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Uphold the Banner Of Mao Tsetung!

Statement by the Central Committee Of the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA

This month marks the second anniversary of the death of Mao Tsetung, the greatest Marxist of our time. When Mao Tsetung died on September 9, 1976, the masses of Chinese people, guided by Mao himself until his last breath, were waging yet another arduous battle of decisive importance for the revolutionary cause of the proletariat. They were aroused in vast numbers to defend the path-breaking gains they had won, through their own struggle and with the leadership of Mao Tsetung, in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. They were fighting to break off the hold of revisionist traitors who, like Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and others before, were making an all-out attempt to seize power, strangle the socialist revolution and turn China from a bastion and bright ray of light for the working class and oppressed people worldwide into a dismal dungeon ruled by these reactionary dregs and posturing bootlickers of imperialism.

In the face of the loss of Mao Tsetung, a death truly weighter than Mount Tai, and in this situation where the counter-revolutionaries were emboldened to step up their attack, the revolutionary Chinese people intensified their struggle with solemn determination. A crucial part of the statement on the death of Mao Tsetung by the leading bodies of the Chinese Party and state, reflecting the actual behests of Mao and aspirations of the masses of Chinese people and the genuine communist leaders at their forefront, urgently declared:

"We must carry on the cause left behind by Chairman Mao and consolidate the great unity of the people of all nationalities under the leadership of the working class and based on the worker-peasant alliance, deepen the criticism of Teng Hsiao-ping, continue the struggle to repulse the Right deviationist attempt at reversing correct verdicts, consolidate and develop the victories of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, enthusiastically support the socialist new things, restrict bourgeois right and further consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country. We should continue to unfold the three great revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment, build our country independently and with the initiative in our own hands, through self-reliance, hard struggle, diligence and thrift, and go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more economical results in building socialism."

Mao Tsetung
(December 26, 1893—September 9, 1976)

Yet within a month after this statement was issued, the revisionists within the leadership of the Party and state, relying on the power they had seized from the proletariat over a period of time, in the armed forces in particular, staged a reactionary *coup d'etat,* replacing the rule of the proletariat with a fascist dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and beginning the process of restoring capitalism in China. Not only have they not carried on the cause left behind by Mao Tsetung, they have trampled on it and all who have continued to fight for it.

Beginning with Comrades Wang Hung-wen, Chang Chun-chiao, Chiang Ching, and Yao Wen-yuan, on every level of Chinese society the successors to the revolutionary struggle championed and illuminated by Mao Tsetung have been purged and suppressed. Outrageous lies and fantastic tales about alleged crimes of the so-called "gang of four" have been spewed out of Peking as a tattered cover for the fact that Mao Tsetung himself, as well as those like the Four and millions upon millions of others who have fought to uphold Mao's revolutionary line and proletarian rule in China, have come under the most vicious attack.

Since the right-wing coup in China, those who hold the reins of power there are none other than the very type of capitalist-roaders against whom Mao repeatedly directed the fire of the masses, including that long-tested renegade, Teng Hsiao-ping, as well as that shameless imposter, Hua Kuo-feng, successors to the counter-revolutionary cause of Chou En-lai, who was the bitter and most

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Wang Hung-wen

Chang Chun-chiao

Chiang Ching

Yao Wen-yuan

The Struggle Over China In the RCP

Editor's Note: Friends of the RCP and others have raised many questions about how the struggle over China came down inside our Party. The following article focuses on the history of the development of this internal struggle. The Mao Tsetung Memorial meetings will, on the other hand, focus on the major questions of line raised for revolutionaries worldwide by the revisionist coup in China and on the causes of this setback and the lessons that must be drawn from this experience. Future articles in REVOLUTION, *especially the continuing series on "Mao Tsetung's Immortal Contributions," will also deal with these matters.*

Struggle in the RCP Over China

The question of China, of a correct stand on the revisionist coup carried off there in October 1976, on the all-round attacks on the revolutionary line of Mao Tsetung and the arrests and purges of those who battled with him against revisionism—this has been and remains the central question of line facing the international communist movement in recent years. Twenty years earlier Khrushchev had his day—established revisionism in power in the Soviet Union and waved his revisionist baton in hopes of getting all the communist parties to sing his sour tune. Today, as then, the future of every Marxist-Leninist party and organization is on the line—will it face facts, draw correct conclusions and strengthen itself as a revolutionary weapon or will it decay and degenerate politically and ideologically and become a weapon or plaything of the bourgeoisie?

The truth of all this came home sharply to our Party. This past year we have defeated an attempt to impose a revisionist line on the Party and expelled the ringleaders of this attempt—Mickey Jarvis and Leibel Bergman. As the *Communique* of the Second Party Congress, held earlier this year to consolidate this victory, put it, "They tried to eliminate Mao Tsetung Thought from our ranks. They negated the significance and lessons of the Cultural Revolution. They attempted to poison the RCP with revisionism that has historical and international roots." (REVOLUTION, April/May, 1978.) In short, the central issue in this struggle, the question that came to concentrate a whole range of political differences was the question of China. The revisionist line on the class struggle in the U.S. which was promoted by the Jarvis-Bergman clique has been spoken to over recent months in REVOLUTION and is further documented in an appendix to the just-published documents of the struggle (*Revolution and Counterrevolution, The Revisionist Coup in China and the Struggle in the RCP, USA*). But it was the revisionist coup in China that was decisive. Jarvis and Bergman welcomed the triumph of the revisionism of Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping because it gave impressive authority to their own revisionism. The struggle to defeat this opportunism, to uphold Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought, has tempered our Party and grounded it more firmly than ever on the high road to revolution.

Partly out of the sensational scoops and scuttlebutt in the opportunist press from the Trotskyite *Workers Vanguard* to the Browderite *Call* and partly out of the natural and legitimate concerns of many people, a number of questions have arisen about this struggle, how it developed and how it was resolved in the RCP. Some rumor that the struggle was "undemocratic," a "coup from the top" with the membership kept unprepared and ignorant. Others speculate that the reason for the split and the Party's stand on China was because the CPML and not the RCP finally received recognition from Hua Kuo-feng. Many others wonder why the struggle and split occurred mainly over China's internal nature and not over its international line, as has been the focus for many other parties around the world.

All these points, whatever their source, bring up important questions which can be clearly spoken to by reviewing the history of this struggle within the RCP and what we have learned from it.

China's International Line

What about China's international line? In fact, while not the central issue, it was a long-term and important issue in this struggle. To be sure China's international line today is thoroughly reactionary. Hua Kuo-feng, Teng Hsiao-ping, *et al.*, are pushing a line which puts China at the center of the universe and advocates that China and revolutionaries worldwide ally with and rely on imperialist powers, including the United States. It is a line that "forgets" the difference between oppressed nations and imperialist countries and which seeks to outlaw revolution. They have dubbed this line the great, strategic "Theory of the Three Worlds" and have had the nerve to try to pawn it off as Mao Tsetung's theory. This is a lie.

While Mao might perhaps have used the term "three worlds" in a way to describe certain secondary conflicts in the world, and while Mao was not opposed to revolutionaries making use of contradictions in the camp of the enemy, Mao knew the difference between revolution and reaction, between Marxism and imperialism, and he consistently gave support to revolution. All this will be the subject of more analysis in future articles, but here something should be said about the role of this question in the struggle with the Jarvis-Bergman bunch. (It should be noted here that the article in the July 1977 REVOLUTION on the "three worlds" was in the main correct, especially in its main thrust of polemicizing against the "three worlds" line as any kind of strategy for revolution. Still it was not possible at that time to make an overall analysis of the "three worlds" line because of the struggle in our ranks over China.)

Because of our Mensheviks' narrow pragmatist and economist line, this clique did not give central attention to the question of the international line of the Party. After all, world war wasn't immediately upon us, was it? But this did not mean they failed to give support to the revisionist international strategy of the "three worlds," as part of their general rightism.

Prior to the Founding Congress of the RCP in 1975, some of their underlings wrote a polemic criticizing the *Draft Programme* that was written by the Revolutionary Union (RU) and circulated as the basic framework for discussion and struggle in forging the line for the Party. "Contrary to the *DP*," they wrote, "we think that the so-called 'three worlds' analysis is valid..." They demanded that this analysis be made the basis of our international line. This polemic, together with an answer which among other things insisted that such imperialist arms as NATO must be opposed and not supported, was circulated for general debate before the Founding Congress. The line of this "three worlds" polemic was firmly rejected as social-chauvinist. As the answer put it in repudiating this social-chauvinism, "The Revolutionary Communist Party must not go the way of Browderism, it must not degenerate into revisionism as the CP did. This is a life and death question for our class."

How did the top leaders of this soon-to-be-revisionist clique respond? Mickey Jarvis, in particular, led economist efforts to divert attention away from such matters. "No big deal" was his routine. Instead he focused on whipping up a right-wing wind on the class struggle at home. At the same time, others sought to smuggle the same basic international line into the Party *Programme* in more subtle form, once the earlier effort had been trounced. The hack "theoretician," who later was commissioned by the clique to write their position paper on China, wrote a paper for the Founding Congress which argued that the defense of China be made much more central to the *Programme*'s line on our duties around the question of war. At that Congress this proposal, too, was firmly rejected.

