accruing to workers of the same length of service.

3. Where these jobs are not available on a cumulative seniority basis, pay the veteran the prevailing union wage scale, plus all benefits accruing to the workers of the same length of service, for one year.

4. These payments to be made out of the swollen war profits of the boss. (Open the books on war profits.)

IV. Not directly related to super-seniority but involving similar rights, is the question of the attempt of the bosses to foist upon returning veterans jobs of a lower skill than that which they held at the time of the draft. In such cases we put forth the following demand:

1. Pay the prevailing union wage scale on the basis of established skill of the veteran at time of draft (plus all benefits accruing to workers of the same length of service, including schedule of upgrading of skill) for one year, notwithstanding the pay schedule of the newly assigned job.

We also assert the right of the veteran, offered a job at a lower skill, to reject such job if he wishes and to be paid on the basis of the demands (3 and 4) listed in paragraph III above. We demand, moreover, that he have the right to reject a job of lower skill and pay without forfeiting his rights under Chapter VII (readjustment allowances provisions) of the G. I. Bill of Rights.

Retroactive Seniority

V. The U.A.W. model contract affords retroactive seniority to all veterans who have never been "previously employed by any per-

son" provided "such shall apply for employment within twelve months" of discharge from the armed services, that "such veteran shall not have previously exercised this right in any plant of this or any other company", and that "such person shall not be employed FOR THE PURPOSE of bringing about the displacement of another worker." (Our emphasis - N.G.)

In the mass production industries, which have powerful unions with memberships approximating hundreds of thousands, particularly, and in a period where wholesale, mass unemployment is not in immediate prospect, "retroactive seniority is a double-edged knife in the ribs of the bosses (1) because the unions here become the champion of the rights of an important section of the veterans to a job, (2) because it offers labor the opportunity to assimilate into its ranks one to two million former students who might otherwise constitute a reactionary potential for American capital.

In recognizing the positive character of "retroactive seniority" it is all the more necessary that we observe a keen vigilance against the dangers inherent in it. Primary among these is the prospect that the bosses may try to turn this to advantage in their current drive against the women and Negro workers, particularly against the latter. (According to the sixth quarterly report of the Director of OWMR, April 1, 1946, of some 6 million workers added to the labor force of the U.S. in the war years, some 3,000,000, mostly women, have withdrawn from the labor force in the last half of 1945. While undoubtedly a large proportion of these have withdrawn voluntarily in view of marriages, returning husbands, etc., it is undoubtedly true that many hundreds of thousands are victims of a new drive of discrimination against women workers in the factories.) However, some effective guards against this eventuality are indicated in clause 3, section "C" of the model contract which provides that "such veterans shall not be employed for the purpose of bringing about the displacement of another worker." This would direct that the unions shall maintain an alert vigilance against any attempt to utilize retroactive seniority against Negro and women workers. Where such an intent is exhibited, the union may invoke clause "C" of the contract.

In the case of the Negro worker, an added guarantee is afforded in the enforcement of "NO DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING." This must be especially enforced with respect to the hiring of the Negro veteran on a retroactive seniority basis. In all employment offices of the plants, union representatives must see to it that Negro applicants for jobs are not discriminated against, and must be especially watchful against any discrimination of the Negro veteran during his probationary period in the plant.

It is necessary to place the entire question of "retroactive seniority" in the context of the closed shop with union control of hiring.

The danger of retroactive seniority becoming an anti-union instrument is, given the "precautionary clauses" of the model contract, the relatively small number who would qualify for jobs under retroactive seniority (and these over an extended period

of time), not a serious one, unless the unions themselves default in their responsibilities. On the contrary, the unions can turn this to their distinct advantage by educating these veterans and assimilating these as active unionists.

Finally, there is the danger that retroactive seniority might be employed to pit the worker-veteran against the non-veteran; the veteran against the veteran. Such a danger would truly be acute in a period of drastic layoffs, mass unemployment, etc. (But in such periods this is not only present with respect to the veteran worker and the worker alone, but for all sections of the working class.) At such a time the Party would bring into active use its slogans: "Open the idle factories! Run them under trade union control!" etc. Since however, such a development is not in immediate prospect as a general trend (though some industries and even some locals may be thus affected in a period of an inflationary boom), the danger of retroactive seniority from the point of view treated here is not formidable, especially if the qualifying provisions are strictly enforced on the one hand and the unions capitalize upon the opportunity to indoctrinate the new recruits to the ranks of labor with a militant unionism.

