

Mike H.

AGENDA FOR 1977 I.S. NATIONAL CONVENTION.

The Convention will open at 10-00 am on Saturday March 12th at the Leland House Hotel in downtown Detroit. It will begin with a brief Convention Steering Committee report and vote. Registration will take place at the Hotel on Friday evening and between 8-00 am and 10-00 am on Saturday.

Convention will continue thru the sessions laid down below and all votes will be on the basis of resolutions, the first and largest batch of which are appended to this agenda. All documents produced over the period of the faction fight now have the status of discussion documents only. The agenda below includes a list of all known motions, allocated to the appropriate session. The final deadline for resolutions is noon on Thursday March 8th. No resolution which is not in the hands of the National Secretary by then will appear on the order paper. Amendments will be accepted up to the start of the convention, though any resolutions, masquerading as amendments will be ruled out of order and will only reach the floor of convention thru majority vote of the convention. Amendments must also be given to the Natsec.

SESSION ONE "Ending the Faction Fight"

Motion to expel "left" faction (Maj. Cauc)

SESSION TWO "Nature of Period - Effects of Building a Workers Combat Org."

Econ/pol perspectives (Maj)...Industrialisation, Mass Work and Priorities (Maj)...Amends to econ. perspective (3rd. force)...Industrial Priorities(3rd.)

SESSION THREE "The Sadlowski Campaign and other Mass Work"

On Sadlowski camp.(Maj)...Keynote motion(Maj)...Industrial Ctte(E.C.)... Labor Perspective(3rd.)

SESSION FOUR "Womens Perspectives"

Keynote motion (MAJ)...On Women(3rd).

SESSION FIVE "Black Perspectives"

Keynote Motion(Maj)...Self organisation of oppressed groups(3rd)

SESSION SIX: "The Policy for Building a Workers Combat Organisation"

Full Policy Statement (E.C.)...Role of Organisers(organisers)...Democracy(3d)

SESSION SEVEN "Functioning and Organisation of I.S. in 1977"

Education and training(Maj)...Districts and National Org (Maj)...Expanded leadership and leadership development(Maj)...Politicisation and education(3rd)

SESSION EIGHT "Building the I.S. in 1977"

Keynote motion (E.C.)...Workers Power(Maj)...Propaganda, agitation & WP (3rd) Use of WP (Maj).

SESSION NINE "Election of New Leading Bodies"

Platform of the E.C.(EC)...Slate for new EC(Maj)...New EC division of Labor(EC)

NOTE The final timetabling will include time for meetings of the Black and Womens Caucuses. Industrial fraction and Southern Africa fraction meetings will also be scheduled and some time (if necessary) will be allocated for faction meetings. Documents from the main industrial fractions will be available and if necessary there will be an extra session of faction meetings reporting back to the full convention. DEADLINE ON CONVENTION ASSESMENTS, ACCOMODATION, ETC IS MARCH 5TH. REMEMBER.

Glenn Wolfe, National Secretary, March 2nd.

MAJORITY CAUCUS RESOLUTION

(1) Industrialization and industrial priorities are established policies of the ISUS. Organizing against these policies, formally or informally is prohibited until the 1978 pre-convention discussion period.

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(2) Recruiting and integrating worker members and building a workers combat organization are immediate and central goals of the ISUS. To accomplish these goals, the ISUS must put major emphasis on agitation and mass work among workers. Organized opposition to these immediate and central goals or organized opposition to major emphasis on mass work and agitation inside the working class are incompatible with membership in the ISUS.

(3) The so-called "Left Faction" have effectively already left the IS. They organized an underground, secret faction. They organized themselves completely separately and in opposition to the IS in branches and fractions where they exist. They show open contempt for our members, our work, our paper. The continued presence of the "Left Faction" in the IS will cripple our work and organization, and prevent the majority of the organization from implementing our democratically decided perspectives.

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Based on their continued opposition to mass work, a focus on working class recruitment, and the immediate goal of building a workers combat organization; and on their consequent indiscipline and disloyalty to the ISUS, the "Left Faction" is hereby expelled from the IS.

(4) We recognize that many members of the "Left Faction" are not firmly committed to the faction's full program, and they could, with no subterfuge, be members of the ISUS within the framework of points 1 and 2 of this resolution. In our view, the leadership of the "Left Faction" has neither the program nor the cadre to establish a new revolutionary socialist organization in the US at this time. We predict that most IS comrades who decide to leave the IS together with the leaders of the "Left Faction" will end up leaving not only the IS, but revolutionary politics as well. We urge all those in the "Left Faction" who do not share the full program of their faction's leadership to rejoin the IS.

Passed overwhelmingly
February 19, 1977

Motion to expel "Left
Faction" passed unanimously

*expulsion for
disloyalty + centrism*

Majority Caucus Resolution
Economic and Political Perspectives

1. The last years of the 1960's marked the end of the long post war boom. International stability based on the Permanent Arms Economy and US imperialist world domination turned into a period of instability marked by international capitalist competition, rising inflation, growing unemployment, stagnation and the reappearance internationally of capitalism boom-bust cycle. The steady and stable growth enjoyed by western economies during the long boom will not return. Instead booms will be brief, fragile and inflationary, while the slumps will be long, deep and inflationary. This period of growing economic and social crisis, has reopened the perspective for proletarian revolution in the developed capitalist nations, national liberation movements in the underdeveloped countries, and new possibilities for revolutionary working class organization.

2. The United States experienced crisis with the rest of world capitalism. First came inflation, then recession in 1970, wage controls in 1971, continuous decline of real wages, and double digit inflation in the boom of 1972-74. The depression of 1974-5 was the deepest since the 1930's. Beginning in the US, it swept the entire capitalist world into 2 years of decline and crisis. Starting at the end of the 60's the working class has responded to the effects of the crisis through strikes, struggles, and the rise of the rank and file movements and the union reform sentiment in a number of unions. In most industries struggles have been too weak to actually drive back the employers offensive. Defeat was expressed in the continued growth of productivity and the decline of real wages. The weak response by American workers cannot be found in the supposed "mildness" of the crisis, for its effects were quite severe and has led to growing dissatisfaction over the erosion of living and working standards. Rather the weakness of the response are to be found in the incredible weakness of the organizational and political traditions of the post war American working class. The reappearance of radicals and revolutionaries in the plants and unions, the development of militants who are learning from defeats and victories is still too rudimentary to have yet significantly altered this pattern. As a result in the 1976 contract round the employers got their way. The size of wage settlements has dropped throughout this year, and productivity rose. The bureaucracy and the employers were able to impose settlements acceptable to themselves on a frustrated but disorganized working class.

3. Recovery began in the US in Spring 1975. It was measured in pace and did not spark large increases in the rate of inflation. But economic activity, particularly capital investment remained below 1973 levels. The growth of the first half of 1976 in the US was not sufficient to spark or sustain even growth in Europe. Economically weak countries like Britain and Italy continue to suffer from high inflation and low growth. Uneasy about the possibility of rapid inflation, beginning in Europe and spreading to the US, investment plans were postponed and capital spending deferred. By the second half of 1976 the recovery became a "pause". The slow growth in the US threatens to create recession in Europe and possibly on a world scale. The result is Carter's new economic stimulus program (government spending, tax cuts, and business incentives) designed to bring the pause back into a real recovery. Most of 1977 will see a relatively stagnant economy, with moderate growth, high unemployment, moderate inflation, unlikely to hit double digit levels until next year.

4. Under these economic conditions there is no reason to expect stronger working class response than in 1976. Most likely wage and benefit settlements of 1977 will follow the moderate and declining packages of 1976. Far more basic to the employers' strategy for maintaining profits is the attack on working conditions. Government stimulated growth in 1977 will recreate the conditions of early 1976 which encourage the employers to intensify their attack on working conditions.

Feeling the attack most severely on the job, most of the resistance and struggle of 1976 was motivated by working conditions or related issues. The continuation and most likely the intensification of this aspect of the employers offensive in 1977 will mean that working conditions, job security, and union functioning will again be the major issues. This may be true in the steel contract, and in the CWA and UMWA contracts later in the year. Meanwhile the third year of mass unemployment will be felt most intensely by the black community, particularly among youth. The persistence of these economic conditions will be a growing pressure toward the emergence of a black movement and for action in the black working class community.

5. Although economic conditions will be similar to last year, the political atmosphere of a new Democratic Administration will be different. Among workers there will be a sense that you have to give a Democratic administration faced with economic difficulties "a chance." The first several months of the Carter administration are likely to reinforce such attitudes as steps are taken to get the economy going. In addition Carter will grant concessions to the leadership of organized labor and the black community, though not necessarily to the mass of workers and black. So far the major concession to labor's demands is to public spending and the promise of job programs. In its attempts to get the economy going, the Democrats will see productivity as a key to recovery--something that does not cost the ruling class money or create inflation. Therefore in one form or another, the Democrats, with the cooperation of the labor bureaucracy will stand behind the employers offensive against working conditions.

6. The crisis of capitalism increasingly means every aspect of life takes on the feeling of a struggle; for jobs, housing, education. With these struggles will arise movements and counter-movements. A Carter administration will raise hopes for improvement in the plight of black and other minority people. Carter's concession to blacks will be to the leadership of the black community in the form of appointments. Some reforms such as federalization of welfare, and revival of war on poverty type operations, will be seen as real moves to reduce poverty and unemployment. In truth these concessions will render the current leadership of the black community even more passive and will not reduce black urban unemployment enough to diminish the fundamental alienation from the system that exists in the black community. It is quite likely that job and community programs will spur the development of new organization and new leadership in the ghettos. Just as black working class leadership began to emerge in the late 1960's under similar conditions, though the crisis was much less developed, so can politically conscious working class leadership emerge from existing industrial struggles to lead future community struggles. Additionally as illusions in the administration's ability to reduce black unemployment declines, the opportunities for black youth organizing in and around job programs can lay the basis for bigger struggles with a new leadership partly provided by revolutionaries. Under the pressure of the crisis the counter revolution against the small gains of the women's liberation movement will continue. Attacks like the Supreme Court ruling which denies women maternity pay unless it is in a union contract, and others will occur as part of the general employers offensive and be felt most severely by women. The leadership of the remnants of the women's movement will provide some leadership for individual protest cases but will not offer a way to build a movement. Increased agitation around issues like maternity pay can point the direction toward such a movement. While we don't expect a full-blown women's liberation movement to arise soon, struggles around specific issues are likely to occur more often.

7. In the summary, the objective pressures on the working class will be strongest at the level of the work place and in terms of job security and unemployment. Big explosions over national wage settlements are unlikely for 1977. However, pressure on the unions with contracts yet to expire, will be strong from both the employers and the rank and file in the areas of working conditions, grievance procedures and shop floor organizing, and

job security. The generally fragmented nature of these issues, however, indicates more motion on the local level than on the national level. The general state of the rank and file organization in the USWA, CMA and even the UMW is very low, which points toward local based, rather than national resistance. But generally, while the issues may be national in reality, actual organization, motion and developing consciousness is likely to occur at the local (or in the UMW, regional) level for the next year or more. This will be even truer for unions whose contracts are now or don't expire for a long time. There, as in auto, trucking and the post office, local resistance to the employers offensive can be used to lay the basis for future initiatives. In trucking, where TDU already exists, local actions as well as some national company-wide campaigns can help build the national movement. But even here, the bulk of real activity will be local. Like the last couple of years, 1977 will be a year in which various struggles, local and to a lesser extent national, will continue the process of developing a small rank and file leadership composed of revolutionaries and of militants willing to work with them on a common program. This process has not been and will not be an unbroken string of success. Many things will not work, campaigns will be defeated, and initiatives will fail to get off the ground. But there will also be the possibilities of small victories. In either case, the role of the revolutionaries and other militants who are willing to take risks as leaders of the rank and file will grow. The experiences of the rank and file movements in various unions and of struggles in the black community will provide the basis for a growing and more experienced working class leadership, independent of the labor bureaucracy and the Carter administration. This leadership and its development in the struggles of the day will lay the basis not only for the rank and file movement, but for the re-emergence of a black liberation movement based in the working class and of the working class women's movement as well.

8. Illusions in the Carter administration and the slow pace of the economy will offset to some extent the other pressures on the working class to act in 1977. But those pressures will be real nonetheless. Struggles, even very important ones, will occur. The opportunities to lead struggles, to deepen the position of revolutionaries in the working class, and to broaden and train today's small rank and file leadership among blacks, women and trade unionists will be there. In the coming year, it will be possible for today's revolutionaries to recruit and train workers to revolutionary ideas and organization on a small scale. Revolutionary recruitment will go on, but will tend to require patient work and long term political relationships. But by late 1977 or by some time in 1978 at the latest, this situation will change.

Over the next year, the central task for revolutionaries in the US is to consolidate and build on past gains; to continue long term work toward the creation of a base and roots in important sectors of the industrial working class; and to begin positioning themselves for the next round of radicalization inside the working class.

Most of the influence toward conservatization will have much less effect on working class youth than on older workers. They have, on the whole, less illusions in the Democratic Party, and have little experience on which to base hope for economic recovery. They will continue having little hope for an acceptable future under capitalism. This is particularly true for black youth.

Inside the IBT, the beginnings of national opposition already exists--TDU (and to some extent PROD). In steel the aftermath of the Sadlowski campaign may leave some national rank and file oppositionist networks. But on the whole, the next year will be a difficult time to start up new national rank and file union movements. Where significant national movements and networks do not exist, the main thrust of rank and file union work will be local and largely around working condition issues. But local work over the next year can lay the basis for future national movements and networks.

9. The stagnant conditions of the coming year cannot last forever. The fundamental crisis of the system will mean the return of both boom and bust, of high inflation and mass unemployment, of growing poverty and social decay. The general perspectives of the IS, for a future of crisis and growing working class struggle, need not be abandoned because we have overestimated in the past, or face a year of patient local work. The size of the working class response in the coming years will grow as a new working class leadership emerges in the unions and in the communities.

As the "pause" of 1976-77 gives way to recovery and even boom in 1978 and another, probably deeper, depression following that, the pressures on the working class and all of its sections will grow. Not only will real wages fall rapidly and unemployment mount over the long run, but the attack on working conditions will become more ferocious over the years. Under these pressures a working class with an increasingly growing and experienced rank and file leadership will respond in ways we have not yet seen. The presence of revolutionaries in the class will be key to that response.

Furthermore, the crisis and response in the US will occur in the context of the world crisis. Already national liberation movements are transforming the politics of Africa and having an effect on the consciousness of American blacks. Working class revolutionary action in Portugal has already announced the coming of an era of workers' revolution. As events in Europe sharpen, they will help create a climate of political crisis and proletarian aggressiveness that will effect the American working class like that of every other nation--though probably at a slower rate.

In spite of "pauses" in the economy, the weaknesses of the political and organizational traditions of the American working class, and even set-backs for the revolutionary movement, we live and act in an era of capitalist crisis, and working class revolution. We know it will be an uneven process internationally and domestically. But we also know that the perspectives and actions of revolutionary socialists in the US must be firmly rooted in the reality of the crisis. Whether in defeats or victories, local or national struggles, union or community, we face the task of building a revolutionary workers' organization in the coming years.

INDUSTRIALIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND MASS WORK

The IS will continue to industrialize members into those industries we have designated as priorities: auto, steel, Teamsters, telephone, and the Post Office. None of the basic conditions which made industrialization necessary in the first place have been overcome. The number of revolutionaries in the ranks of the working class is still minute, and the general credibility of revolutionary ideas still extremely low. On the other hand, the possibilities for mass work and recruitment, which justify industrialization continue to be good in the years ahead.

The interrelated nature of industrialization and mass work cannot be too strongly emphasized. Regardless of the agitational possibilities in any one place at any one moment, it is the ability of revolutionaries to prove themselves dependable fighters and leaders over time that will position us for the mass upheavels of the future. Those socialists who think they can walk in at the last minute and become leaders will be disappointed. We must win respect now, through agitation and mass work, in order to lead masses tomorrow.

Similarly, given our size - not just now, but for the next few years - we cannot possibly industrialize or intervene in more than a few industries consistently. Our strategy for building a workers combat organization is not an individual one. That, is, it is not enough for an individual socialist to win respect in one work place. To attract workers in any industry we will have to be a force in that industry and union - and that means concentration. We have begun to recruit and have influence among rank and file Teamsters because we have become a real, though still small, force in the Teamster union. We can only concentrate enough to get to this point if we limit the number of industries and unions we attempt to work in. We have chosen those industries we believe have the most long range importance. Not because it is guaranteed the revolution will start there, but because they are the "Big battalions" of labor that will decide the fate of the revolution.

The IS now has a foothold in auto and steel and is weak in telephone and the post office. This means that we will have to continue concentration on these priorities. The greatest success and deepest roots in our successful work, auto, steel and Teamsters, is in the mid-west. The fraction leaderships are most concentrated here and the steering committees exist here. To secure our roots and lay the basis for greater events in the future, we will continue to strengthen our industrial concentrations in Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and Chicago.

For the first time national fractions have developed in auto and Teamsters, with steel close behind. For the branches on the Coasts or in the South to maintain the greatest contact with the centers in the Mid-west emphasis on industrialization in the priorities should be continued wherever possible. These outlying branches will benefit greatly from the experience and gains of the mid-west branches. By being in the priorities they will be tied into the major work of the organization. When hiring is possible, local priorities will be worked out.

In each of the priorities women have been able to become leaders of rank and file groups and organizers of activities on women's issues. The lack of a mass women's movement has made women's work in industry limited, but the growing assault of the gains of the 1960's opens up new possibilities. In auto and steel, we have been able to de plant level agitation of women's issues. In trucking, the existence and success of

TDU has allowed us to organize women's groups - based initially on wives, but with the potential to reach women in various Teamster jurisdictions. In telephone and postal, where large numbers of women work, the potential for struggles around women's issues is great.

Auto, steel, telephone, and postal all represent mass concentration of the black working class. Again, the existence of TDU, with a base in trucking, is now able to reach jurisdictions with larger concentrations of black workers than in freight or even UPS. In particular, warehouse and grocery have large proportions of blacks in the major urban areas where the IS is strong. Telephone and postal are among the primary employers of black workers. While we do not see the re-emergence of a mass black liberation movement in the near future, we believe that agitation and propaganda around issues of racism is possible throughout industry.

Therefore, we will continue to urge women and black comrades to industrialize in the priorities. We believe it would be a mistake to create "separate-but-equal" priorities in industries with less political potential. As with the general rank and file movement, we believe that it will give us decisive influence in the movements of the oppressed. We feel that TDU will allow us to recruit in non-trucking areas of the Teamsters Union, with out significant industrialization. We want to industrialize comrades in areas such as grocery, carhauling, freight clerical and warehousing. In general, however, we do not favor sending comrades into sweetheart shops or other marginal jurisdictions, where an unexpected set back in TDU could leave them isolated from Teamsters in more central jurisdictions - freight, Ups, grocery, warehouse and carhauling.

Political training has been a problem in every area of the IS's work. This is no less true in our industrial work. Many new comrades are not well trained in IS politics and know little about the industry and union they work in. IS political training is dealt with elsewhere/ Training in the policies and realities of the industry and union must become the systematic job of the national and local fractions.

The Teamster fraction has taken the lead in this regard through its highly educational national council meeting and various local classes on Teamster history and politics. This must be generalized throughout the fractions. We reject the academic notion that comrades must receive some sort of training prior to industrialization that, like ScotchGuard, is supposed to shield them from contamination. The training of comrades as industrial and trade union cadres must be done in connection with their growing experience on the job.

CONVENTION RESOLUTION: WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVE

I. Resisting the Attack

1. The women's movement of the 60's created significant breakthroughs for women. With the intensification of the capitalist crisis many of these gains have come under attack. Increasing wage differentials between men and women, high female unemployment and generally low income for women all prove that the gains made in the 60's have been severely undermined. Recent court decisions against affirmative action have heightened the attack on working women. The right of women to remain in the work force has been challenged with the Supreme Court decision on maternity leave. The ability of black and working class women to seek abortion has also come under attack.

2. The IS will begin to build a campaign, coordinated by the women's commission to respond to this increasing attack. In our industrial work we expect all members to begin to fight for the right of pregnant women to work without harassment and to campaign for maternity protection in all future contracts. Rank and file groups are expected to begin work in this area to make their commitment to the fight against sexism a reality. Groups should attempt to work with other interested individuals or groups in building opposition to this heightened attack on working women.

3. The women's commission will investigate the developing attack on abortion and the right to live movement. WP will carry increasing coverage on the capitalist offensive and its impact on women.

II. Rebuild the Women's Caucuses

1. Over the past year and a half the IS has conducted significant work among women in several of our priorities.

2. The depoliticization that occurred throughout the organization had a severe toll on women comrades. Internally there was little training and overall political development of women. Women's caucuses which once had one of its goals the development of women comrades and the fight against sexism ceased to play that role. The very existence of the women's caucuses was questioned.

3. The failure of the women's commission to point a clear direction when our CLW perspective failed aggravated the situation. The women's caucuses declined and with it so did our formal women's work.

4. Our ability to move ahead and develop our external work depends on rebuilding the women's caucuses and reintegrating the politics of women's liberation into our work. It is the job of the caucuses to campaign throughout the organization against sexism for the development of women within the group.

5. The women's caucuses must begin to have an internal function again. Regularly functioning women's caucuses that discuss and evaluate our work will be a place where women can be trained and developed.

6. To move forward we must recognize the differences that exist between the caucuses. All caucuses cannot be expected to engage in the same activity. Some caucuses have more developed industrial work, some more developed community work. Our key aim in this period is to develop a periphery of women.

7. Our ability to move ahead rests on understanding the mutual interdependence of women in industry and those not. It is our job as revolutionaries to connect different struggles together and that depends on the work of other comrades not in industry. On the other hand we must begin to bring lessons learned from our industrial work into the community work.

8. Womens caucuses in major industrial branches will obviously concentrate their work in our priority unions. Other womens caucuses will focus on the development of perspectives along with local execs to ensure that our politics will be brought into all aspects of our work, whether it be community work, South Africa work, defense or maternity leave. It will be the job of the womens commission to politically coordinate this work along with the appropriate bodies. All the best local work means little if it is not brought into the organization. This is the job of the womens commission both to generalize and counteract tendencies toward localism and exceptionalism.

III. Education and Development

1. One of the key tasks of the womens commission will be to initiate discussion on the theory and politics of womens liberation. Over the next 6 months the womens commission will organize two major discussions within the womens caucuses to discuss key aspects of womens liberation Marxist analysis of oppression and independent organization of women.

2. Educational discussions in the womens caucuses will be taken to the organization so that male comrades can also be trained in the politics of womens liberation.

3. The womens commission, along with a sub-committee on black women will begin to develop educational material and discussion on the nature of the oppression of black women.

4. The womens commission will also attempt to generally politicize all the ongoing womens work through systematic use of the Bulletin

IV. Priorities

1. We must reaffirm our commitment to womens industrialization and along with it our commitment to auto, teamsters, steel, CWA and postal for women as well as men. Within our priority unions we come into contact with large numbers of women. Women in these key sectors will have a key role in the building of the emerging working womens movement.

2. We urge to seek jobs within our priorities that employ large numbers of women. For example, at this point it is possible to get women into IBT clerical in some key locals because of the existence of an organized rank and file movement. Each branch should assign someone to determine specific areas within our priorities that offer the best possibility of working with women.

3. When and where we can not get into priority areas we want comrades to work with the NO in determining local priorities.

V. Organization

1. The womens commission will function differently than the past. It will oversee the work but to succeed must have more input and more respon-

sibility given to local caucuses.

2. The womens commission will be organizing several regional womens caucus meetings over the year. Such meetings will serve several purposes, 1. input to the commission, 2. discussion of local work, educational. These meetings need not be totally internal and in fact could be an excellent way of showing women contacts we are extremely serious about our womens work.

3. The womens commission will set up a sub-committee with leading black women comrades. This committee will begin to develop educational material and perspectives for work among black women. Discussions will be mandated from this sub-committee in consultation with the appropriate bodies.

4. A womens council will be established whose aim is the development of perspectives and womens leadership in the IS. Membership will include representatives from mid-west branches, one rep from each coast, red tide, womens commission and industrial fractions. The council would give substance and direction to the womens commission.

5. The womens commission will work with the Red Tide comrades in developing their commitment to womens liberation.

TOWARD A BLACK PERSPECTIVE

1. The recent economic and political changes have created the potential for the Black liberation movement to take a working class form. In the Black community it will be workers who lead the struggle forward. At the same time, the possibility of a united class struggle of Black and white workers is greater today than in any other period in American history. The period of boom created by the permanent arms economy intensified the proletarianization and urbanization of black people. Today Black labor is central to basic industry. These economic changes and the Civil Rights and Black Power movements also created a new Black middle class. This social layer has assumed the leadership of the Black community but its ties to the system mean that it is incapable of defending the community from the onslaught of the economic crisis and the growing racist offensive.

The role of the middle class and the impact of the economic crisis means that revived Black struggle will have more class content than the movement of the 60's. There is still, however, a need for an independent Black movement. Special demands and independent forms of organization are still needed. But, they will exist in a new economic and political context. Our strategy for Black liberation must be a working class strategy. We will emphasize class struggle and Black and white unity; a unified rank and file movement and a unified revolutionary party.

Economic pressures will continue to be high on the black community in the coming year. Black unemployment remains above 12%, over all, while black youth unemployment in more than 36% nationally. This means that real unemployment in the inner city ghettos of the major industrial centers is much higher. Against this background the possibilities for activity in the community should be significant, particularly among black youth.

2. It was only after the turn to agitation that the IS began to develop Black work and gain Black recruits. Through our work around busing, Marquette Park and Gary Tyler the IS has begun to develop tentative roots in the Black community. We have also built the Red Tide, a majority Black youth group.

In our industrial work we have been fairly successful in bringing "community" issues into the work place. This will continue to be an important aspect of our industrial perspectives. On the other hand we have been less successful in leading struggles against discrimination on the job. While agitation will continue to be difficult, we must be more systematic in our propaganda about racism at work and the need for a united class struggle to combat it. Each industrial fraction in consultation with the Black commission will draw up a Black perspective for their union.

3. The IS is still small and our Black cadre is still tiny. There is still no mass movement which we can relate to. Our task now is to position ourselves for the opportunities to come. What is proposed is things we can do for the next 6 to 8 months.

a. The Black commission will organize a full political discussion on our strategy for Black liberation. This will include education on all the basic aspects of our position and will culminate in an NC discussion.

b. Workers Power will have a special column on Black struggle. The Black caucus will encourage more black comrades to write for the paper. Special emphasis will be placed on writing articles on Black oppression which

are directed to white workers. "Where we stand" will carry a slogan for the right of self determination and independant organization.

c. A Black conference will be held by the National Black Caucus of the IS in June of 1977.

d. Southern Africa Solidarity work - see resolution of building the IS

e. We will continue to build "community branches and fractions whose role it will be to establish contact and roots in the Black community. These branches/fractions will organize the whole branch/district for the national campaign such as Gary Tyler. They will look for opportunities for local anti-racist work. We will continue our Gary Tyler work through the Red Tide and the Gary Tyler committess.

CONVENTION RESOLUTION: EDUCATION AND POLITICAL TRAINING

1. In the past our educational and political training programs have tended to be ineffective. This will now change. Education must now be seen as a political necessity - to miss an educational session is as much of a political irresponsibility as missing a demonstration or a union meeting. It is as much of a political responsibility as paying dues, attending branch meetings, being active in the assigned arena.
2. The keystone of our program for education and training is "EACH ONE TEACH ONE". Every member will be assigned a more developed comrade to work with. The comrades will get together for political discussion for 2-3 hours a week. These sessions will be informal where newer comrades must be free to raise and explore the questions they have. These sessions will include continual training on our basic perspectives of building a workers' combat organization out of mass work. One EC member will be assigned to ensure this method is organized and put into practice. One comrade in each branch will be in charge for the branch.
3. Workers Power will run political educational articles bi-weekly specifically addressed to new IS members and periphery. These and other articles from WP and WPR will be regularly used in these sessions. The national education committee will prepare and develop other educational material in the center based on experience. These will include the use of films, development of slide shows, and continuing to build the tape library of talks and basic classes. The center will continue to provide individual cadre training in Detroit. We will continue the Revised Basic E Education Program in class form for new worker members.
4. In the next 3 months we will hold regional one day cadre schools aimed at the membership on topics such as Black Liberation, democratic centralism, party building and political questions arising from the Southern Africa campaign (national liberation and permanent revolution.) They will be based on prepared presentations with written material circulated in advance. The center will provide speakers for these schools. National leaders will travel much more to give classes. The specific topics will be worked out in consultation with branch leaderships. Regional conferences directed at contacts, Women's and Black Conferences - rank and file conferences, will be set up also on topics such as political developments in the country, trade union issues, etc. These conferences will focus on developing the IS. They too will be well prepared and the topics chosen in consultation with branch leaderships.
5. "Every member a writer" will be another key slogan. Writing for WP forces comrades and contacts to think through political questions. The Center will organize branch and regional schools of writing for WP to facilitate this.