The Congress documents pointed out that while the socialist countries must be defended, this task must be viewed not separate from, but as part of the basic task of revolution worldwide. It was further pointed out that to give greater emphasis than the *Programme* did to the defense of China today against the threat of Soviet attack would mean in practice a heavy tilt in the direction of presenting the Soviet imperialists alone as the "real aggressor" in the world and "main enemy" of the world's people. This could only lead the Party away from preparing to overthrow U.S. imperialism and working to turn an imperialist war into a civil war in this country.

As a side point, Bergman's response to all of this was quite interesting. While basically inactive in this struggle at the time of the Congress, he was moved to make the following "contribution": he suggested to Comrade Avakian and others that the *Programme* should not say that we stand for Mao Tsetung Thought. Why? According to Leibel Bergman, "things just don't seem to be going that way any more." He went on to explain what he meant: because of its international line (it should be remembered that this was after Teng's "three worlds" speech at the United Nations in 1974) China's prestige around the world was falling, so we should drop Mao Tsetung Thought. While it is difficult to sum up if this suggestion was rearguard or vanguard in relation to the Chinese revisionists—who oppose Mao Tsetung Thought in every sphere—it is definitely symptomatic of the pragmatic tailing after spontaneity that determined Bergman's own final capitulation to revisionism.

History of RCP's Views on China's International Line

It was certainly clear in the RCP, and the Revolutionary Union before it, that we had increasing differences with aspects of the Chinese foreign policy. But did this lead us to denounce China, or even publicly criticize its international line? No, it did not. This was fundamentally correct, although the RU did make the error in 1974 of publicly defending Teng's U.N. speech. We did so in spite of the fact that internally in the RU criticisms were raised of some of Teng's points, and concern expressed about the overall direction it indicated.

Especially from 1974 on, delegations from the RU and then the RCP raised in meetings with the Chinese Party that we did not agree with some of their major policies—especially insofar as they were to be carried out by Marxist-Leninist parties around the world. Even Leibel Bergman, after hearing a presentation in China based on Teng's "three worlds" line, said sarcastically to another comrade, "Win over the Second World to do what?" We made it clear to the Chinese that we would not carry out such a line in our own country, even while we would certainly defend socialist China and Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought. This was for several reasons.

We believed and still believe that socialist countries face a complicated situation and can and do make mistakes in foreign policy, especially as they face a growing threat of world war and imperialist attack, as China has for a number of years. Stalin certainly made such mistakes in the period before and during World War 2, but this did not mean that Stalin and the Soviet Union were revisionist. (For more on this, see *The Communist* series on World War 2, Vol. 1, No. 1 and Vol. 2, Nos. 1 and 2.) The decisive event in transforming the Soviet Union into a revisionist country was the Khruschev-led counter-revolution in 1956. It was a correct and very important part of proletarian internationalism for communists worldwide to uphold and defend the Soviet Union until that time. Such a stand in regard to China before the 1976 coup was also correct and necessary, in spite of the protestations of some like the *Guardian* who were fascinated with a petty bourgeois version of so-called "independence" (not to mention Cuban-style revisionism in the service of Soviet social-imperialism).

Our decision about how to handle these increasing differences was further strengthened when it became apparent, especially from 1975 on, that a sharp class struggle was being waged inside China against revisionism—a struggle spearheaded by Mao and the Four. It was clear that China's international line was conditioned by the struggle and the balance of forces inside China. We had every hope that as part of the struggle a thoroughly proletarian internationalist line would result. We also felt that if we had any differences on international matters with the revolutionary forces in China, such differences would not be over fundamental questions of principle.

Anyone who followed the publications of our Party from the time of its founding, particularly REVOLUTION and *The Communist*, knows that, while upholding China, we actively polemicized against the application of this "three worlds," "Soviet main danger" line as it was being interpreted and applied by parties out of power. We focused especially on the disgusting "vanguard" interpretations of Klonsky and the OL-CPML in rising to the defense of U.S. imperialism worldwide. For this same purpose we called major conferences in several cities in late 1976, whose purpose was to bring these critical questions to the attention of broad sections of people and to expose the social-chauvinist line of the sort typified by the OL-CPML as well as the underestimation of and tailing after Soviet social-imperialism typified by the *Guardian*.

Throughout this period, there were skirmishes over these questions with what was developing as the revisionist headquarters within the RCP. But, unlike the "vanguard" OL-CPML, Jarvis and Bergman saw no need to jump out and make a decisive stand over a social-chauvinist international line. After all, reasoned these seasoned pragmatists, no need to make rash plans; just practice a revisionist line today and capitulation to U.S. imperialism's war bandwagon will take care of itself tomorrow. And how right they are. As Lenin put it, speaking of the social chauvinist stand taken by the reformist parties during World War 1, "The boil burst."

All through this period, and even more so today, the Jarvis-Bergman clique chirps in defense of the "three worlds" strategy, with attacks on the "gang of four" for "opposing Chairman Mao's revolutionary line in foreign affairs"—which is nothing but the Chinese revisionists' cynical codeword for their international line which is totally opposed to Mao's on this as on every front. Thus it was partly because of this clique's behavior that the "three worlds" line did not become the focus of the struggle and split within our Party. But beyond that, the cardinal question before the international working class movement is the overall line of the current rulers in China and which class it represents. The international position of these revisionists is an important aspect of their overall revi-

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powerful opponent of Mao in the last round of Mao's great battle to prevent revisionist reversion. Where Mao declared that the achievements of the Cultural Revolution must be upheld and built on, and that "reversing correct verdicts goes against the will of the people," these reactionaries are rapidly reversing every correct verdict and the very revolution itself.

Where Mao insisted that politics must be in command and that grasping revolution was the key to promoting production and developing society overall on the socialist road, those in power now raise the hue and cry of the bourgeoisie everywhere—production, production, production; efficiency, efficiency, efficiency—even claiming that in China today the Taylor system of sweating the workers has value, just as these same types clamored earlier that "exploitation is a merit" in opposing the socialist road after the founding of New China.

Where Mao constantly armed the masses politically and raised their sights to the lofty goal of communism, those in power now erect a new "historic mission" for the proletariat—capitalist restoration under the signboard of the "four modernizations," in whose achievement the role of the working people is to put their nose to the grindstone and labor like beasts of burden lured with the promise of more grain.

Where, under Mao's leadership, the masters of Chinese society and the models promoted were the working people themselves, taking matters into their own hands, moving mountains and storming the heavens, achieving the "impossible" through their own conscious activism and self-reliant struggle, what is promoted now are colorless bureaucrats barking orders and intellectual aristocrats lording it over the masses and enviously aping their counterparts in the capitalist countries.

Where Mao constantly reminded the masses of their proletarian internationalist duties and led them in carrying these out in opposition to great power arrogance, those insects swarming in the seats of power now indeed assume a great nation swagger and try to act the bully in relations with those they regard as weak, while at the same time they capitulate to and collaborate for bourgeois aims with imperialists and reactionaries hated and scorned by the masses of people the world over.

The revisionist coup of October 1976 in China and the subsequent reversal of the Chinese revolution constitute the most important development in the international communist movement, and in the world as a whole, in many years. The question of what attitude and stand to take toward these events is a fundamental and cardinal matter of principle. The exact causes of this reversal and the appropriate lessons to be drawn from it must be the subject of serious study and summation, to which our Party has undertaken to make its contribution. But this can only be correctly done on the basis of applying Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought. Far from negating or vitiating Mao Tsetung's line and leadership, this setback fully confirms the profound truth and importance of Mao Tsetung's great teachings—that throughout the long socialist transition period there are classes and class struggle, the danger of capitalist restoration is real and must be consistently fought by arming and relying on the masses politically; and that, while the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution "is absolutely necessary and most timely for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat, preventing capitalist restoration and building socialism," still one Cultural Revolution could not solve this problem and "Therefore, we can-not speak of final victory. Not even for decades."

Today Mao Tsetung and his great revolutionary Thought are under fierce attack. The revisionist usurpers in China, even while they must make a hypocritical bow to the love and respect that the masses of people in China and revolutionary people everywhere have for Mao Tsetung and his immortal contributions, must also launch a systematic assault on those very contributions and on Mao's whole revolutionary line. This has become more obvious with each passing day and will become even more so in the future—to all but those who are blinded either by ignorance or opportunism. And the attacks on Mao Tsetung and his revolutionary line and immortal contributions are mounting.

The Revolutionary Communist Party, USA remains firm in our stand: we continue to support the revolutionary masses of China and of the Chinese Communist Party in their struggle against reactionaries of every kind and we continue to stand steadfastly on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought. Now, with control of the Party and state power in the hands of traitors to the Chinese revolution and to the working class and oppressed people of the world, this requires us to resolutely denounce and expose these renegades and uphold and support the Four and all those in China today who are fighting in very difficult circumstances to regain proletarian rule and carry forward the revolution on the basis of Mao's line.

The *Programme* of our Party, adopted at its Founding Congress in 1975, states that "Mao Tsetung today represents the struggle of Marxism-Leninism vs. revisionism, of the proletariat vs. the bourgeoisie. For this reason, the Revolutionary Communist Party proudly raises the banner of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought, and bases itself on the application of it to the revolutionary struggle in the U.S."

