

SPECIAL BULLETIN NUMBER TWELVE (FINAL EDITION).

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For I.S. Members Only

March 8th. 1977

NOTE....The relevant documents for the 1977 convention are the December "News of the Month". Twelve editions of the "Special Bulletin", various "Left Faction Discussion Documents" and the majority reply's to the Third Force. Members attending convention should bring these documents with them if they wish to be able to refer to them. There will be no extra copies available except for a limited number, about a dozen, available as full sets from Tom D. at a cost of \$12 a set. However all convention discussion will take place on the resolutions. These have been published in two parts with the convention agenda as the cover. Part I is headed "Agenda for Convention" and is on yellow paper. Part II, ^{on green} is headed "Final Agenda for Convention". THESE TWO DOCUMENTS ARE INDISPENSIBLE, you should bring them with you. Only a limited number of extra copies are available.

EMERGENCY FINANCIAL APPEAL.

A Brief Document on the Question of Tax Rebates.

As was reported at the end of last year, the organisation is in serious financial trouble. Our income from the membership has not kept up with our growing activity in the last year, indeed because of increased fraction and branch activity it has fallen. Our ability to collect large, individual donations which has kept us in the black for this period is now considerably reduced, due to the simple fact that we have milked various benefactors dry. Without new sources of income, the I.S. cannot last out the year in anything like its present form, indeed we have already been forced to take the unprecedented step of cutting WP orders to branches that are badly in debt.

Our overall position has been worsened by the fact that the faction fight alone has cost us several thousand dollars and in all likelihood, the overall size of the organisation will be reduced by 20% immediately after the convention. This represents a further erosion of our financial base.

There will be a, now much smaller, late spring fund drive. In the mean time we need every member who receives a tax rebate to send us at least \$50 each, as a special, emergency donation, as soon as possible. In the next immediate period we are dependant on an overwhelming response to this appeal for our financial survival. PLEASE DO YOUR SHARE.

Glenn Wolfe,
National Secretary,
March 7th, 1977.

1977 L.S. CONVENTION
POLITICAL SOLUTION CAUCUS

CRITIQUE
THE E.C.'s "ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES"

CRITIQUE

1. The EC draft has the virtue of admitting past errors in our expectations of working class response to inflation, unemployment and the capitalist offensive, as well as our expectations for the U.S. economy. Its wisely modest expectations, at least for the current year, are also a welcome change.

Unfortunately, the document makes its partial corrections without drawing any lessons from those errors. The methods which led to the errors have not been corrected. As a result the document reveals a repeated tendency to slip back into the unwarranted prediction of great motion in the immediate period ahead. This occurs several times, the most pronounced being that "by late '77 or some time in '78 at the latest, this situation will change" (i.e., the working class response will drastically heighten -- although at the same time, on another page, the document expresses confidence that '78 will be a boom year). In short, the basis for a new hype is already being laid, similar to that of '75, and with as little objective justification.

2. The erroneous method of the EC has two sources (other than the dangerous subjective impatience which seems so endemic to the EC).

First is the EC's persistent attempts, in practice, to impose a crude mechanical relation between working class response and the variations in the business cycle and other short term phenomena.

Revolutionists have the right to revolutionary optimism, especially in this period. But to believe that upturns in the class struggle bear anything like a one to one relation to variations in the business cycle is a gross error. The source of our optimism must rest with the fact that here at home, the U.S. has been passing through a period of social crisis (war, the black movement of the '60s, Watergate) joined by the stagflation which has replaced the post-war boom. As a result, the confidence of workers in the system has begun to recede. But it is a process which has only begun. How, and with what speed, this overall process will evolve and mature, it is impossible for us to predict. Attempts to do so based on narrow, short-run predictions of the economic trajectory are likely to produce only false expectations and yet another L.S. crisis.

3. A second methodological error is revealed in the repeated attempts to predict the short-run effects of Carter's Keynesian policies. To assert that we can today, with any meaningful precision, announce that "Carter's action will not have noticeable effect until the second half of '77", or that "double digit inflation in late '77 or early '78", is to give further evidence that we have not learned the lesson of '75, and the consequences of those errors. To assume in turn that we can in any way base our perspective upon these predictions only compounds the error. This method has little in common with Marxism.

Political Solution Caucus

Critique & Amendments to EC's "Economic & Political Perspectives"

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We seem to have more confidence in predicting the consequences of Keynesian methods than the bourgeois economists who have learned in recent years through bitter experience to be more skeptical of these claims. The capitalist class of Europe is not at all confident that the previously "successful" techniques will pull Europe out of its crisis at this stage.

There is good reason for this decline in confidence. Keynesian mechanisms are most effective in dealing with those crises which are essentially an expression of the business cycle (those of the '50s and '60s). When it comes to other crises, structural crises, these methods reveal their severe limitations. The current recession in the U.S. is only partly a cyclical one. It is primarily structural. That is, it is an expression (1) of the decline in the rate of investment and growth of the capital goods industry (the end of the boom), and (2) the decline in economic growth of the U.S. relative to Europe/Japan.

Under such conditions, Keynesian methods, increased government expenditures, will not readily stimulate the economy into new patterns of growth. Government expenditures can and have easily increased consumption, or savings, without generating a boom in the decisive capital goods industry -- the key to capitalist recovery and prosperity. Those who seek evidence for this fact will observe the failure of the Ford administration's far greater government "stimulus" to pull the economy out of its stagnation crisis.

U.S. theoreticians should be careful about mirroring Business Week confidence in the effects of Keynesianism in this period.

Quite the contrary. The evidence of the recent past demonstrates in fact that for structural crises the capitalist class still has no choice but the classic 19th century methods. It was the classic pattern of devaluation of the dollar, and wage cuts (relative wage cuts, since U.S. wages remained stable for over a decade while European/Japanese wages rose markedly) which were and are their only way out of a structural crisis. (Though, no doubt, U.S. arms and food sales, and Europe's greater vulnerability to oil prices, played a role in helping pull the U.S. temporarily out of the crisis in the '70s. But these can not, more than temporarily, substitute for or undermine the fundamental elements leading to stagnation and relative U.S. decline.

4. The document tells us that the midwest will be the scene of our greatest growth in the period ahead. Yes, we do hope and expect some growth, particularly from our IBT work. But the document also asserts, correctly, that "no large scale worker recruitment" can be expected, and that it will be "harder, not easier to recruit workers". To focus growth expectations on the midwest then seems, to say the least, quixotic, and ignores the fact that if we are to grow in the period ahead, work outside our central priorities will be a major source.

A FURTHER STATEMENT BY WINNIE 2/27/77

With grim and sad foreboding for the future of the I.S., I write this. At last Wednesday's Bay Area branch meeting (2/23/77) we were told that there is the possibility of a referendum by the organization to expel the Left Faction before the convention. This is a big step down the road of cannonism.

This bureaucratic maneuver could only mean that the E.C. has no confidence in its ability to gain a majority. All comrades should protest this violation of a basic tenet of democratic centralism: i.e. the minority's right to a hearing before the representatives of the total membership at the convention. If the E.C. succeeds, then, sooner rather than later, all dissent will feel the axe, one way or another.

From my reading of the history of Bolshevism (correct me if I'm wrong), the Bolsheviks became the majority of the Russian Social Democratic Party around 1903. Yet the Mensheviks were not expelled, altho the differences between the two groups were deeper and greater than in the present I.S. faction fight.

Expulsion would be a crime against the I.S. and I must (in good conscience) struggle against the stifling of loyal dissent by the E.C. The fight against bureaucratic abuses in other political organizations and in the trade unions, has been one of the best parts of our program. For the E.C. to stoop to this same dirty politics on our own members is unconscionable. Of all places, it should not be tolerated in the I.S., if we are to be the standard bearers of a liberating socialist society. We do not want to go the way of the C.P.

I don't agree with some of the Left Faction program, but I will defend their right to present their point of view. I call on all comrades to vote against the expulsion in the referendum. I further call for a new E.C.

Winnie

"CHECK IT OUT, COMRADES"

Reply to Kim's Hatchet Job on the L.A. Document

Bob B., Johanna B., Joel J.
for The Political Solution Caucus.

Introduction

The EC's reply, written by Kim, to the L.A. document is appropriately entitled: "Political Solution or Political Confusion", for it sows massive confusion concerning the fundamental issues at stake in the current debates in the IS. Kim obscures, distorts, and even fabricates the actual position taken in the L.A. document. That any comrades could actually believe what he says indicates that they either did not read the L.A. document or that they are prepared to believe almost anything. (A very bad state of mind for marxists.) That the entire EC could have supported this reply shows to what lengths they will go in order to discredit political opposition in the IS.

(1) Kim rewrites the recent history of the IS and of our 2 1/2 year perspective so outrageously as to make the members doubt their memories of the events they have just lived through (unless they have saved their documents). Particularly amazing, Kim denies that the IS predicted that short-term economic crisis would lead in the short run to large-scale working class action, and that we made this analysis the political basis of the turn. Equally far out, Kim denies that we largely failed to connect up our socialist politics with our agitation, so that "being the best fighters builds the party" became in practice the basis of most of our trade union activity. Even the EC has stated as much!

(2) Kim thoroughly distorts, indeed, he fabricates, our position on point after point in order to "defeat" us. He makes the unbelievable accusations, for example, that we opposed CGC; and that we opposed participation in the Sadlowski campaign and critical support for Sadlowski; and that our arguments went against TDC. In fact, there is not a shred of evidence in our document for any of these charges. As the EC is fond of saying these days, "Check it out, comrades!" (At any rate, we will provide ample documentation for this below.) Kim argues, more generally, that we counterpose abstract propoganda about mythical struggles to real agitation. In fact, at every point, our discussion focussed on the actual agitation that we have been doing, both national and local. "Check it out, comrades." We did not attack our agitation per se, but our failures in politicizing it: particularly, failures in the development of concrete strategies to improve the agitation itself in the various industries and in explaining the connections between our day to day work and our socialist political perspectives. Kim is able to fill page after page in an impassioned "defense" of agitation. But it is all quite irrelevant, since the agitation the IS did was the starting point and the basis of our entire discussion. This was because the whole purpose of our document was to try to improve our agitation in the future.

(3) Kim simply ignores the arguments we did put forward. Why bother with them, if you think you can do better by farring your opponent with the brush of "abstract propogand'ets", "sectarians",

"orthodox Trotskyists", "New Leftists"... and, of course, arguers for the Left Faction position (who were too naive or timid to draw the Left Factionist conclusions).

What then were the issues the Political Solution Caucus did raise in our document. To briefly summarize, they were as follows.

(1) We stated that in implementing the turn, the EC hyped the organization (and perhaps itself) by predicting that short run economic crisis (inflationary boom) would in the short term generate the kind of large scale working class response that would allow us to turn ourselves into a workers combat organization in 2 1/2 years. Despite Kim's bluff, there is no way he can deny this, for it is in black and white, in document after document (quoted below).

The Political Solution Caucus (PSC) stated that this crude analysis had disastrous consequences for the organization in at least two respects. In the first place, it made for expectations of large scale working class action. When these failed to materialize there was inevitably widespread demoralization. Inevitably as well, many people, drew the wrong lessons: not that we had turned to agitation an incorrect basis--that is with false expectations-- but that the turn itself, agitation itself, was wrong. This opened the way for the left faction. Secondly, we argued, that because we expected big working class motion, we tended to neglect IS politics during the turn-- politicizing the membership and politicizing our agitation. In practice, as anyone who went through it would admit, we acted as if we thought the IS would grow through its members being the "best fighters" in relatively big struggles which would push workers into the organization.

(2) We said we have failed to adequately integrate our politics and agitation. Even the EC itself raised this problem in its Interim Perspective last year (16 April 1976):

The problem of relating revolutionary politics to the day to day struggle has not been solved yet. It hasn't been solved by our members in the plants or by Workers Power. All too often our members separate the trade union work and their political work into separate compartments. All too often our coverage in Workers Power is either on the level of strike reports or abstract politics... The paper must be used to present a regular analysis of economic and political developments which makes the bridge between our agitation and our socialist program.

But apparently Kim disagrees, for he charges us with counterposing politics with agitation, when in fact, what we said was that the IS had largely failed to actually apply our own analysis of the economic crisis and the employers offensive to the specifics, the concrete situations, in which we were already agitating. The EC said precisely the same thing we did in its Interim Perspective. Again, we propose to do two things at the same time, which are in fact indispensable to one another: developing our politics in relationship to developing our agitation. But Kim clearly feels that such a complex operation is beyond the IS. So it is he who counterposes agitation to politics. In fact, the whole method of his document is to charge us with merely wanting to do propoganda, everytime we say we should have made our work more political. This is the way he tries to cover up for the leadership's inability to politicize our work.

(3) We said that the organization had been drifting to the right in its industrial perspectives and activity--particularly in the recent auto and steel work. We supported entirely the position of critical support put forward by Kim himself in the original IS steel document. We contend, however, that especially in Workers Power, we have failed to maintain a critical stance toward Cadlowski. We said furthermore, that the strategy of alliance with secondary bureaucrats in auto to get CGC going, as outlined in EC and NC documents, was a misapplication of the united front. In this case, we did not have the base, nor was there the rank and file motion, to justify the attempt to bloc with the bureaucracy as we did. In both cases, we feel that we have failed to put into practice, as well as to explain to those we are working with, our political perspective on the trade union bureaucracy in this period.

(4) We said that IE policies of industrialization and priorities, while necessary in themselves, had been falsely counterposed to a wide variety of other possible initiatives outside the priorities, both within the trade union movement and without.--eg., among women, public workers, students. Kim brands our call for flexibility "confusion". But we re-emphasize that we cannot, in the short run, expect to recruit heavily in our priorities. We cannot therefore afford to ignore work outside the priorities, as we have so far. Indeed, recruitment outside the priorities is one of the necessary conditions for successfully continuing a flow of IEsers into priorities through industrializing. We must walk and chew gum at the same time.

The Method of the Turn

Is Kim really trying to deny that we based our strategy since the turn on the crude, economic determinist assumption that because there would be inflationary boom, the workers would respond in the short run? We quote at length below the Economic and Political Perspectives for 1975 put forward at the "Turn to Agitation" convention in 1975. What is important to note is the way in which it argues for an almost perfect gearing in of the workers' response to each predicted stage of the cycle.

"The boom will come at a very propitious time for us. Just as the economy is striding into recovery /precisely then/, and picking up toward boom, the major contract round, including our industrial priorities, begins... It is in this period /early '76 to late '77/, that national rank and file groups must be built as recognizable forces in the unions, and IS be consolidated as a workers organization in the leadership of the rank and file movement."

"The most likely issue of the bargaining round will be a wage explosion. The decline in real wages in the last 2 1/2 years, the continuing inflation, its wild character during the boom, will produce a drive to catch up on wages... As the bargaining round pattern, the IBT and other contract settlements will probably be continually overturned by the drive for big wage increases, as workers feel more secure as the economy picks up, as other sections get big wage increases and as inflation mounts. What will count is how hot inflation gets..."

"The experience of the last years has well prepared the IS for the next economic political cycle. It is in this 3 year period that we will become a workers' combat organization in the lead of a growing rank and file movement or be set back severely."

"...It is the development of strong rank and file groups in the next cycle that will make it possible for us to make the first moves toward the formation of a national movement above industry at the end of this three years."

"Our core worker leaders for the next decade must be recruited in this boom and bargaining round. By the end of the round, at the start of the bust they must have the roots to launch a campaign against layoffs. The people who are entering the rank and file movement have to become a revolutionary group. By 3 years from now we want them to be the leadership of the IS, a working class and black leadership..."

It was all going to work like clockwork. We would have an inflationary boom for three years. In this period we would build national rank and file movements in the separate industries, because the time the contracts expired in these industries precisely coincided with the time we predicted growing inflation. Then, just as the cycle would turn downward, we would move toward the formation of a 'national movement above industry'. Then, as we went into the bust, which was to come in three years, we would have the basis to move directly into building an unemployed movement. If this is not mechanical, what is?

If comrades doubt that the short term economic prediction was at the root of the prediction that the workers would move in the short run, they merely have to consult the reasons the EC puts forward for the lack of political movement:: the boom didn't develop as fast and as high as we had thought. Here's what was stated in the analysis at the October NC Employers Offensive the Bargaining Round and their Effects on Our Industrial Perspective (p. 5):

"In summary, relatively low inflation and high unemployment have put a damper on the response of the working class to a very real employers offensive."

If anyone missed the point, here's what was just said in the EC's recent response to the Left Faction:

"As we stated in the October NC document, the economic pressures on the working class have not been as great as we expected. That, along with other factors, meant that the bargaining round was not as volatile as we expected."

In fact, as pointed out in our document, these analyses are wrong. Our teamster work was, and continues to be the most successful; yet, TDC developed and reached its peak as the economy was slowly turning up with no inflation. On the other hand, in auto, the economic pressures on the working class have been every bit as great, even greater, than we expected, yet there has been little motion. Yes; we do expect that the crisis will sooner or later send workers into motion. But we cannot build our analyses on short term expectation of a simple correlation between economic conditions--inflation or deflation--and worker response; yet this is what we did.

Kim has to resort to the baldest sort of distortion to prove that we did not rely in practice on an economic determinist analysis in our work during the turn. He goes so far as to take a phrase out of context which proves just the opposite of what he says it means, when it is placed back into context. Kim writes:

"Our assessment that followed CGC was not, as Joel says, that economic crisis leads to passivity, but that among other factors the defeat of the black movement has made many of the most militant black workers fearful of 'being out on a limb'. Is that subjective enough?

But why, according to the document which Kim quotes, were the black workers supposedly 'out on a limb'? Where does the quote come from? Precisely from a statement which relies on the same sort of economic determination of consciousness which we have been attacking. Here it is:

"We thought that the greater effects of the layoffs in auto and the relatively high proportion of blacks, who always feel the brunt of the capitalist crisis first, would make auto workers more likely to be combative on their contract than other workers. We were wrong. The fear associated with being out on a limb led to passivity rather than aggression."

Clearly, according to the document which Kim misrepresents, it was the layoffs--that is, economic conditions again--which put blacks out on a limb, and which, according to the document, accounted for their passivity. That Kim can have the nerve to say that we took the defeat of the black movement clearly into account in our analysis of the CGC defeat is amazing. The fact that it was not included was the reason the NC found it necessary to add Mark L.'s amendment as an appendix. The very point of this amendment was precisely to introduce the factor of the defeat of the black movement into our analysis. "Check it out comrades."

