

CHINA TAKES CAPITALIST ROAD

by a PLP member

Concomitantly with the rehabilitation of right-wing top cadre* there has been a re-institution of many of the pre-G. P. C. R. (Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) productive relations in industry in China.

A necessary characteristic of any society in which socialism is being constructed is that the communists who provide the ideological leadership in that society's political development urge a steady reduction in the differential in pay among workers. Communists advocate that those in leading positions in enterprises or state offices be paid salaries which are not so high as to mark them off a privileged stratum and, eventually transform them into a new oppressor class. As the C. C. P. (Chinese Communist Party) pointed out in criticizing the Soviet revisionists:

The system of high salaries for a small number of people should never be applied. The gap between the income of the working personnel of the Party, the government, the enterprises and the peoples' communes, on the one hand, and the income of the masses of the people, on the other hand, should be rationally and gradually narrowed and not widened. --"On Krushchev's Phony Communism and its Historical Lessons for the World" in Polemics on the General Line of the International Communist Movement, Peking; Foreign Language Press, 1965, p. 475

In fact, Chinese wage and bonus policies are such that wage differentials remain high and are growing wider.¹ Income differentials were reduced in Chinese industry during the G. P. C. R. but starting at the end of 1970 there were strong attacks in the provincial mass media on "egalitarianism" as an "idealist deviation."² In February 1971, Hsu-Shigh-yu, a

* Addendum - see page 17

Politburo member, stated: "in making revolution, it is not necessary to level rich and poor."³ By the beginning of 1972, a nationwide attack on "egalitarianism" had begun, and by the fall of that year a system of "reasonable rewards" was being counterposed to the "leftist adventurism" of reducing wage differentials in industry.⁴ Bonuses and other "incentive pays" have been reintroduced and most managers and technicians who were attacked as rightist during the G. P. C. R. have been rehabilitated.⁵ In January 1973, a Shensi broadcast announced that 98% of the managers and skilled technicians removed as rightists during the G. P. C. R. had been reinstated and the following month Kwang Ming Daily cited the same figure for a plant.⁶ The G. P. C. R. policy of making political attitudes of workers a primary consideration in the distributing of work points has also been scrapped in favor of distributing points on the basis of work performed.⁷ Workers management of enterprises have also been abolished in favor of individual management.⁸ "Low productivity", "indifferent work attendance", and "poor attitudes on the part of young workers" as reported in Shensi Daily and Red Flag magazine are perhaps indicative of worker resentment with their loss of control of industry.⁹

THE CAPITALIST ROAD IN AGRICULTURE

The Capitalist Road In Agriculture

In spring 1971, the policy in agriculture began to swing to the right with the promulgation of a new Rural Economic Policy which guaranteed private plots and lifted restrictions on sideline occupations and private animal husbandry.¹⁰ In August of that year, the movement to establish the Peoples' Communes in 1958 was criticized.¹¹ In December, a "Directive on the Problem of Distribution

in the Rural Peoples' Communes" was promulgated which stated that "one must pay equal attention to the interests of the State, to collective interests and to individual interests" and that "artificial egalitarianism hampered the realization and implementation of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line." It instructed that grain rations should be delivered to and administered by individual households and that Communes and Production Brigades could no longer recruit labor power from a production team without its consent, which is to say that the team, a unit of five to fifteen families, often clan-related, is now responsible for agricultural production and distribution, while the Commune is reduced to carrying out administrative tasks and the management of secondary schools and hospitals, with the Brigade running local industry, primary schools, health stations and some public works.¹²

By January, 1973, Hupeh province authorities had announced that the 1962 Charter for Communes was in force there.¹³ This refers to the "Revised Draft Regulations Concerning Rural Peoples' Communes" promulgated in September, 1962. The key sections of this document assigned ownership of land "within the scope of the production team" to the teams, allowed the teams to control labor power, draft animals and agricultural implements, allowed for fixing output quotas and assigning land to households and attacked political incentives and egalitarian distribution of income. These "Sixty Articles on Agriculture" also discouraged enterprises on the communes, allowed for the suspension of mess halls, allowed private plots to equal seven per cent of arable land and prohibited commune authorities from restricting family sideline occupation.¹⁴ The Sixty Articles of 1962 Charter reflected the trend of re-emerging class differences in the Chinese countryside that occurred during the two years prior to their propagation. At that time, a new class of well-to-do peasants had arisen because under the system in force then, and now once again,¹⁵ of "work more and earn more", those

families with greater labor power tended to have advantages in accumulation over those with less labor power and more aged dependents.¹⁶ The rich peasants pushed beyond the legal limits embodied in the 1962 Charter, and in that year the private grain harvest in Yunnan province was larger than the collective harvest and privately cultivated land rose to fifty percent of the total. In Kweichow and Szechuan provinces two years later, there was more private than collective tilling.¹⁷ In fact, the present agricultural policy goes beyond the 1962 Charter even in legal terms since it gives to the individual peasant not only the ownership of trees around his premises as in 1962, but also of those on his private plot.¹⁸ Furthermore, the extensions of private plots that occurred in 1972 were coupled with official encouragement of private sideline occupations and animal husbandry, the insistence that 'individual initiative' is part of the 'correct revolutionary line of Chairman Mao'¹⁹ and attacks on egalitarianism.²⁰

THE CAPITALIST ROAD IN CULTURE

In culture, one source reports the following changes:

