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NAC STATEMENT ON VIETNAM

I. NIXON'S OVERALL STRATEGY. Nixon's overall strategy in the Vietnam war has at no time been a "no win" strategy, i.e. one of looking for a face-saving way to get out before defeat. While Nixon apparently accepted, around the time of the Lao incursion (February 1971) that adventuristic military moves by the U.S. could not tip the scales to military victory, Nixon's political aim at all times has remained the perpetuation of Thieu or another pro-U.S. regime in Saigon for the indefinite future. This constitutes "victory" in political terms; the military actions in Vietnam were, after all, geared to this end. It is not an aim which Nixon or the ruling class as a whole has given up.

We have sometimes been prone to the impression that a section of the ruling class had decided that the war was hopeless and should be terminated; as applied to the political aims of the war, i.e. that the effort to maintain a pro-U.S. regime was hopeless and should be terminated, this was a misassessment. Some parts of the political elite did indeed hold this view. The view of the "anti-war" section of the ruling class however is best stated in the original Wall Street Journal (article) of Feb. 23, 1968; which gave the green light to the anti-war liberals: WSJ stated that it was time to consider whether the "whole Vietnam effort may be doomed" and that the "logic of the battlefield" might require withdrawal -- at that time and subsequently, however, WSJ and other important sections of the class held back from drawing the conclusion that the effort was doomed. The reason was also clear in the WSJ editorial: we "must not blink the fact," WSJ stated, that withdrawal would be "an unmitigated disaster for the U.S. and the Free World." This awareness of the stakes kept any substantial section of the class from waging a real fight to stop the war and made the class and the anti-war liberals a fundamentally vacillating force, which capitulated to the pro-war forces any time it looked as if there was a good chance to come out of the war with a victory or partial victory for U.S. imperialism -- whose aims they of course supported no less than Nixon.

Within the overall aim of continuing to impose a pro-U.S. government on South Vietnam, Nixon's strategy has been threefold: (1) if impossible to win outright on the battlefield, maintain sufficient military pressure to coerce North Vietnam to accept the least favorable truce; (2) use the detente with Russia and China -- which are part of Nixon's overall international policy -- to isolate NVN and if possible secure Russian-Chinese pressure on NVN for the same aim (unfavorable truce); (3) continue sufficient military aid to SVN to maintain or increase military capability and enough economic aid and diplomatic presence to maintain political control.

II. THE TRUCE. The truce must be evaluated in terms of whether it achieves the two fundamental aims of U.S. policy -- the continuation in power of the puppet regime and the elimination of the NVN/PRG threat. The answer is that it achieves the first, at least for the moment, and postpones the second.

(1) Nixon has withdrawn and signed a truce without withdrawal of NVN troops -- this is less than his optimal aim.

(2) The truce however binds NVN and the PRG to accept the continuation of the Thieu government until the promised elections -- this is a compromise of what was, until a year ago, a minimum NVN/PRG aim.

The agreement represents a compromise, which was, of course, the only realistic possibility given the military stalemate. However, from the U.S. viewpoint, it is a compromise which represents a considerable gamble. For it is widely recognized that the chances for the success of these agreements is not great, as the Joint Chiefs recognize. This, of course, does not mean that the U.S. has given up, nor that it won't try to continue to tip the scales in its favor in the future.

It was a gamble that the U.S. was willing to take for the following reasons. First of course was the continuing economic and political cost of the war which forced Nixon to try and achieve some compromise. Secondly, it is believed that the truce will be effective for some minimal amount of time before it breaks down, and when it does break down they will be able to blame the other side for bad faith, etc. Lastly, the agreement does allow for some chance of success for the Saigon regime, due to the development of its military capabilities and the right to continue supplying it with military equipment. (Indeed, a military victory by the NLF is far from a certainty, and will be achieved only at great cost, something our Stalinist friends fail to realize.)

The immediate balance of forces is favorable to Nixon-Thieu. To the extent that the truce goes into effect, government troops, police, etc., will return to areas they could not enter before -- not perhaps the hard-core PRG areas, but all the disputed ones. The same will not be true of the PRG. NVN troops remain in place but under the truce cannot be replaced; while this counts for nothing in the event the truce breaks down, it will affect troop strength and morale if the truce holds up for a considerable period. The truce terms give each side a veto in each "commission allowing either side to paralyze or break the truce quite easily. In particular this calls into doubt the promised "elections" which remain to be negotiated. Thieu has every reason never to hold elections.

The long-term balance of forces is favorable to the Stalinists, unless they can be contained for a considerable period. The Saigon regime rests on an extremely narrow social base (although it is not true that it rests on no social base) -- a tiny parasitic capitalist-merchant class totally tied to U.S. capital, a landlord class whose social power is minimal at this point, a military bureaucracy intertwined with both; its real basis of power remains the U.S. presence -- diplomatic, military (in terms of aid at this point), and economic. The Stalinists are the only political force with a strongly organized base -- they have a monopoly on organized popular support. On the other hand, their base is mainly rural and based on the national question (they have taken a conservative approach on the land question) and while they have considerable support in the cities this remains their weakest point in terms of organized strength. This provides Nixon with some maneuvering room if his short-term advantage can buy time; and this is his hope.

III. NIXON'S STRATEGY IN THE TRUCE PERIOD. Nixon's overall aim remains maintaining Thieu or a satisfactory pro-U.S. replacement. To do this he must (1) maintain the regime in power in the short run, and (2) if possible, shore up its social base through building a stronger military-capitalist stratum, (such policies would tie the decrepit capitalist class even more strongly to U.S. capital, its own military, and U.S. economic and military aid). Both facets depend on holding off and if possible splintering the Stalinist challenge -- a

decrepit regime can last quite a long time in the wake of a defeated or demoralized popular movement, but not otherwise. Thus Nixon's strategy is fundamentally two-sided:

(1) Economic aid (and military aid within or slightly in excess of the truce terms) to Thieu, and a continuation of the U.S. political role in SVN. (A possibility is a breaking of the truce and "preventive war" by Thieu; this would not, however, be a good bet in the immediate future and the U.S. will not desire this until Thieu's strength can be built up. (Thieu might: he overestimates himself.)

(2) Pressure on NVN. This is the real key in the short term to the Nixon strategy -- the variable which will determine whether it can succeed. This pressure comes through

(i) The Russia-U.S. and China U.S. detentes. These were critical in forcing NVN to give up some essential points in its truce position; the example of the mining of Haiphong last May, when neither Russia nor China protested significantly, reminds NVN that these countries have given the U.S. a free hand; by the same token they have pressured NVN through restricting aid, etc., and might well fail to back up NVN should Thieu break the truce or should NVN decide to do so;

(ii) The offer of aid to NVN. The reported figures are enormous (\$2.5 billion, a giant figure for an economy like NVN -- though ironically Nixon's domestic budget cuts may make it hard to get this sum from Congress) and Nixon's aims are explicitly those of bribery: "To the extent that the North Vietnamese... participate with us and other interested countries in the reconstruction... they will have a tendency to turn inwards to the works of peace rather than turning outward to the works of war." However, Kissinger's Hanoi visit seems not to have won anything concrete, though it's impossible to know for certain;

(iii) The threat of reintervention if NVN launches an attack this spring (or later.). Nixon will not send troops, but the threat of renewed bombing, mining, etc., is real and must have been communicated privately. We need not fear that respect for public opinion or other scruples would deter Nixon. Indeed, Sen. Mansfield is attempting legislation to prevent a reintervention; this will fail, but it shows that the threat is taken seriously by some.

However, as time goes on it becomes increasingly unlikely that the U.S. will reintervene, for the simple reason that there is no reason to suppose that military intervention could achieve in the future what it has failed to achieve in the past.

To sum up: Nixon's strategy is to maintain the truce militarily in the short term (several months, a year, maybe more) while (probably) failing to hold elections; to build up Thieu and put enough pressure on North Vietnam through Russia/China and his own bribes and threats to force compliance; to whittle away at the Stalinist base in SVN. At least this buys time, at most it might buy victory.

IV. NORTH VIETNAM'S STRATEGY. NVN's fundamental aim remains the conquest of power by the PRG and the reunification of Vietnam under pro-Stalinist auspices. What their strategy is with regard to the cease-fire is difficult to assess at this time. It is difficult because we do not know the actual military capabilities of the PRG. That is we do not know how strong they are.

tary capabilities of the NLF/NVN. That is we do not know how much damage to their military position was done by the betrayals of Russia and China, and by the massive bombing and mining of harbors by the U.S. We do know that the damage was sufficient to make them accept the cease-fire.

Their likely strategy is probably two-fold. First to uphold the cease-fire as long as it looks likely that they could gain power through peaceful means (i.e., elections, coalition government, etc.). Secondly, at least to get rid of the U.S. so that when the fighting resumes their chances of beating Saigon will be greatly increased.

Of course, given the politics of NVN, there is no guarantee that they will not accept something short of self-determination on a permanent basis, that is, a sell-out of one form or another. However, this is not a repeat of 1954, and there is no indication that the NLF will be willing to give up the areas of the country it controls in the south.

Given the patchwork division of the country, a breakdown in the cease-fire becomes almost inevitable (indeed, it has even prevented the beginning of any real cease-fire.) Combined with Thieu's continuing attempts to suppress the Stalinists' control, the likelihood is that even if the NLF is inclined to wait, they will be forced to take up the fight again if they are to avoid complete defeat. While Nixon's promise of aid to NVN may be able to buy time, there is no indication that it can buy victory.

V. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT. Left to themselves, the Vietnamese parties would not remain at truce very long. The prospects for the truce depend in considerable measure on the international pressures. The basic context is: an overall two-sided detente in the world as a whole (U.S.-Russia) and a four-sided detente in Asia (these plus China and Japan). The stability of both detentes is fundamental to Nixon and (at least) to the Russians and Chinese; for Nixon, they represent both a solution to some economic difficulties and also the chance to press, through detente, for diplomatic and trade gains -- a continuation of the cold war by other means. For North Vietnam, the resumption of a full-scale effort to conquer SVN in the context of a world detente would be quite difficult, though not impossible; the Vietnamese Stalinists' policies in the past have been calculated to the international Stalinist line, and NVN would find it quite hard to go against both China and Russia in fundamentals -- though the "bloc" is no longer so coherent. On the other hand, the international detente itself is obviously not so stable in the really long run. An end to the detente would release NVN to resume the struggle with backing from her "allies," just as its continuation would put pressure on NVN not to. The danger, however, is that if the truce holds for any length of time, Thieu (and his nearly two million troops) may take advantage of favorable circumstances, NLF/PRG/NVN disarray and demoralization, etc., to launch an Indonesia-style "clean-up". Obviously, this would not catch the NLF unaware and result in a gigantic slaughter as in Indonesia, but on the other hand, sudden reversals in the situation cannot be ruled out.

