INTERNATIONAL SOCIALISTS BULLETIN NO. 46 DECEMBER 1973

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In this issue are documents from the 1973 Convention (marked "*") and from the Thanksgiving NC (Marked "+"). Other NC documents were in the last Bulletin. The minutes of the Convention and NC will be in the next issue of the National Report.

KIDRON: IMPERIALISM: HIGHEST STAGE BUT ONE and INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM
NOTES FOR A CRITIQUE BY M. Stewart

Kidron's conclusion, that "we don't have imperialism but we still have capitalism" will seem bewildering, if not embarassing to us in the US, the greatest imperialist power the world has ever seen. Yet while Kidron's conclusion is completely erroneous and must be rejected, the analysis upon which it is based must be taken seriously.

Kidron's main thesis is that capital exports, the basic drive underlying imperialism for Lenin, no longer plays the role in stabilizing the ysstem that they did before the second world war. This role is now played by the permanent arms economy. Thus the permanent arms economy represents a new, and higher, stage in capitalism.

Furthermore, the import of raw materials is less important now than in the past due to replacement by synthetic materials, new domestic sources, and greater efficiency in use.

Lastly, foreign subsidiaries are no longer vertically integrated with domestic industry. Hence the two are more functionally independent today.

With the decline in importance of capital exports, raw material imports, etc., imperialism was no longer necessary to stabilize the system. Decolonization has therefore been acceptable, if not desirable.

(One side point. Kidron may or may not be correct about the existence of finance capital today. However, the important point for Lenin was that finance capital was the structure of capitalism which corresponded to its imperialist stage, that is, it was finance capital which was involved with the export of capital. If the latter is less important, so also will be finance capital, at least in our analysis of imperialism.)

Major strength of this analysis is that it is attempting to update marxist theory in light of the events of the last 25 years, and also discuss the relationship of the permanent arms economy to imperialism.

Kidron's basic point, concerning capital exports and the permanent arms economy is correct. For Lenin, capital exports was necessitated by the moribund condition of advanced capitalism where there was no room for further profitable investment. Hence capital flowed abroad, to the underdeveloped world, where profits were higher. This helped to raise the overall rate of profit and stabilize the ysytem. It also slowed the rise in the organic composition (such as extractive industries). But today, most capital exports are to the advanced world, (Europe and Canada), and capital exports have dropped considerably as a percentage of GNP. This role is now played by the permanent arms economy. The PAE takes investment funds out of the private market, invests in waste goods which return a high rate of profit to the major corporations which produce them, and slows the rise in the organic composition of capital. For this reason alone, Lenin's analysis is no longer valid for today.

However, disproving Lenin's analysis of imperialism does not end the matter, nor prove that imperialism is dead.

There are several major weaknesses in Kidron's analysis.
1. He ignores Stalinism and the struggle between it and capitalism for the divsion of the world, and the effect of this struggle on capitalist imperialism.
2. He ignores the fact that the US was the overwhelmingly dominant capitalist power at the end of WWII, with most monetary reserves and a majority of world production.capacity.
3. He ignores the political, i.e. imperialist, motives for the Permanent arms economy, tending to treat it too much as just an economic mechanism.
4. Lastly, he mistakenly identifies imperialism with direct political control, and even imputes this view to Lenin.

Contrary to Kidron, Lenin never did identify imperialism with direct political control. Indeed, in one passage inLenin's Imperialism he states that "Finance capital....is capable of subjecting and actually does subject, to itself even states enjobying the fullest political independence." Hard to believe, this passage is even cited by Kidron! Lenin went on th point out that direct political control was desirable because in general it was more profitable, something which is certainly questionable today.

It is hard to understand how Kidron could overlook this and arrive at the conclusion he does. Common to all Marxists has been the contention that along with economic dominatioi goes political domination, no matter how "independent" the political apparatus may appear. This is true not only domestically, but also internationally. That is why international relations today have rightly been termed neo-colonialist.

The difference between direct and indirect political control is important, but it is foolhardy to conclude from the lack of direct control that imperialism no longer exists.

While Kidron is on strong ground with regard to capital exports, his other points are less convincing.

With regard to raw materials, I believe that Kidron is just wrong. It is not just a question of volume of imports, but of their importance to production. For the US, it is now importing some materials for the first time in history, where it used to be an exporter. Furthermore, in some branches of industry, while imported raw materials are a small percentage of the total product, production could not continue without the imports. This is the case in the aerospace industry. Another example is aluminum. To produce aluminum you need bauzite. The US imports 90% of its bauxite. While synthetics have replaced some raw materials (rubber is the best example), many of the sythetics we use are based upon petro-chemicals, that is, oil. This has increased the dependency of the advanced world on the sources of oil.

The Pentagon recognizes the importance of raw materials in its latest policy study where it states: "Increased dependency on raw materials from overseas, particularly oil, has fixed attention on the control of trade routes hitherto of secondary importance." (NY Times 7/15/73)

Furthermore, with regard to investments overseas -- while Kidron is correct that most of this goes to Europe and Canadaetc., he fails to note that the money for this comes from the super profits the US makes on its investments in Latin America and Asia. Hence while its new investments in the third world remain relatively low, maintaining control over its investments ther is crucial to its penetration of markets in the advanced world.

Finally, Kidron fails to discuss the need to gain and maintain control over markets which certainly plays a significant role in international capitalism today. This point was discussed by Bukharin, though not by Lenin.

Both markets and raw materials have been important in regard to the struggle against stalinism. since a stalinist takeover meant a loss of both.

<u>notes for an alternative explanation.....</u>

The US has never been a colonial power in the old sense. After WWII, the domination of the US industry meant that it could rationally identify its interests with those of capitalism as a whole. No other national capital could compete with it in the market, and all were forced to meet with it on its terms. Hence, in defending capitalism in general it was defending its own interests. Its domination flowed from its domination of the world market. Capitalist political independence was acceptable to it precisely because this ould not affect its economic domination -- the other countries had to trade with it on its terms.

Stalinism <u>was</u> a threat to it, whether that was Russian imperialsim or national Stalinist movements. These were a threat because they would remove the country from the capitalist market, and while any one country might not be significant, the domino theory did have certain validity. In such a situation, direct political control was a political leability, making political independence a desirable alternative. Of course, where an acceptable political leadership could not be found, or where it floundered, direct control and military intervention were used.

The Permanent Arms Economy does not replace imperialsim but is grafted on to it. It is important to remember that the PAE is not merely an economic tool. Arms and military might were necessary to defend the empire, especially in a situation of permanent, if cold, war with stalinism. It is furthermore the defense of empire which is <u>the</u> justification given for our arms spending.

Today, with the decline of the PAE as a stabilizing mechanism, we are beginning to see the reemergence of all the same old shit. Competition between the major capitalist powers is becoming more ferocious, though it is not yet cutthroat. Today, there is an emerging fight over raw materials and markets. New

attempts are being made to carve up the world through trade agreements, etc... New restrictions are being placed on imports and exports. Etc., etc.

Because of the economic dominance of the US, national struggles are not over even after political independence has been won. While Kidron is correct that political independence helps to lay bare the internal class relations and spur the development of a working class alternative, US imperialism still gives a lot of room for maneuver for reactionary nationalists like Peron, or the military in Peru, and of course the Stalinists. Anti-imperialism is therefore still crucially important for revolutionaries throughout the world. To argue that it makes no sense to speak of imperialism. as Kidron does, is merely to disarm us for the tasks which confront us.

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Reading List:

Lenin - Imperialism (a must)
Bukharin - Imperialism and World Economy (another must, in some a better, more rounded, treatment than Lenin's)
Kidron - Imperialism: Highest Stage but One
International Capitalism
Western Capitalism Since the War (esp. chap. 3)
Nigel Harris - Imperialism (printed in World Crises)
Magdoff - The Age of Imperialism (good for factual material)
Paul Mattick - Marx and Keynes (relevant chapters, difficult but interesting)
Mandel - Marxist Economic Theory (chapter on imperialism orthodox view, thoroughly uninteresting)
Barret-Brown - After Imperialism (a difficult book covering the history of imperialism, especially British. Much of it is very interesting. He is critical of most existing theories of imperialism)
Tom Kemp - Theories of Imperialism (author a member of SLL. In spite of that, this is a good book, going through the various marxist theories of imperialism)
Vance - The Permanent War Economy (there is a section on imperialism)

AMENDMENTS TO LABOR PERSPECTIVES by JOHN WEBER

Part VI, page 5

DELETE: "that is, the militants first response under present conditions is likely to be a new willingness to strike against the government. The way to break wage controls will be direct action on one's economic demands".

SUBSTITUTE: But, the militants first reponse under preesent conditions is likely to be over working conditions, which they feel most intensely and which their existing "point of production" (place of work) organization best prepares them to combat. It is these issues which they can directly affect and strike out against. The struggles over these isues will raise the level of consciousness and organization, making more political combar more feasible, likely and necessary.

Amendment to Part VIII, page 2

In paragraph 4, following "...a revolutionary socialist party in the US." Such an opposition is necessary beaause of the refusal of the class collaborationist union leadership to wage any kind of a real fight in the interests of the working class. We begin by attempting to organize to wage that fight. In the process it becomes evident that the existing union leadership and structure is an obstacle to that fight, and thus that our battle is a dual one: the bosses and the union leadership. We must not give the impression that we are primarily interested in changing the leadership, as are many opportunists, but in fighting the class struggle.

Following paragraph 4:

Basically,what we are attempting to do is to develop a tendency and a leadership in the labor movement which stands for class struggle unionism as opposed to the class collaborationist leadership which currently exists. In general terms, class strugggle unionism is characterized by the following:

1) The working class defends and advances itself best on the basis of its own solf-conscious self-activety. The significance of every struggle, every policy is evaluated first and foremost from the vantage of its effects on working class self-confidence, combativity and consciousness.

2) The workers and the capitalists ahve diffearent, conflicting and irreconcilable interests. Any labor polity which attempts to reconcile this conflict, in the final analysis serves to subordinate the interests of the working class to the interests of the capitalists. Thus, the starting point in determining any policy must be the needs and interests of the working class and not the effect of such a polity upon the capitalists and we strive for a self-conscious adoption of this policy on the part of those with whom we are collaborating.

3) The most basic interests of workers are their class interests which supersede all narrow, sectional, and parochial interests. Every real victory in the class struggle is a victory for the class; every defeat is a defeat for the class. Thus, solidarity with all the struggles of the class is nesessary: An injury to one is an injury to all. A victory for one is a victory for all.

4) The special oppression of any sector of the working class, of for that matter, any group in society, divides, weakens and harms the working class as a whole. In order to achieve a strong and unified working class, all class conscious workers must become the champions of every struggle against all forms of racial and sexual oppression and discrimination. Apparent privileges and bene-

fits that some groups of workers receive at the expense of others must be renounced since they, in fact, serve to weaken and divide the class significantly, harming in the final analysis, even those who appear to be privileged.

5) Politics is a class question. Every question of political and social policy has a different meaning to the working class than it does to other groups in society, particularly the capitalists. It is the task of a responsible labor movemtn effectively to defend the interests of the working class in the political as well as the economic sphere. Since the working class and its interests represent the vast majority of the population, a party of the working class is needed which can politically represent the interests of the working class and can strive to establish a workers' government to put the interests of the majority into power.

6) At present, class collaborationism represents the only politically organized viewpoint within the working class. Its organization is the present trade union bureaucracy which maintains itself on its ability to serve as an intermediary and broker between the workers and the capitalists. Class collaborationism can only be effectively combatted on the basis of an organized alternative movement within the working class which strives to challenge the political and ideological influence and leadership of the bureaucracy at every level. While this organized movement projects itself as an alternative leadership and contest for union office on the basis of its program, this is only one part of its struggle for leadership and influence. From within or without union office it seizes on every opportunity to provide leadership to the broadest masses in the struggle against the employer or capitalist class and seizes every opportunity to spread the influence of its ideas. Capturing union offices is not an end but merely a means of strengthening the class struggle wing of the labor movement, enhancing its ability to lead the struggle forward.

<u>Part VIII, page 5</u>

Following first paragraph, ("organization and program and inseparable".)
ADD:

In general we project our class struggle perspective in contrast to the collaborationists. As conditions change, as working class self-confidence rises and as forces are won to this perspective, the general level of combativity and expectations in the ranks rise. This tends to create tensions even between the class collaborationists and the bosses. To maintain themselves they are forced to try and produce more and more conscessions. They are more and more themselves forced to resort to struggle -- to mobilization of the ranks. This opens up real opportunities for pushing the struggle even farther forward, particularly as the collaborationists show their hesitancy and inconsistancy.

Of course, it also creates illusions. In these circumstances we must insist that we and the others with whom we are cooperating not act like sectarians. To the extent that even the most rotten bureaucrat pushes the struggle forward we and the caucuses in which we function shoud be the most dedicated activists in the struggle. On the one hand we should make it clear that our long standing

hostility to the bureaucrats do not impede our ability to join with them when they are willingg to lead the struggle against the bosses. At the same time, we do not hide the fact that sharp differences still exist. In particular, to the extent that the bureaucrats fight inconsistently, bureaucratically and so forth we fight against them and attempt to assert an alternative leadership.

Part X, page 3

In paragraph 3, following: "We do, however,, point out that the shop floor struggle must be reinforced by a broader struggle,"
ADD:

and that broader struggle must be, can only be based on shop floor struggle and organization. Therefore, even if the broader struggles and/or organizations develop first, we insist that they seek a ship floor organized base.

The capitalist class organizes the working class in production. At present, unfortunately, this is the only organization in which masses of workers actively participate. In this lies the significance of the shop floor struggle. It is only struggle which proceeds directly from the direct experience of workers organized at the point of production (place of work). It is the struggle of the class in which the mediating influence of the trade union bureaucracy and other bourgeois ideologists is least profound and therefore least ideologically disorienting. In the struggles that go on in the shop, it is generally easy to expose the meaning and significance of the class collaborationist policy of the trade union bureaucracy. It thereby opens up a handle to expose class collaborationism in general.