Newspaper articles have become shorter and less ideological. Recent Chinese films have had less didactic content and more individual, human, content. Paintings have become less poster-like and more traditional, depicting scenes immortalized by Chinese painters from time immemorial. The London Philharmonic performed Western classical music which had not been heard since the start of the Cultural Revolution. Opera and ballet troupes reportedly are rehearsing new and less ideological productions. Thus, alongside the model revolutionary operas, there will be other types of art forms, giving the Chinese public a choice, after almost seven years of just one style and content. It could be that if this trend continues, a Hundred Flowers may bloom again.²¹

There is other evidence that in the cultural sphere, where the G. P. C. R. had the greatest

effect, rightest ideas have triumphed. For example, in September, 1971, People's Daily printed three poems by Kuo Mo-jo in classical style.²² In December, that paper stated that traditional literature could be used and in October, 1972, Chinese officials in Japan participated in the preparation of a Japanese classical Peking opera troupe. In 1972, also the first full length novel to be published since the beginning of the G. P. C. R. was released. Authored by Hao Jan and entitled The Bright Road, it uses the struggle between cadre who advocate co-operativization of farming and cadre advocating individual farming during the early 1950's to call for the treatment of those who advocated taking the capitalist road in agriculture before the G. P. C. R. as good comrades. During the G. P. C. R., leftists correctly treated the differences between top party people in power taking the capitalist road and proletarian revolutionaries as being an antagonistic contradiction, while the point of The Bright Road is precisely the opposite. For example, Teng Hsiao-p'ing's 1962 statement that "Private farming is all right as long as it raises production, just as it does not matter whether a cat is black or white as long as it catches mice" is espoused by one cadre in the novel. Yet this cadre is thought to have 'common interests and demands politically, economically, and culturally,' with revolutionaries but is divided from them only 'on ways of attaining these interests and fulfilling these demands.'²⁴

THE CAPITALIST ROAD IN EDUCATION

In education, there has been a return of entrance exams for prospective college students²⁵ and regular exams for students have been reinstated.²⁶ There is less emphasis being put on practical experience for students in the factories and fields and a number of urban high school graduates are now allowed to enter universities without having to go through the two years of manual labor previously required. It has been noted that "old bourgeois professors who had been thrown out of the universities during the G. P. C. R." have been reinstated even before they have been completely reformed."²⁷ It is also

worthy of note that the book most frequently read by students during the G. P. C. R., Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung is now officially attacked in China.²⁸

THE CAPITALIST ROAD IN FOREIGN POLICY

During the G. P. C. R., leftists characterized revisionist foreign policy as consisting of "Three Capitulations and One Reduction"; that is, capitulation to imperialism, revisionism, and the reactionaries of all countries and reduction of support for the world's liberation movements.²⁹ Such a characterization is applicable to Chinese foreign policy since the conclusion of the G. P. C. R. Before this recent time period, however, it would be useful to first characterize foreign policy up to that period.

From 1949 until roughly 1958, the Chinese leadership seemed to be unified in the view that the primary world contradiction was between the socialist and imperialist states and that the U. S. S. R. was China's and the revolutionary peoples' most valuable ally. The C. C. P. believed that a united front of socialist states and parties and the bourgeoisies of as many of the former Asian and African colonies who could be won to join with them ("unite all those who can be united") was the most potent instrument for safeguarding world socialism and breaking the stranglehold of U. S. imperialism and its client states. From 1958 until roughly 1965, it seems that the C. C. P. was still united, but around a somewhat different strategic line, namely simultaneous opposition to modern revisionist states and parties and U. S. imperialism. China attempted unity with the governments of the "intermediate zone"; that is, the bourgeois regimes of the Tri-Continental area not controlled by U. S. imperialism, plus the rising imperialists of the European Economic Community (E. E. C. or Common Market) and Japan who were challenging U. S. hegemony. By 1965, with the escalation of the Vietnam war and serious setbacks for the Chinese policy of unity with "national bour-

geois" regimes in Asia and Africa (e. g. Indonesia, Ghana, Burma, etc) there arose a split in the C. C. P. Liu Shao-ch'i and others opted for reconciliation with the U. S. S. R., while Mao and others desired to maintain opposition to both the U. S. and the U. S. S. R. while retaining unity with the bourgeoisies of the "intermediate zone."³⁰ During the G. P. C. R., foreign policy makers were forced not only to oppose U. S. and Soviet imperialism, but also, to some extent, the reactionaries of the "intermediate zone." Leftists realized that simultaneous unity with the revolutionary movements and the reactionary Afro-Asian governments could only be transitory since all these countries are battle grounds for rival imperialisms and most of their governments employ fascism rather than liberalism or revisionism as their primary ruling method. When the Foreign Ministry did not oppose these reactionaries sufficiently, leftists seized it and carried out a policy of unity with revolutionaries and opposition to the ruling classes of all countries. However, by summer of 1967, the threat of U. S. - Soviet encirclement forced Mao and associates to decide that they would prefer to have allies in power even if reactionary to allies out of power, even if revolutionary. Thus they smashed the influence of the left on foreign policy.

