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11/4/47
Cleveland, Ohio

AMENDMENT TO TASKS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE PARTY

Coupled with the slogan of the Independent Labor Party the party press must give increasing emphasis to such anti-war slogans as "Against universal military training." "No arms to the Reactionary Bourgeois governments of Europe." "Stop the manufacture of Atomic Bombs; Homes for Veterans instead."

Though in all probability world war three is some years away, the party cannot afford to neglect or in any way relegate to a purely secondary place its anti-war role. This is especially true in view of the facts that the WP alone had a clear and unimpeachable record of opposition to World War II and in view of the fact that the CP is already propagandizing against the next war. The Party should be on the alert for anti-war groups that may be formed, with a view to participating in them when possible and feasible. Additional emphasis upon anti-war slogans must not and cannot at this time in any way replace the slogan of "An Independent Labor Party" for reasons already given in the resolution.

Passed unanimously by the Cleveland Branch at its regular meeting of November 2, 1947

PROGRAM OF ACTION FOR THE PARTY

(Submitted to the National Active Workers Conference - November 8-9, 1947.)

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The Program of Action for the Party for the next period, in particular, is conceived as the necessary and realistic means not only of bringing the program of the Party to the widest possible sections of the working class but of building the Party by direct recruitment. It is in this sense that the Program of Action must be carried out by the Party as a whole. Every activity engaged in by Party members must be dominated and repeatedly tested by these criteria: the recruitment of new members to the Party; the increase in circulation of the Party press; the internal consolidation of the Party. With these aims in mind the following Program of Action is set forth.

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I. The Party Must Be in the Mass Organizations in Order to Direct Them into Mass Activity along Lines of Our Program.

- (a) A systematic and intensive drive shall be conducted by the National Office and the Executive Committee of all Party branches to have at least 75 per cent of the Party membership affiliated with and active in mass non-party organizations by the middle of next year. All workers, including non-workers who can be sent into industry, shall join unions; all other Party members shall be assigned to join the indicated and most favorable veterans organization, Negro organization, students organization, professional organization, consumers group, tenants league, etc. Membership and activity in a union shall not necessarily exclude membership and activity in an additional mass organization.
- (b) Principal concentration points for the Party's activities in the unions shall be: United Automobile Workers of America, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers, United Rubber Workers. Secondary concentration points shall be the maritime unions, with increased emphasis on the National Maritime Union, and needle trades unions in the centers of that industry.
- (c) Special attention shall be given to an attempt to extend the contacts with the mining industry which the Party has just begun to establish. Under the supervision of the National Office, (1) the West Virginia organization shall be consolidated and extended to nearby mining camps; (2) the initial plans to establish a Party branch in Pittsburgh shall be systematically followed up with the aim not only of consolidating a branch in that city but of extending its influence in the surrounding mining area; (3) the three Ohio branches shall have the special task of seeking and organizing contacts for the Party in the Southern Ohio mining area; (4) the Chicago branch shall have the special task of investigating the possibilities of

establishing or reviving contacts in the Springfield and Southern Illinois mining area; (5) the Party press shall devote more attention to miners and problems of the mining industry and union in order to facilitate this work.

- (d) Every Party or SYL member who is a veteran shall unconditionally join a veterans organization. A maximum degree of activity shall be required from every member except those who are engaged in other activities of greater importance. Principal concentration point shall be the AVC, with exceptions made in favor of the VFW or the Labor Posts of the American Legion only in those cases where the latter afford more favorable opportunities.
- (e) Every Party or SYL member who is a Negro, or a non-Negro active in Party work among Negroes, shall unconditionally join a Negro organization. Principal concentration point shall be the NAACP, with exceptions made in favor of other Negro organizations, especially local organizations, only in those cases where the latter afford more favorable opportunities.
- (f) Those Party members who cannot join any of the above organizations shall be prevailed upon to join an organization of their profession, if they are professional workers, or in all other cases, consumers groups, women's auxiliaries of unions or veterans organizations, tenants leagues, Parent-Teachers Associations, etc.
- (g) Students, especially G.I. students, shall concentrate on work on the campus, except in those cases where the comrade is willing and able to enter industry and engage in trade union activity. Party and SYL members on the campus shall form non-party students organizations under their own direction only in those cases where a non-party students' organization, which offers a favorable field of activity, does not already exist.
- (h) The executive committees of the Party branches shall direct the affiliation of Party members with non-Party mass organizations, in closest consultation with the Party member involved. Wherever possible, Party fractions shall be set up in every mass organization, with the inclusion of close Party sympathizers. The Party fractions shall select a responsible officer. The branch executive committee as a whole shall have the direct and immediate supervision of the work of all the Party fractions and shall be politically responsible for them. Fractions in national organizations shall be under the general supervision of the corresponding national department of the Party (Trade Union Department, Veterans Department, Secretariat).
- (i) The National Trade Union Department shall be immediately reconstituted and activated, with special attention to the main concentration points in the trade unions, and empowered to issue regularly bulletins of information and direction.