At present, then, the immediate situation remains confused. However, the possibility of a relatively early breakdown of the truce and a new NVN/PRG drive is quite strong.

VI. THE CHARACTER OF THE PEACE AND OUR SLOGANS. Fundamentally the truce is a truce imposed by imperialism -- a truce forced upon NVN and the PRG by the collusion of U.S., Chinese and Russian imperialism against a struggle for national self-determination. Our slogans flow from this.

Self determination for Vietnam -- End all U.S. aid, withdraw all U.S. troops from SE Asia -- Down with the imperialist commissions -- Down with Thieu.

Military support for NLF/PRG against U.S. and its puppets -- defense of their right to violate the imperialist truce.

Full democratic rights for the Vietnamese people, north and south -- For freedom of the press, freedom of political organization, and for free trade union -- Arm the workers and peasants to defend their rights and organizations-- for a workers' and peasants' government -- for a revolutionary party to lead the struggle for independence and socialism.

AMENDMENTS TO THE SEATTLE 'PROFESSOR' DOCUMENT

Document for submission to the NC or NAC by D. Crees (St. Louis)

Motivation

The generally useful guidance provided by the Seattle document is undermined by a tone which borders on passivity and/or scholasticism. The authors' attitudes about participation in unions are particularly questionable. Several points would appear to be relevant:

1. Building an AFT local allows entry into AFT national politics, conventions, etc. To the extent that AFT is a priority focus, access by our members is important.

2. College professors tend to think of themselves as middle-class and professionals. Unionization is a first step toward breaking down such self-conceptions. Even those who do not join are confronted with the existence of the union.

3. Generally, departmental decision-making is nearly as 'undemocratic and elitist' as decision-making in other academic institutions. Of course we must participate in departmental decision-making, but the failure to unionize makes the department the only way in which we can influence decisions about hiring, firing, etc., etc. -- hardly a revolutionary stance!

4. A local which is not yet a ~~back~~ bargaining agent frequently draws upon the most socially conscious sectors of the university (women, blacks, chicanos, radicals, young professors, etc.). To the extent that this is true, the local can provide organized and visible support to the struggles of students, BSU's, or related workers. (to the extent that the local is not socially conscious, a functioning UAC could ~~x~~ operate similarly.) Such organized support is an important way of making contact with other sectors of the working class. Further, such support may prevent those struggles from being isolated and defeated.

5. Finally, we should note that (Katz, et al, to the contrary) that in some circumstances unions of college professors have played critical roles. Geismar's National Union of Higher Education was the first union to strike in support of striking French students and in support of transforming and democratizing the university. That dramatic moment had been preceded by efforts in previous years to build a militant union of college teachers.

Moving on to #13, if we are going to participate at all in radical caucuses, it should be toward some end and not as an abstract gesture. Logically that end should be to encourage Marxist ~~xx~~ scholarship worthy of the name and to build the rank-and-file teacher's movement.

Last (and least) whether college professors have more free time than others ~~xx~~ (#2) appears to be a matter of definition. A significant number of 'professional' academicians devote their entire lives (evenings, weekends, vacations, etc) to their 'professions'. Yet it is in relation to such narrow compulsiveness that our professor members will be evaluated when seeking to retain their jobs, get promoted, etc. The amendment strives to take this into account. Finally, the second half of sentence 1, #13 is simply gratuitous. It should be clearly understood that for no member of IS is political work "a secondary leisure time activity".

Amendments

Page 1, #2 Delete last sentence and insert:

It should be taken into account that professors 1) generally have a more flexible time schedule than other people with full-time jobs, and 2) can frequently dovetail Marxist scholarship with university publishing standards. Professor members should utilize these advantages to the fullest.

Page 4 Delete #12 and insert:

12. Unions. On campuses where AFT locals exist, we join and participate in them. Where none exist we should actively build them (unless particular circumstances completely foredoom such an effort). Given our assessment of academic institutions (#10), the AFT local is the logical place to raise all of the political issues mentioned previously: democratic education, hiring and firing, racism, sexism, academic freedom. In addition, the local should be utilized to make contact with and support related struggles (e.g., campus workers, public school teachers). Finally, professor members should, where possible, participate in AFT politics at the national level.

Page 4 Delete #13 and insert:

13. We do not discourage our professor members from doing the necessary work to keep their jobs, get promoted, etc., however we strongly encourage that this work take political lines where possible. We acknowledge Marxist scholarship as a legitimate form of political activity. However, in the interests of the full political development of all members, scholarship should never be seen as anyone's sole form of political activity

14. We will participate in such radical caucuses as exist within the various professional societies but we generally accept no bureaucratic responsibility for them. Our participation should be designed to move them toward a working-class orientation. Specifically we should encourage them to ~~to~~ 1) promote serious Marxist scholarship, and 2) to build the rank-and-file teachers movement within the AFT. Participation in such radical caucuses may thus dovetail with our scholarship or our union work but otherwise should always remain a secondary concern.

The Farmworkers, Teamsters, and Salinas

1. Brief Background

In 1970 the United Farmworkers (UFW) moved into Salinas as their primary target for organizing, following relative success in the grape vineyards. The Salinas Valley growers (lettuce and other vegetables) responded to the organizing drive by signing a sweetheart agreement with the Teamsters (IBT). It was at that point that 7000 field workers struck against the phony contract and for the UFW. The strike was semi-spontaneous, and included workers from a couple of growers that the UFW did not want to strike, because they had long-standing contracts with IBT. The strike, and the threat of a boycott, brought a few growers to terms with the UFW. The four growers that signed with the union were the giant Interharvest (United Fruit), Pic&Pac, Freshpict, and D'Arrigo.

The majority of growers held out and made it through the strike with some loss of crops. The UFW launched a national boycott of lettuce, most of which is from the Salinas Valley, their main pressure to win contracts. Since 1970 the battle has been on this level, with the farmworkers relying on the boycott, liberal politicians, and AFL-CIO higher-ups. No more Salinas growers have signed with the UFW.

After the Salinas strike the Teamsters backed off and signed a pact with the UFW. They agreed to let the growers out of any agreement with them to sign with the UFW. They also agreed to allow the field worker jurisdiction to go to the UFW, and the UFW agreed that the shed workers belonged in the IBT. This jurisdictional agreement was the same one reached in 1966-7 after the IBT tried unsuccessfully to raid the UFW in Delano (Di Giorgio). The UFW hoped that the AFL-CIO could get the IBT to live up to the pact. Soon after the pact was signed the IBT was complaining that the UFW was violating it, especially through the lettuce boycott, which affected Bud Antle, a big grower that the IBT had signed earlier, in 1961.

With the IBT's firm decision to move ahead with the raid, the situation has changed. The growers are now set for an all out fight. Not only have no new growers been brought to terms, but of the original four that signed with the UFW, only one is still under contract - Interharvest. D'Arrigo has signed with the Teamsters, and the UFW called a strike against him in the Imperial and Salinas valleys. The workers were sent out on the boycott. The other two are "negotiating" with the UFW to renew their contracts, but the UFW thinks they are only stalling before they sign with the IBT.

2. This Summer

The growers, buoyed by the IBT's help, are set for battle. They are challenging the UFW in its strongest area, the Salinas Valley. If they defeat the union here no grower anywhere will feel forced to deal with the union. The existing UFW contracts may well be lost. It's a life and death struggle for the farmworkers' union.

The IBT and growers, and the UFW are all gearing up for the battle. Chavez has announced that the UFW will strike the Salinas fields (all of them - "we don't discriminate") this summer. The growers have shown a bit of their strategy at

D'Arrigo, where they have a scab crew of 60 blacks working. They are attempting to isolate the UFW's support to Chicanos (the farmworkers call themselves Mexicans), cutting the union off from the Filipinos, anglos (Okies) and blacks. However this tactic is of limited value at harvest time, when thousands of workers are needed and the only ones available will be Chicanos. The Teamsters, in addition to posing as the union of anglos/English-speakers, have a number of Chicano organizers, but they will probably not have much effect on the field workers and will be for public relations purposes only.

The UFW is responding to this by posing itself as a union for all farmworkers, not a "Mexican union". For example, when a group of rank and file Teamsters went to the UFW office in Salinas, a black and an anglo farmworker spoke to the group.

With my present minimal knowledge of the situation I couldn't begin to predict the outcome of the struggle. But it does seem clear that this summer's struggle will be critical. If the UFW is successful, it will be a major breakthrough, possibly driving the IBT out of the picture or making them a lot less useful to the growers. If the UFW loses, it could be the beginning of the end (at least temporarily) for the union.

3. Why are the Teamsters Raiding the UFW?

The Teamsters' interest in farmworkers is of long standing. As the IBT brochure, "Facts Behind the Lettuce Boycott", points out, it pre-dates the UFW. In 1945 the IBT "organized" 50,000 cannery workers in California by red-baiting the CIO and collaborating with the corporations. Since then food processing has become an important section of the IBT throughout the US. And of course, in an industry so dependent on packing, warehousing, and trucking as agriculture, it's inevitable the Teamsters will put their eye on the production workers to make their hold complete. It gives them more members, more dues, more leverage with the companies, more control of the workforce, and of course helps prevent another union from organizing the field workers and "disrupting" things for them. The IBT signed sweetheart agreements covering field workers with Bud Antle and Mapes in Salinas in ~~xx~~ 1961-2 (and called it a "breakthru")

Additionally the UFW organizing poses a particular potential threat to the IBT bureaucracy in some other ways. They are afraid of losing the thousands of packing shed workers and tens of thousands of cannery workers, that they have had under contract for some time. Most of these workers are now Chicanos, having largely replaced the "okies" and other ethnic groups. They are sympathetic to the Farmworkers, since many of them have worked in the fields and have family/friends who do now. In the canneries despite a well-entrenched bureaucracy that holds elections in the off-season for canning, there is already a definite threat to them from below. There are oppositionist Cannery Workers Committees in most cannery localities in the ~~xxx~~ state. If the UFW were to gain strength in the fields, there would arise the threat that the cannery workers (and shed workers) would leave the IBT. Or, short of that, the ~~xxxx~~ farmworkers' militancy would spread to these related sectors of workers, bringing the "disruption" the IBT piecemeal talk about right inside the IBT's own house.

At this point a defeat at the hands of the UFW would be a blow to the IBT's reputation. That is, the bureaucracy has staked enough on it that it has its own momentum that would be hard to stop. Perhaps if Fitzsimmons could rewind history a few years, he'd try another way to rip off 500,000 or so potential members. But that option is gone. By "reputation" I mean a couple of things. First of all, the bureaucracy would look bad within the union, especially to secondary leaders. It would contribute to Fitzsimmons' reputation as a bumbler. Secondly, and more importantly, it would hurt the IBT's reputation as "tough". ("They may be crooks, but they can sure deliver the goods") This reputation in part accounts for why the IBT is far ahead of any other union in acquiring new members by winning NLRB elections. For it to be defeated in a major area, food production (and processing) would be a serious defeat. At the same time, it would be at the hands

of a different kind of unionism, a sort-of militant social unionism ("revolutionary movement" is what Fitz called the UFW). So it would not only be an organizational loss but an ideological one as well. Posing a threat to the business unionism par excellence of the IBT tops makes this doubly important to them. And Fitzsimmons takes his right-wing views seriously.

