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SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

EDITORIAL NOTE

The first section of this issue of the International Information Bulletin consists of the original draft resolution on the "Cultural Revolution" drawn up for the Third World Congress Since Reunification (9th World Congress) plus the proposed amendments. These have been arranged in dual columns so as to facilitate following the suggested changes.

The authors of the original draft considered the amendments to be so extensive as to represent a divergent approach. Rather than place the debate within the framework of a dispute over amendments, the authors decided not to incorporate any of the suggested changes, even though a few were not of a decisive nature or were even acceptable.

Thus the United Secretariat had before it two apparently similar but opposing documents.

The majority of the United Secretariat voted for the amended document. This then became known as the "majority" document, while the original draft became known as the "minority" document. These were published separately in issue No. 5

of the International Information Bulletin (1969 volume).

The two documents were debated at the world congress. There the vote was three to one in favor of the amended majority document.

Further changes were then incorporated into the majority document. This final draft was published in the July 14 issue of Intercontinental Press along with the other main documents of the world congress.

The second section of this issue of the Bulletin consists of an article by Joseph Hansen based on a report he made to the New York branch of the Socialist Workers Party as a representative of the Political Committee. In his presentation, he followed the dual columns of the original draft resolution and the proposed amendments.

Thus, if you wish, you can begin reading Comrade Hansen's contribution and then refer back to the dual columns as he takes up the points one by one.

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

Original

Proposed Amendments

The "cultural revolution" constitutes a momentous dividing line in the political evolution of the People's Republic of China. It marks the irreparable shattering of the nucleus of veteran Communists clustered around Mao, which led the ~~Stalinized~~ Chinese Communist party in the civil war, founded the republic, and overturned capitalist rule, and which, since the victory over Chiang Kai-shek, has run the economy, governed the country, and directed the state and party apparatus. The "cultural revolution" tore this nucleus into contending fragments that cannot be put together.

Initiated in September 1965 by the Maoist faction in the Chinese Communist party leadership, it reached its major objective with the expulsion of Liu Shao-chi from the party at the October 13-31, 1968 "enlarged" twelfth plenum of the Central Committee. Liu, the chief of state, Mao's first lieutenant and main interpreter for several decades, his designated heir until the factional struggle broke into the open, was singled out as the central target of attack under such epithets as "the Khrushchev of China," the "first person in a position of authority who has taken the capitalist road," and, finally, as the "enlarged" twelfth plenum put it, "the renegade, traitor and scab Liu Shao-chi."

Mao has defined the internal struggle which has convulsed China as "in essence a great political revolution under the conditions of socialism made by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes; it is a continuation of the prolonged struggle waged by the Chinese Communist Party and the masses of revolutionary people under its leadership against the Kuomintang reactionaries, a continuation of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie." (Peking Review, No. 43, Oct. 25, 1968.)

This official version bears little resemblance to the truth. The "cultural revolution" is not a "political revolution" for the promotion of workers democracy; it was not made "under the conditions of socialism"; it was not undertaken by the proletariat as the continuation of its struggle against the bourgeoisie. The suggestion that the opposition, which was denied the most elementary rights of proletarian democracy, represented the "Kuomintang reactionaries" is a slander.

The "cultural revolution" represented a phase of sharp public conflict in an inter-bureaucratic struggle between divergent tendencies in the topmost circles of the Chinese Communist party leadership which eventually affected every sector of Chinese society. It constituted the greatest single crisis experienced by the bureaucratic regime since its establishment.

establishment and expresses an important weakening of that bureaucratic regime,

OriginalProposed Amendments

The Chinese People's Republic has registered major accomplishments and made remarkable advances in many fields since the military victory over the Kuomintang in 1949, especially when measured against the relative stagnation of such colonial countries as India, Indonesia and Brazil where capitalism has not been overthrown. However, the authoritarian methods practiced by the Maoist command have grievously hampered solving the colossal problems of economic, social, political and cultural development confronting so backward a country as China with its huge population.

The period of intensified difficulties goes back to the damage done to Chinese agriculture and economy during the Great Leap Forward and the 1959-61 near-famine period.

The difficulties at home have been aggravated by the deterioration of Peking's international position due to Mao's foreign policy. This policy, in essence, expresses the narrow national interests of the ruling bureaucracy in China. It has oscillated between opportunism and ultraleftism or combinations of both.

One of the worst setbacks was the break with the Soviet Union. While major responsibility for this lies with the bureaucratic rulers in Moscow, who in the late fifties denied the Chinese government access to nuclear weapons and cut off economic aid, the initiative in extending the rift to the governmental level was taken by Peking.

Moreover, Mao's ultimatism alienated the powerful support and sympathy among the people of other workers states and the ranks of other Communist parties which China had at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Mao's unwillingness or incapacity to promulgate a united front with Moscow served to encourage the expansion of U.S. intervention in Vietnam and a mounting militant danger for China despite the nuclear deterrents which were developed at staggering cost to the Chinese economy.

both as the result of its inner contradictions and of a widespread mobilization of the masses.

2. The sharpness of the innerbureaucratic struggle in China, and the large-scale intervention of the masses in that struggle, can only be understood against the background of objective contradictions and problems which accumulated, since the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties, a growing trend of conflicts in Chinese society and a growing discontent among the Chinese masses.

However, the colossal problems of economic, social, political and cultural development confronting so backward a country as China, with its huge population, were far from having been solved, and the authoritarian methods practiced by the Maoist leadership have in addition seriously hampered the working out of such solutions.

The main contradictions which the People's Republic of China had to face during the last decade were the following ones:

(a) The contradiction between the rate of growth of the economy, which was still too low, and the rate of growth of the population, which threatened to bring to a near standstill the annual rate of growth per capita real consumption.

(b) The contradiction between the objective necessity to socialize the surplus product of agriculture, for purposes of accelerated economic and industrial development, and the political need to achieve this socialization with the approval of the majority of the peasantry.

(c) The contradiction between the objective necessity to interest materially the bulk of the poor and middle peasantry in increasing agricultural production, and the inevitable tendency to increased inequality and private accumulation which results from these "material incentives."

(d) The contradiction between the general low level of consumption of the mass of the people and the increasing bureaucratic privileges appropriated by the ruling strata in the fifties, and even the early sixties, under conditions of great hardship for the mass of the population.

(e) The contradiction between the objective needs for accelerated industrialization created by the Kremlin's sudden and

brutal economic blockade of China.

(f) The contradiction between the rapid expansion of literacy and the increase in general level of education of the Chinese youth at the one hand, and the still relatively low number of skilled jobs available in China.

All these contradictions have been intensified by the damage done to Chinese agriculture and economy during the second phase of the Great Leap Forward and the 1959-61 near-famine period. They created an explosive situation in the country, in which a process of political differentiation and increased political activity of the masses became possible. In this situation, conditions for a genuine political revolution against the ruling bureaucracy matured. The "cultural revolution" constitutes objectively an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy.

3. Some of the exploding social contradictions accumulated in China during the last decade would have manifested themselves, whatever would have been the inner and outer conditions of the country and the nature of the leadership. Others were greatly sharpened by the autocratic and paternalistic nature of that leadership. All were heavily increased by the sudden isolation into which the People's Republic of China was precipitated in the late fifties, by the Kremlin's sudden suppression of all economic and military assistance to China.

This criminal act by the Soviet bureaucracy, extending to state level the factional struggle between that bureaucracy and the Chinese CP inside the world Communist movement, was a stab in the back of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese people, at the very moment when they were confronted with near-famine at home and increased aggressive pressure from U.S. imperialism abroad. It lies at the door of the Kremlin the historic responsibility for breaking up the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the advantages which imperialism could draw from this breakup.

The leadership of the Chinese CP, educated in the Stalinist school, has always accepted the theory of "building socialism in one country." However, in the fifties, the importance of the help which the other workers states could give to the economic growth and the military defense of the P.R. of China, made the dangerous implications of that theory inside China less important than in the USSR in the late twenties and the thirties (its international implications detrimental to world revolution continued to manifest themselves even then). The reversal of the Maoist leadership to a policy of "self-

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reliance" and large-scale economic autarchy and self-sufficiency is only a rationalization of the consequences of the Kremlin's blockade and the tremendous burden imposed on China by the need to develop its own nuclear weapons, given the refusal of the Soviet bureaucracy to assist it on this field.

The more radical line pursued by the Chinese leadership towards world revolutionary developments since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict which, on several important questions, brought it nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism (an analysis confirmed in 1968 by Peking's attitude, in contrast to the Kremlin's, towards the May revolution in France, the prerevolutionary struggles in India, the Mexican students' struggles and the rising political revolution in the CSSR leading to the Warsaw Pact countries' occupation of Czechoslovakia), reflects both the specific relationship of imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy towards the P.R. of China, and the objective impact of the rising tide of world revolution on the Chinese masses.

It is however also true that the bureaucratic character of the Mao faction have added to the international isolation of the P.R. of China and increased the contradictions and political conflicts inside the CP of China.

Although Peking maintained its resolution to defend the USSR against imperialism and the Kremlin failed to reiterate similar assurances to the P.R. of China, Mao failed to promote a consistent policy of anti-imperialist united front in Vietnam, thereby harming the defense of the Vietnamese revolution and the political influence of the CP of China in the world Communist movement.

In place of consistent development of the world revolution, which could have brought new socialist allies into being and carried the struggle for socialism into the main strongholds of the capitalist system, Mao followed a policy of collaborating with the colonial bourgeoisie, as in Pakistan.

in several countries

This helped prepare for the catastrophe in Indonesia, the worst defeat suffered by the world revolution since Stalin permitted Hitler to come to power without a struggle. The development of the cult of Mao, the glorification of Stalin, and opposition to de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union crippled the defense of the Chinese revolution in other lands, reduced Peking's prestige and influence to abysmal levels, and gravely injured the cause of socialism internationally.

The bankruptcy of this foreign policy became glaringly clear when, after deposing Liu Shao-chi as a "lackey of imperialism, modern revisionism and the Kuomintang reac-

It can even not be excluded that a change of line of U.S. imperialism towards China would lead to a significant modification of revolutionary militancy advised by

tionaries," Mao offered "peaceful coexistence" to the Nixon administration.

the Chinese leadership to its followers abroad -- a normalization of relations at state level with the USA being in itself of course not reprehensible.

The disasters in foreign affairs heightened the stresses and strains created by the sharpened tensions within Chinese society between the different layers of the peasantry as well as between the peasantry and the state, and between the working class, the student youth, the intellectuals and the bureaucracy in the urban centers. These multiple pressures generated deep differences on domestic and foreign policy in the leadership of the party, government and armed forces. The wisdom of Mao's past decisions and his omniscience came under increasing questioning.

setbacks

The high officials around Liu apparently sought to close ranks against Mao following the disastrous results of the Great Leap Forward. Liu and his close associates took fright at the appalling consequences of this adventure, counseled retreat, and succeeded in switching over to a more prudent economic course. During this readjustment, the Liu grouping took control of the party apparatus and pushed Mao to one side. Their aim, evidently, was to take this erratic pilot away from the helm and reduce his status to that of a figurehead while utilizing his prestige to lend maximum authority to their decisions and course of action. Thus they assiduously protected his public reputation for infallibility, a policy that facilitated a comeback for Mao.

SHIFT These paragraphs to Page 6

him

By 1965 Mao felt that he was in position to break Liu's hold upon the regime and regain his lost supremacy. By exploiting his immense prestige, by maneuvering between the diverse tendencies and cutting them down one after another, by slandering Liu and his men through a relentless propaganda campaign, Mao succeeded in isolating them and eroding their bases of support among the masses, in the party, the army and the provinces and completing their downfall.

Because of the fragmentary, contradictory and unconfirmed nature of the information available, it is difficult and hazardous to attempt a precise delineation of either the evolution or content of these disagreements. The available evidence indicates that a number of oppositional tendencies were involved. The Maoist machine has not permitted their spokesmen -- or they have not dared or cared -- to state their positions or platforms publicly, frankly or fully.

the disagreements inside the leadership of the CP of China.

The voluminous Maoist polemics, filled with self-contradictions, present obviously falsified accounts and distorted interpretations of the opinions of their opponents and critics. It is, for example, incredible that the head of state Liu Shao-chi, the mayor of Peking Peng Chen and other Political Bureau members such as Teng

Hsiao-peng and Tao Chu (the leading Chinese Communists most publicly identified with the Sino-Soviet clashes), the deposed military leaders, the better-known disgraced Communist intellectuals, and other alleged "renegades, enemy agents or counterrevolutionary revisionists" conspired or aspired to bring back capitalism on behalf of "the imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries."

Even though the roots, history and specific character of the differences remain obscure and unverified, the consequences of the conflicts they precipitated are clear. The central leading team has been broken up. A period of uncertainty as to the eventual composition and orientation of China's leadership has now opened. Great new forces have been set in motion.

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The objective basis of this success lies in Mao's capacity to mobilize larger masses, especially of the youth, and to exploit the hatred which had been accumulated in the people against the bureaucracy as a whole. The Liu faction was paralyzed by sticking to the bureaucratic rules and by its inability to question the Mao myth, which it had itself largely contributed to create.

The factional warfare which burst forth in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy passed beyond the confines of the ruling circles in the middle of 1966 after the showdown in the eleventh Central Committee plenum of early August which adopted the 16-point decision on the "cultural revolution." In their maneuvers, they sought support among layers extending far outside the

party. A social upheaval was touched off. This unfolded in successive waves, starting with the mustering of the student youth organized from above in the Red Guards, spreading to the industrial workers in the big cities during December 1966-January 1967, stirring up parts of the peasantry, and seeping into the armed forces.