II. The Main Political Campaigns of the Party in the Next Period.

- (a) Propaganda and agitation for the formation of a national independent Labor Party, based on the trade unions and other mass organizations, and for the formation of local labor parties or united labor tickets, as against support of the bourgeois parties or of a pure and simple "third party" candidate, shall continue to be the main political campaign of the Party, with every step taken to intensify the campaign during the big election year of 1948. The pamphlet on the Labor Party must be issued immediately for the widest possible circulation, to be supplemented later in 1948 by other literature on the same subject. The ground work must be laid immediately for our members and sympathizers proposing the adoption by mass organizations of resolutions in favor of a Labor Party or for the mass signing of petitions in favor of a Labor Party. In favorable situations, attempts must be made to call city-wide conferences of mass organizations to consider the formation of a local Labor Party or a United Labor Ticket for the 1948 elections.
- (b) In view of the practical demonstrations of the feasibility of the Party's direct participation in election campaigns with its own candidates, preparations must be begun with the aim of putting forward local Workers Party candidates in the 1948 elections in such cities as New York, Detroit, Chicago, Los Angeles, Buffalo, Oakland, Philadelphia and Cleveland. Candidates of our own in these cities shall be our minimum objective for 1948. Branches in such cities as Newark, Akron, Baltimore and Seattle shall also investigate the possibility of organizing campaigns with their own candidates. The National Office, in addition to the pamphlet on the Labor Party, shall prepare a National Election Platform for publication no later than June 1, 1948, to be supplemented later by additional popular election literature issued nationally and by local election literature in those cities where the Party has its own candidates. All election campaigning shall be under the direct supervision of a National Election Campaign Committee to be set up by the Political Committee in consultation with the branches which will be mainly active in the elections.
- (c) In view of the fact that the rent and housing problems will continue to be as acute if not more acute in the next period, the Party must integrate into its regular activity consistent and planned work against rent increases, evictions and for a housing program. Party branches must seize upon every opportunity that presents itself for this work. The existence of numerous organizations devoted to these problems makes it unnecessary in most cases for the Party to attempt to organize movements under its own name for this campaign. It can and must be conducted by the Party, with its own program and its own literature through the medium of the existing organizations in most cases. The pamphlet on the rent problem must be utilized to the maximum. The National Office shall issue an additional popular

pamphlet on the Party program for dealing with the housing problem.

- (d) In view of the increasing concern among the masses over the war danger, the Party must increase many-fold its attention to this question and devote a much greater amount of its time and energy, in the form of articles in the press, public forums, meetings and anti-imperialist demonstrations, to bringing its views on this question before the widest possible public. The National Office shall issue a pamphlet setting forth the Party's views on the question of the war danger.

III. The Party Must Immediately Make Up for the Glaring Defects in the Field of Popular Literature.

The failure of the Party and particularly of the National Office in the publication of popular literature is so great that it must command the first attention of the National Office. The National Office shall therefore immediately issue the manuscript on the Negro question as a pamphlet, to be followed up by pamphlets setting forth the Party position on the most vital questions, namely, the need for a Labor Party; the nature of the Stalinist parties; the danger of a Third World War; the question of Stalinist Russia; and in addition the literature proposed above for the 1948 national elections.

IV. The Youth Organization Must Be Built Up as the Right Arm of the Party and as a Permanent Reservoir of New Strength.

In view not only of the need of a revolutionary socialist youth organization but of the fact that it has been demonstrated that such an organization can be built, the Party throughout the country, must devote its most serious and systematic efforts toward helping in the building of groups of the Socialist Youth League where they do not yet exist and in strengthening such groups where they do exist.

- (a) Young members of Party branches must be assigned specifically to the work of initiating and building up a unit of the SYL. Where such units exist, an able and experienced leading member of the Party must be assigned as Party representative to the youth unit to assist it in every possible way. Wherever necessary the branches of the Party shall unhesitatingly give financial assistance to the youth unit in organizing and promoting its activities.
- (b) Special attention shall be devoted to two fields of youth organization which are immediately fruitful for recruiting to the SYL. One is the Socialist Party YPSL, where a great deal of disaffection is developing against the course of the SP leadership in unification with the Social Democratic Federation. The other is the AYD, where concrete experience has already shown the possibilities of recruitment for us among members who can be won away from Stalinist influence and domination.

V. The Political and Theoretical Level of the Entire Party Membership Must Be Raised to New Heights So That Every Member Is an Educated Member and So That the Party Cadre is Strengthened to the Maximum.

- (a) The National Education Department must be immediately re-constituted out of able and responsible comrades. It shall be required to organize the educational work of the Party from top to bottom, and to conduct it in a systematic and planful manner. The Department must resume the publication of basic bulletins (the "Blue Books"). It must also charge itself with the issuance of research and propaganda material for the information and guidance of all Party members. It must also charge itself with the issuance of outlines for discussion and branch educational work on the most important topical political questions. In general, the educational work of the Party must be organized in such a way that an end is put to the entirely haphazard, decentralized and disorganized educational work that is conducted in the Party at present.
- (b) Under the guidance of the Department, all branches shall devote three branch meetings in the months of November and December to an educational review of the principal political documents of the last Party convention and of the Active Workers Conference, so that all Party members are thoroughly familiarized with the standpoint of the Party on the most important questions.
- (c) The Department shall immediately consider the possibility of organizing three regional training schools with the specific purpose of strengthening the Party cadre, elevating the political and theoretical level of the Party as a whole, and preparing those who attend the schools for more active and able participation in Party building work. Specifically, the Department is to consider an Eastern School to cover New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Buffalo, Baltimore, Reading and Newark; a Mid-Western School to cover Chicago, Detroit, St. Paul, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Akron, Cleveland, Youngstown and West Virginia; a Western School to cover the California and Seattle organizations. Should such schools be possible, the Department is instructed to prepare outlines for the school classes in advance. It is further recommended that each school last for two weeks and that each school be in direct charge of a member of the Political Committee especially assigned for that purpose.

VI. Party Organization, Party Tours.

- (a) The efforts to establish solid branches of the Party in West Virginia and in Pittsburgh are to be maintained until brought to a successful conclusion.
- (b) Efforts shall be made to provide or to maintain full-time or part-time organizers in the Party branches of West Virginia, Pittsburgh, Baltimore and Seattle.

