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The Struggle to Reunify the Fourth International (1954-63): Volume II

“De-Stalinization,” the Hungarian Revolution, and World Trotskyism (Documents, 1955-57)



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COVER: Hungarian workers surround fallen statue of Stalin during the 1956 Hungarian revolution.

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Introduction

by Tim Wohlforth

This is one of a series of twelve volumes devoted to documentary material related to the reunification of the Fourth International, spanning the period from 1954 right up to the successful conclusion of the reunification effort in 1963. These twelve volumes constitute Part 7 of *Towards a History of the Fourth International*, published by the National Education Department of the Socialist Workers Party.

Previous volumes in this series have included articles on the postwar history of the Trotskyist movement and a documentary history of the 1953 crisis and split in the Fourth International.

This new series deals with the aftermath of that split, the period of the independent existence of the two factions that took shape in the struggle (the International Committee and the International Secretariat), and the various efforts to mend the rift.

Included is material on the first parity commission of 1954; political documents produced by components of the International Committee; the response of both world factions to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, to the Polish and Hungarian upheavals in that year, and other events; the effort to reunify the international in 1957 and the causes of the breakdown of that effort; and the successful drive towards reunification beginning in 1961.

The Struggle to Reunify the Fourth International includes correspondence, documents, circulars, and many other items—much of it previously unpublished. Material for this collection was made available by Karolyn and Tom Kerry, Tim Wohlforth, the Library of Social History in New York City, the archives of the Socialist Workers Party, and the late James P. Cannon.

Thanks are due to David Keil, among others, for translating several items published in this series.

The materials were selected and the introductory note preceding each section was written by Fred Feldman. Views expressed in the introductory notes are his own.

For the sake of historical accuracy the material has been subjected to minimal editing. Where comrades used pen-names in their international activity, the real name is inserted in brackets. For instance Gerry Healy used the names Burns and Preston, Dobbs used the name Smith, and Sherry Mangan used the name Patrick O'Daniel.

The term "section" appears frequently in these documents. This word was used in two different senses within the world Trotskyist movement. On the one hand, it refers

to those groups which are affiliated to the Fourth International. Secondly, it is used in reference to organizations that are barred from membership in the Fourth International by reactionary legislation, such as the SWP, but are in full political solidarity with the world Trotskyist movement and represent the continuity of Trotskyism in their countries.

This collection includes relatively little material from the French section of the International Committee (now the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste) or from Latin America. This was due to the limited amount of such material now available in the United States. It is hoped that the publication of this documentary collection will encourage others who participated in these events to help fill in these and other gaps remaining in the historical record of the Fourth International for this period.

Gerry Healy has issued a multi-volumed documentary collection, *Trotskyism Versus Revisionism* (London: New Park, 1974) which purports to cover the period from 1951 to the 1970s. The bulk of the items in that collection dealing with the years 1954-63 will also be found in this series.

However, there is much in this series that is not to be found in Healy's collection. It is hoped that this series will help in establishing the honest historical record of this period.

Gerry Healy's *Problems of the Fourth International*, to be found in Volume Four of *Trotskyism Versus Revisionism*, as well as Cliff Slaughter's introductory material to the various volumes, present a grossly distorted and tendentious account of this period. The need to uphold these distortions may help to explain why so much relevant material is left out of Healy's collection.

The introductory notes to a number of sections in this series refer to some of Healy's falsifications, pointing out how they are refuted by the actual documentary record of what took place, including letters written by Healy.

The factionally-motivated falsifications exposed in these pages were part of a process of degeneration that eventually led to Healy's current campaign to frame up Joseph Hansen, George Novack, James P. Cannon, and other SWP leaders on charges of complicity with or covering up for the Stalinist secret police.

Above all, however, this series demonstrates how principled revolutionaries approached the extremely difficult but vitally necessary task of reuniting the world Trotskyist forces. It will also help to deepen our understanding of how important this reunification was for the future development of the Fourth International.

SECTION II: INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS

During 1955, 1956, and the early part of 1957, the SWP and Peng Shu-tse submitted documents on a wide range of international issues as a means of opening a discussion in the International Committee.

The documents prepared by the SWP were intended to provide an analysis of world events and an overall orientation to orthodox Trotskyists who politically supported the International Committee. Such a discussion would have laid the groundwork for a thorough political clarification among forces which, while in agreement on the principled questions that were under immediate dispute, had been compelled to form a public faction at the very beginning of the international discussion as a defense against Pablo's organizational practices.

"The World Today" analyzed the extension of the postwar boom, noting the contradictions involved in state intervention into capitalist economies and the revival of competition among the imperialist powers. The document took note of the intensification of the colonial revolution and the continuing crisis of leadership in the working class movement.

"The Rise of the Colonial Bourgeoisie" took account of the development of bourgeois nationalist regimes in the neocolonial countries as a phase in the process of permanent revolution. It noted the procapitalist policies of figures like Sukarno and Nehru, and stressed the class-collaborationist approach of the Mao regime.

"The Soviet Union Today" restated the fundamental Trotskyist analysis of the Soviet bureaucracy as a petty-bourgeois caste devoted to the preservation of its privileges and power, whether by means of reform or repression. This document summarized the basic analysis which the SWP later used in evaluating the Khrushchev revelations and the Hungarian revolution.

"The Third Chinese Revolution and Its Aftermath" drew the conclusion that the transformation of property relations had led to the establishment of a deformed workers state in China, ruled by a bureaucratic caste that could be removed only through a political revolution. The resolution held that the Chinese CP, despite its role in the leadership of the Third Chinese Revolution, had remained a Stalinist party, a fact demonstrated by its origins, program, and practice. This resolution is reprinted in the Education for Socialists publication, *The Chinese Revolution and Its Development*.

The extensive discussion which the SWP and Peng hoped that their contributions would initiate did not occur. Rather than consolidating around a program and strategy, the IC proved unable to act as a guiding center for orthodox Trotskyists after the first months of the struggle against Pablo.

The secretaries of the IC, first Gerard Bloch of the PCI majority and then Gerry Healy of the British section,

circulated the documents to leaders of the sections, but organized no discussions around them. The SWP leaders assumed, with good reason, that the failure of the IC to carry out a discussion leading to a decision on the issues posed by these documents was not owing to political difference. It appeared to result rather from the smallness of the Trotskyist groups, lack of resources, material and legal obstacles to travel and communication, difficulties of translation, and overall organizational weakness.

It was suspected that political differences of an undefined character might exist between the PCI (Majority) of France led by Pierre Lambert, and the majority of the IC. However, the SWP leaders had no knowledge of any political differences—or even tactical differences—with Gerry Healy. Resolutions of the SWP and speeches of SWP leaders were regularly reprinted in the British Trotskyist press. Important articles were written by, or in collaboration with, American Trotskyists like George Novack and Sam Gordon. The SWP position on China was readily endorsed by the British Section. Nor did the literature and activity of the British Section reveal any serious differences of approach on political issues.

Today, however, Healy has implied on several occasions that much of this agreement was an elaborate ruse on his part, aimed at delaying a political fight with the Socialist Workers Party until the time was ripe for a split. If this were true, it would rank among the more bizarre examples of unprincipled politics.

When Peng Shu-tse complained in 1961 about the failure of the IC, under Healy's stewardship, to organize a discussion of the documents reprinted below, the National Committee of the Socialist Labour League (the name adopted by the British Section in 1959) replied:

"Comrade Peng speaks lightly about documents having been shelved. It is perfectly true that because of the political differences which constantly lurked in the background a thoroughgoing discussion did not take place in the International Committee." The SWP, unaware of any serious differences, was looking forward to such a discussion. If this account is to be credited, Healy bears the responsibility for blocking it "because of the political differences which constantly lurked in the background."

Aside from such tantalizing hints, the Healyites have provided no indication of what, if any, differences they really had with the documents submitted by the SWP and Peng Shu-tse.

In the same 1961 document, however, the Healyites attempted to pin the blame for the absence of discussion on organizational, rather than political, failings of the SWP. "In 1955 the SWP submitted three documents as part of the series on world problems, but unfortunately the series was never completed."

This is inaccurate. In a July 7, 1955 letter to the leaders of the International Committee (not reprinted here for

reasons of space), Farrell Dobbs promised an extensive resolution on world perspectives in seven parts. Several parts were combined into one document, "The World Today." The project was completed; before 1961, Healy never claimed that these extensive documents provided an insufficient basis for discussion.

After the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in January 1956, at which Khrushchev denounced some of Stalin's crimes, the SWP National Committee adopted "The New Stage in the Russian Revolution." In January 1957, the same body approved "The Hungarian Revolution and the Crisis of Stalinism." These were included in the package of seven resolutions that the Political Committee submitted for a vote by the delegates at the May 1957 convention of the SWP. "Trends in the World Revolution," a speech to the convention by Farrell Dobbs, is also included below. In this report, he takes up the views of those in the SWP who criticized the majority views on world events, particularly Sam Marcy and Art Fox (who often used the pen-name Albert Philips).

The last document in this section is "Suez and Its

Aftermath." This was the international resolution adopted by the British Section in June 1957. It was a rare attempt by Healy's grouping to independently analyze world events.

Despite differences of style and emphasis (due primarily to the greater length and scope of the SWP documents), the British Section's international resolution provided no hint of serious differences. The weight given to the colonial revolution, the approach to the Black struggle and regroupment in the U.S., the approach to the Labour Party in Britain, and the analysis of events in the Soviet bloc were generally parallel to the views held by the SWP at that time. Of course, anyone advocating similar positions in the Workers Revolutionary Party today would quickly find him or herself at the bottom of the stairwell at Healy's headquarters.

Although this document was submitted by the British Section to the International Committee as a contribution to the discussion, it is not reprinted in the Healy-Slaughter documentary collection, *Trotskyism Versus Revisionism*.

—Fred Feldman

1. *"The World Today: Draft Section of the International Resolution" (February 21, 1956—reprinted from SWP Discussion Bulletin, Volume 17, No. 4)*

Capitalism survived World War I only to face the challenge of the 1917 proletarian revolution in Russia. It survived World War II to face the challenge of the Third Chinese Revolution, the colonial revolution, the Yugoslav revolution, the extension of the Soviet property forms into Eastern Europe, the strengthened Soviet Union. The old capitalist countries are rotting. Their colonial empires are falling apart; a whole number of former colonies have broken away; the remaining colonial sectors are in constant ferment.

The survival of capitalism was made possible by the treacherous leadership and policies of Stalinism and Social Democracy. They disarmed the workers of Western Europe, disoriented, and subjugated them to the European bourgeoisie. Following the war, the Stalinists and the Social Democrats in Western Europe imposed upon the advanced workers a serious defeat—a capitulation without a fight. The mass organizations of the workers were not broken; they were immobilized by the treacherous leadership. A class war stalemate resulted.

The dominant feature of the world today is the struggle between the outlived capitalist order and the nascent world socialist order, amid the unresolved crisis of the proletarian leadership.

Capitalist world equilibrium has been completely upset by the abolition of capitalist rule in one-third of the globe, that is, by the extension of Soviet economic forms into China and into Eastern Europe; and by the colonial revolution.

The old stability of West European powers (Britain, Germany, France) has been lost. They used to derive this stability from their supremacy in industry, finance and trade; from their former colonial empires which assured them super-profits, control of markets and raw materials. Not only has the center of gravity of world capitalism definitively shifted to the United States, but all of the West European countries, together with Japan, have become dependent on American capitalism. The disintegration of the former colonial empires acts to reinforce this dependence. U.S. imperialism, however, has gained far less than world capitalism has lost.

The New Features of the World Economy

Capitalism no longer wields its former unchallenged control and direction of the world economy. Between the two world wars capitalist economy stagnated. The Soviet Union was just beginning to emerge out of backwardness. Capitalism must now meet the competition of the rival social order represented by the Soviet bloc; it must now cope with the needs and demands of countries rising from their former colonial status. And wherever the imperialists still continue to cling to colonial rule they encounter resistance by the masses, including armed resistance.

The growth of the world productive forces and of the world economy in the postwar years has been determined by:

1) The productive expansion of the capitalist sector. World War II enabled the imperialists to surmount the

restrictions on production their own system imposes. By 1955 the capitalist sector has grown, as a whole, about one and a half times of the prewar level. World War II has not only pulled American capitalism out of the depression but made it possible for imperialists to expand industry, advance technology, attain the nuclear explosives. In the postwar years U.S. industry continued to expand at a more rapid rate than the rest of the capitalist world, reaching by 1955 a level about two and one-third times prewar.

2) The expansion of Soviet economic forms into the Eastern half of Europe, and over the Asian mainland—China, North Korea, North Indo-China. The growth of the forces of production has been most pronounced and has taken place at the most rapid tempos in the countries where Soviet economic forms prevail. Despite the havoc of World War II, the Soviet Union has become an advanced industrial power second only to the USA. The East European countries are emerging out of semi-colonial, agrarian status as industrial powers. China has embarked on the same road.

3. The stepped-up tempo of industrialization of the undeveloped countries. Their increasing industrial needs arise as the direct result of the worldwide liberation movement of the colonial people.

4. The leap in science and technology represented by the nuclear discoveries, electronic development, automation, and so forth.

The Technological Revolution

Toward the end of 1949 the Soviet Union broke the American monopoly of nuclear development, which has since been broken by other countries as well (Great Britain and France). Once the American monopoly of nuclear development was broken, it could no longer be limited exclusively to military use. Soviet possession of nuclear know-how has made it a part of the world technological progress.

The Soviet economic forms—nationalized industry and state planning—demonstrated in the field of technology as well, their superiority over monopoly capitalism. The Soviet system not only allows for a speedier development of the productive forces, but its inner tendency is to revolutionize the productive forces, to seek ever greater technological advancement at tempos unattainable by capitalism. The same Soviet productive relations that transformed Russia from one of Europe's backward countries to the front rank on the old continent have made possible a similar leap in nuclear and technological advancement. This has been expressed in the fact that the USSR was the first to put a nuclear power plant into operation.

The American monopolists fear not so much a nuclear arms race as they do a race to apply nuclear energy to peacetime purposes. If they had retained their monopoly, the civilian exploitation of this unlimited source of energy would have been relegated to an indefinite future. But their loss of monopoly in this field has altered the situation not only in the military field but in the field of production. The U.S. together with the rest of the capitalist world must henceforth compete in the industrial application of nuclear energy under the dire threat of being outstripped by the Soviet bloc. So far as imperialism is concerned the primary application will continue to be in the military field. Each

technological advance in the civilian areas will be an added spur to its wider application in war preparations. The military continues to have a stranglehold on nuclear development.

In the field of nuclear development and the application of up-to-date technology it is imperative for the other capitalist countries to undertake development of their own. For competitive reasons the deliberate policy of Washington, however, is to keep the rest of the world on a nuclear dole. This is the gist of Eisenhower's proposal for the world utilization of nuclear energy for peacetime uses. Precisely on this account it has met with a cold reception. This is bound to become a new source of inter-imperialist friction.

The development of nuclear energy is of special concern to the undeveloped countries, that is to say, to the overwhelming majority of mankind. They are hostile to nuclear bombs and no less hostile to any attempts to deprive them of the benefits of this source of energy.

Undeveloped countries generally have as their primary requirement the development of power resources. Nuclear energy is an indicated source for them, as the best for meeting their power needs. This is particularly true of countries which lack coal or hydroelectric resources. Every attempt of the imperialists or of the native bourgeoisie to impede such development is bound to create new points of collision with the masses in their struggle for better living conditions and the industrialization of their respective countries.

The demands of World War II revolutionized technology, with the most remarkable developments still to come. Electronics is only in its first phases of growth and so is automation. These conquests in nucleonics and technology are already an inseparable component of the world economy. Nuclear energy, as a great new productive force, the revolution in technology, as an unparalleled means of raising labor productivity are bound to play an increasing role in world production.

The process of capitalist decay has been neither halted nor reversed by mankind's entry into the nuclear age. Capitalist decay derives not from the lack of productive forces but from the fact that the world's productive forces have long outgrown private property relations and national boundaries. They require the unrestricted world arena for their full development. The incompatibility between capitalist rule and the further growth of the world economy will only be deepened by the rise of new productive forces and the corresponding vast increase in labor productivity. Moreover, all the former contradictions of capitalism become aggravated thereby, raising to a new level all of the chronic problems such as markets, over-production, etc. The threat of economic collapse far from being removed is brought all the closer.

The Worldwide Boom Since Korea

Following the end of World War II, the U.S. bolstered up the West European bourgeoisie and used the countries of Western Europe as outlets for its industrial and agricultural surpluses.

The severe winter of 1946-47 threatened Europe with famine. France and Italy were in the throes of social crisis. West Germany was in ruins. Britain was rocked by the

independence struggles in India, Burma, Malaya and caught in the Middle East by the Arab-Palestine crisis, unable to cope with the civil war in Greece and itself in dire need of aid. France was in the midst of a fiscal crisis and fighting at the same time a costly war in Indo-China. Italy was suffering from mass unemployment and inflation. The regimes in both these countries had been sustained primarily by the Stalinist coalition policy.

In June 1947 the Marshall Plan was introduced as an emergency measure to help surmount this postwar crisis.

The West European economies were also sustained for a time by auxiliary markets resulting from the regeneration of normal civilian demand after the cessation of hostilities, and the wartime depletion of all previous stocks; there was the need to restore and modernize the productive plants, particularly acute in such countries as West Germany and others, which suffered the most from war devastation. To this should be added the industrialization programs of countries rising from colonial status, programs, however modest, which have created a new demand for capital goods in the world market.

Moreover, American imperialism launched the cold war which touched off the arms race, inaugurated largescale militarization of the U.S., massive stockpiling, subsidies to the militarization of allied countries, etc.

Up to the middle of 1949 U.S. loans, grants, subsidies, the Marshall Plan, the cold war, the auxiliary markets, kept West European economies going, while feeding the boom in the United States and sustaining both American industry and agriculture.

However, the capitalist stability attained in these ways proved quite tenuous. Toward the end of 1949 a slump set in in the U.S. and throughout the world (world trade declined as did production in West Europe and the U.S.).

The incipient depression was averted when U.S. imperialism plunged into the Korean war. A new war boom ensued. Not the U.S. alone but the whole capitalist world, particularly West Germany and Japan, profited from it as well as from the intensified arms race and inflation.

The boom sparked by the Korean war has endured for five years, lifting world production and world trade to new peaks. Among the major factors that have fed this boom have been the expansion of capital goods production in Western Europe and Japan, the arms race and U.S. arms orders.

This boom does not differ in nature from any previous capitalist booms. It must attain its peak, then level off and finally a decline will set in. All the conditions for this cycle terminating inescapably in depression are being prepared in the course of the boom. Toward the end of 1955 the rate of production began to taper off. Expansion of capital goods slackened. Such key industries as auto (in Britain and the U.S.) cut back production. The fiscal systems of most West European countries remain dislocated. The credit structure has been inflated, particularly in the U.S.A.

The longer the boom lasts, the greater degree of stabilization is attained by Western Europe, by West Germany and Japan, all the more are these countries revived as competitors, all the more sharply are they pitted against one another, and particularly against the U.S., on the world market. To the extent this rivalry for markets in a constricted capitalist world revives, to the same extent

not only are new strains put on the imperialist coalition but also the boom tends to be undermined.

Over the last few years the world-wide agricultural crisis has steadily grown worse. The main cause of this world agricultural crisis is the glut in the United States, more than one-eighth of U.S. farm production must move overseas. It can't. And so the agricultural surplus mounts into the billions of dollars. While small farmers and peasants the world over are being ruined, Washington is impotent to cope with the mounting agricultural surpluses. The disruptive role of American capitalism is disclosed by its inability to alleviate the world agricultural crisis by importing agricultural products as do Britain, West Germany or Japan. Instead of easing the farm crisis, the U.S.A. has aggravated it. Instead of providing outlets, Washington seeks to dump its surpluses abroad and at the same time raises tariff barriers against the importation of agricultural produce. An impossible situation has thereby been created for the undeveloped countries whose chief exports remain foodstuffs and industrial crops. In this impasse they are compelled to turn more and more to the Soviet bloc.

Present-day Expressions of Capitalist Decay

The emergence of the U.S. as the dominant capitalist power amid the eclipse of the old capitalist powers; the abject dependence of the rest of the imperialist world on the economic, financial and military handouts of the U.S.; the status of the U.S. as the only stable and solvent capitalism—these very features of American ascendancy point up the continued decay of world capitalism.

The capitalist world has grown more lopsided than ever. With one-third of the globe removed from capitalist rule, the concentration of production and wealth in the U.S. has become all the more pronounced. The United States has less than 6% of the world's population but produces approximately 40% of the world's goods and services. The resulting discrepancy between American living standards and those of the bulk of mankind is a constant source of provocation and conflict.

Capitalism proved so decayed as to be impotent to hold China and the Eastern half of Europe, although the resources and weight of the mightiest capitalist country, the U.S. were thrown behind the attempt. It has proved impossible for imperialism to contain the colonial revolution which is not only disintegrating the old colonial empires but carries with it the threat of passing over into the proletarian revolution.

Capitalist equilibrium has been upset in the colonial pole of capitalism. The control of the world economy used to be maintained by a handful of privileged imperialist countries (Western Europe, the U.S.A., Japan), which divided the world among themselves and doomed the bulk of mankind to serve as slaves for the metropolitan centers, to provide markets for the export of capital and manufactured goods, act as suppliers of foodstuffs, raw materials and as sources of cheap labor power and super-profits. The premise for the prosperity and industrial growth of the metropolitan centers was the continued enslavement and backwardness of the colonies. Imperialism has been the main obstacle in the way of these countries' development.

The colonial revolution against the background of the industrial progress and relative rise of living standards in

Soviet-bloc countries imposed upon imperialism, especially the U.S., the need to compete with the Soviet bloc countries in the world's key areas, the undeveloped countries. These are key areas, because the overwhelming majority of mankind lives there and because these countries are rich in natural resources.

The universal demand is for industrialization at the highest possible tempos. The living standards of Soviet bloc countries are, true enough, below those of advanced countries, but they have a powerful attraction for the people of undeveloped countries. For them a leap from backwardness, misery, malnutrition to Soviet-bloc living levels represents indeed a most attractive goal. They cannot be fobbed off with promises in the indefinite future. They demand immediate, tangible improvements.

The demands for higher living standards are by no means limited to the masses in the undeveloped countries. As the U.S. pressure mounts to restrict the old capitalist countries to subordinate positions in the world economy and as the burdens of militarism and inflation grow more intolerable, the working classes in the old capitalist countries, particularly West Germany and Japan, will likewise tend to collide not only with the ruling bourgeoisie at home but with the American imperialists.

The gap between Soviet living standards and those of West European countries has not widened; on the contrary, Soviet bloc living standards have been rising while those of Western Europe, dragged down in the course of World War II, have yet generally to return to prewar levels. Any worsening in the conditions of West European workers in the face of the continued growth of the Soviet bloc represents a grave threat to imperialism, American imperialism in particular.

Armaments, inflation, depression, war—this has been the organic tendency of capitalism since the inception of the imperialist era at the turn of the 20th century. It has been left for U.S. imperialism and decaying Western Europe to carry this inner tendency of capitalism to its extreme.

As late as 1929 U.S. arms expenditures amounted to less than 1% of the gross national product; at the climax of World War II in 1944 these expenditures rose to 45%; today the arms program absorbs over 20% of the gross national product. Never before in world history has there been such a peacetime expansion of militarism as has been taking place throughout the postwar period. More and more of the production of the whole capitalist world, including that of West Germany and Japan, is being diverted into war preparations. We have here a vivid confirmation that militarism and war represent the only capitalist solution to the contradictions that are tearing this outmoded social system apart.

Statism in the Imperialist Countries

In the epoch of imperialism massive intervention by the state is one of the by-products of world capitalist decay. Statism becomes indispensable for salvaging and maintaining the capitalist order. This process has been manifested especially in the United States.

State intervention became imperative for U.S. capitalists to bail out their system in the course of the Great Depression of the thirties. It then took the form of a number of governmental inflationary measures ("pump-priming"), creation of artificial scarcities (plowing under,

restriction of production, etc.), and the projection of a public works program to alleviate unemployment. State intervention was envisaged as a temporary, emergency expedient, to be suspended once the country pulled out of the depression. It never did. Instead a period of war preparations and then the war ensued.

Economic life in wartime centered around military requirements, with the state regulation of every sphere of activity. Expansion of production was achieved by state subsidies to corporations and by government construction of plants and equipment.

In the war years, the entire economic life was placed on a war footing and regulated by the state. The total character of modern war made this mandatory. State intervention was further dictated by the need to create entire new branches of economy such as nuclear development, to conduct basic research, to undertake power developments, to meet such scarcities as that of natural rubber by building up a synthetic rubber industry, etc., in brief, projects requiring capital expenditures beyond the reach of private capital

Statism in the U.S., as in the other capitalist countries remains strictly within the framework of capitalism. At the very first opportunity, as in the case of the synthetic rubber industry in the U.S. or of the steel industry in Britain, the policy is to return the plants to private ownership. The same attempt is now underway with regard to the transfer to the monopolists of the civilian use of nuclear power.

There is no overall planning. There is indeed, a manipulation whose aim is to gear state intervention along with privately owned industry with the military machine.

The inner urge of finance capital to fuse more and more closely with the state is reinforced in the epoch of capitalist decay by this, that entire branches of the economy cannot be operated under private ownership. But the imperialist bourgeoisie cannot afford to sacrifice them. Such is the case, for example, of the railways and coal industry in Britain and of agriculture in the U.S. where the state has to step in to bail out the big capitalists. In Britain this state intervention assumed the form of nationalization; in the U.S. it has taken the form of regulation of production through subsidies, price supports, and so forth, and government stockpiling of agricultural surpluses.

The most naked and brutal forms of imperialist statism are manifested under fascism. The crassest examples of bailing out bankrupt capitalists occurred under Hitler in Germany and Mussolini in Italy. Statism, as events have proved, is not a pre-war or wartime trend. It has been carried over into the postwar years, as evidenced by Britain, France, Italy, West Germany and the United States.

Massive state intervention has been further imposed upon the imperialist bourgeoisie, particularly that of the U.S., by the fact that since the termination of World War II, world capitalism has been operating on an emergency basis, engaged in a world arms race, and pending the outbreak of war, forced to compete with a rival social order and to try to contain the colonial revolution.

U.S. imperialism must sustain the rest of the capitalist world, prop up tottering fiscal systems, provide state aid in the shape of grants and loans abroad, arms procurements

in several countries, and so forth. At home, the maintenance of huge armed forces and the need to keep them up date, impels the bourgeoisie to extend the powers of the state over the key branches of industry and to function as the exclusive stockpiler of strategic materials.

So far as the European capitalists are concerned, statism in addition provides them with a means of defense against unbridled encroachment by the U.S.

Among the acute problems in world economy confronting the imperialists is the demand of backward countries for industrialization. The rivalry of the Soviet bloc countries makes it impossible for the imperialists to ignore these demands, which private finance capital cannot meet. This aid, however limited and restricted, can be provided primarily through state channels.

The marked expansion of world economy, well above the levels of production and trade previously attained, the international growth of the working class, the universal demand for raising living standards, in brief, the entire new set of world relations today, does not weaken but, on the contrary, reinforces the statist tendency.

The successive crises of the last quarter of a century: the Great Depression, the emergency preparations for World War II, the war itself, the ensuing cold war and the localized wars have dictated increasing state intervention not only into economic life but into every field of social activity. Above all, the state has intervened in the class struggle. Virtually every strike, every wage demand, every conflict over working and living conditions today confronts the workers with the intervention of the state. This aspect of imperialist statism is indissolubly linked with its intervention into the economy, and pursues the exact same objectives—to salvage capitalist rule.

If in an earlier phase of imperialist development the monopolies stepped in as the chief organizer and regulator of capitalist economy, then today this role has been assumed by the capitalist state, the central executive committee of the bourgeoisie. In the U.S. the state has become a super-corporation, the main regulator of economic life, the biggest banker and controller of credit, the biggest single business enterprise.

But the massiveness of U.S. state intervention does not invest world or U.S. capitalism with immunity to economic crises. The monopolies in their day proved in the end to be the organizers of the depression of the thirties, the greatest economic catastrophe up to that time. The capitalist "state-regulator" now is headed in the very same direction.

There is nothing wonder-working about the massiveness of American statism. U.S. state intervention must of necessity be on a large scale because the country's economy is the most massive in the world. Once world capitalism is seized by crisis, the U.S. is bound to find itself in a most unfavorable position. There is no other country or combination of countries that can come to its aid. On the contrary, the more favorably situated capitalist countries will be dragged down with the U.S.

Statism provides no solution for the bourgeoisie. In the last analysis, the intervention of the state serves to create new contradictions, to drive the old contradictions more deeply inward and combine them in new ways, and prepare for all the more destructive explosion thereafter. The alternative facing U.S. and world capitalism is depression or war.

U.S.—The Dominant World Bourgeoisie

The process of capitalist decay that dragged down all of America's capitalist rivals, has assured to U.S. imperialism its overwhelming predominance. This predominance, in turn, facilitated the postwar salvaging of capitalism in Western Europe and Japan.

U.S. development during World War II was diametrically opposite to that of Europe. The old continent was ravaged and declined; the United States expanded. Moreover, it was able to pool the scientific and technological resources of the entire capitalist world and in this way temporarily gain a monopoly of nuclear developments.

In the immediate postwar years, the U.S. with its greatly expanded productive capacity, took advantage of the social peace enforced by the Stalinists and Social Democrats to deploy its economic, financial and military strength in order to achieve, under its hegemony, the relative stabilization of Western Europe. U.S. resources proved ample to revive the world market, subsidize reconstruction of ruined capitalist countries, allay the food shortages, finance re-equipment of old plants and the reconstruction of new ones, and to prop up bankrupt fiscal systems.

The boom experienced by Western Europe since 1950 has not lessened the dependence of Western European capitalists politically and economically upon the U.S.A. They remain under the challenge of the socialist minded proletariat at home. This likewise increases their dependence on American capitalism.

The greater their dependence becomes upon the U.S.A. all the more dependent does the U.S.A. become on the rest of the capitalist world; all the more directly do all of the contradictions and the threatening upheavals in other countries become incorporated in the foundations of American imperialism. The benefits the U.S.A. derives from its dominant position are temporary and tend to become transformed into liabilities. From a factor of stability and strength, U.S. dominance over the rest of the capitalist world is beginning to turn into its opposite.

The preponderance of the U.S. has not solved a single one of the fundamental contradictions of imperialism. On the contrary it tends to aggravate them.

The central problem of imperialism is the export of capital. And again we find the position of the old capitalist world rulers reversed as against that of the U.S. At the zenith of imperialism the capital market seemed bottomless. Sir Edgar Speyer, well-known British financial authority of those days, was able to boast (May 1911) before the English bankers that "Export of British capital (is) chief cause of Empire's prosperity." But Special Consultant to President Eisenhower Randall had to complain by 1954 how baffling the problem is for the U.S. to export capital. Two-thirds of the world's capital is generated in the U.S. Yet, while the rest of the world is starved for capital, European funds tend to gravitate toward the U.S. (*A Foreign Policy for the United States*, by Clarence B. Randall. Chicago, 1954).

U.S. finance capital suffers from a legendary affliction. On a global scale, as at home, everything it touches turns into dollars, and these astronomical accumulations of capital funds seek for outlets, with few of these in sight. The concentration of the bulk of the world's capital and

gold supply in U.S. underground vaults, epitomizes this impasse of Wall Street.

One consequence of lack of outlets for capital exports had been the saturation of the Western hemisphere with U.S. private investments. By 1954 some 70% of U.S. private capital invested abroad, totalling close to 17 billion dollars, had been invested in Canada and Latin America. (\$3.6 billion in Canada; \$1 billion in Venezuela; \$640 million in Brazil; \$640 million in Cuba, or total of \$5.88 billions for these 4 countries alone.)

The pre-1914 U.S. exports were mainly agricultural (more than 2/3 of the exports). Its post-1914 exports were mainly manufactured goods (60% of the exports). This trend became more pronounced after World War II. U.S. has become an export economy to a greater degree than ever before in its history; and conversely, its dependence has grown on the rest of the world, Asia in particular, for raw materials; and this, in a shrinking capitalist world.

Decisive here are not comparative totals, or proportions of foreign trade to national output, but the rate of U.S. foreign trade growth and needs.

Increasing dependence of the U.S. industry on world reserves of raw materials is evidenced by the following:

The aluminum industry processes mainly foreign bauxite; the steel industry has to turn for ore to Labrador, Venezuela, Africa, Sweden and other places. Large-scale shipments are required of petroleum, manganese, chrome, tin, nickel, copper, lead, zinc and many other strategic minerals.

Outlets are needed acutely for manufactured goods and agricultural products of which the U.S. itself possesses an abundance and superabundance.

Amid a world glut of foodstuffs and industrial crops, the U.S. must find outlets for huge agricultural surpluses. In manufactured goods the imbalance is likewise pronounced.

Britain, as world ruler, maintained a balance in foreign trade by importing more than she exported (this "deficit" being more than covered by the take-home dividends from her foreign investments). The position of the U.S. as the world's chief trader is diametrically opposite. The U.S. exports far exceed imports.

The "dollar gap," the "imbalance of international payments," translates itself into billions which pile up annually. This gulf, which the entire preceding world division of labor has dug, the U.S. monopolists must strive to span. In vain! The dollar invariably appears with a minus sign in the foreign trade balance of the rest of the capitalist world. As a consequence there is not a single capitalist country that is not impelled in self-defense to set up limitations, increasingly rigid, on buying from the U.S.; and conversely, redoubling their efforts to penetrate the U.S. home markets. This, in turn, makes more compelling the impulsion of the U.S. to try to impose a new division of labor throughout the world, by keeping the other capitalist countries on a U.S. dole.

The disorganizing role of U.S. imperialism in world economy is pointedly put by the above-cited Randall. "So," he concludes, "we are caught squarely between the Scylla of export subsidy and dumping on the one hand, and the Charybdis of the destruction of the market of our allies by our gifts on the other." (Same source).

For the U.S. it is not enough to dominate the capitalist sector; to survive it must rule the whole world. It needs

world outlets for its colossal accumulation of capital and manufactured goods. It needs the resources, especially those of Asia, for raw materials. It needs the super-profits that are derived from exploiting cheap labor. These imperialist needs collide with the universal demand for industrialization at the highest tempos possible. American imperialism offers, in the main, lip service; actually, it stands in the way of the rapid industrialization of even those countries, like Turkey, which have been the most publicized recipients of "aid." By the end of 1955, for example, the American bourgeoisie was in open conflict with the Turkish bourgeoisie over the rate of that country's industrialization.

Finance capital, of which American capitalism is the epitome, requires governments throughout the world which are not merely subordinate to it but which are its direct agencies. To put it differently, U.S. imperialism requires strong, stable regimes, stable above all in the sense of being able to seek and guarantee foreign private investments. Such regimes can be imposed only by force, as in the case of South Korea, Guatemala, Iran.

The surge of the colonial revolution has brought the American imperialists into collision not only with the insurgent masses but also with the native bourgeoisie. For the masses the liberation struggle can only be the initial phase in the struggle for socialism because there is no road for advancement for them within the capitalist framework. The respective national bourgeoisies cannot stand on their own feet in the face of mass assault. They need the support of American capitalism, but cannot openly accept it because of the counter-revolutionary role and demands of American imperialism. In the meantime, every crisis of the struggle in the colonies directly affects American imperialism.

The dislocation of the social equilibrium in the colonial pole of capitalism has been so profound that it has had its repercussions in the main colonial base of U.S. capitalism—Latin America. It has turned this area virtually into its own private preserve. Nevertheless, it has not been able to attain the former stability. The majority of these countries are in a state of continuous crisis.

The challenge of the proletariat anywhere is a direct challenge to Washington. This applies with equal force to the liberationist struggle of the colonial masses. This is why American imperialism is the powerhouse of the world counter-revolution, and can assume no other role.

Economically, militarily, politically U.S. policy has been determined on the one side by the continued decay of world capitalism and on the other by the process of the permanent revolution. The keystone of U.S. foreign policy is to ward off the extension of the revolution in order to consolidate its positions and then "organize the world" under its hegemony through the reconquest of the lost one-third.

Frustrations of U.S. Foreign Policy

Prior to the launching of the cold war Washington tried to exploit its nuclear monopoly as a major instrument of policy, above all, against the U.S.S.R. At the start of the cold war Churchill in his Fulton, Mo. speech and Truman in proclaiming the so-called "Truman Doctrine" rattled the atomic bomb. This was continued throughout the cold war. However, U.S. monopoly of nuclear processes was short-lived. The cold war speeded up the nuclear race and the

breach of U.S. monopoly by the Soviet Union.

The passage from the cold war and the localized wars such as Korea and Indo-China into an all-out assault upon China and the U.S.S.R. has been postponed up to now by the unfoldment of the international class struggle, that is, the victory of the Third Chinese Revolution and the spread of the colonial revolution.

Even while the U.S. enjoyed the monopoly of the atom bomb and sought to intimidate the whole world with it, the Chinese masses accomplished the Third Chinese Revolution. The whole experience with the A-bomb illustrates once again that there is no single factor, not even an "absolute weapon" such as the nuclear bomb, that can cancel out the class struggle or reverse a world relation of forces unfavorable to imperialism. Explosives, no matter how destructive, cannot save a dying social order.

The world relation of forces proved too unfavorable to U.S. imperialism. In this context, the possession of nuclear weapons by the U.S.S.R. undoubtedly acted as a "deterrent" to war. The imperialists have been working with might and main to change the world relation of forces in their favor.

Toward this end their first objective was the consolidation of the imperialist bloc under U.S. hegemony. This was to be achieved through the Marshall Plan and NATO. But in this consolidation there were missing links—rearmed Germany and rearmed Japan. Moreover, the disintegration of the colonial empires under the impact of the colonial revolution have kept the NATO partners, Great Britain and France in particular, from achieving the necessary stability.