CONVENTION RESOLUTION: DISTRICTS AND NATIONAL ORGANIZATION

1. In 1970 the IS geographically prioritized the midwest industrial cities, because it is in the midwest that the working class is most highly concentrated, has the strongest traditions of militancy and is best organized. This is as true today as it was then. By 1975 our strategy was clearly successful, and we laid plans for expansion. Building the new branches - eventually 3 - became the priority. In assessing this experience, it is clear that we did not have the resources in terms of growth and cadre to both lead the new branches as well as the older ones. All branches suffered as a result. The branches on the coasts got almost no attention.
2. Today the development of branches in terms of numbers, cadres, roots is very uneven. The key midwest industrial branches are relatively healthy and stable, have on-going, though slow, recruitment and expanding political work. The smaller branches where there is only marginal priority work and/or little or no roots tend to be demoralized. To remedy this, we must first understand that the needs in terms of resources from the center are different for branches in different levels of development. We cannot expect Boston to be able to do everything that Pittsburgh does; and Boston needs different kinds of resources from the center than Pittsburgh does.
3. We are committed to maintaining a national organization while continuing to understand that our development in this period still requires that we prioritize the midwest industrial cities.
4. In the smaller and peripheral branches as well as the coasts we will rationalize the work. Perspectives for each branch will be worked out tailored to the needs and resources of the branch. These branches will still attempt to get into priorities. Where this is not possible, local industrial perspectives will be worked out. Local priorities will not stop continued effort to get into national priorities, but will provide real work and opportunities for sinking roots and building the IS in the meantime. Work in the national priorities and national campaigns will play an important role in integrating these branches into a truly national organization. A high priority for these branches in the development of secondary leaders through encouragement of local initiatives and additional resources from the center to aid in cadre development. The role of the National Organizer will be to work with these branches in developing perspectives, ensuring the necessary resources and aid from the center and in rationalizing the work and developing cadre.
5. In the next period, we will develop four districts (Detroit, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Chicago-Gary). It is in these cities that our industrial work is most advanced, and our cadre most experienced and established. These branches today are leading the organization as a whole in becoming a workers combat organization. Over the next 2-3 years these areas will develop well rounded political districts including industrial work in at least two national priorities, community work, Black work, women's work and anti-imperialist work. It is in these branches where we expect to be most successful in carrying out these activities on a clear working class bases. It is in these areas where we expect to be successful in recruiting and integrating workers from our priorities as well as their friends and relatives not in priorities. It is in these districts where we will aim to build healthy Red Tide branches. As they develop, these districts will be increasingly organized on a functional basis, carrying out diverse activities, and developing a healthy internal political and educational life. These branches will become more and more tied to the political life of the working class in their respective cities.

6. To accomplish this in these branches, they must develop strong, well organized district organizations with their own developed and rounded political leadership. These branches will have priority on the allocation of resources to accomplish these tasks. These districts over time will generate resources in terms of cadre and political experience which will be of immense benefit for the entire national organization.

7. Following the 4 midwest districts, we would like to move in the direction of districts in LA and New Jersey, although it is too early to develop a time-table for this. Our beachhead in the South - Atlanta - will receive the resources necessary to build and maintain a healthy branch.

CONVENTION RESOLUTION: EXPANDING THE NATIONAL LEADERSHIP; BUILDING
THE SECONDARY LEADERSHIP

1. In the past period we have made important strides toward developing a centralized campaigning organization. In developing organizational efficiency and a division of labor two key problems have resulted. Moving to specialize fewer comrades began to take collective responsibility for the organization as a whole. Secondly, leadership at every level has not expanded sufficiently to meet our expanding tasks. In order to overcome these problems we must begin with the national leadership including not simply the EC, but the full national leadership which consists of the central leadership (EC, national organizational staff), NC, the national fraction leaders, and full time organizers. In the next year the IS must develop a fully integrated and collaborative national leadership.

In accomplishing this the key is to overcome the division within the national leadership between the industrial fraction leaders and the central leadership. Overcoming the tensions of the past means that the fraction leadership will have to take more responsibility for the organization as a whole. Full time staff must collaborate closely with the industrial leadership to advance the industrial work and to develop the political lead they give to it in the real experiences of our industrial work. It is only through building a politically unified national leadership including both the full time staff and the industrial leaders that we will be able to successfully combat the tendencies toward conservatism, sectarianism and substitutionism.

2. As a key to expanding the national leadership, the 1977 convention will establish a Central Committee of 12 to 15 members consisting of the EC plus 7 to 10 additional members. These additional members will be selected from the midwest branches and will be weighted toward leaders of our industrial work. They will include at least one full time branch organizer and at least one member central to our black and community work. The members will be selected from the midwest so that we can have meetings monthly and a high level of collaboration among the CC members between meetings. This CC will be weighted toward industrial leadership and under represents branch/district organizers, since the key task is to integrate industrial leadership into the national leadership. We are not projecting that future CC's will continue this imbalance.

The CC will be elected by the convention. It's membership can be changed by the NC. It will review and revise the organization's perspectives on a monthly basis and share responsibility for implementation. The NC will review the functioning of the CC in 6 months and make whatever changes may be needed in functioning and organization.

The National Committee will continue to be elected at the convention. As CC members will be on the NC. Other NC members will be drawn from all geographic sections of the organization. Every 3 months the NC meeting will replace the regular CC meeting. The NC can change the EC or CC, as well as instruct either of these bodies, and it can overrule any of their decisions. The NC must approve major changes in perspectives.

The EC will continue to take responsibility for the day to day tasks of political leadership. It will continue to be charged with overall leadership responsibilities in relationship to all other leading bodies of the organization. The CC can instruct the EC, but it cannot replace the EC.

The EC will not maintain internal discipline within the CC, but will carry out open and frank discussion within it. The CC will develop its own form of disciplined functioning designed to allow the maximum political dialogue and communication within the organization without generating artificial factionalism over CC disputes, without permitting CC differences to undermine or disrupt ongoing work, and without creating a system that encourages every CC member to maintain his/her own constituency.

The EC and CC will be charged with the responsibility of organizing internal IS discussion in the organization of questions going to the CC for resolution or discussions organized by the CC that go on through the organization before final resolution.

3. A midwest full time Organizers' Council will be established. The body will have no formal decision making power. It will play a key role in refining policy and in initiating discussion that can be sent to the EC or CC. It is responsible for developing and refining the political roles and functions of branch/district organizers. It will be able to collectivize experiences in developing rounded branch and district organization, and in the experience of developing collaborative relations between industrial leadership and full time leadership on the branch/district level. It will aid immediately in the rich experience our full time organizers are already developing and will help train new organizers for the organization.

The Organizers' Council will elect a convenor who is one of the full time branch/district organizers. It will include the full time midwest organizers, plus specified members from the National Organizational staff, and from the EC. It will maintain regular communication with all the full time organizers and periodically it will organize national organizer's meetings, schools or conferences for all organizers.

4. Strong and viable national fraction leadership bodies will be established through sufficient commitment and resources. There will be resident steering committees, and national leadership councils. National Industrial Organizers will help build the fractions. There will continue to be national fraction meetings and/or national fraction council meetings between conventions in order to develop and carry out fraction perspectives. In the next period stress will be placed on developing and maintaining collaborative relations between the fractions and other leadership bodies.

5. From 1975 to date we emphasized bold initiatives in the turn to agitation. Training our members and developing a secondary leadership and cadres took place primarily through intense external activity. Through this process many members - the secondary leadership we now have - experienced valuable political growth that could never have been accomplished with intense study. But there were negative effects on the development of leadership; many members and many political questions were left aside; as the organization became overstretched, the number of members involved in this process shrank. We must now adjust our perspectives in order to overcome these weaknesses from the last period.'

We will have to make the time and political space in which to round out the building of a secondary leadership. The secondary leadership we do have has been mainly developed over the last two years. Since there was little planning in developing this leadership, however, it is extremely uneven. Now, comrades on all levels will be assigned tasks they have not normally done in the past. Initiative will be stressed, even to the point of the willingness to live with mistakes and failures. Fractions and

other functional work units will have special responsibility for this leadership development. Fractions on all levels will be given greater responsibility for the development of perspectives in their areas of work. They will also be expected to develop general knowledge of the industries, unions, communities, struggles relevant to their work.

6. Part of developing the secondary leadership in the IS means taking up and giving theoretical depth to the political questions that arise out of the work comrades do. Eg, out of the Southern Africa work, the questions of national liberation, permanent revolution, imperialism naturally arise. Likewise, we will have to begin generalizing discussions out of the trade union work such as the role of the trade unions in time of crisis, the relationship between the struggle in the union and the struggle against the employer, the role of the courts under capitalism, etc. Most important in the coming year is a thorough political education of the entire organization on an in depth understanding of black liberation.

Majority Caucus Resolution
Workers' Power

1. In the past three years Workers' Power has been transformed into a professionally produced weekly paper. Working class struggle and life came into the pages of SO. High quality expose material, special columns, and educational features further increased the quality and usefulness of WP. International coverage improved greatly.

Confusion and lack of confidence in the perspectives of the organization, which came with the failure to grow in the past year, affected WP as much as any section of the organization. Lively material from our industrial work dried up as those carrying out the work lost confidence and enthusiasm. WP became isolated from the work of the organization. Simultaneously, the paper fell into disuse. The outbreak of the faction fight, further isolated WP and made it difficult to maintain its high standards.

The October, 1976 NC charted some new directions for IS work. Without any retreat from the agitational style of the past, WP was to deepen its political content. The faction fight prevented this from happening. It is clear, that this direction will require the reintegration of WP into the work of the organization. The burden for this rests as heavily on the membership as on the WP staff. For a paper that is not used will not be able to reflect what is going on in the real world.

2. We seek to transform WP into a real revolutionary workers paper over the coming years. This means that it must reflect the life of the working class in a way that is both lively and partisan. Eventually it will mean a paper in which a large proportion of the articles are written by workers, rather than staff writers. For now it means bringing workers into the pages of the paper in the best ways possible, e.g., interviews, etc.

We also want WP to become a genuine organizer for the IS. To do this it must be agitational in style and partisan in content. In particular, WP must remain a weekly, line paper. For now it is not possible for WP to carry out consistent agitation in practice, nor to be an organizer on a mass scale. But it can organize in the milieu in which we work for our political line.

As a line paper, WP cannot and should not follow the pattern of many sectarian papers which always draw the same lessons. Since it is weekly, WP can argue and fight for the line that is relevant at that time. While this may mean frequent overlap with rank and file papers, this is not a disadvantage. The purpose of rank and file papers is to link up workers in a specific union or industry. The purpose of WP is to link our immediate line with broader political ideas. The major change in content will, therefore, be in deepening the politics. While any socialist paper will contain propaganda, we are opposed to WP becoming primarily a propaganda paper.

3. WP also has an educational role. It should present socialist ideas and politics in popular form. Various columns and special features can present some of our most basic political ideas in a way that can help educate our periphery and compliment various line articles. These articles will emphasize three main areas: 1) articles that help re-establish class struggle traditions; 2) those that explain certain basic concepts in the IS view of the period (e.g., the employers offensive, roots of racism and sexism, etc.); and 3) educational pieces on socialism and revolution. Wherever possible the "lecture" or monograph form of presentation is to be avoided in favor of more lively forms.

4. The major change in WP proposed for the coming year is to raise the political level.

POLITICAL MOTIVATION FOR PROPOSED EC SLATE

Our conception of the EC's role for the coming year begins with opposition to any attempt to weaken or dismantle the central leadership of the organization or the apparatus that it must necessarily direct. We believe that a strong center that can direct and prioritize the resources of the organization will continue to be the key to success in our external work and to the internal political development of the organization as a whole. We re-affirm the basic Leninist notion that the job of the leadership is to lead.

We believe that the central leadership must be a collaborative body that draws on the most politically experienced and developed people in the organization. The EC must be able to present coherent proposals to move the organization forward, week in and week out. This means it must be willing and able to formulate and administer policy that will necessarily be in advance of the membership as a whole. In organizing discussions, as in other tasks, it is the job of the EC to lead - not merely to administer.

We reject the idea that the EC is some sort of parliament in which various trends in the organization debate and organize debate. The first, and foremost, job of the EC is to formulate policy, and carry it out, and advance the organization politically.

For these reasons we believe that any EC slate must be based on the present personnel of the E.C. By and large this five person core represents the most experienced and politically developed comrades in the organization. The five comrades on the present EC have all been in revolutionary politics for more than a decade. All have experience in mass movements and or trade union work. Most importantly, the five current members of the EC have been the core that has led the organization through several crucial turns and through the difficult and disappointing last year without breaking-up or allowing themselves the luxury of indiscipline that deprive the organization of leadership.

We favor additions to the EC, as a step toward the unity of the central and industrial leadership of the organization. We also favor additions because the size of the current EC restricts its effectiveness in implementing policy. Most of the proposed additional candidates for the are somewhat less politically developed than the core of the EC. Some believe that the solution to this problem is to break up the five person core. We reject this as no more than a weakening of the central leadership. There is also a nonsensical idea floating around that a weaker EC will help create a stronger CC, but this too misses the point that to make the CC effective there must be an effective EC as well. The fact is that if the ~~EC~~ leadership is to be more effective it must increase of the accumulated talent of the present EC, not decrease it. Even the task of helping new ECers develop their politics and self-confidence vis-a-vis the organization and their fellow EC members will require the accumulated talent and experience of the five person core.

The greatest shortcoming of the proposed slate is that it does not sufficiently increase the accumulated industrial experience of the EC. The weakness and fragility of the IS and its industrial work makes it impossible at this time to pull out precisely those people who would most advance and strengthen the EC.

The EC slate motivated by this document, should have a commitment to carrying out the following priority tasks in the coming year.

1) The deeper and more consistent involvement of the EC in the industrial work and fractions. In the past year, EC members have been involved in the fraction steering committees. However in most cases these assignments were one of many and with the exception of Kim in Teamsters and Jack in Steel, usually came near the bottom of the list. To facilitate greater interzention by the EC and a closer working relationship with the industrial leadership, we propose to reorganise the way the EC relates to the industrial fractions. Instead of the old assignments, several members of the EC will be full-time industrial organisers and travellers. They will not only represent the EC on the various steering committees, they will also travel regularly for the fractions and participate consistently in the ongoing work of local and national fractions.

2) Greater direct contact between the EC and the membership. We propose to end the current isolation of the EC by reviving the tradition of EC travelling. We believe that the void between the EC (and other leading bodies too) and the rest of the membership is not the product of discipline, "kick ass" methods or other signs of real leadership. Rather it has been the failure of the EC to get out into the organisation and to see first hand the real or potential problems that merit serious attention. EC travelling is also an indispensable part of building the external work of the IS and recruiting. The emphasis will have to be on mid-west branches, but it is our plan to also increase direct contact with the two coasts.

3) Direct EC participation in cadre development. The fact is that in order to broaden and strengthen the cadre of the organisation, the leadership, at each level, must reproduce itself. To a large degree this can only be done thru regular direct contact. We therefore propose that EC members participate directly in this work. One EC member will be in charge of education and cadre development, but all will work with other leaders to implement the organisations cadre development program for the coming year. In other words we propose that the political experience and development that we spoke of earlier be shared with and passed on to broader layers of the cadre. The EC as a body must assume the responsibility for expanding the leadership and collaborating with other leadership bodies of the I.S.

These central tasks of the EC flow from the priorities outlined in the majority document passed at the 1/1/77 meeting and the general directions charted by the October NC. They can be summed up as the unification of central and industrial leadership; the solidifying of our strength in the mid-west and building a national organisation from that position of strength; the training of and broadening of the cadre of the organisation; the political upgrading of Workers Power; and consistent work in building a political periphery and recruiting out of it.

Executive Committee,
February 18th. 1977.

EC SLATE FOR VOTE BY NATIONAL CONVENTION

Gay S
Joel G
Kim M
Dan L
Eric H
Jack W
Glenn W

Majority Caucus Feb. 20th. 1977

A POLICY FOR THE TRANSITION OF THE I.S. INTO A REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS
COMBAT ORGANIZATION An E.C. Motion to 1977 Convention.

Introduction

This policy statement is a summary of the lessons we have learned for the transition of the IS into a revolutionary workers combat organization. It is not a listing of separate or separable points, but rather is a single program developed with a single aim. Nor is this program complete. We still have much to learn about the transition. But this program is the foundation on which we will build both our theory and our practice in the years ahead.