We put so much emphasis on this point because we have seen the damage this approach has caused and are not convinced that the EC has given it up. Kim does point out, in one place, that Marxists argue only for a general connection between crisis and working class upsurge--not a simple and direct immediate correlation. But then in another place he argues against us by trying to marshal evidence that immediately from the 1929 crash workers went into motion. Kim may be the first to deny what everyone else has proclaimed--that there was, in fact, a lag between the crash and the working class upsurge. As one historian notes, for example,

"Very few strikes were called in the U.S.--637 in 1930, 810 in 1931, and 841 in 1932. Although the volume was only moderately lower than the annual average for the preceding

five year period--914--it was far below any other years of the twentieth century."

(Bernstein, The Lean Years, p.337)

Much more important, however, is the EC's own recent draft Economic Political Perspectives (printed in Special Bulletin no. 7). There it is stated:

"...that while inflation will certainly be on the rise, it will not hit high, double digit levels until late 1977 or early 1978 (p. 3).....What has been done in the past few years and what is done in the next year will lay the basis for greater interventions as inflation returns in 1978, unemployment persists, and eventually the boom turns once again to bust....Revolutionary recruitment will go on, but will tend to require patient work and long term political relationships. But by late 1977 or by some time in 1978 at the latest this situation will change. (p. 8)"

In other words, the EC is saying, don't worry comrades, 'patient work and long term political relationships' (the hard slog) will be required for only a year or so more, until "sometime in 1978 at the latest." Just try to hold out for a little longer. After that, we will get the action we predicted in our 1975 perspectives, so that those perspectives will soon be right on again. This is only setting ourselves up for a new round of demoralizations, while in fact undermining our own correct prescriptions for 'patient work and long term political relationships.' If a mass upsurge, ~~was~~ prepared by crisis occurs soon, so much the better, but we can't count on this.

The point is that the economic prediction, the crude materialism which Kim denies we employed, was obviously used to help make the turn as a hype, to build up expectations of big motion on the part of the working class. Kim denies this outright, but here's what we were predicting (Economic Political Perspectives for 1975):

"...double our membership by the next convention, to reach over 500, and to have over 1000 members in the next 2-3 years. By that time we want to have the core of a party --worker cadres, factory branches, national rank and file movements, a theoretical journal, a strong youth group, and working class and black leadership. It is from these guidelines and timetables (!) that specific plans and perspectives and demands will have to be worked out for branches, rank and file groups, and fractions."

This sort of prediction for dramatic growth could only have been based on the expectations that the predicted inflationary boom would cause very substantial working class motion. For without such big motion we ~~would~~ could never expect to so successfully build the rank and file movement and so successfully recruit for the party. Yet, this sort of hype--even if you're hyping yourself--prepares the groundwork for failure. It leads to false expectations. And when these are not met, there is bound to be demoralization. And when the method which gave rise to the expectations was false in the first place, it is not surprising that the wrong political conclusions are drawn. Thus, the left faction can draw the ~~correct~~ conclusion that our whole turn to the class, our push to agitation was wrong...when what was wrong was the political perspective use to justify and explain the turn.

It was not only that this sort of economic and political analysis led to highly inflated expectations and thus demoralization. It led also to distortions in our political method. Let's remember our predictions; we would be able to build national rank and file movements and most ~~and~~ especially recruit large numbers of workers to the IS. These predictions of successful rank and file agitation and big recruitment could only have made sense if we also expected big working class motion. We expected that because the inflationary boom would send workers into action, we would be able to recruit large numbers of workers primarily by struggling alongside them. We thus ~~overemphasized~~ overemphasized agitation per se--"the best fighters build the party"--and core

correspondingly neglected the hard political slog needed to recruit: the education of our cadre and the establishment of long term political relationships with our contacts.

Now the fact is if there is really big motion in the class, we can in some situations expect to recruit significant numbers of people simply by fighting alongside them (then of course they must be politicized and educated if they are to be held by the party). The British IS showed this when they recruited massively in the course of the big worker struggles against the Tory government in 1972-3. Indeed, we did not hide the fact that we expected to repeat the British experience only faster:

"...it is a turn of gigantic proportions and no one should underestimate the difficulties of successfully executing such a turn. It is a turn which took the British IS 3 years to partly achieve. It is a turn we have already started, which largely (sic) to complete over the next year. (emphasis added) --Bolshevization of the IS, 1975, p. 1

Yet, this sort of expectation of transforming the IS so quickly could only have made sense on the basis of two rather unrealistic expectations. First, that worker motion would in fact be very great. Second, that worker motion would rather easily push the workers toward the IS despite the lack of socialist political traditions in the US, etc. In fact, we not only overestimated the amount of action economic conditions would generate. We also overestimated the amount of political movement that the workers' action would generate. Thus, we overestimated the ease with which we could recruit through our fairly successful agitation in TDC--and this led, for example, to overestimating our ability to hold teamster recruitment rallies toward the end of the TDC campaign. In sum, because of our unrealistic expectation that economic crisis would lead to big working class motion and big possibilities for immediate IS gains through these struggles, agitation became the overwhelming focus of our work, to the neglect of politics. It was not that we ever made this a formal theory. But our actual expectations and actual practical choices made it our practice.

Politics and Agitation

A good part of our document was devoted to putting forward suggestions concerning how to better integrate our socialist politics with our agitational work. We argued this was necessary for two reasons. First, a more politically developed agitation, especially better worked out and more concrete strategies and strategic ideas, would improve our ongoing agitation. Second, it would help us to recruit. We stated, moreover, that unless we succeeded in integrating our politics with our agitation from the start, it would be very difficult to prevent the de-politicization of our membership. The fact is, despite attempts to misrepresent us, we start from the expectation that agitation will be central to our work. It is precisely because of the pressures of day to day work, and the importance we give to that work, that our members naturally tend to put politics to the side, in order to accomplish the immediate task. We argue that unless the organization can make politics a practical question for the membership--that is, make politics essential for the proper carrying out of their day to day work--that they will constantly put politics in second place. That's why we placed such an emphasis on integrating politics with agitation.

Of course, we didn't waste a lot of time in our document trying to prove that there had been a neglect of politics in our agitation and a de-politicization of our membership. This has been universally admitted by everyone in the organization but Kim. Even the EC, as we noted above,

has admitted this on many occasions. Kim's long ~~quote~~ and very general quotes from a couple of documents that say we think socialism and the revolutionary party is important will not change that overriding fact. Nor do we think that it will be easy to change. Every pressure in the current situation in which we are agitating will push us to neglect and play down our politics. The fact is, that because of the generally low level of the workers struggle in this country, it is, and has been historically, very difficult to relate socialist ideas to peoples' day to day experience. It has for this reason been more difficult than in most other places to build a revolutionary party in the US. But this is the task we have set for ourselves. So the problem of integrating our politics with day to day work will continue to be possibly the biggest and most difficult one we face.

In this period, the concrete task will ~~grow~~ thus be to relate our correct, but general conceptions of the economic crisis leading to employers offensive to the immediate experiences and struggles of the workers we're fighting together with, to develop specific strategies for agit and to make our socialist perspectives relevant and understandable so as to recruit. This will require the fullest collaboration and feedback between the national and fraction leadership, local branches and fractions, and the people on the "front lines" in our arenas of struggle.

Of course, Kim will not even admit the problem exists, so naturally he won't deal with the specifics of our ideas. He is too busy fabricating them and distorting them beyond recognition in order to pin on us the tried and true scare labels of "orthodox trotskyst" and "new leftist" (we may, however, be the first to be honored as both!)

- To give an idea of the lengths the EC will go to distort an argument and smear an opponent, take a look at what Kim says about our position on CGC. Here's what he writes (p. 3):

"Joel J. tells us that if we had only remembered the defeats of the rank and file of the early 1970's we would have known that CGC was a mistake." (emphasis added)

This is pure fabrication. Try to find anything like it in our document! But Kim is not satisfied with that. He says (p.4)

"In an early draft(!) of his document, he specifically says, if we had ~~only~~ taken into account the GMAD defeats of those years, we would not have tried CGC."

This is another total fabrication. Our document went through three drafts, but there is nothing like this in any of them. By the way, when we released the earlier drafts to a limited number of people (not including Kim), we specifically stated that they were not for quotation. Indeed, when we gave the majority caucus steering committee a copy of the next to final draft in order to get their approval to circulate it to the organization, we specifically asked the EC to wait to write their reply until they received the final copy, since we were making substantial revisions. Kim was obviously not very concerned about accuracy anyway, so he went ahead and wrote his reply on the basis of a draft. He even blithely admits he did not bother to revise it in light of our revised document. So be it. The fact remains that ~~nowhere~~ nowhere do we make the statements that Kim made up. Why? Because the point we were making was precisely the opposite of what Kim attributes to us. Our point was not that previous defeats had made CGC a wrong strategy and impossible. It was, on the contrary, that they made CGC necessary and possible.

Here's what we wrote:

"...it should be obvious that if we were to move auto workers to struggle around the contract, we would have to show them why they could succeed now ~~at~~ when they had been defeated not very long before 7 in the rank and file revolts against GMAD of the early 70's/

In particular, our main argument had to have been that the previous lack of national organization by the rank and file had left the various militant locals subject to be picked off one by one and sold out. This was why auto workers needed CGC--indeed a permanent rank and file organization. We would not of course contend that this would have guaranteed success. But analysis and strategy in detail, after all, is one of the main things we as revolutionaries have to offer and this requires relating to workers' subjective conditions of self-confidence and organization, not just economics."

So, Kim's attempt to say that our point was ~~that~~ that previous defeats make rank and file activity impossible is a total distortion of our position. What we're saying, is that both we ourselves and the rank and file, have to take into account their entire previous experience of struggle, in relationship to the broader trends in the economy (e.g., crisis and employers offensive) and the labor movement (bureaucracy's swing far to the right), in order both to agitate better and to build the party. On one point, we agree with Kim. Evaluating and understanding the workers' struggles, victory and defeat, is a complex question. Our point, however, is that these struggles have to be dealt with in their complexity, not served up by us in simple-minded pollyanish fashion. We can't just "emphasize the positive." For the workers themselves are too aware that this does not correspond to reality.

In the particular case of CGC, we were saying in the first place that, contrary to Kim's assertions, the analysis of the crisis and the employers offensive had not been fully and ~~explicitly~~ explicitly developed and applied to auto. For this reason, there were leading members of the organization who industrialized into auto who were not in fact aware that the employers offensive had started first in auto from as early as 1971 or before, and that there had been an important, if ultimately unsuccessful rank and file movement against it. We contend that in fact the strikes in Lordstown, Norwood, St. Louis and the ministrikes which followed were not put in the context of the economic crisis and the employers offensive even for our own membership, who needed to understand this to carry out their work effectively.

We also said, however, that the rank and file response to GMAD of the early 1970's was an important experience of workers' struggle which should have been integrated directly and publicly into our campaign ~~to~~ to build CGC. It might have helped to improve our agitation so as to build the CGC. It would have helped us put forward the general socialist analysis which lay behind our strategy in CGC and thus helped to recruit. For the point was that in responding to the employers offensive in auto in 1971-3, the rank and file had started to do what we were trying to carry through with CGC. By understanding the strengths and weaknesses, positive and negative points in their struggle, we could go forward better now. During these years, the rank and file had indeed shown its capacity to fight back, something we want to emphasize--especially in the long and bitter struggles in Norwood, Lordstown, and ST. Louis. Moreover, they had developed and begun to put into practice an important lesson in the process: that it was necessary to stand unified together in order to fight the biggest corporation in the world, GM. Kim would like to charge us with proposing to substitute what he calls a "propaganda idea" of linking up auto workers, for rank and file organization on the shop floor. But already in 1971-3, the rank and file had concretely seen that these were not counterposed. It was necessary to do both. They had, in fact, forced the bureaucracy to call a national meeting of union representatives from all the GMAD locals. They had forced assent to the idea of a national strike against GMAD. But, unfortunately, they had not been able to actually control the bureaucracy, or to develop their own alternative leadership so as to be able to actually carry out the strike. As a result, the bureaucracy was able to consciously break the movement by calling a series of isolated strikes ("apache strikes"), which were designed to be defeated.

We believe that the lessons of this experience were not, as Kim would make us out to say, that auto workers cannot fight. But, ~~if~~ in fact, CGC could and should have been seen as a natural attempt to continue what the rank and file had already started to do. The earlier experience showed in fact that the workers needed, and could have, national rank and file organization. Why? Because the flexibility of GM would make it necessary to go beyond local fightbacks in order to beat back its ruthless offensive. It showed that the bureaucrats would derail the movement, so that the rank and file had to rely on their own organization. We do not think these are ~~any~~ abstract propoganda points. As we understood it, the IS was precisely in the process of trying to build CGC as a national movement of the rank and file that would be able to fight independently of the bureaucracy. Kim makes it sound as if calling for a national ~~rank and file~~ movement, linking up the various shops, indeed emphasizing the ~~mass~~ ~~short term need~~ for such a movement is somehow abstract. In fact that is what we were doing.

It is Kim, not the rank and file or the IS, who sees local organizing as counterposed to national organizing in CGC. In this case, as in TDC, a national organization was "the next step." ~~kk~~ We emphasize this point, because we think it corresponds to an important extent with the contradictory situation the rank and file does generally face. Because most of the really important issues which effect the rank and file in big industry, most especially auto, are decided beyond any individual shop and because the company and the bureaucracy are so well organized to cut down isolated local organizing, it is sometimes actually easier to begin to organize nationally. This is in part because the rank and file realize that it is difficult to win much locally (so they do not see it as worth the trouble or the risk); It is in part because they can easily see that getting together on a national basis they can win something and are likely to be able to appeal to their fellow workers everywhere.

Socialist should relate to this experience and this consciousness precisely by looking for the opportunities to build broader campaigns, as we did in the contract round. In this way, it may sometimes be possible actually to start to develop a local base through national work, even if this national work is not on a gigantic scale. (We showed this in a big way in Teamsters. We also showed it in a small but significant way in post office. Here we only had the strength to begin with a direct IS intervention in the contract period--distributing the IS Post Office pamphlet and seeking WP. We did recruit and succeeded in getting a rank and file paper started. We argue that it is important to project these sorts of movements, not only because they correspond to socialist analysis (which they do), but because they correspond to the actual experience of the rank and file. In fact, rank and file organization in locals and on shop floors did in fact work a lot better in the previous period than they do now--and the ~~rank and file~~ realizes this. We do not think it is being abstract to try to make sense of this experience by placing it in the context of ~~the~~ our socialist analysis-- of the economic crisis and the employers offensive.

Obviously, it will not normally be possible to launch national campaigns and broad struggles. We will be confined to localized agitation. But this does not mean that trying to develop links is somehow abstract and propagandistic, to be counterposed to agitation. Our point is that our perspective and our concrete experience has put us in a position to prepare ourselves and the people we are working with precisely to make these links in action. For this reason, the examples we gave did not concern some impossible future, but struggles in which we have actually played a leading role--struggles which can show the way forward, in particular, TDC, the LA bear strike, and the carnations strike. Yet Kim lectures us, "Only when you have something like TDU, that is when you actually have organization or the opportunities for a national campaign can you link up workers in different locals and shops." But all our examples ~~xxxxx~~, as well as our specific strategies, were from Teamsters! Kim then has the gall to go on and

say, 'These situations (TDU, other teamster work) and opportunities are very important to us --and generally opposed by the arguments in Joel's document.'! He says, moreover, that

These 'linkups' are proposed as a substitute for real agitation that can, over time, lead to practical links between different groups of workers."

This is ~~is~~ simply disgusting, since our argument was that as a result of the economic crisis and the employers offensive we have directly participated in and can expect in the future ~~is~~ significant local struggles outside freight (but inside the IBT), in which these links can be and were made quite concretely. Thus, in LA, by intervening in the beer strike--bringing freight people down to the line, making collections, sending delegates from the beer strikers to freight meetings--we were not only able to make possible a dramatic increase in the level of struggle of the beer workers, but also to get them to see their struggle in broader terms. As a result, the beer workers were ready to join TDU and stick with it after the strike. They are now in the process of organizing their local rank and file group as a part of TDU. However, what has to be emphasized is that many of the TDUs did not see that they could intervene in the beer strike and give it a better chance of winning. Nor did they see that strengthening the beer strike was a way to help themselves, to build TDU. We think we have helped to convince them in practice. But the point has to be driven home, in our rank and file press and in WP. Our national fractions has recognized the importance of struggles outside of freight. But the fact is that in none of our literature have we really put this forward in a systematic way as a strategic idea for TDU., or explained it. In particular, we have failed in WP and Convoy to link up the employers offensive to the strikes outside of freight--e.g., the simultaneous attacks on workers in beer and grocery.

Workers Power

Kim counterposes our notions of what should be in the paper to Lenin's conception for Pravda--a paper which would include large numbers of letters and reports directly from workers on their struggles and their views, as well as political and strategic analyses. But who ever opposed this conception? Obviously, we too are for having WP written as much as possible by workers, including letters and reports in far greater numbers than before. But let's face it. WP has never done this, and shows no sign of being able to. After wrapping himself in Lenin's mantle, Kim gets around to admitting that Lenin's model is largely irrelevant to where we are today: "We are not of course at the stage where WP is a mass agitational tool or a real workers paper. For now it is still a ~~wp~~ paper for workers"...And, he should have added, still written by us. The question is not therefore whether or not WP should be built to an important extent our of workers contributions, as Lenin wanted. But what we are going to put into it.

In this respect, Kim disarmingly proclaims that "Workers Power is not fulfilling the needs of the organization. Of that there is no doubt." Yet the EC has emphasized again and again, that WP is the most important political weapon the IS has, more power than any number of our best agitators and organizers. But somehow, the failure of WP is unrelated to anything else that's wrong with the organization or its leadership. We contend that the paper's problems reflect the same depoliticization of the membership and the same refusal to take seriously the problem of developing concrete political strategies of relating our ~~agitation~~ agitation to our politics which is evident in all areas of our work.

It is only in this context that we can understand Kim's straightforward defence of the cheerleading which has dominated the paper. By cheerleading, Kim does not mean just including a lot of articles covering workers struggles, workers news, from the workers side of the class line. We, and everyone else, have always been for this. What Kim means by cheerleading is telling the workers to go out and fight, and looking at the bright side, while ignoring a whole dimension of their actual experience. Kim thinks that unless we cheerlead, our articles "will not be recognizable as workers real experiences to the workers themselves. Kim's own primary example of how this would be done, not only perfectly illustrates his method, but perfectly illustrates its fatal flaws as well.

The truth is that the whole question of victories and defeat, of what is possible right now, is far more complex... than Joel's document would have us believe. The teamster wildcat of 1970 was both a defeat and a victory in the sense that they forced Fitz to get more money. But for many... it was also a defeat. Indeed, Teamsters in L.A. and elsewhere viewed it as a defeat. In our view, however, it was over-all a victory. ... We used the victory on the money question as the thrust, a positive as opposed to negative thrust, in arguing for a strike /in 1976/.