These interlinked commotions drastically upset the equilibrium of the bureaucratic regime. Despite the present victory of Mao's faction, the turbulent events have weakened its position and power. It will not be able to regain the prestige and stability enjoyed before Mao launched the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." The internecine struggles and the accompanying Maoist propaganda have served to generate new revolutionary energies within the youth and the vanguard elements among the working masses which will not be easily or quickly subdued.

The real situation in China is quite different from the simplistic interpretations offered by various circles. Mao's supporters, and those who take his propaganda at face value, claim that he is promoting an antibureaucratic political revolution against agents of the class enemy, a revolution which aims at and is effectively realizing a wider democracy for the popular masses.

This flies in the face of obvious facts. The authoritarian manner in which the "cultural revolution" was launched, conducted, guided and concluded; the suppression of dissenters, coupled with the conscienceless deformation of the views of the anti-Mao tendencies; the outrageous cult of Mao; the absence of elections and democratic institutions controlled by the workers and peasants; the role of the army under Lin Piao as ultimate authority -- all testify to the antidemocratic characteristics and direction of the political course taken by the Maoist faction, which has dwindled down to a small core of the old leadership.

increased authority of the army under Lin Piao -- all testify to the bureaucratic

Likewise in error are those who view Mao's present position as nothing but a replica of Stalin's tyrannical personal dictatorship. While the bureaucratic ruling castes of the USSR and China have much in common, there are profound differences between the historical situation which enabled Stalin to consolidate his power and the international and domestic context in which Mao advanced the slogan of "seizure of power" by the Red Guards. In China today, the mobilizations of the masses under the impetus of the upheaval, limited and episodic as they have been, have altered the relationship of forces between the bureaucracy and the people to the advantage of the latter. The movement of the masses weakened the bureaucratic regime. This outcome differs from Stalin's rise during the late twenties and early thirties when the masses were crushed and beheaded and fell into a state of unrelieved political passivity which did not ap-

preciably change until after Stalin's death.

The triumph of Mao's faction has by no means eradicated the power of the diversified opposition. Resisters of all sorts remain deeply entrenched in the party, the unions, the army, the universities, the regional committees, the provincial governments, the state apparatus, and in the countryside.

As against this, however, the army, under Lin Piao, Mao's new heir apparent and chief lieutenant, has gained greatly in political weight. By virtue of its interventions in the conflicts between the contending bureaucratic factions and between the masses in motion and the regime, the army -- at the expense of the leading role of the party -- has become the mainstay of Mao's rulership, the chief arbiter and principal centralizing force in the country. This is one of the most dangerous consequences of

the "cultural revolution." However much the military high command has been shaken and its leadership divided over the past period, an ominous pattern has been set for the future.

The "cultural revolution" was prepared and launched by Mao and his liegemen to eliminate the most irritating and persistent critics of his domestic and foreign policy, to give a free hand to his pared-down faction in the top leadership, and, by way of concession to the masses, to curb the worst abuses of the bureaucratic overlords he had himself trained, encouraged and shielded. Having been placed in a minority in the Political Bureau, Mao was obliged to take the risk of bypassing the official cadres of the party and state apparatus where his opponents were entrenched, going over their heads, and mobilizing the students of the universities and high schools as the instrument to initiate his coup d'etat against the majority leadership.

However, Mao tends to reduce again this great weight gained by the army during the previous period, by putting the emphasis on the reconstruction of the party as the mainstay of the regime and the necessity of a single central leadership for all power apparatuses.

6.

took

reestablish his control over the country.

Throughout its course, the Red Guard movement was highly contradictory. Unlike the rebellious student movements in the West, it was initiated from the very summit of state power. It did not have to engage in a "confrontation" with either the police or the armed forces. It operated in collaboration with them or with their blessing. The approbation of the country's living deity helped direct the energies of the Red Guard movement along the course selected for it, so that even in its rebellion against the bureaucratic authority it did not transcend the broad limitations set by the supreme bureaucrat.

stage.

except in its initial

The tendency of the Red Guards toward conformism could be observed at first hand in the West when the Chinese students studying abroad were recalled (not to be replaced to this day). Some of these unfortunates went to extraordinary lengths to arrive home as bandaged heroes, victims of either the Western police or the Khrushchevist bureaucracy.

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The excursions of roaming bands of youth, numbering in the millions, were fostered and financed by the state, either directly or indirectly. Besides facilitating the development of the Red Guard movement in this way, Mao used even stronger means to force its pace of growth. The schools were shut down by decree, China's entire educational system being dealt a blow of immense proportions, the effects of which will be felt for a long time to come.

The fact that the Red Guard movement was initiated from above and not by the youth themselves greatly facilitated the efforts of other sectors of the bureaucracy to counter Mao's factional action by setting up Red Guard groups under their own auspices. Since all the groups were formed under the guise of carrying out Mao's directives and Mao's "thought," the confusion was immense. Nevertheless many of the groups became differentiated sufficiently in their interpretations of Mao's doctrines to come to blows and worse.

Mao's "thought," it was difficult for broader masses to understand their political differences.

Where civil strife reached proportions bordering on civil war, whether through excesses of the Red Guards or through their incapacity to actually "seize power" for Mao in areas where opposing forces were strongly entrenched, the army moved in. Thus behind the Red Guard movement stood the army as the final authority, sometimes instigating the bands of youth, at other times restraining them or even reversing what they had done.

differences among
manipulating

It would be a mistake, nonetheless, to view the Red Guard movement as merely a pliant instrument of factional politics in the domestic strife that featured the "cultural revolution." The Chinese student youth had many grievances comparable to those of youth in other lands today. These included social discrimination in the selection of the student body, inadequate living quarters, lack of campus autonomy, and scant opportunities after graduation. They resented haughty and uncontrolled bureaucratic authority; they wanted greater democracy; they wanted a political revolution to open the road to socialist democracy; they identified their fate with that of the world revolution.

This explains why Mao had such difficulty retaining control of the Red Guard movement and curbing it once it had served the main purposes he envisioned. The Red Guard movement acquired a logic of its own.

Roaming the countryside on their own, engaging in actions of a violent nature against echelons of the bureaucracy, millions of youth gained in self-confidence and boldness. The most unmanageable of these elements passed beyond the specific objectives set for them by their bureaucratic patrons and even collided with them. Their tendency to move in the direction of critical thought and independent political action was observable in many of the wall posters and mimeographed or print-

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ed publications put out by the Red Guards and in some of the "seizures of power" in which they engaged. The movement became so dangerous to Mao's objectives that he finally found it advisable to demobilize the Red Guards and send them back to the classrooms or the countryside for labor.

However, ferment persists among them. The most advanced and revolutionary-minded members of this new generation, who received their political baptism in the "cultural revolution," may later detonate further mass actions against the Chinese bureaucracy as a whole, including the Maoist victors.

Of greater significance than the Red Guard demonstrations was their sequel when the proletarian masses were drawn into the expanding struggle from December 1966 through February 1967. Taking advantage of the splits among the contending factions on top and spurred into action by one or another of them, sectors of the work force began to put forward their own economic and social demands and move along independent lines. This action flared into general strikes in transportation and many plants in Shanghai, Nanking, and other industrial centers.

The movement from below, which in its further development would have threatened the control of the Maoist leadership, was stopped short by combined methods of manipulation and repression. The brevity of the massive strikes does not diminish their historic import. They signaled the end of political apathy among the industrial workers and the resumption of their autonomous action.

The Maoist press depicts the "cultural revolution" as a clear-cut class conflict between staunch defenders of socialism and the proletariat under "the wise leadership of our great leader Chairman Mao," and "a bunch of counterrevolutionary revisionists" and "representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and various spheres of culture" in order, when conditions are ripe, to "seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie."

Actually, an assortment of political currents holding different views and oriented in various directions have emerged from the disintegration of the formally monolithic bureaucracy and the turmoil of the "cultural revolution." Some of the features of these currents are distinguishable despite the concern of all of them to wear the same uniform of "Mao's Thought."

The two principal groupings vying for supremacy in the party, state apparatus and the army centered around Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. On the fringes of these two groupings stand oppositional tendencies of rightist or leftist coloration.

Neither of the chief factions contending for supremacy within the Chinese Communist bureaucracy is striving for socialist democracy or has a program of revolutionary policies at home and abroad. By Marxist standards, neither of the chief factions deserves political support against its rival. From the available information -- and it is admittedly scanty and inadequate -- neither faction can be judged to be more progressive than the other.

actually
genuine

As long as Liu's group retained supremacy it practiced the abominable customs of bureaucratic command learned in the school of Stalinism. Its doctrines and practices were indistinguishable from those of the previous period when Mao was in direct control. The pent-up hatred among the youth, the workers and peasants enabled Mao to arouse these forces against the bureaucratic majority without much trouble.

While the Mao faction has issued calls for rebellion and appeals to the initiative of the masses, its deeds do not harmonize with its words. Mao's objective was to regain supremacy for his faction and line in the bureaucracy, not overthrow the bureaucracy. This explains why he followed the Stalinist methods of slander, physical violence and the fostering of cults in his struggle and strictly limited his appeals to the masses. Whenever and wherever any segment of the people, whether among the youth, the proletariat, the peasantry or the intellectuals, has showed signs of slipping away from domination and direction by Mao to act on its own account, it has been restrained and called to order, sometimes by repressive measures.

The promise held out in section 9 of the original 16-point program in the official declaration of the "cultural revolution," adopted by the August 1966 Central Committee plenum, of "a system of general elections, like that of the Paris Commune," which would usher in an extensive democracy, sounds like a mockery today. Not only have no free general elections been held but the very idea is now scoffed at ("Blind faith in elections is also a form of conservative thinking.") such

Instead of instituting an expanded workers democracy on the model of the Paris Commune, Mao has reorganized the bureaucratic regime under the auspices of "the triple alliance," regulated by the army and presided over by that part of the cadres loyal to his faction. The "revolutionary committees" set up during the "cultural revolution" have not been elected by the working masses themselves and kept under their surveillance by measures of democratic control but have been constituted of individuals handpicked by the authorities.

by compromise between contending factions under the supervision of the Mao-Lin Piao hard core.

There have been reports of elements on the left flanks of the contending top factions, both among Mao's followers and

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among the workers and intellectuals sympathetic to Liu and other disgraced leaders, who have revolutionary ideas and inclinations and who could form the nuclei of a genuinely antibureaucratic opposition. These revolutionists deserve international support. However, under current conditions, it is extremely difficult for such dispersed left Communists to come together, to communicate with one another, to work out a common program, select leaders, and undertake a consistent line of organized activity.

The most ironic aspect of the vaunted Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is the damage it has inflicted upon the cultural life of China. The witch-hunt and persecution of intellectuals, the stifling of discussion and the bridling of free inquiry; the closing down of the universities and high schools for almost two years; the demand that all fields of creative and artistic endeavor submit to the arbitrary specifications laid down by state and party authorities; the universal chanting of obligatory phrases to Mao Tse-tung in the style of a primitive religion creates an atmosphere completely inimical to the development of a humanistic culture permeated with the ideals and critical thought of socialist liberation. Cultural creativity and activity must wither under conformism and regimentation of thought where the expression of dissenting views on all issues of concern to the nation are tabooed and penalized.

The grotesque cult of Mao, who has been elevated like Stalin before him to the height of a semicelestial being with powers bordering on the supernatural, is utterly antipathetic to the critical spirit of Marxism and the development of a socialist culture. Some 3.4 billion sets of Chairman Mao's writings and reproductions of his portrait have been issued during the "cultural revolution" and his name is invoked about five million times a day on the air. Ludicrous and repulsive as this after the lessons of the adulation accorded to Stalin, the deification of Mao serves a practical political function. The reverence for Mao among the masses, serving as an opiate of the people, is an indispensable source of stability for the Chinese bureaucracy. His disappearance from the scene will precipitate a problem of succession more perilous for the present regime than was the death of Stalin for the Soviet bureaucracy.

The Maoists accuse their adversaries of "revisionism." But the very arguments they invoke to justify their current course show that they are even more guilty than their opponents of blatantly revising a number of the basic tenets of Marxism.

8.

as guilty as

(1) In countries that have overthrown the bourgeoisie and abolished private ownership of the means of production, they assert that capitalism can be restored by gradual and peaceful processes through machinations

and false policies of one or another tendency in the leadership of the Communist parties. This discards or disregards the Marxist theory of the state which asserts that such fundamental changes cannot be accomplished either gradually or peacefully.

(2) They identify the bureaucratic degeneration of the revolution with capitalist restoration. In doing this, the Maoists lapse into an extreme voluntarism, enormously exaggerating the social weight of ideology. Mao locates the chief cause of the danger of bureaucratic degeneration and capitalist restoration, not in the material foundations of the socio-economic order, but in the realm of ideology. He proclaims that if revisionism is not rooted out on the theoretical, scientific, artistic and literary levels, it will inevitably lead to the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Marxists have never believed that the ideas of those reactionary classes which have lost economic and political power as the result of a social revolution are capable of gradually changing the class nature and structure of the state. A colossal counterrevolution of this kind could occur only through a civil war between the former possessing classes and the toiling masses in which the masses were crushed; or through the hypothetical generation of a new bourgeoisie which became strong enough economically to launch a civil war and topple the workers state. This has not happened, and it is far from happening, not only in China but in other workers states whose leaderships are at odds with Peking, whatever the incipient tendencies may be in these countries in the direction of capitalism.