Now, this is more true and more important than ever. The road of attacking Mao Tsetung and of denying or downgrading his revolutionary line and immortal contributions is a road leading only to the swamp.

The revisionists in China who have temporarily usurped power there (and their snivelling sycophants in this and other countries) no doubt think, along with the imperialists and reactionaries in general, that the proletariat and revolutionary people will lie down and play dead in the face of this setback. They doubtless expect that their orders forbidding revolution will actually be obeyed.

But this is only another exposure of their bourgeois nature. Revolution and the ultimate attainment of communism are inevitable and cannot be extinguished or prevented. They will live on and be realized in the revolutionary struggle of the masses, led by the working class and its genuine communist vanguard, in every country.

In writing to his wife, Comrade Chiang Ching, in 1966, Mao Tsetung declared with the revolutionary optimism characteristic of this great leader of the proletariat: "If the Rightists stage an anti-Communist coup d'etat in China, I am sure they will know no peace either and their rule will most probably be short-lived because it will not be tolerated by the revolutionaries, who represent the interests of the people making up more than 90 percent of the population."

And as Mao further summed up, "The conclusion is still the two familiar comments: The future is bright; the road is tortuous."

As the Chairman of the Central Committee of our Party, Bob Avakian, declared in memorializing Mao Tsetung right after his death, the working people of the world "will be Mao Tsetung's successors, in our millions and hundreds of millions, and we will continue the cause for which he fought and in which he led us and to which he devoted his entire life, until that great goal of eliminating exploitation and oppression and achieving communism has been finally achieved. *This* is the greatest tribute that we can pay to Mao Tsetung."

With the gathering storms and the sharpening of the basic contradictions in the world, with the prospects for both world war and revolution growing, our Party is determined to stand and fight together with the revolutionaries and masses of people in China and worldwide to carry forward the legacy of Mao Tsetung and continue the epoch-making revolutionary struggle of the proletariat until all imperialists, revisionists and other reactionaries are overthrown and finally defeated and the great historic mission of the proletariat has been fulfilled. ■

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MAO TSETUNG MEMORIAL MEETINGS

Hold high the banner of Mao Tsetung's immortal contributions and the achievements and lessons of the Cultural Revolution!

Hail the heroic efforts of the Four who fought to uphold Mao's revolutionary line and proletarian rule in China!

Revisionists are revisionists and must not be supported, revolutionaries are revolutionaries and must be supported!

On September 9 and 10—the second anniversary of Mao's death—in New York City and the San Francisco Bay Area, the Revolutionary Communist Party and the Mao Tsetung Memorial Committee are sponsoring Mao Tsetung Memorial Meetings to uphold and learn from the great contributions of this relentless revolutionary and great leader of the working class and oppressed people everywhere. Thousands will attend these meetings, where questions of great importance and urgency will be addressed: How did this setback happen in China? What are its lessons? How does it affect the international situation, the developments toward war and the prospects for revolution in the world? What is the true legacy of Mao Tsetung and how can it be taken up and carried forward? The main part of the program will consist of a presentation by Bob Avakian, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Revolutionary Communist Party; after this speech questions from the audience will be answered.

All those who see the need to stand up for Mao Tsetung and all he represents for the working class and oppressed people, and all those who are concerned and want to attend a serious discussion about the developments in China since Mao's death and their lessons and implications, are welcomed and urged to come.

New York City, Sat.,Sept. 9

City Center Theater, 131 West 55th St.
Program starts promptly at 7 p.m. Admission $3.50
For information, call (212) 924-4387

San Francisco Bay Area, Sunday, Sept. 10

Berkeley Community Theatre,
Corner Allston Way & Grove Street, Berkeley, CA
Program starts promptly at 1 p.m. Admission $3.50
For information, call (415) 397-0629

Sponsored by the Revolutionary Communist Party USA and the Mao Tsetung Memorial Committee. Information or contributions: Box 3486, Chicago, IL 60654

Aid to Albania Cut Off

Chinese Revisionists Trail in Khrushchev's Path

On July 7, 1978, the revisionists who have usurped power in the People's Republic of China arbitrarily and visciously cut off all aid to the People's Socialist Republic of Albania. Following in the footsteps of Khrushchev, the Chinese recalled their experts, left plants half finished, refused to turn over blueprints and important papers, and generally tried to inflict as much damage to the Albanian economy as possible. They even made public details of their military aid, thus revealing vital Albanian state secrets. This treacherous act is being condemned by revolutionaries around the world.

As might be expected, the Chinese manufactured several pretexts for their actions, which themselves are very revealing. For example, they charge that the Albanians "ignored the technical guidance of the Chinese experts," that they "violated operational rules," that the Albanians refused to accept 25 grossly inflated invoices, and so on. In taking this stand the Chinese revisionists are not only acting like the Soviet revisionists, who also thought aid enabled them to dictate to others and whose experts carried on like bourgeois tyrants, they are also giving the world a glimpse into the bourgeois relations they are frenziedly restoring within China itself.

However, the cessation of Chinese aid is only secondarily a result of the desire to avoid any "unprofitable" expenditures on proletarian internationalism. Like the USSR when it arbitrarily stopped aiding China and Albania in the early '60s, the Chinese revisionists will be happy to float loans and make outright grants to various reactionaries (like Mobutu of Zaire) or even offer "aid" to some genuine revolutionary forces in hopes of using such aid to promote revisionism.

The real reason for China's aid cutoff lies in their great power chauvinism and in their all-round revisionist line. Since the death of Mao Tsetung and the defeat of his revolutionary line, the Chinese revisionists have frenziedly tried to pressure and coerce revolutionaries everywhere into adopting their counter-revolutionary strategy of capitulating to imperialism, betraying revolutionary struggles, and making peace with every two-bit puppet or local tyrant in the world. All this is done under the banner of their so-called great "strategic conception" of the "three worlds," falsely attributed to Mao Tsetung. Now the Chinese have turned their backs on Albania, their former closest ally, and embraced Tito, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia, as "comrade," "Marxist-Leninist," and "socialist"—all in direct opposition to Mao's well-known conclusions about the nature of Yugoslavia's social system. Because Albania did not jump when Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping's revisionist baton was waved at them, the Chinese revisionists are trying to strangle Albania.

It is well known that for many years the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the Party of Labor of Albania (PLA) were closely united, a unity forged in the revolutionary struggle against imperialism and modern revisionism. The responsibility for severing this friendship lies with the revisionist leaders of China, their big power chauvinism and their attempt to force others to accept their own revisionist theses.

History of Militant Unity

In view of these recent developments, it is worthwhile to briefly review the history of the militant unity between the CPC and the PLA.

Both the Chinese and Albanian parties, led by Mao Tsetung and Enver Hoxha respectively, refused to go along when the Khrushchev clique seized power in the Soviet Union and began dismantling socialism there and pushing an all-round counter-revolutionary revisionist line for the international communist movement. The USSR exerted tremendous influence, including wielding its economic clout and using its military might as a bargaining chip, to try to force other Marxist-Leninist parties to toe the line.

The Soviets tried to use the tremendous prestige the USSR had earned as the home of the Bolshevik revolution and the world's first socialist state, even as they were dismantling these achievements, to force others to accept their revisionism. They cultivated those within other parties who were quick to embrace revisionism—indeed they found agents even within the Communist Party of China and the Party of Labor of Albania. But despite external and internal pressures, both the PLA and the CPC stood firm.

In 1960, at a meeting in Moscow of Marxist-Leninist parties from around the world, the CPSU opened an assault on the Communist Party of China. Enver Hoxha rose to the defense of China and, as a result, became a focus of the revisionists' assault. The joint struggle by the CPC and the PLA against modern revisionism forged unity between these two parties and was a rallying cry for Marxist-Leninists within and outside other parties to take up the fight against revisionism. This struggle also won important victories, including having the Declaration of 81 Communist and Workers Parties (the Moscow Declaration) clearly state that revisionism was the main danger to the international communist movement, and taking a clear stand in opposition to Yugoslavian revisionism, with which Khrushchev was already seeking to conciliate. This was an important point in that Yugoslavia not only was a symbol of modern revisionism, but also posed a grave danger to Albania, its neighbor.

Mao Tsetung greeting Enver Hoxha.

Following this meeting, however, the cleavage between revisionists and Marxists-Leninists continued to grow. Both China and Albania were under increasing pressure, and the Soviets withdrew aid to Albania, arrogantly declaring that the communists of Albania would be starved into submission within fifteen days. The Albanian people replied that they would rather eat grass than betray the cause of the world revolution. Of course they neither starved nor ate grass, but the Albanian working class and people, under the leadership of the PLA, shouldered the new difficulties caused by the Soviet treachery and gave the world a truly inspiring example of a small and beleaguered socialist state standing up to the imperialists and revisionists and building socialism by their own efforts. Albania stood firm in their support for the revolutionary struggle of the working class and the oppressed peoples throughout the world. The Chinese Party, with Mao's leadership, resolutely supported Albania in taking this course and rendered valuable economic aid and political support.