4 Meanwhile, back at the Teamsters

When the raid on the UFW began (DiGiorgio 1966) and even in Salinas in 1970, it did not have the united support of the IBT bureaucracy. Some Teamster officials who are closer to the labor statesman breed or who run with AFLCIO officials did not want the raid. This included Einar Mohn, head of the Western Conference of Teamsters (WCT). And a number of others, especially local officers, wanted no part of it or were favorable to the UFW. Some locals sent money to the UFW. Wm. Grammi, Intl Organizer and #2 man in the WCT hierarchy, was the man behind the raid.

The situation has changed now ~~xxxx~~ that the bureaucracy has staked so much on it. ~~Bxxx~~ Bureaucrats have been brought into line. They feel it would be a threat to the whole bureaucracy at this point, or they feel too much pressure to show any disagreement. Even at the local level, a possibly sympathetic official feels "why should I stick my neck out on this it wont even make me more popular with the rank and file", since it is important to the bureaucracy but at most of secondary concern to most members. This can change if the UFW is successful in striking Salinas and again dramatically exposing the IBTs role as scabherder. Perhaps then even Gibbons-Hoffa would oppose the raid. (Hoffa recently defened it in the bay area).

It should be recalled that on June 30 the national Master Freight Agreement expires, and the next day, July 1, the Californai Cannery Contract expires. Especially in the former case, the bureaucracy may well have its hands full with some problems from the ranks in trucking, and if at the same time they are scab herding in Salinas, this will make it doubly hard for them. More openings for opposition will appear as the rank and file get a real lesson in what the bureaucracy is all about, and more cracks in the bureaucracy may begin.

5. I.S. Activity, Some Ideas

This struggle is not only crucial to farmworkers, but to the entire labor movement. A defeat is a blow against all new organizing, especially of oppressed ~~xxxxxx~~ sectors or workers (eg Farah). And a victory is a victory for militancy in the labor movement, which is why only the "left" bureaucrats who can hope to ride that militancy, support the UFW. (Meanys "support" is completely token). Because of its significance ~~for~~ the mobilization of labor support for the UFW is an important ~~xxxx~~ task for socialists and militants, and one likely to meet with some response. At the same time the opportunities for ~~xxx~~ socialist propaganda are ~~xx~~ many. We should begin now to play some role in this struggle on a national scale and in different areas.

In the Bay area we have begun some activity in the IBT about the issue. We formed a (small) committee of Teamsters against the raids on the Farmworkers, and have got resolutions condemning the raid passed in three locals, taken a group to Salinas, issued leaflets, begun a petition effort, etc. We tentatively plan to continue activity on this scale in the immediate future to get it known there are Teamsters opposed to the ~~xxxx~~ raid, to get a core of people committed to struggle around it, etc. We would also like to make a "publicity splash" a little later (after more resolutions have been passed, etc) perhaps with a press conference in front of the IBT-WCT Headquarters.

This kind of activity should be carried out on a national scale by our IBT fraction, wherever possible. This seems especially true in L.A. where possibilities are probably best. It affords an excellent tool for raising the role of the bureaucracy in a concrete way, and can be linked to other questions, such as racism. Additionally we should try to meet and work with Chicano and Latino Teamsters this way. We should consider forming a statewide IBT group in California on this question, even ~~xxx~~ if its

statewide-ness is largely paper at this point, since its likely to be a more explosive issue later, and a solid nucleus will be valuable. The TUAD is calling a national confab of TUAD_IBTers, and may be planning a one kind of national paper group on this, which could be of use ~~to~~ to our efforts ~~if~~ if we are willing to move.

At the same time we should be involved in other ways--especially through the various UFW committees. Unfortunately, in our branch at least, they have been shunned (at on Exec Committee meeting one member called them "a bunch of Christian liberals"). In fact they are largely liberals but also attract unionists & radical workers, ~~xi~~ And since a major battle may be shaping up, numbers of militants ~~xxxxxxxixx~~ can be mobilized into support of the UFW. ~~ix~~ IN California, at least, there are a few quasi-independent Citizens Committees for Justice for Farmworkers, which in at least one case sees its role as mobilizing rank and file workers from other unions, especially the IBT, to support the UFW. This is the kind of activity we should ~~be~~ be involved in, through the UFW boycott committees or other means. In the case of a strike we should be in apostion to take the initiative in pushing for labor demos, marches, support from locals, etc. Of course we should also attempt to work with Chicano and other third world groups, such as La Raza Unida Labor Committee in L.A. and to meet militants in other unions.

Along with direct activity towards building Teamster and labor support for the UFW, we should carry out independent propaganda around the question. We should hold forums (with IBT, UFW speakers etc) put out some literature broadening the questions involved, raising the labor party as ~~a~~ opposed to Chavez's support for Kennedy-Democrats, etc.

This is only a very beginning on definite plans for activity. But it does seem clear that this is a worthwhile project for us to engage in, that can involve our various fractions (IBT, Chicano, Student, Other unions,) in a common project around a major labor struggle. In Branches with IBT and/or chicano fractions in particular, this work should be taken up.

-- Ken / East Bay Branch / March 15 73

AN APPROACH TO OUR WORK IN THE GAY
LIBERATION MOVEMENT

Judith L.
New York/IS

What is a middle-class movement:

In order to begin to analyze our position on any movement, we must be absolutely clear as to the class nature of that movement. We define the nature of a movement in relation to two criteria: 1. the class composition of that movement, that is, which class or classes are involved in it; and, 2. the class nature of its ideology and program, that is, which class does its program represent. These two criteria must always be evaluated together in order to correctly analyze a movement. For, if only criterium #1 is used, then the Democratic Party is a working class institution as, numerically, working class people compose its majority. On the other hand, if only criterium #2 is used, then the I.S. is a working class party as it certainly does have a working class program. Therefore, these two criteria must be used together in any evaluation of the class nature of a movement.

There are cases in which there are contradictions between these two criteria. However, in the case of the Gay Liberation Movement, there is no such contradiction. Analysis of the class nature of this movement show that this movement is undoubtedly a middle-class movement.

Although one has made a beginning when one has decided that the Gay Liberation Movement is a middle-class movement, it doesn't carry one too far. For, what is a middle-class movement? To say that it is a movement composed largely of middle-class elements and programatically reflecting the middle class, only leaves one with the task of defining middle class. This now must be done.

"The modern middle classes (the independent professions, the

intelligensia, managerial strata, etc. - not white collar workers) are fragmented and scarcely fit the minimum criteria of a social class set by Marx: 'the separate individuals form a class in so far as they have to carry on common battle against another class; otherwise they are on hostile terms with each other as competitors' (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 48-9). In fact, what makes the middle strata a class, or a group of classes is primarily their position between the ruling and the working classes.¹ The middle class is relatively powerless to affect basic changes in society because it neither owns the means of production, distribution, etc. as does the bourgeoisie nor is it powerful by means of its concentrated strength in industry as is the working class. The middle classes, placed between these two classes, shows its feeling of powerlessness by oscillating between the ruling class and the working class - looking towards that class most likely to "deliver the goods" at any particular time. In other words, this is to say that the middle class lacks any historic direction.

As Marxists, we say that the working class is the only class that has an historic direction. The working class "is the only class whose social position in the system compels [it] to struggle against the very property relations of bourgeois society."² The ultimate historic direction of the struggle being socialism. It is because there is this direction to the struggles of the working class that it is possible to develop a program of transition from present bourgeois society to socialism. This program, based on the objective needs of the working class, seeks to bridge the gap between the subjective class consciousness as it is now and the class consciousness necessary for the working class to carry out its historic mission. The transitional program is a graduated program of demands, slogans, etc. which concretizes the steps necessary to achieve a socialist revolution.

The transitional program is thus the program for the socialist revolution. It is the working class' road to state power. And, it is only to the working class that a transitional program

applies because only the working class can make a socialist revolution. What follows from this is that there cannot be any transitional program for a middle-class movement, specifically, the Gay Liberation Movement.

Now, a program for the Gay Liberation Movement may be called "transitional" but only in the sense that this program is based on the transitional program for the working class: the basis of coordinating the work of comrades in the Gay movement with work being done in working class arenas and the basis of turning the political direction of the Gay Liberation Movement towards the working class. (More on this later) To use the term "transitional" in any other sense in relation to the Gay Liberation Movement is confusing.

The "Derivative Transitionality" of the Gay Liberation Movement:³

Our position on Gay Liberation is confusing because it uses the term "transitional" in a way other than that discussed above: it employs the concept of a "derivative transitionality" for the Gay Liberation Movement. I refer to our position that the Gay Liberation Movement is "transitional in a derivative sense" in that "it cannot be won in isolation, but on the contrary the full achievement of gay liberation depends on the transition to revolution and revolutionary society and values". Derivative, in this context, is explained as 1. the need for the gay movement to make alliances with other movements in order to achieve its goals; and, 2. the need for other movements for social change in order to provide the climate in which a gay movement can grow.

Now, the problem with this concept, "transitional in a derivative sense", is that it can be applied to any movement for social betterment - from the movement for prison reform to the struggle for workers control: all need allies to win and all depend on the right social climate for their success. But what does this have to do with their being "transitional in a derivative sense"? No Marxist would apply the concept of transitionality, any type of transitionality, to the movement for prison reform. On the

other hand, the proletarian movement towards workers control is not "transitional in a derivative sense" but just plain transitional. A concept - in this case "transitional in a derivative sense" - should be discarded if it in no way differentiates between different social movements but, rather, sets up a "heading" under which they all fit. This way of looking at social movements confuses rather than clarifies.

The confusion arises in our use of the word "transition". We state: "the full achievement of gay liberation depends on the transition to revolution and revolutionary society and values". In this statement we used the term, transition, not in the Marxist sense of a program that organizes the working class to take state power, but to mean a change: from where we are now to a revolutionary society. The substitution of the word "change" for the word "transition" would clarify the statement just quoted by saying that the full achievement of the goals of the Gay Liberation Movement cannot happen in isolation but requires a change to a socialist society for its achievement.

The Dual Nature of the Gay Liberation Movement:

Historically, the transitional program was developed in response to the pressing need to bridge the gap between two kinds of programs previously thought to be unconnectable: a program of demands seemingly obtainable under capitalism and a program of demands only obtainable under socialism. The former kind of demands were traditionally called minimal demands and the latter, traditionally called maximal demands. The duality of these two kinds of demands, of these two types of programs, was eliminated by the transitional program: the transitional program fused the program for the day to day struggles under capitalism, the minimal program, with the struggle for socialism, and, thus, for the maximal program.