MAO'S UNITED FRONT WITH REACTIONARIES

With the demise of the left, China began to build a foreign policy centered around a united front against Soviet imperialism. This united front was based on a resuscitation of the friendly relations China had before the G. P. C. R. with what it now terms "Third World" countries³¹, the enhancement of relations with secondary imperialists (particularly the E. E. C. countries and Japan) and, starting in 1971, the development of a quasi-alliance with U. S. imperialism.³² China has now established diplomatic relations with more than ninety countries. They claim that their's is a policy of establishing relations

with all countries regardless of social systems, but they have failed to seek relations with the governments of Israel, Portugal and South Africa, knowing that important nationalist movements would consider such a move as an affront and, perhaps, move closer to the Soviet Union. However, China has not hesitated to secure diplomatic relations with virtually all other capitalist states, including many which are fascist.

The C. C. P. leadership has also feted many of the leaders of these states in Peking. For example in November, 1970, Yahya Khan, fascist Pakistani leader was received there by Mao. In August, 1971, Ne Win, Burmese fascist whose troops had been trying to exterminate the Communist Party of Burma for years was also received by Mao. In October, 1971, Haile Selassie, emperor of a fascist government that was attempting at that time to wipe out the Eritrean Liberation Front and crush the Ethiopian student movement was welcomed to Peking with big banners bearing the slogan "Long Live the Emperor of Ethiopia" and was received by Mao. In February, 1972, Ali Bhutto, whose troops had just finished one of history's most ferocious genocidal campaigns against the people of Bangladesh and were soon to massacre striking workers in Pakistan (with Chinese arms) was feted and received by Mao. Later that month, Nixon, who history will show as worse than Hitler in the ferocity of his world-wide attacks on the people was given a reception of sickening grandeur. In June, 1972, Ms. Bandaranaike, whose nationalist-"Communist" Party-Trotskyite coalition government was still in the process of murdering activists from the previous year's rebellion was received by Mao. In September, 1972, Farah Pahlavi, Empress of Iran arrived. Her sister-in-law, the sister of fascist butcher Rezah Pahlavi had attended the May Day celebrations of 1971 where Chou-En-lai toasted the health of "His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran." Shortly afterwards, Kuo Mo-jo, close friend of Mao and President of the Chinese Academy of Science was to lead a delegation to the Shah's sumptuous 2500th Anniversary celebration in Persepolis where

he could be seen kissing the Shah's ring. Also, in September, 1972, the head of Japanese imperialism (and a commander of Japanese troops in Manchuria where the Imperial Army carried out the most ferocious of its "kill all, burn all, destroy all" campaigns in World War II) Kakuei Tanaka came to apologize for the war that took millions of Chinese lives and sow up some trade deals for the zaibatsu that planned that war.

His apology was graciously accepted. In January, 1973, Mobutu, successor to Tschombe as chief comprador of U. S. and European neo-colonialism in Zaire was received. This fascist's troops had recently completed the extermination of the anti-imperialist Simba rebels in Katanga province. In June, 1973, Luis Echeverria, President of Mexico, who was Minister of the Interior and thus director of the police at the time of the 1968 student massacres at Tuataloco was received by Mao and given a grandiose tour by "liberated" capitalist-roadster Teng Hsiao-p'ing. In September, 1973, George Pompidou, head of French imperialism arrived, followed the next month by head Canadian strike-breaker Pierre Trudeau.³³ Not a head of state, but more powerful than any, David Rockefeller, head of the world's largest imperialist banking system was also received to conclude a correspondent agreement with the Bank of China and confer with Chou.³⁴

Those who support the C. C. P. 's united front with the world's bankers, big businessmen, fascist dictators, military commanders, liberal politicians, and sundry monarchs premise their support on the false assumption that uniting with imperialist states or their fascist satrapies weakens imperialism as a whole. They also wrongly assume that one can unite simultaneously with reactionaries in power and revolutionaries fighting for power in a given country. That this is not the case can be seen from the results of China's "united front." For example, China now praises NATO, SEATO and CENTO. These aggressive blocs of Western imperialists and their client states

have as their raison d'etre the provision of troops and bases for inter-imperialist warfare and counter-insurgency. NATO is the chief supplier of arms to Portugal which uses them in its African counter-insurgency. China has also repeatedly urged the U. S. to not withdraw its troops from South East Asia precipitously.

The Chinese have also established close ties to revisionists around the world. The C. C. P. once considered the North Korean regime to be revisionist,³⁵ but now considers it to be socialist. Worse yet, it considers the Rumanian revisionists to be a fraternal party, although the Rumanians are no less capitalist than the Bulgarians, Hungarians, Czechs, etc., simply less pro-Soviet.³⁶

The C. C. P. has also deserted many parties that it had fraternal relations with before and during the G. P. C. R., in favor of revisionist organizations that are larger but not openly pro-Soviet. For example, in late 1971, Santiago Carrillo, head of the "Communist" Party of Spain was feted in Peking as a comrade, indicating that Peking has abandoned support for the Communist Party of Spain (Marxist-Leninist). The Carrillo clique holds to the theory that a united front of the "C" P and all the anti-Franco bourgeois parties, plus whatever members of Franco's ruling clique are willing to turn against him personally should be built that would install a "national democratic regime."³⁷ To keep all bases covered, China also established diplomatic relations with Spain, shortly after setting them up with Greece.