This is indeed a perfect example of Kim's cheerleading method. To each other, we say the question of victory or defeat is complex, that the 1970 wildcat in teamsters was both a victory and a defeat. But to the teamsters, we say it was victory, and on this basis we argue for a strike. Apparently, employing this "positive as opposed to negative thrust," is Kim's idea of making major events "recognizable as workers real experiences to the workers themselves."

Unfortunately, this method doesn't work, because teamsters and other workers know that they have to face reality, not just the positive side of it. The teamsters in L.A. did not recognize our description of the 1970 wildcat as "their experience", simply because it did not correspond to reality, to what they actually saw and felt. In fact, in 1970, it was not the wildcats which had gotten the extra money for the 1970 contract. The big bureaucrats in Chicago took their locals out on an independent strike. But this was hardly a wildcat. This did get the extra money, but it had little to do with rank and file organization and struggle. For this reason, it could cut no ice with teamsters, who knew they would not have the backing of some of the biggest officials in the IBT, if they wildcatted. Moreover, the overriding fact was that 550 people were fired in L.A.... How could we try to sell the wildcat simply as a victory, and not try to deal with the defeat, both the negative and the positive side.

Of course, in this instance as in almost every other, Kim totally distorts our position, trying to say that we were arguing against TDC, because the 1970 wildcats had not been victorious. He insinuates, moreover, that we would have used "the defeats in L.A. as an argument for why freight workers should hang low in 1973." (p. 13). This is another slander. Our method is the same here as with regard to CGC. We would have tried to fully understand the worker's previous experience of struggle in both its "negative" and "positive" aspects, and use this experience in relationship to our political perspective to show how we can overcome real problems and go forward. In fact, a short time before the strike this year, some of us in L.A. submitted an article to WP on the 1970 wildcat. This explained that TDC could be successful precisely because it could make use of the positive examples set by the rank and file in the 1970 wildcat and avoid some of their mistakes. In fact, during the 1970 wildcat, as we wrote, teamsters from L.A. had gone

up to Oakland. They had picketed the freight terminals there, and quickly shut down trucking in the entire Bay Area. This is another one of those "abstract links" which Kim rightly accuses us of advocating. This particular "abstract link" had the result, within 24 hours, of forcing all of the interstate carriers to grant amnesty to their employees. Our article thus emphasized the potential strength of wildcat action in teamsters, especially when there were concrete links between the different areas. We emphasized that interregional, indeed national organization, was precisely what TDC could provide. And this was one of the main arguments to show that it could fight successfully. On the other hand, we wrote that one of the main reasons that 550 workers had been victimised in L.A. was not to be found in the actual conduct of the wildcat struggle per se. It was that the wildcatters had unfortunately put their trust in the local and international union officials, who pulled some of the strings in the background. These officials got the strikers to call off their picketing in the Bay Area, to go back to work; and they ultimately sold out the rank and file in hearings following the strike. We believe that by relating to the workers' experience as it actually was, in its complexity, would have been--and it--the best way we can relate to the workers in their struggles. Not every article of course should be on strategy. Most are not. But when we do try to provide strategic lead, the cheerleading method must be junked.

In sum, we believe that WP reflects the general problems of the organization. Just as we have tended to act in the last period as if the party was mainly an adjunct to the mass movement (of course, nobody raised this to the level of theory, or stated it explicitly), we conceived of Workers Power as a mass agitational tool, "our best organizer". But in the present state of the class struggle, it is usually impossible for a socialist paper to be a mass agitational tool, for we simply cannot reach those masses. Yet, this was the basic conception behind the "WP-as-organizer" method. And naturally, the politics of the paper have become increasingly low key, the explanations offered for what's happening increasingly oversimplified, and our willingness to tackle controversial issues in a controversial way increasingly diminished. The paper will and must continue to carry news and stories of working class struggles. But it must also generalize from those struggles, so that the reader will see how a socialist viewpoint can make sense of their experiences--provide both a "nextstep" and a way forward in the longer run.

We are not saying that WP cannot play an interventionist role. It must do so in two ways: first by bringing strategic ideas for advancing the struggle to a relatively small layer of workers who are likely to read it regularly. We must be particularly clear that especially in our national campaigns we are not speaking to the mass of workers, or carrying out mass agitations with our paper. So, "Strike Ford" and "Vote Sadlowski", as our headlines week after week is missing the boat. In so far as possible, large-scale type coverage of such campaigns should be carried in our rank and file papers. Secondly in on going struggles such as local strikes, we will often want to have an agitational coverage which may call for support of the strike. For it is when workers are in sharp conflict with their employers that a relatively large proportion will be open to reading our press. Especially in areas outside our priorities, such coverage may offer us an opportunity to intervene in action through strike support work.

Finally, there is one charge Kim makes, vis a vis our conception of Workers Power, to which we must plead guilty. We do think it is necessary to explain the limits of TDU on the pages of WP, especially in relation to explaining the role of the party. For example, we criticize the new WP Review #1, which we understood as primarily a weapon for politicization and recruitment of IS, for running a long article on TDU which merely explained why militants should join it, and

failed to place TDU firmly in a broader context--the context of the economic crisis, the employers offensive, and the need to build a revolutionary party. As usual, the article explains why socialists in TDU were excellent fighters in TDU. But, as usual, it doesn't say why TDUers themselves need to become socialists. Thus, in the WP Review article it says, that Socialists "have developed an understanding of the crisis of the capitalist system which allows them to see clearly that the employers will not relinquish their offensive without a real fight." But what does this mean? Why won't the employers relinquish their offensive? Pure greed, or something to do with capitalism. Just what is meant by a "real fight" to defeat the employers offensive? Is TDU the only sort of organization that will be needed? If we do not pose these questions, and provide socialist answers, we will never be able to show people that if they are to fight victoriously against the employers they will have to develop socialist politics, join the party, and make a revolution. They will welcome socialists into their ranks precisely because socialists are good fighters, but see no reason to "get involved" with "their politics". To win workers to the party, we have to show that our politics must become their politics. This will mean talking about challenging the capitalist state and the profit system. Kim will undoubtedly at this point say that we are no longer talking about "the next step", so that we are talking irrelevancies. But the point is, we cannot convince people to join the party on the basis of the next step alone... we have to get them to look down the road a way. This does not have to be done in an abstract manner. The capitalist state, after all, is hardly an abstraction to most workers. We have to go further moreover and try to make the notion of the economic crisis concrete to workers...for this, after all, is at the center of our whole world view for the coming period.

In fact, in our view it is precisely now, when workers are building organizations like TDU, that they will be most open to building a revolutionary party, the reasons for it. Thus, it is precisely at this time that we believe it is crucial to talk to teamsters in Workers Power about both the next step... and the struggles to come.

To give an example of what we are saying, in L.A., immediately after a TDC meeting at which we discussed how to build a contract rejection rally, we organized a meeting of leading TDU militants at which Glen spoke. He talked about TDC, about the need for a national rank and file organization coming out of TDC. But he also went beyond this to raise the question of the economic crisis and the employers offensive, which had made TDC necessary in the first place. From here, he discussed the sort of things which would be necessary to fight the employers offensive... and in this context for the need for a revolutionary party. No doubt had Kim been there, he would have chastised Glen for not cheerleading enough, for exposing "the limits of TDU" and discouraging the workers in a Trotskyist and NEW Left manner. We thought he was making some arguments necessary to build the party, and we do think it will be necessary to argue to build the party.

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5. The Drift to the Right

Kim's response to our argument that in the recent steel and auto campaigns the IS politics showed signs of a drift to the right so distorts our position in so many ways that it is hard to know where to begin. Our major point was, and is, that our politics concerning the IS' relationship to the labor bureaucracy has been distorted in practice and unclear in theory. Kim's document, the confusions he creates, only confirms our viewpoint.

Fundamentally, Kim tries to pin on us a cartload of ridiculous positions by failing to separate from one another three separate questions.

First, What is our attitude to reform struggles like strikes, which of course are generally led by bureaucrats? This question was settled long ago by the IS. Of course we participate in reform struggles even if bureaucrats lead them. That Kim can actually argue ~~for~~ that our position leads to our refusal to participate in bureaucrat led actions, ~~is a xxxxxxxxxx~~ such as Dempsey's move to bring in out-of-state pickets during the telephone strike in NY, should make ISers wonder whether Kim had any intention of dealing seriously with our arguments.

Second, What is our attitude toward the election campaigns of "left" or "out" bureaucrats--campaigns which have neither an adequate program nor a method which relies on organizing the rank and file, but which nonetheless offers the potential, if successful, of causing a break in the bureaucracy and thus of making it easier for the ranks to build self-organization and get a measure of control. Our position should be for critical support. We support the candidate's election, but precisely for the reason that it makes more possible rank and file organization and control. We are critical of the candidate, first because of an inadequate program. Much more important, we are critical because the election campaign does not recognize that any real steps forward require the organization of the rank and file. It is only rank and file organization which will make possible fighting the capitalists especially in a period of employers offensive. We, therefore, maintain our independent political positions. We form no alliance or bloc with the bureaucrat around a common program and shared leadership. Instead, we push for a better program, and, especially we push in whatever way possible for rank and file organization as the way forward. This was the line originally set out by the IS on Sadlowski in the 1976 Convention document, Critical Support for Sadlowski. We do not think however, that critical support, an independent political position, was maintained by the IS, especially in the pages of Workers Power.

Third, When do we enter a real bloc with bureaucrats--a united front around a common program, albeit a program which is limited, has limited goals, and is for a limited time period. This, of course, depends on conditions. There are no hard and fast rules. At no time did we put forward the general position that we should never bloc with bureaucrats. This is another slander of Kim's. However, we did say that the strategy in auto of building a united front with the bureaucrats in order to get the rank and file into motion around the contract, despite the fact that we had little or no base of our own, was a misapplication of the united front.

The fact is, Kim totally confuses (1) working in reform struggles led by bureaucrats; with (2) giving critical support to the left or out bureaucrats in election campaigns; with (3) entering into united fronts with bureaucrats. He can do this because he tries to use the same inappropriate word to cover all three, i.e. "blocking". So, he can argue that because we oppose blocking, or a united front with bureaucrats in some instances, et. CGC, that we always oppose giving critical support to bureaucrats or working in strikes with them. But in fact, ~~neither~~ critical support for bureaucrats or working in bureaucrat led strikes ~~having anything~~ are not blockwith, or forming united fronts with, bureaucrats.

IS and Reform Struggles Led by Bureaucrats

First of all, when we support an official strike led by bureaucrats we are not "blocking" with these bureaucrats. They've made no agreements or commitments to us; we've made no agreements or commitments with them. As revolutionaries we believe it is essential to build reform struggles whether or not led by bureaucrats, because we believe that in struggle workers learn, gain confidence, and develop their self organization. At the same time, they are open to new ideas and new ways of struggling as well, in other words to our politics. Therefore, we enter and support such struggles wherever possible. In fact, of course, we hope that the bureaucrats will get such struggles going, for we believe that such struggles can take on their own logic, that it may be possible for us to agitate for more effective, more militant and political forms of carrying on the struggle. The more effective we can make the struggle, the more open workers will be to ~~xxxx~~ us and our ideas.

It should go without saying that, precisely since we have made no block with the bureaucrats, we make sure in these struggles that we are totally free to put forward our politics, our specific ideas for the struggle itself and our broader political conceptions. It is precisely when the bureaucrats are in the lead and in control (as is usual), that our political independence and putting forth our viewpoint is most crucial. We cannot form a bloc with the bureaucrats, because we do not have the forces to make the bureaucrats agree to a common program and method of struggle which we could accept and taken responsibility for. We have to be free to put forward what is the proper tactic of struggle and the politics behind it. Indeed, we have to expect, especially given the weak forces at our disposal, that the bureaucrats will maintain control of the struggle. Therefore in general, we will not get to demonstrate that in practice we as ~~workers~~ are best able to carry the fight forward. Even though our views may sound better, the workers will not generally see a break with the established union officials as practical. So, they will see the bureaucrats' policies as the only realistic ones. All the more reason for us to put forward very clearly and forcefully our ideas, in order to win over even small numbers who will be open to our reasoning... and who, if the opening presents itself as the struggle develops, will help us to show the superiority of our ideas in practice in that struggle.

Critical Support for Sadlowski^{ki}

Kim is distorting our position yet again when he writes:

Joel J. would have us believe that by entering Sadlowski's Steel Workers Fight Back, we would be increasing the control of bureaucrats over the rank and filers involved, and these rank and filers would tend to depend on the bureaucrats.

Comrades, this is complete fabrication.. Please check our document to see what we actually wrote about the Sadlowski campaign, for there is nothing remotely like this there.

Let's be clear once again on the general reasoning behind our position of critical support. In entering Sadlowski's campaign as critical supporters we are not making a bloc with Sadlowski. We would not make such a bloc because this would mean our taking responsibility for his program and for his method. We could not support his program because, among other things, it does not adequately address ENA, which is the key issue today before steelworkers, the key to the next step forward. Even more important, we could not enter a bloc with Sadlowski because we do not believe that electoral campaigns by our bureaucrats are the way forward for steelworkers..

We do not see electoral campaigns ~~as~~ by our bureaucrats as the way forward because of our whole analysis of the bureaucracy, especially in this period. First, in general, the privileged position of bureaucrats (no matter what they were like when originally elected) leads them to shy away from a fight with the bosses or from mobilizing the rank and file. For either of these things could endanger the bureaucrat's privileges. The bosses could defeat the union in a fight, jeopardizing both the union and the official. The rank and file could get out of hand.

These bureaucrats' tendency to sell out is, moreover, magnified in periods of crisis and employers' offensive like this one. The bureaucrat usually sees no choice but allow the capitalists to restore their profits so that the workers can get their share later on.. Thus they do not oppose the employers' offensive. But even a self-styled "socialist" like Sadlowski ~~sometimes looks~~, who got into office in the way Sadlowski tried to, would be in no position to fight. This is because the only way to stand up to the capitalists in this period is through mobilizing the power of an organized rank and file. Sadlowski never tried to build such rank and file organization, so no matter how "left" or "socialist" his rhetoric, he would have no choice but to cave in before the bosses and other bureaucrats.

The proper tactic for Sadlowski, from our point of view, would have been not to run an election campaign, but to organize a rank and file movement in steel, possibly around ENA. Had he taken this direction, we might have had the basis for ~~an~~ bloc with him. But of course we had no intention of doing this, so we had no choice but critical support.. ~~Because~~ We had to support Sadlowski, because if he won it would likely have provided better conditions for us to carry out the essential task, ~~the~~ that of organizing the rank and file. But a Sadlowski campaign and victory would not, and did not organize the rank and file in itself. That would still be the thing which has to be done--the thing we had to be building for during and after the campaign. ~~xxxxxxx~~ During the campaign, we had to get across the point that this organization would still have to be carried out, and that the rank and file would not be able to get Sadlowski to do it for them.

It needs to be emphasized that in an election campaign, critical support is far more essential than during a direct struggle against the capitalist led by bureaucrats, such as a strike. A strike is a struggle in which workers have a chance to learn by doing. The very act of opposing the bosses collectively is consciousness raising, and opens the way for self-organization. Indeed, the whole logic of the struggle against the bosses--such as a strike--on the side of the left, i.e., us.. In order to carry out a struggle successfully, it is usually necessary to go far beyond where the bureaucrats-leaders have any intention of going--and this

and this becomes clear to at least some workers. That is, the more militant and political struggle is almost always the most likely to win. But in an election campaign, the dynamic is often entirely different. Because the focus is on getting the candidate in above all, the rank and file sees every reason to defer to the leader in his methods. At the same time, the best methods to win are not all necessarily the methods of rank and file organizing, militancy, politics. Very often, what is needed to win it to attract more conservative workers, so the logic is to go the right and to not rock the boat. For this reason, we have much less chance than in a strike to do any independent agitation, to show in action the superiority of our ideas. We have less freedom; and our ideas are not necessarily so superior (for the purpose of getting someone elected). For this reason, the importance of putting across our distinct political position in our paper and other literature takes on much greater importance. It is by far our best weapon.

Thus, the position of the Political Solution Tenency on Sadlowski is well summed up in the convention document Critical Support for Sadlowski, written by KIm.

Our support for Sadlowski is unconditional. That is, we put no condition on Sadlowski to win our political support. But our support is also critical. That not only means that we rankly state our criticism of Sadlowski's actions, lack of program or whatever, but also that we put forward our class struggle views. In WP and other IS IS literature we want to make clear that we do not believe Sadlowski can take on the big steel companies or really turn the USWA into a fighting union because he is fundamentally a supporter of a capitalist system. We want to put forward class struggle union politics in the rank and file steel workers movement.

Within the various rank and file groups, as within the movement generally, we want to give this fundamental difference an agitational focus around one single demand--Break the ENA. This demand points toward what a real class struggle union would do. It also puts a potential political wedge between Sadlowski and his best supporters. This wedge is not designed to cost him votes, since we insist that real fighters vote for Sadlowski. The wedge is more long range one, meant to lay the basis for a rank and file movement along class struggle lines.

To make clear our political independence became all the more crucial when we folded our rank and file groups into fight back. But let's face it. The line of critical support was not carried out in WP or other IS literature. We didn't even put out a pamphlet on the steel campaign. In fact, in Workers Power, we totally undermined our position of critical support. Very often we would feature Sadlowski's program to fight the companies, its superiority over McBride's--as if this program, in itself, could mean very much. To do this contradicted our own position that "we do not believe that Sadlowski can take on the big steel companies. On the other hand, it was typical of our coverage, that at times we could go so far as to proclaim the enormous changes a Sadlowski victory could lead to inside the union. (WP, 1/24/77, p.7). This blatantly contradicted our official position that "we do not believe Sadlowski/...can turn the USWA into a fighting union"

Most important, we simply did not explain our position on the labour bureaucracy. This would have required a full explanation of the connection between Sadlowski's inability either to challenge the capitalists or turn the USW into a fighting union...and his support for the capitalist system. ~~It also would have required a constant emphasis on the need for the rank and file to develop its own organization.~~

The United Front With The Bureaucrats in CGC

Finally, we get around to the real block with the bureaucrats--the united front. Here we actually enter into an alliance, around a common program and usually shared leadership. It's an alliance for a limited goal and for a limited time, but it is an alliance. In so far as we are allied with people in a united front for a particular struggle (which is what such fronts are for), it makes no sense to criticize them for having a different program and a different method for this struggle than ours. For, in fact, ~~the~~ the program and method of this alliance embodies our own idea of the next step--or close enough to make it worth trying to fight on this basis. So, in this case, "critical support" is really beside the point. However, we may still find it necessary to criticize our allies on other grounds. Most likely, that in our view they have no intention of carrying out the program and method to which they have agreed on paper. We may want to do this, especially with regard to the "left" bureaucrats who enter the bloc--if ~~for~~ for example their whole past record gives a lot of evidence that they never carry through on a fight, or if, in the carrying out of this alliance, they are not living up in action to their words. We do this with the hope of preparing their base to take ~~independent~~ independent action independent of the bureaucrat, should this be necessary.