Under our general demand for "A decent job at a living wage" for all veterans, we support the retroactive seniority clauses of the U.A.W. model contract.

V. The veteran is allowed at present a 90 day period from the date of discharge before the expiration of which he must apply for reemployment at his job held immediately prior to induction into the service or forfeit all right to this job. A three month period for readjustment is totally inadequate a time for literally millions of veterans. This is attested to by the abnormally large numbers released from the army as psychoneurotics and in various states of ill health due to ailments contracted in the service. While these are listed as ambulatory and "cured", or as having received the "maximum benefits of hospitalization", they are in reality in no condition to return to former jobs and require long periods of rest or lighter work. Aside from these there are many hundreds of thousands who, due to long absences, changes in life and habits, etc. all imposed by the conditions of army life, require longer periods for readjustment. We demand therefore:

Extend the 90 day deadline on reapplication for jobs to twelve months.

VII. The United States Employment Service, while practicing discrimination against Negro veterans, also farms out jobs to veterans which are low paying and operating under non-union wage rates and non-union plant conditions. One of the functions of the Veterans Placement Service and its representatives to the USES is: "To maintain regular contact with employers...with a view of keeping employers advised of veterans available for employment..." No provision is made for contact with the unions which would guarantee against the ruthless exploitation of the veteran. We demand:

1. Union approval of all jobs offered veterans by the USES to assure a decent job at a living wage.

2. No discrimination against Negro, Japanese or Mexican veterans by the Federal and State employment services.

The Right to Strike

VIII. Title V, Chapter VIII, subsection (b) of the G. I. Bill of Rights imposes duress upon the veterans' democratic right to strike. This clause causes the worker-veteran to forfeit his right to readjustment allowance claims while he is on strike. We demand:

1. The right of the veteran to strike. Remove the strike penalty clauses (Title V, Chapter VIII, subsection (b)) of the G. I. Bill of Rights.

Jobs for Disabled Veterans

IX. There are no adequate provisions made for job placement of the almost 1,000,000 wounded men and many more disabled as a result of service, many of whom cannot sustain work demanded in their pre-service jobs or who, to one degree or another, are limited to a narrow field of work by virtue of their disabilities. For these we demand:

1. A disabled veteran shall be reinstated to his old job (whenever he is fit to apply) if he can handle it. (Same rights as provided in section III, demands 3 and 4, above.)

2. Where he cannot handle his old job: The right of the disabled veteran to claim any job in the shop to which he is qualified by ability and seniority. The veteran to be paid the prevailing wage (on his former rating of skill) plus all benefits accruing to workers of similar service. Plant wide (rather than departmental) seniority for all disabled veterans.

3. Retroactive seniority rights for disabled veterans who have never been employed previously.

On the Job Training

X. On the job training for veterans has become a notorious device for exploitation of the veteran, for boosting the profits of the bosses at government expense, and has already been used in an effort to slash the general standard of wages of the workers. Veterans receiving "on the job" or "apprentice" or "vocational" training are allowed a subsistence allowance of \$105 per month if single, or \$115 per month if married plus the \$10 per month for an additional dependent and \$7.00 per month for each additional dependent, and \$15 for a dependent parent. For this category of veteran training we demand:

1. A \$40 weekly minimum wage and subsistence allowance for single veterans; \$55 for married veterans, plus \$5.00 weekly for each additional dependent.

2. Apprentice training in each field shall be conducted under the supervision of the respective unions.

3. Union certification of companies applying for on-the-job trainees.

4. Union certification and enforcement of "type of job", "period of training" and "schedule of up-grading of skill."

Housing

XI. No problem has struck the returning veteran more directly nor more forcefully than has the housing shortage. In almost every other field at least some token measures were taken to "provide" for the veteran. But the housing crisis in the country struck the veteran with full force and the very nature of the situation affected the veteran more acutely than any other section of the population. No question, therefore, has excited greater attention or more vigorous action than has this. Veterans housing demonstrations have taken place from coast to coast. Real estate offices have been invaded by committees from veterans organizations; picket lines were formed before boarded up mansions. The magnitude and severity of the problem is indicated by these at-random facts:

In New York City alone, over 200,000 veterans are in need of immediate housing. The national housing agency estimates that by the end of 1946 over 7,000,000 families in the nation will be doubled up. Wyatt's report to the President states: "We would have to build approximately 3,000,000 new homes by the end of 1947 just to keep the situation from GROWING WORSE." (Yet the Patman bill, incorporating the Wyatt proposals, suggests starting construction on 2,700,000 homes by the end of 1947, less than half of which are to be started before the end of 1946. Of these 250,000 were to be temporary units.) Yet the powerful banks and building and real estate interests with powerful lobbies in Congress are blocking all moves to serious construction. The government emergency powers, still retained and being used to break strikes and extend the draft, is a "dead duck" where housing is concerned. We put forth the following demands:

FOR EMERGENCY ACTION:

1. Open all boarded up mansions and subdivide them for occupancy by veterans.

2. Requisition all hotels necessary, to be available to veterans at nominal rentals.

3. Construction of at least 10,000,000 homes and low income apartments to be started by the end of 1946, with one-third completion before the end of 1946.

4. Government subsidy up to 50% of cost, for homes to be built by veterans and their families, such homes to be tax free for 12 years.

5. Government interest-free loans for home building projects for individual veterans.

6. A \$250 billion five year program to provide decent housing, extensive public works, rural electrification and modernization.

Adequate Provision for Social Readjustment.

XII. For each veteran the return to civilian life represents a major problem in psychological readjustment. For each veteran of working class origin, the readjustment problem is in addition a crisis in his economic and social life. For millions of veterans of working class origin there is the most acute problem of reestablishing or establishing homes, equipping and furnishing them; a complete outfitting of new clothes, in many cases costly legal proceedings held in abeyance during service. The \$300, \$200 or \$100 doled out to the soldier in mustering out pay is usually all the average soldier has to meet his new life and its many costly problems and obligations. This is inadequate to meet his needs. We put forth the following demands to provide adequately for the readjustment period:

1. Increase the mustering out pay from present levels to a flat \$1,000 for all those eligible, this to be retroactive for all servicemen now discharged.

2. Terminal leave pay for all enlisted personnel, retroactive for those already discharged.

3. For the immediate enactment of a Federal bonus on the basis of \$1,000 for each year (or major fraction thereof) of service for all veterans. (The \$1,000 yearly would represent about the average balance between the wage of the soldier and that which he would have received had he been employed in private industry.)

Unemployed veterans are granted a readjustment allowance of \$20 per week for 52 weeks. \$20 per week is inadequate for subsistence. The allowance should correspond to a living wage. This paltry sum has the effect of forcing veterans to accept jobs that are substandard from the point of view of wages and conditions. We therefore demand:

1. A living readjustment allowance - \$40 per week minimum for single veterans, \$55 per week for married veterans, plus \$5 per week for each additional dependent.

2. Revoke the disqualification clauses of the readjustment allowance provisions of the G. I. Bill of Rights.

3. A one month vacation for every veteran and his family, at government expense.

Hospitalization, Compensation, Medical and Dental Care

Millions of veterans are victims of deteriorated health, the

cumulative effect of army life, diet and service incurred maladies, of injuries from wounds and accidents. These will be in need of medical care and periodic hospitalization for the rest of their lives. The government has provided that these shall have access to any of the veteran hospitals. But the veterans hospitals are not only inadequate in number and gravely understaffed to accommodate the needs, but they are notorious for their read tape, inefficiency and have been charged with medical inefficiency in the quality of medical care. Veterans applying for medical care by the veterans hospitals have been treated as they were on sick call in the army - given an aspirin and sent home. Where admissions to the hospitals are granted, an unduly long waiting period precedes examination and treatment. The demands for larger and better staffed veterans hospitals coming from many quarters must be supported by us. But in addition we demand:

1. The right of private hospitalization, medical and dental care at government expense for all veterans who have incurred injuries or ailments during their service.

While in the service, government insurance while not formally compulsory was nevertheless forced upon the soldier by various pressures. The veteran is compelled eventually to convert his insurance at private premium rates or to drop his insurance altogether in which case he forfeits the money paid in premiums. We demand:

1. The refund in full of insurance premiums to veterans desiring discontinuation of government insurance.

The Veterans Administration provides a scale of disability pensions on the basis of \$115 per month for a full disability and correspondingly lower proportions for partial disabilities. The base figure of \$115 per month for total disability is not a living allowance. We demand:

1. Increase the base figure for total disability to \$215 per month (\$50 per week) with corresponding increases for partial disabilities.