Take, on the other hand, the strggle against deteriorating living standards, unemployment, or even national negotiations over productivity. While workers experience these directly, they are not struggles over which workers feel they can have any immediate control. Unlike the day to day struggle over working conditions, they come to know and understand them only as they are relayed to them from variously ideologically colored sources. The hegemony of class collaborationism and the concomitant feeling of impotence in relation to such important and distant events is debilitating. It lays the basis for pessimism, cynicism, and even the belief that the collaborationists are doing all that is possible, and that those who disagree with and attack them are either dreamers or demagogues.

The struggle on the shop floor prepares the working class to take on broader and more significant tasks. It is on the basis of this struggle that a stable and extensive leadership can emerge, basing itself on the ongoing struggles of the class rather than bureaucratic privilege. So long as the working class lacks effective means of struggle against the diverse oppressive conditions they face in all aspects of life, the frustrations and anger generated by the diverse oppression in capitalist society is often expressed on the ship floor. This in turn makes it easier to generalize from the shop floor struggle to other struggles and to the political ideas required to carry them forward.

Within caucuses, inrelationship to the shop floor struggle we seek ways to implement the following conceptions to concretize our general approach:

1) The caucus attempts to provide political leadership, justification and defense of the shop floor struggle on every level. It attempts to win to its ranks and to its program all the genuine militant leaders of the shop stuggle in in the plant.

2) It fights for the establishment of a steward system with a very low ratio (if necessary, unofficial stewards), and for the active organization of the stewards into ongoing stewards' bodies. It seeks hegemony over the stewards' bodies.

3) It continually articulates the felt problems of the workers in the shop and agitates for solutions to them: harassment, discrimination, production standards, safety, overtime, environment, and so forth.

4) It propagandizes and agitates for the right of any bargaining unit by a majority vote at an open meeting, to call a strike of that unit over any issue deemed sufficient without the need for prior authorization from anyone or the need for any waiting period. It uses this agitation as a means of legitimizing the right to strike, even without sanction.

5) It generalizes from the experiences of the shop floor struggle to a greater understanding of class collaborationism and the need for a movement that can provide alternative leadership in the working class to the present bureaucrats. It also generalizes toward a broader and more comprehensive program to deal with the wider range of problems facing the workers and the class as a whole, and points to the necessity of a union-wide opposition cauxus.

In projecting a program for a national or industry-wide caucus for tactical reasons we will often start with the point of connection between the struggles on the local level and the international union. In doing so we fight against all policies of the international that inhibit the development of class struggle on the local level and counterpose policies that encourage the intensification of class struggle and a class struggle approach on the local level. The specifics have to be workeed out union by union. They include changes in the contract such as untrammeled local's right to strike, steward ratios, etc. which strengthen the ability to carry on the fight against the employer on the local level, and in particular, strengthen the workers in the shop floor struggle. They also include questions of union policy relating to local struggles such as the manner the international intervenes in the grievance procedure, the defense by the international of fired militants, whether militant locals are thrown in trusteeship, and so forth. For a militant fighting local caucus, these questions can often be the ones that convince its members of the need for a caucus throughout the union.

Specifics vary from industry to industry, but the kinds of ideas we raise point toward the greatest active mobilization of the rank and file: attempts to win support from workers in other industries and the attempt to mobilize general community support and to attempt to at least neutralize opposition. We raise these, not merely as demands of the bureaucrats. Where possible, rank and file movements can, on their own, begin giving leadership to more advanced levels of struggle within the context of collective bargaining -- in conjunction with a fight for a better contract than the bureaucrats are ready to go after. Finally,

we raise demands on the bureaucrats themselves like: public negotiations, time for the ranks to study proposed settlements prior to ratification meetings, right to vote on contract, etc.

Part X, page 4

Add to paragraph beginning: "Alone with the political conception of national rank and file oppositions in the unions...."

ADD the following:

We call for a labor party based on the unions. We sometines even demand of the unions that they convene a Congress of Labor. But the context in which we put this forward is not the the goal of a labor party led by the present collaborationists. Rather, we call for a labor party as part of the fight against collaborationism. It is one more issue which we use in the attempt to project an alternative leadership for the labor movement. It is part of the program on which a class struggle wing contends for leadership of labor. Behind it lays a political program based on class struggle and not collabotationism and so forth. This does not preclude a collaborationist leadership from launching a labor party in defense against the inroads of a class struggle left opposition. But then the struggle against collaborationism is just carried forward in the arena of the labor party. This is not a likely immediate course of events.

We project a class struggle wing that does not wait on elected officials to act, but takes leadership in its own name. The fight for a labor party based on the trade unions (and for trade unions whose policy requires them to launch a labor party) is a struggle which contributes to the development of a class struggle wing of the unions. Given sufficient strength and following, we would advocate such a movement itself engaging in independent labor political action even on the basis of it being a minority force in labor. In this way, the fight for a labor party based on the unions can lead toward working class political action based on organs of struggle.

But how does one make political action based on a minority of labor project itself as a serious political force in American soeiety? For starts, we project a minority of albor in alliance with other progresseve organizations and movements of struggle based on the oppressed engaging in political action, not just a minority in the unions. Furthermore, the conception of political action we project goes far beyond merely eleetoral action. But even in the framework of electoral action our general perspective indicates the approach. "You say we can not possibly win the election andput our excellent program into effect. You're right. We don't have that kind of strength today. We represent only a minority within labor. But we are fighting for the leadership of organized labor on the basis of our excellent program, and for a labor party to fight for that program based on the organized working class coalition with the oppressed. We are a minority today because the collaborationists who do the bidding of the bosses hold sway in labor. If you agree with our platform we want more than your vote. We want you to help us throw out these collaborationists who are standing in the way of working class progress and struggle." In this way, political action based on working class organs of struggle point back toward a labor party based on the unions.

Part X, pages 6-7

DELETE starting with paragraph 2, page 6 through the program on page 7.
SUBSTITUTE the whole of J.W.'s section on Blacks.

Part X, page 9

Paragraph 3. Following the sentence "They will make the change (for example from being a popular militant to a revolutionary who can no longer depend on popularity) because they believe that we are right and that the IS offers the hope of carrying out those ideas in spite of its small numbers."

ADD: This in no way implies that some organizational forms may not be more conducive than others both to attracting and to integrating workers into the IS and in acclimatizing our members to the working class milieu.

# # # # #

Motion: (by [illegible] Stewart) - substitute the following for the entire section on education in the tasks and perspectives document.

Education must be seen as one of the most important tasks facing the organization, not only today but also in the future. It is a responsibility of the national organization to carry out the education of the membership on the basis of a common, national education program. While the national program will not be the only education done in the organization, it must set the standard for what is expected of all members.

Not just any program will do. Our education is aimed at arming our cadre to be able to defend the IS and fight for its ideas in the external world. Thus it is not sufficient that our members know our "line" in some vague way, ~~but that~~ they must be able to explain and defend our politics to people outside the organization and possibly hostile to it. Our education program should also be of such a character that any member, upon completing it, is then competent to teach the program to new members. The following is an outline of what our program should consist of:

1. A class series for contacts and candidate members. This class series would be aimed at providing the candidate or contact with enough information about our politics so that they will have a greater understanding of what the IS stands for and also so that upon becoming members they will be able, at least minimally, to defend our politics. This should be a broad introduction to the IS with emphasis upon our perspectives for today. This series should probably last about three months.

2. A national class series for all members. This should be patterned after the class series that Lutte Ouvriere has. It should be one series lasting for about a year (50 classes) which would cover the whole range of our politics, history of revolutionary movement, perspectives for today, etc.. This list would consist of the minimum education that we expect every member to have. ~~[illegible]~~ This conception is counterposed to the idea of having several different class series, which all together are supposed to give a member a well rounded education. This has never worked in the ~~[illegible]~~ past. ~~[illegible]~~ This class series shoud also be given on a more individual basis, rather than in large groups. Given the length of the class series, this would be necessary so that individuals could start the series upon joining the IS, and ~~[illegible]~~ not have to begin in the middle, etc.. In addition to developing the list of topics to be covered, the NAC should also draw up a required reading list, produce study guides for each topic, publish material where readings are not readily available, etc..

3. The NAC should also be responsible for developing educational programs concentrating in specific areas, and aimed at going into those topics in greater depth. This should include organizing summer schools, educational weekends, publication of hard to get material, anotated reading lists on selected topics, aid to branches in establishing seminars to develop specialization in areas where there is a desire, etc..

4. All branches should also include an educational topic for all their regular branch meetings.

5. Lastly, we must aim at the development of experts, and a coresponding speakers list ~~[illegible]~~ for public forums ~~[illegible]~~, writing literature, etc.. This means encouraging members to do extended studying in a particular area to devd op the necessary expertise.

Immediate implementation: The convention mandates the incoming NAC to establish a candidate members class series based upon the above proposal, and also the list of topics to be the basis for the members class series. Both of these ~~[illegible]~~ are to be submitted to the December NC for adoption.

AMENDMENT TO NAC DOCUMENT (Section on "National Fractions")
By Leslye R.

Our industrial priorities for the coming year are UAW, IBT and CWA. AFSCME and steel should be dropped from priority at ths time because we have insufficient resources, although we regard public employees and steel as important arenas in the labor movement and we will, as soon as possible, attempt to build I.S. work in those unions.

AFT should be cobsidered a priority in certain local branches. It is not, however, a national priority. Given the social composition of the I.S. at this time, we will continue to have a large number of teacher members. They should be active in the AFT where their work is significant. When their locals are dormant or so unorganized that little work can be done, they should be assigned to back-up work in priority fractions, or other organizational work (particularly Workers' Power).

A national fraction of the AFT should be built and the work be taken seriously, through discussion of AFT work in the organization as a whole, but it is not a priority in the sense that we encourage members to get teaching jobs. Teachers should ae encouraged to industrialize in UAW, IBT and CWA just as all other members are.

The first oe ganizational task of the national fractions should be to write an IS program for their particular industry. The advantages of such a program will be that the work can be coordinated on a nationallleval and that a "real" socialist program for American indusj ry related to the actual conditions at the point of production can be developed. We should expect that the first attempt to write such programs may be less than perfect because of our inexperience and because there is considerable lack of xxlax analysis of our industrial arenas in the organization. Nevertheless it is urgent that we attempt to tie our general understanding of "destabilization" in the comibg period to the actual conditions (in the plants) as experienced by the workers.

Amendment to Tasks and Perspectives by Leslye R.

Recruitment and Membership

During the coming year, our goal is to recruit workers and minorities. To do this we should take the most open possible stance with regard to prospective members, consonant with the political requirements for membership.

We should be careful to distinguish recruitment of workers and minorities who are won to socialist politics through their direct participation in the class struggle and those who come to their politics through primarily intellectual activity. We welcome intellectuals and previous members of other groups, but greater care in recruiting such comrades should be taken.

The national secretary should develop guidelines on how branches can organize and facilitate the recruitment of new members. This may be done most easily by getting reports from branches on their recruitment efforts and making the information available to all branches.

The political basis for eligibility for membership in the I.S. should remain agreement with our program in brief. Beside such agreement, a prospective member must have demonstrated a willingness to actively fight capitalism. Finally, the prospective member must have the view that the I.S. is the best organization for carrying out the struggle for revolutionary socialist politics in the U.S.

Recruitment should be primarily a function of fraction activity. Prospective members should work with the approprate fraction for a period of joint activity. Through such activity we can better evaluate the committment of a person and they in turn can know, in practice, the politics of the I.S. There should be no period of candidate membership for individuals who have worked with us. Once the basis of political eligibility is met and willingness to act on revolutionary committment is evaluated through joint work, a person should be asked to join on the basis of full membership.

In the case of groups or collectives which have been defined politically, recruitment should be done through joint discussion with the branch executive committee, the National Action Committee and the prospective members. Further, recruitment should be preceeded by a period of joint activity as well as negotiations. In this case a period of candidate membership might be agreed upon.

MOTION ON PERSPECTIVE MEMBERSHIP AUGUST 26, 1973

The Los Angeles Branch of the International Socialists by a vote of 6 to 0 moves that the 1973 convention of the IS should not adopt any motions regarding candidate membership. Each branch of the IS shall be free to act on this matter according to its needs and in conformity with the IS constitution as amended by the 1972 Convention.

If the Convention does approve a motion on prospective membership the following amendment should be put forward:

No prospective or candidate member of the I.S. shall be required to pay dues, defend the political positions and line of the I.S. to the outside world or carry out organizational tasks and activities unless that prospective or candidate member is entitles to vote on all and every question including elections and matters of disipline. Full responsibilities must entail full voting rights.

On TASKS & PERSPECTIVES: AN AMENDMENT TO PART I

-- David Miller

The signs of economic crisis -- inflation, monetary crisis, etc. -- unmatched since World War II, suggest that the post-war boom may have reached its zenith, and that we are in a period of destabilization.

But, in the absence of a clear understanding of the reasons for the boom, it is quite impossible to grasp the significance of these symptoms, impossible to determine if in fact they are transitory, or reversible. It is therefore impossible to use these "facts" to anticipate the future.

In the absence of a clear theory of the boom and of crisis, we will find ourselves torn between three, equally unacceptable alternatives: (1) the pressure of Keynesian-based reformism, often with a Marxist facade; (2) the so-called "Marxist" crisis mongering so familiar to us; or (3) faced with the evident decline in the role of the arms economy, both theoretically and practically -- a fact the L.S. (GB) is recognizing, at least for Britain -- we could lapse into the essentially archaic view which limits itself, as the Tasks & Perspectives document does, to saying that "the world economy will see a constant short-term repeating cycle of booms and recessions". This last view fails to give adequate consideration to, and comes close to abandoning, any theory on the unique nature of crisis in an epoch of state intervention in the economy.

There are three main means of state intervention available to the capitalist class -- all variants of Keynesianism: (1) rising consumption (the welfare state); (2) encouragement of capital investment; and (3) arms production. All have similar, though not equal, consequences for capitalism: inflation, drain on capital, etc.

In fact, of the three variants, the arms economy is least satisfactory to the capitalist class as a whole. Arms themselves produce no goods for sale. Thus arms production is even more inflationary than other government expenditures. On the other hand, welfare payments (as goods and services) are not only less inflationary, but, for today's sophisticated bourgeoisie, have the partially compensating side effect of dampening the class struggle, thus producing a chance to "buy" increased productivity. Further, arms production does not cheapen capital goods nearly as well as does the second variant, direct government aid to investment.