- (c) A Pacific Coast speaking tour shall be organized with Max Shachtman as speaker for the months of December and January.
- (d) A speaking tour, covering all the cities from the Atlantic Coast to the Mid-West, shall be organized with Emanuel Garrett as speaker for the months of December and January.
- (e) An organizational tour, covering all the cities in the country where a Party branch exists, shall be organized with Nathan Gould for the months of January, February and March, 1948, primarily for organizational purposes and on the basis of remaining the main cities for a substantial period of time during which all organizational problems of the branches shall be considered in greatest detail.

VII. An Organizing and Sustaining Fund Must Be Raised.

In order to assure the carrying out of the program and the general work of the Party, to assure the organizational and publications activity of the Party, to maintain the press and the working staff of the Party, and to discharge our international obligations, a Three Months Organizing and Sustaining Fund Campaign shall be organized beginning on December 1, 1947, with the aim of raising the sum of \$ _____ through the efforts of the Party branches, the National Office and all friends and sympathizers of the Party.

Political Committee

October 17, 1947.

THE S.W.P. MINORITY'S STATEMENT

ON ENTRY INTO THE W.P.

I.

1. In 1943 the Minority began its struggle against the S.W.P. leadership for a revision of the international perspective. Analyzing the course of the second imperialist world war, it stressed the importance of the following developments: mass struggles for national liberties; the growing danger of Stalinism for the development of the European revolution; sectarianism and ultra-leftism as a factor of sterility, passivity and disintegration in the ranks of the movement; finally, in the immediate post war period, mass struggles for democratic and economic demands.

Internationally, it asked for a discussion of all past activity of the movement and for the convening of a democratic EPC which would proceed to the political rearming of the movement or, at least, would formulate its necessary conditions.

Finally, the Minority decided - as it expressed it formally at the 1946 Plenum of the SWP - to determine its future tactical orientation according to the international situation of the movement.

The Minority thinks that a modification of its tactical orientation is now required. Accordingly, it hereby informs the movement of the international and national reasons, the conditions and perspectives of this new orientation.

2. NOWHERE HAS THE MOVEMENT BEEN ABLE TO FACE EFFICIENTLY THE TASKS IMPOSED ON IT BY THE WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH. Everywhere - partial exceptions notwithstanding - the movement in general and particularly its de facto leadership have manifested their theoretical as well as practical incapacity. No militant can question this, if he has the historical task at heart and does not entertain illusions. No prestige policy, no pseudo-Marxist phrasemongering prevails against this fact.

ON THE MORROW OF THE WAR, STALINISM HAD PASSED FROM ISOLATION TO THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD DOMINATION ON AN INTERNATIONAL ARENA WHERE THE U.S.A. IS THE ONLY POWER TO BE FEARED; WHEREAS THE MOVEMENT HAD, AS NEVER BEFORE, BEEN REDUCED TO ISOLATION, OR RATHER, HAD CONDEMNED ITSELF TO ISOLATION AND CUT ITSELF OFF FROM THE MASSES, AND ITS LEADERSHIP HAD EVEN GONE SO FAR AS TO RATIONALIZE THIS SET-BACK BY MEANS OF SELF-VINDICATING PSEUDO-ANALYSES.

3. Historical experience shows us - and Trotsky incessantly stressed the importance of this teaching - that AN ORGANIZATION UNABLE TO FACE ITS HISTORICALLY IMPOSED TASKS IS DESTROYED IN THE PROCESS. It teaches us also, however, that the oppressed learn even from their defeats and can draw new strength from them.

Therefore the task for the movement was to analyze the why and the how of the general set-back of the struggle of the masses during and as a consequence of the war - set-back by which it itself was so gravely hurt and to which it contributed by its own faults - with a view to deduce from this analysis the new international perspective and its tasks. It would thus have assured its own political rearming and thereby placed itself in the center of the international regrouping for a new socialist vanguard.

Thus it would have formed, in spite of its own difficult development and political mistakes, the historical link between two epochs of socialist offensive and decisively contributed to the advent of the latter.

4. Such was the best alternative for the crisis of the movement. The re-establishment of international contacts, the meetings which followed, the official orientation which "resulted" from them show - after a two years' trial - that such an alternative is excluded. FAR FROM OVERTAKING ITS DIFFICULTIES, THE MOVEMENT IS DISINTEGRATING. Any other formulation of facts which are here for anyone to see, expresses, at best, an incorrigible inclination towards wishful thinking and, at worst, either the self-satisfied irresponsibility of petty bureaucrats or the half-conscious histrionism of charlatans like Johnson.

5. In its "Appeal to All the Sections of the Movement on Unity and the EPC" the Minority has given the factual and organizational reasons why it is impossible to have a positive solution for this protracted crisis, itself generated by a constant and general failure, and why it is illusory to keep hoping, as some do, that it can be reached.

To resume briefly, AN ORGANIZATIONAL CRISIS IS ADDED TO, OR RATHER GRAFTED ON, THE POLITICAL CRISIS. Its virulence is caused by the physical or moral destruction of the old cadres of the movement, above all in Europe, who could and would have provided a political solution for the crisis and would have imposed it; and, on the other hand, by the existence of American cadres systematically bureaucratized, particularly since Trotsky's death, by the Cannon clique which has always had semi-stalinist conceptions on organization and opportunist ones on trade unions (trade unionism).

On the rotting basis of a political crisis "ignored" and curbed by all possible means, this clique and its European acolytes did not consider any solution except in terms of their remaining at the head of the movement, and hid this, their central preoccupation, by the mechanical repetition of a degenerated phraseology void of any concrete political content.

As usual, the most negative aspect of this situation is, of course, the complete incapacity of the bureaucratic clique to find any real political way out. Such incapacity does not fully explain the organizational crisis and the bureaucratic tumor of the movement - FOR THERE IS AN AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONAL CRISIS - but it accounts for the rigidity of this bureaucratic stiffness and its proportions. The existence of an inert bureaucracy at the head of the movement - already in itself a deadly symptom of the condition of the movement - explains, on the other hand, why the crisis cannot resolve itself positively but generates the disintegration of the movement.