Nevertheless, we have to realize that in entering an alliance with someone, we give them a certain recognition and legitimacy. For this reason, classically, revolutionaries entered united fronts with relatively strong forces of their own, forces which could at least to some extent mount a struggle on their own. The revolutionaries expected, therefore, in the process of struggle, to win over part of the base of the union bureaucrats because they would not carry the struggle through to conclusion. So, the revolutionaries not only had the politics to carry through the struggle but the strength to put their politics into practice. They therefore had a real hope of being able to prove the superiority of their politics in practice and thus win the base of the bureaucrats. However, what was lacking was the base. For if they had little base, a united front did not make much sense. For even if the ~~bureaucrats~~ bureaucrats failed to carry through on the program, they could not offer a credible alternative to them. Their politics in itself, they realized, would not be enough to pull the base away from the bureaucrats, who would be the only ones capable of offering a realistic way forward.

Now, specifically, what we opposed with regard to CGC was the apparent strategy of the organization. This was to try to build the CGC, and especially its rank and file base, through allying with second level bureaucrats. There are conflicting reports of what was actually put into practice. But what we are objecting to is the method, the strategy, which was explicitly set out as the basis for CGC in both the EC's reply to the left faction and in the CGC evaluation. These documents stated very clearly that central to our whole approach was the idea that we could use the second level bureaucrats to generate motion in the rank and file. As the EC's anti New Course document put it (Special Bulletin No. 4):

Our perspective was to build a broad united front for a good contract... By entering into various united fronts, and even by trying to influence sections of the secondary leadership, we were positioning ourselves to become the leadership of the rank and file forces.

Indeed, one of the main reasons cited for the failure of CGC, was

With the exception of the President of the Twinsbur local we failed to get any of the broader forces we mobilized seriously involved in and taking responsibility for the CGC (CGC Evaluation document)

Clearly, from these quote, it can be seen that we expected not only that the second level bureaucrats would formally ally with us, but that they would actually follow through and mobilize their rank file. Their action was essential to our plans.

Whether or not these statements represent what was actually carried out, we believe that the fact that they are put forward as our conscious strategy in CGC represents a dangerous political direction for the IS.

As we stated in our document, there seem to have been three possible justifications for our having sought out an alliance with the bureaucrats in auto: (1) we actually thought they would lead a fight; (2) we thought their entering the fight would inspire other rank and filers to move; (3) we thought we could rip off their base.

With respect to the first possible justification, it is a cornerstone of our analysis of this period that we do not expect bureaucrats of any stripe to actually fight the bosses unless they are pushed to do so by the rank and file. Yet, in CGC we apparently counted on this! To our knowledge the actions of Weisman, Oginsky, et al in allying with us at various points in the auto campaign were at no time forced by their supporters, nor was there significant independent rank and force in their locals pushing to keep them committed to the fight. So, we had no reason whatsoever to think they ~~would~~ would carry through a real fight, rather than go through certain motions to maintain their "leftish" ~~reputations~~ reputations--and of course they didn't.

With respect to the second possible justification, it is possible that entry by bureaucrats into CGC did move some rank and filers to join too. But this does not justify the tactic of setting up an alliance with them. For we had no reason to believe, given our own weakness, that these rank and filers would not continue to follow them. The point is when you start off with an alliance with the bureaucrats, without a base of your own, you create the conditions for the bureaucrats to control any movement which you yourself may actually get going. Suppose we had gotten some modest action in auto. Do we really think that the Weissmans, Oginskys, et al, who were publicly touted in our press and elsewhere as the leaders of the movement, would not have been able to control it? We might have been able to offer the better strategy on paper for the rank and file. But with their powerful bases, the bureaucrats would have, in fact, been in position to present the only "realistic" alternative within CGC and, thus, to have been able to derail the movement rather easily. Obviously, when any movement really gets going, there is no way to prevent opportunist bureaucrats from jumping on the bandwagon. But at least if the bandwagon is already rolling, having been pushed off under rank and file and, or socialist leadership, the bureaucrats at least have to put up a fight to gain control of the leadership.

The third possibility, that of ripping off the base of these bureaucrats, was, if anything, more unrealistic. Their followers were ~~largely~~ largely under their control. If they hadn't been, the bureaucrats would not have been so glad to join us. On the other hand, given the small number of people who backed us, how could we have possibly formed a real pole of attraction to win away the bureaucrats' supporters from them?

On the other hand, although we didn't get anything out of the alliance with bureaucrats strategy, a tendency to depend on them may have hurt us. Because we hoped to use them to move the rank and file, it was logical for us to promote them. And this is what we did for Weissman Oiginsky, et al on the pages of WP. We would have found it difficult to tell the rank and file that although they gave formal support to CGC, they could not be counted on to carry through the fight because of their bureaucratic positions. To do this, would have undermined our very purpose for allying with them in the first place. In other words, this strategy tended to prevent us from putting forward our politics concerning the bureaucracy--its position and its tendencies in this period. Indeed, it has yet to be explained how come we allowed to pass without notice the ~~fact~~ fact that Weissman, our chief ally, undermined the wildcat strike action that occurred in his own local at the time of the contract settlement. After this, we even continued to refer to him favorably in our press.

One final point is further cause for our concern that the organization is tending to put too much weight on a strategy of maneuver, of bureaucratic alliance: this is the continuing attempt by the EC to justify the alliance with bureaucrats in CGC by reference to examples of previous alliances between socialists and bureaucrats in the labor movement. In the first place, these analogies are totally inappropriate, because the situations are totally unlike ours. Secondly, there is a tendency, especially in Kim's recent document, to entirely distort the history, to make it look like the bureaucratic maneuver was the key to the success of the movement, rather than understand that what was determining in the situation was the strength of the independent rank and file action on the one hand and the strength of the revolutionary forces on the other. This again leads to the idea that by maneuvering, we can somehow get the leverage to get around our present lack of strength and relatively low level of rank and file action.

Thus, in their original document, the EC referred to the CP's bloc with John L. Lewis, to justify the IS' bloc with bureaucrats in CIC. We said that this was a sign of derangement. For a) the CP's base in labor was in the thousands, especially strong in auto and heavy industry; b) there was a workers struggle of gigantic proportions already in motion, for several years, reaching its high point with the titanic struggles of the Toledo, Minneapolis, and San Francisco General strikes in 1934, and leading into the auto sitdowns of 1936-7; c) John L. Lewis and the other bureaucrats who broke with the AFL to form the CIC, did so precisely under the pressure of the mass rank and file movement, and could hardly be said to have consolidated any sort of bureaucratic control over it. To compare this to the situation of the IS in auto, where: a) we had almost no base of our own; b) there was no motion at all on which we could base any prediction of mass struggle; c) the bureaucrats we were allying with, far from being pushed by their rank and file base into struggle, actually had bases which they could control, even discipline.

Apparently, even the EC realizes they went a little too far with that example. So Kim doesn't take it up in his reply to us. Instead, he raises another example of a united front, a try to justify by analogy, the one we made in auto. Yet, as with almost everything else in his document, he totally distorted the facts. As Kim would have it William Z. Foster and a handful of weak and scattered militants from TUFL entered into an alliance with the president of the Chicago Federation of Labor. On the basis of this maneuver they got the legitimacy and the room to organize. They were able to use the cover of this bureaucrat to then build a huge rank and file movement. He gives the impression that the CP leaders, at the time they entered the alliance, as "a tiny group with a network of a few..." He describes Foster's ally John Fitzpatrick as a nondescript, if progressive, bureaucrat. He implies it was this alliance, and not the previously acquired strength and prestige of the CP leaders, which "gave them the legitimacy needed to launch its first mass agitational campaign." (pp. 15-16)

In fact, the situation was very different from that portrayed by Kim. It was a lot more similar to the 1930s situation than he would care to admit with regard to; a) the level of rank and file struggle; b) the CP base; c) the relationship between the bureaucrat in question (John Fitzpatrick of the Chicago Federation of Labor) and the rank and file. And nothing like the IS in CGC!

So, in the first place, this alliance occurred at the tail end of one of the great mass labor upsurges in US history. And William Z. Foster, and the militant group around him, had been at the center of much of the action. In 1916-7, Foster and his group led in the union organizing drive of some 25,000 railroad workers in the Chicago area alone--and this culminated in 1919

with a national unofficial strike involving some 200,000 workers. In 1917-8, these same militants, were at the center of the great drive to organize the packing workers, a mass struggle which also ended in a high strike, which won its demands. Finally, in 1919, Foster led one of the most famous labor struggles in US history, the great steel strike.

In light of this background, it would have been surprising indeed if Foster and the CP had entered into the alliance with Fitzpatrick in 1922 with only a few scattered forces. Kim is simply off the wall in trying to contend that the CP was weak at the point it entered the alliance with Fitzpatrick around the amalgamation campaign. Here's how one historian describes the CP's opening shot in this campaign.

The first serious Communist penetration of the American labor movement began March 19, 1922. On that day, Foster and Johnston on behalf of the TUEL introduced a pro-amalgamation motion resolution in the Chicago Federation of Labor without consulting the Federation's leaders. The communists had a strong bloc of twenty eight delegates (!) in the Chicago Federation, almost one fifth of the total, and pushed through the resolution by a three to one vote. (Draper, American Communism, p. 71)

Kim calls "a tiny group with a network of a couple of dozen people", had more delegates in the Chicago Federation of Labor alone than we have members in auto!

Moreover, in view of the fact that they had led one mass movement after another for almost a decade, it is hardly surprising that they did not have to depend on a bureaucrat to get the "legitimacy and authority they needed."

...the practical experience and union prestige of the group of TUEL militants, now become Communists, who led the big meat packing and steel organizing campaigns as well as many other progressive causes in Chicago.

By the way, who was this bureaucrat Fitzpatrick with whom Foster suddenly maneuvered an alliance in 1922. In reality, Foster had been in alliance with Fitzpatrick since 1915! They together had been in the lead of the railroad strike, the packing house strike, and the great steel strike. Fitzpatrick's Chicago Fed, as Foster explains in his book, was perhaps the biggest center of the labor left in the entire country, having supported the campaign to save Tom Mooney, hailed the Russian Revolution and demanded the recognition of the Soviet government, and fought Gompers and the AFL on many fronts. In fact, the alliance with the CP on amalgamation was not the only one being forged at this point. In the wake of the national railway strike of 1922, the CP and Fitzpatrick were working together in the forefront of the movement to found a Labor Party.

With this background, does Kim really think the best way to view the success of the TUEL in these years is in terms of a maneuver for legitimacy with some bureaucrat? Does he really think this alliance between the CP and Fitzpatrick can provide a sensible justification for our strategy of alliance with bureaucrats in CGC?

The faction fight we are now in raises many issues. The dispute, however, has a political core. Given the economic and political situation facing us in the US today, and given the strength and composition of the ISUS as it now exists, should we set as our central and immediate goal recruiting workers and building a workers' combat organization? Should the IS place heavy emphasis on working class agitation and mass work as a necessary part of our struggle to achieve that goal--as a necessary task if we wish to develop the IS as an actual leadership group inside the working class?

Until the "Left faction" surfaced, the IS as a whole answered these questions in the affirmative. Until then, debate in our organization revolved around how to recruit, hold and develop worker members, how to move toward becoming a workers' combat organization, how to do effective agitation and mass work, how to build a political periphery and carry out socialist propaganda in the context of building the IS as an agitational working class organization.

The organization, as a whole, for several years has shared common goals and objectives. Our internal debates, however sharp or heated they became, were part of a struggle that the whole organization was going through to work out how to actually accomplish these shared objectives. And because of this common commitment to shared objectives, these debates never crystallized into hard factional divisions.

From the very beginning, however, the "left faction" organized itself for the specific and intended goal of challenging our fundamental perspectives and strategy that the ISUS has evolved over a period of at least seven years of struggle. Until only recently, the leaders of the "lefts" had not only shared these perspectives and strategy with the rest of the organization, but in fact had themselves fully participated in the struggle to develop them. To organize this faction, therefore, the leaders of the "left faction" had to make a fundamental political break, not only with the political perspectives of the majority of the IS, but had to break fundamentally with their own political pasts as well. It was because the political differences raised by the leaders of the "left faction" were so basic and so sudden that they felt the need to spend months of secret, conspiratorial, underground, factional activity before they were willing to present and defend their new program to the organization as a whole.

The present faction fight can have at least one healthy by-product. It can serve to reestablish and reaffirm the fundamental strategy and perspectives of the IS on a more solid and self-conscious basis. It can serve to help win a solid majority of the organization to a fuller understanding of our basic goals and perspectives. Many of the comrades who originally adhered to the program of the "left faction" can be won back. But it would be a dangerous illusion for anyone to believe that the differences that exist between the "left faction" and the IS majority can co-exist unresolved in the organization.

for any extended period of time without thoroughly crippling and paralyzing the IS. For this reason we believe that after full pre-convention discussion and convention debate, the 1977 IS convention should declare continued adherence to the core program of the "left faction" to be incompatible with membership in the ISUS.

To do this, the burden of proof rests firmly with the majority. Such declaration can not be made without good and compelling cause, and without full debate. Nor, however, can an organization establish its historic right to survive and succeed if it refuses to take such action when it is necessary and justified. The purpose of this document is to prove that a declaration of incompatibility is both justified and necessary in order to defend the survival and growth of our political tendency in this country. If we fail to take this act, the ISUS will suffer a severe defeat, and possibly a fatal defeat.

THE PROGRAM OF THE "LEFT FACTION"

On the surface, the faction fight inside the IS is about "industrialization", "priorities", "second class citizenship", "mass work", Sadlowski, "militant minorities", "EC commandism" etc. But in this, like in any other faction fight, the program of the opposition has a political core--a coherent set of ideas that tie together the various diverse issues in dispute.

The "left faction" constitutes a self-conscious middle class opposition. It must be characterized this way, not because of the class origins of its leaders and supporters--a majority today of IS members of all tendencies are middle class in origin--but because the program of the "left faction" calls for a shift in our political orientation away from the working class and toward middle class elements.

Leaders of the "left faction" defend the need for an IS shift to a middle class orientation by arguing that efforts in the coming period, to recruit, hold, and integrate worker members, and to start building a workers' combat organization, are doomed to failure. They argue that American capitalism is healthy enough to dampen any substantial outbreaks of working class struggle for the foreseeable future. From this assertion, they reach the conclusion that the level of working class militancy will be too low to sustain IS efforts to recruit and hold workers and to begin building a workers combat organization. If the IS continues on this "impossible" course, they argue, we will only burn out our present cadre and set the stage for political degeneration and adaptation.

This explains why the "left faction" rejects industrialization, priorities, mass work, an agitational focus etc. These are the specific means that the IS has adopted to progress toward our goal of building a workers' combat organization. When the leaders of the "left faction" decided that our efforts to achieve this goal were futile, it made perfect sense for them to then conclude that the means adopted by the organization toward achieving that goal were

wrong and burdensome.

When the "left faction" raises the slogan of "second class citizenship", they liquidate with a stroke of the pen, all the real problems of turning an organization like the IS toward doing systematic industrial and trade union work. It is the responsibility of the organization to help each comrade no matter what their occupation, no matter what their class origin--find a useful role in helping build a workers' combat organization. Our record in fulfilling this responsibility is less than perfect. But, under the slogan of second class citizenship, the "left faction" appeals to those sections of the IS most alienated from our industrial work. This appeal is then used in an effort to mobilize then in a struggle against the IS orientation toward building a workers' combat organization. It is because of this programmatic orientation that the "left faction" must be characterized as a middle class revolt against the admittedly very difficult and very exhausting task of building a workers' combat organization in this country at this time.

Leaders of the "left faction" tell us that in the coming period, what's most important is not who we recruit, but how many people we recruit. They believe that the greatest potentiality for recruitment in the next period will be among students, intellectuals, and white collar workers. They believe that so long as the IS concentrates on industrial agitation and the recruitment and integration of industrial workers, it will not attract those who they think can be most easily recruited. They view a policy of industrialization and the concentration on our industrial priorities as something particularly obnoxious to those they wish to recruit in the coming period. They are for a propagandistic orientation and changes in the nature of the newspaper for the specific purpose of an orientation toward recruitment in the more highly educated and privileged sectors. For them, IS industrial work would become, primarily, a showcase for middle class recruitment. Therefore, effectiveness and concrete results count for very little--abstract purity would count for much more. The "lefts" accuse the majority of adaption to the backward consciousness of the working class. Their program, however, represents a crystal pure and intentional adaption to the consciousness of the radical petty-bourgeois and his/her preconceptions of the working class and the working class struggle.

Starting in 1969 and 1970, when the IS first started making our turn to the working class, there still existed in this country, substantial amounts of petty-bourgeois radicalism. It took an enormous struggle to turn the organization away from the illusion that we could make substantial gains by an orientation to these elements and their movements. Instead, where we successfully recruited out of petty-bourgeois radical milieu, it was primarily on the basis of an IS reputation of excellent and serious trade union and industrial work. And a large proportion of those who joined were

willing and anxious to industrialize. Now, in 1977, petty-bourgeois radicalism in the US has largely evaporated. To seek recruitment in this milieu would require the IS to establish its own niche in competition with the more experienced and established petty-bourgeois tendencies: the SWP, Sparts, and the OL.

If the IS were to shift toward a middle class orientation, it would be a profound error, even if it opened up the opportunity for substantial numerical recruitment and growth. But the notion that the IS could grow rapidly by shifting to a middle class orientation, is in fact, the most ludicrous illusion our "lefts" are trying to peddle. The most attractive thing about the "left faction" is their promise that it is possible to remain in revolutionary politics in the US at this time, and find an easy and comfortable berth. Unfortunately, it's not true.

INCOMPATIBILITY

There is little doubt that a large majority at the 1977 IS convention will reject the middle class orientation and program of the "left faction". But in our opinion, it must do more. The convention must declare that continuing adherence to the views of the "left faction" is incompatible with membership in the IS.

In taking such a step, the IS will be setting a new precedent for our organization. We must make it clear that by taking this step, we are not challenging the right of comrades to organize factions. What we are proposing is the proscription of a particular set of views for specific and concrete reasons. We are asserting that it is not possible for an individual to both continue adhering to the core program of the "left faction" and at the same time, to function as a loyal, disciplined, constructive comrade. We are asserting that the incompatibility between the views of the minority and those of the majority is a fact that we did not create, but that we can not deny. We believe the convention, if it is to fulfill its obligation for moving the organization forward, must come to grips with this fact, must take responsibility for it, and must have the courage to act on it. The alternative to that will be a permanently paralyzed and floundering organization.