Washington found itself faced with the need of "stabilizing" its positions in the Far East, Middle East, North Africa, and even in its private preserve, Latin America (Guatemala, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina), in brief, throughout the former colonial world. Hence the drive for supplementary regional military alliances—SEATO and METO.

Capitalist decay, however, has reached the stage where American imperialism cannot depend militarily on any single ally but must rely on its own military build-up and its own bases. The network of American expeditionary forces, of land, air and naval bases must, therefore, of necessity cover the earth. Under the pretext of "mutual defense," the old European empires are now forced to tolerate foreign military garrisons on their soil. The same conditions are imposed rigorously on underdeveloped countries which are pulled into alliance with the U.S.

The same forces that have acted to postpone the outbreak of World War III have been operating to prevent the attainment of social stability in the strategic areas. The search for imperialist consolidation remains elusive. American imperialism has been involved in one crisis after another. No sooner was a relaxation of tension achieved, for example, in the Far East, than crisis erupted in North Africa and the Arab world.

After Korea had proved the futility of localized warfare, the United States was on the brink of becoming embroiled in Indo-China, and over Taiwan (Formosa). While an uneasy truce was achieved in the Far East, Washington started marching toward embroilment in North Africa and the Arab world. By the beginning of 1956 Washington was threatening armed intervention in Palestine over the issue of Israel.

The Near East, North Africa and virtually the whole of Africa, had by 1956 become the most explosive region in the world. The tasks of the belated bourgeois-democratic revolution are posed on razor edge. The struggle for liberation from foreign oppression has reached the stage of armed conflict. It is at the same time the region of the world's lowest living standards, which makes the more urgent the resolution of the agrarian problem, and the need for industrialization. Meanwhile, the imperialists are fighting to retain their rule all the more ferociously not only because these are key remaining colonial holdings but also because they contain the richest oil fields and oil reserves in the world. In the Near East the U.S. imperialists are defending not only their commitments to Great Britain and France and their own military bases in this area but also the huge investments and profits of the U.S. monopolists in the oil and mineral resources. At the same time they are haggling with Britain and France over the division of spoils.

Aggravating this already explosive situation, is the injection of the state of Israel into the Arab world. The Jewish people who proportionately suffered the greatest casualties in World War II, were led into a bloody trap following the war. The imperialists, with the U.S. in the van, aided by the Kremlin bureaucracy, helped the Zionists carve out the state of Israel, at the very time the Arab world started struggling for their liberation. Under these conditions Israel could serve no role other than that of a wedge to serve imperialist ends. It could be established and maintained only by naked force, an armed camp which impels the Arabs to arm themselves. While unable to offer a stable base to the imperialists, the existence of Israel sharpens the conflict between the Arabs and the Jews, between the Arabs and the imperialists. The victims who stand to lose most in this situation are the Jews.

U.S. imperialist quest for social stability in the Near East, as in the rest of the colonial world, runs up each time against the imperialist inability to substitute new forms of domination other than colonialism, avowed or covert, against which the masses are up in arms. The imperialists can find support only among the old feudal rulers, the landlords, the militarists. Every U.S. military alliance made with the undeveloped countries is thus directly aimed against the masses and their aspirations.

Moreover, in the Near East, as elsewhere, U.S. imperialism runs up against another new reality, namely, the loss by the imperialists generally of their monopoly, militarily, economically and politically, over the colonial people. The unfolding colonial revolution and the existence of the Soviet bloc, offer the countries rising from former colonial status an alternative course, with resources and assistance beyond the power of the imperialists to block.

Whenever the imperialists seek to ignore this new relationship in the colonial world and to coerce even small countries such as Jordan, the attempt boomerangs. British pressure on Jordan to join the Baghdad pact resulted in an acute crisis and set the masses immediately into motion not only in Jordan but throughout the Arab world.

The social tensions in the world today are so acute that every aggressive step taken by American diplomacy brings it to the brink of war with the Soviet bloc and the insurgent colonial masses. Washington continues to refuse to recognize China, to give its support to the discredited and bankrupt regime of Chiang Kai-shek. In Korea it

continues to base its policy on the support of Syngman Rhee, under the conditions of a tenuous truce. In Indo-China, it seeks to bolster up a puppet regime, and to prevent the unification of the country through an election agreed upon at Geneva.

In Europe Washington continues to carry through the policy of "liberation" of the Baltic and East European countries and of incorporating a rearmed West Germany in the NATO, perpetuating the dismemberment of Germany. Washington has involved itself in more than two score pacts. These are not only military alliances aimed at the Soviet bloc but U.S. guarantees to perpetuate the existing social order in each of the "allied" countries. Every upheaval in each of these countries thus threatens to embroil the U.S. As a consequence U.S. foreign policy has kept adding one time-bomb after another to an already intolerably tense international situation.

The Threat of the Next World War

The fact that the next world war would be the most destructive and costliest of all is a poor safeguard against its eventual eruption. True enough, the entry of militarism into the nuclear age has made militarism so expensive and destructive as to virtually negate its role as an instrument of imperialist expansion. But this inner logic which dooms militarism is subordinated to the inner logic of the class struggle. Militarism is an instrument of class rule and class policy. In the hand of the American imperialists, militarism serves as one of the main levers for establishing its hegemony over the rest of the capitalist world; it prevents any combination of capitalist powers from challenging this. Against the Soviet bloc, militarism—the arms race—serves also as a means of economic aggression, forcing the Soviet bloc to divert an increasing share of the national income to arms production. And above all, militarism is intended as the ultimate "deterrent" against the encroaching socialist revolution, the only remaining means of safeguarding the capitalist order.

American imperialism would reduce the world to atomic waste-land rather than voluntarily surrender its bid for world hegemony. The American imperialists have not hesitated to plunge into the cold war and then into the Korean war, using throughout the threat of nuclear war. Never before has there been such a piling up of arms, creation of systems of military alliances, rings of global bases, with projects to multiply such bases and extend them even into the stratosphere.

Stockpiles of nuclear explosives have been mounting. Military organization and strategy is being more and more oriented toward nuclear warfare. U.S. land, naval and air forces have been reorganized for nuclear war.

War is rooted in decaying capitalism. Two world wars within the span of a single generation have amply demonstrated this.

World War III became implicit the moment hostilities in World War II terminated. It was implicit in the cold war; in the Korean war; in the division of Korea that followed; in the subsequent division of Indo-China. It is implicit in the division of Europe into the West vs. the East. It is implicit in the division of Germany, in the attempt to create "two" Chinas—Chiang on Formosa as against the Mao regime on the mainland. This social conflict cannot be resolved

definitively by any means other than war or revolution.

In the face of these realities the most malignant of illusions is that war has become outmoded. Pacifist illusions facilitated the imperialist preparations for World War I as well as World War II. Such illusions can again only play into the hands of the preparers of World War III. The masses are lulled and disoriented in order to be caught completely off-guard when the war erupts.

Among the crassest of illusions is that the UN provides some sort of "safeguard." Korea has already supplied the answer in this connection. It was the UN, the alleged "preventor of war," that engaged in a full-scale war in Korea, a war that carried with it the threat of expanding into a world conflict, with the use of nuclear weapons.

Illusions that "disarmament," "neutralism," and the like will prevent World War III are being fostered just as assiduously as similar lies were fostered in the interval prior to World War II.

The program of "peaceful co-existence" is excluded precisely for the United States. World capitalism was unable to maintain "peaceful co-existence" among the rival imperialist powers and at a time when the Soviet Union was isolated in the period prior to World War II. How can it attain "peaceful co-existence" today in a world that is divided into two antagonistic social orders amid the unfolding colonial revolution?

The only alternative to war is the socialist revolution.

The World Working Class and Its Leadership

The world political situation as a whole continues to be chiefly characterized by the historical crisis of the proletarian leadership.

The eruption of the colonial revolution, the abolition of capitalist rule in one-third of the world, the continued decay of capitalism have posed point blank the need for the world socialist solution. Failing the world socialist revolution, the existing power stalemate can only be resolved by World War III.

The imperialist bourgeoisie, under the hegemony of U.S. monopolists, has gained a new lease on life thanks primarily to the role of the traditional labor bureaucracies—the Stalinists, the Social Democrats, the trade union bureaucrats. For the imperialists there is no way out than the plunge either into economic or military-nuclear catastrophes.

In the United States the imperialists retain their most stable base because, under the conditions of the war and postwar boom, they have been able to subjugate the workers through the AFL-CIO bureaucracy. In size, power and privileges this bureaucracy surpasses that of any other capitalist country. It sits astride 17 million organized workers and keeps the class as a whole harnessed to the capitalists politically, keeps them shackled to the imperialist war machine. It is the main agency for spreading capitalist ideology among the workers and it wages incessant and ruthless war against class consciousness and class struggle methods.

This bureaucracy derives its position and power primarily from the backing of the imperialist state coupled with the ability of the capitalist rulers to grant concessions to the workers. The power of the bureaucracy has expanded with the growth of the working class and the maintenance of relatively high living standards. Every threat to U.S. imperialism is felt by this bureaucracy as a threat to itself.

Hence its hostility to the colonial revolution, to the Soviet bloc and to Marxist ideas at home. Hence its unwavering support of U.S. foreign policy. It stands and falls with the U.S. bourgeoisie.

The same forces that have fed the bureaucracy prepare the conditions for its downfall. Even though as a belated hangover of the past, the American workers have yet to break with capitalist parties, overcome their political immaturity and stride toward socialist consciousness, they remain a constant challenge to capitalist rule. They can be kept under the heel of the AFL-CIO bureaucracy only so long as their living and working conditions continue rising, only so long as U.S. capitalism can grant them reforms, however limited.

But the existing social equilibrium at home is neither stable nor lasting. Once the capitalists find it necessary, as they must, to attack living and working standards, the class struggle will once again break out into the open. As the U.S. workers have demonstrated in the past—during the depression of the thirties, in their struggles to organize the CIO, in the struggles of the coal miners in wartime, in the demands of the GIs to "go home" after the termination of World War II, in the postwar strike wave—they will not shy away from the most drastic solution.

The American working class closed the lag in its trade union consciousness by a single leap into the most highly advanced industrial unionism under the CIO in the thirties. The lag in its political consciousness and the gap between its class power and its class needs prepare the conditions for another leap in the political field. It is by no means excluded that the American workers may free themselves from their subjection to the AFL-CIO bureaucracy even before the West European workers have rid themselves of the Stalinist and Social Democratic leadership.

In the social structure of American capitalism the Negro question plays the role of a bourgeois-democratic task still to be resolved. With the urbanization and the proletarianization of the Negro there has been a corresponding sharpening of the Negro struggle. In the very midst of the boom this struggle tends to upset the existing social equilibrium. The needs and aspirations of the Negroes as an oppressed minority tend to fuse with the unresolved problem of the labor movement, namely: the organization of the unorganized in the South. In the impending radicalization of the American working class as a whole, the Negro struggle is bound to play a great role. Even today this struggle plays a major role in advancing the consciousness of labor and in aggravating the international and domestic contradictions of U.S. imperialism.

In Western Europe the socialist-minded workers remain the captives of the Stalinists and Social Democratic parties. With the exception of Italy and France, where the Stalinists dominate, the Social Democrats survive as the majority parties within the working class. Their function is to subjugate the workers to the bourgeoisie, just as the AFL-CIO bureaucracy does in the U.S.A. The European Stalinists do so in the interests of the Kremlin bureaucracy; while the Social Democrats operate in the interest of their respective bourgeoisies. They made possible the resumption of power by the bourgeois parties and the corresponding rightward swing in Western Europe.

The relative stability attained by the West European capitalism is tenuous; it hinges on the continuation of the

worldwide boom. The European capitalists are far less able than ever before to grant concessions and reforms. There will be no lack of revolutionary situations in these countries, just as there has been no lack in the past. The main obstacle the workers face within their ranks is constituted by the old leaderships. The success or failure of the impending struggles depend on the ability of the workers to build a new, revolutionary leadership.

Stalinism has not been endowed with any revolutionary mission by the destruction of capitalism in Eastern Europe by military-bureaucratic means; nor by the success of the Maoites in exploiting the Third Chinese Revolution. These blows to imperialism, important as they are, do not represent definitive victories in the struggle for socialism. The fate of China, of the USSR, and Eastern Europe still remains to be decided on the arena of the world class struggle.

Stalinism will never bring about socialism in the USSR or in China, and, least of all, the socialist reorganization of the world. This can be achieved only by the international working class. "Only the proletariat, after having seized the state power and having transformed it into an instrument of struggle against all the forms of oppression and exploitation, in the interior of the country as well as beyond its frontiers, gains therewith the possibility of assuring a continuous character to the revolution, in other words, of leading it to the construction of a complete socialist society." (Leon Trotsky)

Stalinism has helped prolong the death agony of capitalism; it is primarily responsible for the fact that imperialism still remains the dominant force in world economy. And imperialism, the Kremlin to the contrary notwithstanding, cannot "peacefully coexist" with the antagonistic social order.

Stalinism is chiefly responsible for preventing the fusion of the colonial revolution with the socialist struggle in the advanced countries.

Stalinism is chiefly responsible for paving the way for the rise of the colonial bourgeoisie and preventing the working class in the colonial countries from assuming the leadership of the revolutionary masses and coming forward as the only true representative of the interests and aspirations of the oppressed.

How costly Stalinism has proved both to the advanced workers and to the colonial masses is demonstrated by the French experience. By disarming the French workers and reimposing capitalist rule both in France and in the colonies following World War II, the French CP bears the main responsibility for the eight year war in Indo-China and for the subsequent partition of the country. The French CP threw obstacles in the way of the struggle of the North African masses for liberation, rendering it more costly and more protracted, leaving it under the leadership of the native bourgeoisie, imposing on the native workers the role of auxiliary troops and depriving the struggle of the full support of the French proletariat.

Stalinism has enabled the imperialist bourgeoisie and its Social Democratic and trade union agents to exploit the

abominations of the Kremlin rule to their own advantage. The advanced workers have democratic traditions of their own, gained through long and bitter struggle. They are repelled by Stalinist totalitarianism. The imperialist bourgeoisie has exploited this revulsion by identifying Stalinism with communism.

The social nature of the bureaucracy as a parasitic caste without any independent roots of its own in the process of production compels it to seek to substitute itself for the working class; to survive it must strip the workers of all initiative and self-action—keep the class from entering the political arena as an independent force. In those cases where it finds itself impelled to provide the impetus for social overturn, it must immediately intervene to strangle or half-strangle the revolution. It must claim for itself, as Khrushchev now does, the omnipotence to prevent war, impose "peaceful coexistence" upon the imperialists, and assure "world socialism" by gradual means.

The Kremlin has demoralized and disoriented the advanced proletariat so that it facilitated the outbreak of World War II; prevented the utilization of this war for the establishment of workers' power; paralyzed the workers from taking power in the successive postwar crises; and is today repeating the same criminal course amid imperialist preparations for World War III.

Mankind has entered the nuclear age. The socialist solution is rendered even more urgent by a leap in production methods, signalled by automation, child of world technology, of its needs, its growth. Adding to the urgency of the socialist solution is the destructiveness of new weapons. At the same time this revolution in productive and military techniques illuminates the necessity, power and meaning of liberating ideas; above all, the nature and role of the workers' party as the instrument of socialist liberation. This historic need is likewise today more imperious than ever before.

This is the reality that the world working class faces today. The condition for the emancipation of the working class, and its forward progress, is that it rise to the level of history's needs, create the deciding motor force in the world of our time, the world party of the socialist revolution, armed with the program of the permanent revolution.

POLITICAL COMMITTEE MOTION

1. To approve the general line of the draft section of the international resolution entitled "The World Today"
2. To poll the National Committee with recommendation that the draft section be submitted for general party discussion, with the NC members free to express any differences they may have during the discussion.

Adopted May 31, 1956

(Note: Submission for discussion approved by National Committee poll)

2. "The Rise of the Colonial Bourgeoisie" (June 29, 1955—reprinted from SWP Discussion Bulletin A-31 in 1955)

Old colonial forms of imperialist rule could not withstand the hammer blows of the colonial revolution. Parallel with the ascent of revolutionary China, such countries as India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma, Pakistan, etc. have gained their independence, with political power passing into the hands of their respective native bourgeoisie.

The imperialist rulers, able in the past to quell with comparative ease the uprisings of unarmed masses, were confronted during and following World War II with revolutionary masses able to enforce their demands arms in hand, arms they acquired in the course of the war and after the Japanese capitulated. This has confronted the imperialists with new problems, and with the search for new forms of domination.

Class relations in the Middle East, Africa and Oceania (Micronesia, Melanesia, Polynesia, etc.) tend to shape up in the same manner as in Asia. With the deepening crisis of outlived capitalism at one pole and the continuing crisis of the proletarian leadership at the other, the native bourgeoisie in these areas as well is impelled to make its bid for power and seek to play an independent role.

The New Relations in the Former Colonies

World War II laid bare the atrophy of old colonial powers, Great Britain, France, Holland and Japan. The colonial masses carried their struggle for independence to a new climax.

The imperialist belligerents had sought to enlist the support of native populations, first and foremost of the native bourgeoisies. The blows Japan dealt militarily to the Western "democracies," its "Asia for the Asians" campaign and the solicitation of support, forced both sides to promise native rule and independence. The masses proceeded to make these promises good.

The old forms of colonial rule had to be sacrificed in order to salvage capitalism. Otherwise, in the struggle for independence, the insurgent masses would, as in China, assault the very foundations of imperialist rule, i.e., foreign investments.

There was another reason why the colonial powers transferred power "peacefully" to some of the native bourgeoisies. Once the U.S. gained the ascendancy among the imperialist powers, it required different forms of domination.

The U.S. monopolists with their overwhelming economic, fiscal and military superiority, do not need direct colonial rule, but primarily an opportunity for economic penetration. Hence their wartime pressure on the old imperialist powers to grant self-rule in the colonies in order thus to enable U.S. capital to penetrate these areas.

To beat back the revolutionary masses who had entered the world arena, and to accommodate itself to U.S. demands, Great Britain yielded political rule to the native bourgeoisie in India, Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon. In this way London salvaged the main thing: British investments, the "commonwealth union," the sterling bloc, etc.

Wherever the old colonial powers attempted to restore the *status quo ante bellum* they were taught lessons costly in prestige, money and blood, e.g., the Dutch in Indonesia,

the French in Indo-China, Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria and the British in Egypt, Malaya, etc.

This impasse of the old colonial powers mitigates against stability, feeds the colonial revolution and, simultaneously, adds to the frustration and exasperation of U.S. imperialism.

The fraud of Washington's attempt to play the role of an "anticolonial" power has been exposed by the ferocity of its intervention against the Chinese revolution, by the Korea war, the intervention in Indochina, the intervention in Guatemala, etc. U.S. pressure in favor of homerule and its backing of colonial despotism are two sides of one and the same policy of counterrevolution, rooted in U.S. imperialism's belated arrival as aspirant to world dominion.

Confronted with an unforeseen situation, above all in Asia, the heart of the colonial sector of world capitalism, U.S. imperialism needs time to make indispensable adjustments, to bolster the shaky positions of the native bourgeoisies in the colonial areas, etc. These and other considerations determine Washington's strategy for Asia and the turn of the Eisenhower administration toward new agreements with Moscow and Peking.

The Bandung Conference

The Bandung Conference of April 24-28, 1955 reflected the present stage of the liberating struggle of the colonial masses, the gains as well as the limitations. Represented were 29 countries of Asia and Africa, well over one-half of the world's population. This conference registered on a global scale the transformations that have already taken place throughout the colonial sector. The Western imperialists were barred from direct participation, so were their most discredited puppets (Chiang Kai-shek and others). The warmest welcome was accorded to the representatives of China, which in the eyes of the colonial people symbolizes the greatest victory thus far over imperialism.

Even Washington's stooges at Bandung had to join in a demonstration against colonialism and, moreover, had to accept the participation of China, while the U.S. continues to refuse to recognize the Peking government.

Bandung was a blow at the imperialist-dominated UN, discrediting its claim to speak in the name of the former colonial people, and above all of those that still remain under colonial subjection. This intercontinental conference had to solidarize itself with the aspirations and aims of those peoples who still live under "colonialism in many areas of Asia and Africa under whatever form it may take," thereby spurring this struggle.

The limitations of Bandung found their sharpest expression in the dominant role played by the native capitalist politicians, representing already established governments and interested primarily in maintaining their class in power. Their doctrine of anticolonialism constitutes nothing more than opposition to the direct rule of any country by the imperialist powers. It does not connote the uprooting of all imperialist interests in a subject country, least of all, the driving out of imperialist capital already invested in a country which arises out of its colonial status. On the contrary, as Nehru's India, Sukarno's Indonesia, etc., show, their anticolonialism is completely consistent with the continuance of imperial-

ism's investments in former subject countries.

The anticolonialism of Nehru and the other native bourgeois rulers rejects the revolutionary uprising of subject people against imperialist rule. In this respect the gist of their anticolonial doctrine is reform, i.e., an "orderly" transfer of power by the imperialist rulers. Thus the doctrine of Nehru and similar capitalist politicians not only differs from revolutionary anticolonialism but stands counterposed to it.

From this standpoint Bandung represents an effort by the native bourgeoisies to freeze the colonial revolution within the existing relations and maintain a status quo. Here Peking sees eye to eye with Nehru and the others.

China's emergence as a world power has made the Indian bourgeoisie and other native rulers feel protected in a twofold manner. On the one hand, China's manifest power gives them more bargaining room in relation to the imperialist countries. On the other hand, they use the cover of the Third Chinese Revolution against the masses at home.

Mao's opportunist line helps perpetuate the rule of Nehru and Co. by helping them subjugate the toilers through their bourgeois and petty-bourgeois organizations. In the quest for a status-quo deal with the imperialists the Chinese Stalinists are pursuing abroad the class-collaborationist line of the "bloc of four classes" they pursued for so long at home. It is the traditional foreign policy of Stalinism, subordinating the needs of the masses to the needs of the bureaucracy.

National Struggle—The First Step

National liberation from imperialist rule is indivisible from the permanent revolution. The Third International in its first resolution on the colonial question stated:

"Foreign oppression is a permanent brake upon the free development of every aspect of social life; for this reason the first step of the revolution must be to overthrow foreign rule. To aid the struggle for the overthrow of foreign rule does not mean to underwrite the nationalist aspirations of the native bourgeoisie. It simply means to clear the road for the proletariat in the colonies to emancipate itself." (Second World Congress of the CI, 1920). This prognosis of 35 years ago that national struggle is inseparable from social struggle is the reality of our times.

Historical experience has amply demonstrated that national independence is indeed the prelude to proletarian emancipation. To put it differently, in backward countries it is the first sequence of the permanent revolution. Historical experience has confirmed this conclusively.

In China, following the First Revolution of 1911, the young proletariat did not long delay in coming forth as the challenger to the national bourgeoisie. In the Second Revolution of 1925-27 it made its own bid for power. Even after it lost, the bourgeois counterrevolution proved neither stable nor lasting. The Chinese bourgeoisie, headed by Chiang, could eke out only two more decades. For this borrowed time it was indebted to the Stalinists.

In Indochina the struggle against foreign rule was led virtually from the beginning by a proletarian party, the Trotskyists under the leadership of Ta Thu Thau. This uncompromising revolutionary leadership based itself on the program of the permanent revolution. The Stalinists came into the leadership of Indochina's national revolutionary war by gangster methods. They assassinated the

Trotskyist leaders and imposed class-collaborationism on the movement. They opened the country to the return of the French imperialists; they advocated the incorporation of Vietnam in the French Union. The war of more than eight years that followed did not, however, bring the native bourgeoisie to power. Despite U.S. backing, its rule is shaky in the territory ceded to it by the Geneva agreement.

In Indonesia the organized working class is the most powerful and most decisive force. It is bound to come more and more to the fore as the weak bourgeoisie, whom the Stalinists today sustain in power, demonstrates how powerless it is to solve any of the tasks of the democratic revolution.

In Burma, the native bourgeoisie has assumed power, under a "socialist" cover, and has confronted a civil war. Its chances for stability are not bright.

In Pakistan, which has been carved out of the body of India, the Moslem League, in control of the country from the beginning, has discredited itself, lost its mass following, and rules mainly through its military forces, built up and supported by American imperialism.

Even countries as backward as Kenya prove how much explosive power there is in the national question. Here the British sanctioned a native movement, in the hope of channelizing the social struggle. Instead the social struggle erupted into the armed uprising of the Mau Mau.

Again, in the case of British Guiana, London consented to home-rule, only to move immediately to cancel this concession because a workers' movement gained the ascendancy in the very first elections. In Singapore the same process is asserting itself. The first election resulted in a Labor Party government and the workers underscored this victory by a wave of strikes to improve their working and living conditions.

The Ceylon Experience

In Ceylon the native bourgeoisie no sooner assumed power than its rule was challenged by the toiling masses, led by the Lanka Samasamaja Party (Trotskyist). The Ceylonese bourgeoisie through its ruling party, the UNP, failed to solve a single one of the burning problems facing the country. What is more, the UNP broke its own election promises, cut rice rations, removed the rice subsidy, hiked prices on basic foodstuffs (rice and sugar in particular), raised rail fares, postal rates and the prices of cloth and cheap cigarettes, abolished the free mid-day meal in schools, shut down the milk-feeding centers, etc. Therewith this capitalist government not only lost the confidence of the mass of the people but roused them to anger. The explosion came in the *hartal* of August 12, 1953.

Both the Colombo and Moratuwa Town Halls flew the black flag of the *hartal*. Strikes tied up industry, railways, trams, buses and docks; government and municipal employees joined the *hartal*, so did the University students.

It was countrywide in scope, involving cities, towns and villages in every province. In twenty-four divisions of the Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa provinces, the mass movement reached the level of a mass uprising.

The government in panic invoked "a state of emergency," little different from a declaration of martial law, and prolonged it with the aim of stifling all opposition. The attempt proved unsuccessful.

With the 1953 *hartal*, a new force has entered the

political life of Ceylon—the direct intervention of the masses. As the Ceylonese Trotskyists state: “Our politics hereafter can never be the same as before. The sense of mass power generated in the masses themselves as well as in their opponents ensures this.”

The Ceylonese bourgeoisie is heading toward increasing collision with the masses. The revolutionary challenge to UNP rule far from decreasing is bound to intensify.

India, The Classic Colonial Country

India gives an outward appearance of a country whose native bourgeoisie is strong and stable. At all events, the odds seem to be in its favor.

The Indian bourgeoisie reaped lush profits from the war and expanded its industrial base. It was further reinforced by its retention of control of the national liberation struggle.

From its inception the Congress Party set up arbitrary limits to the struggle. Its goal was an amiable settlement with the British rulers, via petitions, redress-of-grievances campaigns, pleas for reform, etc. When the elemental mass movement took the road of open struggle, Gandhi elaborated a program designed to give an impression of struggle while in reality curbing it.

His doctrine of nonviolence, passive resistance, etc., served to restrain the revolutionary awakening of the Indian peasantry, the first phases of which are marked by passive resistance.

Each time the masses broke through the barriers imposed by Gandhi's policy, the Indian bourgeoisie withdrew from the struggle, denounced the “excesses,” and permitted the British to repress the movement. Amid the wartime crisis of British rule, the spontaneous mass uprising of August 9, 1942, the Stalinists sided with the British imperialists against the insurgent masses, denounced the uprising, and thus bolstered the position of the native bourgeoisie.

Gandhi's policy prevented the Indian masses from driving the British rulers out by revolutionary means. It prolonged British domination and finally facilitated an “orderly” transfer of state power to the native capitalists.

The Indian capitalists today confront the workers and peasants as the country's rulers. To hold power they must carry through agrarian reforms, abolish the massive survivals of feudalism. They must do more. They must industrialize to raise the living standards. India's living standards are among the lowest in the world; her population of 370 million is growing at a rate of 1¼% annually.

To carry out agrarian reforms, and industrialize the country, Nehru would have to mobilize the workers and poor peasants for active support against the landlords, the usurers, the gentry, the princes, the Brahmins and other castes. Nehru must shy away from this. It would unleash the revolution, bringing about the downfall of his own capitalist class. That is why he can do no more than put patches on Indian society; that is why the capitalists must rest instead on an alliance with the feudal exploiters against the poor peasants and workers. The native bourgeoisie cannot break its ties with imperialism, either. It must on the contrary lean more and more upon the imperialists.

In the economic life of India, as of the other former colonies, the world arms race is playing a major role. A

considerable part of India's meager national income is being devoured by militarism. Such expenditures tend to rise because of Washington's aggressive military subsidies to such countries as Pakistan, the Phillipines, Thailand, Turkey, etc. In the interests of self-defense India, just as Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, etc., must keep pace with the growing military strength of their neighbors and rivals. They must unload the costs on the backs of the masses.

The Indian bourgeoisie resorts to nationalizations because private foreign capital dominates the country's economic life. Lacking the necessary funds the native bourgeoisie uses statization in order to develop branches of industry. These nationalized projects and government planning remain entirely within the capitalism framework.

It is planned misery to provide a stabler home base for the native capitalists. India's first 5-year plan set as its target an annual increase of 1% of the *per capita* income, officially estimated at \$60. Needless to say the lion's share of any increase of national income will flow into the coffers of the bourgeoisie.

The imperialists frown upon even such nationalizations; their governments greet the projects with hostility; they threaten to cut off funds and clamp on a general economic and political squeeze. In the end the native government is compelled to retreat. In India's case, the most ambitious part of the plan is to increase steel production fivefold by 1961 (from 1.2 million tons to 6 million). New Delhi “in a move apparently intended to reassure foreign investors . . . decided to allow already established private concerns to expand their steel production” (*New York Times*, June 5, 1955). The Tata family is dickering with the U.S. financiers to boost its output to two million tons a year; the Birla group proposes to boost its output by one million tons, thus assuring in advance that one-half of the projected increased steel output will be in private hands, backed by foreign capital.

The program of “planned economy” on capitalist basis cannot accomplish any of the primary objectives claimed by the capitalists, least of all, lead to socialism, as a Nehru demagogically declaims. It will not gain economic independence from private foreign capital and their governments, who play the decisive role in India's economic life. It cannot develop industry to a level in any way commensurate to the needs of the mass of people, or significantly raise living standards. India's economy and the economies of other former colonial countries must remain primarily producers of food crops and raw materials and must suffer from both the crisis in the advanced countries as well as their own internal crises.

Historical experience has already exhausted nationalizations as a way out for native rulers. Turkey in the interval between the first and second world wars tried nationalizations on a scale beyond that now envisaged by Nehru & Co. Turkey remains today a semicolon of imperialism. Mexico in the course of her national revolution, employed even more drastic measures, namely, nationalization through expropriation of foreign holdings in oil (British and American). And with what results? Today private foreign capital is reentering the Mexican oil industry. The native capitalists can no more escape the domination of finance capital than a small-scale concern can stand up against the big corporations.

The position of the Indian bourgeoisie under Nehru does

not differ essentially from that of the Chinese bourgeoisie under Chiang Kai-shek.

Can Nehru do in India what Chiang Kai-shek couldn't do in China? Chiang, too, started out to industrialize. He, too, introduced nationalizations and "planning." He praised the Russian revolution, and had Russian political and military advisors on his staff, as well as the unqualified support of the Stalinists. Stalin hailed Chiang in terms more laudatory than those Bulganin now bestows on Nehru.

Chiang's failure was not a personal failure. It was the failure of a bourgeoisie relatively weak in regard to the native proletariat; at the same time, it was too weak to withstand the pressure of the imperialists. The Indian bourgeoisie is basically in the same position.

Peking and Moscow are today giving Nehru the appearance of strength and stability. In addition, Nehru has been made a hero by the neutralist petty-bourgeois tendencies in Western Europe because of his foreign policy. He couples the doctrine of anti-colonialism with "peaceful coexistence." To the Indian bourgeoisie, "peaceful coexistence" offers a way out for a class that is caught in a squeeze between decayed imperialism and the permanent revolution. Neutralism is the political expression of the Indian bourgeoisie's fear of the colonial revolution. It is an extension internationally of Gandhi's doctrine of "passive resistance" at home. That is why Nehru welcomes collaboration with Peking and Moscow in foreign policy.

At the same time, he remains irreconcilable against the native Stalinists. He needs completely free hands on the one hand in relation to the workers at home, and on the other, in relation to the imperialists. "Socialist" Nehru wants no obstacles in his way when he moves against the workers to whom his class cannot grant any significant concessions. "Neutralist" Nehru wants no interference when he is ready to turn against Peking and Moscow. Under conditions of "coexistence" the Indian bourgeoisie, together with the other colonial bourgeoisies, would soon discard neutralism and lean more and more upon the imperialists. It would do so for economic as well as political reasons.

For the Indian bourgeoisie, as for all the other native capitalists, the least possible of regimes is that of bourgeois democracy. "Surrounded by decaying capitalism and enmeshed in the imperialist contradictions, the independence of a backward state inevitably will be semifictitious and its political regime, under the influence of internal class contradictions and external pressure, will unavoidably fall into dictatorship against the people—such is the regime of the 'People's' party in Turkey, the Kuomintang in China; Gandhi's [read Nehru's] regime will be similar tomorrow in India" (Trotsky, May 1940).

For the Indian bourgeoisie there is no way out. Its main antagonists are now at home.

There are the peasants. The Indian land problem is more heavily charged than in any other country because of the provincial multiformity of India, the diversified governmental forms and their equally diversified ties with the feudal-caste relations. In India, the tasks of the democratic revolution are saturated with an exceptional revolutionary content precisely because of the massive survival of feudal serfdom, of caste divisions and even of slavery side by side with the irrepressible antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the working class.

The Indian working class is young, but it already has a great tradition of militancy. It is not procapitalist, on the contrary, it is socialist minded. It is highly concentrated and organized. The workers have available the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, for India is now one of the biggest markets for Marxist literature because the bourgeoisie is in no position as yet to prohibit it.

The main obstacle in the workers' path are the Stalinists and the Social Democrats. The road for the success of the native bourgeoisie was cleared by the Kremlin which completely demoralized the workers' vanguard by ascribing to the Indian bourgeoisie a revolutionary role and by the class-collaborationist line of the "People's Front." The brazen Stalinist support of Nehru today will clear the road for class struggle policies and the building of the Trotskyist party in India.

Conclusion

The overwhelming majority of mankind who up to now have been the object of Western politics have proclaimed that henceforward they themselves are on the arena as the subject of politics, as a determining force in the world.

The new class relations in the colonies find their most concentrated expression in India, the classic colonial country. The colonial revolution has up to now been conditioned by this, that the working class in the metropolitan centers has been immobilized by the Stalinist and Social Democratic class-collaborationist bureaucracies. There has thus been no fusion of the liberating struggle of the colonial people and the socialist struggle of the Western workers. To cite one instance, while the French bourgeoisie was waging for more than eight years a losing war in Indo-China, the Social Democrats and the Stalinists in France assured the imperialist bourgeoisie social peace at home.

The national bourgeoisies have been aided thereby. Moreover in countries such as India, the Socialists and the Stalinists played a major role in immobilizing the native proletariat, paving the way for Nehru's ascendancy. The national bourgeoisies have likewise been able to take advantage of the temporary stalemate between imperialism and the Soviet bloc, and their being wooed by both the Stalinists and the imperialists.

In defense of their interests and particularly in the interests of military self-defense, the Peking and Moscow bureaucracies are quite capable of undertaking progressive measures, especially so in periods of open rift with the imperialists. But in defense of the self-same bureaucratic interests, they will, as they have systematically demonstrated, sacrifice and betray the revolutionary masses and their own Stalinist parties for the sake of diplomatic agreements with the imperialists.

Right now the buildup they are giving Nehru, their prostration before him, is cutting the Indian CP to ribbons, as witness the March 1955 defeat suffered in the Andhra elections by the Indian CP. It had excellent chances of winning control of the Andhra provincial government until Peking and Moscow pulled the rug from under the CP and assured victory to the Congress Party.

People's Frontism can be invested with a semblance of plausibility in the eyes of the masses in the course of struggle against colonial rule. But once the national bourgeoisie assumes power the bankruptcy of class-collaborationism is quickly laid bare.

There is no material basis for class-collaborationism in colonial countries. The traditional labor bureaucracies in advanced countries can impose such policies so long as the imperialist bourgeoisie is able to raise living standards and grant reforms. Impoverished backward countries cannot afford it. This tends to invest the struggles of the colonial proletariat with the sharpest forms, and renders colonial workers all the more ready to follow the leadership of the revolutionary party. Events are proving this in Ceylon.

In Ceylon a revolutionary mass party is on the scene. Three forces come into play therewith. First, as against the LSSP neither the native bourgeoisie nor the Stalinists can hope to control or decisively influence the workers or the mass movement. "Secondly, the Stalinists have no disguise for their reformist policies. In Ceylon everytime the CP turns toward collaboration with the capitalist class," say the Ceylonese Trotskyists, "the LSSP, with its policy of consistent class struggle, is able to expose the CP before the masses as a betrayer of the working class and the mass movement. Indeed the masses themselves discover the betrayal." Finally, there is a third and even more fundamental force. "The aim of the new CP line is impossible of achievement. The capitalist class of Ceylon

despite any protestation from any quarter, cannot be kept neutral in a war between imperialism on the one side and the USSR and the associated states on the other."

With their opportunist line the Stalinists will come into ever greater collision with the insurgent masses. Right now the French CP is in open conflict with the embattled Algerian movement of national liberation. At the 1955 May Day meeting held by the French Stalinists at Vincennes, outside Paris, the Algerian workers walked out in a body when they were refused a speaker of their own choice; the Stalinists gave the platform instead to a right-wing Algerian conciliationist.

It is to the credit of the French Trotskyists that they have come to the fore as the only consistent militant fighters against French colonialism in North Africa.

The next stage will witness ever growing conflict between the masses and the ruling national bourgeoisie. In this conflict will be forged the leadership for workers' emancipation. It will not come from the defenders of the status quo but only from the partisans of the permanent revolution.

The Fourth International has every reason to look forward with optimism toward the growth of the Trotskyist parties in the colonies.