The C. C. P. has also severely reduced its support to revolutionary fighters. While China used to widely publicize anti-imperialist struggles, the pages of Chinese publications now only mention such "safe" struggles as southern Africa, Palestine and Cambodia. While China used to give support to the Communist Party of India (M-L), there was not even a resolution of support for any struggle on the subcontinent at the 10th Party Congress.³⁸ China now also disavows any connection with

the struggle of the Communist Party of Malaya³⁹ and is steadily improving relations with the Thai fascists by inviting high-government officials to accompany Thai table tennis teams visiting China.⁴⁰ It has also made overtures to Indonesia, including welcoming the U. S. imperialist backed Association of South-East Asian Nations. That these improvements in relations with fascist governments are coupled with a reduction of support for those fighting them may be seen from the curbs in range and political sharpness placed on the Partai Komunis Indonesia's radio broadcasts emanating from China.⁴¹

RED BOURGEOISIE SUPPORTS COUNTER-REVOLUTION

China has also actually aided or supported counter-insurgency in at least three cases. The Chinese politically and monetarily supported the Ceylonese reactionaries destruction of a worker and student uprising in April, 1971, led by the communist Peoples' Liberation Front. Chou En-lai even sent a congratulatory telegram to Bandaranaike, whose government murdered at least 12,000 rebels and imprisoned thousands more.⁴² Also, in 1971 the Chinese supported the Pakistani fascist butchering of 500,000 Bengali workers and the tremendous rapine and plunder that accompanied it.⁴³ The C. C. P. revisionists also applauded Sudanese fascist al-Nimery's execution of thousands of Sudan "C" P members.⁴⁴

We believe that the above facts substantiate our arguments concerning the restoration of a bourgeois dictatorship in China first enunciated in Road to Revolution III. Just as it was necessary for all revolutionaries to recognize and condemn Soviet revisionism, so too, it is now necessary to repudiate revisionism in China. As the C. C. P. itself once put it:

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has often said to comrades from fraternal parties that if China's leadership is usurped by revisionists in the future, the Marxist-Leninists of all countries should likewise resolutely expose and fight them and help the working class and the masses of China to combat such revisionism.⁴⁵

Notes

1. Dwight Perkins in "An Economic Reappraisal" in the May-June, 1973 Problems of Communism reports that substantial disparities in income still remain in China and that most steps toward reducing disparities were taken in the 1950's and "there has since been a slackening of efforts to push ahead with income equalizations as this policy has come into conflict with the requirements of growth and the policy of self-reliance." He states that visitors to China in 1972 reported that the eight-grade wage scale, with the top-grade wage three-plus times the bottom continues to be the basis of wage determination in the large enterprises, just as in the 1950's." Professional and managerial staff are usually paid wages equal to or somewhat higher than the top grade among the workers (pp. 11-12). Ross Terrill reported in the "The 800 Million" in Atlantic Monthly, November, 1971, reported a differential of 10:1 between the highest and lowest paid employees of Peking University and a ratio of 6:1 between the highest and lowest paid faculty members at Fudan University in Shanghai. In agriculture, Perkins cites Pakistani agronomist Shahid Burki's 1965 investigations of commune incomes and states that as of 1972 there had been little indication of any major change in rural organization or general policy. If anything, it is possible that the independence of the individual production teams may have increased" (p. 8). Burki's study of 13 communes showed that the ratio of income per worker between the richest and poorest commune sampled was 3.4:1 "Moreover, this differential obscures the fact that in the poorest communes, the income of some production teams was below the average for the whole commune, while some teams in richest commune earned incomes higher than the commune's average." If one were to hypothesize that within the poorest and within the richest communes there were differentials of 2:1 (in the communes Terrill examined the ratio was 1.8:1 excluding earnings from private plots, which are very uneven and if taken into account would bring the ratio up to at least 2:1) and each had the same deviation from the mean, it would mean that between the richest peasant

household and the poorest peasant household on the communes that Burki visited, the income ratios were approximately 7:1. Perkins also reports that "measures that could offset the continuing differentials in farmers incomes have not been extensively resorted to." He cites a study showing that in one region grain output rose only 7% from 1957 to 1970 while in another it rose 69%, suggesting a growing differential between peasants of the two areas (p.11). Of course, it is in the government service with its 26 grades for cadre and in the People's Liberation Army that income differentials have always been highest, as we showed in Road to Revolution III. There is no indication of change in this regard. The difference between a top-grade cadre such as Chou En-lai and a poor peasant in terms of income is enormous, at least 30:1. This does not take into account subsidiary benefits, such as cars or residences placed at the disposal of top cadre at low rates.

2. Kansu Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), October 6, 1970.
3. Kiansu PBS, February 27, 1971
4. People's Daily (JMJP) October 20, 1972 and Anhui PBS, January 10, 1972.
5. Goldman, Merle "In the Wake of the Cultural Revolution" in Current History, September, 1973, p.131
6. "Industry's Outlook: Growth Varies" in Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) October 1, 1973, supplement "Focus", p.17
7. JMJP, October 20, 1972
8. JMJP, March 3 and March 5, 1972
9. "Industry's Outlook..." in op. cit., p.18
10. JMJP, March 21, 1971
11. JMJP, August 15, 1971
12. Domes, Jurgen "New Course in Chinese Domestic Politics" in Asian Survey, July, 1973
13. "Agriculture: Strange Paradox" in FEER, op. cit. p.15
14. Chang, Parris. Patterns and Processes of Policy Making in Communist China, 1955-1962, Three Case Studies. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Columbia University, 1969 pp. 282-83. The 'sixty Articles' have been printed by the Taipei regime under the title

of Nung-t'sun jun-min kung-she tiao-li ch'ao an (1965). See especially Articles 20, 21, 22 31, 33, 34, 37 and 40.