The political views of the "left faction" are incompatible with those of the majority because, in terms of practical work, there is not enough common ground between the two groups for serious, consistent joint activity. In practice, every substantial victory or accomplishment of the organization in carrying out its majority perspective will necessarily be viewed as a factional defeat, by consistent and principled adherents of the "left faction" program. Likewise, every setback or defeat suffered by the organization in carrying out its majority perspective, will necessarily be viewed as a vindication and a victory for the "left program." Such a state, over any extended period, corrodes all efforts at completely collaboration between members of the majority and adherents of the "left

program", and utterly undermines the political cohesion and mutual trust required within a healthy revolutionary organization.

To explain by example: comrades of the "left" now say that the IS TDC/TDU intervention was "too successful". What do they mean? They believe that in general, it is impossible to build effective rank and file workers struggle organizations in this period, and that it is a hopeless task for the IS to continue trying to build such organizations. In their view, the TDC/TDU success was a total fluke. And from their viewpoint, such flukes are very dangerous because they encourage the IS to maintain a false and hopeless perspective--a perspective which they believe, if it is not overthrown will guarantee that the IS has no future.

If this viewpoint had already been crystalized at the time we were working to build the TDC/TDU, could a comrade of the "left" have, in good conscience, been an effective organizer and builder of the TDC/TDU? No! From consistent and principled adherence to the "left" viewpoint, such a comrade would have had to conclude that the more successful the venture, the more illusions it would generate and the more it would harm and set back the organization. Under such circumstances, only a hypocrite would sincerely strive to advance the work. A principled and consistent adherent of the "left" viewpoint might have gone through the motions of advancing the work--but only for the purpose of preserving the right to criticize, and to be in a position to say: "I told you so" when the expected and predicted failures occur.

Luckily for the IS, the "left" viewpoint had not crystalized during the formative period of the TDC/TDU, and many comrades who now adhere to the "left faction" played a very constructive role at that time. (Although if they believe their current politics, they should be ashamed of the constructive role they then played.)

For our steel comrades, on the other hand, the situation is very different. The Sadlowski campaign provides our fraction an excellent opportunity to advance our work. But the hard and consistent adherents of the "left program" in steel, carry out a charade. They profess to be disciplined comrades and go through the motions of carrying out the majority perspective. But, in fact, they carefully work to rule, seek factional points, and demoralize those actually striving to advance the work. Who but a Pollyana or a professional mush-head would expect any other kind of behavior from politically hard "left faction" adherents in steel. And who but a liberal could demand that it is the comrades involved in steel, whose work is being demoralized and undermined who have sole responsibility for taking action against this kind of disruption, while the rest of the organization sits back like impartial judges waiting to see the "definitive proof."

Today, the IS is in the midst of a faction fight. To seek disciplinary action against "left" comrades in steel would serve

only as a provocation. In fact, most of the steel comrades who now adhere to the "left faction" do not do work in a hard and consistent way. While the current debate and faction fight is in progress, our steel comrades must, not only attempt to advance our steel work, but at the same time, they must patiently try to win back "left" comrades to the basic majority views of the organization. But this cannot become the permanent state of affairs inside the IS. When the convention resolves the issues in dispute, we must bring this faction fight to a final end.

It is the desire of leading members of the "left" faction to stay inside the IS following the convention, and still maintain their views that: 1) it will be impossible to recruit and hold any substantial number of workers in the next period; 2) that no progress can be made on the task of building a workers' combat organization; 3) that the IS mass work perspective and agitational thrust will lead to failure, demoralization, exhaustion of the cadre, and adaptation to working class conservatism and chauvinism; and 4) that unless the IS abandons its current perspective and regears its perspective to a focus on middle class and white collar recruitment, the IS is doomed to failure.

But if they actually believed these views, they could not possibly want to stay in for the purpose of sincerely striving to implement the majority perspective. As argued earlier, if they maintain adherence to their views, they have to believe that any actual success in implementing the perspective will merely foster harmful illusions. It follows that if they wish to stay inside the IS while maintaining adherence to the "left program", it can only be for one of two purposes. Either they will wish to stay in the IS in the hopes that efforts to implement our perspectives will dramatically fail, and that this will vindicate them and give them a majority; or they will wish to stay in for the purpose of hardening and recruiting cadre in preparation for a later split.

Many members of the "left faction" did not join on the basis of a commitment to the faction's core program. They have been won to the faction on the basis of agreement with specific parts of the "left faction's" program. They have not yet developed hardened views that are inconsistent with the politics of the IS majority. Even some of the "left faction" leaders may change their minds during the pre-convention and the convention debate. If so, they too are welcome to remain members of the IS. But when the debate is resolved, the convention must take concrete steps to end the faction fight totally and completely,

IN DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION

(Reply to Criticisms by Mike U. and Marilyn D.)

by Nancy H.

Although the documents by Mike and Marilyn differ, they make many of the same charges -- and many of the same mistakes. The difference is that Marilyn's is more substantive and, hence, reveals more of her politics. We are saved the trouble of going over old examples because Marilyn provides us with fresh examples of some of the worst aspects of EC politics.

In fact, we would like to know if the EC and other leaders of the Majority Caucus endorse the political conceptions in her document, since they clearly are not only attacks on our position, but contradict the direction taken by the October NC documents, and the politicization proposals found in Majority Caucus Bulletin #2.

The main thrust of both Marilyn's and Mike's attacks on our document is that our calls for politicization and true democratic centralist procedures show that we yearn to "Return to the Talk Shop"!! Marilyn, in at least attempting to provide a political basis for this slander, treats us to a very instructive lecture on her (and the EC's, we'd like to know?) understanding of democratic centralism. In so doing, she does us the service of going to the heart of the problem.

Some further accusations tossed into Mike and Marilyn's non-responses to our document are that we are "eclectic", that we are "unserious", and that we were "irresponsible" in finding some truth in some of the Left Faction's criticisms. No matter that these were not "picked up from the Left Faction", but, in fact, reflect the opinions of a far wider sector of L.S. members, and no matter that our document served to effectively refute the Left Faction's political conclusions and therefore won over potential Left Faction adherents which, of course, no EC loyalist diatribe such as the ones we're discussing could ever begin to do. For Marilyn and Mike, not rallying to an uncritical defense of the EC and the status quo in the face of Left Faction attacks brands us as "irresponsible". In point of fact, only our group did manage to win away actual and potential Left Faction members; while loyalist hysteria seems to have served primarily to harden Left Faction members and to insure the split!

The Nature of Democratic Centralism: Freedom of Discussion, Unity in Action

It is we, and not Marilyn, who understand and advocate democratic centralism aimed at unity in action. In the very quote from Lenin that Marilyn presents, but misinterprets!, he says,

"...the principle of democratic centralism and autonomy for local Party organizations implies universal and full freedom to criticize so long as this does not disturb the unity of a definite action; it rules out all criticism which disrupts or makes difficult the unity of an action decided on by the Party."

Marilyn makes it clear that she disagrees with this conception of democratic centralism because she would rule out all internal discussion during a campaign, and not just that which would interfere with unity in action. The problem is that she assumes that any disagreement means disloyalty. Democratic centralism is precisely a means of insuring the loyalty of all comrades even where there is disagreement. Marilyn says that it is the responsibility of comrades to carry out a democratically decided on campaign, and "not to debate and discuss every part of it", as if doing one rules out doing the other! Of course, comrades have the right to expect the entire organization to back them up in carrying out the campaign. This is the essence of democracy. And, of course, this precludes raising questions about or criticisms of the organization's position at public functions. This is the unity in action part of democratic centralism. However, this does not rule out all internal discussion and debate about the campaign. Combined with this discipline and unity in action, Lenin says that democratic centralism implies universal and full freedom of criticism so long as this does not disrupt or make difficult the unity of an action decided upon by the party.

Now, we understand that even internal discussion may, at times, be limited by a democratic centralist organization in order to insure maximum effectiveness in its external campaigns. Here we have to distinguish between debate of differences about the basic perspective of the campaign which has been previously established, and differences about the means of implementation (or tactics) of the campaign. The first should not be re-raised in the formal units of the organization (branches, fractions, etc.) during the actual implementation of the campaign (although informal and private discussion even of basic perspectives should be tolerated). The second (differences over tactics and means of implementing a campaign) can and should be discussed internally during the campaign, or else we lose the opportunity to learn through practice. Whatever is decided, of course, then has to be implemented by all. Of course an organization geared to action has the right to set limits on discussion of even legitimate tactical questions. Here no mechanical abstract formula can spell out what these limits are. The organization has the right and responsibility to make such decisions in each concrete case.

In the case of the Sadlowski campaign it was ludicrous to think that democratic centralism means that you can't discuss criticisms of the campaign in your living room. It shows a complete lack of confidence in democratic centralism to think that raising differences informally or raising tactical differences even formally amounts to overturning the whole perspective or undermining effective unity in action. Such conceptions are the opposite of the norms of a Bolshevik combat organization. They lock the organization into tactical inflexibility and hinder the process of political learning through struggle. The crucial part of democratic centralism is that when it comes to action in the external world, the will of the majority not only must be accepted, but must be implemented to the best of one's abilities in spite of internal disagreements. Far from discussion and debate impairing unity in action, it furthers unity in action because comrades will have a better understanding of our approach and won't feel stifled if they have questions or disagreements. Remember, it was comrades inside the steel fraction who raised objections to our approach to the Sadlowski campaign, contrary to Marilyn's demagogic picture of loyal worker comrades bravely trying to carry out the line while petty bourgeois intellectuals engaged in endless discussions on the sidelines.

Action Guided and Motivated by Political Understanding

Both Mike and Marilyn state that even though we stressed and strove to make clear our own opposition to the much dreaded "talk shop", our emphasis on politicization leaves their phobias unrelieved. This is because they, especially Marilyn, consistently and falsely counterpose action and discussion. We are told that, since 1975, the I.S. has attempted to build an organization that is "geared to action and combat in the world and away from discussion for the sake of discussion." What they still fail to see is that the real solution -- an integration of action and discussion -- action informed, guided and motivated by adequate political understanding has been by-passed. We agree with Marilyn that the organization exists to carry out activity. But what kind of activity? We're not mere "action freaks" engaging in action just for the sake of action either. All actions we carry out are done because we see them as part of the process of building a movement that can overthrow capitalism. And this takes some very tough thinking and discussing before, after and during our work. Unless comrades fully understand what the organization does and why, we won't be as effective as we could be. Inadequate discussion often breeds unnecessary dissension. Furthermore, without adequate discussion we can not learn from our mistakes and successes.

Mike and Marilyn try to paint us as wanting abstract discussion removed from practice. But this is a gross misinterpretation (to put it kindly). Could it be that they did not bother to read our explicit refutation of this in our response to the Left Faction where we state explicitly in our document: "The level of our political discussion of labor perspectives is infinitely superior -- because it's more concrete and reality-based in the present I.S. than those we had at our inception, or than those in other non-industrialized Left organizations, thanks to industrialization."

Yet another "proof" for this slander is that our proposal for convention discussions are all basic items and have nothing on perspectives for the coming year. It is dishonest of Marilyn to fail to point out that these topics were included in our December document when what we were calling for was a Special Convention -- to deal with the issues raised by the Left Faction, to reaffirm and re-motivate basic I.S. perspectives, and thus move us out of the present crisis, and not, as Marilyn would demagogically have it, as a replacement of the regular convention, which, of course, would have to focus on upcoming perspectives. Perhaps Marilyn wasn't being demagogic, perhaps she honestly mis-read this part of our document, as she seems to have done with so much of the rest of it.

Depoliticization, Discussion and Democracy

We need adequate political discussion for the reasons already discussed, but also because without it members are not politically developed and trained and because this makes real democracy impossible. Mike and Marilyn have a strangely passive conception of the leadership's responsibility in this area. In response to our criticism that information about Portugal was suppressed and discussions discouraged, we are told that the reports from comrades visiting Portugal were not suppressed; they were available in the national office for anyone who wanted to see them. This is not enough. We

did not even know they were there. The leadership has the responsibility to circulate such important information to the membership (along with any critiques they think appropriate) and to organize discussions on the issues. Similarly with John Charlton. He is a leading member of the ISGB which had a different position on Portugal and wanted to discuss it. Most ISUS members had not been exposed to that position and it would have been an excellent opportunity to educate ourselves. Of course we can't prove that the EC explicitly forbade him to talk about Portugal (we're not privy to that information), but we do know that not a single branch scheduled a discussion on it while he was here. That is strong evidence of suppression. The point, Mike, is not that discussion must be organized around "any and all" differences that might exist. The point is that the EC has the responsibility to organize discussions on important issues and Portugal represented a unique opportunity to learn from an actual revolutionary situation. The truth, we continue to fear, is that the EC is afraid of discussion because they are afraid of differences, because, as we're increasingly told, differences undermine unity of action in a combat organization.

Marilyn cites the question of independent organization for blacks and a black party as an example of the kind of abstract issue we want to discuss and that used to be discussed in the old I. S. But that missed our point. We cited this example because the organization's position on it was changed without any discussion by the membership. Consequently most members don't even know what our position is, much less why we have this position (instead, for example, of the position we used to have).

Functioning of the Leadership

Both Mike and Marilyn accuse of being "irresponsible" because we share some of the Left Faction's criticisms concerning heavy-handed and undemocratic leadership methods in the organization. They pretend that such criticisms are just malicious inventions of the sinister Left Faction conspiracy, that, for some strange mysterious reason, happen to need no further documentation for at least half of the organization.

Perhaps such "folklore" (as Kim M. terms the widely shared triumphalist illusions of results in our turn to agitation in his polemic against the L. A. document) was transmitted by fluoridation of the water supply of so many of our comrades living in major urban centers Or, maybe, we all got subliminal messages in secret letters from the Canadian I. S. The fact remains that the Left Faction initially attracted so many comrades on the basis of widespread dissatisfaction with leadership methods in the I. S., and that many more comrades who decisively reject the political conclusions of the Left Faction continue to feel this "mythical" dissatisfaction. Neither Mike nor Marilyn have any explanation for why this is so. We do.

Mike and Marilyn justify EC "substitutionism" with the argument that it was necessary because of weak secondary leadership. Sometimes this was undoubtedly the case, as in CWA. But to stop there is to stop at the level of symptoms. If the secondary leadership is weak, the question is why is it weak? It is because of the depoliticization in the organization and the heavy handed "kiss ass/kick ass" method of leadership -- the lack of training and the wrong training we described in our document. Of course,

Marilyn, there's nothing wrong with people agreeing with the EC or the EC encouraging newer members to take on older members where they think they are wrong. That wasn't our point (another mis-reading?). It's that they were set up to be burned out by having to be EC agents without the political preparation to convince anyone. (The result is the hardly accidental fact that many former EC loyalists are now in the Left Faction).

Marilyn's elitist and un-Leninist conception of the role of leadership is revealed most clearly on page 9. She says we will never have a truly "internally politically conscious membership" which, according to her, is why we need leadership, just as the unevenness in the working class is the reason we need a revolutionary party. (Actually that is not the only reason we need a revolutionary party). Her comparison of the relationship of the leadership to the membership and the party to the class reveals exactly what we have been saying. The leadership operates as an organized disciplined faction within the organization! (CF. Sam F.'s 1975 convention document on this). Recognizing the unevenness in the membership is quite proper. However, it should have led her to a different conclusion. The leadership should constantly struggle to overcome that unevenness since the goal of a cadre organization is to raise all members to the highest level of understanding and consciousness in the organization. But the EC's conception and their method of leadership is directly contrary to that goal. It is for this reason that the good things the EC has done (which we do credit them for though they're too little and too late) will be to little use.

Proposals for Action: Priorities and Non-Priorities

Mike and Marilyn would have it that we're "eclectic" in our proposals. They also claim that the sorts of suggestions we make regarding non-priorities are really incompatible with having national priorities. It's too bad they misunderstood the nature of our proposals since we expressly said (on page 15) that we concentrated on non-priorities simply because we felt it was necessary to correct the rigidity of our present orientation and that we did not call for these to be new priorities.

Our proposals were intended to illustrate an approach or methodology of combining priorities with the flexibility and openness to enable us to take advantage of opportunities in other areas. There are cases where opportunities for priority work are limited, and non-priority work is justified in any case simply on the basis that it can help us to recruit. We made a number of suggestions to indicate the type of work we had in mind. Precisely what should be done depends on differing concrete conditions. However, we did not think it appropriate in a document of this sort to attempt to specify exactly what should be done every place or in any particular place. Mike refers us to Lenin (I'm not sure why). I would refer him back to Lenin, for surely one of the most important things one can learn from Lenin is tactical flexibility and careful attention to concrete conditions.

I don't think that Mike wants to defend the rigid implementation of priorities, but, if not, then he is very fatalistic about the possibility of combatting it. Given that the main priority work of the I.S. is the industrial work, there will be a ^{strong} tendency for other work to be seen as not only not priority but as distinctly unimportant. It is appropriate

to point this out to the Left Faction. But to recognize this as a tendency does not mean we have to succumb to it. It can be counteracted -- but only if we recognize it as something to be struggled against. Mike and the Left Faction make it all inevitable.

One specific attack by Marilyn on our action proposals is so outrageously demagogic that it must be replied to. Marilyn says that we want to turn to middle class college campuses rather than black and working class community colleges or high schools. We did not mention high schools simply because work is already being done there, and because there are distinct and different potentialities at college campuses. Contrary to Marilyn's not-so-subtle insinuation of class and racial bias on our part, we distinctly emphasized schools which had heavily black, Latin and working class student bodies. Marilyn really should be very angry at whoever served as her source of information concerning what the N. Y. document actually says! Still in all, we won't be baited, and state that even more middle class colleges may be worth approaching in a limited way. They have in the past and can still yield us valuable cadre.

"Seriousness"

The charge of "lack of seriousness" is always a difficult one to reply to. However, we think our group had the most serious response to the crisis facing the I.S. With one third of the organization in the Left Faction it was the height of unseriousness and irresponsibility to resort to cheap attacks and simplistic analyses, and not to try to understand what problems in the organization contributed to the crisis. That is what we did with more success, in our opinion, than any other pole in the organization, but with too little, unfortunately, to effectively counteract the rampant factionalism on both sides that now appears to have resulted in the disastrous split we had sought to avoid.

AUTO PERSPECTIVES

Summary and Update for 1977 I:S: Convention

-- Our guiding idea for the first half of 1977 is building up our base from the foothold we have carved out in the last few years. Our relations with other forces, the politics of campaigns, our use of WP, will be largely dependent on the pressing need to further reduce the isolation we began to break out of with the CGC.