(3) No less voluntaristic is the Maoist belief that incessant appeals to the spirit of sacrifice, the idealism and enthusiasm of the toiling masses can in and of themselves suffice to surmount the immensely difficult problems arising from the inadequate development of the productive forces in China during the transition from capitalism to socialism.

(4) In defiance of the historical lessons drawn by Lenin State and Revolution, the Maoists proclaim that in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism the class struggle is bound to intensify and not diminish, and can even go on for hundreds of years. This "theory" serves to justify intensifications of the role of the state as a repressive instrument. The state, instead of withering away under socialism as Engels forecast, will endure for an indefinite period, if Mao is correct. Thus a "theoretical" excuse is provided for the worst bureaucratic excesses and abuses of power.

(5) The strategy of world revolution expounded by Mao and Lin Piao extols the insurrectionary movements of the peasantry in the backward colonial areas and systematic-

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ally underrates or dismisses the key role which the industrial working class in the advanced countries must play in overthrowing the power of imperialism and helping to create the new socialist society.

The "cultural revolution" has given widespread currency to the idea that a workers state can become subjected to deformation and degeneration after the conquest of power, an idea that was previously propagated only by the world Trotskyist movement. Coming after the antibureaucratic campaigns in Yugoslavia and Cuba, the Maoist propaganda on this point, distorted though it is, has focused attention upon one of the most crucial problems confronting a victorious socialist revolution: how to protect and promote workers democracy.

The need for a political revolution where state power has been usurped by a bureaucracy and all avenues of democratic control have been closed to the masses has been made clearer and more understandable to broad sections of the international Communist movement and the revolutionary vanguard. This lesson has been reinforced by the abrupt and brutal halting of the drive toward democratization in Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the Soviet occupation.

If the "cultural revolution" has helped popularize and win acceptance of the notion of political revolution in the bureaucratized workers states, its course and outcome under the tutelage of Mao Tse-tung demonstrates that the methods pursued by his faction leads to the opposite result. It is impossible to eradicate bureaucracy by bureaucratic means. The "cultural revolution" has ended in the constriction of democracy and the fortification of the positions of one faction of the bureaucracy against its rivals rather than the expansion and deepening of decision-making powers by the masses.

There is no other road for effective struggle against the bureaucratic degeneration of the revolution and the authoritarian regimes it spawns than the program outlined by Lenin and Trotsky; that is, the consolidation and institutionalization of workers power on the basis of democratically elected councils, the widest proletarian democracy, the right of various socialist tendencies and parties to exist legally within that constitutional framework, the limitation and progressive abolition of inequality in remuneration, the management of the economy by the workers themselves, the planned development of the productive forces, and the international extension of the revolution, above all, to the centers of imperialism.

Proposed Amendments

9.

The "cultural revolution" has ended in an attempt to stop the mass movement and to restore a new form of bureaucratic rule, under the guise of the "triple alliance," instead of the rule of the old party and state bureaucracy which had, in its majority, supported Liu. This "triple alliance" is in reality a compromise between the Maoist faction and parts of the old majority faction, compromise initiated when the masses started to intervene autonomously into the struggle and thereby threatened the whole bureaucratic rule.

* * *

The position of the Fourth International on the Chinese revolution, which has been set forth in numerous documents and declarations in recent years, can be summarized as follows:

The Fourth International has been a firm supporter of the socialist revolution in China from its beginning. Its partisans within China and throughout the world stand for the unconditional defense of the People's Republic of China against military attack by U.S. imperialism or any of its vassal states.

The Fourth International holds the Kremlin leadership primarily responsible for the Sino-Soviet split, condemns its vengeful withdrawal of economic aid from China, and its continued diplomatic deals with Washington, Paris, New Delhi and other bourgeois governments against the People's Republic of China.

At the same time, the Fourth International criticizes the ultrasectarian attitude and bitter-end factionalism exhibited by Peking in its relations with other workers states that do not fully endorse its policies. Especially harmful has been its stubborn refusal to propose or participate in joint action with the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Communist countries against U.S. intervention in Vietnam because of political disagreements with them.

10.

them, although some practical agreements on military assistance to Vietnam were finally concluded.

While recognizing that for its own reasons Peking often pursues a more aggressive diplomatic policy than Moscow, the Fourth International also criticizes the opportunism of the Chinese Communist leadership. In seeking to gain influence in the colonial world, Peking uses a language that is strongly anti-imperialist. It has extended material aid to guerrilla forces as well as countries like Tanzania, thus helping to create an image far to the left of Moscow. Nevertheless, Peking's basic policy, as reiterated many times by its leaders and voiced once again upon the inauguration of the Nixon administration, has been "peaceful coexistence" with U.S. imperialism. Out of narrow nationalistic considerations and in line with its doctrine that the revolution must first pass through a bourgeois stage before it can reach the socialist stage, Peking counsels and countenances support to bourgeois governments in Indonesia, Pakistan and other countries, instead of mobilizing the masses for uncompromising struggle against the neocolonial regimes.

advocates a more militant line to its followers abroad
bureaucratic centrism

It has extended material aid to guerrilla forces. This has not only created an image far to the left of Moscow but also objectively favored anti-imperialist struggles in various parts of the world, especially Southeast Asia, the Arab countries and Africa. Likewise, the sharp campaign which Peking unleashed against the right-wing opportunist line of the CF's following Moscow's lead, and against some key features of the bureaucratic rule in Eastern Europe, has objectively contributed to deepen the world crisis of Stalinism and to facilitate the upsurge of a new youth vanguard the world over. Inside that youth vanguard the general sympathy for China and Maoist criticism of the Kremlin's revisionism remains deep, even if extreme organizational sectarianism and political infantilism has prevented the orthodox Maoists from stabilizing important youth organizations anywhere.

On the other hand, Peking's basic policy has continued to imply support to whatever bourgeois government in a semi-colonial country happens to diplomatically collaborate with China (yesterday Indo-

nesia, today Pakistan and Tanzania), which leads to disastrous results for the revolutionary class struggle in these countries.

The conduct of the Chinese Communist party leadership since it came to power proves that it has not shaken off its Stalinist heritage. These nationalistic-minded bureaucrats do not hesitate to subordinate the welfare of the Chinese masses and the interests of the international revolution and socialism to the protection and promotion of their own power and privileges.

The same features mark the policies and behavior of the Maoist groups that have appeared in numerous countries since the Sino-Soviet split. They mix adventurism with opportunism. They have shown themselves incapable of critical or independent thought along Marxist lines. As a result, most of them display little internal cohesion and tend generally to splinter into warring fragments.

In a few areas newly radicalized youth have mistaken the verbal militancy and activism of the Maoist groups as representing Marxist-Leninism in contrast to the cowardly reformism of the Social Democrats and the opportunism of Moscow and its followers. With experience this initial impression soon fades in most instances. Almost ten years after the Sino-Soviet dispute began, the Maoists have still proved incapable of creating a sizeable youth movement in any country outside of China or providing substantial or lasting programmatic inspiration to the leaderships of the new generation of rebel youth advancing into the political arena on an international scale.

The experience of the "cultural revolution" offers fresh evidence that the crystallized bureaucratic caste headed by Mao cannot be reformed. It will have to be removed from power by the new vanguard of genuine revolutionaries now in the process of formation in China who will come to the head of the aroused and organized masses in the subsequent development of an authentic antibureaucratic revolution. Such a resurgent independent movement will break the grip of the bureaucracy over China's economic, political and cultural life and really expand and consolidate the workers democracy which the "cultural revolution" promised in its propaganda but lamentably failed to deliver.

also in China, the bureaucracy cannot be removed by reforms.

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO DOCUMENTS
ON THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

By Joseph Hansen

[Based on a report and discussion at two meetings of the New York branch of the Socialist Workers Party June 11 and June 18.]

* * *

I assume that all of you have read the two resolutions published in issue No. 5 of the International Information Bulletin and that you may have had some difficulty in determining the meaning of the differences to be found between them.

We had the same problem in the national leadership when we received the suggested list of amendments to the original draft. To facilitate the analysis, we prepared a document with the original resolution running in one column and the suggested amendments in a parallel column. By following this, it was easier for us to see what was involved. It appeared to us that the amendments were of considerable scope, really representing two divergent approaches, and that it would be in the interests of clarification to stand on the original document without making any changes. It would thus be easier to follow the discussion from its very origin.

We intended to distribute the document presenting these dual columns at the world congress. Unfortunately the bundle was forgotten, and that's why we have a number of copies here so that you will be able to follow the columns in the discussion this evening.

Comrade Livio Maitan gave a report on the "Cultural Revolution" on behalf of the majority of the United Secretariat. This will be published in a forthcoming issue of Intercontinental Press, and you will be able to read it and study it there for yourself at your leisure. To forestall any expectations, I should like to mention that Comrade Livio in his report does not deal directly at all with the differences appearing in the two resolutions. This was somewhat of a handicap to clarifying these differences at the world congress.

There were two opposition reports. One was given by Comrade Ross Dowson on behalf of the minority of the United Secretariat. This is the position represented by the resolution in the left-hand column, called "original" in the document which you have before you.

The other opposition report was given by Comrade Peng, who, as you know, was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist movement. Briefly, Comrade Peng

took the position that critical support should have been given to the Liu Shao-chi faction. He was against abstaining in the factional conflict in China. Comrade Peng's report is not yet available. However, his position can easily be studied, having been presented in previous bulletins.

As I mentioned, the two resolutions on which the congress had to decide may appear at first glance to be almost the same. Therefore, to many delegates it seemed rather strange that these two resolutions should be presented as opposing resolutions. Yet the main interest at the congress when this point came up on the agenda centered around the differences between them.

I don't want anyone to think that we regard the original text as something sacred. It has never been our tradition to elevate any text into something un-touchable. And I would say that the comrades of the majority rather took the same attitude toward their version after they had finished working on it. In their view, I imagine, it still remained unsatisfactory. This is indicated by the nature of the report which Comrade Livio Maitan gave, which appeared to me to be intended to fill in the gaps as they saw them and to strengthen the resolution from their point of view.

In considering the resolution -- the original, that is -- it is quite essential to understand its purpose. This was conceived as being, first of all, an assessment of the "Cultural Revolution" in China as an event that had occurred since the previous congress -- no more than that; simply assess the "Cultural Revolution" without taking up the much broader question of the Chinese revolution as a whole. In addition to that, the purpose of the resolution was to set a political line in relation to the "Cultural Revolution," to the factions involved in the struggle in the "Cultural Revolution," and to set a political line in relation to the Maoist tendency internationally.

We began with the assumption that it had been recognized by our movement that a hardened bureaucratic caste and a corresponding regime exist in China and that the "Cultural Revolution" provided incontrovertible evidence of the accuracy of this estimate.

The "Cultural Revolution" did not lead to any greater proletarian democracy in China. It did not lead to any greater control by the masses of the regime in China. And the main strategic objective in

the resolution as we prepared it was a political revolution. In the process of advancing this aim, our position was that it was inadvisable to support either the Mao faction or the Liu Shao-chi faction.

Thus, the resolution was intended to serve a rather narrow function, that is, to make a political delineation between Trotskyism and Maoism.

The sharpness of tone in the resolution was intended for a specific purpose. That is, to set a general attitude, a general political way of looking at the Maoists and their position. It was not intended to be a balance sheet of the Chinese revolution, a much more ambitious project. It did not attempt to probe the origins of the "Cultural Revolution" in detail, because in our opinion there is not yet sufficient factual material to enable us to do that satisfactorily. There are very few documents available in China or abroad presenting accurate, detailed information on the positions of the different contending forces, what their origin was, and how they developed.

And the original resolution did not attempt to forecast the ultimate consequences of the "Cultural Revolution." That's rather difficult, and rather hazardous in the absence of sufficient material to determine the exact origin and development and relationship of forces in China.

In short, the original resolution was intended to be strictly conjunctural. It was intended simply to provide a guiding line for the immediate period ahead, following the congress and up to the next congress, which should be held within two years or so.

The original resolution was tied in with what we conceive to be the main task of the international Trotskyist movement in the immediate period ahead, that is, to win leadership among the radicalizing youth, where we find ourselves faced with the challenge of Maoism, which we have to meet in any number of ways, in different areas, including inside the U.S., as you well know. These were the considerations that determined in our thinking the character and limits of the resolution.

At the congress, we discovered that these limitations, which were deliberate ones, met with a good deal of criticism. Various delegates considered this not to be a high-level document. By "high level," they mean a document that covers a wide field, offers an abundance of material, and generally includes a liberal number of footnotes to show that the available printed material in the field has been consulted.

So evidently there were two concepts

at the congress of what a resolution of this nature should seek to accomplish. Some comrades seemed to be of the opinion that the best type of resolution is a "flood" document. We preferred one stripped down to the essence of the question, making it easier to single out those aspects on which one may have a disagreement. The bulky side, in our opinion, is best supplied in signed articles, or statements of an article type, which can be published in conjunction with current events.

So now with these preliminary remarks, what I want to do is take the two documents as presented in the two columns and indicate why we reached certain opinions and conclusions concerning the changes that were made in the original.

The first one, in the first column, is simply one word. The word "Stalinized" has been deleted from the phrase "Stalinized Chinese Communist party."

When I first saw that deletion, I did not immediately hit the ceiling. From an editorial viewpoint, we very often have to take out adjectives, and we're not too concerned about that, because we don't hold adjectives to be sacrosanct. It was only later, as we proceeded studying the changes, that we began to think that possibly there were other reasons than editorial ones for removing this particular word. My first reaction, as I said, was that the comrades thought it might be misunderstood; maybe it could be regarded as an epithet.