From 1960 to 1963 Albania was attacked by the revisionist leaders of the CPSU on many occasions, including congresses of other parties. In July 1963 the Khrushchev clique published an open attack on the Communist Party of China, formalizing the split between Marxism-Leninism and revisionism. The Chinese Party responded with a series of famous polemics beginning with the article "Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement" and continuing with the nine part reply to the Open Letter of the CPSU which culminated in the article "On Khrushchov's Phoney Communism and Its Historical Lessons for the World." These polemics drawn up under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tsetung remain to this day important Marxist-Leninist works. The PLA, also, under Enver Hoxha's leadership, made important contributions to the criticism of modern revisionism.

With a unity based on Marxism-Leninism and the revolutionary struggle, these two Parties fought together on all fronts. The Chinese assisted the Albanians in their struggle to build socialism self-reliantly, encircled by imperialism and revisionism. The Albanians rendered great assistance to the Chinese Party, by standing firm as an ally when China was besieged on all sides by the U.S. imperialists and the USSR. Albania led a long and eventually successful fight for China's rightful place to be restored at the United Nations.

All during this time, under Mao's leadership, the CPC never considered aid anything but its internationalist duty, still less did they try to use it as a club. In 1962, Mao put it, "First of all, we must thank you, because you stand in the forefront, because you are in very difficult situations and persistently fight to defend Marxism-Leninism. This is a very valuable thing, this is most valuable." (June 29, 1962) Similar statements by Mao and the Communist Party were issued on many occasions.

Under the leadership of Mao Tsetung, China's relationship with Albania was governed by proletarian internationalism. Undoubtedly, differences between these two fraternal Marxist-Leninist parties emerged—differences on some questions of building socialism and on assessing the international situation and the role of the socialist countries. These types of differences are, of course, entirely natural and, while no doubt exacerbated by wrong tendencies in one or another Party, never changed the fundamental unity and solidarity between China and Albania as long as both were following a Marxist-Leninist line.

In particular, the Albanian Party always highly valued the contributions of Mao Tsetung to the arsenal of Marxism-Leninism. For example, on Mao's 80th birthday, in 1973, various activities, gatherings, scientific sessions and meetings were held in Albania. On the evening of December 26th an important meeting was held which was attended by leaders of the Albanian Party and state, presided over by Mehmet Shehu, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Comrade Shehu pointed out in his opening speech that, "Comrade Mao Tsetung is the loyal and courageous continuator of the theory and immortal work of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin that today inspire the revolutionaries of all countries and all those fighting against imperialism, revisionism and reaction."

Comrade Hoxha sent a message to Mao on this same occasion which said: "you further developed and creatively enriched Marxist-Leninist science in the field of philosophy, the development of the proletarian party, the strategy and tactics of the revolutionary struggle and the struggle against imperialism, and the problems of the construction of the socialist society. Your precepts on continuing the revolution under the condition of the dictatorship of the proletariat, so as to carry socialist construction to final victory and bar the way to the danger of the restoration of capitalism, whatever form it takes and wherever it comes from, constitute a valuable contribution, of great international value, to the theory and practice of scientific socialism. Your works are a real revolutionary education for all Marxist-Leninists and working people."

The Albanian Party gave full support to the Cultural Revolution and made a correct assessment of its historic importance. At the same meeting on Mao's 80th birthday, Hysni Kapo, member of the Political Bureau, delivered a major speech which went at length into Mao's contributions to making revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, military affairs, the struggle against modern revisionism and other matters. He pointed out:

"Comrade Mao Tsetung worked out at the proper time the ideas, the strategy and tactics of the great proletarian cultural revolution in China, that revolution which overthrew from the state power all those who had taken the capitalist road, defended and consolidated the dictatorship of the proletariat, and became a great school of class education for the broad masses of the Chinese people, especially the younger generation. In the stormy days of this great revolution, there shone once more the vital force of Mao Tsetung's thought...

"Our party and people hailed this victory, wholeheartedly and enthusiastically, and they evaluate the experience of the great proletarian cultural revolution as an experience of world historic importance. 'The great Chinese proletarian cultural revolution,' comrade Enver Hoxha has said, 'is an inexhaustible source of inspiration for the revolutionary peoples in their struggle against imperialism and aggression, it serves as a brilliant example of how to overthrow the various revisionist cliques which have usurped the leadership of the party and state.' "

Again at the 7th Congress of the Party of Labor of Albania, held shortly after the revisionist coup in China, and at which he blasted the "three worlds" theory, Comrade Hoxha pointed out, "The historic victories which the Chinese people have attained in their glorious revolution and the construction of socialism, the creation of the new People's China and the high prestige it enjoys in the world, are directly linked with the name, teachings, and guidance of the great revolutionary, comrade Mao Tsetung. The work of this outstanding Marxist-Leninist represents a contribution to the enrichment of the revolutionary theory and practice of the proletariat. The Albanian communists and people will always honour the memory of comrade Mao Tsetung, who was a great friend of our Party and people."

In short, it can be seen that while Mao Tsetung was alive and a proletarian line was in command in China, Albania and China remained close friends and allies and that the Party of Labor of Albania led by Enver Hoxha made a correct assessment of Mao's contributions.

The experience of the close relationship between the CPC and the PLA, forged by Comrades Mao Tsetung and Enver Hoxha, and tempered in the common and courageous struggle against revisionism and in defense of Marxism-Leninism, remains a model of proletarian internationalism.

No opportunists, least of all Hua Kuo-feng and Teng Hsiao-ping, will succeed in masking their great power chauvinism and betrayal of revolution under Mao's revolutionary banner. The cutting off of aid to Albania while embracing reactionaries everywhere, including the pioneer revisionist Tito, is another clear-cut reversal of Mao's revolutionary line, and will be seen as such by communists and revolutionaries everywhere. ■

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sionist line, but the pivotal event to the international proletariat was not Teng Hsiao-ping's reactionary "three worlds" speech at the United Nations in 1974, but the coup that he helped headquarter in 1976.

Reaction to Revisionist Coup

This coup did, in fact, bring the struggle within our Party to a head. The stand and line of the Jarvis-Bergman clique toward the coup in China had a process of development from October 1976 to their frantic split in January 1978. This downhill process continues to this day, as the crass opportunism of the "Revolutionary Workers Headquarters" becomes enriched and deepened daily. But there have been certain consistent features which characterized their behavior from the beginning. Careerism, emotional ties to China and other factors entered in, but basically this clique liked the revisionism coming out of China because of their own revisionism. It fit them like a glove.

As each new revisionist and pragmatist line would appear in China, the Jarvis-Bergman clique would welcome it as if it were their own—and it was. And when all else failed them, they fell back to the most basic tenet of their pragmatic line, "if it works it must be right." Since the Four lost, they must have been wrong; since Hua and Teng won, they must be right. Any other conclusion would challenge their whole pragmatic outlook.

Thus something external to the RCP, USA—the question of China—linked up with and brought to the boiling point the internal contradiction between Marxism and revisionism. It made it impossible for Jarvis and Bergman to straddle the fence between Marxism and revisionism. And the factional behavior of this clique—also a consistent hallmark which helped earn them the name "Mensheviks"—brings home the truth spoken to by Wang Hung-wen in his report to the 10th Congress of the Chinese Party, "If one practices revisionism...one will inevitably go in for splits, intrigues, and conspiracies." So it went with this clique, in their downward slide process of development.

In early October 1976, as soon as the word of the arrest of the Four reached the United States, no one at the Party Center liked what had happened. Everyone said that these four were the revolutionaries, the ones who had been fighting at Mao's side against revisionists like Teng Hsiao-ping. At the same time all agreed, at least in word, that further study of the basic questions of political and ideological line was necessary for a full understanding. This even included Leibel Bergman, who had approvingly said at the time Yao Wen-yuan and Chang Chun-chiao's two major (and now attacked) articles had appeared in early 1975, "That's the RU line." What he was referring to was the fact that these two articles, which made important analyses of the basis of capitalist restoration under socialism, put forward much the same line on this question as did the RU's publication *Red Papers 7: How Capitalism Has been Restored in the Soviet Union.* Of course, this was no surprise since both *RP7* and these articles were based on Mao's analysis of the same subject. (Perhaps all Bergman was thinking of, though, was not the question of line, but of the possibility that such agreement might open up a vast market in China for sales of *RP7.*)

Right after the arrests, Mickey Jarvis even did his final work on an article conceived by him (written by a ghost writer, of course) on "Bourgeois Right, Economism and the Goal of the Working Class Struggle" (*The Communist*, Vol. 1, No. 1). This article, which he had suggested in order to help him "sum up some errors" he had made, linked to his history in the CPUSA, drew heavily and consciously from the Yao and Chang pamphlets.