3. "The Soviet Union Today" (August 12, 1955—reprinted from SWP Discussion Bulletin A-33)

World War II and the decade of cold war have confirmed the class nature of the Soviet Union as a degenerated workers' state. The October 1917 conquests of the permanent revolution on Russian soil have survived despite and against the nationalist bureaucracy. The evolution of Soviet society remains *internally* determined by the conflict between the ruling caste and the needs and interests of the Soviet masses; *externally* the most fundamental social contradiction is between the USSR and world capitalism.

The Stalinist bureaucracy has been compelled to defend the Soviet economic foundation in its own way, with its own methods, and in its own interests. Its primary aim was and is to defend its positions of power, privilege and revenues as a caste that has expropriated the Soviet workers politically. The Soviet workers, like the advanced workers internationally, defended the USSR in an entirely different way and with diametrically opposite aims. They safeguarded the revolutionary conquests in order to expand them beyond the Soviet borders; they fought to extend not the privileges of the bureaucracy but the socialist revolution; they aimed not at a new status quo but the abolition of world capitalism and the institution of the world socialist order.

While the Soviet masses and the bureaucracy were striking together at the same enemy, they remained nevertheless in uninterrupted conflict during the war and the cold war.

Soviet Masses and the Bureaucracy

The mass of the people, the workers in the vanguard, rallied to the defense of the October conquests; the

bureaucracy rallied to continue its war against the permanent revolution. When the disastrous defeats in the initial phases of the war compelled the arming of the masses, the bureaucracy proceeded at the same time to mobilize every reactionary force: The chauvinist "Holy Russia" campaign and equally poisonous anti-German campaign, the institution of a super-privileged officer caste, the militarization of the entire bureaucracy including the diplomatic staff, the state sponsorship of the Orthodox Church, etc.

In wartime the Soviet workers en masse performed miracles on production lines; the bureaucracy responded by intensifying the differentiation in workers' ranks, spurring the growth of privileged layers. The mass zeal to sacrifice continued through the reconstruction period; so did the bureaucracy's maneuvers to consolidate its oppressive rule.

The oppressed nationalities tried to seize the opportunity of the war to liberate themselves. The bureaucracy replied with totalitarian reprisals against the Ukrainians, the Poles, the Baltic nationalities, the Volga Germans, the Kazaks, the Chechens, and other Georgian and Central Asian nationalities. This struggle, too, continued into the postwar period. It cannot be repressed.

The new postwar moods, the demands for better living and working conditions, for the relaxation of the totalitarian regime, etc., are peacetime expressions of the inner urge of Soviet society to get rid of the Stalinist incubus. The opposition to the regime is strikingly expressed in the growth of political prisoners.

The Revolution in Permanence

The destiny of the Soviet Union was decided not on the military map alone but on the map of the class struggle.

The 1917 revolution proved its vitality when after the first defeats, the Soviet masses rallied for the struggle at the fronts and on the production lines. In Hitler's rear, in Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, France, etc. the partisans did more to demoralize and disintegrate the Nazis than the strategic bombing raids and other military actions undertaken by the "democratic" imperialists. The Third Chinese Revolution stymied the cold war and the preparations for the all-out assault upon the USSR.

The 1917 revolution proved its dynamism over again when the Soviet economic forms extended beyond the Soviet borders, into eight European countries, into China, North Korea, North Vietnam. One-third of the human race has abolished capitalism. The proletarian revolution which started on Russian soil could not be contained despite the imperialists and the Stalinists. It has proved its permanence. It has proved that October 1917 is only the prelude of a world process which leads inexorably to the socialist triumph. The Kremlin bureaucracy has fought the theory of the permanent revolution savagely and has carried on a systematic war of annihilation against its partisans. Owing to the crisis of proletarian leadership, the Stalinist bureaucracy has been able to disorient and defeat the workers of the advanced countries and in this way prevent the fusion of their struggle for socialism with the workers' struggle in the Soviet Union.

The Kremlin disarmed the workers in France and Italy and handed state power back to the capitalist class of France and Italy. The very first defeats of the Hitlerites opened the way for the German workers to rise; the Kremlin appealed not to the workers but to dissident Nazi generals. The victory of the USSR over Hitler could have assured the rise of a Communist Germany. Stalin & Co. averted this by quartering the country, using the bayonets of the occupation forces to suppress the German workers. They fear the advanced proletariat no less than do the imperialists, and for the same reason. The Western workers can and will carry out the socialist revolution. They will tolerate neither the rule of imperialism nor that of Stalinism. The East German workers have demonstrated the manner in which the advanced European working class will deal with the bureaucracy.

By defeating the advanced workers, the bureaucracy has been able, as Trotsky put it, to warm its hands at the fires of revolution. Under duress of imperialist attack it has permitted revolutionary successes to be scored only in countries where it was in a position to beat the masses back and impose its rule.

The Extension of Soviet Economic Forms into Europe

At the outbreak of World War II, the Kremlin's aims were limited by considerations of military self-defense. They led to the Hitler-Stalin pact which was supposed to keep the Soviet Union out of the war, allow the bureaucracy to play quartermaster to Hitlerite Germany; and by way of payment for the services and as safeguards against attack, permit the occupation of the Baltic countries, Western Ukraine, etc.

With the Soviet victory over Hitler, the Kremlin obtained East Europe as its sphere of influence in return for guaranteeing capitalism in West Europe. Up to February 1948 the Kremlin bureaucrats sought to exploit these

countries on a capitalist basis, in collaboration with the native bourgeoisies and the imperialists.

They improvised. They confiscated German assets as war booty, along with the property of the native collaborators; they imposed reparations. Some plants were dismantled; others were continued in operation under Soviet ownership or through joint stock companies.

Despite the bureaucracy's efforts, the conflict between capitalist relations and Soviet economic forms could not be avoided. Stalinist betrayals in Western Europe, the liquidation of the civil war in Greece, withdrawal from Iran, etc., were not enough for imperialism. American imperialists in alliance with the West European capitalists launched their cold war against the USSR, in preparation for World War III. The bureaucracy found itself under direct fire: the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the threat of military assault coupled with economic blockade. The booting out of the Stalinists from the French and Italian cabinets meant the untying of the hands of the bourgeoisie for the projected onslaught. In self-defense, the Soviet bureaucracy had no choice except to wrench loose the countries of Eastern Europe from their dependence on imperialism.

The wrenching of one-half of Europe from the capitalist orbit had to be carried out as an emergency operation. It placed heavy burdens upon the masses in the satellite countries.

Responsible for the economies of East European countries, the Kremlin had to dismantle the improvised structure previously rigged up. The bureaucracy could substitute no economic forms other than Soviet forms. The Stalinists were compelled to destroy capitalism. They could do so only by bureaucratic-military means. They had prevented the masses from taking power and abolishing capitalism when the Soviet armies entered these countries; they maintained capitalist relations and cohabited with capitalist politicians with the aid of Soviet bayonets. When a turnabout was imposed on them by the assault of the imperialists, they provided an impulsion to the mobilization of the workers, restricted it carefully throughout, and set up the rule of their native agents.

The Moscow oligarchy understands that it cannot rule in the satellite countries except through native representatives. But the asset of puppet regimes is negated by this, that the native Stalinists have little standing and less mass support in their respective countries, a liability that is bound to become more and more pronounced in the future.

With the extension of Soviet economic forms the Kremlin bureaucracy found itself improvising substitute means for directing, developing, and coordinating the economic life of half of Europe. This, in its turn, gave rise to a new set of relations, obligations, responsibilities, and new contradictions for the Stalinist bureaucracy. On the USSR's western borders there were no longer capitalist, predominantly agricultural countries, but nationalities who economically as well as traditionally, by their customs and living standards had been integrated with Western Europe but now severed from it. This aggravates the decay of European imperialism and at the same time generates new centrifugal forces against Stalinist rule in the USSR.

Control over half of Europe poses directly the question of organizing the whole of Europe. The retention in Eastern Europe of national boundaries, national currencies, tariff

walls, etc., brings to the fore the long delayed need of the Balkan Federation. Again, the conflict of Great Russian bureaucrats with the oppressed nationalities has now been extended to seven other countries. The bureaucratic methods of rule and administration weigh most heavily on these newly acquired territories.

The Kremlin is the chief obstacle in the way of federating the countries of Eastern Europe; it is the chief force imposing the retention of national boundaries between these countries as well as retaining the frontiers between them and the Soviet Union. The self-interest of the bureaucracy dictates this course. By atomizing these countries the Great Russian chauvinists are enabled to subordinate them politically, militarily, and economically to their rule. The rise of revolutionary China makes this reactionary course all the more indispensable. Federation with undeveloped China they wish to avoid at all costs.

In Eastern Europe the well-to-do peasants remain dominant in agriculture while the collectives play a subordinate role. The clash between the capitalist relations in the countryside and nationalized industry cannot be indefinitely postponed. A head-on collision between the bureaucracy and the peasantry still lies ahead.

The workers in the satellite countries have rich revolutionary traditions; their living and working standards have been higher than those the bureaucracy imposes on them; they are smarting under the double oppression of native parasites operating under orders of a foreign bureaucracy. Their dissatisfaction and resistance has already reached the point of open conflict (strikes, demonstrations, underground activity, etc.). The showdown between the bureaucracy and the workers likewise lies ahead.

The Yugoslav Revolution and the Kremlin

The Yugoslav revolution, erupting simultaneously with Hitler's assault upon the USSR, developed a tempo independent of the Kremlin's course and policy. The Soviet bureaucracy sabotaged the Yugoslav revolution not simply in the interests of their alliance with the "democratic" imperialists, but above all from fear lest World War II be transformed into the proletarian revolution. With the end of the hostilities, the Yugoslav revolution tended to become a pole of attraction to the Eastern European countries. Particularly so in the Balkans, where the slogan for the formation of the Balkan-Danubian Federation came close to becoming realized in life. The Kremlin was alarmed.

The proletarian nature of the Yugoslav revolution worried the Soviet bureaucracy the most. At a time when elsewhere in Eastern Europe the Kremlin was busy improvising coexistence policies with the capitalists, the revolution in Yugoslavia passed over to the destruction of capitalist relations. After a long series of maneuvers to "peacefully contain" the Yugoslavs (permeation by secret police, imposition of restrictive trade agreements, pressure through the Cominform, etc.), the Kremlin broke with Belgrade and clamped on an economic blockade, suspending in the background the threat of military assault. From 1948 to as late as 1952 the Kremlin convulsed the East European countries by a series of blood purges. It broke with Belgrade to free its hands in preventing the masses from entering the political arena while the destruction of capitalism was accomplished by bureaucratic-military means; it used the method of blood purge to crush any

potential opposition, notions of independence or critical voices.

The split with the Titoites and the purges in Eastern Europe were required by the bureaucratic caste in order to preserve its domination and privileges. The Kremlin bureaucrats sacrificed Yugoslavia to consolidate their grip on the satellite countries. They suffered a defeat in Yugoslavia; the Tito regime survived all their attacks and machinations.

Today the Kremlin has new requirements, flowing from the consolidation of the Mao regime in China, the integration of satellite economies with Soviet economy, the defeats of imperialism in Korea and Indochina, and the resulting opportunities to arrive at new agreements with the thwarted imperialists.

Yugoslavia again plays a key role in the plans of the bureaucracy. Belgrade has found a way to coexist with the imperialists, which is what the Kremlin now seeks to find itself. Coexistence with Yugoslavia is a bridge for the Kremlin's coexistence with the imperialists. From this standpoint the Kremlin now needs Belgrade as a means of linking with the West.

Khrushchev & Co. likewise woo Tito & Co. out of consideration of their new world position and problems. A hostile Yugoslavia is not only a military but a political threat in the Balkans. The closer the Titoites are drawn into their orbit, the less danger is there of a rival pole of attraction in Europe. To the Kremlin rulers the popularity of the Titoites is well worth a price, all the more so because the Titoites have demonstrated throughout that they are in no sense to the left of the Soviet bureaucracy. Having gained a partner in the Peking bureaucracy, the Kremlin is not adverse to a junior partner in Belgrade, especially since this partner can easily be made economically dependent.

By telling the world they look with favor on Yugoslavia, Khrushchev & Co. indicate that they would likewise favor China's trading and establishing links with the West; and, naturally, the satellite countries as well.

Under coexistence the puppet regimes require a semblance of "national sovereignty," "equality," and the like. With housebroken native CPs and with these countries economically integrated, the Kremlin feels it can afford to grant the satellite bureaucracies a little more elbow room.

The Soviet bureaucracy has repeatedly demonstrated its capacity for compromise and power-to-power deals. It compromises with the imperialists. It compromised with Chiang Kai-shek when he was in power. Within the international Stalinist apparatus it is sharing power with Peking. It compromises with Belgrade. It has not compromised, and never will, with the permanent revolution. The one force it cannot share power with is the working class.

The Chinese Revolution and the Kremlin

The Soviet bureaucracy's policy toward the Third Chinese Revolution was dictated in the first instance by its own narrow caste interests. It was calculated to bring immediate, practical benefits. Stalin aided the Chiang regime against the Japanese invasion in the late thirties; at Yalta he pledged to support Chiang in return for territorial and economic concessions. As late as January 1949 Stalin, Mao & Co. still sought a coalition government with the moribund Kuomintang regime. Throughout the civil war, the Kremlin's conduct was such that the

imperialists could find no fault with it. That Stalin expected U.S. imperialism to win in China by backing Chiang was admitted by him in 1948 to Tito.

Banking on Chiang's victory and assured in advance that it could claim some credit and receive some payment for it, the bureaucracy maintained close ties with its trusted agents, Mao & Co. The Chinese Stalinists were a valuable asset for the Kremlin. In control by 1947 of an area with over 80,000,000 population and with powerful armed force under their command, they represented an important factor in international power politics and a weighty bargaining piece in international diplomacy. They were in a position to tie up Chiang militarily and obstruct his functioning as an auxiliary force for the imperialists in the event of war. Short of war, the Kremlin aimed to tie up Chiang politically by means of a coalition government in which he would be dependent on the support of the CCP.

This game of working both sides of the street blew up when Chiang launched his all-out assault against the CCP at a time when the U.S. was stepping up its cold war against the USSR. When all efforts at compromise with the Kuomintang failed and the rotted regime collapsed, the Kremlin started to readjust itself to this unforeseen situation.

Revolutionary China was now on the Soviet Far East borders; the trusted agents of yesterday now wielded state power in the world's most populous country. Unlike the puppet regimes of Eastern Europe, they could neither be dictated to nor purged.

In the case of China, the Kremlin had to adjust itself to dealings with a partner. The Soviet bureaucracy was able to make this adjustment without a serious crisis, because it was in a position to exploit the imperialist hostility to the Chinese revolution. In relation to China, the Soviet bureaucracy pursued a twofold aim: to contain the Third Chinese Revolution within the national boundaries and to clamp a grip on China which would enable the Kremlin to maintain its primacy in order, later on, to bargain with the imperialists for a new status quo.

The Korean war, while imposing considerable burdens on the Kremlin, made China dependent on Moscow militarily; China's industrial needs have made her still more dependent economically. The bureaucracy will continue to use the USSR's world position and industrial might to keep China more and more dependent militarily and economically.

But revolutionary China, leaning upon the Soviet Union, imposes obligations, tasks, and strains the Kremlin bureaucracy never sought, but must now fulfill. Nor is China's dependence episodic or ephemeral. China's industrialization problems and difficulties are henceforward superimposed on the industrial contradictions and difficulties of the bureaucracy at home. Precisely at a time when the Soviet masses are pressing for improvements in their living and working conditions, for more consumer goods, the bureaucracy must cope with China's needs of heavy industrial goods.

In adjusting itself to revolutionary China, the bureaucracy, as usual, has pursued immediate, practical aims, seeking to derive maximum benefits at minimal risk under each given set of circumstances. But now the circumstances are such as to aggravate the unfolding crisis of Stalinist rule in the Soviet Union.

The Dynamism of Soviet Industry

The Soviet Union's rise to the position of a modern industrial power, second only to the U.S., demonstrates the incomparable superiority of Soviet productive forms and relations. Industrially, the USSR has far outstripped the capitalist countries of Europe. Its tempos of growth are without parallel. The dynamism of Soviet industrial development constitutes a mortal challenge to rotted capitalism, in the first place, the USA.

Compared with prewar levels capital investments in Soviet industry has quintupled. There has been an increase ranging from threefold to sevenfold in the production of oil, cement, coal, and steel. The most striking expansion has taken place in the production of electric power which has grown more than 37-fold. In 1935 there were 95 Soviet power stations generating 4.35 billion kwh. In 1955, five major installations are scheduled for completion—the hydroelectric plants at Molotov, Gorki, Kuibyshev, Stalingrad, and Kakhovka—which will add over 24 billion kwh annually, or more than three-quarters of Italy's annual production (31.9 billion kwh). The Soviet machine-building industry is surpassed quantitatively only by the USA; in some branches Soviet machine-building matches the American. The Soviet nuclear plant and development is similarly up-to-date.

Per capita production has indeed lagged but here, too, notable progress has been recorded. Steel per capita output is nearly 400 lbs. as against the prewar output of 140 lbs. per person; 1.7 tons of coal were produced per capita in 1954 as against 0.7 tons in 1934 (comparable U.S. per capita figures for steel and coal production are approximately three to four times as large).

Marxism has demonstrated its correctness not alone in theory but in terms of steel, coal, electric power, and so on. There can no longer be a serious debate over which is more productive—capitalism or the new economic forms established by the 1917 Russian revolution.

The extension of Soviet economic forms into Eastern Europe affords evidence of the same dynamism. These countries have recorded growth of 42 percent (coal production) to 84 percent and 93 percent (steel and electric power respectively). Compared with these tempos the progress of the most vigorous capitalist country in Europe today—Western Germany—offers a picture of relative stagnation.

The Soviet Union's New World Role

World capitalism which proved impotent to crush the first victory of the permanent revolution on Russian soil, or of containing it thereafter within Soviet borders, today faces that revolution as a challenger to capitalist domination of the world.

The USSR's new world role is strikingly disclosed by its altered position in world trade. Prior to the war the Soviet share of world trade was confined to one-fiftieth and less of the total, as against Czarist Russia's share of around 4 percent. Soviet postwar world trade has leaped to almost three times the prewar levels, increasing from 2½ percent in 1937 to 7.1 percent in 1953. The share of the Soviet bloc countries is naturally bigger having grown from 6.1 percent in 1948 to 10.4 percent in 1953. To be sure, roughly four-fifths of this trade is carried on within the Soviet bloc; but this only serves to point up the severe losses incurred by imperialism.

From an economy reduced to a fiftieth dole or less of the world trade, imperialism had little to fear. Moreover, prewar Soviet economy was an exporter of food crops and raw materials while importing primarily machinery. In contrast the Soviet Union plays today a key role in the world economy. When, at the turn of this century, capitalist Germany captured 10.8 percent of the world trade, imperialist rivalry reached the breaking point and precipitated the struggle to redivide the world. (On the eve of World War I Germany controlled 12.6 percent of world trade.) This was in the era of imperialist ascent. In the epoch of decay, imperialism is even less able to tolerate a rival economy of the power of the Soviet bloc, based, moreover, on an antipathetic mode of production.

The dynamism of the Soviet economic system inexorably brings the Soviet Union into collision with the imperialists. At the same time this dynamism attracts the colonial masses and makes them determined to emulate Soviet industrialization. The countries rising from colonial status offer the Soviet bloc avenues for tapping the world resources. In return for food crops, raw materials, strategic commodities, etc., these countries possess in abundance, the Kremlin is able to offer capital goods, industrial equipment, arms, technical aid, limited loans, and so on.

The position of the USSR as the second world power places the Kremlin in a position to respond to these aspirations of the colonial people.

This new interrelation the bureaucracy has sought to exploit in pursuit of the status quo. Such offers as tractors, steel mills, and similar equipment to India and other countries, at a time when China is in need of as much plants and machinery as the Soviet Union is able to supply, serves one purpose above all the rest: it is an economic weapon to impress imperialism with the need of getting along with the bureaucracy. Economic collaboration is both a threat and an offer; a threat of economic penetration into the colonial countries, including Latin America; an offer to withdraw such intervention once coexistence is reached, i.e., respective spheres of influence to be mutually honored economically, militarily, and politically.

Soviet overseas trade is inimical to imperialism not only because of a potential threat to its markets and sources of raw materials but also because it offers the colonial sector of world capitalism a rival pole of attraction.

Soviet Dependence on World Economy

The danger of military attack is only one expression of the dependence of the USSR on the rest of the world. Still another is the threat of economic aggression.

In addition to economic blockade, U.S. imperialism has forced upon the USSR an arms race, the need not to fall behind in armaments, nuclear and conventional alike.

The Kremlin has been obliged to divert an increasing share of the national income for the production of the means of destruction. The strain thus imposed on Soviet economy may be gauged by the annual appropriations for defense as compared with state investments in heavy industry. Since 1952 the Soviet defense budget has swallowed some 110 billion rubles a year; in 1954 there was a cut of about 10 percent only to be followed in 1955 by a 12 percent hike. State investments in heavy industry, on the other hand, amounted to less than 80 billion rubles in 1954, and to 93.5 billion in 1955, that is, 25 to 30 billion

rubles a year less than have gone into the arms race.

Defense orders take priority and tend to dislocate the development of industry as a whole. They necessitate a diversion of the labor force and aggravate an already acute labor shortage. The burden falls directly upon the mass of the people whose living standards are impaired.

The economies of China and the satellite countries are put under analogous pressures by the arms race. Moreover, their key military requirements must likewise be met by Soviet industry. The USSR is the main arsenal for China. In the military field, as in others, the Kremlin is henceforth obliged to plan and produce not within the old Soviet framework but on a multinational scale.

The American imperialists need the arms race as the principal prop of capitalist economy; the Soviet bloc, in the first instance the USSR, finds it a drain on their resources and an obstacle to economic progress.

* * *

The stormy growth of Soviet industry, instead of diminishing, has increased the USSR's dependence on the world economy. Soviet industry depends on trade to a greater extent than ever before.

The Stalinist doctrine of "two parallel world markets" represents an attempt by the bureaucracy to justify theoretically its nationalist policies in the USSR's new world position. This bureaucratic construction stands counterposed to the permanent revolution just as the theory of "socialism in one country" does. It flies in the face of reality. The economies of the USSR, China, and the satellite countries form not a parallel but an antagonistic mode of production.

The extension of Soviet economic forms into China and over half of Europe; the new tasks assumed by Soviet economy, especially because of China's industrialization, act to reinforce still further the dependence of the Soviet bloc on the rest of the world.

But capitalism remains dominant in the world economy. The Soviet bloc controls only a fraction of the world productive forces, raw materials, and foodstuffs. The economic preponderance remains on the side of the imperialists. This subordinate economic position cannot be altered by Stalinist concepts of building self-sufficient "socialist" economies within the national borders of China, of the satellite countries, and the Soviet Union and in this manner catching up and outstripping both the USA and Western Europe. Only the intervention of the world revolution can settle the issue of whether the world economy shall remain, as before, ruled by the imperialists, or organized by the only class that can succeed the bourgeoisie, the world working class.

Capitalism has engaged in two wars to redivide the world. To survive, it must reconquer the lost one-third; capitalism in two-thirds of our planet is as utopian as socialism in the other third. On the other hand, events have proved that neither imperialism nor Stalinism is able to contain the permanent revolution.

For the world proletariat and the insurgent colonial masses, a program of "coexistence" runs up against their needs and interests; and can be imposed upon them in the last analysis only by their political immaturity, lack of mass revolutionary organization and leadership. For the imperialists, coexistence is a temporary expedient. They gain a breathing spell to stabilize their positions; they are

offered the services of the bureaucracy to subjugate the class struggle at home and in the colonies; they seek at the same time to consolidate their forces for the all-out assault on the Soviet bloc. For the bureaucracy alone coexistence is not a means to an end, but an end in itself, namely, to perpetuate its own existence.

The Aggrandized Bureaucracy

The Kremlin political gangsters now stand at the head of a powerful array of countries whose mode of production is in irrepressible conflict with capitalism. The bureaucracy lives in dread of the revolutionary implications, the international conflicts inherent in this situation. The Kremlin is eager to hold on to its gains at all costs and not to run the risk of revolutionary "adventures." This is why the organic course of its foreign policy is a quest for coexistence. The tactics the bureaucracy employs may vary at any given moment, running the gamut from crass opportunism to unbridled adventurism. But the goal remains one and the same: to attain a status quo with the capitalist environment.

Today the status quo entails the recognition by the imperialist rulers of the aggrandized bureaucracy, the expansion of its rule, power and privileges. It further entails mutual guarantees against attack and the acceptance of the bureaucracy as equals in world councils. The "liberal" airs assumed by the bureaucracy conform to this new position it aspires to hold in the domain of capitalist diplomacy.

For more than three decades a totalitarian caste has ruled the Soviet Union. It is a declassed petty-bourgeois stratum of a special type, special because the process to which it owes its origin was likewise previously unknown, i.e., the degeneration of a proletarian revolution. After Lenin's death, the bureaucracy exploited the social antagonisms, internationally and internally, to expropriate the Soviet workers politically, and usurp state power.

It consolidated itself as a ruling caste; the power being concentrated in a narrow inner circle, with the intermediate and lower echelons rigidly controlled from above. The caste consciously excludes the masses from intervening in any field of social activity. Within every layer of Soviet society it promotes differentiation, a differentiation based on granting privileges to a few at the expense of the overwhelming majority. Within its own ranks the caste likewise fosters differentiation, ranging from the low-paid functionaries at the base to a handful of chiefs at the apex of the bureaucratic pyramid. The whole monstrous structure is imposed on the mass of the people and safeguarded from them by a system of repressions unexampled in history.

Aggrandized in point of numbers as well as in point of privileges, this caste today confronts the Soviet and world working class. Far from diminishing, its fear of the masses has on the contrary increased. Far from feeling more secure the usurping caste feels more jittery than ever.

It is spurring the differentiation of Soviet society in the extreme, widening the chasm between itself and the people. The one thing that the universally hated rulers are still able to exploit is the justified fear of the Soviet masses of imperialist aggression. The war and the cold war was a key factor in the growth of the Soviet military caste and in bringing to the fore political generals like Bulganin and professional militarists like Zhukov. The position and

weight of the officer caste within the bureaucracy has notably increased.

An impersonal machine from its origin, the bureaucracy's essential need is to camouflage the very fact of its existence as a ruthless, cynical, privileged minority, blocking the road to socialism. Stalin was the product of this bureaucratic machine and not the other way around. Stalin's death has altered fundamentally nothing as regards the inner needs, interests, and operation of its power machine, least of all its method of rule and relations with the masses. That this faceless apparatus rules by creatures of its own creation, suited to the exigencies of the situation, has been amply demonstrated in the post-Stalin period.

The difference between the regime under Stalin and under his successors boils down to the difference in the tasks of the bureaucracy in the period when Lenin died as against the period when Stalin died. To entrench the bureaucracy in power it was necessary to exterminate all the revolutionary generations of October, the Leninist cadres, the Bolshevik party as a whole and the Communist International; it was necessary to crush the resistance of the masses, to destroy the Soviets, the trade unions, and all other mass organizations, to despoil the people of the political conquests of the revolution. The nature of these tasks brought to the fore the hangman's role, for which Stalin was so suited. Stalin's personal traits expressed most adequately the needs of the bureaucracy at the time. Stalin's successors rest on his labors and heritage. The hecatombs he presided over are the foundation of their power. Their task is to preserve the bureaucratic edifice intact, to perpetuate their expanded privileges and revenues. This makes them anxious to cover up the bloody past, to cast a veil over their coercive rule and don the mask of "liberalism." No one in the Soviet Union is deceived. The mass of the people do not draw any fine distinctions between Stalin's regime and that of his henchmen.

The masses showed no concern when Stalin died or when the trio of Malenkov-Beria-Molotov fell to be succeeded by the trio of Khrushchev-Bulganin-Zhukov. The publicity campaign to make the faceless successors known came in the wake of their elevation to top posts. The shifts at the top alter nothing in the incessant pressure exerted by the bureaucracy upon the workers and peasants.

A Bonapartist regime of crisis, the bureaucracy balances itself between the proletarian revolution and decayed imperialism. It exploits the revolutionary struggle of the masses to demonstrate how indispensable it is to world imperialism for the maintenance of the status quo.

Geneva

Throughout the postwar decade of cold war the bureaucracy's central aim was to arrive at top level agreements with the imperialists, the USA in particular. Every agency at its command from the puppet regimes through the native CPs down to the countless "peace movements," was mobilized to achieve the yearned-for rapprochement. It sought to exploit every postwar revolutionary explosion toward the same purpose. It celebrated the July 1955 Geneva Conference as a crowning achievement.

On the part of the USA, Geneva constitutes a belated recognition that the revolutionary conquests in Asia and

the extension of Soviet economic forms into half of Europe cannot be overthrown militarily at the present time.

The American imperialists have reluctantly decided to suspend the cold war. It has brought them all that they can expect to gain (consolidation of Western Europe under the aegis of Washington; retention of capitalism throughout the colonial sector under the rule of native capitalists, under puppet rule, or colonial domination). They have achieved a relative stabilization of the world market, with U.S. foreign trade dominant in it. They have militarized at home and throughout the capitalist world, with the militarization of Japan and Western Germany under way. The world arms program and the corresponding inflation has fed the current worldwide capitalist boom. This has permitted the Western bourgeoisies to rule in their own name and with the aid of the Stalinists and Social Democrats to demoralize the workers and impose on them low living and working standards.

From a prolongation of the cold war American imperialism risks to lose more than it can gain. The risks fall under three main headings: 1) the danger of the extension of the Chinese revolution; 2) the undermining of the position of native bourgeoisies in the former colonial countries; 3) potential rifts in the imperialist alignment. These and other considerations are impelling the imperialists to accept the status quo for the time being.

While reaping profits from the present world boom, the imperialists reckon on gaining a powerful ally to safeguard social peace. The bureaucracy, in Moscow as in Peking, as in Belgrade, will spare no effort in collaborating with the imperialists to subjugate the workers and the colonial masses through their far-flung agencies.

Geneva was a formal manifestation of mutual desire, for different reasons, to suspend the cold war but not a single practical agreement was reached. This was due to the explosive charges which are lodged in such issues as the unification of Germany, of Korea, of Indochina or the question of Formosa. It suits the bureaucracy and the imperialists to discuss remoter problems such as East-West coexistence, trade, tourism, control of nuclear weapons, reduction of armaments, and the like. Both sides agree to relegate to an indefinite future all the touchy problems. Meanwhile, lavish parties, state visits, and handshakes amid pledges of good-will serve as substitutes for tangible agreements.

In the final analysis, the rapprochement signalled by Geneva, has been brought about by the threat of the permanent revolution. The defense of the status quo is directed in the first instance against the world working class and the colonial masses. The imperialists can, as they have, get together with the bureaucracy, but never with the proletarian revolution.

The Soviet Proletariat

The Soviet proletariat is today the second largest in the world. The working class in Eastern European countries is likewise experiencing a stormy growth. Since 1948 the proletariat in these countries has increased by more than four million, at an average annual rate of 7 percent.

In 1928, the year prior to the introduction of the first five-year plan, the workers in the USSR numbered 10.8 million. The official total for 1954 is 47 million. The Soviet working class has thus grown more than fourfold. In the

last five years, the rate of growth has averaged 1.7 million annually, or almost 4 percent, roughly double the rate the population as a whole is growing.

In prewar years the expansion of the labor force took place primarily through conscripting the rural youth, with the trainees in the factory and trade schools averaging a million and more a year. This is no longer the case. In the last five years these drafts have provided approximately one-third (340,000), the prewar number, with the bulk of new recruits coming from urban centers.

The working class has grown in experience and skills. In recent years the number of workers trained on the jobs, acquiring higher skills, etc. has averaged 7.6 million, or from 16 to 17 out of every hundred. A large proportion of the unskilled is composed of women whom the bureaucracy has reduced to a degraded status in Soviet society, with the women among the oppressed nationalities, especially those of Central Asia, degraded the most.

The specific weight of the youth in industry is high. In his July 4, 1955, report to the plenum of the Central Committee of the Russian party, Bulganin estimated that the youth constitutes "about half of the workers" in the plants. This dominance of the youth in industry is the more telling because the Soviet people as a whole are young. Admiral Kirk, former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, testified as follows:

"The people in Russia are young; the average is probably between 31 and 35, and that is young. The former rulers, aristocrats, businessmen, industrialists are all gone—finished. The new race springs from the soil and from the city workers. . . . It is a country undergoing a tremendous development and change, things which require the enthusiasm, the strength, the vitality of youth—and Russia has them." (*Look Magazine*, April 22, 1952).

The youth of the Soviet working class, apparent even to a hostile observer, fills the bureaucracy with dread. Its need for social masquerade is accentuated by the rising generations of young workers, predominantly city-bred, enthusiastic, strong, vital, who abhor capitalism and who are ambitious to advance toward the free socialist society but who run up at every step against the bureaucratic rule.

The cultural levels and demands of the workers have risen. One index of higher culture is the rise in paper consumption. In 1935 it amounted to less than four kilograms per person as against 8½ kilos in 1954, or more than double. But it is precisely these higher needs that the bureaucracy has not and cannot satisfy. The expansion of consumer goods production has been commensurate to neither the growth of industry nor the growth of the proletariat and its culture. Comparative movements in their living conditions have whetted the mass appetite for more substantial gains.

The output of shoes has tripled. As against ½ pair of leather shoes per person in 1935, nearly 1½ pairs per person were produced in 1954. In cotton print, which serves the mass of the people for both winter and summer wear, the increase has been only 90 percent—16 meters per person in 1935 as compared with 27½ meters in 1954. In contrast, woolen cloth, priced within the reach of only the privileged, has more than doubled in output, leaping from less than ½ meter per person in 1935, to 1 1/5 meters in 1954. The production of silk, likewise earmarked for bureaucratic consumption, has quadrupled.

The acute housing shortage persists, with the bulk of the workers compelled to live in barracks or hovels and to crowd several families into a single room.

Despite the material improvements, the gulf between the bureaucracy's living standards and those of the masses has not been bridged. The zigzag in economic policy in the post-Stalin era—the shift in emphasis on the expansion of light industry and then back again to renewed emphasis on heavy industry—is symptomatic of the mass pressure upon the Kremlin rulers.

The higher rate of productivity set by the plan remains unfulfilled despite the huge annual investments in up-to-date plants and equipment. The modern techniques, the growing skills and culture of the Soviet working class are not expressed in a corresponding rate of productivity increase because of bureaucratic misrule. Bureaucratic mismanagement, inefficiency, waste, and arbitrariness result in the improper use of plants and machinery. In order to meet the targets set by the plan, auxiliary manual labor is recruited, and these unforeseen increases of the labor force are a major factor in pulling down the rate of productivity increases.

In the face of the privileged bureaucracy and its administrative pressure for ever higher productivity, the discontent of the workers assumes elemental forms of resistance. These passive, self-defensive reactions include—migration, absenteeism, resistance to speed-up, and so forth.

The labor shortage in the USSR is, in its turn, aggravated by the failure of the rate of productivity to increase in correspondence with the new levels of industrialization. The workers take advantage of this situation to seek jobs wherever working and living conditions may be more tolerable (in violation of draconic labor laws that bind the worker to his job).

Migration of workers is a characteristic feature of this elemental struggle on the part of the workers. In his report Bulganin released two significant sets of figures. The first relates to labor turnover. In the industrial enterprises of the All-Union industrial ministries and those of the Federated Republic "2,923,000 workers were hired while 2,802,000 left in 1954, not counting workers transferred from other enterprises in an organized way." In the construction projects "in the same year 1,771,000 were hired while 1,453,000 workers left, again not counting transfers." (*Pravda*, July 17, 1955). Almost nine million industrial workers, or about one-fifth of the total labor force, were engaged in migratory practices in 1954. Small wonder that Bulganin declared, "the liquidation of the fluidity of manpower" to be "an unpostponable task."

The second set of figures released by Bulganin concerns the number of man-days lost because of idle machinery and other unspecified reasons. In 1954, Bulganin said, "the losses of working time in industry amounted to more than 40 million man days, of which 18 million man days were due to (machine) idleness." The loss in production was estimated at "over 10 billion rubles" (same source).

The bureaucracy exposes itself not only as a brake upon higher living standards but above all as an alien force which deprives the workers of any sense of ownership in the nationalized means of production, of any voice in planning, allocation of resources, division of national income, etc. The crisis in labor productivity reveals the bureaucracy's role as an absolute brake on a harmonious

growth of Soviet productive forces. The revolution in modern technology, the growth of automation, the needs of new technology and of its rapid introduction only serve to point up this role of the caste, and speed the unfolding conflict.

The Soviet workers have gained in confidence. Coupled with the victory in World War II, the rise of revolutionary China in the East, and the extension of Soviet economic forms to the western European boundaries cannot fail to dissipate the old moods of isolation and fears of imperialist encirclement. China's victory in the single combat in Korea over the U.S.-led imperialist coalition and the subsequent triumph at Dien Bien Phu has made the Soviet workers feel they have reliable and powerful allies who will come to their aid against imperialist assault.

New forces have already begun to take shape for organizing the mass struggle against the bureaucracy. These forces have already passed through their first major test in the July 1953 Vorkuta general strike of 250,000 political prisoners which lasted for more than three months, and which enlisted the sympathy and aid of the soldier-guards. It was the Leninist Youth that headed this biggest mass action on Russian soil since the 1917 Revolution.

The Soviet Peasantry

The bureaucracy has failed to supply the countryside with manufactured goods in return for food and industrial crops; the peasants replied in 1953-55 with a passive slow-down strike in agriculture just as they did in the twenties. In September 1953 Khrushchev, then minimizing the farm crisis, proclaimed that "a major task in agriculture is to secure higher yields."

Crop yields, which have been steadily declining, must be stabilized before there can even be talk of higher yields.

In 1940 Soviet agriculture disposed of 530,000 tractors and 182,000 combines. The latest figures are 1,400,000 tractors and 350,000 combines (*Pravda*, July 23, 1955). Mechanization has thus grown from two to three times. The sown area has likewise greatly expanded. The quarter of a million collective farms have been amalgamated into less than 90,000 huge farm-factories. The overall gross output of food and industrial crops has meanwhile stagnated at around 1950 levels, while the yields per hectare have declined.