15. "Agriculture: Strange Paradox", loc. cit. and Goldman, loc. cit.
16. Ahn, Byung-joon. Ideology, Policy and Power in Chinese Politics and the Evolution of the Cultural Revolution, 1959-1965. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Columbia University, 1972, p.243
17. Wilson, R. "The China After Next" in FEER, February 1, 1969, p.193
18. Kiangis and Shansi PBS March 2, 1972
19. JMJP, August 4 and September 5, 1972
20. "Agriculture: Strange Paradox", in FEER, October 1, 1973, supplement, p.16. Manchester Guardian, October 23, 1972. New York Times May 7, 1972. Christian Science Monitor June 26, 1972
21. Goldman, loc.cit. Goldman believes the right-wing changes are good while we obviously think the opposite.
22. JMJP, September 19, 1971
23. JMJP, December 16, 1971
24. Los Angeles Times, October 11, 1972
25. Goldman, op. cit., p.136; Domes, op.cit. p.640
26. NYT, September 25, 1972
27. "Education: The Long Road to Normalcy" in FEER, op.cit. and Goldman, loc. cit.
28. JMJP, September 7, 1972
29. For an analysis of left-wing attacks on China's foreign policy during the G. P. C. R., see Gurtove, Melvin. Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs in China's Cultural Revolution Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1969
30. Cf. Zagoria, Donald, "The Strategic Debate in Peking" in Tang Tsou, China in Crisis, V. II Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968
31. "Third World" is a term originally used by bourgeois nationalist leaders to create the impression that the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America could have societies that were neither capitalist nor socialist. Because of the term's obvious revisionist implications and its similarity conceptually to the Soviet phrase "countries taking the non-capitalist path", the C. C. P. refrained from using it until two years ago.

32. An example of the closeness of U. S. -China government relations (aside from the unprecedented establishment of "liaison offices" whose heads are accorded ambassadorial rank while U. S. troops continue to occupy Taiwan and the Chinese U. N. delegations similarly unprecedented invitation to Police Commissioner Murphy and 17 New York City policemen to a "thank you" feast) is the fact announced on U. S. television during Nixon's China visit that the C. I. A. was starting to supply Chinese military intelligence with high aerial reconnaissance photos of Soviet troop concentrations along the Sino-Soviet border.

33. China News Service, YB 456 (Hong Kong) and various Peking Reviews

34. Cf. FEER, August 20, 1973, p. 5. The British already have a bank branch in Shanghai and the Bank of America is opening a China branch.

35. Cf. "A Report on the International Situation by Comrade Feng Piso, Director of the Information Department of JMJP" in Canton Hung-se Hai-yuan, January 24, 1968 reproduced in Current Background #850, April 3, 1968. U. S. Consulate General, Hong Kong

36. The Rumanians, in turn, cultivate even more revisionist (but anti-Soviet) organizations. For example, they sent a delegation to the 1972 convention of MAKI, the openly pro-Zionist Israeli "Communist" Party. Cf. Yearbook on International Communist Affairs Stanford: Hoover Institute, 1973

37. Cf. Claudin, F. "The Split in the Spanish Communist Party" in New Left Review #70 and NYT December 25, 1971. China now also cultivates the revisionist "Communist" Party of Mexico which supports the government of Echeverria. Cf. "Maoists in Search of a Mecca" in National Review, February 16, 1973 p. 204

38. "Puzzling Peking" in FEER, op. cit. p. 25

39. "Peaceful Intentions" in op. cit., p. 32

40. "Sports Diplomacy" in op. cit., p. 38

41. "Thawing Relations" in op. cit. p. 31

It might be added that very few "fraternal" organizations from countries with which China has developed relations are now invited to

Peking. Cf. "Maoist in Search...", loc. cit. PR during the last year has mentioned only about half a dozen "fraternal" organizations and no longer describes the struggles they are involved in.

42. Cf. "Rebellion in Ceylon" in New Left Review, April, 1972

43. "Friends of China" usually tow justifications for this pro-fascist policy: 1. China wanted to protect Naxalbari insurgent bases in Bangladesh from invading Indian troops and 2. the Bangladesh independence movement was led by pro-Soviet reactionaries. Of course, the Pakistani fascists would not dream of slaughtering Bengali communists and "independent" fascists are nicer rulers than liberal lackies of imperialism!

44. "Friends of China" in this case claim that al-Nimery was seeking "independence" while the "C" P of Sudan was tied to Soviet imperialism, thus it was correct to side with him. Of course, the Sudanese fascists have no ties to Common Market or U. S. imperialists! The Sudanese "C" P also happened to be the only organization with even a pretense of being left-wing in that country, so one would probably have found many honest revolutionaries in its ranks before al-Nimery murdered them all.

45. JMJP and Hung-ch'i Editorial Departments November 11, 1965, editorial translated in

Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on "United Action". Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965, p. 30

Addendum

CHANGES IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY (CCP), CENTRAL COMMITTEE (CCPCC), AND POLITBURO:

I. Regional and Provincial CCP Structure:

1. Central-South China Regional Bureau and Subordinate Provincial and Selected Municipal CCP Committees. (Honan, Hunan, Hupeh, Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Canton)

Third Secretary: Ch'en Yu-- under Red Guard (R. G.) attack between 12/66 - 3/67. Appeared officially in 10/67 and

very active in '68. In 3/68, named Vice-Chairman of Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee (PRC). 4/69--re-elected full member 9th CCPCC.