Consequently, of all variants, arms production is least conducive to a boom. In fact, far from explaining the boom (and the crisis -- any real explanation must cover both), arms production can, in the present period (unlike the 1930s), even be a deterrent to the boom. It is no accident that the countries which have benefitted most from the post-war boom are those in which the arms economy plays the smallest role (smallest share of GNP). Japan and Germany are the clearest examples of this. On the other hand the countries which have had the greatest arms involvement -- U.S., USSR (Britain is a special case) -- have participated least in the boom.

In fact, if the Permanent Arms Economy theory explains anything, it is the economic forces impelling the U.S. and USSR to slow the pace of the arms race, if possible, or to impose an arms race upon other states (clearly not in US/USSR interests).

It is therefore not the stabilizing effect which induces the capitalist class to accept arms production TODAY in place of the more advantageous means available (for capitalists).

The vast capital drain of arms production is tolerated by the class as a whole as an economic overhead essential to the maintenance of the imperialist system. The arms burden is borne even though the result is that cost of production rises above the international socially necessary labor required (because arms costs must somehow be included in the costs of production of all commodities). As a result, costs exceed average value (price) and profits fall. This remains true, even though individual capitalist arms manufacturers may gain. The gain is at the expense of the rest of the capitalist class (to the extent that the burden can not be shifted to the workers).

As a result, the arms generated drain has been, generally, in the post-war period, a drain on capital, i.e. serving as a major impediment to a boom -- not a stimulus. In fact, the arms budget is a major contributor to the great defeat for U.S. capitalism expressed in the current monetary crisis.

At best, the PAE theory suggests some counter-tendencies to the on-the-whole anti-expansionist consequences of arms production in this period. First, the claim that arms generate a technological spin-off, while incontestable, proves nothing, since the real questions are: (1) With capital allocated elsewhere in the economy -- say, in direct or in indirect subsidy to corporate research -- the same funds might easily have produced greater technological innovations. Military research is wasteful in being often too specific, and inapplicable to civilian production. (2) An arms-produced capital shortage reduces the ability of capitalism to take advantage of the spin-off technology.

We know of no attempt to demonstrate empirically that, in reality, the net technological effect of arms is positive.

Secondly, the PAE theory maintains that arms production keeps the rate of profit from falling. Possibly, in the short run, looked at statically. But the decline in the mass of profit, which also results from the arms budget, and the negative technological consequences of the decline in capital accumulation, suggest that, in international competition, U.S. costs will be relatively high, i.e. goods will contain socially unnecessary labor, and that therefore the rate of profit will fall.

Kidron did make an original contribution to PAE theory. He argued that increased cost stemming from arms production compels other states to follow.

suit (on pain of military defeat), and, as a result, all states would experience comparable increased costs, resulting in the elimination of competitive disadvantage to anyone. This theory has merit, but, unfortunately, in practice, only with respect to the U.S.' sole real competitor in arms production, the USSR, which is hardly a serious economic rival on the international market. Had the U.S. bourgeoisie followed Kidron's theory, they could now blame him for the current economic defeats.

If then the PAE theory does not explain boom, but at best suggests why the boom is muted in the USSR/US, then the PAE theory can also not be offered as an explanation for the end of that boom. For if the PAE were a valid theory of the boom, then a decline in the arms budget should be central to any theory of the crisis. We know of no PAE theorists who offer the decline of arms production as an explanation for the current crisis, despite the acknowledged fact that the arms budgets throughout the capitalist world are declining. Arms production has been in steady decline throughout the boom (except for the U.S. when it was at war). Fortunately for the boom, if not for the PAE theory, as arms expenditures declined other government expenditures rose consistently, both absolutely and as a share of GNP.

It is these expenditures (and the forces to which they are a response) which are one major source of the stability and of the boom. In this context, arms are reduced to a special, often negative case of the actual process which fueled the boom -- the Keynesian policies of government intervention.

It is therefore among the contradictions inherent in Keynesian "solutions" that we must seek the cause of and prospects for the current crisis. The outline, but just the bare outline of such an analysis, does exist.

1. State intervention on a national scale is qualitatively more advanced than on an international scale. The lack of an international state projects all the contradictions of classic capitalism onto the scene. The conflict between national and international needs of the capitalist class reflects the continuation of the most fundamental contradiction of capitalism -- the conflict between social production and private appropriation.

2. Inflation -- unless state deficits and credits are taken totally from the working class, government expenditures tend to deficit financing and are hence inflationary (especially given reasonably full employment). The power and aggressiveness of the working class in the post-war world have prevented the theoretically non-inflationary government intervention.

3. The tendency to the decline in the mass of profits available for capital accumulation (due to arms, welfare state) results in deliberately inflationary policies. Inflation, when modest, and if it can be contained, serves to redress the danger of capital shortage. Administered prices perform a similar function, though administered prices must not be considered essentially arbitrary impositions of higher prices by the corporations. In actuality they are reflections of the decline in the rate of profit and the declining competitive position of U.S.

capitalism, which compel price increases and at the same time limit them.

4. The dampening of the business cycle by government intervention eliminates the major self-correcting mechanism in capitalism whereby individual, inefficient, fictitious capital is eliminated, thereby restoring profitability to the system as a whole through devaluing the total capital.

5. The vast expansion of debt -- government, corporate, private -- today totals nearly two trillion dollars. Like inflation today, some credit is essential to grease the capitalist mechanism. But, clearly, as inflation rises to, say, present levels, we witness a change in quantity to quality, and the formerly helpful inflation becomes a powerful threat and deterrent to stability and growth. So with debt. At some point, undefinable today, a similar qualitative change can appear. Today's unparallelled world-wide interest rates suggest we may be approaching such a qualitative change.

6. State intervention comes into conflict with the normal international, competitive market mechanism. Thus, attempts to encourage production via low interest rates produce an exodus of capital, worsen the balance of payments, and threaten monetary collapse. Or, attempts to control wheat prices and inflation run up against the needs of exports to aid the international balance of payments, etc.

7. A vicious cycle. As government expenditures on "non-productive" parts of the economy -- hospitals, arms -- increase, the base, from which surplus value which supports the entire edifice, shrinks relatively. Given the relative capital shortage, increases in productivity become key. But to the extent that such increased productivity comes from an increase in the organic composition of capital, it generates a tendency to decline in the rate of profit and thus in investment or production. Such a decline produces, in turn, a need for further state intervention to keep full employment, thus accentuating the original difficulty stemming from government expenditures.

But the fact that as yet only the barest bones of an analysis exist makes our responsibilities in this Tasks & Perspectives document very difficult to meet. Abstract analysis is no substitute for concrete understanding. The sharp increase in productivity by American workers in 1972 should warn us of the dangers and limits of necessarily oversimplified theory.

But, at the very least, a start will have been made when fruitless conceptions are rejected and the path our thinking must take is better defined.

Carl Feingold, AN AMENDMENT TO THE TASKS AND PERSPECTIVES RESOLUTION

The anchor and hallmark of I. S. proletarian orientation is our interventionist policy of industrialization coupled with our aim of building rank and file groups. We view this as central to the strategy of building a revolutionary party in America and of fusing that party with the working class as an indispensable step toward achieving socialism.

However, even here within the class -- where we are most action-minded and agitationally oriented -- our approach is and, for the foreseeable future, must be mainly that of a propaganda group, that is concerned with educationally raising the level of consciousness among the advanced, albeit thin, layer of the working class -- to better prepare them for the actions and struggles of tomorrow. It is, however, the thrust of our ideas toward class action that distinguishes us from non-Marxist and petty bourgeois educational societies.

This emphasis on our propaganda role is mandated by (1) the limitations placed upon us by our size, resources and limited influence; (2) the thinness of the advanced strata of the working class, the relatively low level and mixed consciousness of the American proletariat; and (3) the nature of the period which, while being highly unstable, is neither pre-revolutionary in the social and political sense, nor one of deep cataclysmic crisis.

Our propaganda-educational role plays a special function in the United States where pragmatism and empiricism have dominated American intellectual and theoretical history. Americans, including American Marxists, have always prided themselves on their know-how while their know-why has been weak or missing. All Marxist currents to date have failed to meet the ideological challenge of capitalism. Nowhere is there the serious analysis of our special history, social and economic development, class relations and racial interactions. These are absolutely necessary for us and the working class as a whole -- in order to develop the methods, self-perception and ideological confidence needed to achieve state power. When Marxism is an ideological current of serious dimensions in conflict everywhere with bourgeois conceptions and methodology, only then can we seriously talk about the overthrow of the system.

First and foremost in developing our propaganda role is our press which must be brought to the forefront of all of our political work. Our present paper is a hybrid. It is neither clearly a propaganda nor an agitational organ, nor is the audience to which it is directed clear. It is not a question of format or even what and how it is written, as important as these are. It is a question of knowing who we are, what we are about, and what is possible and necessary at this time.

To make it clear by contrast -- what is inappropriate in America at this time, for the reasons stated previously, is a paper like the agitational British Socialist Worker. While this may be suitable for England, where the consciousness and class combativity is at a higher level than it is here, and where our English comrades may be on the verge of a breakthrough in size and influence,

their paper hardly meets our needs. We must aim at developing analytical publications that will provide direction and strategy, that is, a line for our comrades, for the advanced workers and those on the left oriented toward the working class and revolutionary politics. Our publications must take up and take on in a serious way such questions as the nature of the trade union bureaucracy, critical support, independent class political action, capitalist economic crisis, and international revolutionary developments. We must provide a political answer to the views of our major serious contenders in the left, those contenders who vie with us for ideological hegemony over the working class and who are listened to by advanced workers.

To further our propaganda tasks and give them central direction and cohesiveness, the I. S. will develop propaganda-action campaigns around such class-wide issues as inflation. No single problem is likely to be so pervasive, persistent and exacerbating over the next extended period as the question of runaway inflation. It is worldwide, deep-going, creates tremendous economic instability and undermines the position of the oppressed everywhere. No single issue today is potentially so explosive.

To aid in the furtherance of our propaganda role and our ideological challenge, the I. S. will undertake in selective local areas, where feasible, beginning in such areas as New York, Detroit and the Bay Area, electoral campaigns directly in the name of the I. S. and, where possible, stimulate worker groups to run their own candidates.

Such activities, which will take advantage of the electoral farce of bourgeois democracy, will permit us to receive extensive free publicity in the mass news media; expound publicly our full program (something we can't do in the unions and shops); speak at schools, community rallies and union meetings; "legitimatize" us in the minds of thousands of workers, radicals, youth, and oppressed peoples; and develop our comrades as speakers, teach them to formulate our ideas in ways comprehensible to ordinary people, and permit comrades not in industry to play a wider political role.

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These activities, rather than draining us, will help us to grow and expand. All these activities will lend an enlarged scope to our propaganda presence, will develop and enhance us as a live and vital organization on the American left, give us greater purposefulness and cohesiveness, and back up and aid our primary orientation and perspectives within the working class.

The I. S. today is too narrowly oriented. There is the danger, if we do not expand our scope as an organization, of becoming mere trade union fetishists and workerists. Our concept of a proletarian orientation must not be viewed in such a limited way.

Contrary to the debilitating and self-destructive small mass party conception tried by many (some with a great deal of know-how), our conception of revolutionary

organization is altogether different. The small mass party idea conceives of itself as an agitational organization, as having in embryo all the ideas and organizational elements necessary to achieve socialism. It suffers from a peculiar grandiosity that sees its hegemony in a narrow, manipulative, and organizational sense. It is, in short, a substitutionist outlook.

Our view, rather, is that we are a necessary anticipation of the future revolutionary party -- that we are a repository of advanced cadre, class experiences, traditions and programmatic concepts gained from the struggles, defeats, and partial victories of past social and class conflicts. We represent an advanced consciousness of the class to the extent that mass consciousness lags behind historical needs.

Our fundamental role is to aid that historic process whereby the subjective factor is brought into congruence with objective historical needs and fused in that most conscious step to be taken by humankind: socialist revolution. For us to aid that process, and more, provide leadership for it, means an active interventionist role whereby we attempt to merge our cadre and organization physically and ideologically with today's advanced sector of the working class. While today we are relegated to primarily a propagandistic role, our conception of ourselves as a propaganda group is hardly a passive one. It is an anticipation that we, with others, will become the revolutionary party of tomorrow. It is this that gives us a dynamic and an optimistic outlook that will settle for nothing less than one, but good, revolution in America.

Barbara L. (N.Y.) AMENDMENT
to
Brian Mackenzie, TASKS & PERSPECTIVES

(U.S. Tasks)

Delete last paragraph on page 4 which includes first 2 lines on page 5.

Substitute:

While we give critical support to independent women's organizations, even those without working class leadership or program, we do not consider it our responsibility to rebuild such movements. Instead, in line with the program and strategy outlined in the L.S. 1972 Women's Liberation perspectives, the primary focus of our agitational and educational work on women's liberation must be in the labor movement -- both because the labor movement is the central focus of our work and because a radical wing of the women's liberation movement no longer exists. Individuals with a radical women's liberation, but not yet revolutionary socialist, consciousness are most likely to be won to our perspectives only when those perspectives have begun to take on some reality.

Women's work within the labor movement should be aimed at involving women workers in the class struggle -- both to advance that struggle which in the long run cannot be won without the effective participation of women, and to advance the self-confidence and combativity of women, their consciousness of themselves as full participants.

The likelihood that male workers, for a host of material and historical reasons, will continue to dominate the organizations of class struggle, in a period where the recent women's liberation movement has succeeded in raising general consciousness of women's rights, should provide us with opportunities to promote organization of women workers in the plants, in the unions, and on a broader basis.

In this way we seek to create the physical bases for a women's movement under working class leadership. As in the case of the black movement, only such leadership can prevent the capitulation of that movement to capitalist limits, and as in the case of the ERA, the surrender and subordination of the interests of working women to the interests of bourgeois and petty bourgeois women.

Only such leadership is capable of attracting and holding middle class radical women who abstractly see the relationship between sexual and class oppression, as well as housewives organized around women's demands in society and issues such as the meat boycott.