H.R. 6114 is a bill before Congress authorizing the Veterans Administration to provide, in addition to prosthetic appliances, a "suitably equipped automobile ... to any veteran having a service incurred disability due to loss or loss of use of, one or more limbs when in the judgment of the administrator such equipment would enable such veteran to engage in gainful employment notwithstanding such disability..." The Workers Party supports this measure and asserts moreover that the government shall be responsible for the repair or replacement of the vehicle.

Education

XIV. Of the almost 10,000,000 veterans who have been returned to civilian life, no less than 2,100,000 have enrolled as students and apprentices under the education clauses of the G. I. Bill of Rights. These range from elementary schools to colleges, from trade schools to "on the job" training, from correspondence courses to dancing classes.

The subsistence allowance provided veterans receiving educational, apprentice and vocational training under the G. I. Bill of Rights is substandard and is, in fact, a bar to education to many veterans desiring continuation and completion of training interrupted by the draft. (Subsistence allowance for education is \$65 per month for single veterans and \$90 per month for married veterans, i.e., even less than the allowance for on-the-job training.) It denies the opportunity of further education to those workers whose economic conditions in youth precluded completion of a high school and even elementary school training.

Even among the students, drafted from schools as it were, many have returned from the service, mature and with obligations. It is false to assume that most of the veterans desiring further education are youth still relying upon and receiving support from their families. Many of these can now continue their education only by sending their wives to work, by assuming personal debts, or by living upon a below-subsistence diet. The rolls of veteran students will be thinned by economic insecurity. Thousands will be compelled to sacrifice their education again to find a job. Other thousands urgently desiring education are already denied this privilege. Unless the subsistence allowance is increased, the educational provisions of the G. I. Bill will remain primarily a facility of veterans of middle class families. For veterans receiving education benefits under the G. I. Bill of Rights we demand:

1. \$40 weekly minimum subsistence allowance for single veterans, \$55 weekly for married veterans plus \$5 weekly for each additional dependent.

If the educational provisions of the G. I. Bill are to have real meaning, it is imperative that the present dire shortage of schools, institutions of learning and teachers and instructors be remedied. Thousands upon thousands of applicants have already been turned away because of the shortages. The solution to the problem lies in the fight for an adequate public works and building program advanced by the Workers Party and in the fight, especially in the south, for a living wage for teachers.

Some of the most flagrant acts of discrimination are being committed against the Negro veteran precisely in the application of the education program. The G. I. Bill of Rights has no anti-discrimination clauses. The bi-racial school system of southern states assigns to the Negro the very dregs of their over-all inadequate and incompetent school facilities and systems. A sole Negro in Texas applied for admittance in the State University at Austin and threw the board of regents into a furor. The Negro veteran has the right only to attend the inferior schools and these are inadequate in number. Many of the Negro veterans have been looking forward to receiving elementary school training under the G. I. Bill of Rights.

DEMANDS:

1. No discrimination against the Negro veteran.
The right of the Negro veteran to enter any approved school of his choosing under the G. I. Bill of Rights.

2. End the bi-racial school system in the south.

The G. I. Bill limits education to four years "except with the approval of the administrator." We demand the amendment of the G. I. Bill of Rights guaranteeing the right of every veteran to the completion of the equivalent of four years of high school. The section of the G. I. Bill (Title II, Chapter 14, Section A, as amended) reading: "That no course of training in excess of a period of four years shall be approved..." be further amended to read: "except in such cases where additional education is required to complete four years of high school training or its equivalent, in which case no limitation shall be prescribed."

Sub-committee of Political
Committee

(For submission to National Committee
Plenum)

RESOLUTION ON THE JEWISH QUESTION AND THE
MARXIST PROGRAM FOR PALESTINE

1. The barbarous depths to which a decaying capitalism can drag civilization finds its extreme example to date in the physical destruction of some six million Jews at the hands of the Nazis, i. e., all but the total extinction of European Jewry.

The rising, world-wide tide of anti-semitism in the period of capitalist decay again emphasizes the close inter-relationship between the progress of the democratic and socialist struggles of the working class and the liberties of all oppressed and proscribed peoples. The Jews of Western Europe were liberated from their ghetto-existence and their civil and economic disability by the French Revolution, which, though bourgeois in historical form, was achieved by the struggle of the urban and peasant masses and, in large measure, in opposition to the bourgeoisie. The rise of the modern working class and the development of the Socialist and labor movement further fortified these rights and carried them forward across Central and Eastern Europe, culminating with the Russian Revolution which liberated the millions of Jews from the Tsarist ghettos and the periodic pogroms. With the growing inability of capitalism to maintain any kind of stable economic existence, the capitalist class finds all democratic forms and rights increasingly incompatible with their further rule. All the great conquests of the last two hundred years, not only those of the modern labor movement but those of the bourgeois democratic revolutions as well, fall victim one by one to the onslaught of capitalist-totalitarian reaction.