But then the question arises, who will object to such an epithet? Why should the leaders of the Chinese CP object to their party being called "Stalinized," when they're very proud of Stalin and their association with him, display portraits of Stalin, hold him almost in equal reverence with Mao himself, and are utterly opposed to de-Stalinization? From their viewpoint, the word "Stalinized" might be taken as a compliment.

Actually, the only people who could really feel uncomfortable about our using the word "Stalinized" in connection with the Chinese Communist party are those who want to support Mao, but who do not want to support him in a package deal that includes Stalin. They're the ones who object to it.

At the congress, this type of objection was not raised very seriously, because it was very hard to maintain that the Maoists would take offense at being called Stalinists, a label they consider to be very apropos.

Several delegates did raise the objection that if we used the word in this particular place it would indicate a cer-

tain concept of the Chinese Communist party when it took power -- that it was Stalinized then. This would then create a great theoretical difficulty, it was maintained, because how can a Stalinized party take power?

It would have been interesting to have had a discussion on this point at the congress, but this did not occur. And so I can only raise certain questions in the light of what was intimated on this point at the congress.

For instance, if you say that the Chinese Communist party was not Stalinized than the opposite conclusion can be drawn, the conclusion that you must say it was revolutionary, since only a revolutionary party can take power. We had some discussion on this question in the SWP, and you will recall that this was essentially the position taken by Arne Swabeck. He eventually came to the position that the Chinese CP could not have come to power unless it was revolutionary. Since it did come to power, it was therefore revolutionary.

The question nevertheless arises, when did it become revolutionary? We know that at one point it was not revolutionary; it was Stalinist. At what point did it change? This is a very crucial question from the viewpoint of theory.

Other questions arise. What was the evidence of this change? What was the point of qualitative change? Answering these doesn't get us out of the woods either, because the same questions must be asked concerning the regime today. Is the regime today a Stalinized regime? If it is not a Stalinized regime, then why should we call for a political revolution?

If it is a Stalinized regime, but was previously revolutionary, when did it become Stalinized? If you hold that the CP was not Stalinist when it took power, but is Stalinist today, the question must be answered, when did it change from being not Stalinist to being Stalinist? What was the point of qualitative change? You have to determine that to adequately complete our theoretical appreciation of the Chinese revolution.

There's still another possibility that can be suggested. That is, you can eliminate the label "Stalinized" or "Stalinism" altogether in reference to the Mao regime. Just not use such words. There are various ways this can be plausibly done.

You can do it, for instance, by saying that Stalinism only applies to the Soviet Union. The difficulty with that is that Stalinism is an international phenomenon -- a well-known international phenomenon.

Or you can take another tack; you can say that Stalinism existed only for a period in the Soviet Union, the period of the purges, the period say from 1934 to 1937. If you do that, then, of course, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the label "Stalinism" is not applicable to China. You can't apply the term Stalinism to China, if it's only applicable to the Soviet Union in the period 1934-37.

But then we run into another problem -- what about the reverence with which Stalin is regarded by the Maoists? How do you explain that? Still more important, what about the business of carrying on Stalinist practices? Of imitating the Stalinist pattern of rule? Of fostering special privileges, however modest the scale, in the Stalinist tradition?

Moreover, if you are to be consistent, then you should say that in the Soviet Union Stalinism ceased to exist after about 1937. It ceased to exist during Stalin's lifetime.

That would confront us with a major problem -- how to explain on the level of theory the continuity of bureaucratic rule in the Soviet Union from that period up to the present time. Not to mention the question of "de-Stalinization."

So you see that if we try to simply eliminate this designation, we create a lot more problems than we evade.

My opinion is that we ought to retain the label, and try to find some other solution.

So much for the first change in the original document.

At the bottom of the same page -- page 1 -- a phrase has been added. The phrase refers to the weakening of the regime owing to its inner contradictions and the mobilization of the masses during the "Cultural Revolution." We have no objection to the statement being included here. The point is made later in the resolution, so it could be argued that it is superfluous to add it here.

On page 2, we come to a rather considerable substitution. The first paragraph of the substitution, which begins with the number 2, is merely introductory. Further down is a list of contradictions, beginning with "a" and ending with "f."

Comrade Livio Maitan's report was devoted almost wholly to proving that these contradictions are real and do exist in China. He cited considerable evidence with regard to this. Now we have no objection to that; as a matter of fact, I think there is nothing wrong in making a list of contradictions like this. In studying the Chinese revolution as a

whole, it is necessary to begin with such a list. But the question remains to be answered: How do they relate to the "Cultural Revolution?"

Comrade Peng made the point, for example, that contradiction "a" -- which deals with the rate of growth of the population in relation to the rate of growth of the economy -- has been true of China for the past 100 years and is also true of some other countries. To include this contradiction in a list offers little to enable us to better understand the specific phenomenon of the "Cultural Revolution." Comrade Peng made a telling criticism, I think.

His criticism is even substantiated by the statement made by the comrades of the majority on page 3 in the paragraph beginning with the number 3: "Some of the exploding social contradictions accumulated in China during the last decade would have manifested themselves, whatever would have been the inner and outer conditions of the country and the nature of the leadership."

If this statement is correct -- and I think that it must be granted that it is correct -- then at least some of the contradictions listed would not enable us to distinguish between developments under the Mao regime and under a regime headed by a Lenin or Trotsky. No matter what the "nature of the leadership," we are told, some of the contradictions listed would have confronted the country. For the sake of clarity, it would have been well if the comrades of the majority had indicated which ones.

Further, on this same point. If some of the contradictions listed by the majority would have "manifested themselves" no matter what the nature of the leadership, they offer no means for making a precise analysis of the "Cultural Revolution," for it follows that the "Cultural Revolution" could have occurred just as well under a Trotsky as under a Mao.

The contradictions listed are, in fact, so general that the comrades of the majority felt compelled to say that they would have manifested themselves no matter what China's general situation might have been both domestically and internationally.

It must be admitted that Comrade Peng put his finger on a considerable weakness in the majority's list of contradictions when he called attention to their extremely abstract nature.

And when you read Comrade Maitan's report, which will soon appear in Inter-continental Press as part of the documents of the world congress, you will be able to see for yourself that with regard to the crucial question of precisely how these general contradictions came to be specifically expressed in the "Cultural Revolution," he has nothing to say. There is a gap in his report precisely where concreteness is demanded.

To fill that gap it is necessary to consider at least five more contradictions which were apparently overlooked by the comrades of the majority.

Let me list them:

1. The contradiction between the narrow national interests of the bureaucracy and the international interests of the Chinese revolution.

Understanding this contradiction is basic to understanding the foreign policy followed by Mao and the possible criticisms of it in China from various quarters that may have helped precipitate the intense factional dispute which Mao called the "Cultural Revolution."

2. The contradiction between the objective national need to overhaul policies and leaders from top to bottom, that is, to break up the bureaucratic crust, and the need felt by this social layer to retain its position, its power, and its special privileges.

Understanding this contradiction is basic to understanding the specific disputes in the "Cultural Revolution," whether they involved the masses against the bureaucracy as a whole, or sectors of the bureaucracy in dispute with each other, or combinations of these.

3. The contradiction between the professed aims of the Great Leap Forward and its actual catastrophic results.

Understanding this contradiction is basic to understanding the references among the contending forces in the "Cultural Revolution" to the period of the Great Leap Forward. In the minds of all the politically conscious layers in China, the Great Leap Forward remains the outstanding example of the ill-advised and costly ventures which the regime is capable of plunging the entire country into.

4. The contradiction between the need for a thoroughgoing criticism of the Great Leap Forward and Mao's need to foster, maintain, and expand the cult of his personality and Thought.

Understanding this contradiction is basic to understanding the obscure disputes, formation of cliques, tendencies, and undeclared factions that culminated in the "Cultural Revolution."

5. The contradiction between the need for de-Stalinization and Mao's need to maintain the prestige of having been right in hailing and following Stalin and in reproducing in China the Stalinist pattern of rule.

Understanding this contradiction is basic to understanding why the "Cultural Revolution" ended in the monstrous growth of the Mao cult instead of the establishment of any institutions of proletarian democracy let alone elections on the model of the Paris Commune as prom-

ised by Mao at the beginning.

No doubt other contradictions of a similar nature could be added, but these should be sufficient to indicate the point.

If it were possible to obtain concrete material on these five contradictions, we could at once gain a very clear understanding of the specific origins of the "Cultural Revolution," its specific course and outcome, and the specific stands of the warring factions. But it is precisely here that the Mao regime has made it most difficult to obtain the facts required. In this way, we have mute testimony on how real these contradictions are and how sensitive the regime is to any probing into them.

Without being able to analyze how these five contradictions were specifically expressed, we are unable to relate the "Cultural Revolution" in a specific way to the very general six contradictions listed by the majority. To deal with the six contradictions in abstraction from the five -- in fact without even mentioning the five -- becomes a barren exercise not without its overtones of scholasticism.

Let me call your attention to an item in the left-hand column on page 2 that was deleted by the comrades of the majority when they substituted their list of general contradictions. This is the sentence in paragraph three from the top which reads, referring to Mao's foreign policy: "This policy, in essence, expresses the narrow national interests of the ruling bureaucracy in China."

We'll come to this point several times -- Mao's foreign policy and its relation to the national interests of the bureaucracy. In our view it is necessary to underline this relationship, whereas the comrades of the majority take a different position. At this point the difference was expressed simply by their removing this particular sentence.

Note the very next sentence: "It has oscillated between opportunism and ultraleftism or combinations of both." I will return to this later, since it came up in the discussion at the congress in another connection. Meanwhile it is worth noting how early we injected the item of the ultraleftism fostered by Mao.

In our opinion, this is one of the most dangerous aspects of Maoism, since it is least understood by the radicalizing youth. One of our main responsibilities is to make it clear to them.

In the next paragraph of the original text on page 2, the point is made about the responsibility for the break

with Moscow. It is clearly stated that the main responsibility lies with Moscow. But it is also pointed out that the Chinese government has some responsibility in the matter; that is, in taking the initiative to deepen the rift.

What has happened in general -- in this substitution on page 2 which continues on page 3 -- is a substitution of general abstract statements of contradictions in place of concrete, specific political characterizations of the policies of the regime.

To continue. On page 3, in the column "Proposed Amendments," we come to the paragraph beginning, "All these contradictions..." In the last part of the paragraph, we read the sentence, "In this situation, conditions for a genuine political revolution against the ruling bureaucracy matured."

We, of course, welcome the decision of the comrades of the majority to adopt the position of calling for a political revolution. It could be said to be one of the positive results of the "Cultural Revolution." Before that they avoided taking a clear position on this question.

Let us take the next sentence: "The 'Cultural Revolution' constitutes objectively an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy." In other words, they are of the opinion that Mao is trying to block a political revolution, which was maturing, and trying to carry out a kind of reform instead.

Now they don't say that this was his intention; they say that this constitutes an attempt "objectively." But this is rather obscure. It leaves us with a great big question, what were Mao's subjective intentions? What were his political aims? What was he trying to do consciously, as a political figure, looking at the forces as they stood in China? This is very important to understanding the reasons for the "Cultural Revolution."

Now I go over to page 4, to the second paragraph in the second column: "The more radical line pursued by the Chinese leadership towards revolutionary developments since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict which, on several important questions, brought it nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism..." Some instances are cited of where this is presumed to be true. This coming nearer the positions of revolutionary Marxism, we are told, "reflects the specific relationship of imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy towards the People's Republic of China, and the objective impact of the

rising tide of world revolution on the Chinese masses."

When we analyze this statement, we run into some interesting things from a general theoretical viewpoint. First, on the statement that the Maoists come nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism. (The reference, of course, is nearer than the Khrushchevists.) If the declarations of the Maoists are placed in a scale and weighed against the declarations of the Khrushchevists, the scale no doubt tips in favor of Peking. But this is so abstract that it can be misleading. It is necessary to distinguish revolutionary verbiage and throw this out, since for purposes of determining which comes "nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism," only those declarations should be considered that are in correspondence with the actions of the regime. These actions in turn must come "nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism" if any validity is to be found in the point.

As soon as we do this, everything becomes more uncertain, or at least more complex. For one thing, the consequences of the actions have to be taken into consideration and also placed in the scales.

How much weight should be given the catastrophic defeat of the Indonesian Communist party in placing this item in the scales? Isaac Deutscher considered the defeat in Indonesia to be comparable to the defeat in Germany in 1933. No doubt he had in mind what the consequences would have been in the world if there had been a victory in Indonesia. While Moscow also bore responsibility, Mao's responsibility was much more direct and decisive. The opportunism of the Kremlin was well-known. But Mao advanced his policies and influence as a revolutionary alternative to the Khrushchevists and their line. It is precisely because of his success in appearing to stand nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism that Mao bears the greater responsibility for the defeat in Indonesia. His guilt is truly colossal and it is out of the question to even raise the question of how "near" he stands to the positions of revolutionary Marxism.

One of the conclusions we ought to draw from this is that the posture of standing nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism can be a deadly trap for those who mistake it for standing within the framework of Marxism.

But if it is necessary to assign different weights to the items that are placed in the hypothetical scale, perhaps it would also be well to examine the scale itself. Is it really adequate to the task?

In my opinion, this way of consid-

ering the policies of the two regimes is altogether too abstract. It leaves out completely the most important item that must be considered if we are really to determine the relationship between the positions of the two regimes and the positions of revolutionary Marxism. That item is, what is their direction of movement?

Let us take Peking, for instance, and the date of 1963, a rather arbitrary date, but one which is convenient inasmuch as that was the time our movement took a formal position on this question at the Reunification Congress, and inasmuch as the comrades of the majority referred to these formulations during the discussion at the congress.