PROPOSAL FOR LOS ANGELES BRANCH REORGANIZATION

by
Bernard O'Higgens and Richard Stockman

Due to our greatly reduced resources and the general downward slide that has characterized this branch since the recent split in the IS, it seems to us that a fairly sweeping branch reorganization is called for. We must stop the slide and rebuild a functioning unit capable of operating in the "outside" (i.e., real) world. Furthermore, we feel that the branch can and must be rebuilt on a new basis, a basis that seems to flow from the very logic of our position as well as from the peculiarities of Los Angeles itself.

A CADRE ORGANIZATION?

We feel that our proposal can make the idea of a "cadre organization" really mean something in this branch. Since we are forced to rebuild, we would do well to rebuild on a sounder basis. One of the sources that caught our imagination in this regard was a brief description of how a member of the Bolshevik party was expected to function, and though we have no pretensions on that score, we think the principle is generally applicable: "The party member was expected to participate in determining the general line of the party and to know the specific job he himself had to do. There was no place for theintense gossip group."(Tony Cliff, "Lenin and the Revolutionary party." International Socialism 58 p.14). We are not trying to appear "more bolshevik then thou", but we do feel that the absence of this approach was at the root of many of the organizational difficulties of the old branch.

REQUIEM FOR THE OLD IS

The greatest weakness of the pre-split IS in Los Angeles was it's inability to integrate people into its ongoing work. There was an excessive stratification of the organization, an exaggerated deperdence on the exec and a small group of "heavies"(most of whom have bolted to follow the unstained banner)to make all the decisions for a largly passive and unorganized membership. The proposal to establish a General Industrial Committee(GIC) was an attempt to channel our members into the branch's work, especially into broadening and deepening our industrial work, to put an end to the horrible waste of human resources that was taking place. But, as we all know, this attempt was aborted by the split and now our situation is quite different.

Besides most members not having specific functions to preform and to be accountable to the group for, another contributing factor to the lack of initiative from below in the old branch was the ignorance of most members concerning what the branch as whole was really doing: there was a real air of mystery about our real and supposed functioning. Only the exec was "in the know" about most of what we were doing, and neither they nor the fractions regularly shared their experiences with the rest of the branch. The only kind of "collective experience" that existed was limited to the exec or even to single individuals, while the rest of us were mystified with such vague phrases as "the teamster work", work which sounded terribly significant

but which we knew very little about, (in some cases this even applied to members of the Teamster fraction!). There was a really stifling atmosphere of fetishization of the exec and mystification of the branch's functioning, while most of the members were kept in the dark. In that atmosphere and given those conditions there could be no real collective work or collective responsibility. And we are desperately in need of both of them.

IS THIS A MERE "TECHNICAL SCHEME"?

We wish to answer in advance the objection that we are presenting a purely "organizational" or "technical" scheme, not a "political" solution to the impasse we find ourselves in. There are two reasons why we do not consider this to be the case. First, we feel that a system of organization that puts a premium on individual initiative and collective sharing of experience will force our members to develope politicaly and function closer to their capacity. Thus if major new arenas should develope in the near future, or even if a large new struggle arose that required us to pore all our resources into it (the "classical" political solution" for a scattered branch), we will be ten times more prepared to work to full effect. A second and related point one that should be obvious, but for some reason is not, is simply that it is a political task to forge an organization capable of effective, sustained political intervention. Our proposal is 'mearly technical', only in the sense that we recognize the need to create an instrument technically capable of carrying out political tasks to the full extent of our (admittedly limited) resources. In the absence of such an instrument no "political solution" can ever be implemented.

Our concrete propasals follow:

I. COORDINATORS

In the past, the political lives of the members of the Los Angeles branch were consumed in internal committee, fraction, faction, and branch meetings (footnote to history: hence the title of the New Left-oriented movie THE ENDLESS MEETING.). Approximately 70% of members political time was spent on internal hair-splitting. Yet even with the enormous amount of planning, Drawing up of perspectives, discussion, etc., our actual functioning in the external world was at a minimum. This is a situation we must keep from recurring, both out of principal and due to our limited resources.

We are in touch with a number of arenas which at this point do not warrant full-time fractions (i.e., black/brown work). A coordinator would be able to keep in touch with the specifics of an arena and report back to the branch as a whole. This will not only cut down the number of internal meetings but will also inform the branch as a whole of developments in L.A.. The whole branch would then be in a position to determine priorities for intervention as well as perspectives for our work.

We do not conceive of a situation arising in which it is the leaders of the branch who each perform the job of coordinator for two or three areas. There is no reason why each member cannot assume responsibility for one arena. The most important task of the Los Angeles branch is the training of the inexperienced members (ourselves included) who make up the bulk

of the branch. We must not let all responsibility fall back into a few hands. We must train each and every member to handle responsibility.

A. SPECIFIC COORDINATORS PROPOSED

1)Oppressed minorities: this speaks for itself.

2)Industrial reconnaissance: specifically,to look for new opportunities for activity and/or industrialization.

3)WORKERS POWER: someone to collect articles and to organize distribution, both technical and politically. This will become even more important if we move to weekly publication.

4) Contact work: to the fullest extent possible given security considerations,every member must be drawn into this work.

5) Educationals: branch meetings,classes,new members' classes.

B.TASKS OF THE COORDINATORS

1)To keep in touch with political developments in given arena,and to keep an eye out for possibilities for IS intervention.

2)To be responsible to keep the branch posted on these developments, through bi-weekly or monthly reports when possible.

3)to mobilize the branch for leaflotting,demonstrations,and other activities.

C.RELATION TO FRACTIONS

The idea of coordinators is not strictly counterposed to having fractions. However,Fraction should only be set up where we have ongoing intervention involving more then one person. At the present time only SWAC seems to warrent a full-blown fraction. Fractions,of course,would be responsible for day-to-day functioning in an arena and for carring out the perspectives decided upon by the branch. As we grow more fractions will probably become necessary,in which case the coordinators can serve as their ready made nuclei.

II AREA EXPERTS

The Main virtue of the GIC proposal of the old branch was that it saw the need for an organized network of input from the membership. The conception of area experts is a broader application of the same idea. The branch needs to be kept informed on a regular basis concerning certain key local,national,and international developments. We feel that every member should be willing to accept specific responsibility to follow one of these areas and report on them regularly at branch meetings. every two weeks to one month,depending on how crucial,fast-moving,etc. the given situation is. This system will help overcome some of our isolation and sense of making proposals in a vacuum ,and will allow a much more intellegent assessment of the alternatives open to us. Some areas we could use experts in are:

1)the farmworkers struggle

2)deportations

3)the rank and file movement(locally and nationally)

4) Latin America

The Branch needs to know at all times what is going on in these areas, as well as other national and international questions on which we shoul d demand more imput from Detroit.Plus individual members need to learn how to follow a situation long enough to develop a feel for where it is moving, and to organize and share this understanding with the branch.When possible we can rotate these areas so that members will have an in-depth knowlage of a more all round nature. This is necessary for the development of our cadre and key to our attempt to function intelligently. The most glaring example of our present ignorance is that the Los Angeles branch knows nothing about the developments concerning deportations that have been taking place here since last spring. This is stupid if not criminal.

III. THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Since we do not live under an autocracy or fascist regime,for us the type of executive committee each branch requires is determined by the nature of the given branch,by its size,resurces and situation. Though being for a "strong exec" has been something of a fetish in the IS (leaving aside for the moment the question of what exactly constitutes a strong exec),in a branch of eight people we see very little reason for a committee of three or four people deciding most political questions. Thus our conception of the role of an exec in our present situation in Los Angeles is rather limited.

But first of all,to allay any fears of (gasp) "anti-centralism" or (horror of horrors) "anti-Bolshvism" on our part,let us state that we recognize the need of an executive committee capable of organizing and coordinating the different aspects of our political work and seeing to it that branch and national perspectives are carried out. But besides this general task,the main functions we see for the new exec are to organize meetings and forums,take care of branch business (finances,etc), and deal with those subjects that cannot be discussed in open meetings due to security precautions (though sometimes simply having special closed mettings for members only can solve this problem). One advantage of having such a small branch is that most major political questions can be discussed and decided upon directly at branch meetings. One of the worst aspects of the old branch is that a "strong exec" came to mean a bottleneck through wich everything had to pass before,trickling down to the branch as a whole. We are certainly not in a situation t.

That would justify such strictly top-down organizational practices.

IV. BRANCH MEETINGS

But what, we have been asked, will branch meetings look like if our proposal is adopted? So we will attempt to paint the best picture that our limited reproductional facilities will allow. First of all, in our opinion, they will be more interesting. There will be coordinators reports concerning different arenas in which we are active (staggered, of course, so they don't all come on one night), and reports by area exports on key local, regional, and broader developments. Our political discussions will not take place in a vacuum and will not be mechanically separated from our discussions of how and where to intervene. When we grow to the point where meetings threaten to become too long and ponderous some reports will have to be given less often than others. When this happens we feel that absolute priority should be given to reports from industrial arena in which we are active.

Besides making most of our decisions at meetings, there will be a far more extensives series of educationals, both on such "abstract" subjects as labor history and the higher levels of Marxist theory, and on such "concrete" subjects as how to organize a rank and file caucus, how to operate in a united front, etc. In other words they will be more varied, interesting and externally-oriented discussions, discussions that we can bring contacts and especially worker contacts to without having to apologize for the bizarre, fevered atmosphere of sectarian intrigue and "revolutionary" fantasising. Overall, we feel that meetings can and must be better, more interesting, more accessible to non-members and more concise: they should be something we want to bring our contacts to, not keep them away from. This alone would be enough to make our proposal worthy of consideration.

August 16, 1973

MOTION ON ORGANIZATION (Barbara Z., N.Y.I.S.)

That, whereas the I.S. should seek to be financially self-sustaining, therefore this convention directs the incoming NAC to set up a national progressive dues scale, based on ability to pay (perhaps using the N.Y. branch scale as a model,), (a) to be paid directly to the National Office by NALs, and (b) to be paid to the branches by branch members! The share to be paid by the branches to the National Office should be determined on the basis of branch ability to pay over and above a set minimum.

On Recent Changes in the UAW -- A Working Paper J. Weber

For a good many years, the UAW has been almost monolithic organizationally. Serious opposition to the policies and leadership of the international union has been very nearly non-existent among elected officials in the locals from the level of president right down to the level of shop steward. While serious strains have existed within the international bureaucracy, especially following Reuther's death, these have represented little more than a scramble for power. More important, even with these strains, no international executive board member has yet violated the discipline of the administration caucus even so far as casting a dissenting vote on any issue. Those executive board members who strongly opposed dumping Schrade merely resigned without a fight.

Up until recently, Doug Frazer, Chrysler department head, had the reputation as heading up the "left wing" of the bureaucracy. CP types and other left liberals in the union had the hopes for a succession struggle between Frazer and Greathouse upon the retirement of Woodcock. Schrade, whether intentionally or not, began assuming the role of stalking horse for Frazer trying to attract a following of secondary officials in opposition to the policies of the international. Willing to use fairly militant rhetoric when addressing a militant audience, Schrade, at the same time tried to wrap himself in the Reuther mantel, charging the current Reutherite administration with deviating from Reutherism. It was clear that any serious following Schrade might have picked up could have easily been taken over by Frazer if and when he decided to make a bid for power. (Remember, we are talking about the situation a month or more ago.)

Schrade had little or no success. He proved no more capable of breaking even a modest number of secondary offficals from their loyalty to the office holders in Solidarity House than has the United National Caucus. And in failing to attract large numbers, the handful of secondary leaders in the UNC saw no reason to get that excited about Schrade.

All past documents we have written dealing with the UNC have pointed out that the leadership of the UNC has consistantly wished to orient toward opposition secondary officials. We in turn have consistently pressed for a rank and file orientation. The extent we have made inroads in pushing the caucus in this direction has only secondarily been the result of our excellent powers of persuasion and logic. The main basis of our success in pressing UNC leadership toward a rank and file orientation, and most important, toward some of the conclusion which flow from such an orientation has been the lack of any opportunities in carrying out an orientation to secondary leadership. Our perspective seemed to be the only one with any real hope of success. Still UNC leaders preferred a secondary leadership orientation. At the time of the bargaining

At the time of the bargaining convention, the occasion where an orientation to secondary leaders as concretized by an orientation toward attracting convention delegates to the UNC appeared possible, relations between the IS and the UNC leaders deteriorated quickly the same as had happened at the UAW Constitutional Convention. The opportunity proved illusiary, but the UNC leaders were trimming their sails just in case. Similiarly, before agreeing to get involved in the projected Chrysler Coalition for A Decent Contract, Simms checked around for UAW officials who might be willing to take a stand on the contract and agreed to our approach (tentatively and hesitantly) only because he found no takers.

It appears that the entire situation inside the UAW is rapidly changing. Frazer, the alleged leader of the "left" within the bureaucracy, personally took charge of mobilizing the goon squads of 1,000 bureaucrats each that were used to crush the Mack strike. Frazer made the statements to the press that Chrysler should hold firm against the demands of the Mack workers and that Chrysler had brought trouble on itself by "caving in" to the Jefferson workers. Frazer was praised by both Chrysler and the police for his behavior during the recent strikes and he has pledged to maintain order in the plants and to crush any further independent actions of the ranks.

Frazer has become the symbol of the new UAW public face which replaces the old image of progressive, democratic, social unionism. He has become identified with the reactionary turn in the UAW. Frazer as "leader of the left" is no more. Until recently, one could have assumed that Fraser would have taken advantage of any serious upsurge in the union tending to discredit the Woodcock regime in a move to defeat Freathouse as Woodcock's successor. on the basis of his image as a more progressive bureaucrat. There is no longer anybody in the top UAW leadership who could effectively play that role. The split at the top has been jammed together. While in the past, dissatisfaction with the international's policy could have been channeled into support for the alleged "left wing" minority against the Woodcock/Greathouse majority, this option has been closed.

We consider the jamming together of the split at the top to be a progressive development. To the extent that dissatisfaction below would be funneled into support for the alleged "left wing" of the bureaucracy against the right wing little would have been accomplished besides dissipation of energy and turnover in the personnel of the bureaucracy. Now that the Frazer potential outlet for discontent has been closed off, we can expect the dissaffection from below to find more progressive potential expressions.

The same pressures that closed the Frazer/Greathouse fissure have begun to open up new cracks, though still on a very low and tentative level. They have simultaneously laid the basis for the develop-

ment of a genuine rank and file movement, based in production and led by blacks independent of any section of the bureaucracy. Neither of these developments is in any way assured, but it is on the basis of this new potentiality upon which we must base our new perspectives.