But the possibility of bridging the gap between minimal and maximal demands exists only where there is the possibility of a

transitional program - in the working class. A non-working class movement, thus a non-transitional movement, can only have minimal and maximal demands. Our position on Gay Liberation is a good example of this. We state that, on the one hand, the Gay Liberation Movement "is a struggle for civil rights" and, on the other hand, it "is a struggle against social mores which are repressive against homosexuality specifically and against sexual freedom and deviance (and indeed social freedom and deviance) more generally". In the later connection, we go on to say that "bourgeois society is not really capable of inculcating a culture of genuine freedom thus the gay struggle cannot be won on a purely reformist basis". Thus the Gay Liberation Movement has demands which are theoretically achievable under capitalism, civil rights, and demands which require socialism for their achievement, a culture of genuine freedom. This is the format of a classical minimal/maximal program. In our position, we call the minimal/maximal nature of the Gay Liberation Movement its "dual nature".

But, here, another problem arises: in our discussion of civil rights, i.e. minimal demands, we present some demands that are not minimal at all but properly belong to a discussion of maximal demands. We write: the struggle for civil rights includes "a struggle for full human rights, equal to all others and for a social atmosphere which encourages full freedom for the group in question...more immediately, civil rights includes all the rights - to employment, freedom from police harassment, etc. - for which other groups have struggled". Now these last rights - to employment, freedom from police harassment, etc. - are all rights theoretically obtainable under capitalism, in other words, reforms. But full human rights and an atmosphere which encourages full freedom is only obtainable under socialism - so how could they be civil rights (reforms)? Because we were confused on the (non-transitional) nature of the Gay Liberation Movement, we were confused on the (minimal/maximal) type of demands the struggle produces. In some way we hoped to bridge the gap between minimal and maximal demands by taking a maximal

demand and calling it a minimal demand. Unfortunately, calling a maximal demand a minimal demand does not make a non-transitional movement transitional. We must be clear on the fact that there can be no transitional program for the Gay Liberation Movement. From this it follows that the movement can only have minimal and maximal demands. And, if this is so, full human rights and an atmosphere which encourages full freedom, should be called what it is: something obtainable only under socialism, a maximal demand.

A Reason Why Our "Look to the Working Class" Approach Failed:

The unique contribution of revolutionary socialists to the Gay Liberation Movement is our ability to see that the achievement of full gay liberation - full human rights - requires a socialist society. Even the achievement of the more limited concept of civil rights becomes more and more difficult to achieve, and once achieved, retained, given the general decay of capitalist society.

In discussing a strategy for winning civil rights for gays, we must raise the need for an "action movement" especially in dealing with those groups oriented towards "pressure-group" politics. We must point out that it is only through mass action that the Gay Liberation Movement can win and keep its demands for social reform. However, even a mass action movement will be defeated if it looks towards the capitalist state for the success of its program. There is no end of such examples. We must say that it is only in a break from bourgeois politics and in linking up with the struggles of the working class that the Gay Liberation Movement can insure the achievement of its demands. In other words, we raise the demand for a working class orientation.

The question is how we raise this demand. In the past we have pointed to the potential power of the working class and its history of militancy and struggle in the cause of social justice, in order to convince people to orient towards it. But working

class struggles have not developed to a point where the power of the working class to effect social change becomes real and not just potential. This is the reason that, in the past, this approach has failed: Having the potential power of the proletariat on the one hand and the real power of the bourgeoisie on the other, the Gay Liberation Movement looked toward the bourgeoisie as that class most able to "deliver the goods" now. Whether this "look to the working class" approach will succeed in the future depends upon whether there will be a significant increase in working class struggles - sufficient to provide a working class pole of attraction for the Gay Liberation Movement.

However, the near future will not witness such a significant increase in the level of struggle. We will neither 1. see a strong, militant movement of the class as a whole nor, 2. see the development of a strong working class gay movement. Point #1. does not need further discussion as there is general agreement on it. Point #2, however, needs some elaboration. Working class gays need a higher consciousness to see themselves as a doubly oppressed sector of the working class (oppressed because they are workers and because they are gay) than do other specially oppressed sectors (such as blacks or women). This is partly related to the unique "ability" of gays to conceal the "cause" of their oppression, i.e. ones gayness - an ability not readily available to blacks or women.

This need for higher consciousness can be illustrated by looking at the movements of the 1960's. It was out of the struggles of the black liberation movement that women developed the consciousness necessary to struggle around demands related specifically to women. And it wasn't until after this occurred that gays saw the need to struggle around their own demands. This is not to say that working class movements of the specially oppressed will develop in this order. It is only to point out that, historically, the consciousness needed for any kind of gay struggle is higher than for other kinds of struggle. This does not preclude the possibility of individual gay workers or groups of workers fighting for their specific demands. But it does

preclude the possibility of a movement of working class gays in this period. One cannot expect the development of a powerful working class Gay Liberation Movement in the absence of a generally more conscious movement of the whole class. And without either a generally powerful movement of the whole class or a powerful working class Gay Liberation Movement there is no real pole of attraction for the Gay Liberation Movement.

Another Reason Why Our "Look to the Working Class Approach Failed:

However, the reason this "look to the working class" approach has failed goes even deeper than this: it goes to the fact that we have lost sight of the relation of socialists to middle-class movements of the specially oppressed. As I said before, socialists intervene in a movement in order to produce a socialist consciousness within that movement. This is the unique contribution that we can make. We are not there just to add some more bodies to the movement, for, unfortunately, there are not enough of us to make that much of a difference. The difference we can make is with our ideas - the need for socialism in order for there to be real gay liberation.

Now there is no "easy" way to raise the issue of socialism. Even the most militant demands of an action oriented movement in no way bridge the gap between the reformist consciousness of the movement today and the revolutionary consciousness we wish to develop. This is another thing that is meant by saying that a movement is non-transitional: there is no programmatic bridge between reformist and revolutionary consciousness. It is only by raising an explicitly socialist perspective that we can work to transform the consciousness of gays struggling for gay liberation from reformist consciousness to revolutionary consciousness. We must point out that gay oppression is rooted in the capitalist system and can only be eliminated under socialism. We must also point out that gays can most effectively fight for their liberation by becoming part of the movement for socialism - that the most consistent supporters of gay liberation are socialists, both gay and straight.

Unfortunately, it is not easy to convince people of this - being oppressed does not lead automatically to socialist consciousness. Nor, as said before, does a militant, action-oriented movement automatically lead to socialist consciousness. But a militant, action-oriented movement provides the context in which our point of view will get a hearing. It is only by fighting for every single reform capitalism is capable of providing that gay people will come to understand that real gay liberation cannot be achieved by reforming capitalism but requires a new freer society - socialism. It is also in this struggle that we can prove what we said - that socialists are indeed the most consistent defenders of full gay rights.

It is at this point that we socialists - having fought consistently for civil rights for gays and having openly raised the need for a socialist perspective - will be given a hearing. Individuals within the Gay Liberation Movement can be won to socialism but only if we are there presenting a socialist perspective. The step from dis-illusionment with capitalism to the need for socialism is not an automatic one. We must be there raising the need for socialism as the alternative for those gays who recognize the inability of capitalism to provide full human rights.

The recruitment of gays to the I.S. follows as an integral part of this perspective. Individuals who we convince of the necessity of socialism in order for there to be gay liberation will be more than open to our positions on other questions relating to socialism. Individuals in substantial agreement with our program belong in the I.S. and we should say so. It is by raising a socialist perspective within the Gay Liberation Movement that we provide the basis of recruiting gays to the I.S.

In the context of the above, the statement, "look to the working class", does have a place in our approach to the Gay Liberation Movement. It says in the fewest of words what our approach should be: the need for socialism for there to be full gay liberation and the need for those gays who recognize this fact to take part

in the movement for socialism. In other words, "look to the working class" is a slogan that we can raise in the context of an explicitly socialist perspective.

The Question of Independent Political Action:

(NOTE: I agree with the NAC position on IPA for the Gay Liberation Movement and I recognize that a discussion of IPA is of primarily educational value at this time. Nevertheless, I want to discuss why I agree with the NAC position. In addition, an over-all approach to the gay movement must include a position on IPA for the movement. My position follows.)

We call for a labor party as a major point in our transitional program. We believe that such a party would be a tremendous step forward for the working class. It would greatly heighten class consciousness, it would strengthen class unity and, potentially, it would pose the question of state power in the form of whose party - thus what class - should rule: the working class' party or the capitalist class' party. These implications would be present in the formation of a labor party even if the program and consciousness of the leadership and rank and file were reformist.

In such a reformist party, we would be the left wing. We would fight for a revolutionary program - our transitional program - and for a revolutionary leadership committed to carrying the program out - ourselves. In the process of waging this fight successfully, we would transform the consciousness of the rank and file from reformist consciousness to the revolutionary consciousness needed to carry out the program we advocate.

This is what our role would be if a reformist labor party arose. We don't however call for such a (reformist) party. We call for a party that has our entire transitional program - in effect we call for a revolutionary socialist labor party. (We don't need to say "What labor needs is a revolutionary socialist labor party" because the content, i.e. the program that we bring to the

slogan "What labor needs is a labor party" amounts to the same thing.)

With the fore-going in mind, it should be obvious that the case of a middle-class based party is entirely different. Such a party is inherently unstable because it lacks any power to effect any real political or social change. Although a middle-class party can follow the lead of a working class party (as the Left Social-Revolutionaries did for a time during the Russian Revolution), in the absence of a working class party, a middle-class party inevitably looks towards the bourgeois state and its parties for support.

This is the main feature of a middle-class party. But there is another feature that deserves mention. It is a Marxist commonplace that the nature of the working class is such that its organizations (e.g. a labor party) have the potential for great unity and strength. It is also a Marxist commonplace that the nature of the middle classes or strata is such that its organizations cannot have this unity and strength. Thus, a middle-class party always has the feature of "the man on a white horse", the leader, the "nano" personage around whom the party is organized. Without such a person to cohere the party together, the party would never get off the ground in the first place. This method of organization necessitates an ideology that places great emphasis on reliance on the leader who will be the voice of the party and through whose activities the party will accomplish its ends. A middle-class party thus provides a classic case of ideological elitism.

Now, given these two inherent features of a middle-class based party - its instability and, thus, its elitism - what should be our position towards such a party; specifically towards an independent gay party? First of all, it should be obvious from the above that we never call for such a party. To call for an independent gay party would raise the illusion that such a party could be independent of the bourgeoisie - which it could not. Such an independent gay party is not possible. To call for an

independent party would also raise the illusion that the goals of the gay movement could be realized through the activities of an independent gay party - these goals can only be realized through the activities of a revolutionary socialist working class party. Socialists should never advocate actions that raise illusions: we are in the business of dispelling illusions not of raising them.