But within a week or so—as soon as it became clear that the arrests and the power seizure by Hua and Co. were going to stick—the powerful fact that Hua had actually won was dawning on Jarvis. His attitude was becoming: the Four lost; what more is needed to discredit them? But our Mensheviks' act was not yet together on what to do about it. So Jarvis' response began to take the form of agnosticism in discussion with other Party leaders—saying he wasn't sure, he'd have to see, and so on and so froth. But, again in words, he agreed that line would be the decisive question. This stand, weak as it was, enabled the revolutionaries at the Party Center, led by Comrade Avakian, to publish an important article in the October 15, 1976 issue of REVOLUTION. This article, "Chinese People Will Carry Out Mao's Line, Continue Revolution," did not take a direct position on the coup, but summed up the Party's understanding of Mao's revolutionary line and fighting legacy around the question of capitalist restoration. Its title, taken from Mao's most recent battle against Teng and the "right deviationist wind to reverse correct verdicts" was "Class Struggle Key Link." It was understood and agreed to by everyone at the Center at that time that this article had to have what was termed a "tilt" toward the view that the line of the Four—and Mao—was correct. Today every line of that article stands as a ringing indictment of the Chinese leaders (not to mention Jarvis and Bergman) for their blatant reversals of Mao's line and legacy. It concluded with what was agreed as a fair and correct "check list"—centered on the decisive question of line—by which the nature of the Hua leadership should be gauged. This was in clear opposition to the "slander story" method being employed by the Chinese leadership to discredit the Four. It quoted Mao, "The correctness or incorrectness of the ideological and political line decides everything," and then went on:

> "We are confident that the Chinese people, guided by the revolutionary line of Mao Tsetung, through all the twists and turns, will: continue to make revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat; continue to carry out the campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and combat and prevent revisionism; continue and deepen the struggle against the reactionary line and policies of Teng Hsiao-ping and all other capitalist roaders; continue to uphold, consolidate and build on the great achievements of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, defend and expand the 'socialist new things' and restrict bourgeois right and the other soil engendering capitalism; and continue to grasp, ever more deeply, in the course of struggle, the correct line charted by Mao to advance in making socialist revolution, continue to support the world revolutionary movement and, together with the people of the world, eventually achieve the goal of communism." (page 17)

These statements, enough to condemn Hua, Teng and Co. to the revisionist dustbin they deserve, were not drawn from some hat. They were drawn from the crucial questions of line and struggle to which Mao himself had drawn ever sharper attention through his last years. Most, if not all, are to be found in the Chinese Central Committee statement just after his death. All at the RCP Center agreed this REVOLUTION article should set the basic standard, as we studied further developments.

It was by keeping to this cardinal question of line that the revolutionaries in the Party leadership were able, as events unfolded, to confirm and deepen the initial impression that what was under attack in China was Mao's revolutionary legacy and Marxism-Leninism as a whole.

Party Stress on Studying the Lines

It was to this question of ideological and political line that the leadership directed the attention of the whole Party in order to evaluate events in China. Everyone was instructed in October and November to begin study of these questions. Along with the above-mentioned REVOLUTION article, everyone was to read Chang's and Yao's pamphlets, together with a major address by Hua given in late 1975 at a Conference on "Learning from Tachai." In addition, suggestions were made about studying more basic Marxist-Leninist works, including other material from China and from our own Party. In an internal bulletin to the whole Party which was sent out at that time, it was pointed out that "It is an important task for our Party to study carefully the current struggles [in China]." At the same time it made clear that the leading bodies had not yet come to a conclusion about "who's right and who's wrong" in China. The bulletin pointed out this was because "there are classes and class struggle under socialism, and that in those struggles ideological and political line are decisive. As we study more deeply, and as events, including the expounding of lines and policies by the new Chinese leadership, further unfold, matters will definitely become more clear."

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Incredible as it may seem for Marxist-Leninists, just taking this approach of focusing on line was a victory over the "rush to the telegraph office with a congratulatory telegram" approach of Klonsky and the OL, and the by-now growing approach of Jarvis and Bergman of downgrading the importance of line.

Of course, had the initial unity of assessment on the events in China been maintained at the Party Center, things would have proceeded differently. It would have been possible quite soon to put out to the whole Party that the leading bodies had the strong feeling that these developments were negative and opposed to Mao's line, while calling for further study and investigation as events unfolded. But the quick adoption by Jarvis and Bergman of rank opportunism made this approach impossible.

The early bulletin went on to say, "This same principle [paying attention to line] should guide comrades throughout the Party in taking up these questions. While going deeply into the lines involved, people should strive to keep an open mind, and while people will and should tend to have opinions, these should not become hard and fast and should not lead to the formation of groups in the Party taking one side or the other. Further guidance will be coming in the future from the Party Center." Party units were called on to have collective discussion of basic points of line on the struggle under socialism, but to not collectively discuss and "decide on" who was right and wrong in China—though informal discussion of this by people in the same units was not discouraged. The reason for this was two-fold: first, to arm people with a grasp of the most important line questions to strengthen the Party's ability to judge things as they developed; secondly, it was part of an effort to unite the whole Party through serious study based on Marxism-Leninism. This, it was hoped, would certainly include uniting the leadership through study and struggle, as events developed.

Factional Activity

Within weeks of the publication of the October 15 article, Jarvis had done a complete turnabout. Hua had won, no doubt about it, and "the gang" had lost. That was the real standard. Never mind all the "yak-yak" about line in that REVOLUTION article. In the face of this, the previously agreed-to "tilt" had to be abandoned, while the Party carried out further study. By mid-November 1976, around the time of the Conference on the International Situation in New York City, this clique had already begun to unleash its social base—with people gossiping about how "the gang" was no good.

Jarvis and Bergman had in fact violated the decisions of the Party on how to approach this question almost as soon as they were made. Both managed to drop their opinions here and there to "friendly forces" in the Party. Pretty soon discussions were held in some units under this clique's influence to "tighten up" people that "the gang was ultra-left." All this, of course, was in direct opposition to what they had agreed to, and was kept hidden from the Party leadership as a whole.

On leading bodies at that time Jarvis limited his performances to agnosticism. "I gotta lot of questions," was a frequently heard refrain. But when pressed, Jarvis and most other leading members of the clique would express the opinion that "the gang was no good."

This bunch began the endless—if unfilling—process of gorging themselves on horror stories printed in the *Peking Review*. A typical exchange:

> Jarvis—The gang didn't believe in paying attention to production, they said it would "automatically" go up.
>
> —Oh, how do you know?
>
> —It says so in the current issue of *Peking Review*.
>
> —Have you ever seen that—or anything different than Mao's line "grasp revolution, promote production" in anything the Four wrote, or in articles under their leadership?
>
> —Naw. But articles are just articles. Practice is what counts.

It would be constantly pointed out by Comrade Avakian and others that written articles from both before and after the Four's arrest were precisely the best, most concentrated way, to compare and understand the lines of the two sides. Other sources of facts should be sought out, but not ridiculous one-sided acceptance of current horror stories as the evidence against the Four.

Leibel Bergman, meanwhile, was promoting agnosticism—and revisionism—in his own peculiar form. He didn't believe in articles either. Just rumors. During this period in meetings Bergman was not coming out openly with his line. He'd just "tell stories." He'd weave and blow with the rumor breeze, but his feet were always firmly planted in the camp of the revisionists in China. If anyone seriously risked getting into a major political question about China on the leading bodies, Bergman would rush in to "save the day" with advice like, "Hope for the best, have faith in the Chinese people, *la lutta continua*, the struggle goes on," and anything else he could dish up to keep Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought from being applied.

Bergman was a self-styled Confucian sage to whom all that mattered was "genius" (particularly his), not line. He cast himself simultaneously in the role of "humble commoner" and personal spokesman for "the Chinese people," and just kept reeling off rumors. It seemed there was nothing too ridiculous for him to repeat. Around mid-November 1976, he was especially fond of repeating a story from some Canadian students in China which supported the current leaders and which actually said "*no one*" in China was attacking the Cultural Revolution! One might ask why Mao in 1976 had bothered to warn of the "right deviationist attempt to reverse correct verdicts"—perhaps he was just whistling in the wind or didn't know the facts. But, no matter, Bergman was undeterred and kept repeating this story even up to the 1977 Central Committee meeting!

Around this same time (November 1976) Bergman told another interesting story. He recounted that Huang Hua, now China's Foreign Minister, had recently told him that Mao himself had gone over, made suggestions on and approved Chang Chun-chiao's article "On Exercising All-Round Dictatorship Over the Bourgeoisie." To Bergman, this was just more proof that articles—and particularly articles by the Four which had been quite popular with RCP members—meant nothing at all. But to Marxist-Leninists not blinded by subjectivism like Leibel Bergman, this little story is just further proof of the fact that the Four's line was Mao's line.

Under these increasingly difficult conditions, the revolutionaries at the Party Center continued to try to lead the whole Party in study of the basic line questions, and to lead the leadership bodies in study, investigation and struggle to unify around a correct line.

1977 RCP Delegation to China

As part of this, the RCP in early 1977 sent a delegation, which included some leading members, to China. The purpose of this trip was not to "take a side," but to assist the Party in coming to conclusions. After this trip was originally arranged, the revolutionaries in our Party's leadership initiated an attempt to add Leibel Bergman and another leading member of this clique to the list of those going. The hope was that once these two saw first-hand what was really going on in China they might come around, and that this would help in efforts to unite the whole Party. Ironically, for some reason, the Chinese turned down this request. To the extent that the Chinese made political presentations to this delegation—as opposed to tales about how the "gang of four" didn't want the trains to run on time—it was clear that the line presented was quite the opposite of the line of Mao Tsetung. This was true on the cardinal questions of the relation between revolution and production, of the class struggle and its targets in the socialist period, culture, and many others. The international line presented was even further out than before in its support for NATO and various imperialists. This, at least, was the opinion of all but at most a couple of members of this delegation. It was also significant that, unlike on past delegations, no rank and file workers were among the people who met with the delegation as it visited the factories.