6. But what matters here is the political side of the crisis. Today the movement, insofar as its official cadres represent it, or insofar as it is incapable of reacting against them, is brought to a standstill without any possible way out.

If, two years after the end of the war and the unfolding of its consequences, it continues to affirm the progressive character of the USSR and the necessity of its defense, there is no other logical outcome than pure and simple capitulation to Stalinism. THE DEFENSE OF AN ISOLATED USSR BY REVOLUTION BEFORE THE WAR BECOMES, AFTER THE WAR, THE DEFENSE OF THE EXPANDING BUREAUCRATIC IMPERIALISM. Defensism has its constraining logic. If upheld, it will lead to capitulation.

That is why the standstill can take on another possible, even probable, aspect. That is to say, a revision of the "Russian question" on the basis and according to the principles of ultra-leftist sectarianism. BUT THAT WOULD ONLY BE CHANGING ONE FORM OF IMOTENCE FOR ANOTHER. Nevertheless, in the long run no leadership can maintain itself merely by bureaucratic maneuvers. It has to nourish its victims with some sort of ideology which they can take seriously. In its defense of defensism, the Cannon clique has exhausted its "dialectical" resources to a grotesque degree. The evolution of facts no longer permits clinging to defensism without throwing Trotskyism overboard.

In fact, most militants reject defensism. The Cannon clique seems to understand that to maintain itself it has to "compromise", and is preparing itself for it, as usual, by dropping the most crass of its formulations without any word of explanation. Whatever the final result of its vacillations may be, an ultra-leftist turn will bring no solution to the crisis of the movement.

7. But if, according to its own embarrassed statements, the Cannon clique no longer represents the majority of the movement, and has to resort to electoral blocs with the defeatists, thus beclouding the discussions, the opposition, on the other hand, has no political homogeneity and DOES NOT INTEND TO CREATE IT ARTIFICIALLY BY RESORTING TO GENERALITIES DEPRIVED OF CONCRETE POLITICAL CONTENT (such as "inevitability of socialism", or "elemental drive of the masses").

Thus it is EVEN ON POLITICAL GROUNDS - because of the international conjuncture and the state of the movement - that the WPC would have been able to arrive at a positive result only on the basis of the Minority's propositions: not to close, but to open and organize the discussion; to acknowledge without ambiguity or limitation the existence and legitimacy of tendencies within the movement; to hope for a solution of the political crisis from the political discussion arising out of the activity and struggles of the masses.

THE CRISIS OF DISINTEGRATION HAS GONE TOO FAR AND THE INERTIA OF THE BUREAUCRATIC RIGHT IS TOO COMPLETE FOR THIS SOLUTION TO BE VAIL. Therefore the alternative is the regrouping of forces according to their natural affinity; the continuation of the international discussion, notwithstanding the bureaucratic pretensions, and the rejection of any bureaucratic solution with or without electoral compromise. At the present time, faced with the seriousness of the international crisis and the danger either of giving support to the expansion of Stalinism (defensism) or of practical passivity before it (sectarian defeatism), any political group conscious of its responsibilities will not accept to keep silent and to compromise either with pro-stalinist impotence or with sectarian impotence.

II.

8. The Minority now draws, on the national plane, the tactical consequences of this international situation. Because, internationally, all efforts to arrive at a positive solution within a single framework and on a democratic basis have been shattered by the bureaucratic conservatism and the determination to split of those elements who impose themselves on the movement as its leadership; BECAUSE THE MOVEMENT WAS UNABLE TO IMPOSE ON THE CANNON CLIQUE A POSITIVE AND DEMOCRATIC, THAT IS TO SAY, A LASTING UNITY, the Minority has decided to ask the CP leadership for entry.

9. The Minority will integrate itself into the theoretical and practical activity of the CP as a political tendency. In the course of a common discussion as wide as possible, it will continue to elaborate the points of the political platform on which it has already taken a position: the Russian question, the democratic and national question, the building of the socialist vanguard. It thinks that the analysis of THE REVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM must be posed in the forefront of the discussion as the main basis for the elaboration of an international perspective. These points (not excluding others) constitute in our opinion the starting point for the rearming of the socialist vanguard and for a fruitful discussion within the CP and internationally.

The Minority thinks that the regular functioning of democratic centralism and the primacy which it accords to political discussion in the life of the party as a matter of fact, permit avoiding factional conflicts and their organizational and personal consequences in favor of a progressive discussion and cooperation in the building of the party. It is with this work

in perspective that the Minority intends to enter the W.P. Common experience will determine its realization in the party.

III.

10. What is to be done, international? Here, as we have said, the first task necessitated by the situation of the movement is to constitute an international center for discussion. To the criticisms of the epigones of "Bolshevik homogeneity", (specialists in bureaucratic maneuvers, in reality) and to those of quack doctors à la Johnson, we shall answer that it is futile, and criminal to pretend to gloss over the real situation of the movement, for which they themselves are heavily responsible. SUCH A CENTER IS NECESSARY PRECISELY BECAUSE THERE IS NO POLITICAL HOMOGENEITY. It is precisely because political homogeneity à la Cannon (routine repetitions plus systematic lies plus bureaucratic constraint) or à la Johnson (finally and practically "Marxist" phrase-mongering plus unprincipled compromise) is so highly undesirable that we say: far from stifling the internal crisis, we must lay it bare in all its fullness before international opinion as the only means of solving it. The alternatives are either to reorient oneself radically or to accelerate the invading disintegration. Each militant must speak out his mind and contribute to the clarification.

We must reconstruct an international program of action suitable to the epoch, then to the concrete conditions in each country. (We are no longer in 1938, with all due deference to Cannon, nor in 1934, with all due deference to Johnson).