Why were 1,000 goons (union officials) mobilized per shift to break the Mack strike? The bureaucracy probably knew they could have done the job with a much smaller army, although it is possible that they were so out of touch that they didn't even know what to expect. But the main purpose of the massive mobilization seems to have been, not to break the strike at Mack, but to launch a counter-offensive against militants in all UAW locals. The goons were mobilized from a radius of 100 miles or more of Detroit. They were called out on the basis of an hysterical appeal that the union was under attack and subject to being destroyed and they were called upon to "save our union." They were brought together for a meeting where Fraser and other officials made speeches, and then they were marched out to surround the plant. But behind this was the desire for these officials to go back to their own locals and to clean up house there. The purpose was to prepare local officials to take a hardnosed attitude toward any independent action and to use force, if necessary to break it up. This was translated within the next few days in several Detroit area plants where local officials threatened known militants and in a few incidents, pulled together local goon squads for the purpose of preventing leafletting of the plant. Fraser made a public statement tat the local leaders now had the situation under control, and that there would be no further disruptions of production.

The bureaucracy was aided in this drive by the red/outside agitator scare played up in the press as a result of politically destructive behavior on the part of WAM, the PL front group involved in triggering the Mack actions. But inspite of the mobilization of the bureaucracy, and the vicious hysterical reporting of the press, large numbers of rank and filers in almost every plant got the message of what was going on. The union had mobilized a massive goon squad putting it at the service of the corporation to break a workers' strike. A unifying focus for discontent with the already unpopular bureaucracy had been found. At the same time, local union officials in most plants were fully implicated, having themselves participated in the goon squads.

The wildcat wave represented not only graphic proof that the bureaucracy had failed in dealing with workers' problems, but gave new credibility to the idea of independent rank and file action. In this context, disgust with the bureaucracy is coupled, at least vaguely, with the idea that the forces exist to create an alternative.

Will the bureaucracy succeed in destroying rank and file militancy? We think not. It already appears that they sense the reaction of the ranks and are backing off. Still, the task of defence of the ranks against the bureaucracy, coupled with defence of fired workers are immediate issues already starting to attract the most political of the rank and file militants to one another. During the wildcats, small numbers of the most political workers from the various plants met each other and for the first time the sense of a city-wide left mileau inside auto began to emerge. Contract time is upon us, a natural time for militants from different plants to band together. Since defence of the fired workers requires mobilizing the ranks to vote down any contract until the workers are rehired, this will tend to pressure militants to come together around an approach to the contract. It should not be difficult to develop a more comprehensive approach to the contract once the question is raised. We seek the formation of a city-wide autoworkers organization as the organizational expression and continuator of the struggles of the past months. The young, black, rank and file production worker character of this movement implies that, at least in the first instance, such a movement can not be directly channeled into the UNC.

While we believe the basis for such a movement exists it would be an error to over-estimate it. The image of setting out to fight a monolithic UAW bureaucracy in close collusion with the corporations is frightening to say the least. Many rank and file workers sympathetic to the development of such a movement will tend to lay low out of fear, or out of the notion that it's impossible to wim so why bother, why take the risks. The knowledge that large numbers of workers have already been fired will not generate confidence. UAW's blundering and the red scare they helped generate will also keep many workers back. Still we believe that the visible presence of a militant rank and file opposition emanating from the recent struggles will be sympathetically received by a large portion of the ranks. We believe that such a development will serve to solidify and deepen the growing disgust with the bureaucracy and help to give it a more unified, articulate and politically coherent expression.

The same exact forces that lay the potential basis for the development of a rank and file movement, also have their effect on the local union bureaucracies. While most local bureaucrats are implicated with Solidarity House beyond salvage, there are a significant number that project a slightly more militant and independent image. It is a commonly known phenomena that strong dissatisfaction with the performance of the top bureaucracy leads to rapid turnover among secondary officials, the only representatives of the UAW the ranks actually get a chance to vote out of office, thereby registering their discontent. To the extent that the current

opposition to the bureaucracy among the ranks finds articulate and sustained expression, pressure will be generated for some local bureaucrats to begin dissassociating themselves from Solidarity House either as a means of holding on to their jobs, or alternatively, as a means of going after the job of a bureaucrat who is more tied up to Solidariyt House. In other words, under present circumstances, the development and deepening of R&F opposition will encourage the development of opposition among secondary level officials. If such opposition among secondary leadership develops on any significant scale, it too will seek organizational expression.

Without a doubt, the development of a significant bureaucratic opposition based on secondary leadership in opposition to the international would cut in two ways.

It would give courage and room to move to a rank and file opposition. At the same time it could generate new illusions in the ability of a new bureaucracy to bureaucratically meet the needs of the needs of the rank and file. But without a doubt, any significant R&F opposition movement would generate a reformer bureaucratic opposition to go along with it. Whether a bureaucratic and a rank and file opposition would eventually become part of a single movement, competing movements, cooperating movements or what can not yet be predicted. Our main task, of course, is to build, strengthen and politically arm the R&F opposition and its ability to act independent of any wing of the bureaucracy.

(What distinguishes a R&F from a bureaucratic movement is not primarily that one is primarily based on office holders and the other is not. The distinction is rather one of perspective. A R&F opposition puts its main emphasis on consciousness, organization, and self-activity, a bureaucratic opposition puts its main emphasis on electing better officials to do a better job <u>for you</u>. As a corallary, the main dynamic of a R&F group is the desire to fight the company, the main dynamic of a bureaucratic opposition is the desire to get a better office, even though this is rarely made explicit.)

We can say with some certainty, that no significant bureaucratic opposition will develop inside the UAW in the near future unless the assertiveness of the ranks and the opposition and disgust with Solidarity House find continuing and strengthening expression. In this sense, deepening of the rank and file movement is a precondition to such a development. But, at the same time, indications of potential fissures within the union can help give courage to the ranks.

Under present circumstances, our perspective to the UNC must change. In the past, the lack of opportunities in orienting to secondary leadership figures in the UAW was the basis on which we were able not only to raise the notion of a R&F orientation in the caucus, but to have success with it. The new shift in the situation is not lost on UNC leadership. Kelly, at least, senses that new opportunities exist to appeal to new layers of secondary leaders. The basis of this is growing dissaffection in the ranks brought to a head by the recent struggles, and the argument that for many secondary officials with a militant image, they better start now dissassociating from Solidarity House or end up an early victim of the disaffection. As Kelly would start graphically putting it to these individuals, "You better start screaming now, good and loud, or you will be part of the carnage. . . ." In particular, Kelly is now attempting to get signatures for a statement condemning the bureaucracy and supporting a fight to reinstate the fired workers. We fully support this move and would like to see the signatures of as many prominant UAW members from as many locals as possible upon this statement. Going further, we would encourage the UNC to call a meeting sponsored by as many of these individuals and by all possible UAW groups in defence of the fired workers and against the bureaucracy. At present, we don't expect such attempts to turn up more than a couple dozen UAW office holders above the level of steward. Certainly not enough to constitute any significant secondary leadership opposition. But even a statement and meeting sponsored by a few dozen office holders among others, would tend to help to combat some of the fears and pessimism in the ranks and as such contribute to developing a rank and file movement.

Organizing such activities and attempting to mobilize secondary leadership elements in defence of the ranks does not by itself constitute a bureaucratic orientation. But, we must expect that to the extent we are successful in our basic perspective, that is organizing and mobilizing a rank and file movement, the basis will be laid for the UNC to begin orienting more agressively to secondary officials. We should stay in and fight against the political manifestations of a bureaucratic orientation, but we can expect this to tend to be a losing battle in the long run as the opportunities for a genuine bureaucratic opposition open up.

One way to avoid this, would be to attempt to build the rank and file movement under the rubric of the UNC to begin with. But under present circumstances this would be impossible. The UNC recognized leadership have to much mixed feelings about the struggle out of which this new rank and file movement can be crystalized. This movement will have to be led by the young black militant workers like Shorter and Carter who led the Jefferson struggle. It will have

a militant posture. It can't be built under the leadership of an organization which will not permit its newspaper to have pictures of the clenched fist. Even after toning down the last issue of the UNC paper, Kelly still got static from people like Fox that the paper was too "black." The new rank and file movement that must be built will be a whole lot "blacker" which would freak out much of the present UNC base if they were forced to associate with it. To attempt to build the kind of rank and file movement we now consider possible under the rubric of the UNC would get us into simultaneous battle with the UNC leadership and with any of the young rank and file leaders we wish to pull into such a movement. We would fail on both ends. Rather we should attempt to establish the most friendly possible relations between the present UNC leadership and such a developing movement. To the extent this new movement gets off the ground and developed it would have our primary loyalty. But we should stay in the UNC so long as we can do so on a principled basis trying to bring as much of the new movement as we can in with us. This also puts us in the position that we are not left high and dry if our perspective for this new movement fails.

Resources permitting, we should still continue providing what technical assistance we can to the UNC. However, we must stop trying to make it act as if it were an IS front through which we put forward our mass line. In the past, if we wanted to put out a leaflet to all auto plants, we would write it and then try to get the UNC to sign it. This approach has already caused tensions in that the UNC leadership did not fully share our perspectives. In the future it will become increasingly impossible precisely because we can expect the UNC to become more viable and more attractive to elements from secondary leadership. Politically we will be able to become a minority force in the UNC for the first time rather than a part of the leadership as it becomes more of a real organization in its own right. If the predicted developments occur, we will be able to stay in and influence the UNC over the long haul only to the extent that we are able to represent not only ourselves but an organized rank and file movement with which the UNC will have to come to terms.

In the next several months, our main political goal is the building of a new rank and file movement in auto. The prime definition of this movement should be the political expression and continuation of the struggles that have been going on. As such defense and justification of those struggles, the fight against the bureaucracy as a pro-company scab-herding outfit, and the struggle for the reinstatement of fired militants will be the starting point of the definition. Beyond that, we wish this movement to have as an important part of its definition: the struggle against racism both in the plants and in the community; the need for strong local rank

and file organization to organize the struggle in every plant and every local against the company and the bureaucracy to rebuild the union as a fighting instrument of the rank and file in the shops; the struggle for a decent contract; the need for a national opposition inside the UAW. Our goal would be to win such a movement to our full labor program, but that can't be the starting

basis. For example, we would fight within it for IPA, but shouldn't demand that be a starting point of definition. Still, the kind of movement we hope to build is more likely to move toward real independent political action than is the UMC that has been on record for a labor party for years. The real definition will be the need for militancy and struggle.

With the exception of WAM, our stance is to welcome all political tendencies actually doing real work in auto into such a movement. In particular, this includes CL, RU, BWC, Spark. We must take the most all-inclusive, non-sectarian stance because if ot, we are likely to be the first group throwm out by sectarianism since we have strong enemies in the CL and BWC who will have the political advantage over us of being black and will use every opportunity to try and exclude us. We see Shorter and Carter, not as a gimmick to attract people to the group, but as the most important human symbols of the struggle and of the new layer that is emerging out of these common experiences. Shorter also apears to be the sort capable of providing real leadership and helping congeal an organization which could otherwise quickly degenerate into warring factions. Our guess is that if the various political groups attempted to form a joint formation, this would immediately attract large numbers more who in total would greatly outnumber the politicos. Even if the other groups do not wish to cooperate, we will only get types like Shorter and Carter to cooperate with us rather than some other group if we make it clear that we at least are willing to work with anybody with whom we can reach principled agreement on immediate questions. The burden of a divided left must rest on the other groups.

We see the first steps toward forming such a group as joint activities carried out cooperatively by the various forces that we would hope will make us the basic skelatal structure of the new group. Toward this end we have already proposed a leaflet to be handed out in as many plants as possible in defense of the Mack sit-in; we have invited Shorter and Carter to speak to a Shifting Gears meeting; we have organized defense of the right of rank and file groups to distribute literature and offer to continue such efforts.

We see winning Shorter to the idea of this group as quite important because of his ability to congeal other forces. But we do not desire, nor will we permit the formation of a group in which we relate to Shorter and Carter the way we now relate to Kelly and Sims. If the

group has no reality beyond us and them, we want no part of it and neither would they. We want a democratic group. In particular, though, in the early stages of such a group, we would be willing to hold back the participation of our IS members so that we are not in a position to dominate the group artificially.

There has been some confusion as a result of the AFSC discussion between the idea of a citywide group with local chapters and the idea of a coalition of local groups. Neither proposal was designed to de-emphasize the importance of strong local groups active in the individual plants and locals dealing with local problems. Opposition to proposing a group made out of a coalition of pre-existing local groups was the fear that this would be taken as a proposal on our part to set up a coalition whose main basis was groups we already dominate, thereby seeming to propose to Shorter and Carter that they be our political captives. Also, most of the groups we relate to have the character of being white groups in black plants. Where this is the case, we wish to overcome this problem, if necessary at the expense of dissolving existing groups. So, for instance, at Chevy, the local members of the larger group may decide to keep shifting gears as their local organ. Alternatively, at Dodge, possibly forces would become involved who might prefer to start with a new publication rather than adopting Strike-back which they might fear already had a fixed character and leader-ship. In practice, the difference between a coalition of existing groups approach, and the formation of a new group with local chapters approach has probably disappeared for all intents and purposes on the basis of the discussions. Both sides agree on the need to be willing to make clear that we are not demanding everyone join our thing. Both agree that a condition for membership in a citywide formation must be either membership in a local affiliate, or the commitment to build a local affiliate if none exists.

Besides the local chapters, we desire a group that also has strong existance as a citywide formation. This includes provisions for a responsible citywide decisions making body and a regular citywide organ that has the authority to act as the voice of the entire group. We understand, however, that what we strive for and what we get may be two very different things.

Amendment for T&P, pg 35 On women's perspectives CRG, Chigagp

A necessary task for IS branches is to develop local perspectives for building a working women's movement in their area. Such perspectives must (A) guide the local industrialization ~~08~~ priorities for women comrades and determine the course of the industrial work they will lead and (B) direct our work in the organized women's movement/

Without such perspectives there is no way that IS women as a group will develop politically in the IS and that the IS as a whole will over come its culturally ingrained male chauvinism;..