Secretaries: Wei Kuo-ch'ing--9/66 -- named 2nd secretary of Regional Bureau. RG attacks intense between 1/67-7/67. However Central Party support indicated Central Committee Decision on Kwangsi in 11/67 and by an alleged meeting between Mao and Wei in Peking in 6/68. Appointed Chairman of Kwangsi PRC in 9/68. although occasional criticism from provincial sources continued. Made full member CCPCC -- 1969.

Huang Yung-sheng-- RG attack began in early 1967 and lasted for most of year despite reports claiming support by Mao and Chou En-lai. 2/68-named Chairman of Kwangtung PRC. 3/68 -- named People's Liberation Army (PLA) Chief of Staff when incumbent purged. 7/68--elevated to head Administrative Unit of Military Affairs Committee. 4/69--made full member CCPCC and appointed to Politburo.

Chang P'ing-hua -- RG attacks in late 1966 --July, 1967. Not dropped as secretary, however.

Lin Chien-hsun-- RG press between 10/66-9/67 both praised and criticized Lin. 4/67--named standing committee member, Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee (MRC). 1/68--named Chairman, Honan PRC. 4/69--made full member CCPCC.

also: Hupei CCP Committee

2nd Secretary: Chang T'i-hsueh -- attacked by RG throughout 1967. 2/68-rehabilitated. 4/69-made full member CCPCC.

Canton CCP Committee

2nd Secretary: Chiao Lin-i - RG attack 2/67-7/68. 1969--reappeared-rehabilitated.

ted. 4/69-made alternate member CCPCC mentioned as having PLA responsibilities.

2. East China (Anwei, Chekiang, Fukien, Kiangsi, Kiangsu, Shantung, Shanghai)

Secretaries: T'an Ch'i-lung -- RG attacks began 11/66. 4/69--re-elected alternate member CCPCC.

Hsu Shih-yu -- 1967-under heavy RG attack. Mao invited Hsu to Peking and forbade criticism of him. Early 1968--named Chairman of Kiangsu PRC. Praised by Chou En-lai. 6/68--RG pamphlet reported purge of Air Force officers who opposed Hsu. 4/69-- promoted to full member CCPCC and Politburo. also: Commander Nanking Military Region.

3. North China (Hopei, Inner Mongolia, Peking, Shansi, Tientsin)

1st Secretary: Li Hsueh-feng--replaced P'eng Chen as 1st Secretary in Peking in 6/66. Intensive RG attack began 9/66 Sent to Tientsin for rehabilitation (1/67). 4/67-wall poster support for Li by Chou and Ch'en Po-ta. 5/67-transferred to Inner Mongolia. 2/68-named Chairman, Hopeh, PRC. 4/69-made full member CCPCC, alternate to Politburo.

Secretaries: Hsieh Hsueh-kung--2/67--RG attacks. Not dropped 4/69--full member CCPCC. 1st political officer-Tientsin Garrison.

Liu Tzu-hou-- early 1967 RG attacks. No appearances in 1967. 4/69-made 1st Chairman, Hopeh PRC and full member CCPCC.

4. North West China (Kansu, Ninghsia, Shensi, Sinkiang, Tsinghai)

Secretaries: Chang Ta-chih--RG attack in 5/67 for suppressing revolutionaries in Kansu. 4/69-made full member CCPCC.

Kansu CCP Committee

2nd Secretary: Hu Chi-tsueng--heavy

RG attack 1-4/67. 4/69-made full member CCPCC.

V. South West China (Kweichow, Szechuan, Tibet, Yunnan)

Secretaries: Li Ta-chang -- 1-8/67--
RG attacks. Li criticized Li Ching-ch'un
(1st Secretary) who was purged and Li
promoted to full member CCPCC.

Tibet CCP Committee

1st Secretary: Chang Kuo-hua -- attack-
ed 11/66-4/67. 5/67-made 1st Political
Officer of Chengtu Military Region. 6/67-
made Head of Preparatory Group of
Szechuan PRC. 5/68 - emerged as Chair-
man, Szechuan PRC. 4/69-made full
member CCPCC.

Provincial and Selected
Municipal Governments:

Sinkiang

Governor Sai Fu-ting--2/66 -attacked
8/68 -attacked by RG in Peking. 4/69-
made full member CCPCC.

Regional and Provincial
Military Leadership:

1. Canton Military Region (Canton, Hun-
an, Kwangsi, Kwangtung)

Commander Huang Yung-sheng-- 3/67-
8/67-attacked. 2/68-made Chairman
Kwangtung PRC. 3/68-made PLA Chief
of Staff and Secretary General. 4/69 -
made full member CCPCC and Politburo.

Commander Ting Sheng-- early 1967--
attacked. Transferred from Sinkiang to
Canton. 4/69 -made full member CCPCC

Commander Lung Shu-chin--attacked in
1967. 4/68 -made 1st Vice-Chairman,
Hunan PRC. 9/68-made Chairman, Sink-
iang PRC. 11/68-made Commander,
Sinkiang Military Region. 4/69-made full
member CCPCC.

also: Chang Kuo-hua

1)attacked by RG as head of handful of
counter-revolutionary revisionists with
Party Committee of Tibet Military Re-
gion.