But, in addition to raising illusions, there is another negative feature inherent in calling for an independent gay party: success in building such a party would be in direct proportion to the failure to build an independent gay movement. The call to rely on the leader, to work for him/her, is diametrically opposed to the call to rely on oneself, to build a movement which will involve us in the struggle for what we want. We are for a militant, action-oriented gay movement in part because we believe in the self-activity of gay people as the means of struggling around gay demands. But, by calling for a gay party we say just the opposite - we tell gay people to rely on another who will get things for them. Thus, the success of an independent gay party would under-cut a militant, action-oriented movement.

Although we should never call for an independent gay party, there may be times when we would critically support such a party should it arise. In this connection, our position, "Substitute Section on Political Action for Gay Liberation Perspectives" (IS National Report No. 12 - 9/23 - no page number), offers adequate criteria for giving critical support to such a party.

In line with this position, we could critically support a party that called for "the gay movement to commit itself to promote 'a new mass party whose basis is all groups struggling for economic and social justice; that is, gays, blacks, other minority groups, women and rank and file labor'". This is the election strategy of the Detroit Gay Activists (from page 3 of the proposed amendment to the Gay Liberation Perspective - 1972 - defeated).

This election strategy has certain very good features. It

recognizes the oppressive nature of this society and the need for economic and social justice. It sees the need for a break from the Democratic and Republican Parties in order to accomplish this. It is certainly the best of such statements from gay activist groups.

However, it would be fundamentally wrong for the I.S. to call for a party based on this program. First of all is the demand for "a new mass party whose basis is all groups struggling for economic and social justice". But there is no economic and social justice in the abstract - there is only concrete economic and social justice. What type of economic and social justice is being called for? That is, what is the class nature of this economic and social justice? Is it the bourgeois economic and social justice of the Great (Bourgeois) French Revolution of 1789 or is it the proletarian economic and social justice of the Russian Revolution? Which is it?

Secondly, there is the demand that this party should be "based on all groups struggling for economic and social justice; that is, gays, blacks, other minority groups, women and rank and file labor; in other words, the oppressed masses. This is a totally classless approach. It has no conception of the class nature of society nor of the central role of the working class in any attempt to change society.

The reason I have gone into this program at length is to point out the limitations of even the best of independent gay electoral programs. We might critically support such a program while putting forward our socialist analysis but we should never call for a party based on this program.

This brings up the question of what type of party we would call for. What we call for is a revolutionary socialist party - nothing less. In raising this in the Gay Liberation Movement, we must point out that this type of party can only be based in the working class and can in no way result from independent gay political action. Those gays who agree with us should be

encouraged to join the I.S. and work towards such a party. The question of whether we should run a socialist campaign addressed to gays depends on our ability to mount such a campaign and the degree to which we feel it would be effective.

In sum, our program for electoral action is an outgrowth of our program generally for the Gay Liberation Movement: the need for socialism for there to be real gay liberation, the need to build a revolutionary socialist party in order to make a socialist revolution, and, thus, the need to recruit those gays who agree with us on the need for revolutionary socialism.

FOOTNOTES:

1. Moody, K. Thesis on the Transitional Program, pg. 2
2. ibid., pg. 2
3. Gay Liberation Perspectives (Colman/Cross document, Bulletin 15 January 14, 1972.) pg. 2
4. ibid. pg. 1

ANOTHER VIEW OF THE MFD VICTORY

E. Langdon

The victory of the Miners for Democracy and the ouster of Tony Doyle and his henchman is the most significant victory for rank and file forces within a major industrial union since the 1940's. Despite the reliance of the MFD leaders on the courts and other government intervention in order to obtain a fair election, their victory represented the aspirations of most miner militants and was based on the recent movements in the coalfields among black lung activists, pensioners, widows, etc. It reflected their mass strength and pressure.

The victory occurs in the context of intensifying class struggle in the miners. In 1968, the Black Lung Association helped galvanize one of the few political strikes since the 30's in their quest for protection against unsafe conditions and health hazards on the job. The murder of 78 miners at the Farmington No. 9 mine helped spark the movement.

Miners challenged the Nixon freeze in one of the first tests for the pay-board. Wildcats, which have always been more frequent in the miners than in other sectors of US industry, have almost doubled in the last four years often led by returned Viet Vets.

Opposition to the Doyle machine had been brewing for almost a decade. The Doyle contracts of 1964 and 1966 bred discontent. Anthracite pensioners who received \$30 a month became increasingly disgruntled.

Challenges to the Doyle apparatus began in various districts when popular maverick oppositionists like Leri Antal in District 5 began running against Doyle's handpicked cronies.

Under the pressure the International bureaucracy started to crack. The initial candidacy of Elijah Wohlford for UMW President demonstrated the fissures when long-time pie card Jock Yablonski was prompted to break with his fellow bureaucrats to run for president, threatening to tell all about the machinations of the International.

Even this threat from a bureaucratic opportunist was too much for Doyle to stomach. In collusion with other union bigwigs, Doyle planned and had carried out the brutal assassination of Yablonski, his wife, and kid. Yablonski may well have won the union election which was patently rigged.

Miners for Democracy arose from this process of gathering militancy and discontent within the union. It was organized by a heterogeneous group of miner activists from various coalfield movements, lower echelon bureaucratic oppositionists, and liberal lawyers, etc. who had been associated or tied to the Yablonski campaign.

The MFD never created a membership rank-and-file group or based itself on the real membership groups such as the BLA directly. Its convention last year was hardly an exemplar of worker's democracy. Nevertheless, its program did represent these forces.

The "Miller Platform" was divided into five sections including pensions, fringe benefits, union democracy, safety, and grievance machinery. The program had numerous limitations (which we will return to later) but its

basic thrust was a democratic union which would back up the men in the pits and which could serve as a genuine vehicle for a fight against the coal operators.

This thrust to the program as well as revulsion with the corruption of the Boyle administration won the support of an overwhelming majority of working miners, disabled and pensioners.

Hence, unlike most recent shake-ups in International leaderships, the MFD victory was no palace coup. It served notice that even the crustiest, most entrenched, gangster-like and corrupt leadership can be swept out by a reform movement with a militant reform program.

This helps cut through the cynicism of many present-day rank and filers whose moral capital consists of a deeply rooted "you can't fight city hall". Already the MFD victory has given focus to the opposition to Currans dictatorship in the UMU.

For socialists, it should come as no surprise that miners are once again in the van as they have been in much of the world. The dangers of mining life, the closeness and dependency on fellow workers entailed in the work, the close knit working class communities organized around the work place and the relative isolation from other classes and class ideologies that infect urban workers, helps breed solidarity and worker consciousness.

Mineworkers, Capitalists and Liberals

For the coal barons- ranging from the giant energy and mining conglomerates like Consolidated, Peabody, Island Creek, and Kenecott to the cockroach pennyante operators,- the MFD victory represents a resounding defeat. The opening to the left in the UMU at least initially poses the possibility for miner initiative from below, greater strike action and a real fight around health and safety with International back-up - all of which will crimp profits and productivity.

Since Boyle had lost control of the ranks and many capitalists were already sweating martinis over anarchy in the coalfields - sectors of the liberal bourgeoisie such as the Wall St. Journal decided tactically to give critical support to the MFD. This should fool no one, they are making the best of a bad bargain and to coin a phrase, it's their contradiction. They would much prefer the halcyon days when coal was king and Boyle's machine could control the ranks.

Various "pro-labor" Democratic politicians like Ken Heckler (D. W.Va.) have enthusiastically jumped on the MFD bandwagon. But for socialists - the mere fact of liberals supporting something, contributing funds, etc., are not the determining criteria for whether or not we support it. (The same is true on the liberal labor bureaucracy such as Woodcock which would like another liberal "social unionism" ally in the bureaucracy of an important industrial union.)

For us, the question is whether or not it strengthens the self-confidence, fighting ability and independence of the class. In these terms, the MFD victory is a small but significant step albeit that the MFD leaders support Democrats, have various bureaucratic assumptions, are soaked through with

reformist illusions etc. In terms of working class activity today and the ossified and reactionary character of the trade union bureaucracy, the MFD victory has progressive content mostly in terms of the potential for the ranks which it unlocks.

Within the MFD various liberal lawyers have had a major impact and influence and have served to keep the MFD tame, serving as a conveyor to the liberal Democrats. These types, like Yablonski's sons, were the architects of the court and federal reliance policy. We oppose MFD's political subordination to the liberals and their strategy not their mere support.

These liberals, for instance, wish UMW Headquarters to remain in Washington, in opposition to Miller's campaign promise to move it back to the Appalachia mining region. While this issue is largely symbolic, its resolution should serve as a pale reflection of future developments in the MFD.

What's Ahead for the MFD?

Our support for the MFD was largely based on the possibilities which it opens up for rank and file action, not our of simple support for Miller, Patrick or Trbovich - their strategy or program. Within the context of the present capitalist government anti-labor onslaught, the expected productivity drive and increase in strip mining with a concomitant sacrifice of health and safety - due to the "energy crisis" and present coal boom - the Miller platform falls well short of even the necessary minimal program to meet the objective situation.

The Miller program is a reform bureaucratic program not because Miller, Patrick, Trbovich are bad guys or die hard bureaucrats (in fact they were militant leaders) but because their social vision is limited to the boundaries and horizon of what can be "realistically" won under present day capitalism. Their organizational procedures are bounded by the methods of the liberal social unionist bureaucracy. (While the Miller Leadership has moved to narrow the sociological gap between the bureaucracy and ranks by cutting union salaries to the level of the 1930's or 40's, etc, they have also moved to dissolve the semi-organized form of the MFD after the district elections. We should oppose this, since it makes them even less controllable, and call for rank and file MFD committees in every local to bird-dog the leadership.)

Of course, the only grouping whose program would not be so bounded is a revolutionary socialist leadership. This, however, is not on the immediate agenda. But to fail to put forward the program, strategy and tactics that can meet the objective situation (though confined largely to single-jack propaganda work in the UMW or to what we say to workers in other unions) would make us liars, opportunists and worse.

It would guarantee that such a leadership never emerges since it won't happen mechanically out of the increasing militancy of the miners. We wish to avoid both the absolutely uncritical ra-rah cheerleading of the CP (see the January Labor Today, for example) or of the SWP (see Lovell in the Militant) and the maximalist sectarianism of the Sparts, NCLC, etc.

Nor do we wait to make our criticisms or propose programmatic amendments and alternatives until Miller carries out an open betrayal - carefully concealing them in our back pockets in the meantime. Such a policy would

guarantee ~~can~~ failure to reach the best militnats.

The acid test for Miller will probably be in the test tube before long. The Miller leadership is frightened that their victory will give the ranks a green light on strikes (according to a West Virginian active in the miners movement) and they are committed to honoring the Doyle contract which includes a no strike pledge until it expires in 1974.