There are two sides to base building: 1) activating new people at a variety of levels by agitation; 2) consolidating a periphery composed of more militant and political fellow workers who are willing to share leadership responsibility in agitation.

We are finding that class-struggle politics, which last year we raised mechanically through Network, are now arising in a real way from our work. They are posed naturally and grappled with concretely when non-socialist activists are forced to make and carry through decisions on how to move and organize the ranks, both as a force in the local and on the shop floor in struggles against the company.

Consciousness. There are signs of a backlash sentiment aimed at the lower levels of the UAW machine, but it has not been sharpened as we hoped by an open split in the IEB. The contract sellout, coupled with the continuing employers' offensive on working conditions and jobs, has opened the ranks in the locals we know about to considering alternatives. We can be part of that alternative.

Local Work. Given our resources, our position in the industry, the lack of a national focus, and the still strong economic position of the industry, our focus will be local.

1. Presence and influence. We will move carefully, selecting issues which we hope can move broader forces. We are not just oppositionists, but builders of union strength. Our members will prove this in standing for steward and committeeperson as quickly as they have the experience to qualify.

2. Our emphasis will shift towards integrating internal union struggle with fighting the company. Union reform is necessary not for its own sake but to better carry on class struggle. We have often, in our perspectives, created an artificial division between these two elements. It is from our ability to move people against the company that participation in the union makes sense to people. And a victory in the union can create the confidence to fight the company.

Working conditions have a special importance, not just in forming our reputation and base, but in opening discussion on exploitation, productivity, the wage system and workers' control. The hundreds of conversations we have as socialists with other workers on immediate problems allow us to introduce literary propaganda without it seeming alien and off the wall.

How the union handles working conditions--the obstacles thrown up in the grievance procedure and especially by the politics of the administration--is a uniting thread among diverse individual problems. Local campaigns arise from shop floor issues which immediately lead to union issues, and at that point can be made political.

3. Caucuses. The goal in locals remains building broad-based, militant, rank and file caucuses, active and rooted on the shop floor, and also contending for power both locally and--in collaboration with similar groups--in the International. Our emphasis is on participation in real struggles wherever they arise; we have no pre-commitment or ongoing commitment to any particular caucus-type formations as the only proper vehicles. We are willing to split, abandon, or reform groups which separate us rather than draw us closer to the mass of workers.

Campaigns.

1. Southern Africa. South Africa support is a low-level, long-term commitment. At present our problem is to tie in these struggles with the struggle at home. The "two audience" syndrome is normal in Detroit-area plants: people who read WP and do nothing to fight the boss, and people who are fellow militants but not interested in WP. At present, the link-up is through our own comrades and a section of their periphery.

The Shoes for ZANU campaign will be taken to all the auto locals with large black populations in the Spring and Summer after ground work is done to make sure that this goes beyond a mere propaganda effort. We expect to produce real results.

2. Maternity leave. We are asking all subfractions to begin talking about the threat of further inroads against women in auto posed by the recent Supreme Court decision. We do not expect an outright erasure of contract rights, but some sort of additional restrictions to make life more difficult for women auto workers and drive them out of the industry. The center will prepare talking points for a defensive campaign. This too is low-level and long-term.

3. UAW Convention. Lacking burning issues which can be dealt with nationally, we will use the formation of convention delegate slates to crystallize or bolster local formations. WP will carry a shop-oriented propaganda series where our convention resolutions will be used to explain more particular problems. We will be pushing the following resolutions: bargaining demands, southern Africa, energy crisis, strike all three, referendum vote on officers, two-year term for officers, ratification rights, for joining the AFL-CIO to change it, maternity leave (see the March Auto Newsletter for suggested texts for these resolutions, to be raised in the locals).

These are not the meat, but the potatoes and carrots of our initiative. We will coordinate with the UNC, which has scheduled a pre-Convention conference in March, and the ISTC, but both groups are in poor shape. Real (mass and agitational) intervention in the Convention will be slated at the Convention itself. We are not presently guessing what the hot issue will be, but expect that one will arise to crystallize all the general dissatisfaction with the International's politics. Fraser will not be the issue. He inspires neither enthusiasm nor opposition, just more of the same. We will make Fraser an issue where and when that is useful to separate the sheep from the goats among our collaborators and to protect our right to publicly represent the anti-International political pole in our local groupings.

The meat of our initiative is that we are the voice of shop concerns demanding a hearing against the frivolous party atmosphere of machine-dominated Conventions.

I.S. Functioning

1. National Fraction. Our hopes and real possibilities of cohering a national fraction have been serverely damaged by the faction fight. Communications are as good as in the past, maybe better, but not what they could have been.

The fact is that the Detroit area fraction has emerged stronger than ever from CGC and despite the faction fight. Other fractions are worse off. The post-faction fight period will be one where the methods and experiences learned in Detroit are exported around the country. In many areas, this will mean starting from scratch but with a much better idea of how to start, a savings of years.

By the summer we will produce three pamphlets, including: one on auto workers and the auto companies in South Africa, one outlining our overall strategy in auto, and one giving the socialist view of exploitation in auto.

It is a fact of life that the political and organizational skills we possess put us head and shoulders above anyone else in auto. That puts a premium on further industrialization. There is a vacuum of ideas and initiatives to the left of the International bureaucracy; either we fill it, or someone else will.

Periphery and Recruitment. The immediate period ahead will be the most difficult we have ever faced for recruitment. The New Left, the memories of the New Left and to some extent the Black Power movement of the 60s, is defunct. While many of our collaborators will come from the generation which experienced these movements, most of our recruits will not. We now begin the process of serious working class recruitment, where most of our viable contacts will want to recapitulate all the mistakes of the past. They must be taken through this process quickly, and few if any forces around are more qualified to do this than we are.

But recruitment and periphery building will not arise naturally. They are goals to be planned for over a long period and they will not be achieved without consistent political work, including: use of WP on a regular basis, with a particular emphasis on non-member writers and sellers, the imaginative use of films for small groups in members' homes, as well as in large forum-type gatherings, the enthusiastic organization of the campaigns mentioned above, and the serious organization of fractions and subfractions. All these initiatives become more important in the next period as we begin to be a force in certain locals. We will have gained nothing if we succeed in developing a rank and file base but cannot ensure that there is an expanding revolutionary presence within that base.

Auto Fraction Steering Committee
March 5, 1977

Note: The comprehensive post-CGC perspectives for auto were published in December. A limited number of copies are still available from the auto fraction administrator, as are copies of the first three editions of the Workers' Power Auto Newsletter.

Statement on My 'Suspension' From The Boston Branch
Marriane
Left Faction

2-27-77

According to the local exec, I have been suspended from the IS as of Feb. 17 (although the letter was delivered to me and apparently not written before February 23). There has no, however, been any hearing at which I was allowed to defend myself from the charges against me. They assure me one at a later time; however, this is not in keeping with the IS democratic tradition which is that suspension only takes effect after the hearing.

The IS constitution states: "Disciplinary proceeding against an individual must be sen to him. . .at least two weeks prior to the general branch meeting called to act on the discipline. A member has full rights to defend himself at the proceedings." Thus it is clear that the claim than an exec can suspend a member indefinitely before a hearing takes place is false.. There is a procedure that must first be followed, and since "during the entire proceedings . . . individuals have full rights to the use of the discussion bulletin", I am making use of my right to appeal to the membership to prevent factional manipulation of the suspension procedure.

The IS national secretary has not heard any of my answers to the charges against me--I have not written or otherwise given an answer to specific charges, though I have stated that they are unwarranted, include outright falsehoods, and should be dropped. Nonetheless in a bulletin circulated throughout the organization he says, "In Boston the branch exec has a case for suspending the only 'left' for refusal to accept assignments and for internal functioning which damages and demoralizes the branch. Only the very existence of the faction fight could prevent this suspension from being carried through." I asked him if he weren't pre-judging the case, and shouldn't he hear my answers to the charges before making that sort of judgement. He answered: "I'm not interested in hearing every side; having some petty middle class debate about it. . .This isn't an organization set up as some sort of glorified liberal court. . .I heard the position of the elected and unified leadership of the branch and that's what I'm interested in."

Given the uncertain position of the Left Faction in the organization, why the rush to suspend me? The answer lies in delegate representation at the convention. There are two members of the Third Camp in Boston who are not on leave, and should I support their delegate choice Boston could have one oppositional delegate at the convention. (See statement of Joan and Peter on my 'suspension'.) Thus my 'suspension' at this time, before a hearing, is merely an opportunistic move to ensure another delegate. The Boston exec does not act alone--the national secretary has been informed of this situation and has taken no steps to change it. As the above quotation shows, his position is nothing short of claiming that procedures of democratic debate are irrelevant. The facts are there for those who have eyes to see. They are now a matter of record and will not change; the leadership of the IS, however, can and must be changed if even the elementary right to membership is to be ensured.

To the Boston Executive Committee

2-26-77

Peter L.

Joan B Third Force

We are sorry that you have chosen to suspend Marianne at this time. Since this "suspension" comes at a time after the EC faction voted to expel the Left Faction at the convention, we can only wonder why you have chosen to make this move now. (Though the letter is dated Feb. 17, some incidents mentioned in it occurred after the EC faction meeting on the week-end of Feb. 19, and Marianne was handed the letter Feb. 23.) We take this move as a gross factional maneuver on your part, one designed to prevent any possibility of the Boston branch getting an oppositional delegate.

The charges against Marianne are full of lies and distortions. They amount to a character assassination unworthy of any revolutionary leadership.

We might add that we have been consistently appalled by the Boston executive committee's behavior throughout this faction fight. It has been irresponsible. Its behavior towards Marianne in particular has been incredibly slanderous, even to the point of "lunatic"-baiting. The branch organizer has consistently tried to discredit her character to other comrades, even to the point of leaking "security" behind her back.

This style of leadership, by suspicion, "Security", "breaks in discipline", has by design kept the branch divided even before the faction fight. We were slandered behind our backs to a member when he joined the branch by the organizer. We didn't find this out until months later.

The branch organizer said at the last branch meeting that "the Boston executive committee has never acted in a heavy-handed manner". Yet even before the faction fight we have been subjected to intimidation and harassment; it is only because of our commitment to the politics of the organization that we continued to function as best we could in the branch.

Since the faction fight the behavior and tactics of the exec have deteriorated completely. One member who joined the Third Camp is presently on leave because the situation is so intolerable.

Let's be clear. The real intimidation is not coming from Marianne, as you had the audacity to charge in your letter. The real intimidation is coming directly from the Boston executive committee. You have been dishonest in your dealings with the membership of this branch; you have destroyed the morale of this branch through your malicious gossip, and through irresponsible methods that have included verbal and physical intimidation, swearing comrades to "security" and breaking security at your convenience. The atmosphere of this branch is thoroughly polluted and we hold you responsible for it.

It should be clear that we do not share the political conclusions that led Marianne to join the Left Faction and that we had not reached a decision to ask for her support in voting for a delegate but that the exec's action to suspend her prevents any possibility of the Boston branch voting against the expulsion of the Left Faction.

NOTE: On March 4th these comrades wrote to the Boston exec informing the exec that they had made an unilateral decision to take a 3-month leave.

Complete Response to "Statement on the Faction Fight in Boston"

"The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries, and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honored disguise and this borrowed language." Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte"

The I.S. is still a sect of mainly middle class revolutionaries, who, in 1975, began the task that nearly everyone in the organization at that time saw as ~~key~~-key to building a revolutionary party in the U.S. at this particular time and in these particular historical circumstances. This task was, and remains, to turn the I.S., with no illusions in what it then was (and in too large a part today remains), into a workers' organization, that is, a revolutionary, democratic centralist, workers' combat organization.

And lo and behold! We had barely begun to make progress on this most crucial of tasks in the present period when a portion of the membership decided that it was all much too difficult. After a year of trying (and yes, in some cases trying very hard), they decided to throw in the towel- and began quickly hunting up a political rationale as best they could. Simply put, this rationale is the politics of defeatism- a politics that says that not only is setting up a workers' combat organization difficult, but that it has now been "discovered", thankfully for these comrades, that the task they agreed with and set forth to begin in '75, has, by '76-'77 become theoretically impossible. The politics of the "left" faction are an easy way to both give up and save political face at the same time since only "fools" will attempt to "burn themselves out" doing the "impossible".

When the "left" faction ceased its clandestine wrecking of the I.S. and decided to try to finish the job aboveground, all the old guardians of the "spirits of the past" I.S. saw their chance. Seizing the time that they judged the organization to be in a precarious and weakened condition, they called all the old troops back from leave and tried to see how many old "battle cries" they could try to make sound new to the newer members. Single-handedly, the Third Camp gave those of us who joined since the '75 convention and were unacquainted with the old middle class and discussion oriented I.S. a crash course in what it was really like and just how bad it really was. We are now prepared to believe that the worst stories that we've been told of the I.S. of that period can't really have told the half of it, judging by the crap we're being forced to sit through now.

The Boston exec was formed and elected on the politics of the '75 convention. It was our view then and remains our view now that the key task of the present period is to build a workers' combat organization. It was our view then and remains our view now that only a truly democratic centralist I.S., with a disciplined, strong central leadership, could lead us toward, and finally accomplish, this extremely difficult but absolutely crucial transformation. Indeed, the present unnecessary and artificially maintained paralysis of the organization demands a leadership that can truly lead- and an organization disciplined and capable of carrying the majority line on every level of the organization, from top to bottom and bottom to top. It is only an organization capable of doing this that will be capable

(2)

of translating that line into an external lead in the real world, which, after all is said and done, is actually the reason you have an organization in the first place.

As the organization made slow and painful progress toward both the membership and norms of a workers' combat organization, some individuals began to lose the positions of prominence and intellectual prestige that they had formerly held and had come to assume was theirs by right. It is these people which make up much of the core leadership of the Third Force. It is this faction fight which has brought them back from inactivity, or even leave in some cases, and back into their element. Perhaps it is not surprising then, that the faction fight has been carried out with a degree of enthusiasm, thoroughness, motivation and productivity notably lacking in other tasks the organization has undertaken in the previous year and a half.

This exec has taken seriously its responsibility to build the Boston branch as one part of a national, externally oriented I.S. This meant, here as elsewhere, an I.S. firmly rooted in the industrial priorities, using the method of mass work and the present tactic of industrializing as key components of the present strategy of building a workers' combat organization in the present period. Contrary to ruling class propaganda, there is a working class that lives and works in the city of Boston. An interesting characteristic of this group of people is that they do not after four years and tend not to split for the summer, in contradistinction to another segment of the Boston population. It was this local exec which convinced the national E.C., shortly after the branch's founding in the summer of '75, that Boston, too, could and should be an industrially oriented branch like the rest of the organization. We made our case on the strength of our postal work at that time and on the fact that Boston, although it never will be as important or as strategic as the industrially concentrated midwest, nevertheless did have some industry, some of which were priorities. We argued then that it was in these priorities that our energy was best spent, and, in fact, argued that this conception was far more in keeping with the stated national objective of building a workers' combat organization than was the older concept of Boston as "student-feeder branch". The N.O., seeing our work and hearing our arguments, agreed with us and moved quickly to back us up, putting us in touch with Boston teamster contacts that the I.S. had made through its national work. Indeed, the charge in the "left" faction document that Boston was "forced" to "ignore" students only reflects their intense alienation from the actual processes and real internal life of this organization. It is precisely this alienation that the "left" faction organizes around. It is this alienation that is the actual core of their new found "politics". Equally ludicrous is the idea put forth by one Third Camp leader that Boston once again become a student feeder branch! (Of course, it is not known whether or not there is real "unity" on this particular conception of Boston within the Third Force, as this group is not known to have much political unity, in fact, on much of anything.) (The truth is that their politics call for and guarantee disunity. We doubt the two Third Campers here have even heard of this conception. They would probably be shocked). It is interesting to us to note that it was a Third Camp supporter who was asked to do a certain minimum of work around a college he was attending and with which we had a few other connections. However, selling WP between two class changes proved to be too difficult for this comrade. We do not "ignore" college students. We are not against recruiting them (as we have to an industrial perspective. But what we

(3) are about in Boston is a focus on the industrial working class and industrial agitation. It is only in the working class, where the racists have their overwhelming strength and organization, that the racists will ever be defeated- by our strength and organization. A Red Tide, high school student work (which we have done) and such community work as is possible here (such as work around the Ella Ellison case, or the possibility of revived Gary Tyler work) will all supplement and strengthen an anti-racist movement that must be built in the plants. Unless we are willing to undertake this task, the racists will be able to smash us back in every plant we show our face in. We will see all progress and every victory rolled back on us by their superior force, weight, and organization- in the plant and out. (You didn't read about it in WP, but we had one Gary Tyler rally here broken up by Powderkeg, the Charlestown ROAA group. It may be coincidence and it may not be that Local 25, the biggest Teamster local on the east coast, has its headquarters there).

We are a long, long way from our goal. We say that in a year and a half we have made a beginning, that is all. If you say that what we have done for a year and a half is wrong, prove it. Explain why we wasted our time and what we should have done differently. If you are raising the suggestion unseriously and with only a smattering of knowledge about Boston, the racist movement, and the I.S. work here, as we think you are- then shut the fuck up; because you are not helping.

The Boston exec has stood as a united, disciplined local leadership based on the majority politics of this organization, as we have outlined. We demand to be judged as a leadership on our success or failure in translating these politics into a concrete lead in the real world. If we fail to make that progress in the real world that we believe to be possible, even given objective difficulties in Boston, then we demand to be replaced. And we demand that our "opposition" in the branch, if that is how they choose to see themselves, be serious about putting themselves forward as an alternative leadership that can do a better job in Boston than we have done.

Being a disciplined local executive committee, it has always been our position that branch problems, debates, etc., should remain inside the branch. At any one time the development of individual branch members will be uneven, so, even in N.O. reports, we have been careful not to criticize individual members unduly, so as not to present a static and incorrect picture of the political development of individual members to the national leadership. Insofar as branch members don't develop or fuck-up, it is the responsibility of this local exec to develop them, point out errors and advancements, and to generally insure that branch work is done in a consistent and politically correct way. Our position has been that any political problems of individuals in the branch are our immediate responsibility, not the national E.C.'s, or the national organization's. All along we have encouraged branch members to accept responsibility for areas of work and have tried to be consistent about offering guidance, criticism and encouragement to the comrades in charge of areas of work. We attempted, at the same time, not to substitute ourselves for the branch, even when we considered areas of work to be key. When we have fucked-up, we tried to take the lead in admitting and politically rectifying our mistakes. It was the exec itself which charged in early September '76, that we tended toward substitutionism. At that time we demanded that other branch members take responsibility for key areas of work, so that we would not end up codifying the error we had discovered in our political functioning. It is true that some of these assignments were handed back to the exec a few months or even a few weeks later, but

we could not have foreseen at the time that branch members would take it on themselves to do this. Some members have taken responsibility for key areas of work and have advanced with that work. Some have not. Boston as yet has discovered no loophole in the law of uneven and combined development. Nor do we expect to.