1. The Basis of the Transitional Organization.

1.) After a quarter century of capitalist stability and expansion, the world capitalist system has returned to a state of fundamental and deepening crisis. It is again possible to build a fighting organization of revolutionary workers. For many years, revolutionary Marxism has been isolated from the working class. We have inherited, therefore, a political tradition that is both abstract and distorted. Now that we are firmly on the road toward building a revolutionary workers combat organization, we are gaining the practical experience through which we are able to reestablish the revolutionary tradition.

In the years ahead, there will be many ups and downs before the transition is complete. But despite all problems, there is no turning back. We will not be reentering a period where it is no longer possible to make progress in establishing a workers combat organization. We have a strategy for transforming the IS over a period of years. We will not reconsider this strategy every time the going gets rough.

2.) It will be many years from now, only after the transition is completed, that we will confront the task of building a real revolutionary workers party in this country. Developments in the US, and international experience in countries far in advance of us, indicate that there are other political formations that may also be part of a future party. For now, this is only speculation. We should, however, be fully confident that the IS has taken the extremely difficult, but necessary first step on the long journey to socialist revolution.

3.) Our central task in this period has two parts: a) the recruitment of workers to revolutionary politics and revolutionary organization; and b) training and organizing our members to play leadership roles in the struggles of the working class. We maintain a conscious policy of open recruitment of workers to the IS. We place no barriers in the path of workers who are prepared to join us in the struggle for socialism. As members, we struggle to train and organize them to become politically effective revolutionary cadre.

4.) In the recruitment, training, and retention of worker members, our industrial fractions have to play the major role. In our transition to combat organization, we will phase out our branch structure and reorganize on the basis of functional organizational units. These will be integrated into a political district organization. Their fractional activities will be led and coordinated by national fraction centers. Our present industrial fractions are on the way toward becoming such functional organizational units. Other fractions assigned to political or organizational

work will be eventually organized on a similar functional and activist basis. During the period of transition, our branches and national organization exist to weld these units into a single, effective weapon dedicated to the destruction of the capitalist system.

5.) The IS must be an organization of professional revolutionaries. All members, whatever their occupation or class origin, are expected to dedicate themselves to carrying out the objectives of the organization to the full extent of their ability. Comrades are expected to carry out these objectives whether they are passed unanimously, overwhelmingly, or by a single vote.

Strict adherence to carrying out the majority policy of the organization is particularly important for the full time staff. The purpose of having a staff is to make sure that majority policies are refined, concretized, and carried throughout all the units of the organization for implementation. Staff should be trained and developed to carry out their tasks with maximum creativity and maximum feedback. But, the democratic will of the majority, demands that staff may not use their posts as a base from which to pursue an independent political path.

As a professional organization, we require a high level of specialization. We are a collective of many experts, from many different arenas. At every level, we are engaged in building an efficient machine to do combat with powerful and effective enemies.

6.) We are a small organization with tiny resources. Our success and growth depends on our ability to have a real impact on the world around us. But we can only do that by developing the ability to sharply focus our energy. Centralism for us, therefore, is an extremely important principle - though one we have not yet learned to apply well in practice.

There is no room in the IS for a "do your own thing" mentality. Membership initiative should be encouraged in the development of specific political roles and specific political tasks. But it is the job of leadership at every level to make sure that membership initiative and creativity are sharply focused-in on accomplishing of the organization's priority political objectives. We must learn to focus maximum resources on a single point. Leadership must stop members from taking political tasks that are extraneous to the priority objectives of the district, branch, or fraction. We must end the practice of overstretching the organization to the point of ineffectiveness.

The centralized, directed activity of the organization comes from the EC, CC, NC, national fraction committees, branch or district execs, organizers, and local industrial fraction convenors. It is effective, only if it is based on the collective experience of the whole organization. We democratically elect leadership both to give a lead, and to organize discussion and feedback so that the experiences and ideas of comrades on all levels can shape and influence the direction and perspectives of the organization as a whole.

Except in the pre-convention period, it is the elected leadership that decides around which political topics we will or will not have organized political discussion. Individual members have the right to submit their viewpoints to the internal bulletin. But the decision to consume internal resources in organized political debate outside the pre-convention period

can only be initiated by the elected leadership and cannot be imposed on the organization at the whim of members who were never elected to do so.

B. The Industrial Work of the Transitional Organization.

1.) Industrial work in our priority unions and industries is the core work of our organization in the period of transition. Success in this area is the pre-condition for success in carrying out our other political task on a proletarian basis; putting out a workers paper; doing working class youth work; doing working class community work; recruiting and integrating workers from outside our priorities; doing effective working class agitation and propaganda around concrete issues of racism, sexism, imperialism, and other general political issues.

Placing the maximum possible number of our members in jobs where they can play a first hand role in this core work remains central. Training of non-industrial members, and finding ways to involve them too in this work is increasingly important. To accomplish this requires the leadership of increasingly expert, self-confident, activist national fraction leadership committees. Many of our next generation of political leaders will be forged on these committees.

2.) The key to our industrial work is concrete agitation on the basis of the principles of "mass work". We understand that there can be no wide spread acceptance of our revolutionary politics by workers unless we have proved the effectiveness of those politics in practice. Nor will we succeed in developing our working class base unless we put down deep roots in the present institutions of the working class. Our aim must be to win positions in the unions as revolutionaries while leading real agitational struggles. Our experience has demonstrated that only the dual approach will take us towards our goal.

3.) We recognize that the American working class is only now awakening from decades of slumber. In general there is no militant rank and file base waiting for leadership, no masses on the verge of self activity. There are still extremely widespread feelings of impotence and timidity. We are therefore committed to conscious strategy of united fronts at all levels of our industrial work. Our aim is to bring together enough people on a limited program to create the size and influence necessary to move forward. We make partial and temporary alliances with forces well to the right of us while always maintaining the basis for independent action. Our achievement over the past two years has been to break decisively with the sectarianism and self-imposed isolation that has paralysed other small political groups.

4.) We face a considerable problem in the death, since the thirties of any real traditions of political struggle and effective self-organization amongst American workers. But we must turn that weakness to our advantage. We can gain credibility for ourselves. There is a considerable political advantage in IS members being regarded as the best organizers, most efficient technicians and most reliable activists of the rank and file movement.

5.) IS members operate in their work-place and unions as open socialists who are clearly identified with the newspaper, Workers' Power. Deep roots, widespread respect and real leadership capabilities do not take a revolution a single step forward unless they are associated with the

revolutionary politics of our members. A high level of rank and file activism is the price we pay for the ability to do effective, as opposed ineffective, revolutionary political work. Add that is what we are there for. It is also proven that a combination of political openness and virtual indispensibility to the rank and file struggle is the best defense against the red-baiting of our enemies.

C. The Other Major Components of the Transitional Organization.

1.) While industrial work in our priority industries and unions is the core work of the organization in the period of transition, we will have to continually struggle against any tendency to glorify this work as an end in itself. If all we did during the period of transition was to concentrate on industrial and trade union work, we will not succeed in eventually building a revolutionary socialist workers combat organization. At best we would end up building a union reform or syndicalist group. We concentrate today on the economic struggle as the surest way to root our organization in the working class and its struggles. This work lays the basis for carrying out more general political and socialist agitation and propaganda in the working class, and for penetrating and influencing all institutions of working class life.

2.) Workers Power - a revolutionary workers paper - is a critical tool for the organization in the period of transition. Its most important use is to give our members who are active in any arena of struggle, a revolutionary socialist identity. Developing and improving the paper will be a process of continual struggle that will not proceed evenly. It will require greater input of political and material resources. But further improvement will also require greater use of the paper and greater feedback and input from our membership and working class periphery.

We will have to continually struggle for members to use WP so consistently that it becomes an integral part of their identity - just like their car, their clothes, their smile, or their rap. Regular use of the paper is key to transforming a trade union periphery into a political periphery.

Workers Power Review will be an extension of this process. It will need be aimed at our members and periphery. It is a tool for political discussion, education, and recruitment.

3.) Another major component of our transitional organization is our youth organization - the Red Tide. Young people respond first to a period of economic and political crisis. They are not held back by years of reactionary conditioning. They respond more quickly to an openly revolutionary appeal. A dynamic, revolutionary youth group is an important counterweight to the routinism and conservative pressures on an industrially based organization.

The Red Tide has been our biggest source of black working class recruitment. Like all youth organizations, it is unstable. But it has the right to demand more help from the IS, and more practical help and encouragement from our older and more experienced members. As the IS moves more into anti-imperialist and community work, the value of the Red Tide to the transitional organization will become increasingly clear. Serious joint work between the two organizations and a push for youth industrialization into our priorities is now in order.

4.) In America, a revolutionary party cannot be built unless it is the-roughly multi-racial on every level - from the central leadership right on down. While we have made some progress in the development of a black membership and cadre, we have a long way to go before we can effectively carry out the transition. Given our correct emphasis on industrial work, much of our black and latin recruitment will have to come through the industrial fractions - even the IBT fraction with a relatively low proportion of blacks. But we will have to also launch serious anti-racist campaigns that we carry on a community, high school, and industrial basis. The Tyler case was one example. The Southern Africa campaign must be even more successful. Community work in the large industrial cities will be still another opportunity for black recruitment. The IS must develop and deserve a reputation as an organization that consistently fights every manifestation of racism, wherever it arises. We must stay aware that a predominantly white workers combat organization will just about as useless in building a party as was the activist discussion group that we have moved beyond.

5.) In the period immediately ahead we do not expect that agitational work based on working class women's issues will provide us the same opportunities we expect from industrial, youth, anti-racist, and anti-imperialist work. But the politics of women's liberation are an important part of the struggle for socialism. We need an active IS women's caucus that organizes to carry the whole organization on the politics of women's liberation both theoretically and practically. It should work with Red Tide women to carry the struggle among the youth, and it should participate in the recruitment of women contacts. We should also launch limited external campaigns on women's issues, and must struggle to bring the politics of women's liberation into our industrial work.

6.) As the transition progresses, we will put increasing effort into anti-imperialist and international solidarity work, into political work in working class communities, and into industrial work based on worker recruits in non-priority unions. In general, this will be most effective in districts where we already have well established industrial work. In areas where this work is not well developed, we will have to resist tendencies for this work to degenerate into either forays into the petty bourgeois left, or into social work. Where we can develop strong district organizations with established industrial work, experienced industrial cadre, Red Tide chapters, strong district leaderships, and progress toward reorganization along functional lines, these types of work become extremely important. It will create an overall political balance that will allow for the most rapid political development of worker recruits and for the most rapid worker recruitment as our organization begins acting like a contending political tendency in the working class of the cities in which it exists.

D. The Further Development of the IS as a Transitional Organization.

1.) Our transition to a Revolutionary Workers Combat Organization will have to proceed at a sober rate over the next period. We have paid the price for moving too fast. After twenty years of isolation there is no short-cut to the rebuilding of a workers organization. There is no alternative to consistent, patient work over a long period.

2.) Divisions between industrial leadership and full time political leadership must be broken down. They must be transformed into a unified expanded leadership on the basis of a common program and common leadership. This will not happen unless we end the habit of mushing, and negotiating

differences - and instead encourage sharp, open, but comradly, political struggle when disputes arise. The Only way to ensure that political struggle goes on within the bounds of comradly behaviour and without factionalism. Indeed the only way to really broaden the leadership is to make certain that the full-time leaders are so thoroughly involved in the work of the industrial committees at every level that their mood is as effected by the ups and downs of the struggle as is the mood of the industrial leaders. The industrial leadership will also be involved in the political work of the full timer to the extent that they can never take the easy route of disclaiming responsibility for the political setbacks that inevitably test and organization that has embarked on our difficult course.

3.) We are building a dedicated, disciplined, cadre organization. We will fight the middle-class liberalism that implies that workers cannot achieve the level of dedication that our middle-class cadre has achieved. Producing a new layer of committed cadre will be the responsibility of every one of the present cadre. The cadre must reproduce itself. Each individual cadre will consciously train one other member to be self-conscious, expert cadre of the IS both internally and in external work. This is not an extra burden to our present overworked cadre. It is the only method we have of spreading the load and coming out of the next period with a larger organization and equally important, double the cadre.

4.) A disciplined organization, a workers organization, requires disciplined collective leadership. Individualism inside the organization and working class collectivity outside is a contradiction which will at first confuse and eventually harm the organization. We are disciplined on the outside because we intervene. But inside the leadership intervenes too, it is not worthy of its position if it doesn't. The EC, the national industrial committees, the branch execs will all intervene inside the organization. They must have a single line to do it so that it is irrelevant which individual carries on the intervention. In terms of central leadership, the CC is taking on some of the responsibilities previously covered solely by the EC. That body, the national fraction committees and the branch execs must work out norms of collaboration which includes, self-discipline. They should not forget however, as the EC sometimes has, that organizational principles of this kind follow politics and should not be followed either on insignificant questions of those questions which would bring real political progress to the organization if hammered out in the open.

5.) Not everyone can be involved in full discussion of every aspect of the organizations activity. This is a simple principle once it becomes clear that the actual level of activity of a real combat organization makes such discussion procedures impossible. The other side of this principle however is that there is a consequent level of autonomy for other leadership bodies besides the EC/CC. For the central leadership cannot be in on every discussion either. So what is required is a common program, clearly understood, so that every leadership body can be confident that discussion and decision in other sections of the organization is going on, on the basis of common political assumptions.

RESOLUTION TO 1977 CONVENTION - On Setting Up the IS Industrial Committee

1.) The clarifications and changes of functioning by the organization following the convention require changes in the way the central leadership does its job. In terms of the industrial work this requires that EC members cease to merely attend regular national fraction steering committees, but become full working members of those committees, both at their centres and on travelling, on behalf of the centres to the local fractions. Where possible EC as well as members must take on specific local fraction assignments too. This goal can only be achieved by developing a core of professional, national industrial organizers who are part of the central leadership.

2.) These organizers should constitute a new EC sub-committee, the national industrial committee, which as a body responsible to first the EC and then the CC, will take on the national organization of our industrial work. This body will also take responsibility for keeping in close touch with the national fraction convenors and providing full industrial committee reports to all national steering committee meetings so that there can be a link-up across our industrial priorities.'

3.) The industrial committee will share with the EC, CC and fraction steering committees the responsibility for integrating the political and industrial work of the organization more effectively. But this is not its most important duty at this time. And certainly the committee should not be viewed as some special task-force for "injecting" our national political initiatives into our practical work. For its main task will be to create a fusion, through joint political development and practical work, between the national leaders who are in industry and those who are full-time. Only such a fusion can guarantee the progress we require for the next crucial steps in our development as an organization. Together the Industrial Committee and Steering committee will take us forward in the dual task of expanding our industrial base and developing the techniques required to create a growing revolutionary presence within that base.

4.) The organization will provide the industrial committee and fraction steering committees with the necessary resources to carry out these tasks. In the next period the industrial committees will be at the very centre of the political life of the organization. Externally, the faster development, both on the rank and file and IS level, of our industrial work is crucial. Internally, the principled unification of the industrial and political leadership is no less a life-and-death question for the organization. This centrality demands that the industrial work has the major call on our scarce resources. These resources will include, finance, administrative assistance and the time of our professional political organizers.