It will be the taslk of local execs over the next two months to develop such perspectives. These perspectives must include designation of a local industrialization priority where industrialized women can find a base among women, and where the organizing projected will be in some way characterisitc of the organizing tasks which confront large sections of working women.

In no city are all women required to enter one or several such industrial areas. However the goal must be to conduct a portion of the industrial work in these areas.

These perspectives must also guide our women toward building organizations of working women within the women's movement, and investigate the possibility of organizing working women's committees -- such as DARE in Chicago-- within these. The task of these committees is (1) to attract the growing numbers of working women who are beginning to seek support in the woman's movement, (2) to serve as a clearing house through which particular local struggles receive direction, guidance and support, and (3) to organize public campaigns and newspapers which build consciousness of working women's ossues and of the potential of working women as workers to fight around them.

It will be the task of the local execs to establish women's commissions repponsible' to the execs, whose task it will be to implement these perspectives and to initiate such activities as will ensure that adequate contact work is done among working class women.

amendment to T&P, pg 35

The national organization will solicit from the Bay Area comrades a written perspective on the organization Union WAGE, to be ready for distribution in two months. This perspective will iiclude a description of the organization, of the IS's past work with it, and a perspective on our future relation to it.

AFSCME Amendment to Joint Tasks and Perspectives Part IX: The IS in Industry: The Last Two Years and the Future. K. Stacy

1. Page 1, paragraph 2, second sentence to read ". . .we should scale down the number of priority industries by dropping steel."
Same paragraph, delete last sentence.
Same page delete paragraphs four and five. Substitute Amendment 1.

2. Page 2, add Amendment 2 after end of paragraph beginning on page 1.

3. Page 3, Substitue Amendment 3 for list of national priorities.

Amendment 1:

We are for re-establishing AFSCME as a national priority because we xpect AFSCME to be among the national unions to respond earliest to the current crisis in capitalism. The major over-riding reason for this is that AFSCME is forced to confront the state itself, which will continue to try to solve its problems through cutbacks in services and personnel. This, and the compositon of the work force in big-city blue collar locals, offers us tremendous potential organizing openings both on the job and, through our positions in the union, in the black community -- a priority equal to industrialization.

Amendment 2:

AFSCME presents us with the opportunity to do consistent, ongoing, and potentially, highly political work with militant black women. This alone is a priority for the IS. And while it is true that the sectors of AFSCME that have been traditionally the most militant have been largely male, many of the recent organizing drives have been spear-headed by black women, and a comparatively high proportion of the elected union officials are black women. It is our belief that by combining both on-the-job organization with a political presence in the councils and regions (bringing local contacts into those larger arenas), and with an emphasis on linking organizationally the impact the industry cut-backs will have on communities that many, if not all, of the workers live in, the basis wxists for us to do high-level and politically crucial organizing. The opportunities to recruit both to our periphery and to the IS militant blacks, transforming our membership both socially, sexually, and racially, cannot be ignored.'

Amendment 3.

1. UAW/auto
2. IBT/trucking and freight
3. CWA/telephone
4. AFSCME/blue-collar public employees
5. ~~AFT/~~public schools

Motivation:

In the past we have "industrialized" into AFSCME in exactly the wrong way. Most of our cadre
Most of our cadre in AFSCME have been either students with jobs on campus, or cadre in campus areas, looking for jobs to support themselves working in what happened to be one of our priority industries.

At the last Convention we had one member in a non-campus big-city local. That comrade has since left, so that we have ro representation in the section of AFSCME we consider to be politically the most militant: the big-city locals and councils facing and having to deal with the effects of the cutbacks in social services and the crisis in the cities today -- both on the job and in their communities.

The Union itself has a reputation as a liberal, socially-concious union. It conciously and comtinuously pushes its membership to political activity,i.e. membership and activity in electing the Democratic Party. It still takes seriously organizing the unorganized, and is still the fastest growing (through organizing) union in the nation. In spite of the left-liberal rhetoric of Werf and others on the International, a national opposition caucus surfaced at the '72 Convention.

It had little impact on the Convention itself because its major focus had b3en the lack of social responsibility of the union nationally. The Int. pulled the rug out from under the oppostions feet be improting and exgremely dynamic UFW spreaker, and then leading the room in pledges of financial support and solidarity. Unable to ge-group their forces, some of the ppositionists were satisfied that this represented a real committement to organizng and supporting ~~XXXXX~~ minority movements.

The extent to which we can over time have an impact nationally is unknown, but many local and refional opportunities for our intervention do exist. Within the AFSC,E frame work it is possible to have a political impaat on the Councils, which unusally include all the city locals.

In addition to Council meeting and class AFSCME also holds many classes for blacks and women, both municipally and regionally, that give us the oppostunity to put forward our program for city employees, and to be a left-wing pole of attraction for militants as the bankruptcy of the International support for the DP becomes more clear.

The question of spreading our resources too thin is a difficult one. On one hand, it is partially solved by the ordering of our priorities. We should also recognize that with the expected recession, and the cut-backs in social services industrialization into AFSCME may be difficult. We believe all comrades should be encouraged to enter our highest priorities as hiring permits.

We should recognize, however, that some of our members -- most of them women -- while open to industrialization are hesitant to enter our heavy industry priorities for a variety of good and substantial reasons. While we are for the re-introduction of AFSCME as a priority, in part for the reason just stated, we reject the idea that AFSCME is a "training ground". It offers the opportunity for IS'ers to do politically very important and valuable work, without forcing cadre to put themselves in positions they feel politically incapable of dealing with.

OUR POSITION ON ERA

by John Sullivan

For the second year in a row, the teachers fraction has been embarrassed by the failure of the IS to consider the question of ERA since 1970. Our difficulty stems mainly from the fact that the organization has not, since then, considered the changed circumstances surrounding the ERA.

In 1970, when our last organizational debate occurred, the ERA had not yet passed Congress. By last year, ERA had been sent to the states for ratification. This made it more difficult than it had been previously to argue for a different ERA. In fact, given the way the debate went on in the women's rights committee of the AFT Convention, the best we could do was to tie the ratification of ERA (rather than its statement) to the extension of protective laws for men. This was considered by some to be a breech of organizational discipline, but most of us in the fraction (including me) felt that the position we took then was the best way we could apply the organization's position in the circumstances we faced.

This year we have even more of a problem. The pro-ERA forces within the AFT are trying to repeal the position of last year (which is the position we fought for) and to replace it with a simple pro-ERA position. (Note: This is being typed after the end of the AFT Convention, whereas it was written before. In this year's convention, the position of last year, which we supported, was upheld. However, I think we can expect this problem to recur next year.) They can be expected to argue that protective legislation is being lost because of the civil rights laws without ERA and to back up this argument with considerable documentation. Since none of us are prepared to document specific cases in which protective laws are still in operation which would be lost by the passage of ERA, it will be next to impossible for us to make a credible argument for continuing to tie the ratification of ERA to the passage of protective legislation. (In addition to this, there are states, such as my home state of Illinois, in which state laws(or, as in the case of Illinois, a provision in the state constitution) exist which have the same effect that ERA would have with regard to these laws.) As a result, we have decided that the best we can do is to try to amend the pro-ERA resolutions to call for an additional campaign to restore protective legislation and extend it to cover men as well as women. If the NAC finds that this is a breech of organizational discipline, we will have to abstain from the ERA discussion this year. (Note on typing: As noted above, the events of the Convention have shown that this perspective was overly pessimistic; however, the problem is likely to get worse as the years go by, and so my call for a reconsideration of our position still stands.)

If the organization has not reconsidered the position on ERA by next year, the position of this fraction on this question will be very awkward.

The first thing that is needed in the reconsideration is a thorough study of the facts. Are there still any protective laws in operation which would be lost by the passage of ERA but would remain intact otherwise? If so, which laws, in which states, and affecting which workers? If we are to maintain our previous position, we need facts with which to defend it, and most members of IS do not have the time to do the necessary research on their own.

On the other hand, the facts may well show that the question of saving and extending protective laws really is a separate question from the passage of ERA in practice. If this is the case, then we need to change our position. Obviously, we would need to call for a campaign to restore protective laws and to extend them to men; whether or not we would need a position on ERA itself would require further discussion. (This is written off the top of my head; I do not have time right now to give this serious thought.)

One more point we ought to consider: so far the discussion has dealt with the question of which laws should be on the books. But there is also the question of the enforcement of the laws. This question is usually more important to working people than the question of which laws are on the books and their exact language. Perhaps we ought to give some consideration to relating our agitation and propaganda on the whole ERA question to the need to organize to insure proper enforcement of whatever is actually passed.

IN DEFENSE OF WOMEN'S CAUCUSES WITHIN THE I.S.

Sheila A. for the Bread&Roses Caucus NY

Our common goal in our fight for socialism is human liberation. We view socialism as the material precondition for this goal. We differ, however, in our view regarding how this can be attained.

It is the touchstone of our world view, that is socialism from below, that human liberation can only be attained through self-liberation of the working class. Divisions among sectors of the class weaken the struggle for self liberation of the working class. The closer we can approximate class unity, the stronger and more effective will be the common movement towards socialism. Class unity, then is a strategy for attaining a goal- the liberation of all oppressed and exploited people.

What, then, does class unity mean? For real class unity, all sectors of the class must be united programmatically on an equal basis. In order for struggle on an equal basis to be achieved, all sectors must be able to participate fully in that struggle. We, however, recognize the reality that the class is divided in the sense that there exists an uneven consciousness both among individuals and sectors of the class. The special oppression experienced under capitalism by certain sectors of the class blocks full and equal participation of these sectors in the common struggle. Special oppression affects both people who are members of an oppressed sector and those who are not. For example, women are characterized as less intelligent, less able to perform "serious" roles outside the home, and less able to play leadership roles in class militancy. This affects men to the extent that they will not take women as seriously politically, as they do men, and therefore will tend to ignore women as a potential political force. Women, as a result, internalize this self-concept. Although women workers many times have shown militancy at crucial points of struggle, when the immediate issue subsides, they return to their previous roles as wife and mother. Their roles as workers and as militants become less important. In addition, the lowered self confidence and submissive roles that women are taught tend to discourage women from taking leadership roles in struggle. Therefore, the program of the class must include demands relating to special needs of oppressed groups. At every point in the fight for socialism, steps must be taken to alleviate special oppression, and therefore maximize participation of all working class groups in the fight.

Who will fight for the demands of oppressed groups? We agree that the special demands of the oppressed should be and will be fought for by the entire class. But in the present period, the class as a whole often lacks the consciousness to see that it is in their class interest to fight for the demands of the oppressed. Until working class consciousness reaches this point, it will be the oppressed groups themselves who will and must fight for their own demands and force the class as a whole to fight for them as well.

In the process of struggling for self-liberation, oppressed groups will attain the skills, confidence, and strength necessary to fully participate in the struggle. In the process they will gain the respect of fellow workers, which will in turn lead to the unity of the class on an equal basis. Even after major sectors of the class have realized that it is in their interest to unite with oppressed groups, and furthermore, even after the conquest of state power and during the building of a socialist society, the oppressed must remain the hardest and most consistent advocates of their own needs.

Self-liberation means then, not only the self-liberation of the working class, but the self-liberation of the oppressed sectors in the class as well. We are, therefore, opposed to any subordination of the struggles of oppressed groups for their own liberation in the name of class unity. To say that the self-liberation struggles of the oppressed divides the class is fallacious and does not recognize the dynamics of real class unity.

Even after the revolution, we believe, there will be an uneven consciousness with an advanced layer. Historically women have not been in this advanced layer in numbers comparable to men. Part of our fight at present, and after the revolution as well, will be to insure that women are in the advanced layer. We seek and will seek to change the consciousness of the vanguard with respect to oppressed groups.

We extend this conception to the revolutionary organization as well. Many would agree with our views on self-liberation but would not agree that this conception applies to the revolutionary organization, an organization in which, hopefully, its members have attained an advanced level of consciousness. A socialist organization, however, is not an alternate culture. On the contrary, we all come from, live in, and work politically in a society that is sexist. Overcoming sexism is not a matter of sheer will. Sexism cannot be eliminated without first eliminating the material reasons for its existence. By this we mean that under capitalism, no group of individuals, however good their intentions or ideas, can be free of sexist group constructs. Therefore, within the revolutionary organization it will still be women, themselves, the victims of sexism, who will be the most alert and militant fighters around their own demands.

In arguing against a women's caucus, some have expressed the notion that problems dealing with sexism within the IS, or neglect of women's issues in program or practice, should not be dealt with in a women's caucus as that would tend to "isolate women into a political backwater". The fear was that the organization as a whole would not be forced to deal with women's issues. What is the alternative posed? Is the alternative individual women fighting alone to pressure the organization to take women's issues seriously? Socialists do not pose individualistic solutions to social problems. Women fighting as individuals are not as effective as women fighting together. Faced with the social problem of sexism within the IS, we therfore see the necessity of

A women's caucus is not a substitute for fighting sexism within the organization; rather it is one vehicle for bringing this issue to the whole organization. The history of the socialist movement's active involvement in the building of a women's liberation movement in the working class in periods of feminist quiescence has been for the most part, dismal. Since changes occur only when people are thinking and acting on a problem, one of the major functions of a women's caucus is to keep the issue alive. Without this pressure, consciousness often regresses. We see it as a task of the women's caucus to insure that the IS include in its program the concept of self-organization of the oppressed both inside and outside the organization.

Another function of the women's caucus is to develop women as political cadre. The members of the women's caucus have taken the role of aiding each others political development through discussion, and helping each other gain self-confidence to participate actively in the functioning of the organization.

One of the criticisms that has been raised against a women's caucus has been that we did not have a program. Many went as far as saying that we could not have a program because there could be no program for a caucus based on sex. We believe that this criticism shows a narrow understanding of the question of program. There are many different kinds of programs for different purposes. Our program is not solely a question of political positioning on the woman question (or any other question) which we wish the organization to adopt. For, although we take the question seriously and consider one of our purposes to be to assure that the IS as a whole continue to do so, that is not our only purpose. Even if every single comrade were to agree with us totally, we would not be for disbanding the women's caucus. (This would happen with any caucus which was defined solely on a political basis - having won the organization to its point of view, or program, it would no longer need to exist.) Our program, instead flows from our tasks. These tasks include enabling women to be full members of the IS, guarding against male chauvinism in ourselves as well as in male comrades, and assuring that the IS continue to consider the liberation of women, and all the oppressed, a major part of its program. Therefore, our program essentially is a program of tasks for ourselves and the organization, as opposed to a list of demands for the IS to adopt. In addition, our program includes the belief that oppression is more than an abstract analysis but has a real effect on the functioning of the oppressed, in this case, women. Further, our program includes the notion that one of the ways that women can overcome their oppression is through their self-organization, through actively organizing themselves and taking the lead in their own struggles-- even in the revolutionary organization.