On the whole, though a mountain of tasks remain, it is our view that in the areas of auto work, teamster work, Gary Tyler work, women's work, international work and now shipbuilding work that this exec has given a concrete and generally correct lead. We built these areas of work, none of which existed previous to the branch's founding by this present leadership a year and a half ago. While regrettably we are still only on the margins of Boston working class life, our recruiting of a worker with long experience in a major local industry, our largely outside work in Teamsters with TDU (with all of the weaknesses of such work, our success, though still limited, has been real), and our success, even in this city with its slim industrial base and astronomical unemployment, of industrializing people, all stand us in good stead for our political future. By themselves these successes, along with the knowledge and contacts with community groups gained through the hard fought Gary Tyler campaign, represent still fragile, but real, inroads into the class- and as such represent a political advance which can be defended now and built on in the future.

It is one mark of the political success of this exec and of the logic of the national politics of the I.S. that, even in Boston, the branch was carried 9 to 1 on the basic policies of industrialization, mass work, and priorities- this in a city which, given its lack of heavy industry and great distance from the geo-political center of the organization, could likely be expected to be weak in its understanding of I.S. politics.

Significantly, the two Third Force members in Boston who signed the "Statement on the Faction Fight" (along with Marianne, in fact, up until her very recent conversion to "left" faction politics) would defend today and have continually defended and expressed their agreement with the general direction of the lead the Boston exec has given to the branch work here. Their only consistent differences have been stylistic, not political ones.

All of which brings us to this "Statement on the Faction Fight". Circulating this statement nationwide marks a departure for Peter and Joan. Previously they elected, correctly in our view, to keep their criticisms of the Boston "regime" inside the branch. The current unnatural atmosphere inside the organization, which encourages everyone who ever had a political idea in their head to put it down on paper and organize around it, is something that they have unfortunately capitulated to. This necessitates this political response to and about both them and Boston, and as such marks a departure from our own past practice as an exec which has unfortunately been forced upon us by them.

As stated previously, the "Statement" contains no criticism of the general political lead of the Boston exec but consists of stylistic criticisms, undocumented allegations and simple statements. Though nothing is presented to back any of their criticisms, statements, etc. up, the organization is in such a state that some individual members across the country don't know what to believe. So, the allegations in the "Statement" perhaps gain a credibility that in normal times they certainly would not have.

But, for the record, here we go. It is odd, in our view, that Peter who, in the "Statement", "reaffirms the policies of industrialization, mass work, and the priorities", should in a "verbal attack" "degenerate into vicious slander" by accusing the I.S., as he did on Feb. 13, nationally and locally of (and this quote is verbatim!) "sucking after workers" (sound like anyone you know?). It is also odd, in our view, that two signers of the "Statement" who want the national organization to believe that "Since the faction fight began, we have continued our work in the branch as loyal members of the organization." should, on Feb. 1st. of this year, unilaterally inform the organizer that they would not:

A. Have any relationship with their own branch exec other than that which they defined as "procedural"

B. Meet with their own branch exec privately to even discuss their unilateral declaration of independence (but of course, it is these people, don't forget, who "condemn the use of divisive, undemocratic measures" and "urge" others "to work towards an atmosphere of free political discussion").

C. Accept any new assignments. This turned out to mean that they would also not do any old assignments either. Peter did not attend a strike support meeting that week that he had pledged previously to attend. Joan refused to make a banner for a demonstration Feb. 5. She accepted the assignment months ago (when ROAR ripped off (and ripped up) our old one).

Now, of course, in any organization such divisive, undemocratic, and intimidating political maneuvers and attempted unprincipled and bankrupt manipulation is IMMEDIATE grounds for suspension. And, with an exec as gleeful as ours is reputed to be about "harassment, intimidation, or threats of expulsion"- what did we Stalinists in Trotskyist clothing do? Well, we permitted Peter D., a Third Camp leader from N.Y.C. to come up and try to talk them back into becoming members of the International Socialists. WE DID NOT SUSPEND THEM. They laid their heads down on the chopping block and smiled up at us- and we still didn't give them the axe. Something tells me Joe Stalin would have found us a little too soft for his liking.

It is known that this action distanced Peter and Joan from both the leadership and much of the rank and file of their own group. Because of this, they came to have a reputation for "extremism" even within their own group, the Third Force. In fact, when finally, under pressure from Peter D. these gracious people deigned to meet with their own exec on Feb. 6th. (after their refusal point blank to meet with us on Feb. 4th) and were called to account for their bizarre political behaviour; they did let on as to how, well, yes, they had made a "political error" (an error because it embarrassed their bloc? What kind of error? But this we were not to find out). They also said (hurray!) that they would "accept democratic centralism" (a given for every I.S. member at all times). They then demanded that they be allowed to read us more "statements", so we let them read us statements.

Needless to say we have still not gotten our explanation. This is probably because there is none, that is, no political one. Peter and Joan were recruited out of a new left "tenants organizing committee". Both have been active on the left for some time, both are from middle-class backgrounds. They never really adjusted to the fact that the I.S. left the new left a long time ago. We may have a long way to go (and we do, we do) but looking back on the organizations we have left

behind (P. and J.'s old group, the Cambridge Tenants Organizing Committee, for one) we can see how far we've come. No, in the I.S. all egos are not stroked equally, all ideas are not "appreciated equally" and all people are not "valued equally". The arguments as to why all of this is true have been put forward in other documents and are beyond the scope of this paper here (which, after all, is just a reply).

But we can't go on without laying to rest what the authors of this "Statement" obviously hope will be the most sensational of their charges, rag-tag allegations and thrown-in-for-good-measure statements, that is, the "attacks" which "on two occasions" "became physical".

First off, it is true. There were physical attacks. There were two of them. Any time such an attack occurs, no matter what the circumstances, it is a serious departure from principled political practice and should be treated as such. These attacks occurred, the comrade involved, a former member of the exec, was disciplined immediately, made a public apology for her actions, and the matter was closed. Neither Peter, Joan, nor Marianne chose to pursue the matter further. They knew they had the right to bring formal charges against Anne, but chose, correctly in our view, to consider the matter settled. Until they remembered that they were in a faction fight and might be able to use what happened as a way to get at the Boston leadership. So, since they have already circulated complaints about physical attacks nationwide and used it as a topic of discussion at at least one national meeting of the Third Camp, we are now forced to bore you all with the details:

Yes, the most physically diminutive member (at that time) of the Boston exec, standing 5'1 $\frac{1}{4}$ " and weighing in at 117 lbs., physically assaulted two different comrades on two separate occasions. Regardless of her physical size, and regardless of the fact that she did neither comrade any physical injury (and in her thrashing about gave her own self cuts requiring 6 stitches to close), it is absolutely true that a member of the Boston exec under personal pressure from family problems as well as the pressure of being in a local leadership during a faction fight, totally lost her cool. She was formally suspended from this exec by this exec for one week and was asked to take an indefinite leave of absence from the exec, again at our instigation. We had to persuade her not to take a leave from the branch all together. As mentioned, she also made a public apology. Is this enough for you Peter, Joan, and Marianne? Or is it better to have one woman crucified for the people? The Third Camp is satisfied, do you want to go beyond the bounds of their discipline and advice another time too? Then do it. Now. You have the right to bring charges, make them. If you don't, then where do you get off using the issue of "physical attacks", which you know damn well looks good and scary in print with no explanation of how it was dealt with, and drag it from one end of the country to the other?! If you don't believe you've been dealt with fairly, go for blood. It's your right. BUT DON'T SENSATIONALIZE- which is what you are doing now. It is the worst thing you could do in this situation. It is unprincipled. Come clean, you are using this issue to bolster a weak case with something that looks good. If you really want to say it's part and parcel of our method as a leadership, i.e., that we beat people up that we disagree with, say it right out, see if you can defend that charge. Anne was disciplined immediately, made a public apology- and she did not excuse her act as just an unfortunate "political error".

And it goes on. In another statement from Peter and Joan received by this exec they protest the suspension of Marianne. They accuse the

exec of having a political method which includes "swearing comrades to security and breaking security at your convenience". In some organizations it is not enough to just state things, especially charges of this magnitude. YOU HAVE TO BACK IT UP. Where did we break security? When? What discipline proceedings are you initiating? Though one of your favorite words is "democracy", your concept of due process for your own leadership can only be called "trial (and judgement) by proclamation". The issue is not Marianne's "character", as you allege - it is whether or not she is a danger to the organization. We feel we have enough proof. This comrade has consistently violated security, in two cases it involved literally life and death matters. Did these violations not occur? Does it matter to you whether they did or not? Did she not accuse the exec of telling a lover of hers that she was sleeping with another man? and this lurid accusation was not made to us, in the open air where it would have been quickly exposed as the lunacy it was, no, it was whispered in a phone conversation to a rank and file member who decided that at that point things were getting so weird that he was going to bug out for a while. Maybe she didn't count on this comrade investigating her slander with the local exec. But it's a little late for her now, don't you think? No incidents in the letter of suspension to Marianne occurred after the Majority Caucus meeting in Detroit the weekend of Feb. 19th, as you allege. Name one, one, that did. You say our timing is "grossly factional". Except you know that Marianne's suspension proceedings would have occurred while you both were still in the Majority Caucus. In a consultative vote taken after an explanation of Marianne's situation by the exec in a Majority Caucus meeting, Peter voted that we put Marianne on leave and that we back it up with suspension proceedings is she did not accept it. Joan abstained because, as she stated, she wasn't sure if Marianne was more "dangerous outside the organization than inside the organization". These are the "friends" you have, Marianne. Nowhere in any of their numerous statements has there been any political defense of Marianne. That is because there is none and even Peter and Joan can not create one. Furthermore, they know it, too. But right now it's any stick to beat the leadership with. They also know the suspension case against Marianne was pending even before they left the Majority. In fact, suspension was held up because it was known the "left" faction would try to turn it into a political free-for-all, with everyone, but especially the work of the Boston branch, as the losers. No, we didn't know you planned to bloc with Marianne in order to try to get Boston a "oppositional" (your term) delegate to the convention so you could vote against the expulsion of the "lefts" (or, pardon, that you had "not yet reached a decision to ask for her support in voting for a delegate" are your exact words, words you are kind enough to put in print now and distribute nationally). No, we didn't know, but now that you've told us we do find it interesting. On what "principled, political" basis (such long-standing concerns of yours, after all) was this unholy alliance contemplated, hmm? Tell us.

Why is it "undemocratic" if Marianne is put on suspension immediately (no due process, no due process!) and at the same time flagrantly irresponsible of the exec not to suspend another member immediately (well, he's a threat says Peter, so he should be suspended). Using the cover of "democracy", these two are perpetrating one of the most undemocratic shows on earth - rule by fiat, rule by the minority, in this case, rule by two people alone. If they don't like a procedure, rule, assignment or normal security procedure, they just declare it null and void for themselves and go ahead and break it. If confronted on this, they will innocently inform you that they "did not agree" with the procedure and so had to break it, don't you see? Anything else (like

disagreeing with this, talking about democratic centralism, or God forbid, trying to enforce

it, is, of course, "undemocratic, intimidating, inhibiting free discussion, polluting the atmosphere, etc., etc.". Incidents like their UDI are not on the other hand undemocratic. It is merely "resisting bureaucracy". Even the Nat. Sec. doesn't have the kind of power they want to reserve to themselves as individuals.

We publicly call upon Peter and Joan here to abandon their announced "adversary role" in relation to this exec. you have to recognize that the "political differences" you claim exist are more created than actual.

We call upon Peter, if he is actually serious about "reaffirming priorities", industrialization, and mass work" to help us implement them. This comrade has been told about three opportunities to apply for work in three major Boston area industries in the last month. One is a top national priority, one a local priority with one member already inside with excellent ongoing work, and the other is a major local industry in which any of our members could gain valuable industrial experience and a credible job background that could be used in the future when applying in priority industries. Instead of "reaffirming" industrialization in print nationwide, we suggest Peter do his absolute best to industrialize himself. Go down and put in some applications. Actions speak a whole lot louder than words, even if they can't be put down on paper and circulated to all the branches. If you succeed in industrializing, this branch will back you 100% in "reaffirming" whatever mass work you and this branch can collaboratively launch. We prefer to say that we will see you in the class - and that it is here that will be the acid test of whatever political differences we may have. Our position is that you can "reaffirm" your politics a lot better there than you can taking only part-part-time work and mooning to the organizer about graduate school. This is a political challenge that we are throwing down to you in black and white Peter. We're hoping you pick it up and run with it. Maybe you can show us all something. The truth is, we hope you do.

We call upon both Peter and Joan to let the past rot peacefully in the past; to begin now to both accept and begin to show real political leadership. We publicly, here in black and white, want to leave the door wide open for the both of you. If you chose to slam it, that is your affair. We hope you don't. We call for the ending of this huge waste of all of our precious time and energy - and call for you both to help us begin the work, paralyzed since the fight, once more. As usual, there is tons of it. What's more, it's been piling up while we've been doing this silly arguing. Let's get it on.

Fraternally and sincerely,
Ray W., for the Boston exec

A REPLY TO BRITISH SWP LETTER

Members of ISUS have received the letter (dated 25 February) signed by Tony Cliff and Duncan Hallas for the British Socialist Workers Party (ISGB) Central Committee. We are making it available with this reply to our fraternal organizations internationally.

The Cliff-Hallas letter makes very clear what conclusions the SWP leadership have drawn from their factional intervention inside the ISUS -- an intervention which was initially secret, and has been more open since their letters on industrialization and then the formation of the "Left" Faction. They state that the decision by our convention to expel the "Left" Faction "would mark a qualitative political degeneration in ISUS as to effectively rule out the possibility of its development as a serious revolutionary socialist organization."

This is underlined on the following page, which states the expulsion will "mean the severing of relations with us. We would not see the point of continuing relations with an organization which tolerated that kind of bureaucratic regime."

In short, the letter announces that the British SWP leadership are breaking off the fraternal relationship which has existed between our organizations since we were founded as the International Socialists of the US in 1969, and which indeed has existed between our predecessor organizations for some 25 years. For our part we have no choice but to recognize the reality, that this break has already occurred. Indeed, the real content of fraternal relations between ISUS and the SWP dissolved in the course of this faction fight. The SWP leadership set up its own independent ties to the "Left" Faction, provided it with a full-time factional organizer for a month from the British CC, and then waged a campaign to enable the "Left" Faction to remain after the "Lefts" had exposed themselves as a disloyal, entrust tendency. We will demonstrate this further below.

We are totally committed to the expulsion of the "Left" Faction at this Convention. Make no mistake, the split has already occurred. Politically, there is no agreement on any area of work. Organizationally, two groups now exist under one umbrella. The "Left" Faction has already prepared its separate organization, and the SWP leadership has pledged its support to them. A failure to carry this split through, now, would paralyze and destroy some of our branches and industrial work. The very fact that the British CC can claim the "Left" Faction could remain and loyally build ISUS, proves one of two things. Either you are totally, completely blind to the real politics of this faction fight and the situation in the ISUS. Or else you are simply engaging in diplomatic evasion and denagogy, in one last attempt to cover up for the "Left" Faction. Neither of these possibilities can be ruled out.

It follows from this that for the present period, our relations with the British SWP are broken. Accordingly we will not permit representatives of either the British SWP or CanadianIS, who have acted as their North American agents in this faction fight, to attend our convention as fraternal delegates. The relations between our organizations, which were built on the basis of a common political tradition and perspectives, will have to be rebuilt in the same way. This will occur after the insane Adventurism of the SWP leadership, first in attempting to create a faction to take over the IS and now a new group to compete with us in this country, has collapsed.

We are engaged in a common task, of creating workers' organizations as the basis for revolutionary workers' parties. Your own progress helped lay the basis for an international political tendency. We are confident those ties will be rebuilt. However, some hard lessons must be learned from your totally bureaucratic and irresponsible intervention in this faction fight, about the

methods of building fraternal ties among organizations and an international tendency. We will lay out these lessons at the conclusion of this reply.

But before that, at least some of your worst distortions must be directly answered. Otherwise there is the danger that members of other fraternal organizations and the membership of the British SWP, who have not seen this faction fight at first hand, could become confused over what has actually occurred.

According to Cliff-Hallas, the motion to expel the "Left" Faction "runs against the categorical assertions your EC made to the contrary at their meeting with Steve Jeffreys on 19 January." First of all, no such categorical assertions were made by the EC at that meeting. On the other hand, comrade Jeffreys did have some categorical assertions ~~of~~ of his own. One of them was that, if the ISUS majority were to maintain its politics, then the ISUS ~~was~~ majority and the Left Faction would be politically incompatible. This was forced out of Jeffreys only after members of the EC insisted he come out and discuss the politics of the faction fight, which initially he would not do. This meeting occurred after Jeffreys had spent approximately one month travelling in America. While telling some comrades he was here to "observe", in reality he was travelling as an organizer for the "Left" Faction. He met with our EC only at the conclusion of that tour, not before.

Both during and following Jeffreys' tour, your support for the "Left" Faction has not been based on anything resembling principled politics. The "Left" Faction is based upon politics which have absolutely nothing to do with what the SWP stands for. Your support for this faction has consisted of a series of improvisations in which you have attempted to hide the real political debate.

For example, during his tour Jeffreys invented a new economic theory to explain why ISUS should not be concentrating its resources on industrial agitation ~~and~~ and the immediate building of a workers' organization. This theory, which has not been and will not be written down in IS Journal or anywhere else, stated that American capitalism in 1977 is in the position of Britain in 1964. The continued expansion of the system will therefore prevent a strong working class response to the employers' offensive. This absurdity has nothing to do with your real views.

Jeffreys' other main task in this country was to re-organize the "Left" Faction and its tactics. On his arrival he clearly discovered that the Left Faction, which had come above ground in December believing the collapse of ISUS was just around the corner and that we could rapidly be taken over or split apart, had badly misjudged the situation. In fact this faction did not have the political agreement, program or leadership to lead the IS or set up a new organization.

Jeffreys stepped in to insist to the "Left" Faction that it must draw back from a split. Its only hope for survival was to remain in the ISUS, carrying on a long-term debate against the perspectives of industrialization, industrial priorities, agitation and mass work established by ISUS. It must use its time to clarify its politics, wage a struggle to win new IS members and branches, and harden up its own cadre. Yet members of the "Left" Faction still made it clear that as far as they were concerned, the debate over the basic direction of ISUS could not be ended by any Convention discussion or resolution. The debate must continue until they had won, industrialization was defeated and our trade union and other policies overturned.