5.) The committee should be co-ordinated by Glenn W, Jack W, the other two industrial organizers will also be a full-time member. Kim M. will sit on the body, though not as an organizer, as a full member with an important consultative role and responsibility for integrating WP into the needs of our industrial work. There will be a fourth non-EC full-time member who will also be a national industrial organizer. That person is to be appointed within one month of convention and must have considerable industrial experience in order to qualify. This is not another premature attempt to start an industrial department, so no additional administrative staff will be necessary.

6.) In terms of fraction assignments there will be some specialization on the committee, though the exact nature of that and the overall relationship of committee members to the steering committees will have to be worked

out in collaboration with the fractions. We will also aim eventually to develop well-rounded industrial organizers with expertise in all our priorities; The committee will concentrate on IBT, UAW, and USW and on the four priority districts. It must also accept the responsibility for giving direction to CWA and postal work as well as certain, local non-priority industrial work. Indeed despite the limited time available, given that these areas do not have functioning and proven leadership bodies of their own, the political responsibility of the industrial committee will be proportionately greater.

Executive Committee.

CONVENTION RESOLUTION: BUILDING THE I.S.

- 1.) Continuing efforts to build a political periphery out of our industrial, Black and women's work will be the major source of recruitment to the IS. Specific proposals on Black and women's work are covered under resolutions on those topics. Building a political periphery out of our industrial work means continuing to politicize that work. It means developing and fighting for the political direction arising from the movement that carries that movement forward, such as fighting red-baiting. It means politically educating the militants on the context of these struggles, such as the employers' offensive, and class against class. It means bringing in the political issues of the day like Carter and the Democrats, Southern Africa. And, above, all, it means winning over a layer of militants to revolutionary socialist ideas.
- 2.) Over the next year we will recruit workers in ones and twos. During this period we must also train ourselves and the militants we work with to lead the future mass struggles as they break out. Specific perspectives must be developed by all the industrial fractions on building a political periphery, specific areas of recruitment, targets and dates. The direction of the national IBT fraction provides an excellent beginning. The methods used by the IBT fraction must be carried into the other industrial fractions.
- 3.) In building a periphery, we will lay the basis for building the IS. Recruitment will become easier as our political influence and effectiveness grows in our mass work. IS events are key to building the periphery and to recruitment. Through events, organized by the fractions, branches, and districts, the IS should gain a consistent presence. Additionally, IS events must provide a regular means for contacts and collaborators to learn our politics. While informal discussion and contact will always provide the main way for contacts to learn our politics, IS events provide a formal means of education that cannot be done in the meetings or activities rank and file or community based mass work organizations.
- 4.) The developing revolution in Southern Africa provides us excellent opportunities to raise the political questions of national liberation and self-determination, permanent revolution, reform and revolution and Stalinism. Southern Africa has all the potential to be the Vietnam of the 70's. It will have a profound effect on the consciousness of Black Americans. We unconditionally support the struggle for national liberation in Southern Africa today.
- 5.) Following the convention we will undertake a major campaign around Southern Africa support work. Specific perspectives will be further worked out. Major branches are already in the process of setting up Southern Africa Liberation Committees (SALC). The SALC's will be non-sectarian and will support ZANU in Zimbabwe, SWAPO in Namibia and the many groups now involved in South Africa. The orientation will be educational and activist. Where similar groups already exist, we will work to build those. A midwest center has been set up in Detroit and is distributing two films, buttons, posters as well as a large selection of Southern Africa literature. The center will also provide limited research facilities and is in the process of preparing a handbook on building SALC's and activities such as the ZANU shoe drive.
- 6.) The growth of the Red Tide represents the future growth of the IS. In particular in the coming year it will be through the Red Tide that the bulk of our black working class recruitment will take place. Through work in the High Schools of the major industrial cities where we have districts or branches, the Red Tide recruits black working class youth and trains them to become the IS cadre of the future. As RT'ers leave school and get jobs in industry they provide a source of industrial cadre for IS.

POLICY STATEMENT ON THE TRADE UNION STRUGGLE. Majority Caucus

1.) In the period ahead, effective working class defensive struggle against the employers offensive will have to be carried out through the existing trade unions. Our primary agitational goal is to give a lead to such struggles.

Even the smallest shop floor struggle that effectively by passes the steward (committeeman, griever etc.) is still part of the union struggle. Anyone who gives leadership to collective action on the shop floor is either strengthening the position of the union rep, challenging and contending for leadership against the union rep, or both. On issues larger than the most immediate shop floor problem, there is no way to bypass the union and still fight management. Even where agitation and struggle is carried out totally independent of the union structure, management will bargain with and grant concessions to and through the union if at all.

2.) In most unions today, the attitude of the rank and file towards the union activists tends with good reason, to be distrustful and scornful. This tempts our less experienced members to seek an identity separate and apart from the union activists. This approach is wrong and disorienting. If being a union activist necessarily makes one a corrupt careerist, there is no hope for changing the union. We cannot bow to the pessimistic cynical attitudes that predominate among the rank and file. We should view ourselves as union activists, and should encourage others to view us as such. We should let people know that we think the union can be changed, but only if fighters like ourselves get involved.

Among the union activists, we attempt to establish ourselves as a rank and file oriented, class struggle pole - and we fight for recognition as a legitimate trend within the union. We are neither opportunist careerists looking for an easy job, nor are we crackpot oppositionists in principle. We are class fighters. In a fight with management, even sell-out bureaucrats can count on our support. We want a strong fighting union with a high level of rank and file involvement and activism.

3.) Our immediate objective in the union struggle is neither propaganda nor the exposure of bureaucrats and their policies. Rather, our primary goal is to build and lead the actual struggles that go on within the union and against management and to develop and train other militants to join in building and leading these struggles. Success in this is the precondition for effective propaganda and exposure. It is the precondition for building strong rank and file organizations. And it lays the basis for worker recruitment to the IS - both recruitment of militant union activists out of the experiences of the struggle, and the recruitment of workers who are attracted to our political ideas because they see how we translate our politics into practice.

4.) Effective agitation requires us to enter into all kinds of alliances and united fronts. We will work with the devil, if we believe that doing so advances the struggle. In entering into any alliance, our members should always have a clear understanding of why they are entering into it and what they hope to get out of it. Our loyalty is never to the alliance itself, but to the objectives. Within united fronts where we do not play a leading role, we should always seek to maximize our ability to take independent initiatives, and should seek to maximize an independent identity for our members and for whatever forces they lead.

5.) In the next period, we expect union reform sentiment to be on the rise. This sentiment is often naive and easily manipulated by liberal bureaucrats. It is based on the half-truth that a more formally democratic and less corrupt union will automatically defend the membership from the employers offensive. In truth, defense requires a willingness and ability to fight.

But never the less, we welcome union reform sentiment as a response of the workers to the growing economic crisis and we try to organize it and give it class struggle content. Successful union reform campaigns lead to a higher membership involvement and impact on the policies of the union. They raise the level of expectation and self-confidence in the membership. They create conditions in which class struggle ideas have more currency, and in which it is easier for socialists and class struggle unionists to emerge as leaders. And on the whole, they lead to a higher level of struggle with management.

6.) We always seek to give union reform sentiment an anti-management thrust, drawing out the relations between union reform, the need to fight the company more vigorously, and the employers offensive. We fight for unity among the union reformers - but within that unity, we seek to cohere a rank and file, class struggle pole. At times, it will be our agitational initiatives that create openings and opportunities that the union reformers seek to fill. Even then, we seek unity unless rank and file class struggle forces are already so strong that they can credibly contend for leadership against the bureaucratic reformers.

7.) In the IBT, where class struggle, rank and file organized pole already exists, we argue that TDU should always have an open clear and independent presence if not the leading role, in broader union reform slates and campaigns. In other unions, where no such clear pole exists, we seek this presence in other ways.

We should encourage IS members to seek union office. It is a necessary part of contending for working class leadership in a responsible way. Otherwise, we're just complainers. Which offices to run for should be decided on the basis of practical considerations: what can we win? what kind of influence in the ranks will it give us? how hard will it be to survive in the office? how hard will it be to maintain close ties with the ranks and a fighting reputation? etc.

Members who hold union office will come under an enormous amount of pressure. They will often need a great deal of help both from their fractions and from the industrial department, just to survive. It is important for them to be widely known as open socialists before they run. To come out openly, after being elected is very difficult - even their closest friends and supporters will demand they shut up about socialist stuff. Union office holders, openly known as socialists and openly associated with WP, however, can have a great deal of political influence.

8.) There will have to be a concerted effort for IS members in industry to openly associate themselves with WP as soon as they have the minimum seniority, experience, and self-confidence to pull it off. It is important that they do more than sell the paper privately to a few friends. Everybody they know should know about the paper. It is not part of some conspiracy. We have no one we want to hide it from. "Coming out" as a socialist is often a difficult struggle. But the sooner we can pull it off, the better.

Waiting, after a certain point, makes it harder not easier.

Industrial members should also be openly associated with IS non-economic political campaigns. The influence and leadership they achieve in the economic struggles should be used to help further these campaigns. We must always view economic and trade union agitation as an opening wedge for more general political agitation and propaganda. We seek the development of a cadre of militant union activists, who are recognized leaders in their workplaces and unions, who are open socialists and openly identified with WP, and who engage in political as well as economic agitation and propaganda at the workplace. It is through this cadre that we will build both the rank and file movement and the party.

DEVELOPING THE USE OF WP

Majority Caucus Motion

1.) This motion is BASED ON TWO MAIN IDEAS !) that the use of WP is closely connected with two other main problems facing the organization, repoliticization and the training of cadre, and 2) The simple proposition that when you participate in something you then have a stake in making it work.

2) We often sell the paper but seldom use it, because it's easier to sell the paper than it is to use it. Many of us have had the experience of selling a paper to a co-worker, pointing out the article and coming back later to discuss it only to receive a positive but passive reaction. The obvious problem with this approach is that it is a very superficial use of the paper. It doesn't leave any lasting results.

3) For example, we have two comrades in a large plant who have used this approach extensively..At high points they were able to sell as many as 80 copies of a single issue. But, when the layoffs came and the workers were dispersed in all directions, the superficial character of our high sales and large "pare routes" was revealed. We are now lucky to sell 15 papers per issue. We had not gotten very close to our goal. We hadn't developed our routes into a network of politically minded people interested in the paper and discussing its contents. Namely, we hadn't accomplished the first step in making the paper our "best organizer". We didn't have a clear strategy for developing the use of the paper.

4.) Let's go back to the statement at the beginning: "when you participate in something you then have a stake in making it work." This statement applies equally to our members and to our friends(periphery). It also applies equally to industrialized members as well as non-industrialized. We have to create a situation among our members where many, not few, participate in the paper. Namely, write or help write for it. There is nothing quite like having to write to make you think through the various things required to have a political discussion of WP's content. You have to decide who your audience is. How best to get your points over to that audience, and how to organize your points so they will be interesting.

5.) Once you've done this you are far better equipped to use the paper with a particular audience. You've invested some time and energy and are therefore far more inclined to try until you get political discussion that goes deeper than the response of "Yeh! WP is hip." Period. In addition to preparing yourself to use the paper, actually writing for it takes a big step in the direction of two very important problems facing the IS. Repoliticising the IS and the training of cadre. You've had to think through the political content of your article and thereby raised your political level.

6.) TO Get alot of participation in writing for WP will require more than requests to do so, it will require a campaign. Our watch word should be Every Member A Writer. An atmosphere must be created that makes people take WP as seriously as they take going to work. You might miss once in awhile but mainly you go. The contents of WP should be made a standing topic of branch and committee meetings. The desired goal of such a campaign would be to create the feeling that to be a member of a branch or committee means to be prepared to write or help write for WP. And not just workplace reports either.

7.) As we said, participation is also the key for our periphery. The level of participation won't be as high but the important thing is participation at any level. Writing for the paper, selling it or even simply buying it and dis-

POLITICAL SOLUTION CAUCUS RESOLUTION
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INDUSTRIALIZATION -- UTILIZING OUR RESOURCES

Once it is recognized that mass actions around the major contracts in our priorities are not in the cards in the short run (although the contract round still offers opportunities for work), and that we cannot hot-house their development, the particular justification for industrialization that we have operated with up to the present falls apart. We can no longer view industrialization simply as a way of grasping leadership of mass movements through being the best fighters. Therefore, we can no longer make industrialization into the strategy for building the rank and file movement and of overcoming the cynicism and powerlessness of the working class.

Does this mean, then, that industrialization makes no sense, that we should get out, or change our priorities? We believe not. In the long run, workers in auto, steel, telephone, trucking, will be the heart of the rank and file movement because these industries are at the center of the capitalist economy. We can also expect that, perhaps sooner but quite possibly later, the rank and file in these industries will go into motion. We cannot predict when that will be. We can only begin to position ourselves now so as to be as well prepared for it as possible. To position ourselves, we need to industrialize many of our members in these arenas. For, in highly concentrated heavy industry with powerful union bureaucracies and traditions of union organization, it is extremely difficult to recruit from the outside in the absence of mass struggle. By industrializing, we can recruit slowly but steadily and, at the same time, build a base from which we will be able to intervene in the future when more motion does occur.

Consistent activity in the priorities has another rationale. Such work can be a significant springboard for carrying out rank and file work and/or attracting militants from other industries. The fact that I.S. is already doing serious work in the priorities shows its long-term commitment to working class struggle, provides models for work in other arenas, and at times can be used directly in support of work outside the priorities (e.g. the carhauleders strike in Detroit, the L.A. beer strike, etc.) Once we understand that our industrialized comrades are in the priorities with a much longer run perspective, we will be far more open to developing types of work for them, both within their industries and outside of them, that allow them to operate much more flexibly and politically, freed from the unrealistic demands of producing a national rank and file organization immediately regardless of the circumstances.

Because we believe that our members can keep two things in their heads at once, we believe that industrialized comrades can stick it out even when the present gains of work are not enormous, while non-industrialized comrades can continue to support them even in the absence of immediate pay-offs. The key to this is a realistic assessment of what can be done and an appreciation on the other hand of the value of industrialization, not only for the priorities, but for the rest of our work also (i.e. for other union work, community work, and work among oppressed groups).

Industrialization in a few priority industries must remain a basic task for the I.S. But it must cease to be the sum total of our external activity. For it is not in basic industry, in this period, that the working class is most in motion; nor is it in basic

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industry that the scattered recovery from the defeat of the black and women's liberation movements is occurring; nor is it in basic industry (except in Teamsters), in this period, that we will most likely recruit significant numbers. However, simply to pass resolutions that work outside basic industry is "equal" with rank and file work within industry is not enough. What is necessary is an approach both to work in the industrial priorities and to other work that centers on linking the two in practice. We develop activity, for example, around South Africa to be attractive and available to our worker contacts. The more we can bring our contacts out to these kinds of events, the more we will show other workers we may know, students and radicals we wish to recruit, that the U.S. does not simply have working class politics, but has working class connections, is putting those politics into practice.

On the other hand, as we bring workers, especially black workers in our industrial priorities to these kinds of actions, we help to convince them of our position that the U.S. is committed not just to the rank and file movement but to black liberation. And we are able to provide our industrialized people with an opportunity for raising racism with their contacts, both black and white, again in a concrete, practical way.

Finally, intervention from the outside in industries other than the priorities as well as U.S. participation in other types of work, must be recognized as absolutely essential to recruitment and growth.