2. The struggle for the defense of the Jewish people, of their full economic, political and social equality and against all forms of anti-semitism is, therefore, an integral part of the struggle in defense of democracy and civilization, a struggle which finds its only complete expression in the struggle for Socialism.

3. The remnants of European Jewry finds itself today in a worse plight than that of any other war-torn people of Europe. Deprived of all earthly possessions, totally homeless, without a means of a livelihood, in most instances bereft of relatives, friends and even families, herded into "Displaced Persons Camps", often little better than the concentration camps they survived, most Jews of Europe see no future in their old homelands and seek to emigrate into other lands to start life anew. The elementary democratic demand of free emigration and immigration, long part of every genuinely democratic program, must be most vigorously fought for in this specific case of the European Jews. All barriers against their immigration to the countries they choose must be broken down. For Socialists in the United States, in this the richest nation in the world and one having industrial and agricultural resources for a population many times the present size, this means, in the first place, the struggle against exclusion of Europe's Jews from this country. We must fight for the realization of the slogan, "Open the doors of the U.S.!"

4. A tremendous desire exists among Europe's Jews to settle in Palestine and take part in the building up of a Jewish community life which will afford them an economic existence and also shield them from the barbarous anti-semitism to which they have been subjected. Their desire to go to Palestine has been continually frustrated by the opposition of the British imperialist regime, which conditions its immigration policy to its own reactionary political needs. It opens and closes the gates to Palestine, (thereby playing with the very lives of tens of thousands of people) in accordance with its deliberate policy of maintaining and fostering Arab-Jewish hostility for the ultimate benefit of British rule. The struggle for the freedom of immigration is, therefore, today largely a struggle against the reactionary British barriers around Palestine. Our English comrades, together with the revolutionary Marxists of the United States and of Palestine, must become champions of the slogan of "Open the doors of Palestine!"

5. The Zionist movement has recently carried on a determined, world-wide struggle for free Jewish immigration into Palestine. While Marxists can give conditional and critical support to this fight, above all to those heroic Jewish youth in Palestine who have taken to direct action to break down the barriers to immigration, we at all times sharply condemn the reactionary political program to which the Zionists tie their fight for free immigration, i.e., the achievement of a Jewish majority and a Jewish state. The reactionary political character of the Zionist movement is revealed precisely in their demand for free Jewish immigration, while opposing free Arab immigration into Palestine. Their fight is not motivated by a genuinely democratic and internationalist position but rather by a narrowly Jewish, nationalist position. This position finds its ultimately reactionary conclusion in their opposition to a Constituent Assembly for Palestine at the present time, on the grounds that the Jews do not yet constitute a majority! This position leads them to prefer continued British rule to a free Palestine with an Arab majority.

6. The problem of Palestine is not, in the first place, a problem of Arab-Jewish relations but rather a problem of British imperialist domination over both Arabs and Jews. The solution of the Palestinian problem must, therefore, begin with the struggle against British imperialist rule. This struggle proceeds under the slogan of "Out with the British! A free Palestine!" Not the British but only the inhabitants of Palestine can decide its future.

7. The struggle for a free Palestine must, therefore, be a struggle fought on the basis of Jewish-Arab unity. Every national and religious issue which Jews and Arabs permit themselves to be divided over is another prop for British rule. It is not a problem, today, of self-determination of Jews against Arab rule or vice versa, but of Palestinian self-determination against British rule.

8. The slogan for a free Palestine finds its concrete political expression in the demand for the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly, elected by direct, secret, universal suffrage of men and women over 18. This demand must be the crowning politi-

cal slogan for any genuinely democratic (not to speak of Socialist) program for Palestine today. The reactionary character of Zionism is seen precisely in their opposition to this slogan. From the extreme right wing to the most left, all Zionist tendencies stand united in opposition to a Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage until a Jewish majority is assured. Not only does this position of Zionism make it an obvious tool of British imperialist policy but it plays into the hands of the most reactionary Arab nationalist elements. The latter use this reactionary role of Zionism as a means of assuring their own reactionary domination over the Arab masses and, thereby, to undermine all tendencies toward Arab-Jewish unity.