In 1934 agricultural production per hectare (approximately 2½ acres) amounted to 82 hundredweight (advanced European farm output is from three to four times as large). No official figures for postwar yields per hectare have been released. However, the output of model state and collective farms cited by Khrushchev in his 1953 report provides a gauge. Their output per hectare has ranged from 50 to 65 hundredweight, a sharp decline from prewar levels. The output of the majority of state-farms and collectives is by official admission below that of the model-figures cited.

Attempts, under Malenkov, to solve the farm crisis by concessions to well-to-do peasants, "millionaire" collective farms and generally individualistic tendencies boomeranged. When inclement weather struck, the peasants neglected collective crops and herds to save their own. Under Khrushchev further concessions to individualistic tendencies have been coupled with attempts to increase drastically the scope and output of state farms hitherto the

most inefficient, costly and least productive branch of Soviet agriculture.

The solution of the acute farm crisis has been officially dated for the year 1960. The new plan envisages a rapid conversion of agriculture in the old areas (Ukraine, Volga region, etc.) to dairy farming and cultivation of corn while more grain is to be grown in the semi-arid pastures and mountain valleys of Central Asia and West Siberia. The projected extension of these "virgin and fallow lands" covers more than 30 million hectares, about one-sixth of the present sown area for the whole of the U.S.S.R. While the success of this gamble sways in the balance, the existing shortages of food stuffs and industrial crops started, by the end of 1954, to affect the operations of Soviet industry as a whole.

The rural population has declined from 137 million in 1940 to 132 million in 1953. This reduction of five million took place despite the incorporation of extensive territories, predominantly agricultural. The peasants are leaving the land. This loss of manpower has resulted in a growing proportion of women and older men in the countryside. It has constrained the bureaucracy to draft manpower from the cities for work in the fields. This reallocation of the labor force is still in its early phases, but the numbers involved are already impressive.

From March 1954 to July 1955 the following allocations have taken place:

- 1) 575,000 trainees from Agricultural Mechanization Schools set up under the new Chief Administration of Labor Reserves (340,000 in 1954 and 235,000 more in the first half of 1955).

- 2) 83,000 technicians transferred from industry and transport.

- 3) 200,000 YCLers and other state employees sent into Central Asian and West Siberian steppes. (By the end of 1954 the YCL announced that 500,000 had already volunteered).

Over 800,000 had thus been reallocated by July 1955.

Three effects follow from this modification of the social composition of the labor force in agriculture. To begin with, alongside the traditional day laborers, many of whom are women, industrial workers now comprise a growing proportion of the rural proletariat. Secondly, the existing labor shortage is bound to be aggravated by the shift. Thirdly, the bureaucracy must henceforth cope in the countryside with the struggle of the peasants against the state on the one side; and the workers' struggle against bureaucratic rule on the other.

The scarcity of manufactured goods hits the countryside the hardest. The peasants have been deprived of goods they need even when these are in good supply. The stock remains in depots beyond their reach owing to the generally primitive trade network. The provincial centers where the rural bureaucracy is concentrated are favored at the expense of the villages. Consumer goods production is concentrated in the Moscow and Leningrad provinces, the main centers of the bureaucracy, where over four-fifths of the light industry is located.

The peasantry has been systematically subjected to brutal coercion. The reply has been—passive resistance punctuated by open revolts. The regime is feared and hated in the countryside. The differentiation in the villages is as monstrous as in the cities; there is a chasm between the living standards of the privileged minority and the mass of the peasants who barely eke out their

existence. The peasant is further embittered by the generally higher living standards in the cities. As a consequence, he devotes his efforts to cultivating his own midget plot to the detriment of the collective-farm crops, herds, etc. The administrative measures of the bureaucracy, its "incentive," piecework pay, etc., etc. have only aggravated the farm crisis as the declining agricultural output per hectare shows. The main source of the Soviet farm crisis, just as of the crisis of productivity is—the bureaucracy.

Only its overthrow and the revival of workers' democracy in the USSR will close the gap between the city and the country, release the creative energy of the toilers, weld the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, and resolve the agricultural crisis which the present regime is unable to solve.

The Inevitability of a Political Revolution

The industrial rise of the USSR, the postwar extension of Soviet economic forms, the growth of the Soviet proletariat, the concentration of the peasants in huge collectives, the needs and aspirations of the toilers collide with the ruthless rule of the bureaucracy inherited from conditions of backwardness and isolation. The bureaucracy is not only a force of coercion, it is a constant source of provocation, arousing protest and resistance, the more intense the longer these are repressed. The existence of a cynical caste of liars and purgers feeds mass discontent and indignation. Improvements in material conditions of the toilers do not reconcile them with the regime, but on the contrary prepare the conditions for open conflicts.

The whole course of war and postwar events is preparing the realization in life of Leon Trotsky's Transitional Program for the USSR.

Transitional Program

"A fresh upsurge of the revolution in the USSR will undoubtedly begin under the banner of the struggle against *social inequality* and *political oppression*. Down with the privileges of the bureaucracy! Down with Stakhanovism! Down with the Soviet aristocracy and its ranks and orders! Greater equality of wages for all forms of labor!

"The struggle for the freedom of the trade unions and factory committees, for the right of assembly and freedom of the press, will unfold in the struggle for the regeneration and development of *Soviet democracy*.

"The bureaucracy replaced the Soviets as class organs with the fiction of universal electoral rights—in the style of Hitler-Goebbels. It is necessary to return to the Soviets not only their free democratic form but also their class content. As once the bourgeoisie and kulaks were not permitted to enter the Soviets, so now *it is necessary to drive the bureaucracy and the new aristocracy out of the Soviets*. In the Soviets there is room only for representatives of the workers, rank-and-file collective farmers, peasants and Red Army men.

"Democratization of the Soviets is impossible without *legalization of Soviet parties*. The workers and peasants themselves by their own free vote will indicate what parties they recognize as Soviet parties.

"A revision of *planned economy* from top to bottom in the interests of producers and consumers! Factory committees should be returned the right to control production. A

democratically organized consumers' cooperative should control the quality and price of products.

"Reorganization of the collective farms in accordance with the will and in the interests of the workers there engaged!

"The reactionary *international policy* of the bureaucracy should be replaced by the policy of proletarian internationalism. The complete diplomatic correspondence of the Kremlin to be published. Down with *secret diplomacy!*

"All political trials, staged by the Thermidorian bureaucracy, to be reviewed in the light of complete publicity and controversial openness and integrity. Only the victorious revolutionary uprising of the oppressed masses can revive the Soviet regime and guarantee its further development toward socialism. There is but one party capable of leading the Soviet masses to insurrection—the party of the Fourth International!" (Emphasis in original.)

The uprising of the East German workers on June 17, 1953 and the virtually simultaneous Vorkuta general strike on July 20, 1953 are not mere coincidence or episodes. They are the heralds of the coming political revolution.

Stalinism—The Enemy of the World Proletariat

The class solidarity of the world proletariat in defense of the USSR has been exploited by the Stalinist bureaucracy to subordinate the workers' struggle for socialism to the interests of the bureaucracy. The real defense of the Soviet Union is indivisible from the struggle of the Soviet masses to overthrow the bureaucracy, just as the bureaucracy's struggle against the revival of workers' democracy inside

4. "The New Stage in the Russian Revolution," resolution adopted by the SWP National Committee, April 1956

A new stage has opened in the continuing development of the Russian Revolution. The masses of the Soviet Union, who were politically expropriated by the bureaucracy under Stalin and who suffered its brutal rule for nearly three decades, are evidently once again in motion; they have already forced far-reaching concessions from the ruling bureaucracy and more can be expected to follow. The international repercussions, great as they are, have only begun. The correctness of Trotsky's struggle against Stalinism bids to rapidly become a key issue among the ranks of the Communist Parties throughout the world. Stalinism, the main obstacle in the path of the world revolution, faces its death agony. Great new possibilities are now opening up for reassembling the world revolutionary socialist movement on a new plane and thus solving the "crisis of leadership" which has paralyzed the revolutionary proletariat. This is the meaning in brief of the death knell of the Stalin cult sounded at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

East Germany and Vorkuta

After putting Stalin's corpse on display, the heirs of the dictator attempted to rule in his name as high priests of

the USSR is indivisible from its counterrevolutionary role in the advanced countries.

In their struggle against Stalinism the Soviet workers cannot be left to their own forces and resources. They need the active support of their class brothers. In the advanced countries, as in the colonies, the workers fighting for socialism confront Stalinism as Enemy No. 1 inside their ranks. To defeat the capitalists they must settle accounts with Stalinism. Every blow the revolutionary workers are able to deal Stalinism within the labor movement is at the same time a blow in defense of the Soviet Union, active aid to the struggle of the Soviet toilers. Conversely, the rebirth of Soviet democracy would tumble the barriers between the Soviet masses and the Western workers and fuse the delayed proletarian revolution in the West with the colonial revolution.

The bureaucracy's quest for stability on the international arena and at home, remains elusive. Decayed capitalism can provide no stability for itself; neither can the native bourgeoisies in the former colonial countries. The Soviet economic system has a dynamism of its own, independent of the control and policy of the bureaucracy. Imperialist decay cannot be arrested. The socialist opposition is building up within the Soviet bloc. The revolutionary process continues in both the former colonies and those countries that still remain under the yoke of imperialism. The imperialist countries, including the USA, are not immune from the permanent revolution. In the proletariat of the Soviet bloc, in the insurgent colonial masses, the Western working class in its struggle for the world socialist revolution has powerful allies. The bureaucracy has no historic mission and its downfall cannot be averted precisely because its struggle against the permanent revolution is doomed to fail.

the cult they had helped establish. But this proved short-lived. To gain the time needed to consolidate their shaky regime, they felt forced to grant actual concessions to the masses and to promise more. These involved primarily better living conditions for the workers and a relaxation of the purge system. The concessions, however, served to hearten the masses who had already felt fresh hope with the death of the foul dictator who had ruled the Soviet Union with blood and terror for some three decades

One of the consequences was the strike movement throughout the Soviet zone of Eastern Europe which culminated in the uprising of the East German workers in June 1953. This was put down. But the uprising served to inspire workers elsewhere under the Kremlin's heel. Throughout the concentration camps stirrings were apparent. The most dramatic was the strike at Vorkuta where 250,000 slave laborers downed tools. These two events, the East German uprising and the Vorkuta strike, frightened the Kremlin. They revealed the mood of the workers and the abyss separating the ruling strata from the Soviet masses.

Concessions to Workers

The result was the decision to give a really major concession—nothing less than Stalin himself. This was done at the Twentieth Congress, making it a landmark in

Soviet history. In addition, other concessions—genuine concessions—were made. These included the promise of a shorter working day, an increase in social benefits, better housing, an end to lawless dictatorial rule, the rehabilitation of victims framed up by Stalin. But the greatest concessions were the promise to return to Lenin and the deliberate destruction of the artificially constructed image of Stalin. This set in motion forces that will inevitably pass beyond the control of the bureaucracy, for the Congress pronouncements on Stalin will become a banner for the masses in marching forward to completely cleanse the Soviet Union of the hated Stalinist system. It legalizes their demand for an end to Stalinism and a return to Lenin. They will know how to put this significant concession to full advantage. The Congress thus marks the beginning of a new, profoundly revolutionary stage in the Soviet Union.

The immediate reason for the concessions, as we have indicated, was the palpable pressure of the masses which has grown so great that the bureaucracy calculates it cannot be suppressed simply by sweeping purges as in the days of Stalin—it is more expedient to bend with the pressure in hope of avoiding being broken by it.

The growing mass pressure within the Soviet Union is a consequence of profounder developments. Most important of these is the shift in the balance of world power away from capitalism. The crushing of the Axis powers, accompanied by the extension of planned economy to Eastern Europe, was a blow from which the capitalist system has not been able to recover.

The tremendous victory over German imperialism achieved despite Stalin's crimes, served to inspire the Soviet working class—already grown in size and skills to second in world importance—with new self-confidence. The incapacity of American imperialism to rebuild Germany and Japan as powerful military threats took away from the bureaucracy the specter of invasion which it had used for decades as a means of diverting attention from itself and securing sullen submission to its dictatorial rule. The post-war wave of revolution and uprisings that swept through the colonial world, above all in China where the greatest victory since 1917 was registered, began to catalyze revolutionary moods among the Soviet masses. These were furthered by the death of Stalin. The success of the Chinese together with the North Koreans in blocking American military power demonstrated in the most vivid way how drastically the balance of power has shifted. This objective weakening of the capitalist structure also objectively weakened the Soviet bureaucracy as a bourgeois growth upon the workers state structure. Tito's successful challenge was already an intimation of this. Thus precisely when the power of the bureaucracy seemed at its pinnacle, with vast new territories and populations brought under its domain, its fatal internal weakness was revealed. The Russian revolution, heaving up again from the depths, has begun to break the bureaucratic crust.

In foreign policy, Khrushchev & Co. did not make any concessions whatsoever that could be interpreted as a return to Lenin's policy of revolutionary socialism. In fact they openly revised Lenin, declaring that imperialist war on the Soviet Union is no longer inevitable and that socialism can be achieved in capitalist countries along strictly parliamentary paths. These revisions signaled no change in the foreign policy followed by Stalin. In fact, as

diplomatic formulations, they served to give notice to the Western powers that the slogan of a return to Lenin was designed to meet domestic pressures. The revisions were calculated primarily as reassurances to the capitalist statesmen that no return to Lenin is envisaged for the foreign Communist Parties even partially or as demagoguery for rank and file consumption.

Fresh Betrayals

At the same time the announcement of these revisions was designed to facilitate new fresh betrayals of Leninism by the Communist Parties abroad. Moscow views such betrayals as a way of helping to secure a deal with the Western Powers. As in the time of Stalin, the Kremlin means by "peaceful coexistence" a mutual policy with imperialism of live and let live, or mutual assistance in putting down, derailing and heading off revolutionary movements of the workers and colonial peoples. The present policy of the Communist Party of France in supporting the French imperialist government against the insurgent North Africans is a case in point. Another example is the policy of the U.S. Communist Party in supporting the Democratic Party and attempting to head off all moves of the working class toward independent political action.

The attempt by spokesmen of American imperialism to make out the end of the Stalin cult as due to pressure from abroad is thus false to the core. The imperialists never had any trouble in getting along with Stalin. They even assisted him in building up the cult when it suited their purposes. The Social Democrats likewise never found the cult an obstacle to alliances and coalitions with the Stalinists. The acceptability of Stalinism to both imperialists and Social Democrats during the past 30 years is actually additional proof that the decision to smash the cult was due to internal pressures that threaten the rule of the bureaucracy.

That these pressures are proletarian in character is demonstrated by the simple fact that what the bureaucrats promise in breaking up the Stalin cult is a return to Lenin. This is the most popular promise they could make, the promise best calculated to appease the forces moving against the bureaucracy. A return to Lenin means keeping the planned economy but restoring the workers democracy that existed in Lenin's time. The slogan "Back to Lenin!" is thus a proletarian slogan which the masses will inevitably fill with their own revolutionary socialist content.

Naturally, this will not occur in a day. The workers are as yet unorganized. The bureaucracy will fight desperately as it nears its doom. The entire process will have its ups and downs and even reversals. The important thing is that the process has begun and in the final analysis it will prove to be irresistible.

'Collective Leadership'

The bureaucratic tops are seeking to present a solid front which they call "collective leadership." They hope to stabilize their enjoyment of special privileges, to end the uncertainty and fear that existed in their own ranks under Stalin's purge system. But at the Twentieth Congress itself nuances in the "collectivity" were observable. These can be expected to deepen and to be reflected among Stalinist bureaucrats abroad as the mass pressure takes more direct

and open forms. The weakening position of the bureaucracy will, as in the case of all other similar formations in history, manifest itself in sharpening internal differences in which some bureaucrats can be expected to cast their lot with the revolutionary movement of the workers. Such splits, of course, are of subordinate importance to the appearance of revolutionary currents among the Soviet workers and the ranks of the Communist Party.

Differences in the bureaucracy will tend to break out at specific points involving what limits should be set to the concessions. Each new concession will cause fresh tremors among the bureaucratic tops.

Each new revelation constitutes a fresh indictment of their share in Stalin's crimes. The crimes go back to 1923 and include the crushing of the Left Opposition, the smashing of workers democracy, the slaughter of Lenin's entire generation of Bolsheviks, the murder of millions of peasants, the establishment of slave labor camps, the decapitation of the Red Army on the eve of war, reliance on the Stalin-Hitler pact to safeguard the Soviet Union, the useless sacrifice of millions of soldiers, the wrecking of scientific institutions, pillaging of Soviet income, repeated blood purges of the working class, imposition of totalitarian regimes on the satellite countries, the smashing of the Communist International and the murder of working-class leaders abroad, the betrayal of one revolution after another beginning with the Chinese revolution of 1925-27, the German revolution that could have prevented the rise of Hitler, the Spanish revolution that could have blocked Franco, and ending with the betrayal of the great post-war revolutionary upheavals in France and Italy. Khrushchev & Co. will not willingly admit their guilt in these crimes.

How Far Can They Go?

Aside from the subjective aspect—and we must recognize that the Soviet workers can force the bureaucrats to admit a great deal—for the bureaucracy as a whole the concessions cannot go so far as to eliminate it as the ruling caste. To go that far would mean to accept the program of Trotskyism; that is, end the rule of the parasitic caste and replace it with genuine workers democracy exercised through revived soviets, trade unions and workers' political parties. Above all it would mean the end of the special privileges that constitute the material base of the bureaucracy. In this respect, in its tenacious defense of its special privileges, the bureaucratic caste in the Soviet Union is akin to a ruling class. The basic conflict is between the organized bureaucracy and the working class which is seeking to overthrow it.

Khrushchev & Co. are conscious of this, for they accompanied their denunciation of Stalin with praise for his purges of Trotskyists and other oppositionists. They are attempting to justify the early years of Stalin's rule when the cult was established and the bureaucracy consolidated its rule. And *Pravda* has already begun denouncing "rotten elements"—that is, workers and their spokesmen who want to carry the ending of the Stalin cult beyond the narrow limits within which the bureaucracy would like to keep it. By bringing the dead Stalin partially to justice for his monstrous crimes, crimes that were really due to the entire system of bureaucratic rule, Stalin's heirs hope to retain this system which they helped Stalin establish and which they now head. This aim sets the ultimate limits to the concessions they will grant.

Thus in conceding to the masses on the Stalin cult, the bureaucracy will find itself in a worse predicament. Taking this concession with relief and joy, the masses will demand more. Each new concession will further heighten the self-confidence of the masses and bring closer the decisive point where political revolution can break out in the Soviet Union. An attempt by the bureaucracy to turn back now to the use of savage repressions as in Stalin's time can precipitate the coming political revolution that will overthrow their rule. Thus neither concessions nor repressions can long delay the Soviet masses from once again putting in power a government that represents their will. The bureaucracy faces a contradiction it cannot escape.

Trotsky Vindicated

The bureaucracy has no intention of rehabilitating Trotsky or of permitting the Soviet public to read his works. Yet despite their intention, Trotsky's great struggle in defense of the conquests of the Russian revolution against Stalinist degeneration is being vindicated point by point. All of those issues that seemed to have receded into history are now being reviewed by world public opinion as if they were fresh living events. This is what always happens when the truth catches up with the lie.

The historical review became inevitable once the Kremlin began admitting the frame-ups of the final years of Stalin's rule. Already, in trying to appease the Soviet people who suffered some 40,000,000 casualties in World War II, they have been forced to go back to the key period of the infamous Moscow frame-up trials. The confession that Tukhachevsky and the other Red Army generals, plus some 5,000 officers, were slaughtered by Stalin in a frame-up confirms what Trotsky said at the time. The confession about the fearful costs of Stalin's policy to the defense of the Soviet Union confirms one of Trotsky's main charges against Stalin. In face of such admissions the verdict of the Dewey Commission in 1937 that Leon Trotsky and Leon Sedov were innocent of the charges levelled by Stalin and that the Moscow Trials were frame-ups gains fresh force.

In the Soviet Union itself, the whole structure of slanders against Trotsky must crumble along with the plaster statues of Stalin that are now being hammered to powder. The truth will begin to spread among the masses about Trotsky's proposing the first five-year plan, advocating industrialization against Stalin's opposition, collectivization against the Stalin-Bukharin bloc, friendly alliance with the peasantry, balanced production of heavy and consumers goods, continuation abroad of Lenin's policy of furthering the world revolution as against Stalin's policy of blocking it under guise of building "socialism in one country." Trotsky will emerge as the revolutionary socialist hero who joined Lenin in 1923 in beginning the fight against Stalinism and who remained true to that struggle until he was struck down by Stalin's pick-axe.

This is certain to happen because the Soviet workers with their socialist consciousness will not be satisfied with the explanation that Stalin's crimes were due to his paranoiac aberrations. In dumping the cult which ascribed all good in the Soviet Union to Stalin's remarkable personality, the bureaucracy will not succeed in turning the cult into its opposite, ascribing all the evils of bureaucratic rule to Stalin's villainous personality. From the Marxist outlook, how can it be explained that a blood-

thirsty lunatic could become personal dictator in the Soviet Union? This question must loom large right now in the USSR. Marxism demands an analysis of the social forces making such a phenomenon possible. Trotskyism has already provided that analysis just as Trotskyism is now providing the Marxist analysis of the social forces bringing an end to the cult of this madman. Soviet Marxists among the masses, whose names we do not yet know, are surely making their own independent analysis, demonstrating that the degeneration of the Russian revolution was due to the formation of a parasitic caste which put Stalin in power. When their voices are heard they will prove to be the voices of Russian Trotskyism, the leaders of the regenerating Russian revolution

Since Stalin usurped power, the Soviet Union survived the pressure of encircling capitalism thanks to the power of planned economy. The new property forms established by the Bolshevik Party under Lenin and Trotsky proved incomparably more powerful than even the founders of the Soviet Union with all their great confidence dreamed. Despite Stalinist degeneration and mismanagement, planned economy brought the Soviet Union victory in World War II against the full weight of German imperialism, the conqueror of the European continent. From the weakness of Czarist Russia, this country has emerged as the second most powerful in the world, the only one outside the United States capable of developing atomic energy out of its own resources. The new property forms have proved even more powerful than the Stalinist degeneration, for the Stalinists themselves despite their own intentions were forced to extend them by military-bureaucratic means.

The Conscious Factor

This long and painful state is now closing. The conscious factor is coming to the fore. It is visible in the pressure the masses are exerting upon the bureaucracy. Revolutionary consciousness is moving toward reasserting its rightful rule in the Soviet Union. When this occurs revolutionary socialism will appear once again on a world scale—if this has not happened already by then—in the form of mass parties as it did in the early years of the Communist International. This time the power of socialist consciousness will prove to be decisive in the struggle to replace capitalism with the superior order of socialism.

The end of the Stalin cult is a great victory for revolutionary socialism. No worse mistake could be made than to dismiss or underestimate the significance of this event. The verdict of the impartial Dewey Commission discredited Stalin in the eyes of informed public opinion. The verdict of the very partial bureaucracy discredits Stalin among the rank and file of the Communist Parties throughout the world. This opens up wholly new perspectives for removing the obstacle of Stalinism and bringing the Trotskyist program to the workers whose minds are now being freed of the Stalin cult.

Trotskyists works now acquire burning actuality, with fresh facts pouring in every day to confirm our entire position on the Soviet Union. In historic perspective our movement is seen to have been preparing for this great turn since the days of the Left Opposition when Trotsky first organized the struggle against Stalin.

In contrast, the entire Stalinist movement, large and powerful as it is, finds itself in utter confusion and consternation. What doesn't it have to revise in its

ideology? What book does it have that must not be converted into pulp? What pamphlet even? All its histories must be rewritten and the new ones will remain suspect so long as they attack Trotskyism. All the resolutions and pronouncements must be scrapped, the entire education of the rank and file admitted to be loaded with lies and perversions of the truth.

None of the groups in the Stalinist periphery can escape these devastating consequences. What are the dissident Stalinists, for instance, left with? Nothing but a record of boasts about their exemplary loyalty to the paranoiac butcher.

Those circles who pretended to be independent of Stalinism but who always managed to end up approving the purges and frame-ups and false confessions are now seen for what they are—either ignorant dupes or conscious apologists for the fiendish crimes of a modern Ivan the Terrible.

Victory for Marxist Theory

The groups here and there who decided that Trotskyism had been bypassed by history and that the wave of the future belonged to Stalinism are now confounded by each fresh concession calling the world's attention to the fact that Trotskyism was the only force that told the truth about Stalinism. The politics of betrayal narrows down for these groups to vying with the worst Stalinist hacks in providing rationalizations for the bureaucracy, painting up the desperate efforts at rehabilitation in face of the mass pressure as "self-reform" of the bureaucracy. Deutscherism, which leaves out the Soviet masses as if the bureaucracy were a rational autonomous power, turns out to be the ideology best suited to assist the demagoguery of the Khrushchevs.

Among the victories that the end of the Stalin cult gives Trotskyism in the field of theory, two are outstanding. The contention that Stalinism was the logical continuation of Leninism has now been repudiated by its originators, Stalin's own hand-picked political gangsters. They are forced to confess what Trotsky insisted upon from the beginning, that Stalin was not the continuator of Lenin but his opposite. The bourgeois ideologues who also tried to make out that Stalinism was the continuation of Leninism are not much better off. To explain why Stalin has been dumped and the banner of Lenin raised again, they must explain the differences between the two. Rather than do this they have for the present preferred to maintain a discreet silence about the subject.

The other theory that has been dealt a mortal blow by the new stage of the Russian revolution now opening up is "bureaucratic collectivism." According to this theory, planned economy upon superseding capitalism becomes the economic base for a new type of ruling class never before seen in history, a "bureaucratic collective" that exploits the working class through its control of the state. This view is a revision of the basic theoretical structure of Marxism, inasmuch as Marxism puts planned economy—in its full, rational development—as the essential and sufficient economic requisite for the coming classless society.

Planned economy has the capacity to eliminate the scarcity that nourished all previous class formations. The Soviet economy was confined to one country, and hampered and distorted in its development by a bureaucratic caste formation, parasitic in character. The caste, enjoying

bourgeois privileges, represented the tendency toward restoration of capitalism. The caste is basically alien to planned economy and not, as the bureaucratic collectivist theory holds, inherent to it. It is parasitic and not exploitative. Therefore the caste lacks the stability of a true ruling class.

The Hypnosis is Broken

Trotsky maintained that in the Soviet Union the development of planned economy, as it revealed its enormous potentialities and heightened the industrial level at a new and unprecedented rate, would undermine the caste—not strengthen it—and create the necessary economic and social conditions for its overthrow. He predicted that the further development of Soviet planned economy would, therefore, be accompanied by increasingly severe manifestations of the basic instability of the bureaucracy's rule. Trotsky's Marxist position has now received the most powerful confirmation as against the novel theory of bureaucratic collectivism, for the first stirrings of the Soviet working class in the new stage of the Russian Revolution shook down the central ideology which had bound the bureaucracy together for three decades. Moreover, the bureaucrats themselves were forced to confess to the precariousness of their positions under Stalin, thus adding graphic testimony to the instability of the caste's place in Soviet society.

Trotsky's defense of the Soviet Union against imperialism has likewise received the most powerful confirmation as against the defeatist line of the bureaucratic collectivists and others of similar views. It was the new self-confidence of the Soviet workers, gained through their victory in World War II, the consequent extension of state ownership and planning into Eastern Europe and the victory of the Chinese revolution, that resulted in today's demolition of the Stalin cult as a harbinger of the overthrow of the bureaucracy and the restoration of democratic workers rule.

The entire Stalinist movement has been hit by the most profound ideological crisis since its origin. The sacred Kremlin texts have been thrown into the ash can. The Stalinist parties are in a state of shock. The hypnosis that closed the eyes and ears of the Stalinist rank and file has been broken. They are now compelled to think. They are beginning to ask searching questions. Many of them, it is true, especially the older generation will drop aside in demoralization. The cynical hard core will continue to serve the new Kremlin masters as they did the old. The Stalinist youth, however, will prove increasingly willing to discuss with Trotskyists and the best of them can be won over to revolutionary socialism. Already, with deep shame, they are dropping the epithets they were taught to use like robots in referring to Trotskyists such as "Hitlerite agents," "fascist mad dogs," "cohorts of the Titoite scum," and so on. All the elements are present for profound

differentiations within the boasted monolithism of the Stalinist machine. In countries such as France and Italy, where great mass Communist parties exist and where the Stalinist bureaucrats are going to new lengths in supporting the imperialist government, the opportunities are especially favorable.

Seize the Opportunity!

To realize these opportunities, however, requires the utmost attention on the part of the Trotskyists. Aloofness to this work would be sterile sectarianism. We have prepared for this for more than 25 years. Now we must move in, and move energetically. Campaign methods must be used to bring the message of Trotskyism to rank and file Communist Party members. Our press must turn full attention to this task, attentively following the developments in the new stage of the Russian Revolution and making sure that the Marxist interpretation is consistently brought to the attention of the Communist Party rank and file. This means that they must be persistently sought out, their attention called to pamphlets and books in our rich arsenal elucidating the events of the past that are now being relived in the world press and in the consciousness of millions as Stalin's victims are rehabilitated. The Communist Party rank and file can and must be made to know the truth about Trotsky's fight against Stalin. They can and must be taught the truth about the stubborn fight of the Fourth International to keep alive the tradition of Leninism.

This campaign must not be viewed as a short-term proposition but as a sustained effort, primarily educational in character. The objective must be to win Communist Party members to the program of Trotskyism without the slightest illusions about reforming the apparatus that has been rotting for more than a quarter of a century. Some, it is true, will go all the way in repudiating Stalinism. But most of this apparatus, their hands dripping with the blood they helped Stalin spill, will sooner or later depart from the scene as discredited, as despised and as hated as the master they served. But the rank-and-file members who joined the Communist Party because they thought it was genuinely revolutionary will draw the bitter lesson of their experience and become key cadres in the reassembling of forces now made possible by the death of the Stalin cult.

The great victory won by world Trotskyism should serve to inspire the entire movement to follow up in the most vigorous way. The Russian Revolution by rudely pushing over the Stalin idol and forcing concessions from Stalin's heirs has again proved its vitality. We must now prove ourselves capable of seizing the opportunities it opens up for revolutionary socialism in other lands. That is the best way to help the Soviet workers as they move forward to a final settling of accounts with the Stalinist system.

5. *"The Hungarian Revolution and the Crisis of Stalinism," resolution adopted by the SWP National Committee, January 1957*

The Hungarian and Polish revolutions have again demonstrated the leading role of the working class in the transformation of society from capitalism to socialism. The world struggle for socialism, which has experienced a rapid acceleration since World War II, has now been thrust forward with renewed power.

The Hungarian and Polish events have confirmed the view taken last April by the National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party that a new stage has opened in the Russian revolution. The mortal crisis of Stalinism, which became manifest at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was interpreted by the Committee as a sign of the intensity of the mass unrest and pressure, both in the Soviet Union and in the East European countries dominated by the Kremlin bureaucracy. The developments in Hungary and Poland, which brought the masses into the political arena on a nationwide scale and lifted the struggle to a higher level, now make it possible to draw new and important conclusions regarding the further course of the death agony of Stalinism and the rebirth of revolutionary socialism as a mass movement.

The general reasons for the renewed motion of the masses in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were explained in the April resolution of the National Committee of the SWP as follows:

The victory of the Soviet Union in World War II, due primarily to the planned economy, altered the relation of world forces to the disadvantage of capitalism. The expansion of the Soviet Union into Eastern Europe broke the isolation that had fostered the growth of the parasitic caste in the Soviet Union. The victory of the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions ended the long series of defeats of revolutions which had further strengthened Stalinism. The repeated revolutionary upsurges in the colonial world weakened world imperialism still more and added to the forces favoring rebirth of revolutionary socialism as a mass movement. Within the Soviet Union the unparalleled rate of expansion of the means of production, again due primarily to the planned economy, increasingly shifted social relations in favor of the growing proletariat. Russia's backwardness, another source of Stalinist strength, began to give way with the advance of technology and education. The Soviet Union, moving ahead of the West European powers, even broke America's monopoly in atomic energy. These happenings undermined the foundations of Stalinism, a change that was bound to become reflected sooner or later in the minds of the masses of the Soviet orbit.

Thus, as Trotsky long ago foresaw, the successes of planned economy at home and the advances of the revolution abroad sharpened the internal contradictions of Soviet society, bringing them to explosive political expression against the totalitarian regime of the bureaucratic oligarchy that usurped power following the death of Lenin.

The post-Stalin policy of granting concessions to the masses and correcting the most monstrous abuses was evidence that Stalin's heirs recognized the gathering resistance to their rule. But contrary to the expectations of

the Kremlin the concessions raised the revolutionary spirit of the masses and brought them closer to open revolt. The first evidence of this was a widespread strike movement in Eastern Europe that culminated in the uprising of the East German workers in June 1953. Use of violent repressive measures likewise did not halt the movement of the masses, for the East German uprising, put down by military force, inspired dramatic strikes in the prison camps inside the Soviet Union. In consequence of this ferment, the Kremlin decided to go even further in granting legal and economic concessions. In an attempt to associate themselves with the popular hatred of Stalinism, the top bureaucracy under Khrushchev's leadership at the Twentieth Congress opened an attack on the Stalin cult and raised the slogan of "Back to Lenin."

"This set in motion forces that will inevitably pass beyond the control of the bureaucracy," the April resolution declared; "for the Congress pronouncements on Stalin will become a banner for the masses in marching forward to completely cleanse the Soviet Union of the hated Stalinist system. It legalizes their demand for an end to Stalinism and a return to Lenin. They will know how to put this significant concession to full advantage. The Congress thus marks the beginning of a new, profoundly revolutionary stage in the Soviet Union."

The correctness of this estimate was quickly confirmed. On June 28 the workers of Poznan, Poland, went out on a general strike that grew into an uprising. Their action was symptomatic of the popular urge to extend the concessions made by the bureaucracy and to convert the paper promises about a return to Lenin into living reality.

Not a "Self-Reform" Movement

The pattern of events was much the same as in the East German uprising three years before. The workers' struggle began with economic demands; and, in face of resistance from the regime, was converted into a political uprising, culminating in the demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops; that is, freedom from the grip of the Kremlin bureaucracy. At first the Polish Stalinist leaders acted like their East German counterparts. They slandered the rebellious workers as "fascist" agents and their rebellious actions as "imperialist-inspired." As in East Germany they relied primarily upon the Soviet Army with its tanks to crush the uprising.

Despite the tough line of the Kremlin, fresh concessions, much more extensive than in the case of East Germany, were won in Poland. Stalin's frame-up system having been renounced by Khrushchev the trials of participants in the uprising could not be converted into frame-ups and window dressing for a mass purge. Instead, the defendants were able to reveal in open court how the police had tortured them into "confessions" following arrest; they were able to voice their feelings about the conditions that had driven them to revolt. Some were freed and others given relatively light sentences. The nationwide support of the Poznan uprising forced the regime to acknowledge that the Poznan workers had been slandered and that they had just grievances.

This restraint on the part of the Polish regime was not evidence of any Stalinist "self-reform." It was occasioned by fear that the Poznan events might touch off a general revolutionary conflagration that could spread throughout

Eastern Europe and into the Soviet Union itself. The Stalinist bureaucrats decided to make another public display of anti-Stalinism and deal gently with the heroes of Poznan. But the concessions following the Poznan uprising represented a significant gain by the Polish workers, a by-product of their revolutionary struggle, and it inspired them to press for more.

In a bold move, the leadership of the Polish Communist Party deposed the Kremlin proconsul Rokossovsky. They replaced him on October 21 with Gomulka, a popular symbol of resistance to Moscow's rule because of his long years of imprisonment on charges of "Titoism." Gomulka demanded a greater measure of independence from Moscow, while the workers began mobilizing for a struggle. Stalin's heirs, including the top generals, flew to Warsaw to put pressure on the new government. Gomulka responded by keeping the armed Polish workers informed of the hour-to-hour developments. Minor clashes occurred between Soviet and Polish troops. In face of this resistance, which marked the high point to date in the Polish revolution, Khrushchev and Co. backed down, but on their return to Moscow they began mobilizing troops on the borders of Poland.

Hungary Aided Polish Revolution

The outbreak of the Hungarian revolution cut across these developments. If Stalin's heirs had thought of resorting to force in Poland, the experience in Hungary changed their minds. They made their peace with the Gomulka regime, granting new and significant concessions although these are far from meeting the demand of the Polish workers for independence and equality in a free association of the Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China.

The Polish revolution thus made big gains, in part due to the struggle of the Hungarian workers. It is now gathering fresh power for the next advance along the road of political revolution.

In Hungary the pattern visible in the East German and Poznan events appeared again but on a greatly magnified scale. Much that was previously implicit now became explicit, above all the power of the working class and the forms its struggle tends to take against the bureaucracy. Just as the preceding uprisings were previews of the Hungarian revolution, so the Hungarian revolution is a preview of the coming struggle in the Soviet Union, a struggle in which we can confidently expect the appearance of what was lacking in the Hungarian revolution—a revolutionary socialist party capable of guaranteeing success.

The Hungarian revolution was inspired by the October 21 success of the Polish workers in ousting Rokossovsky and putting Gomulka in power in Warsaw. On the following day, October 22, students and intellectuals in Budapest, most of them members of the Communist Party, staged meetings demanding the restoration of Nagy to the premiership and the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops. The next day, October 23, parades began. Demonstrators appeared at the Budapest radio station to ask that their demands be broadcast. Security police gave a typical Stalinist answer. They arrested the delegation. As the aroused crowd moved forward, the police opened fire. This touched off the revolution.

Subsequent developments can conveniently be divided

into three stages: (1) the Nagy regime and the armed uprisings; (2) the crushing of both the Nagy regime and the armed uprisings; (3) the struggle between the Kadar regime and the Workers Councils.