We should maintain and expand the number of our members in all our priorities. However, certain changes in industrialization and priorities are necessary if we are going to recruit in the difficult period ahead of us, politicize our work, and improve our women's work.

We need more careful selection of those comrades we ask to industrialize. We must realize that many comrades are playing critical roles in the organization without being industrialized (e.g. organizers, teachers, blacks and women in non-priorities, etc.) We should make the effort to convince people to go into industry, but only comrades with real personal commitment to industrialization should industrialize.

We must politically train all comrades who are going to or already have industrialized. Members must be fully trained, not only in the general politics of the U.S., but in the specific politics and history of the union and industry.

Women's work must become a priority. In many places this can be done by prioritizing the areas in the Teamsters where there are majority or near majority of women (some warehouse, some production, Montgomery Ward's, freight clerical, etc.) This will take advantage of our position in the union through TDU and our broad political experience in the IBT. In areas where Teamster women's priorities are not a possibility because of no jobs, gangsterism, no women's work in the area, we should prioritize a local area of work of non-professional working women where the prospects for continuing rank and file activity and recruitment are judged best by the branch in collaboration with the national leadership.

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We cannot count on mass upsurges or even organization on the level of TDU to form in our other national priorities in the next year. This means significant recruitment will be difficult. However, it also means that less resources of the organization will be tied up in these campaigns and we will have a greater possibility to intervene and recruit in non-priorities. Wherever possible, this should be done so that it links up with our priority work.

POLITICAL SOLUTION CAUCUS RESOLUTION
1977 U.S. CONVENTION

AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA: POLITICIZING OUR WORK

Successful organizing, in our external rank and file work as well as for the U.S., requires that we be clear about the proper relationship between agitation and propaganda and the application of both in this period. With the exception of Teamsters, where there is a fledgling national rank and file organization, we face a situation where the level of organization of the rank and file does not meet even the minimum requirements for standing up to the employers. This is especially true during an employers' offensive. This means that our shop floor agitation must always combine agitation with propaganda, that is, from the start we must be raising and pushing for our groups to have the perspective of going beyond an individual factory or local and toward national rank and file organizing as a tactical and strategic necessity. Of course, this doesn't mean we don't take part in and build groups which have not accepted this strategy. It's our job to convince them. By raising this strategy in our local work, we cannot help but put forward our conception of the economic crisis leading to the employers' offensive, the way the capitalists are organized, and the role of the bureaucracy. Thus we are making propaganda which leads naturally to socialist conclusions for the small number of workers who are open to that, since its basis is in a Marxist analysis. At the same time, we are speaking to the tactical needs of anyone wishing to fight, beginning with the smallest issues. This can also apply to linking up local work in one industry with another industry, especially where they are economically interdependent. To do this adequately we need to develop concrete strategies, especially for the priorities. This means analyses of each industry, its bureaucracy, and the self-organization of the rank and file.

This combining of agitation with propaganda in our rank and file work requires a socialist presence. It is our socialist politics which allows us to generalize appropriately from the present struggles, problems, and illusions of workers. Recognizing that it is the lack of self-organization and reformist consciousness of workers which has weakened their response to the economic crisis, we must be prepared to aggressively convince the most advanced workers that only a revolutionary party and socialism provide a long term solution for the rank and file. But to do so requires that the U.S. be politically prepared to convince them. It will not be enough merely to show that we are the best rank and file fighters and organizers.

Our first job is to show workers that we thoroughly understand the workings of present day capitalism in all its various parts, the role of the trade union bureaucracy as a whole and industry by industry, and the strengths and weaknesses of the rank and file, so that we may better devise strategies for action. A national discussion must be undertaken immediately on the role of the trade unions under capitalism especially in times of economic crisis. This includes discussion on the trade union bureaucracy -- from former militants like Arnold Miller to died-in-the-wool business unionists like Frank Fitzsimmons. It also includes understanding the limitations of rank and file movements in industry which only seek to control a trade union.

Only these kinds of discussions can make sense out of the work we're doing, can enable us to generalize from our specific situation to understand the whole picture.

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Such discussions, held in the fractions, the branches, and at the center, can form the political basis for the recruitment of our trade union contacts to the I. S. as the only organized force in society with a program and a strategy which can win.

In this manner, we will put an immediate end to the notion inside the organization that "politics" means only discussion of the Permanent Revolution or the Permanent Arms Economy, or Fascism, as opposed to political analysis of trade unionism and our working class activity.

Similarly, many of our members have not been educated on the strong conservative tendency of the entire trade union bureaucracy in the economic crisis -- left, right and center. We must be mercilessly critical of such bureaucrats or emerging bureaucrats -- explaining why if left on their own they will be forced to the right -- so as to prepare the rank and file that it is only through their own actions that anything will be won no matter who is elected to union office. This is not to say that we do not participate in campaigns to elect such bureaucrats, but without fostering any illusions in them. We are for Sadlowski not because he will win significantly bigger gains from the steel corporations than McBride, but because his election provides an opening for the rank and file to organize themselves and the possibility of the democratization of the union by the rank and file.

We must also have a serious national discussion on special demands for women and blacks such as superseniority. Right now there are few people in the I. S. who even think we have a position on this question, much less know what it is. This is a luxury we can ill afford at a time when the employers' offensive is wiping away gains by women and blacks in employment.

Finally, the organization must fully discuss the role of the revolutionary party in the trade unions and in society generally, and how the party must always fight against the conservatizing influence of capitalist society, even on its own members and leaders, through discussion and debate (which is the only condition for real unity in action):

Such discussions, carried out with the participation of our contacts, with the understanding of the need to politicize our external work of all kinds, can lay the basis for the politicization of the I. S. and the recruitment to our tendency. It will be out of such discussions that a newly politicized WP which will be of real use to us will emerge. WP will be a newspaper of socialist analysis written primarily for militants we wish to develop into our periphery. It will not be primarily a paper seeking to move large numbers of workers in mass action, though the paper will and must continue to carry news and stories of working class struggles. The primary job of WP will be to generalize from these struggles so that the reader will see how only a socialist viewpoint can make sense out of his/her experiences and provide a way forward. This is not to say that WP cannot play an interventionist role. It does so in two ways: first, by bringing strategic ideas for advancing the struggle to a small layer who are likely to read it. We must be particularly clear that especially in our national priorities we will not be speaking to the mass of workers or carrying out mass agitation with our paper. Insofar as it is possible, agitational type coverage of our priorities should be

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carried in our rank and file papers. Secondly, in on-going struggles such as local strikes, we will often want to have an agitational coverage which may call for the support of the struggle, for it is when workers are in sharp conflict with the employers that a relatively large proportion will be open to reading our press. Especially in areas outside our priorities, such coverage may offer us an opportunity to intervene in action through strike support work.

Workers' Power should open up its pages from time to time to debates or disagreements within the membership and/or leadership which would have no immediate bearing on our campaigns. It is important that our periphery see us as an organization which is not afraid to bring some of these differences out in the open. Most workers have been brought up to suspect revolutionary organizations of monolithism and closed-mindedness, not intellectual dilettantism. Such a policy helps to bring our periphery closer to the I.S. by involving them in the working out of our line. Differences which arise before conventions should be aired in the paper to show how the I.S. works out its positions and to advertize for the convention.

The I.S. is in serious need of relevant pamphlets. In particular, we need a political analysis of Teamsters, our most important work. We must have usable pamphlets on black liberation and women's liberation and/or on racism and sexism at the work place. We must produce pamphlets which are the outgrowth of the political discussions within the national fractions, black commission, and women's commission. These should be complemented by pamphlets on all other major issues which affect our work, such as Gary Tyler, the Sadlowski campaign, the Employers' Offensive, etc.

February 10, 1977

POLITICAL SOLUTION CAUCUS RESOLUTION
1977 I.S. CONVENTION

SELF-ORGANIZATION OF OPPRESSED GROUPS

For a number of years the I.S. has neglected to develop thought out perspectives on the struggles of oppressed groups, in particular blacks and women. This has resulted in, among other things, a political retreat on the question of self-organization. The I.S. has no clear position on whether we generally advocate self-organization of oppressed groups, which is the traditional I.S. position, or whether we merely grant the right to self-organization. This confusion grows out of the failure to apply a general method to this question which contributes to a sloppy and haphazard approach.

The 1975 Convention passed a document on Black Liberation but tabled to future NCs a section dealing with black self-organization. That section marked a radical break from our past position. It argued that, since white workers were now in motion it was unnecessary for blacks to organize independently against their oppression, and that the intervention of revolutionaries in the rank and file movement against racism was sufficient that black self-organization would not be necessary. This line of argument was repeated at the 1976 convention -- that the I.S. only supported the right of self-organization, not self-organization itself -- even though this was never discussed or adopted by an NC or a convention.

We must decisively reaffirm our traditional position. As Marxists, we understand the necessity for oppressed groups to fight around their particular oppression and to organize themselves to do so, whether inside or outside of broader formations, such as rank and file caucuses or revolutionary organizations. We say this because we understand that racism and sexism are so fundamentally interwoven into American institutions and consciousness that there will be a strong tendency for all sections of society, even white and/or male workers in struggle, even white and/or male revolutionaries, to accommodate in some manner to racist and sexist social pressures, even during revolutionary periods. Since we expect these pressures to exist, generally speaking, we advocate the self-organization of oppressed groups to combat these pressures. This is the theory that underlies the need for the I.S. women's caucus, the black caucus, and the gay caucus, as well as formations of working women and black workers.

To advocate merely the right of self-organization indicates an unwillingness to draw political conclusions from the objective situation. Such a view either assumes that these racist and sexist pressures don't exist or that these pressures can generally be overcome solely within unified organizations without the prodding of organized black or women's groupings. Of course, the fact that white and/or male workers are beginning to move as a result of the economic crisis opens up new possibilities for enlisting them in the struggle against racism and sexism. As these workers struggle around their immediate needs and demands, they begin to see their real enemies as the corporations and the state apparatus, not women or blacks trying to get or keep jobs. And they also begin to understand the need to make allies with all sections of the working class. Nevertheless, our method must be based on the recognition that white

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Self-Organization of Oppressed Groups Resolution, page 2

and/or male workers continue and will continue to derive significant, if relatively small, advantages from this racism and sexism, so that blacks and women must continue to organize themselves around their own needs as part of waging the class struggle with whites and with men.

Does this mean that we agitate for such groups at any and all times, regardless of the situation? Of course not, just as we don't agitate for rank and file caucuses at any and all times, even though they are part of our general strategy for building a rank and file movement. The point is that we do not merely wait for such groups to emerge and then (maybe) take part in them, but we must strive to initiate and build them, wherever possible and feasible, as part of our strategy for black and women's liberation. Of course, we don't recommend a women's caucus in a plant with one woman, or a black caucus in an all black shop. It may not even be feasible to agitate immediately for such groupings because of the low state of consciousness or demoralization of women or black workers. We also have to make tactical decisions about whether to build such groupings outside or inside of broader formations. But none of this takes away from the general need to form such groups, where possible, or to create the conditions for their formation.

Does self-organization imply separating women from men, blacks from whites, rather than unifying them? The answer to this depends upon the politics of such groups, not their existence per se. Black caucuses dominated by nationalist ideology, for instance, do little to overcome the racial divisions within the class because they accept them as more or less permanent. Black nationalist ideology presupposes that since whites will always be racists, there can never be a basis for unity with them. By thus drawing apart from whites, nationalists tend to accommodate to, rather than confront or challenge, white racism.

On the other hand, black and women's groups, guided by good politics, can and do serve to overcome racial and sexual divisions. Women's groupings in TDU push for stronger stands on women's issues. The women's, gay, and black caucuses in the I.S. do the same for the I.S. The existence of such groupings within rank and file and revolutionary organizations is the organizational form of how the workers' struggle, the struggle for socialism, and the struggle for black and women's liberation are interconnected. Our job is to initiate black and women's groups which actively intervene in rank and file groups to raise their special needs as an integral part of the need to develop a unified rank and file movement. Similarly, our job in the I.S. black and women's caucuses is to develop and better integrate our perspectives on black and women's liberation into our trade union work, as well as in the independent black and women's movements, as they arise.

Finally, we support demands for democratic rights of women as women, blacks as blacks, latins as latins, gays as gays, even where the movements fighting for these demands are not strictly based on the working class. We understand that only the self-organization of oppressed groups will develop the skills, self-confidence and politics

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Self-Organization of Oppressed Groups Resolution, page 3

to achieve their real equality within the class as a whole. We reaffirm the L.S. position that real unity of the class cannot be achieved through the subordination of the special interests of its oppressed sections. Rather, class unity must be built up by the interaction and convergence of oppressed groups fighting for their own emancipation alongside and within broader class struggles of the rank and file movement and of the revolutionary party.

February 28, 1977

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Critique & Amendments to EC's "Economic & Political Perspectives"

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AMENDMENTS:

1. DELETE page 3, paragraph 5: "The likelihood of an immediate recession or depression is in part dependent on the actions of the Carter administration. The U.S. economy is not so far out of control to prevent turning the 'pause' back into a real recovery. It will take considerable government spending, tax cuts, and business incentives to get investment going enough to create a real recovery."

ALSO DELETE page 3, paragraph 6: "Action by the Democratic administration, however, will not have noticeable effects until the second half of 1977. It takes several months for government economic stimulation to be felt. This means that while inflation will certainly be on the rise, it will not hit high double digit levels until late 1977 or early 1978".

INSERT, in place of the above:

"The effect of Carter's Keynesian pump priming tax proposals can not be effectively prejudged. The current economic crisis is not just a typical business cycle for which Keynesian remedies have in the past demonstrated some effectiveness. The nature of the current crisis is structural in character -- a crisis of stagnation. Unlike a business cycle, government spending in a structural crisis needs to have a direct impact on the capital goods industry -- the key to economic recovery under capitalism. That this will happen today can hardly be predicted with confidence."

2. DELETE page 8, paragraph 1: "In the coming year it will be possible for today's revolutionists to recruit and train workers to revolutionary ideas and organizations on a small scale. This will require the concentration of resources in the industrial cities of the Midwest."

INSERT, in place of the above:

"In the coming year recruitment of workers to revolutionary politics will be possible on a small scale. But the needs of the organization to grow substantially, and the real possibilities for such growth (though, for the present, largely outside our priorities) require that we relate to such growth areas and devote resources to them. These areas of potential growth are through the women's movement (still powerful though unorganized); the black movement -- in black colleges, high schools (via Red Tide), and in plants (where the Southern Africa campaign and the direct appeal of our revolutionary politics are more likely to result in recruits than our strict rank and file work in the priorities at this time)."

3. DELETE page 8, paragraph 2, last line: "But by late 1977 or some time in 1978 at the latest, this situation will change."

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Critique & Amendments to EC's "Economic & Political Perspectives"

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No insert to replace this line. The sentences preceding the deletion make it clear that the "situation will change" means that in late '77 etc. we can expect a qualitative change in our ability to recruit workers in plants. This assertion sums up all the illusions and false methods which have caused the organization so much grief over the past six months.

4. DELETE page 9, paragraph 2: "As the 'pause' of 1976-77 gives way to recovery and even boom in 1978 and another probably deeper depression following that, the pressures on the working class and all of its sections will grow. Not only will real wages fall rapidly and unemployment mount over the long run, but the attacks on the working conditions will become more ferocious over the years."