What has been the evolution of the Maoist leadership since 1963? Have they come nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism or have they moved further away? The answer to this is absolutely decisive so far as the immediate point is concerned.

If we judge by Mao's actions and declarations, it is obvious that his own opinion was that the majority leadership of the Chinese Communist party even before 1963 was moving away from Marxist positions. He accused them of having taken the capitalist road. That was why, if we are to believe him, he launched the "Cultural Revolution."

We thus come to the period from the eve of the "Cultural Revolution" to its close. How should we estimate this period? During these years, the cult of Mao reached monstrous proportions; Chinese literature, art and science suffered blows comparable to those in the darkest days of Stalin's rule in the USSR; the educational system was closed down; a murderous, unprincipled factional war was opened up; and the struggle for proletarian democracy in China received fresh blows. Did all this represent a movement on the part of the Mao leadership nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism? Is that how we should estimate the outcome of the "Cultural Revolution"?

It is hardly necessary to debate the question any longer in our movement. The comrades of the majority themselves drew the conclusion that what is now required in China is a political revolution. They could hardly have come to such a conclusion if they had not decided that the Maoist leadership moved further away from the positions of revolutionary Marxism, not nearer.

We are thus led to the conclusion that there must be virtually unanimous agreement in the leadership of the world Trotskyist movement that both Peking and Moscow are moving in a direction which,

in the past six years at least, has taken them further and further away from the positions of revolutionary Marxism. And it can be added that this view is an accurate reflection of the reality.

Consequently, at best, it becomes rather meaningless to try to measure which of them stands nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism. At worst it can be quite dangerous since it can convey the impression to our own ranks that the top leadership of the world Trotskyist movement believes that the Maoist leadership actually stands near to the positions of revolutionary Marxism and not merely relatively nearer in comparison with the Khrushchevists as both of them race away from revolutionary Marxism.

From the methodological point of view it is rather deplorable to rest on the statement made in 1963 without taking into account the direction in which the Maoists have been moving since then. Such an approach is static and not at all dialectical.

It might be argued that it is quite true so far as domestic policy is concerned that the Maoist leadership, like the Khrushchevist leadership, has been moving further and further away from the positions of revolutionary Marxism but that this does not hold true for foreign policy, which is the point under discussion.

But this is hardly tenable either. Such a stand would signify a conviction that there is no relationship between the domestic policy of the Mao regime and its foreign policy, or still worse that its foreign policy is the precise opposite of its domestic policy -- that while moving further and further away from revolutionary Marxist positions domestically, Mao was moving nearer to Marxist positions internationally.

Such a stand would fly in the face of basic Marxist theory which views foreign policy as merely the extension of domestic policy.

Naturally, if anyone can really prove this point, then Marxist theory would have to be reexamined. We suspect, however, that the "proofs" would turn out, on close examination, to be examples of the ultraleftism fostered by the Mao regime in many parts of the world -- instances in which it tries to make its pseudorevolutionary mask look more real.

Ultraleftism is not nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism than rank opportunism. In certain situations ultraleftism can be more dangerous than opportunism because it is less well understood and because it appears to be more revolutionary than opportunism.

Ultraleftism is not always merely a disease of small sectarian groupings separated from the masses and with very little chance of overcoming their isolation. When used by conscious opportunists it should be viewed as preparation for a new opportunist betrayal. An ultraleft turn is very deliberately undertaken by such opportunists in order to undercut a revolutionary opposition or to gain a fresh following to be used for bargaining with reactionary formations. The history of Stalinism provides illuminating examples of this. An ultraleft posture can be extremely dangerous for the revolutionary Marxist movement when it is undertaken by a state power with vast material resources and the prestige of a revolution at its disposal. For our movement, the ultraleftism of the Maoists is a very important question.

The truth of it is that Peking's foreign policy has been oriented to seeking bases of support for the regime in two areas. One is with any national bourgeoisie that cares to enter into a mutually profitable relation with the Mao regime, including the extension of "peaceful coexistence" to domestic class relations. These deals, as we have seen, above all in Indonesia and Pakistan, can reach degrees of opportunism not much different from the opportunism practiced by the Khrushchevists and certainly not different in its disastrous consequences to the revolutionary movement.

The other area where Mao seeks bases of support outside of China is among radicalizing sectors of the population. The Maoists assume an ultraleftist posture which corresponds to the impatience and lack of experience of these sectors, their rejection of the crass opportunism of the Social Democracy and the Kremlin, and their search for an alternative revolutionary leadership and policy.

At the world congress it was implied by some of the comrades who mentioned this point in taking the floor, that if the resolution did not stand on the 1963 statement concerning the Peking leadership being "nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism" then this would signify giving up our position favoring China in the Sino-Soviet conflict. It was even implied that it would signify shifting to the position of supporting Moscow in this conflict. This argument was not very well thought out, in my opinion.

In taking sides in an interbureaucratic dispute like this, we base our estimate on what will best advance the interests of the world revolution. Our stand does not necessarily hinge on the policies advocated and practiced by the two sides, although I will agree that it could be a sufficient reason if one or the other of

the contending parties were actually to begin moving nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism. Unfortunately, in this instance, time and events have shown that neither of them is moving in this direction. Consequently it is necessary to base our stand on other considerations.

While we are dealing with this particular paragraph of the amended draft on page 4, I would like to call your attention to the phrase about "the specific relationship of imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy..."

What this phrase reflects is the opinion that the foreign policy of the Mao regime is in essence determined by the attitude of imperialism, and not by the national interests of the bureaucracy. This is spelled out a little bit more clearly by Comrade Germain in his polemic with Comrade Charlier, which appears in International Information Bulletin No. 8 under the title "An Unacceptable Amendment." This has some interesting ramifications but I will reserve comment on it for the time being as I plan to make a contribution to the Bulletin on that particular exchange of opinion.

And then we come to still another phrase, "the objective impact of the rising tide of the world revolution on the Chinese masses." The meaning of this, if I interpret it correctly, is that the Chinese masses, responsive to the rising tide of the world revolution, exert some kind of pressure on the regime to which the regime in turn responds. This raises a series of questions that ought to be answered. In what way does Mao respond to the pressure of the masses? Through what measures and through what institutions? Or, looking at it from a different angle, through what actions and through what institutions do the masses pass the pressure of the world revolution on to the regime? Democratic ways and means of exerting pressure or control by the masses are missing in China. Other means, such as strikes, demonstrations, and slowdowns are not welcomed, to say the least.

How can the masses even voice their opinions in China? It is true that at a certain stage of the "Cultural Revolution," wall posters were permitted. But this was hardly adequate; it was intended as part of a factional maneuver, and it was soon ended. The truth is that critical thought -- thought responsive to revolutionary developments abroad -- is not allowed in China. Finally, what information do the masses have about events in the world except the information doctored up with Mao Tse-tung Thought that is fed through the Chinese press and radio?

On the same page 4, in passing, note the small addition of the words "in several countries." This was defended at

the congress as being one of the improvements added to the document. From our viewpoint, it watered the document down a bit. Instead of stating that the regime followed a policy of collaborating with the colonial bourgeoisie, the document is changed to read that this policy was followed "in several countries" -- implying that in other places, it was not followed.

It's not a big point, but it's something to be noted. Was the regime doing its best to follow a consistent policy of collaborating with the colonial bourgeoisie? Or did it happen only in several countries because they were inconsistent in following a revolutionary policy? In other words, did Mao follow a revolutionary foreign policy in general, with only some temporary aberrations in several countries? Such a view may stand in back of a small change like this, even though the modification in and of itself is not a great one.

The final fate of this sentence is not without interest in revealing the thinking behind the small insertion of "in several countries." Here is how the paragraph reads that will appear in the version adopted by the majority for publication:

"In place of conducting a policy stimulating a consistent development of the world revolution, which could have brought new socialist allies into being and carried the struggle for socialism into the main strongholds of the capitalist system, the policy led the Maoist tendencies in Pakistan several times to oppose the mass movements that developed there."

If this final version means anything, it means that Peking sought to follow a policy of stimulating the world revolution but did not do so consistently. This inconsistency led the followers of Maoism in Pakistan into the error "several times" of opposing the mass mobilizations that occurred there.

This comes perilously close to permitting the blame for the results of Peking's opportunism in Pakistan to fall on the local lieutenants of the cult instead of the real criminal, Mao. However, they fell into this error only "several times." Next time they may do better.

It should be observed how the original sentence concerning Mao's following a policy of collaborating with the colonial bourgeoisie was finally washed out.

And notice how the logical sequence of the paragraphs has likewise been washed out. For the one paragraph now ends, saying how the Maoist tendencies in Pakistan several times opposed the mass movements there and the next paragraph be-

gins, "This helped prepare the way for the catastrophe in Indonesia..."

I fail to see why this should be listed as an improvement in the document.

This still does not end this point. At the end of the document (fourth paragraph from the end), the comrades of the majority inserted a paragraph which states that Peking's basic policy has continued to "imply" support to whatever bourgeois government in a semicolonial country "happens to diplomatically collaborate with China...which leads to disastrous results for the revolutionary class struggle in these countries."

I suppose this is intended as consolation to the minority. It is nevertheless hard to understand why the comrades of the majority would want to subject the plain, simple paragraph in the original to such torture.

Farther down on page 4, the characterization about Peking's prestige and influence having been reduced to "abysmal levels" has been deleted. Again, this is not much. But, in our opinion, the original statement was accurate, if you compare Peking's present prestige with the colossal prestige it enjoyed at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Naturally, if a better phrase can be found to characterize the decline in Peking's prestige, we are for it. But the comrades of the majority apparently were not interested in measuring whether Peking's prestige was nearer or further than an abysmal level, and so left it rather high.

At the bottom of page 4, we come to an interesting substitution. The original notes that after a big campaign against Liu Shao-chi, in which he was branded as a lackey of imperialism, etc., etc., the regime topped off the campaign by itself offering "peaceful coexistence" to Nixon's administration. This created quite an impact in Washington. A great deal of material appeared in the capitalist press concerning the significance of the move. In our opinion, the move was consistent with the basic policy of the Peking regime, which is to express the narrow national interests of the privileged bureaucracy.

But if you do not hold that view of Peking's foreign policy, then the gesture toward the Nixon administration could appear to be merely an aberration, an aberration in a course that is otherwise more or less revolutionary, an aberration that really ought not to be noticed.

This deletion, consequently, was taken by us as a possible indicator of divergent estimates of the Peking regime.

On page 5, you will note that the word "disasters" has been changed to "setbacks." When an observation was made by Comrade Dowson at the congress concerning the consistency in direction of such changes, the majority comrades pointed out that the word "disasters" was left in other places in the document. Thus it appeared that we were being unreasonable in insisting upon the word "disasters." But we would never fight over a single change like this. What interested us was the pattern revealed by the series of changes.

The next change is the shifting of two entire paragraphs over to page 6. We have no objection to a shift of this nature. The phrase "this erratic pilot" was mentioned at the congress by the comrades of the majority as an instance of where the tone of the document was out of keeping with the seriousness that ought to characterize a resolution of this nature, and which they thought it advisable to delete. We do not insist on any phrase like this but it was hard to understand the objection. What Maoist publication does not hail the great chairman as at least a "pilot" or "helmsman"?

Further down on the same page is another change. We are indifferent to this one since it is required for continuity once the previous paragraph has been shifted.

On page 7 what has been changed is the estimate of the role of the army. The original sentence states that during the "Cultural Revolution" the army under Lin Piao served as the ultimate authority. This was changed to "increased authority of the army under Lin Piao." And the "antidemocratic characteristics" of the leadership was changed to "bureaucratic." In this instance we are indifferent to whether the adjectives "bureaucratic" or "antidemocratic" are used, although we are curious as to why such a change was thought necessary.

The question of the weight of the army came up for some discussion at the congress, although not a great deal. In our opinion, the army was, in fact, the ultimate authority during the "Cultural Revolution." The evidence is abundant showing that in key disputes in a number of different places, the force that played the role of ultimate authority was the army. If the army was not the ultimate authority during the "Cultural Revolution," what force was the ultimate authority? The shattered party? The divided bureaucracy? The chaotic Red Guards?

Of more importance is the role of the army following the "Cultural Revolution." For if the army played the role of ultimate authority during the "Cultural Revolution," as it did, then a certain

precedent has been set that cannot help but have significance for the succeeding period.

So we must ask, just who is the ultimate authority in China today? Is it the party? The youth? The secret police? The unions? The government apparatus? The educational system? The Red Guards? What force in China today constitutes the ultimate authority if not the army under Lin Piao?

It is already possible to trace a certain rise in the role of the army. Let us recall the report that at the October 1968 plenum of the Central Committee, Lin Piao brought in the army to make sure of a majority for Mao. That was the decisive instrument with which Mao won his majority.

One of the consequences was that at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist party, Lin Piao was designated the heir of Mao. This is perfectly consistent with the role played by the army in the previous period, during the "Cultural Revolution." I don't think that Mao utilized the new constitution to designate Lin Piao as his heir simply as a personal favor to a close friend, no matter what the favors Lin Piao may have performed for him. The designation of Lin Piao as heir was made for political reasons.

Why the comrades of the majority insisted on this change becomes all the more obscure in face of the fact that they let the following sentence in the original stand: "By virtue of its interventions in the conflicts between the contending bureaucratic factions and between the masses in motion and the regime, the army -- at the expense of the leading role of the party -- has become the mainstay of Mao's rulership, the chief arbiter and principal centralizing force in the country. This is one of the most dangerous consequences of the 'Cultural Revolution.'" That sentence is to be found in the second paragraph on page 8.