The story of the clear supporter of the Chinese revisionists who went on that delegation is instructive about the factional madness that the clique was already promoting. For example, one evening the delegation was discussing among itself some of the criticisms that had been raised by the Chinese of

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Chang Chun-chiao's pamphlet. This fellow piped, "It's metaphysical." When asked to explain why he thought so, for the benefit of the discussion, he became agitated and all he could blurt out was "I can't explain it, but there's someone back in my area who can." He then accidentally revealed the fact that the leadership of the "water-tight kingdom" from which he came had violated the decisions of the Party and had a group discussion and come to conclusions as a body about this pamphlet. This fellow actually felt bound to the decision, even while he had been kept so ignorant he was unable to explain it at all.

Later on, when the delegation was being given one of many denunciations of the "crimes of the gang of four" this same fellow broke into applause. As everyone on the delegation knew, the purpose of the trip was to study and investigate and not to offer endorsement or opinions on the current leadership as against the Four or vice versa. This person's responses were therefore clearly not appropriate. But this fellow's Party spirit was so undermined that he could not carry out this political task. In fact, later he was cranked up by the clique to condemn the leadership of the delegation as "factional" for criticizing him afterwards for this behavior!

Upon the return of this delegation, the Party leadership put out further guidance to the Party as a whole for study. It stated explicitly "The attitude and approach every Party takes in understanding and evaluating the events in China will have much to do with determining whether or not that Party remains a Marxist-Leninist Party or degenerates into one kind of opportunism or another." This bulletin identified several key questions to focus in on, basically centering in on the relation between revolution and production and the meaning of Mao's statement that "class struggle is the key link."

It referred all comrades to a theoretical article in *The Communist* (Vol. 1, No. 2) called "On the Relationship Between the Forces and Relations of Production and the Base and Superstructure." This article, while it was forced into a compromise position of being fuzzy on a few questions relating to the constant class struggle against the bourgeoisie, was fundamentally correct and an indictment of the "theory of the productive forces." As such, it was then (and can be seen even more clearly now to be) an indictment of the Chinese revisionists in power who champion exactly this theory. This bulletin also called people's attention to the developing polemic between China and Albania on international line and urged comrades to study it.

During this time it had also become clear that Teng Hsiao-ping was about to be restored to some level of leadership in China. Especially since this was so flagrantly and openly in opposition to Mao, and even more since Teng was not yet in office, there was still an ability to force at least Jarvis to go along with maintaining our earlier principles and reiterate that Teng was a revisionist whose line would have led to capitalist restoration. Even as this was reiterated, however, it was necessary to go through ridiculous contortions and say that this did not necessarily mean the current leadership was revisionist and the Four correct. This compromise was necessary to get out anything at all on Teng. The revolutionaries at the Party Center did so in order to keep up the study of line among the cadre and to continue to make efforts to win over the Jarvis-Bergman forces and unite the Party leadership.

The Teng Hsiao-ping story is an excellent illustration of the sliding-scale revisionism which Jarvis had embarked upon and held to as his method throughout this whole struggle. First Jarvis agreed that the continuing and deepening of the campaign to criticize Teng was an important criterion for determining the character of the new leadership in China. Soon enough this campaign was dropped and Teng's counter-revolutionary revisionist line was suddenly changed to "criticizing Teng's revisionist line errors." Did Jarvis agree with that? No, he would reply, but suddenly it wasn't a decisive criterion any more. A little later, there was not even *pro forma* criticism directed at Teng, and it was clear that he was about to be restored to leadership. Did Jarvis agree? No, said Jarvis, but let's see how high in leadership he's restored. It was clear from this method that there would be no limit to the revisionist depths to which Jarvis would eventually sink. He was repeatedly told so by other leading comrades, but he would only scoff, while always blustering (then) that "I've *always* been consistent on Teng! He's a revisionist!" Today he has sunk to such a depth that even the arguments he originally made in defense of Hua would stand as indictments of the current leadership. ("Well, at least they haven't brought back Teng and his line"—to name just one such argument.)

Jarvis' "Three Lines" Theory

It was at this time (spring 1977) that Mickey Jarvis came out fully and openly in leadership with his so-called "three lines" argument. This was an eclectic mishmash, designed to cover over the obvious embarrassment at the development of such events as the restoration of Teng, while its fundamental purpose was to open attack on the Four as counter-revolutionary "ultra-leftists" responsible for everything bad in China—including the rise of Teng. This "three lines" argument did not then and cannot now hold water in the face of the clear demarcation between two opposed lines and camps—that of Mao and the Four on the one hand and Chou En-lai and the current leaders on the other. But if "three lines" could be invented, then every outrage could be excused, blamed on the "havoc" caused by the Four, or dismissed as unimportant because "the Right controls the *Peking Review*."

Shanghai workers criticize the revisionist formulation of "taking the three directives as the key link" during the movement to criticize Teng and beat back the right deviationist wind (1976).

Leibel Bergman, however, didn't bother much with such trappings. His revisionism was as naked as it was decrepit. Behind the smokescreen of "have faith in the Chinese people," Bergman had a line. He was busily summing up that Mao had messed up and that the Cultural Revolution had left nothing but chaos and power-grabbing. Bergman was perfectly characterized by Mao in his poem "Two Birds: A Dialogue":

> "A sparrow in his bush is scared stiff.
> 'This is one hell of a mess!
> O, I want to flit and fly away.' "

Under these circumstances, Bergman had an answer: give me my old friend Chou En-lai—and all his old friends, including Teng Hsiao-ping. To Bergman, Chou and not Mao was always the real hero of the struggle in China. He would never tire of telling stories about how "Chou En-lai was everywhere in the Cultural Revolution." He was the man who "kept things from getting out of hand." In the period of 1976 between the death of Chou and the death of Mao, Bergman repeated favorably a statement by a bourgeois "expert" on China: "When Chou En-lai dies the Chinese people will feel great grief; when Mao dies they will feel great relief." He actually said this reactionary statement "had something to it"! This perfectly reflected the view of the unreformed bourgeois intellectuals and others in the social base of the current Chinese leadership.

Bergman even knew, and occasionally admitted, that Chou and Mao were fighting in the last years. Especially when Mao launched the campaign to criticize the novel *Water Margin* in 1975, Bergman felt the target was Chou. But all that did was lead him into cynicism, idealism and revisionism. He moaned at that time how it was no good that "as soon as anyone gets next to Mao, down they go." Never mind Mao's teachings on capitalist roaders and the bourgeoisie in the party; never mind the obvious question of who else but a powerful and prestigious leader could headquarter a counter-revolutionary attempt; never mind the questions of line; never mind all that—just stick with your "old friend Chou" and that "tough cookie" Teng Hsiao-ping.

Bergman and Jarvis played quite a revisionist duet during their last months in the RCP. Jarvis with his "three lines" theory and his "sliding scale revisionism" was a frenzied sight. He was like a man whose truck had already gone over a cliff, but was on his CB radio protesting all the way down. Bergman, on the other hand, was already sprawled on the rocks below beckoning, "Come on down, once you get past the bumps it's soothing down here."

By the summer of 1977, this clique's factionalizing on the question of China and what they were calling "gang of four idealism" in the basic line of our Party's Chairman and others in leadership had reached a very high pitch. It was clear they were even going outside the Party. One comrade later reported that he was told around this time by a leading CPML member, "We know your Central Committee is split and Jarvis and Bergman oppose the 'gang of four'." These Mensheviks were trying to block political discussion of China in the Party, postpone any decisive dealing with that question, while they whipped up a frenzy of opposition among their social base to the "ultra-leftism" of Comrade Avakian and others. They thought time was on their side.

In leadership meetings they began to threaten they would split the Party if a "premature" Central Committee meeting was called. Meanwhile they busily spread revisionism everywhere, like fertilizer for their splitting aims. Under these conditions, the revolutionaries at the Party Center insisted that if a Central Committee meeting wasn't going to be held very soon, then the leadership should do some more thorough education among Party members on some key points of line in order to combat the deluge of revisionism which was coming at them unanswered from the *Peking Review* (as well as being promoted by the Jarvis-Bergman clique). Through firm struggle, Jarvis, Bergman and the rest were forced to go along with this and allow a leadership meeting to discuss these questions. In the wake of the 11th Party Congress in China, the meeting took up and discussed the line of the "General Program" which had been authored in 1975 by the Chinese revisionists and condemned by Mao, as well as the question of the bourgeoisie in the party under socialism.

Because they had no Marxist leg to stand on in front of the cadre of the Party on these questions, and because they were laying low in leading bodies, while running wild below, the leaders of the clique agreed to an internal document which went still more deeply into the history of Teng Hsiao-ping (who was reinstated to the highest levels of the Chinese Party at the 11th Congress), which blasted the "General Program" as a revisionist promotion of the theory of the productive forces, and which analyzed the line of the current rulers on the question of the bourgeoisie under socialism as fundamentally opposed to Mao's line and to Marxism. Documents putting this forward, together with documents from China, including the "General Program," were circulated for study in the Party. Still, it was argued for by Jarvis, in particular, and it was included in this bulletin that all this did not necessarily mean the present leadership was revisionist, but might also indicate the current weakness of "genuine leftists" because of the wrecking of the "gang of four." Even with this twisted-logic qualifier, this bulletin, which reached comrades in the fall,

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played an important role in educating them as to the basic questions of line.