Finally, we wish to point out that the tasks of a women's caucus are ongoing. Even when the IS has an excellent position on the women's question (which we think it does now, i.e. the Winkler document), and even when male chauvinism is at its lowest, a women's caucus continues to be necessary. It will enable newer women to deal with their oppression. It will enable women comrades, in general, to continue to function and act as an organized force confronting male chauvinism, even if only implicitly. Further, a women's caucus will guard against a return of the IS of 5 years ago in which women were little more than bodies populating meetings.

Our advocacy of a women's caucus, then, is based on our political conception of how to attain human liberation, in general. We recognizethe need for self-liberation, and therefore, independent organization of women, both as an aid to real class unity and as necessary for a high, sustained level of consciousness of women's oppression. This conception applies to the revolutionary organization. Our view is that sexism, both inside and outside the IS is a social problem that requires group, not individual solutions.

Amendment on Transitional Program

Jack Trautman, John Weber and Joel Geier
for the Transformation Caucus

Our program is not a transitional program -- at least not in the sense that the term was used by Trotsky and the Trotskyist movement in the thirties and forties: a system of demands stemming from today's conditions and today's consciousness leading unalterably to the conquest of power. The transitional program implies both an assessment of the nature of the period and a perspective flowing from that assessment. The 1938 program, The Death Agony of Capitalism, begins with the assumption that world revolution was on the immediate order of the agenda. Any important strike, government crisis or scandal, mass demonstration, sharp decline in economic conditions and so forth, could provoke the beginning of the revolutionary struggle. It was a period in which the failure of the revolution about to begin would lead to the utter defeat of the working class. The perspective of the program was the attempt to raise within all struggles a program which politically poses the question of revolution as an extension of that struggle with the purpose of giving direction to the struggle for power about to unfold.

What was involved in that notion was the idea that there could be a system of demands which solved the existing problems from a working lcass point of view, that the demands were such that a revolution was necessary in order to implement them, and that whatever the actual level of consciousness and organization of the working class, the material basis and material pressures for organization and consciousness was such that the masses of the working class could at any moment by impelled into struggles around those demands, or at least around some of them.

One cannot construct a system of demands and call it a transitional program simply because it includes conceptions whose fulfillment requires revolution. The purpose of any program is to influence and shape working class consciousness and struggle. To put forward a program that cannot affect working class consciousness and struggle, and call it a transitional program because of its logic or inherent value is an error similar to idealism or utopianism.

Individual demands and even numbers of demands from the 1938 program can be very useful and applicable at times when a transitional program is not called for. The 1938 program was not merely a shopping list of demands, but a system implying both an evaluation of the period and a perspective. When utilizing some of these demands on the basis of a different perspective from that of 1938, one is not applying the transitional program.

Transitional demands can be correctly raised and fought for when a full transitional program is not on the order of the day. Demands such as 30 for 40, open the books, even nationalization under workers' control are appropriate under some circumstances today. But revolutionaries have attempted to raise transitional demands at times and places when these demands can have no effect on the consciousness and struggle of even thin layers of workers as was attempted by some Trotskyists in the 1950's. To say that the individuals were in fact even raising transitional demands is to confuse appearances with reality.

In the 1930's the depth and imminent solution of the world crisis, through communism or fascism, and the organizational weakness of the revolutionary Marx-

ists, led Trotsky to project the simultaneous building of the revolutionary party with the seizure of power. The two were to be achieved through fighting for the transitional program in counterposition to all other political currents with their programs for the world depression, social crisis and impending war. Immediate struggles of the workers were solely a taking-off point for presenting this program.

The post-war boom and Cold War reduced the revolutionaries to an ideological current. The current period of capitalist destabilization opens up the possibilities of building revolutionary parties as the precondition for the proletarian struggle for state power. To do so requires a correct, current relationship between the revolutionaries and the current struggles of the workers.

Revolutionaries can take part in and provide leadership, strategy, policy and organization for the immediate and partial struggles of the workers, even if these struggles are not today the taking-off point for revolutionary struggle and the revolutionary program. In today's situation the reformist labor bureaucracy's support for the capitalist system makes them more and more capable of leading militant struggles even for immediate demands as these more and more clash with the interests of the capitalist system. This provides new possibilities for the revolutionaries to contend for leadership and political indluence within existing, albeit limited struggles, and to show in practice that the best strategy for fighting these immediate struggles flows from the revolutionary perspective. In doing so it will be possible to win the most committed militants to the perspectives and organization which provides the strategy and perspectives for the struggle, and thereby to build the forces for a revolutionary party.

It is the method of the Theses on Tactics of the Comintern which guides us:

"The communist parties do not put forward any minimum program to strengthen add improve the tottering structure of capitalism. The destruction of that structure remains their guiding aim and their immediate mission. But to carry out this mission the communist parties must put forward demands whose fulfillment is an immediate and urgent working class need, and they must fight for those demands in mass struggle, regardless of whether they are compatible with the profit economy of the capitalist class or not.

"It is not the viability and competitive capacity of capitalist industry, nor the profitability of capitalist finance to which communist parties should pay regard, but the poverty which the proletariat cannot should not endure any longer. If the demands correspond to the vital needs of broad proletarian masses and if these masses feel that they cannot exist unless these demands are met, the the struggle for those demands will become the starting point of the struggle for power.

"To the extent that the struggles for partial demands and th partial struggles of particular groups of workers develop into a general struggle of the working class against capitalism, the communist party must also intensify and generalize its slogans, bringing them together under the single slogan of the direct defeat of the enemy." (Degras, The Communist International 1919-1943 Documents, Vol. 1, pp. 248-249) (emphasis added).

The critical importance of workers' consciousness and the need to move it in struggle should be clear from the excerpts. When Trotsky said he was advancing a program stemming from today's conditions and today's consciousness, he menat both. Given the conditions and consciousness the conquest of power by the working class was a plausible goal. In the fifties it was not.

Today, we see that the process that will once again lead to that possibility has begun. This means that it is possible to raise in propagandistic form some of the demands that we believe will become transitionsl. A few, such as 30 for 40, may even become agitational in the next few years.

But it will not be possible to advance a system of transitional demands whose coherence can only be in the struggle launched around them, and not in someone's mind. When Trotsky advanced his program he was simply carrying out the method of the Theses of Tactics at a time when the struggle for state power was literally or would be very shortly on the agenda. In the sense that Trotsky's was a transitional program, such a program is not possible today.

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AMENDMENTS TO "DOCUMENT ON I.S. PRESS" DF

1. To part II. Before last paragraph, p.2, insert:
The role of WORKERS POWER today is to put forward fight for and popukarize the distinctive ideas and program of the I.S. The analysis and political line we develop on issues of theday are based on these ideas. The paper is the one effective, ongoing vehicle we have to introduce our full politics to workers in the shops, in a way that is impossible within the framework of rank and file groups. The paper is the most crucial vehicle we have for arguing, consistently and uncompromisingly, the necessity of building a revolutionary socialist organization. The paper is our most crucial link between shop floor/union activity and the task of building the I.S. The paper cannot be a success until it actually ~~xxxxxxx~~ serves as such a link, is used as such and is viewed in this way by the entire membership.

What follows from this, given the situation of the I.S. today, is that WP is a propaganda organ aimed at winning militant workers, and Black and Latin workers and activists, to our point of view. The I.S. must accomplish this in this period if we are to play any kind of central role in the class struggle. WP must develop as a propaganda organ with a concrete, interventionist political line that establishes the importance of our ideas and fights for them wherever we are in a position to do so.

2. To part III. Following last paragraph, p.3, insert:
Articles - whether long or short - even if they are strike or shop floor reports, should be written to carry a political line to our readership and to working class militants in general, not simply to the group of workers involved in a particular struggle at a given moment. Articles written in this way will also have a particular relevance to those workers who are directly involved in the struggle: they will put it in a broader political context than is possible in agitational rank-and-file-bulletin articles.

3. To part III. Delete first paragraph, p.4, and substitute:
An understanding of our audience is important if we are to build up a stable readership. Those readers who buy a copy on the way to or from work will often have little time to stop and read the entire paper in a serious way. Indeed, those who are not I.S. contacts or other radicals will rarely have the political motivation to do so. They will first quickly glance through the paper (before or after buying it) to find something they will enjoy - something short and light, or something more substantial on a topic of particular interest to them. If the articles they look for are hard to get into or ramble, they will probably t hrow it away and not buy it again. If they do find something that attracts them, they are much more likely to read more of the issue and to buy another one (this is a strong argument for regularly appearing features which readers can easily find in each issue). In designing our paper we must take all these factors into account.

At the same time, it is also our goal to build up a core of readers who will take the time to sit down and go through the paper with care and in detail. These readers will tend to be our own periphery and contacts. This is the kind of periphery we want the paper to help build for our comrades in unions and factories. Given the kind of commitment that even serious reading of a political paper requires, it is especially important to strive for readability, clarity of ideas and general attractiveness if we expect to get any workers to read WP in depth. It is equally important that the content of WP articles be at a high level: while we never try to cram an entire world-view into any given article, it should be clear to our readers that we do have a worked-out analysis that underlies our articles and that reading WP will be both informational, useful and intellectually stimulating. Since even many of our own members do not bother

to read WP regularly at this point, it is silly to think that very many workers do.

In short, to be successful WP must be both popular and analytical in various respects. The audience we want to win and politically develop cannot be attracted by filling the paper with long, detailed features which are documents or position-papers-in-article-form; neither, however, will it be satisfied with flashy or clever gimmicks that substite for analysis and political congent.

4. To part VI. In first full sentence on p.7, change the word "important" to: "desireable as a long-term goal". Delete last sentence of second paragraph ("We should aim...") and substitute:
If distribution improves substantially and the paper continues to improve, a weekly paper will become a possibility. At the very earliest, we might be able to begin weekly publication next fall.

It is not, however, our top priority to move toward weekly publication as rapidly as possible. An organization of a couple of hundred people, heavily committed to other activities than just putting out a paper, will be doing extremely well if it can produce and distribute a high-quality biweekly paper of the size of WP. Our criteria for re-organization of the paper are based on improving its content and technique, not on regearing for weekly publication, although of course we are establishing the pre-conditions for more frequent publication in this process.

5. To part VII (Distribution). Delete proposal to reduce price to 10¢.

MOTIVATION AND COMMENTS

First, on the last two amendments. The proposal to reduce the price of WP to 10¢ is financially absurd unless our circulation at least doubles, given what is happening to our printing costs and so forth. The idea that WP can become a mass-circulation product by selling it for a dime simply has not been thought through clearly.

On the frequency question, I did not intend to raise this question at all, nor does my amendment place any barriers in the way of any actual measures put forward in the document. However, it was mentioned in a NAC discussion that the document might be read by some comrades as an acceptance of the EASt Bay exec motion making weekly publication our top priority. I do not want the passage of the document to lead to this interpretation unless the NC actually decides that weekly publication next year is a priority goal (I think it's hallucination-mongering myself), although I don't want to rule it out offhand.

Secondly, on the first two amendments. These state in concise form a couple of ideas which are generally implicit in the document, but which I think need much more emphasis and sharper formulation. The conception that WP is an organizer for the I.S. is important; it must be understood thatthis applies above all to the distinctive role of our ideas, and their relationship to industrial work. No matter how many subs we sell, or how many bookstores carry WP, it is a failure if our members in industry cannot use it as an organizing tool for their contact work, and where we differ from other currents that exist in the labor movement.

Finally, on the third amendment For the Thanksgiving NC discussion on WP, the editorial board is presenting a unified general point of view on the direction for the transformation of the paper. We support the Rose Veviaka document

in opposition to the others that have been put forward (East Bay exec, S. Jacoby, Kevin Bradley). On the question of our audience and how to address it, however, I felt that the treatment in the document was a little unbalanced and needed some correction.

I am somewhat more sympathetic than the rest of the editorial board to the ideas put forward in Kevin Bradley's document onthis issue. I do not support KB's document, however, for several reasons. First, there is really no such thing as an "analytical newspaper", and I am for a newspaper rather than an analytical magazine or joirnal-in-tabloid-form. Second, KB defines our audience as "the very few semi-intellectualized wirkers that exist at each work place". Regardless of whether or not such a layer of worker intellectuals as KB describes actually exists, this is not the way in which we have generally described the advanced militants in our tasks and perspectives and labor documents. The kind of audience KB describes does not even include most of the workers with whom we directly collaborate in rank and file groups! Third, some of the goals that KB wants the newspaper to accomplish seem to me to be more appropriate for a pamphlet program, in which many of our analytical ideas can be discussed in complete depth.

Some of what KB is driving at is valid, however: mainly, his complaint that the content and political level of WP articles are often extremely shallow. I believe that this is one of our most serious problems. One of the things that comrades should notice about SW is the almost unfailing consistently high political level of its articles, even when the articles are short or deal with very elementary questions. We would do well to try to achieve the level of political sophistication of SW, even though SW is a mass-circulation paper rather than a propaganda organ.

PROPOSAL ON REORGANIZATION OF WORKERS'POWER Rose V.

Turning WP into the kind of paper that can organize for our politics in industry is a process that will take some time. Planning of the paper is of the utmost importance in that regard. Assuring that the paper comes out at the same time is also crucial. Comrades will only be able to use the paper in their work when they can count on getting it on the same day issue after issue.

A real distribution network can only be developed when the paper meets its deadlines. We can no longer afford to have issues of the paper that are dated before they are distributed. A paper of that character will not act as an organizer for the I.S.

In order to accOmplish increases planning of thepaper and absolutely regular publication, the production of WP must be reorganized.

Easch page of the paper should have a consistent character. Pages 1, 3, and 16 whould carry the most important topical pieces. Editorials should always appear on page 2, International report on page 4, Labor briefs of page 6 and the Mackenzie column on page 7. In addition pages 5, 6and 7 should carry important and current coverage on labor, black, women and domestic politics.