Productivity is the real key. Given the present bind of US capitalism vis a vis other capitalist powers, a productivity drive is already being carried through (see Lori Larkins's series in ME). The attacks on the UAW at GMAD plants, the rubberworkers, etc. are only a part of a broader drive. With the present energy drisis, the situation of the coal mining industry is acute. The owners are going to be less and less likely to put up with strike action, rows over health and safety, etc. Due to their relatively high profits they will probably be willing to offer productivity deals. Another future course for the mine owners is intensified strip mining which is enormously productive and profitable while requiring low capital/labor investment.

Miller has already claimed that the owners can have high productivity while providing safety - which represents either Utopianism on Miller's part or a retreat on the MFD promise that "coal will be mined safely or not at all". While calling for \$200 a month pension base, the MFD program said nary a word about the present policy of tying pension funds to coal royalties and therefore to productivity.

While the giant corporations may have the liquid assets necessary to invest in order to make relatively safe mines, the exorbitant cost and degree to which such a cost would cut into profits will make them extremely reluctant. Many of the small operators simply cannot afford it. Hence, the demand for nationalization under union control should be posed as the logical consequence of a consistent fight for health and safety and against the drive for productivity.

As part of the productivity fight, we should call for an end to tying pensions to coal royalties. Pensions should be paid in full by a fund paid for by the employers - with C.O.L. protection.

Likewise the fight for a shorter work week at full pay should be posed in similar terms.

Since all energy unions (UAW, OCAW, etc.) face similar problems, we advocate united actions in coalition - organizing mass demos in Washington, etc. to demand enforcement of the Health and Safety Act as well as its extension and tightening up many of its provisions. (This, as well as more generalized working class political demands such as the controls, anti-strike laws, etc., provides a concrete way to focus independent labor political action and give some flesh and blood to the labor party demand)

The programmatic points indicate a long range strategy which point to a solution to the government/corporate attacks on the miners.

Our short range tactics should be to urge the consolidation of the MFD victory and its inherent potential for ~~xxx~~ the ranks. Only the firming up of organization and a serious fight around health, safety and productivity in the mines provide the future basis for victory in the coalfields.

The ranks who made possible the Miller victory should fight against the dissolution of the MFD and for its broadening into a democratic membership vehicle for miner militancy to which Miller is responsible. If Miller is successful on this, it will mean a step toward consolidating a new bureaucracy and the growing isolation of the leadership from the working miners from which they recently emerged.

In that case, we should focus on the BIA and other militant constituency groups and call on them to form a union-wide group that can exercise popular sovereignty over the Miller leadership and carry out a consistent battle against the coal bosses.

Critical Comment on Other Documents

Of the two and a half documents (the half being McKenzies amendments), Ron T's document is the one I regard as the more serious attempt to come to grips with the MFD and to outline a strategy. My main criticisms are on certain stresses (which are, of course, political questions) and a certain number of sectarian formulations.

Ron's political conception of the driving forces in the MFD - their hybrid and heterogeneous nature and their reflective rather than direct relationship to the Black Lung Fight and other movements, is on the whole accurate. However, at points later in the document, the MFD leadership assumes something of the character of a usurpatory excrement "riding the wave of this unorganized movement of younger miners".

This appears to me to be the flip side of Lynn's document which presents a lawyers brief to prove that Miller, Trovich, etc. are just militant miners leaders. The BIA, for example, may in fact have had a certain dampening effect on militancy, the wildcats, etc. But by making the political fight for a health and safety law in W. Va., it provided the movement with a strategy, cohesion, and direction. Otherwise, the movement would probably have fizzled out and ~~ended~~ ended in demoralization.

The Schrade, Lewis, MFD warning is another example of sectarian formulation that strikes me as particularly inept. Part of this stems from the inadequacy of our present labor perspective and its complete failure to come to grips with bureaucratic elements moving leftward under the impact of events.

In the 30's, Lewis really did cut off a great deal of the militant independent and even revolutionary potential inherent in the pre-CIO and CIO strike wave. If Ron's attack on Lewis is meant as a reply to Lynn's article, it's necessary and accurate. Schrade is much closer to a second-rate Lewis or Teather type.

However, in the present situation, the MFD leaders have a somewhat different character than slick bureaucratic opportunists. To a degree they have advanced consciousness on issues such as health and safety, in a way that Lewis for all his Shakespeare quoting and rhetoric never did.

In any event, any serious rank and file movement is going to attract a certain number of opportunistic elements, bureaucrats and bureaucratic aspirants.

Our job to jumble the phrase of good ol' far-sighted John L. Lewis is to make sure it's they who are the bird dog and it's we the hunters who bring home the bird. The presence of these types opens up certain possibilities and links to broader strata of trade unionists. We have to be careful not to accommodate to them.

Part of Fox's problem in the UMC is that he thinks by accommodating to types like Singer from Chicago, by jettisoning enough programmatic ballast like the labor party, he can find a short cut to building a mass opposition in the UAW. Instead he will miss out on more advanced black production workers and end up with a semi-bureaucratic cabal based on skilled workers. We want Singer types, but only if they adhere to the program and are accountable to the UMC. (The Marxist but non-CPer AJ Cook who was a British miner's leader in the 1920's is a case in point. The Miner's Minority Movement was able to control him. He served as a valuable agitator, organizer and propagandist for the UMC. Of course, Cook was made of incomparably better stuff than most US bureaucrats and trade unions were more autonomous of the capitalist state, etc. than today.)

A number of my other criticisms on formulations on the liberals, etc. should be clear from the document.

On revolutionary leadership - I think Ron's formulation is at best hazy. If he means we have to begin the long and arduous task of winning the best strata of miner militants to our programmatic perspectives and a revolutionary socialist world view than we are agreed. If, on the other hand, he means the kind of rhetoric hounding "need for revolutionary leadership" posed as an abstraction ala the editorial on Viet Nam in WP #71 is, than we differ: Building a revolutionary leadership is not a slogan-agitational or propagandistic-but a serious task. The question of building a revolutionary leadership flows from winning advanced workers to our program, perspectives and tactics. (We also may accept responsibility for leading struggles well short of the point when masses of workers agree with our entire program. Only revolutionaries could have carried out the Minneapolis strike in the manner it was carried out - though the ranks hardly accepted the entire Trotskyist program or even understood the method from which the strategy came in other than a gut sense.

My differences with Lynn's document are in many respects questions of method - which can be better discussed around Geier's last year convention document and Ron's document on the Transitional program. I think it involved a political adaptation, rather than a pedagogical one to working class consciousness.

If our program is what is objectively necessary to carry the miner's struggle forward rather than some rather interesting theoretical fillips for Sunday conference speechifying - than we may part company with critical support of Miller (which is a question of tactics not principle or program), while still understanding that we must win the best elements from his base.

MAKING OUR MARXISM A SCIENCE: A CRITIQUE

A discussion document by D. Crees (St. Louis)

1. The questions that John Sullivan raises about the relationship between Marxism and science are crucial to any Marxist. Marx and Lenin felt they were engaging in 'science'. We must be aware of what 'science' meant to them and to assess that definition in the light of current knowledge and conditions.

2. The Second International generally posited 1) the existence of objective reality, 2) a reflection theory of consciousness which tends to view humans as passive and, thus 3) general laws of history. The result was a linear, mechanical conception of history up to and including a mechanical conception of 'dialectics'.¹ Comrade Sullivan wants to attribute this fundamentally positivist conception of history (and science) to Marx. Such a position reveals a misunderstanding of Marx's conception of science.

3. It was precisely this kind of mechanical materialism that Marx vigorously critiqued in the 'Theses on Feuerbach' specifically focusing on the passivity of Feuerbach's conception of consciousness.

4. Mechanical materialism begins by positing the objective existence of the world. This is a philosophical (or, more precisely, an ontological) position. It is important to note how sharply different is Marx's position. Marx sided with neither Hegel nor Feuerbach. Rather, he felt the issue was falsely posed--in an abstract, philosophical, scholastic manner. For Marx, human existence is practical from the outset and man must prove the truth in practice. By emphasizing that "all social life is essentially practical"², Marx removes himself from a sterile, pointless debate and begins his investigations of the concrete and the historical. By asserting the objective existence of the world which is known through a reflection theory of consciousness, Plekhanov and (pre-1914) Lenin (as well as Stalin and Mao) have resurrected the Feuerbachian position of an abstract, pre-Marxist debate. Such a position cannot be attributed to Marx, as Lenin was to discover.³

5. Mechanical materialism ends by positing general and deterministic laws of history. It is interesting to counterpose Lenin's view: "Law takes the quiescent--and therefore law, every law, is narrow, incomplete, approximate."⁴ Or again, "The all-sidedness and all-embracing character of the interconnection of the world . . . is only one-sidedly, fragmentarily and incompletely expressed by causality."⁵

6. In "making our Marxism a science" Comrade Sullivan adopts the bourgeois notion of what a science is! Thus science is a special activity, unique from other human activities. But for Marxists, the scientific attempt to understand is differentiated from each human's attempt to understand only ~~ix~~ in its systematization and rigor.

7. Similarly, Comrade Sullivan wants to use the model of the scientific experiment as if that model defined 'real' science when actually it defines one cramped approach to science which is popular in modern class societies. The experimental model is capable of capturing only a fragment of what Lenin called the "all-embracing character of the interconnection of the world." To utilize that model of science, IS would in fact abandon its practical revolutionary project and, consequently, scientific Marxism.

8. Our decision to use Marx's definition of class is not arbitrary. Such a position comes close to 'paradigmatic relativism'. The origins of Marxism are located in the practical attempt to understand and change ~~the~~ capitalism. Our present analysis, too, is the consequence of our practical efforts to understand and change our social existence in modern capitalist society. (Either such efforts are 'science' or nothing is.) We cannot casually change our paradigm as we would a coat because our original choice (rather: process of choosing) is and continues to be bound up with our life-experiences and those of our class.

9. Marxist science learns through its own practical experience but not only through that experience. Our ~~x~~ 'exemplars' are found in history. Our insights are tested in practice and in the daily and yearly flow of events. To treat political practice as something which accumulates until a coherent paradigm can be formed is to abandon our rich scientific tradition for that of empiricism.

10. Comrade Sullivan's application of the experimental model to the Marxism of IS yields two concrete proposals. The first is that IS have various programs in effect simultaneously. Members would be disciplined only to evaluate the results of activity and share that evaluation. Thus we find that the political consequence of an experimental model of science is a model of organization shown to be deficient in 1917. Recent experiences with SDS and NAM do not suggest that such an organizational model has improved since then.