2)attacked in leaflet signed by Revolut-
ionaries Rebel Regiment, Regional
Trade Union Counsel of Lhasa, Revolu-
tionary Rebel General Headquarters as
"Chang Kuo-hua, the Elf Who Continues
to Hatch Plots"

3)Died of heart attack -- 2/21/72; at the
time he was also member of CCPCC,
member of Military Committee of CCP
CC, 1st Secretary of CCP Szechuan
Provincial Committee, Chairman of
SzechuanPRC, 1st Political Commiss-
ioner of Chengtu PLA Units.

Chang T'i-hsueh

7/67--

attacked as counter - revolutionary in
Wuhan. 1/68-follower of counterrevol-
utionary Wang Jen-chung. Vice-Prem-
ier Li Fu-ch'un said, "Chang T'i-hsueh
has a very miserable childhood and has
stayed with the Red Army for a very
long time. If only he completely breaks
with Wang Jen-chung, criticizes him-
self and comes over to the side of the
rebels, he can still do something use-
ful. He is full of energy."

(from "News from Various Parts of the
Mother Country"--Canton Hung-Ch'i
P'iao-p'iao, #4, 11/68)

Made Vice-Chairman of Hupeh PRC
2/68-reported to be member of Liu-
Teng black HQ. 4/68-author of "Resol-
utely Overthrow Wang Jen-chung"

Chen Yi - 1/6/72-dies of cancer. De-
nounced during GPCR but restored with
high honor. Reappeared 5/1/71.

Hsieh Fu-chih - attacked by RG. 1/8/67-
Chou En-lai urged RG to limit denuncia-
tions to Liu and Teng Hsiao-ping and to
cease harassment of five Deputy Premiers-
Chen Yi, Tan Chen-lin, Li Hsien-nien,
Hsieh Fu-chih, and Li Fu-chun.

Never removed from Politburo however.
5/1/71-after year's absence, named 1st
Secretary of Peking's new party commi-
tee. Wu Teh is his deputy.

The power structure after China's 10th Party Congress

	Total	M	F	Average Age	No. for whom ages are available	Back-grounds unknown	Since 1969 Party Congress		Professional Army Careers		Provincial Revolutionary or Party Committees		Cultural Revolution Experience	
							Promoted	Demoted	Pre-1966	Post-1966	Chairmen	Others	Rote to power after 1966	Disgraced 1966-68
Politburo (Full and Alternate Members)	25	23	2	65 years	17	—	10	—	11	—	5	8	2	2
Full Central Committee Members (New & Past Alternates)	195	178	17	67 years	72	18	18	—	67	25	23	54	29	27
Alternate Central Committee (New members)	52	44	8	62 years	22	17	—	—	18	4	4	11	10	17
Alternate Central Committee (New members)	124	103	21	62 years	12	50	—	2	26	18	1	25	20	10
(New members)	57	45	12	64 years	5	39	—	—	9	1	—	5	3	9

THESE tables analyse the backgrounds of the men and women elected at last month's Communist Party Congress to guide the nation's political destinies. Although full information on all the members of the Party Central Committee is not available (thus the tables do not total in all cases), a clear picture emerges of a "veteran" leadership. There is no evidence of rejuvenation despite the youth of the Cultural Revolution leaders who toppled the pre-1966 power-holders.

Professional soldiers on the active list after 1966 are no longer a dominant feature of Chinese political life. They are easily outnumbered by the workers and peasants on the Central Committee.

Provincial leaders are strongly in evidence. A rough balance has been struck between those who came to power with the Cultural Revolution and those numbered, before their "rehabilitation," among the upheaval's chief victims.

The central Government is strikingly under-represented in the new party supreme command, with a large number of ministers of considerable prominence and their deputies excluded from the Central Committee. (The exceptions are the defence and security departments whose responsibilities include political affairs.) Central Committee members are not entirely without experience of the outside world, though their travels have been confined largely to the Soviet bloc. Few members can be identified as being under the thumb of individual national leaders. While cliques have probably formed around the men at the very top, such factions cannot be identified easily.

Research by JILL LAI

Leaders Central Government as Identified August 1973

	Total Persons	Central Party Committee (Full Members)
Premier & Deputy Premiers	5	5
Heads, State Council Commissions	3	2
Ministers	13	7
Vice-Ministers	52	7
Assistant Ministers	4	0
Total	77	21

Category of Ministry or Commission

	Total Persons	Central Party Committee (Full Members)
Economic	48	7
Foreign Affairs	9	2
Defence & Security	7	6
Others	8	1
Total	72	16

Native Province by Region

	Central-South	East	Southwest	North	Northeast	Northwest
Politburo	4	5	1	2	1	2
Full Central Committee	31	27	7	10	1	8
(New & Past Alternates)	7	2	1	2	—	3
Alternate Central Committee	4	9	1	2	—	2
(New Members)	2	4	1	1	6	1

Current Provincial Residence

	Central-South	East	Southwest	North	Northeast	Northwest
Politburo	3	3	—	16	1	2
Full Central Committee	18	27	7	49	9	7
(New & Past Alternates)	2	4	2	12	2	—
Alternate Central Committee	26	9	8	17	9	13
(New Members)	3	1	1	3	2	2

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	Foreign Travel		Study Abroad		Protégés of			Liu Shao-chi Associates	Central Government Leaders or Officials	Workers	Peasants	Intellectuals	9th Party Congress Members not re-elected
	Communist Country	Non-Communist Countries	Communist Countries	Non-Communist Countries	Mao	Chou	Lin						
Politburo	13	2	6	2	1	1	1	—	25	2	3	4	9
Full Central Committee (New and Past Alternates)	54	24	9	7	4	7	5	7	37	54	20	10	48
Alternate Central Committee	17	13	5	2	—	3	2	2	11	16	5	3	—
(New Members)	13	3	1	1	2	—	—	1	13	12	10	2	31
	6	2	1	1	1	—	—	1	2	3	—	1	—