INSERT, in place of the above:

"The continuing crisis of stagnation will not be qualitatively affected by the secondary fluctuations of the business cycle (whose timing is beyond our capacity or need to determine). It is this stagnation, stagflation, which will provide the central focus for our expectations and our intervention both organizationally and politically. The crisis means intensified exploitation, speed-up, etc. It does not, however, follow that real wages will fall (they have been constant for a decade), or that unemployment will qualitatively increase. What does follow is that the lag between the objective crisis of capitalism and the consciousness of the working class (as expressed by its readiness to take on the union bureaucracy) is likely to narrow. The presence of revolutionists in the class can contribute to speeding this process through providing strategies which workers need to enable them to successfully challenge the union leadership, and through demonstrating the relevance of these strategies through our participation in the daily struggles of the class."

February 10, 1977

POLITICAL SOLUTION CAUCUS RESOLUTION
1977 L.S. CONVENTION

STUDENTS

The organization should seriously attempt to recruit students. While there is no student movement at this time, the fact remains that there still exists a significant minority of students in colleges and universities who are open to revolutionary ideas and activities. Sizeable numbers of students are being recruited to such organizations as the Revolutionary Student Brigades, Young Socialist Alliance and Young Workers Liberation League (and even to sectarian groups like the Spartacist League and lunatic groups like the US Labor Party). Also, in spite of the decline of the Third World movements of the '60s, significant numbers of Black and other Third World students are being recruited to various nationalist and Marxist groups (for example, the Puerto Rican Socialist Party).

The workings of the American class structure have allowed sizeable numbers of working class students to attend colleges and universities. Many of the most militant radical workers have attended such schools and this school experience has often been a factor in their radicalization. It should also be clear that revolutionary Black and other Third World students and intellectuals can and have played an even greater role in the leadership of their own Third World movements. These Third World intellectuals are bound to carry greater political weight in communities which have been more oppressed and less educationally advantaged while at the same time being more radical and more receptive to Marxist and revolutionary political ideas.

While the U.S. is in no position (at least at this time) to help build a new student movement, it should be able to carry on a systematic and organized program of student work for the primary purpose of growth and recruitment. It should be clear from the outset, however, that the goal of our campus work is, where possible, to orient students away from the campus and to integrate them into our working class activities, to work from the outside. Campus work should be initiated, in general, where we already have members or contacts on campus as students or professors. An exception to this would be in situations where the local exec expects extraordinary recruitment possibilities.

Our program should be designed to attract working class and working class oriented students and would most likely concentrate on two types of issues: (a) Working class issues external to the campus -- strike support and boycott work (for example UFW and J.P. Stevens boycotts). (b) Working class issues internal to the campus (tuition hikes, cuts in EOP and other types of financial assistance to Third World and white students with low incomes, unions of campus workers, attacks on Affirmative Action for women and minorities, etc.) In addition, campuses are an ideal place to do educational work, especially where we have national campaigns, e.g. Portugal, South Africa, Gary Tyler. Some of these can involve agitational campaigns as well. Our main emphasis would be work in working class state and community colleges and in those so-called "elite" schools with strong radical traditions.

Recruiting students, like recruiting anyone else, requires careful follow-up and organized and systematic ^{political} work. Student work is not to be a "do your own thing"

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Resolution on Students, page 2

project in random branches here and there. It is to be organized by the Center through a coordinator (not full time) appointed by and responsible to the EC. It is to be done in those cities and campuses where this is more likely to be a fruitful project. Work organized in this manner will be more likely to be more effective and to be taken more seriously than "make do" work to keep "second class members" busy. Our intent is not to make student work a new national priority. It is rather to implement our general perspective of greater flexibility and serious commitment to non-priority work.

The recruitment of students will help the organization in several respects. (1) Growth -- this speaks for itself. The "fear" of recruiting too many students who may "dilute" our organization is not worthy of a politically aggressive, serious, and self-confident revolutionary organization. (2) These recruits are likely to include a significant number of Black and other Third World revolutionaries sorely needed in our organization. (3) These recruits are likely to bring into the organization political skills (for example, writers for WP and for our industrial fractions). (4) Last, but by no means least, these recruits can provide valuable new comrades for further industrialization. Let us not forget that most of our present industrial cadre came out of the student movement of the '60s.

Finally, a word on resources: obviously, that is a problem in our organization. But there are members in this organization who are grossly underutilized because of our political and ideological rigidities often passing themselves off as mere concern with resources. We do find the resources to do politically important things. Student work is important today at least in terms of recruitment, and the very limited resources that would be required for this, which would seldom compete with our priority needs, would certainly be justified.

February 10, 1977

POLITICAL SOLUTION CAUCUS RESOLUTION
1977 I. S. CONVENTION

POLITICIZATION

It is recognized by just about everyone -- from the most bitter Left Faction critic to the staunchest EC supporter -- that the I. S. membership has, in the recent period, been deeply depoliticized. Our contention is that key to any real and lasting resolution of the current I. S. crisis, not only of the faction fight, but of the tendency of the organization to go through repeated cycles of "boom and bust", in terms of growth vs. stagnation, enthusiasm vs. demoralization, and activity vs. passivity, must be a thorough process of politicization of the membership. This process must involve four interrelated aspects: 1) first and foremost, the fostering of an active, serious and disciplined internal discussion of the politics involved in our real external work, most particularly that of our major fractions. 2) the democratization of the I. S. in order to facilitate such discussion, and the development of a political cadre. 3) the politicization of our external political practice, involving both agitation and propaganda, both movement-building and party-building, and 4) systematic development and application of specific political education programs for all members, old as well as new. The fulfillment of all four of these aspects will be required for the successful development of a fully political cadre. If any one aspect is neglected, the others will tend to add up to little more than good intentions or abstract exhortations that look good on paper, but mean little in practice.

1) Internal Discussion of our On-going Work: As important as measures to politicize our external work and specific education programs (to be discussed below) are, they cannot be the starting point for politicizing the I. S. by themselves. The political life of the I. S. must flow, rather, from the practice of regular, full and open discussions of the concrete perspectives involved in our actual day-to-day work. This kind of discussion is the single most important way of developing and maintaining a politicized I. S. We therefore call for the following:

a) It should be the responsibility of all fractions to formulate and convey the politics of their work to the rest of the organization. This means that fraction reports and bulletins must go beyond Who did What, When and Where, and get into Why certain alternative tactics and strategies are adopted, and why some are rejected. This is so the whole membership has the means with which to evaluate and support the politics of our work everywhere. All fraction reports should go into the Internal Bulletin, or into a special Industrial Bulletin to be distributed to the whole organization.

b) The continued regular production and circulation of the Internal Bulletin with leadership at all levels taking responsibility for encouraging and soliciting contributions. The EC should periodically initiate a national discussion of some major aspect of our work (examples: united fronts with certain reform caucuses or leaders in a given union, or how to raise special demands (such as super-seniority, etc.) in one of our priorities, etc.) Of course, it will be reasonable and necessary to impose certain limits on the amount and length of discussion articles that can be included.

Political Solution Caucus
Politicization Resolution, page 2

c) The steering committees of national and local fractions cannot be made responsible for actually organizing and structuring the political discussion of their work for members outside the fractions. This must be the job of the central leadership at both national (EC) and local (branch exec) levels.

(i) Regional membership conferences (open to close contacts around a certain topic relevant to our work, held on a periodical basis, should be initiated and organized by the national leadership.

(ii) Branch execs should make it their responsibility that regular political discussions are a natural and consistent feature of branch life. Ideally these should occupy a portion of every branch meeting (one hour) and should be based on a topic selected by the exec from any of the following: a fraction report (local or from a national fraction bulletin); an article from WP, WP Review, ISJ, etc.; a discussion article in the Internal Bulletin; a major political question that comes up in the course of some comrade's local work (for example, Affirmative Action suit, or some particular local manifestation of racism, etc.); etc.

d) Of course, to once again lay to rest the "Return to a Discussion Group" phobia still afflicting certain leading comrades, we insist that these internal discussions be organized in the context of an action organization functioning with democratic-centralist discipline. It should be clear that full, open and democratic internal discussion is in no way incompatible with unity in action, that it is, in fact, the precondition for such political unity. Nevertheless, given certain unfortunate polemics against our position, the following differences from the "good ole days" need to be spelled out:

(i) Discussions of on-going campaigns cannot be allowed to undermine the effectiveness of their implementation. Differences over perspectives that affect our success must remain internal, and not be debated in public. Policy decisions adopted by the organization or any of its fractions cannot be re-raised in any of the formal meetings of the organization in such a way that the will of the majority is hampered. (This is not to say that dissent over perspectives in other forms -- internal bulletin articles, informal conversations -- are to be prohibited).

(ii) Discussions must be organized in advance, and held at pre-determined appropriate times and places, rather than in a spontaneous, random, unprepared, scatter-shot way.

(iii) The appropriate channels (branch execs, fraction steering committees) must be gone through to prepare such discussions.

(iv) As much as is possible, such discussions should revolve around

previously circulated materials, and presentations should be prepared in consultation with the exec (or relevant committee).

(v) Once agendas and structures (orders of presentation, time limits, etc.) for these discussions are arranged, they must be firmly adhered to.

2) Democratization of the I.S.: It is clear that for the political life of the I.S. to truly grow and involve all members, the organizational practices and leadership functions of the organization must be democratized. We see the adoption of our resolution on democratization (see separate resolution) as crucial for the successful implementation of this proposal.

3) The Politicization of our External Work: This fall's NC adopted a number of ideas that, we believe, point in the right direction (as long overdue first steps) towards politicizing our external work. What is still needed is a set of concrete measures to implement and expand these ideas. We propose the following:

a) the production of pamphlets for use in our external work. Priority topics include the Limits of Trade Union Reformism, Black Liberation, Women's Liberation, the Urban Crisis, Revolution in Southern Africa...

b) Further politicization of Workers' Power (see separate resolution on Agitation and Propaganda)

c) The creation and circulation of national guidelines for specific Forums to foster the presentation of I.S. revolutionary politics on each respective topic (for example South Africa), and for Fraction Educationals (along the lines proposed in the L.A. branch periphery campaign document).

d) The adoption of a policy by the EC (and on local level, the branch execs), demanding that fraction perspectives be consistently formulated in such a way that the integral connection between our immediate agitational work and our longer range strategic political aims is clear. Fraction reports must, from now on, be written and evaluated in the light of this crucial interconnection.

e) To insure that we recruit to the I.S. through our political ideas, national, branch and fraction leaderships must seek to involve all our contacts in our discussions of our perspectives, both on a group and individual basis. All available resources (such as WP, WP Review, pamphlets, forums, educationals, etc.) should be used to this end.

4) Political Education Programs: Many of the educational ideas developed in the I.S. in recent years (in terms of methods - such as small study groups, one-on-one "buddy" systems, etc., or content of specific class series) are, in their conception, good. The major problem is that, in spite of this, education programs have, on the whole not been systematically implemented throughout the organization. The reasons

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Politicization Resolution, page 4

for this lack of implementation are two-fold: a) adequate resources (in terms of local personnel responsible for branch educational activities) have generally not been allocated, with some notable exceptions; and b) depoliticization sets up a vicious cycle, in which depoliticized members (and secondary leaders) do not take such political education seriously enough to make participation in it a high enough priority. We therefore call for:

a) That each branch select an Education Director, whose responsibility will be the organizing, structuring and coordinating of all educational programs for the branch, including aiding the development of fraction educationals. We recognize the need for local flexibility in fashioning programs most suitable for branch needs. However, the national leadership must see to it that all branches, at all times, have some internal education perspective and adequate personnel assigned to implement it. Local education programs must be presented in such a way that their content be made relevant to the daily life and work situations of class members.

b) The extension of the national Cadre Schools that have been held around specific issues and campaigns, to be instituted on a regional basis.

c) The expansion and up-dating of existing education programs by the NO, and the development of new ones in consultation with local branch members, in the light of their experience with various methods and educational content.

The systematic implementation of all four aspects of this proposal will greatly aid the development of a newly politicized I.S. cadre which will stand the greatest chance of avoiding future faction fights and the "talk shop" which those entail. More important, it will vastly increase our capacity to build the revolutionary workers party.

February 24, 1977

RESOLUTION ON THE SADLOWSKI CAMPAIGN IN STEEL.

Executive Committee

1) In 1973, at the time of our last big faction fight, Arnold Miller and the Miners for Democracy successfully challenged the corrupt Boyle machine in the UMW. Despite the fact that we had neither members nor contacts in the UMW, this union reform struggle became a central issue in our internal political struggle. In fact, it was in response to sectarian attitudes towards that campaign, held by ~~the~~ what was then the IS majority leadership, that there was a new alignment of forces and a new IS majority formed. The present IS majority leadership came together in that realignment.

2) The Sadlowski Fightback campaign in steel, despite the fact it was lost was a union reform campaign of the same scope and same order of magnitude. This time however, we had a fraction - though small and inexperienced, - operating in the union. As a result, this campaign has enormously expanded our practical experience and understanding of union reform ~~campaign~~ movements. During our present faction fight the Sadlowski campaign unfortunately became a factional football. Because of the enormous time burdens on the comrades involved in the work and the factional atmosphere in the organisation as a whole the fraction will not have its report and evaluation of the campaign available until the first day of the convention.

3) This report deserves a level of serious consideration by the organisation that would not, in any case, have been possible in the midst of the immediate pre-convention discussion. What we can learn from it goes far beyond the points that were in dispute in the faction fight. The USW fraction report should therefore, together with the theses on which its conclusions are based, be submitted to the first regular meeting of the CC following the convention. Other viewpoints on the campaign should also be submitted, in advance to the CC. Following CC discussion, a discussion of this material will be organised throughout the convention. Further amendments that arise as a result of this discussion should be submitted to the next meeting of the CC which will vote on them and adopt a final set of theses to represent our official political evaluation.

POLITICAL SOLUTION CAUCUS RESOLUTION
1977 L.S. CONVENTION

TOWARD AN L.S. WOMEN'S PERSPECTIVE

The Women's Commission perspectives, approved by the EC on Aug. 25, 1977, state that "Our primary political task is to rebuild the political confidence of the women in our organization and to revive the politics of women's liberation." (L.S. Women's Bulletin, Vol. 2, no. 1)

That it should be necessary to "rebuild the political confidence" of L.S. women and to revive the politics of women's liberation within the L.S. requires explanation -- as does the absence of serious organizational commitment to an arena where L.S. members do consistent work with working women. In our view there are two reasons: (1) our false theory on women's work, and (2) the objective situation -- the absence of a working class women's movement.

(1) The 1975 document "Building the Working Class Women's Liberation Movement" stated:

"There must be women leaders in basic industry and in the biggest industrial unions who can provide political leadership and direction for women throughout industry. (1. 1)... By being in these key industries and unions, revolutionary women will be bringing women's liberation politics into the most important sections of the rank & file movement... While it may be true that women in these key areas are small in numbers, they have an impact upon the class far greater than their numbers. (p. 5)"

Another rationalization for this course was that "we do not have the luxury of time, given our analysis of the period" (p. 4) to industrialize women into "women's industries.