(1) In face of the fighting in the streets, the hated Gero government sought to combine concessions with repressive action. On the one hand, it installed Nagy as premier; on the other, it invited Soviet occupation troops into Budapest to put down the demonstrators. This was in accordance with the general policy followed by Stalin's heirs since the dictator's death.

Nagy at first collaborated with Gero. He called on the insurgent people to disperse. But as Soviet tanks began rolling into Budapest October 24, the masses took up arms in self-defense, spearheading the mass insurrection. Nagy responded with appeals to lay down arms and surrender on the promise of amnesty.

The refusal of the Hungarian masses to place confidence in Nagy demonstrates that they trusted no one in the political arena but themselves. This is the classic hallmark of popular revolution.

Three more equally significant things happened—the Hungarian army went over to the revolutionists, the Soviet troops began manifesting sympathy with their cause, and on October 25 the workers launched a general strike.

Role of Workers Councils Decisive

Most important, the masses began organizing themselves. Councils—organs of workers' power—appeared on a nation-wide scale in the factories, the army and neighborhood areas. Dual power thus arose on the foundations of socialized property. Although capitalist restorationist elements maneuvered for advantageous positions in government, they were an insignificant force in contrast to the working class and its allies. The workers proved that in a revolutionary showdown they could crush all attempts at capitalist restoration just as they could defeat the native Stalinist bureaucracy, steering the political revolution on its true course toward the establishment of workers democracy. It was to preserve bureaucratic rule that the Kremlin intervened in Hungary, using the presence of restorationist elements as a pretext for its brutal assault on the working class.

In the absence of a revolutionary socialist party, the Workers Councils lacked the clear leadership and the clear declaration of aims that would have made the uprising unequivocal from the beginning. Nonetheless, all the available evidence shows that the working class, which was the decisive power, was bent on defending the social conquests already achieved, such as the planned economy, that it would not tolerate any attempt to return to the horrors of the fascism it had experienced under Horthy and under the Nazis, that its movement was in the channels of political revolution; that is, the building of a workers' state freed from the bureaucratic abominations of Stalinism. Later events showed that the peasantry gave open sympathy and even direct support to the workers.

The Moscow bureaucrats were aware that a successful workers' revolution in Hungary would immediately sweep across the borders into the rest of Eastern Europe and into the Soviet Union. They realized that the revolutionary forces were beyond control by Nagy or any other sector of the native Hungarian bureaucracy. The masses had taken

matters into their own hands, were exercising their sovereign will, and had begun the process of elevating a completely new leadership out of their own insurgent ranks. Moscow, therefore, prepared to abandon the Nagy regime and resort to Soviet tanks as they had in the case of East Germany and Poznan.

On October 26, just three days before being co-opted into office, Nagy announced the formation of a new "peoples front" government that would include leaders of former peasant parties. He abolished collectivization of the land, promised free elections and a "multi-party" state. On October 29 he demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest. However, when reinforced Soviet troops again moved toward Budapest November 1, Nagy repudiated the Warsaw pact, declared Hungarian neutrality and appealed to the United Nations for guarantees and defense.

In a showdown crisis, this typical Stalinist bureaucrat showed his fears both of the rank and file of the Communist Party and of the working-class fighters on the barricades. He sought support among capitalist restorationist elements and their foreign imperialist backers. Nagy's course played directly into the hands of world imperialism which had already been seeking to convert the turmoil to its own advantage by picturing the revolt against Stalinism as a revolt against the planned economy of Hungary. It made such counter-revolutionary figures as Cardinal Mindszenty appear to the outside world to have much greater weight than they actually possessed. For a time it confused the picture enough so that in the absence of a revolutionary socialist party it could appear that the aims of the revolution itself were those implicit in the policies of Nagy.

Above all, Nagy's announcements and actions gave invaluable material to the Stalinist propaganda machine, which, as in the case of Eastern Germany and Poznan, slandered the Hungarian revolution as "fascist," "imperialist-inspired," and a reversion to "Horthyism."

The truth is that some 11 years after the Hungarian workers welcomed the Soviet forces as liberators of their country, Moscow's power lay shattered in Hungary. The puppet Nagy regime was torn between the restorationist forces and the proletarian revolution. The Communist Party of 800,000 members had suffered an internal explosion, virtually the entire rank and file and the lower stratum of the apparatus going over to the cause of the working class. The workers, together with the students, intellectuals and the Hungarian army, were in full-scale revolt and the peasants began supplying them with food. Workers Councils had appeared on a national scale and had begun to formulate revolutionary demands. These offered powerful confirmation of the validity of the program of political revolution against the Stalinist bureaucracy long advocated by world Trotskyism.

(2) Stalin's heirs had already made their decision. The second stage of the Hungarian revolution opened on November 4, three days before the thirty-ninth anniversary of the 1917 Russian revolution. A part of the Nagy government, lured into a trap by a promise of negotiations, were placed under arrest, Moscow ordered the overwhelming military forces that had been concentrated during the previous week on Hungary's frontiers to move on Budapest. These troops, spearheaded by some 5,000 tanks, appear to have been carefully selected from among the

most backward sections of the Soviet armed forces. They had been lied to, being told that their task was to defend Hungary against a bourgeois counter-revolution inspired by American imperialism.

The Spirit of the Paris Commune

The bloodbath began. Once and for all, Stalin's heirs demonstrated the idiocy of any belief in the possibility of their "self-reform." They showed in the harshest way possible the correctness of Trotsky's view that they resemble a ruling class in the tenacity with which they cling to power and the special privileges it assures.

What was remarkable was the heroic resistance of the Hungarian people, headed by the working class, in this unequal military contest. Their spirit was that of the Paris Commune which served to inspire generations of class-conscious workers. Though overwhelmed by vastly superior military force, the workers did not end their political resistance. They refused to accept the Kadar regime that rode into power on Soviet tanks.

(3) The third stage of the Hungarian revolution is extraordinarily instructive. All the figures of the Nagy regime vanished from the scene; some of them in Stalinist hands were either shot or imprisoned; some took refuge abroad; Nagy himself took asylum in the Yugoslav Embassy only to be later tricked into capture by the Stalinist invaders. The weight of the restorationist elements that participated in the revolution for their own reactionary ends turned out to be in inverse proportion to the noise they inspired in the capitalist press abroad. The real power proved to be with the working class, organized in Workers Councils.

Backed though it is by the might of the world's greatest army, the arrogant Kadar regime finds itself forced nevertheless to deal in all questions pertaining to the rule of the country with the very antagonist it sought to crush, the Hungarian workers. The workers won this position by refusing to place confidence anywhere except in their own elected Workers Councils.

The bloodbath—to the consternation of the Kremlin, we may be sure—failed to prostrate the working class or to drown its Workers Councils. The new leadership of the Hungarian workers, born in struggle only a few weeks before, continued the general strike, continued to hold meetings, to issue militant leaflets, to protest the arrests and deportations, to organize new mass demonstrations, and to repeat the demands which the workers had raised in the early days of the revolution—withdrawal of Soviet troops and the institution of workers' democracy. The central demand of the general strike was for legal recognition of the Workers' Councils as permanent political bodies with sole authority in the management of industry.

The role of the Workers Councils after the armed conflict was over demonstrated in the most convincing way that the Kadar regime has no base of support in the populace whatsoever. All the Stalinist propaganda about saving Hungary from "fascism" is thus shorn of the slightest shred of plausibility. Moscow's real target, as the whole world can see in the relation between the Kadar regime and the Workers Councils, turned out to be the rebellious Hungarian workers.

The capacity of the Workers Councils to sustain themselves in face of the worst military and police terror is

a lesson that will not be lost upon the workers throughout the Soviet bloc. The Hungarian workers made a priceless discovery in the course of their struggle—they discovered the form through which the political revolution against the Stalinist bureaucracy will be organized. The form is the same as that previously used by the Russian workers in 1905 and 1917 against Czarism—Soviets or Workers Councils. This form provides an arena in which a revolutionary party can develop with extraordinary speed.

Whatever the immediate fate of the Hungarian Workers Councils, they will undoubtedly prove to be the greatest single contribution made by the Hungarian workers to the political revolution in the Soviet sphere that will finally accomplish the aim they have so courageously and brilliantly advanced.

The Need for a Marxist Party

The absence of a revolutionary-socialist party was costly to the Hungarian workers. This is not to say that they can be held responsible for its absence. As experience has shown, it is not easy to build such a party under the totalitarian rule of Stalinism. Lacking conscious revolutionary-socialist leadership, the Workers Councils failed to assert their power. They continued to negotiate for concessions from Moscow's puppets. This proved disastrous. While the leadership of the Workers Councils wasted time in futile negotiations with figures who had no real power within the country, the Stalinist counterrevolution mobilized its repressive forces.

(a) The leadership of the Workers Councils failed to proclaim clearly the aims of the revolution: national freedom and workers' democracy; the overthrow of the bureaucratic caste and the vesting of power in the Workers Councils.

(b) The leadership of the Workers Councils failed to systematically issue revolutionary appeals to the workers of all Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, explaining the aims of the revolution and asking for socialist solidarity in the common struggle.

(c) The leadership of the Workers Councils failed to systematically appeal to the Soviet forces, reminding them of their heritage in the 1917 revolution, of their socialist convictions, and of their own deep-seated grievances against the Kremlin.

(d) The leadership of the Workers Councils failed to turn toward the workers in the capitalist countries for help in preventing the imperialists from taking advantage of the situation.

(e) The leadership of the Workers Councils failed to arouse every section of the populace to its stake in the victory and failed to mobilize the nation for all-out military defense.

(f) The leadership of the Workers Councils made a fatal mistake in taking for good coin the promises of the Moscow bureaucrats to reform and to end the occupation.

(g) The leadership of the Workers Councils failed to anticipate Moscow's readiness to drown the revolution in blood and were therefore caught by surprise when the counter-revolutionary attack came.

Had the Workers Councils asserted their power, as they would have under a revolutionary-socialist leadership, this would have signified the doom of the Moscow bureaucracy, for their political appeals and resolute actions at the head of the revolution would have resounded through the length

and breadth of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, bringing the masses to their feet with the blazing conviction that this marked the return to Lenin, the regeneration of the workers state.

The Hungarian revolution has already done much to assemble, within the Workers Council and among the revolutionary students and soldiers, the cadres of a revolutionary socialist party. No other interpretation is possible of the breaking apart of the Hungarian Communist Party and of the refusal of the Hungarian workers to place confidence in either the Nagy or Kadar regimes. On top of this, the appearance of Workers Councils as the organized form of the political revolution demonstrates the readiness of the Hungarian workers to seek out and build adequate forms of political expression. The most necessary of all is the party, which brings conscious leadership to its highest expression. How bright the prospects are for the rise of a revolutionary-socialist party among the workers of the Soviet bloc can be judged from many of the slogans that appeared in the Hungarian revolution. These slogans were the products of thinking minds, who, perhaps without even knowing it as yet, came to Trotskyist conclusions.

In opposition to this heartening tendency, it is now clear that the Soviet bureaucracy is shifting toward reliance on the armed forces as the main instrument of its rule. We now have three instances in which the principal means of repression was the army—Eastern Germany, Poznan, and Hungary. This signifies increasing importance for the generals in the top bureaucracy, a reactionary development. As Trotsky foresaw, a shift by the bureaucracy away from reliance on the secret political police has been accompanied by an increasingly repressive role for the army. The exhaustion of the efficacy of police terror has brought Stalin's heirs to the use of tanks and machine guns.

The expedient, however, will not save the bureaucracy. The social composition of the Soviet armed forces corresponds far more closely to that of the country as a whole than the secret political police. It is far more vulnerable to revolutionary contagion than the police, as all experience testifies, including the latest experience in Hungary. Moreover, the new climate in the Soviet Union, the mass unrest and desire for change, has its reflection in the armed forces. Already, far and wide among Soviet soldiers, we may be sure, the story of the blood-letting in Hungary is arousing wrath and revulsion against Stalin's heirs. Finally, even if the Soviet military should prove solid enough to be used in another Poznan or Hungary, the entrance of the Soviet proletariat on the arena of political revolution will speedily win over the ranks of the army and disintegrate the Kremlin's repressive power.

Why has Eastern Europe rather than the Soviet Union become the scene of the first major revolutionary assault against the Stalinist dictatorship?

Kremlin Choked Economic Growth

Contrary to the boasts of Stalinist propaganda, socialism has not been under construction in Eastern Europe. It is true that the preliminary steps were taken by bureaucratic-military means after promulgation of the Truman Doctrine. The landlords and capitalists were expropriated and planned economy was introduced. Although these measures brought economic progress to Eastern Europe, they were at the same time utilized to

serve the interests of the Kremlin bureaucracy at the expense of Eastern Europe. Had the economies of these countries been integrated through a general plan on an equal basis with that of the Soviet Union, and had they been fitted together in an Eastern European Socialist Federation, there might have been some truth in the contention that these countries were moving toward socialism.

However, the fact is that the Kremlin arbitrarily kept each country locked within its national frontiers and its economy just as arbitrarily locked to that of the Soviet Union. The economic policies imposed by bureaucratic decree undermined the living standards and working conditions of the masses. The exploitation of these countries has thus been analogous to that of imperialist exploitation of colonial lands. This alone tends to give an added revolutionary impulsion to the workers of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the workers have revolutionary traditions, including a record of socialist struggle under fascist or semifascist regimes. These traditions are continually revitalized by the mere fact of living under a foreign rule of totalitarian character. To this must be added the pressure of the peasantry who are aware of the postwar recovery in the neighboring lands of Western Europe and see no reason why they should not have a better standard of living.

The same factors that made Eastern Europe the initial arena of the political revolution also determined its initial form. The Hungarian revolution took the form of a national uprising against the Kremlin bureaucracy. It placed national independence—the withdrawal of Soviet occupying troops—at the head of the list of demands. Freedom from Kremlin control is essential to the creation of autonomous working-class organizations. It is also essential to the revision of economic planning in favor of the workers.

By placing itself at the head of the national independence struggle, the working class was able to make a firm alliance with other strata of the populace—especially the peasantry. Indeed, it is only under the leadership of the working class that the century-old national problem of Eastern Europe can be solved and the basis laid for voluntary association of each national unit in a broader socialist federation of nations.

The bureaucratic-military way in which the property overturn took place in Eastern Europe created an additional problem in barring the masses from making a clean sweep of the old propertied classes.

In Hungary, these bourgeois elements appeared in the national independence movement, hoping to steer it back to capitalism. The triumph of the Hungarian revolution against the Kremlin would have cleared the field for a battle between the workers councils and these restorationist forces. Proof of this can be gathered from the fact that many workers councils were aware from the beginning of the restorationist danger and sounded the alert.

The advantage in this struggle would have been on the side of the working class. The weight of the working class organized in its councils and in emerging independent unions; the socialized property foundations associated with working-class power; the attachment of the workers to these foundations; the clear signs of revolutionary working-class ferment throughout the Soviet orbit; the growing weakness of world capitalism and its lack of

appeal for the masses—all these favored a socialist victory. A capitalist restoration is conceivable only through the crushing of the organized force of the working class by imperialism. This is excluded at present because the world relationship of forces is unfavorable to such an imperialist adventure.

Capitalist Reaction Strengthened

The Kremlin's repressive war against the Hungarian working class can be viewed only as an aid to capitalist restoration if it should eventually be attempted. The Kremlin aim is to atomize the working class and exclude it from control of industry. A Kremlin victory thus facilitates a primary task of the capitalist counterrevolution.

A corollary to the unfinished struggle against the bourgeois restorationists is the problem of political institutions. In every country of Eastern Europe, the Kremlin retained the framework of the old capitalist parliaments. The governments of Eastern Europe are all technically "popular fronts" based on the parliamentary system. The political revolution in each of the East European countries poses, therefore, the need to replace the parliamentary form by the Soviet form of rule. The parliamentary form offers the most favorable opportunity for Stalinist bureaucrats and capitalist restorationists to check the revolutionary drive of the working class. The completion of the political revolution requires the elimination of this relic of the capitalist order.

The national character of the Hungarian revolution split the native bureaucracy into a wing that was totally subservient to the Kremlin (the Rakosi-Gero wing, subsequently headed by Kadar) and another wing that sought to head off the revolutionary developments by standing at the head of the mass movement (Nagy). The worker-CP members meanwhile took their place in the insurrectionary ranks of the working class, and in many key areas stood at the head of the revolution, playing important roles in creating and leading the workers councils.

Nagy stepped forward as the spokesman and defender of the bureaucratic caste. His shortlived regime was based on the deformed workers' state, but in seeking allies against both the masses and the Kremlin, it became a point of infiltration for restorationist elements. They favored the Nagy regime because its policies—a combination of the Stalinist popular-front program initiated by Nagy and the pro-Western orientation of the bourgeois, petty-bourgeois and Social Democratic politicians—would have immensely facilitated imperialist military intervention or an eventual reactionary coup d'état.

The rise in revolutionary potential in the Soviet bloc is visible in the accelerating tempo of events. From East Germany to Poznan, three years elapsed. From Poznan to the Polish victory, less than four months. From the Polish defiance of Moscow to the Hungarian revolution, two days. The savage use of military force in Hungary will check the movement for a time, but as the lessons of the events are absorbed, a new rise should occur of even greater power. The antagonism between the masses and the bureaucratic caste remains explosive. The question now is whether the bureaucracy can find a new equilibrium in its relations with the rebellious peoples.

The political cost to the Kremlin of putting down the Hungarian workers by armed force has created a crisis in Soviet policy. The concessions granted the Gomulka

regime in Poland are sufficient evidence of sobering second thoughts on the efficacy of military violence. The notion of some bourgeois commentators that the suppression of the Hungarian revolution signals a change by the Kremlin to exclusive reliance on repressive measures is wrong. The Kremlin will find itself compelled to grant new concessions. Revolutionary struggles win concessions and reforms as byproducts. This holds true for the Hungarian revolution as in the case of any other similar struggle. But new concessions will only provide fresh fuel for the fires of revolution. The Soviet bureaucracy is thus caught in a dilemma from which there is no escape. It happens to be their destiny to preside over the death agony of Stalinism.

The repercussions of the Hungarian revolution were worldwide. One reason for the enormous publicity was the tender solicitude the imperialist powers showed for the fate of the Hungarian people as Britain and France launched their blitzkrieg on Egypt. As always, the guardians of the capitalist system sought to take advantage of this fresh crime of Stalinism, utilizing it to smear the idea and program of socialism; and the Kremlin butchers did much to facilitate the imperialist objectives.

The Eisenhower administration repeated the pattern it followed in the East German uprising, at first posing as the patron saint of the rebels and then permitting its ardor to flag as the class character of the revolutionary upsurge became clear. In East Germany, Dulles' benevolent interest in the uprising reached its high point in the Packages from Eisenhower campaign. In the case of Hungary, the State Department had to go further, admitting token numbers of refugee immigrants from the strife-torn country. It was noteworthy that as the weakness of the Kadar regime and the strength of the workers councils became manifest, the excitement of the would-be capitalist "liberators" over their prospects in the Hungarian revolution died down. They advised against armed uprisings. As in East Germany, they found a genuine workers' revolution not to their liking even though directed against Stalinism. The reason for that is plain enough. "Liberation" through imperialist intervention is one thing. Workers revolution is a different matter.

Socialist solidarity with the heroic Hungarian rebels has nothing in common with the hypocritical tears shed in the capitalist press by the imperialists and their agents. Socialist support of the Hungarian revolution rests on furtherance of the class struggle at home. A militant worker in an American plant who wants to help the Hungarian fighters stands at opposite poles from the Big Business publication that seeks to convert Cardinal Mindszenty into a new Horthy. After discounting the Catholic-inspired demonstrations and the capitalist editorial rhetoric, the hard fact remains that proletarian sympathy for the Hungarian bid for freedom was profound. Workers were stirred everywhere. The Stalinist bureaucracy, in their eyes, stood discredited as never before.

The effect of the Hungarian events on the world-wide crisis of Stalinism was immediate and devastating. Already profoundly disturbed by the revelations about Stalin at the Twentieth Congress, rank and file Communists gagged at the request to swallow the suppression of the Hungarian revolution by Stalin's heirs. Wasn't the shooting of Hungarian workers evidence of the same "paranoia" that the late dictator was said to have suffered

from in the final decades of his rule? And how explain the revolt in the first place, a decade after "socialism" was launched in Hungary and three years after Stalin was laid away? Large-scale resignations from Stalinist organizations occurred on an international scale. Rifts appeared in the lower ranks of the apparatus and prominent figures who had long been in the Stalinist orbit moved away.

The major planes of cleavage in world Stalinism were described in the April resolution of the National Committee of the Socialist Workers Party as follows: In the top bureaucracy two main formations are apparent, an extreme right wing desirous of making its peace with liberal capitalism and an ossified grouping that is hopelessly committed, as a venal agency of the Soviet bureaucracy, to defending everything that comes out of Moscow. In the rank and file considerable demoralization is evident. Ranging from apathy to doubts about Marxism itself, the main tendency is to drop into inactivity and withdraw from politics. However, many members are seeking their way to firm Marxist ground. Their willingness to start fresh, to examine the programs and findings of other working-class tendencies is a healthy indication that the break-up of Stalinism will lead to a resurgence of revolutionary socialism.

This analysis has been confirmed. The Hungarian events served to speed up developments in the Communist Parties along the lines predicted and to precipitate decisions that were still in the making. More is yet to come as the enormity of Moscow's counter-revolutionary stand sinks in.

The Hungarian revolution and its suppression added new issues to those already causing fissures in the Stalinist movement. First of all, fresh differences cropped up between Moscow and Belgrade. The Kremlin admitted "errors" and "mistakes" in the past in Hungary, which it blamed on the Rakosi-Gero leadership, but argued that the use of Soviet troops in Hungary was justified to save the country from "fascism." Tito blamed the Kremlin for the errors in Hungary and included as an "error" the first use of Soviet troops after Nagy took office. Tito especially scored the Kremlin for its slowness in carrying out promised reforms. But he agreed that the Kremlin was right in using troops the second time to smash the revolutionary uprising.

It is obviously in Tito's interest as head of Yugoslavia to favor greater independence for the Eastern European countries now under Moscow's domination. To advance this aim he seeks points of support among the leaders in Moscow and in the Eastern European countries. It is just as obviously in Tito's interest as head of the Yugoslav bureaucracy to side with Stalin's heirs in suppressing a proletarian revolution which might leap across the Yugoslav border. Tito played a despicable role during the Hungarian revolution. He did not lift a finger to help the fighters and ended up by condemning and slandering them. When the cards were down, the fact that Tito represents simply a variety of Stalinism proved decisive—despite his differences with Khrushchev & Co. Because of his critical attitude and his reputation for independence, Tito's arguments in defense of Moscow were far more effective than anything that came out of Moscow itself.

To the right of Tito stands the leadership of the French Communist Party which gratefully thanked Moscow for all the numerous blessings it brought Hungary.

Continuation of Russian Revolution

To the left is the Gomulka regime, which cautiously criticized the "errors" of the Kremlin and just as cautiously, but significantly, refrained from justifying the use of Soviet troops in Hungary.

What stands out in the most glaring way is the simple fact that in the entire Stalinist movement not a single outstanding leader anywhere in the world took a stand in defense of the Hungarian revolution. Not one! They simply repeated variations of the arguments advanced by Moscow and Belgrade. It would be difficult to find more convincing proof of the decay of the Stalinist bureaucracy and the lack of reality in any policy based on the hope of their self-reform.

The Hungarian revolution has revealed with crystal clarity the source of danger to the progressive social structure of the Soviet Union and the East European countries. The danger comes from world capitalism on the one hand, and from the bureaucratic caste on the other. The evidence is now conclusive that the revolution of the

Hungarian workers is a continuation of the Russian revolution of October 1917. In their aspirations, their conscious program and their organized action, the Hungarian workers are deepening and extending the social conquests of the Russian revolution are striking powerful blows at the bureaucratic obstacle to its extension.

The Hungarian revolution is thus a living proof of the Trotskyist thesis that the best defense of the Soviet Union is the extension of the workers revolution. The Hungarian revolution constitutes this type of defense in a double sense; it sparks revolutionary forces within the Soviet Union itself and at the same time contributes enormously to clearing the way for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism in the West.

By its exposure of the counter-revolutionary nature of Stalinism the Hungarian revolution has further dissipated the baneful influence of Stalinism among the socialist minded workers of the world. This has opened new possibilities for the regroupment of the revolutionary vanguard under the banner of Leninism and Trotskyism.

6. "*Trends in the World Revolution*," by Farrell Dobbs (summary speech in the international debate at the May 1957 convention of the SWP—reprinted from SWP Discussion Bulletin, Volume 18, No. 10)

Our discussion today has turned on a central axis of an assessment of the present world conjuncture to determine its basic nature. Two distinct views in opposition to the position of the majority of the National Committee have been presented to the convention, one by Comrade Sam Marcy, the other by Comrade Art Fox.

Comrade Marcy's position strikes me as a conservative world view. He assumes a rigid alignment of two global class camps. He thinks the prolonged capitalist boom is binding the workers to imperialism in the capitalist sector of the world, attracting the East European workers toward capitalism, and threatening capitalist restoration in the workers states. He assigns to the Soviet bureaucracy the principal role in defending the Soviet property forms, subordinating to this concept the deadly conflict between the workers and the bureaucracy, and thereby blinding himself to the living reality of the developing political revolution.

Where the world crisis of capitalism has actually opened the way to a revolutionary advance in the Soviet sphere, Comrade Marcy appears to see instead the death agony of the workers' states. Without intending that result, his policy leads inevitably toward identification with the bureaucracy as against the revolutionary workers.

In contrast to the Marcy view, the majority sees the death agony of capitalism entering a period of deeper convulsions. This trend finds expression in the mounting intensity of the colonial revolution and in the expansion of the Soviet sector, particularly with the establishment of a workers' state in China. The deepening crisis of capitalism is in turn precipitating a crisis of Stalinism and opening the way to a political revolution throughout the Soviet zone. These great events on the international arena imply a qualitative advance for the world revolutionary forces.

In disagreement with both the majority and Comrade Marcy, Comrade Fox advances the state-capitalist theory.

He charges the majority with making a fetish out of nationalized property, holding we are thus unable to perceive the development of state capitalism in a country like China. He contends that we destroy the role of the revolutionary party, subordinating it to Stalinism; and that we vitiate the role of the working class, subordinating the workers to the peasantry.

At the root of Comrade Fox's position is the notion that state capitalism has developed as an all-pervading world phenomenon. He perceives a sequence in the capitalist countries passing from the individual ownership of the means of production to corporate ownership, and from there through the monopoly control of finance capital to the development of state capitalism. In the Soviet Union he sees the degeneration of the workers' state into a form of state capitalism and the extension of this peculiar form throughout the Soviet sphere. Comrade Fox rejects the concept of a political revolution against the Stalinist bureaucracy and appears instead to see the social revolution as a universal world task.

It is well known that the official party position rejects the theory that state capitalism prevails in the Soviet Union. Although there has been a political degeneration under the Stalinist bureaucracy with many social ramifications, the progressive property forms have been preserved and the Soviet Union therefore remains a workers state. In Eastern Europe the bureaucratic-military overturn of the old capitalist property relations led to the establishment of new workers states, although politically deformed. China, too, has become a deformed workers state through a revolutionary process we shall examine later in more detail. With regard to all these countries—and in the case of Yugoslavia which had its own peculiar development as a deformed workers state—it is the revolutionary duty of the working class to defend the progressive property forms against imperialism. At the same time it is the revolutionary task of the working class to support a political revolution to establish workers democracy in the workers states.

Concerning the increased state intervention in the internal affairs of the capitalist countries, the majority views this tendency as a byproduct of capitalist decay. Total war requires attempts at state regulation of the capitalist economy, along with extensive intervention in the class struggle to discipline the working class. These needs sharpen the tendency of finance capital to fuse more closely with the state but do not loosen the grip of monopoly capital over the state. The resort to statism in these forms does not overcome the crisis of capitalism. Instead it intensifies all the old contradictions and creates new ones, thus preparing greater revolutionary explosions.

Statism in the colonial areas represents a makeshift resorted to by the native bourgeoisie because of the lack of native capital. The bourgeois class seeks controlled reforms within the capitalist framework, at the same time protecting itself against the revolutionary masses through alliances with the feudal exploiters within the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Antagonisms between the native capitalists and the imperialist powers cause them to seek "neutralist" advantage from the Soviet-imperialist stalemate on the world arena, but they are always ready to make deals with imperialism at the expense of the masses.

These contradictions forecast a deepening conflict between the exploited masses and the native bourgeoisie. The struggle for liberation from imperialist domination can therefore be only a first sequence in the processes of the permanent revolution, only a prelude to social revolution throughout the colonial sphere. Strong confirmation of the laws of the permanent revolution and evidence of a quickened tempo in their unfoldment has appeared in the case of the Chinese revolution. China passed swiftly, historically speaking, from a liberation struggle, through the democratic revolution, to the establishment of a deformed workers state. It now faces the unresolved task of the political revolution which remains to be fulfilled.

Comrade Copeland, who shares the general conceptions advanced by Comrade Marcy, attacks the majority's analysis of the successive stages in the Chinese revolution. Comrade Copeland contends it was the masses who took the power in China in 1949 and thereby automatically created a workers state. In determining the nature of the state, he calls it an error for us to stress the false policy of Stalinism. He terms the false program merely a deformation. The masses, he insists, put their party in power in 1949. How else, he challenges, can you justify support of the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek after the Japanese defeat?

Our answer is plain and direct. The struggle of 1947-49 represented a progressive stage of the democratic revolution. Its chief tasks were to solve the land problem and unify the country, to sweep away the old feudal relations and to crush the Kuomintang which functioned as an agency of imperialism. We affirmed these revolutionary implications of the 1947-49 struggle and supported the revolution despite its Stalinist leadership. But we remain constantly alert to the dangers of Stalinist treachery.

I do not mean to infer that Comrade Copeland does not consider Stalinism treacherous. He simply made an abstraction from this basic characteristic of Stalinism, and its political and economic implications, when he equated the Stalinist seizure of power in 1949 with the establishment of a deformed workers' state in China. Yet it

is precisely at this point that we come into sharp disagreement with him. As I will undertake to demonstrate, Stalinist treachery prevented China from becoming a workers' state until an imperialist intervention, subsequent to the 1949 seizure of power, compelled the Stalinists to initiate a fundamental social change.

Predominant in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party are declassed petty bourgeois elements schooled in Stalinism. This leadership exploited the linking of the CCP in the popular mind with the prestige of the October 1917 revolution and the Soviet power. They used this prestige in an effort to derail the Chinese revolution into "coexistence" channels, trying repeatedly to make a deal with Chiang Kai-shek for a coalition government.

When they were compelled in 1949 to take the power, after one last overture to Chiang, the CCP leaders tried to remain within the framework of a coalition regime including native capitalist elements. They delayed completion of the agrarian reform and failed to expropriate the imperialist holdings within China.

Only when faced with the mortal threat of the imperialist intervention in Korea did the CCP make a basic shift in policy. Under new objective pressures the Stalinists were compelled to resort to class struggle measures, taken bureaucratically. They nationalized key branches of the economy and instituted planning. They finally carried through the agrarian reform and also imposed a monopoly over foreign trade. They at last expropriated the imperialist holdings, marking a definitive shift in policy.

With the changed property forms, the Chinese economy has become closely linked with the Soviet economic system and China has been drawn completely toward the Soviet bloc as a deformed workers' state. At the same time it remains subject to all the bureaucratic contradictions that are preparing a political revolution throughout the Soviet zone, and the Chinese revolution itself has given a major impulse to the processes of the political revolution.

It will be profitable for us to recall Comrade Trotsky's analysis of the basic features of the political revolution which he set down quite extensively in *The Revolution Betrayed* and in *The Transitional Program*. Soviet democracy is not an abstract policy, he pointed out, it is a life and death question. While the bureaucracy is able to introduce important elements of capitalist technique, a qualitative advance for the Soviet Union is not possible without a free conflict of ideas. The existing improvements do not reconcile the workers with the authorities. A vast gap remains between the mass living standards and the bureaucratic privileges. This gap stands as a constant provocation to the working class.

As a consequence Comrade Trotsky forecast a rebellious polarization of the masses around the culturally developed forces, above all around the industrial workers, together with the youth and sections of the intellectuals. He predicted the program of the political revolution would depend generally on the moment when the struggle breaks out, the level which the country has then attained and the given international situation.

Comrade Marcy denies, however, that the Soviet workers have reacted politically to the developing crisis of Stalinism. He considers them to be in a state of apathy which he attributes to war-weariness and to modest increases in Soviet living standards. Actually the origin of

the East European events traces back to the Soviet Union, with the Soviet workers the primary force behind it all. They are seizing the chance Comrade Trotsky predicted they would watch for, "another revolutionary dawn . . . in the West or the East." Let me emphasize that Comrade Trotsky also included the East as a direction from which impulses to the political revolution might come, a direction from which Comrade Marcy seems to exclude impulses of such decisive weight, demanding instead revolution in the West as the precondition for a genuine political revolution in the Soviet zone.

Today the Soviet workers have become emboldened by the new revolutionary dawn about which Comrade Trotsky spoke. They gained confidence from the Soviet defeat of the imperialist invasion during World War II. They have witnessed a postwar expansion of the Soviet sphere helping to overcome their past isolation in a hostile capitalist world. They feel themselves aided by the colonial revolution, above all by the Chinese revolution. They see world imperialism temporarily stalemated by the revolutionary forces. To their minds these favorable developments are beginning to open the way for them to settle accounts with the Stalinist bureaucracy.

The concessions made by the Stalinist bureaucrats at the Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communist Party stemmed primarily from internal Soviet pressures and were calculated to appease the masses. But as Comrade Trotsky pointed out, reforms create a semilegal cover for mass intervention, rifts in the bureaucracy open the way toward broader political struggle. The first major outbreaks, touched off by the Twentieth Congress, came in Poland and Hungary, and they are causing profound repercussions in the Soviet Union.

The insurrections in Eastern Europe would undoubtedly have been more chemically pure if the first explosion came within the Soviet Union or if the political revolution was given a basic impulse by a social revolution in Western Europe. But our job is to draw a balance sheet of the objective evidence in the light of the living struggle as it is actually unfolding within a contradictory world situation.

Upon close examination we find that the revolt in Eastern Europe assumed a dual character. It took the general form of a national uprising against Kremlin domination. Within that complex there appeared a workers' struggle for democracy on the basis of the Soviet property forms, and the workers showed the ability to lead toward a socialist solution of the national struggle.

Comrade Marcy contends, however, that a restorationist and bourgeois-democratic trend prevails in Eastern Europe. He attributes sweeping attractive powers to the capitalist boom, including the power to draw the East European masses toward a capitalist revival. This view assumes the exact opposite of the growing world antagonism toward American imperialism. It overlooks the revolutionizing effects of U.S. foreign policy which stands as a constant source of irritation, envy, and hate among the discontented masses everywhere.

Comrades Marcy and Copeland contend the Hungarian workers made common cause with the capitalist restorationists and were helping to smash a deformed workers' state. As a result, they assert, defense of the progressive property forms was left to the Soviet bureaucracy and therefore the Kremlin intervention was necessary and progressive.

We must recognize the danger of restorationist elements appearing within the national uprising. In fact a prolonged floundering by the workers' leadership could permit the accumulation of counterrevolutionary forces, threatening the workers grip on the factories and leading toward capitalist restoration. This danger, moreover, is much greater in Eastern Europe than in the Soviet Union. The retardation of the Polish revolution provides an example. The Catholic church is gaining unwarranted strength. Gomulka is duplicating Stalin in creating a state church as a source of support against the working class. In the process he is helping to provide a rallying center for reactionary elements.

Protection against restorationist dangers lies in the workers orienting toward a full revolutionary policy. That is why we insist on the need for creation of a revolutionary socialist party as an integral part of the developing political revolution. But we disagree with Comrade Marcy when he contends that, in the absence of such a fully-developed party, the Hungarian workers became the captives of a capitalist coalition government under Nagy and that the workers councils came under the leadership of Social Democrats and the bourgeois Smallholders party.

The Nagy government represented a continuation of the bureaucratic regime of a deformed workers state. It was a Stalinist-type coalition government which served as the point of infiltration for restorationist elements. With political action centered around the parliamentary system, a capitalist relic deliberately preserved by the Stalinists as a barrier to workers' democracy, the workers manifested confusion under the Nagy regime on the question of free elections as a class question. But the developing struggle for legalization of the workers councils had already marked a shift in political emphasis toward Soviet forms. The workers demanded that their councils have sole authority over industry, thus implying the ultimate slogan: All power to the workers councils. With the councils emerging as a rival power in opposition to the parliamentary authority, the suffrage issue was shifting objectively toward the concept of free elections for Soviet parties.

Comrade Copeland admits that class war was implied in the national uprisings, that is, a dual power situation. But he denies the dual power could lead to a progressive outcome. He contends the workers had to follow bourgeois leadership for lack of their own independent program and therefore they subordinated their general strike to the national struggle. Where the majority sees motion toward a political revolution, Comrades Copeland and Marcy contend the workers are backing a capitalist counterrevolution. Comrade Fox, on the other hand, from the premises of his state-capitalist theory, looks to the possibilities of a social revolution, not a political revolution to correct deformations in a workers' state.

There is overwhelming testimony from all observers of the Hungarian events in confirmation of several key facts: The workers were the decisive force and they were on the stage throughout the struggle. They showed a manifest desire for workers' democracy on the basis of Soviet property forms. The workers organized from the factory level up to district and regional councils. These councils rejected the idea that they should be confined to trade union tasks. The leading forces in the workers councils came from the Communist Party and the Social Democrat-

ic rank and file, that is, from the traditional organizations. At first the old union leaders stood in the forefront of the key Budapest council. When they tried to halt the general strike against Kadar, they were replaced by revolutionary workers about November 11. The Social Democratic workers in Miskolcz proved as revolutionary as the Communist Party ranks in Budapest. From the best of these elements that spearheaded the councils a revolutionary party can and will be built.