It must be centered around the following points:

- 1) the struggle against Stalinism and Russian imperialism and adequate political consciousness of their danger at the present stage (this does not mean tactical uniformity for all countries; but even in the U.S.A. no American revolutionary party can today win over the masses and lead them against their own imperialism if it does not manifest itself as an unyielding and principled enemy of stalinist demagogy and the reality of totalitarian imperialism which it covers);
- 2) the struggle against statism (in our opinion, the tendency to state capitalism) in all its manifestations - which poses, concretely and fully, the democratic question in our epoch;
- 3) integration in and, if possible, organization of, the movements of national resistance and democratic struggles of the masses (here also, no tactical uniformity) and raising to the plane of political consciousness, as an aspect of their democratic self-assertion, the economic struggles of the masses.
- 4) nature and function of the vanguard party deduced from the practical requirements and the concrete analysis of the national situation.

Systematic distrust of all varieties of spontaneism! Propaganda and agitation must draw the practical consequences of the historical lesson: THERE IS NO SPONTANEOUS GENERATION OF THE VANGUARD; WHERE THERE IS NO VANGUARD, THERE CAN BE NO SUCCESSFUL REVOLUTION.

The S.W.P. Minority
October 13, 1947

STATEMENT OF POLICY FOR UAW FRACTION

I. Goal of the Party in the UAW

The Party sets the UAW as its main trade union concentration.

- The UAW is a large mass union in one of the leading mass production industries.
- Of all the mass production unions the UAW is the most democratic, with the greatest degree of internal democracy.
- From the political standpoint it is the most "advanced" trade union in the US.
- At present it is the union best adapted to the political intervention of revolutionaries.
- Opportunities for recruitment to the Party should be best in the UAW.

These considerations determine for the WP its basic orientation toward the UAW and the reasons for selecting the UAW as the main Party trade union concentration. This concentration can be more easily effected than for example a general concentration in such a union as the miners or the steel industry. The Party membership is better fitted to work in the automobile industry and the nation-wide nature of the automobile industry facilitates the entry of the Party membership into this industry.

Because of the relative smallness of our forces and because of the prime necessity for doing political work in the unions, this must be the chief goal of the Party in the UAW. It is time now for the Party and the UAW fraction to take this question under practical consideration. The national conference of the UAW members must make the question of political work a main point on its agenda. The Conference must discuss and decide the actual steps to achieve this aim.

II. The Reuther-Addes Conflict in the UAW

The history of this struggle and the real situation today in the UAW are well-known to the fraction and to the Party. The Party has taken the position for support of Reuther in the struggle between the group lead by Reuther and the Addes-Thomas-Leonard group. The rejection of the Addes-Thomas-Leonard group is based on its Stalinist connections and the fact that this group is the Stalinist political front in the UAW. Our support of Reuther is motivated by the comparative progressive character of the Reuther program and the rejection by the Reuther group of Stalinism and Stalinist entanglements.

The Party rejects the prevalent description of the Addes faction as the "left wing" of the UAW, and of the Reuther faction as the "right wing." The Stalinists are in no sense a left wing. The Addes faction, insofar as it follows the political line and operates in the camp of the Stalinist Party, is not a left-wing. The Addes faction in the conduct of its campaign for victory at the coming convention has demonstrated that it is completely dominated by the Stalinists and that it operates in the union at the spearhead for Stalinist domination of the UAW.

In relation to the Addes-Stalinist opposition, the Reuther group is not "right-wing". In this concrete situation it is the progressive tendency in the union. It is the group therefore in which the revolutionaries can function and where the revolutionaries have the opportunity for carrying on organizational and political activity. It is

only in this situation that it is correct to speak of the Party as being "Reutherite" as being "for Reuther". We are for the victory of the Reuther slate against the Addes slate at the UAW convention. This is why we entered the Reuther caucus and why we work for the victory of Reuther.

Aside from the struggle between the two groups and aside from the practical issues of the convention, we are for the Reuther program because here again Reuther represents a progressive tendency in the UAW and in the labor movement. Reuther enunciated what the Party has called the "GM Program". We said that this program had revolutionary implications. We espoused this program and made it the program of the Party with the necessary implementation and emphasis. We said that the Reuther program as put forward by Reuther should be adopted by the whole labor movement. The demand for "wage increases without price increases" - "open the books" was in line with the Transitional Program of the Party.

Our support of Reuther is tempered by differences of the most fundamental significance. We give no political support to Reuther. We condemn Reuther for his vacillation on the question of independent working class political activity. We condemn Reuther for his desertion of his own program or if not desertion, the shelving of the program which he put forward.

While we condemn Reuther for his vacillations and maintain our own independent political positions for the UAW, we recognize that the correct tactical approach for the Party in the UAW is the use of all the progressive notions which Reuther has advanced. We become the chief protagonists of this program of these ideas.

III. The ACTU

While the Reuther caucus is the progressive caucus in the UAW it is burdened and stultified by the support of the ACTU and the ACTU membership in the union. Next to the Klan, and apart from the Stalinists, the ACTU is the most reactionary group in the UAW. This trade union arm of the Catholic Church, in addition to its basing itself ideologically on the tenets of that church; in practice expresses its religious principles in the most backward and reactionary manner.

The ACTU is anti-Stalinist and therefore enters the Reuther caucus. But its anti-Stalinism is really anti-communism and anti-socialism. It is against Stalinism because it conceives of Stalinism as communism or socialism. It is anti-red in the genuine sense. Because of its source in the Catholic church the ACTU is composed of the most backward white workers in the North. Many of these workers are of foreign birth and come from areas where the Catholic Church is the leading religious sect, dominating the whole life of the people. In the US these workers remain priest ridden.