9. As demonstrated by every other democratic revolution of our epoch, the only class in Palestine that will prove itself capable of leading a thorough-going revolutionary struggle against British imperialism is the Palestinian proletariat. The proletarian class struggle against economic exploitation unites all toilers and serves as the bridge across all reactionary nationalist barriers. Under the political influence of a revolutionary Marxist party the Jewish and Arab workers will find their way to each other in a common economic and political struggle, directed against all exploiters and oppressors, British, Arab and Jewish. The inspiring unity of the Arab and Jewish railroad workers in their recent strike is an example of how the proletarian class struggle can cut through all national barriers. (The strike of the civil service employees which followed likewise demonstrated this.) The fact that the Jewish strikers received no support from the Jewish bourgeoisie and that the Arab strikers were viciously condemned by the Arab landed aristocracy on the grounds that they were forsaking the Arab national front reveals how proletarian class action not only forges the unity of the Arab and Jewish masses from below, but also takes the national struggle out of the hands of the bourgeoisie and landowners and places it in the hands of the proletariat.

The organization of the Palestinian proletariat demands the fight against all attempts at setting up separate Jewish or Arab workers organizations. The trade unions and other working class organizations that are founded on the principle of the class struggle must encompass all workers, regardless of nationality. The organization of a specifically Jewish trade union movement by the "Socialist" Zionists is but another reactionary Zionist blow against genuine Arab-Jewish unity. The Palestinian workers organizations will, of course, guarantee the fullest freedom of Arabs and Jews in the use of their own language, in the conduct of meetings and will foster a bi-lingual workers press and literature.

10. As in every democratic revolution, the demands of the masses for political freedom take on real meaning only as they relate these to their economic needs, so the struggle for a free Palestine must be linked to the economic needs of the Arab and Jewish masses. The key slogan in such demands for Palestine must be the slogan of "Land to the peasants!" This slogan, like all demands directed against the privileged, possessing classes, strikes a blow at the British, Jewish and Arab interests simultaneously. The

fight for "a free Palestine" and "land to the peasants" will guarantee the best possible road to a liberated Palestine in which the Arab majority preponderantly composed of landless peasants and day-laborers, will wage an agrarian revolution against the Arab land-owners, a struggle which will link up with the fight of the city and town proletariat against its capitalist oppressors. To the democratic demand of "land to the peasants" must be linked the transitional program of the Fourth International, as adapted to the specific economic conditions of Palestine.

11. The Workers Party warns all supporters of Palestinian freedom against the treacherous role of Russia in the struggles of national liberation and of the infamous role of the Stalinists everywhere in relation to the Jewish question and Palestine. Russia's interest in the Middle East is that of an imperialist rival of the British Empire. Russia will seek to exploit the differences in the Palestinian situation, not to advance any democratic cause, but to strengthen her own reactionary influence in that part of the world. Palestine's strategic location between the Iranian oil fields and the Mediterranean makes of it a natural pawn in the struggles of the great imperialist powers, and in this period, of special interest to Russia. Russia sought to enlist the support of world Jewry during her role as a war-ally of the United States and England against Germany. During this period, above all, in the light of the pro-Axis role of the Arab nationalist leaders, Russia sought to appear as the champion of the Jews. (This did not prevent the GPU from murdering Ehrlich and Alter and thousands of other Jewish anti-Stalinist Socialists.) Today, Russia seeks to curry favor with the reactionary Arab nationalists by appearing as the champion of the Arab world against British oppression. Nothing but disaster will result from either Jews or Arabs placing the slightest confidence in Russia's role in the Middle East.

The Workers Party likewise warns all supporters of Palestinian freedom against any faith in the "democratic" intentions of American imperialism in the Middle East. As with the other great powers, the United States is motivated by its economic interests in this part of the world, above all in oil resources. The somewhat obscure dealings of Roosevelt with the King of Saudi Arabia are an indication of the American role of playing both the pro-Arab and pro-Jewish game in this sphere in the interests of American political and economic domination. The United States seeks to garner the maximum advantages from the Palestinian situation, without, however, openly taking political responsibility. It prefers to leave the latter in the hands of the British, thus freeing itself from the obvious blame for the reactionary results of what is, in the last analysis, Anglo-American policy.