This tactic has failed the "LEFT" Faction, for two reasons. The first is that, despite its claims and yours, the "Lefts" RE simply not loyal. In one branch after another -- Louisville, Boston, Atlanta, Cincinnati, Gary, Cleveland -- it is clear to everyone they are building their own group, not ours. They do as they will. Their members in full-time organizer posts take outside jobs. They maintain their own contacts, without bringing them around the IS. They

work-to-rule in the steel fraction. In the Louisville branch which they temporarily controlled, they attempted to push through a perspective totally opposite to national policy and work. They are simply unable to put up a convincing front of being loyal members who are building the IS.

But the second, more basic reason is politics. In the last analysis, how can members of the "Left" Faction make a show of devoting themselves to building IS as a workers' organization - when in fact, they are totally convinced that the road we are following leads nowhere? They believe that industrial agitation among workers in America, today, inevitably means liquidating revolutionary politics. They believe that coalitions to fight for around major industrial union contracts means selling out black and women's liberation. They believe any temporary alliances on partial aims (i.e. united fronts) with any sections of trade union bureaucrats means getting into bed with goons and strikebreakers. They believe that for IS members to attempt to be "the best leaders" in the day-to-day struggles of workers, means that our members inevitably become corrupted and destroyed by the backward consciousness of workers around them.

For the "Left" Faction to maintain a respectable front of loyalty to the IS/ under those conditions would require an experienced, highly competent and politically cohesive leadership and cadre. The "Left" Faction has none of these things. Indeed it stands for just the opposite. It is a right-wing, middle-class opposition which wants a thorough retreat from every aspect of building a proletarian group. It wants to substitute a pure propaganda group based on students, professors and white-collar workers doing strike support work from the outside, for actual involvement in the life and struggles of the working class. It wants none of the basic norms of party democracy in a Leninist sense. The "Left" Faction is every bit as bad if not worse, than the various right-wing oppositions which the British IS has expelled over the past number of years.

You have not made available to your own members any of the "Left" Faction's documents. This is another example of the way in which you have conducted this fight, without acknowledging the politics of the faction you are supporting. Yet there are clear signs that some of your leading members know what is going on. When our comrade Mark L. met with your International Committee, which included Cliff and Harman from the CG, Mark's repeated insistence that you discuss the politics of the "Left" Faction were finally answered with: "Mark, you can't hold a gun to our heads!" Harman finally stated, "We support the Left Faction because its expectations are more modest than yours."

Subsequently comrade Colin Sparks told Mark: "It does sound like the Left Faction are very much like our old wankers' oppositions, doesn't it?" Colin was quite right. Yet this is the Faction to whom you have pledged your full support. They boast that you have promised to send them full-time organizers for their group, while you plead to us that you have no cash resources to even dream of "the creation in our own image of another tiny little group in the United States." Sad to say, the new group you are supporting will have nothing to do with your "own image", except in the world of its own peculiar illusions. Yet you seem determined to throw good money after bad, without even informing your own membership as to what political road you are following in the USA.

The next example of your efforts to evade the politics of this faction fight, is your claim that an expulsion of the "Left" Faction marks a break with tradition and bureaucratic degeneration. You state: "Never, at any time, has any such proposal as you are now facing even been considered, let alone attempted, in our organization. What a joke. The wreckage of the sectarian left in Britain is scattered with little clumps of debris which used to be known as the "Right Opposition", "Left Opposition", and "IS Opposition" inside the British IS. You left these groups behind you in the process of making your own successful transition toward a workers' organization and now a small revolutionary party. Without those splits, your organization would have been demoralized and paralyzed at several crucial points in your development. Nor is it the case, by a long shot, that all these factions were "outside the IS tradition". Nor is it even the case that all these groups were as thoroughly disloyal as our "Left" Faction in the ISUS today is.

You claim the "Left" Faction "stands by our joint tradition: for building rank and file movements against the employers and the trade union bureaucracy; for building a democratic centralist revolutionary socialist party in the United

States; on the central importance of the American working class in the revolutionary process; against both American and Russian imperialism; for genuine national liberation movements against imperialism." There is really just one small difference. The $\frac{1}{2}$ ISUS is for building rank and file movements and the serious basis for a revolutionary party today. The "Left" Faction, in practice, is for starting to do them sometime in the 1980's. You are deliberately evading this.

Let comrades Cliff and Hallas try to argue that the "IS Opposition" did not share all the views they list, and a good deal more as well, of the common IS tradition. But the IS Opposition would not accept or carry out the Right to Work campaign or the break with the Broad Left in the AUEW. The IS Opposition raised the following charges: the Cliff-Hallas leadership is bureaucratic and substitutionist. It is unconsciously degenerating toward Healeyism by trying to organize the Right to Work Match. It is liquidating the distinct ideas and unique role (read: propaganda) of the IS. It wants spectacular circuses instead of real political intervention. We don't have the necessary forces. And so forth and so on. That is exactly what Cliff and Hallas are now telling us, whether it is about Teamsters for a Democratic Union, our auto and steel work, or any other campaign we are engaged in.

"Tell the truth to the workers", comrades. Tell the truth to your own working class cadres about the real politics and perspectives of the group you are setting up here. Tell revolutionary workers in Britain why Jeffreys came here in January, to argue to us that building a workers' group in America today is premature, suicidal and means accommodating to the trade union bureaucracy.

Our own membership has now had a very "extensive experience" with the Left Faction. It is an experience of the fullest factional debate we have had since 1973, of twelve (12) special bulletins not counting "Left" faction documents which have been distributed separately instead of going through the N.O., of branches paralyzed and work coming to a halt. You will soon learn that our membership has drawn the necessary conclusions from that process.

That is why a split has occurred, and why your diplomatic evasions cannot prevent it. This split has nothing to do with "consensus factions" or "administrative resolution of political problems". We formed a Majority Caucus to defend the basic perspectives of the IS, of building a ~~xxxxxx~~ working class combat organization through industrial agitation. You chose not to help us in that defense, but to oppose us. You chose the wrong side.

You state: "We are not defenders of permanent factionalism. Quite the reverse!" Yet for American revolutionaries today, for ISUS in 1977, what you are quite consciously using your considerable prestige to promote is precisely "permanent factionalism" and precisely "the unending wrangling that becomes a substitute for intervention in the outside world". And why to you demand this? Because you maintain that the ISUS leadership doesn't have "the political confidence of $\frac{1}{2}$ the membership." And why do you maintain this? Because the ISUS leadership and Majority Caucus are trying to carry through the struggle for a proletarian organization, the struggle you carried out in Britain -- and you are trying to prevent us from doing it. We cannot, and will not accept this.

There is no "consensus faction" in ISUS. If the EC is returned by $\frac{1}{2}$ the Convention it will be on the basis of a sharp, clear platform which has already been distributed in advance of the Convention. If the platform is not approved, the current EC will be overturned and a new one established. We are not banning the formation of political caucuses and factions between Conventions, as your party did several years ago. The democracy of our organization compares quite favorably with yours.

Everyone in ISUS now knows that you have established your own separate relations with the "Left" Faction. This ranges from providing organizers, to sending documents (e.g. attacking our southern Africa solidarity work) directly to them without even sending us a copy. The latest example of this is the "British Socialist Worker North America Appeal." The official notification to us of this appeal, dated March 1, is a leaflet that arrived at our office March 7, stating that Steve Jeffreys will arrive in North America March 9 for a week-long fund-raising tour. This just happens to coincide with the weekend of our Convention, and also the founding conference of the new organization to be established by the Left Faction. The phone number where Steve can be reached in North America is that of the two major leaders of the Left Faction. No other notification was ever given to us at any time of this appeal or Steve's trip. Indeed, a few of our members who get Socialist Worker by air mail noticed it a day or two before the actual leaflet came.

Finally, we want to bring to your attention and that of our fraternal groups internationally, the extremely serious implications of your unprincipled and irresponsible intervention. The fact is that you committed yourself to support of a right-wing middle-class opposition in ISUS, against the leadership and perspectives of our organization, not because you have any principled agreement with the "Left" Faction, but primarily because you are committed to overthrowing the leadership of ISUS for other reasons. In fact Tony Cliff spelled this out in a conversation with Joel Geier: "Glenn Wolfe wanted to be independent in Manchester, now you want to have an independent line on Portugal."

Comrades, we are closer to you than any other organization in the world. But we are not your agents in America, any more than you are ours in Britain. What you are saying, to us and any other group that sympathizes with you, is: either you follow our line, or else we will organize to overthrow your leadership and split your organization. This really is a fundamental break with the tradition of the IS internationally. And worse than that, we are absolutely convinced that if you pursue it, it will lead to new and more serious setbacks. At a time when the European revolutionary left has gone into crisis, when the possibilities for an IS international tendency should have been advanced, they have instead been set back. And let's be clear. No serious revolutionary organization will be drawn toward us by the method you have adopted, a method which combines the worst features of literary dilettantism and Fourth Internationalist factionalism. You are in very grave danger of embarking on a course which would lead, not to genuine fraternal organizations but rather to sterile satellite groups, thoroughly dependent on you for their political perspectives, leadership and resources. And in most cases you will not even be able to fulfill the promises you make to them.

Any party, no matter how excellent its practice at home, which functions internationally the way you have, is going to find itself isolated from people who are serious, who intend to think for themselves rather than simply find a parent group to revolve around. Frankly, our future as an international tendency is completely bound up with yours. We believe that your functioning as internationalists can be reformed through a political struggle, and that the relations we have spent years in building will be restored.

But you have done us, and yourselves, a lot of damage already. We believe your membership has a right to be acquainted with our point of view and judge the results. We will make available to you any documents you want from this faction fight, for the purpose of making them available to the British SWP membership. That is only a minuscule fraction of what we have allowed your CC to do inside our organization. It is also the best way, in our opinion, to ensure that your tragic blunders in this episode are not repeated.

Yours fraternally,
Executive Committee -- ISUS

RESPONSE TO AN ATLANTA LF STATEMENT BY THE ATLANTA MAJORITY CAUCUS

Most of the Atlanta LF statement is not worth responding to. They do, however, raise one political point that is important to address. That is their complaint about the motion passed by the branch here that states: "Anyone who is a member of a fraction, including the women's caucus, must attend meetings of the fraction, carry out assignments, and participate in activities unless specifically exempted by the fraction convenor or the organizer." Besides their bizarre contention that it was passed as a way of "getting" the LF, they politically oppose it. "This motion is appropriate for a militaristic sect, not a workers' organization" is what they say in their statement.

First of all, it should be understood that it was not passed as a means of "getting" the LF, nor was it simply "the result of an argument over scheduling a woman's caucus meeting" as the LF contends.

What happened was that the woman's caucus had scheduled its first public meeting on Women Under Apartheid, as part of our South Africa campaign and immediately following the appearance of the movie Last Grave here in the Atlanta area. Far from harassing Carla, she was given the assignment to prepare the talk for the meeting. A meeting was scheduled for a week prior to the public meeting for the caucus to discuss the content of the talk Carla was presenting, to plan how to carry the meeting, and to make sure we had done all we could to assure a good turnout. The meeting was to be on Wednesday night.

Then came an event that somewhat upset the applecart. This all occurred during the bitter cold of the winter (it was cold down here, too). An inch of snow on the ground forced the closing of all the schools including Atlanta University, where we had a showing scheduled. AU is an important school here; it is one of the major black universities in the country. So, we felt it was important to reschedule the film showing, which we did. Unfortunately, the only date we could show the film was on the same Wednesday the caucus was supposed to meet. So, they had to reschedule their meeting.

By this time it had also become clear that the meeting needed to be held as early as possible because the question of a decent turnout was one that worried us as a new branch in a city where our roots and periphery were virtually nonexistent. So, we proposed a meeting on Thursday night. LF women vetoed it: they were busy (having dinner with friends). We proposed Friday night. They vetoed: they were busy (having dinner with friends). We proposed Saturday night. They were busy (having dinner with each other). We proposed Sunday morning, which they also vetoed: we do not know why. They made a counter proposal: to have the meeting Monday night after the branch meeting. We rejected this proposal as unserious. To have a serious meeting after a meeting, where there would be a presentation on women in South Africa and a serious discussion would not be possible. If there needed to be anything more than cosmetic changes in the talk there would be little time to do them before the meeting. But most important, we wanted the meeting to be one in which we really tried to come up with ideas to secure a turnout, and then to have time to organize for the public meeting. A meeting late Monday night would leave us virtually no time to organize for Wednesday.

So, the caucus voted to meet Friday night. Carla said she

When Todd presented his opposition to this motion at the branch meeting, he went beyond the arguments he was willing to commit to print. He stated that there was no precedent for such a motion in the history of our movement, and that it represented gestapo tactics. Perhaps he was too embarrassed to put these claims to writing, but they deserve comment anyway.

When Todd stated there was no precedent we reminded him that in 1975 he had voted for a motion that stated that members had to come to meetings unless they had the permission of the organizer to be absent. (Todd was an organizer at the time; perhaps that is why he had no objection. Or, perhaps he will tell us that the reason he voted for it was because he had been a hack at the time, but now he has a different point of view. (One wonders with amazement at such people. Max Shachtman once described them as follows: They are the ones who say to us very sincerely, "All my life I've been wrong, now I'm smart -- follow me." Why follow someone who has always been wrong? Why should we think they're right now? Why should we follow someone who had been a hack before? Why should we think he isn't a hack now, only for someone else?)

At any rate it is useful and instructive to delve into the history of our movement. What have been the norms in the past? The following is from a document from the Communist International of July, 1921 from the Theses on Tactics under the heading The Communists' Obligation to Work:

"It goes without saying that all members should take part in the general membership meetings of the local organizations. It is not good to wish to replace these periodic meetings in conditions of legality by local delegate meetings; rather all members should be obliged to attend these meetings regularly. But that is far from enough. The proper preparation of these meetings presupposes work in smaller groups or work by designated comrades, as does the preparation for the effective utilization of general workers' meetings, demonstrations, and mass actions by the working class. The manifold tasks involved can be examined with care and carried out only if prepared by small groups. Unless this detailed work is constantly carried out by the entire membership and distributed among small working groups, even our most zealous efforts to participate in the class struggles of the proletariat will only lead to vain and powerless attempts to influence these struggles and not to the necessary concentration of all living revolutionary forces of the proletariat into a unified communist party capable of action."

This was meant to be applicable to mass workers' parties, not to small groupings, not to middle class groups. And funny thing -- the workers remained in the organizations. Would the LF have remained?

Jack T.
Sarah S.
Larry H.
Sally E.
Pam W.
Dwight H.
Ara D.
Ben V.

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM

Part of what has come into question in the current period of the IS is what are the norms of democratic centralism? The TPS group has argued that the EC has had a distorted conception of democratic centralism, that it has tended to be bureaucratic and undemocratic. They have called for a return to the norms of democratic centralism. For that reason it is worthwhile to examine just what the norms of Democratic centralism are, or have been in the history of our movement. So, I went to examine the documents of the Communist International (CI) to see what they had to offer us as advice and guidance. The following are quotations from documents from the second and third years of the CI, years when the CI was composed of genuine revolutionary workers' parties and organizations which were completely untouched by the later stalinist traditions. Some of these documents are worthy of being reprinted as a whole, and hopefully some of them will be after the convention. But for purposes of haste, only those questions which are of direct concern to us now in this struggle are being offered here. These were to be applicable (not, of course, in a mechanical way) to every national organization: they were as relevant to the mass workers' parties that existed in some countries as they were to the small tendencies that existed in some others.

"The class struggle demands the centralization and unified direction of the most varied forms of the proletarian movement. Only a political party can be such a coordinating and guiding center. The refusal to create and to strengthen such a party and to subordinate oneself to it implies the rejection of unity in the direction of the different fighting forces of the proletariat acting on the various fields of battle.

"The CI is of the opinion that the communist party must be built on foundations of iron proletarian centralism. In order to lead the working class successfully in the difficult and prolonged civil war the CP must establish iron military discipline in its own ranks. The experience of the CP which for three years has led the working class in the Russian civil war has shown that without the strictest discipline, without complete centralization, and without the fullest comradely confidence of all party organizations in the party center, the victory of the workers is impossible.

"The CP must be built on the basis of democratic centralism. The basic principles of democratic centralism are that the higher party bodies shall be elected by the lower, that all instructions of the higher bodies are categorically and necessarily binding on the lower; and that there shall be a strong party center whose authority is universally and unquestioningly recognized for all leading party comrades in the period between congresses.

"At the present time the advocacy of broad 'autonomy' for the local party organizations only weakens the ranks of the CP, undermines its capacity for action, and favors petty-bourgeois, anarchist tendencies, tendencies making for a loose structure." (all above from "These on the Role of the CP in the Proletarian Revolution adopted by the second Comintern Congress, July, 1920)

"In making a thorough examination of the possibilities of struggle, the CP must carefully note the circumstances and opinions which indicate difficulties, and subject the reasons advanced against an action to searching inquiry, but once action has been decided on by the party

authorities all comrades must obey the decisions of the party and carry the action through. Criticism of the action should begin only after the action itself is ended, it should be made only in party organizations and bodies, and must take account of the situation of the party in relation to the class enemy. (From the Theses on Tactics adopted by the 3rd CI Congress")

"The central leadership of the party is responsible to the party congress and to the leadership of the CI. The smaller committee as well as the larger committee and advisory council is as a rule elected by the party congress. The congress may instruct the central committee (CC) to elect from its own membership a smaller committee consisting of the members of the political and organizational bureaux. The smaller committee convenes regular plenary sessions of the party central committee to decide on matters of greater importance and larger scope. In order to gain a thorough knowledge of the political situation as a whole, and to be able to have continually in view a living picture of the party and its capacities, it is necessary, when electing the central committee, to bear in mind the different areas of the country if suitable candidates are available. For the same reasons differences of opinion on tactical questions which are of a serious character should not be suppressed on the central committee. On the contrary, their representation on the CC by their best advocates should be facilitated. The smaller committee, however, should, whenever this is feasible, be like-minded in their views and they must be able, if they are to provide strong and confident leadership, to rely not only on their authority but also on a clear and numerically strong majority in the leadership as a whole.

The representatives and delegates of the central leadership are entitled to attend all meetings and sessions with a consultative voice and the right of veto. The central party leadership must always have their delegates available in order to be able to give responsible instruction and information to district and area committees, not only by political and organizational circulars and correspondence but also by direct work of mouth. (From the Theses on the Structure of CPs and on the Methods and Content of their Work, 3rd CI Congress, July, 1921)

submitted by Jack Trautman

Faint, illegible text at the bottom of the page, possibly bleed-through or a second page.