How did the army become the "chief arbiter and principal centralizing force in the country" following the "Cultural Revolution" if during the "Cultural Revolution" it did not serve as the "ultimate authority"? It is difficult to follow the reasoning of the comrades of the majority on this point.

To this should be added the fact that on page 9, in the third paragraph from the top, they left the sentence in that reads: "Thus behind the Red Guard movement stood the army as the final authority, sometimes instigating the bands of youth, at other times restraining them or even reversing what they had done." All they changed in that sentence was the word "instigating." They let the

phrase "final authority" stand.

Yet at the congress, several delegates scored the way original draft has used the phrase "ultimate authority" in characterizing the role of the army during the "Cultural Revolution."

To finish with page 7. Further down, the one word "episodic" has been deleted. In analyzing the mobilizations, we said they were "limited and episodic." The comrades of the majority did not like the word "episodic." This is a question of estimate. It is my impression that the comrades of the majority conceived the mobilizations as being more continuous during the "Cultural Revolution" than we were able to ascertain them as being. To us it appeared that the regime very early sought to reduce the scope of the mobilizations and to keep them under control so as to be able to turn them off when they had served their designated function. Thus while some large mobilizations did occur -- we don't deny that or their importance -- they turned out to be episodic, not continuous on a tremendous scale. The sharpness of the civil strife, which led to considerable bloodshed, particularly as the army moved against the strongholds of the opposing main faction, is another question.

On page 8, we come again to the question of the army. Following the sentence I already quoted concerning the army now being the "chief arbiter and principal centralizing force," a sentence notes the "ominous pattern" that has been set for the future. In place of this, the comrades of the majority substituted the assertion that Mao "tends to reduce again this great weight gained by the army during the previous period, by putting the emphasis on the reconstruction of the party as the mainstay of the regime and the necessity of a single central leadership for all power apparatuses."

We were much more cautious. In our opinion, the sentence they introduced implies confidence that that's what Mao intends to do -- reduce the power of the army. Against that, you've got to weigh his political relations with Lin Piao, particularly his making the head of the army his heir. In any case, we felt it better to be more cautious about Mao projecting a reduction in the role of the army, at least for the time being.

The next change is a small one -- from Mao was "obliged to take" a risk to Mao "took" a risk. The original formulation was consistent with Mao's being in a minority position which thereby obliged him to take a risk in violating the will of the majority. If he was not in a minority, then he would not have been obliged

to take the risk. If he had been in a majority, he could have taken the step without any risk. We wouldn't battle about that change. We just don't understand the reason for insisting on changing a sentence that was logical into one that is somewhat illogical.

At the end of the same paragraph, the phrase about Mao initiating a "coup d'etat against the majority leadership" is replaced by a very mild phrase, "re-establish his control over the country." The original designated very specifically what Mao did. In place of this, an abstract formulation was substituted. This leaves unanswered the question, how did Mao reestablish his control over the majority? Was it through a decision of the majority? Through their democratic assent? Just how did it happen? Our impression was that it was through the use of the army in a very forceful way, and thus constituted a coup d'etat against the majority. That seems accurate whether you are in favor of the coup or against it.

We come to the next change. This involves deletion of the whole bottom part of the column and the top of the column on page 9, several paragraphs dealing with the nature of the Red Guard movement and the nature of its rebellion. We, examining the Red Guard movement, came to the conclusion that in order to understand it better -- particularly its relation to the radicalization of the youth in the Western countries, and in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union -- it was necessary to note how much it was deliberately inspired and fostered and then shut off by the Chinese government.

The tendency exists in certain sectors in talking about the radicalization of the youth on a world scale to cite the Red Guard movement in China as a magnificent example of what has been happening. It is equated with the rebel movement of the youth in the U.S., France, the Soviet Union, and other places.

We think that this is wrong. We recognize that there was a rebel component in the Red Guard movement; but the mobilization as a whole was different from the mobilization in the Western countries in that it was inspired and fostered by the government, and partly financed by the government. This is a very important element in reaching a correct judgment on the nature of the Red Guard movement in China. It requires us to discount that movement rather heavily as a genuinely rebel formation.

Let us recall that where the Red Guards ran into trouble in "seizing power" they were backed by the army. Where they couldn't carry through in the Maoist way, as called for, the army came in behind them and completed the job. In other

places where the Red Guards went too far, the army pulled them back. The army exerted its control in every situation like that.

Finally, we saw that whole vast movement, presumably involving millions upon millions of rebel youth, brought to a halt rather rapidly, and retired from the scene as if they were responsive to orders from above. That isn't a characteristic of a real rebel youth movement. It tends to move in a revolutionary direction despite any promulgations from the Establishment on how they should behave or what they should do.

In our opinion, these were the real rebels in China -- the ones who rebelled against being demobilized. But just who were the rebel contingents? Where are they today? These questions are very difficult to answer in the absence of any information. But this should be borne in mind in considering this movement.

In the deletion at the top of page 9 we run into another question. This is in relation to the school situation. Part of the means used to mobilize these millions of youth in China was to shut down the schools. This facilitated getting them into the streets. The teachers were given other employment or different tasks than educating the youth. What did this do to the Chinese educational system?

Our opinion was that this constituted a blow of immense proportions to China. We made this judgment in light of the fact that besides the arms race in the world today, there is also an educational race.

The educational race between the Soviet Union and the United States is well-known. Quite frequently we see estimates of how it is proceeding, who is ahead, what subjects are receiving the most attention in the curricula. You will remember that for a while there was talk about how much attention was being paid to the teaching of mathematics in the Soviet Union in contrast to the United States. This was held to be an example of how the Soviets were winning the educational race, and that there should be some adjustments in the American system to make it possible to catch up.

We know that in the educational field, Cuba is not doing so badly. They have eliminated illiteracy in Cuba, and they're continuing to turn out cadres in various fields on a stepped-up basis. What about China? Here the educational system was shut down for the duration of the "Cultural Revolution." Shut down.

It could be that there was a national emergency of such immense import

that it required shutting down the schools and utilizing the youth as a factional battering ram. If that was so, then you must admit that even if it was justifiable, some damage was done to the educational system. But the comrades of the majority simply removed this, and put nothing in its place. So we are left with a resolution that says nothing about this important question.

On the same page 9, there are three other changes. In one, the word "confusion" is eliminated and replaced by something else; "excesses" is changed to "differences among"; "instigating" is changed to "manipulating." We have no big argument to make on any of these changes. We simply note that they follow the same general pattern of toning down characterizations of what the Mao faction did in China.

On page 10 there is another deletion of some importance. The original presented the Maoist view of the "Cultural Revolution," then sought to show that this view of the "Cultural Revolution" was not correct, but fraudulent, and that in contrast to the Maoist presentation of the "Cultural Revolution," what was really involved was a multiplicity of warring tendencies -- not just two, but a multiplicity.

This was designed to help lay the basis for rejecting the Maoist claims and for deciding not to support either Mao or Liu Shao-chi. We support a different tendency which, insofar as we can ascertain, does exist in China, is moving towards Trotskyism, and may have conscious Trotskyists within its ranks. This position is developed in the subsequent paragraphs.

I imagine that what the comrades objected to was quoting from Maoist sources to indicate how the Maoists picture the "Cultural Revolution." The phraseology used by the Maoists is not exactly scientific. On the other hand, is there a more accurate way of indicating the picture presented by the Maoists of their "Cultural Revolution?"

On page 11, at the top of the page, two words are added. Again this is a small item that might be presented as purely editorial. The sentence as changed reads: "Neither of the chief factions contending for supremacy within the Chinese Communist bureaucracy is actually striving for socialist democracy or has a program of genuine revolutionary policies at home and abroad."

Those interested in questions of style might observe how an adjective or adverb can alter the meaning of a noun or verb, even though rather subtly. The two chief factions, we might now conclude, could be striving for democracy, could be

striving for revolutionary policies, but from our viewpoint what they are striving for is not genuinely or actually democratic or revolutionary.

Towards the bottom of page 11, the phrase "free general elections" has been changed to "such elections." This, in my opinion, is a good change. I'd accept such a change because the formula originally used could be misinterpreted if you didn't read the whole paragraph carefully. Moreover, it could be torn out of context and an enemy could say, "You see, the Trotskyists are talking about having free general elections in China." What we were really referring to is Mao's promise to have elections on the model of the Paris Commune.

At the bottom of the page, a change has been made in the sentence concerning the composition of the "revolutionary committees" that were set up during the "Cultural Revolution." The original states that the committees were constituted "of individuals handpicked by the authorities." This has been modified to say that they were constituted "by compromise between contending factions, under the supervision of the Mao-Lin Piao hard core."

I really do not know where the comrades of the majority found this kind of information. A compromise suggests that the leaders of the two factions got together, in whatever is the equivalent of a smoke-filled room in China, and made a deal. But there's no evidence that this is what happened. We'll come to this point again.

On page 12, two paragraphs are deleted. The first deals with the damage done to the cultural life of China by the "Cultural Revolution." The other deals with the outcome of the "Cultural Revolution" in bringing to new heights the monstrous cult of Mao.

At the congress, several comrades stated that the resolution ought to say something about the damage done to culture in China by the "Cultural Revolution." None of these comrades appear to have noticed that this point was included in the original resolution and was deleted by the comrades of the majority. It was evidence of a kind to show how difficult the delegates found it to compare the two resolutions. Perhaps some of them did not read the original resolution too carefully; or, if they did, they tended to forget items like this.

In any case, in the final draft, the one to be published, the point is squeezed in as a result of the requests of some of the delegates who favored the majority resolution at the congress. Let me read it: "In the field of culture prop-

erly speaking, the Chinese leadership has advanced anti-Marxist positions of a Zhdanov type, defending the notion of 'proletarian culture' and bureaucratically submitting literature, art, and science to the 'party line.'

The name of Zhdanov -- the miserable instrument of Stalin -- is used to characterize what was done in China to culture under the "Cultural Revolution." Why the squeamishness that requires such a euphemism? Why are the comrades so reluctant to say what terrible blows have been struck against Chinese culture by Mao carrying on the practices of Stalin?

And why is Mao's gangsterism in this field pictured as if it involved a dispute over the concept of "proletarian culture" when what was involved was a brutal war against China's intellectuals as the opening move in a rabid factional fight?

In our opinion, it is important to speak out on what was done under the "Cultural Revolution" to literature, art, and science. This is one of the most telling examples that can be used in explaining to intellectuals -- and to students and workers who are interested in culture -- what the difference is between Stalinism-Maoism on the one hand and Trotskyism on the other.

The same goes for the cult of Mao. This should be in the forefront of our propaganda in relation to the Maoists so as to compel them to become increasingly ashamed and embarrassed every time they are compelled to discuss the question in front of an objective audience.

It is a strange polemical method that acts as if China's abomination, the Mao cult, which is patterned on the Stalin cult, and even exceeds it in grotesqueness, should not be heavily scored -- as if we were carrying on a dialogue in polite company in which certain subjects are just not dwelt on, and preferably not even mentioned. At least it was like that in polite company until the present generation of rebel youth broke into the parlor. Why should we be demure in telling them our opinion of the Mao cult?

Not to speak out is to bend in the direction of those Maoists who are shamefaced about the cult, but who remain staunch Maoists nonetheless.

At the bottom of page 12 is another small deletion in which the phrase stating that the Maoists are "even more guilty" than their opponents of blatantly revising Marxism has been changed to "as guilty as." We will let this go. Perhaps the comrades of the majority are right about the inadvisability of trying to

measure which of the factions comes nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism, or which has revised Marxism the most.

On page 14, we return to the question of an alleged "compromise" between the Maoists and "parts" of the main opposing faction, a compromise that was allegedly "initiated when the masses started to intervene autonomously into the struggle and thereby threatened the whole bureaucratic rule."

This is a pure deduction. There is no direct evidence available that I know of that the factions got together and made a compromise making it possible to reach an amicable end to the murderous factional war carried on under the fraudulent title of a "Cultural Revolution."

The word "compromise" suggests equality, or at least a kind of balance of power between the factions. What was more likely involved in a situation of this nature was that certain concessions were made to some of the losers in order to speed up the consolidation of the Maoist victory.

The announcement of the convocation of the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist party came after the resolution was written and was thus not taken into consideration in the original draft. The announcement itself, however, rather confirmed that Mao had scored a crushing victory. He felt strong enough at this point to hold the first party congress since 1956.

Why did he feel that strong? Because he had reached a compromise with his opponents? That would have signified continuation of the struggle in a new way. That's what a compromise would have meant -- deferment of the showdown until another time. It would have meant continuing to operate with the other faction. It is much more likely that Mao conceived the Ninth Congress as a finishing blow, the registration of the complete rout of the other side.

They had already been capitulating. The capitulators were given a certain recognition here and there.

The original formulation, while it does not spell things out -- the facts were lacking to do that -- fits the situation better than the formulation declaring that a "compromise" was reached between the two factions.

On page 15. The first change from the word "them" to the expanded phrase is acceptable. I count it to be an improvement over the original.

On the same page, a little bit

farther down, we come again, as I promised earlier, to the question of foreign policy. The sentence in the original states: "While recognizing that for its own reasons Peking often pursues a more aggressive diplomatic policy than Moscow, the Fourth International also criticizes the opportunism of the Chinese Communist leadership." This has been changed to read: "While recognizing that for its own reasons Peking often advocates a more militant line to its followers abroad than Moscow, the Fourth International also criticizes the bureaucratic centrism of the Chinese Communist leadership."