This theory that the leadership of the future working women's movement would come out of heavy industry led us to try to industrialize as many women as possible into our priorities and to downplay everything else. In action we thus contradicted all our basic notions of workers' self-organization by implying that the leadership of the working women's movement will not come out of the same places where women workers are concentrated.

L.S. women have shown their ability to lead rank & file struggles in our priorities and have gained important experience from this. But one of the lessons of our past year's work -- contrary to EC expectations -- is that in these industries -- best organized and paying considerably higher wages than do "women's jobs" -- women workers have not been in the forefront of the struggles that have occurred. Consequently our women comrades have not found it possible to organize women's caucuses (with the current exception of Steel). In Auto the absence of women's work is rationalized (see Sara B.'s article in the recent Women's Bulletin) by saying that it is impossible to raise women's demands in an agitational way. In IBT our most successful women's work to date is based on organizing, not working women, but workers' wives, inevitably taking on the character of an auxiliary, as well as proving the EC's 1975 case in reverse.

Political Solution Caucus
Women's Resolution, page 2

When CLUW ceased to be a real possibility toward building a working women's movement, the I. S. correctly withdrew its forces. Since that time we have had no serious strategy for women's liberation or for building a working women's movement and have done little to position ourselves amongst working women. It is true that other women's work has been undertaken, but in a piecemeal and unsystematic way because our "theory" has not considered such work important. Unless the organization develops a systematic perspective with which we can reach working women, there is no way the organization will take women's liberation politics seriously, no way we can recruit significant numbers of women to the I. S., no way that serious work for non-industrialized women comrades (and contacts) can be developed, no way there can be a viable women's caucus because the question of women's politics would be of no practical importance to us.

(2) The absence of a working class women's movement in 1975 was an "objective condition" -- which persists today. "The growing crisis of capitalism" and the concomitant working class radicalization which would aid the process of building a working women's movement have not kept pace with EC expectations. Perhaps the first evidence of this was the failure of a strong rank & file movement to materialize within CLUW that would have made it possible to defeat the bureaucrats' design of killing any possibility of CLUW's becoming a rank & file vehicle in the future.

What, then, should we be doing?

1. Given the difficulty of recruiting women through our highest priority industrial work, the recruitment of women should nonetheless be one of the I. S.'s central goals. We must consistently and systematically search for opportunities to implement our women's liberation perspectives. There is no reason that this should conflict in any way with our industrial priority work. The I. S. has women members (and women contacts) whose political devotion, time, and energy are not now utilized by the organization only because of the inflexible way in which we have focussed on our priorities in the last year.

2. For women's liberation to be more than an abstract position in the I. S. it is critical to do on-going work where there are significant numbers of women, both to be a part of building a rank & file women's movement and to rebuild consciousness in the organization. I. S. members must be involved in women's struggles at the workplace. Nothing short of establishing a new priority which would give us this opportunity will begin the process of making real our commitment to women's liberation in the absence of a mass working women's movement.

Of the possible unions which would enable us to do rank & file women's work, Teamster non-freight provides for us the greatest political advantages. We already know a great deal about the International and about many IBT locals, including general locals and non-freight locals. Non-freight includes light manufacturing, mail order houses, food processing and warehouse. Sweetheart contracts with poor wages and working conditions are common in this sector; however the conditions are generally

no worse than other places where women and minorities are concentrated. Teamster non-freight is also an area where there are large numbers of blacks and latins, men as well as women, and this work would help in the recruitment of blacks and latins both to the rank & file movement and to the I.S.

13.9% of the IBT is women. They are largely concentrated outside of freight and number 257,000. Local 743 in Chicago, predominantly women and minorities, is the largest local in the union and therefore its importance cannot be minimized. Throughout the country IBT non-freight provides us with the possibility to do work with rank & file working women and build a link to freight by bringing these women into TDU. I.S. women have had some experience in this arena already in Chicago, Cleveland, Indianapolis, and Los Angeles.

Independently, TDU understands the importance of linking up with non-freight. In those localities where a TDU organization exists, IBT non-freight should be made a new priority. We would be building our working women's work in an area where we have had some of the strongest, healthiest and most successful of all our industrial work. And an important by-product of this would be that we would be better able to take on the tendency towards the accomodation to sexism in our current Teamster work.

3. In every city we should have a priority primarily women's industry. CWA and Postal should be among the first possibilities checked out. In cities where I.S. women work and where women can be recruited in local priorities (e. g. among teachers or other public employees in NYC, etc.), women should be encouraged and helped by the organization to do on the job organizing and union work -- to develop themselves politically, gain organizing experience among working women and within unions, help build a stronger rank & file movement, and recruit working class women to the I.S.

4. It is true that we cannot create a working women's movement and that nationally no such movement exists. But national issues do arise, such as the attack on abortion rights or the Supreme Court decision against pregnancy benefits. At such times the EC should come up with a national campaign that we can then organize local actions around. We can then raise this national issue, and other women's issues, in our unions and wherever we work, and I.S. men will be expected to do the same, as for any campaign. We should also be on the lookout for strikes and union struggles where there is a predominantly female work force. The Trico strike for equal pay that the ISGB has been involved in is a good example.

February 10, 1977

Statement by E.C.

Following the expulsion of the Left Faction, a struggle inside the IS will still be required to put the organization back on course. Ideally, the EC elected by the convention--in cooperation with the CC-- can lead this struggle. But it will require a mandate from the convention to do so. Passage of the resolutions brought to the convention by the majority caucus and the EC will secure many elements of this mandate. But these do not go far enough. We believe that to move the organization forward, a further mandate is needed. For that reason we have drafted a platform that, in our opinion, if adopted by the convention, would complete the mandate required to establish a strong EC with the ability to move the organization forward. In the event the convention rejects this platform, or fundamentally weakens it by amendment, the existing Majority EC slate cannot stand as presently composed. A rejection of this platform by a majority of the convention would mean, in particular, that the five current EC members could not serve as a majority of the new EC. They would determine which of them would serve as a minority on the future EC. The leaders of the political opposition to the EC's platform would have to share in the responsibility of constructing a new EC slate with two or more persons from the current EC serving only as a minority. The five will aid in every possible way, including serving as a minority, to establish a new leadership reflecting the balance of power. Nevertheless, the five present members cannot and will not take majority responsibility for leading the organization if this political mandate is rejected.

Platform for New EC

March 1, 1977

1. Just as the organization has other priorities, it also prioritizes which sections of the membership can draw on the resources of the organization. Workers, industrialized comrades and youth will have far greater draw on the resources of the organization than will middle class comrades who are unwilling or unable to industrialize, work for the organization, or find some other means of systematically relating to the struggles of the working class. These comrades obtain all of the democratic rights of members, but it must be recognized that their concerns, needs and problems will have low draw on the resources of the organization. They will also have proportionately less influence than their numbers, while workers and those involved in working class activity will have proportionately more influence than their numerical weight in determining the direction of the organization.
2. Middle class comrades who have been members of the organization for an extended period of time, must be expected to engage in systematic political work under the guidance of the organization. It is the responsibility of their branch to help them find such roles. But the primary responsibility rests with them. Middle class comrades unwilling or unable to do systematic political work should be made sympathizers. They should be encouraged to contribute in any way they are willing, to the working class struggle, and to become members again when they are prepared to do systematic political work on a long term basis.
3. Contemptuous attitudes in the organization toward the IS full time staff must be vigorously fought. We should strive for all staffers either to be political cadre, or to be transformed into political cadre. If necessary, staff duties must be lightened to provide every staff member time to carry out regular external assignments and to develop a regular relationship to some area of IS external work. Every IS staffer must have some area of direct regular work outside the organization, preferably in a working class area where they can work under the guidance of experienced industrial members.
4. The EC--subject to being overruled by the CC, NC or Convention--must have the power to intervene in branches, fractions, and other units of the organization

and have the power to impose its will. The majority viewpoints of such units should never be overruled for arbitrary or capricious reason. If the disagreement is sharp, and if time and resources permit, the EC will designate a representative to fully discuss the matter with the comrades involved. But if the conflict can not be resolved, the EC has the power to impose a line, to impose the composition of a committee, to impose assignments, or to impose any other decision. The EC must politically justify any such intervention to the organization.

5. The key task for the IS in the next year is the political integration and unification of our industrial and our full time leadership cadre. The tensions between them that have existed, and that continue to exist, if not resolved, will eventually generate internal conflicts far more destructive than the fight we have been through. When the American Communist Party was still revolutionary, it never resolved a permanent faction fight between the "trade union communists" (the Foster wing) and the "party communists" (the Rothenberg wing). Only Comintern intervention prevented a split. If we are going to resolve this conflict, we are going to have to do it ourselves.

Despite all the talk going around about the "conservative pressures" on the industrial cadre, these pressures will grow enormously as our work becomes more successful. In the period ahead, a growing part of our industrial cadre will win election to union office, and will assume other leadership positions that institutionalize their need to take responsibility for leading workers who are still conservative and politically backwards. We welcome this even though it will put comrades under tremendous pressure. And if the fraction leaderships are properly in touch, they will tend to reflect this pressure. Only a thorough integration of trade union work and trade union leadership with party work and party leadership will head off an eventual split, disastrous to all.

6. The following program to achieve integration of trade union and party work must be vigorously implemented:

a) Full, honest discussion of trade union work, perspectives and problems must regularly occur on the CC. All comrades on the CC must struggle to politically unify this body and to develop a common political approach that the whole CC is prepared to vigorously defend and carry in the organization. If the CC divides regularly along party/trade union lines and is unable to internally mend that division, this will have to be taken as a sign that the IS is heading for serious trouble. If that happens, we must be prepared to construct a new EC, a new CC and change fraction leadership, transfer leading industrial cadres to central staff, or take whatever other reorganizational steps required to create an authoritative and unified central leadership able to lead the integration of trade union work and party work.

b) The organization must commit sufficient political and material resources to create professional and effective industrial department. Two or more members of the EC should work for the industrial department as their primary political assignment. The industrial department, through its organizers, should be thoroughly integrated into the industrial fractions. The industrial department should work with the fractions, not just in developing perspectives, but also to help implement them and to help work out solutions to the practical problems as they arise in the work. To the extent possible, industrial department organizers will become directly involved in carrying the work of the fractions. The primary responsibility for giving a lead in the integration of the industrial and political work of the organization rests with the industrial department.

c) The EC and CC must politically and theoretically clarify our industrial perspectives, and then must wage a systematic campaign throughout the organization to make sure that the members have a full political and theoretical understanding of

our actual industrial work and its relationship to party building. Wrong and sectarian attitudes toward this work are still widespread in the organization. Many comrades still only understand the work from an abstract, outsider, intellectualist viewpoint. This was revealed, not only by the confusion generated by the Left Faction, but also in the positions of the third force. Understanding of our work is shallow, even among the non-industrialized sections of the majority and there is still confusion everywhere. To unify our industrial and party work, all sections of the organization must share a rich understanding and appreciation of the industrial work.

d) IS trade unionists must carry out systematic political work among their co-workers and the membership of their unions. Comrades should aggressively and openly associate themselves with Workers' Power, except for people who are so new, that they lack the base and/or experience, or except for other specifically approved security reasons. In general, it is a mistake for comrades to take union office unless they are already well identified and established as socialists. It is particularly important that comrades who hold union office are seen by their constituents as systematic campaigners around non-economic political questions like for example: Gary Tyler, South Africa, and other concrete issues that are anti-racist, anti-sexist, anti-imperialist, anti-Democratic Party, anti-capitalist, etc. Comrades who fail to do this, however difficult it will be, over time will yield to the pressures on them, stop being revolutionaries, and will become merely militant trade unionists. If the IS does good trade union work, the pressures involved will make it impossible to avoid losing some comrades to trade union opportunism. But by integrating trade union work and party work at every level, we can make sure that the organization itself will not split over these pressures.

7. We are committed to maintaining the IS as a national organization, and to assigning a full-time National Organizer to work regularly with the smaller branches. But it would be a harmful illusion to believe that the unevenness in the organization can be overcome in the period ahead. The forward motion for the organization will come most decisively from those branches and districts that have the most developed and advanced industrial work and the most base in industry. It is these branches and districts that will lead the organization in developing youth work, anti-racist work, anti-sexist work, anti-imperialist work, and community work, on a proletarian basis. It is these branches and districts that will most rapidly become integrated into the life of the working class of their cities, that will most rapidly become proletarianized, that will most rapidly begin recruiting and holding substantial numbers of workers from outside our priorities as well as in our priorities, and that will come under greatest pressure to reorganize into diversified political district organizations based, not on branches but on functional units. In other words, the transition of the IS into a workers combat organization will not occur uniformly, but will be led by those branches and districts that have the most advanced industrial work and the greatest base in industry. In the period of transition, the bulk of political and material resources of the organization will have to be concentrated - not on the least advanced branches, but on the most advanced.

8. The job of branch or district organizer is primarily a political, and only secondarily an administrative post. It is our goal to develop branch and district organizers who are, in fact, the political leaders of their branches or districts. It is these comrades who have front line responsibility for resolving conflicts between trade union and party work and conflicts between branches and the center, for building the party in their district, and for moving the organization forward. Organizers must have easy access to and involvement in all important work in their district or branch. Tendencies to keep the organization out of the work must be fought. Candidates for organizer must be willing to lead in the task of politically integrating the branch or district into the national organization, integrating the industrial work with the party work, and struggling to break down clique and factional divisions in the organization. In doing this, the organizer will get help from both the National Secretaries office, and from the industrial department. All EC, CC, NC members and ~~xxxx~~ national fraction leaders

in the branch are expected to support the organizer in these efforts.

9. The organization has found it difficult to recruit, train, and keep competent branch or district organizers. As an example, we have spent months, unsuccessfully looking for a qualified permanent organizer for Chicago. In the next year, we expect there will be several openings. In general, the older cadre of the organization have been unavailable, unwilling, or unable to serve as organizer. Most of our present organizers have been recruited to the IS since the RSL split. The older middle class cadre who are not industrialized and who are unwilling to put their lives and careers at the service of the party, cannot be permitted to compete with the organizer for leadership of the branch or district. And the center must put all its weight into making sure we develop close collaboration between organizers and the older industrial cadre.

10. To repoliticize the organization, political debate in the IS must be taken out of the corridors and the various phone networks and put into the public arena of the organization. In the past year, the contending political leadership groups, including the EC and the "Convention Opposition" have all been guilty of this practice. The majority of members are left out, and therefore do not understand or fully learn from the internal life of the organization. Cliques and old ties still dominate the internal life of the organization. Members are lined up and votes are counted before meetings. As a result there is too little productive give and take discussion. Beginning with the CC and NC this process should be reversed. We should encourage debate outside meetings to be carried out in writing, and be available to the whole committee, and where it is useful, available to the whole organization. This norm should apply to the EC as well as to other contending groupings.

We must stress the need to still struggle for collaboration on and between leadership bodies. But we must end a system where no leader or leading body is willing to float any proposal until it is checked out with everyone who might be effected. This method is too inefficient, too slow, and has a depoliticizing effect. In open and frank debate feelings might get hurt, positions advanced may sometimes have to be withdrawn etc. But unless we can learn to carry out internal debate in a reasonable, sharp, frank, and comradely way, the organization will degenerate into competing phone networks, the old and harmful method evolved at a time when neither the EC nor anyone else had a working majority in the organization.