Ulanfu's comeback

By Alan Sanders

Hongkong: The rehabilitation of Ulanfu (Ulaanhuu, Red Son, or Wu Lan-fu, otherwise Yun Tse) has been noted with interest in Ulan Bator. The New China News Agency reported that he was in Peking on August 26, and was later elected to the Central Committee at the Tenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. Interestingly, just before Ulanfu's reappearance, China news media in Hongkong publicised the activities of two other Mongols from China — the writer Malachinfu (Malchinhuu, Herdsman's Son), who was said to have been preparing material in the countryside, and Prof. Chingerhtai, who is compiling a new Mongolian-Chinese dictionary.

Ulanfu, now nearly 70, is a Mongol from Tumet Banner, west of the Inner Mongolian capital of Huhehot (Blue City). As a boy he studied at the Mongolian-Tibetan School in Peking. In 1925, the year he joined the CCP, he attended the first meeting of the Inner Mongolia People's Revolutionary Party in Kalgan. He later went to the Sun Yat Sen University in Moscow. During the 1930s he was back in Inner Mongolia organising the anti-Japanese struggle, but he was forced to flee and arrived in Yen-an in 1939.

Following Japan's defeat, there were three different "governments" in what later became the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, two supported by the Soviet Union and seeking union with the MPR, and the third led by Chinese communists. Recognition of the MPR's independence was finally gained from China under US pressure in 1946 following the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance the year before. Soviet policy changed and official Mongolian irredentism ceased.

The boss of a united Inner Mongolia from May 1947 and reinstated after October 1949, Ulanfu later became chairman of the PRC Nationalities Affairs Commission and Deputy Premier of the State Council (October 1954), a full general (September 1955), and then alternate member of the CCP Politburo (September 1956).

Ulanfu travelled abroad quite frequently after 1951. An officer of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association for many years, he paid official visits to the Soviet Union at least twice (1957 and 1964), travelled extensively in

Europe, and attended the 13th and 14th congresses of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in Ulan Bator (1958 and 1961). On January 1, 1956, he officially opened the Ulan Bator-Chining section of the trans-Mongolian railway.

The turning-point in Ulanfu's career was probably the CCP Central Committee's decision of April 13, 1967, the "red eight-point decision," on "handling Inner Mongolia's problems." But another six months passed before he was personally attacked in the official media. On October 14, the *Inner Mongolia Daily*, in an editorial entitled Ulanfu, Who Opposes Mao Tse-tung Thought, Deserves a Myriad Deaths, attacked him for pursuing nationalism instead of class struggle. He was reported as saying: "The question of nationality is the essence of the class struggle. Class struggle is empty talk if it ignores



Ulanfu: An adviser.

the question of nationality. The question of nationality is the main contradiction."

According to the paper, Ulanfu also thought that the "main contradiction" was between the "demands of the people for the improvement of material and cultural life, and the inability of economic and cultural development in the IMAR to meet their demands." He had dreamed about establishing an "independent kingdom," and even "brandished the banner of vigorous study of the Mongolian language" to oppose the "mass movement of vigorously studying Mao Tse-tung thought." In essence, Ulanfu had wanted to "unite with the feudalistic upper level, stock-owners, landowners and the bourgeoisie."

In the same issue, the paper began to

run Red Guard material on the "counter-revolutionary statements of Ulanfu, the counter-revolutionary revisionist and national splittist," which declared that this "top agent of China's Khrushchev in the Region" had been "dragged out." Four days later, at a rally in Huhehot, the "birth" of the Municipal Revolutionary Committee which it celebrated was said to have "proclaimed the complete bankruptcy of the Ulanfu clique."

A Red Guard paper from his "stronghold," Tumet Banner, was reported at the time by Huhehot Radio to have quoted Ulanfu as saying in 1961 that the living standard of Mongolian commune members declined after the formation of the communes (in 1958). In 1962, Ulanfu arrived in Tumet Banner "to enforce his idea of separating Mongolian from Han members of the production teams." Ulanfu said that as

far as he was concerned "the Mongolian people are better than the Han people." Other Red Guard publications later accused him of wanting to create a "Greater Mongolia" with the MPR.

In limbo for six years, Ulanfu is now back in circulation, but it seems unlikely that he will be permitted to return to his old stomping ground on the sensitive northern border. Moreover, some analysts consider that the August 7 *People's Daily* article by a Canton professor, Confucius, A Thinker Who Stubbornly Supported The Slave System, was an attack on Chou En-lai and rehabilitation. According to the article

Confucius, who had a "reactionary political line," wanted at one stage to "call back to office those who have retired into obscurity."

It is presumed that Chou En-lai was responsible for the rehabilitation of Teng Hsiao-ping, Ulanfu and Tan Chen-lin. "Criticism of Confucius' reactionary thinking," the article concluded, is helpful to the "class struggle in the ideological sphere, in the realm of the superstructure."

Ulanfu was undoubtedly the most powerful non-Chinese in the PRC leadership until his downfall in the Cultural Revolution, and his rehabilitation must be connected with two inter-related factors — a return of CCP attention to the minority nationalities, and the northern frontier situation. In Peking, his advice may be needed.