Two changes have thus been made: "advocates a more militant line to its followers" in place of "pursues a more aggressive diplomatic policy than Moscow" and "bureaucratic centrism" in place of "opportunism."

Let us take the first change -- Mao's diplomatic policy and the line he advocates to his followers abroad. I think two questions are mixed up here. What Mao suggests to members of his cult is not necessarily identical with the regime's diplomatic policy. Even in the case of a healthy workers state the diplomatic policy of the government might be at variance with what the leaders of the revolutionary party in that country might suggest to revolutionists abroad.

Thus this change shifts us from the question of Peking's diplomatic policy to a different subject, the allegedly more militant line it advocates to its followers abroad.

Why this change was made, I do not know. It was not explained at the congress. To strike out mentioning Peking's diplomatic policy could be taken to mean that it is not worth mentioning or that it is of no interest to us.

The substitution is not without its faults in its own right. It could be interpreted as implying that Peking, in advocating a more militant line to its followers abroad, is coming nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism.

The insistence that Peking comes nearer than Moscow to the positions of revolutionary Marxism can lead some comrades to conclude that Peking is not only near to those positions but is actually coming nearer or could come nearer. The comrades of the majority, we have deduced, do not hold this position, but they are far from having made this crystal clear. So perhaps we should take a minute or two to explain the consequences of thinking that Peking is coming nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism, or could come nearer.

If Mao is capable of projecting a

more militant line to his followers abroad, what is to prevent him from projecting a more and more militant line? A revolutionary line, or something close to it? If it is really possible, then we should prepare for it.

But then it is ridiculous to call for a political revolution in China. What revolutionists everywhere ought to do, if the possibility is a real one, is struggle to push Mao more and more in that direction. However, that runs counter to the line of trying to mobilize the masses in China to overturn Mao's regime through a political revolution. If Mao can project a more and more revolutionary line, then in the intrabureaucratic struggle between Mao and Liu Shao-chi, we ought to try to form a bloc with Mao in order to crush the danger from the right wing. That would create conditions in which it would be much easier to push Mao further to the left.

Fortunately, the comrades of the majority are completely against any such perspective and reject it out of hand. They stand for a political revolution in China.

It appears to us, however, that there is a certain inconsistency in this stand and the formulations demanded by the majority comrades concerning a supposedly more militant line advocated by Mao to his followers abroad and the supposedly more radical line pursued by the Chinese leadership towards world revolutionary developments. We wondered what concepts they had in mind that led them to insist upon such formulations.

Let's turn to the second change in this sentence on page 15, the change from "opportunism" to "bureaucratic centrism." That seems like a very small change, a tiny unobjectionable change, but it turned out to be one of the points that stood out in the discussion on the "Cultural Revolution" at the world congress.

In his contribution, Comrade Pierre Frank explained that while he was not the one responsible for suggesting the change, he voted for it. In defense of his vote he said that "bureaucratic centrism" was the correct label to put on the policy of zigzagging between opportunism and ultraleftism which the comrades of the minority themselves included in the original draft.

(We would have been willing to settle for the original sentence about Mao zigzagging between opportunism and ultraleftism in his foreign policy. Unfortunately the comrades of the majority deleted it.)

In any case, Comrade Pierre said, in defense of his vote, that the formula

"bureaucratic centrism" was used by Trotsky in 1928 in his introduction to The Third International after Lenin.

It should be mentioned that a new edition of The Third International after Lenin was published this spring in France under the editorship of Comrade Pierre, who also supplied a preface. This edition has been checked against the original Russian manuscript in the Trotsky archives at Harvard. It is an improvement over the old English edition and includes a foreword by Trotsky, written in 1929 after he was exiled from the Soviet Union, which does not appear in the English edition.

In the foreword Trotsky mentions "Stalinist centrism," and he also refers to its zigzag course in foreign policy. He calls Stalin's policies "a variety of the same centrism" as that represented by "Friedrich Adler & Co." but "based on the ideological and material resources of a state that emerged from the October Revolution."

What Comrade Pierre had in mind, I suppose, was not this foreword, in which the term "Stalinist centrism" is used, but the subsequent item in the French edition, a letter written by Trotsky from Alma Ata in 1928, which actually constitutes an introduction to the main document in the book, the famous criticism of the Draft Program of the Communist International. In the English edition, this letter, entitled "What Now?" follows the main document. It is here that Trotsky uses the term "bureaucratic centrism."

What did Trotsky mean by this term? To begin with, I don't think he identified it with zigzagging, although zigzagging is one of its characteristics. For example, Trotsky speaks elsewhere in The Third International after Lenin of the "inevitable Leftward zigzags of the Chinese bourgeoisie." Evidently "bureaucratic centrism" -- which certainly does not refer to any bourgeoisie -- has a deeper content than mere oscillations in policy.

Comrade Peng made what I thought was an effective rebuttal on this point. As he put it, we no longer stand in the period of 1927-28. The situation has changed. As a matter of fact, Trotsky, and the whole Left Opposition internationally, dropped the use of the term "bureaucratic centrism" in reference to the ruling group in the Soviet Union when the orientation of calling for a political revolution was adopted in 1933. Trotsky in 1927 and 1928 had not yet reached the position that a hardened bureaucratic caste had crystallized out in the Soviet Union which could be removed from power only through a political revolution. "Comrade Pierre Frank, of course, understands this very well," Comrade Peng said, "but then

he did not explain it."

Comrade Peng maintained that if one believes there is an analogy between the situation in China today and the situation in the Soviet Union in 1927-28, then it is inconsistent to call for a political revolution in China.

On the other hand, if you call for a political revolution in China, then to be consistent in drawing an analogy with the Soviet Union, you must say that the situation in China today is comparable to the situation in the Soviet Union after 1933, or after it became clearly established that a hardened bureaucratic caste had seized a monopoly of power and consolidated its position so firmly that it could be removed only by a political revolution.

For myself, I would like to add a few observations on Trotsky's use of the term "bureaucratic centrism." In 1927-28 he distinguished between the Right, which was intertwined with the growing bourgeois tendency observable in the Soviet Union at the time, the Left, represented by the Left Opposition, which was carrying on the tradition and program of Leninism, and the Center, the key figure of which was Stalin. Trotsky's terminology, as well as his platform at the time, was shaped by the view that the Communist party in the Soviet Union and the Comintern on a world scale could still be reformed. Thus in the letter "What Now?" -- which I assume Comrade Pierre was referring to -- Trotsky states the position of the Left Opposition as follows:

"In any case, the Opposition, by virtue of its views and tendencies, must do all in its power to see that the present zigzag is extended into a serious turn onto the Leninist road. Such an outcome would be the healthiest one, that is to say, involving the least convulsions for the party and the dictatorship. /Trotsky means the dictatorship of the proletariat./ This would be the road of a profound party reform, the indispensable promise /premise?/ of the reform of the Soviet state." /Emphasis in the English original./

We can see in this the consistency in Trotsky's use of the term "bureaucratic centrism" and his program of reform rather than political revolution.

This is not the end of the matter, however. In 1935 Trotsky returned to this question and brought things up to date both as to terminology and the great historic analogy he saw between the degeneration of the French and Russian revolutions. He did this in an article entitled "The Soviet Union Today." This was published in English in the July 1935 issue of The New International and repub-

lished in the summer 1956 issue of the International Socialist Review.

Trotsky explains in this article that "bureaucratic centrism" has given way to "bureaucratic absolutism"; or, in relation to the historic analogy he was discussing, "bureaucratic Bonapartism."

In the period 1926-27, Trotsky recalls, the question of the "Thermidorean" reaction was intensively discussed among the opposition circles. A split even occurred over the question. At the time, Trotsky projected the possibility of a Thermidorean triumph only in the future, and even then, of course, only if the growing rightist tendencies in the Soviet Union were not halted. Looking back, he continued, it can be seen that the analogy was used in a faulty way. Actually the Soviet Thermidor began in 1924. And the "Thermidoreans can celebrate, approximately, the tenth birthday of their victory." The present political regime in the USSR, he said, is "the regime of 'Soviet' (or anti-Soviet) Bonapartism, closer in type to the Empire than the Consulate."

Trotsky did not say in his article whether he considered it to have been an error to use the term "bureaucratic centrism" in the earlier period. He was concerned only about correcting the broad analogy with the French revolution; and he said that whatever adjustments this correction might call for, it did not alter the correctness of the program and policies which the Left Opposition had fought for. These had been vindicated completely by events.

We note that by 1929, in his foreword to The Third International after Lenin, he used the term "Stalinist centrism" instead of "bureaucratic centrism," and distinguished "Stalinist centrism" as a specific variety of centrism, observing that in distinction from centrism in general, as hitherto seen in the workers movement, it had at its disposal the ideological and material resources of the state that had emerged from the October Revolution. By 1935 he had adopted the term "Soviet Bonapartism."

Whatever we may say today about the use of the term "bureaucratic centrism" in the late twenties, it is clear that the shift to the term "Stalinist centrism" and then "bureaucratic absolutism" or "Soviet Bonapartism" did not signify that the Trotskyist movement had taken the view that the Kremlin could no longer follow a zigzag course. During his pact with Hitler, Stalin ordered a sharp left turn for the Communist parties in the Allied countries. Again in the period following World War II, Stalin finally shifted far enough to the left in Eastern Europe to topple a number of capitalist states.

All of this has an important bearing on our appreciation of the course of the Chinese revolution, but I will leave that for another time.

In relation to the question of using the label "bureaucratic centrism" to designate the bureaucracy in China, Comrade Livio Maitan made the point, if I understood the translator correctly and the translator was translating and not betraying Livio, that the phrase "hardened, crystallized caste" is not a scientific designation. The term "bureaucracy" is meaningful but the term "hardened, crystallized caste" does not signify anything in a scientific sense. I think this relates to Comrade Livio's view that the term "Stalinism" should be reserved for the specific period of the worst excesses under Stalin in the middle thirties, a view I do not at all agree with.

Aside from that, we have used the term "hardened caste" and similar terms to designate the development of the bureaucracy to such a point in a workers state that it completely displaces proletarian democracy and establishes its own rule. In the political arena, we have recognized this qualitative difference from "bureaucratism" in general by calling for a political revolution.

The attitude of the bureaucracy toward political power -- towards proletarian democracy -- is a certain indicator of the degree to which a caste has been formed. If it succeeds in eliminating proletarian democracy, refusing the masses any possibility to express themselves; if it prevents the formation of independent proletarian tendencies and political parties, you can be certain that it has special reasons for this and that it understands these reasons quite well. The point of qualitative change in the crystallization of this peculiar formation is registered by its success in monopolizing state power, which it then uses to consolidate and defend its special privileges at the expense of the interests of the masses and the revolution.

In comparing the bureaucracies in China and the Soviet Union from this standpoint, I would say that differences between the two can be recognized. The Soviet bureaucracy is older, more hardened, more entrenched, with the greater wealth and resources of an advanced industrial power at its command, able to afford a more crass display of opportunism. In other words, a number of differences in quantity or degree can be found -- and these are important -- but qualitatively, the two formations are pretty much the same. In both instances, we are compelled to call for a political revolution and by that fact we recognize that a certain identity or equivalence does exist despite the differences.

It may seem that I am belaboring the point. But it also seems to be of considerable importance to the comrades of the majority. Even after the discussion at the congress they insisted on their formulation with but a small modification. Here is how it reads in the final draft which is to be published as the majority document:

"While not forgetting that the Chinese leadership is led by the defense of its own interests to inspire among its partisans in the world a more militant line than Moscow's, the Fourth International criticizes the bureaucratic centrist nature of the policy."

We would very much like to know why the comrades of the majority are so insistent on the forty-year-old label "bureaucratic centrist" which Trotsky dropped so long ago.

In the next changes on page 15, several points are involved. We will begin with the question of granting aid to guerrilla forces. In the original, it is indicated, although not stressed, that Peking's chief purpose in this is to create an image to the left of Moscow. In the reformulation, the stress is placed on the objective consequences of granting material aid in this way. Once again the objective consequences of Peking's ultra-leftism are left out.

Without a break in the paragraph, the reformulation then brings in Peking's attacks on the right-wing policies of the Communist parties under Moscow's influence, and its attacks on some of the features of bureaucratic rule in Eastern Europe, all of which are described as "objectively" contributing to deepening the crisis of Stalinism and facilitating the upsurge of the new youth vanguard. These sentences replace the sentences in the original, pointing to the fact that Peking's basic policy is "peaceful coexistence," that the leaders of the Chinese bureaucracy are motivated by "narrow nationalistic considerations," that their line is that the revolution must first pass through a "bourgeois stage" before it can reach a socialist stage, that it "counsels and countenances support to bourgeois countries," and does this as a substitute for "mobilizing the masses for uncompromising struggle against the neo-colonial regimes."

These points, deleted from the original, appear completely valid to us, both empirically and theoretically. They are completely explainable from a Marxist standpoint if it is granted that what exists in China is a bureaucratic formation so hardened that it can only be broken up by a political revolution.

Of course a problem is created if

it is maintained that such a formation does not exist; then it is more accurate to say that what does exist is "bureaucratic centrism."

To stress the objective consequences of Peking's actions at this point is out of place, particularly when it is substituted for something more fundamental to understanding the nature of the regime and the origins of its policies. A clear appreciation is required of the nature of the bureaucracy in China, its degree of development, and its motivations. Otherwise we can run into the error of substituting questions of a secondary order for the more important primary questions, as has occurred in this instance.