11. The second concrete proposal suggests that some occupy themselves with theoretical work (paradigm-tending, as it were) while others take care of the day-to-day political work. (Coincidentally, the paradigm-tenders within IS are to be drawn from the same societal strata which generally tends paradigms anyway). We must recall that Marxism breaks down the arbitrary distinction between thought and action which is characteristic of bourgeois society. In practice, such a division of labor may tend to emerge and may be necessary in the short-run, but it must not be elevated into a principle. Theory without action and action without theory have resulted in some of the worst political practice that marxism has known. History provides ample warning of the consequences of such a division of labor, and no one states it more eloquently than Trotsky does in The Russian Revolution:

"Notwithstanding their opposite characters, it was no accident that Kamenev and Stalin occupied a common position at the beginning of the revolution: they supplemented each other. A revolutionary conception without a revolutionary will is like a watch with a broken spring. Kamenev was always behind the time--or rather beneath the tasks--of the revolution. But the absence of a broad political conception condemns the most willful revolutionist to

indecisiveness in the presence of vast and complicated events. Stalin, the empiric, was open to alien influences not on the side of will but on the side of intellect. Thus it was that this publicist without decision, and this organizer without intellectual horizon, carried Bolshevism in March, 1917, to the very boundaries of Menshevism."

It continues to be necessary to develop all the political potentials of all of our members.

12. The continual growth and reassessment of our scientific and revolutionary project is an imperative. The failure to incorporate new knowledge, the degeneration of science into exegesis, spells the death of scientific and revolutionary activity--as ~~the~~ numerous sects illustrate daily. But we must be on guard against 1) accepting bourgeois or Stalinist definitions of the thought of Marx, Lenin, etc., and 2) unconsciously allowing bourgeois conceptions of reality (e.g., the definition of 'science') to shape the direction of our reassessment.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lenin was critical of the mechanistic dialectics of Bukharin in his "will," and of Plekhanov and Engels in his "philosophical notebooks" (Collected Works, Volume 38, Moscow, p. 359), although he notes that for the latter it was "in the interests of popularization."

2. Selected Works, Moscow, p. 30.

3. Lenin, op cit; also, see Gramsci's insightful critique of Bukharin (Selections from the Prison Notebooks, New York: International, pp. 419-472).

4. Ibid., p. 151. Parenthetically, this quote is conveniently omitted from the Solsam and Martel reader (International).

5. Ibid., P. 159

PHASE II IN BRITAIN: THE WORKING-CLASS RESPONSE
by Paul Benjamin

I. The economy. Britain continues to be enmeshed in economic crisis. The current rate of inflation is close to 10%, the highest in Europe. An artificially induced economic boom (the rate of growth of the money supply soared up to 30% a year in the first half of 1972, while business was granted generous tax cuts) brought with it a serious turnaround in Britain's balance of payments situation. The balance of payments went from a surplus of 76 million pounds to a deficit of 220 million pounds in one year.

The economy did grow in 1972. Unemployment fell toward the three-quarter million mark, industrial production rose 6% in the last quarter of 1972, while consumer spending was up 6.8%. Profits skyrocketed.

But while profits went up, they did not re-enter the economy. There was a decline of around 10% in investment in manufacturing industry in 1972, while British investment overseas doubled.

Heath will not win the confidence of British (and other) investors until he can demonstrate that he has a firm hold over the economy. And he cannot achieve this until he has a firm hold over the British working class.

In one sense this simply means bringing the working-class wage offensive under control. British working-class militancy won wage increases of around 17% last year.

The Economist, in its issue of March 10, 1973, argues for a much more fundamental shake-up of the British working class, asking government "to take steps that will discriminately shake labour out of the least productive and least profitable or most loss-making places." More specifically, "The principal object of the medium-term review of public expenditure which the Chancellor says is in progress should be to set down now very specific target figure for large redundancies of labor during 1974-77 in steel, coal mining, electricity, gas, the railways, the post office, shipbuilding, subsidized high technology boondoggles, subsidized low technology boondoggles, the London-based section of the civil service and all other government assisted lame ducks."

(The Economist wants the government to continue its growth economy strategy. Aside from the balance of payments question, they see the main argument against tax cuts to business as being the huge public sector deficit. This in turn is the result of the government historically trying to keep up employment in nationalized and subsidized industry.)

These are, of course, the areas which have borne the brunt of the government's offensive. In addition to the low-paid workers, the list includes steel (over 100,000 jobs to be eliminated by 1980), coal (over 100 mines to be closed this year), gas (one third of work force eliminated), etc.

II. Incomes Policy. Heath's "confrontation" strategy was defeated with the dockworkers' strike last June. Last summer and fall he was unable to win the TUC over to enforcing voluntary wage guidelines. Talks broke down late last October. Almost immediately Heath announced Phase I, a 90-day wage-price freeze. On January 17, he announced the outlines of Phase II, to take effect in April.

The details of both the freeze and Phase II need little elaboration. They are copies of Nixon's freeze and Phase II, down to minor details.

The freeze has worked. The Economist (quoted in Socialist Worker, March 3, 1973) states that in the past three months real incomes have shown no growth and may even have been reduced. Shop prices rose 6%, as import and raw material costs were "passed on."

Phase II will last through September. Until then, wage increases will be held to one pound plus 4%. This amounts to cutting the average wage increase by 50% over 1972 figures. Strikes against the wage guidelines will be illegal. Companies are allowed to figure their allowable profit margin on the basis of their best two out of the last five years. Already, the Confederation of British Industry is condemning these limits as too strict.

III. Working-Class Response. Working-class opposition to the government's incomes policy began in January, when 200,000 civil servants protested the freeze in a one-day strike. Numerous local unions in various industries and parts of the country engaged in brief demonstration or strikes against the freeze. The most active opposition has come from the public sector: gas workers, hospital workers, railway workers, teachers and civil servants.

(1) Gas: the 47,000 gas workers are represented by two unions, most by the General and Municipal Workers Union, some by the General and Transport Workers Union. This is the first national strike in their history.

Gas men are angry because (1) low pay - 19 pounds for laborers, 22.87 for skilled workers. The government is offering two and a quarter pounds (2) other unions, particularly electric, settled just before the freeze and got more than the Phase II guidelines would have given them. (3) Massive lay-offs.

Throughout the struggle, the rank and file has been forced to take the lead. Their militancy forced the bureaucracy to sanction working only to rule, overtime bans, and selective strikes to maintain its control. Militants were unable to force a national all-out strike.

In this as in all other public sector strikes, the government and bourgeois press have mounted vicious attacks on the strikers as greedy

heartless bloodsuckers, and, in the case of gas and hospital, as potential murderers.

This strike was seen by all political groups in Britain as the first decisive test of the government's policy. The union has now called for a vote on some near meaningless concessions. This serves two purposes; it cuts down militancy, and it delays the decision past April 1st, when strikes against the guidelines will be illegal.

(2) Civil Service: Largest union is the Civil and Public Servants Association. Some quarter million civil servants have gone out on one-day strikes against the freeze and projected guidelines. Again, this is the first such action in their history.

They have not received wage increases in two years; their expected increases were due in January and fell to the freeze.

The February 28th strike was official. It was forced on the leadership, which at first rejected calls for industrial action, after several half-day and full-day strikes by local groups. While the leadership sanctioned the strike, it called no demonstrations or meetings, saying everyone was needed to picket. For rank and file activity in this area, see section on British IS intervention below.

(3) Rail: The train drivers' union, some 29,000 men have gone out twice against the guidelines; they have been supported up till now by the trainmen. However, there is a rivalry between this union - or its leadership - and other trainmen in the National Union of Railwaymen, whose leadership has opposed the strike. SW has given this strike relatively little coverage.

(4) Teachers: Some 3,000 teachers struck in London on February 27th. They promised an increase a year ago and still have not received it. For rank and file activity in this area, see section on British IS intervention below.

(5) Hospitals: The most militant struggle being waged at this time. Hospitals have offered 1.84 pounds in line with Phase II. The union (National Union of Public Employees) is asking for 4 pounds. A rank and file group, NASH, is demanding 10 pounds increase.

The union is following a policy of selective strikes and slowdowns, despite rank and file pressure for an all-out strike. The TUC has asked district organizations to organize support demonstrations for the hospital workers.

(6) Ford: Almost everyone expected a militant strike here: Ford workers are the worst paid auto workers in Britain, and know Ford made huge profits last year. Convenors called for an all-out strike to begin March 1st. It didn't come off.

SW gives several reasons for the failure. Union negotiators (unions

are the AUEW and the General and Transport Workers) agreed to low-key negotiations, which forbade use of the press and tightly restricted propaganda. Union officials stressed the dangers of going it alone.

The shop stewards and convenors were less than brilliant. They agreed to the propaganda restraints, and relied on bureaucratic methods to line up the rank and file.

Clearly the role of the CP was critical. Both of the unions involved are led by "progressives" who have the support of the CP. SW mentions that at Dagenham, the largest Ford plant (25,000 workers) the CP was responsible for the "appalling conduct" of the leadership of the mass meetings. Somehow they forgot to bring this up in earlier articles.

(7) Miners: The National Union of Miners was asking a wage increase of 5 - 7 pounds; the Coal Board was offering two and a quarter, "respecting" the guidelines. The union exec refused, by a 14 - 11 vote, to call a special congress on the issue. The union has now rejected the board's offer since it has refused to give an extra week's holiday, and is conducting a strike authorization vote. The role of President Joe Gormley will be taken up in the discussion of the TUC conference. For rank and file activity in this area, see section on British IS intervention below.

(8) Steel: The big question here is lay-offs. 400 steelworkers picketed TUC Steel conference. The TUC Steel Committee, headed by Sir Davies, president of BISAKTA, the largest steel union, said he could not logically oppose "modernization." BISAKTA is asking only that job guarantees be given to laid-off workers. The rank and file newspaper, Steelworker, asserts actual lay-offs will reach 130,000 rather than the 50,000 claimed by the government's White Paper on steel.

(9) Post Office: Tom Jackson, head of union, has said that labor must work within the guidelines. He has refused a common front with other public sector workers, saying that their claims would conflict. SW says demoralization of 1971 defeat lingers, but that militancy is building up, could explode in coming months.

IV. The TUC. The TUC has provided its usual set of "revolutionary" measures against the government offensive. The bureaucracy as a whole has refused to sit on either Wage or Price Commissions. TUC leadership has mouthed support for striking workers while maintaining that every union is on its own in winning wage increases.

The TUC has reached agreement with the Labor Party on a reform platform. This includes

1. effectual limit on rising prices, particularly strategic prices
2. rent freeze
3. repeal of Housing Finance Act (which increases rents according to ability to pay)
4. control of property speculation by a premium rate of capital gains tax
5. repeal of industrial relations act.
6. moratorium on value-added tax, whose rate should be reduced to 7.5%
7. dividend restraint
8. increase in housing
9. price reductions for cereals by renegotiating EEC common agricultural policy
10. firm commitment to economic growth
11. substantial cut in unemployment
12. increased consumer protection
13. raising pensions

Right-wing labor leaders have pointed out that there is no guarantee that Labor, if in power, wouldn't put through an incomes policy.