In Poland the workers mobilized for armed resistance to the Kremlin during the October events. They created councils in Warsaw that have since spread throughout the country. These organs of the working class have compelled official recognition of the right to strike and are forcing a greater voice for themselves generally in industry. Workers' councils are thus assuming the role of an organizational vehicle for the political revolution. The Soviet form is developing alongside parliament and the bureaucratic apparatus.

Making reference to a quotation from Comrade Trotsky, concerning attempts to break down centralized planning, Comrade Marcy—if I understood him correctly—counterposes centralized planning to the “syndicalist anarchy” of demands for the workers' councils to have sole authority over industry. Actually, Comrade Trotsky was referring to bureaucratic motion toward capitalist restoration in the form of demands for greater concentration of power in the hands of the factory managers. He was not discussing the problems of economic planning as they relate to the processes of political revolution

In addition it is necessary to observe that Comrade Marcy omits one small point in his thinking: Before the workers can institute centralized planning on a democratic basis, they must first break the grip of the bureaucracy. To do so they must begin where they are the strongest—in the factories. As the workers' councils organize on a centralized basis in opposition to the whole bureaucracy, they will lay firm foundations for centralized economic planning, but on a new and higher plane of genuine workers' democracy.

Yet Comrades Marcy and Copeland manifest no confidence in the workers councils. They contend the workers are abandoning defense of the workers' state as captives of the capitalist restorationists. They remind us that the Stalinist bureaucracy, on the other hand, has material roots in the nationalized property. This line of thought implies that the bureaucracy is a supraclass force standing forward as the most reliable defender of the Soviet property forms. It assumes an identity of the bureaucracy with the fundamental interests of the working class, when the actual struggle in Eastern Europe is proving the exact opposite.

Comrade Trotsky taught us that in a strictly defined case there might be the need for a united front of the workers with the bureaucracy against a counterrevolutionary danger. But the chief political task remains the overthrow of this same bureaucracy. The main danger of capitalist restoration comes from the bureaucracy, he pointed out, both as a hungry privilege seeker and as a provoker of an “explosion of the whole system.” Comrade Trotsky always counterposed the working class to the bureaucratic danger and he did not demand that worker action await the appearance of a fully-developed party. On

this latter point we have serious differences in the present discussion.

Comrade Fox contends the social revolution cannot begin without the previous development of the revolutionary party. In the case of China he accuses us of consigning to Stalinism the role of the revolutionary party. Comrades Marcy and Copeland, on the other hand, consider the role of leadership in the Chinese revolution as secondary because it was a social revolution, a war between classes. The masses took power, they argue, and made the Stalinist party their party.

In the case of Hungary, Comrades Marcy and Copeland reverse this view. There the role of leadership becomes primary for them. Since the political revolution is the war of a class against its own treacherous leadership, they warn, the other classes may intervene. Therefore it is necessary to have a new leadership ready in advance to replace the old one. In short, these comrades contend that a social revolution can be launched without a Marxist party to lead it; but a political revolution cannot begin without a conscious Marxist leadership.

From their rigid concepts of the global class struggle, Comrades Marcy and Copeland arrive at this generalization: Stalinist bureaucrats can make progressive adaptations to anticapitalist struggles and provide a working substitute for the revolutionary party; but the workers can't challenge the rule of the bureaucracy without falling prey to counterrevolutionary forces, unless they already have a revolutionary party to lead them. Without their having such intention, this concept actually leads to defense of the bureaucracy against the workers. It negates the rich possibilities of creating a revolutionary party in the course of the unfolding political revolution.

In periods of social upheaval, Comrade Trotsky pointed out, the masses are impelled by a sharp feeling they can no longer endure the old regime. They gain confidence from favorable revolutionary trends and make a forcible entry onto the political arena without a preconceived plan. The mass program and revolutionary party are forged in the course of action. These factors apply to political revolution as well as to social revolution.

In Eastern Europe the mass demands have instinctively gone in a Trotskyist direction. They include: abolition of bureaucratic privileges; equality of wages for the workers; freedom for the unions and factory committees; the right of assembly and freedom of the press. These issues in turn imply the demand for legalization of the workers' political parties. This trend leads directly toward the revival of Soviets with full working class content and toward a revolutionary international policy.

In contrast to Comrade Copeland's charge that the Hungarian workers didn't mention defense of the Soviet Union, Comrade Trotsky always listed international policy at the foot of the workers demands. He did so not because international policy is least important—in the last analysis it is the most important—but because the masses begin their struggle with demands corresponding most closely to their vast accumulation of grievances.

There are three major criteria for determining the character of a revolution: the forces waging the revolutionary struggle; the leadership and program; and the results achieved.

In Hungary both the forces and methods of struggle were in the main proletarian—the general strike and

workers' councils. The program corresponded to the main aspects of our transitional program. The leadership had not yet been determined. Nor had the results of the revolution which was crushed by the Kremlin. It was not at all proven that restorationist counterrevolution could have seized the plants from the workers who had taken possession of them during the struggle.

If the elemental, instinctive motion of the workers in a revolution were procapitalist, we would have to conclude that Marxism is a Utopia, that the Trotskyist program bases itself not on the objective reality but on wishful thinking.

Rejecting the notion of any such prevailing trend among the workers, we must in all seriousness ask Comrades Marcy and Copeland: Can't the revolutionary party possibly be forged in the course of the revolution? Can it be formed on a broad basis in any other way under conditions of Stalinist terror? And do you persist in forbidding the workers to rise against the bureaucracy before they have a full-fledged party to lead them?

In our view the revolutionary party will arise in the course of the struggle, deepening the content of the political revolution as it comes into being. The cadres of the party are already assembling in the workers' councils. They are arising among the youth, from sections of the intellectuals, among Communist Party elements who are going over to the workers.

We call for full support to the revolutionary workers of Eastern Europe. We back their fight to establish workers democracy on the basis of Soviet property forms. We welcome their struggles which feed the fires of political revolution throughout the entire Soviet sphere and give a general forward push to the world revolutionary forces as a whole.

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Our differences in this discussion are sharp and they run deep, but they are differences among comrades who are loyal to the party on all sides. Let me illustrate the point. Since the particular example I have in mind happens to involve comrades of the Marcy tendency, I want to stress

7. *"Suez and Its Aftermath": Draft International resolution submitted to the Thirteenth Congress of the British Section (May 3, 1957)*

The shortlived Suez adventure of Anglo-French imperialism has thrown into bold relief the new situation facing world imperialism.

This new situation is characterised by:

(1) The decisive shift of power within the Western Alliance to the all powerful United States at the expense of both British and French imperialism.

(2) The growth, development and deepening of the colonial revolution to the point where it has been able to inflict a crushing and humiliating blow on the oldest of the imperialist powers—Britain and France.

(3) The forging of a new internationalism linking the struggle of the working class in the metropolitan countries

that the point applies equally to comrades who share the views of Comrade Fox.

At the plenum of the National Committee last December we had an extensive debate over the Hungarian question, with the comrades of the Marcy tendency opposing the majority decision to support the uprising against the Stalinist bureaucracy. The same plenum launched a fund campaign to finance party work, including general publication of the majority position on the Hungarian events.

Although the comrades of the Buffalo branch are generally in agreement with the Marcy position and therefore opposed to the majority view, they took the third largest quota in the campaign. Their quota was exceeded only by those of the New York and Los Angeles locals, both of which are larger than the Buffalo branch. The Buffalo comrades were also among the very first to convert their entire quota from a promise to pay into the hard cash. This demonstration of party loyalty speaks for itself.

We have come to the end of the discussion on this agenda point and the convention is about to take a vote. The majority submits for convention approval the general line of the following series of National Committee and Political Committee documents: April 1956 resolution on the crisis of Stalinism; December 1956 statements on Eastern Europe and the Middle East; a series of 1955 documents including: *The World Today*; *The Soviet Union Today*; *The Third Chinese Revolution*; *The Rise of the Colonial Bourgeoisie*.

Comrade Kirk mentioned that he is contemplating an amendment to the resolution, dealing with the colonial bourgeoisie. From an earlier reference I assume he has in mind something on the question of Africa. In any case it should be understood that all comrades who may so desire are free to submit amendments to these documents, either now or subsequent to the convention. The outgoing National Committee proposes that the convention authorize continued discussion of all the fundamental features of the present fluid world situation. At the same time the convention is asked to approve the general line of these documents as a guide to the party in its work during the next period.

with the struggle of the colonial peoples against their imperialist masters, and

(4) The rapid changes and fluctuations within the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, China and Yugoslavia following the 20th Congress of February, 1956.

Each one of these features of the new world situation bring sharply to the fore the question of power. In the situation of world imperialism today, with its rotten-ripe objective basis reeling from blow after blow—only the decisive subjective factors allow the system to proceed with a pretence of self-assurance. The organisation and preparation of the advance guard of the working class movement for the overthrow of this system remains the principal task of the working class. The continued existence of capitalism depends not on the confidence of the ruling class in its system or its ability to rule, but the cowardice and treachery of the representatives of the

working class movements, Social Democrats and Stalinists alike, who have functioned not as leaders of the only class which has the power to rule, but as bureaucrats with their own short-term material self-interests. It is not an accident that the bureaucrats of Transport House single out our Trotskyist comrades for their special attention, nor that French "socialists" arrest our comrades in France, still less that the Soviet bureaucrats remain firm in their refusal to rehabilitate Trotsky and the Left Opposition. Both Social Democrats and Stalinists, reflecting directly or indirectly the fears of world imperialism, see in our movement the threat to their own leaderships, their own bureaucracies. Whether these bureaucrats derive their privileges as part of the capitalist system (in the metropolitan countries) or derive them from the parasitical role in relation to the workers states, does not alter their essentially reactionary role in relation to the arming of the working class for its historic role, the grave-diggers of the capitalist system.

As imperialism suffers blow after blow, so too, the strength and confidence of the working class and the colonial peoples receive new sources of power. Within such a favourable situation, the opportunities for rapid advance and expansion of the movement become very great.

Events over the last period have only added further evidence to the contention of the Transitional Programme that despite all Social Democratic and Stalinist bleatings to the contrary—*the epoch of today is the epoch of the death agony of capitalism.*

IMPERIALISM VERSUS WORLD REVOLUTION

The Second World War unleashed a revolutionary wave wider in scope than the wave following the First World War. The repercussions of the decisive property changes in Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav and Chinese Revolutions and the election of the 1945 majority Labour Government are by no means at an end. They were all expressions of the new upsurge, analysed and understood in advance by Leon Trotsky in his polemics with those who took the temporary and transitional power of labour bureaucracies as a reflection of a permanent state of affairs in the U.S.S.R. and the Social Democratic working class and trade union organisations. Despite the absolutely favourable situation in Western Europe following the collapse of the Nazi 'thousand year' new order—both Social Democracy and Stalinism flung its weight and power against the potential residing in the working class. In France, Italy and in Britain,—Stalinism and Social Democracy had between them the allegiance of the overwhelming mass of the working class and an important section of the middle classes and poorer peasantry. Within their grasp was the whole fate of Europe. Instead of advancing along the road to power within the framework of a plan for a Socialist Europe, they proceeded to take office within the confines of their own respective bourgeois state apparatus. In France and Italy, together with the Christian Democrats they pursued a policy of open class collaboration. In Britain, Social Democracy, whilst carrying through a number of important nationalisation measures and certain social reforms, revealed its true colours in its foreign policy. The policy of Ernest Bevin was the policy of the Foreign Office. The policy of intervention against the Greek Revolution, the policy of alliance with American imperialism, the policy of the cold war against the U.S.S.R. and the colonial revolution.

And yet, despite this historic betrayal of Stalinism and Social Democracy, this post-Second World War upsurge was never finally crushed. On the contrary, the power of the colonial revolution reached its maximum point in the 1948-49 Chinese Revolution, which has changed the face of Asia, stimulating the colonial revolution to new advances and at the same time inflicting a blow to the greedy designs of American imperialism in the Far East.

During the Korean War too, imperialism received a rebuff. Only the containment policy of the Kremlin prevented the North Koreans from obliterating the rotten regime of Syngman Rhee.

In Indo-China too, it was Molotov and Chou En Lai who sold out the hard won victory of the Vietminh (following Dien Bien Phu) to Mendes-France at Geneva.

From Iran to Kenya, from Cyprus to Algeria, from Spain to Argentina—the instability of the old imperialist world has become clearer day by day.

The nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Colonel Nasser in July 1956 was but the culmination of the new stage in the advance of the colonial revolution.

Around this measure, a storm of great dimensions blew up. For upon the success or otherwise of this bold stroke at British imperialism depended the next stage in the relations between the imperialist world and its interests, and the colonial world freeing itself from these very same interests. Could Nasser be allowed to get away with it? This was the question which confronted the British and French imperialists. It was a life-or-death question for the old European imperialist partners in crime. Britain's hold in the Middle East (via the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and her Baghdad Pact) was challenged to the very foundations. French imperialism too, was faced with a costly war in Algeria, ferment throughout the whole of the Magreb and economic crisis at home. Moreover, Britain and France found Israel a willing partner to her plan for defeating the hated Colonel Nasser. In reality, of course, it was not Nasser they hated, it was the insolence of the Egyptian Revolution which touched the imperialists to the quick.

What more simple an operation could possibly be conceived than a quick military blitzkrieg against the 'inferior' Egyptian Army and a rapid occupation of the Suez Canal in the interests of the maritime powers utilising the Canal? It was too simple.

France, the sick man of Europe, and Britain, the grey-be-whiskered former lion, now toothless in decline, miscalculated. All ruling classes in their period of decay and decline reveal an abysmal ignorance of the real situation. They live in a world long bypassed by history; bypassed today by the might and dominance of the American ruling class. In a series of operations now known as Operation Musketeer, Britain, France and Israel prepared to intervene against Egypt on the flimsy pretext that troops had to be sent to separate the combatants, following the Israeli invasion of the Sinai Peninsula. Instead of bombing the Israeli aggressors, British aircraft bombed Egyptian airfields! This was the obtuse logic of Sir Anthony Eden's excuse for intervention.

Meanwhile after a few day's hedging, the landing commenced at Port Said, and British and French troops marched towards Ismaila. Israel's armies were conveniently routing the Egyptians in the Sinai Peninsula. Unfortu-

nately, British and French imperialism had failed to take into account five factors:

- 1) The storm of protest and opposition generated within the Labour Party and Trade Unions, with 'Tribune' spearheading the opposition.

- 2) The power of American imperialism.

- 3) The strength and solidarity of the Arab-Asian bloc.

- 4) The Soviet threat to intervene.

- 5) The stupidity and blockheadedness of the Brass Hats at the War Office.

The shock of realisation that the days of the gunboat—at least the British gunboat—are over has yet to be transmitted to all the elements of the old ruling class. The Suez Rebels, with their antiquated anti-Americanism, are as capable of turning the wheels of history back, as the Jacobites were more than two hundred years ago.

British and French imperialism can never go it alone again. This was the lesson which Uncle Sam taught the treacherous Sir Anthony. Moreover, he demanded his head—and got it!

The Bermuda Conference only formalised a situation that had become clear following Sir Anthony's 'resignation'. Macmillan had to eat humble pie before the President of the United States. Whilst America had agreed to join the military committee of the Baghdad Pact, she had done so more as a means of constructing a new regional Pact, perhaps involving not only Iraq but Saudi Arabia as well. The recent visit of the Crown Prince Illal of Iraq and Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia to Washington can only be construed as a preview of the Eisenhower Plan for the Middle East. Down with imperialism (British, no relation to the American variety)! Down with Soviet intervention into the Middle East! Down with communism! This is the policy Eisenhower is trying to sell the Arab despots. At all costs, Nasser must be isolated. His insistence that all dues are to be paid to the nationalised Suez Canal Authority is being resisted and pressure is to be exerted on Egypt via her ally, Saudi Arabia. Again American imperialism, hedging on the Gaza Strip question for fear of alienating the sympathies of the Arab-Asian bloc leaders, is caught in a trap of her own making. Both the Israelis and the Egyptians insist on a simple answer to a simple question, is the Gaza strip to be administered by the United Nations (read American imperialism) or Egypt? A simple question demanding a straight answer. Foster Dulles has no straight answer, as it is impossible to act as a mediator between two fundamentally opposed concepts. American imperialism will find the problem of 'policing' the Middle East even more difficult than her predecessors. The American Sixth Fleet's 'visit' to the Lebanon will quickly disillusion the Arab world about the intentions of the State Department.

It would be wrong, however, to underestimate the degree of penetration which American imperialism has succeeded in achieving in the Middle East. Thanks to the narrow, empirically based diplomacy of the Soviet Union, with its reliance on mobilising not the Arab peoples against the imperialist aggressors, but on diplomatic alliances and agreements with the feudal despots and native feudal capitalists—American imperialism has once again scored a temporary victory. In the Lebanon, in Saudi Arabia and now in Jordan with the dismissal of the Nabulsi Government, American imperialism has been able to reverse to a limited extent the position of Arab solidarity that arose following the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Suez. At the

Bermuda conference Macmillan was unable to involve American imperialism in the Baghdad Pact structure as a whole, only gaining its adherence to the Military Committee of the Pact. In other words, whilst basically American imperialism lines up with British imperialism against the Soviet Union and the colonial revolution, it nonetheless finds a useful area of freedom of manoeuvre to negotiate with the Arab rulers, who regard British and French imperialism as the main enemy.

The disastrous collapse of British power and prestige in the Middle East following the Suez crisis has also affected the situation in Cyprus. Despite the loud assertions to the contrary, the climbdown over Cyprus followed by the resignation of Lord Salisbury can only be seen as part of the continued pressure of the State Department on British imperialism for a NATO solution to the Cyprus problem. Now that the Middle East is becoming the object of President Eisenhower's new Plan, Cyprus becomes an object of strategic value to American instead of British imperialism.

British imperialism is in retreat the world over, from Singapore and Malaya in Asia to Ghana in Africa. The American colossus bestrides the continents that once knew only the imperialism of the Old World. The only great difference is this—American imperialism finds the continents of Africa and Asia in the grip of a revolution that aims not at substituting one imperialism for the other, but at undermining the very basis of all imperialisms.

While the old Empires crumble, American imperialism rushes in to fill the vacuum. Vice-President Nixon's visit to Morocco, his greetings to the people of Ghana from Eisenhower, are all part of the reinforcement of American global economic and military strategy. Manipulating to the best of their ability the leaderships of the various nationalist and colonial movements in Africa and Asia, American imperialism pushes aside Britain and France, at the same time attempting to head off the successful conclusion of the colonial revolution. In North Africa for instance, the French settlers complain bitterly at American dabbling with the Algerian armies in their attempt to push the French out of the Magreb. Again, in Britain, the Tory right expresses its hostility to the continual American pressure on the vestiges of British power and influence in no uncertain terms.

THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET

The European Common Market is partly an American device for further penetration of the European economy and partly an attempt to strangle the working class of Britain and France.

The German economy has been re-established by masses of American investment. Since 1950, its growth has been extraordinary: in 1950 her share of world exports was 7.3%. In 1956 it was 16.4%. In the same period, Britain's share fell from 25.7% to 19%.

Due to this investment, German industry is modern and it is underselling Britain all over the world, even in markets favourable to Britain like Argentina since Britain is the best customer for Argentine goods, taking approximately twice as much of her exports as Germany. Yet in 1956, Germany sold more than twice as much to Argentina as Britain.

In Europe in 1956, Britain's net deficit was £96m while

Germany's favourable balance was enormous. In one month alone, November 1956, her credit balance with EPU was \$133m—in that month Britain's debit balance was \$66m.

The French are aware of the purpose of the European Common Market and are resisting the whole idea and may even ultimately reject it. In the meantime she has demanded, as the price of her adherence, the inclusion of her colonial empire and that investment in her African colonies by the other members of the Common Market shall be \$312m. In other words, the remaining 5 states in the scheme must embroil themselves in France's colonial wars and must invest heavily in the continued future domination of these countries as the French price for their adherence—if they do adhere.

Further, it was not at all accidental that Macmillan's idea of associating British economy in a Free Trade Area with the Common Market—except for agricultural products—and bringing both the Dominions and Colonies into the scheme was cooked up in Washington. It was his answer to the pressure being put upon him by the Americans to take Britain into the European Customs Union. Now, of course, if he continues with the Free Trade Area it will put Empire Preference on an equal footing not only with the Six European Common Market countries, but with the French colonial countries, plus Tunisia and Morocco as well.

That is one aspect: U.S. capital hopes to dominate European capitalism through its close partnership with German capital in the rebuilt German industry. On the other hand, the European capitalists hope to establish themselves on a competitive basis during the 15 years over which the scheme will be introduced. During this period the British and French capitalists also hope to whittle down the gains of the postwar period and to bring about welfare conditions approximating to those of West Germany and Belgium.

Despite the obvious difficulties facing the capitalists it is not enough to sneer at the idea of a European Common Market with an associated Free Trade Area. The idea has got to be fought and exposed as part of the bourgeois strategy in the class struggle to down the working class. The fact that, as well as the difficulties mentioned there is also an internal struggle between the different national bourgeoisies going on—U.S.-German on the one hand and British-French on the other with Italian-Dutch-Belgian-Luxembourg tending towards the U.S.-German side—does not at all mean that the whole idea is utopian. It is no more or less utopian than the aim of dominating the capitalist world by the U.S., in fact it is part of that aim.

In short, it will fail only if the European working class, together with the American, succeeds in the struggle facing it for political emancipation from capitalism. But if the working class was definitively defeated in the next period such a scheme, modified according to the strengths of the participating capitalist states, could quite well succeed.

The conclusion, therefore, is that the European Common Market with an associated Free Trade Area must be looked upon as something to be fought, as a bourgeois weapon for smashing working class standards of living in general and in defeating the struggle for a Socialist United States of Europe in particular.

The difficulties in the way of a bourgeois success in such a project should be taken merely as the measure of the

crisis that faces the bourgeoisie in the period ahead.

THE ROLE OF THE U.S.A.

The absolute military and economic superiority of American imperialism in the capitalist world remains unchallenged. Its overwhelming preponderance so recently demonstrated in Bermuda and during the Suez crisis, grows in inverse ratio to the decline of European capitalism. It is, today, not only the banker, arms contractor and strategist of the 'Free world' it has also assumed the role of supreme arbiter, thanks to its control of the United Nations.

"In order to study world economy it is necessary, first of all, to study American economy," these words of the founder of our movement retain for us their topicality and profound meaning in the present analysis of the mutual relations between America, the Soviet Bloc, Western Europe and the colonial and semi-colonial world.

The fate of West European economy, more than ever before, is inextricably bound to the vicissitudes of American economy. The rehabilitation and boom of European economy, while it has modified this relationship, has not changed it fundamentally. On the contrary every blow delivered by the colonial revolution to the metropolitan countries increases this dependence, enhances the role of U.S. imperialism and forces it to intervene *in its own interests*, in the 'privileged preserves' of the former colonial powers, Dien Bien Phu, the Suez Crisis, the present crisis in Jordan and the declarations of Vice-President Nixon in West Africa illustrate the real objectives and motives of U.S. foreign policy and its growing role as undertaker to British and French imperialism.

The feverish, unplanned and unprecedented growth of American productive forces coincides with the general crisis and decline of world capitalism. The uneven and combined development of world capitalism which has blessed America with the greatest productive plant in the world, with enormous capital reserves, a huge internal market and extremely high level of labour productivity has, at the same time created the conditions which prevent the full and effective utilization of these potentialities.

One-third of the world market has withdrawn into the anti-capitalist orbit. The colonial world already divided and re-divided amongst the old colonial powers seethes with revolt, making dollar investments unsafe and unusable. In Latin America, an American 'Sphere of Influence' for decades, the struggle against 'Yankee Imperialism' has acted as an effective deterrent to further dollar penetration. In Central America the U.S. government has to indulge in a massive demonstration of military, naval and aerial might in order to prevent the expropriation of American 'sovereignty' over the Panama Canal!

Furthermore, America's ambitions for world domination under the almighty dollar are frustrated by the presence of a powerful anti-capitalist enemy—the USSR which has deprived her of the monopoly of the H-bomb and possesses an approximately equivalent military strength. The existence of the USSR, revolutionary China and the satellite states constitutes a threat to the expansion of U.S. capital.

In its infancy, American capitalism could afford to propound the 'Monroe Doctrine' which expressed the needs of a capitalist system based on a rapidly expanding internal market and the free flow of labour and capital

from Europe to the States. Conversely, the 'Eisenhower Doctrine' today expresses the insatiable demands of a decaying capitalism trying to expand in a rapidly shrinking *world* market.

REARMAMENT, BOOM AND INFLATION

American imperialism has so far been able to postpone the inevitable crisis and depression of her productive system by the creation of an artificial market in armaments and through the stimulus of credit and monetary inflation. The primary reason for the unprecedented fifteen year boom in the U.S. is the vast government expenditure on arms amounting to 20% of the national income or \$41 billion per annum. It is this factor which has sustained and stimulated the growth of private capital investment, the retooling and rationalisation of U.S. industry and the consequent technological revolution.

A supplementary cause for the boom, directly related to the arms drive has been the industrialisation of the Deep South as well as the capital exports to the governments of Europe and Asia and the direct military expenditures of the U.S. government in Europe.

Despite the appearance of superficial prosperity U.S. economy shows unmistakable signs of an impending crisis. The productive forces beat incessantly against the barriers of private property relations. This is most glaringly revealed in the agricultural sphere where huge farm surpluses accumulate annually and cannot be exported for fear of depressing world agricultural prices. As a result the U.S. government spends \$5½ billion per annum to support farm prices—an amount almost equal to half the annual farm income.

In industry too, signs of a gathering recession are evident particularly in the auto-industry and in housing construction. Sales in March '57 (an important month) in the auto industry have been 8% fewer than the same time last year. As a result April-June production schedules have been cut by 11% below the first quarter (6½% more than originally intended). This lag in car sales is more important than it seems because the car industry reached a peak year in '56 and record amounts were spent on plant and equipment to take advantage of the expected boom in '57. This boom has not yet materialised.

In building, for the first time since 1951, housing construction has gone below the 1 million mark and will continue to move down. Added to this are the signs—slight but growing—of inventory reductions in basic raw materials such as copper and paperboard.

The most significant pointer to date is the information revealed by the Exchange and Securities Commission and the Commerce Department. The survey of the ESC&CD forecast a 37½ billion dollar investment for 1957. However actual spending has been lower than expected and in all probability will decline in the last half of '57. Moreover even if this figure is realised the physical volume of production will increase by much less than the total nominal growth.

Anticipating a downward trend in the economy the U.S. government has attempted to offset it by increasing Federal, State and local government expenditure by \$2½ billion—about half goes to the armed services.

THE WORKING CLASS

Increasing expenditure on arms will mean inevitably an increasing inflationary pressure resulting in higher prices,

higher taxes and a cut in real wages for the American working class. Already private indebtedness has reached the astronomical figure of \$124 billion!

Since the investment boom has begun to decline the U.S. industrialists are left with the alternative of reducing costs of production and increasing the exploitation of labour to a much greater degree than before or reconciling themselves to an immediate stagnation and decline of corporation profits.

The offensive against the unions typified by the attempt to discredit the Teamsters' union through the Dave Beck inquiries and the passage of numerous anti-labour laws in the state legislatures confirms the aggressive intentions of Wall Street.

The past and present trend of U.S. economy indicates clearly that the stage is being set for great economic and political struggles which in their magnitude, their intensity and their scope will dwarf the sit-down strikes of the 1930s.

The massive American working class with the finest and strongest union organisation in the world is potentially the most decisive force on our planet. It is the only power capable of disarming the power drunk bourgeoisie of America and preventing a relapse of all humanity into a radio-active barbarism. If it lacks at present the consciousness of its own historical goal, namely the socialist transformation of the USA, this is due mainly to the reactionary, corrupt bureaucracy of the AFL-CIO which continues to adhere to the capitalist foreign and internal policy of the Democratic Party.

The break-up of the two-party system and the creation of a labour party based on the unions is a vital necessity for the further advancement of the working class. This task will undoubtedly be facilitated by the process of regroupment and discussion evoked by the 20th Congress and the Hungarian events in the vanguard of the working class movement. It will also receive an added impulse from the anti-union offensive of big business and the attempts of the Southern Bourbons and their northern colleagues to smash the resurgent Negro movement for integration.

THE NEGRO STRUGGLE

Every social crisis rouses the most oppressed and backward strata of society. This is particularly true of the Negro population in the U.S. Their struggle for integration and equality is a reflection within the powerhouse of capitalism of the worldwide struggle of the colonial peoples for freedom and independence. Moreover their struggle is integrally linked with the struggle of the American workers for emancipation. In this sense the present struggles in the Deep South are but heat-lightning flashes of the bigger struggles to come.

Subjected to the worst forms of economic, political, social and cultural degradation, the Negro population which is overwhelmingly proletarian in composition will play the role of detonator in the powder keg lodged in the foundations of American capitalism. Rejected by the Republicans, deceived by the Democrats and disillusioned by the trade union bureaucracy, the Negro masses have expressed their hostility to the Jim Crow states through militant and independent action. The post-war era has witnessed the creation of a powerful Negro movement—the NAACP under petty bourgeois reformist leaders.

The industrialisation of the South where two-thirds of the Negroes live, has given a new impetus to the creation

of a unionised Negro working class and an articulate Negro urban petty bourgeoisie. It is this that has strengthened the NAACP and sharpened the struggle for Negro equality. This struggle rose to a new level when the Federal Supreme Court ruled segregation in schools and universities illegal. Since then the movement has snowballed from education to transport and from transport to housing. Confident in its ultimate victory and conscious of its collective strength the Negro movement threatens—with its projected 'March on Washington' to become a truly national movement, embracing the whole Negro community.

THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION—A NEW STAGE (1)

The Suez crisis also played an important part in raising the colonial revolution itself on to a new stage, a new plane. The nationalisation of the canal is one of the most important conquests of the colonial revolution to date. In significance it is not to be separated from the challenge of the Chinese Revolution, the heroic struggles of the Korean peoples, or the collapse of French imperialism at Dien Bien Phu. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal gave an impetus to the whole scope of the colonial revolution from the Middle East to Indonesia and to Panama. Britain was even temporarily expelled from the Pact of her own creation—the Baghdad Pact. Despite American counter-pressure it would be superficial to assume that imperialism can restore the situation to ante-status quo in the Middle East. Even Jordan where King Hussein has attempted to re-assert the authority of the Court over the Nabulsi Government brought into power by the turn of events following Suez, the Baathists, National Socialists and Stalinists have given notice to King Hussein that they will not support his arbitrary action of dismissing the elected government of Jordan.

The Suez crisis also brought to the fore the total incapacity and bankruptcy of the Arab rulers and despots, parasitic growths and leeches on the Arab peoples. Faced with the Israeli thrust towards Sinai, the much-vaunted Arab unity of Syria, Jordan and Egypt soon revealed itself as a bluff and a sham. Egypt had to face a modern well-trained Israeli army backed by the French Military Staff in total isolation. Again following the Suez debacle, the rulers of Egypt, Syria and Jordan under the pressure of the situation agreed to a Federation of these countries as a counter-weight to the Iraqi dominated Baghdad Pact powers on the one hand and the State of Israel on the other. Like the much publicised unified military command, the Federation discussions reflected not the earnestness of the Arab rulers in preparing the ground for a unification of the Arab States in the Middle East but the enormous pressure set in motion by the Suez crisis. The Federation of Egypt, Syria and Jordan is basically utopian. Without including the Jews, without involving the technical skills and advanced techniques of the West, above all without mobilising the Arab peasantry, the dispossessed refugees, the oil workers of Aramco and the young, fresh proletariat of Cairo and Alexandria, all talk of federation expresses only the weakness of the position of the Arab rulers. Israel as a capitalist Zionist state, as an outpost of imperialism has to be removed through *joint action* by Jewish and Arab workers and farmers, irrespective of artificial frontiers. It can be removed in no other way.

The first Israeli defeat of the Egyptian Armies in 1948

led to the military coup against the Nero of Egypt, King Farouk. The second defeat of 1956 will undoubtedly liberate the working class and peasantry from any illusions that Nasser, King Hussein or Kuwatly have the power to exorcise the Israeli threat or even inflict a decisive and final defeat on world imperialism.

The Suez crisis has thus had a contradictory effect on the colonial revolution. On the one hand it has given a new confidence to the Arab peoples in their historically just and legitimate struggle against world imperialism. On the other hand it has exposed the bankruptcy of the Arab rulers and despots. It is in this context that the Trotskyist movement is absolutely justified in insisting that without the effective leadership of a Marxist tendency grounded in *internationalism* the colonial revolution cannot finally triumph.

THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION AND INTERNATIONALISM (2)

Suez brought to the attention of the world movement yet another important aspect of the development of the colonial revolution. It was this. Trotsky has placed on record his fundamental conviction that the colonial revolution could succeed only as part of the world revolution. This conviction challenged alike by the Stalinists and Social Democrats safe in the haven of their 'socialism in one country' or 'socialism by easy stages' received a powerful vindication during the Suez turn of events. The movement witnessed a great upsurge of the colonial revolution radiating out from the Suez Canal to countries as far off as Indonesia and Panama. The whole attention of the colonial and semicolonial world was gripped by the spectacle of Egypt taking on the imperialist powers. The Algerian people witnessed the ignominious 'Dunkirk' of Anglo-French imperialism with a confidence that the same fate awaited the colons in Algeria and the rest of North Africa. In Indonesia, the leftist government immediately cancelled its debts to the former Dutch imperialists. And in far away Panama, friction arose between the Panamanian Government and the American Panama Canal authorities. Within the United Nations, the Afro-Asian bloc reflected in a distorted fashion the international scope of the defeat of imperialism and the provisional victory of Egypt.

This was one side of the internationalism of the colonial revolution. The other side was not less important. *It was the internationalism that linked the struggle of the workers in Britain to the struggles of the colonial peoples against imperialism that characterised the new stage of the colonial revolution.*

For the first time in the history of British imperialism, with the doubtful exception of the Boer War—British imperialism went to war without the support of social democracy and its trade union supports. This was not due to a change of heart on the part of Gaitskell or Cousins, it was the pressure within the Labour Party, Trade Unions and the country as a whole which forced Gaitskell along the path of an 'anti-war' opposition to the Tory Government of Sir Anthony Eden. The election of Bevan as Treasurer of the Labour Party at the Annual Conference of the Labour Party was the first nail in the coffin of the right-wing bureaucracy. The Suez war, the mass demonstrations in the streets was the second nail.

The opposition of the Labour Party and Trade Unions to the Suez War, in a situation with a ruling class divided

was one of the principal factors in calling a halt to the imperialist adventure and thus assisting the work of the Egyptian revolution.

Again, although in France, the unity of the French working class and the Algerians has been retarded for a number of reasons—not least of which is the effect of Mollet's socialism and Thorez' communism—the reports of desertions of conscripts from the French Army only add to the picture of a new internationalism being forged out of the class struggles in the metropolitan countries and the colonial revolutions abroad.

This internationalism forged in these struggles has underlined the necessity for tying up the demands for immediate withdrawal of all imperialist forces from the colonies with the demand for a new Labour Government based on the class struggle, conscious of a perspective of workers power. Internationalism becomes, by this means, a reality.

THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION—THE FAR EAST

(3)

In the Far East, the polarisation of the colonial revolution versus imperialism continues. The absolute incapacity of even the most 'progressive' and 'socialistic' of the Afro-Asian bloc leaders, e.g. Nehru, Soekarno and Bandaranaike to proceed even along the path of the bourgeois-democratic revolution or along a path of radical agrarian reform has been fully confirmed. In India, the problem of Pakistan, carved out of the Indian economy, and dependent on the Baghdad Pact and the support of Western imperialism for its very existence—remains. In Indonesia, despite frantic efforts by the bourgeois-nationalist parties to establish a political and economic stability, Indonesia remains a disunited and unstable unit. The recent left-opportunist moves of Soekarno are but desperate efforts to find stability. In Ceylon, following the sweeping victory of the MEP under Bandaranaike on the crest of a mass revolt against the corruption of the old UNP—disillusionment is spreading far and wide. The MEP promised to nationalise the tea plantations, in fact, it has been shelved. Again, the communalist policies of the MEP have served to stir up trouble and discontent between the Sinhalese and Tamils, the Sinhalese and the Indian minority.

The existence of a powerful Trotskyist party in Ceylon is therefore of the greatest importance in this explosive situation. Coupled with the victory of the Indian Communist Party in the Province of Kerala (on the southern coast of India)—Trotskyism will undoubtedly find an avenue to the genuine communists in India and throughout the Far East. In India with the CP victory in Kerala, the Congress Party of Nehru is faced with an alternative leadership. But it must be said, with no real alternative policy, Stalinism in India is, therefore, faced with its biggest crisis. To simply act as gendarmes of the Delhi government would rapidly alienate not only its mass support, but also its base in the Party. On the other hand, to break with 'National Frontism' means to break with Moscow. The decisive factor here, of course, will be the experience gained by the 20 million population of Kerala and the transmission of this experience into the Communist Party rank and file in an absolutely favourable situation with a Ceylonese Trotskyist movement on its front door.

THE SOVIET UNION AND THE 20TH CONGRESS

Against this background of world imperialism in

advanced decay, the colonial revolution on a new higher plane and the militancy of the working class of the West—the 20th Congress falls into place.

The repercussions of the 20th Congress are by no means over and its effects will remain so long as Stalinism continues to dominate the workers' states and the Communist movements.

At our last Conference, the analysis we made of the situation retains all its validity to-day. We said:

(1) The Soviet bureaucracy aware of the development of the capitalist crisis, the growth of the proletariat within the Soviet Union itself and the growing contradictions within the Soviet bloc seeks to bolster up its crumbling positions by a left turn. Rebuffed in its overtures to imperialism and rejecting the methods of Stalin, the bureaucracy seeks to forge a front with the colonial bourgeoisie and with social reformism. (The Crisis in the Communist Party—p. 7)

(2) Throughout the world Stalinist movement, as in the Soviet Union the situation is in flux and capable of rapid developments. We are entering the period of the break-up of Stalinism. The shell has been cracked and the various tendencies inside are entering into their own motion. The 20th Congress released a stirring of ideas and discussions not seen since the expulsion of the Left Opposition. (International Resolution—p. 10)

The 20th Congress reflected the explosive power lodged in the Soviet proletariat coming on the scene of Stalinist Russia. The Soviet bureaucracy hoped to buy time in the face of the mounting opposition from a politically articulate working class by disassociating itself from the crimes of Stalin and even Stalinism. In reality, the bureaucracy unleashed a process which the Soviet proletariat will complete. Complete by expelling the bureaucracy from the seats of State power.