It is not enough to point out how some of Peking's actions "objectively" assist the revolutionary process. It is not enough, either, to point out how some of Peking's actions "objectively" aid the counterrevolution, leading to such catastrophes as the one in Indonesia. It is necessary to first grasp the nature of the bureaucracy in China, its narrow, nationalistic interests and preoccupations. From this we can gain a correct and balanced appreciation of the political aims of the leadership of that bureaucracy both domestically and internationally. Then, in the light of the international situation and the contradictory forces in operation on a world scale, we can better determine the portent of Peking's actions and to what degree they must be assessed as objectively revolutionary or counter-revolutionary, or a combination of the two.

Otherwise we can have a bad echo of such disputes as whether the ultraleft phases of Stalin's course did not objectively further the world revolution, or at least come nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism than the openly opportunist phases. Or, to reduce things to an absurdity, whether Stalin's publication of the works of Lenin did not objectively help the world revolution.

On second thought, that might not be so absurd. Some circles have maintained that publication of the little Red Book by the tens of millions has had objectively revolutionary consequences. One wonders whether this comes nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism than Stalin's publication of the works of Lenin.

In the final sentence in this same paragraph on page 15, you will notice that the substitution by the majority mentions that among the youth vanguard, sympathy for the Maoist positions in relation to Moscow remain deep; and it is asserted that the reason the Maoists have been unable to stabilize any important

youth organizations anywhere is because of their "organizational sectarianism and political infantilism." Note that there is no suggestion here of a connection between Peking's policies or the meaning of this important and telling failure. The whole question is reduced to the organizational level. I don't know what is meant by "political infantilism" -- but I can't help observing that the phrase comes from the same comrades who considered it a journalistic epithet to describe Mao as an "erratic pilot."

I'll return to this point in a moment.

On page 16, I am sure that no one by now will be surprised at the deletion of the characterization of the Chinese bureaucracy as "nationalistic-minded." Since nothing is offered by way of a substitute, one wonders if it was felt that the Chinese leadership is internationally-minded. Or perhaps something in between, neither completely international, nor completely national. A series of questions arises, in fact, as to how the majority comrades really view the leadership of the Chinese Communist party.

On the very eve of the congress, the national interests of the Chinese bureaucracy came into such sharp conflict with the national interests of the Soviet bureaucracy that shooting broke out in several places along the Sino-Soviet border and hundreds were killed in pitched battles over a patch of land in the Ussuri River.

I was glad to see that in the final draft, the Ussuri battles were mentioned, although the narrow nationalism motivating both sides was not brought out. Major responsibility was placed on Moscow, and the answer of the Chinese was said to have been determined by "bureaucratic interests and prestige considerations" and "in the final analysis" by a "concept" -- the concept of "socialism in one country." Perhaps it would have been better in this instance to have stressed what kind of minds function in accordance with such concepts. The word "nationalistic" seems the most appropriate.

On page 16, the entire paragraph concerning the "newly radicalized youth who have mistaken the verbal militancy and activism of the Maoist groups as representing Marxism-Leninism" has been deleted. This deletion is, of course, counterbalanced by the addition on the previous page of a reference to the "political infantilism" and "extreme organizational sectarianism" of the helmsman steering the ship of state in China. Such a meager reference hardly provides us with a high-level understanding of this question.

In trying to win youth who have been

leaning in the direction of Maoism, or who have gone through a more intimate experience with this disorienting political current, it is important for our movement to stress both the incapacity of the Maoists to build a youth movement -- which is a glaring fact -- and the political reasons for it; namely, the ultraleftism of Maoism which repels thinking youth after first attracting them, as does the cult of Mao, the ritualistic waving of the little Red Book, and the total mis-education it gives its adherents.

In our opinion, if this particular paragraph required alteration -- and we do not deny that it could be improved -- it should have been sharpened, expanded, and explained in greater detail. We did not do this in the original because of our objective in drawing up merely a line document, leaving it to the world Trotskyist press to provide the necessary supplementary material in the coming period.

A good example, in my opinion, of what is required is the series of articles by Mary-Alice Waters in The Militant examining one Maoist organization, Progressive Labor.

The problem of Peking's initial attractiveness to the youth, which is comparable to the initial attractiveness that Moscow once had to the youth, is a very real one. At bottom it involves the error of identifying the leadership of a workers state with the workers state itself and the revolutionary process that brought it into being.

The resolution on the "Cultural Revolution" required at least a specific reference to the problem of Maoism and the newly radicalized youth, not only because it is related to the "Cultural Revolution" but because it is connected with the major task facing the entire world Trotskyist movement in the immediate period ahead -- taking maximum advantage of the extraordinary openings provided by the appearance of a new generation of radical youth.

At the bottom of page 16, we come to another change which likewise can hardly be characterized as unexpected. The phrase "the crystallized bureaucratic caste headed by Mao cannot be reformed" has been altered to read, "also in China, the bureaucracy cannot be removed by reforms." By now, we have become well aware that the comrades of the majority are acutely sensitive to the words "crystallized bureaucratic caste" and do not want such a characterization in the resolution.

In our opinion, this demands explanation. Why shouldn't we use this characterization? What's wrong with it? If China does not have a crystallized bureaucratic caste, what kind of social formation does

rule China? And what is the nature of the leadership that represents and defends the special interests of this formation?

It's not an exploiting class -- a class like we have in the United States or Mexico or elsewhere in the capitalist world. It's not a mere bureaucracy such as is found in the trade unions. It's not like the bureaucracy to be found in Cuba. So what is it exactly? Is it just to be called "bureaucracy" -- bureaucracy in general? Is it not possible to give it a more precise sociological definition?

This is very important from a theoretical standpoint. A series of questions are involved.

If in China we do not have a crystallized bureaucratic caste, which is consciously fighting to preserve special privileges, why is Mao so concerned about maintaining secrecy in China? What has he got to hide? Why all this tremendous apparatus in China to prevent anyone from coming in and seeing what is really happening?

The secrecy in China is even worse, if anything, than it was in Stalin's day in the Soviet Union. There are certain areas in China that no one from the outside, from any party, no matter from what country, has ever seen since the revolution so far as we know. What is the political significance of this? How do we estimate it politically, the fact that a regime in a workers state acts this way?

A closely related question concerns explaining why it is that this regime does not turn to the revolutionists in seeking allies abroad. They turn to either the national bourgeoisie, with whom they seek to make some kind of deal or other along the lines of "peaceful co-existence," or they seek sycophants and paid agents. I leave aside people who are sucked in, the innocents and inexperienced who think that Maoism is revolutionary, the people first becoming radicalized. I'm talking about people in the know.

What kind of ruling group is it that exercises power this way in the world today if not a crystallized bureaucratic caste and its representatives?

This is a real question, not a matter of splitting hairs or engaging in a scholastic exercise. It's a real question, dealing with a real formation. And we have to account for it on a theoretical level as well as meet it politically.

Perhaps you feel some relief at having come to the end of the two documents. I hope that by way of compensation you noticed that the final item concerning the existence in China of a crystal-

lized bureaucratic caste actually involves the question of Stalinism. That was the point we started with, wasn't it? So we have come full circle back to the beginning. Almost like Hegel, isn't it? On a higher level of integration of ideas, I trust.

It at least shows that there's a certain consistency in the logical structure of the original resolution. The same note was struck at the beginning and the end, and actually the end indicated the essential grounding for the position that what is required in China is a political revolution.

What has been indicated by the differences that have emerged between the original draft of the resolution and the modified version submitted by the majority? They are rather important from the viewpoint of seeking clarification and arriving at greater homogeneity in the position of the world Trotskyist movement on the question of the "Cultural Revolution" and the nature of the regime in China.

Let us note some of the main divergences observable in the two documents, without attempting to put them in any kind of order.

1. It's evident that there are different estimates as to the degree of damage done by the "Cultural Revolution." This includes damage done to the educational system and to culture in China.

2. There are differences over the nature of the Red Guard movement. We seek a better differentiation of the tendencies within the movement so as not to foster any illusions about its nature as a whole and so as to be able to see better what component was instigated by the regime and was responsive to it and what component constituted genuine rebel youth.

3. There are different estimates of the role of the military -- over the role played by the army in the "Cultural Revolution," its current position in the bureaucratic structure as a whole, and its weight in the regime. We realize that this is difficult to determine in view of the secrecy of the Maoists.

4. There are differences over how the "Cultural Revolution" ended. The comrades of the majority are convinced that it ended in a compromise between the two main factions. We were more cautious about this. We are inclined to conclude that Mao has won a crushing victory which he is now trying to consolidate with the help of widespread capitulations.

There is no disagreement, it should be added, over the instability of the situation and the likelihood of fresh convul-

sions in the coming period.

These differences will no doubt be resolved rather easily as more information becomes available. However, other differences have emerged that go somewhat deeper. A tentative list of these may prove useful.

1. There are differences over the significance of the cult of Mao. We view the cult as a very serious matter. The comrades of the majority discount its seriousness somewhat. They don't disregard it; they are opposed to it. But in the resolution they tend to discount it and this no doubt reflects their judgment of how much attention should be paid to it.

2. There are differences over the nature of Mao's foreign policy. We think Mao's foreign policy is not revolutionary; that he alternates between ultraleftism and opportunism or combinations of the two and that fundamentally he seeks "peaceful coexistence." The majority comrades do not speak so clearly on this. We are not sure if they think Mao's policy is revolutionary, sometimes revolutionary, or just what. In the resolution they assert that it is "objectively" revolutionary. They appear to dismiss its subjective, or consciously calculated aspects.

3. There are differences, apparently, over the nature of the regime. In our opinion, it represents the interests of a narrow, nationalistic, bureaucratic caste, a bureaucracy of a certain specific character. The comrades of the majority appear to view the regime as "bureaucratic centrist" in the sense of the term used by Trotsky in 1928 to characterize the Stalinism of that period before he reached the conclusion that it could be broken up only through a political revolution.

4. Back of this difference may stand different estimates of the meaning of the term "Stalinism." We consider Maoism to be a variety of Stalinism. Where the comrades of the majority stand on this is not clear to us.

5. To clarify this difference, or possible difference, may require a discussion of the origin of the Chinese revolution and the role played in it by the Maoists. A number of theoretical questions come up, such as explaining how a "Stalinized" Communist party could come to power in China.

Some of these questions have not been probed extensively by our movement. Perhaps it is now requisite for us to go into all this in greater detail. Such a discussion will most likely prove valuable in removing sources of differences that could prove even more troublesome in

the future than they are now.

6. It is possible that differences of a political nature could arise in the course of the discussion. These would hinge on what attitude to adopt toward Maoism and could generate a certain warmth in the discussion. I don't think this will occur. Nevertheless, it is worth noting a certain insistence on the side of both the majority and the minority as to the correct attitude to adopt in approaching the Maoist youth. This could adumbrate a political difference.

Our opinion is that it is best to make a sharp delimitation and attack the positions of the Maoists in a vigorous polemic while at the same time seeking to engage them, wherever possible, in common actions. Naturally, in a common action working relations have to be established. But on the political and theoretical level, a sharp demarcation is required, otherwise we can lose our own ranks to the Maoists.

The majority comrades think that this sharpness is unnecessary and even stands in the way of approaching the Maoists for the purpose of recruiting from them. At the congress, the majority comrades constantly referred to the fact that during the May days in Paris, the Maoists were to be found on the "same side of the barricades" as our comrades. Therefore, they maintain, a sharp tone should not be adopted in polemicizing with them.

Beyond this tactical question involving the comrades in Paris in May 1968 we see a much bigger question, the problem of ultraleftism, which goes beyond Maoism -- Maoism being only a contributing current, although an important one.

How big is the problem of ultraleftism today? How serious is it to the world Trotskyist movement? What are we going to do about it? There are evidently differences over how we should estimate this. Our opinion is that ultraleftism has made inroads into our ranks in some parts of the world and constitutes a considerable problem.

7. Finally, looming behind all of these differences is the question of how to go about building a revolutionary combat party. In the United States, this concerns us a great deal. We see it in relation not only to the Communist party, which is no longer the great problem it once was, but in relation to the ultraleftism of Progressive Labor, of tendencies in the SDS and other formations, notably the Black Panthers. We have the impression that other sectors of the world Trotskyist movement face comparable problems in their daily work of forging a combat party.

Does unanimity exist on how to solve these problems? Here the test of practice is decisive and we think it would be very fruitful if a better exchange could be reached between the sectors of our movement as to their experiences in grappling with ultraleftism.

In closing, let me indicate where the comrades of the majority think we are in basic agreement and what our opinion is on this.

They maintain that we both agree that a privileged bureaucracy exists in China, and that there is a need for a political revolution.

We think this is a correct judgment in general but that the comrades of the majority are unclear or inconsistent in their characterization of the bureaucracy and still more unclear or inconsistent in relating the need for a political revolution to their view of the bureaucracy and its policies.

They maintain that we both agree that the "Cultural Revolution" represented an intrabureaucratic struggle in which we supported neither of the two main contending factions.

That is accurate in general, in our opinion, but again it appears to us that the comrades of the majority are inconsistent and that various things they argue for really imply offering critical support to Mao in the intrabureaucratic struggle.

They maintain that we both agree that the masses were mobilized in China and that this weakened the bureaucracy. We think that is accurate but we differ on the degree of mobilization and perhaps the degree to which the bureaucracy was weakened by the mobilization.

The area of agreement is substantial and should enable us to undertake an educational discussion without undue friction arising.

Finally, I should like to add that in my opinion this is only the beginning of the process of clarification. We hope for a free discussion throughout the world Trotskyist movement, and we are fully aware of the fact that this takes time.

In the next phase, I trust, we will be able to proceed beyond the necessity of examining two texts that on first glance appear to be almost identical.