Due to the fact that many of these workers are at the same economic or near the economic level of the Negroes, because of decades of conflict, ignorance and false indoctrination; these workers are tensely anti-Negro. For similar but not identical reasons these workers are also anti-Semitic.

It is necessary for the Party to understand the ACTU. It is also necessary to understand that while the individual ACTUer may be "mili-

tant", his militance is controlled and diluted with his fundamental ideas and program. It is only at the lowest bread and butter level that the militancy of the ACTU or its membership can be relied upon. In every decisive political contest the ACTU will be found taking a reactionary position. In every important situation the ACTU and the ACTUer will resent the activities of the revolutionaries and militant progressives. They will make no significant distinction between progressives and Stalinists, Trotskyites and Stalinists. All militant groups, particularly political militants will be "reds" and "reds" will be Jews.

This indicates that the Party will exercise every precaution in making anti-Stalinist blocks which include the ACTU. Reuther will have the task, after the UAW convention, of taking a strong position against these reactionary elements. They will not be satisfied with the elimination of the Stalinist menace. They are up in arms against the entire "red menace."

Our attitude toward Reuther, following his victory at the convention must be determined on the basis of the degree to which he moves to promote the economic and political advancement of the UAW. The Party however must prepare for a more independent role in this union, a more progressive role in advancing the political program of the WP. We must revise our whole approach to the question of what has been called "progressive groups." Generally speaking and in periods where there is no such deflecting situation as the present struggle; "progressive" groups in which we participate must be "our" groups, in the sense that they are actually under the leadership of the WP fraction. In any situation where this can not be consummated the fraction members must concentrate activity on the politicalization of individual militants and the recruitment of these militants to the WP.

In the future this must be the test of the value for the Party of being in the union: how many prospects for Party membership does the fraction have, how many new members has the fraction gained from the plant or progressive group.

All other considerations, all other activity must be given a subordinate place. We propose that the agenda of every fraction meeting, of every trade union meeting, shall have as one point a report on recruitment and the prospects of recruitment. This shall apply to the fractions and to the individual trade union member in the Party.

This matter should occupy a prominent place in the deliberations of the meeting of the national UAW fraction.

IV. The SWP in the UAW

The SWP has announced its support of the Addes-Thomas-Leonard faction. It is called the Thomas-Addes-Leonard group by the SWP. The SWP is supporting this faction according to an editorial in the Militant, because, Reuther is a "Social Democratic trade union bureaucrat, who aspires to respectability... Reuther has dictatorial ambitions... Reuther has consolidated a personal caucus on an outright reactionary basis." GM is the most bureaucratic division in the international and Reuther has built this autocratic edifice with the help of the General Motors Corporation.

"In contrast; the Thomas-Addes-Leonard faction has an over-all more progressive character. In its structure (it) is a collection of independent leaders...The Reuther faction is dictatorial...the affairs of the opponent caucus are conducted with a greater degree of democracy...the Thomas-Addes-Leonard group is tolerant of left-wingers...the Stalinists are on the decline in the auto union...they have no voice in the top councils (of the Addes group)...a victory for the Thomas-Addes-Leonard group would insure a continuation of the present democratic set up... and provide a freer atmosphere for the advocacy of a progressive program and militant methods of work."

This is the crassest and most cynical piece of opportunism which has come from the SWP to date. While there was definite opposition to this line when first presented it is reported that Cannon was convinced by Bert Cochran that the line was correct and that this was the correct course for the SWP. The NC of the SWP thereupon approved the line for the support of the Addes faction.

This support of the Stalinist faction in the UAW is only the low point of years of opportunistic "main chance" operations of the SWP in the labor movement. It is the result of the years of the application of the Cannon policy making deals at the top with this or that trade union bureaucrat and then handing the decision to the membership without their participation in the making of the decision.

The leadership of the SWP does not believe what is said in the Militant editorial quoted above. Their belated discovery of the dictatorial ambition of Reuther, and the democratic character of the Addes caucus is a concoction of the Stalinists which was brewed at the last convention of the UAW. It is now being used by the SWP in a block with the Stalinists.

V. How the Fraction Should Function in the UAW

We have said before that the main role of our Party in the union is political propaganda. This presupposes the usual and necessary "trade union work". We do not propose that the shop or union hall be turned into a street corner meeting or a forum for unreserved presentation of the Party line. We do not propose that the fraction member fling away caution. What we do propose concretely is that every fraction member, in an organized and planned manner, become a socialist propagandist in the shop and in the union. We propose greater boldness in the presentation of the concepts of socialism and the definite political program of the Party.

We do not here enter into the important question of what is called "tempo" or the practical method of organizing this procedure. This must be determined by the objective situation and the experience of the fraction.

What is important and imperative is that progressively more of the fraction members become known in the union, not only as outstanding militants but militants who are also revolutionary socialists, who present socialism as something better than capitalism. It is time for some of us to clear away the confusion in the minds of the workers as to what we are and why we act as we do and say the things we do. The workers know that we are different but their knowledge ends right there.

It is reported from time to time by some comrade that he is known "as a Trotskyist". Who does this mean? Some comrades must be known as WP members. That is specific and gives the opportunity to discuss something concrete: the program of the WP and what the WP has to offer the workers in real situations.

In order to carry on the kind of political work we have in mind it is necessary for the fraction to get down to the "grass roots." The Party still suffers from the old disease of working at the top. This is interesting but not productive of much for the Party. The WP can not exert any appreciable influence in the UAW. We do not have the forces. We are restricted to a relatively small group of workers. Only rarely will influence with the top bureaucrats give us contact with the ranks of the union. If association at or near the top does not open possibilities for us in the lower ranks than such association is time wasted and can only redound to the credit of the bureaucracy. Furthermore, this fruitless maneuvering at the top is oftentimes productive of opportunism which will not be the case if we are working in the ranks.