Neither Great Britain, nor Russia, nor the United States, nor the Zionist world organization, nor the League of Arab states, can be relied upon to conduct a fight on behalf of the interests of the Palestinian masses. This struggle must rest entirely in the hands of the masses. Their only real allies are to be found in the world struggle of the working classes and the colonial peoples.

12. The successful conduct of the struggle of the Palestinian proletariat on behalf of national and social emancipation can only be guaranteed by the existence of a powerful revolutionary, Marxist party, firmly rooted among the Arab and Jewish toilers. The contribution of the Fourth Internationalist movement toward the solution of the Jewish question and the Palestinian question must, therefore, begin with all assistance toward the establishment of such a party in Palestine.

Ernest Erber

(For submission to the Plenum of the Nat'l. Com.)

ADDENDUM TO JOHNSON RESOLUTION ON U.S.

In the WP the tendency led by Temple is opposed to the use of the Labor Party slogan. Yet this tendency bases itself on the conception of the transitional program as a means of the mobilization of the masses for proletarian revolution. The program of this tendency is based not on political conjunctures or the thought or mood of the masses but on the objective situation as it is represented in the social crisis and the revolutionary actions and organizations required for the mobilization of the masses.

In its resolution it proposes:

a) that the main line of the party in putting forward the transitional program should be the posing before the workers the necessity of depending on their own extra-parliamentary strength and organizations, shop committees, councils of workers and farmers, workers defense guards, workers militia, etc. The strategic orientation for these extra-parliamentary organizations as the crisis matures is the formation of soviets.

b) By its propagation of this line the party will/^{best}be able to counteract the class collaborationist leadership of the Stalinists and liberals.

c) that the party advance revolutionary propaganda of this kind to its own cadres and the ranks of advanced workers in this present brief interlude before the real deep-going post-war social crisis.

In proposing this strategic orientation for the party in this period, Comrade Temple puts forward with no essential difference whatever the strategic line of the Johnson minority in this resolution. Insofar as it differentiates itself from the Johnson minority it holds the patently false position that today in the United States (May 1946) the post-war social crisis has not arrived.

The party rejects the conclusion of the Temple and Russell resolution that the use of the Labor Party slogan is opposed to the revolutionary education and organization of the American workers.

The party condemns the political confusion thrown into the party by these comrades who recognize that the present use of the slogan by the party leads to the sowing of constitutional and parliamentary illusions, who propose a strategic orientation in harmony with the line of the Johnson minority, and yet, find themselves able to support the majority resolution which is uncompromisingly opposed to the strategic line of the Johnson minority.

J. R. Johnson

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ON SUB DRIVES

By M. Slater

The recently completed LABOR ACTION SUB DRIVE has been "successful". While at the time of writing, the final tally on subscriptions obtained in the drive is not yet available, it is known that the results will show we went well over our original goal of 5,000 new subscriptions to LABOR ACTION.

The purpose of this article, however, is to question just how "successful", in an organizational sense, such a completion of a subscription drive actually is. It is the opinion of this article that such drives are "successful" only in the sense that a given number of names are added to our subscription list - without any real benefits (financial or organizational) to be gained from such additions.

To deal first with the financial aspects of the question, it can be stated that such subscription drives as we have just completed prove a complete financial loss to the organization - in monies expended for advertising purposes for the drive, and because of the actual cost to us of handling such subscriptions as against the price collected for them.

It is a well known fact that our 25¢ subscription rate has barely covered postage alone. To this expense must be added the cost of printing the paper, the wrappers used for mailing, the addressograph plates, etc., etc. And it takes no financial wizard or economist to reach the conclusion that 26 issues of the paper, sold for 25¢, add up to a heavy financial deficit. If this has been true of the four page LABOR ACTION, how much more true in the present drive, when the subscribers will receive the new 8-page issue!

The financial aspects of the questions are dealt with first, so that any arguments to the effect that a large subscription list is required in order to help sustain the press may be dealt with. This aspect would, actually, be of little relevance were the organizational results (both tangible in the sense of new members to our organization, and intangible in the sense of influence gained thereby) sufficient. Such results, would, it goes without saying, more than compensate for the financial losses incurred.

But are and can such results be obtained from the type of subscription drive we have just completed? It is highly improbable that they can, and past experience has shown that they are not.