The contradictions within the USSR have reached the boiling point. The over-centralised bureaucratic planning comes into increasing conflict with the needs of a planned economy. The supercentralisation and bureaucratisation expressed only the Stalinist attempt to build 'socialism in one country'. In reality, as the 20th Congress has sharply brought out, as well as in the attendant Krushchev revelations concerning the plight of Soviet industry and agriculture—the lop-sided and uneven development of the different branches of Soviet Industry, have imposed on the USSR a gigantic overhead burden on her industrial growth. The over-emphasis of heavy to light industry, industrial production to production of consumer goods, has added to and not minimised the problems of the planners. Again, the crisis of Soviet agriculture reflects the same distortions of Soviet economy. Forced collectivisation under Stalinism, without regard to the possibilities has resulted in a situation where Krushchev was forced to admit in 1953 that the number of cattle in the USSR in that year was 8 million less than in 1928 (at the beginning of the Five Year Plan).

On top of all these problems, the bureaucracy has been up against the problem of the oppressed nationalities, the deported nationalities. Slowly but unmistakably, the full extent of Stalinism's brutality, not only to the Chechens and Volga-Germans (deported in 1941) but to the Jews has come to light. The attempt by the bureaucracy to 'repair' the damage revealed only its extent.

POLAND AND HUNGARY

To the bureaucrats, the anti-Stalin revelations meant one thing, the protection of the bureaucracy *from* the political revolution. To the masses they meant something else, something fundamentally different and opposed. The political revolution not against Stalin but against the bureaucracy of which he was the supreme expression, shaper and moulder. The peaceful evolution of Soviet society might have been adduced by a few dupes taken in by the first provisional and transitory stages of the Polish revolution. These stages reflected only the uneasy relations between the Soviet bureaucracy, the Gomulka regime and the Polish workers and peasants. The withdrawal of Gomulka from his October positions up to and including the reinstalling of the Natolin Stalinist group in the leadership has only emphasised the makeshift character of the compromise between the Polish October Revolution and the Soviet Army. Gomulka balances uneasily between the workers and peasants who brought him to power, the Soviet Army protecting the bureaucracy's interests and undoubtedly in the present situation, a section of the Roman Catholic Church.

In Hungary, however, the situation got out of hand. Literally, or almost literally, the whole of Hungary rose up in arms against the monstrous regime of Rakosi and his successors. The Hungarian bureaucracy was too late to check the uprising by a Polish-type compromise. Workers Councils were set up and in epic struggle the workers of Hungary took on the might of the Soviet Army. The peaceful changes within the Soviet bloc appeared to be not so peaceful after all. The Kadar regime revealed itself in all its brutal frankness as a regime of terror not against reaction but against the working class and poor peasantry.

In the words of Peter Fryer: "The present Hungarian State is nothing more than an instrument for the domination of the Hungarian people by a bureaucracy that acts as consul for the Soviet leaders. The Kadar government, which according to one Yugoslav commentator rests on "military occupation and police terror" has not more claim to represent the Hungarian workers and peasants than Britain's satraps in Cyprus or Kenya can claim to represent the peoples they oppress and murder. The terrible thing is that what Kadar and his colleagues do, they do in the name of communism," (Hungary and the Communist Party—p. 340.

EASTERN EUROPE, CHINA AND THE USSR

In the USSR to-day a year or so after the 20th Congress, we are now witnessing a hardening out of the bureaucracy. The true face of the bureaucracy was not seen in Poland but in Hungary. In Hungary, the working class saw the bureaucracy with the mask off. And in the USSR to-day, the process begun with the anti-Stalin revelations is being halted, slowed down or at least checked. The same Khrushchev whose fulsome praise of the great Stalin in 1934 won him a place in Stalin's inner circle, revealed the horror of the Stalin regime in 1956 at the 20th Congress. And this very same Khrushchev less than a year later, was forced to return in part at least to the Stalinism he denounced with such vitriol. He was quoted as having said that all Soviet leaders were Stalinists when it came to 'fighting the imperialists' (The Times—Jan. '57).

Khrushchev of 1934 was the same Khrushchev of early '56 and late '56. Khrushchev continued to express the interests of the bureaucracy in '34 and in '56. What had

altered only was the different situations confronting the bureaucracy in its period of rise and in its period of break-up. Khrushchev saw the end result of his 20th Congress speech in the Hungarian Revolution. He had to beat a hasty retreat to his former Stalin positions albeit modified.

It was no accident that the puppet bureaucracies of Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania should have regarded the whole 20th Congress revelations as an irresponsible and indecent exposure of Stalinism. Even less securely based than the Stalinist bureaucracy in the USSR the satellite bureaucracies depended in the majority of cases on the might of the Soviet Army alone and they acted as powerful factors in forcing the Soviet bureaucracy back in the direction of the Stalin era. After the Hungarian Revolution, the Siroky's and the Gheorgiu-Dej's were even more anxious than the Khrushchev's and Molotov's to call a halt to the 'irresponsible' denunciation of Stalin. "The Sunday Times" reports that Rakosi himself stubbornly resisted the 20th Congress turn, even suppressing 'Pravda' in his desperate efforts to turn back the wheel of history.

Yet another factor in the re-Stalinisation was the role of the bewildered and shaken parties of France, Italy and Britain. Undoubtedly the 20th Congress was an embarrassment to their own clique leaderships, based on fraud and deceit. Without a Soviet army at hand, the 20th Congress revelations could but lead to a complete shattering of the relations of the old CP leaderships and the rank and file. The Pollitt's and Thorez's added their puny voices to the call for a halt.

Although it is true Chou En Lai 'aided' the Polish October Revolution he provided Moscow with the best conceivable mask for its treachery in Hungary—the authority of the Chinese Revolution and the colonial revolution. All this, in exchange for certain economic concessions from the Soviet bureaucracy.

The Yugoslavs too, played a double role during the Hungarian Revolution. Whilst disapproving at various stages of the Soviet intervention at no time did they provide the minimum assistance to the Hungarian workers. Their concern was the concern of their own self-interested Yugoslav bureaucracy. Their principal fear was a return to the Stalin era of total isolation of Yugoslavia from the USSR and Eastern Europe.

The 10-year sentence passed on Professor Harich in E. Germany confirms only the general hardening in the bureaucracy. However, it would be an oversimplification to assume that this will continue in a straight line. The recent concord signed between the Yugoslavs and the French CP is certainly not a sign of the hardening out of the situation. A full return to the Stalin era is excluded not because of the general trend within the bureaucracy at the moment but because the stability of the Stalinist world has been irrevocably shaken by the 20th Congress. In any circumstances, the policy of concessions or repressions can only heighten the crisis of the Soviet bureaucracy.

The Soviet Union, second most powerful industrial country in the world, with its 50 million strong working class has survived the horrors of the Stalin era. The small-time bureaucrats who sit collectively in Stalin's place, sit on a powder-keg, the potential of the Soviet working class.

The rapid construction of a Bolshevik-Leninist cadre of the new generation of Oppositionists within the USSR, Eastern Europe and China remains the principal task

facing the world movement. Resting on the great traditions of the October Revolution, the working class of the workers' states will raise themselves to the positions of political power overturning the bureaucracy's domination and restoring the Soviet state to the policies of Lenin and Trotsky.

In Hungary, we witnessed the concrete expression of the political revolution in a degenerated workers state, in its first stages. The building of a Party internationalist in outlook, alone remains the problem for the Hungarian working class.

Parallel with, and interacting one with the other, the social revolution in the West will assist the political revolution in the USSR, Eastern Europe and China. Each revolution being component parts of the world revolution and inseparable from each other.

THE SUEZ CRISIS, WAR AND THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY

The Suez war gave the movement a glimpse of the shape of things to come given a conflict between imperialism and the colonial revolution, imperialism and the USSR.

War has remained implicit in the international situation since 1949. This does not mean that it has always been imminent at any particular point in time from then to the present. In Korea, Indo-China and in Algeria, imperialism revealed its basic policies of halting the advance of the colonial revolution by force, by the use of its armed might.

The brink of war revelations of Dulles, confirmed only the dangerous situation that existed at the time of the Korean war—during the crossing of the 38th Parallel. In early 1954 too, the world was at the brink over Formosa. In the autumn of 1956 the world went over the brink. Thanks to the strength of the colonial revolution and the opposition at home, the Suez adventure was stayed.

Our position remained and remains intransigent. We were for the unconditional victory of the Egyptian national liberation struggle against imperialism. We were for the victory of the Egyptian armies. We were for the defeat of our own bourgeoisie.

Even though the Soviet intervention in Hungary might have gravely complicated the straight issues, we remained intransigent in defence of the USSR from imperialism, despite the Soviet bureaucracy. Our defence of the USSR was determined not by the designs or policies of the bureaucracy, but the needs and requirements of the world revolution. Had imperialism seen fit to intervene during the Hungarian Revolution in defence of the Nagy government, we would have been for the victory of the Red Army against the armies of intervention.

The Soviet bureaucracy's role was determined not by the real, historic needs of the USSR, but by the narrow requirements of the caste privileges on which it rests. In reality, the bureaucracy inflicted the greatest possible damage to both the colonial revolution and the working class parties by its assault on the Hungarian Revolution. The bureaucratic defence of the USSR revealed itself only as a godsend to imperialism. The bureaucracy fed on the imperialist crime at Port Said, the imperialists fed on the Stalinist crimes in Budapest.

The Kremlin talk of volunteers for the Egyptian armies to assist Nasser in defeating the invasion forces was seen as so much wind. The bureaucracy's assistance to Egypt was even less than its assistance to the North Koreans, which it contained.

The bureaucracy itself, is unable in the final analysis, to defend the conquests of the October Revolution. Its elimination is absolutely necessary to ensure that the defence of the USSR is linked up with the struggle of the working class for power in both the metropolitan and colonial countries.

THE H-BOMB, IMPERIALISM AND THE KREMLIN

The hydrogen bomb tests currently being prepared have only brought into focus the real position in which mankind is placed. Either the continued existence of the capitalist system with its 3rd World War preparations, its bomb tests and guided missiles, or the replacement of this system by social revolution.

Society as a whole is now faced with the Frankenstein monster created by the continued existence of capitalism. In all walks of life, the question of life or death is being posed. Only the dupes can fail to realise that mankind is literally on the brink, not only because the gigantic armaments programmes continue as an ever-present warning that the Third World War *is* being prepared, but also because in the very preparation for this War, the possibility of mass poisoning by radioactive material from the fallout during the H-bomb tests is present. Whilst it is true that the Pacifists, Quakers and Stalinists have cottoned on to this mass revulsion against the tests, it would be too simple to dismiss the anti-bomb propaganda as a stunt without basis. It is absolutely necessary for the movement to give a *class* character to this anti-war, anti-bomb feeling throughout the country. It is necessary to demand that the H-bomb tests be *immediately stopped* and that this demand be addressed not only to the imperialists but also to the Soviet bureaucrats.

The Labour Party and Trade Unions in this country must be pushed to take up a principled position on the H-bomb tests. It must pledge itself to stopping them immediately, when it comes to power again. More important, it must call for a Conference of all working class political and trade union organisations to prepare an international campaign against the tests, and against the 3rd World War preparations.

This does not at all come into conflict with our defence of the USSR from imperialism. We have emphasised again and again, that the bureaucracy's defence and our defence are poles apart.

The only *effective* defence of the USSR, China and the other workers' states from imperialism is not to follow the imperialists in their 'bigger and better bangs' but by mobilising the workers throughout the world *against* the H-bomb test, manufacture, etc.

The perspectives of our movement are not fatalistic and pessimistic. War is not inevitable, given the mobilisation of the working class and colonial peoples against it. Suez demonstrated that it is not a simple matter to bludgeon the workers once again into war. The heightened class consciousness of the Labour movement brought to a halt the Suez adventure and certainly more adventures are on the order of the day.

The struggle against war, against the H-bomb tests, is identical with the struggle against capitalism.

Trotskyism has never wavered on this fundamental issue. The new period opening for our movement makes certain the triumph of Marxism, and the conquest of power by the only class which has the power to change society—the working class.

SECTION III: A CONVERGENCE OF VIEWS ON THE KHRUSHCHEV REVELATIONS AND THE HUNGARIAN REVOLT

During the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in January 1956, Khrushchev made a secret speech denouncing many of the crimes committed by Stalin and promising that there would be no repetition of such atrocities. When its text later became known, this event and its repercussions provided a new test for both factions of the world Trotskyist movement.

In some quarters, the revelations fed illusions that the Soviet regime under Khrushchev was gradually eliminating bureaucratic rule. John Lawrence and Michelle Mestre, former supporters of Pablo who had broken with the Fourth International in 1954, joined the Communist parties of their countries under this illusion.

Both the IS and the IC rejected such conceptions. In contrast to its response to Stalin's death (when Pablo and Clarke began to indulge in questions about the possible self-reform of Soviet society under the leadership of a section of the bureaucracy), the IS stressed both the scope and the limitations of the Twentieth Congress decisions.

The IS explicitly rejected the concept of "self-reform" and polemicized with its advocates. Both factions saw the revelations as an opportunity for a political offensive by the Trotskyist movement, taking advantage of the growing disarray in the Stalinist parties throughout the world.

In addition, the IS dropped the perspective put forward in the 1954 resolution, "The Rise and Decline of Stalinism," that the Stalinist parties were bound to move leftward under the pressure of imperialist war plans. Instead, stress was placed on criticizing the Stalinist search for "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful roads to socialism."

A certain degree of convergence could be noted in the

first editorial on the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU (which still reflected some of Pablo's views on the role of the bureaucracy) in the March 1956 issue of *Quatrième Internationale*, published by the IS. This impression of convergence was strengthened by Ernest Germain's report to the Seventeenth Plenum of the International Executive Committee.

A decisive test, however, was the reaction of both factions to the Hungarian revolution. After this, it was difficult for any objective observer to deny the basic similarity of the two lines on the key political questions of the time that separated Trotskyism from other currents. The International Secretariat declaration solidarizing with the revolutionary struggle and calling for a government of soviets was distributed to the fighters in Hungary.

At the time of the East German uprising in June 1953, the IS refused to call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops and placed primary stress on the reforms granted by the bureaucrats. In Hungary, however, the Soviet intervention against the revolutionists was unequivocally opposed. Denunciation of the bureaucracy's counterrevolutionary measures was in the forefront.

The IS declaration on the Hungarian revolt and the editorial, "Revolution and Counterrevolution in Hungary," provide examples of this stance.

Differences of analysis persisted, particularly on the weight and role of divisions within the bureaucracy, and the prospects of a sizable sector going over to the working class in the political revolution. Nonetheless, it was evident that the political line adopted by both sides was essentially Trotskyist. This raised the question of the desirability of ending the de facto split.

1. "The Twentieth Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union" (editorial in the March 1956 issue of *Quatrième Internationale*, translated by David Keil)

The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will without doubt be regarded as a milestone in the history of the USSR and the postwar communist labor movement.

Everyone understands and proclaims this fact now, but not necessarily in the same profound way or for the same reasons as the Fourth International. The most experienced bourgeois observers have concluded that the congress had, in fact, "smashed the idol" of Stalin and had even "danced on the debris," thus, according to this point of view, opening a new era in the history of the USSR and the international communist movement.

Others spoke of this congress as "ten days that shook Stalinism" and emphasized its long-term consequences in these areas.

In its fundamental assessment of the USSR and

Stalinism, as well as in its analyses of the objective developments since the outbreak of the last war, our movement was naturally the best prepared not to be "surprised" by the "sensational" character of this congress and at the same time to understand its profound significance.

Particularly since the death of Stalin, we have followed literally day by day the developments in the USSR, which in a way were confirmed as well as amplified by the Twentieth Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union.

The Twentieth Congress was shaped essentially by factors and considerations of a domestic order in the present Soviet situation. This can be proved by a critical analysis of the main themes of the reporters and speakers; a critique of Stalin and the "personality cult," "collective leadership," economic and political concessions to the masses, all under the new slogan, "Back to Lenin."

The Twentieth Congress effectively shattered the idolization of Stalin and repudiated his absolutist regime. Naturally, this was not done in a frank or political way, but essentially bureaucratically.

It made him appear to be—and occasionally this time even explicitly designated him—responsible for the most repugnant aspects of his regime—arbitrary rule over the party and state, falsification of history, terror and crimes against revolutionary opponents—and cast discredit on his credentials as a “theoretician” or “classical authority” on Marxism.

His most famous writings, *History of the Communist Party (Bolshevik)* and *The Economic Problems of Socialism*—which until his death were considered to be holy scripture, the Bible of the Stalinist church—were put on the index as “inadequate” and even “erroneous.”

The vague, apolitical way these books were criticized, without reference to specific ideas, is naturally the worst way it could have been done, a truly Stalinist way. No one will dare look for what might be correct in these writings, after such a condemnation.

History offers few examples of such a scandalously rapid transition from supreme glory to oblivion and discredit as the one that took place between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Congresses of the CPSU at Stalin’s expense, and this at the hands of his closest collaborators.

The Twentieth Congress allowed the profile of Stalin, the chief culprit, to appear behind the hated shadow of Beria. It made him, in his turn, the scapegoat, responsible for a whole series of “the most negative” consequences to “the party’s life and activity” during his regime.

Naturally, this is only the beginning.

Now that Stalin has been removed from his pedestal, it seems that his cult is being replaced by the “collective leadership.” But this time, the flattery which studs the speeches and the accounts by the press of the Communist parties has a new meaning. *On the one hand it creates an unfavorable climate for any attempt to impose a new supreme “leader,” and, on the other, it reflects a real broadening of democracy among the highest bureaucrats.*

When Khrushchev found himself obliged to recall the verse of the *Internationale*, “We need no condescending saviors. . . .,” this was no mere oratorical trick; he wanted to show that he was “loyally” playing the role of reporter—at worst a leader—of a team, nothing more.

The congress gave more important evidence, as well, for the existence of the “collective leadership” and greater democracy at the level of the Presidium and the Central Committee of the party. The congress did not seal an exclusive victory, politically or organizationally, for any one clique. The Central Committee held private, internal discussion sessions. There were not yet open manifestations of crystallized tendencies based on a whole program, but divergent points of view in the leadership, whose representatives were not organizationally penalized in orthodox Stalinist fashion.

As we will explain in our analysis of the results of the congress, Khrushchev’s report, and even more so the political resolution adopted, reflect the *centrist, compromising tendency which now dominates the leadership, a tendency midway between different opinions, further to the right and left*, which also exist and have been manifested in the leadership of the bureaucracy. The composition of the Presidium was not changed; the representatives of these divergent viewpoints were not left off.

Khrushchev did criticize those who took viewpoints other than his own, thus revealing where the differences

lie. He referred in a critical tone to “some comrades” who “showed a certain distrust toward the workers in the State Security institutions” and compared them to “Chekists.” He also referred to those whom “the Central Committee had to reprimand, who sowed confusion on clear-cut issues that had been decided a long time ago by the party. . . . In their conversations, they had used erroneous formulations, claiming that all that had been created in our society so far was the bases for socialism, that is, the foundations of socialism”; and also to some who “on the problem of the evolution of socialism” go to the “opposite extreme.”

“There are those who believe that the theory of the gradual transition from socialism to communism is even a call for the immediate application of the principles of communist society.

“Some hotheads have decided that the construction of a socialist society has been completed.¹

“It is proposed that the replacement of Soviet commerce by the direct exchange of goods be accelerated. . . .”

Finally he attacked “the smart alecks” who “counterpose light industry to heavy industry, arguing that it was necessary to give priority to heavy industry only in the early stages of the Soviet economy, etc.”

It is unlikely that these divergences—whose future importance cannot be underestimated—are unrelated to each other, or that they don’t very often merge with each other on the basis of a similar logic: that of a *tendency which, starting with the fact that only the basis for socialism have been established in the USSR, has a different view of economic, social, and cultural problems of socialist construction, properly so-called* (which, in a sense, has only just begun in the USSR).

The fact remains that all these manifestations, limited as they are, nevertheless constitute a real revolution compared with the methods in use during Stalin’s lifetime, if you judge from the standpoint of the proletarian democracy of Lenin’s time.

What are the dynamics and the future prospects for these changes? The broadening of democracy at the top levels of the bureaucracy, already accompanied by signs of *divergent points of view, embryonic tendencies*, has only two possible outcomes: either it will be extended to the base of the party and the masses, or it will be rudely cut short, marking the consolidation of power by a single faction and its leader, after an ephemeral “democratic” interlude.

The answer to this crucial question, by far the most important among all those posed by the Congress, is *partly indicated by the breadth of the economic and political concessions granted or promised to the masses*. They reveal the pressure the masses exert on the bureaucracy, the relationship of forces between them, and the dynamic of this relationship of forces.

It is significant that on the question of consumer goods production as well as on the question of wages, the congress decided more in favor of what might be called the “Malenkov-Mikoyan” tendency than the “Bulganin-Kaganovich” tendency. What Khrushchev did on these two questions in his “centrist” speech as well as what was said in the final resolution, indicate that there was a compromise in favor of a rapid increase in consumer goods production and a rise in the lowest wages.²

The reduction of the workday, the improvement of the system of pensions and vacations, the promise of a new

work code, and the improvement of food service in the factories and for all wage-earners, are all measures which move in the same direction and show the bureaucracy's concern about promising satisfaction to the worst-paid layers of the working class, which certainly exert the greatest pressure on it at the present stage.

The proposed measures concerning the kolkhoz members, the most underprivileged mass of the Soviet population up to now, are no less indicative of the same tendency.

The leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy seems to be about to make a major turn in this area, which would be at the same time an equally important abandonment of the orthodox Stalinist policy: consolidation of collectivization and turning it toward effective socialization by not only supporting a larger technical base in the form of machines, but also rapidly increasing the remuneration of the kolkhoz members, allowing them more rights and initiatives within the framework of the kolkhozes and supplying them with a greater quantity of cheap merchandise, with variety and high quality. In this way the bureaucracy hopes that the kolkhoz members will voluntarily abandon working their private plots in order to devote themselves exclusively to collective production and thus sharply increase this production.

The congress's promises of social and political measures are equally important: the abolition of tuitions and the generalization of secondary education, the announcement of a new penal code and of a reform of the judiciary system, the stress on measures to make sure that "Soviet legality" will be respected, the many suggestions, especially in the speeches by Mikoyan and Voroshilov—on the need for more effective participation by the masses in the management of the economy and the state through democratization of the soviets, trade unions, etc., *are all signs that the bureaucracy finds itself obliged to extend economic concessions into the social and political domain as well.*

Naturally, one should not exaggerate the *practical* importance of these promises, nor the actions which will be taken to carry them out, nor the differences between what the official reporters said on many of these points and what was said by individual speakers in the discussions.

Taken as a whole, however, promises, actions, and differences that were pointed out clearly indicate the fundamental fact which should help us understand the real meaning of this congress and show us the course of future developments: *The bureaucracy is under pressure, in different forms, from a Soviet society liberating itself from the Stalinist yoke. It is beginning to differentiate itself at the top under the influence of these increasing pressures. The future development of this process will be determined by the interaction of this pressure, the direct action of the masses, and the struggle of tendencies within the bureaucracy.*

This evolution is only beginning. It would be an unpardonable error to imagine that this evolution will proceed, as before, in a straight line ending quickly with the restoration of real proletarian democracy in the USSR and a "return to Lenin" in domestic as well as foreign policy. *To arrive at such a result, it will be necessary to reach a stage where the politicization of the masses, going over to direct action, combines with a sharper differentia-*

tion, an actual break, between the developing revolutionary wing and the more and more isolated thermidorean wing of the bureaucracy. This process of political revolution will culminate in the overturn of the bureaucratic regime and the reestablishment of Soviet democracy.

But what must be understood is that these two processes will interact; and that, on the other hand, the objective conditions, both in the USSR and internationally, are now favorable. Abrupt halts and even retreats on the part of the conservative bureaucracy are not only possible but inevitable. But it is unlikely, if not impossible, in the framework of the current relationship of forces in the USSR and internationally, for this wing of the bureaucracy to annul all the concessions promised to the masses or already carried out, and for it to return to a policy of force and to the methods of the orthodox Stalinist era.

The Twentieth Congress took place under the Khrushchev regime—let us not forget—and, on more than one point, not only maintained the positive acquisitions that have evolved since the death of Stalin but enlarged them.

The Twentieth Congress, as we emphasized, was shaped fundamentally by factors and considerations of domestic order. For that reason, the progressive aspects are manifested, and will be manifested, only inside the USSR and, by their consequences, inside the satellite "people's democracies." But since it was not at all a "self-reform" with the leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy sincerely returning to the Leninist traditions and program, its policy toward the rest of the "non-socialist world" takes on a different character which is, in short, traditional: Utilize the workers' movement to neutralize imperialism, not to overthrow it.

The Twentieth Congress's major themes of "theoretical" innovation in this area, on "the inevitability of war," "peaceful coexistence," and the "new roads to achieving socialism," are tied together by the same logic. They tend to justify a policy of class collaboration by the Communist parties with "anti-American," pacifist wings of the bourgeoisie of the metropolitan and dependent countries. Combining mass pressure with flexible diplomacy, the Soviet bureaucracy hopes thus to "neutralize" the most aggressive forces of imperialism, to maintain the *status quo* and, in this atmosphere of "peace," proceed to consolidate the gains achieved by the "socialist world."

The theory of "socialism in one country," with all its consequences for the international workers' movement, is carried over to the category of countries that "are in the process of building socialism." The final collapse of capitalism is seen as resulting from the striking confirmation, through "peaceful coexistence," of the overwhelming superiority of the "socialist world"³ purified of the most hideous aspects of Stalinism, "reformed," and developing henceforth more freely and amply.

Moreover, the congress's analysis of the present situation of capitalism is based on the perspective of the forthcoming outbreak of an economic crisis. In the framework of such an evolution and counting on the inability of capitalism—according to the congress's theory—to resort to war at the present time, the logical conclusion is to foresee a sort of "self-destruction" of capitalism, without any major battles either internally or internationally. One couldn't imagine a rosier view of historical evolution, a more "consoling" theory, to present to the masses justifying "socialism in one, part of the world."

The "theoretical" innovations of the congress are designed to justify a historical evolution now seen as possible, which best corresponds to the needs and interests of the new leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy at the present time.

The theory that war is avoidable from now on—since it is challenged every day by the international reality and by the incessant preparations of imperialism—is put forward in a conditional way, leaving the door open for retreat.

The "vigorous social and political" forces that now exist and possess "serious means for preventing the imperialists from setting off a war" should, however, "practice extreme vigilance" and be ready if it is necessary (this is not excluded) to inflict a crushing counterblow to the aggressors in the eventuality that they "make an attempt" to start a war. Thus, the theory of "non-inevitable war" is put forth in order above all to make the supposedly "Leninist" theory of "peaceful coexistence" seem more plausible.

The bureaucracy seeks this "peaceful coexistence" strictly on the basis of the *status quo*. As a concession to imperialism it can only offer the revolutionary movement's renunciation of taking power in the capitalist and dependent countries at any price by revolutionary means. This is a way of proposing to exchange "social peace" for "peace" between the bureaucracy and imperialism.

Not everything that was said at the congress about "new paths for achieving socialism" was so new. It is reminiscent of the argument advanced, especially in the 1945-47 period, by the theoreticians of "new democracy" in Germany, France, Italy, and elsewhere, as well as the argument of the Chinese leadership before its victory and during the first few years after. Moreover, the policy of the Communist parties in recent years has rarely been much different from the line endorsed and "theorized" by the Twentieth Congress.

It may be that the relationship of forces in some country at some time might soften the fierceness of the class struggle and civil war and weaken the bourgeoisie's capacity for resistance. It could be that the form and peculiarities of the revolution and the proletarian dictatorship which would follow the victory will be quite diverse from country to country. But this is not the issue raised by the Soviet leaders, Mikoyan with more embarrassment than the rest.

Is it possible to come to power in collaboration with the bourgeoisie? Can the machinery of the bourgeois state then be used, without its being smashed and without building another, proletarian state machine?

These are the real issues, which summarize the essence of the Leninist doctrine on revolution and the state. History provides no examples—such as might "enrich" the theory in a different way—of a proletariat coming to power along with a representative wing of the bourgeoisie (not a phantom wing under exceptional circumstances); nor of making a revolution by using the bourgeois state machine. The examples given by Mikoyan to illustrate his own concept of these "new paths" and to combat "reformism" lead one to believe that, on this question too,⁴ he was carrying on, with embarrassment, a kind of criticism or a veiled polemic against the argument of the reporter, who failed to convince him. Giving Czechoslovakia and the other "people's democracies" as an example to illustrate the "paths" of "peaceful transition" to revolution and socialism is only a bad joke.

The occupation of these countries by the Soviet Army, after the war created *exceptional* conditions for forcing the bourgeoisie (already dislocated during the war) to abandon its positions "peacefully." Even here, in the case of Czechoslovakia in particular, it was necessary for an extraparliamentary movement of armed workers to develop.

The Communist parties will certainly interpret the "new paths," endorsed by the Twentieth Congress, in the most opportunist way possible. The French CP has already done so in its policy toward the socialist-led Guy Mollet government and the Algerian revolution.

Instead of a united-front policy with the mass Socialist parties, with the perspective of a CP-SP workers' government based on united-front workers' committees, which would begin to apply a real anticapitalist program, the CPs practice opportunist adaptation to the bourgeois policy of the social-democratic leaderships and even to the "Mendesist" bourgeoisie's policy in the metropolitan countries and to the policy of the "Nehruist" bourgeoisie in countries like India.

This policy naturally does not in any way lead to revolution and socialism. It could only end in stagnation, setbacks, and even defeat of the workers' movement, despite the objective conditions which are everywhere favorable.

It will be rejected by the masses, who will take the only path which the realities of capitalism and imperialism allow them: that of revolutionary struggle to overthrow both.

* * *

The Fourth International determines its attitude toward the changes and developments marked by the Twentieth Congress, not by subjective considerations but by what they represent objectively for the future of the USSR, the international workers' movement, and socialism.

Whether or not the Soviet bureaucracy rehabilitates the Trotskyists, whether it continues to put them in the category of tendencies always hated by the workers' movement and in the company of "bourgeois nationalists and other champions of the restoration of capitalism," this will not influence our judgment nor cause us to depart from our principles.

We know that it is now obliged to rehabilitate a whole series of revolutionary victims of the Stalinist terror and to disavow a whole series of lies about the history of the revolution, the Soviet CP, and the Third International.

The bureaucracy will do this under the increased pressure of the masses and of tendencies within it that will be the most affected and the most sensitive to these pressures, in an eclectic, indirect, limited way, without saying too much and especially without giving frank explanations, as the bureaucracy has operated in the past. It is impossible to say now how broad or in what order these now-inevitable rehabilitations will be. But one thing is certain: *the last assault which the bureaucracy will attempt to maintain will be that which it has kept up against Leon Trotsky and the movement he founded, the Fourth International.* For to sincerely rehabilitate Leon Trotsky and his movement would in reality mean recognizing in them the proletarian tendency which defended the real positions of living revolutionary Marxism in relation to the economic, social and political problems of the USSR as well as in those of the

international workers' movement. Sincerely rehabilitating Leon Trotsky and the Fourth International would mean recognizing not only the correctness of our positions on the Stalinist degeneration of the USSR, the abolition of proletarian democracy in the party, the soviets and the trade unions in the USSR, the zigzags and errors in economic policy in the USSR even before the first five-year plan, etc., but also the correctness of our positions on the reactionary character of the theory of "socialism in one country" and the whole policy of the Third International and the Communist parties that followed it. *The rehabilitation of the Trotskyists would in reality signify a genuine and complete return to Lenin, which would be inconceivable without the destruction of the bureaucratic regime which still holds power in the USSR and in the Communist parties, as well as the abolition of the privileges of the Soviet bureaucracy, and the restitution to the workers of control and management of the economy and the state.*

For this reason, the Fourth International, while welcoming the results of the Twentieth Congress without sectarianism, has no illusions. It knows that the struggle for a genuine renewal of proletarian democracy will be a long one. But the Fourth International has shown that it has all the tenacity that is required.

We note with satisfaction and salute the first results of the revolutionary rising of the Soviet masses which are beginning to break the fetters of Stalinist absolutism. We understand the immense long-term significance of these results, signifying the definitive decline of Stalinism. We are strengthened in our determination to remain closely attentive to the developments, to the inevitable shake-ups which we foresaw for the Communist parties. But we will refrain from mistaking the melodious themes such as are found in an operatic overture for the full melodies, which will only be played in the future and under a different conductor than the bureaucracy. What is in sight and counts immensely is the recognition of our tendency by a larger and larger number of revolutionary elements as a legitimate tendency in the workers' movement. We are confident in the revolutionary activity of the proletariat of the USSR and throughout the world, and in its ever-

2. *"The Twentieth Congress of the CP of the USSR: Beginning of the Final Stage of the Crisis of Stalinism," report by Ernest Germain to the Seventeenth Plenum of the International Executive Committee in May 1956 (translated by David Keil from the September 1956 issue of Quatrième Internationale)*

The events marking the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet CP and its reverberations are clear indications of an increasingly rapid maturing of the objective and subjective conditions for political revolution in the Soviet Union.

The meaning can be summarized in three points:

1. Increasing pressure from the masses, for the first time since 1933-34, has begun to divide the central leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy. Relatively free discussions have taken place inside the Central Committee of the CP of the USSR, without any of the tendencies which began to crystallize being crushed. Political differences in this top

greater victories, which will help it to recognize the expression of its aspirations, its goals, its tactics, its strategy for revolution and for socialism, raised to the highest levels in the whole program of Trotskyism and the Fourth International in the new, more critical, freer atmosphere that will exist from now on in the international communist movement. Despite the inevitable drawbacks of centrist and outright opportunist confusion which the "thaw" of Stalinism produces, the program and ideas of the Fourth International will make their way forward more easily and will triumph. March 15, 1956

Footnotes

1. According to Khrushchev's science, socialism is already "constructed" in the USSR but not "completed." More than a nuance is seen in the distinction—justifiably, since his "constructed" socialism is really only a preparatory phase of socialism ("completed").

2. "While maintaining the rapid pace of development in heavy industry, we can and must give more scope to the development of consumer goods production."

Further: "Now that we possess a powerful heavy industry, fully developed, there is a practical possibility to quickly advance not only the consumer goods industry but also the production of current goods for consumption" (Khrushchev's report).

"The Communist Party considers it absolutely necessary to continue to put priority on the development of heavy industry. . . . At the same time the congress considers the level of social production now attained makes it possible to develop at a rapid pace not only the production of capital goods, but also the production of goods for mass consumption" (resolution passed by the congress).

"The Congress fully approves of measures, etc., aimed at continuously increasing the real wage of workers and employees and the income of kolkhoz members, as well as raising the wages of the lowest-paid categories of workers. . . ." (resolution passed by the congress).

3. "We are convinced that all the workers of the world, after considering the advantages of communism, will sooner or later take the road of struggle to build the socialist society" (Khrushchev's report).

4. As he did in relation to the criticism of the past, the policy on wages, "proletarian democracy," "Soviet legality," etc.

layer have begun to appear over several ideological questions (class struggles after the revolution; the degree to which socialism has been attained in the USSR; forms of the proletarian seizure of power; the nature of economic crises in the epoch of capitalist decline, etc.) and political questions (distribution of the national income between consumption and investments; wage reform; the extent to which freedom of criticism is to be tolerated inside the party; the agrarian question; the attitude to take toward the Stalinist period, etc.). As a whole this reflects the pressure of two antagonistic social forces: that of the laboring masses and the lower layers of the bureaucracy, on the one hand (the Mikoyan-Malenkov tendency), and the pressure of the most conservative layers of the society, (the most privileged elements in the bureaucracy, managers, the top officer caste, etc.) on the other hand (the Kaganovich-Molotov tendency).

2. Under this pressure from the masses, and with the aim of anchoring itself more securely in power in the new

period—in order to obtain a new respite—the bureaucracy has been forced to sacrifice Stalin and the Stalinist tradition in the strict sense of the word and to blame him for the most repulsive aspects of its dictatorship. In so doing, it tries to limit itself to these aspects and to avoid being held responsible for them. By making Stalin, and no longer Beria, the scapegoat for everything that the masses hate in the bureaucratic dictatorship, it implicitly promises them that many things will change quickly. These implicit promises will have to be followed up by real concessions if they are to have any effectiveness. This is why, with the Twentieth Congress, for the first time since the beginning of the “new course,” *political concessions* were added to the economic concessions made earlier to the masses, which were themselves broadened at the same time (free middle and secondary education; the initiation of a reform of the labor code and the penal code; promises of a broader involvement of the masses in municipal administration, etc.).

3. The struggle against the tradition of Stalin and the “cult of the personality” brought about a deep crisis in all the Stalinist parties of the world, though the intensity of the crisis has varied from one country to the next. This crisis is only beginning. It is the result of the fact that by undermining the argument of authority and blind obedience to the decisions of the “leaders,” the speeches of the Twentieth Congress opened the door for a critical atmosphere and political ferment in the ranks to make their way into the Stalinist parties, not only in regard to past events but also for every important new decision of their national CPs and the CP of the USSR.

The new phase of the “new course” thus opens a new and decisive phase in the crisis of Stalinism. It puts on the agenda the overthrow of the bureaucratic dictatorship in the USSR and in the “people’s democracies,” as well as the complete renovation of the international workers’ movement.

I. A NEW STAGE OF THE “NEW COURSE”

As we just pointed out, the new stage of the “new course” essentially consists in the fact that, *for the first time, the bureaucracy has been forced to make political concessions to the masses*. The nature of these concessions tends primarily to shake the terror-associated foundations of the dictatorship more than previous attacks on arbitrary police rule had ever done. At the same time, the rigidity of the bureaucratic caste is challenged and the door is opened wider for a new recruitment from below. On this last point, the pressing requirements of the economy have certainly contributed, along with mass pressure, to the attainment of the important reform of the educational system.