At that time a Central Committee meeting was also set for the end of the year, at which all agreed the basic questions would be taken up and resolved. It was around this time that Jarvis, in particular, began even more despicable double-dealing. On the one hand, people in his camp were whipped up to oppose the line of the last bulletin, with which he expressed agreement. On the other, he began to float to others at the Party Center that he might be having a change of heart on the question. After all, he said, there was a lot of revisionism coming out of China.

Central Committee Meeting

Other comrades at the Center welcomed this attitude on Jarvis' part, while understandably not fully trusting it, especially in light of continued factionalism and stepped-up attacks on the part of many in his social base. Winning over Jarvis on this question would certainly provide the best possible conditions for uniting and educating the whole Party around a correct line. Jarvis was given more material to study. Finally, in the weeks before the Central Committee meeting at the end of 1977, Jarvis stated to other comrades at the Center that he felt his position had been wrong and that, although he still had some questions, he thought the Four were basically correct. He said he would submit a paper to the Central Committee that would make self-criticism and put forward this view.

Comrade Avakian offered to help out if necessary, and arranged for further discussions with Jarvis for that purpose. But Jarvis, who was always notorious for being late, was even later than usual for these meetings. In fact, he didn't show at all. He evaded phone calls. Even on the very eve of the Central Committee meeting, in a phone conversation with another comrade at the Center, Jarvis gave no indication he was retracting his recently expressed views.

Then, in a surprise attack, without even having made an effort to notify the Chairman of the Central Committee, he showed up at the Central Committee meeting with a three-page paper—as empty as it was backstabbing—which proclaimed his support for Hua Kuo-feng and denounced the Four as counter-revolutionaries. This paper was not intended to have substance, it was intended as a tattered flag, a rallying symbol to his clique to "stand firm."

Weeks earlier, Comrade Avakian had submitted to all Central Committee members a draft of the paper "Revisionists are Revisionists and Must Not Be Supported, Revolutionaries are Revolutionaries and Must Be Supported." Another opposing paper was circulated at this same time. Jarvis and Bergman had given the thankless task of preparing the main defense of the current leadership to their hack "theoretician."

This scholar, with a doctorate in agnosticism, knew that he had no chance to conduct an argument on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. So, in a predictable move, he declared the basic lines irrelevant and instead would dig up a morass of so-called facts—truly a jumble of accusations and rumors against the Four. He would dig through Kuomintang and Hong Kong sources until he found an accusation copied by them from a Peking source, and would then produce this as "proof" of a *Peking Review* story. The aim was to stir up enough confusion and an atmosphere of "it's impossible to know all this stuff" so as to paralyze comrades from applying Marxism-Leninism and arriving at correct conclusions.

This fit in nicely with the overall aims of this clique. Overwhelmingly they were not interested in China. Their main goal was to pull a coup in the Party, finish off its revolutionary line and thoroughly implement their own revisionism. But only by stopping a Marxist-Leninist approach and correct conclusions around the China question could they hope to do this. And, as noted before, the triumph of a revisionist line in China was a big boost to their own revisionist line.

The meeting began with long presentations from many holders of both positions. Bergman rambled on egotistically with more old China stories, praising Chou En-lai. (When confronted with the fact he had said he believed Chou was Mao's target in the *Water Margin* campaign, he yelped, "Yes, but I didn't say I liked it, did I?") By the time he finished, one comrade spoke up and said that some people present wouldn't identify anyone as a revisionist unless that person pinned a tag to that effect on their chest, but that he seriously doubted that even this would make a difference to Bergman. Bergman had also presented a paper of no more substance than his speech, which capped off its anti-Marxist exercises at combining two into one by criticizing the Four for attacking the "General Program" instead of seeking to improve it. Even Bergman had to admit that was ridiculous when someone pointed out that would amount to "improving" an all-but-explicit attack on themselves. Bergman also dragged out other cheap appeals to emotionalism—to anyone who would oppose the current revisionist line on "modernization" he retorted, "How would you like to try a carrying-pole?" To this, it was replied, "How would you, Bergman, like to work under the Taylor system [the capitalist speedup system now being openly praised in China]?"

Jarvis gave a speech and, much to the embarrassment of his clique, fell flatter than his paper onto his face. He ended up mumbling blatant nonsense about how 40% of the factory workforce were singers and dancers "and stuff" and these made up the Four's social base "and stuff," and how their line for agriculture had been to build up "green belts" around the cities—"and stuff." This fiasco badly disheartened his followers, who never really did recover at that meeting.

After days of long presentations and debates, the arguments—such as they were—of this clique had been badly battered. Their "facts" had been examined one by one and shown to be utter falsehoods, or else to prove the exact opposite of what the Mensheviks alleged. By this time, leaders of this clique were reduced to pathetic efforts such as, "Well, they built a sarcophagus to preserve Mao's body, so that shows they don't intend to dump his line," and "Mao told Chiang Ching 'Don't nit-pick' about the film *Pioneers*, and that must be significant."

The clique was clearly badly in need of a rallying cry. In a staged move marked by the hand of Leibel Bergman, one of the clique's leaders picked up on an earlier threat made by Jarvis and called on his comrades to "be strong," saying he wouldn't abide by the Central Committee's decision and carrry it down in the Party. In the careerist fashion typical of this clique, he added that he was a leader of important Party sections and work and "a lot of cadre respect me."

But this sickening show of bluster failed to shake the revolutionaries in the Central Committee, and the bluff got nowhere. Debate over the line on China continued, and comrades spoke to the connection between the Mensheviks' revisionist stand on China and their overall line of eclecticism, pragmatism, and factionalism. Finally this same self-proclaimed big-shot raised his hand, retracted his earlier threat, and made self-criticism for a whole series of wrong lines he had held. He said he would carry down the line of the majority on China. Then, other clique members began making self-criticism.

A short sample is instructive of these people's line: "When Teng Hsiao-ping first fell we were all happy. Now he's back. The criticism that we have disdain for cadres is true. The criticism that we don't carry on ideological struggle over world outlook and only have struggle over how to implement things is true. To all in the faction: our argument is f---ed up. I think we should restudy the question of China, accept criticism and transform our world outlook..."

"We [the faction] don't know s--- about China. We need to say we don't *give* a s---. We were just afraid that once they [the majority of the CC] get the line on China, they'll use it to start a rectification in the Party and beat the s--- out of us. I'll vote for the thing [Chair's resolution] and do whatever the Party asks me to carry out."

At that point the Chair said emphatically that no one should vote for the resolution if they still disagreed with it; if they disagreed they should vote no; and if they didn't think they knew enough they should abstain.

All the Central Committee members in this clique made some self-criticism and pledged to carry the line down and "reserve their opinions." Mickey Jarvis made a characteristically penetrating self-criticism, "I've been jelly for some time." The Central Committee passed the Chairman's resolution on China by two to one (three to one including alternate members) and a rectification campaign in the Party was unanimously approved. It summed up that an attempt had been made to institute a revisionist line, and failing that to

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Struggle...

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split the Party. Organizational changes were made, too, and the door was left open for members of this clique to unite around the Party's line and remold their outlook in the course of doing work—in almost all cases in some leading position—as members of this faction had pledged themselves to do.

Menshevik Treachery

With changes based on the discussion, the Central Committee report was prepared for circulation to all comrades. It called upon the whole Party to deeply study and discuss this crucial matter of China in a thoroughgoing and serious way, based on the Chairman's report. Discussion was to take place according to normal methods of democratic centralism—with people to raise their differences with the report only on the highest body to which they belonged, while leading lower bodies in study and discussion on the basis of the line adopted by the Central Committee. But most units hadn't even received the documents, let alone begun study of them, before the faction regrouped its forces, reversed its pledges and confronted the Party with a headlong rush to split it. In doing so they even made use of their own two-faced behavior, attacking the CC Report, which had taken seriously their pledges to unite, for "hiding the split in the Central Committee."

In a sickening display of hypocrisy, this clique, whose whole line completely opposed the Chinese Cultural Revolution, raised the slogan "It's right to rebel" to whip up their own reactionary revolt. They raised a hue and cry about "democracy." Regular unit meetings were cancelled and mass membership rallies called in areas under their leadership—all in complete disregard of the security of Party members. People's attention was focused on lurid tales and "inside scoops" on what had "really" gone on in the leadership. Their "democracy" was a carbon-copy of bourgeois democracy for the masses: lots of form and no substance at all. People were rushed to take illegal votes and split without having seriously studied the line of the Central Committee. The Menshevik leaders quickly rewrote another draft of their "theoretician's" paper on China and circulated that—along with an attack on the Party's line on the class struggle in the U.S.—as their split documents. (These are both available in the just-published book of documents of the struggle.)