Nor is this failure due solely to the fact that the branches, once completed their quotas and obtained the subscriptions, failed to follow up on them because of "sloppy organization". The very nature of the subscription drive, the goal set, and the necessity for the branches to "come through" with a

given number of new subscriptions, tell in advance that it will be an impossible task for an organization like ours to "follow-up" on the subscribers and reap proportionate benefits. This is not meant to excuse those branches who do not attempt to see their LABOR ACTION subscribers. Readers of our press are our best potential contacts and members. They know what we and our paper stand for and are driving toward, and with them we have a talking point from the start.

This article, therefore, rather than disputing the advantages of a subscription list, disputes instead the advantages of our particular list of subscribers and the manner in which they are obtained. Nor is it the intention of the article to set forth that purely sectarian point of view which would call for a subscription list (and therefore a contact list) of only those highly politically developed workers and intellectuals who subscribe to our press because they are in complete accord with our political position as against that of any other organization. It IS the contention of the article, however, that on the basis of the law of averages, as much good could be accrued from a subscription list compiled of names picked out of telephone books in the various cities in which our branches operate, and sent free to those persons - even though this would mean adding, say, 2500 names to our list rather than 5000 as aimed for in the drive.

What specifically is objected to in the manner in which we conduct sub drives, and what specific recommendations are made for improving them? The statement has been made above that it will be "an impossible task for an organization like ours... to reap proportional benefits" from such subscription drives. Just what is meant by this?

In view of the fact that sub-drive quotas for the branches are set far higher than could be reached through their regular daily type of activity, the branches find it necessary to tap new and as yet untouched sources. This means that subscriptions must be sold to people who have neither seen nor heard of us before, and in all likelihood will not see or hear from us again. Under these circumstances, the branches start looking around for the "easiest places to sell the most subs", and end by selling their subscriptions to those persons who are least politically aware, and at the same time have the least sales resistance. In Chicago, this usually means hitting first the Negro housing projects, where the tenants are chiefly miscellaneous unskilled packinghouse workers, and amongst whom a "likely contact" is an extreme rarity.

In addition, it is never he who can best present LABOR ACTION's politics, but rather he who is the best salesman, who sells the most subscriptions. Nor is it quality of subscriber that is looked for, but merely "how many subscriptions did you sell"?

This result is not the fault of a particular branch or a

given group of comrades. Under the circumstances, when the most possible subscriptions must be sold in the shortest possible time, what else could be expected? What else would be discussed except the best sales talk - "Oh, I always tell them 'we buy the paper for you really, all we ask you to do is pay part of the postage. After all, you know, 25¢ doesn't even cover the cost of mailing'." And, "25¢ for six months means less than a penny a copy. What can you lose? You can't afford to turn it down. Not at that price." And on that basis we sell our subs and move on to the next door. By the time the drive is completed a branch like Chicago has consumed well over 100 precious man-hours of work "going over their quota" to obtain subscriptions that will net no more results than would have been accrued by a hit and miss selection of names from any list we could have gotten hold of, even if we had sent the paper to 200 of those people for three months, instead of sending LABOR ACTION for six months to the 429 new subscribers we secured. Besides, other and at least as important activity will keep the members so occupied that they will not have the time to revisit so many subscribers for political contacting.

Does this mean that subscription drives are ruled out as a useless waste of time? Not at all. But the organization should take time out for a review of the type of subscription drives we have held, and the resultant gains from them. And from such a review we can only come to the conclusion that we have not as yet hit upon the method of running a really successful subscription drive.

One of the obvious solutions would seem to be the extension of the time set for a subscription drive - and the separation of the drive into two phases.

This would mean that during the first phase of such a drive, the branches would occupy themselves with "feeling out" various types of and centers for activity, and in general laying the ground-work for the selling of subscriptions. It might mean that a given branch would concentrate on a given plant or plants and another on a given housing project or on a combination of both. In the second phase of the drive, concentration would be placed on the selling of the subscriptions amongst people who have already been found to be interested in, or at least sufficiently familiar with our press; and quotas set which would be realistic, not only in the sense of possible quantity sold, but also in the sense of the branch being equipped (physically as well as otherwise) to follow up on the subscribers in order to make party members of them.

This article does not purport to lay down the blueprint for the most perfect of subscription campaigns. No one article and no one person could ever do that - if indeed it can ever be done at all. It does, though, try to point out what is felt to be some glaring faults in our present methods, and attempts to find a solution to some of the difficulties. It is hoped that the delegates to our forthcoming convention will deal with this problem, and through collective experience and ideas, reach a more satisfactory plan for conducting subscription drives in the future.