The TUC called a special congress held on March 5 to seal approval of its proposals. No action proposals were included. This was voted down, by a close vote at the congress. In the end, a resolution "inviting" unions to join in a one-day general strike "as soon as possible" was passed. The actual date will be May 1.

The vote marked a fairly sudden shift to the left in TUC politics. Thus Hugh Scanlon, "leftist" head of the AUEW, said in the beginning of February that those who were thinking of a general strike were living in cloud cuckoo land. Obviously the left wing, in the face of a strong rank and file upsurge, has moved to head it off.

The role of Joe Gormley, head of the NUM (miners) is particularly interesting. Before the congress he had proclaimed loud and clear that it was suicide for any union to strike alone against the government and its new laws. At the same time he said that the trade union movement could bring about new elections in the next few months if it wants to, by calling for a general strike. He also said that, "But if that is not what they really mean, they had better tell us, because I am not sure many politicians, even in the Labour Party, would welcome office as a result of this strike. However, this is a matter for the movement to decide, not me."

At the congress on March 5, it was Gormley who challenged the executive board's decision against action proposals. In addition to heading the NUM (for life), Gormley is on the national executive of the Labor Party.

V. British IS. The IS has generally pushed a line of building the strike movement, including support of specific actions while stressing the need for a general strike to bring down the government. It has exposed the TUC and trade union bureaucracy roles in abdicating leadership, and has called for the building of Committees of Action, Joint Strike committees, etc., around rank and file groups. In its March 17, 1973, issue it has called for the revitalization of the Liason Committee for the Defense of Trade Unions, which played a leading role in the fight against the Industrial Relations Act. The Committee has called a conference in London for March 31. Editorials and analytical articles have pointed out the bankruptcy of the Labor Party.

Specific details of their intervention are hard to come by in their press.

(1) Civil Service: An IS member is chairman of the British Museum branch of the Civil and Public Services Association. He is one of the founders of Redder Tape, a CPISA rank and file group. The group's anti-freeze program was (a) selective extended strikes in the most effective areas, (b) national one-day stoppage, preferably with other public sector unions (c) full pay award retroactive to January 1. These demands were defeated, 15-11, at a CPISA executive meeting. Redder Tape handed out 15,000 leaflets at 22 rallies in an attempt to overthrow the decision.

The British Museum CPISA group has led in forming a joint action committee in Camden and Islington, in East London, to coordinate and further the common struggle against the freeze. It has been backed by the Camden Trades Council and "many important trade unions in the area."

(2) Teachers" Here there are only hints. The local teachers' association in Hackney has also formed a joint action committee. On February 28, 1,500 teachers at a meeting in London shouted down Harry Allison, President of the National Union of Teachers, when he declined to accept a resolution calling for continued strike action after Phase II goes into effect. An article in New Solidarity claims that IS members played a leading role at the meeting.

(3) Miners: Gareth Williams, secretary of the Morlais lodge and an IS member, argued against the "left" wing of the NUM at a South Wales miners delegate conference. He condemned the union leadership and the TUC, saying that leadership was non-existent unless it came from the pits themselves.

The Collier, a rank-and-file miners' paper, is sponsored by the CWM and Morlais Lodge. Its program is

- (a) fight for the full (wage) claim
- (b) No productivity deals
- (c) Force the union leaders to fight
- (d) All out on February 28

VI Summary. The first great upsurge against the Heath government's incomes policy appears to be ebbing. Both the gasmen and the railway workers are reportedly going back to work, while the Ford strike has yet to get off the ground. It appears that the public sector workers involved had neither the experience nor the organizational strength - not to mention economic resources - to carry on sustained struggle at this point. The British IS realized this and made continual appeals to workers in the stronger union, pointing out the folly of depending on the weak to carry through fights without their help.

The decision of the TUC to carry through even a token general strike, indicates that they may feel it possible to unseat the Heath government. This is all the more possible since the TUC and Labor Party bureaucracies are on closer terms than they have been in years. The right wing of Labor is clearly uneasy at the thought of riding to power on such "unorthodox" means.

NATIONWIDE A.F.T. LOCAL: A NOTE FOR STUDENT-MEMBERS

by Andrew B.
February 7, 1973

Members who are fulltime students and who see the American Federation of Teachers as their prospective political arena may be eligible to join the Workers Education Local, Local 189 of the A.F.T., and may wish to consider so doing.

Local 189 has six categories of membership (i.e., for dues purposes), as of May 1, 1971. Fulltime students (and "unpaid community action workers") may apply for membership. Dues in this category are \$0.50 monthly, or \$3.00 every six months, or \$6.00 a year.

Parttime students (and a whole host of other people, too) may also apply for membership as "ad hoc instructors," paying somewhat higher dues of \$2.75, or \$16.50, or \$33.00, respectively.

Interested persons should request a membership application from: Keith Knauss, Treasurer, Local 189, A.F.T., Indiana University at South Bend, 1825 Northside Blvd., South Bend, Indiana 46615. It may be worthwhile to indicate that you heard of Local 189 through the December, 1972, special supplement to the American Teacher on the Workers Education Local.

In some respects, Local 189 is a polymorphous anomaly in the A.F.T. today. There are no other nationwide locals in the A.F.T. to my knowledge. At the same time, few (if any) of its members work under collective bargaining agreements negotiated by Local 189.

Now in its fifty-first year, Local 189's early development intersected part of the Trotskyist movement in the U.S. The Workers Education Local was chartered at the request of the staff of Brookwood College on November 1, 1922. Brookwood was an independent labor college like many others at the time. The chairman of the charter signers was A.J. Muste, formerly the general secretary of the Amalgamated Textile Workers of America and subsequently important in the American Workers Party. The latter organization merged with the Communist League of America. Muste, however, dropped out of politics (and went back to theology) after failing to prevent the implementation of the U.S. variation of the "French turn," viz., into the Socialist Party.

((EDITORIAL NOTE: CORRECTION. A.J. Muste did not leave politics after breaking with the Trotskyist movement. He was active for years after as a "socialist" and anti-war activist and was prominent in the anti-war movement of the sixties up until his death a few years ago.))

SOUTHEAST ASIAN COMMUNIST AND TROTSKYIST MOVEMENTS:
FRENCH- AND ENGLISH-LANGUAGE SOURCES

by Andrew B.
2/4/73

With the official "end" to the Second Indochina War this January, the class struggle may come to the fore much more readily in the coming months and years. With the apparent subsiding of the military aspect of U.S. imperialism's involvement in Indochina and perhaps elsewhere in Southeast Asia, it has become more important for the I.S. to evaluate and comment on the movements that may emerge in the future.

This document is not a bibliography on the subject of working class and peasant movements in Indochina and Southeast Asia. Rather, it lists some of the more important sources that should be regularly consulted either for information or for references to other publications. I do not make any further evaluation of the items listed below.

1. Bibliography of Asian Studies. Formerly included as a special number of the Journal of Asian Studies; now a separate (annual) publication of the Association For Asian Studies.

2. Peking Review. Can be subscribed to from China Books & Periodicals (see #3, below). Weekly; indexed annually. Gives some insight into the attitudes of the dominant section of the CCP toward different movements in Southeast Asia.

3. China Books and Periodicals, 2929 Twenty-Fourth Street, San Francisco, California. Main U.S. distributor not only for Chinese English-language publications, but also for Stalinist movements and governments in Southeast Asia. Write for catalogue.

4. Far Eastern Economic Review. Published weekly in Hong Kong.

5. Laging Una; an English-language monthly which has been published since the very early 1950's and concentrates on news from Maharlika (the future name of the present Republic of the Philippines). \$2.50 annually; 3003 Future Place, Los Angeles, California 90065. Anti-imperialist; but unclear in attitude toward revolutionary groups

6. Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars. Quarterly; beginning fifth year of publication. After Pakistan and Ceylon, not quite as super-Maoist. \$6.00 annually (\$4.00 for students). 605 Mission Street, Room 1001, San Francisco, California 94105. Volume IV, Number 4 (December, 1972) has cumulative index at pages 44-45.

7. Association for Asian Studies, News Letter. Lists dissertations in progress and recently completed dissertations. Address of authors is included.

8. Indochina; published by Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars every three weeks. \$4.00 annually; P.O. Box 3045, New York, N.Y. 10001.

9. Indochina Chronicle; published by Indochina Resource Center, 1322 18th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Every two to three weeks.

10. United Front Press, Box 40099, San Francisco, California 94140. Write for catalogue.

SOUTHEAST ASIAN COMMUNIST AND TROTSKYIST MOVEMENTS:
FRENCH- AND ENGLISH-LANGUAGE SOURCES (cont.)

by Andrew B.

11. Radical Asian Publications Service. Write for list of pamphlets from: Thomas P. Fenton, 110 Charles Street, Hingham, Massachusetts 02043.
12. Monthly Catalogue of U.S. Government Publications.
13. Peace Research Abstracts Journal. Monthly.
14. Journal of Contemporary Asia (Stockholm). Quarterly.
15. Bibliographie Géographique Internationale. Paris.
16. Southeast Asian Research Materials Group Newsletter: write to Barbara Guthrie, Secretary, Southeast Asian Research Materials Group, The Library, Australian National University, Box 4, P.O., Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, Australia.
17. Current Thought on Peace and War; published by the Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh, Wisconsin 54901.
18. Geographical Abstracts D; Social Geography and Cartography. Social geography is what you and I call politics or sociology.
19. Historical Abstracts: Part B-Twentieth Century Abstracts, 1914-1970
20. International Political Science Abstracts/Documentation Politique Internationale. Published three or four times a year.
21. UNESCO. International Bibliography of the Social Sciences. Annual; and about two years late at that.
22. Newsletter on Comparative Studies of Communism. Free; write to Frederic J. Floron, Professor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Buffalo, 4238 Ridge Lea Road, Buffalo, New York 14226.
23. Comparative Political Studies; has bibliographic section.
24. International Organization; has bibliographic section
25. Foreign Affairs; has bibliographic section
26. American Historical Review; has a section on Southeast Asian politics and history in its regular bibliographical section.
27. Asian and Pacific Planning Bibliography; published by University of Hawaii.
28. Arms Control & Disarmament; A Quarterly Bibliography with Abstracts and Annotations.
29. Foreign Broadcast Information Service publishes texts of intercepted radio broadcasts. It is impossible to subscribe to this, but it is available in the libraries of universities whose faculties are prestigious enough to have persons with connections to the RAND Corp. or to the CIA. The CIA is the apparent publisher, even though this is not acknowledged in print.
30. Message d'Extrême-Orient, Editions Thanh-Long, 34 rue Dekens, 1040 Bruxelles, Belgique (Belgium). Has "Analyses Bibliographiques."
31. Theodore E. Kyriak, Asian Developments: A Bibliography.
32. Pacific Imperialism Notebook, P.O. Box 26415, San Francisco, California 94126. Monthly.
33. Indochina; Journal of the Vietnam Solidarity Committee, 182 Pentonville Road, London, N 1, England