Many in the movement press, of course, picked up on their accusations of "lack of democracy" in the RCP. But what is really involved here, in part, is whether you take a bourgeois or a proletarian view of democracy. From a Marxist-Leninist point of view, in order to really rely on the masses—including the masses of Party members—it is necessary to arm them with the *science* of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought. Otherwise what criteria can they use to judge right from wrong? This was the approach the revolutionaries in Party leadership took from the very beginning to the end of this struggle—constantly struggling to keep things centered on the decisive question of line, and to the maximum degree possible at every step seeking to arm the masses of Party members with the basis in Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought to distinguish right from wrong. Seen in this way genuine proletarian democracy and real reliance on the masses involves the question of the *science* of revolution, and is not simply a bunch of demagogic appeals to be made while losing a struggle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that for communists, the question of safeguarding the party of the working class as a *revolutionary* party and keeping it from being destroyed by revisionism is fundamentally a question of *class struggle*—and often fierce struggle at that—and not simply a question of great debates over ideas.

Nonetheless, anyone who is interested in checking the record of the RCP and the RU before it can plainly see that, in every major struggle, every effort has been made to make the different lines known not only internally but also (at the appropriate time) to the broadest audience possible, so that people may judge for themselves. This has been done in the RU's *Red Papers*, in the Party press and in other ways. This, too, is the purpose of the recent publication of a volume of the major documents of this struggle from both sides.

In the face of the reactionary "rebellion," the large majority of Party members repudiated the split and consolidated the ranks of the Party. True, a number of people who had been in the "private kingdoms" of the Mensheviks and had been primed by factionalism for a long time regarded the Central Committee Report as a "bolt out of the blue." But most Party members, who had been carrying out serious study and discussion of the basic questions in accordance with the guidance agreed to at the Party Center, enthusiastically welcomed the Report, recognizing it as a continuation of the Party's revolutionary line and the concentration of the understanding they themselves had been arriving at. Despite all their fanfare and prolonged factionalism, the Menshevik clique managed to drag along somewhat less than one-third of the Party membership. This is due in large part to the tremendous contributions of Mao and the revolutionary left in China, which armed our Party and communists throughout the world with a much deeper understanding of the class struggle under socialism.

Second Congress

As part of Party consolidation, preparations were made to hold the Second Party Congress. These preparations included the circulation of the Jarvis-Bergman clique's major papers, together with replies from the Party leadership, to all Party members for serious discussion and for repudiation. Those who drew a line and repudiated the mad splitting efforts of the faction but continued to have questions or differences with the Party's line were encouraged to raise and struggle over these differences in this context. There was every confidence that these comrades could be won over based on political line and Marxism-Leninism, and in almost all cases this proved to be so. On the basis of all this, the Congress was held earlier this year and was—as reported in the April/May issue of REVOLUTION—a congress of unity and of victory against revisionism. It was a lively and serious congress which greatly deepened the Party's grasp of all the major questions of line involved in this struggle, including the question of China. It reaffirmed the Party's determination to stick to the revolutionary path, to stand up to revisionism here and internationally, and to press on to victory.

In contrast, since the split the Jarvis-Bergman "Revolutionary Workers Headquarters" has continued to reveal their bankruptcy and opportunism. Their "sliding scale" has continued its dizzying descent into the pit of revisionism but, we are confident, it has by no means reached the bottom.

They have even changed their documents upon publishing them, to stay in tune with their descent. Their first papers, for example, characterized Teng and the Four as "opposite poles of the same stupidity." But today such pretenses are gone. Their latest version of their line criticizes their "earlier antagonistic characterizations of Teng Hsiao-ping, in effect negating the fact that he is a leading figure within the collective leadership of the Chinese Communist Party which is giving correct leadership to the continuing revolution there."

We should thank our Mensheviks. In this one sentence they have given us more in the way of self-exposure of their pragmatism and opportunism than ten pages of our documents could ever hope to reveal. One of the points made early on in this struggle was that Jarvis-Bergman's line is straight pragmatism: Hua and Co. won; the "gang of four" lost; therefore, Hua and Co. must be right and we must support them. But this unsolicited confession of theirs is really too much: Principle be damned! Teng's got the power!

Let's return to the haunting refrains of Jarvis huffing, "I've always been consistent on Teng! He's a revisionist!" It's true Jarvis has always been consistent—consistently pragmatic and opportunist. When it was necessary to criticize Teng in order to peddle his revisionism inside the RCP Jarvis did so—though in an empty way. Now that it is necessary to embrace Teng to peddle this revisionism elsewhere, he's ready at the drop of a trip to China.

CPML—Shameless Flunkeys

Of course, in this naked opportunism and bootlicking, our Mensheviks are still only apprentices when compared to Klonsky and the OL-CPML. The OL-CPML has put on a prolonged display of lick-spittle opportunism which has caused alternate gagging and laughter among genuine communists, not to mention anyone with an ounce of a scientific attitude. This same display has won them the endorsement of the present leaders of China just as surely as it has earned for Klonsky and company the cynical contempt of these same leaders—after all, nobody respects a prostitute, least of all his/her pimp.

At the time of the struggle against Teng and the Right deviationist wind in 1976, the OL faithfully sent its congratulations and the CALL was full of articles speaking to such questions as "Why did Teng Hsiao-ping become an enemy of socialism and take the capitalist road?" and explaining that there are capitalist roaders who "are bourgeois democrats whose world outlook has remained unchanged. Teng Hsiao-ping is one of these." (CALL, May 17, 1976.) On Mao's death in September, Klonsky's message hailed Mao's guidance of "the current struggle against Teng Hsiao-ping's Right deviationist line," and sent "sympathy to Comrade Chiang Ching..."

One month later, after the coup, the OL raced to the telegraph office in a mad dash to be among the first in the world to greet Chairman Hua. For Klonsky and company a moment's doubt could never be permitted—let alone a scientific attitude—nothing to challenge the holy grail of the "China connection" which keeps the patchwork of opportunism of the OL-CPML together with Klonsky on top. In succeeding weeks, the CALL was again faithfully regurgitating how the Chinese people were united in criticizing the "gang of four" and in continuing to criticize Teng. They wrote in the CALL (Nov. 8, 1976), "But the Chinese people, tempered through the fiery years of the Cultural Revolution and the mass criticisms of capitalist-roaders like Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-ping, quickly saw through the schemes of the 'gang of four.' " Or again, in another soon-to-be-forgotten statement, "The line that stability and unity are on a par with waging the class struggle is the revisionist line of the defeated capitalist-roader Teng Hsiao-ping..." (CALL, Nov. 15, 1976.)

As soon as it was apparent that "criticism" of Teng was no longer in vogue, it was dropped like a hot rock by the OL-CPML. Finally, in the August 1, 1977 CALL, as soon as it was official in China, Klonsky wrote an article beginning, "A great victory has been won. A great wrong has been set right." Teng is back!

All this, of course, even drew laughter from the Menshevik kingpins who were in the RCP—partly because of the constraints the Marxism-Leninism of the RCP was imposing on them, and partly because their own pragmatism and opportunism had not quite achieved the stylistic depths perfected by Klonsky. But their method is fundamentally the same. Once Marxism is abandoned—anything goes. And what is Klonsky's explanation for this glaring toadyism? "We can only report and analyze news of the struggle based on what is known at the time. It obviously would be impossible for the CALL or CLASS STRUGGLE to have a better understanding of the class struggle in China than the Chinese people themselves." Translation please? We were misled before by the "gang of four press." And what is the OL-CPML doing to prevent its being misled again in the future? Why it is going to repeat *anything and everything* that is said by the Chinese leadership. As with the Mensheviks, "faith in the Chinese people" becomes a smokescreen for opportunism and for throwing the stand, viewpoint and method of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought out the window. If in the future, Hua goes down, or Teng goes down, you will read it faithfully reported in the CALL. Only a revolution which would restore proletarian rule and Mao's line would drive these bootlickers to flight.

For this performance, the OL-CPML earned a reception with Hua and "the Chinese franchise" in July 1977. Some have speculated that this was the reason the RCP "turned against" China. From what has already been recounted, this should be recognized as transparently ridiculous. For one thing, all parties to the struggle agree that the Chairman of our Central Committee had drawn full conclusions about China long before this CPML trip. In fact, the CPML had been favored over the RCP for some time in China—even before the coup. But this did not deter the RCP from its internationalist duty to uphold China and Mao Tsetung Thought. The RCP has never thought that revolution could be made or a party built by a conferred franchise. And, while we must always seek to learn from the experience of the socialist countries and Marxist-Leninists worldwide, we have never thought it was the business of revolutionaries to jump on bandwagons. A party must be based on and rely on the masses in its own country, in unity with the international working class and communists worldwide. Mao always made the point that no party should wave a baton and force others to go along, as did Khrushchev; and if some party does so, then others should not follow. This has always been our approach, and today we can only look to the Chinese revisionists for teaching material by negative example. The CPML got the final nod because they had proved their "reliability" by going along so shamelessly with revisionism. Our Party, due largely to the teachings of Mao Tsetung along with the heroic struggle of the Four, refused to do so.

The RCP "turned on the Chinese Party" not when the Chinese Party "turned on us," but when that Party turned into its opposite and turned on the masses of people in China and worldwide.

The CPML, our Mensheviks and a host of other opportunists have brilliantly demonstrated by their stand and approach on this question of China that they cannot and will not ever make revolution. Our Party is more determined, and better armed, than ever before to base itself on Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tsetung Thought and carry through that task. ■