The organization of our political propaganda for the coming months must be on a very modest scale. It should take the form of the indoctrination of individual workers and small groups of workers with the political ideas and program of the WP. The technique must be worked out in practice and to fit given conditions. The basic idea is to take the Party to the individual worker and to small selected groups of workers. We do not wait for them to come to the Party.

We have had some experience in conducting classes for contacts and prospects in the homes of the member, in the prospects home and in the Party headquarters. These "classes" have been composed of only 2, 3, or 5 persons. Wherever these "classes" have organized and competently conducted, recruiting has followed automatically.

The material for such classes should be LA, the NI, The Fight For Socialism, Plenty for All, the Party political and trade union resolutions. It is not enough to give these things to the prospect and tell him to read it. The pamphlet should be explained and its contents outlined and described to the worker before it is given to him to read.

The NI is underlined to emphasize that we do not subscribe to the snobbish nonsense that the magazine is "too advanced for workers." All the party literature is too advanced for most workers. The function of the party member is to reduce the ideas of the party to the level and experience of the prospect and contact. There is always at least one article in the NI which can be understood by some worker.

The Party political and trade union resolutions are underlined because we want to emphasize that these resolutions should not remain the private property of the Party member but should be used in the education of prospects for membership.

The Party trade unionist is in the most favorable situation for recruiting. To date we have not taken advantages of our opportunities. What does it mean to say that the UAW for instance is the union best suited for our propaganda and recruitment, if we recruit nobody? This condition must be changed and corrected. The meeting of the UAW fraction must give this problem attention. We must establish a new test for all members. "What is your WP influence in the plant and union?" "How many prospects for party membership have you given a political education: a WP education?" "How many workers from your plant have you recruited to the Party?" A national fraction meeting without this foundation is just one more organization; a mere aggregation of trade union busybodies.

WORKERS PARTY
4 Court Square
Long Island City 1, N. Y.

January 10, 1947.

Dear Comrades:

The attached preliminary statement of policy on maritime is being sent to all branches for the purpose of information and of discussion by all maritime fractions which are urged to communicate to the National Office their opinions of the same before a final policy is adopted.

Comradely,

Nathan Gould
For the Political Committee

THE SITUATION IN THE MARITIME UNIONS

Preliminary Statement of Policy

The following statement is a resume of discussions which have taken place in the Political Committee on the situation in the maritime unions. The statement deals especially with the Committee for Maritime Union (CMU). It is not to be considered as a definitive statement of views of the PC but as a preliminary statement of views for discussion in the maritime fractions and discussion in the Party. Each maritime fraction should give thorough consideration to the statement and express its point of view in writing to the PC. At the close of the discussion the PC will adopt a line of policy.

I. The situation in the maritime industry and among the maritime unions is a part of the general situation resulting from the separation of organized labor mainly into two national federations: CIO and AFL. The situation arises also out of the general political situation which developed following the close of the second world war. The various conflicts of policy between the AFL and CIO have been particularly manifest in the maritime industry and among the maritime unions. This is due in part to the development of these unions not only as between the AFL and CIO, but in the development of organizational activity on a geographical basis between the East and West coast. These differences arose also and were aggravated further by conflicts on the ships due to the existence of rival leaders to expand their jurisdictional interests not only within the formal framework of their particular craft or industrial unions but to fields which had not previously come under the jurisdiction of a particular union. These differences in craft, geography and other lines have seriously interfered with the functioning of the unions, with the development of complete organization of the maritime workers and with the interests of the workers in the maritime industry.

II. The constantly recurring conflicts between the unions in the maritime industry have not been confined merely to jurisdictional disputes as such or to differences of opinion as to how the unions should function at the economical level but have been aggravated and motivated by political considerations due to the political set-up which exists in these unions. The general difference along political lines has been and is between the Stalinists and anti-Stalinists. The ILWU on the West coast under the leadership of Harry Bridges, the NMU on the East coast under the leadership of Joseph Curran are representative of the Stalinist controlled unions, while the SIU on the East coast with its SUP section on the West coast, under the leadership of Harry Lundberg are representative of the anti-Stalinists.

The ILWU and the NMU are both Stalinist controlled unions in the CIO. The SIU-SUP are AFL anti-Stalinist unions. While the SIU-SUP in its anti-Stalinist position and agitation is part and parcel of the general anti-Stalinist, or better, anti-Communist Party and anti-Communist attitude of the AFL, this union under the leadership of Harry Lundberg has been and is particularly violent, reactionary and outspoken in its opposition to the CP. Under the domination of Lundberg the SIU-SUP has consistently refused any and all forms of collaboration with the CIO maritime unions even during periods of great stress and strain in the maritime unions when faced with assault by the ship owners.

unions often on the same ships and to the efforts of the various maritime

During the war Lundberg, who has developed a reputation as a militant labor leader, moved steadily to the right and became a reactionary patriot. As national president of the SIU of which the SUP is the west coast division, he has maintained a dictatorial administrative and organizational position in the organization. Under the domination and leadership of Lundberg the SUP has degenerated from its former position of militancy and leadership and has been concerned recently with a most backward campaign of opposition to the CIO unions dominated by the Stalinists. The SIU on its part, composed as it is of some of the most backward elements in the labor movement, has also developed and has taken a more or less pure and simple anti-Stalinist Party position.

In contrast to the CIO maritime unions the SIU-SUP has been anti-Negro and has expressed this again and again in advancing its slogan of "no checkerboard crews." This has been due not only to the general backwardness of the SIU membership, a large part of whom on the East coast are from the South, but also to the adamant position taken by Lundberg on this question.