The centerfold (8 and 9) should generally deal with broader social questions; housing, education, forced overtime, conditions in the shops, the crisis in the cities; etc. Centerfolds should also deal in greater depth with important political quwstions such as Watergate, the Middle East and the energy crisis. They should also deal with important events such as a spread on women for International Women's Day, etcl.

The front half of the paper should have the mroe topical pieces and the back half more educational pieces as well as less topical and important coverage.

Arranging the paper this way follows the pattern of American newspapers and feeds into the psychological preset we allhave when reading a paper.

The women's column should appera on page 11 and educational material cultural pieces and reviews. Page 15 would continue to be the organizational page and should also have a "What's On" column. The Program in Brief should be made briefer and most of the organizational suff being reduced to one page with ads for our various pamphlets spread out throughout the issue. Page 14 and ½ of 11 would provide flexibility for overflow and other pieces that don't fit elsewhere in the paper.

Instead of having one major planning session and one deadline the flow of work should be staggered with three different sections. Two weeks before the actual work on an issue is begun the least topical pages should be planned: the cent4rfold, the columns and the educatonal and cultural piecies. One week befor the work is begun the issue as a whole should be planned including coverage on labor, domestic and international politics and oppressed groups.

The beginning of the tow week period should be the deadline for the centerfold, columsn, educational and cultural pieces and the planning session for the featured pieces on pages 1, 3 and 16.

The beginning of the second week would be the second deadline. This would include coverage of labor, domestic politics, international report and oppressed groups. The end of the decond week would be the deadline for the featured pieces.

After each deadline copy would be edited, typeset and laid out so that all the work would be staggered. As the paper is printed on Monday, this would leave the weekend just prior to the printing of the paper for last minute changes and polishing.

All deaklines must be absolute as must be the scheduling of editorial board meetings. The only way that the organization will learn that deadlines are real and the editorial borad will learn to tkae its tasks seriously is to be absolutely ruthless about meetings and deadlines.

In this way the editorial borad will have greater control over all aspects of the paper. Along with increased planning of each issue page layouts can be checked. By allowing more time for review of the paper, page by page, unclear headlines and layout stand a better change of being caught.

A proper balance of each issue will almost be assured because of fixing of pages and the ability to review the issue before it goes to the printer.

Along with the reorganization of the paper must go the reorganization of staff functioning. Each staff member should be given a topic that the y are responsible to follow, generate articles about and write on whe n necessary. The areas of specializati on should be as follows: labor, blacks, women, domestic politics, internationl coverage, education, culture and reviews and centerfolds. It will be the responsibility of each staff member to bring in proposals on their area of specialization to editorial board planning meetings.

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Discussion Concerning Theoretical Journal

Jack Trautman

The following working paper was adopted by the NAC as the basis for ammendment, minus the dates.

Despite objections to the hteoretical journal which were raised at the convention we continue to favor the establishment of a quarterly theoretical journal representing our political tendency at the earliest possible date. We still have hopes that the first issue of that journal could appear in early 1974: something like a Summer issue to appear in May. A more realistic timetable, however, given that 1975 is already drawing to an end, isprobably Fall, 1974, with the first issue to appear in July.

The arguments for a theoretical journal remain the same: the need for a serious vehicle to spread our ideas on the left and to combat those real tendencies to which we are opposed; the need for a public, regularly appparing organ where we can analyze the various problems and perspectives confronting us in our real work; the need to educate our members and our periphery, and to build a broader periphery; the need to have an organ to consolidate those contacts made for us by Workers Power and by personal contact; and the need for a public, regularly appearing organ that will force us systematically to develop and produce our ideas.

The arguments against a theoretical journal are a good deal weaker than they appeared to many at the contention: we are producing a raft of pamphlets while at the same time the quality of WP is regularly increasing. One pamphlet has been published to date. I have in hand drafts for two others, with expectations of five more shortly. The writing of pamphlets have evidently not interfered with writing for WP. Nor do I expect a theoretical journal to interfere with pamphlets. Rather, we can expect to get pamphlets from the TJ articles.

The next question is, whz t kind of a journal do we expect it to be? First, we must stop calling it a theoretical journal. The name has connotations which are much too academic. It must be a Marxist review, or magazine. It should have few or no articles on philosophy, Hegel or abstract Marxism: it is not to be either a new Studies on the Left or a new New Left Review. But rather it should be a magazine that attempts to analyze the world from a revolutionary Marxist -- i.e., our -- point of view.

The main focus of the magazine should be on labor. There is a void on the left of serious treatment of the labor movement in both theory and practice. If there is one thing for which the journal becomes known for it must be its labor orientation. We must be analyzing what is going on in the labor movement, putting forward perspectives for revolutionaries, scrutinizing particular unions -- their hisgories, current lessons, etc. The magazine must discuss and advvnce our point of view on the questions in dispute in the movement today: what are the unions; the need to build a class-struggle wing in the union movement; what that is; evaluation of past efforts to do it, particularly in the United States, the role of revolutionaries in that task and how it is related to revolution.

In particular, we should see the journal directed toward that milieu of industrialized collectives, many of which are soft or harder Maoids, with whom we differ on questions like attitude toward the unions, white skin privilege, etc., but who are looking for perspectives, and who can be won over to our point of view if consistently and gogently presented over time.

The second main focus of the magazine must be blacks and the black movement. This focus must be its other identifying character: it must present our analysis of black oppression and its relation to class exploitation and capitalism, the relation between the black struggle and the class struggle, analyze the various black movements and the lessons to be learned from them, present our strategy for black liberation, discuss the role of revolutionaries today, their mistakes in the past, etc., etc. Once again, it must combat our opponent tendencies and in particular be oriented to the industrialized collectives, and to the black collectives which I believe to be proliferating.

None of this should be taken to imply that we will not have analyses of American problems, international questions, women, culture and a variety of other issues. We will. I am only discussing here the main focus of the magazine. We should aim to develop our politics concretely. That is, we should oppose Stalinism not only via critiques and analyses of the b.c. countries, but also by explaining and arguing for workers control in the context of the labor movement.

Nor should there be any impression that the magazine will be a 'line' publication. In general we want it to be the vehicle for our distinctive ideas. We also want it to be a lively, interesting, informative publication, where new ideas can be presented, where differences can be discussed and debated. I would hope we could induce writers who are not in the IS, who may not agree with us on many questions, to write for our magazine. At times we should arrange for debates, symposia and other forms of interchange.

The magazine should aim to have original research which it is impossible to get elsewhere. Obviously, this feature will attract to us a readership who we would not be able to reach on the basis of our politics alone. Hopefully, this attraction will then enable us to influence them with our politics. Furthermore, such a policy will also attract contributors outside the IS. A high-quality magazine will be an attraction to authors of some stature to write in it.

While historical pieces are important and useful, the magazine is not a magazine of history, but of politics, and as Trotsky said, history is no substitute for politics. Therefore, we should have no more than one historical piece per issue.

There must be a 'survey' section comparable to that in the British IS magazine. In many ways this is the most important section of the magazine. In it we should present our line: our view of what has gone on in the world, in US politics, in the labor movement and what revolutionaries should be doing. If the magazine were to come out tomorrow this section would predominantly take up Watergate and oil. It would probably discuss the state of affairs in the UAW, summing up the events of the summer and the recent contract round. This section would give guidance to our members and to our periphery. It would be the most activist section of the magazine.

We should have a book review section. It should be organized like the British IS section. This section could have an editor of its own, situated outside of Detroit in order to minimize the drain on our resources in the center.

Watergate Addendum'

1. The Watergate crisis continues to be prolonged. Nixon still retains ~~xxxxx~~ some ruling class support for services rendered (Vietnam settlement on terms thought impossible under Johnson, detente and trade with Russia and China, balancing the' latter off, the containing of wages to a greater extent than in other capitalist countries, the realignment of currencies in America's favor, restoreing America's competitive edge on the world market even in basid industries like auto and steel that would have been thought virtually impossible just 2 or 3 year s ago). Moreover there is continued hesitancy on how to get rid of him without undoing aspects of the governmental structure, without appearing to give in to popular pressure, to fears of opening the doors to future impeachments for future unpopular Presidents faced with crisis, which unhappily they realize may become more frequent. Moreover there are those who condider Nixon to a lesser evil to Ford, who is both not to be bright, does not have the confidence of the ruling class, and has a set of politics (opposition to food stamps, Medicare, public housing, minimum wage, civil rights, etc which are too primitive and reactionary for the functional needs of the system today.

2. Nonetheless, Nixon must go. His continuation in office prolongs and deepens the crisis. Now in addition to govenrmental officials, corporate executives are being dragged into the coutts (American Airlines, Braniff, Gulf, Marathon Oil, Goodyear, etc), and the fabric of ruling class self-confidence and solidarity is Being undermined. Nixon's defense, granting that the counter-offensive was something more than plea bargaining, demands the open condoning of all the scandals- the ITT, milk trust, taxs, Presidentail estates, etc, something that would undermine the legitimacy of the ruling class to rule in the long run. His continuation in office now threatens the Republican Party as an institution, and its most conservative wing directly. Morevoer he uses every national crisis which erupt like clock work from the governmental paralysis for his own use. The Middle East war becomes the occasion for the coup against Cox. The energy crisis is used for free t.v. time to deny resignation talk. Nixon is more concerned with his own skin than with the globabl interests of American capital, and therefore can no longer be entrusted with the collective affairs of American imperialism. Indeed there is fear that ~~xxxxxx~~ weakened presidency will give too much away to the Russians.m To bail itself out from domestic trouble, it will score foreign triumphs at a price too expensive. Nixon must go, but the destruction of his adminstration has produced a vacuum on domestic policy. The function of the state as the executive committee of the ruling class continues on foreign policy, but there is still nothing to fill that void on domestic policy because there is still no agreement, or political leadership, to implement policy.

3. Why Watergate? Now making the rounds in the left are theories of yankees vs cowboys , that Nixon represents Southern Rim interests which are in conflict ~~with~~ with Eastern capital. These southern rim influence are listed as Texas-California oil, the defense industry, Florida-California real estate. There is no basis for this theory except that many of Nixon's entourage are drawn from these nouveau riche middeus. However, oil is primarily controlled by Eastern capital (Rockefeller, Morgan, Dupont, Mellon, etc), the defense industry is dependant on the good graces of every existing government and plays no indpendent political role, real estate speculation is national. There is no basis for theory, and no one has, to my knowledge, being able to adduce what the differ3nt interests are, what different policies they require, what different strategies they have produced, or a shred of evidence that Nixon's regime is different from previous adminstrations in carrying out the wishes of the ruling class as a whole, and therefore primarily its dominant Eastern wing, as opposed to carrying out some sectional interests, for which there is little basis for believing in in the 1960s. Indeed if capital did function in that fashion, we might still have a strong Congree, representing different sectional interests.

4. The liberals are closer to the thuthe, or the conflict between the Presidency and the Congree, even if they cannot understand it. The Watergate crisis resulted from the growing power and indepeadce of the executive. It is a part of the long term decline of bourgeois democracy. Th e state plays a greaer role in the economy and world affairs, in collectively mangging the affairs of the bourbeoisie and individually rewardings elements of if. The system become more interreated, rigids and continues the partial negation of capital on the basis of capitalism. Power becomes concentrated in the hands of the executive, and executive departments (like State, Defense, Treasury, etc) and Congress here, or parliament in the other advanced countries, becomes less important in making decisions.The struggle of sectional interests of capital requires the firmer hand of a disciplined executive committee in the interrelated, more rigid economy. Congress has become more irrelevant. In the current crisis it has been able to cripple the executive, but even then has been incapable of political intiative or leadership - it has been incapable of filling the vacuum it helped create. In the 1930s Congress desgroyed the Johnson adminstration but a strong Republican machine ran the Congess and acted as an executive committee for the ruling class. Today there are no strong parties, parliamentary instituions have had there power wither, and the liberal political reformers who base their strategies on Congressional reforminsm are chasing after bourgeois utopias.

5. The Watergate crisis erupted because the Nixon entourage ~~nx~~ did not understand how to correctly use the enormous power that was being concentrated in the hands of the executive over the last decadesThey continued the process by going after the most important remaining power of Congress-appropriations-the porkbarrel which protects the interests of different local and sectional wings of the capitalist class, and the press, which includes the power of the ruling class to shape public opinion, and with it the political process and the Presidency. The powers of the executive were being expanded at the expensense of the ruling class' ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ political independence. Moreover this was coupled with the excesses of the political mediocrities Nixon surrounded himself with who went after the Democratic Party and shook down the ruling class in naked fashion in fiancing the 72 elections, raised the question of was the tail wagging the dog. What ~~xx~~ began as an effort to control the excesses, and growth of Presidential power, a lag in consciousness of the process which had developed for decades, ~~xxxxx~~ resulted in a process they lost control over and ended in the crippling of the Nixon Presidency. The resulting crisis has produced self-recognition on the part of the capitalist class. It requires a strong executive, a more independent Presidency, a real executive committee . It cannot function without one, and Congress cannot provide it. With or without excesses, a strong government must be restored. When the immediate crisis is overcome, the reform will rationalize even greater concentration of power in the Presidency and its growing indepences. The inevitable reform movements arising from Waterage cannot set back the process of the decay of bourgeois democracy, which results from the rigidification and decay of a system which is overripe for extinction. Only the revolutionary working class is the bearer of democraay in the modern world..

6. The Nixon adminstration cannot be reconstructed as a strong government. Ford can only be a front man. There will be a series of crisis in the next years even in Watergate is resolved. Crisis in foreign policy over Middle Eastern oil, the disintergration of the capitalist alliande and the growing inter-imperialist rivalry among the capitalist powers, the necessity to revamp the army, and war buget, economic recession,intensified by the energy crisis and its impact on world production and trade, the continuation of inflation even in recession, etc. The political imbolism produced by the defeats of the late 1960s will sooner or later start to break up. The weak links of the capitalist chain will feel the crisis first and strongest. The process of creating a revolutionary layer out of the sontrol ~~xx~~ of social democracy and Stalinism will continue internationally. At home that process will intensify due to the accumulated fallout of Watergate when the working class goes into motion.