In addition to these political concessions, the Twentieth Congress of the CP granted new and important economic concessions to the masses, especially to the masses of workers. The increase in the wages of the lowest-paid workers, the reduction of the work week, the increase in pensions, the organization of a system of housing for the elderly created by the state, the impressive new promises of increases in the production of consumer goods (made despite the victory—Platonic, it would now seem—of those who wanted to give priority to heavy industry)—all this should show the masses that their condition is already

rapidly improving and that even more rapid improvements are coming soon. But this will only whet their appetite, and there are vital sectors (such as housing and food) which are in a condition of impoverishment while others (such as clothing) suffer from poor quality. Thus it seems excluded that these concessions will give the present masters of the Kremlin a broad mass base in the USSR.

The decisions of the Central Committee of the CP just before the Twentieth Congress seems to have had several aims, in regard to the peasantry: to immediately increase potato and vegetable production by making important new price concessions to the peasants; to attack the structural crisis of the *kolkhoz* system by trying to turn peasants away from work on their own plots of private land. This latter aim is pursued both through *stimulants* (money credit) and *threats* (expulsions from the *kolkhozes* and seizure of the private plots of all those who do not do a minimum number of hours of work on the *kolkhoz* lands). It remains to be seen whether the peasantry will view these measures as a serious attack on their means of earning a living and whether the measures will open a new and serious crisis in the provisioning of the USSR.

The most important aspect of the muffled dialogue over “demands or concessions” which began three years ago between the bureaucracy and the masses is now the one concerning industry in the exact sense of the word, i.e., the system of wages, the organization of factories, and the rights of managers and workers. Pressured by economic considerations (the struggle against inflationary tendencies) the bureaucracy attempted to undertake a full-scale modification of the wage system which means that, under cover of a break with Stakhanovism, the total nominal wages of a whole layer of workers, especially skilled “vanguard” layers (miners, metallurgists, steelworkers, rail workers, etc.) would be reduced or at least frozen. The resistance the bureaucracy ran into here forced it to suspend the application of all these measures and to announce for the time being an increase in the lower wages. For the first time, as well, workers and lower layers of the bureaucracy raised the question of bonuses, demanding, it seems, that a higher percentage of these bonuses (seventy-five percent) be paid automatically to the workers.

All the events of the last six months demonstrate clearly that the pressure of the masses, especially the masses of workers, is still the preponderant factor in the evolution of the internal situation in the Soviet Union. This is the tendency which the top levels of the bureaucracy have generally bent to, up to now. As the pressure of the masses spreads into the factories, however, it is inevitable that the privileged layers of the bureaucracy, the “masters of the country,” seized with panic, will loudly demand extra guarantees for their privileges. This was the meaning of the “Industrial Conference” held in Moscow in the Spring of 1955 and the decisions of the Central Committee of the CP in June 1955 on increasing the rights of managers, on the drawing up of a model statute for managers, etc. It is also clear that one tendency of the bureaucratic leadership (Kaganovich, Bulganin, etc.) more or less openly identified itself with the interests and desires of this still very powerful layer (it continues to hold the principal levers of economic power). *The inevitable clash between the workers’ demands and the positions of these layers will lead to the crisis point of the “new course.”*

II. THE BUREAUCRACY LIQUIDATES THE STALIN MORTGAGE

After Beria, Stalin himself is more and more being made the scapegoat for all the dictatorship's crimes, which are collective crimes of the leadership of the bureaucracy.

It is inconceivable that the bureaucracy as such, which saw in this particular form of dictatorship the principal safeguard for its power, could have decided of its own free will to carry out this sensational turn. While the individual desire for security may have caused the ending of arbitrary rule to be popular even in the ranks of the bureaucracy, this is not at all the case with the ending of the myth of the infallibility of Stalin *in the eyes of the masses*. It is true that a regime of "collective" dictatorship allows broader layers of the bureaucracy to take part in the exercise of power; but at the same time, the development of an atmosphere of ideological and political criticism inside the CP and among the masses threatens to destroy the very foundations of the bureaucratic dictatorship and create a powerful democratic and egalitarian current which will ring the death-knell of the dictatorship. Therefore it is mistaken to try to explain the sensational turn of the Twentieth Congress other than as a concession made by the bureaucracy in self-defense, in face of the discontent which is constantly rising in the country.

It is also unlikely that Khrushchev and the majority of the Central Committee decided in advance to drop the "Stalin bomb" on the congress. If they had intended to do this, they would have moved more cautiously, preparing public opinion by stages, proceeding in a more orderly and logical way. In actual fact, the initial report to the Twentieth Congress by Khrushchev contained no indication that an open attack was going to be made on Stalin; his name was not even mentioned. It is more likely that the sudden attacks at the congress by Mikoyan and his friends against Stalin forced the hand of Khrushchev and the "centrist" elements who tried to reconcile the two incipient tendencies in the CP Central Committee. Afraid of being bypassed by an oppositional anti-Stalinist tendency, Khrushchev made his move and identified the whole party with the anti-Stalinist campaign (running up against the perhaps passive but not less real resistance of Kaganovich, Molotov, Shvernik and others).

But by organizing the liquidation of the "Stalin mortgage" in this way on a grand scale, Khrushchev and the other leaders of the bureaucracy took care to set limits which constitute a last safety barrier around the privileges and power of the bureaucracy. The criticisms against Stalin apply especially to the last twenty years of his life, which is the period after the Seventeenth Congress beginning with the "Kirov affair." They concern essentially the monstrous "purges," the conduct of war and the postwar policy, particularly the policy toward the nationalities and the break with Yugoslavia. It is not clear whether the policy of forced collectivization was openly denounced. In any case, all the leaders of the bureaucracy made it a point to demonstratively solidarize themselves with Stalin's fight against the Left Opposition, the Zinovievists, and the Bukharinists. The political meaning of this maneuver is clear. The bureaucracy is saying to the country, "we reject the mass killings and the gross blunders that almost made us lose the war, but we can only support the policy on which our power and privileges are based."

The partial and unexplained (or at least insufficiently explained) rehabilitation of some of the Communist vic-

tims of Stalin shows the same effort of the bureaucracy to set a limit beyond which the very foundations of its dictatorship would be shaken by the attacks against Stalin. It is difficult to explain in detail that Zinoviev, Bukharin, and Trotsky were "only" ideological opponents and not spies and traitors without specifying their "ideological" differences with "Marxism-Leninism." It is impossible to really open the archives without simultaneously exposing the falsifications of the real positions of the Communist oppositions by the present and past leaders. A genuine discussion of the real political positions of the Communist opposition could easily develop—which would be a mortal threat to the group in power.

III. THE DYNAMIC OF THE "NEW COURSE"

Having noted what happened and why it happened, we now have to determine what is the dynamic of the "new course." Where is the bureaucratic dictatorship headed? What forms could it take? How will it be overturned?

It is clear that lacking close contact with events today at the base of Soviet society, especially inside the cells of the CP and in the factories, and unable to base ourselves on any historical precedent, we must be very cautious in approaching this matter. However, it is indispensable for the orientation of our own movement and of the international vanguard for us to give a *clear and unequivocal* answer to two fundamental questions.

The first question is: Is the "new course," as a political response by the bureaucracy to the increasing pressure of the masses, *in its overall character* irreversible? In other words, is it excluded that in the immediate future, two or three years from now, most of the concessions to the masses will be withdrawn, the police regime will be reestablished in all its Stalinist frightfulness, freedom of discussion in the Central Committee will be repressed once again, and a "new Stalin" will establish a new "personal dictatorship"?

Our answer to this question is an unequivocal "YES." Such an evolution is impossible, not because the Khrushchevs and the Bulganins are more "intelligent" or more "liberal" than Stalin, or because they have "drawn the lessons of history," but because the relationship of forces in the world between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, and the relationship of forces in the USSR between the proletariat and the bureaucracy, make such a sudden overturning of the evolution underway impossible. It would require heavy defeats of the working class, nationally and internationally, that is, a complete reversal of the world trend, for the dictatorship in the USSR to be able to stabilize itself rather than disintegrate (in the social sense of the word).

We repeat that this does not exclude that the bureaucracy will do its best on some specific point to take back what it has let go, or that it will do its best to forcibly crush explosions of discontent by the masses. But this is within a *general line of evolution* which must be clearly understood.

The second question is: Can the "new course," as a political response by the bureaucracy to the increasing pressure of the masses, arrive by stages at the reestablishment of Soviet democracy under the leadership of the present leading team in the Kremlin? In other words, is it possible that at the Twenty-first Congress, Khrushchev

and Bulganin will reestablish freedom of discussion in the party cells; at the Twenty-second Congress organized tendencies with different platforms will appear at the congress, as in the Leninist period, that at the Twenty-third Congress the "maximum" on incomes for Communists and trade union independence will be reestablished, etc.?

We answer this question "NO" with just as little equivocation as we answer the first question "YES."

Of course, the concessions which the bureaucracy made to the masses objectively favor a rise in their consciousness, their activity and their self-confidence. They objectively prepare *the revolution*, just as any reform under a hard-pressed dictatorship prepares in the long run the revolution which overturns it. But despite the dialectical ties between "reforms" and "revolution," they cannot be identified with each other without falling into reformism and vulgar evolutionism, thus concealing the decisive problem of the "leap," the "qualitative change," which is implicit in every revolution. The political revolution in the USSR is above all the bureaucracy's loss of absolute power in the factory and the state. To think that these hundreds of thousands of highly privileged persons will watch passively as their power is dismantled when they still dispose of an enormous defensive force, is to be a victim of illusions. *To start a revolution, mass pressure is no longer enough.* It is necessary for the masses to pass over to *action* and, in the factory and in the street, to go up against the last defenders of the dictatorship. It is quite possible and even likely that this action can be short in duration, that the privileged layers of the bureaucracy can be completely isolated at this time, that between the fall of the dictatorship and the establishment of the genuine regime of Soviet democracy (that is, between the beginning and the end of the political revolution) a series of intermediate stages could be interposed. But it is equally certain that the bureaucracy will not commit hara-kiri under the pressure of the masses and through love of the Soviet fatherland. We emphasize this point from the beginning; the "new course" is not a movement for *self-reform* of the bureaucracy; it is a last maneuver of *self-defense* by this bureaucracy. The time will come when the "new course" will end and the revolution will begin, a time when the leading group in the bureaucracy will turn from a subject into an object of the historical process.

Clearly the bureaucracy cannot be considered as one "reactionary mass" which the working class will have to attack all at once. This mechanistic and anti-Marxist position is contrary to everything Trotsky taught. The more the pressure of the masses (and, parallel to it, the pressure of the most privileged layers) increases, the more the bureaucracy, including its leaders, will split into conflicting tendencies. In the course of this process a "Reiss tendency" will appear which will sincerely realign itself with the Leninist tradition. The Mikoyan tendency certainly cannot be identified as such a tendency; at most it provides a culture medium for the ideas of such a tendency to develop). It is impossible to predict the exact comportment of every Kremlin leader in the course of this process; but it is excluded that a return to democracy will come about gradually, coldly, without overt action by the masses against the bureaucracy, without splits in the CP and in the bureaucracy itself.

Events have completely confirmed the correctness of the

view we defended since 1953 on this subject of the decisive role of pressure of the masses in the internal evolution of the USSR. Some of our so-called orthodox critics tried to explain these events as the result of internal dissensions in the bureaucracy. Today it is clear how untenable this position is, and how it is this position itself which actually favors tendencies to capitulate to Stalinism. It is clear that if the bureaucracy dismantled the Stalin myth of its own free will, as a mere maneuver, the nature of the Stalinist regime and the very nature of the bureaucracy would have to be seen in a different light from that of Trotskyism. If, on the other hand, the pressure of the masses—during the period preparatory to the action of the masses, that is, the revolution—is the decisive factor in the evolution of the last three years, then the Trotskyist analysis of the USSR is strikingly confirmed.

As for those who accuse us of "exaggerating" the importance of this pressure, all we can say for them after the Twentieth Congress is that they must look sheepish today.

IV. THE "PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES"

The repercussions of the Twentieth Congress in the "people's democracies" differ from country to country according to the local character of the Communist Party, its ties with the masses, and the degree of pressure the masses put on the bureaucratic leadership. However, it can be said that in all these countries, confidence in the leadership has been shaken to various degrees and that a new period is opening for these parties, a period which will see a blooming of critical, if not oppositional, ideas and tendencies.

In Poland there is a genuine popular explosion which, by intervals, has begun to resemble the debut of a revolution. Violent debates have broken out in the party's cells, in the trade-union organizations, intellectuals' organizations, and even the local councils (soviets) and central Parliament. Everywhere rank-and-file members have opposed the official positions *not only the Stalinist but even the post-Stalinist ones* to the extent that the leadership has spoken of a campaign "organized by anti-Soviet and anti-Party elements." There have even been, it seems, street demonstrations at the time of the burial of Beirut. The content of the criticisms which appeared in the press equals, if not outstrips, the heat of most of the Trotskyist criticisms. They do not touch only theoretical and ideological aspects of the Stalinist era, but even the way industry is organized, the system of wages, bonuses, the rights of managers and the absence of rights (and independence) for trade unions.

It is true that we must refrain from identifying the possibility for oppositional elements to express criticism during a turbulent transition period with the reestablishment of democratic freedoms in the workers' movement, and even more, identifying it with the acceptance of these criticisms by the leadership and their applying them in practice. It is probable that, at least on this score, there will be a certain "reestablishment of discipline" and that the elements who advanced the furthest risk paying dearly for their audacity. But the sudden revelation of immense discontent accumulated in the ranks of the Polish party will quite likely destroy its "monolithic" character for a long period and will lead to constant internal debates (probably, in the near future the creation of a solid left-wing current).

According to not yet confirmed Yugoslav sources, something similar is taking place in Bulgaria, where violent debates and anti-Stalinist criticisms have broken out "even in small villages."

In Czechoslovakia and in East Germany, where the CP once had a base of popular support as broad as in Poland and Bulgaria, but where it came to attack much more crudely the interests and aspirations of the masses—which resulted in greater isolation—the leaders seem to have tried to profit from the decisions of the Twentieth Congress to work out a popular maneuver by adopting the anti-Stalinist line, though there is not yet a really deep wave of popular sentiment in these countries. Given the industrialized character of these countries, however, and the social relationships of forces, the beginning of a new reawakening of the masses threatens to almost immediately overturn the dictatorship (as the events of June 17, 1953, demonstrated). This explains why the Czech and German Stalinist leaders will need to act more cautiously than the Polish or Bulgarian leaders, especially in questions that directly concern industry and workers' lives.

In Hungary, the Twentieth Congress bomb exploded after a prolonged struggle of tendencies inside the party, during which the Nagy tendency, which was linked to the Mikoyan-Malenkov tendency, was decapitated by the expulsion of Nagy himself. While the decisions of the Twentieth Congress certainly represent a defeat for the Rakosi tendency, which had to rehabilitate its victim, Rajk, nevertheless it seems that this tendency is entrenching itself in power very securely and that an internal struggle will be waged for Nagy to be allowed back in. Since the masses, at the same time, seem more passive than in other countries, the whole situation seems ripe for Hungary to be one of the first countries where a more or less open struggle between tendencies will take place inside a Stalinist party which holds power.

In Rumania and Albania, where the ties of the CP to the masses are much more limited, it seems that the leadership is having more success in resisting the Kremlin's efforts to impose a revision of the Stalinist line. In Albania, however, the leadership has already met with a surprising amount of opposition, even inside the legislature.

In general, the recent experience of the people's democracies therefore confirms the conclusion that we drew about the evolution of the Soviet Union. The decisions of the Twentieth Congress favor the unleashing of a more or less violent movement of criticism and anti-Stalinist opposition. The old structures nevertheless remain in place in all the CPs, and it is necessary to wait for the outbreak of an open struggle of tendencies, as well as overt action by the masses, before this will change. It is not excluded that this will occur in one of the people's democracies before the political revolution breaks out in the USSR, or that such events could exert a profound influence on the evolution of the Soviet Union.

V. THE CRISIS IN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

The Twentieth Congress of the CP of the USSR opened up a new stage in the crisis of the Communist parties. In order to understand the relative extent of this crisis in the various parties, however, it is necessary to consider several supplementary factors: the "right-wing" international policy inaugurated by the Twentieth Congress; the relative strength of this Communist Party and its actual ties with

the masses; the (relative) degree of solidarity in the top Stalinist leadership, etc.

We can distinguish three categories in particular:

(a) The case of mass Communist parties in advanced industrial countries, (the PCF [French Communist Party], the Italian CP). The crisis is developing in both through the destruction of the authority of the leadership, the discussions that have begun over the right-wing policy announced by the Twentieth Congress and applied enthusiastically by the national leaders (peaceful coexistence, parliamentary roads to socialism, the Algerian affair, etc.), and through the demand for a revolutionary class struggle which revolutionary layers of these parties are beginning to raise. The absence of any objective basis for collaboration with the bourgeoisie limits the room for maneuver for the right wing and in spite of everything makes it sensitive to the pressure from below in the long run. This does not change the fact that it remains initially in control of the situation, since the whole tradition of Stalinism favors a right-opportunist policy today.

(b) The case of small Stalinist sects in advanced industrial countries (Great Britain, Belgium, Austria, West Germany, etc.). The crisis in these parties is influenced on one hand by the destruction of the authority of the leaders, and on the other hand by the search for a suitable attitude to take toward the mass Social Democratic movement. Part of the apparatus undeniably bases itself on the decisions of the Twentieth Congress in order to propose a liquidationist-reformist orientation. The healthiest elements in the ranks oppose this, reinforcing, however, sectarian attitudes which they hold toward the mass movement. Our intervention can be very influential in preventing this reaction of the healthiest part of the Communist ranks from being led into sterile adventures doomed to defeat.

(c) The case of the Communist parties in the colonial and semicolonial countries (such as the Indian CP). The orientation of the Twentieth Congress toward these countries is the most right-wing of all. (Kuusinen's rotten criticism of the theses of the Communist International!) But at the same time there is a real objective basis for collaboration between the "national" bourgeoisie of these countries and the Stalinist leaders. These leaders will therefore be less sensitive for some time (until they are subjected to a genuine revolutionary mass movement) to criticism from the ranks and more inclined to follow the line of the Kremlin. For these reasons we have a real chance to broaden and draw toward us critical tendencies, left centrist tendencies, if not tendencies that are revolutionary in their strength, which will develop inside these Communist parties.

VI. OUR TASKS

In a general way, the stage which has opened in the crisis of Stalinism in the USSR itself, in the people's democracies, and in the Communist parties, is characterized by a process of disappearance or at least a loosening of many prejudices which the mass of Communist militants had against our movement. The struggle for our ideas can therefore be carried on more successfully on the periphery and in the interior of the CPs, provided that we carry on this struggle with arguments that are better and better worked out, more precise and concrete, and provided that the political level of our own organizations be raised higher and higher. The

disappearance of some of the most repulsive aspects of Stalinism makes this all the more necessary and our own ranks will be in danger of becoming susceptible to pro-Stalinist and semi-Stalinist illusions if they are not thoroughly educated, particularly about the past history of the "Russian question" and about all of our analyses and our world orientation.

In relation to the evolution of *the USSR and the people's democracies*, we hail and support—critically—all the concessions that the masses have been able to tear away from the bureaucracy which feels its position shaking. At the same time we denounce unmercifully the hesitations, the half-measures, the delays and retreats, and especially the hypocrisy of the "liquidation of Stalin" by his principal lieutenants. We demand a complete political explanation of the crimes of Stalin, an explanation which can only be "sociological," Marxist, in the sense of a Trotskyist analysis. We denounce the "personality cult in reverse" which consists of explaining everything wrong about the USSR by the faults of one (or a few) individuals. We demand a real and honest review of all the trials, by means of an international commission of inquiry in the labor movement.

At the same time, we will exploit to the maximum the theme of "back to Lenin" by demanding a genuine return to the teachings of Leninism in every area: politics ("State and Revolution"), economics (trade union independence), the international domain (Leninist theses of the Communist International), etc.

In the *mass Communist parties*, we will support the development of a broad revolutionary *left current*, inside the mass Communist movement, employing if possible a public organ appearing outside the CP but published by personalities known to Communist militants, or even employing a public organ of a tendency, which could become possible if the opposition in the CP takes on a mass character. The platform of such a left tendency, with the inevitable national variations, should generally be: a revolutionary orientation for the country in question; back to Lenin; reestablishment of the Communist International. One of the most effective forms of activity of such an organ would be the centralization of all kinds of information about the evolution (and the critical currents) inside the CPs.

In the *small Communist parties* we will support healthy rank-and-file tendencies which oppose liquidationist-reformist maneuvers, at the same time that we try to increase these comrades' understanding of the need to

work in the mass movement. Given the lack of perspectives and the acute organizational crisis of these parties, the constituting of a Bolshevik-Leninist fraction with a precise organizational orientation will probably be necessary in short order so as to avoid many militants becoming demoralized and returning to passivity. This work will be carried on in these countries without changing our fundamental orientation concerning the social democratic organizations, beginning particularly with sympathizers, contacts, former members, or isolated members who, for particular reasons, have not been able to apply our orientation of mass work.

Everywhere our members will understand that the events of recent months represent a historic confirmation and a total justification for the struggle taken up by Leon Trotsky and the Soviet Left Opposition in 1923, as well as a complete confirmation of the "new course" of Trotskyism and the theses "Rise and Decline of Stalinism" adopted at the fourth world congress of the International. No other tendency in the labor movement has been so well equipped to understand and predict these events as has the Fourth International.

The study of the history of our movement, particularly of our Russian movement, will be developed in a useful way by our sections, and our movement ought to try to draw up a kind of historic balance sheet of thirty years, comparing the Trotskyist and Stalinist positions on the major events between 1923 and 1953, and making it possible to see how much every step forward taken in the USSR and in the Communist parties can only be a step on the way traced by Trotskyism. Such a work will at the same time be an important contribution to the struggle against the pro-Stalinist tendencies which try to argue in support of the "objective necessity" for the Stalinist crimes of the past.

With the period of the death agony of Stalinism which is opening up, an extremely favorable period is also opening up for the strengthening of our movement internationally. But it would be mistaken to assume that the decline of Stalinism will automatically strengthen Trotskyism. It will only do so to the degree that Trotskyists are able to follow a politically correct and tactically adequate political line, in every country and internationally, toward the labor movement as a whole and toward the Stalinist militants in particular. Our initial experience has shown that these opportunities are real in many countries. It is necessary to get to work so that the crisis of Stalinism will be translated in practice into a strengthening of the Fourth International.

3. "Long Live the Independent and Democratic Republic of Hungarian Workers' Councils! An Appeal of the Fourth International to the workers, poor peasants, and intellectuals of Hungary" (Translated from the December 1956 issue of *Quatrième Internationale*)
Comrades,

The Fourth International, which includes in its ranks oppositional Communists in thirty different countries in the world, including the Soviet Union, and which for more than 20 years has conducted a merciless struggle against capitalism and Stalinism, sends its fraternal greetings to the victorious masses of Hungary.

Greetings to the heroic workers and students of Budapest! You have shown that the inflexible and united will of the working people is stronger than all the modern arms of oppression!

Greetings to the valiant workers and poor peasants of the country, to the insurrectional councils of the workers, soldiers, and students of the innumerable towns and villages of Hungary where the power has passed into the hands of the working people!

Eternal glory to the martyrs of your great insurrection, which has written a glorious page in the history of the international labor movement!

Hatred and contempt for the rotten clique of bureaucrats who tried to save their regime through the firepower of Russian tanks, passing over the corpses of hundreds of massacred Hungarian workers! This clique has nothing in common with communism, with socialism.

Your victorious revolution is not finished; it has hardly begun.

But the deaths of the martyrs of bureaucratic madness must not be in vain.

The power which is today in the hands of the Hungarian people must never again be lost.

The workers and students of Budapest, of Miskolcz, of Debreczen and Salaegerczegs did not rise in order to see the old masters of Horthy's Hungary, the capitalists and landlords, take the place of the ruling bureaucratic clique.

Today, in the giddy spirit of the victory just won, this danger does not seem essential to you. But tomorrow, across the open Austrian border, a whole flood of emigrants will return to the country; not only our Social Democratic comrades—who, as representatives of a working class party, must in our opinion benefit from all the rights of the democracy of the councils, even though we opposition communists do not share their political ideas—but also the representatives of the darkest reaction will come.

The discussions on a new Constitution, a new army, and a new government must not be carried on behind your back and without your active participation.

What you want is a political revolution, the overthrow of the dictatorship of the bureaucracy, the exercise of power by the toiling people as a whole, and *not a social counterrevolution*, not a return to private capitalism and great landed estates, not an end to planned economy and industrialization.

This is why we call upon you to show the *greatest vigilance*, permanently, and to take the only road which can guarantee the fruits of your victory:

In each factory, in each neighborhood, and in each town, set up a council of workers, soldiers, and students.

In each village, set up a council of poor peasants.

All legislative and executive power should repose exclusively with these councils, elected in free elections, meeting openly and under the control of all the toiling people.

All armed power should be wrested not only from the Stalinist secret police, but also from the old officers; this is why you should call for the dissolution of the police and the permanent army; all weapons should be given to the workers, organized into workers', students', and poor peasants' militias.

Have no confidence in any Parliament which would appeal to the old and new political connivers. All executive and legislative power in the state should be in your hands, victors of October 23. Demand the immediate convocation in Budapest of a congress of workers' councils of all Hungary, which would take power in the whole country!

Only such a congress of councils, with the delegates working under your constant control, subject to recall at any time if you do not agree with their decisions, will be a truly democratic expression of the will of the working people of Hungary!

Only such a congress of councils can draw up a new Hungarian constitution which should incorporate the following principles:

—All power is based on the councils democratically elected by the workers and poor peasants.

—All private acquisition of land and of the major means of production and transportation remains forbidden by law.

—The overall economic plan is set up, administered, and controlled with the democratic participation of all the producers.

—No state functionary receives a higher salary than that of a skilled worker.

The Hungarian Democratic Republic of Councils is an independent state which is in the camp of the working people and which should in a sovereign way, without the presence of foreign troops and without the meddling of a foreign power, decide on its international trade treaties and its treaties with other states.

These measures should be taken by the Congress of Councils of all Hungary. We opposition communists, who have been savagely persecuted for thirty years by Stalin and the Soviet bureaucracy; we, who have seen our leader Leon Trotsky assassinated by Stalin's minions, say to you again in the name of hundreds of thousands of Soviet communists who struggled and struggle today against the bureaucracy: don't be fooled by the promises of international capital! The British, French and American capitalists did and do commit the same infamies in Malaya, Kenya, North Africa, Korea, Guatemala, and Egypt that the bureaucrats committed in your country.

The task of defending the international expansion of the socialist conquests requires you to remain closely linked with all the workers' states, but like the Polish and Yugoslav peoples, on the basis of absolute independence and equal rights.

Hungarian Communists,

The recent weeks and the recent days were a terrible awakening for you. What seemed unbelievable before has now come true: your criminal leaders, with Erno Geroë at the head, have sought to keep their power, not against the counterrevolution but against the working class, by using the most sordid methods of bloody terror. With sudden violence, the correctness of all the criticisms and all the warnings of *Trotsky and the left Communist Opposition*, who from 1934 on predicted the inevitability of a political revolution against the bureaucracy's power to exploit and oppress, was verified for you.

Think of the odious crimes of your former leaders. Remember Lenin's warning: The only tactics, the only maneuvers which are permissible are those which reinforce the self-confidence and class-consciousness of the workers and not those which weaken it! Think of the principles described by Lenin in *State and Revolution* concerning the workers' state: a government of councils in which the masses of workers must possess democratic rights to the greatest degree, not of less rights than under capitalist democracy!

Remember Lenin's warning that in a workers' state which is deformed in a bureaucratic way, the trade unions must absolutely defend the rights of the workers against the state and the right to strike and demonstrate must be absolutely guaranteed.

There is no reason to despair or resign oneself. *It was not the cause of communism which met a defeat in Hungary, but the cause of an inhuman bureaucratic system which the best communists have consistently fought for decades.*

The time has come to draw the lessons of these bloody experiences.

Close ranks! Introduce in your party an unlimited democracy as well as freedom for conflicting opinions and tendencies. Study and spread the works of Leon Trotsky and the International Communist Opposition, which should be published and sold freely in Hungary.

Under the leadership of Stalin and Rakosi, the cause of communism was soiled and dishonored! Under the banner of Lenin and Trotsky communism will be victorious in your country and throughout the whole world!

If you, in the vanguard of the working people and on the basis of the broadest proletarian democracy, are willing to wage a struggle today for the Hungarian Republic of Councils, independent and democratic, the future is yours.

The demands of true proletarian internationalism today more than ever mean international coordination of the struggle against capitalism, imperialism and the bureaucracy. Long live the new Communist International! Long live the Hungarian section of the Fourth International!

Workers, students, soldiers, Communists of Hungary!

All of toiling humanity has its eyes on you. The fate of hundreds of millions of people may depend on how ready you are to advance on the path of socialist democracy and not to tolerate any retreat either toward Stalinist dictatorship or toward exploitative capitalism.

With the greatest confidence in the consciousness which you yourselves have of your responsibilities and in your socialist conviction, we cry out to you:

Long live the Hungarian Republic of Councils, independent and democratic!

Long live the world socialist revolution!

The International Secretariat
of the Fourth International
(World Party of Socialist Revolution)

October 30, 1956

4. "Revolution and Counterrevolution in Hungary" (Translated by David Keil from the March 1957 issue of *Quatrieme Internationale*)

Once the Soviet tanks had put it in power, the "Kadar government," trying to win some mass support, declared that the gains of the revolution would be protected and the government would make it its task to defend these threatened gains.

But having come to power only by force of Soviet arms, and not finding any support among the masses, it has been led to institute a regime reminiscent of the Rakosi government; it has even been forced to defend the Rakosi regime, claiming that criticism of it has been exaggerated. As time passed, it has stopped calling the October-November events a "revolution" and begun to call them a "counterrevolution." As the British Communist journalist Peter Fryer put it so well in his pamphlet on his expulsion from the British Communist Party: "If this was a counterrevolution it was the first counterrevolution whose first act was to put arms in the hands of the proletariat."

Kadar and his supporters around the world talk about "counterrevolution," about fascists, about returned Hungarian emigrés, foreign arms, etc. For two months now, "order" (Stalinist style) has ruled in Budapest. The government has made many arrests and conducted many court martials. To this day it has not produced a single emigrant, a single foreign weapon. All the same, in such a struggle as took place, it would be surprising for nothing to be found if there had really been a significant number of repatriated emigrés in the country and if the uprising had been prepared well in advance in a foreign country. The government is silent on this point because the weapons it found are those of the Hungarian army, and because its arrests are mainly of workers and intellectuals who never emigrated and who express the aspirations of the entire people to get rid of the Rakosi-Geroë regime.

The judges are now being reprimanded for being too lenient. The attorney general, Geza Szenasi, a former AVO, said: "A humane attitude is no longer appropriate; the fascists must be shown that it won't do to oppose the Karhatolom." That is the new name of the AVO, which carries out dragnets in the suburbs of Budapest.

Kadar had promised in the first few days that the infamies and horrors of the Rakosi regime were over. But the first major trial that took place was of a group of students who had published a newspaper, *Truth*, during the revolution. What was the accusation against the medical student Ilona Toth? Injecting oil with a hypodermic needle and pumping air into the heart of a Communist whom she took to be an AVO! This is a rehashing of the "Doctors' Plot" and the "Assassins in White," "confessions" being a central factor.

Does Kadar plan to give Nagy and Maletér a "Rajk-type" trial? This is not excluded; but will they be the kind of defendants that are needed? That is doubtful right now!

If this is no longer the Stalinist Rakosi regime, its methods are more or less the same; for example, the technique of the amalgam. Using this method the leadership of the new party permanently expelled at one blow Imre Nagy and Losonczy, on one hand, and Rakosi and Geroë on the other. The amalgam has its limits, however, in that Nagy and Losonczy are under arrest, while Rakosi is living peacefully in the USSR.

Kadar denounces the "counterrevolution." But whom does he repress?

Among the prisoners are long-time communist writers such as Guyla Hay, Zoltan Zelk, and Tibor Tardos. On December 29, despite the governmental terror, the Hungarian Writers Association expressed the sentiments of the working masses:

"We must declare with a heavy heart that the Soviet government made a historic error when it drowned the revolution in blood. We predict that the time will come when this great power will regret its mistake. We warn everyone against the misconception that the Hungarian revolution would have destroyed the conquests of socialism if Soviet arms had not intervened. We know that this is not true."

Such a declaration, however moderate its tone—it could be called too moderate, in fact—could not go unpunished. On January 17, the Writers Association was dissolved.

Where else does Kadar see "fascists"? In the working class.

The workers' councils which supposed they might turn their attention to politics—fascist. The workers who did not want to belong to his party (supposedly it had about 150,000 members, but they were mostly government functionaries required to join in order to keep their jobs)—fascists.

The government manipulates the extremely difficult situation to the disadvantage of the workers. January production was about 50 percent that of the previous October. The government refuses to carry out its promise of a 10 percent raise in salaries. Unemployment has been used to put pressure on the working class.

And now Kadar establishes a "workers' militia," responsible for suppressing rebellions in the factories and preventing strikes! The factories are where Kadar's "fascists" are. The militia is designed not to defend the factories against someone who wants to turn them over to the capitalists—for there is no significant force of that kind—but to combat those who in October and November demanded workers' democracy and created councils (soviets) to put it into effect.

Of course, Kadar imitates Rakosi even in details. Russian is now a required course again in school. Any occasion is suitable again for glorifying the USSR.

This "climate of terror"—as Marosan, the Minister of State, shamelessly calls it—may allow Kadar to appear for a time as the head of a government which calls itself a government of the workers. But it will not give this regime a long life. The Hungarian revolution is not dead; it cannot die.

It lives in the clandestine movements in Budapest itself, which are making a real analysis of the events in preparation for future struggles. The Hungarian revolution was a precursor of the great mass uprisings against the bureaucratic regime which will raise workers' democracy to a previously unattained level. The period separating it from this great mass uprising will be short. Certainly Kadar's bureaucratic counterrevolution will become even more fierce in the days ahead. But it will save neither the Kadars nor their masters in the Kremlin. Both will pay for their counterrevolutionary crimes.

Throughout the world, the labor movement, revolutionary intellectuals, and all progressive elements must raise their voices to demand an end to the bureaucratic terror, in order to tear the Hungarian revolutionaries out of the clutches of their executioners, and to aid the Hungarian workers who displayed so much heroism and self-sacrifice in the service of the socialist cause.

A glimpse of the tendencies that exist in Hungary is provided by a duplicated document signed "Hungaricus," circulating in Budapest, excerpts of which have been published by the journalist Fetjo in *France-Observateur*. According to this document, "the anti-Rakosi opposition inside the Hungarian Workers Party began to disintegrate with the fall of Rakosi" and "after the crushing of the national insurrection by force, it could be said that the opposition fell apart completely."

There appears to exist a tendency which aims solely at military resistance in the form of guerrilla warfare, which the document's author says shows "total incomprehension of the actual situation and impotent rage."

Another tendency wishes to "flirt with Kadar's Workers Socialist Party." According to the document, leaving aside opportunists and cowards, it is possible to find "many comrades who believe or at least would like to believe that inside the Workers Socialist Party they would be able to resume the struggle against Stalinism. But isn't the principal lesson to be drawn from the history of the last few years that such struggles inside the party, respecting the party's statutes, fail?"

Rigorously criticizing the errors of the Communist opposition, it continues, "History has shown the opposition to have been correct. But the same time it has judged it severely for failing to organize an independent force. While the party leadership was ceaselessly condemning antiparty factions in a whole series of resolutions, what did the opposition do? It discussed. It discussed whether or not it should organize itself into a faction. It did nothing to reach the people and in particular to establish a base in the working class. It did nothing to approach the bourgeois-democratic parties. In fact, even on the eve of the revolution, the Communist opposition limited itself to drawing up petitions and issuing gloomy prophecies—courageous but ineffective." The document warns against believing Kadar's statements portraying himself as an enemy of Rakosi and Geroë: "In any case, it would be difficult after the revolution to pursue the policy abandoned by Geroë. Kadar must know this. Thus—as has often happened in history—it is possible that despite the defeat of the revolution, some of its essential demands may be realized. We should fight to see that this happens. But we must fight knowing that this path is strewn with the dead of our revolution. It is no more than a provincial road in an empire, a road that ties us inseparably to Moscow. The Hungarian people do not want that; and we can be sure that as soon as they begin to move, the hundred thousand members of Kadar's party will abandon him even more quickly than the 900,000 members of Rakosi's party deserted Geroë last October . . ."

It denounces those who flinch or who desert the workers' side: "It is a pretty poor outcome to arrive in the port of Eisenhower and Eden after serving on Rakosi's ship so zealously and for so many years." "The Marxist critique of capitalism remains valid, as does the Leninist critique of imperialism; the Egyptian expedition furnishes stunning new proof."

The document sets itself the task of political clarification:

"The socialist partisans of Hungarian freedom should set themselves apart from whatever falsely goes by the name of socialism in Hungary today. They should be independent. Only by establishing their independence can they join with the popular movement and cooperate with the democratic and bourgeois elements who do not plan a restoration but seek a genuine renewal."

* * *

"The theory of Hungarian socialism must be created, based on a revision of all ideas which have up to now been considered final, based on confronting the reality of our times. Only after clarifying our ideas and our aims can we go on to the second stage, that of organization."

After such a momentous experience, the first result of defeat will necessarily be disintegration and ideological divisions. But the Hungarian revolution—in only a few days—provided important lessons for the international proletariat; and Hungarian revolutionaries, with the aid of the international revolutionary Marxist vanguard, will not fail to surmount this initial period and to strengthen their ties with a political cohesion forged from the lessons of the struggle.