III. Growing rapidly a group known as the Committee for Maritime Unity (CMU) was formed under the leadership of the Stalinist Party. The ostensible purpose for the CMU was to form a bloc of all maritime unions or to effect a merger of maritime unions for the purpose of protecting the maritime workers and defending their interests. There were particularly good reasons for undertaking such a bloc for the unification of the various unions in the maritime industry. The unions were under attack by the shipping interests and any number of problems arose with the government. On the basis of these and many events developing during 1946 such a step was indicated. Unified action was also necessary for the purpose of resolving many and serious conflicts which arose between the various unions and for the clearing up of jurisdictional disputes which took place. These conflicts and jurisdictional disputes were weakening the resistance of the unions to the aggression of the ship owners and was preventing them from presenting a united front to the government shipping powers.

Under cover of serving the needs of the workers in the industry the Stalinists had and have three specific reasons of their own for organizing and promoting the CMU: 1. To acquire the maximum possible control of the maritime industry as a base of operations and an industrial fortress for Stalinist imperialism in the growing conflict between Russia and the United States. 2. To pool the strength of all the CIO and independent unions in the maritime industry for the purpose of liquidating the AFL unions and their influence, which are a thorn in the side of the Stalinist drive to control the industry. 3, and not least important. To liquidate, curb and keep under control any opposition to Stalinist domination represented by non-Stalinist elements in the CIO and independent unions or by elements who from the strictly Stalinist point of view are not entirely "reliable". Most prominent among the latter are Curran of the NMU and his associates. Conflict between the Curran and Stalinist forces has long been an open secret and has recently climaxed in the resignation of Curran as co-chairman of the CMU. These are the three real reasons for the formation of the CMU and the real reasons for its existence.

IV. It must be emphasized that whereas both groups of unions have from time to time demonstrated a high degree of militancy, the SIU (AFL) is at a far lower political level than the CIO maritime unions. This is due not only to the general higher political level of the CIO and the general backwardness of the AFL unions, particularly the SIU on the Atlantic coast, but also to the political education which has been carried on by the Stalinist Party through the years in the ILWU and NMU. While in the SIU of the East coast the political atmosphere might more accurately be described as apolitical, in the SUP the attitude towards "politics" has its roots in its IWW tradition and background.

V. The main question at issue is the attitude which the Workers Party should take towards the Stalinist organized and dominated CMU. The main question raised is not whether Lundberg is more progressive or more conservative than the CMU or vice versa but rather what should be the attitude of the Party toward the CMU as an organization politically dominated by the Stalinist Party. The WP severely criticizes the reactionary attitude of Lundberg and of the AFL group, as in a different way it severely criticizes the reactionary attitude of the leadership of the CIO. We call to the attention of the maritime comrades and of the Party, however, that the Stalinist Party is also reactionary (see resolution on an anti-Stalinist Drive in CIO adopted by last Plenum). The question of whether or not to support the CMU can not be decided in the main by attempting to answer whether or not Lundberg is progressive or reactionary or by attempting to discover which group of unions AFL or CIO is the more militant. The question cannot be decided primarily by appeal to the fact that the SIU, on the Negro question, is more reactionary than the ILWU or the NMU. The point to bear constantly in mind is the fact that the CMU is a creation of the Stalinist Party, organized for Stalinist purposes and for use in any situation where the Stalinists see fit to use it for their own particular political needs. It must also be remembered that whereas there is need for maritime unity and that the CMU was formed ostensibly for the promotion of maritime unity the question must be asked always whether or not it is possible or probable for any step in this direction to be taken under the leadership of the Stalinists.

VI. The world political situation being what it is the Stalinists find it necessary to seek hegemony particularly among workers organizations dealing with shipping and allied industries. They will attempt, of course, to control these unions for use whenever the conflict between Russia and the United States makes such control necessary.

The Party therefore cannot endorse the program of the CMU in the abstract. We have to consider the fact that every effort at unification is under the leadership and domination of the Stalinist Party. We do not go in to detailed theories on this question because sufficient elucidation of the matter is contained in various Party statements and particularly in the Resolution of the last Plenum referred to above.

VII. Proposals:

1. The Party does not ~~oppose~~ ^{oppose} the CMU. The CMU is a purely bureaucratic top committee ~~and is~~ ^{and is}, in addition, especially now with the resignation of Malone of the Firemen, and Curran of the NMU, an exactly 100% Stalinist body.
2. While the Party ~~continues~~ ^{continues} to express its preference for the CIO this position is not to ~~be~~ ^{be} applied abstractly to the situation in maritime.
3. The Party therefore will place its forces in the ILWU, the SIU and the NMU, it having been amply demonstrated that in spite of the great difficulties, it is entirely possible to do fruitful work in the unions contaminated by Stalinism and even in unions under their "complete" control.
4. The Party will continue to attack the reactionary anti-political forces inside of the SIU-SUP and particularly its position in connection with Negro maritime workers.
5. The Party continues to propose and elucidate the peculiar reactionary role of Stalinism in the maritime organizations including the CMU.
6. To stand for unity of action of the maritime unions and of the maritime workers in the face of attack by the ship owners and the government.
7. To call for unification of the maritime unions, starting in the CIO.
8. Lacking the probability of unification, to call for the initial step of a loose working federation of all maritime unions with each one retaining full autonomy, for the purpose of carrying on joint practical activity.
9. If neither of the above can be obtained to call for the establishment of a joint board of strategy for all the maritime unions to be used for the purpose of concrete joint action, for the elimination of inter-union conflicts and jurisdictional disputes.
10. To propagate the idea of a general representative conference of all unions in the maritime industry, regardless of affiliation, based on thoroughly democratic and fair representation from the rank and file locals, for the purpose of discussing problems common to the industry and of arriving at the most satisfactory solution, under the concrete circumstances, of the problems created by the present division and ~~internecine~~ ^{internecine} struggle among the organized workers.

E. R. McKinney,
National Secretary